

# ZAMBIAN DIASPORA MAPPING AND PROFILING SURVEY IN TARGETED COUNTRIES

FINAL REPORT



REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  
International Cooperation



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# ACRONYMS

<b>DDI</b>	diaspora direct investment
<b>FDI</b>	foreign direct investment
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>KNOMAD</b>	Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development
<b>MFAIC</b>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (of Zambia)
<b>NRC</b>	National Registration Card
<b>SADC</b>	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>TOKTEN</b>	Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate National Program
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme



# 1

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.1. INTRODUCTION

A mapping and profiling survey was commissioned by the Government of Zambia under the project, “Building the Capacity of the Government of Zambia to Maximize the Development Potential of the Diaspora”, supported by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) through the IOM Development Fund. The project’s overall objective is to improve and strengthen the Government’s capacity to mainstream and harness the potential of the Zambian diaspora to contribute to national development.

The study is one of the project activities seeking to contribute to better understanding of the Zambian diaspora by generating knowledge about its size, geographic spread, demographic characteristics (e.g. profession, education and financial capacity), and willingness to participate in national development initiatives. The three main target countries for this study are South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Thus, an expected outcome of the activity is improved knowledge of the Zambian diaspora, with a gender dimension, that the Government of Zambia would be able to utilize. A draft database of the Zambian diaspora in these three countries is another output of this study.

This report adopts the IOM and Migration Policy Institute (MPI) definition of *diaspora*, as follows:

...emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. The common thread among these recent arrivals and members of long-established communities is that they identify with their country of origin or ancestry and are willing to maintain ties to it. These ties are, potentially, beneficial to development.<sup>1</sup>

Likewise, IOM and MPI has put forward a four-stage road map for engaging the diaspora in national development, described below.<sup>2</sup>

- (a) Identifying the goals of diaspora engagement;
- (b) Mapping the location and characteristics of the diaspora;
- (c) Building trust between the diaspora and government institutions;
- (d) Mobilizing the diaspora as development partners of their country of origin and/or ancestry.

<sup>1</sup> Agunias and Newland, 2012:15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

The first stage of the road map was completed with the Diaspora Policy of 2019, which defines the vision, goals, objectives and institutional arrangements for diaspora engagement and management.

As mentioned, the current survey (which constitutes the second stage) maps and profiles the Zambian diaspora in terms of geospatial distribution and other characteristics. It builds on the findings of the 2010/2011 Zambian Diaspora Survey, conducted online, which targeted the Zambian diaspora in the United Kingdom and South Africa – the top two destination countries for Zambian skilled labourers and professionals for that year. The 2010/2011 survey focused on the following objectives:

- (a) Profiling the diaspora in terms of profession, education and financial capacity;
- (b) Documenting the diaspora's wishes, expectations and aspirations as regards participating in national development;
- (c) Identifying channels through which the diaspora could participate in national development;
- (d) Identifying what the diaspora perceived as constraints to their participation in Zambia's national development.<sup>3</sup>

The 2010/2011 Zambian Diaspora Survey found the following:

- (a) There was willingness among the Zambian diaspora to participate in national development – specifically through the acquisition of property, private investment, philanthropy and participation in development projects and skill transfer programmes.
- (b) The diaspora makes a significant contribution to the national balance of payments through remittances.
- (c) A significant proportion of the surveyed diasporans desired dual citizenship.
- (d) There were significant constraints to effective diaspora participation in national development, including: (i) absence of formal diaspora engagement institutions; (ii) lack of information on trade and investment opportunities in Zambia; (iii) perceived corruption and apathy of officers in the civil service; (iv) a shortage of employment opportunities; and (v) limited access to credit, land and reliable business partners.<sup>4</sup>

Some diaspora concerns have since been resolved: For example, the 2016 Constitution Amendment Act provides for dual citizenship, and, in 2019, the Diaspora Coordination Desk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) was created to serve as a formal diaspora engagement institution.

## 1.2. OVERVIEW OF ZAMBIA'S MIGRATION SITUATION

Data on Zambia's migrant stock and destinations are both scant and unreliable. Migration data from annual reports of the Department of Immigration, under the Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, does not itemize Zambian emigrants' destinations and purpose

<sup>3</sup> Government of Zambia, Diaspora Liaison Office at the Office of the President, 2011.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

for leaving the country. Furthermore, access to the annual reports is discretionary; as such, a request sent (through the IOM Mission in Zambia) by the author of this report to access the 2018–2020 Department of Immigration annual reports was not granted.

The Department of Immigration's 2013–2017 annual report data shows that net migration (i.e. the difference between the number of exits and the number of entries) in Zambia was quite small relative to the population. The figure increased from around 571,000 in 2013 to 699,000 in 2017, with large concentrations of Zambian migrants in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) region and certain member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As regards the geospatial distribution of the 725 online respondents to the 2010/2011 Zambian Diaspora Survey, the United Kingdom was the main destination country (30% of respondents), followed by the United States (18%), South Africa (14%), Botswana (6%), Australia (4%) and Canada (3%); about a quarter (26%) of the respondents were living in various other countries.

The distribution pattern of Zambian migrants among destination countries has changed since 2010. The bilateral migration matrix of the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) 2021 Database estimated 201,231 Zambian migrants throughout the world. According to this matrix, Zimbabwe hosted 31,692 (or 15.7%) of Zambian migrants, followed closely by Malawi, with 31,375 (15.6%), and South Africa, with 22,901 (11.4%). Statistics from the database also shows that, instead of migrating out of the continent, Zambians are increasingly preferring SADC countries: (from the largest to the smallest number of Zambian migrants hosted in 2021) Zimbabwe (31,692), Malawi (31,375), South Africa (22,901), the United Republic of Tanzania (7,637), Mozambique (5,315), Botswana (4,415), Namibia (3,167) and Angola (307) host over half (53.1%) of Zambian migrants. The United Kingdom (33,040) and the United States (36,122) are ranked first and second, respectively, in terms of the number of hosted Zambian migrants and account for about 16.4 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively, of the estimated 201,231 Zambian migrant population.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> KNOMAD, 2021.



# 2.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

One practical reason for conducting a diaspora mapping and profiling exercise is to identify conditions and factors in the country of origin that contribute to the diaspora's effective engagement in national development.<sup>6</sup> Essentially, diaspora mapping and profiling involve collecting information on the size and geographic distribution of the diaspora, as well as sociodemographic variables such as the gender identity, employment status, received training and professional skills/expertise of its members. Diaspora participation in country-of-origin development spans a wide range of avenues: diaspora direct investment (DDI), remittances, diaspora bonds, networking, and skills- and expertise-sharing (including through temporary return, as a part of a cycle of circular migration).<sup>7</sup> Diaspora participation in national development depends on many factors, which include the size of the migrant stock, the cost of sending remittances, the prevailing economic situation in the host country, and, at the individual level, the diaspora member's gender, job category, skills, income and immigration status in his/her host country, as well as his/her perception of the socioeconomic situation and the quality of governance back home. Newland and Tanaka<sup>8</sup> contend that, in the country of origin, other factors would include DDI incentives and proactive diaspora engagement strategies by the government.

A survey of the literature on diaspora engagement reveals tensions between those who criticize States for “interfering” with their diasporas in any of various ways and those who celebrate such engagement.<sup>9</sup> Gamlen<sup>10</sup> argues that very few countries see diaspora policy and diaspora engagement as distinct issues that require coordinated efforts among different arms of government. Rather, efforts are often ad hoc and arbitrary, as governments pursue other endeavours that inadvertently also affect their diaspora. For migrant-sending countries, however, development opportunities arising from the migration phenomenon justify the formulation of diaspora policies. Such policies, as well as institutions concerned with migration and diaspora issues, are instrumental in improving inflows of remittances and investments, facilitating knowledge transfer, and bringing other benefits to the home country.

Emigrants tend to maintain strong links with their countries of birth or origin. Moufakkir<sup>11</sup> presents evidence showing that tourism in countries of origin benefits from visiting diasporans. He finds that, among Turkish diasporans in Germany going on holidays in Türkiye, those born in Türkiye, stay longer than those born in Germany, as well as other tourist categories. Furthermore, Turkish-born diasporans visit their country of origin more regularly than the

<sup>6</sup> Nkurukiye, 2019; Moufakkir, 2011.

<sup>7</sup> Newland and Tanaka, 2010.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Gamlen, 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Moufakkir, 2011.

German-born. In addition, Ayanruoh and Di Benedetto<sup>12</sup> find that the Nigerian diaspora's investment decisions back in their homeland are not solely for financial reward, but, as a matter of fact, are mainly emotionally and socially motivated.

Newland and Tanaka<sup>13</sup> posit that diaspora entrepreneurs, as “first movers”, could contribute to the development of their countries of origin through business (i.e. job creation), stimulating innovation and social capital, and directing political and financial capital back home. However, many developing countries have not succeeded in attracting DDI from the diaspora. In addition, Newland and Tanaka<sup>14</sup> argue that not all forms of entrepreneurship contribute equally to the economic development of the country of origin, distinguishing between “necessity entrepreneurs” and “opportunity entrepreneurs”. The former category comprises those who create their own small businesses because they cannot find other work and have minimal effect on economic development, while the latter is made up of those who recognize and take advantage of market opportunities and have a considerable positive impact on economic development.

A global survey by Newland and Tanaka<sup>15</sup> of practices supportive of diaspora entrepreneurship (i.e. DDI) identifies five main categories of DDI support institutions: networking, mentoring, training, investment and venture capital or partnership organizations. They also list six country-of-origin policy responses to address challenges with attracting and generating DDI:

- (a) Access to capital or credit, especially for small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs, in the form of loans, competition prizes and risk-sharing schemes;
- (b) High-quality education and vocational training to develop skills necessary for exploiting opportunities in knowledge-based industries;
- (c) Lowering of tariffs on imported production inputs, including equipment, to support DDI entrepreneurs in starting transnational businesses;
- (d) Establishing regular diaspora consultative mechanisms;
- (e) Making it very clear that DDI is welcome in the country of origin;
- (f) Making it easier for DDI entrepreneurs to travel between their host and origin countries.

Country-of-origin governments, their partners and other stakeholders play an important role in facilitating both DDI and foreign direct investment (FDI). Since DDI gives diasporans more control over the use of their resources than either remittances or diaspora bonds, diaspora entrepreneurs better understand the market and business contexts of their countries of origin and can take more risks than other forms of FDI.<sup>16</sup>

Outwardly, Zambia's Diaspora Policy of 2019 reflects the typology whereby “improving diaspora policies is in large part a matter of improving the coherence of what is already taking place in the area of [S]tate–diaspora relations, rather than doing something entirely new”.<sup>17</sup> The summary of the Diaspora Policy in Box 1 shows that while its main thrust is to promote diaspora participation in national development, actual policy implementation,

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<sup>12</sup> Ayanruoh and di Benedetto, 2018.

<sup>13</sup> Newland and Tanaka, 2010:10.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>17</sup> Gamlen, 2008.



to date, has focused only on the two traditional roles of the Government – allowing dual citizenship and facilitating access to national documents. Fiscal challenges have necessitated the prioritization of the two (out of 13) policy measures for implementation.

## Box 1.

### Highlights of the 2019 Zambia Diaspora Policy

#### Vision

A Zambian diaspora that is protected, engaged and participates as an active and reliable partner in the socioeconomic development of the country.

#### Rationale

Zambia's Diaspora Policy of 2019 is based on the realization that the diaspora has enormous potential to contribute positively to the country's development with, for example, skills and technological transfers, networking and investment, and the desire of the Government to use Zambian diaspora skills and financial resources.

#### Overall objective

To integrate the Zambian diaspora in the development agenda of the country by creating an enabling environment and platform for the effective participation of the Zambian diaspora in national development and promote their rights, interests and welfare abroad. The Diaspora Policy will harness the Zambian diaspora as a resource for development and maximize its contributions to national development.

#### Policy measures

1. Promote, facilitate and leverage remittances (e.g. provide information on various available transfer options and on the cost of remitting from host countries; facilitate lowering of the cost of sending remittances; provide incentives for returning diasporans to import personal belongings and capital goods; and monitor remittances transfer and payment systems to inform policy interventions).
2. Promote trade and investment (e.g. provide information on trade and investment opportunities and incentives; facilitate the establishment of a Diaspora Investment Fund to enhance the capacity of the diaspora to invest in Zambia; and establish a formal platform from which the Government can borrow through diaspora-targeted bond issuances).
3. Improve access to land (e.g. provide information on land availability and acquisition procedures; create an online portal on which diasporans can apply to purchase plots of land directly from local authorities that have newly opened up areas for real estate development; designate Zambian diplomatic missions abroad to facilitate the processing of land acquisition applications by the diaspora).

4. Facilitate the portability of social security benefits.
5. Promote tourism, culture and the arts.
6. Promote patriotism.
7. Safeguard the rights and interests of the Zambian diaspora (e.g. develop and promote mechanisms to aid the re-entry and reintegration of Zambian diaspora members returning permanently).
8. Improve access to national documents.
9. Allow dual citizenship.
10. Promote political participation.
11. Promote knowledge and skill transfer (e.g. promote the permanent, temporary and virtual return of skilled Zambians in the diaspora).
12. Facilitate effective administration of the diaspora (e.g. establish a Diaspora Coordination Desk at the MFAIC to coordinate and mainstream diaspora issues, and establish diaspora focal points in relevant government institutions and diplomatic missions abroad).
13. Establish and organize comprehensive information on an online portal and diaspora database.

### **Implementation framework**

The Diaspora Policy assigns specific tasks, roles and responsibilities to the following governmental bodies to formulate and implement a Diaspora National Action Plan:

- Ministries: Foreign Affairs (overall lead); Labour and Social Security; Gender; Legal Affairs (Justice); Home Affairs and Internal Security; Education; Lands and Natural Resources; Finance and National Planning; and Commerce, Trade and Industry
- Zambia Development Agency

Non-governmental entities (IOM, cooperating partners, diaspora associations, private sector, civil society organizations and NGOs) may provide support, as needed.

*Source: Government of Zambia, 2019:6–15.*

# 3.

## METHODOLOGY

Following Creswell's mixed-methods design of combining dominant and less dominant approaches,<sup>18</sup> the Zambian Diaspora Mapping and Profiling Survey research methodology included the following activities:

- (a) General and specific literature reviews of institutional documents and other publications to document practices around the world and other countries' experiences of why, what and how their diasporas contribute to their development. The findings fed into the design of the online survey (i.e. the dominant quantitative approach).
- (b) Design and publicization of a self-administered, online Diaspora Mapping and Profiling Survey, and identifying where to place links to the survey. Lessons from the experience with the recent online Zambia National Remittances Study Survey to inform the diaspora about the survey after it went live. Both MFAIC and IOM channels, as well as the author's own social media and other personal networks, were used to publicize the survey.

The 2021/2022 Zambian Diaspora Mapping and Profiling Survey (an updated version of the 2010/2011 Zambian Diaspora Survey instrument) collected individual sociodemographic data, including (but not limited to) gender identity, marital status, location of spouse and/or other family members, human capital credentials, employment status, income/earning level, current nationality, length of stay abroad and country of current residence. For data on their relationship with Zambia, the survey collected information on diasporans' reasons for emigrating; willingness to share skills on a temporary basis (through circular migration); history of contact with family and friends back home and the communication channels they use; the media channels they use to access information on current developments in Zambia; the frequency of and the reasons for their visits to Zambia; their remittance-sending behaviour; and the impact of COVID-19 on their ability to send remittances to Zambia. The survey sought to measure the level of the diaspora's awareness of Zambia's Diaspora Policy of 2019, and rate the MFAIC and Zambian diplomatic missions' outreach and diaspora engagement record since 2019. Other information sought included diasporans' level of interest in investing in Zambia and the sectors they were interested in investing in; the type of investment, businesses and/or property in Zambia that they already owned or have invested in; the challenges they face with regard to their investments; and government action necessary to encourage and facilitate diaspora participation in national development. Finally, the survey sought information on respondents' membership in diaspora associations and willingness to provide personal information for enumeration in the Zambian Diaspora Database.

<sup>18</sup> Creswell, 1994.

- (c) Virtual key informant interviews (the less dominant approach) with diaspora focal points at Zambian diplomatic missions in London, Pretoria and Washington, D.C., to obtain clarification on findings of diaspora surveys in their respective countries of representation pertaining to diasporans' perceptions of the Government's diaspora outreach and engagement activities.

The target respondent sample size for the online survey was 1,000. The survey went live in late November 2021, with 15 January 2022 as the first closing date. The response rate was very low due to the Christmas and New Year holidays, necessitating two extensions (31 January and then 15 February 2022). By 15 February 2022 (the day of the second and final extension), there were 909 respondents. Respondents and Zambian diaspora community leaders (from the United States, the United Kingdom and continental Europe) who contacted the author suggested some of the most likely reasons for the low response rates: the use of a Gmail account instead of a government email account to publicize the survey; the non-placement of the survey link on the MFAIC, Zambian Embassy and High Commission websites; and the absence of a government cover note introducing the survey. Even as these challenges were resolved sometime in January 2022, the target of 1,000 respondents did not materialize.

Some respondents only answered the gender question and skipped the rest of the survey questionnaire – more men than women respondents in January and February 2022 showed this tendency. The final data set excluded such respondents. After some adjustments and data cleaning, only 685 out of 909 respondents (cases) were retained for analysis. These 685 cases represent a reasonably large number to make the analysis and findings valid. The main limitation of online surveys (which utilizes convenience sampling) is that the study population is usually unknown – and so the sample size might be too small, to a point where external validity is violated.<sup>19</sup> To address this challenge and make the survey findings valid, the snowball method (respondents were requested to forward the survey link to other members of the diaspora they knew) was adopted. Zambian diaspora community leaders and influencers, the MFAIC, IOM and Zambia diplomatic missions abroad in the three main host countries (South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States) accordingly publicized the survey link among the various Zambian diaspora communities.

At the virtual validation workshop for this report, held on 15 June 2022, the diaspora participants urged the Government of Zambia to improve on its diaspora communications and engagement. Building trust between the diaspora and the Government was an imperative to improve rates of formal registration of diasporans at Zambia's diplomatic missions abroad. In this regard, they suggested that the Government undertake a diaspora census (perhaps as part of the forthcoming Population Census 2022) to update the data on diaspora numbers and their geographic distribution. Furthermore, the various Zambian diaspora associations were urged to ramp up publicity among their respective emigrant communities to register with Zambian missions abroad.

One participant commented that the MFAIC should have collaborated with SMART Zambia (the third party contracted to develop and deliver e-government services) to administer the diaspora survey, to avoid the perceived risks of using a Gmail account to send out survey invitation emails. Another participant pointed out that diaspora surveys should not have been conducted too far apart. Over the past three years. Furthermore, the surveys should have been structured in such a way that they were logically linked and sequenced, with respondents informed of the schedules of successive surveys.

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<sup>19</sup> Ayanruoh and di Benedetto, 2018.

# 4.

## DIASPORA MAPPING AND PROFILING SURVEY FINDINGS

### 4.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Table 1 presents the social and demographic characteristics of the sample. Of the 679 respondents able to answer the question on gender identity, 53.5 per cent ( $n=363$ ) report being male; 46.4 per cent ( $n=315$ ), female; and one person, non-binary. The civil status profile of the sample shows that the largest proportion (65.2%) of the respondents are married, followed by the never-married, at 22 per cent. A total of about 13 per cent of the respondents were widowed (5.4%), divorced (4.2%) or cohabiting as if married (3.2%). The majority (86.7%) live with their spouses in their respective host countries, while 8.3 per cent have their spouses back home in Zambia and the remaining 5 per cent in a third country.

In terms of the number of children, those with either 3 to 5 (42.2%) or 1 to 2 (35.9%) make up the majority (total of 78%), followed by those without children (19%) and those with more than 5 children (as a minority, at 2.9%). About half (48%) of the sample live with their children, a sibling(s) (16.8%), or with either a parent(s) or grandparent(s) (6.4%) in the host country.

**Table 1.**

**Sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents**

Characteristic/Variable	Frequency	Valid % (of $n$ )
<b>Gender</b>		
Male	363	53.5
Female	315	46.4
Other (non-binary)	1	0.1
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>679</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Citizenship</b>		
Zambian	467	68.9
Dual citizenship (Zambian plus another)	155	22.9
Others	56	8.3
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>678</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Country of residence</b>		
South Africa	206	30.5
United States	141	21.0
United Kingdom	96	14.2
Eurozone and other European countries (excluding the United Kingdom)	88	13.0
SADC member countries other than South Africa	87	13.0
Other sub-Saharan African countries	19	2.8
Asia (including the Middle East)	25	3.6
Canada	14	2.1
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>675</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Characteristic/Variable	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Number of years living abroad</b>		
0–5 years	97	14.5
6–10 years	58	8.7
11–20 years	216	32.2
21–30 years	243	36.3
31–48 years	56	8.4
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>670</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Main reason for leaving Zambia</b>		
Seeking better opportunities (employment/ business)	364	53.5
Education/training	154	22.6
Moved with family	72	10.6
Marriage	54	7.9
Political asylum	10	1.5
Descendant of first-generation diaspora (i.e. never lived in Zambia)	4	0.6
Others	23	3.4
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>681</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Civil status</b>		
Married	445	65.2
Single (never married)	150	22.0
Widowed	37	5.4
Divorced	29	4.2
Cohabiting as if married	22	3.2
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>683</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Spouse's country of residence</b>		
With the respondent, in the host country	385	86.7
Remaining in Zambia	37	8.3
In a country other than Zambia	22	5.0
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Number of children</b>		
None	129	19.0
1–2	244	35.9
3–5	287	42.2
Over 5	20	2.9
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>680</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Other family members living with the respondent in the host country</b> (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple responses possible)		
Children	329	48.0
Siblings	115	16.8
Parents and/or grandparents	44	6.4
None	251	36.6

Table 1 shows that the sample comprises 68.9 per cent Zambian citizens, 22.9 per cent dual citizens (Zambia plus another country) and 8 per cent others. The geographic spread of the Zambian diaspora is quite wide, as the sample shows, with respondents in 50 different countries ranging from Cambodia, China and Japan in East Asia, Norway and Sweden in Northern Europe, and New Zealand and Australia in Oceania, to Canada in North America. A lone respondent from among the 141 documented Zambian citizens in Ukraine (as per the MFAIC) participated in the study.<sup>20</sup> One key informant indicated that some Zambians in the diaspora are not willing to register their presence in foreign countries until they run into problems – when it may be too late for them to obtain assistance from either the Zambian mission or fellow Zambians.

Table 1 shows that South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom have the largest concentrations of Zambian diaspora respondents. Among SADC member countries, Botswana had the next largest number of survey respondents ( $n=59$  respondents; 9% of the sample). Overall, the respondents are concentrated in four main areas: Southern Africa, North America (the United States and Canada), the United Kingdom and continental Europe.

Table 1 also shows that respondents' length of stay in their respective host countries varied widely – from under 1 year to 48 years (i.e. those who emigrated in 1974) at the time of the study. The frequency distribution is bimodal, with peaks at 21–30 years (36.3%) and 11–20 years (32.2%). About 68 per cent of the respondents have lived abroad for a period ranging from 11 to 30 years. Recent migrants (those living abroad for at most 10 years) account for about a quarter of the sample (23.2%). Diaspora engagement is an imperative in the context of such a frequency distribution. One of the respondents noted that the new Government should implement practical actions to help diasporans prepare for their return to Zambia to avoid the “*A Phiri Anabwera syndrome*” (i.e. “returning home after a very long time living abroad with empty hands”).

The foregoing is an important consideration given the fact that over half (53.5%) of the sample emigrated to seek better employment and business opportunities. Other reasons for emigrating shown in Table 1 include education and training (22.6%), moving with the family (10.6%) and marriage (7.9%).

Table 2 shows the educational attainment, employment status and annual earnings profile of the sample. Zambia's diaspora is highly educated, with two thirds of the sample holding university degrees – that is, 24.3 per cent with a first (or bachelor's) degree; 35.9 per cent with a postgraduate degree, up to the master-of-philosophy level; and 7 per cent with a doctor-of-philosophy degree. Those with a college/tertiary level of education, holding a national certificate, a national diploma and/or a higher national diploma accounted for 25.8 per cent of the sample.

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<sup>20</sup> Kakubo, 2022.

Table 2.

**Educational attainment, employment status  
and annual earnings profile of the respondents**

Characteristic/variable	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Educational attainment (highest level of education completed)</b>		
Never been to school	1	0.1
Primary school	3	0.4
High/secondary school	46	6.8
College/tertiary level (if degree obtained is lower than a bachelor's degree)	174	25.8
University, bachelor's degree	164	24.3
University, postgraduate degree (diploma, master's, master of philosophy)	242	35.9
University, postgraduate degree (doctor of philosophy)	45	6.7
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>675</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Current employment status</b>		
Employed and working full-time (with a work permit or national social security number)	404	59.7
Employed and working part-time (with a work permit or national social security number)	36	5.3
Self-employed/running own business (with a work permit or a national social security number)	124	18.3
Student	37	5.8
Unemployed and looking for work	29	4.3
Unemployed and not looking for work	8	1.2
Retired	6	0.9
Disabled and unable to work	3	0.4
Others	30	4.4
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>677</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Annual income (equivalent in USD)</b>		
USD 14,999 or less	120	17.9
USD 15,000–29,999	104	15.5
USD 30,000–49,999	98	14.6
USD 50,000–74,999	109	16.2
USD 75,000–99,999	72	10.7
USD 100,000–149,000	82	12.2
USD 150,000 or more	33	4.9
No income	54	8.0
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>672</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The sample's high human capital and high-value credentials are reflected in respondents' employment status and earnings profile. Table 2 shows that about 60 per cent of the sample are in full-time formal employment, with work permits and social security numbers (i.e. they are residents of their host countries), and that 18.3 per cent are engaged in self-employment (i.e. running their own businesses), but also with work permits and social security numbers. The estimated annual earnings ranges show that those who earn from USD 50,000 to over USD 150,000 per annum in 2020 account for 44 per cent of the sample.



The respondents represented 24 occupational categories at the time of the survey – with categories including management, engineering, health, construction, farming, transportation and humanitarian work. The dominant occupations include health-care support (13.4%); business and financial operations (11.3%); education, training and library management (9%); (business) management (8.1%); protective services (6.9%); and computer science and mathematics professions (5.9%). Diaspora engagement is an imperative for the country if it were to benefit from such a wide array of global practices, exposures, work ethics and experiences that could be transferred back to Zambia through circular migration.

## 4.2. DIASPORA RELATIONSHIP AND CONNECTION WITH ZAMBIA

Table 3 outlines questions to gauge survey respondents' relationship and connection with their country of origin, Zambia. Overall (93.1%), respondents are willing to return to Zambia on temporary skill transfer programmes to share their skills and global experiences with the motherland.

**Table 3.**

### Diaspora relationship and connection with Zambia

Survey question	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Are you interested in returning to Zambia, on a temporary basis, to work or practice your profession/trade if an opportunity presented itself?</b>		
Yes	635	93.1
No	47	6.9
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>682</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How long would you be willing to stay in Zambia for a skill transfer/capacity-building programme?</b>		
1–4 weeks	101	16.3
2–3 months	80	12.9
4–6 months	62	10.0
7–12 months	36	5.8
>1 year	221	35.6
Not sure	121	19.5
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>621</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Have you been in contact with family, friends and/or business/professional associates in Zambia since you emigrated?</b>		
Yes	657	99.2
No	5	0.8
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>662</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>What medium do you normally use to communicate with Zambia? (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple responses possible)</b>		
Telephone, WhatsApp, Skype and other messaging apps	635	92.7
Social media platforms (Facebook and Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Instagram, etc.)	415	60.6
Email	324	47.3
Word of mouth (through third parties visiting Zambia)	103	15.0
Physical mail	21	3.1
Others	45	6.6

Survey question	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>What medium do you normally use to access news or information on developments in Zambia?</b> (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple responses possible)		
Social media platforms	500	73.0
Telephone, WhatsApp, Skype and other messaging apps	448	65.4
Online news sites and/or platforms	446	65.1
Zambian television/radio streaming	206	30.1
Zambian diplomatic missions	89	13.0
Others	24	3.5
<b>How often have you visited Zambia since emigrating?</b>		
Never	59	9.1
At least once every 6 months	62	9.6
Once a year	211	32.6
Once every 2–3 years	188	29.1
Once every 4–5 years	65	10.0
Once every 6–10 years	17	2.6
Less than once every 10 years	17	2.6
Others	28	4.3
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>647</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How long, on average, do you stay in Zambia during each visit?</b>		
Less than 1 month	440	75.9
1–3 months	130	22.4
4–6 months	8	1.4
7–12 months	1	0.2
1 year or longer	1	0.2
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>580</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>What are/were your main reason(s) for visiting Zambia?</b> (n=588 respondents who visited Zambia; multiple responses possible)		
Visit family, friends and tourist sites in Zambia	498	72.7
Attend social functions with family and friends (e.g. births, weddings, funerals)	365	53.3
Inspect the progress of one's own or a group investment project	229	33.4
Vacation or sabbatical leave	188	27.4
Charity and other community work	60	8.8
Work-related trips (including conferences and seminars)	57	8.3
Participate in political events (general elections or party conventions)	34	5.0
Short-term skills/professional knowledge transfer and capacity-building programmes	33	4.8
Others	28	4.1

Table 3 shows that respondents are willing to stay up to over a year back in the country on a skill transfer or capacity-building programme. Specifically, over 80 per cent are willing to stay for periods ranging from 1 to 4 weeks to more than a year. The Government may consider approaching either IOM or the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to access the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Program to actualize this idea of circular migration for development. Other countries in Africa, such as

Rwanda and the Sudan, have enrolled with TOKTEN to enhance their respective diaspora knowledge transfer efforts.

Table 3 shows that respondents have been in contact with family and friends. Telephone conversations and social media platforms (e.g. Facebook and Facebook Messenger, Instagram, Twitter, and the like) are the main preferred means of communication. With regard to the mediums used to access news and information on developments in Zambia, mobile telephones, social media platforms and online news sites are, again, the main channels (Table 3).

Most (71.6%) respondents visit the country either once a year, once every 2 to 3 years, or once every 4 to 5 years (Table 3). The most common duration of such visits is less than one month (75.9%), followed by one to three months (22.4%). The main reasons for the visits include:

- (a) Seeing family, friends and tourist sites in Zambia (72.7%);
- (b) Attending social functions with family and friends (e.g. birth, wedding, graduation ceremony and funeral) (53.3%);
- (c) Inspecting the progress of one's own investment project, including those undertaken with others (33.4%);
- (d) Vacation/sabbatical leave (27.4%).

Visits to Rwanda to participate in short-term skills and knowledge transfer programmes are quite uncommon, with only about 4.8 per cent of respondents having engaged in such – a similar percentage as those who come to visit for political events such as general elections or party conventions.

### 4.3. REMITTANCE-SENDING BEHAVIOUR AND IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON REMITTANCES

As discussed in Chapter 2 (Literature review), remittance inflows are a major channel through which the diaspora participates in country-of-origin development and poverty reduction. Remittances to low- and middle-income countries were projected to have grown globally by 7.3 per cent to reach USD 589 billion in 2021 – a second consecutive year that remittances were expected to exceed the sum of FDI and official development assistance. Remittance inflows to the sub-Saharan region returned to growth in 2021, increasing by 6.2 per cent (from the previous year) to USD 45 billion.<sup>21</sup>

Table 4 shows that sending of remittances, in the form of either cash or both cash and goods, is quite prevalent, with about 94 per cent of the respondents engaging in this activity. Parents and extended families of Zambians in the diaspora are the main beneficiaries, followed by friends and community development projects. The proportion of respondents sending remittances to their spouses or children is low simply because most of them have their immediate families living with them in their host countries (Table 1). As such, the main purpose for sending remittances is to provide social safety nets for immediate extended families and friends (i.e. the Ubuntu social safety net mechanism), personal investments, and

<sup>21</sup> World Bank, 2021.

contributions to community projects such as the construction of health facilities and places of worship and support to orphans and schools.

The frequency distribution for the frequency of remittance-sending is dominated by ad hoc and monthly intervals. A sizeable proportion (10.4%) send such support on a quarterly basis, and very few do so semi-annually and annually. A third (33.6%) of the respondents send from USD 100 to USD 299 per transaction, followed by those who send from USD 300 and USD 499 (19.9%), and then by those who send from USD 500 to USD 999 (16.9%). Those who send USD 100 or below and more than USD 1,000 per transaction account for 14.3 per cent of the sample, with another 15.4 per cent remitting more than USD 1,000 per transaction. Whatever the amount sent to Zambia creates some utility among recipients through the purchase of goods and services that improve (economic) well-being, or the undertaking of some form of investment that create future streams of income.

**Table 4.**

**Remittance-sending behaviours  
of the respondents**

Variable	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Form of remittances sent to Zambia</b>		
Money/cash	260	40.9
Both money/cash and goods	337	53.0
Mostly goods (e.g. equipment, groceries, clothes, electronics)	17	2.7
None (i.e. respondent has never sent remittances)	22	3.5
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>636</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Remittance recipient(s) (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple responses possible)</b>		
Parents	344	50.2
Spouse and/or children	117	17.1
Extended family	502	73.3
Friends	244	35.6
Community and/or church organizations	127	18.5
Investment brokers, financial institutions, project managers and the like (for personal/group investment projects)	95	13.9
Others	39	5.7
<b>Purpose of remittances (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple responses possible)</b>		
Financial support to family and friends	567	82.8
Contribution to community projects	168	24.5
Personal/group investments	256	37.4
Personal obligations or debt service	79	11.5
Others	45	6.6
<b>Frequency of remittance-sending (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple responses possible)</b>		
Monthly	298	43.5
Quarterly	71	10.4
Every 6 months	14	2.0
Annually	8	1.2
Ad hoc (as and when necessary, i.e. when a specific reason arises)	241	35.2
Others	18	2.6

Variable	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Amount sent per transaction (in USD equivalent)</b>		
< USD 100	84	14.3
USD 100–299	197	33.6
USD 300–499	117	19.9
USD 500–999	99	16.9
USD 1,000–4,999	74	12.6
USD 5,000–9,999	11	1.9
USD 10,000 or more	5	0.9
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>587</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Remittance methods (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple answers possible)</b>		
Major money transfer companies (e.g. Western Union, MoneyGram, WorldRemit, Mukuru)	476	69.5
Mobile money transfers	222	32.4
Direct bank transfer to recipient	210	30.7
Internet-based money transfer services (website-based)	62	9.1
Hand-carried cash (through a friend, family, courier or bus/truck operator)	61	8.9
In kind (i.e. goods for recipients to sell to raise cash)	49	7.2
Bank deposit into the foreign account of a person resident in Zambia (who would turn over the ZMW equivalent to the actual beneficiary)	46	6.7
Independent money transfer companies	28	4.1
Others	5	0.7
<b>Effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on ability to send remittances</b>		
Not at all	353	60.3
Reduced both amount and frequency of sending	147	25.1
Stopped sending regularly, except in emergencies	51	8.7
Increased both the amount and frequency of sending	34	5.8
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>585</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The major money transfer companies (e.g. Western Union, MoneyGram, WorldRemit and Mukuru) (69.5%) mobile money transfers (32.4%) and direct bank transfers (30.7%) dominate the respondents' remittance-sending channels (Table 4). A quarter of the respondents relied on other methods, such as informal channels, which include friends, couriers and bus or truck operators to hand-carry or deliver cash; sending goods, to be sold by recipients to raise cash; and depositing money into the foreign accounts of persons resident in Zambia, which would be withdrawn in its ZMW equivalent and turned over to the intended recipients.

Table 4 also shows that the COVID-19 pandemic has had mixed impacts on the ability of the respondents to send remittances (whether cash or in kind) to Zambia. Whereas 60.3 per cent of the respondents report not being affected at all, and another 5.8 per cent reported increasing both the frequency of remittance-sending and the amount sent, the rest either reduced both (25.1%) or had to stop sending altogether, except in cases of emergencies back home (8.7%). From a welfare economics perspective, such reduction in or cessation of remittance-sending has made Zambian society worse off. Some recipient families could have fallen back into extreme poverty, thereby overturning any initial positive impacts that remittances previously had on their (economic) welfare and well-being.

#### 4.4. DIASPORA AWARENESS OF ZAMBIA'S DIASPORA POLICY AND INTERACTIONS WITH THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ZAMBIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS

Table 5 shows data on the respondents' awareness of Zambia's Diaspora Policy of 2019 and interaction with the Government through the MFAIC and Zambian diplomatic missions, including the Embassy and the High Commission, in their respective host countries.

**Table 5.** Awareness of Zambia's Diaspora Policy and interaction with the Zambian foreign affairs ministry and diplomatic missions

Survey question	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Are you aware that Zambia adopted a diaspora policy document in April 2019?</b>		
Yes	201	33.1
No	406	66.9
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Has the Zambian Embassy, High Commission or the MFAIC in Lusaka ever contacted you (as a diasporan) between 2019 and now regarding your participation in national development or in national events?</b>		
Always	8	1.3
Usually	10	1.6
Sometimes	26	4.3
Rarely	35	5.8
Never	528	87.0
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How would you rate the current outreach activities of the Zambian Embassy, High Commission and/or the MFAIC and their interaction with the diaspora, relative to those in 2019?</b>		
Better	67	11.2
About the same	284	47.3
Worse	249	41.5
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The findings on the views of the respondents in the three main target countries (South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) are discussed with the diaspora focal point officers at the Zambian diplomatic missions in these countries to obtain their perspectives. Of the 607 respondents who answered the question on Diaspora Policy awareness, only a third (33.1%) answered in the affirmative; thus, two thirds (66.9%) were unaware of the policy. This is a recurring issue with Zambia's policy implementation ethos where policies are not publicized, reflecting on the country's weak policy implementation record since independence.

Table 5 shows that 87 per cent of the respondents had never been directly contacted by the MFAIC or the Zambian mission in their host country since 2019 – 90 per cent of respondents in South Africa; 88 per cent, in the United Kingdom; and 87 per cent, in the United States. The respondents' ratings of the diplomatic missions' outreach activities and interaction with the diaspora since 2019 (with 41.5% reporting that they have become worse) show that a lot more can be done in this area.

The above issues are discussed with key informants – that is, the diaspora focal point officers at the Zambian missions in the three countries. The United Kingdom High Commission’s take on these matters is as follows:

- (a) The High Commission does not communicate directly with individual diaspora nationals but through diaspora associations, or to the overall diaspora community through postings on its website. Survey data shows that only a third of United Kingdom-based respondents belong to a diaspora association. Communications through Zambian diaspora associations are, therefore, bound to miss most Zambian nationals (as there are more of them who are not members of diaspora associations).
- (b) Ordinarily, the Zambian High Commission in the United Kingdom does not randomly engage with their nationals in the country. Diaspora engagement activities are mostly confined to national celebrations such as Independence Day, when heads of diaspora associations and prominent resident Zambians are invited to the High Commission.
- (c) Some Zambians are not keen to associate with fellow diasporans and are reluctant to register with a diaspora associations.
- (d) The High Commission’s handling of diaspora communications (through its website) during the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic explains the poor rating of diaspora engagement by United Kingdom-based respondents. However, some nationals either rarely or never visit the website.
- (e) The High Commission instructs nationals to register on its database when they visit to renew their national documents. The database goes back two decades and stores information on the demographics, skills and human capital credentials. To date, over 20,000 individual records have been included on the database. It should be noted that there is no mechanism for updating records in the database.
- (f) Since the United Kingdom has relaxed COVID-19 restrictions, the High Commission plans to commence immigration roadshows and “clinics” in different cities in the United Kingdom to register and interact with diaspora nationals.
- (g) The Zambian Department of Immigration received three computers in February 2022 to strengthen its diaspora affairs operations.
- (h) The High Commission does not play any formal role in the formation of Zambian diaspora associations. At best, it can encourage Zambian nationals in the United Kingdom to form such associations.

For representatives of the Zambian Embassy in the United States, the diaspora ratings may be explained as follows:

- (a) Like the Zambian High Commission in London, the one in Washington, D.C. also goes through diaspora associations to reach out to Zambian nationals in the United States. They also have no direct link or contact with individual Zambians, and they normally use social media platforms to communicate with their constituents.
- (b) The major challenge is that not all Zambians in the United States are registered with either a diaspora association or the Embassy.

- (c) The poor ratings arise from challenges in the issuance of national documents. Most Zambian diaspora nationals in the United States do not follow set procedures for the acquisition of national documents despite the fact that the turnaround time for such documents has greatly improved.
- (d) The role of the Embassy in the formation of diaspora associations is to register them after they have been established. The Embassy also arranges meetings between diaspora associations and the Zambian ambassador.

The Zambian High Commission in South Africa expresses the following observations and views on the ratings by survey respondents based in South Africa:

- (a) Holding “immigration clinics”, where diaspora engagement issues are discussed, has been difficult because of COVID-19 and funding challenges. The High Commission has been riding on Gauteng Zambian Diaspora Association meetings to conduct such clinics.
- (b) It is not possible to contact all diaspora nationals individually.
- (c) The High Commission has made partnership arrangements with Mukuru Money (Remittances) Transfer Company to conduct immigration clinics, where the latter is able to promote its money transfer services. The High Commission wrote to Lusaka for approval to enter such a partnership after similar arrangements with Mukuru to conduct such clinics in Malawi and Zimbabwe have worked very well.
- (d) Like their compatriots in the United Kingdom and the United States, Zambians in South Africa are not keen to visit or read information that the High Commission posts on its website.
- (e) In South Africa, indifference among Zambians who are not inclined to joining a diaspora association is a major challenges.
- (f) Despite good publicity, attendance at immigration clinics has been poor. This is illustrated, in particular, by one such clinic in Cape Town in 2021, and several cases of Zambians resident in the Western Cape who contacted High Commission officials only after they have had the chance to visit Pretoria.
- (g) Zambian diaspora nationals in South Africa generally expect the High Commission to help resolve their irregular immigrant status in the country – if possible, ending in action similar to the issuance of special residency permits on compassionate grounds to Zimbabwean nationals who were illegally resident in South Africa. Failure to meet such expectations often lead to negative perceptions of the High Commission.
- (h) The Zambian High Commission in South Africa plays an active role in the formation of diaspora associations in the country, with the High Commissioner regarded as the “patron” of all such associations. The High Commission is usually invited to the official opening of diaspora associations and their respective branches. Immigration clinics and other diaspora outreach activities often feature at such events.

One respondent suggests that Zambia should consider issuing its main national identity document – the National Registration Card (NRC) – at its diplomatic missions to enable, in particular, children born in the diaspora to obtain NRCs when they come of age. The respondent adds that there are many Zambians in the diaspora with expired passports that cannot be renewed because they lack NRCs. The Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal



Security, however, has indicated that NRCs, as the primary national identity document, cannot be issued from outside of Zambia. As such, Zambians in the diaspora who need an NRC must travel back to Zambia on a passport and use either their mother’s or father’s NRC number.

This was a key topic during the virtual validation workshop for this report. The diaspora participants raised the following issues for the Government’s consideration:

- (a) There is a need to improve diplomatic missions’ quality of service and improve diaspora outreach, communications and engagement. The United States-based survey respondents suggest customer service training for the Zambian diplomatic mission staff there.
- (b) Rebuilding trust between diplomatic missions and the diaspora communities requires embarking on a comprehensive, and sometimes complicated, change management processes to forge transparent and accountable relationships between them. It is imperative to train or retrain diplomatic mission staff in diaspora engagement to equip them with the skills they need to perform one of their core responsibilities.
- (c) Improving attitudes towards Zambians born abroad and encouraging other diasporans to register with the Embassy or High Commission may also help with diaspora communications and engagement efforts, as well as gather information on the size and distribution of the diaspora, among others.
- (d) Deploy electronic solutions (i.e. e-governance). For example, instead of requiring Zambian emigrants to physically travel to the offices of Zambian diplomatic missions to pick up their passports and NRC application forms, such forms may be uploaded to the various missions’ websites to cut down on costs.
- (e) Some diaspora participants are not aware that the Diaspora Coordination Desk has already been established and is functional.

#### 4.5. ZAMBIAN DIASPORA INTEREST AND WILLINGNESS TO INVEST IN ZAMBIA

Table 6 outlines respondents’ interest and willingness to invest in Zambia, sectors of interest, availability of investible resources and the current business ownership profile.

**Table 6.**

Zambian diaspora interest  
in investing back home

Survey question	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Are you interested in investing in Zambia?</b>		
Yes	589	97.8
No	13	2.2
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>602</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>What sector(s) of the economy would you consider investing in?</b> (n=589 respondents who answered “Yes” to the previous question; multiple responses possible)		
Manufacturing and agro-processing	177	30.1
Agriculture, horticulture and aquaculture	342	58.1
Hospitality and tourism operations	155	26.3

Survey question	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
Beauty and other personal services	56	9.5
Transportation services	106	18.0
Machinery repairs and spare parts merchandising	47	8.0
Supply of goods and services (including warehousing and retail sales)	140	23.8
Health and educational services (e.g. clinics, hospitals, schools, colleges)	197	33.4
Professional advisory/consulting services	172	29.2
Crowd-funded national infrastructure (e.g. diaspora bonds or government instruments)	88	14.9
Financial and capital markets (e.g. shares, unit trusts, pension plans)	83	14.1
Real estate (e.g. housing, office blocks, shopping malls)	304	51.6
Others	34	5.8
Rarely	35	5.8
Never	528	87.0
<b>Do you have either savings or access to a credit line to actualize such investments?</b>		
Yes	345	60.4
No	226	39.6
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Are you, at present, engaged in a business venture or have investment (on your own account or as part of a group) in Zambia?</b>		
<b>Yes</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>43.9</b>
<b>No</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>56.1</b>
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>574</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>What is the nature/type of that investment?</b> (n=252 respondents who answered "Yes" in the previous question; multiple responses possible)		
Developed property (residential, commercial or agricultural)	127	50.4
Land ownership (residential, commercial or agricultural)	171	67.9
Business enterprise (including small and medium enterprises)	90	35.7
Community/church project	23	9.1
Financial/capital market instruments (government securities, shares, investment accounts, etc.)	21	8.3
Others	21	8.3
<b>When did you undertake such investment?</b>		
Before emigrating from Zambia	47	19.1
After emigrating from Zambia	191	77.6
Others (before and after emigrating)	8	3.3
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>246</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The respondents' interest in investing in Zambia is very high – at 98 per cent. The top five sectors that respondents are interested in investing are as follows:

- (a) Agriculture sector, including cropping, horticulture and aquaculture (58%);
- (b) Real estate and property development, including of residential housing, office blocks and shopping malls (52%);
- (c) Health and educational facilities and services (e.g. clinics, hospitals, laboratories, schools, colleges) (33%);

- (d) Manufacturing and agro-processing (30%);
- (e) Professional advisory/consulting services (29%).

A large proportion of respondents (60%, or  $n=345$ ) indicate that they either have savings or access to a credit line to actualize such investments.

Only about 44 per cent ( $n=252$ ) of respondents report being presently engaged in a business venture or presently having investments in Zambia. Table 6 shows that for the majority (68%) of this subgroup, such investments take the form of ownership of pieces of undeveloped land in residential, commercial and agricultural areas in Zambia. On the other hand, about half (50%) of the subgroup own developed properties. Slightly over a third (35.7%) of the respondents own business enterprises, including small and medium enterprises. Those who are part of a community project or hold financial and capital markets investment instruments each account for less than 10 per cent of the subgroup.

That emigration contributes to individual economic development (and ultimately national development) is evidenced by the time when such investments were executed. About 78 per cent of the respondents report that they effected such investments after they emigrated; only 19 per cent of the respondents indicate that they made such investments before emigrating from Zambia.

Table 7 shows the top five investment-related challenges:

- (a) Lack of up-to-date information on investment opportunities in Zambia;
- (b) High costs of doing business (e.g. onerous licensing and regulatory regime, heavy taxation and rigid labour market regulations.);
- (c) Unreliable business partners and practices (e.g. time management and slow responsiveness of suppliers and other business partners);
- (d) Pervasive rent-seeking behaviour that necessitates the payment of bribes to government officials and other suppliers to facilitate service;
- (e) Policy inconsistency and unpredictable policy changes.

Other challenges include labour force-related constraints (quantity- and quality-wise, e.g. skills shortages and poor work ethic, respectively); weak contract observance and enforcement; and lack of respect for private property rights. In the comments section to the related survey question, some respondents provided the following perspectives and opinions:

- (a) "There is a lack of interest in my contributions to the country as a diasporan with expert knowledge and potential to borrow cheap money in the United Kingdom to invest in Zambia. I feel ignored and locked out of the system by various barriers and lack of connections and links with upper powers that be, regardless of which party is in government it seems."
- (b) "Getting farmland title deeds is a nightmare!"
- (c) "There is a lack of access to local capital."
- (d) "There is a lack of government support."
- (e) "Government delays payments on contracts already executed."

- (f) “It is difficult to open bank accounts.”
- (g) “There is too much bureaucracy, and red tape and corrupt practices are rife. Until recently, there was such a chaotic governance system that made accessing public services difficult.”

**Table 7.**

**Diaspora investment challenges and required government actions to encourage diaspora participation in national development**

Survey question	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>What investment-related challenges have you faced in Zambia?</b> (n=685 respondents answered the question; multiple responses possible)		
Lack of up-to-date information on investment opportunities in the country	184	26.9
Policy inconsistency and/or unpredictable policy/governance situation	114	16.6
High costs of doing business (e.g. onerous licensing and regulatory regime, heavy taxation, rigid labour market regulations)	154	22.5
Labour force-related constraints (e.g. skilled labour shortages, poor time management and work attitude)	85	12.4
Unreliable business practices (e.g. time management difficulties, unresponsiveness of business partners and/or suppliers)	139	20.3
Rent-seeking behaviour (need for bribes to officials and/or suppliers to facilitate service)	103	15.0
Weak contract observance and/or enforcement	75	10.9
Lack of respect for private property rights	62	9.1
Others	23	3.4
<b>In your view, which of the following actions should the Government implement to encourage your participation in Zambia's development agenda? (n=685 respondents)</b>		
Creating a Diaspora Affairs Directorate (to replace the current Diaspora Coordination Desk) at the MFAIC	283	41.3
Creating a global Zambian Diaspora Coordination Association, based in Lusaka, to coordinate all Zambian diaspora associations globally	226	33.0
Adequately resourcing Zambian missions abroad with effective diaspora outreach and engagement programmes	326	47.6
Publishing information about investment incentives, remittances channels, land acquisition guidelines and other necessary measures	330	48.2
Delegating and simplifying land acquisition procedures at Zambian diplomatic missions; share and publicize links to the electronic land management system in Zambia	308	45.0
Strengthening transparent dialogue between diaspora associations and diplomatic missions (as representatives of the Government)	242	35.3
Formalizing Zambian diaspora participation in general elections through secure electronic gateways and web links at Zambian diplomatic missions	330	48.2
Providing timely and simplified access to the national identity document and dual citizenship application and issuance systems	350	51.1
Others	27	3.9

Survey question	Frequency	Valid % (of n)
<b>Would you participate in infrastructure project-specific diaspora bonds issued by the Government if you had the resources to do so?</b>		
Yes	522	93.4
No	37	6.5
<b>Total (n)</b>	<b>559</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The top six actions that respondents feel the Government should implement to enhance diaspora participation in national development are as follows:

- (a) Ensuring timely and simplified access to national identity documents and dual citizenship approval systems;
- (b) Publishing information on DDI incentives, available remittance channels, land acquisition guidelines and other complementary measures;
- (c) Formalizing diaspora participation in general elections through secure electronic gateways at Zambian missions abroad;
- (d) Adequately resourcing Zambian missions abroad with effective diaspora outreach and engagement programmes;
- (e) Delegating and simplifying land acquisition procedures at Zambian missions abroad linked to electronic land management systems in Zambia;
- (f) Creating a Diaspora Affairs Directorate to replace the current Diaspora Coordination Desk at the MFAIC.

Other measures proposed include strengthening the dialogue between diaspora associations, missions abroad and the MFAIC, and creating a coordinating umbrella organization, based in Lusaka, for all Zambian diaspora associations worldwide. As regards the latter suggestion, the South Africa-based Zambian Diaspora Organization (ZDO), which coordinates all Zambian diaspora associations globally, is already operational. In addition, one respondent points out the need to make either the Diaspora Coordination Desk or Diaspora Affairs Directorate functional to scale up diaspora engagement to impact national development.

Other observations from respondents in areas where the Government should take action in and implement changes and improvements to enhance diaspora participation in national development include the following:

- (a) “Effective communication from embassies, as most of the time, people reach out to them for information and we never hear back. Closely monitor relationships between embassies and diaspora associations.
- (b) “Be welcoming to the Zambian diaspora when they come back home and not to inconvenience us at airports, especially at departure, and on the road.”
- (c) “Create a register of diasporans who can provide professional services to the home country at much lower rates. ...In the United Kingdom, they use websites for public communication and contact. Not everyone is on Facebook. In fact, even in Zambia not everyone is on Facebook. An interactive website can be used by both government staff and diasporans, especially those in remote places.” Publish and update contacts, emails, and policies and procedures.

- (d) “Let the new Government be practical. Let us avoid political speeches and empty promises with no actions. We want to return home, but obviously people want to avoid falling into an “*A Phiri Anabwera*” situation of returning empty-handed.”
- (e) “Lobby for the Department of Home Affairs of South Africa to issue Zambians work permits, permanent residence permits and South African identity documents.”
- (f) “Friends who applied for dual citizenship have waited for four years. How much corruption do we need?”
- (g) “More events. Many who leave Zambia want to stay connected to other Zambians in foreign lands so the diplomatic missions should hosting more events (e.g. Zoom, WhatsApp, Twitter Live Chats and IG Lives) would help.”
- (h) “Nothing. I would not trust any Government-led investment. I will continue investing on my own.”

The above opinions suggest that respondents are keen to engage productively with their country of origin, and it is up to the Government to implement necessary policy actions to nurture their participation in national development.

Most (93%) of the respondents would be willing to participate in “crowd-funded” infrastructure and specific diaspora bonds (Table 7). A Bank of Zambia official who participated in the validation workshop indicate that while no such diaspora specific bonds have been issued, there are numerous other government securities, instruments and bonds that are available for all (be it Zambians or non-Zambians, wherever they are in the world) to participate in freely. At any rate, some survey participants feel that issues of accountability and transparency are important considerations for their subscription to any such diaspora-specific bond.

#### **4.6. WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE PERSONAL DETAILS FOR INCLUSION IN THE ZAMBIAN DIASPORA DATABASE**

The survey asks the diaspora respondents whether they are willing to provide their personal details, to be kept in confidence, to help construct a Zambian Diaspora Database. In total, 457 respondents respond in the affirmative and a draft database is prepared separately.

# 5.

## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 5.1. CONCLUSION

The study, commissioned by the project, “Building the Capacity of the Government of Zambia to Maximize Development Potential of the Diaspora”, which seeks, among other outcomes, to improve the Government’s knowledge of the different aspects of the Zambian diaspora. Specifically, the objectives of the Diaspora Mapping and Profiling Survey were to design and administer an online survey to collect data on various characteristics of the Zambian diaspora, primarily in South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The study adopted a triangulated data collection methodology that comprised a literature (desk) review; an online diaspora mapping and profiling survey; and virtual key informants’ interviews with diaspora focal point officials at the Zambian diplomatic missions in South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States. The response rate of the online survey was low; was as such, the survey period had to be extended twice. Even with two extensions, the target of 1,000 respondents was not achieved. Only 909 responded as of 15 February 2022, the closing date after the second extension. The low response rate could be attributed to several factors. The timing (i.e. during the Christmas and New Year holidays); survey fatigue; use of a Gmail email account, instead of an official government email account, to send out invitations to participate in the survey; and the survey’s non-introduction and/or endorsement by the MFAIC were the main factors. Some of these factors affected both diasporans’ willingness to participate and the quality of some of their responses to the survey. The literature review and the key informants’ interviews helped to ameliorate some of these shortcomings.

Diaspora mapping and profiling surveys help to create knowledge about diaspora characteristics, human capital credentials, geospatial distribution, niches and contributions to national development. Such surveys also afford the diaspora the chance to evaluate country-of-origin government outreach and engagement efforts (and enables comparison between their perceptions and objective reality) and provide useful feedback that can enrich future diaspora engagement endeavours. There are opposing schools of thought on diaspora engagement in the literature. Some feel that diaspora engagement is intrusive, while others celebrate such engagements. Various scholars, however, agree that migrants understand their countries of origin better than other, non-Zambian sources of FDI and that the former, as first movers, can take more risks than the latter – a situation that tends to enhance the development profile of the home country.

This report has presented empirical evidence of the characteristics of the Zambian diaspora and their interactions with the home country, reasons for their emigration, remittance-sending behaviours and patterns, investment profiles and individual opinions of what the Government should do to facilitate and improve their participation in national development. The evidence presented in this report shows that the Government is the main weak link in diaspora engagement in the national development value chain. Technically, nationals emigrate out of their countries of origin to seek better opportunities abroad because their home country governments have failed to create such opportunities. Such country-of-origin governments should not fail twice – that is, they should (a) to create opportunities so that their nationals would not have to leave in the first place and (b) productively leverage on the strengths of such emigrants, once in the diaspora, to contribute positively to opportunity creation back home.

## 5.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of the Zambian Diaspora Mapping and Profiling Survey, presented in this report, prompt the following recommendations:

- (a) **Design diaspora engagement ethos and protocols to have a global focus and not be focused on only South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States.** Data from current host countries shows that while South Africa, the United States and the United Kingdom are the largest destination countries for the Zambian diaspora, other countries in the subregion (e.g. Botswana), as well as in the eurozone, need prioritization as they host large pockets of resident Zambian diasporans.
- (b) **Design and follow through on inclusive policies that encourage innovative participation of various stakeholders.** Avoid diaspora centric policy actions that may alienate other foreign or domestic investors. Making public policy inclusive to cater to various actors and stakeholders and enable them to excel in their chosen vocations can put the country on a sound and productive sustainable developmental trajectory.
- (c) **Reach out to individual members of the Zambian diaspora directly, instead of relying on diaspora associations.** The majority of the Zambian diaspora (except in South Africa) are not members of any diaspora association. It is, therefore, an imperative for the MFAIC and its diplomatic missions abroad to deploy ICT and other tools to reach out to individual members of the Zambian diaspora directly.
- (d) **Fix institutional weaknesses.** Transform the Diaspora Coordination Desk into a Diaspora Directorate to better coordinate diaspora engagement and management efforts by the Government and other stakeholders. Strengthening Zambian diplomatic missions' capacity for diaspora engagement and outreach programmes, by providing the necessary resources and delegating some functions to them, such as the dissemination of land acquisition protocols and publicity for DDI incentives, could improve diaspora engagement in national development.
- (e) **Formalize diaspora knowledge transfer back to the home country.** A number of United Nations agencies have programmes for leveraging national expatriate expertise in national development. The Government of Zambia should urgently approach either or both IOM and UNDP on this issue (e.g. TOKTEN for UNDP and Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) for IOM).



- (f) **Strengthen diaspora data collection and other information management systems.** Updated and reliable information on the diaspora stock, characteristics and global spatial distribution will be imperative. The draft *Zambian Diaspora Database*, created as part of this survey, provides a great opportunity to actualize this ideal.

The above list of recommendations is not exhaustive. This report has highlighted other challenges and perspectives that call for various public policy actions. Historically, Zambia has made various diaspora policy recommendations but has always faltered on implementation. The advent of a new Government provides an impetus for breaking with the past and carve a new path of effective policy design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.



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