

# Migration, Development and Natural Disasters: Insights from the Indian Ocean Tsunami

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# **Migration, Development and Natural Disasters: Insights from the Indian Ocean Tsunami**

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International Organization for Migration  
Geneva



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# CONTENTS

<b>Executive Summary</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>2. Linkages Between Migration, Development and Natural Disasters</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1 Conceptual Framework	13
2.2 Migration and Development Nexus	16
2.2.1 <i>Remittances</i>	16
2.2.2 <i>Brain Drain/Gain</i>	17
2.3 Development and Natural Disasters Nexus	19
2.3.1 <i>Impacts of Natural Disasters on Developing and Developed Countries</i>	19
2.3.2 <i>Impacts of Natural Disasters on Different Socio-Economic Groups</i>	20
<b>3. Context</b>	<b>22</b>
3.1 Overview of the Indian Ocean Tsunami	22
3.2 Migration and Development Linkages in Affected Countries	24
3.2.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	24
3.2.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	25
3.2.3 <i>Thailand</i>	26
3.3 Economic Impact of the Tsunami	26
3.3.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	26
3.3.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	27
3.3.3 <i>Thailand</i>	27
3.4 The International Response to the Tsunami	28
3.4.1 <i>Needs Assessment</i>	28
3.4.2 <i>Emergency Assistance</i>	29
3.4.3 <i>Reconstruction and Development</i>	31
<b>4. Vulnerability of Migrants Post-Natural Disaster</b>	<b>33</b>
4.1 Migrants <i>in</i> Tsunami-affected Countries	33
4.1.1 <i>Myanmarese Migrants in Thailand</i>	33
4.1.2 <i>Thai Internal Migrants in Thailand</i>	36
4.2 Migrants <i>from</i> Tsunami-affected Countries	36

<b>5. Migratory Movements Following Natural Disasters</b>	<b>38</b>
5.1 Migration <i>Out</i> of Affected Areas	38
5.1.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	40
5.1.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	40
5.2 Migration <i>Into</i> Affected Areas	41
5.2.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	41
5.2.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	41
5.2.3 <i>Thailand</i>	42
5.3 Trafficking	42
5.3.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	43
5.3.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	44
5.3.3 <i>Thailand</i>	44
<b>6. Diaspora Response to Natural Disasters</b>	<b>46</b>
6.1 Diaspora Remittances Following Disaster	46
6.1.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	49
6.1.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	49
6.1.3 <i>Thailand</i>	50
6.2 Governments Facilitate Diaspora Support	51
6.2.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	51
6.2.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	52
6.2.3 <i>Thailand</i>	52
6.3 Diaspora Send Skilled Labour and In-kind Support	52
6.3.1 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	52
6.3.2 <i>Thailand</i>	53
6.4 Diaspora Mobilize External Support	53
6.5 Role of Local Media	53
6.5.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	54
6.5.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	54
6.5.3 <i>Thailand</i>	54
6.6 Limitations of Diaspora Support	54
6.6.1 <i>Indonesia</i>	55
6.6.2 <i>Sri Lanka</i>	55
6.6.3 <i>Thailand</i>	55
6.7 Diaspora Role in Disaster Preparedness	55
6.8 Private Companies Catering for Diasporas	56
6.8.1 <i>Thailand</i>	56
6.9 Agency Links with Diasporas	56
<b>Conclusions</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Glossary and Acronyms</b>	<b>60</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>63</b>

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When natural disasters strike populated areas, the toll in human lives, infrastructure and economic activities can be devastating and long-lasting. The psychological effects can be just as debilitating, instilling fear and discouragement in the affected populations. But, adversity also brings forth the strongest and best in human beings, and reveals initiatives, capacities and courage not perceived before. How is development undermined by natural disasters, what is the effect on migrants and migratory flows and what is the role of migration in mitigating some of the worst effects of natural calamities?

The interplay between migration and development has received increased attention in recent times and a United Nations High-Level Dialogue<sup>1</sup> held in September 2006 discussed ways of maximizing the development benefits of international migration, and reducing its negative impacts. The conference recognized a number of interlinkages between migration and development and concluded that migration, if properly managed, could be a positive force for development – though not a substitute for development strategies or donor funding.

This paper explores how the occurrence of a natural disaster interplays with the migration-development nexus by reviewing the impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami on migration issues in three affected countries: Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The Tsunami was an unprecedented disaster in terms of its character, scope and the degree of public support it received, and thus provides a valuable opportunity for examining these interlinkages. Development and natural disasters intersect in various ways as underdeveloped countries, and depressed socio-economic groups within those countries, tend to be more vulnerable to the effects of such calamities. It is not natural disasters themselves as geophysical events that generate risk, but rather the state of human development, which shapes vulnerability to natural hazards and exacerbates their effects and consequences.

Some aspects of the links between migration and disasters are already well known, and population movements due to environmental, geophysical and meteorological events, like desertification, hurricanes or floods, are a recurring feature of human life in most parts of the world. However, the issue of migration and the environment is likely to take on an added gravity in years to come with the recognition that climate change will in all likelihood lead to more natural disasters and freak weather events. The phenomenon of forced migration caused by climate change is a problem the world still remains ill prepared to face.

This is an issue of particular pertinence to the Asian region since it has been affected by almost half of all natural disasters between 1990-1999 (some 43% with 70% of all lives lost).<sup>2</sup> The problem has increasingly come to the fore in recent times,<sup>3</sup> leading IOM to initiate a series of meetings on Migration and the Environment, including most recently an Expert Meeting held in Bangkok, 22-23 February 2007 (see [www.iom.int](http://www.iom.int)).

This paper focuses on three particular aspects of how natural disasters interplay with the migration/development dynamic:

- **Impact of natural disasters on migrant communities, in particular heightened vulnerabilities and lack of access to assistance.**

Migrants, both regular and irregular, face increased vulnerability at times of natural disaster. At times of crisis, they may become forgotten, hidden groups unplanned for in the disaster response. They may miss out on humanitarian assistance and support, be unable to reclaim the bodies of dead relatives, and have difficulties in re-establishing their legal identity and recovering permits and authorizations. In particular when migrants are irregular, as the case of the Myanmarese in Thailand shows, this situation may arise through their own fears of coming forward for assistance or be a consequence of state neglect, or even the exclusion of migrant groups from aid efforts.

- **Effects of natural disasters on migratory flows into and out of affected areas due to socio-economic changes which undermine pre-disaster development levels.**

Natural disasters may lead to migratory flows out of affected areas. This is to be expected in areas where the calamity has left social and economic destruction in its wake. The Tsunami case studies show some indications of interest in economic migration among affected populations, who had been internally displaced on a large scale close to the affected areas, but numbers of actual émigrés appear limited and a mass exodus never occurred. This may be so for a variety of reasons, including the degree to which humanitarian assistance was able to cushion the blow caused by the Tsunami. There were also examples of some movements into affected areas, e.g. in Sri Lanka, migrant relatives returning home to provide support and highlighting potential problems of returnee re-integration. New migrants also arrived, e.g. Myanmarese migrant workers came to the coastal areas of Thailand in search of work in reconstruction, leading to questions of migrants rights, labour exploitation and protection.

- **Diaspora response and support in the aftermath of disasters and the degree to which this can offset losses and bolster “re-development”.**

Diaspora from all three affected countries across the world mobilized to provide support to their homeland at this time of crises. Governments of countries of origin were quick to recognize the potential for support to recovery and redevelopment often facilitating donations from diaspora communities. Skilled diaspora members, especially from Sri Lanka, returned home to provide medical and other support and the local media mobilized to support these efforts. Although the full scale of the diaspora contribution is unknown, it is likely that diasporas made a substantial contribution signalling the key role they can play concerning the development of their home countries, including in the aftermath of disaster.

The Tsunami experience shows very tangible links between migration, development and natural disasters. It spotlights a number of issues arising in such contexts and draws attention to key recommendations of relevance to all governments when planning for future disasters. Firstly, disaster preparedness and response should take account of migrant communities to ensure that their basic needs are met at times of crises, in accordance with core principles of international human rights and humanitarian law and, secondly, that the development role of diasporas in the aftermath of natural disasters needs to be harnessed by ensuring remittances, in-kind contributions and other forms of support for the home country are facilitated to the optimum degree possible.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

When natural disasters strike populated areas the toll in human lives, infrastructure and economic activities can be devastating and long-lasting. The psychological effects can be just as debilitating, instilling fear and discouragement in the affected populations. But, adversity also brings forth the strongest and best in human beings, and reveals initiatives, capacities and courage not perceived before. How is development undermined by natural disasters, what is the effect on migrants and migratory flows and what is the role of migration in mitigating some of the worst effects of natural calamities?

The interplay between migration and development has received increased attention in recent times, and a United Nations High-Level Dialogue<sup>4</sup> held in September 2006 discussed ways of maximizing the development benefits of international migration and reducing its negative impacts. The conference recognized a number of interlinkages between migration and development:

- Development is needed to address root causes of migration (poverty, conflict, human rights violations, poor governance or lack of employment).
- Migration can have a multi-faceted effect on development:
  - negative effects include the exodus of highly skilled migrants from developing countries, where this “brain drain” can inhibit necessary productivity and economic growth;
  - positive effects include the contribution of migrant remittances that benefit families by providing income growth, but also boost the wider economy and promote development goals.

For developing countries of origin, migration can thus be a trade-off. The conference concluded that, if properly managed, migration could be a positive force for development, though it should not be seen as a long-term development strategy in itself and that migrant remittances were not a substitute for development aid or debt relief.

This paper will seek to address the question of how the advent of a natural disaster interplays with the migration-development nexus by considering the impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami on migration issues in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand. These three countries were selected for study because of the degree of damage suffered by them and since they represented a range of pre-existing internal and international migratory movements. Development and natural disasters intersect in various ways as developing countries, and economically weak communities in those countries, are more vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters. As the poor suffer the most,

the correlation between low socio-economic development and the impacts of natural disaster is widely recognized. It is not natural disasters themselves as geophysical events that generate risk, but rather the state of human development, which shapes vulnerability to natural hazards and exacerbates their effects and consequences. The level of development is a critical factor and disasters have a disproportionate effect on developing countries for a variety of reasons, including the lack of resources to guard against the effects of natural disaster.

When a disaster strikes, it will undermine the development of affected individuals and communities and, if massive and/or recurrent, may even undermine the overall national economy and development. While there is no standard definition of “development” (see glossary), this paper will take “development” to encompass the usual types of developmental goals, including poverty reduction, higher standards of living, and access to health and education. A natural disaster occurring in a developing country which lacks the economic resources to meet the needs of its citizens at the best of times, will no doubt undermine the quality of life of affected individuals and communities. Humanitarian and recovery assistance provided by the international community may serve to bridge this gap and help restore populations to their former status.

The paper will examine three particular aspects of how migration interplays with the development/natural disaster dynamic:

- impact of natural disasters on migrant communities, in particular heightened vulnerabilities and lack of access to humanitarian/development assistance;
- effects of natural disasters on migratory flows into and out of affected areas due to socio-economic changes that undermine pre-disaster development levels;
- diaspora response and support in the aftermath of disasters and the degree to which this can offset losses and bolster “re-development”.

Some aspects of the links between migration and disasters are already well known, and population movements due to environmental, geophysical and meteorological events like desertification, hurricanes or floods, are a recurring feature of human life in some parts of the world. Recent examples include desertification (North Africa), hurricanes (Katrina or Mitch in Central and North America) or floods (Yangtze river in China). However, the issue of migration and the environment is likely to take on an added gravity in years to come with the recognition that climate change is a global reality and will in all likelihood lead to more natural disasters and freak weather events. The phenomenon of forced migration caused by climate change is one that is poised to take on increasing prominence in years to come, and is a problem that

the world is currently ill-prepared to deal with either at a policy, legislative or operational level. This paper presents an analysis of natural disasters and their effects on migrants and migration issues in the hope of stimulating further international thought and policymaking in this area.

It is an issue of particular pertinence to the Asian region, given that Asia has been affected by almost half of all natural disasters between 1990 and 1999 (viz. 43% to 70% of all lives lost).<sup>5</sup>

The research for this paper was carried out by review of secondary literature available on the Internet and in academic journals. The paper is divided into five sections:

- Interlinkages between migration, development and natural disasters – outline of the conceptual framework underlying this discussion and existing literature on these issues.
- Context – overview of the Tsunami, its main impacts on the three affected countries, pre-existing patterns of migration and diaspora support and the international aid response.
- Vulnerability of migrants post-disaster – drawing on examples of Myanmarese migrants in Thailand and Thai internal migrants, this section highlights the enhanced vulnerability of migrants at times of natural disaster and the difficulties faced by them in accessing humanitarian assistance and support for recovery.
- Migratory patterns post-disaster – drawing on examples from all three countries, this section recounts evidence on the types of migratory flows that occurred both out of and into the affected areas. It also considers the issue of trafficking and the extent to which this was a real threat post-Tsunami.
- Diaspora role in providing support for recovery – support provided by the diaspora from all three countries in terms of remittances and in-kind support, the ways and means used to mobilize donations and the role of governments in reaching out to diaspora communities.
- Conclusion and Recommendations – main findings emerging from the Tsunami review and learning for future natural disasters.

## 2. LINKAGES BETWEEN MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL DISASTERS

### 2.1 Conceptual Framework

The issues of migration, development and natural disasters interweave together in a myriad of complex ways and, traditionally, academic disciplines in the development field have tended to work in a compartmentalized manner,<sup>6</sup> not recognizing these interlinkages. There has been a shift in recent times towards more cross-fertilization in some areas with the connections being made between migration and development on the one hand, and development and natural disasters on the other. The nexus between all three policy areas, migration, development and natural disasters, remains as yet uncharted territory, uncovered by existing research, policy or programme work.<sup>7</sup> The following table presents a simple typology of how these issues intersect with each other in a multifaceted way:

TABLE 1  
OVERVIEW OF LINKAGES BETWEEN MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND NATURAL DISASTERS

	Migration	Development	Natural Disasters
Migration		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Migration can support development, e.g. through remittances, in-kind support, return of qualified nationals.</li> <li>- Migration can undermine development, e.g. brain drain</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Migration, by promoting or undermining development, can lessen or exacerbate the effect of natural disasters.</li> <li>- Migration, through remittances and support from migrants abroad, can aid recovery and re-development after natural disasters.</li> </ul>

	Migration	Development	Natural Disasters
Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Under-development can increase the prospects of migration as people leave in search of economic and other opportunities.<sup>8</sup></li> <li>- A certain level of development is required to enable migration to occur, as some minimum assets are needed to migrate and often the poorest in society are not able to leave.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Development can decrease the impact of natural disasters on affected areas/ communities by enabling greater resilience and protection.</li> </ul>
Natural Disasters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Natural disasters can undermine economic/ social prospects of the affected area and lead to emigration.</li> <li>- Natural disasters may also lead to migration into the affected area by relatives/families of those affected or migrants in search of work in reconstruction.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Natural disasters undermine development, at least of individuals and communities affected, and sometimes at the national level if the disasters are particularly large in scale and/or recurrent in nature making it difficult for countries to continually absorb shocks successfully.</li> </ul>	

Table 1 shows multi-directional linkages:


- Migration can be both a positive and negative force in development; it can foster disaster-preparedness through improved economic and social resilience, and help support recovery once a disaster has occurred.
- Development can be both an inhibitor and a spur to migration, lack of economic opportunities may foster migration but a minimum degree of resources is required and it is often not the poorest in society who tend to migrate.



- Natural disasters may lead to increased out-migration if affected areas become economically and socially moribund in the aftermath of crises, but they can also draw in migrants, with relatives and organizations coming in to provide support and new migrants arriving in search of work in the reconstruction effort.

This paper is set against this broad canvas of complex interactions and aims to assess the specific effects of the Tsunami on migration issues in terms of diaspora support and impacts on migrant communities and migratory flows (as shown in Figure 1). It begins by presenting available information on the links between migration and development in the region, and then explores the links between development and natural disasters.

FIGURE 1  
MIGRATION ISSUES POST-NATURAL DISASTER



## 2.2 Migration and Development Nexus

### 2.2.1 Remittances

The nexus between migration and development will be explored with reference to the Asian region. The diaspora of permanent and temporary migrants of Asian origin, the majority living in OECD countries and in Asia itself, are important sources of remittances into and within the region. It is impossible to fully quantify the scale of remittances given large-scale irregular migration and the use of informal remittance channels. In Indonesia, for example, official remittances cover those reported by the Bank of Indonesia, which includes transfers of Foreign Agent Banks, mostly from the Middle East and Malaysia, but the free foreign currency exchange system does not make a distinction between money exchanged by returning migrants and tourists/visitors.<sup>9</sup>

Most Asian nations, including Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, have experienced an increase in formal remittance flows in recent years,<sup>10</sup> which in turn have played a significant role in the national economy.<sup>11</sup> Guest (1998) concluded that remittances significantly contribute to improving household income in the rural northeast of Thailand.<sup>12</sup> The level and portion of contributions in the overall household income depend on a wide variety of factors, such as the length of migration (with temporary migrants more likely to remit). He also found that due to other variables, such as high charges by middlemen and agents, debts, detention and deportation of migrants, the economic situation of some families did not improve.<sup>13</sup> Remittances were used for consumer goods but also for necessary investments in education and health, thereby assuming the function of a social safety net. According to work by Adams and Page, a correlation between the increase in international remittances and a reduction in poverty, appears to have been established:

*On average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international remittances in a country's GDP will lead to a 1.6 per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty.<sup>14</sup>*

Negative effects of the reliance on remittances at the national level can occur when agriculture and/or industry stagnate because of a government failure to strengthen exports.<sup>15</sup> In addition, the geographical distribution of remittances is not equal, but tends to concentrate in certain areas, where the impact is consequently large and magnified. In Indonesia, for example, migrants tended to come from and to remit to poor rural areas, neglected by private investors and the government.<sup>16</sup>

### 2.2.2 Brain drain/gain

Brain drain has traditionally been seen as having a negative impact on the development of countries of origin, depriving them of skilled human resources necessary for the economy. In Asia, this is a particular concern for smaller lower-income countries: Dumont and Lemaître show that emigration rates are relatively low for large nations, such as Indonesia and Thailand, but higher for smaller countries. The brain drain phenomenon has received renewed attention in recent years with greater emphasis placed by OECD countries on higher-skilled migrants.<sup>17</sup>

The negative view of brain drain, or more rightfully, skills and capacity drain, has become more nuanced over time. Some smaller countries are not able to absorb all skilled and unskilled labourers into their labour market, so migration abroad and the subsequent return of remittances is often a better solution for the individual as well as an enhancement of the development of the home country.<sup>18</sup>

There is growing evidence of the ways in which diasporas can be mobilized in other ways to support the development of their home areas. Influential and high-level diaspora members can stimulate companies to set up businesses in countries of origin.<sup>19</sup> The diaspora can also act as a bridge expanding economic linkages between their country of origin and the destination country and others. Whether or not a government is able to capitalize on these transnational networks depends on its policy towards involving diasporas in homeland affairs, including, at a minimum, enabling diasporas to maintain links and identification with the country or home area. The granting of dual citizenship, e.g. to Indian and Philippine expatriates, is one way of reconfirming the ties of nationals permanently living abroad with their country of origin.<sup>20</sup> Another strategy is to support the development of expatriate organizations and associations by building transnational communities of experts: expatriate scientists and engineers, for example, can be brought back to attend meetings and conferences sponsored by the government of the home country.<sup>21</sup> Many migrants dream of returning to their home country in the long term, and programmes facilitating and removing obstacles to return (e.g. tax exemptions on remitted income, granting of permanent residence status to spouses and children, salary packages, multiple entry visas, etc.) can be advantageous for the home country in terms of bringing back skilled labour into key positions. Table 2 summarizes some of the positive and negative effects of migration on development.

TABLE 2  
IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON DEVELOPMENT<sup>22</sup>

Positive development effects of migration	Negative development effects of migration
<p><b>INDIVIDUAL/FAMILY LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Individual advantage and personal gain, especially when there are new employment opportunities not available in the home country.</li> <li>- Families with migrant members abroad benefit economically from inflow of remittances.</li> <li>- Communities with many migrants abroad may experience an enhanced economic/ social environment with increasing prosperity of families in the area.</li> <li>- Charitable activities by diasporas can promote local community development back home.</li> </ul> <p><b>SOCIETY LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Foreign exchange benefits economy</li> <li>- Lessens pressure on government/ economy in cases of high unemployment</li> <li>- Technology, investments and venture capital brought in by diasporas</li> <li>- Increased trade flows and exchanges between sending and receiving countries.</li> </ul>	<p><b>INDIVIDUAL/FAMILY LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Loss of social/emotional support both by migrants going abroad and families left behind can in turn undermine social capital and affect development.</li> </ul> <p><b>SOCIETY LEVEL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Loss of highly skilled workers and reduced availability and quality of essential services.</li> <li>- Reduced growth and productivity due to the reduced stock of highly skilled workers.</li> <li>- Lower return from public investments in public education.</li> <li>- Selective migration may cause increasing income disparities in sending country.</li> <li>- Sending country loses potential tax revenues.</li> <li>- Risk of creating a “remittance economy” and dependency among receivers, a problem exacerbated when remittances diminish over time.</li> <li>- Inflationary potential of remittances, especially on real estate in some areas.</li> </ul>

## 2.3 Development and Natural Disasters Nexus

### 2.3.1 Impacts of natural disasters on developing and developed countries

The links between underdevelopment and increased vulnerability to disaster are well recognized. It is not natural disasters themselves as geophysical events that generate risk, but rather the state of human development, which shapes vulnerability to natural hazards and exacerbates their effects and consequences. The level of development is a critical factor and disasters have a disproportionate effect on developing countries for a variety of reasons, including the lack of resources to guard against the effects of natural disaster, e.g. poor quality of construction and compliance with building codes, absence or non-application of land registration and other regulatory mechanisms. According to the World Bank, most natural disasters are predictable to a certain degree.

*Small island states in the Caribbean and states along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico will undoubtedly be repeatedly hit by hurricanes; Pacific Rim states in the “ring of fire” are highly likely to be hit by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; low-lying coastal areas on the Bay of Bengal are sure to experience more flooding, and Africa will likely experience more drought. Therefore, it makes sense to treat the hazards of nature as risks to development, especially where they occur repeatedly.*<sup>23</sup>

Thus, not only do developing countries suffer disproportionately when disaster strikes, but if they are located in areas where they are likely to experience a greater number of disasters, that in itself may impede development due to the continuing need of overcoming natural calamities. Research also shows a difference in the impact of natural disasters on developing and developed countries in terms of the type of loss: data show a higher death toll in developing countries compared to developed countries, but absolute economic losses may be greater in developed countries<sup>24</sup> (though more research is needed on the relative impacts, and the relative loss as a proportion of national wealth, and the comparative better ability of developed economies to absorb these losses).

If the degree of impact of a natural disaster is influenced by the level of development, then disaster risk<sup>25</sup> can be approached from two angles: prospective and compensatory disaster risk management. Prospective disaster risk management addresses root causes and seeks to promote forms of development that help reduce disaster risk in a long to medium-term approach. Compensatory disaster risk management, also known as corrective disaster risk management, is more focused on existing vulnerabilities and

the reduction of natural hazards, and more of an immediate short-term approach, concerned with preparedness, response, rehabilitation and reconstruction.<sup>26</sup> The international humanitarian community has been slow to include strategies to decrease vulnerabilities that cause disaster risks in the first place; instead, disasters are viewed as events that interrupt regular development processes to be dealt with by emergency assistance.<sup>27</sup> A better integration of human development and emergency responses is highly desirable,<sup>28</sup> but is impeded by a lack of political commitment and the designation of resources for predominantly short-term emergencies.<sup>29,30</sup>

### **2.3.2 Impacts of natural disasters on different socio-economic groups**

Those occupying the lower socio-economic tiers of society<sup>31</sup> are more likely to be at risk of heightened loss and damage following natural disaster. This is the case in both developing and developed nations, as can be seen by the plight of low-income African American and migrant communities in the United States in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Low-income groups are disproportionately affected due to habitation in inferior quality housing made of weak infrastructure and materials, limited choice over type and location of residence, and less-effective disaster prevention/response capabilities. Lower-income groups may have no choice but to ignore the hazard, may not be able effectively to anticipate it, or have to accept the risks, e.g. poor fishermen dependent on backwater fishing may have to live with the continual risk of flooding.<sup>32</sup> Economically better off households are better able to protect themselves from the effects of natural disasters and have more resources, means and capabilities to re-establish themselves once disaster occurs. They may also have the financial resources and ability to leave the area, if only on a temporary basis.<sup>33</sup>

In less-developed countries in particular, the growth of urban slums<sup>34</sup> means that low-income groups often live on land that has either been reclaimed (silted riverbeds), located close to hazardous industrial plants (e.g. Bhopal) and transport infrastructures, and on unstable mountain slopes, marshlands and similar accident-prone environments. Many large cities often house large numbers of transient populations emanating from rural areas, with insecure social networks, experiencing social and political marginalization and lacking in resources and social welfare mechanisms, all of which increases their vulnerability to shocks placing them in a position of dependency on the government for early warning and support.<sup>35</sup>

In rural areas, it is often the poorest who occupy the most marginal lands and rely on precarious and highly vulnerable livelihoods in areas prone to drought, flooding and other hazards. Local ecological and environmental change as a consequence of agricultural practices can itself create risk.<sup>36</sup> The capacity of rural communities to cope has been undermined by the need to compete in a globalizing economy, which

currently rewards specialization and intensification over diversity and sustainability. The effects of climate change also increase uncertainty and the complexity of risk for everyone, including landless labourers, small-scale farmers, and wealthy agriculturists and people whose livelihoods serve the rural economy.<sup>37</sup>


Blaikie et al. have described the progression of vulnerability as being caused by a variety of root causes such as:

- Limited access to power structures, resources and ideologies, political and economic systems.
- Dynamic pressures (lack of local institutions, training, appropriate skills, local investments, local markets, freedom of expression, ethical standards in public life and rapid urbanization, population growth, deforestation, decline in soil productivity).
- Fragile physical environments.
- Vulnerability of particular segments of the population (special groups at risk).
- Lack of appropriate and timely public action (e.g. lack of disaster preparedness and prevalence of endemic diseases).<sup>38</sup>

As the Task Force on Climate Change concluded:<sup>39</sup>

*For poor people, vulnerability is both a condition and a determinant of poverty, and refers to the (in)ability of people to avoid, cope with or recover from the harmful impacts of factors that disrupt their lives and that are beyond their immediate control. This includes the impacts of shocks (sudden changes such as natural hazards, war or collapsing market prices) and trends (for example, gradual environmental degradation, oppressive political systems or deteriorating terms of trade).*


### 3. CONTEXT




#### 3.1 Overview of the Indian Ocean Tsunami

On 26 December 2004, an earthquake off the coast of Indonesia triggered the Indian Ocean Tsunami, which killed some 229,000 people across 14 countries and caused an estimated US\$ 10 billion in damage. The worst-affected countries were Indonesia, India, the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Thailand. The scale of the public response was equally unprecedented with some US\$ 13 billion<sup>40</sup> donated for relief and recovery; more than that raised for any disaster ever before due, no doubt, to a variety of reasons, including its unprecedented nature and scope, the involvement of many tourists, its occurrence on a national public holiday in many parts of the world, and graphic images of the wave and its victims beamed into homes across the world. This paper selects three of the worst-affected countries, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand, for an examination of the linkages between migration, development and natural disasters.







### 3.2 Migration and Development Linkages in Affected Countries

All three countries had pre-existing patterns of migration and remittances, which formed an important part of the economy in each case.

#### 3.2.1 Indonesia

Indonesia is one of the main sending countries to the Middle East and other Asian countries, with legal migration seen by the government as a means of decreasing unemployment levels and acquiring foreign exchange.<sup>41</sup> There are also irregular movements, mainly to Malaysia.<sup>42</sup> The northern tip of Sumatra, including Aceh, has always maintained close ties with Malaysia and irregular flows have increased in recent years due to the conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. The causes of migration from Aceh included the lack of services, lack of employment opportunities, insecurity in certain areas, as well as pull factors such as the availability of migration channels, jobs and higher wages elsewhere.<sup>43</sup> The civil war, in particular, led to a deterioration of labour opportunities and the persecution of certain groups, particularly men of working age, by both sides<sup>44</sup> (as testified by the increase in asylum applications in Malaysia over that period of time).<sup>45</sup> Remittances

from overseas migrants have increased in recent years, viz. from US\$ 1.31 million in 2000 to US\$ 2.18 million in 2002, highlighting the important contribution of migrants to the country's development.

### 3.2.2 Sri Lanka

The Sri Lankan diaspora is diverse in terms of ethnic and educational background, and length of stay abroad. The Sri Lankan Tamils have been extensively studied as a diaspora, but the Sinhalese community has received less attention.<sup>46</sup> There were initial waves of migration to Europe, the United States/Canada and Australia,<sup>47</sup> and more recently to the Middle East and other Asian countries. A total of 318,298 Sri Lankans were estimated to be residing in Europe, Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand in 2001.<sup>48</sup> In addition to the large numbers of unskilled workers, a relatively smaller yet significant number of highly skilled professionals have migrated to newly industrializing countries (NIS) such as Indonesia, to fill the gap created by low national education levels and the demands of the labour market.<sup>49</sup> Most of these movements are circular rather than permanent. There are more women migrants than men; as of 2004, the total number of Sri Lankan overseas contract workers was 744,100 (262,052 men and 482,048 women),<sup>50</sup> with women migrant workers estimated to support a population of 2.5 million, approximately 15 per cent of the country's total population.<sup>51</sup>

The inflow of foreign currency in the shape of remittances is extremely important to the national economy. Since 1991, there has been a steady increase of remittances. In 2004 an estimated 158,291 million Sri Lankan rupees (SR) were privately remitted from around the world. In 2000, remittances amounted to approximately 20 per cent of the country's foreign exchange earnings, contributing significantly to the Sri Lankan economy, improving national savings and having a positive effect on the balance of payments.<sup>52</sup> Remittances from the Middle East constitute 55.51 per cent, or SR 87,871 million.<sup>53</sup> Remittances exceed income obtained from the export of services and goods, and the government tries to increase this inflow by offering specific banking arrangements and high interest rates.<sup>54</sup>

Many Tamils use informal money transfer networks, called *undiyal*, to remit money to Sri Lanka, as these are considered to be a trustworthy, effective and a relatively cheap remittance transfer mechanism.<sup>55</sup> Agents use various means to transfer the money, including goods exchanges, invoice manipulations but also, sometimes, currency and goods smuggling.<sup>56</sup> The ongoing civil conflict in Sri Lanka has entirely destroyed the formal banking system in the conflict zones, no new system has been put in place in the areas controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since the signing of the cease fire agreement in 2002 (The LTTE has its own banking system, which only operates in the Vanni area in the north).<sup>57</sup> Although disputed by

Tamil diaspora leaders, the Sri Lankan government estimates that remittances as a result of LTTE fund-raising efforts, approaches US\$ 80 million a year. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) says that it collects about US\$ 10,000 a month. These remittances are partially returns on investments made by families through sending a member abroad.<sup>58</sup>

### **3.2.3 Thailand**

Thailand is both a migrant sending and receiving country. It is a hub for migration in Southeast Asia, attracting migrants looking for work from neighbouring countries, especially Cambodia and Viet Nam and, in the case of Myanmar, fleeing persecution, internal conflict, and forced labour. Most migrants have irregular status and are estimated to number hundreds of thousands.<sup>59</sup> Thailand has made efforts to regularize illegal migration since July 2004 by strengthening its migrant registration system, but at the time of the tsunami many continued to be undocumented.

Thailand also has approximately 150,000 skilled and unskilled Thai contract workers per year living abroad, and receives US\$ 1.5 billion annually in remittances through official channels. The unofficial remittances are also likely to be very significant.<sup>60</sup> The Middle East used to be the main destination of Thai migrants, but since 1995, the majority of Thais (85%), have migrated to other countries in East and Southeast Asia because of tighter regulations introduced by Saudi Arabia and its neighbours. In 2001 the top three destination countries were the Taiwan province of China (94,126 migrants), Singapore (20,411) and Israel (12,163).<sup>61</sup>

## **3.3 Economic Impact of the Tsunami**

The Tsunami wreaked devastation on affected areas and individual households, but the data suggest that the national economies have been little dented and that all three countries recovered relatively swiftly from this set back.<sup>62</sup>

### **3.3.1 Indonesia**

Poverty levels had been steadily increasing over the last 30 years<sup>63</sup> when the Tsunami struck, and an estimated 40 per cent of Aceh's population was already living below the poverty line.<sup>64</sup> The agricultural sector provided employment to the largest portion of the population (48% in 2003).<sup>65</sup> The devastation and loss of life caused by the Tsunami further aggravated Aceh's weak physical and social infrastructure. Damage was estimated to amount to US\$ 4.4.5 billion, the equivalent of 97 per cent of Aceh's GDP.<sup>66</sup> The Asian Development Bank said that the disaster could plunge another million Acehnese into poverty.

A positive outcome of the Tsunami was that the Indonesian government was forced to open up the province to foreign humanitarian organizations whose presence had been severely restricted since the launch of the military offensive in May 2003. The disaster also encouraged both warring parties to scale down their operations and negotiate a peace agreement. In terms of overall impact on the economy, the Indonesian government took the view that the disaster would not inhibit Indonesia's economic growth as reconstruction costs did not come from the government budget and overseas development was likely to stimulate industry with demands for construction materials and other products.<sup>67</sup>

### **3.3.2 Sri Lanka**

The overall damage caused by the Tsunami was estimated at around US\$ 1 billion, or 4.5 per cent of GDP, with much of the damage to private assets.<sup>68</sup> An estimated 70-80 per cent of fishing craft were destroyed along with ports, piers and markets, small-scale businesses, homes and several large tourist hotels.<sup>69</sup> The World Bank concluded that the impact of the Tsunami on Sri Lanka's national output and GDP was not as extensive as the damage to assets and human loss.<sup>70</sup> The Tsunami was expected to slow down GDP growth in 2005 by up to 1 per cent; this limited projected impact being a direct consequence of the rather small contribution of the affected sectors of fishing and tourism to the economy, namely 3 per cent of GDP. Other sectors that were also negatively affected included telecommunications and transport. The construction sector, on the other hand, was likely to make up for part of the loss with projected growth of an earlier average of 5.5 per cent to 8-10 per cent in the three years following the Tsunami. The impact on GDP was also limited as many of those affected were already very poor before the disaster struck.<sup>71</sup>

### **3.3.3 Thailand**

The economy of the affected areas was largely dependent on tourism, fishing and agriculture (particularly rubber plantations) and was badly damaged. The Thai Department of Fisheries estimated that 7,446 fishing boats were lost or severely damaged, and that 40 per cent of the 53,000 hotel rooms in Tsunami-affected tourist areas destroyed. The tourism industry expected huge losses, forecasting a drop in tourists from 13.5 million to 12 million in 2005, a major blow to an economy that depends on tourism for 6 per cent of its GDP.<sup>72</sup> It was, however, expected that Thailand was likely to recover from the catastrophe within two years.<sup>73</sup>

The Thai government responded similarly to the Indian government, by declaring a position of self-reliance in the coordination and delivery of post-Tsunami emergency

relief, which was supported by the efforts of hundreds of Thai and foreign volunteers as well as international, national and local humanitarian organizations.<sup>74</sup>

### **3.4 The International Response to the Tsunami**

International humanitarian and development agencies enjoyed an ample and generous amount of funding for the Tsunami disaster as never before. This, no doubt, mitigated the effects of the disaster on affected populations and the overall development of the countries concerned. A number of interagency evaluations of the aid response (Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, Disasters Emergency Committee evaluation, and NGO impact initiative spearheaded by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General)<sup>75</sup> have found the response of the international community to fall short in a number of areas. Specific concerns included the lack of coordination,<sup>76</sup> the quality and professionalism of the response, accountability to beneficiaries, relations with local partners and the effective targeting of needs. The net result of this is that despite the liberal availability of funding, certain vulnerable groups may still have been missed out leading to a worsening of their socio-economic condition. The different phases of the response, assessment, relief and reconstruction, raised a variety of issues.

#### **3.4.1 Needs assessment<sup>77</sup>**

National governments, donors and international agencies undertook a wide range of needs and damage assessments caused as a prelude to developing rehabilitation and reconstruction plans.<sup>78</sup> The collection of accurate data proved problematic, as is the case in many emergencies, for a variety of reasons, including the lack of pre-existing reliable data, e.g. absence of baseline data in areas such as Aceh, or northeastern Sri Lanka which have suffered ongoing civil conflict for years, the usage of different types of assessment methodologies, and the challenging physical context and the displacement of populations post-disaster.<sup>79,80,81</sup>

There was stark contrast between the humanitarian assessments carried out by aid agencies and the economic studies coordinated by national governments in conjunction with the major financial institutions (including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank) and which resulted in single authoritative assessments of damage and loss.<sup>82</sup> Economic assessments tended to focus on the monetary impact of the disaster and did not include an extensive coverage of capacities, vulnerable groups and the social context.<sup>83</sup> A third type of assessment focused on livelihoods, taking a top-down approach to local capacity, assets and strategies. Overall, it seemed that such assessments focused on post-Tsunami information without taking into account pre-Tsunami data, thus failing to differentiate needs induced by the Tsunami and those resulting from long-term poverty.<sup>84</sup>

Research has shown that, given the lack of reliable data, arriving at a real cost assessment of natural disasters and consistent definitions and methodologies is a challenge:

*Monetary indicators linked to disasters should be critically reviewed as they often fail to capture specific economic and social circumstances. Calculation of losses should take the nature and magnitude of employment losses into account. Similarly losses have to be related to households' situation and vulnerability before and after disasters. The impact of a US\$ 50 loss of assets can be minor or huge depending on one's economic and social situation.<sup>85</sup>*

The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition evaluation of needs assessments concluded that “educated guesses” based on assessment of needs,

*are quite legitimate if they are (...) educated, that is, technically sound and not based on myths or extrapolation from complex emergencies in failed states. However, this approach routinely tends to overlook the local or national contributions and assumes that local communities are passively awaiting the international humanitarian actors.<sup>86</sup>*

Initial humanitarian assessments can only be of limited coverage, focusing on those remaining in the area with no registration of those who have returned temporarily to their place of origin, therefore missing economic migrant populations in the affected area, and households of returnee migrants. Generally, needs assessments did not refer comprehensively to the impact of the Tsunami on migrants (internal and international), the impact on present and potential migratory flows and the effect of remittances from the diaspora. There were some exceptions to this, i.e., the WFP real-time evaluation, which recognized remittances as an important source of income for affected Acehnese and Sri Lankans,<sup>87</sup> and Save the Children UK child protection assessments in India, which took into account impacts on migratory patterns.<sup>88</sup>

### **3.4.2 Emergency assistance**

The Tsunami response appears to have been characterized by an excessive emphasis on the emergency response and an over-supply of goods to some groups of victims, whilst missing some more marginal groups, and a relative failure to move to the reconstruction phase. The TEC assessment noted:

*The evaluators found more evidence of non-existent needs being met than people, or groups of people, left without basic survival support. The constraint to meeting needs was not the lack of good assessment data but rather poor logistics, lack of access and an offer that transcended the level of need.<sup>89</sup>*

Generally, even a few months after the disaster (March to May), aid agencies were still operating in “emergency” mode instead of focusing on the reconstruction of livelihoods, which required going beyond just providing working capital and materials. Assistance continued to be focused on the most basic needs, such as food, water, housing and money, and any consideration for sustainable livelihoods was highly limited.<sup>90</sup>

Evaluations of the specific technical areas confirmed these findings, but also highlighted that the overall response had clearly contributed to saving lives in the affected areas.<sup>91,92</sup> There was a great redundancy in food and clothing.<sup>93</sup> The initial health response was shaped by fear of disease<sup>94</sup> and further complicated by the fact that health care systems were greatly affected by the Tsunami, e.g. 35 per cent of midwives in the affected areas of Aceh died, one out of every six clinics was destroyed, and the entire region witnessed the loss of equipment and drug supplies.<sup>95</sup>

Water and sanitation was immediately addressed by short-term interventions, though these measures faced the problem of high levels of salinity in ground wells, e.g. in Sri Lanka alone some 12,000 wells are affected by high salinity. It was likely to take several rainy seasons for the fresh water/sea water to recalibrate to pre-Tsunami levels. Highly sophisticated reverse-osmosis systems introduced by external agencies may have proved impractical if cost recovery was not possible and communities were unable to take responsibility for their maintenance.<sup>96</sup> The high levels of salinity affected livelihoods directly, for example of fishermen engaged in backwater fishing.

Many families lost their homes and lands to the Tsunami. In some cases in Sri Lanka and Aceh, families with housing intact provided shelter and support to IDPs. This posed a heavy burden on host families in terms of sharing scarce resources such as household space, food as well as in lost privacy.<sup>97</sup> In other cases, temporary shelters were erected to provide immediate housing while working on longer-term options. Land ownership and loss of documentation further complicated the issue of shelter and property restitution, which could also lead to a denial of access to health, education and other essential public services.<sup>98</sup> The government redrawing of coastal protection zones also served to restrict the right of victims to return to their homes, especially in Sri Lanka and Thailand;<sup>99</sup> in Sri Lanka, government policies prohibited



new constructions within 100 metres of the mean sea level (in some areas 200 metres), an area where most of the 500,000 affected were living before the Tsunami.

The participation of the affected population in the humanitarian response was not fully secured, e.g. it was considered that both the Thai government and private aid agencies needed to make community participation a top priority.<sup>100</sup> There were also some questions about impartiality in the distribution of aid, as in the aftermath of the Gujarat earthquake, although not state-sponsored, there are indications that some local officials and/or communities may have discriminated against Dalits in Tsunami-affected areas of India, viz. Dalit survivors were reported to have been only reluctantly received in some higher-caste temporary shelters and camps, and some Dalits were driven away.<sup>101</sup> Obviously, these limitations in the aid effort and, in particular the issues over property, may have affected the decision to migrate.

### **3.4.3 Reconstruction and development**

The focus for a relatively long period of time on short-term emergency responses was partially the result of the complexities surrounding reconstruction efforts in general. Overall, in all countries, a holistic approach to livelihood recovery was lacking in reconstruction planning by governments and aid agencies, for instance the need to address markets, prices and competitiveness. Immediately after the Tsunami, for instance in Aceh, wages were higher in projects set up by aid agencies than regular employers, making it difficult to find labourers for local industries, such as brick making.<sup>102</sup> In Thailand, after a few months complaints began to surface that the government was more concerned with revitalizing the tourist industry whilst leaving long-term social and livelihood issues to international organizations.

Those hardest hit were mostly from the informal sector, such as fishermen, farmers, small businessmen and women performing home-based work.<sup>103</sup> Fishing communities received more help than others, but much of this assistance was short-term and in the form of loans, which many fishermen are unlikely to be able to pay back in the long term.<sup>104</sup> At times, inappropriate equipment was provided<sup>105</sup> and in some cases too many boats were handed out risking the rapid exhaustion of the fishing capacity of coastal waters. Generally speaking, the entire chain of the fishing industry received insufficient attention, thereby leaving out many workers who were involved in the related processing and support functions.

A major discussion emerged around the issue of whether reconstruction should aim to re-establish pre-Tsunami living standards, or whether it should “build back better” and aim for sustainable livelihoods.<sup>106</sup> Thus, for instance, the establishment of a sustainable agricultural sector essential for Aceh’s recovery would have involved

broader land reforms, including land administration, land and water rehabilitation, subsectoral strategies, diversification of production and market access, the support of skilled extension officers, infrastructure, micro-finance and small enterprise support.<sup>107</sup> This would in turn have benefited the overall development of the economy, thereby enhancing human development in the affected region.

## **4. VULNERABILITY OF MIGRANTS POST-NATURAL DISASTER**

The status of being a migrant can lead to increased vulnerability post-disaster due to compromised access to services and protection in the affected area. Legal residence rights can become a real or perceived bar to assistance. This is particularly crucial for irregular migrants who lack legal rights in the first place. However, it can also affect regular migrants who may lose their documents in the disaster and find themselves in a legally precarious situation. Internal migrants may also be implicated, as there may be rules on the registration of internal movements. Access to assistance may be further complicated by linguistic, cultural and religious barriers, as, for example, aid not being adapted to the particular needs of migrant communities, and information not being available in the migrants' languages, or the provision of food they are not used to. Moreover, they may not be sufficiently aware of their entitlements,<sup>108</sup> a problem affecting certain categories of migrants, in particular women.<sup>109</sup>

Examples of vulnerability of migrants post-natural disasters include the Gujarat earthquake or the Orissa cyclone in India, where at times migrants were reportedly unable to access any aid. Migrants caught up in Hurricane Katrina, which hit the US Gulf Coast in September 2005, also had difficulty in accessing aid due to fears of reprisals and deportation, or loss of identity documents. Some suddenly found themselves ineligible for legal residence if their application was dependent on a relative or employer who suffered losses in the disaster. US government policy allowed non-citizens access to short-term in-kind emergency disaster relief and services,<sup>110</sup> but the government response to migrants in the aftermath of the hurricane was variously criticized. Heightened migrant vulnerability post-Tsunami is best illustrated by the case of Thailand where both international and internal migrants were affected.

### **4.1 Migrants *In* Tsunami-affected Countries**

#### **4.1.1 Myanmarese migrants in Thailand**

Thailand is home to hundreds of thousands Myanmarese, Cambodian and Laotian migrants who fill gaps in the blue collar and service sectors of the labour market. There has been a historical flow of Myanmarese migrants<sup>111</sup> for a combination of reasons, including persecution of some minority groups (such as the Mon, Karen and Shan), internal conflict, forced labour and lack of economic opportunities.<sup>112</sup> An estimated 120,000 people live in refugee camps along the border, but many more are economic migrants, including many ethnic Myanmarese, working for instance in agriculture, fisheries, construction, rubber plantations, shrimp farms and the tourist sector.<sup>113</sup> All

foreign workers, including Myanmarese, are required to register with the Thai Ministry of Interior, but the large majority remain irregular.<sup>114</sup>

The Tsunami further aggravated the precarious legal and socio-economic position of the Myanmarese in Thailand. Many lived in shantytowns next to piers or close to construction sites near the shoreline, working in agriculture, fisheries, construction, rubber plantations and shrimp farms, and suffered directly from the disaster.<sup>115</sup> Data on the number of affected Myanmarese migrants are uncertain due to the irregular status of the majority. Moreover, even some of those who were registered had their identity and work permits washed away. Estimates of the numbers of Myanmarese migrant workers killed range from 700 to 2,500.<sup>116</sup>

Some tried to return to Myanmar immediately after the Tsunami and the Thai Ministry of the Interior opened a transit centre to facilitate such returns.<sup>117</sup> However, they went home without the certainty of knowing they could return to Thailand, as the authorities did not give any guarantees (though some provincial governors expressed a degree of openness to permitting registered migrants to return to Thailand).<sup>118</sup> Others fled to the hills and plantations for fear of arrest and deportation. There were reports of police raids on migrant settlements and arrests.<sup>119</sup> Hundreds and possibly thousands of Myanmarese irregular migrants were forcibly returned to Myanmar.<sup>120</sup> Moreover, the media was criticized for scape-goating Myanmarese migrants in incidents of post-Tsunami looting. Those who had lost their documents, such as temporary residence card – Tor RoR 38/1, and work permit,<sup>121</sup> faced major problems in obtaining new documents. Some were turned down for re-issuance of permits because they could not remember their 13-digit registration code;<sup>122</sup> others found the costs of re-registration prohibitive.

Reports of the exclusion of Myanmarese migrant workers from access to assistance were contradictory; however, generally it can be concluded that despite a degree of inclusion in the beginning, some Myanmarese migrant workers were in fact excluded from receiving relief under Thai government aid programmes by local officials.<sup>123</sup> This was partly the result of actual discrimination during the distribution of aid, and partly because the migrants themselves did not come forward for fear of arrest and/or deportation by local police in the post-Tsunami crackdowns on illegal migrants. The Myanmar authorities reportedly did not offer services such as logistical assistance or translation.<sup>124</sup>

Issues over legal status also posed challenges when it came to the identification of the dead bodies of relatives and friends. Although DNA testing was open to migrants, only a few came forward for fear of arrest and deportation, as well as language barriers. Those who lost family members often returned home or relocated to other places

in Thailand because of shock, discrimination, devastation and limited employment opportunities. The cost of transfer and funeral services may also have been too high for some.<sup>125</sup> Since most Myanmarese migrants were unregistered single men, there was no way of quantifying the exact number of dead and missing since there were no relatives to reclaim their bodies.<sup>126</sup>

Many registered migrant workers failed to claim the compensation of 20,000 baht offered by the Thai government for deceased relatives.<sup>127</sup> They may not have known about the compensation, or may have been unaware of the procedures to obtain death certificates from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was charged with issuing death certificates for foreign victims. In Ranong province special compensation was available for injured Thai and migrant workers, but it is not known whether this compensation was actually paid out to migrants.<sup>128</sup>

Many of the migrant workers affected in the south of Thailand were working in the fishing industry, in agriculture (rubber and coconut plantations), on construction sites, as domestic workers, as sex workers or in the tourist industry.<sup>129</sup> A major concern after the Tsunami was loss of employment.<sup>130</sup> Employers too were concerned by the potential loss of labour supply with the sudden departure of migrant workers after the Tsunami, particularly in cases where they had paid registration fees. In other cases, workers were abandoned by their employers, making it more difficult for them to replace lost work permits.<sup>131</sup>

These problems were further aggravated by the generally uneven spread of services accessible to migrants around the country. Some provinces had public health departments and NGOs collaborating with the migrant population for the provision of education and health care, but the Tsunami-affected areas were generally underserved.<sup>132</sup> IOM and WHO expanded their Migrant Health Programme in cooperation with the government to cover selected districts affected by the Tsunami for three years,<sup>133</sup> and UNFPA initiated a general and reproductive health care programme in affected areas, which included migrant populations.<sup>134</sup>

The Thai government could have capitalized more on the capacity and skills of Myanmarese migrant communities to improve the provision of assistance to affected individuals. Registered Myanmarese migrants from the northeast of Thailand were not allowed to travel, despite the fact that the Mae Sot public health department had trained hundreds of Myanmarese migrants as volunteer health workers who would have been able to provide counselling and other forms of support to those affected.<sup>135</sup> More could have been done at the policy and programming level to ensure that resources available within certain migrant groups were used optimally to meet the needs of migrants in the aftermath of the disaster.

The international effort to respond to the plight of Myanmar migrant workers in the aftermath of the Tsunami was a good practice meriting replication in other disasters. Myanmar community networks in Thailand also mobilized and sent remittances and other necessities to southern Thailand. Given the limited resources available, these probably did not contribute to development, or disaster risk reduction, but at a minimum supported existing coping mechanisms of irregular migrants, and helped to temporarily reduce their vulnerabilities.

#### **4.1.2 Thai internal migrants in Thailand**

In addition to the thousands of Myanmar migrants, the affected areas were also host to internal migrants from other parts of Thailand who faced similar challenges in terms of lack of access to assistance or compensation if they were not registered in the affected provinces. Some lost their identity documents in the Tsunami and had to return to their place of origin to have them renewed.<sup>136</sup> Without regular documents, including work permits, birth certificates, land and property titles, migrants and other survivors were unable to receive certain types of aid or prove that they had lives on a particular plot of land prior to the Tsunami.<sup>137</sup> The province-bound nature of the Thai compensation programme made it impossible for children whose parents had died during the Tsunami and who now lived in other parts of the country to receive compensation.<sup>138</sup> A tracking compensation system was needed to enable victims to make claims irrespective of where they were.<sup>139</sup> Many internal migrants returned home either on a temporary or permanent basis making it difficult to fully assess the impact of the Tsunami and the subsequent humanitarian response on their situation.<sup>140</sup> In some cases, the *Chao Lay* or sea nomads, some of whom lacked citizenship and identity papers, were also unable to receive assistance.<sup>141</sup>

### **4.2 Migrants *From* Tsunami-affected Countries**

Migrants far away from the affected country/area and in host countries may also find themselves in a vulnerable position by the advent of disaster. A number of host governments sought to respond to this uncertainty by introducing some special measures, such as easing travel restrictions for Tsunami-affected families, providing incentives for family reunification in host and destination countries, and reducing the cost of sending remittances back to households in affected areas.

Various countries, such as Norway, Canada and Australia relaxed immigration rules to a certain degree for those affected by the Tsunami.<sup>142</sup> The South Korean government introduced special measures from 5 January to 10 February, which included waiving penalties and the re-entry ban for migrants from Tsunami-hit countries who had left the country voluntarily in that period.<sup>143</sup> Canada and other countries temporarily

suspended the deportation of migrants on the basis that it would be inhumane to send people back during this period of crisis.<sup>144</sup> The Malaysian government did not change its policy, begun in July 2004, of deporting irregular migrants,<sup>145</sup> but the amnesty was extended until 1 March 2005. In Lebanon, home to many Sri Lankan migrants, the government waived penalties for irregular migrants from 7 to 20 January<sup>146</sup> and released overstayers from detention as a gesture of goodwill.

Other types of assistance were also offered, for instance an IOM project in collaboration with the Norwegian government facilitated the provision of travel assistance to families of Tsunami victims; it is estimated that approximately 60 migrant families were taken back to their countries of origin to reunite with their relatives, to take care of family matters and to participate in memorial ceremonies.<sup>147</sup> Singapore's Ministry of Manpower announced plans to provide grief counselling for foreign workers affected by the disaster in conjunction with NGOs, such as the Humanitarian Organization for Migration Economics and Migrant Workers Forum.<sup>148</sup> Another example concerned the South Korean government, which decided that migrants from affected areas would be given priority in the 2005 roster of applicants for the Employment Permit System.<sup>149</sup>

## 5. MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS FOLLOWING NATURAL DISASTERS

Migratory movements out of areas affected by natural disasters might be expected, given the damage to the local environment. However, the overall picture from the Tsunami was, that while affected individuals and families remained internally displaced for a long time, only some actually migrated out of the area for economic reasons. There were also signs of migration into affected areas as relatives and aid agencies moved in to provide support, or migrant workers arrived in search of work in reconstruction. There was heightened awareness of the risks of trafficking post-Tsunami, but little indication that this threat ever materialized, perhaps due to swift action by governments and agencies to put prevention measures in place.

### 5.1 Migration *Out* of Affected Areas

Migration out of areas affected by natural disasters is an expected response, given the lack of access to material assistance and protection;<sup>150</sup> access to employment or other income sources, safety and security, availability of natural resources, pre-existing socio-economic/political context, and previous migratory patterns. The scale of damage is a key factor, which, in turn, depends on the nature of the disaster as well as the ability of the community to withstand such shocks due to disaster-preparedness. Inevitably, in most cases, affected areas will suffer immediate impoverishment because of the

*(m)assive loss and destruction of assets, including loss of life; unemployment, sudden drop in welfare and standards of living; prolonged uprooting, alienation and social disarticulation; cultural and identity loss; severe long-term stress and psychological effects; political disempowerment.*<sup>151</sup>

The degree of damage to property and livelihood assets (e.g. whether it was gradual or sudden and the extent to which people were able to retrieve their assets<sup>152</sup>) greatly influences the potential for rapid recovery.

There are many examples of outward migratory flows triggered by natural disasters. Drought often results in increased migration and examples include the 2000 drought in the Bolangir district of Orissa, India (where nearly 60,000 people migrated to the neighbouring state of Andhra Pradesh in search of food and work<sup>153</sup>); East Africa in the 1980/90s; China in 1994; the 2001 drought in many sub-Saharan eastern African countries.<sup>154</sup> Hurricane Mitch in 1998 led many survivors in Latin America to migrate to relatives already living abroad, capitalizing on pre-established transnational networks.



The perennial flooding in Bangladesh leads to temporary migration to urban areas, or abroad, if support is available from social networks or employment brokers.<sup>155</sup>

It is critical to note that in most cases migration is a response to the increase in poverty and limited employment opportunities caused by natural disasters, and not directly by the hazard itself. Osterling (1979), writing about migration in the aftermath of the 1970 earthquake in Peru, stated:

*Results suggest that most migrants were compelled to seek employment through migration because the natural disaster had intensified traditional poverty in their origin villages. Only a handful of migrants indicated that the earthquake was their primary migration motivation.*<sup>156</sup>

Research in Bangladesh and Afghanistan also highlights the role poverty plays in the decision to move elsewhere.<sup>157</sup>

In some areas that are more prone than others to drought, hurricanes, flooding and/or earthquakes, communities living there may have adopted migration as a livelihood strategy to spread risks and mitigate the worst impact of shocks.<sup>158</sup> Households at the lower socio-economic rungs tend to respond to regular shocks by diversifying livelihood strategies, including migration if they have the assets necessary to support such a move.

On the other hand, poverty may be an inhibitor: migration is not a livelihood strategy available to all,<sup>159</sup> as poverty can negatively affect the ability to leave and the decision where to go. Other factors also prevent migration out of disaster-stricken areas. According to research from Malaysia, structural factors such as poverty, low educational attainment and social mobility, insecure land tenure and limited government aid restrict the residential choices of many inhabitants of risk-prone regions.<sup>160</sup> Furthermore, a recent study of the 2004 hurricane in Bangladesh concluded that no migration took place in the aftermath of the disaster because it was seen as an exceptional event, unlikely to occur again; a relatively small area was affected, and there was sufficient aid distributed in an equitable manner (partially the result of the effective government response system).<sup>161</sup>

Thus, whether or not there is an increase in migration after a natural disaster depends on a wide variety of factors. Thus, not only poverty, but also the scale of the disaster, its immediate impact, the aid response, as well as the likelihood of its recurrence determine whether migration takes place out of the disaster-affected area. These factors influence the scope and form of migration, i.e. circular, long-term or permanent. The nature of migration trends prior to and after the hazard, and whether migrants are

able to find work to support their families either in the areas of destination or origin, will determine the level of remittances flowing back into the disaster-affected area. This, in turn, will determine the rapidity of the reconstruction process. Expenditure patterns, dependent on micro- and macro-level policies, facilities and markets, can strengthen development and disaster risk reduction measures.<sup>162</sup>

### **5.1.1 Indonesia**

Migration flows to Malaysia were said to continue, some directly from the Tsunami-affected areas and others from conflict-affected areas suffering poor economic conditions.<sup>163</sup> However, there is no evidence available to show whether numbers increased post-Tsunami. There were few reports indicating that the Acehnese were moving within Indonesia or to other countries aside from a few references, e.g. Batam Island apparently refused entry to the Acehnese because they did not have identification cards or the requisite deposits (Rp130,000 per day) which, according to officials, was a policy intended to separate refugees from those looking for economic opportunities.

### **5.1.2 Sri Lanka**

There were some indications of increased interest in out-migration following the Tsunami, particularly through the use of (trans)national networks. A Save the Children livelihood assessment found some families considering sending members overseas to make up for lost assets and livelihoods. One agent estimated that enquiries about migration had doubled since the Tsunami, clearly indicating an interest among affected people in finding employment abroad.<sup>164</sup> This picture was confirmed in discussions with Sri Lankan researchers who had worked in the tsunami affected areas.<sup>165</sup>

A study by the Center for Development Research and the United Nations University on migration in the urban area of Galle following the Tsunami concluded that households who had been more negatively affected by the Tsunami (in terms of the number of dead, missing or seriously injured members which, in turn, is linked to settlement in the buffer zone) were more likely to migrate elsewhere, with their decision often prompted by the receipt of “moveable” assistance, such as tents or tools. Migration was less likely among those with higher education, access to information, land and/or house ownership and assistance programmes providing construction material.<sup>166</sup> It concluded that about a quarter of the 500 households surveyed intended to leave their homes in the near future for nearby urban settlements.<sup>167</sup> Although the government facilitates migration, it did not seem to view it as a strategy for post-Tsunami recovery.<sup>168</sup>

## 5.2 Migration *Into* Affected Areas

Reverse movements into affected areas are also known to occur. Relatives may move to the area to find out whether their family has been affected, and to offer their support. Reconstruction projects can increase the demand for labour, pulling labour migrants from other areas into the affected region. As could be seen in the aftermath of the Tsunami, also numerous agencies – government, national and international – moved in to distribute aid.

Returnees and new migrants may experience increased vulnerability. A 2002 study regarding Sri Lanka addressing this concern concluded that an earlier than anticipated return means coming home with substantially less savings.<sup>169</sup> Indebtedness aggravates the poverty of returnee families, and their position is worsened by the exclusion of migrant families from certain bank and loan systems in Sri Lanka.<sup>170</sup> The prevailing poverty and unemployment levels in the area of return, including limited infrastructure, market outlets, and the lack of bargaining power in local markets can make a smooth reintegration difficult and often expose the conditions, which led to migration in the first place.<sup>171</sup>

### 5.2.1 Indonesia

Many Acehnese living in Malaysia decided to remain there given the continuing military and political instability of Aceh. Those who returned were mostly men, those seeking missing relatives or who had the financial means to return, Acehnese students with regular residency in Malaysia came to provide humanitarian assistance alongside Malaysian NGOs. Some Acehnese civil society leaders also returned on the assumption that they would be better protected with the internationalization of Aceh. Women and children tended to return only if deported and then stayed on in Aceh, given the costs of travelling back and forth.<sup>172</sup> On 15 August 2005, the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace agreement in Helsinki, which had the potential to result in the return of large numbers of transmigrants and Acehnese.<sup>173</sup> Yet, even after the signing of the agreement, Acehnese continued to travel to Malaysia in search of work, given inflation, rising prices and low wages and the slow pace of reconstruction despite an overall improvement in the security situation.

### 5.2.2 Sri Lanka

The reintegration of migrant returnees was hindered in a variety of ways. Many returned home to support their families at a time of crisis earlier than they had originally planned, sometimes with the financial and emotional burden of knowing they were less likely to be able to repay the loans they had originally taken out to go abroad.<sup>174</sup>

No special reintegration programmes appear to have been provided for them, contrary to the situation concerning migrant workers repatriated from Kuwait during the 1991 first Gulf War.<sup>175</sup> Allegedly some migrant households were excluded from assistance, as they were perceived as belonging to wealthier socio-economic classes. As is likely applicable in the post-tsunami context, earlier studies on female migrants show that few may have been in the labour force prior to departure from Sri Lanka and again upon their return, and had not acquired marketable skills during migration. Strategies for coping included the use of savings, remigration or arranging for the overseas migration of another household member.<sup>176</sup>

### 5.2.3 Thailand

Some Myanmarese migrant workers arrived in the area to take up reconstruction activities. There were some reports of exploitation and abuse of migrant workers, both of those who were already there and new arrivals, for instance in the form of delayed payments or no payments at all for work done, and of workers being beaten or withholding personal identification to prevent workers leaving for other jobs. However, there were also individual acts of kindness by employers who helped out financially,<sup>177</sup> or vouched for migrants with the authorities. In one case, employers became so concerned about losing their supply of migrant workers that they resorted to violent action; in one case, World Vision staff assisting the voluntary return of migrant workers to Myanmar from Ban Thab Lamu village in January 2005, suffered a vicious attack by villagers, reportedly instigated by a local fishing operator concerned that his workers would desert him.<sup>178</sup>

## 5.3 Trafficking<sup>179</sup>

The terms irregular migration, human smuggling and trafficking in persons are often used interchangeably and, while there may be differences in the modes of recruitment and the migration process between regular and irregular forms of migration, when it comes to *outcomes*, all forms of migration render migrants at risk in varying degrees, with trafficking exacting the heaviest toll on migrants.<sup>180</sup> Females are often over-represented in the statistics on trafficking in persons, due to the focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation though males are also trafficked both for labour and possibly also sexual exploitation. Reliable estimates of numbers of victims of trafficking are difficult to obtain given the challenges facing data collection. (See IOM, 2007, *ASEAN and Trafficking in Persons: Using Data as a Tool to Combat Trafficking in Persons*).

Natural disasters tend to increase the risk of trafficking as economic opportunities and social support mechanisms become stretched or completely disintegrate. Risk factors include lack of community support, pre-existing trafficking rings, lack of

awareness, poverty and the absence of livelihood opportunities. Risks may also vary according to the different stages of the response. Groups, such as women-headed households and orphaned children, may find themselves in a particular vulnerable position if social security networks have become fragmented or disappeared due to the effects of the disaster.

Trafficking is known to occur in the aftermath of disasters, but it is difficult to prove actual increases in numbers.<sup>181</sup> Reports of trafficking from disaster zones include cases following Hurricane Mitch in 1998,<sup>182</sup> where Honduran women and girls were said to be lured to the US by traffickers promising education and employment, but who instead ending up being trafficked and sold to brothels in Tapachula (southern Mexican state of Chiapas). It was also reported that children, many of whom were orphans from Honduras and El Salvador, were forced into brothels in Guatemala in the same disaster.<sup>183</sup> There was heightened awareness of the risk of trafficking post-Tsunami, but the threat never really materialized, perhaps due to swift preventive measures taken by governments and agencies.

### **5.3.1 Indonesia**

There is a known problem of trafficking in women from some Indonesian provinces, including Sumatra,<sup>184</sup> with North Sumatra being a major hub for trafficking for sexual exploitation and domestic work to other countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore. Young boys are trafficked to work on offshore fishing platforms, on plantations, in restaurants and as domestic workers in private homes in North Sumatra.<sup>185</sup> There is no information available on the occurrence of trafficking in Aceh; but, given that North Sumatra is a sending, transit and receiving area of trafficking victims, it is likely that trafficking networks stretch into Aceh.<sup>186</sup>

Although there was heightened awareness of the risk of trafficking in the aftermath of the Tsunami owing to the high level of devastation, the large numbers of orphans and the fragmented protection and care mechanisms, the threat did not in fact materialize, perhaps because of urgent preventive measures taken by the government and agencies. The government alerted major airports to watch out for possible trafficking cases, and several potential transit or destination countries of trafficked persons introduced stricter immigration checks to prevent attempts to traffic Tsunami survivors, especially children. In Malaysia, the Cabinet issued a directive to check child trafficking from Aceh and a tighter watch was kept over all entry points to Malaysia, with immigration authorities screening both locals and foreigners travelling with children.<sup>187</sup> In Bahrain, authorities were on the alert given unverified reports about young girls being shipped from Indonesia to the Gulf.<sup>188</sup> Various agencies implemented programmes to reduce the risk of trafficking. UNICEF registered separated and unaccompanied children

and carried out family tracing and, where possible, reunification. Compared to other emergencies, there were few visible unaccompanied children. Many families, having lost their own children, were desperate to take in those children who remained, and were reluctant to disclose that a child was alone for fear that it might be taken away.<sup>189</sup> IOM implemented a counter-trafficking cum livelihood assistance programme.<sup>190</sup>

### **5.3.2 Sri Lanka**

Risks of trafficking in Sri Lanka are increased by the manner in which unregistered agents and employment agencies<sup>191</sup> carry out recruitment and charge exorbitant fees in exchange for finding job placements abroad, compelling people to borrow at very high interest rates.<sup>192</sup> Given the more rigorous recruitment procedures for workers employed in the formal sector of the economy, it is safe to assume that the majority of unofficial migrants are female domestic workers.<sup>193</sup> Thus, female migrant workers, who make up most of the domestic sector, are at a higher risk of ending up in exploitative situations abroad. Migrants using irregular channels run the risk of serious problems in the host country, sometimes arriving with forged documentation given to them by agents and forfeiting the benefits available to those who register with the formal Sri Lankan government programme (SLBFE), such as insurance in the event of accident, death or early termination of contract. Migrants with little or no education are more likely to encounter problems due to their inability to access or process information.<sup>194</sup>

There were no substantiated reports of an increase in trafficking after the Tsunami<sup>195</sup> (although bearing in mind that the Sri Lanka penal code seems to have limitations in the way it defines trafficking, it refers only to children, which may skew the outcome).<sup>196</sup> Soon after the Tsunami, the National Child Protection Authority of Sri Lanka indicated that most children who had been orphaned as a result of the disaster, had been claimed by family members, extended families, relatives or other kin or, on some occasions, after identity checks and DNA testing.<sup>197</sup> Law enforcement agencies in India (Indian Coast guard, Indian Navy and Police and Kolkata and Bengal police) monitored vessels moving between Sri Lanka and India for the possible transport of Tsunami orphans from Sri Lanka, though no reports are available on the outcome of these efforts.<sup>198</sup> In India itself, the government had announced the suspension of the adoption of Indian orphans following the Tsunami, following fears of trafficking there.

### **5.3.3 Thailand**

Thailand is a main trafficking hub in Southeast Asia, as economic and social disparities in the region cause widespread irregular migration flows into Thailand,

often leading to labour and sexual exploitation. Trafficking continues to be a major problem despite pledges by the Thai government to bring a halt through tighter border controls, more prosecution of offenders, and improvements in child protection laws, information campaigns, and inter-regional cooperation.<sup>199</sup> Reliable estimates of numbers are impossible to come by.

The Tsunami increased the vulnerability of the affected population generally, and of migrant communities in particular. The Tsunami disrupted existing social networks, separated families, displaced people and interrupted livelihoods. Approximately 1,172 children were orphaned (964 in the six affected provinces and 208 in the province of origin, mostly in the north and northeast<sup>200</sup>). In addition, the problem of lost documentation and the inability of survivors to establish who they were and what assets they owned put Tsunami victims, especially women and children, at higher risk.<sup>201</sup>

As of mid-2005, no system had been put in place to monitor the well-being of women and children, including orphans.<sup>202</sup> A human rights monitoring mission came across several incidents, which it felt could have the potential of becoming trafficking cases, given the slow pace of reconstruction and a curtailment of humanitarian assistance, despite the continuing lack of employment opportunities.<sup>203</sup> The Thai Bureau of Anti-Trafficking in Women and Children (BATWC), working under the department of Social Development and Welfare, stated that it had not received any reports of trafficking in the aftermath of the Tsunami. The BATWC and several other organizations conducted awareness-raising campaigns to educate local communities about human trafficking, safe adoption and safe migration. According to BATWC, communities are well aware of trafficking issues, and knew to refer outside requests for child adoption to the appropriate authorities. BATWC also confirmed that it had not received any reports of domestic trafficking of Thai labourers from other regions to Tsunami-affected areas.<sup>204</sup>

## 6. DIASPORA RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS

Diaspora groups can make a major contribution to the disaster response, both directly through financial contributions as well as by mobilizing strategic political action. The degree to which they are able to do so depends on their own socio-economic status and the extent to which they continue to identify with their homeland, i.e. some, like the diaspora networks in the Middle East, have particularly strong ties with the countries of origin as they and their families are unable to acquire citizenship in their destination countries, thus retaining very real responsibilities in their homelands.<sup>205</sup> Remittances sent home by migrants assist individuals, households and communities in coping with disasters and help reduce risk/vulnerability in the face of such an event by enabling individuals to fortify their economic base. In the aftermath of the Tsunami, there was a strong response by the diasporas linked to the affected countries.

### 6.1 Diaspora Remittances Following Disaster


Remittances can be an important resource in the emergency and recovery phases following disaster and diaspora communities are quick to transmit funds to areas affected by natural disaster.<sup>206</sup> Remittances can play the role of reducing risk before the event, as a form of insurance, as well as providing assistance once the disaster has struck. Remittances generally increase when the home economy faces macroeconomic shocks due to financial crises, natural disaster, or political conflict, as migrants transmit more financial resources to families and friends in need. A World Bank study found that remittance inflows rose after natural disasters in Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Honduras (see Figure 2).<sup>207</sup> This is supported by other statistics, for instance a report on remittances in Pakistan noted an increase of 7.89 per cent in 2005 compared to the same period the previous year.<sup>208</sup> Although no reference is made as to the cause of this increase, it can be speculated that the earthquake of September 2005 was a contributing factor. It is also worth noting that national data on remittances do not capture informal remittance flows, which are likely to be several times higher than formal transfers.

Remittances can assist with consumption, sustain livelihoods, and stimulate the operation of markets affected by the shock at local level, and compensate foreign exchange losses at macro level. Yang concludes that specific types of international flows can respond positively to damage caused by hurricanes, replacing a major part of losses within a few years of a disaster; on average, total inflows (remittances, ODI, FDI/international asset sales, loans) amount to about four-fifths of the estimated damage within four years after a disaster.<sup>209</sup> According to the World Bank, the increase in remittances makes up for 13 per cent of income losses in the year of the natural disaster



and 28 per cent within four years; in contrast, increases in development assistance make up for roughly 26 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively, during a four-year period.<sup>210</sup> This shows the relevance of remittances to emergency and reconstruction efforts, yet also confirms that Overseas Development Assistance cannot be replaced with remittances, as some might suggest.<sup>211</sup>

FIGURE 2  
REMITTANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION,  
TWO YEARS BEFORE AND TWO YEARS AFTER NATURAL DISASTERS<sup>212</sup>



Note: The bar marked 0 is the year of the natural disaster.

Remittances are also an important source for household recovery. In their study on the impact of Hurricane Gilbert in Jamaica, Clarke and Wallsten<sup>213</sup> found that remittances increase when households are hit by an external shock. The analysis is based on families who had sent a member abroad as a form of household self-insurance prior to the disaster. Female-headed households may receive higher remittances, as it is more likely that their partners are located abroad, relatives are also more likely to remit to female-headed households. The level of remittances is directly related to the level of loss, as households facing the greatest damage received higher remittances following the hurricane, though only by a few cents.<sup>214</sup>

Remittances increase in situations of drought. Based on a ten-year average, Miller and Paulson (1999) found that households in Thailand tended to receive more remittances in times of less than average rainfall.<sup>215</sup> Jones, Hull and Alburg (2000) found that rural migrants in Thailand were expected to return to the capital, Bangkok, during the 1999 dry season because of the need for cash income of rural households.<sup>216</sup> Further, Lucas and Stark (1985) provide evidence that internal migrants in urban areas of Botswana send more money home when there is a drought, in particular when

families own drought-sensitive assets, such as cows and crops.<sup>217</sup> These findings, however, do not assess the amount of damage per household caused by the disaster, household income and assets relative to the amount of remittances received, and the impact of disaster preparedness (e.g. with migration being a preparedness strategy due to which other options are felt to be less necessary).<sup>218</sup>

Remittances also have a cultural and social value. Intercommunity cooperation after disasters was very important to Pacific island communities, and part of the sustenance of ceremonial exchange networks. However, with commercial trading, colonial rule, relief aid and Christianity replacing traditional exchange networks and values, and the migration of many Pacific islanders to developed countries, new exchange networks have emerged leading to increased diaspora resources to the islands following disasters that enable the Pacific island diaspora to feel allied and supportive of their places of origin.<sup>219</sup>

Following the Tsunami, the diasporas used various ways to collect and transfer money and goods to the region. The scale of donations is not known given that many proceeded through informal channels. Indonesian, Sri Lankan and Thai student and citizens associations raised money and transmitted funds through regular NGOs, such as the American Red Cross, directly to personal bank accounts or to special accounts set up by their respective embassies. Some of this channelling occurred along ethnic lines, as can be seen in the case of the Tamil diaspora in North America and Europe, but not all contributions were related to nationality or ethnicity. For instance, the Asian American population of California donated more than US\$ 200 million to Indian Ocean Tsunami relief efforts. According to a poll by an association of ethnic media organizations, 70 per cent of Asian Americans made a contribution, but only 8 per cent knew of someone affected. Up to 80 per cent of Indian Americans had made contributions alongside some 70 per cent of Chinese Americans (e.g. US\$ 1 million raised by the Chinese language *Tsing Tao Daily* newspaper) and Vietnamese Americans (e.g. US\$ 500,000 by a Vietnamese language radio station in Orange County). Indonesian, Sri Lankan and Thai Americans donated in relatively smaller numbers. The cross-ethnic contributions suggest the move towards a “pan-Asian identity” in which all Asian Americans felt connected with each other as a consequence of the Tsunami.<sup>220</sup> In fact, most Tsunami donations transcended ethnic, religious and national divides. For instance, American Muslim organizations worked together with other US religious groups to collect cash donations from Muslims, but also from Christians, Jews, Hindus and Buddhists.<sup>221</sup>

A comparison of damage and loss incurred by the Tsunami with remittance flows provides some interesting insights. Damage and loss estimates were said to be US\$ 4,451 million in Indonesia, US\$ 1,454 million in Sri Lanka and US\$ 2,198

million in Thailand. Despite the magnitude of the losses, it is interesting to see that they did not substantially exceed the value of pre-Tsunami remittances in 2004 for Sri Lanka and Thailand, and were slightly lower than 2004 pre-Tsunami remittances to Indonesia. Moreover, remittances would have increased in 2005 following the Tsunami, thus superseding the cost of damage. This is not to suggest that remittance flows can replace international assistance, but merely to illustrate the relative size of these flows compared to the impact of the Tsunami.<sup>222</sup>

### **6.1.1 Indonesia**

Various organizations were involved in raising funds, including Indonesian student organizations in Japan, Malaysia (the latter in collaboration with the Indonesian Embassy), the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; Indonesian embassies/consulates in Singapore, Washington, D.C. and San Francisco; Komite Zakat Infaq Dan Sadaqah of the Indonesia Islamic network (KZIS-ISNET) a global Internet-driven network of Muslims,<sup>223</sup> and IMAAM,<sup>224</sup> a non-profit, religious, charitable organization largely serving Muslims from Indonesia in Washington, D.C., Virginia and Maryland, working together with internationally recognized Indonesian relief organizations.<sup>225</sup>

In Malaysia, the Indonesian diaspora alongside other parts of Malaysian society (Malaysian Islamic groups, Malaysian humanitarian organizations and the government itself) all mobilized resources for the affected populations in Aceh. Many Acehnese themselves sent remittances, though no data are available on these flows and Malaysians with Acehnese ancestry and permanent residence status in Malaysia were able to set up formal funds to transfer aid to Aceh. Generally, many recipients of remittances have bank accounts in Aceh,<sup>226</sup> although given the devastation caused by the Tsunami in that region, it may have been difficult for them to actually receive these funds. The Malaysian government clamp-down on illegal migrants led to job insecurity,<sup>227</sup> which in turn had a negative effect on the quantity and quality of assistance transferred by the Acehnese diaspora living in Malaysia.<sup>228</sup>

### **6.1.2 Sri Lanka**

The Sri Lankan diaspora, both Sinhalese and Tamil, played a significant role in the relief effort following the Tsunami. There was a high influx of remittances in the period immediately after the Tsunami. The figure jumped to US\$ 1.23 billion in the first eight months of 2005 compared to US\$ 1.02 billion in the corresponding period in 2004. Most foreign remittances came from Sri Lankans working abroad.<sup>229</sup> The Central Bank of Sri Lanka stated that the total amount of net private remittances had grown by 28.6 per cent from US\$ 1,350 million in 2004 to US\$ 1,736 million in 2005. The actual amount was likely to be higher as many international migrants do not

use a fixed method for remitting their earnings.<sup>230</sup> Such transactions would normally involve smaller amounts.<sup>231</sup>

In addition to individual remittances, many members of the diaspora collected funds and basic materials for the relief effort. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO) set up committees in ten countries, including Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. In Canada the TRO raised over US\$ 900,000 for the Tsunami disaster relief fund in one month.<sup>232</sup> Other ad hoc groups also made contributions, for instance expatriate Tamils in the Washington metropolitan area sent a container filled with medicines, tents, toys and clothes via Norfolk to the TRO in Colombo. The individual plus donor inflows to the government bolstered the Sri Lankan economy as reflected in the balance of payments and the appreciation of the rupee.<sup>233</sup>

Data on the most affected districts<sup>234</sup> show that approximately 60,146 of all international registered migrants came from these areas (as well as a significant proportion of female internal migrants to Colombo and Moneragala).<sup>235</sup> The number is likely to be much higher as many migrants originally left in an irregular manner. The data for 2003 show that men made up 42 per cent of the migrant labour force, and women 58 per cent. Dependent persons of migrant households account for nearly one-fifth of the total population of the affected districts (5,649,000).<sup>236</sup> The professional activities of migrants directly affect the amount of remittances they are able to send, and over two-thirds from the Tsunami-affected districts were housemaids and unskilled workers.<sup>237</sup>

### **6.1.3 Thailand**

The contributions of the Thai diaspora provide evidence of the powerful role of transnational ties in the mobilization of financial resources and goods in the assistance effort to areas affected by the Tsunami. Thai diaspora organizations channelled money directly to national organizations in their host country, to the Royal Thai Embassy and to government-linked charity funds. Thai associations in various US and Canadian states organized fund-raising efforts (Central Texas,<sup>238</sup> Alberta,<sup>239</sup> Arizona<sup>240</sup> and San Diego<sup>241</sup>). The Thai USA Association collected US\$ 53,617.20 (as of 9 February 2005) with four-fifths for the Princess Bajrakitiyabha Foundation, and one-fifth for the Somdet Pra Tep Charity Fund.<sup>242</sup> Thai student associations transmitted funds to national associations and through international bodies; thus, the International Student Organization raised more than US\$ 3,000 for UNICEF.<sup>243</sup>

The Myanmarese diaspora also mobilized to support Myanmarese migrants living in Thailand. Although the Thai government specified that it recognized foreign

diaspora associations as partners for development, such as those from Ghana and Nigeria, this did not appear to cover Myanmarese associations in Thailand.<sup>244</sup> Instead, the U.S. Campaign for Burma (USCB) helped facilitate the process of donations by providing its website for online donations from Thai and foreign individuals for affected Myanmarese migrants. Myanmarese communities around the world collected donations for Myanmarese migrant workers, some of which were passed on to the Tsunami Action Group (TAG), a coalition of NGOs in Thailand aiming to support the needs of affected Myanmarese victims.<sup>245</sup>

Myanmarese migrant communities in other parts of Thailand themselves provided financial support, care and hospitality, despite the fact that they themselves were relatively poor. They offered board and lodging and contributed funds, and within two weeks of the Tsunami 40,000 baht had been collected for affected Myanmarese communities and a similar amount was collected by migrants in the Bangkok area.<sup>246</sup>

## **6.2 Governments Facilitate Diaspora Support**

The Tsunami shows affected governments coordinating support from diaspora communities and actively making linkages between remittances and the development role of the diaspora.

### **6.2.1 Indonesia**

The Indonesian government played an important role in enabling the Indonesian diaspora to contribute to the response by acting as a channel for financial and other resources to the Tsunami-affected region of Aceh.<sup>247</sup> It facilitated contacts in Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and others through professional/business networks (e.g. migrant worker associations), community and hometown associations, students and alumni groups and individuals,<sup>248</sup> and adopted measures to facilitate the transfer of remittances through a specific account; to inform diasporas of existing transfer mechanisms through embassies and associations and to identify local projects for diaspora investment. The Indonesian Embassy Relief Fund in Canada, for example (closed on 7 July 2005<sup>249</sup>) collected CAD 101,559.17 and US\$ 990.00, which were transferred to the Indonesian Affairs Social Fund and the Indonesian Red Cross.<sup>250</sup>

### **6.2.2 Sri Lanka**

The Sri Lankan government was active in coordinating donations. Sri Lankans in Saudi Arabia, for example, raised SR 500,000 plus in-kind contributions in a

campaign launched by the Sri Lankan Embassy in Riyadh in cooperation with the Sri Lankan Expatriates Society.<sup>251</sup> In some places, e.g. Riyadh,<sup>252</sup> Sri Lankan embassies set up information cells to provide information to migrant workers who were worried about the whereabouts and the situation of their families. The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) set up a special unit to enable families to get in touch with their migrated family members. This Tsunami Information Centre was based in Battaramulla, and naturally only covered a portion of affected families with family member working abroad.<sup>253</sup>

### **6.2.3 Thailand**

The Thai government also mobilized Thai communities living abroad, particularly in the US, the European Union and other countries hosting large numbers of Thai migrants, such as Japan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.<sup>254</sup> The Royal Thai Embassy in the United States received US\$ 161,460.97 in donations from the Thai community and individual Americans, and a cheque of over 1 million dollars for transmittance to the Rachaprachanukroah Foundation, under the patronage of the King.<sup>255</sup> The Royal Thai Embassy in Japan listed a number of activities and visitors who made donations for the Tsunami victims,<sup>256</sup> and in Australia the Royal Thai Consulate in Melbourne, in conjunction with the Thai Disaster Fund Victoria Inc., indicated that (as of 18 March 2005) funds of almost US\$ 150,000 would go to the Thai Red Cross.<sup>257</sup>

## **6.3 Diaspora Send Skilled Labour and In-kind Support**

Diasporas may send in-kind resources of various kinds following a natural disaster.<sup>258</sup> Following the Gujarat earthquake, in addition to the several religious organizations that also undertook assistance efforts, Indian professional groups organized medical assistance to reach the area, either in the shape of funds, equipment or by actually sending medical personnel to the area of the natural disaster, in particular for tertiary health care.<sup>259</sup>

### **6.3.1 Sri Lanka**

The information found regarding the diaspora involvement in Sri Lanka covered largely the Tamil diaspora. This does not imply that the Sinhalese one did not provide assistance, but only that this was not made available in the public domain. The Swiss Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation assisted 26 volunteers from Switzerland to help in the Tamil areas in Sri Lanka.<sup>260</sup> Overall, more than 100 professionals from the Tamil diaspora network and the international community worked in the area, including 52 doctors.<sup>261</sup> In the Tamil northeast, the civil conflict has undermined the health and education systems, and schools, universities, hospitals and other institutions are

generally understaffed and lack qualified personnel. The Medical Institute of Tamils (MIOT), Asian Medical Doctors Association (AMDA) and diaspora groups based in England, Canada, Australia and Japan facilitated the travel of Tamil doctors from the diaspora.<sup>262</sup> Other professionals also provided in-kind support, e.g. Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organization (TEEDOR), the Tamil Refugees Organization (TRO) and UNDPs Tokten programme (Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals).<sup>263</sup>

### **6.3.2 Thailand**

Individuals and businesses donated funds through associations based on professional identity and nationality, although no evidence has been found regarding the utilization of skills of the Thai diaspora as part of the aid effort.

## **6.4 Diaspora Mobilize External Support**

The diaspora can be a driving force in promoting an increase in official assistance to the affected area or country. The role of the Indian-Gujarati diaspora during the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat provides an example of their resource-mobilization efforts. The Gujarati-American community was able to respond quickly, partly due to enhanced information and communication technology, and their efforts also mobilized former President Clinton to raise contributions for the relief effort.<sup>264</sup>

## **6.5 Role of Ethnic Media**

Ethnic media play a pivotal role for diasporas in bridging language and cultural barriers, contributing to the creation of virtual homelands and taking on the role of fundraisers when a sudden shock occurs, viz. the Spanish broadcaster Univision in the US following Hurricanes Mitch and Katrina, and the Chinese diaspora media after earthquakes in Taiwan Province of China and floods in eastern China.

Ethnic media fulfilled this role following the Tsunami, and aside from examples of diaspora media given below, other Asian media, from China, Bangladesh and Viet Nam, also devoted resources to collecting money, such as the *Sing Tao Daily*, a Chinese newspaper raised US\$ 310,000 from readers and listeners signalling the sense of a pan-Asian cultural affinity by stating, “It also shows the great connection we have to others around the world. We are a global village.”<sup>265</sup>

### **6.5.1 Indonesia**

*Indonesian News* coordinated efforts among 11 Northern Californian Indonesian churches and the consulate, whereas in Southern California, the publication *Indonesian Media* helped raise more than US\$ 17,000. Ethnic Internet and radio can also be powerful tools for the purpose of mobilizing others.<sup>266</sup>

### **6.5.2 Sri Lanka**

Three Toronto-based Tamil community organizations and one Tamil television station carried out a three-day fund-raising event, which raised CAD 2.5 million. The funds were transferred by informal money transfer to Tsunami-affected regions every three hours, or whenever it reached CAD 50,000.<sup>267</sup> These funds were crucial in the initial relief phase, even though the government had allocated SR 10,000 rupees for funeral expenses of each Tsunami victim, the banks in the eastern province were unable to provide even half of this amount because of lack of funds.<sup>268</sup>

### **6.5.3 Thailand**

Thai ethnic media played a key role in providing information, acting as a bridge for those facing language barriers, and in searching for missing relatives, for instance the Thai Press Club in San Francisco, a consortium of Thai media outlets, in the United States assisted in the tracing of relatives. The Thai media also undertook fund-raising activities in temples, in a new Thai-themed casino in Las Vegas, and sent a sea container with 30,000 pieces of clothing to Thailand, along with US\$ 139,000.<sup>269</sup>

## **6.6 Limitations of Diaspora Support**

The Gujarat earthquake experience suggests that although the diaspora can be rapidly mobilized, the actual response may sometimes be short-lived and runs the risk of being misplaced due to weak intermediaries and/or inappropriate relief material. The substantial resource flows tend to dry up when the emergency shifts into rehabilitation mode, and preventive measures fail to receive sufficient attention (e.g. better building codes to limit future earthquake damage).<sup>270</sup>

The effectiveness of diasporic philanthropy may sometimes be questioned as they may not have the necessary expertise in the delivery of humanitarian aid or are driven by their own preferences rather than an objective and comprehensive assessment of needs (though it has to be noted that professionals often face the same criticisms). This is borne out by the response to the Gujarat earthquake, as today in Kutch houses built by NGOs remain empty because too many resources were concentrated on one



activity, whereas preventive measures with a potentially greater impact on long-term development hardly received any attention.<sup>271</sup>

### **6.6.1 Indonesia**

The financial support of the diaspora was of major importance in the immediate response, but it seems individual donations dwindled over time and the diaspora played a lesser role in reconstruction, though this impression would need further substantiation.

### **6.6.2 Sri Lanka**

The role of the Tamil diaspora is not always seen in a constructive light. The LTTE was accused of raising funds for terrorist activities by exploiting the plight of the Tsunami Tamil victims by creating the impression amongst the Tamil diaspora and in Sri Lanka that Tamils were not assisted in the aid effort, except by the TRO.<sup>272</sup> In addition, the Canadian government viewed the informal money transfer systems with suspicion in the post-9/11 era, although the extent to which terrorists and other criminal elements use this system as compared to conventional banking institutions is likely to be limited.<sup>273</sup>

### **6.6.3 Thailand**

As in the other countries, the response focused on initial humanitarian assistance, and dwindled as the reconstruction phase took over.

## **6.7 Diaspora Role in Disaster-preparedness**

Besides helping to improve the economic status of communities through remittances as an insurance against disaster, migration can have both positive and negative effects on the state of disaster preparedness of a particular region or country. A positive example of the interlinkages between the diaspora and disaster preparedness is that of the Indian organization AIF, which sponsored a visit by a qualified member of the diaspora to facilitate the development of a national Indian disaster mitigation plan in response to the 1991 Gujarat earthquake. The organization further planned to develop a disaster management resource centre to mitigate and respond to future disasters. However, migration can sometimes undermine disaster-preparedness, as shown by the migration of skilled workers from Pakistan to the Middle East from the 1970s onwards, with the encouragement of the Pakistani government. The result was clearly visible in the earthquake and landslide regions of the Karakoram region, where unsafe

houses were built because of the shortage of carpenters, a situation which is likely to result in higher mortality rates during natural disasters.<sup>274</sup>

## **6.8 Private Companies Catering for Diasporas**

Following the Tsunami, private companies catering to diaspora needs were able to adapt their range of products to incorporate aid packages for the locally-based assistance agencies. Private companies remitting money reduced transfer fees to affected countries. Studies have shown that independent money transfer organizations are preferred to high-street banks and building societies. Research<sup>275</sup> suggests that customer satisfaction improved after the Tsunami with some organizations offering a special discount rate on remittances to Tsunami-affected countries (e.g. Money Gram charging a flat rate of five pounds, and NatWest offering transfers free of charge).<sup>276</sup>

### **6.8.1 Thailand**

After the Tsunami, the Internet turned into a major tool for mobilizing funds. A US business set up for gift delivery to family and friends in Thailand was rapidly transformed into a website where low-cost delivery items could be donated to the Thai Red Cross. The idea originated with an emerging development trend to keep diaspora communities worldwide connected to their original culture, while at the same time supporting vendors in the home country as part of development efforts.<sup>277</sup>

## **6.9 Agency Links with Diasporas**

Agencies were also involved in helping families with relatives abroad. In Sri Lanka, 12 mobile ICRC teams over 1,700 people to use satellite and mobile phones to contact relatives abroad. In addition, the organization collected and posted more than 400 “I am alive” messages on the ICRC website, which were also published in Sri Lanka. These tracing activities were scaled back after a few weeks when regular communication channels had been restored,<sup>278</sup> but the need for information and communication technology underscores the importance to not only inform relatives of the destruction caused by the disaster, but also to enable them to seek emotional comfort and financial assistance.

## CONCLUSIONS

The Tsunami was an unprecedented natural disaster in terms of its character and scope and the degree of attention and public support that it received. Whether it left any substantial mark on the development of affected countries is as yet unknown as development statistics for 2005 published by the World Bank and UNDP are not yet available, making a comparison of 2004 pre-Tsunami and subsequent data impossible. Indications are that the disaster did not affect the rate of economic development, that countries were able to absorb the loss and that there may have even been a positive boost to socio-economic development and balance of payments in some cases. Development at individual and community levels no doubt suffered as, despite the vast aid response, it seems that at least some vulnerable communities failed to be reached. However, whether this results in a change in the human development indices of affected countries remains to be seen as the effect may have been too localized to be reflected in national statistics. The Asian Tsunami highlighted three particular facets of the interaction between migration, development and natural disasters:

- Migrants, both regular and irregular, face increased vulnerability at times of natural disaster. At times of crisis, they may become forgotten, hidden groups, that no one has planned for in the disaster response. They may miss out on humanitarian assistance and support, be unable to reclaim the bodies of dead relatives, and have problems re-establishing their legal identity and recovering permits and authorizations. As the case of the Myanmarese in Thailand shows, this situation may arise through their own fear of coming forward for assistance, or arise in consequence of state neglect of migrant groups, or government measures to arrest and deport migrants at times of crisis which would intimidate and frighten such groups and, in some cases, local officials may behave in a discriminatory way when handing out assistance. The data suggest that migrants were only to some degree included in the response at the height of the emergency, but that assistance tapered off and that they did not receive the help they needed to re-establish themselves.

The Thai case also shows that internal migrants can face similar hurdles in accessing aid and establishing legal status. Migrants from the affected area living in host countries may also suddenly find themselves in a precarious situation, and the Tsunami provides examples of good practice by several host governments that halted deportation proceedings, allowed temporary returns and facilitated contacts and reunions with relatives in affected areas. Programmes to speed up family reunification through rapid assessment of visa applications were also carried out by some countries.

The Tsunami experience highlights the need to take migrant communities, both regular and irregular, into account when planning for disasters in order to ensure that they are treated in accordance with the core principles of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.<sup>279</sup> Migrant communities require access to humanitarian assistance, the ability to receive medical treatment and to reclaim the bodies of their dead relatives without fear of reprisals. They also require assistance with re-establishing their legal status and the re-issuance of lost legal documentation. It is incumbent upon authorities to act in a way that minimizes distress at times of crises, for example, by suspending arrests and deportations; ensuring the rights of migrants are widely disseminated and that racism and xenophobia from other groups in society are stamped out.

- Natural disasters may lead to migratory flows out of affected areas. This is to be expected in areas where the calamity has left social and economic destruction in its wake. The Tsunami case studies show some indications of interest in migration among affected communities, but numbers of actual émigrés appeared limited and a mass exodus never occurred. This may be due to a variety of reasons, including the fact that the degree of humanitarian assistance available cushioned the blow caused by the disaster. Other Tsunami studies<sup>280</sup> have also shown that migration became an issue in the medium-term rather than in the emergency phase, as the crisis settled down and families realized economic recovery was going to be a long haul. More research and action is warranted on addressing the socio-economic risks which lead to migration.

There were also some movements into affected areas; e.g. Sri Lanka, however, examples of migrant relatives returning home to provide support and assistance reveal that returnees may face difficulties in reintegration. New migrants may also arrive, e.g. Myanmar migrant workers coming to the coastal areas of Thailand in search of work in the reconstruction efforts, raising issues about labour exploitation and adequate protection of migrant labour.

- The diaspora from the affected countries across the world mobilized to provide support to their homeland at a time of crisis. Home country governments were quick to recognize the potential for support to recovery and redevelopment and, in a number of cases, facilitated donations from diaspora communities. Skilled diaspora members, especially from Sri Lanka, returned home to provide medical and other support and the ethnic media and, to a lesser degree, the private sector mobilized to support these efforts.

The full scale of the diaspora contribution is not known, as information on their donations is piecemeal and anecdotal; however, for example, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka stated that the total amount of net private remittances grew by 28.6 per cent from US\$ 1,350 million in 2004 to US\$ 1,736 million in 2005. As such it seems that the diaspora played a key role in the emergency effort, but that support again waned during the reconstruction phase. It is worth recalling that previous disasters have shown that, while remittances increase at times of natural disasters, they do not match ODA and cannot replace development assistance.<sup>281</sup> Nonetheless, the important lesson from the Tsunami is to ensure that the transmission of funds by diaspora communities is facilitated at such a critical time by minimizing costs and bureaucratic obstacles, and by providing the logistics for such transfer. Skilled members of the diaspora should also be supported to return to their country to provide technical expertise and in-kind support.

The Tsunami case study highlights the very tangible links between migration, development and natural disasters and raises many other questions which merit further research. For the moment, the Indian Ocean Tsunami has spotlighted a number of measures which need to be taken to ensure that migrants are fairly treated in the aftermath of a disaster and that the contributions of diaspora communities to help with recovery and reconstruction are maximized. Above all, it emphasizes a need to ensure coherence between the three policy areas of migration, development and disaster response.

## GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS

**Asylum seeker** – A person who has fled across an international border and has not yet received a decision on his or her claim for refugee status. This term could refer to someone who has not yet submitted an application for refugee status, or someone whose claim is being processed and who is awaiting the outcome. During the claim assessment procedure, the asylum seeker is entitled not to be returned. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee.

**Development** – There are no standard definitions of development, but widely accepted indices which illustrate the progress of a country in meeting a range of economic, social and environmental goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (see separate entry); UNDP’s Human Development Index which has three measures of human development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy); being educated (adult literacy; enrolment at primary, secondary and tertiary education establishments), and decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity, income etc.) at <http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics>; World Bank Development Indicators that include 900 measures. Since indicators represent data that have been collected by a variety of agencies using different collection methods, there may be inconsistencies among them.

**Diaspora**<sup>282</sup> – Communities of migrants settled permanently outside their country of birth, but maintaining their cultural and family links to their country of origin. A diaspora is defined as both a dispersion of people from their original homeland, and as the community founded by them in other countries.

**Economic migrant** – A person leaving his/her country of origin or habitual place of residence to settle in a third country with the aim to improve his/her quality of life. This term is also used to refer to persons attempting to enter a country without legal permission and/or by using asylum procedures without bona fide cause. It also applies to persons settling outside their country of origin for the duration of an agricultural or tourist season, appropriately called “seasonal migrant workers.”

**Frontier worker** – A migrant worker who retains his or her habitual residence in a neighbouring country to which he or she normally returns every day or at least once a week.

**GDP** – Gross Domestic Product

**Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief** – A form of development assistance to promote human welfare, reduce pain and suffering and prevent loss of life or destruction of property in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters.

**Internally Displaced Persons** – Defined in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as persons who, within their own country are forced to leave their habitual residence in order to flee from armed conflict, situations of widespread violence or systematic human rights violations, or to escape natural or manmade disasters or their effects, without crossing international borders.

**IOM** – International Organization for Migration

**Irregular Migrant** – Refers to a migrant in a transit or host country who has either entered illegally or overstayed the visa entitlement, thereby infringing the transit or host country’s entry or residence regulations. Such persons may also be referred to as “undocumented migrants”, “clandestine migrants” or “illegal migrants”.

**MDG** – The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), endorsed by the United Nations in September 2000, and which aim to improve human well-being by setting eight goals:

- Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
- Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
- Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
- Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
- Goal 5: Improve maternal health
- Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other disease
- Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
- Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development

**Migrant Worker** – “a person who is to be engaged, is engaged, or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national” (Art.2(1), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990). A migrant worker establishes residence in a host country for the duration of his/her work.

**NGO** – Non-governmental Organization

**ODA** - Overseas Development Assistance, or Official Development Assistance (in OECD countries), refers to official aid flows by developed countries with the aim of promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

**Refugee** – A person who, pursuant to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, owing to a founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable, or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. In 1969, the Organization of African Unity (now the African Union) adopted a broadened definition to include any person who is forced to leave his or her habitual residence due to aggression, external occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disrupting public order in a part or the entirety of his or her country of origin or his or her country of nationality. In adopting the Cartagena Declaration in 1984, the governments in Latin America also considered as refugees persons fleeing their country because their life, security, or their freedom are threatened by widespread violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, large-scale human rights violations, or any other circumstances seriously disrupting public order.

**Remittances** – Monetary and, in some cases, in-kind transfers made by a migrant to the country of origin.

**Seasonal Worker** – A migrant worker whose work is limited to particular parts or seasons of the year, depending on the nature of the activity.

**TEC** – Tsunami Evaluation Coalition

**UNDP** – United Nations Development Programme

**UNFPA** – United Nations Population Fund

**WFP** – World Food Programme

**WHO** – World Health Organization



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## NOTES

1. United Nations, Summary of High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 13 October 2006; and also United Nations General Assembly report on International Migration and Development, Report of the Secretary-General, 18 May 2006.
2. ISDR, 2004: 46.
3. ISDR, 2004: 30.
4. United Nations, Summary of High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 13 October 2006; and also United Nations General Assembly report on International Migration and Development, Report of the Secretary-General, 18 May 2006.
5. ISDR, 2004: 46.
6. For instance, as Yamin et al. (2005: 1) point out “Why are MDGs, climate change and trade processes running in parallel tracks? And what can be done to link these processes synergistically in favour of those vulnerable to climate change?”. Skeldon (2005: 55-6) considers it to be correct that migration has not become an MDG itself as these consist of clear goals and targets that are difficult to apply to migration, and because of its scope in terms of the world’s population (3%). He then argues (2005: 61) that migration impact statements for the MDG targets should be considered.
7. See for instance the reports of Task Force (2003), Yamin et al (2005), which fail to refer to migration and mobility, while only reference is made to displacement as a direct result of the effects of climate change (Task Force, 2003: 6). IUCN et al (2003: vii) call for “a convergence of four distinct communities who have long been tackling the issue of vulnerability reduction through their respective activities – disaster risk reduction, climate and climate change, environmental management, and poverty reduction” to address the increased vulnerabilities that people face because of climate change. In particular natural resources are important as the poor heavily rely on eco-systems.
8. UNDP, 2004: 2, Usher, 2005: 29.
9. Hugo, 2005: 28.
10. *Asian Migration News*, December 2002, in: Hugo, 2005: 29.
11. *Asian Migration News*, December 2001, in: Hugo, 2005: 32.
12. Guest, 2003: 12.
13. Soeprobo, 2005: 6; Wong et al, 2003: 222.
14. Adams and Page, 2003 in Usher, 2005: 31.
15. Athukorala, 1993: in: Hugo, 2005: 32.
16. Hugo, 1995: in: Hugo, 2005: 32.
17. Hugo, 2005: 33.
18. Hugo, 2005: 33-4.
19. Sharma, 2003: 34 in Hugo, 2005: 34.
20. Hugo, 2005: 40.
21. Hugo, 2005: 35.
22. Derived and adapted from Farrant et al, 2006: 8.
23. World Bank, 2005: xix.
24. Van der Wink et al. 1998 in: Hunte, 2005: 12.

25. Disaster risk reduction (disaster reduction) is the conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development. (ISDR; 2004: 17).
26. UNDP, 2004: 2.
27. UNDP, 2004: i.
28. UNDP, 2004: 2, DFID, 2005: Yamin et al, 2005: 9, Worldbank, 2006: 69.
29. ISDR, 2004: 7.
30. ISDR, 2004: 7-8.
31. Vine, 2005: 145; Hunte, 2005: 12.
32. Kates 1962; expanded by Fordham 1992; in: Hunte, 2004: 10.
33. Hunte, 2004: 26.
34. UNDP, 2004: 4.
35. UNDP, 2004: 2,4 The IFRC's (2002) community risk assessment based on vulnerability and resilience notes that new immigrants and visitors are among the highly vulnerable social groups (in: ISDR, 2004: 74). Yet when increasing capacities and reducing vulnerability, no reference is made to legalization and integration issues of international migrants, and integration issues in reference to internal migrants. ISDR, 2004: 188.
36. UNDP, 2004: 5.
37. UNDP, 2004: 6.
38. The progression of vulnerability – adopted from Blaikie et al – page 71, ISDR, 2004.
39. Task Force (2003: 6).
40. NGO Impact Initiative (Special envoy for the Tsunami, Clinton), An assessment by the international humanitarian community, October 2006, p.2, see also World Bank, 2005: 14.
41. Adi, 2003: 138.
42. APMRN, 2003: 4.
43. “A large gap in social service delivery between urban and rural or remote areas existed prior to the Tsunami, and public health and education services were reportedly of lower quality due to poor infrastructure”. UNDP/CIU, 2005: 10.
44. ICASERD, 2005: 46.
45. Refugees and asylum seekers in Malaysia 1994-2004 – refugee population end of year and asylum applicants during the year (UNHCR, 2004: 236-7; UNHCR, 2005: table 4).

	'94	'95	'96	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02	'03	'04
Refugees	61	9	9	20	264	181	149	83	144	3,198	15,181
Asylum Applicants	-	-	8	11	879	61	87	259	1,448	5,659	13,149

46. Cheran, 2003: 5.
47. Cheran and Aiken, 2005: 10.
48. Hugo, 2005: 7.
49. Hugo, 2005: 8.
50. SLBFE, 2005.
51. Jayaweera et al, 2002: 1.
52. Jayaweera et al, 2002: 2.
53. [www.slbfe.lk/feb/stat.main.html](http://www.slbfe.lk/feb/stat.main.html)

54. Sharma, 2003: 34 in Hugo, 2005: 34.
55. Cheran and Aiken, 2005: 14 – they also refer to a saving mechanism called *cheetu* in which individual members can participate from Sri Lanka or any country of residence.
56. Cash generally does not cross the border and stays within the network, while Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China are the preferred operational bases for the Tamil information money transfer systems, Cheran and Aiken, 2005: 17-8.
57. In contrast, financial banking and other formal remittance transfer agencies, such as Western Union and Moneygram, charge a commission of about 20 per cent, while there is a perceived higher risk of discrepancies between the exchange rates at the date of transfer and delivery, and commission fees charged at both ends. Cheran and Aiken, 2005: 18-9.
58. Cheran, 2003: 11.
59. Hugué et al, 2005: xiii-xiv.
60. Hugué et al, 2005: xiii.
61. Hugué et al, 2005: 25, 27.
62. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006) Synthesis report, pp. 37-38.
63. National and multi-national companies in Aceh, in cooperation with the government, heavily exploit natural resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. In 1990 the contribution of oil and natural gas to NAD's GDP reached 77 per cent, but by 2003 this contribution had declined to 20 per cent, further resulting in the closure of various industries. As a result, the contribution of the agricultural, industrial and service sectors to the GDP increased, with the agriculture's one rising from 11 per cent in 1990 to 28 per cent in 2003 (ICASERD, 2005: 4).
64. Laksamana.net, 29 October 2003.
65. ICASERD, 2005: 5.
66. Bappenas, 20 January 2004, p. iii.
67. Prof. Sadli, as cited from *Koran Tempo*, 2 January 2005 in Soeprobo, 2005: 7.
68. World Bank, 2005: 11 – In terms of the damages sustained by the private sector, preliminary estimates report around 110,000 houses have been partly or fully damaged, over 19,000 private fishing vessels sustained damages, and about a quarter of hotels were affected (58 of the total 242 registered hotels have been fully or partly damaged). In the public sector, about 97 health care institutions, and 190 schools, universities and vocational training institutes were damaged.
69. Soysa, 2005: 1.
70. World Bank, 2005: 11.
71. The government has been unable to significantly reduce poverty in the rural areas because of the unfinished reform agenda, the weaknesses in the macro-economic framework, and the rise in oil prices. World Bank, 2005: 12. Critical for both growth acceleration and poverty reduction is the achievement of permanent peace, as the civil conflict has resulted in many casualties, a major disruption of the economy and large-scale internal displacement World Bank, 2005: I.
72. Stover et al, 2005: 75.
73. Stover et al, 2005: 88.
74. Stover et al, 2005: 77.
75. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition Synthesis report at <http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/>; NGO Impact Initiative, (2006), An assessment by the international humanitarian

- community at [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/NGO\\_Impact\\_Initiative-Oct2006.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2006/NGO_Impact_Initiative-Oct2006.pdf); Disasters Emergency Committee (2005) Independent evaluation of the DEC Tsunami crisis response, [http://www.dec.org.uk/uploads/documents/dectsunamievaluationfinalboardreportdec\\_Y1F1A.pdf](http://www.dec.org.uk/uploads/documents/dectsunamievaluationfinalboardreportdec_Y1F1A.pdf)
76. World Bank, 2005: 17.
  77. Needs assessments are “the analysis of what affected populations require in order to stop actual and/or avert imminent ‘threats to life, health, subsistence and physical security’” (HPG, 2003, in: Ville de Goyet et al, 2006: par 24). Ville de Goyet et al makes further a distinction between risk assessments, damage assessments and impact assessments as well as non-formal and formal assessments (idem).
  78. Hedman, 2005: 4.
  79. ISDR, 2004: 77.
  80. ODI, 2005: 28.
  81. Hedman, 2005: 4 and see also Ville de Goyet, 2005: above para 70.
  82. Idem: para 151.
  83. The Bank has participated in damage assessments in 32 projects since 1984. Recently, assessments are generally a cooperative effort of the government, the Bank, and other donors, and are used to effectively design reconstruction projects, measure the impact of disasters in monetary terms, including its effects on economic flows, the social and physical reconstruction needs. The limitations of the World Bank’s assessments can be found in the lack of information on the country and social context, capacities, and the differential effects of disaster on vulnerable groups. (World Bank, 2006: 40).
  84. Ville de Goyet et al, 2006: para 159 - Examples of assessments that also review the pre-Tsunami situation include the Save the Children’s Household Economy Approach, which uses DFID’s sustainable livelihoods framework (ODI, 2005: 28).
  85. (ISDR, 2004: 23).
  86. Ville de Goyet et al, 2006 : para 148.
  87. WFP, 2005: 8.
  88. Naik A., Save the Children UK Tsunami Child Protection Assessments in India, January and June 2005.
  89. Ville de Goyet, 2005: para 167.
  90. CIU/UNDP, 2005: 24.
  91. WFP, 2005: ix.
  92. Hudspeth, 2005: 20.
  93. Cohen et al, 2005: 32.
  94. Many explanations that they were not an immediate health threat were pushed aside and many traditional ritual practices were set aside, resulting in feelings of guilt that will need to be dealt with at a later stage Carballo and Heal, 2005: 12.
  95. Carballo and Heal, 2005: 12.
  96. Carballo and Heal, 2005: 12.
  97. Carballo and Heal, 2005: 12.
  98. Many Tsunami victims in Thailand literally lost their identities. Without vital documents, including work permits, birth certificates, and land and property titles, they are unable to obtain certain types of aid, secure employment, obtain health care, and receive inheritance from deceased family members. If survivors cannot establish who they are, and what land or property they owned, then the process of returning home and

- reconstructing their lives is infinitely more difficult, which in particular for women and children can put them at a higher risk. Stover et al, 2005: 77.
99. Stover et al, 2005: 86 and Leckie, 2005: 15.
  100. Stover et al, 2005: 78.
  101. Hedman, 2005: 4.
  102. Also corruption, pollution, CFW used to clear areas of a forest, possibility of inflation and business and farmers are finding it difficult to recruit labourers as they can't compete with the CFW wages. CFW has an impact on other livelihood projects ODI, 2005: 27.
  103. Carballo and Heal, 2005: 12.
  104. Banerjee et al, 2005: 42.
  105. "Nicobarese fishermen, for example, refused to accept the mainland-manufactured fishing equipment provided in the post-Tsunami period as it was inappropriate for their needs". "As a result of the disaster, fishing communities in the islands are likely to be affected, mangrove forest to be denuded and corals to be damaged". Banerjee et al, 2005: 43.
  106. "As outlined in earlier sections, there were numerous constraints on local livelihoods, including conflict, poor government services, relations in the community and reliance on traditional money-lenders. The question of whether future livelihoods programmes aim merely for a 'recovery' of the pre-Tsunami situation, or for authentically sustainable livelihoods in Aceh". CIU/UNDP, 2005: 25.
  107. CIU/UNDP, 2005: 25.
  108. Usher, 2005: 34.
  109. Usher, 2005: 33.
  110. Wasem, Ruth-Ellen, "Hurricane Katrina-Related Immigration Issues and Legislation", CRS Report for Congress, 19 September 2005.
  111. IRC, 2001: 4.
  112. Chantavich, 2005: 109; IRC, 2001: 3-4.
  113. IOM/ILO, 2004: 11.
  114. Either the employer or the migrant workers can initiate the registration process by requesting a 13-digit registration number from the Ministry of Interior. At the same time, the applicant provides the ministry with a photograph. If the application is approved, the migrant has the right to stay in Thailand for a specified period of time. If the applicant wishes to work, he or she must obtain a health card from the Ministry of Public Health that entitles him or her to participate in the "30 baht scheme". Once the initial 1,900 baht fee (600 baht for physical examination and 1,300 baht for insurance) to join the scheme is paid, the migrant can access health services by paying 30 baht per visit. Finally, to receive a work permit the migrant or employer must pay an additional 1,900 baht (100 baht for the work permit application and 1,800 baht for the work permit card). This means a total of 3,800 baht (US\$ 95) must be paid to receive a work permit", Stover et al, 2005: 84.
  115. Stover et al, 2005: 84.
  116. There were 127,714 Myanmar migrant workers in the six provinces hit by the Tsunami. Of these, only 22,504 or less than 18 per cent were registered with the Thai Ministry of Labor (Chulalongkorn University). Stover et al, 2005: 84 From these specific reports alone, the death toll of Myanmar migrants seemed to amount to at least 1,000. Official figures put the number of missing Myanmar at 89 (TAG, 2005a: 4). Over 200,000 migrant workers, mainly from Burma, were working in the affected

areas, with over 30,000 working in the worst-affected area of Phang-nga (TAG, 2005a: 1) Some reports presenting the number of missing at 4,000. A joint assessment mission carried out by IOM/WB/UN estimate of at least 7,000 Myanmar migrant workers excluding their dependents affected by the Tsunami in Thailand It is roughly estimated that at least 7,000 migrant workers plus their dependents were affected by the Tsunami. This estimate is based on the number of registered migrants who were employed in sectors that were most affected (Fishery, construction and tourism) in the areas devastated by the Tsunami. The figure does not take into account either dependents or unregistered migrants. See also IOM et al, 2005: 12.

117. IOM et al, 2005: 10.
118. IOM et al, 2005: 21.
119. Stover et al, 2005: 84.
120. Oberoi, 2005: 41.
121. TAG, 2005b: 1.
122. Stover et al, 2005: 84.
123. Hedman, 2005: 4. See also Oberoi, 2005: 40 who confirms reports of discrimination, and IOM et al, 2005: 4 stating “Although there were sporadic reports of discrimination, most migrants who sought relief and medical care immediately following the Tsunami received it”.
124. TAG, 2005b: 1.
125. IOM et al, 2005: 16 Several migrants interviewed said that they identified the bodies of their family members or friends, but that they were soon collected by authorities. Since then, they have not been able to claim or access the bodies of deceased. This measure was meant to prevent wrong body claims and/or false compensation claims, which are increasingly prevalent, however, the measures seem to be disproportionately applied to migrant workers IOM et al, 2005: 15.
126. IOM et al, 2005: 4.
127. IOM et al, 2005: 16.
128. IOM et al, 2005: 17.
129. IOM et al, 2005: 11 Most migrant workers in Phuket Province are employed in the construction sector (60%), and at the time of the Tsunami there was little or no construction work along the coastline. Migrant workers in Krabi province were not really affected by the Tsunami as the vast majority worked inland in the agricultural sector; also IOM et al, 2005: 4, 10.
130. IOM et al, 2005: 21.
131. Stover et al, 2005: 84 S In at least one case, the owner of a large fishing fleet in Baan Tub Lamu used force to stop volunteers with World Vision from helping some of this Myanmar deckhands return to Burma.
132. TAG, 2005b: 3 Bangkok itself benefits from over a hundred thousand migrants working as domestic workers and construction site workers, but there are very few health, legal or labour services available for migrants. The deep south, for example Haad Yai, or the northeast, Khon Kaen also employ many thousands of migrants but few specific services are available.
133. ESCAP, 2005: 15.
134. ESCAP, 2005: 16.
135. TAG, 2005b: 2.



136. For instance, Chaiyos Wichitbot from the Mobile Assistance Centre had documented the cases of 40 Tsunami survivors who have been denied governmental assistance as they are registered as residents of other provinces (Stover et al, 2005: 79).
137. Stover et al, 2005: 77.
138. Stover et al, 2005: 90.
139. Stover et al, 2005: 79.
140. See for instance, Stover et al, 2005: 75.
141. Reed et al, 2005: 22.
142. [www.workpermit.com/news/2005\\_01\\_06/canada/entry\\_rules\\_after\\_Tsunami.htm](http://www.workpermit.com/news/2005_01_06/canada/entry_rules_after_Tsunami.htm) consulted 01/09/2005; IOM 2005.
143. *Asian Migration News*, 15 January 2005.
144. *Asian Migration News*, 15 January 2005.
145. Nah and Bunnell, 2005: 249 – In May 2005, there were 1.6 million migrant workers in Malaysia, with 1.1 million from Indonesia. During amnesty periods for irregular migrants to leave the country without penalty, more than 300,000 migrants departed in each 2002 and 2004/5. Foreign workers in Malaysia remitted RM1.7 billion in 2002. ESCAP et al, 2005: 13; see also Ikatan Relawan Rakyat Malaysia or “People’s Volunteer Corps”.
146. *Asian Migration News*, 15 January 2005.
147. IOM, 2005b.
148. *Asian Migration News*, 15 January 2005.
149. *Asian Migration News*, 15 January 2005.
150. The role of food aid is often limited by the uncertainty regarding its timing of distribution, the often poor targeting, and its usage by local elites (ODI, 2005: 11).
151. Cernea, 2004 in: Vine, 2005: 146 There are various models that could be used to list criteria that determine increased poverty. One model identified eight main risks, which are landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, social marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, lost access to common property resources, the shattering of community ties, social capital, and communal life (Vine, 2005: 147).
152. ODI, 2005: 10.
153. Wandschneider and Mishra, 2003: in: Deshingkar and Grimm, 2004: 9.
154. Drought and desertification in Eastern Africa in the 1980s and 1990s created large IDP movements within countries like Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. In 1994, mass migration to urban areas within China took place as a result of floods and droughts in upland areas, thereby increasing urban population pressures already present. The 2001 drought in many sub-Saharan African countries (such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan) forced many people to leave their homes in search of food, thus moving from one part of the region to another.
155. Hunte, 2004: 15.
156. Osterlingh 1979: in: Hunte, 2005: 15.
157. See case-study Bangladesh and Stigter 2005.
158. Yang, 2005: 3.
159. See articles Bangladesh on char inhabitants and Stigter and Monsutti, 2005.
160. Chan 1995 in: Hunte, 2004: 15.
161. Unknown source.
162. ISDR, 2004: 21.

163. The process was managed by the Acehnese community themselves, and only 35,000 work permits were handed out, only partly covering those with refugee status, Nah, 2006.
164. Save the children, 2005: chapter 4.10.
165. Interviews held by Elca Stigter in Phuket, Thailand, November 2005.
166. Grote et al, 2006: 1.
167. Grote et al, 2006: 15.
168. This is also said to be a reason for lack of arrangements of social security provision for them though more than 10 per cent of national work force more than 17 per cent of national savings and more than 20 per cent of foreign exchange earnings are contributed by them. Soysa, 2005: 2.
169. Jayaweera et al, 2002: 123.
170. Cooperative Rural Banks which are the closest to the community have no special schemes for returnees, and migrant workers are excluded from the Samurdhi schemes. Further, self-employment schemes have often turned out to be a form of disguised unemployment because they focus narrowly on the provision of credit Jayaweera et al, 2002: 129.
171. Jayaweera et al, 2002: 124.
172. Nah, 2006.
173. Worldbank, 2005b: 2.
174. Jayaweera, 2002: 6.
175. The training programmes for self-employment proved not to be successful but these women did receive compensation for losses incurred as a result of the war., Jayaweera, 2002: 4.
176. 23 per cent of these women have savings that could be invested in enterprises that could yield economic rewards. A positive feature has been the social empowerment of women as an outcome of economic independence in alien lands. Jayaweera, 2002: 6-7.
177. Inter-agency mission in Thailand, 2005: 9.
178. Amnesty International, AI, 2005: 19.
179. "Trafficking in persons means the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons: by the threat or use of kidnapping, force, fraud, deception or coercion, or by the giving or receiving of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of sexual exploitation or forced labor." Article 3, paragraph (a), UN International Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children Office of the UNHCHR <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/protocoltraff.pdf>
180. It has been argued that viewing legal migration and unauthorized migration as part of an integrated migration system rather than as polar opposites (which presume different sets of policies) may be more constructive and effective in managing migration (Battistella and Asis, 2003). This approach can be extended to trafficking in persons. There is also a need to advance the discussion on trafficking beyond the migration or movement part and to address demand side factors and the conditions of that render migrants. Also in East and Southeast Asia, there has been much more research, advocacy and regional discussion on trafficking; while these activities have drawn attention to trafficking, the attention to unauthorized migration and the problematic aspects of legal migration have been sidelined. Also, trafficking within countries has received much less attention.
181. Enarson, E, and B.H. Morrow, "The Gendered Terrain of Disaster", p. 3.

182. Investigation on the trafficking, sex tourism, pornography and prostitution of children in Central America and Mexico: regional synthesis / ECPAT/Audrey Hepburn Children's Fund; San José, Costa Rica: Casa Alianza, 2002.
183. Calcetas-Santos, Ofelia. Report on the Mission to Guatemala. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, UNHCR (E/CN.4/2000/73/Add.2.). US Department of State, "Global Issues: Responses to Trafficking", June 2003, Volume 8, Number 2 <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0603/ijge/ijge0603.pdf>>
184. ICMC/Solidarity Centre, 2003: 44-5.
185. ICMC/Solidarity Centre, 2003: 175-6.
186. This illegal movement covers two major routes, namely for East Java and Sumatra to Malaysia and from Flores and South Sulawesi to Sabah. Those originating from Aceh logically taking the first route, either through Medan to acquire the requisite documentation and taking the ferry to Penang, or by way of the numerous small harbours in West Sumatra. From there to the west coast of Malaysia or the Riau Islands to Singapore, it is only a two to four-hour boat ride, usually undertaken at night in order to evade detection. Trafficking routes encompassing north Sumatra are various, as the region can be accessed via bus, plane and ship. Medan has an airport, with many flights to other regions in Indonesia, such as Jakarta and Aceh, as well as international flights to and from Malaysia and Singapore.
187. *Asian Migration News*, 15 January 2005.
188. *Asian Migration News*, 31 January 2005.
189. While UNICEF fully supported fostering as a critical support mechanism, it was nevertheless extremely important to register all separated children, both to increase the chances of family reunification and to enable them to access programmes aimed at reducing the financial and care burden they might place on foster families Hudspeth, 2005: 20.
190. IOM, 2005: 1 This will benefit a total of 134 women from the villages of Meunasah Keude and Meunasah Kulam in Aceh Besar.
191. INSTRAW/IOM, 2000: 108.
192. Jayaweera et al, 2002: 3.
193. INSTRAW/IOM, 2000: 106.
194. INSTRAW/IOM, 2000: 124 – Agents who ignored the complaints of workers during the first three-month surveillance period exacerbated the problems domestic workers face, as after this initial period, they have to find their own solution (e.g. running away, seeking refuge in the embassy). INSTRAW/IOM, 2000: 127.
195. One NGO said that "women and children from Tsunami-affected areas are trafficked for employment with false promises forcing young women to live under minimal living conditions victimized often by organized crime groups". Soysa, 2005: 2.
196. More information on Sri Lankan statistics see Soysa, 2005: 3.
197. Senanayake, 2005: 4.
198. *Asian Migration News*, 31 January, 2005. Also on a separate point, Further, 1,000 youths attended Youth Information Workshops held in five districts and provided mental health training for trainers courses for 117 local psychosocial workers and training courses for more than 400 field workers. Further, 550 vulnerable households, including single-headed ones, were assisted in regaining a sustainable livelihood. Though should be noted that no evaluations have been undertaken regarding the programmes implemented

- in Sri Lanka to prevent human trafficking by means of awareness raising campaigns and livelihoods assistance in Tsunami-affected areas (IOM Sri Lanka, 2005).
199. Stover et al, 2005: 87.
  200. UNICEF situation report April 2005.
  201. Stover et al, 2005: 77.
  202. Stover et al, 2005: 83.
  203. Stover, 2005: 87-8.
  204. Email 28/11 2005 from Lance Bonneau to Elca Stigter.
  205. "Thus to the extent that the diaspora (in the U.S) comes from those geographical regions that are relatively richer (metropolitan cities, richer states, like Kerala, Gujarat and Punjab) they are more likely to channel resources to these areas exacerbating inequities. p.486.
  206. Gupta, 2004: 13 For instance, the Indian community in Kuwait contributed Rs 3.4 crores and 11 containers containing relief material towards the relief fund headed by the prime minister. pp. 483.
  207. World Bank, 2005.
  208. [www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C19%5Cstory\\_19-2-2006\\_pg5\\_1](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006%5C02%5C19%5Cstory_19-2-2006_pg5_1)
  209. Yang, 2005: 22.
  210. World Bank, 2005: 100.
  211. See Ghosh, 2006: 24.
  212. World Bank, 2005: 100.
  213. Clarke and Wallsten 2003: 13-5.
  214. Clarke and Wallsten, 2003: 21-2.
  215. Clarke and Wallsten, 2003: 6.
  216. Guest, 2003: 5.
  217. The increase in remittances should however be considered in relation to other contextual factors. First of all, households with particularly unstable earnings or risky assets might be more likely to encourage family members to migrate to diversify risk, that is, household that are most vulnerable to hurricane damage (e.g. banana production) will benefit more from income diversification than other households. Second, households that have migrants abroad, might display a different interest in self-protection and preparedness than those without this safety net. Thus, self-insurance (e.g. diversifying household income through migration) can act as a substitute for self-protection (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972 In: Clarke and Wallsten, 2003; 16-7).
  218. Clarke and Wallsten, 2003: 6.
  219. ISDR, 2004 : 22.
  220. Estrella, 2005.
  221. E.g. Islamic relief. The organization raised US\$ 850,000 via the Internet in the first week.
  222. Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (2006) Synthesis report, pp. 37-38.
  223. <http://kzisnetherlands.blogspot.com> consulted 25/01/2006.
  224. [www.imaamnet.org/docs/aga05/TsunamiGeneralReport.pdf](http://www.imaamnet.org/docs/aga05/TsunamiGeneralReport.pdf) consulted 25/01/2005 For instance, Imaam not only collected financial donations, but also received clothing and medicines, which it forwarded to the Indonesian Embassy, and jewellery, which it sold or forwarded to other NGOs. The sources were individuals, mosques, organizations and companies.

225. <http://indonesiahelp.blogspot.com/2004/12/27/international-donations.html> consulted 12/12/2005.
226. Nah, 2006.
227. Nah and Bunnell, 2005: 249.
228. Nah and Bunnell, 2005: 254.
229. AFP, 2005.
230. For female workers their salary payments were irregular and monies were given in lump sums after a certain period of service. Generally, males in the household assisted the women to remit money through a bankers order. A few resorted to informal methods such as requesting friends and relatives to carry money home Jayaweera et al, 2002: 43.
231. Cheran and Aiken, 2005: 20.
232. <http://www.ctconline.ca/primary/tdrcc.asp> consulted 17/11/2005.
233. Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2005: 7.
234. Most affected districts were Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara, Hambanthota, Matara, Galle, Kalutara, only Hambanthota, Matara, Galle and Kalutara.
235. "The Population Censuses conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics is the most reliable source on internal migration in Sri Lanka. Since 2001, the census obtains detailed information on internal migration of the entire population, while in 1971 and 1981 only of 10 percent of the population this information was obtained. Because of the disturbances in the northern and eastern provinces of the country, no census was conducted after 1981 until 2001". (Ukwatta, 2005: 3).
236. Soysa, 2005: 2.
237. SLBFE, 2004.
238. [www.ci.austin.tx.us/oem/20041230.htm](http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/oem/20041230.htm) consulted 01/12/2005.
239. [www.thaiassociation.ab.ca/activiteis/event2005/Tsunami.htm](http://www.thaiassociation.ab.ca/activiteis/event2005/Tsunami.htm) consulted 01/12/2005.
240. [www.thaisunday.com/Tsunami\\_donations.html](http://www.thaisunday.com/Tsunami_donations.html) consulted 01/12/2005.
241. Fleming, 2005: 1.
242. [www.thai-usa.org/donations/Tsunami-relief/Tsunami-totals.html](http://www.thai-usa.org/donations/Tsunami-relief/Tsunami-totals.html) consulted 01/12/2005.
243. [www.unl.edu/TANU](http://www.unl.edu/TANU) consulted 01/12/2005.
244. Questionnaire response, Thai government for IOM survey on diasporas.
245. TAG, 2005a: 6.
246. TAG, 2005b: 2.
247. The Indonesian government has adopted some institutional and legislative measures aimed at the diasporas abroad. Thus there are official governmental declarations, schemes or programmes (Law on Foreign Relations no. 37/1999), specific governmental structure to work with diasporas (embassies, immigration offices, labour ministry office, ministry for social affairs, State Ministry for Women Empowerment and other related agencies/ institutions), consular services, right for expatriates to vote in national elections, recovery of property upon return.
248. The Indonesian government has adopted measures aimed at organizing their diaspora abroad, namely by giving grants to start up associations, funding diasporas return programmes on a case by case basis, design a website for some diasporas, and organizing events for diasporas. In some countries of destination, the Indonesian government targets the human resources of their diaspora by collecting data on diasporas' qualifications, building a diaspora skills/knowledge database, matching diaspora skills with job offers in homeland and target specific sectors, and organize permanent returns of skilled people on a case by case basis.

249. [www.indonesia-ottawa.org/Tsunami\\_2004](http://www.indonesia-ottawa.org/Tsunami_2004) consulted 12/12/2005.
250. The funds were planned to be used for assistance to 187 Acehnese Tsunami orphans in an orphanage, the reconstruction of 92 houses, construction of two mosques, one primary education facility, scholarships for two university students, 578 reference books for the faculty of law library, and construction plan for a polytechnic college in Banda Aceh.
251. Rasooldeen, 2005.
252. Rasooldeen, 2005.
253. CENWOR, 2005: 4.
254. The Thai government has consular services, grants to start up associations, project funding, and the diasporas return programme. The Ministry also collects data on diasporas qualifications, and facilitates remittance transfers (questionnaire response, Thai government for IOM survey on diasporas).
255. Thai embassy Washington, 2005: 3.
256. [http://www.thaiembassy.jp/announcement/Tsunami/eng/donation\\_news.htm](http://www.thaiembassy.jp/announcement/Tsunami/eng/donation_news.htm) consulted 1/12/2005.
257. [www.thaifestvic.com/tdf.htm](http://www.thaifestvic.com/tdf.htm) consulted 01/12/2005.
258. One example is the Share and Care Foundation, which was started in 1982, when five couples in New Jersey decided to send simple necessities (like used clothes, milk powder and medical equipment) for the poor in India. This initiative rapidly expanded with aid responses to the victims of the Union Carbide gas leak, the 1987 drought in Gujarat, the 1993 earthquake in Maharashtra, the 1998 cyclone in Kutch, the 2001 earthquake and the 2002 riots in Gujarat. The organization raised nearly 5 million dollars in supplies and cash in response to the Gujarat earthquake Kapur, 2003: 10 Another example is the Shrimati Pushpa Wati Loomba memorial trust which a prominent UK Person of Indian Origin (PIO) businessman, Raj Loomba. The trust educates the children of poor widows in India, and funded for instance the education of 100 children whose mothers were widowed in 1991 Gujarat quake. pp. 486. Sewa international UK raised an enormous amount of funds for the Gujarat earthquake and other causes through individual donations, fundraisers and group contributions from the Indian community and religious organizations. Pp. 487. For raising US\$ 303,000 for the rehabilitation of victims of the 1993 Maharashtra earthquake, the India Development and Relief Fund (IDRF) was awarded the designation of America's top voluntary NGO p. 490.
259. For instance, in March, 2001, AIF sent doctors from the US to Gujarat for microsurgeries on earthquake victims under Project Swasthya (p. 489.) The American Association of Physicians of Indian origin (AAPI), one of Americas main ethnic medical associations with a membership of 35,000 physicians, is also committed to India's development activities such as in conjunction with supporting NGOs or governmental agencies in the Gujarat earthquake effort. (p.489). Not only specific technical associations provided assistance, but also more general organizations sent expatriates to support victims. One initiative to the launching of its India Service Corps composed of qualified second generation PIOs (age between 20/35) to work on projects in infrastructure, education, agriculture, health, sanitation and economic development with non-governmental organizations. p. 489.
260. <http://www.tamilnation.org/diaspora/Tsunami/rally.htm> consulted 17/11/2005.
261. Hariharan, 2005: 4.
262. Cheran, 2003 : 13-4.

263. Cheran, 2003: 14-15.
264. Gupta, 2004: 7 The American Indian Foundation was founded in February 2001 by group of prominent Indian Americans and former president Clinton following the Gujarat earthquake. It is dedicated to helping India by partnering with existing NGOs. It also enjoys tax exemption status. p. 488.
265. Vongs and Roy, 2005.
266. Vongs and Roy, 2005.
267. A representative of the Toronto Money transfer agent was also on line from Sri Lanka as well as members of the relief operation operating in the north-eastern part of Sri Lanka.
268. Cheran and Aiken, 2005: 1.
269. Vongs et al, 2005: 1-2.
270. Kapur, 2003: 12.
271. Kapur, 2003: 11.
272. <http://www.lankanewspapers.com/news/2005/1/153.html> consulted 17/11/2005.
273. Supra note 5 in Cheran and Aiken, 2005: 26.
274. Blaikie et al, 1994: 28; in: Cannon, 2000.
275. Study undertaken by Profile Business Intelligence, in collaboration with NOP World and DFID – also showed that most common form of remittances were ad hoc contributions in response to specific needs.
276. Profile Business Intelligence et al, 2005: 13.
277. Gawf, 2005.
278. IFRC, 2005:122.
279. These recommendations have been built on earlier ones provided by TAG, 2005b: 3, IOM et al, 2005: 5.
280. Naik, A, Save the Children UK, Child Protection Assessment in Andhra Pradesh, India, August 2005.
281. World Bank, 2005: 100 and see Ghosh, 2006: 24.
282. Diasporas can be defined in line with G. Scheffer's definition "Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin – their homelands" (in: Newland et al, 2004: 1).


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# ASEAN and Trafficking in Persons: Using Data as a Tool to Combat Trafficking in Persons



ASEAN member countries are always looking for ways to improve their response to trafficking in persons. However, these efforts are being held back by a lack of relevant, reliable data on trafficking. Recognizing this problem, in 2005, the ASEAN member countries commissioned IOM to conduct a pilot research project to identify “best practice” in data collection on trafficking, and to prepare a situation report on data collection by government agencies in four ASEAN member countries (Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand).

This report presents the findings of that research and reflects the work of four national research teams, based in Phnom Penh, Jakarta, Manila and Bangkok. It analyses information obtained through reviews of the existing literature, interviews with government officials, and examination of government documents, such as intake forms and annual reports. The report would not have been possible without the assistance and cooperation of the four host governments – Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.

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
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# The IOM Handbook on Direct Assistance for Victims of Trafficking



IOM has had some 13 years of experience in implementing counter-trafficking activities and has provided assistance to over 14,000 victims of trafficking in all regions of the world. With a growing number of organizations, especially local NGOs, now providing or intending to provide assistance to victims of trafficking, IOM would like to share its experience and lessons learned. This Handbook summarizes and systematizes this experience. IOM recognizes that each victim is unique and requires and desires different assistance. As well, the nature of trafficking is different around the world and is ever evolving, requiring changing responses. Therefore this Handbook is not meant to provide a single methodology

for the provision of assistance to victims of trafficking, but to offer suggestions and guidance, based on IOM's many years of experience. IOM hopes that it will be helpful to all organizations providing such assistance to victims, but especially for organizations who are just beginning to develop victim assistance programmes and can benefit from IOM's experiences.

This Handbook provides guidance and advice necessary to effectively deliver a full range of assistance to victims of trafficking from the point of initial contact and screening up to the effective social reintegration of the individuals concerned.

2007, Soft cover, 352 pages, English, ISBN 978-92-9068-371-1

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
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# International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges



This book encapsulates the law of international migration by examining developments first addressed in the volume on *Migration and International Legal Norms* (edited by T.A. Aleinikoff and V. Chetail; T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003) and by discussing wholly new themes. In this regard, the book considers emerging issues, such as the challenges posed by migration to state sovereignty and the protection of human rights as a result of the increasing tensions between anti-terrorism or security legislation and immigration measures, the impact of the use of biometrics technology to identify and better monitor international movements of persons, and enhanced cooperation on the European Union external

border. The human rights of vulnerable groups of migrants are also examined. The issue of forced migration warrants a consideration of the international law relating to groups such as internally displaced persons, as well as the international community's response to secondary movements of asylum seekers. Questions of state responsibility concerning, for example, stranded migrants and provision of consular protection and assistance to migrants are also discussed. Moreover, the expansion of regional legal frameworks concerned with migration, such as EU immigration and asylum law and policy and the growing case law on European citizenship, as well as developments in free movement regimes in Africa, the Americas and the Caribbean, are added to the analysis of the growing body of international migration law.

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When natural disasters strike populated areas, the toll in human lives, infrastructure and economic activities can be devastating and long-lasting. The psychological effects can be just as debilitating, instilling fear and discouragement in the affected populations. But, adversity also brings forth the strongest and best in human beings, and reveals initiatives, capacities and courage not perceived before. How is development undermined by natural disasters, what is the effect on migrants and migratory flows and what is the role of migration in mitigating some of the worst effects of natural calamities? This paper explores how the advent of a natural disaster interplays with the migration-development nexus by reviewing the impact of the Indian Ocean Tsunami on migration issues in three affected countries; Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

This paper focuses on three particular aspects of how natural disasters interplay with the migration/development dynamic: (a) Impact of natural disasters on migrant communities, in particular heightened vulnerabilities and lack of access to humanitarian/development assistance; (b) Effect of natural disasters on migratory flows into and out of affected areas due to socio-economic changes which undermine pre-disaster development levels, (c) Diaspora response and support in the aftermath of disaster and the degree to which this can offset losses and bolster “re-development”.



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