Contents

Introduction ................................................................. 2
   Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

The lives of children on the move in the policy debate: Are their voices influencing policy? ....................... 4
   Ignacio Packer

Child migration: The need for international cooperation for effective policy responses ............................ 6
   Mike Dotridge, Ana Fonseca, Dr Najat M’Jid and Hans van de Glind

Child mobility and the 2013 UN High-level Dialogue .... 12
   Daniela Reale

People on the move in a changing climate: What role for regional policy? ........................................... 14
   Karoline Popp

Mixed migration into Libya: Mapping migration routes from Africa to Europe and drivers of migration in post-revolution Libya ...................................................... 18
   Arezo Malakooti

Death at the border: The challenge of documenting lives lost during migration ........................................... 22
   Tara Brian

Book review: Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century, by Paul Collier .... 26
   Frank Laczko

Publications .................................................................... 28
Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Welcome to the new issue of Migration Policy Practice. This issue focuses on a range of themes including child migration, regional policy initiatives in the field of environmental migration, mixed migration flows into Libya, the challenge of counting and documenting lives lost during attempts by migrants to cross borders and a review of Paul Collier’s book Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century.

The first of three articles on child migration, by Ignacio Packer, the Secretary General of Terre des Hommes, stresses that while the social cost of migration on families and children had been largely ignored in previous UN high-level dialogue (HLD) summits, the declaration adopted by the UN Member States in October 2013 for the first time sets out to “protect the human rights of migrant children, given their vulnerability, particularly unaccompanied migrant children, and to provide for their health, education and psychosocial development, ensuring that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in policies of integration, return and family reunification”. Civil society organizations are now engaged in making the case for migration in the post-2015 development agenda and in reaffirming the critical importance of child protection with a specific concern for children on the move.

The need for international cooperation in the field of child migration is discussed in the second article, by Mike Dottridge (an independent expert on child migration and protection), Ana Fonseca (IOM), Dr Najat Maalla M’Jid (United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography) and Hans van de Glind (ILO). The authors identify a number of barriers that need to be overcome in order to establish effective policies for the protection of children on the move, including: a lack of common comprehensive understanding and knowledge; inadequate approaches by States; gaps in laws and implementation; insufficient medical, psychological and social care services; and insufficient account of the transnational dimension of issues of child migration. The article discusses a number of key guiding principles and measures to overcome such obstacles.

The third article on child mobility, by Daniela Reale (Save the Children–United Kingdom), discusses the activities implemented by the Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move in the lead up to and during the HLD on International Migration and Development in 2013. This has included various proposals setting out the key components of a comprehensive approach to migration management that can guarantee the protection of children’s rights and the inclusion of such a child-sensitive approach in the HLD follow-up process. The Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move also looked at ways in which protection of children in international migration can become an integral part of the post-2015 framework.

The remaining articles in this issue of Migration Policy Practice focus on a range of different policy areas.

We first hear from Karoline Popp (IOM), who outlines selected examples of regional policy initiatives in the field of environmental migration. The author points out that environmental migration has entered regional policymaking and cooperation through four principal tracks: the migration track, the climate track, the security track and the human rights track. However, with very few exceptions, regional policy and cooperation remains informal and does not produce outcomes that would be binding on States or lead to legislative changes. There is therefore a need to examine other possible “tracks” and entry points for environmental migration, in particular, in the realm of regional development cooperation.

The next article, by Arezo Malakooti (Altai Consulting), outlines the main findings of a recent research commissioned by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which aimed to understand the routes that migrants take in order to reach Libya, and the drivers of their migration, including the ways in which these might have changed since the revolution. The article shows that there is a need for a comprehensive approach to the management of mixed migration into Libya, based on the range of vulnerabilities and risks, actors and opportunities that are associated with such flows. Given the mixed nature of migration into Libya and the challenges in separating asylum-seekers from other migrants, tight coordination between the various actors in the field is essential in order to ensure that the issues at stake are effectively targeted.

The sixth article, by Tara Brian (IOM), discusses the challenge of counting and documenting lives lost during attempts by migrants to cross borders. IOM recently calculated that at least 2,400 migrants died in 2013
in regions where such data exist. However, the vast majority of governments do not publish numbers of deaths, and counting the lives lost is largely left to civil society and the media. The article informs the current data sources in key border regions (United States/Mexico, Australia/Indonesia, Bay of Bengal, Europe, Northern Africa and the Sahara, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden), and also discusses issues of gender in border-related deaths (i.e. research suggests that men and women may face differing degrees of risk associated with the various hazards involved in illegal border crossings). The article calls for more accurate and comprehensive data that can serve as a basis on which to assess the efficacy of policy intervention.

The last article in this issue of Migration Policy Practice, by Frank Laczko (IOM), is a review of Paul Collier’s latest book Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century. This book, which has received considerable media attention in recent months, examines the key determinants of migration decisions and the impact of migration on host societies, the migrants and those “left behind”. In particular, Collier sets out to write a “critique of the prevailing thinking among liberal thinkers” about migration and its benefits. Laczko discusses many of the key parts and arguments of the book and concludes that while Collier has set out to write a dispassionate and evidence-based analysis of current migration thinking, some of his critics may argue that he has instead written a book based on a limited review of the evidence, which exaggerates the possible risks of migration and downplays its benefits.

We thank all the contributors to this issue of Migration Policy Practice and encourage readers to contact us with suggestions for future articles.
The lives of children on the move in the policy debate: Are their voices influencing policy?

Ignacio Packer

The High-level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development has not left children behind but, as the tragedy of Lampedusa was there to remind policymakers, a lot remains to be done, indicating the high relevance of the coordinated efforts by civil society organizations (CSOs).

Civil society brought to the HLD on 3 and 4 of October 2013 a unity message, one carved out of national and regional consultations. This has included an eight-point agenda to work with governments over a five-year period, and which brings about substantive change, to demonstrate commitments and to bring an end to the globalization of indifference.

This is an agenda where children have not been left out. An agenda built around the synergies created during the civil society days of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and the interactions at the GFMD with governments. One built with intense and open civil society interactions and strategic moves at the national, regional and global levels. One prepared with leadership generating a proposal at the HLD Hearings in New York on 15 July and to the HLD. The proposal is without precedent in depth and specifics. Civil society came to the HLD more prepared to discuss with governments. Civil society came with a greater degree of optimism that, in fact, CSOs are making major changes.

In addition to the time allocated to the issue of children at the plenary session of the HLD, four events on children on the move were organized as HLD side events or as events at the People’s Global Forum. The Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move, in collaboration with IOM Missions in Italy, Mexico and the Philippines, organized a high-level event. In addition, an HLD side event on alternatives to child detention coordinated by the International Detention Coalition and two workshops – held within the People’s Global Action – organized by the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), Terre des Hommes and the Destination Unknown campaign (Box 2) – reminded of the social resistance, continued indifference and lack of efficient responses to ensure protection and dignity of children on the move.

Apart from the experts’ voices and the debates brought by these events, the views and opinions of Saleh, Fattah, Mamadou, Farah (Box 1), Kavilas, Singrad and other children were heard. The voices of these children who were not given protection measures in their search for a better future were shared through short documentaries for the policy dialogue in New York. Unlike the children on the move lost at sea, these children featured during the events can still speak out and call for respect for the rights of all children.

At the HLD, UN Member States adopted a declaration that did not leave children behind. This seems obvious but, until very recently, the global agenda was ignoring children and the social cost of migration on families and children. UN Member States committed to “protect the human rights of migrant children, given their vulnerability, particularly unaccompanied migrant children, and to provide for their health, education and psychosocial development, ensuring that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in policies of integration, return and family reunification”.

The second HLD represents a significant advance for how the issues of children affected by migration are approached. Children are now visible on the agenda and there is a growing focus on the most urgently needed changes in current policies and practices.

One of the many urgent current policy challenges is making the case for migration in the post-2015 agenda. In these crucial months of debate on the post-2015 at the global and national levels, CSOs are engaged in making the case for migration in the development agenda and to reaffirm the critical importance of child protection with a specific concern for children on the move.

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1 Ignacio Packer is Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes International Federation.
2 See http://hidcivilsociety.org/five-year-action-agenda/.
Box 1: Destination Unknown Campaign

Destination Unknown is an international campaign to protect children on the move coordinated by Terre des Hommes. To date, over 40 organizations have joined forces under this campaign to develop protection mechanisms for children on the move, raise awareness of, and advocate the campaign messages for policy change. See www.destination-unknown.org.

Box 2: Views and Opinions of Children – Farah’s Unknown Destination

“My aspirations and hopes for my future and for the one of other children and youth is that, if I have learned something through my experience (and I have lived through prison, the desert, being shot at, to being accused of something I did not do, to be stereotyped), the only solution of getting out of this cycle of poverty and pain is education.” (August 2013, Farah, 18 years old, Somali refugee in Malta)

Listen to Farah on http://destination-unknown.org/farahs-destination-unknown/.
Child migration: The need for international cooperation for effective policy responses

Mike Dottridge, Ana Fonseca, Dr Najat Maalla M’Jid and Hans van de Glind

"Child Migration: The Need for International Cooperation for Effective Policy Responses" was a topic that the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Special Rapporteur (on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography) and the Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move brought to the table of discussions during the thematic workshops at the 2013 International Metropolis Conference held in Tampere, Finland. Chaired by Mike Dottridge, an independent specialist on child migration and protection, the session presented key issues and discussed key policy responses needed to protect migrant children who move within a country or across borders. It particularly addressed the rights of children and their protection in the context of migration, international cooperation for protection, and direct assistance of unaccompanied migrant children and migrant children in child labour.

This article presents the key issues, identified at the thematic workshops, and identifies the key ways forward within the spectrum of international cooperation as a means to responding to these challenges.

Setting the Scene

Across the world, millions of children migrate every year, some within their countries and some across international borders. Despite the huge numbers, the needs and interests of migrant children are largely absent from mainstream debates on migration, as well as those about child protection and child labour. And yet, the complexities and conditions under which child migration takes place and the increased risks for this population of young migrants requires international cooperation in order to bring about comprehensive national and international responses.

Either accompanied by a relative or another adult, or unaccompanied, children are increasingly migrating across borders or within their own countries, through regular or irregular means. As a result, they now form a significant part of mixed migration flows across the globe. The exact number of children who move is not known. A recent UNICEF estimate suggests there are 33 million international migrants under the age of 20; among these 11 million are between 15 and 19 years old, and 9 million are between 10 and 14 years of age. Of the total migrant population under 20 years of age, very young children aged 5–9 are estimated to represent 7 million and those under 5 represent 6 million.2

Migrant children are by no means a homogeneous group. They are differentiated by at least ethnicity, nationality, socioeconomic status, cultural and religious background, age and gender. They migrate under a variety of circumstances and face various challenges and opportunities throughout the migration cycle.

Despite ongoing attempts by the international community and academia to capture data on migrant children, the reality is that more needs to be done to make migrant children more visible in research and data gathering at the national and international levels and to increase the consistency with which such data is collected and analysed.

Significant research on why children leave their homes in the first place has been conducted. Whether the decision was an individual one or taken by the wider family, the root causes of migration of children are the same as the reasons for migration of adults; some flee from persecution in their home countries, while a large proportion migrate in search of economic and educational opportunities. Very often, the lack of regular means to migrate leads unaccompanied migrant children to depend on smugglers or other intermediaries and embark on dangerous journeys to reach their intended destinations. Many do not reach their intended destinations and end up stranded in countries en route, facing risks of being detained, abused and exploited. Those who do arrive at their destinations are at high risk of child labour and other forms of exploitation.

Contexts of detention, discrimination, xenophobia, violence, criminalization and violation of human rights

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1 Mike Dottridge is an independent specialist on child migration and protection; Ana Fonseca is Senior Specialist at the Migrant Assistance Division of IOM in Geneva; Dr Najat Maalla M’Jid is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; Hans van de Glind is Senior Specialist for Anti-Child Trafficking and Child Migration at ILO in Geneva.

for migrant children all point to the need for more responsive policies and actions that can effectively identify, protect and assist vulnerable migrant children. In recent times, significant actors have demanded attention for protection of migrant children. In 2009, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants referred in his United Nations General Assembly Report (14 May 2009) to the obligation of States “to ensure the protection of all children in all stages of the migration process”. In the European Union, the Stockholm Programme (and more specifically the European Commission Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors) addresses the need for more concrete responses to child migration – particularly in the areas of prevention, regional protection programmes, and reception and identification of durable solutions (European Commission, 2010). In September 2012, the Committee on the Rights of the Child devoted its Day of General Discussion to the rights of all children in the context of international migration. On the Day of General Discussion, the Working Group on Children on the Move presented a joint statement advocating protection of children on the move and encouraging the participation of children in policymaking processes by listening to their experiences and ideas. Subsequently, IOM and other research-focused agencies under this Working Group published Children on the Move in April 2013, which illustrates many of the challenges for policymakers.

While relevant instruments and standards in international law are already in place for the protection and the rights of children (notably to ensure that their best interests are a primary consideration in decisions affecting them), there are many inconsistencies and gaps in national legislation and policy frameworks for child migration. Applying international law concerning child migrants at the national level is still a significant challenge for relevant government and non-governmental entities and experts across the world.

Participation of young migrants in policy debates still deserves more attention, and current protection policies may need to be revisited to account of children’s age and gender while acknowledging further the agency of migrant children and the importance of the lessons that they can teach others, including policymakers, based on their own migration experience.

3 The Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move was formed in 2011 following a global conference on children on the move held in Barcelona in October 2010. It includes the following agencies: ILO, IOM, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNICEF, Plan International, Save the Children, Terre des Hommes, the African Movement for Working Children and Youth, Environmental Development Action in the Third World, World Vision, the Oak Foundation, and individual experts and academics.

4 See http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Children_on_the_Move_19Apr.pdf.

The Rights of Children and Their Protection in the Context of Migration, by Dr Najat Maalla M’jid, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography

A wide range of circumstances are linked to child migration, such as emergency situations (e.g. conflicts and natural disasters), trafficking or sale of children (which is perpetrated by criminal networks), insecurity (for example, because of religious or ethnic discrimination), lack of opportunities (due to poverty or social disparities), escape from family or personal problems, family reunification, being left behind (for instance, because of migration of parents), and many others.

There is no homogeneous profile of migrant children. They may be accompanied, separated or alone; they are of varied ages; both boys and girls migrate; they are migrating through irregular or regular ways with those who enter a country regularly but end up in an irregular situation; they may be born in transit or destination countries; they could be victims of trafficking/sale, asylum-seekers, refugees, children left voluntarily, children-seeking family units with migrant parents; and they could be children wishing to be reunited with their families.

Despite the almost universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its three protocols, and the increasing number of ratifications of international and regional instruments related to protection of children and their rights, too many children in migration situations, particularly those migrating irregularly, are still subject to a lot of violations of their human rights.

There are a number of barriers that need to be overcome for policies to be effective in protecting children in the context of migration:

- Lack of common comprehensive understanding and knowledge

The number of children in migratory situations worldwide is increasing. However, the statistical data available is scattered and unreliable, and the evolving complex and multidimensional aspect of child migration is not well known.

5 Examples include: ILO Convention Nos. 138 and 182, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women; International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families; Palermo Protocol; the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; regional conventions in Asia-Pacific, Europe and the Americas; and African Charter bilateral and multilateral agreements.
• Inadequate approaches by States

Migration is often seen by States either as a “problem” that needs to be overcome through a repressive security-centred approach, or a reaction to emergency situations (in the case of asylum-seekers and refugees) or to transnational crime (in the case of victims of sale or trafficking). Furthermore, the primary consideration for States is the immigration status of children and not the best interests of the child.

• Gaps in laws and implementation

Legal gaps persist in many countries. Many children – because of their irregular situation and/or that of their relatives – are not considered minors. These children are usually deported or detained because of the way of determination of the minority that is often detrimental to the child. Consequently, they have no access to a legal representative or guardian, or to justice, are not well informed about their rights, cannot attend school or vocational training, do not benefit from health care or safe accommodation, and are eventually detained or deported.

• Insufficient and inaccessible medical, psychological and social care services

These services are only available in certain places and the capacity to provide comprehensive and sustainable care to children, as well as regular follow-ups, remains inadequate. A large number of children’s shelters are not governed by suitable standards and norms of child protection and are not subject to regular monitoring. Sustainable, long-term solutions in the country of origin, the host country or the third country are still very weak, and not many services are available for those approaching or those who have just turned 18.

• Transnational dimension not sufficiently taken into account

Transnational dimension is a key factor for migrant children who cross borders. Child migration is a process, a cycle involving many countries (countries of origin and destination, and one or more countries of transit and other third countries). There are many disparities in respect to laws, data processing and information sharing, and practices, procedures, and approaches and cooperation modalities among countries.

In light of this context and the challenges involved, it is important to reflect upon what needs to be done to build an effective international cooperation in order to duly protect the rights of migrant children.

To achieve international cooperation, it is crucial that there is an international agreement on key guiding principles and what measures need to be taken as a result, supported by a global and harmonized legal framework, an institutional cooperation and an appropriate framework for coordination. All these elements need to be regularly assessed, monitored and modified as appropriate.

The chart that follows presents the various elements of an international cooperation approach to the protection of children in the context of migration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global, complex and multidimensional aspects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common understanding and knowledge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harmonization of laws, regulations, procedures, practices</td>
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<tr>
<td>Effective international cooperation for effective policy responses</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protect, empower children Full access to their rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global, comprehensive and child rights-centred transnational cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common child rights-centred approaches</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reliable and standardized information system</td>
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Unaccompanied migrant children have become part of global and mixed migration flows across the world. Travelling unaccompanied (i.e. with no parents or adult relatives), on false documents or having no documents at all, the young migrants are often apprehended and sometimes detained in transit or after entering a new (host) country and may also be subject to exploitation and abuse. Despite their vulnerability, unaccompanied migrant children cannot escape the highly politicized debates on immigration policies and child welfare systems in countries to which they migrate. Public discourse is usually polarized between two key policy considerations – integration and return – with many countries adopting migration policies focused on expediting family tracing and the return of unaccompanied migrant children to their countries of origin. However, research shows that at least some unaccompanied migrant children do not want to be returned to their families because of experience of ill treatment, abuse in the family environment, armed conflict or other life threats. Thus, existing legal frameworks should not trigger the assumption that return to the families (if existing) is always in the best interests of the child (FRA, 2010).

International cooperation, as a means to ensure protection and effective responses for the protection of unaccompanied migrant children, cannot be achieved without taking into account the contexts and challenges in the countries involved in their migratory routes (which include the origin, transit and destination countries) and without addressing the whole cycle of migration, including an eventual return home or to the country of origin.

In the light of these challenges, the role of legal guardians is crucial; whether individuals or institutions, legal guardians need to fulfil their legal rights and responsibilities, requiring them to take decisions on behalf of an unaccompanied migrant child in the absence of the parents.

The constraints on these actors are numerous and, when working within and across borders with different legal frameworks, they need to be able to take effective and sustainable actions to protect and assist unaccompanied migrant children.

The key challenges in destination countries are identifying legal guardians back in children’s countries of origin (especially when these countries have weak child protection systems), determining the age of an individual, and reconciling international child protection obligations with migration policies. On the other hand, countries of origin would aim to prevent young people from migrating irregularly in the first place, ensure protection of their nationals abroad, and, for those migrant children that do return, battle for better local care facilities with the capacity to meet the basic needs of child returnees and to provide them with more age-appropriate assistance to for sustainable reintegration.

**Legal Guardianship**

The role of legal guardianship and the challenges for professionals working in the protection and direct assistance of this migrant group are still unexplored in terms of policymaking, particularly transnational cooperation among States. Different countries designate different entities as legal guardians, such as social services, immigration authorities, private persons, the ministry of justice and NGOs, among others.

For an effective response, it is important to have the involvement of legal guardians (who need to be completely neutral with respect to immigration authorities and policies) and State entities with key responsibility for the welfare of children. Evidently, it is also key that at the national and transnational levels, principles of international law are respected. The participation of the child in decision-making is also of paramount importance.

Several gaps can be found in the context of child migration in the course of the various phases of the migration cycle and in all the countries involved (origin, transit and destination): the lack of contact between legal guardians based in host and origin countries; weak or non-existent coordination among different ministries in the same country; the lack of financial and human resources at the level of relevant entities (for training and other purposes); the lack of access to services by unaccompanied migrant children; and insufficient assistance available to ensure that reintegration in the country of origin is sustainable.

It is important for international organizations that the action taken is sustainable. States and civil society promote capacity-building efforts to cover the different outcomes of the migration process, from integration to return and reintegration. These efforts should include support for young migrant networks and for partnerships of organizations with a shared vision. These would provide a solid foundation for comprehensive approaches that can tackle and respond to the challenges facing countries of origin, transit and destination.

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There is recognition that there is a need for more transnational approaches that can support further international dialogue and sharing of good practices, more links between development and child migration, and clearer standards and guidelines for legal guardians and practitioners in the field. All this should, in turn, promote greater operational cooperation between guardians in host and origin countries, more tailored responses and comprehensive solutions for migrants, and the participation of unaccompanied migrant children and former unaccompanied migrant children in policy decisions and processes.

**Child Migrants and Protection from Child Labour**, by Hans van de Glind, Senior Specialist, Anti-Child Trafficking and Child Migration, International Labour Organization

While international migration accounted for 214 million people in 2010 (according to the United Nations), these figures are dwarfed by the number of internal migrants, which was estimated to be 740 million people in 2009 (according to United Nations Development Programme). Youth make up about a third of the world’s migrants. Their number will likely rise further, as the global South has fast-growing youth populations, especially in Africa. Youth and child migrants have the right to be free from child labour according to the ILO child labour conventions, and yet it is migrant children in the South who are at high risk of child labour. Also, among child labourers, it is often the migrant children who are worse off in terms of working conditions and exposure to work hazards, pay, exposure to bondage, exposure to violence and access to education (ILO and CHI, 2012).

**Policies and services at source (prior to departure)**

Initiatives to protect migrant children from child labour prior to departure may include: improved birth registration, among others, targeting ethnic minorities and stateless children; pre-departure orientation courses for prospective migrant children of working age; raising awareness of rights and opportunities; training in life skills, negotiations, and do’s and don’ts; offering vocational skills training services that are relevant to the labour market at destination; licensing and monitoring of recruitment agencies; having all actors adhere to Article 7 of the ILO Convention 181, which states that “private employment agencies shall not charge [...] any fees or costs to workers”; providing access to cheap credit and low interest government loans to migrants who currently take loans at exorbitant interest rates, and which increases their vulnerability to exploitation; and offering credible education, training and youth employment alternatives at source to postpone the need of young people to migrate.

**Policies and services while on the move (in transit)**

Initiatives to protect migrant children from child labour while they are on the move may include training police and workers in the transport sector to monitor movement to prevent harm, without stopping migration. Initiatives to reach out to children on the move may also include information services on trains, buses, ferries and at stations. Functioning hotline services with trained staff linked to referral services is another way of reaching out to migrant children in need. Agreements that govern migration between sending and receiving areas may be another way to increase protection for migration workers, including children who have reached the minimum employment age.

**Policies and services at destination (and in workplaces)**

Initiatives to protect migrant children from child labour at destination should include compliance of countries with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the ILO child labour conventions, in that all children are equal and should be treated equally and be free from child labour.

Extending the reach of the labour law into types of work that host many migrant workers, such as domestic work and other work in the informal economy, may also help to improve protection of young migrants at work. Other initiatives to improve protection include: improved labour inspection and investing in complaints and settlement mechanisms; holding recruitment agencies liable for exploitation if employers cannot be charged; fighting the isolation of migrant children which makes them vulnerable to exploitation; promoting corporate social responsibility among employers to ensure that their entire supply chains are free from child labour, including child labour by migrant children; operating drop-in centres that offer social and legal assistance;
and, national action plans and policies on child labour, which include attention to child migrants.

To aid any future interventions, it would help if future policy research on migration and social issues (including child labour) systematically includes attention to child migrants. In both sending and destination areas, it is furthermore recommended to employ proactive policies that are partly based on forecasting migration flows of children and youth.

Finally, to ensure that “children” – among the bigger category of migrants – benefit from specific attention by policymakers, practitioners and the research community, it is important to continue to campaign for the issue. A specific opportunity may be the International Migrants Day (on 18 December), which could possibly devote special attention to migrant children in a specific future calendar year.

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International Labour Organization (ILO) and Child Helpline International (CHI)  
Child mobility and the 2013 UN High-level Dialogue

Daniela Reale1

On 3 and 4 October, the UN General Assembly session held its second High-level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development.2 The HLD was an important platform to discuss why migration and child migration in particular are central to the migration and development agenda and to share experiences on policies, concrete and coordinated measures, and actions within and across countries, and discuss how governments and the international community can do more to ensure that the specific needs and human rights of children on the move are explicitly addressed in domestic policies and international debates and processes.

Child mobility is a key issue that cuts across all the thematic areas discussed at the HLD, including:

- the link between migration and development in the post-2015 framework;
- the specific needs and rights of vulnerable migrant groups, including migrants in situation of crisis and in transit;
- the need for improved coordination and cooperation mechanisms; and
- the impact of labour mobility in international development.

To further this discussion, the Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move,3 Save the Children and the UN Missions in Italy and Mexico organized two international events in the lead up to the HLD and a high-level side event during the HLD itself.

The first event was held in April 2013 in New York during the Forty-sixth Session of the Commission on Population and Development. The second event was held during the Human Rights Council on 3 June in Geneva. Both meetings focused on why children matter in migration and development. These events saw high-level panelists, including UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants Prof. Francois Crepeau, and representatives from the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and civil society, who outline concrete measures to protect and support children on the move.

The third high-level event took place during the HLD on International Migration and Development. The aim of this event was to highlight the specific needs and human rights of children on the move so that they can be explicitly addressed by States in their domestic policies and by the international community in the follow-up process of the HLD as well as in the post-2015 negotiations. Commissioner Pillay, Mr Peter Sutherland, UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Migration, Ambassador William Swing, Director General of IOM, and Valerio Neri, CEO of Save the Children Italy were interviewed by Dave Price, a US journalist and broadcaster. On the same day of the event, a boat carrying 500 migrants capsized off the coasts of Lampedusa, Sicily, killing over 300 people. This tragedy was at the forefront of the discussion during the event and made the issue of protection of migrants’ rights even more compelling. All panellists were highly committed and vocal on the need to better protect the rights of children and using the best interests of the child as a primary consideration.

Panellists commented on the key components of a comprehensive approach to migration management that guarantees the protection of children’s rights and on how such a child-sensitive approach can be included in the HLD follow-up process. The discussion also looked at ways in which the protection of children in international migration can become an integral part of the post-2015 framework and what could be the key priorities that the post-2015 agenda should include for the protection of these children. Finally, speakers recommended that States take concrete steps to ensure adequate protection of the human rights of migrant children, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and other international human rights standards.

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1 Daniela Reale is an Adviser at Save the Children in the United Kingdom.
3 The Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move was formed in 2011, following a global conference on Children on the Move held in Barcelona in October 2010. It includes the following agencies: ILO, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF, Plan International, Save the Children, Terre des Hommes, the African Movement for Working Children and Youth, Environmental Development Action in the Third World, World Vision, the Oak Foundation, and individual experts and academics.
During the HLD on International Migration and Development, the members of the Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move called on the international community to:

1. Ensure that the needs and rights of children on the move are properly prioritized during the preparation of the post-2015 development framework. The post-2015 framework must recognize that there are 33 million international migrant children worldwide and a far higher number of children moving within countries often from rural to urban areas. Protection of children on the move must therefore be an integral part of the post-2015 framework and include explicit outcomes and indicators for children in the context of migration.

2. Ensure respect for and protection of children affected by migration: States and the international community should ensure that the UNCRC is applied in full when addressing the situation of children involved in migration. This means that the best interests of the child should be a primary consideration in all actions in their regard. Policies on migration, rights and protection of children should be coherent and based on the UNCRC, and specific procedures and tools should be in place to identify, protect and assist migrant children, in particular those most vulnerable.

3. Build partnerships and cooperation on international migration: The international community should agree on a common child protection agenda on which to base concrete proposals for normative, institutional and procedural solutions for cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination to address the situation of children who migrate.

4. Build on labour mobility and development opportunities for children on the move: Many children migrate to find work. Given the strong correlation between child mobility and youth employment, we need effective partnerships to foster educational, training and employment opportunities for children and young people in countries of origin, transit and destination. We need to build on the great opportunities that migration opens up to children and their families while protecting them against the risk of unsafe migration and exploitation, including child labour, through access to appropriate protection services.

The explicit reference to children, child rights and best interests of the child in the HLD’s outcome document is very welcome. This is an important step forward in a debate where children on the move were, until very recently, virtually invisible. In particular, the declaration states:

- Reaffirm the need to promote and protect effectively the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, especially those of women and children, and to address international migration through international, regional or bilateral cooperation and dialogue and through a comprehensive and balanced approach, recognizing the roles and responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination in promoting and protecting the human rights of all migrants, and avoiding approaches that might aggravate their vulnerability.

- Express the commitment to protect the human rights of migrant children, given their vulnerability, particularly unaccompanied migrant children, and to provide for their health, education and psychosocial development, ensuring that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in policies of integration, return and family reunification.

A key issue discussed during the HLD focused on protection of migrants stranded in vulnerable situations. During the HLD, the United States and the Philippines agreed to work on the development of a “framework” specifically aimed at assisting and supporting migrants stranded in vulnerable situations. It is absolutely crucial that such a framework includes a clear and explicit focus on migrant children.

Finally, the HLD outcome document also places some emphasis on international cooperation and on the responsibilities of countries of origin, transit and destination, which the organization members of the Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move have indicated as a key issue to better protect children on the move during their migratory journey.

All these are good steps towards a more child rights-focused approach to international migration and development. It is crucial that concrete steps follow the HLD and that children are placed at the centre.
People on the move in a changing climate: What role for regional policy?

Karoline Popp

With growing attention to the consequences of climatic and environmental change for migration, policymakers and the research community alike have made calls for regional approaches to environmental migration. Regional cooperation has become a set feature of governance in most parts of the world. Existing institutional structures for political and economic integration, albeit at different levels of maturity, offer a natural space to extend collaboration to emerging challenges, such as environmental migration. In addition, most migration is regional, and empirical findings suggest that regional, rather than long-distance, movements will likely predominate where individuals cross borders due to environmental factors. Evidence compiled in the recently published Springer volume *People on the Move in a Changing Climate: The Regional Impact of Environmental Change on Migration* confirms the relevance of applying a regional scale to the analysis and reveals that environmental migration plays out in largely similar ways in different major regions of the globe, although availability of data is uneven.

From a global governance perspective, migration on the one hand and environmental issues and climate change on the other hand rank high on the list of concerns, but equally high among the most intractable issues on the international policy agenda: political sensitivities are palpable and positions and interests disparate, consensus is inchoate at best, and the powers of regional and international institutions to impose policies or laws are limited. Unsurprisingly, these obstacles are magnified when the two issues are combined. In addition, policymaking in this area has been beset by institutional(ized) blind spots: where policy silos – such as development, security or environment – are deeply entrenched, a cross-cutting issue such as environmental migration is liable to be dealt with in a partial manner, or not at all. Blind spots are also reflected in and perpetuated by the segregation between policy communities: for example, most policy processes on migration would not typically include environmental experts, or vice versa.

Having established that, as a policy matter, approaches to environmental migration are likely to be fraught with fragmentation; regional initiatives on environmental migration cannot be analysed exclusively within the logic of migration policy. Instead, other spheres of policymaking have contributed significantly to shaping the debate. Environmental migration needs a “carrier”: rather than a stand-alone policy item, it tends to be embedded in broader, more established policy domains. A review of regional initiatives, processes and institutions that are State-led or that at least show significant degree of State involvement reveals that while there is little evidence of concrete regional action, environmental migration has begun to permeate policy awareness, mainly through exhortatory statements of intent and soft policy tools. Environmental migration has entered regional policymaking and cooperation through four principal tracks: the migration track, the climate track, the security track and the human rights track. This article outlines selected examples of regional policy initiatives in each of these categories, before concluding with a broader assessment of the state of regional policymaking on environmental migration.

The Migration Track

The African Union (AU) pioneered the inclusion of environmental considerations in regional migration policy, specifically in its *Migration Policy Framework for Africa* adopted in 2006: the document recognizes environmental factors, both degradation and disasters, among the drivers of mass migration and forced displacement in Africa, including internal displacement, refugee movements, rural–urban migration, and cross-border migration in its analysis. Unusually, the AU Framework also pays attention to the environmental impact of migration and displacement, such as pressure on natural resources and urban infrastructure and services as well as environmental degradation caused by large numbers of displaced persons. To what extent the goals stated on paper are implemented in practice is an open question, given that the Framework is not binding and in the absence of a monitoring or implementation mechanisms, States have considerable discretion in applying the recommendations contained therein.

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The European Union (EU) has almost exclusively treated environmental migration as a matter external to the EU region, not an intra-EU phenomenon. Environmental migration has emerged in various branches of the EU’s work, in particular the EU’s external migration policy, where environmental migration has found its way into instruments such as the 2009 Stockholm Programme and the 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. Most recently, the European Commission issued a Commission Staff Working Document on climate change, environmental degradation and migration\(^4\) (April 2013), which is the result of broad consultation among relevant directorates of the European Commission, but does not make legislative and policy proposals. The document is noteworthy in its focus on creating coherence between environmental migration and different existing EU policy or funding instruments. While this comprehensive analysis is encouraging and the paper acknowledges “the need to strengthen policy coherence at the EU level”, the paper limits itself to general recommendations in the areas of research, dialogue and cooperation. By contrast, the EC Thematic Programme on cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (strategy for 2011—2013)\(^5\) comes closer to concrete action and, importantly, financial commitments, with “migration and climate change” being one of 12 thematic priorities for funding.

Regional Consultative Processes on Migration (RCPs) have so far played a rather limited role in putting environmental migration on regional policy agendas. Their informal, non-binding nature and relative flexibility in agenda setting would seem well suited for a potentially controversial topic,\(^6\) but a combination of limited interest, limited capacity and limited participation – many RCPs are based on well-established circles of officials specialized in a certain area of migration policy, such as labour migration or counter-trafficking, and rarely involve officials from other policy domains – may explain why RCPs have been less active in raising awareness of environmental migration. Nonetheless, the South American Conference on Migration had tabled a discussion on migration and climate change in 2010 and subsequently adopted the South American Human Development Plan for Migration, which recognizes, in passing, “environmental factors” as among the possible causes of migration flows. Similarly, the Colombo Process in Asia urged participating States “to further explore the possible nexus between environmental degradation and climate change on one hand and human mobility on the other, and its likely implications on labour migration” in the final declaration of its Fourth Ministerial Consultations in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 2011.

### The Climate Track

The Pacific Islands, as may be expected, have a significant track record in collective regional engagement on climate change, yet there has been comparatively little joint action on the migratory consequences of climate change. Notably, the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration (first endorsed in 2005, revised in 2007) and the 2006—2015 Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change make no mention of migration, displacement and, least of all, of relocation in relation to environmental factors. One reason for the relative silence on the subject may be found in the divergent positions among Pacific Island States, with some fearing that planning for the movement of people will reduce the sense of urgency in combatting climate change.\(^7\) Nonetheless, a stronger statement is found in the 2011 Communiqué of the Forty-Second Pacific Islands Forum\(^8\) in which, under the subheading “climate change”, “leaders stressed the critical and urgent need for adaptation finance to enable Forum Island Countries to respond to the adaptation needs of its people, in particular those already suffering, are displaced or are being displaced as a result of the detrimental impacts of climate change.”

A different take on the issue of environmental migration comes from the Council of Arab Ministers responsible for the environment, where references to migration appear within the parameters of disaster risk reduction and sustainable development in the 2010 Arab Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction.\(^9\) The framework recognizes the displacement consequences of natural and human-induced hazards and concludes that “in combination with the current demographic trends, most parts of the region will experience severe migration pressures as a result of which the most vulnerable groups, especially women, are likely to be the most affected”. Internally displaced persons are considered a vulnerable group in the Strategy’s key priorities for action.

### The Security Track

In Europe, both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the EU have situated the issue of environmental migration in a security context.

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The OSCE’s 2007 Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security\(^{10}\) states that “environmental degradation, including both natural and man-made disasters, and their possible impact on migratory pressures, could be a potential additional contributor to conflict. Climate change may magnify these environmental challenges.” More recently, the Economic and Environmental Activities unit of the OSCE launched a project on the security implications of climate change, with the objective of creating regional scenarios on the impact of climate change on security. An externally commissioned scoping report\(^ {11}\) for the project dating from 2010 clearly identifies migration and population displacement as a security risk, highlighting the Southern Mediterranean as a region of concern and projecting that of the “50 million African environmental refugees [sic]” most will “want to relocate to Europe”, although it remains unclear how the report arrives at this conclusion. This type of analysis is echoed in other parts of the study. Having been produced externally, the report does not represent a formal OSCE position on the subject, but is nevertheless likely to have influenced the approach taken in the project.

While the EU has approached environmental migration from various policy angles as mentioned above, it was the EU’s foreign policy arm that introduced the issue under the rubric of security in the 2008 European Commission report to the European Council on climate change and international security, which became known as the Solana Report.\(^ {12}\) The report identifies migration as a potential future threat and warns of increased migration pressures towards Europe and links with instability and conflict. A more recent Joint Reflection Paper\(^ {13}\) by the European External Action Service and the European Commission accompanying the conclusions on EU Climate Diplomacy of 2011 explicitly references migration but comes to more nuanced conclusions, stating that “while climate change alone does not cause conflict, it is leading to increased competition for scarce resources, further weaken fragile governments and exacerbates migratory pressures.”

The Human Rights Track

The 2009 AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (known as the Kampala Convention)\(^ {14}\) has attracted much attention, being one of the few binding instruments to link displacement and climate change. The convention stipulates that “States Parties shall take measures to protect and assist persons who have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate change” (under Article 5: Obligations of State Parties relating to Protection and Assistance). Given that the convention entered into force only in December 2012 with the necessary 15 ratifications, it is difficult to assess its impact at the domestic level at this point. It is important to note, however, that in contrast to other regional policies discussed here, the Kampala Convention only applies to internal displacement, not cross-border movement. So while it emerged from regional cooperation, it is ultimately only relevant at the level of individual countries, and will not influence responses to regional migration patterns brought about by environmental factors.

Also, on the African continent, the Lomé Declaration on Protection Challenges to Climate Change in West Africa of 2009, initiated by the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States, makes ambitious calls for a new legal instrument to protect those displaced by climate change and, unusually, highlights migrants as a group vulnerable to climate change: “recognizing the urgency to encourage the recognition of the protection needs of populations which are not taken into due account by the existing legal instruments (International Refugee Law, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Refugee Convention of the Organization of African Union)”. The Declaration goes on to recommend “the establishment of measures to protect the various categories of populations affected by climate change, including migrants, and especially, women, youth, children, disabled people and other vulnerable groups, in order to preserve the full enjoyment of their fundamental human rights” as well as “the drafting of a new legal instrument aimed at ensuring protection for climate change displaced persons, residing outside their country of origin”. It seems, however, that nearly three years after the adoption of the Declaration, no further steps have been taken to transform its exhortations into action, let alone into legal instruments\(^ {15}\).

Conclusion

Regional policy and cooperation on environmental migration have often remained at the level of informal, non-binding dialogue (such as those held in the context of RCPs), have in some instances translated into “soft” regional policy (including in broader policy frameworks advanced by more formalized regional institutions and regional economic communities), and in a few cases

\(^{10}\) See http://www.osce.org/mc/29550.

\(^{11}\) A. Maas, et al., Shifting Bases, Shifting Perils: A Scoping Study on Security Implications of Climate Change in the OSCE Region (Berlin, Adelphi Research/Chatham House/CIMERA, 2010).


\(^{14}\) See http://www.internal-displacement.org/kampala-convention.

have acquired legal force (the main example being the Kampala Convention).

Overall, regional policy action on environmental migration remains incipient, indirect, informal and often incoherent: incipient, because most initiatives are barely half a decade old and are in many instances not fully mature, making assessments of levels of implementation or effectiveness very difficult. Indirect, as the examples show that the linkages between migration and the environment are entering the policy discourse via other issues that may perpetuate segmented policy approaches: whether environmental migration is addressed in a migration, environment, security or human rights context will influence how it is conceptualized and the kind of policy responses that would be contemplated. With very few exceptions, policy and cooperation remains informal and does not produce outcomes that would be binding on States or lead to legislative changes. As a result, it is doubtful whether any regional cooperation mechanisms could be relied upon in the event that a large number of people move in response to environmental factors. Lastly, the existence of numerous initiatives in parallel and from different policy angles, sometimes within the same region, spells the risk of incoherence.

As the work of regional institutions and integration processes and RCPs is ongoing, the assessment of many of the initiatives described above will soon be in need of an update. As a possible extension of this research, it may be useful to examine other possible “tracks” and entry points for environmental migration, in particular in the realm of regional development cooperation. A question for future analysis is how existing and nascent regional migration schemes will respond to environmental migration. While a number of regions have moved towards varying degrees of free movement of people, it remains to be seen if these emerging regimes will withstand any additional migration pressure arising from environmental factors or whether the trend towards greater openness and freedom of movement may experience a reversal.
Mixed migration into Libya: Mapping migration routes from Africa to Europe and drivers of migration in post-revolution Libya

Arezo Malakooti

Since the turn of the century, migration flows into Libya, thanks to its geographic location among six bordering countries, and through the country, due its strategic positioning between Africa and Europe, have steadily increased. As the migration flows are mixed, the countries of origin and the motivations may vary, but the migrants follow the same routes and most of them claim to be drawn to Libya for the opportunities that exist in terms of income generation.

Between January and May in 2013, Altai Consulting conducted a research study to better understand the routes that these migrants take in order to reach Libya, to better understand the drivers of their migration, to look at how the situation has changed since the revolution and to pinpoint protection needs. The study was commissioned by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Libya.

Methodology

The methodology involved a number of qualitative research modules that spanned two continents and seven countries and that resulted in 92 in-depth interviews with migrants and 86 key informant interviews. The research modules were as follows:

1. **Secondary research**, involving a literature review and high-level key informant interviews at the national level in Libya.
2. **Fieldwork in 10 Libyan “hotspots”**, involving in-depth qualitative interviews with migrants and key informants in ten locations that were deemed to be hotspots on the migration route in Libya.
3. **Fieldwork in countries of origin and transit** (Ethiopia, Niger, Somaliland and Sudan), involving in-depth qualitative interviews with migrants and key informant interviews with practitioners, actors and government authorities.
4. **Fieldwork in countries of destination** (Malta and Italy), involving in-depth qualitative interviews with migrants and key informants in the form of practitioners, actors and government authorities.

This study also built upon the findings from two other studies (i.e. one is “A Social and Economic Assessment of Urban Refugees in Three Libyan Cities” and the other is “Assessing Genealogical Profiles, Access to Documentation and Access to Services in Southern Libya”) conducted for this tri-layered project for UNHCR Libya, which included 400 interviews with asylum-seekers in Libya and 600 interviews with tribal groups (who represent another form of cross-border movement and are prominent in the smuggling business). This means that the findings for this study were informed by 1,000 quantitative interviews, as well as 178 qualitative interviews.

Main travel routes and the journey to Libya

The research resulted in a number of maps that were produced to delineate all the main routes of travel from sub-Saharan Africa to Libya. The map on the next page illustrates all the main routes coming to Libya. For more specific, individual maps, please refer to the final report.

1. **The East Africa route**

The East Africa route is followed by Sudanese, Ethiopian, Eritrean and Somali migrants and asylum-seekers. Somalis and Somalilanders make their way to Addis Ababa where they join Ethiopian migrants and also Eritrean migrants who came via Asmara or Massawa. From Addis Ababa, the migrants move to Khartoum where they change smugglers and make the final leg of the journey to Kufra, Libya. This final leg requires 4 to 10 days in the Sahara and is consequently quite risky and also expensive. Most stages of this journey require a smuggler.

Since the revolution, clashes between the Tebu and the Zway in Kufra have decreased flows into this region, and most smugglers now take groups via Tazerbo in order to avoid the region.

Some asylum-seekers spend time in the refugee camps in Sudan, but Ethiopians and Eritreans are concerned that spies from their governments monitor the camps and so do not stay for long. Other asylum-seekers are pushed out by the encampment policy in Sudan, which prevents them from building a life. Often smugglers are
also used to move from the camps to Khartoum. Many spend some time working in Khartoum in order to make money for the next leg of the journey.

There is a new route emerging through Egypt, where Sudanese migrants make their way to Cairo (usually by plane) and then connect with smugglers that take them to the Libyan border at Salloum-Um Saad.

2. Routes through Niger

Routes through Niger are common for West and Central African migrants who wish to reach Libya. Depending on where they start their journey, migrants take different routes that end in either Mali or Niger, from where they continue to Libya, either directly or through Algeria.

From Mali, they have the choice of either going southeast through Niger or directly north through Algeria. The Bamako-to-Tamanrasset route involves crossing the desert, which makes it a difficult journey, but crossing the border into Algeria is easy for Malian passport holders and many buy false Malian passports on the market to facilitate their travel.

For those that move through Niger, they travel by bus to Agadez (facilitated by the ease of movement within the Economic Community of West African States region), which has become a major smuggling hub, and from there connect with smugglers that take them to Libya.

The journey is conducted in stages, and migrants typically pass through Dirkou, Madama, Al Wigh, Ghatrun and Murzuk, often changing smugglers for each leg.

Some travel though Algeria to get to Libya, instead of entering directly from Niger. Many spend time in Tamanrasset to make money for the next leg of the journey. This route is quite risky, given the presence of terrorist groups attacking convoys and affecting kidnappings and given the harsh terrain (also involves crossing the desert). Consequently, it is quite expensive. There is a relatively minor route from Chad to Libya, which takes Chadians, Western Sudanese and Cameroonian men from Ndjamen to Sabha.

3. Routes within Libya and onto Europe

Once in Libya, most migrants head north to cities with good employment opportunities (e.g. Tripoli and Benghazi) or to the coastline where they board boats to Europe.

The journey from Sabha to Tripoli involves a number of checkpoints, which is why it is usually undertaken with a smuggler. Despite this, however, there are very few reports of detention or deportation along this road.

The journey from Kufra to Benghazi or Tripoli can be undertaken by bus for some portions but requires a
smuggler for other portions. This route passes through Ajdabiya, and the road from Ajdabiya to Tripoli tends to be particularly problematic as many migrants report being detained there.

For those wishing to move on to Europe, smugglers organize boat trips that leave from the Libyan coast, somewhere between Tripoli and the Tunisian border.

With these routes, if a smuggler is not used for the entire journey, it will at least be used for key locations, particularly at border crossings or where the terrain is harsh and a solid knowledge of the area is required for passage. Some tribal groups were found to be active in the smuggling business because of their knowledge of the desert and their ability to move over borders (e.g. Tebu, Tuareg and Zway in Libya; and the Rashaida in Eritrea and Sudan).

4. Circulation of information

Information sources: Some villages have produced so many migrants that information on how to make the journey to Libya is now common knowledge, particularly in Chad, Niger and Sudan. Moreover, migrants in Europe often call those in Libya, or migrants in Libya call friends and family back home, to relay information about their journey. There are also points along the route that act as information hubs, such as Agadez in Niger, Sharia-Arabin in Sabha, and Omdurman in Sudan.

Types of information: Although information is available, most migrants begin their journey with little information because they are selective in what they want to know. Learning about the risks of the journey does not deter them as they believe that nothing can be worse than what they are currently living and, despite a dangerous journey, they believe that their life will improve once they arrive at their destinations. Unrealistic expectations of their migration is fuelled by migrants in destination who rarely send negative news home because of the pressure on them to succeed, which creates a distorted understanding of life abroad.

5. Drivers of migration to Libya: Push and pull factors

Migrants are drawn to Libya because there are good employment prospects, relatively high wages and relatively easy passage to Europe, particularly in the post-revolution environment where controls are minimal.

While migrants are attracted to Libya for employment reasons, competition for low-skilled jobs is immense (given the increasing numbers of low-skilled migrants entering the country) and incidences of labour exploitation are rife, meaning that most do not make as much money as they expected. However, as Libya is a resource-rich country with a high GDP per capita but a small population, certain industries suffer from a lack of labour supply, which has increased demand for foreign labour in the form of migrants.

Migrants who manage to find stable employment and are well integrated, such as Arab migrants, are more likely to stay in Libya. Western and Eastern African migrants fall on the other side of the spectrum and are far more likely to board boats to Europe, particularly the East African asylum-seekers who are looking for protection. The presence of networks in Europe and the high levels of abuse and vulnerability in Libya are other factors that cause migrants to move on.

6. Types of migrants in Libya

Regular economic migrants tend to be Tunisians, Westerners (Europeans, Americans, etc.) or from the Indian subcontinent. However, the demarcation between regular and irregular migrants in Libya is blurry at best with many moving between the two regularly.

In any case, irregular economic migrants have been the biggest group of migrants in the country, and they tend to be Egyptians (the largest migrant group in the country), Sudanese, Nigerians, Chadians and Western Africans. Some of them are seasonal migrants, meaning they repeat their migration on a regular basis, particularly those that come from neighbouring Sahelian States that are reliant on crops and affected by recurrent drought. However, seasonal migrants tend to be both regular and irregular.

There is also a small community of asylum-seekers, mainly Syrians, Eritreans, Somalis, Ethiopians, Palestinians and Iraqis. While the Arab asylum-seekers are well integrated and, in some cases, have a refugee status that they gained under the former regime, the African asylum-seekers, particularly those that arrived recently, are vulnerable to abuse and exploitation and arbitrary arrest and detention (since Libya maintains no framework for asylum). This causes them to live deeply underground in Libya and to board boats to Europe as soon as they have enough money to do so.

Involuntary migrants, or those who are victims of kidnapping, misinformation and trafficking, also enter the country but to a much lesser extent. Migrants are sometimes fooled by being made false promises of employment in Libya. Trafficking is less frequent but usually happens among Nigerian women being forced into prostitution. Kidnapping is particularly common at the border crossing between Eritrea and Sudan.
Outflows from Libya

Boats leaving the Libyan coast are aiming for Lampedusa, Italy, but some become lost at sea and are rescued by the Maltese coast guards. Malta now receives more migrants, per capita, than any other developed nation in the world. In the ten-year period between 2002 and 2012, 16,645 migrants arrived in Malta by boat, almost all of which came from Libya. In 2012, the recognition rate was 78 per cent and the main nationality of arrivals was Somali. Roughly 80 to 90 per cent of arrivals were rescued at sea and UNHCR Malta estimates that in 2011, 2.5 per cent of those making the journey died at sea. All migrants are detained on arrival and until their status is determined, at the exception of the vulnerable.

Between 2001 and 2011, 190,425 migrants arrived by boat in Lampedusa, roughly 60 per cent of which came from Libya. Migrants prefer Italy because it is on the mainland and they can move to other parts of Europe more easily from there, especially given the fact that boat arrivals in Lampedusa are transferred to the mainland for processing. Also, Italy does not have a policy of systematic detention. Actors in the field estimate that probably 5 to 10 per cent of boats that were aiming for Italy were lost at sea.

Other outflows from Libya include forced deportation by the Government, voluntary returns using smuggling routes and assisted voluntary returns through the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Embassies are often contacted by migrants when in detention. They usually only succeed in releasing them on the promise that they will be sent home and they usually coordinate with IOM for voluntary returns.

Perspectives and concluding notes

Mixed migration flows to Libya are problematic for a number of reasons and present a number of concerns, thereby requiring effective management. More specifically:

• There are a number of countries of origin and a spectrum of pre-departure situations which lead to a variety of profiles of migrants.
• In transit countries, there are a number of obstacles and consequent vulnerabilities that migrants are faced with, ranging from legal constraints, lack of job opportunities, racism, crime and smuggling, and challenges represented by the terrain (desert and sea) to their irregular status and their general lack of rights.
• The governments of these transit countries have their own policies for dealing with migrants, which means the situation changes from country to country and often migration organizations need to adapt their own strategies and preferences to respect the decisions of the local governments.
• There is a lack of formal coordination across countries and few concrete attempts to create regional border management strategies, which contributes to the contextual inconsistencies that migrants face as they pass through various countries.
• In parallel, there are also different reception arrangements at the European ports of arrival as well as a growing concern about boat arrivals in Europe as the countries of destination struggle with the large flows they receive.

Given such a landscape, there is a need for a comprehensive approach to the management of mixed migration based on the spectrum of vulnerabilities and risks, actors and opportunities that exist. Given the mixed flows and the challenges in separating asylum-seekers from other migrants, tight coordination between the various actors in the field is essential in order to ensure that the issues at stake are effectively targeted. Specifically:

• It would need to take into account all key countries along the route (from countries of origin to destination) and the different actors that exist across the route.
• In each country, specific obstacles and areas of vulnerability can be highlighted.
• In each country, local authorities and existing initiatives, actors and assets would be assessed, together with their willingness to collaborate in a collective effort.
• Each area of vulnerability would be linked to a strategy to address it, as well as a number of actors able to coordinate their work, across countries. This should lead to a number of action plans, covering the entire matrix of issues and opportunities, with a time dimension to be integrated so that initiatives are appropriately placed at the relevant points along the route.
• This work plan would be presented to all relevant actors in a multi-year strategy to manage mixed migration between Africa and Europe (probably requiring preliminary data to be gathered in West Africa and Morocco to ensure that the plan is comprehensive).
• Once validated by all stakeholders, the work plan would need to be closely monitored on a yearly basis to ensure that lessons learned, best practices and successes are built upon accordingly while also allowing any inconsistencies to be addressed.

For further details, please refer to the full report, available at: www.altaiconsulting.com/mixedmigrationlibya.
Death at the border: The challenge of documenting lives lost during migration

Tara Brian

The recent shipwreck off the cost of Lampedusa, in which over 360 people lost their lives, highlights the growing risks that migrants are taking around the world to reach their destinations. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently calculated that at least 2,400 migrants died in 2013 in regions where such data exist. During their journeys, many face great danger as they travel over land, sea and air to reach their destinations, and countless lives are lost in deserts, seas and mountains, their bodies left in unmarked graves or carried by currents to remote shorelines. Even along well-travelled divides between the global South and the global North – the southern border of the European Union (EU), the borderlands between Mexico and the United States, and the waters surrounding Australia – where tragedies are relatively more visible, the vast majority of governments do not publish numbers of deaths, and counting the lives lost is largely left to civil society and the media. Counting the number of lives lost is a daunting task and one that can never hope to be complete. However, not only could more complete data bring greater attention to the extent of the tragedy, but improved documentation is crucial in guiding effective policy.

What counts?

In addition to the challenges of finding physical evidence of death, the definition of what constitutes a border-related death is hazy, and how deaths are measured may be influenced by the political motivations of those recording data. At times, numbers for the same border regions vary widely by collecting body. In part, what constitutes a border-related death is dependent on how the border is defined. In their book Globalization and Borders: Death at the Global Frontier, Weber and Pickering refer to “functionally mobile borders” that extend both within and beyond a State’s territorial limits.

Several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) track deaths in regions known for high irregular migration flows and dangerous border crossings, including the southern border of the EU, the South Pacific/Australia and the United States–Mexico border region. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Danish Refugee Council, some National Societies of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and organizations like Refugees International, among others, also report on deaths in some areas, such as crossings of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Most organizations count deaths along exterior borders, either through remains found or through reports of departures that have no corresponding arrival information. Some, however, such as UNITED for Intercultural Action, which maintains a “list of deaths” of migrants attempting to enter the EU, adopt a more expansive view of border control that is more closely aligned with Weber and Pickering’s functional border notion. Hence, although most in UNITED’s list have died at sea, the list also includes deaths at the internal border that have occurred through suicide in detention, loss of life through lack of access to medical care that can be attributed to a migrant’s irregular status, violent death during deportation or in other circumstances involving border control officials, and others. In contrast to this wide-ranging definition of the border, agencies on the United States–Mexico border tend to count deaths based on the locality in which remains are discovered. While this may seem more straightforward, complications arise. For instance, how should skeletal remains from unknown years be counted? At what geographical line do deaths stop being considered “migration related”? And how complete are counts based on medical examiners’ records that necessarily must exclude all deaths for which bodies are never found? (Weber and Pickering, 2011).

Counting the dead

United States–Mexico border

Despite the many challenges involved in counting border-related deaths, rough estimates can be determined. For instance, according to the US Border Patrol, which began publishing data on deaths in 1998, over 5,500 migrants have died in the border region between 1998 and 2012 (Anderson, 2013). The Border

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1 Tara Brian is a Research Officer in IOM’s Migration Research Division, based in Geneva.
2 Counting the number of border-related deaths globally is a daunting task and one that can never hope to capture the full number of lives lost. This figure represents only a minimum estimate of recoded deaths in relatively well-documented border regions, namely the southern border of the EU, the United States–Mexico border region, Australian waters, the Bay of Bengal, the Caribbean, and some isolated incidents in North and Southern Africa.
3 For instance, there are disputes regarding the data collected along the United States–Mexico border by civil society, the Mexican Government and the US Government. See Weber and Pickering (2013), pages 47–51.
Patrolled by Australian naval and coastguard vessels, are Bay of Bengal unlikely to be officially documented. Deaths occurring beyond Australian waters, yet and does not claim to be a comprehensive account of all deaths. Deaths occurring beyond Australian waters, yet patrolled by Australian naval and coastguard vessels, are unlikely to be officially documented.

**Australia/Indonesia**

The most comprehensive source of data on deaths in Australian waters is the Australian Border Deaths Database of Monash University, which began recording deaths associated with Australia’s borders in 2011. Covering the period from 1 January 2000 to the present, the database now contains a record of over 1,487 deaths. The list is compiled through a combination of media search and networking with NGOs and lawyers, and does not claim to be a comprehensive account of all deaths. Deaths occurring beyond Australian waters, yet patrolled by Australian naval and coastguard vessels, are unlikely to be officially documented.

**Bay of Bengal**

A large number of asylum-seekers have met their deaths crossing the Bay of Bengal. UNHCR estimates that in 2012 roughly 13,000 people left on smugglers’ boats, with about 500 of them perishing at sea (UNHCR, 2013a). Estimates cited by Refugees International suggest over 700 deaths between October 2012 and September 2013, as migrants travel by boat to Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia (IRIN, 2013).

**Europe**

It is estimated that in just over two decades about 20,000 people have lost their lives in efforts to reach the EU’s southern border (Fortress Europe, n.d.). Mainly compiled through media reports and its network of over 500 NGOs in Europe and North Africa, UNITED’s list of deaths associated with EU border control includes 17,306 deaths from 1 January 1993 to November 2012. According to a recent report from Altai Consulting (2013) on mixed migration flows to Libya, actors in the field estimate that likely 5–10 per cent of boats leaving Libya for Italy are lost at sea.

**Northern Africa and the Sahara**

Although the devastating and recurring tragedies on the Mediterranean are regularly covered in mainstream media, little is known about the experiences of migrants as they transit through the Sahara to Libya and other countries along the northern coast of Africa, either to remain and work in these countries or to board boats for Europe. Primarily from the Horn of Africa and Western and Central Africa, these migrants often must travel long distances through treacherous terrain and are subject to violence, exploitation, kidnapping, abduction, detention and deceit. A recent study on the routes of irregular migrants travelling to Libya, the principal location of departure for Europe, gives an indication of the scale of flows. For instance, the authors estimate that each month anywhere from 2,000 to 8,000 Western and Central Africans travel through Agadez, Niger, to Sabha in southwestern Libya (Altai Consulting, 2013:37 – see article in this edition). Other routes, from the Horn of Africa, for instance, are also highly travelled. Through interviews with smuggled migrants, it is evident that death often occurs, although numbers go largely unrecorded. It is not uncommon for smugglers to abandon sick or injured migrants so they do not hold the others back, often leaving them in the desert to fend for themselves. While some make it to neighbouring towns, others are unable to survive, their bodies buried in unmarked graves in the sand (Altai Consulting, 2013). Still others are injured, or even killed, while squeezed in the back of overcrowded vehicles (Altai Consulting, 2013).

**The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden**

Additionally, a large flow of migrants from the Horn cross the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden every year to reach Yemen. According to UNHCR, since 2006, close to half a million (some 487,000) people have arrived in Yemen through mixed migration movements (UNHCR, 2013b). Although numbers of arrivals remain high, figures collected by coastal monitors suggest the rate of death during crossing has decreased in recent years, from 1,056 in 2008, to 529 in 2009, 19 in 2010 (DRC and RMMS, 2012:35) and just 5 in the first half of 2013, according to UNHCR (2013b). This decline in deaths at sea may, in part, be due to training provided by UNHCR and other agencies to the Yemeni coast guard to allow boats to come closer to shore for passengers to disembark. Because authorities are aware these boats contain irregular migrants, previously the coast guard would attempt to intercept the boats, a practice that resulted in smugglers throwing passengers who were unable to swim overboard far from shore (DRC and RMMS, 2012). Other reasons for the decline in deaths may be a decreased number of travellers in general, as access to the Gulf States through Yemen becomes increasingly difficult (Siegfried, 2013). Numbers
collected relating to drowning or missing at sea are likely a considerable underestimation, however. Even before the sea voyage, migrants traversing overland to reach the coastline are also at great risk. In a recent study by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) in which Ethiopian migrants were interviewed, although the figure is impossible to verify, some respondents claimed that as many as 50 per cent of those who begin the migration journey die from either exposure to the elements or suffocation in transit (DCR and RMMS, 2012:35). Still, other migrants travel overland via the Sinai to Israel and perhaps on to the Gulf States or Europe, a route which is also becoming increasingly cut off (Siegfried, 2013); others head south towards South Africa.

**Gender- and border-related deaths**

Some research suggests men and women may face differing degrees of risk associated with the various hazards involved in illegal border crossings. For instance, research suggests women are more likely to die crossing physical borders between nation-States, than at internal border sites, such as at detention centres – through suicide or violence, for instance (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013). Furthermore, Pickering and Cochrane (2013) found that the cause of death for women was more likely to be drowning than it was for men when crossing to Europe or Australia (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013:37). An examination of the sinking of the SIEV X in 2001 near West Java, which killed over 350 people, revealed that women were more likely to die than men. Seventy-seven per cent of the men on board drowned, whereas 93 per cent of the women and 95 per cent of the children on the boat drowned (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013:41). Women and children were also found to be more likely to die in recently uncovered data on Christmas Island (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013:41). Qualitative and anecdotal evidence suggest pregnancy may be a feature of women who die by drowning (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013). The manner of death may also be influenced by the location of women in vessels when incidents occur – for instance, during sea voyages, women and children may be more likely to be located in areas below deck where exposure to fumes, leaking water and other hazards is more likely (Pickering and Cochrane, 2013). Women may also face greater risks during travel in the United States–Mexico borderlands; Amnesty International (2010), for instance, suggests that as many as 60 per cent of women without proper documentation travelling through Mexico to the United States are victims of sexual violence.

**Concluding note**

The recent sequence of tragedies at sea involving migrants and asylum-seekers – including the death of at least 18 Haitians when their boat capsized just 150 metres from shore on Christmas day – has brought the issue of “desperation migration” to the forefront of policymakers’ attention. While this short article does not address the complex factors that play a role in greater border-related deaths, it illustrates the need for improved methods of documenting the extent of the tragedy that is occurring. More accurate and comprehensive data can serve as a base on which to assess the efficacy of policy intervention. Furthermore, by counting the dead, the lives that are lost are recognized, where too often they remain invisible.

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Book Review: Exodus: Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century, by Paul Collier

Frank Laczko

Sir Paul Collier’s recent book Exodus has received a great deal of media attention in recent months, including a review in The Economist and an op-ed article in The New York Times. The book examines what determines migration decisions and the impact of migration on host societies, the migrants and those “left behind”. Collier sets out to write a “critique of the prevailing thinking among liberal thinkers” about migration and its benefits. Perhaps, not surprisingly, the book has not been well received by many migration and development experts. One reviewer writes, many of the solutions to migration proposed by Collier “are morally questionable”, another review suggests “the book’s conclusions are alarming”, while another states “there is often a chasm between the evidence and Collier’s more contentious arguments”. Others argue that “Collier has written an extended apologia for the tight stricures on immigration and . . . for a global system of coercive quotas on people moving from poorer to richer countries”. Another review concludes: “there is a feast of ideas in Collier’s book, but the dominance of rhetorical spice over evidence-based nutrition makes the meal rather indigestible”. This “review of reviews” looks at why Collier’s book has aroused so much controversy and some of its key arguments. Why has Exodus provoked such critical reviews? The answer is probably because of the assertions made in the book, its timing and the profile of the author. Collier is a very well-respected development economist, a former Director of Research at the World Bank, who is a self-confessed member of the “liberal-left elite”. Collier’s views on development are influential. He is best known for his work on Africa and books such as The Bottom Billion. The book has also been published at a critical moment in time for those who work on migration and development. Migration scholars already have a hard time trying to persuade the development community to take migration issues seriously. Too often migration is seen as a result of a lack of development, rather than a positive force for development. Migration was not factored into the Millennium Development Goal framework, but many argue that it should be integrated into the post-2015 global development framework. Not least because remittances are more than three times greater than official development aid, and the increased mobility of people would have a beneficial impact on the global economy.

What are some of the main arguments of Collier’s book? Collier argues that the migration debate is too often polarized between two extremes: “popular hostility to migrants, tinged by xenophobia; and the views of business and liberal elites that ‘open doors’ are both economically and ethically imperative”. Collier’s book aims to take a careful look at the evidence to initiate a more evidence-based debate about international migration and its effects. One of the key messages of the book is that policymakers should not ask whether migration is good or bad, but how much migration is best and for whom. Calling for better management of migration is hardly new, and most countries do not operate either a closed-door or an open-door policy.

Collier, however, does ask policymakers to think more carefully about the effects of their policies, and in particular the development impact of migration policies. He argues that policymakers in destination countries in the global North need to think more about the three different types of effects of migration: first, the social and economic effects on the host society; second, the effects on the migrants; and third, the effects on “those left behind” in the country of origin. Encouraging policymakers to consider carefully such questions is welcome. Too often, for example, migration policy is conceived with little assessment of the likely implications for developing countries. However, Collier


2 Not all reviews have been negative, and many acknowledge Collier’s academic credentials. In a review of Collier’s Exodus: How Migration is Changing Our World on The Economist, it acknowledged that “Paul Collier is one of the world’s most thoughtful economists”. See “The costs and benefits of mass immigration”, 28 September 2013. Available from www.economist.com.


4 Ibid.


takes a fairly limited approach focusing primarily on the 40 per cent or so of international migrants who move from the global South to the global North. The majority of international migrants are therefore overlooked in Collier’s assessment of the costs and benefits of migration.

**Impact on developing countries**

Collier argues that the costs of the brain drain outweigh the benefits of remittances and hence controls should be put in place to limit emigration from poor countries. He believes that the impact of remittances on development are exaggerated and notes that the average remittance per migrant is roughly USD 1,000 per year, “so remittances add only a few percentage points to the incomes of those left behind”. At the same time, he is concerned about the negative impact of the brain drain on smaller poorer countries like Haiti, which has lost 85 per cent of its educated people. However, many argue that the poorest countries often make ineffective use of the skills of their population. Qualified doctors, for example, often serve the urban elite and have little impact on the health of the poor.

Collier would like rich countries to impose more controls on immigration, because poor countries do not have the capacity to do so and it would be ethically wrong for them to prevent their people from leaving. Critics question why Collier thinks it is ethically wrong for poor countries to restrict emigration, but not ethically wrong for rich countries to impose such controls.

**Impact on host societies**

Perhaps the most controversial claims in Collier’s book are that migration poses problems for host societies because the economic benefits are modest and the social costs are potentially high. The economic evidence does not support the view that migration is bad for host societies according to Collier, but unplanned and large-scale migration can create social problems. He is particularly concerned that too much diversity leads to a loss of “mutual regard”. Research conducted in the United States by Robert Putnam suggests the more diverse a community, the less socially engaged are its members – they vote less, give less to charity and have fewer friends. But Putnam's findings are based on a study of racially mixed US neighbourhoods, and his study uses data on race, not national origin. Furthermore, critics argue that the study offers only a snapshot of attitudes at one point in time and does not capture how the impact of diversity can change.

**Impact on migrants’ well-being**

One of the most interesting chapters in Collier’s book is the one that reviews the evidence regarding the impact of migration on a person’s well-being. This is a chapter that has not received as much attention in reviews of the book as others. In economic terms, Collier concludes that migrants are clearly the big winners from migration as they usually move to a country where they can earn much more. But does this make them happier? Collier is not so sure that it does, noting that “families are separated, and the migrant spends his life in a culturally alien environment”. Collier notes that it is difficult to answer the question about whether migration makes someone happier when we usually know little about the well-being of the migrant before he or she migrated. Collier cites only two studies that have looked at this question. New evidence from IOM’s World Migration Report 2013, published after Collier’s book was released, suggests that there is evidence to support the fact that migration does lead to improvements in well-being. However, the greatest gains seem to occur when someone moves from South to North, rather than from one developing country in the South to another.

Collier’s book concludes with a discussion of policy options. He is brave enough to point out that “no migration policy can benefit everyone”. Policymakers have to make choices about how they wish to manage migration. But Collier is concerned that many richer countries in the global North will not be able to cope with greater diversity in the future. He claims that “the track record of culturally diverse societies is not so encouraging . . . in most societies, in most of history, high diversity has been a handicap”. He seems to forget that some of the most dynamic cities and countries in the world have very diverse populations, including London – the most diverse and richest city in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the percentage of migrants is higher in the United States than in Europe, yet it has managed to grow and prosper from increased diversity.

To conclude, Collier set out to write a dispassionate and evidence-based analysis of current migration thinking. His critics argue that he has instead written a book based on a limited review of the evidence, which exaggerates the possible risks of migration and downplays its benefits.

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8 Drawing on the findings of the Gallup World Poll, the report compares the well-being of migrants with the lives of people of the same age, sex and education profile in their countries of birth (“matched stayers”) to gain an insight into what migrants’ lives might have been like had they stayed at home.

South-South migration is a traditional livelihood strategy for millions of people in the global South. Despite its importance, mobility between developing countries has only recently been targeted by researchers and policymakers.

Drawing from research commissioned by the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration, this issue of the Migration Research Series provides innovative insight on the realities of South-South mobility and explores how these movements may challenge our traditional conception of the migration paradigm. Concepts such as return migration, the role of diaspora for national development and cross-border mobility have a specific meaning in the South-South context.

This publication draws attention to the often unexplored potential for development of migrants within the South and provides key recommendations to strengthen the relevance of migration research. These outputs come at a very significant moment for the international community in light of the United Nations High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, where the necessary integration of migration in the post-2015 development debate was discussed.

More than 2 million Southerners have returned to South Sudan since 2005, following the end of the North–South civil war. Building on research conducted in South Sudan, as well as Egypt and northern Uganda, Ensor examines the process of reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons returning to South Sudan since the signing of the 2005 Peace Agreement. The study focuses on the role played by displaced youth as they find themselves differentially situated vis-à-vis the various determinants of sustainable return and reintegration. The research finds that intergenerational tensions are a result of many displaced youths’ aspirations to a “modern” – often meaning urban – way of life perceived as incompatible with traditional livelihoods and social relations. In turn, these dynamics are impacting the way in which access to material assets, education, employment opportunities, political participation and other key resources is negotiated among displaced groups and those who stayed behind. The study also finds evidence of significant gender differences.

As the pressures of responding to the complex needs of the vast numbers of returning individuals continue to mount, reintegration remains a loosely defined concept among government officials and external assistance agencies and, furthermore, understandings of what constitutes “sustainable return” differ markedly among the various stakeholders. Intergenerational differences regarding reintegration needs and aspirations, and even the very desirability of return, are rarely considered. This report shares primary research findings that may support return and reintegration programming so as to better respond to the age- and gender-differentiated needs and aspirations of diverse migrant groups in South Sudan.