Diaspora – Partner in the Development of Tajikistan
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Publisher: International Organization for Migration
Mission in Tajikistan
22A, Vtoroy proezd Azizbekov street
Dushanbe, 734013
Republic of Tajikistan
Tel.: +992-37/2210302/2270206
Fax: +992-37/251 00 62
Internet: www.iom.tj

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Diaspora – Partner in the Development of Tajikistan

Vladimir Mukomel

IOM Mission in Tajikistan
Dushanbe
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FOREWORD

This study is a result of significant efforts to collect data through quantitative and qualitative methods and analysis. A number of experts were involved in preparing this study, and their contributions differ in content but not in importance. The author would like to thank Ekaterina Kasimskaya, Igor Kuznetsov, Anna Rochevf and Maria Yevseyeva for providing assistance in preparing this report.

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Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation, the most numerous outside Tajikistan, plays an important role in the development of Tajikistan. Diaspora and certain communities can become key players in engaging investments and savings to the republic, in terms of transfer of technology, provision of qualitative education, circulation and return of skilled personnel, and organization of care and protection of citizens of Tajikistan abroad. Diaspora can become an effective channel of communication at various levels between the Russian Federation and Tajikistan and in lobbying and promoting interests of the Tajiks in the Russian Federation.

In the foreseeable future, the Russian Federation will remain as the preferred direction of migration from Tajikistan, and its scales – brought by push factors (such as the need to search for jobs and sources of livelihood and complexity of the social and economic situation in Tajikistan) and pull factors (such as availability of employment, significantly higher wages and higher standard of living in the Russian Federation) – will only expand. Respectively, the number and capacity of Tajik diaspora will increase.

The main objective of this study is to assess the potential contribution of the diaspora into the development of Tajikistan. Development policies on engaging diaspora for development involve the following tasks: (a) defining objectives of interaction with the diaspora; (b) mapping and specification of characteristics (profiles) of the diaspora; (c) building confidence between the diaspora and government institutions; and (d) mobilization of the diaspora as a partner in the development of countries of origin.

This study focuses on the following: (a) mapping of the diaspora; (b) identifying its members’ attitudes, life plans and migration strategies; (c) members’ willingness to contribute to the development of the country; (d) identifying the possible directions and channels of assistance; and (e) development of fundamental objectives of policy in engaging the diaspora in the development of Tajikistan. The study, which includes both quantitative and qualitative methods (a survey of 725 representatives of the diaspora and in-depth interviews with 25 experts who are members of the diaspora), was conducted in the summer of 2013 in three Russian cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg.

The main findings of this study are as follows:

1. Social and demographic profiles of the Tajik diaspora are intermediate between the profiles of Tajik labour migrants and the host population. The Tajik diaspora is represented by more educated and mature representatives holding better positions on the labour market than labour migrants.

2. Diaspora is not uniform and consists of a core, semi-peripheral part and peripheral parts. The core of the diaspora includes representatives of the “first wave” of emigration, or those with Russian citizenship and representatives of the subsequent generations who have integrated in the Russian Federation. Those in the peripheral and semi-peripheral parts are mainly represented by circular labour migrants. Different groups of diaspora differ in human capital, economic status (including employment, wages and income), life plans for the future, family

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2 This study, with its limited approach, defines the term “diaspora” as “emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin.” (D. R. Agunias and K. Newland, Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries. IOM, MPI (2012); p. 15)

3 These types are based on the legal status and duration of residence of diaspora members in Russia.
composition and households’ economies, communications with other Tajiks, and attitudes and intentions to contribute in the development of Tajikistan.

The diaspora’s composition is constantly changing and the boundaries between its core, semi-peripheral and peripheral parts are mobile. The peripheral part of the diaspora is constantly replenished by migrants, both by circular migrants (primarily by seasonal migrants) and by new arrivals. After reconsideration of their plans and adaptation in the Russian Federation, some of them replenish the semi-peripheral part. In turn, representatives of the semi-peripheral part, when integrated, enter the core of the diaspora.

3. The main components of diaspora members’ identities are nationality, religion, language, citizenship and regional affiliation. The blurring of identities takes place in the diaspora, especially in the second generation who are partly losing Tajik language skills and ties with the particular location and country of origin.

4. The dominating motivation and expectations of coming to the Russian Federation are brought by the need to address economic problems that most Tajiks are facing at home. Along with these, some significant motives for emigration include the following: (a) the desire for self-realization; (b) investments into the human capital (such as upgrading of qualifications and education for themselves and for their children); and (c) striving to realize personal and family plans. Political motives related to the situation in Tajikistan were very rarely observed.

5. More than half of the diaspora representatives associate their future with the Russian Federation: 37.8 per cent of the respondents intend to stay in the Russian Federation for good, while 27.9 per cent plan to travel continuously between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Tajiks belonging to the core of the diaspora, who have Russian roots and integrated into Russian society, much more often plan to stay in the Russian Federation for good. Those who are in the peripheral and semi-peripheral parts more often prefer to have circular trips.

The important factors in making decisions on a particular migration strategy are the following: (a) the degree of success in the realization of plans that originally existed in connection with migration; (b) the ratio of the social capital in the Russian Federation and at home; (c) evaluation of the host environment in conveniences of staying; and (d) institutional factors in the two countries.

6. The education, skills and professional knowledge of members of the Tajik diaspora are not much in demand in the Russian labour market: 71.4 per cent of Tajiks who were employed before coming to the Russian Federation have to change their economic activities, and 65.6 per cent changed the professional group to which they belonged at home. Migrants in the peripheral part of the diaspora and comprising the lower occupational groups on a mass scale are in the worst situation.

7. The majority of the diaspora members regularly communicate with their families, relatives and friends in Tajikistan (72% have constant communication several times a week) and are equally interested in the social life in the Russian Federation and in Tajikistan. Those members who are in the core of the diaspora prefer to have personal interaction with friends and acquaintances. In contrast, those in the peripheral and semi-peripheral parts prefer to have virtual contacts. However, many of the “old-timers” of the diaspora consciously pull themselves away from the life of the diaspora.

8. Of the respondents, 41 per cent live in the Russian Federation independently; the rest are living with their families and 7 per cent have other families. Those with other families live with a spouse in the Russian Federation while still providing financial assistance to the other spouse in Tajikistan. A diaspora member with better social and economic conditions is more likely to provide education in the Russian Federation.

9. The bulk of the respondents plan to spend their savings at home, or both in Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Those who belong to the core of the diaspora intend to spend their savings mainly in the Russian Federation or both in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan. In contrast, those in the semi-peripheral and especially peripheral parts of the diaspora intend
to spend their savings in Tajikistan. Most Tajiks send remittances home only to members of their families and close relatives and plan to spend their savings for their current needs.

10. Of the respondents, 47.7 per cent of Tajiks expressed their readiness to contribute to the development of Tajikistan, “if it would be possible,” 35.4 per cent would not agree with such a perspective and 16.8 per cent found it difficult to answer. The diaspora members specified corruption, economic instability and lack of trust to whomsoever as main obstacles to their personal involvement in assisting Tajikistan. As such, recognition of these problems is not an obstacle for those who consider it possible to make a contribution within their powers to various aid programmes.

11. The institutional, intergroup and interpersonal distrust is so great that most Tajiks consider that assistance can be rendered only at the local level (at the mahalla level and maximized on the district level).

12. Diaspora members view the material and financial assistance in the development of Tajikistan rather as a philanthropy, the results of which are non-transparent. And though some of the respondents – especially those who belong to the core of the diaspora – speak of their readiness to contribute to the development of Tajikistan, their behaviour, in reality, would be more restrained.

13. Almost every fifth respondent is ready to help the republic in the framework of the skills transfer programme. The most eager to participate in this programme are those who are the least qualified for this, which are the seasonal and circular labour migrants and representatives of the diaspora’s peripheral part. On the contrary, those who belong to the core of the diaspora and have the most needed skills are the most restrained.

14. About a quarter of the diaspora members are ready to set up or expand their business in Tajikistan. The 89 per cent are willing to deal exclusively with relatives or friends. Preferences towards engaging with the immediate environment for doing business in Tajikistan are products of distrust of the most energetic diaspora members – representatives of small and medium businesses to the institutional environment. Those in the peripheral part of the diaspora (circular and seasonal migrants) are particularly encouraged by perspectives of doing business in Tajikistan. The most enthusiastic for doing business are the young, well-educated, well-paid migrants who are often engaged in unskilled labour. On the contrary, the core of the diaspora does not show such enthusiasm: only 28 per cent of the respondents would like to do business in Tajikistan, while almost three times as much, or 61.1 per cent, have the opposite opinion.

15. The most important problems of organization of the diaspora as a partner of Tajikistan are the following: (a) lack of agreed interests among various diaspora communities and leaders of diaspora organizations; (b) competition between them; and (c) localism (regionalism, group interests), often caused not only by the regional origin but also by civil, ethnic and linguistic identity. It is necessary to construct a dialogue not only between government authorities of Tajikistan and diaspora organizations in the Russian Federation, but also between diaspora organizations themselves.

The most important characteristics of the Tajik diaspora transformation in the Russian Federation at the present are the following: (a) the rapid growth of its population due to labour migrants settling and linking their future and their respective family’s future with the Russian Federation; (b) the qualitative changes in its structure, accompanied by a shift in the social and demographic profiles of the diaspora; (c) transformation of long-term strategies of migratory behaviour that involves the growing number of those who intend to stay in the Russian Federation, and of circular migrants, among whom the number of long-term migrants is increasing; (d) change

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4 Residential neighbourhood
in the behaviour of Tajiks on the labour market, followed by diversification of employment; (e) accumulation of the initial capital; (f) and increasing social segregation in the Tajik diaspora.

Recommendations on policymaking in engaging the diaspora in the development of Tajikistan were worked out in eight main areas: (a) building trust between the diaspora and Tajikistan authorities; (b) improving organization and communications with the diaspora; (c) development of financial instruments for attracting resources of the diaspora; (d) development of measures in promoting direct investments; (e) change in the tax regime; (f) efficient use of the diaspora’s human capital; (g) measures on increasing the symbolic capital of the diaspora members; and (h) specific measures in using the diaspora’s resources, particularly by engaging the diaspora in tourism development programmes.

The policy on engaging the diaspora’s potential for the development of the country illustrates openness and transparency. Implementation of proposed policies regarding the diaspora will be seriously complicated without solving the major problems upon specifying the objectives and transforming the institutional environment in Tajikistan, thereby increasing the investment potential of the country, building confidence to the financial system and improving the business climate.

A considerable part of Tajiks who are staying in the Russian Federation on a permanent or temporary basis still return to the country of their origin; they experience nostalgia and long for their home countries and are ready to help the Tajiks. The fact that nearly three quarters of the diaspora representatives consider Tajikistan their home creates favourable conditions for engaging diaspora in the development of the country.
INTRODUCTION

Over the last couple of years, migration has been recognized for playing an important role in global development. A population of Tajikistan that is actively involved in international migration is linked with diaspora abroad by many threads. Despite the multiplicity and growing influence of diaspora, the issue of engaging them in activities involving the development of Tajikistan has not been properly addressed.

At the same time, the diaspora could greatly contribute to the development of Tajikistan. The role of the Tajik diaspora should not be underestimated: the diaspora and its organizations can be a key factor in rendering assistance and protection to migrants abroad, in finding new labour markets, in attracting investments and savings, in the transfer of technology and innovation development, in improving the quality of education, and in the circulation and return of qualified personnel.

Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation dates back to the first settlements on the territory of Siberia in the sixteenth century. The present diaspora is a product of the post-Soviet development – a large-scale emigration of citizens of Tajikistan in the 1990s, followed by mass labour migration in the subsequent years. It has since intensified the process of formation of the Tajik diaspora, the core of which was formed in the Soviet period and contributed to the formation of Tajik communities in many regions of the Russian Federation.

Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation is the most numerous diaspora outside Tajikistan. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), in 2013, outside Tajikistan lived 602,821 people who were born in Tajikistan territory; 452,000 (75%) lived in the Russian Federation, 38,000 in Kazakhstan and 31,000 in Ukraine. The other major countries receiving migrants from Tajikistan are Afghanistan (25,000), Uzbekistan (16,000), Germany (12,000) and Belarus (5,700).\(^5\)

Estimation on the number of Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation is a subject of a particular discussion and derives definitions of who should be referred to as a diaspora member. To do a complete and comprehensive calculation, it is necessary to take different sources of data and take note of their limitations and possible misreporting. For example, along with Russian citizens who consider themselves Tajiks, those citizens of Tajikistan who are permanently residing on the Russian territory should be referred to as Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation, as well as some other contingents (groups) of circular migrants intending to integrate into the Russian Federation and all those who retain the emotional and other ties with Tajikistan.\(^6\) Descendants of migrants, the so-called second generation of migrants who also identify themselves with the diaspora and have special relationships with their “historical homeland” is the complex category of diaspora that are accounted for.

Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation is so numerous that it would be very unreasonable to neglect its potential for the development of Tajikistan. In 1992–2013, about 330,000 citizens of Tajikistan received Russian citizenship\(^7\) (Table 1).

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\(^6\) Taking into consideration that the main purpose of this study is the assessment of the potential contribution of diaspora in the development of Tajikistan, all the above-mentioned contingents (cohorts) are surveyed.

\(^7\) Data on citizenship are given on Chudinovskyh, O. S., *Receiving citizenship in the Russian Federation – trends and policy* (manuscript).
Table 1: Number of people from Tajikistan with Russian citizenship in 1992–2013

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<td>MIA-FMS of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>300,500</td>
<td>150,200</td>
<td>117,500</td>
<td>32,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>13,600</td>
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Note: *Russian citizenship is admitted through two channels: the Ministry of Internal Affairs-Federal Migration Service (MIA-FMS) and the consular services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation. Half of the immigrants (50 per cent) from Tajikistan (expatriates) received Russian citizenship in 1992–2002, 39 per cent in 2003–2009 and 11 per cent in 2010–2013. In 2003–2013, through consular services of the MFA, 293,000 Tajikistan citizens received Russian citizenship (unfortunately, there is no available data from previous years). It should be taken into consideration that a part of the Russian-speaking people from Tajikistan who came to the Russian Federation and received Russian citizenship in the 1990s (especially before the 1997 agreement between the Russian Federation and Tajikistan on regulation of dual citizenship issues) do not identify themselves with the Tajik diaspora.

The number of citizens from Tajikistan who received Russian citizenship was the highest in the middle of the 1990s. Over the next years, the number descended and in 2003, the number of Tajik citizens who received Russian citizenship was less than 1,5008 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Number of natives of Tajikistan with Russian citizenship in 1992–2013 through the MIA-FMS and consular services of the MFA of the Russian Federation

The decrease in the number of those naturalized in the Russian Federation in 2003 is connected with the implementation of the new law on citizenship that in the first draft turned out to be very strict and practically stopped the process of citizenship conferment.
By 2009, the naturalization of people from Tajikistan has practically reached the peak threshold of the 1990s, covering up to 39,200 people. But from that year onwards, stricter restrictions on admission to citizenship were imposed, mainly under the articles of the law within the competence of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) of the Russian Federation. As a result, the naturalization of immigrants from Tajikistan was reduced to 4,400 people on the following year. The increase in the number of naturalized immigrants from Tajikistan in 2013 is a result of the new articles of the law related to regulation of the status of migrants who have lived in the Russian Federation for a long time. Among those who received Russian citizenship from 2010 to 2013 were children under 18, who made up 57.2 per cent (48.3% in 2013) and women (40.4 %).

Tajikistan, having surpassed various obstacles since gaining its independence, is currently faced with many social and economic problems. Present difficulties are the result of the initial period of development, when Tajikistan was one of the least developed areas within the USSR, as well as the subsequent period when social and economic difficulties were overlapped with issues on demographics, insufficient demographic transition and political opposition and Civil War. The labour market is quite limited and not able to accept hundreds of thousands of new hands coming every year. This caused an increase in unemployment that, together with low wages, promoted massive migration flows from the country.

The scales of migration are so large and impactful on the development of Tajikistan that it could not but lead to understanding of the importance of the diaspora for the country’s development. Taking into account trends of labour migration from Tajikistan, constantly nurturing diaspora and the ever-increasing potential of the diaspora, the role and importance of the Tajik diaspora in the social, economic and political life of both the sending and receiving countries will only grow.

The Government of Tajikistan, realizing the need to establish partnerships with the diaspora and use its potential, takes certain efforts in this direction. In the beginning of 2000, the government recognized the need for cooperation and interaction with the diaspora in terms of organization. Within the structure of the Executive Office of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) of Tajikistan, departments that will work with Tajiks abroad were established. On 4 October 2007, President E. Rahmon approved the action plan for addressing the issues of departure of the population from Tajikistan for labour migration purposes. This plan aimed to enhance the cooperation between the Government of Tajikistan, employees and representatives of relevant ministries and agencies with organizations of the Tajik diaspora “for a decent representation of our cultural values abroad.” Certain efforts were made to unite uncoordinated organizations of Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation. In 2010, by Resolution of the Government, the Concept on engaging compatriots abroad as partners in the development of the country was approved and its primary objective was declared “... engagement and mobilization of the Tajik diaspora, of labour migrants and Tajiks compatriots abroad, as well as cooperation with them to ensure the sustainable development of the Tajikistan, through creating favourable conditions, confidence building and development of social programs.”

The Tajik Government, recognizing the growing role and importance of organizations of the diaspora, asked for cooperation from the Tajik diaspora. Despite the desire of both parties, the cooperation was faced with numerous difficulties. First of all, there is an acute shortage of information about the diaspora; it is not clear who belongs to the diaspora and its organizational forms, functions and potential are unknown.

Tajikistan has accumulated a vast and highly efficient experience in conducting researches (to attract competent international organizations and individual specialists) on labour migration and remittances, mapping of migration, economic and social consequences of mass migration to the Russian Federation on the sending society, including its certain institutions (primarily on families and households, systems of education, health care and public health, social security, etc.). A large volume of studies and publications were produced due to the economic crisis of 2008 and through endeavors to understand its implications to labour migration, to the economy and to the society of Tajikistan (see Bibliography).

The monitoring of labour migration is done on a permanent basis. In 2004, the State Agency for Statistics of Tajikistan included the issue of labour migration into the list of priorities. For a more in-depth study of the foreign labour migration, the Statistical Agency under President of the Republic of Tajikistan has conducted sampling surveys of households: of living standards of the population (2005, 2007, 2009) and of the labour force (2004, 2009).

While carrying out the 2010 Census, the module for migrants was included into the census paper. It included questions about employment abroad, duration of migration, among others. In August 2010, the Statistical Agency under President of the Republic of Tajikistan, in accordance with the National Strategy and the Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2010–2012 on addressing problems of improving the social and economic level and the quality of life of the population, conducted a survey titled “The impact of remittances on the household’s welfare.” The sampling survey covered 3,133 households across the territory of Tajikistan.

Apart from the State Statistics Agency, the data on the labour migration is systematically collected by the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Social Protection of Tajikistan (through employment agencies and local authorities in each district) and scientific and analytical institutions of Tajikistan.
Thus, the Centre of Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan every year carries out sociological researches on various aspects of labour migration. In December 2012, for example, a report on the survey of households titled “The impact of labour migration on the lifestyle and behaviour of the population” was presented. The main purpose was to study the profile and gender characteristics of labour migration, utilization of remittances at the household level, types of labour activities and identification of problems in the host country, and determining the impact of labour migration on the lifestyle of labour migrants and their families (1,500 households). In 2013, a similar study was carried out to focus on utilization of remittances. There were notably more studies on mobility, particularly on labour migration in Tajikistan in the last five to six years.

The diversity and scales of research on migration topics conducted by international organizations and foreign research institutes and centres are noteworthy. One of the recent examples is the Tajikistan Household Panel Survey (THPS), initiated in 2011 by the Institute of Eastern and South-East European Studies in Regensburg (Germany) with the purpose of studying migration and remittances in Tajikistan. As part of this study, another repeated survey was conducted among households that have participated in the Tajikistan Living Standards Survey (TLSS) in 2007 and 2009, organized by the World Bank and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The nature of the study allowed the creation of a unique database on migration and remittances in the country with the developing economy.

However, studies on diaspora carried out in Tajikistan have some objective limitations: as opposed to labour migration, which can be effectively studied with the use of developed procedures on studying the labour force and households in the sending society (better yet, both in sending and receiving countries), it is impossible to carry out a study of the diaspora exclusively in the sending country. This is due to the following reasons:

(a) There are difficulties with organizing the contacts of members of the diaspora who are permanently residing in another country and may not be coming to Tajikistan in years or never coming back to the homeland. Researchers face special problems while studying the second generation of Tajik and Russian citizens of Tajik origin.
(b) The diaspora is localized in specific regions and settlements of the Russian Federation and analysis of the specificity of each of these diaspora networks is practically impossible outside of the Russian Federation.
(c) Respondents in the host society are more frank on issues sensitive for them, such as earnings, savings, remittances, life plans and strategies.

For these reasons, not many studies of Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation have been carried out, and the number of publications on this topic is limited.¹⁶ The internal life of diaspora, relations with the sending society, interconnection between the diaspora and the homeland, and capacity and abilities to play an important role in the development of Tajikistan are still poorly studied.

The effectiveness of using the potential of the Tajik diaspora currently is quite low and conditioned by the uncertainty of the following problems: (a) lack of clear ideas about the composition of the diaspora, its profiles, mapping and assessment of its economic potential, as well as identifying the

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¹⁶ International Labour Organization (ILO), Migration and Development in Tajikistan: Emigration, Return and Diaspora (Moscow, 2010); T. Heleniak, Harnessing the Diaspora for Development in Europe and Central Asia, World Bank (2011); H. Umarov, Tajik diasporas of labour migrants in the Russian Federation, IOM (Dushanbe, 2012). Publications in the Russian Federation on Tajik diaspora are mainly based on researches carried out in certain cities. However, Russian researchers study the life of Tajik diaspora in terms of its involvement into the Russian context, mainly as a tool for adaptation of Tajik migrants to the Russian reality or as a management institute in multi-ethnic communities.
interests and capacities of different groups of the diaspora; (b) lack of selective policy regarding different groups of diaspora; and (c) lack of developed tools and mechanisms (including the “road map”) on engaging different groups of diaspora in the development of the country.

This report is based on the research conducted in the summer of 2014 in three cities in the Russian Federation. Without pretending to solve all the given problems, it is designed to expand ideas about the Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation and outline the possible ways of engaging its potential for the development of Tajikistan.
1. THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To achieve the goals and objectives of the research, the integrated approach was used in terms of the primary data collection methodology, where the quantitative methods (sociological survey) were combined with the qualitative methods (interviews).

The researches were conducted in three cities of the Russian Federation with the “oldest” and the most numerous Tajik diaspora: in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg. According to data from the national census of 2010, 25.2 per cent of Tajik nationals in selected regions lived on permanent basis. According to the databank on registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons in these three regions, as of 1 April 2014, there were 30.7 per cent of citizens of Tajikistan.

Methodology of the research is focused on addressing problems in the following areas: (a) studying profiles of the diaspora; (b) analysing the internal life of the diaspora; (c) identifying the structure and frequency of communications of diaspora representatives with home; (d) analysing life plans and long-term strategies of diaspora representatives (integration into the Russian society, returning to Tajikistan, transnational plans); (e) exploring the potential of the diaspora and its ability to play a certain role in the development of Tajikistan; and (f) developing recommendations for the Government of Tajikistan on strengthening ties with the diaspora and encouraging the use of its potential for the social and economic development of Tajikistan.

Development of the methodology, instruments for data collection, instruction of interviewers and control over the reliability and quality of the collected data were provided by experts of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (Moscow) and the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow).

The Quantitative Research

Respondents from the Russian Federation should have met at least one of the following requirements:

- born in Tajikistan;
- citizen of Tajikistan;
- Tajik by nationality;
- long-time resident of Tajikistan;
- considers Tajikistan as one’s home country;
- at least one parent is a citizen of Tajikistan; and
- at least one parent is Tajik.

Respondents were individuals aged 18 years and above and has been living (staying) in the Russian Federation for at least six months, regardless of their legal status.

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17 The census took into account only the local population; therefore the majority of those who identified themselves as Tajik nationals had Russian citizenship (56.5%).
18 The majority of respondents (435 from 725 or 60%) corresponded all the listed parameters, i.e., born in Tajikistan, they themselves and both parents had Tajik citizenship, identified themselves as Tajiks and considered Tajikistan their home.
19 In this study, the approach suggested by D. R. Agunias and K. Newland is applied: the term diaspora refers to “emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. (D. R. Agunias and K. Newland, 2012; 15). Explanations of such approach are given in the section “Diaspora, the composition of diaspora.”
The sampling design. For stratification by regions, the data of the 2010 national census on the number of Russian citizens of Tajik origin in the regional context were used. Materials of the databank on registration of foreign citizens and stateless persons from the number of citizens of Tajikistan living on the territory of subjects of the Russian Federation were also utilized. Distribution of persons of Tajik nationality among the resident population and of Tajikistan citizens residing in selected regions is very similar.

Given the relatively small proportion of representatives of the Tajik diaspora who have Russian citizenship, their ratio was quoted in the sampling in each region.

The final sampling of regions had the following parameters:

Table 1.1: Distribution of respondents by region and citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Moscow</th>
<th>St. Petersburg</th>
<th>Yekaterinburg</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of Tajikistan</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons with dual citizenship</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Russian and Tajikistan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens of other countries</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Snowball sampling was utilized. The questionnaire was developed on the basis of the pilot survey that was carried out in Moscow.

The Qualitative Research

The qualitative research was based on individual in-depth interviews in parallel with analysis of the quantitative data.

The purpose of in-depth semi-structured interviews with experts was to clarify and prioritize problems faced by representatives of the Tajik diaspora. The interviews were targeted at Tajik compatriots working in certain sectors (such as education, entrepreneurship and medical industry) and employees (office workers) to study their experience, expectations and opportunities and possibly engage them in the development of Tajikistan. Interviews were conducted in Moscow by qualified specialists in Tajik (primarily) and in Russian languages on four guides, focused respectively on heads of organizations of Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation, businesspeople, representatives of government agencies of Tajikistan, those who are working in the Russian Federation and the ordinary members of the diaspora.

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20 In order to exclude those coming for short periods (visiting members of families, tourists, entrepreneurs, transit passengers and other categories), only the data on the number of citizens of Tajikistan who stayed on the territory of the Russian Federation for more than 31 days were used.

21 In Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg, accordingly 54.1 per cent, 24 per cent, and 22 per cent among the resident population and 58.5 per cent, 24.5 per cent and 17 per cent among the dwelling citizens of Tajikistan.
The in-depth interviews were conducted with experts,\textsuperscript{22} including:

- Heads of Tajik cultural centres – 4 interviews
- Employees of government agencies of Tajikistan working in the Russian Federation – 2 interviews
- Representatives of the creative intelligentsia – 12 interviews (including three doctors and six doctors of philosophy, a writer, a journalist and a theologian)
- Businesspeople – 3 interviews
- Ordinary members (grassroots) of the diaspora – 8 interviews (including three drivers, a student, an administrator of a café and others)

Thirteen respondents have Russian citizenship; four of them have dual citizenship (Tajikistan and Russian).

\textsuperscript{22} Some experts answered on behalf of several persons representing both the creative intelligentsia and heads of diaspora organizations.
2. PROFILES OF THE DIASPORA

Social and Demographic Profiles

Among the respondents (representatives of the Tajik diaspora), people in the most active working age of 20 to 40 are prevalent; at that, more than two fifths of them are respondents under the age of 30.

Table 2.1: Main sociodemographic characteristics of the Tajik diaspora (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age in years*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and older</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and incomplete secondary</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General secondary</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary special/vocational</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher, including incomplete education</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (including civil and religious marriage)</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed, divorced</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < 0.001.

Eighty per cent of respondents are men and the most notable is the prevalence of men in the youngest age groups. The age structure of men is characterized by the higher proportion of individuals in the age groups of 20–24 years and 25–29 years old; and among women, the older age groups are more represented (Figure 2.1). From the average age of the respondents (33.5 years), the average age of men is 32.8 years and 36.5 years for women.

Figure 2.1: Age structure of respondents
Gender disproportion specific to the Tajik diaspora is associated with the profile of the labour migration involved in its turnover, primarily young men and older women. According to the gender ideology that exists in the Tajik society, only older women, especially those who have vocational education, can work abroad and stay there without a husband or any other male family members.

The educational attainment of the Tajik diaspora representatives is quite high: the majority (3/4) are people with secondary general and secondary special/vocational education. Diaspora representatives with higher education and academic degrees make up 16.6 per cent, and those with incomplete higher education make up 3.9 per cent of the respondents. Only 6 per cent of Tajiks have no general secondary education (though among the women, the share of such respondents is high and makes up 10.4%).

**Figure 2.2: Educational attainment of diaspora representatives**

![Educational attainment of diaspora representatives chart]

The particularly high level of education is among those who have arrived in the Russian Federation for the first time more than 10 years ago: 20.5 per cent of such respondents have higher education and 3.6 per cent have not completed their higher education.

*I came to Moscow to the institution for doctoral candidacy in March 1993. This was still within the uniform Soviet system. Then in 1999, I brought my family to Moscow. In Moscow, only my daughter studied at school. My eldest son entered the Institute of Foreign Languages, the youngest graduated from the MIPT (Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology). My daughter is studying in the first professional university – it is a distance education. She is married and has two children. Her husband is a doctor, traumatologist, he graduated from clinical residency in Dushanbe and now is working here in a private clinic. (Interviewee 2)*

Considering the relatively high average age of diaspora representatives, it is quite explainable that the overwhelming majority (71%) already have a family, while the share of unmarried respondents makes up 22.9 per cent (Table 1). Among women, 68 per cent of women are married, but the marriage of every fourth of them is not registered.

Women make up most of the older age groups; of these, the number of unmarried women is significantly lower than men. This result is partly because there are more divorced and widows among them. However, an abnormally high proportion of widows and divorcees (in every six women, 9% are
widows) cannot be attributed neither exclusively to this fact nor to consequences of the Civil War.\textsuperscript{23}

This result may account for the high number of much older divorcees and who have little chance of finding a new husband-breadwinner and only have themselves to earn a living and provide for their children abroad.

Among the diaspora members, the religious marriages are very common (Figure 2.3).

\textbf{Figure 2.3: Family status of diaspora representatives}
\textit{(Number of respondents of this gender)}

An essential parameter of the demographic status is the composition of families. The main part of the diaspora members is married; 58.9 per cent have children under the age of 18. Coming over to the Russian Federation, only a small part of the diaspora brings members of their families. The typical situation is when a part of the family is in the Russian Federation, and another part is in Tajikistan. Most often, they live in the Russian Federation with their legal spouses, minor children and siblings. Largely other members of the respondents’ family (parents and/or siblings) are left at home (See the relevant section). There are also cases where the respondents are still legally married to a spouse in the Russian Federation, and confessed to have another spouse in Tajikistan to whom they render assistance.

The social and demographic characteristics of the respondents (representatives of the Tajik diaspora) significantly differ both from the similar parameters of labour migrants as well as characteristics of the resident population of Russian cities. Table 2.2 shows the main social and demographic characteristics of representatives of the Tajik diaspora and labour migrants surveyed in Moscow.

\textsuperscript{23} There are more widowed and divorced women whose areas of origin have less conflicts and dramatic events, such as the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.
Table 2.2: Main sociodemographic characteristics of the Tajik diaspora, labour migrants and population in Moscow (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tajik diaspora – 1</th>
<th>Labour migrants from Tajikistan – 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age in years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40–49</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50–59</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and older</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and incomplete secondary</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General secondary</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary special/vocational</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher, including incomplete education</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (including civil and religious marriage)</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed, divorced</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
1. The sampling in Moscow, N = 425.
2. Analysis of the migration profile, of problems of adaptation and integration of migrants for the National Research University "Higher School of Economics" (HSE CEPRS/Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies, Russian Federation 2011) was performed by the CERSR. At the end of 2011, there were 8,499 migrants in 8 regions of the Russian Federation who were interviewed, including 1,691 immigrants from Tajikistan. The data is given based on citizens of Tajikistan, and the sampling was done in Moscow (383 persons).

The social and demographic profiles of the Tajik diaspora are transitional between the profiles of Tajik labour migrants and the host population.

**Ethnic Composition and Citizenship**

Of the respondents from the Tajik diaspora, 77.6 per cent have Tajik citizenship, 16.3 per cent have Russian citizenship and 3.2 per cent have dual citizenship (Russian and Tajikistan). A minor part of the respondents (2.9%) has citizenship of other countries; all of them, except for one respondent, are citizens of Uzbekistan.

Table 2.3: Distribution of diaspora representatives by nationality and citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer, finds it difficult to answer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>563</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For the most part, 78.8 per cent of Tajiks are citizens of Tajikistan; 87.3 per cent of ethnic Uzbeks are citizens of Tajikistan. The overwhelming majority of those who identify themselves as Russians are Russian citizens. Similarly, Russian citizenship is spread among representatives of other nationalities (including three Kyrgyz, three respondents identified themselves as Pamirians, two of them are Lacais, 24 Afghan, Tatar and “Russian Tajik” among others).

Figure 2.4: Citizenship of representatives of different nationalities

![Bar chart showing citizenship distribution]

The majority of those who have dual citizenship (Russian and Tajikistan) are Tajiks. It should also be noted that 10 per cent of those who identified themselves as Tajiks are from mixed families, as a rule from Tajik-Uzbek families.

Territories of Origin, Duration of Residence in the Russian Federation and the Migratory Behaviour

A large number of Tajiks were born in Tajikistan (94.2%), 3.6 per cent were born in Uzbekistan and 1.4 per cent were born in the Russian Federation. Several respondents were born in other former Soviet republics (Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine).

Native Tajikistan residents of Dushanbe and districts of the republican subordination (33.8%) are widely represented. Those who have come from the capital and the oblast centres of the republic make up almost half of the respondents (48.2%).

24 Representatives of one of the Uzbek tribes in Tajikistan.
Figure 2.5: Territories of origin of Tajikistan natives

The main part of diaspora representatives have been living in the Russian Federation since 2000; of these, more than half of the respondents arrived during the first decade of the 2000s (54.4%).

Figure 2.6: Distribution of answers to the question When did you live in the Russian Federation (or When did you come to the Russian Federation to work)?

Of the respondents, 24 per cent have come to the Russian Federation during the last three and a half years, and 21.5 per cent came in the 1990s.

The 42.2 per cent of those who came to the Russian Federation in the 1990s possess Russian citizenship, while those who came in the 2000s makes up 13.1 per cent (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Legal status of respondents (Diaspora representatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of arrival</th>
<th>Russian citizenship</th>
<th>Residence permit</th>
<th>Temporary Resident Permit (TRP)</th>
<th>Temporary stay permit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2000</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–2005</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2010</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–2013</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of diaspora representatives (62.8%) at the time of the survey have been staying in the Russian Federation for 10 months or more, and 42.4 per cent have not left for a year or more.

Figure 2.7: Distribution of answers to the question: In the last 12 months (starting from May 2013), how long have you been staying in the Russian Federation? (in months)

Employment Profiles

The main motives for coming to the Russian Federation in the 2000s are connected with work opportunities and earnings. The rate of the labour remuneration is significantly lower than in the Russian Federation and the unemployment rate is high. Thus, coming from Tajikistan, they can use more of their labour skills in the Russian Federation (39.6% of respondents did not have any work at home before coming to the Russian Federation). The overwhelming majority of the interviewed representatives of the diaspora are working in the Russian Federation or looking for work (Figure 2.8).
The main types of employment of the diaspora representatives are as follows: wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and of household goods (33.0%); construction sector (26.2%); and communal, social and personal services (15.6%).\textsuperscript{25} Those in the fourth category of working migrants are engaged in other economic activities (Table 2.5). Native people are not very willing to work in these areas due to the following reasons:

(a) These are types of activities where, as a rule, working days are non-standardized or the work schedule is inconvenient.

(b) Wages in most of these areas are lower. The salary of those employed in hotels and restaurants makes up 64 per cent of the average salary in the Russian Federation, those in communal and social services make up 78 per cent and those in trade make up 88 per cent.\textsuperscript{26}

(c) These types of activities are characterized by particularly difficult working conditions. The rule is “dirty, difficult, dangerous” (3Ds) and often humiliating ones. The personnel turnover in these industries is extremely high; in 2010, among those who worked in hotels and restaurants, 61.4 per cent of the average staffing number left their jobs, 58.2 per cent from trade industries, 49.0 per cent from construction industry and 29.0 per cent from communal, social and personal services.\textsuperscript{27} The labour demand in these industries is largely satisfied by foreign labour force.

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\textsuperscript{25} Those who are currently working and also those who have previous jobs but are temporarily unemployed and looking for a job. The labour and employment classification was based on the All-Russian Classifier of Types of Economic Activities (OKVED), the Russian analogue of the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community – NCEA, Rev.1.1 (NCEA, 1993).

\textsuperscript{26} Labour and Employment 2011, p. 416.

\textsuperscript{27} Labour and Employment 2011, p. 281.
Table 2.5: Types of economic activities and working class of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of economic activities</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral production</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation and distribution of electricity, gas and water</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor transport and household goods</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotels and restaurants</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial activities</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate business, renting and services</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration, statutory social security (welfare)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health-care and social services</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other communal, social and personal services</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping services</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 698.

Of the respondents, 80.9 per cent of those who work or are looking for jobs are men. Their jobs are more diversified than those of women. Along with the main areas of employment that include construction (32.3%) and trade (29.6%), men are also widely represented in municipal services (14.4%) and transport and communications (8.5%).

The main portion of women are concentrated in trade (47%). Another 20.9 per cent of women work in communal, social and personal services and 9.0 per cent in hotels and restaurants. Women, as a rule, are less pretentious when choosing their place of work, especially in the older age groups, and the industries of their possible employment provide very few opportunities for professional growth. (Young unmarried women have more opportunities of being employed than married women due to the following reasons: (a) it is a requirement in the services sector; and (b) the young and therefore, more likely, unmarried woman is not controlled by a husband and may agree to the work schedule that assumes the work at night or late in the evening.)

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28 The all-Russian Job Classificatory, a Russian analogue of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88).
3. COMPOSITION OF THE DIASPORA

Definitions and Approaches to Studying the Diaspora

With a large volume of available literature devoted to the diaspora, there is generally no accepted definition for this term. At the end of the last century, several approaches to studying the diaspora were marked out. These approaches were based on studying of classical diaspora – of Jewish and primarily Armenian diaspora. William Safran, for example, identifies six basic characteristics of diaspora: (a) dispersal, as a rule, or forced dispersal of people from a specific original “centre” to two or more peripheral territories or outside the country; (b) collective memory about the original homeland, and often mythologized; (c) perception of their “foreignness” in the host country; (d) desire to return or a myth about returning; (e) the idea of supporting or rendering assistance to the homeland; and (f) identification with the country of origin and a group solidarity resulting from it. Some different approaches were offered by others, such as (a) A. Ashkenasi, who emphasized the communication between diaspora communities and the communicative code; (b) K. Tololyan, who developed ideas of A. Ashkenasi and W. Safran and paid particular attention to the diaspora identity by G. Sheffer, J. Clifford, A. Brah, M. Dabag and K. Platt, R. Cohen and others.

Nowadays, there is an emergence of “new” diaspora that are being formed as a result of labour migration waves and quite different in nature compared to the criteria used to define the so-called classic diaspora (reasons, ethnic homogeneity, unity of culture and identity among others). This resulted in the blurred concept of diaspora and its broad interpretation. Furthermore, it became clear that definition of the diaspora should be maximally operational in order to: (a) clearly identify its members; and (b) adapt existing information of a statistical nature and various surveys, primarily sociological, for carrying out the analysis of diaspora.

As an example, the European Commission, for this purpose, gives the following definition of the diaspora:

_Diaspora of the given country includes not only citizens of this country living abroad, but also migrants who, living abroad, have acquired citizenship of the country of residence often losing in this process their original citizenship and also migrants’ children born abroad, regardless of their nationality, as long as they retain some form of devotedness and/or interest to the country of their origin or to the country from where parents have come. In some extreme cases, such as the Chinese diaspora, people can still feel themselves a part of diaspora of the country, even if their families live in another country for several generations._

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31 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. _Migration and Development: Some concrete orientations_, 390 final (COM, Brussels, 2005) p. 23.
This project focuses on exploring the potential of the diaspora and its engagement in the development of the country. While engaging them in the development of the country, the possibilities of Tajiks who are ready to cooperate with the Tajikistan Government and social structures should not be ignored, even if they find it difficult to identify with the diaspora because of their residence or nationality, as proposed by the European Commission. In this respect, it would be more efficient to use an approach in accordance with the definition of “diaspora” according to Agunias and Newland. In accordance with the specified approach, severe restrictions on the citizenship of the country of origin for migrants as well as for their residence abroad, presumably permanent, are removed; to be categorized as a member of the diaspora, as well as a labour migrant, one should maintain various relations with Tajikistan.

For this study, in full accordance with this approach, persons classified as diaspora representatives are those who have ties with Tajikistan either by citizenship, origin (by one’s own origin or at least by the origin of one parent) or ethnic identity, those who have stayed in Tajikistan for a long time and those who consider Tajikistan their home country. At the same time, persons under the age of 18 and those who first came to the Russian Federation less than six months prior to this study were not regarded as diaspora representatives.

Based on the last limitation, it was possible to exclude those migrants who: (a) do not have any experience of staying in the Russian Federation; (b) do not feel confident (orientate) in the daily life of the diaspora; (c) do not have concrete ideas about future life plans; and (d) have not decided on their capabilities to contribute to the development of the country. However, Tajik labour migrants who have come to the Russian Federation recently (more than six months ago) are considered potential members of the diaspora. The analysis of their moods, attitudes and life plans, being of a separate interest, allows to foresee what the Tajik diaspora will be like in the nearest future. As such, this has become an important argument for inclusion of such migrants into this study.

**Tajik Diaspora: An Outward Glance**

The general understanding of diaspora was formulated by one of the informants:

Diaspora – it is a nation, language, culture and religion. (Interviewee 6)

But among the Tajik diaspora representatives, there is no clear understanding of the Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation nowadays and who belongs to it. There is a widespread attitude in accordance with which the diaspora: (a) is formed by Tajiks, who have come to the Russian Federation for good or for permanent residence; (b) is made up of labour migrants who do not belong to the diaspora; and (c) includes people who have come from Tajikistan, regardless of their nationality. It is also implicitly understood that the diaspora is a result of the first wave of emigration and includes mainly the elite of Tajikistan.

They came to Russia knowingly; they understood that they are coming forever ... Diaspora and labour migrants – these are different groups. Diaspora is represented by those who came into a foreign country and decided to live here. And labour migrants – these are temporary workers, seasonal workers. (Interviewee 1)

Diaspora and labour migrants – these are different groups. Labour migrants are temporary workers. There is absolutely no relationship between them. (Interviewee 4)

---

There is a chasm between the diaspora and labour migrants. (Interviewee 10)

The first wave of migration that has made up the diaspora – these are highly trained specialists, representatives of the science and high culture, who had fled from the war and immediately after it. There are also Russian-speaking Tajiks and Russians there. This group also includes representatives of that time opposition... This wave included many specialists, people with merits, famous doctors, employees of the science and culture (Interviewee 1)

All the beau monde of Tajikistan are in Russia. They have almost no contact with the labour migrants. (Interviewee 10)

At the same time, it is noted that there is an evolution of the diaspora and replenished both on the account of highly educated specialists of the second wave and also by migrant workers. Hence, a recurrent idea is that there is alternation of generations in the diaspora.

The second wave of the diaspora includes a post-war generation. Though they were educated... yet they could not find a job that is their speciality...

There are also labour migrants who ran after receiving Russian citizenship and then started to settle in Russia. Basically, it’s not a very educated wartime and post-war generation...

More recently, these waves started to adjoin...

Current representatives of the diaspora – these are former labour migrants... (Interviewee 1)

There is also such a point of view that it is too early to speak of the Tajik diaspora, that it is not yet formed, as there is no specific diasporic identity yet.

I am against the word “diaspora”... Until the diaspora is not united under the common spiritual field, it is a community. We have not self-defined yet. (Interviewee 18).

I do not see any idea that could unite Tajiks in Russia. (Interview 10)

Another expressed position is that there is no solidarity among Tajiks, and hence there is no diaspora itself.

Diaspora – it’s just a concept. Actually, there is no diaspora. Everybody exists on his own account. There are communities, acquaintanceships. (Interviewee 13)

One informant expressed an important idea: the barrier between the diaspora and labour migrants is caused by the distrust that is probably mutual, based on social inequality and cultural differences.

The most important in the diaspora is trust. Labour migrants do not belong to the diaspora. They are a separate caste, basically... they exist by their own and drag out the most miserable existence. (Interviewee 15)

The informant refers to diaspora as (“community” in his terms) “Tajiks who have received Russian citizenship, including Russians and others, labour migrants and those who are citizens of Tajikistan but intends to live in the Russian Federation in the long-term and mid-term, i.e., those who live in the Russian Federation and are temporarily working.”
The size of the diaspora, like any other population, is constantly changing due to migration inflow (or outflow), natural increase (or decrease) and change in the age composition. The qualitative composition of the diaspora is also changing. Representatives of the second wave of the diaspora (those who came at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century) who were uneducated and unqualified were replaced by their children who have socialized in the Russian Federation.

*Today’s Tajiks differ from those Tajiks who came to the mosque five to ten years ago. Their fathers have come to Russia about 20 years ago. Twenty years have passed and the gradual progress is observed in their education, in their comprehensions. Many of them can read both the Cyrillic script and the Persian script. Their level in this respect has increased by 3 to 5 per cent. We can say that in terms of cleanliness and personal hygiene, clothes, behaviour, they have changed for the better by 18 per cent. (Interviewee 24)*

The informants emphasized that, contrary to common belief, the qualitative composition and behaviour of arriving migrants has improved.

*Arrival and staying of our people in Russia significantly raises their cultural level. I went to Dushanbe five years ago and this year, in April. Five years ago in the airport, it was impossible to stay ... and now – they behave very decently. (Interviewee 9)*

**Typology of the Tajik Diaspora**

Taking into consideration the importance of the legal status that regulates civil rights, as well as the time of residence “in the diaspora,” these two parameters can represent key bases for identifying the typology of the diaspora. (Along with the formal criteria, the emotional and other ties with the homeland, personal development plans and strategies that will be mentioned below are also worth noting.)

Diaspora representatives differ by their legal status in the Russian Federation. Along with Russian citizenship, they may have a residence permit (permit for permanent residence), a temporary residence permit, or a temporary stay permit (they may have no legal bases for staying or residing on Russian territory).

Holding Russian citizenship does not automatically make its owner as someone who has integrated into the Russian society. In the same vein, having a temporary residence permit (or lack of any legal grounds for staying in the Russian Federation) does not mean that the person intends to stay in the Russian Federation only for a limited period.

Possession of a Russian passport officially allows its owner to enjoy all civil, social and economic rights and significantly reduces the possibility of being discriminated. Practically for all Tajiks, including those who do not mind integrating into the Russian society, the acquisition of Russian citizenship is a desirable goal. Acquisition of a residence permit is almost equally attractive, as it allows its owner to enjoy many economic and social rights. Especially important for a Tajik is that a residence permit, unlike a temporary residence permit and temporary stay permit, gives freedom to choose an employer).

On one pole, there are formally integrated Russian citizens of Tajik origin who consider themselves as temporary residents. On the other, there are long-term migrants registered in migration bodies as well as illegal immigrants who have been staying in the Russian Federation for years, often with their families. They are actually integrated, albeit only temporary.

*I know there are Tajiks who have been staying here for decades. Many of them do not register themselves. (Interviewee 12)*
Diaspora representatives who are de jure integrated into the Russian society may not be de facto, and equally, those who are de facto integrated may not be established de jure.

In this survey, 19.3 per cent of the respondents have Russian citizenship, 4.6 per cent have residence permit, 36.4 per cent have temporary residence permit (TRP) and 39.7 per cent have temporary stay permit.

A group of those with temporary residence permit is not homogeneous: at the time of the survey, 27.1 per cent have not left Russian territory during the preceding 12 months or more (Table 3.1). The last group of long-term migrants is represented by more mature respondents, most often with families and children.

Long-term migrants, in general, are well integrated into the social environment of Russian regions. They do not have Russian citizenship, a residence permit or a TRP not because of their unwillingness to obtain relevant documents, but as a result of difficulties in obtaining the relevant status.

I have been living in Russia since 1993, but I have not received a citizenship yet. Far from citizenship, it is very difficult to obtain even a residence permit, a TRP. In order to submit the documents, it is necessary to gather a lot of information, certificates, references. For example, the reference from the venereal disease clinic may become out of date while you are gathering information about the availability of housing and about your financial status. In Moscow, you can submit documents only in two places. You have to stand in a queue for submitting documents for several months up to a year. And then, after submission of documents, you have to wait for another hundred years. (Interviewee 20)

For Tajiks, it is very difficult to obtain a citizenship. Some people receive citizenship through a fictitious marriage.... If you want to obtain citizenship for your wife and for your family, then you have to gather information for all of them. You have to wait for the answer from one to five years. It is much easier to obtain citizenship for yourself. Together with the family, it is very difficult. (Interviewee 7)

... I decided to obtain a Russian citizenship through a fictitious marriage. Now I have a residence permit – I obtained it with the help of my wife. I am planning to receive the citizenship of the Russian Federation. (Interviewee 21)

Along with long-term migrants, two other groups of migrants can be distinguished. First is a group of circular migrants staying in the Russian Federation from 7 to 11 months. (A part of circular

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34 A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her country of usual residence as defined on R. Perruchoud and J. Redpath-Cross (eds.), Glossary on Migration 2nd edition, International Migration Law No. 25, (IOM, Geneva, 2011; 60).

35 In the first half of the year 2014, there were 1,869 resident permits and temporary residence permits issued based on data on the migration situation in the Russian Federation for six months (See www.fms.gov.ru/about/statistics/data/details/96024/). The quota for issuing permanent residence permits in 2014 is 1,466 persons (Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 19 July 2014, N 1343-p).

36 Circular migration – the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or long-term movement which may be beneficial to all involved, if occurring voluntarily and linked to the labour needs of countries of origin and destination (World Migration Report 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy, Geneva, IOM, 2008; 492). The definition is based on several measurements: spatial, temporal, iterative (repetition frequency) and human dimensions (K. Newland, Circular Migration and Human Development, Human Development Research Paper 2009/42. (UNDP, 2009); 10)
migrants can be conditionally defined as temporary migrants: among those residing on Russian territory for 10 to 11 months, where a significant part go home only on vacation or by familial circumstances and many of them are also integrated into the Russian society.) Second is a group of seasonal migrants. Over the last years, seasonal migration is intensively replaced by circular migration.

*About 10 years ago, we could surely say that our labour migration is seasonal ... And now we cannot say so; this trend is passing, more and more people are moving together with their families and for a long time, if not forever. People are coming for one to two years, many of them are striving to be legalized; many want to obtain citizenship. (Interviewee 1)*

The legal status and the period during which the Tajiks live/stay in the Russian Federation classify the diaspora representatives by the above-mentioned grounds.

**Table 3.1: Legal status and length of residence of respondents for the last year, in months (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of the continuous residence for the last year, in months</th>
<th>Russian citizenship</th>
<th>Residence permit</th>
<th>TRP</th>
<th>Temporary stay permit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 and less</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4–6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–11</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 and more</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
Red highlight – core of the diaspora.
Yellow highlight – semi-peripheral part of the diaspora.
No color – peripheral part of the diaspora.

The core of the diaspora includes people with Russian citizenship, as well as citizens of Tajikistan and residing/staying on Russian territory permanently or for a long time. Thus, the core of the diaspora includes all Tajiks who have Russian citizenship, residents (those residing for more than six months) with a residence permit (81.1% of all those who have residence permit), residing with a temporary residence permit and staying in the Russian Federation for at least 10 months in a year (54.4% of those who have TRP), as well as long-term migrants with a temporary residence permit (27.1% of those who have temporary stay permit). Thus, 52.5 per cent of the respondents belong to the core of diaspora.

Those in the semi-peripheral part of diaspora are: (a) individuals with residence permit and living in the Russian Federation from four to six months (16.2% of those who have residence permit); (b) those residing with TRP from seven to nine months (29% of those who have TRP); and (c) circular migrants with temporary stay permits who are staying in the Russian Federation for ten to eleven months during a year (22.5% of this group). Thus, 22 per cent of the respondents can be referred to the semi-peripheral part.

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37 Labour migrants whose work in nature depends on seasonal conditions and is performed only during a part of the year. In this group, migrants were referred to those who have come to the Russian Federation not only once and stayed not less than six months on their last arrival.
The peripheral part of the diaspora – which includes mainly short-term migrants\textsuperscript{38} or those with residence permit and who do not stay long in the Russian Federation, and some circular and seasonal migrants, including those who have arrived for the first time – make up a little more than a quarter of the respondents (25.5%).

The conditional structure of the diaspora is given in Figure 3.1.

\textbf{Figure 3.1: Structure of the Tajik diaspora}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{figure3.1.png}
\caption{Structure of the Tajik diaspora}
\end{figure}

Diaspora representatives belonging to its core differ from those belonging to the semi-peripheral and peripheral parts by their social and demographic characteristics. The core of the diaspora includes more mature Tajiks, who are much better educated and who have come to the Russian Federation for the first time earlier (on average, two years earlier – the average year of arrival of the diaspora core representatives is 2004, while 2006 is the average year for the diaspora representatives of the semi-peripheral and peripheral parts). They differ also by their marital status: the number of those married among them is less, as there are more widows and divorcees (Table 3.2).

\textsuperscript{38} A person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year, except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business or medical treatment. For purposes of international migration statistics, the country of usual residence of short-term migrants is considered to be the country of destination during the period they spend in it. (R. Perruchoud and J. Redpath-Cross (eds.) 2011, p. 91) Formally, persons staying in the Russian Federation for a period of less than three months during a year are not migrants. But they are all planning to stay in the Russian Federation for a longer period: only one respondent is planning to return to Tajikistan the next year.
Table 3.2: Main sociodemographic characteristics of the core, semi-peripheral part and peripheral part of the diaspora (%)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>Core</th>
<th>Semi-peripheral</th>
<th>Peripheral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 20 years</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–29</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30–39</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 years and older</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age, in years</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married (including civil, religious marriage)</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced, widowed</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Children</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No children under 18</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An average number of children under 18 among respondents with children</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary special</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete higher education, higher education, academic degree</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the findings, the differences between these groups are not only limited to the social and demographic parameters: representatives of the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral parts differ in their economic status (including employment, wages and income), life plans for the future, composition of families and households economies, communications with other Tajiks and the like. Basically, these are differences in the level and style of life and organizing relations with the social environment both in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan.

The composition of the diaspora is constantly changing and the boundaries between its core and the peripheral and semi-peripheral parts are mobile. The peripheral part of the diaspora is constantly replenished by labour migrants, both by circular migrants (primarily seasonal migrants) and those who are coming for the first time. Upon reviewing their plans and after getting adapted in the Russian Federation, some of them replenish the semi-peripheral part. In turn, representatives of the semi-peripheral part, upon getting integrated in the Russian society, join the core of the diaspora.

**Identity and Ties with Tajikistan**

Most respondents mentioned the following, rarely ranging, hierarchy of identities: Tajik, Muslim, Tajik language and citizenship. More rarely, regional affiliation was mentioned. Upon mentioning that they are Tajiks, informants often read their own thoughts into these words not limited to ethnicity.

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39 Only one respondent, an Uzbek, gave a different classification of identities: a person, citizenship, Muslim, nationality.
I am Tajik. I feel myself as Tajik. (Interviewee 6).

... First of all, we are Tajiks. The citizenship is not very important ... The fact that we are of Samarkand descent – it is in the second place... (Interviewee 26)

First of all, I am Muslim. Secondly, I am Tajik. Thirdly, I am a citizen of the Republic of Tajikistan or will be a citizen of the Russian Federation. (Interviewee 7)

The blurring of identities takes place in the diaspora, especially in the second generation who are partly losing Tajik language skills, ties with the particular location and with the country of origin. Even religious affiliation, seemingly resistant to external effects, sometimes becomes eroded, particularly in mixed families.

It is better (for my daughter) to be a Christian than a “half-done” Muslim. I have a friend, he is originally from Kulyab. His wife is also Russian and his children are christened. (Interviewee 16)

Representatives of the older generation mention that the next generation, though still preserving their national and religious identity, is already different.

They also are Muslims and they are Tajiks, but with different ideas and principles, approaches. They usually know several languages, have studied various disciplines...

... Muslims, who today receive education in schools and universities in Russia, think differently. They have grown up in Russia, not in Tajikistan. They have different visions of life, different interests and values. Even if you are to look in terms of understanding of Islam, they understand it based on the life in Russia. (Interviewee 24)

The vast majority of Tajiks in the Russian Federation, being patriotic and nostalgic about their homeland, identifies themselves with Tajikistan. From the question: “What country is your home?” 40

72.8 per cent of the respondents answered Tajikistan, 19.2 per cent named the Russian Federation, 2.6 per cent answered other countries and 5.4 per cent were at a loss for words.

Physically, with our body, we are in Russia, but our heart is in Tajikistan (Interviewee 2).

It is good to be a Tajik. (Interviewee 7)

There are some nuances: respondents belonging to the core of the diaspora significantly more often identify themselves with the Russian Federation (Table 3.3). In contrast, diaspora members belonging to the peripheral and semi-peripheral parts of the diaspora, despite often expressing their intention to stay for good, very rarely associate themselves with the Russian Federation.

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40 In full, the question was such: “When people travel much, sometimes it is hard for them to say where their home is. And where is your home?”
Table 3.3: Distribution of answers of representatives of different groups of the diaspora to the question: What country is your home?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Diaspora groups (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core of the diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other country</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer, undecided</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More often, those more mature old-timers of the diaspora associate themselves with the Russian Federation, who for the most part have Russian citizenship, are educated (a third of them have higher and incomplete higher education), have come to the country many years ago (69.1% before 2005) and have integrated into the Russian society and connect their future with the Russian Federation. The vast majority of them don’t want to return to Tajikistan for good; only 7.9 per cent would like to return and 7.2 per cent were undecided with the answer.

Among the old-timers of the diaspora, there are those who completely deny their relationship to Tajikistan (and basically should not be associated with the diaspora).

*I have nothing to do with Tajikistan to [sic]. I don’t communicate neither with any organizations associated with Tajikistan nor with diasporas... with nobody from Tajikistan. I consider myself a “like Russian” [Russianized].* (Interviewee 9)

*We are Russians at hearts.* (Interviewee 4)

For diaspora members, Tajikistan is associated with a social setup of the country that is different from the Russian Federation with habitual lifestyle.

*We were brought up in the spirit of collectivism. We cannot stay without neighbors, without different arrangements, without chaikhana (tea house).* (Interviewee 2)

However, the second generation of the diaspora, whose socialization took place in the Russian Federation and familiar with the Tajik society either by hearsay or through rare trips to Tajikistan, often don’t share such nostalgia. Representatives of the second generation have fully integrated into the Russian society, and their parents more often tend to believe that they are rather assimilating than integrating.

*Children – they are absolutely assimilated* (Interviewee 16)

*Here are my children – they have the Russian mentality. If they feel themselves as representatives of Russian people, what’s wrong with that?* (Interviewee 18)

*Children will not return to the place where they had never lived. For them, Moscow is their own home.* (Interviewee 3)

Even if representatives of the second generation experience problems with self-identification, it is mostly because of their belonging to the “visible” minority.
My both sons do not have friends who are Tajiks. They’d like to change their appearance, so as not to differ from others. (Interviewee 4)

Some children are not pleased with being Tajik – a father speaking with an accent, sooty skin, etc. (Interview 10)

Greater problems are faced by representatives of the so-called one-and-a-half generation – these are children who were brought to the Russian Federation in a relatively conscious age of 6 to 15 years and who have undergone primary socialization in Tajikistan. They perfectly speak Russian, as a rule, have a Russian citizenship, and by all formal features have been integrated into the Russian society. However, many of them (especially the teenagers), have problems in communication with the local population (but not with their coevals) and are in search of their own identity.

In contrast to the second generation of migrants whose socialization takes place in the Russian Federation, representatives of the “one-and-a-half generation” preserve memories of their country of origin, social setup, as well as codes of conduct and traditions of the sending society. For them, dual (multiple) identity is typical. They perceive themselves as a group of culturally adapted individuals speaking the language of the country of residence, but to whom the society has erected barriers as to “aliens.” The communication practices of representatives of the “one-and-a-half generation” with their coevals demonstrate their certain aloofness from the ethnic majority; they communicate with natives of the country from where their family has come as often as they do with local Russians. More than half of the respondents retain relations and contacts with friends left in the country where they were born. Their life plans are often not associated with the Russian Federation.41

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4. LONG-TERM STRATEGIES

Analysis of long-term plans showed that more than half of the diaspora representatives associate their future with the Russian Federation: 37.8 per cent of the respondents are planning to stay for good and 27.9 per cent are going to travel constantly between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Some respondents are currently planning to return home: 6.4 per cent intend to do so in a few months after having earned money, and 16.2 per cent after having worked for another year or two. (Another 1.8% of the respondents intend to stay for some more time in and then migrate to other countries).

Long-term Strategies of Different Sociodemographic Groups of the Diaspora

The intention to stay in the Russian Federation is common in all educational groups. But the maximum readiness to finally stay was expressed by well-educated Tajiks – those who have incomplete higher education and specialized secondary/vocational education (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Long-term strategies of Tajiks based on educational attainment of respondents

In cases when a diaspora representative is living in migration together with family member(s), the decision to stay in the Russian Federation is pronounced more clearly: 43.6 per cent of the respondents express such an intention. On the contrary, those who are living in the Russian Federation alone are more inclined to circular trips (35.2% indicated this) than staying (29.5%).

Also, more often, married (within civil marriage), widowed or divorced diaspora representatives plan to settle in the Russian Federation.

The Impact of the Migration Experience and of the Legal Status

The strategy of the migratory behaviour depends on sociodemographic characteristics. Equally important is the migration experience and, in particular, duration of staying in the Russian Federation. The longer an individual stays, the more likely he/she will strive to stay for good. Among those who first came to the Russian Federation in the 1990s, about 62.5 per cent are planning to stay (against 28% of those who came after 2010).
After two or three years, they cardinally reassess their life plans. In terms of staying in the Russian Federation, diaspora representatives make up their minds on their life plans more clearly or revise their plans: among those who came after 2010, 14.9 per cent were undecided about their future plans, whereas among those who arrived in 2006–2010, only 6.3 per cent of the respondents could not answer this question.

Figure 4.2: Long-term strategies of Tajiks based on duration of residence in the Russian Federation

With regard to gaining experience in living in the Russian Federation, the number of those who plan to address their routine tasks – to make money and return home in a few months – is reduced, as well as those who are ready to travel constantly between the country of their origin and the Russian Federation. At the same time, the number of those who are planning to stay is increasing. Long-term plans do not depend on the age of the Tajiks: even among the youngest respondents aged up to 20, 34.5 per cent are planning to stay for good (with the only exception: older persons often express their intention to travel for another year or two and then return to Tajikistan).

Nevertheless, even those who are planning to settle in the Russian Federation would not like to break their ties with Tajikistan. Many of them are going to return home upon old age.

Representatives of the Tajik Diaspora in Russia want to settle here so far, to set up the material basis and then to return home in retirement. The same is with their children. (Interviewee 10)

We connect our future both with Russia and Tajikistan. And also do our children. My academic interests and money (incomes) keep me here in Russia. But for us, it is impossible to stay here in Moscow in our old age ... we are here on a temporary basis. (Interviewee 2)

In Moscow, you have to work. What else is there to do? At the end of my life, I will go back to my homeland. Well, I’ll go to Hadj (pilgrimage) and then return to Dushanbe. (Interviewee 14)

42 In this age group, the share of undecided respondents is significant; 20.7 per cent were at a loss for words.
Long-term strategies are closely linked with the legal status of Tajiks.

Table 4.1: Long-term strategies of Tajiks based on legal status (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal status</th>
<th>To stay in the Russian Federation for good</th>
<th>To earn money and return home in a few months</th>
<th>To work for a year or so and return to the country of origin</th>
<th>To travel constantly between the Russian Federation and the country of origin</th>
<th>To live in the Russian Federation for a while and then move to another country</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>No answer; Undecided with the answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian citizenship</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence permit</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent residence permit</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent stay permit</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Formation of the strategy on final resettlement in the Russian Federation is a long and complex process that is connected with changing the legal status of migrants.

For the first time I came to Russia in 1996 when I was a student ... in 1998, the financial conditions of my family worsened so much that I took an academic leave and came to Moscow for working [sic]. Since that time, I worked in Moscow on markets and had my own business. Of those 16 years that I worked in Moscow, for 5 years I worked as the deputy director of the market. I did not want to receive Russian citizenship... In 2010, I decided that it is necessary to obtain Russian citizenship. Now I have a residence permit. After a year, all my family and I will receive Russian citizenship (Interviewee 12).

Those who are planning to stay in the Russian Federation are making certain efforts, such as obtaining Russian citizenship or residence permit, or at least a temporary residence permit. Acquisition of each of these permits is a step indicating the desire of the migrant to integrate into the Russian society and the refusal to return home.

Selecting and changing migration plans and strategies are conditioned by certain life plans set by the migrant for one’s self.

**Dependence on the Initial Plans**

For Tajiks oriented to finding a job and good earnings in the Russian Federation, the most acceptable are circular trips or coming for a relatively short period (for several months or for another year or two) and then returning home.

About the future? We will stay both in Tajikistan and in Russia. Some people think you should live in there where it is better for you, where you have incomes. This is true, but at home, you have your mother, father, wife, children. If I get citizenship, then I will take my family with me to Noyabrsk. I want my son to study and to get a good profession so that he would not suffer like me, so that his life would be better than mine ... Yet I have to send my parents to Hadj [pilgrimage]. I have to earn good money for it. And I can do it only in Russia. And in the old age, we will return home. (Interviewee 7)
The most ambitious Tajiks striving to find a job according to their experience and qualifications most likely intend to stay in the Russian Federation (52.4% of the respondents) (see Table 4.2).

Other strategies are preferred by those Tajiks whose arrival to the Russian Federation was motivated by making investments into the human capital, such as education and professional development. To get education and achieve professional development, much time is needed and none of them are ready to return to Tajikistan in the coming months. Some of them prefer circular trips or returning home after several years, but more often, they express the intention to settle in the Russian Federation for good (Table 4.2).

Similar strategies are also chosen by those members of the diaspora whose arrival to the Russian Federation was conditioned by personal and family plans (such as those who want to arrange their personal life, who came together with the family or avoiding military service). The desire to stay in the Russian Federation is prevalent among them. Most often, those who strive to arrange their personal life express such intention. The 72 per cent are not planning on returning.

Table 4.2: Long-term strategies of Tajiks based on motives of coming to the Russian Federation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hopes and expectations</th>
<th>To stay in the Russian Federation for good</th>
<th>To earn money and return home in a few months</th>
<th>To work for a year or so and return to the country of origin</th>
<th>To travel constantly between the Russian Federation and country of origin</th>
<th>To live in the Russian Federation for a while and then move to another country</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>No answer; Undecided with the answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To find any job</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To find a well-paying job</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To find a job conforming to experience and qualification</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To get/continue education</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To obtain a profession, upgrade skills</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To marry/ find a mate</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To provide education for children</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To avoid military service</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Russian Federation, living standards are higher</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political situation in Tajikistan</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation in Tajikistan</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Came together with the family</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Slightly different are strategies of those Tajiks whose arrival to the Russian Federation was motivated by assessment of socio-political and economic situations in Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. Many of them have circular trips in mind and most probably, if the political situations in Tajikistan and the Russian Federation change, they will be inclined to adjust their plans, making choices either in favour of Tajikistan or the Russian Federation.

For twenty years I stayed packed and ready to go, I thought that I came to Moscow for the time being, I thought that here I’ll return to my state university. But the time passed, my children grew up, my daughter married a Muscovite. On the one hand, my grandchildren are Muscovites, and on the other hand, they are Tajiks. Now both for them and for me, Moscow is our own home. (Interviewee 3)

I regularly go to Tajikistan; my parents are there. In summer, we take our children to their grandparents. First, I thought that Russia – it is my place, and I can live here. Now, after I received Russian citizenship, bought a house, etc., settled all material problems, I think that it is not my place and I cannot always stay here. If in Tajikistan they take care of our people and I feel it, I will not stay here even for an hour. I will go back home. (Interviewee 23)

Russian social institutions have very few capacities for helping foreign citizens realize their personal plans. Also quite limited are efforts to organize access to jobs that are preferred by these foreign citizens (taking into account not only instrumental opportunities but also potential challenges caused by the competition with local workers). Thus, for diaspora members, education and professional development are probably the most effective ways of integrating into the Russian society. Apparently, the understanding that professional education is the most important tool in integration is becoming more evident among the Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation.

Now, if Tajiks in Russia have spare money, they spend it for their education. They enter colleges and universities. Some of them even go to the budgetary department. If they do not have the opportunity to study themselves, they educate their children. They themselves also enter universities. Go to any university – state or non-state university – you will definitely meet a Tajik. There is a desire for getting education. There is a respect [sic] for educated people. (Interviewee 2)

The majority of people come to Russia to earn money. But many of those who are educated, successful and skilled stay here and receive citizenship … Also through the program on the simplified procedure of obtaining citizenship, especially those who are educated. Now Tajiks are studying in the Moscow State University, in the Teachers’ College. (Interviewee 3)

Realization of Life Plans, Comfort Conditions of the Social and Institutional Environment

Long-term strategies and plans of Tajiks are formed under the influence of a wide range of factors. First is the “success” in the home country and in the Russian Federation. If the person’s stay in the Russian Federation promotes the real implementation of one’s life plans, then it is more probable that one will stay here for a long time or for good.

I grew up in a low-income family. I wanted very much to enter the university or the college, but financial conditions of my family did not allow me to do it, though the level of my knowledge would let me to enter any university in Tajikistan. In 2001, I had to go to Russia for earnings, as at home there was no work for me. We had a cow at home. We sold it in order to buy a ticket to Moscow. Since 2001 to 2004, I worked here in Moscow. In 2005, I entered the evening department of the Moscow Institute of National Regional Relations.
In the daytime, I worked, and in the evening, I studied in the university. Five years later, I completed the course on jurisprudence. There was no sense for me to go back, so I engaged in business in the sphere of trade. Since 2010 and up to now, I am doing business. I received citizenship in 2007 while studying in the institute, by the simplified option. (Interviewee 23)

Many would like to return home, but it is impossible. There is no work and professionals of this level are not needed yet. As an economist, I say, while there is no serious economy in Tajikistan, the process of emigration from Tajikistan will continue. (Interviewee 2)

If there are more prospects in the home country, the probability of returning home will be higher:

You can more often meet migrants returned from Russia among the different level leaders of Tajikistan. For some of them, the migrant experience was a trial of the transitional period. I know an excellent journalist and a notable tax official, who in difficult nineties worked as loaders on the Moscow market. Afterwards they remembered about them in Tajikistan and invited them to work. (Interviewee 18)

The second important factor is the ratio of social ties of diaspora representatives in the host country and country of origin. If a foreigner has considerable social capital in the Russian Federation but has weak social ties in his/her homeland, the chances of staying are increased.

If a migrant before coming to Russia held a responsible and profitable position, after return he will not be able to take this position, because it is already taken by others. Contacts are also lost. It is difficult to find krysha (backing). As a result, you realize that you don’t have a future in Tajikistan. You have to stay in Russia.

– Jamoliddin, 46 years old, with higher education, finishers’ foreman from Yekaterinburg

In contrast, the small volume of social capital in the host environment, while maintaining social ties at home, stimulates returning to the country of origin:

Before leaving for labour migration, I worked as a teacher. During the time of my working in Russia, I returned home twice for family reasons and remained there for a year each time. I returned to my school and continued working. Our school is always in short supply of teachers .... The school management received me back gladly. I think that after I earn money in Russia for a house, family events, save up money for education of my sons, I’ll return home and will again work at school.

– Suhrob, 36 years old, with higher education, constructor from Yekaterinburg

Supportive and favourable conditions for the foreigner’s stay in the host country and in the country of origin also play an important role. Wherever one feels more comfortable, there he/she will strive to stay:

Well, they say that in Russia all Tajiks are changing. This is true. Those who have stayed in Russia, in Moscow have changed greatly. Here, there is more freedoms [sic]. They afterwards cannot live in Tajikistan. They again long for Russia: more freedom, then again – women’s beauty. (Interviewee 17)
We returned to Moscow, as formerly we used to live here, and I was born in Moscow. However, we have not received what we expected – a better future for my sons – because of the strong xenophobia. My sons don’t tie their future neither with Tajikistan nor with Russia. (Interviewee 4)

The age and gender roles that people play in the traditional Tajik family are of great importance. Thus, men have to take care of their parents and arrange marriages for their children, so regardless of their desire, they return to Tajikistan to carry out their duties.

If a migrant is over 45, he has to return home in order to bring up his children and take care for his parents, who are already old and definitely need care. (Interviewee 7)

Institutional incentives and barriers in both the Russian Federation and at home can also influence personal plans. For example, complicating the procedure of acquiring Russian citizenship yields a decreased number of foreign nationals wishing to become naturalized. In addition, legal migrants working in the Russian Federation, and even those who have been working there for a long period, do not have any social guarantees:

Now it has become more difficult to live and work in Russia. There is a problem with deportation of our migrants. And not only that, checks by apartments, etc. All this has a negative impact not only on us but also on our children growing up in Russia. (Interviewee 18)

The initial individual motivations shape long-term plans of Tajiks, but these plans significantly transform under the influence of those conditions and circumstances in which foreign citizens find themselves after arriving in the Russian Federation.

Tajiks belonging to the core of the diaspora, who have taken root in the Russian Federation and are integrated into the Russian society, are much more inclined to stay for good.

Table 4.3: Long-term strategies of Tajiks based on diaspora classification (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora classification</th>
<th>To stay in the Russian Federation for good</th>
<th>To earn money and return home in a few months</th>
<th>To work for a year or so and return to the country of origin</th>
<th>To travel constantly between the Russian Federation and the country of origin</th>
<th>To live in the Russian Federation for a while and then move to another country</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>No answer; Undecided with the answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The core of the diaspora</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-peripheral part</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral part</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The semi-peripheral part of the diaspora includes those Tajiks who would prefer to travel on a circular basis. Such attitude is also observed among representatives of the peripheral part. However, the number of those who intend to return home in a year or two, or even in the next few months is quite high, and almost as much as those who are planning to stay in the Russian Federation.
The important factors at making decisions in favour of a particular migration strategy are the following: (1) the degree of success in realizing the plans that originally existed in relation to migration; (2) the ratio of social capital in the Russian Federation and at home; (3) evaluation of the host and sending environment for the favourable conditions of staying; and (4) factors of the institutional character in both countries. Those belonging to the core of the diaspora, who were more successful in realizing their plans and have a great social capital in the Russian Federation, understand “the good and the bad” of living in the Russian Federation and make a sober estimate of the institutional environment of the sending and receiving societies. They have undeniable advantages over the peripheral part, the backbone of which consists of temporary labour migrants.
5. DIASPORA REPRESENTATIVES ON THE LABOUR MARKET

Different Groups of Diaspora on the Labour Market

The main types of business activities of Tajiks in the Russian Federation are the wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and household goods, construction and communal services (see the section on diaspora profiles). There are, however, significant differences between the types of activities in which different groups of the diaspora are involved. In Table 5.1, data on the major types of activities of diaspora representatives are given, where 78.1 per cent of the respondents from the core of the diaspora are employed and 87.5 per cent for those in the peripheral part.

Table 5.1: Major types of economic activities of representatives of different groups of diaspora, per cent of employed respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of economic activities</th>
<th>Core of the diaspora</th>
<th>Semi-peripheral part</th>
<th>Peripheral part</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and household goods</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other communal, social and personal services</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the construction sector, there is an increased demand for unskilled labour and seasonal work. The work is relatively few for those who belong to the core of the diaspora (and they are engaged in other works in this industry). Those belonging to the core of the diaspora are employed in areas where job places assume permanent employment: once an employee quits the workplace, he/she has little chances to return to the same workplace.

There are also significant differences in occupations of Tajiks belonging to different groups of the diaspora.

Table 5.2: Distribution of representatives of different groups of diaspora by employment (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional group</th>
<th>Core of the diaspora</th>
<th>Semi-peripheral part</th>
<th>Peripheral part</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military servicemen</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heads of organizations, of structural units</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly skilled specialists</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled specialists</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office employees/Clerical workers</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers in the services, trade and housing and utilities sector</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers in agriculture and production field</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machines and mechanical devices operators</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Those belonging to the core of the diaspora are much more likely to have occupations where high qualifications are required (groups 1–4), particularly those with the highest qualifications (groups 1–2). Some of them are representatives of the first wave of emigration to the Russian Federation or representatives of the Tajik intellectual elite.

*Those who came to Russia in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union are basically well settled, they work in the intellectual sphere – these are artists, cinematographers, creative workers, lawyers, businessmen – there are many of them. (Interviewee 10)*

*This wave includes many specialists, individuals with merits, famous doctors, science and culture employees... Now they are at the age of 50–60. Basically, these old people have well settled in Moscow. 80–90 per cent of them have found themselves. (Interviewee 1)*

It also includes a new generation of young Tajiks who has received good education in the Russian Federation.

*I am studying at the Moscow State University, faculty of mechanics. My friends who have graduated from the MSU and other universities in Moscow are working here on good places with a high salary. But I don’t know in what situation our workpeople are. (Interviewee 5)*

But the peripheral part of the diaspora is represented more by unskilled workers.

**Labour Mobility**

The bulk of the diaspora representatives (59.3%), who had work experience before coming to the Russian Federation and are working now in the country, worked in the following industries in their homeland: agriculture (18.6%), construction (15.6%), wholesale and retail trade (15.3%) and transport and communications (10.7%). After coming to the Russian Federation, the overwhelming majority of migrants have to change their type of economic activities; less than 30 per cent were engaged in the same activities as at home.

Diaspora representatives on a mass scale are engaged in trade, construction, communal and social services; the number of those employed in these sectors has increased respectively by 1.9 times, 1.8 times and 3.4 times. Currently, 75.2 per cent of migrants who had work experience before coming to the Russian Federation are engaged in these kinds of activities.

Those who were employed before coming to the Russian Federation were in the most attractive and competitive areas of employment: in construction, in trade, least of all are inclined to engage in other activities. Today, 63.6 per cent and 58.5 per cent of those who worked in these industries at home are engaged in these types of activities in the Russian Federation.

The demand for those who worked in the agriculture sector and the very few respondents previously employed in mineral production, public administration and financial sector turned out to be very low in the Russian labour market. The well-trained contingents (groups) who were previously employed in the health and education sectors are in the same situation.

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43 The increased number of those rendering services on housekeeping and those engaged in real property business. However, in these kinds of activities, only 1.7 per cent of employed respondents are engaged.
Representatives of the first wave (those who arrived in the middle of the 1990s) are in much better conditions. They were in difficult situations in the beginning, perhaps even more so for those who arrived later.

First-class surgeons came to Moscow and worked as loaders. (Interviewee 3)

But at that time, the Russian intelligentsia – who also had to quit their professions in order to survive – turned out to be in a similar situation. Tajiks of the first wave had one advantage that the next generation of migrants did not have: soviet education and social capital in the Russian Federation.

In the 1990s, most Tajiks who were currently studying, post-graduate students and doctoral candidates decided not to return home. In general, representatives of this group of diaspora made successful careers.

I came to Moscow to the institution of doctoral candidacy in March 1993. All this was still within a the frames of a single Soviet system. I completed the doctoral program and now I am working at the Russian Academy of Sciences. At one time, I went into business, but then returned. The science and my family are on the central place in my life. My son wanted to work in a mobile company and would get there a salary of Rub 100,000. I made him to work in an academic institution for Rub 15,000. Investing in science is investing into the future. (Interviewee 2)

I came to Moscow in 1995 after being enrolled to the post-graduate school. In 1997, I quitted the post-graduate school and started practicing. I have gone through fire and water. In 2000, I established a juridical office on the business support. (Interviewee 15)

Those who came later were faced with a different situation: their diplomas turned out to be unnecessary.

... here in Moscow, guys of different professions are working with us. There are teachers, doctors, drivers, former military and police officers. Also very young people without any specialty, after secondary school worked. They don’t trust our diplomas received after 1990 and don’t employ by that diploma. Nobody is interested in your specialty. Here, we are needed only for a simple and cheap work, and we don’t need our diplomas. I have a higher pedagogical education and I worked as a general labourer on the construction site. Together with me there worked a former policeman, a major by rank. – Hudobahsh, 36 years old; with higher education, a constructor from Moscow

Only 7.7 per cent of those who were previously employed in the field of education are now working in the same industry in the Russian Federation. A similar proportion is among those working in the health-care system (9.1%). More than half of these workers are now employed in construction and trade, and every sixth are in the communal and social services.
A significant part of the diaspora representatives are working on workplaces that do not require special skills; 39.8 per cent of Tajiks work as general labourers. (According to the survey conducted among labour migrants, 46.7% of migrants from Tajikistan work as general labourers (HSE CEPRS). Based on the Russian Federation’s national economy, only 10.8% of employees are general labourers).  

For the first time I came to Moscow for earnings in 2000. I have graduated from the Kanibadam Teachers’ College. Initially, I worked as a general labourer. I went to a special place where they hired labourers and waited till I was hired for any job. Afterwards, I went into the sphere of trade and was selling goods on the market.  

Teachers from our jamoat are also working as general labourers on a construction site.  

– Muhammad, 45 years old, constructor from Odintsovo, has a residence permit

I graduated from the Tajik institute of physical culture. In Moscow, I started to work on ZIL (a plant named after Likhachev) ... then together with friends, we went to the Leningrad market. There I worked as a foreman, administrative assistant and supervised 30 stalls. So I worked for 2 years. My parents opened a café on the market, and I started to work as a manager for them. (Interviewee 20)
Workers who don’t have higher education, qualifications, work experience and poorly speak or do not speak Russian at all cannot demand for better jobs. These are mainly labour migrants, many of whom only have general secondary education.

*What prevents our guys from getting settled well in Russia? Lack of specialty ... A person with a specialty always can find a job.* (Interviewee 7)

More than four fifths of unskilled workers work in three areas: municipal and social services (30.6%), trade (30.2%) and construction (21.9%). In the field of communal services, unskilled (common) labour prevails: 78 per cent of Tajiks engaged in this kind of activities are unskilled workers. (For comparison, 36.5% are in the trade industry, and one third are engaged in the construction sector).

Migrants’ typical pathway (trajectory) is finding employment at the worse workplaces, compared with where they worked at home. For example, 39.7 per cent of highly qualified specialists who had an appropriate workplace at home are working in the Russian Federation as common labourers. (27.9% of those with higher education work as common labourers.)

*Figure 5.2: Distribution of respondents with previous working experience by professional groups in Tajikistan and the Russian Federation*

Only 34.4 per cent of Tajiks belong to the same occupational group to which they used to be part of before coming to the Russian Federation. The 13.8 per cent are those who worked both in Tajikistan and in the Russian Federation as general labourers.

More than a third of those who had work experience before coming to the Russian Federation are engaged in general works where there are no necessary requirements in terms of education and qualifications. On such workplaces, 18.5 per cent of representatives from occupational groups have specific special requirements for education (availability of higher or secondary special education); these are heads of organizations and their structural units and highly skilled and semi-skilled specialists.
Migrants’ education, skills and professional knowledge are not in demand in the Russian labour market; migrants in a mass scale replenish the lower occupational groups. The 71.4 per cent of Tajiks who were employed before coming to the Russian Federation have to change their economic activities; 65.6 per cent changed the occupational group to which they belonged at home.

Vertical labour mobility also takes place: 45.3 per cent of those who started their working practice in Tajikistan as general labourers are currently working in the Russian Federation on better jobs, mainly as skilled workers or operators of machines and mechanisms.

*I came to Russia in 1998, to my uncle, to Noyabrsk in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District. Then I was 18 years old, I was “master of none.” For two years, I worked as a loader in the shop. Then I returned to Tajikistan, graduated from a driving school, received a driving license and again went to Noyabrsk. I got a job as a driver. Now I have a heavy-duty truck and work on rotation – I work 15 days, for another 15 days – I take rest in Noyabrsk.*

The demand for unskilled labour is supplied mostly by skilled workers. “The status in exchange for wages” is a conscious choice of migrants, but this does not eliminate problems of inefficient investments into the human capital by the sending states and inefficient use of this capital from the side of the Russian Federation.

**Remuneration of Labour (Wages)**

Wages, being the main source of income of diaspora members, relatively vary.

*Figure 5.3: Distribution of respondents by size of average wages*

Tajiks’s earnings vary depending on the types of their economic activities. With the average wage of Rub 21,400, the maximum earnings of those in the health-care and social services sector is Rub 24,700, and Rub 24,100 in construction, and in transport and communications. Except for the
construction industry, the earnings of mass employment for Tajiks (such as those in the wholesale and retail trade, communal services and hotel and restaurant industry) are either close to the average wages (Rub 21,600 in trade) or significantly lower. The wages of those in the communal services is Rub 16,700, and Rub 18,200 in hotel and restaurants industries. Those who provide housekeeping services even earn less (Rub 15,700).

To some extent, remuneration of labour depends on the occupations of the Tajiks. Classification to occupational groups, imposition of higher demands to education and qualifications of the employee are crucial; salaries of department and organizational heads, as well as highly skilled and semi-skilled specialists (groups 1–3 on ISCO-88) are 1.22 to 1.3 times more than the average wages.

At that, men are paid for more than women: the average remuneration is Rub 22,100 for men and Rub 18,900 for women. On some of the most massive occupations, such as qualified employees in the fields of trade and skilled workers, the gap in the remuneration between men and women is minimal. However, among unskilled workers, the difference is relatively significant (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3: The average remuneration of labour for men and women by certain large-scale professional groups (Rub/month)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional group</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers in the trade, services and housing and utilities sector</td>
<td>21,950</td>
<td>21,946</td>
<td>21,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>23,346</td>
<td>23,382</td>
<td>22,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>17,876</td>
<td>18,763</td>
<td>14,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21,402</td>
<td>22,071</td>
<td>18,586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Especially great is the difference in the remuneration of men and women working in the public services: Rub 17,900 and Rub 13,400 respectively.

There are differences in the remuneration of labour based on educational attainment and other factors. Remuneration of labour depends both on performance features of specific enterprises and organizations (type of economic activities, quality of job placement, mode and schedule of the work and the like) and also on personal characteristics of the employee (education, work experience, motivation and others). Those belonging to the core of the diaspora, the more educated and skilled employees who are occupying more prestigious jobs, are paid much better; their average salary is Rub 24,500, while representatives of the semi-peripheral part receive Rub 22,300 and of the peripheral part, Rub 18,800.

The education of the employee is remunerated: the average salary of those with below general secondary education is Rub 16,900, Rub 19,400 of workers with secondary education, Rub 23,400 for those with secondary special/vocational education and Rub 23,400 for those with higher education.

I was lucky as I have a higher education. In addition to working in the academic institution I’ve been all my life working as a private tutor, giving English lessons. This is good, very good money. I am earning for a housing (I am planning to buy an apartment in the future), I pay for studies of my nephews, participate in weddings (I provide material assistance for wedding ceremonies of my nephews in Tajikistan). (Interviewee 9)

But having Russian citizenship is critical: remuneration of labour of men and women in all educational groups is higher among Russian citizens than among citizens of Tajikistan.
Furthermore, holding Russian citizenship reduces the risks of gender inequality, allowing women to take better jobs on the labour market with higher payment.

**Working Groups**

The majority of respondents work on micro and small enterprises. Of the respondents, 40.7 per cent work on micro-enterprises (of which 27.2% work on enterprises with five employees working), 31.8 per cent on small enterprises, 9 percent on medium-sized enterprises and 3.2 per cent on large enterprises. (Another 10.8% of Tajiks were at a loss to answer and 4.6% are self-employed).

Except for those self-employed, only 15.6 per cent of diaspora representatives are working in teams comprised of foreigners only, with no Tajik citizens or natives. Most often, there are one to five Tajiks who work together with them (42.8%). Much more rarely, there are 6 to 10 Tajiks in the

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45 Enterprises with less than 10 employees are classified as micro-enterprises, those with 10 to 50 employees as small enterprises, with 51 to 250 employees as medium-sized enterprises and with more than 250 employees as large enterprises. The number of small enterprises is very scanty in the Russian Federation and in accordance with data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), it is one of the lowest among developed countries. Of the enterprises with less than 20 employees, only 390,000 people are working; of those with less than 10 employees 157,000 people. Even in the service sector, the share of those employed on enterprises with less than 20 employees makes up 3.8 per cent, and for those with less than 10 employees is 1.6 per cent. (OECD, *Entrepreneurship at a Glance*, OECD Publishing, 2013, Available from https://dx.doi.org/10.1787/entrepreneur_aag-2013-en). The real situation is a little different: from the majority of small enterprises, informal (unreported) employment is thriving, but most often, the presence of such employees (both migrants and Russian nationals) is not registered by statistics. According to the Rosstat data, 19 per cent of workers are engaged in informal employment (see “The decent work indicators,” Rosstat, gks.ru (http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/trud/ind-dtr.xls)
group (14.9%) or 11 to 20 Tajiks (7%). Even more rarely, the group includes more than 21 natives of Tajikistan (4.8%). The smaller the enterprise, the greater is the likelihood that it is a mixed group or a group consisting exclusively of immigrants from Tajikistan.

I meet and associate with different people – both with Russians and also with people of other nationalities. Mainly at the workplace. We have different nationals working with us — Tajiks, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Dagestani. Our relations with Russians are good at work. We are very close and united. Generally, here in Noyabrsk, it is not like in Moscow, relationships between people are not bad. (Interviewee 7)

Nevertheless, regardless of the size of the enterprise, almost all representatives of the diaspora (97.1%) at work in the Russian Federation speak Russian (least of all, in medium-sized enterprises with employees of 50 to 250 people, 95.4% of the respondents communicate in Russian).

At work, I communicate with different people of different nationalities. Generally, I talk Russian. (Interviewee 21)

If you work with Tajiks, you speak Tajik with them, with Uzbeks, Uzbek. With the rest, Russian. ... In such cases, I help in contacting with employers, with the police etc. (Interviewee 8)

Bilingualism at work is common for more than half of the Tajiks: in addition to Russian, 44.1 per cent of Tajiks speak Tajik at work (more often, 53.5% on small enterprises), 10.6 per cent speak Uzbek and 1.1 per cent speak other languages.

**Legitimacy of Stay and Labour Activities**

The key parameter of the migration profile is the migrant’s legal status, determining the everyday life, conditions and the nature of work.

The majority of Tajiks has permits for their stay/residence in the Russian Federation: only 1.4 per cent of the respondents do not have any valid documents. However, 3.3 per cent were turned off with this question. According to the survey, at least 95.3 per cent of Tajiks are legally staying on the Russian Federation.

However, the same is not true for those who are documented with the right to employment (work permit) (see Figure 5.5).
Among those who work in the Russian Federation and need such permit (those who have temporary residence permit and temporary stay permit), 5.1 per cent do not have work permits or the so-called patent (a work permit for physical persons). Another 1.5 per cent of the respondents have work permit, but they do not have it in their hands and have not seen it. Another 4.8 per cent were turned off with the question.

Formally, at least 88.6 per cent of Tajiks have the right to work in the Russian Federation. First, however, only a part of those who have work permit (63.3%) have their employer indicated in this work permit as a requirement of the Russian legislation). Second, there is no doubt that the majority of those who have patents are working not for physical persons, but in business structures (that is also prohibited by law). At least one of the five Tajiks (or rather two of five) have no legitimate grounds for engagement in labour activities in the Russian Federation.

Employment profiles of diaspora representatives differ from the characteristics of the local population as well as labour migrants from Tajikistan. Though representatives of the diaspora do not hold the highest positions on the Russian labour market (as they are considered inferior to the local population by many parameters), their job placements are significantly better than those held by Tajik labour migrants. The majority of this group, in contrast to labour migrants, have legitimate grounds for working in the Russian Federation.

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46 Two thirds of foreigners with patents have never worked with physical persons (HSE CEPRS/Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies, Russian Federation 2011).
6. FAMILIES AND HOUSEHOLDS

Family

Almost half of the respondents (45.2%) are within a registered marriage, while about a fifth (22.9%) have never married. Civil and religious marriages are typical for few of the respondents, which are 6 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. There are more of those who are within a registered marriage, divorced and widowed among women than among men, and the number of those who have never been married is less.

Table 6.1: Family status of respondents (%) (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Status</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total, by sampling method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In a registered marriage</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never married</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a registered and religious marriage</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a civil marriage</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a religious marriage</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a registered and civil marriage</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a registered, civil and religious marriage</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a civil and religious marriage</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Less than a fifth of the respondents availed themselves of the opportunity to choose more than one answer to a question on marital status. However, this does not mean that all of them have a “second family.” In some situations, the respondent probably marked two or three characteristics of the only marriage.

The “second family” is a category under which different phenomena are combined. First, there are cases when a migrant has partners both in Tajikistan and in the Russian Federation and provides financial assistance to families in both countries, so the household becomes transnational. Second, there are cases when in the Russian Federation, one enters a fictitious marriage that does not necessarily result to emerging of a household. Finally, cases when a migrant “forgets” about his family in Tajikistan and gets a “new” family in Russia. These forms are unstable and can transfer from one form to another:

_I entered into a fictitious marriage in order to obtain a citizenship. Afterwards, it became real. My wife is Kazakh, she is here since 1997, she is also a finisher (wallpaperer). We together are engaged in apartments remodeling and repairs. She has two adult children; her daughter is married to a Russian. She is 15 years older than me; she is a good person. She knows that I have a wife and two sons at home. She does not mind it. She understands everything. (Interviewee 21)_
To pick out respondents who are simultaneously supporting two families in different countries, an additional analysis was done. Those respondents were picked out based on who run a joint household in the Russian Federation together with a spouse (regardless of whether the marriage is registered, religious or civil), as well as those who provide material support to a spouse in Tajikistan (also regardless of whether the marriage is registered, religious or civil). Crossing of these categories allowed to pick out 7 per cent of respondents who live in the Russian Federation with a spouse and financially supports another spouse left in Tajikistan.

Tajiks in Moscow live differently. It is much easier for men. They come, get a job, get married. My “first cousins once removed” work in the markets. They have wives and children in Faizabad. Here, they also have wives and children. They live in Maryina Rosha. (Interviewee 9)

However, this analysis does not show those who do not provide material assistance to spouses left in Tajikistan. Nevertheless, the interviews show that there are such cases:

Labour migrants also have family problems: they find a new partner in life and leave their own spouse. Recently, a citizen of the Republic of Tajikistan applied to me. They arrived 10 years ago. Her husband obtained the Russian citizenship, and she did not. They both worked; they have three children. Then they get divorced, but did not formalized [sic] a divorce. Then her former husband brought a new wife from Tajikistan and obtained a Russian citizenship for her. The woman [was] left alone with three children, with an array of migrant’s problems, without citizenship and without her husband’s support – he does not help her. She applied to the Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT). (Interviewee 1)

Children

Of the respondents, 59 per cent have children under 18, a third part of them have one child under 18 (30%), another part have two children under 18 (34%), and a fifth part have three children under 18 (20%).

Figure 6.1: Distribution of respondents by number of children under 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Children</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 427.
Households in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan

More than half of the respondents live in the Russian Federation with family members and live in a joint household with them (59%) and the rest (41%) keep a house in the Russian Federation alone. Tajik households in the Russian Federation are not large: a fifth part of the respondents (22%) consist of only two people, which includes the respondent and one more person. The households of 14 per cent of the respondents consist of three people, and 12 per cent have four persons each household.

*We decided to migrate together with my husband. I have four children. My mother agreed to take care of my children.*

– Etibor, 37 years old, with secondary education, a hairdresser from Yekaterinburg

Figure 6.2: Distribution of respondents by size of household in the Russian Federation

If the respondent keeps a house with another person in the Russian Federation, most often, it is with a spouse (43%). Sharing it with sibling/s (36%) is on the second place. One third of the respondents (30%) have a child or children under the age of 18 in the Russian Federation. The 16 per cent of respondents run a joint household in the Russian Federation with their children over 18 and 13 per cent run it with their parents; 10 per cent have a common-law husband or wife, 9 per cent live with other relatives, and 7 per cent share it with a civil marriage partner.
Table 6.2: Composition of household in the Russian Federation to whom the assistance is rendered (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of household in the Russian Federation</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wife/Husband (registered marriage)</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblings</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child/children under 18</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child/children aged 18 years and older</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents (one of parents)</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/husband (civil marriage)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other members of the family</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/husband (religious marriage)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority (86%) of the respondents provides material assistance to someone in Tajikistan; these people form a part of the migrant’s household in Tajikistan. In contrast to households in the Russian Federation, which consist of a small number of members, households in Tajikistan consist of a much larger number of people. Almost two thirds (60%) of the respondents provide material assistance to four or more people in Tajikistan.

Figure 6.3: Distribution of respondents by size of household in Tajikistan

Note: N = 619.

Most often, members of the diaspora provide financial support to their parents in Tajikistan (79%); almost half of the respondents provide for their children under 18 (45%) and their brothers/sisters (44%). The 38 per cent provide for a spouse, and 9 per cent assist other relatives in Tajikistan.
Table 6.3: Composition of household in Tajikistan to whom the material assistance is rendered (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of household in Tajikistan</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents (or one parent)</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child/children under 18</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers/sisters</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/husband (registered marriage)</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child/children aged 18 years and older</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other members of the family</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/husband (religious marriage)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/husband (civil marriage)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contacts with Members of the Family in Tajikistan

Tajik migrants maintain intensive contacts with family members, relatives and friends living in Tajikistan. One third of the respondents communicate with them every day or almost every day (29%), slightly less than a half (44%) communicate one to three times a week and another fifth (18%) communicate once or three times a month. Only 3 per cent of the respondents do not communicate with families and friends in Tajikistan.

Figure 6.4: Distribution of respondents by frequency of communication with family members, friends and relatives living in Tajikistan

Note: N = 712.

Almost all migrants use their phones to communicate with relatives and friends in Tajikistan (98%), while other communication options are much less popular; 17 per cent use Skype and 10 per cent use social networks.
Table 6.4: Distribution of respondents by means of communication used for communicating with people in Tajikistan (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication Means</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skype</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social networks</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messages</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-mail</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letters</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In response to the question: What communication means do you use for communicating with family members, relatives and friends living in Tajikistan?

More than half of the migrants (59%) go to Tajikistan once a year or more often, one third (32%) go less than once a year, and about a tenth part (9%) said they never go to Tajikistan.

Table 6.5: Distribution of respondents on frequency of trips to Tajikistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of trips to Tajikistan</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than once a year</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice a year</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three times a year and more</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 725.

Almost half of the respondents (37%) leave for Tajikistan for vacations for one to two months, 21 per cent leave for two to four weeks, 26 per cent leave for a period of three to six months, and 8 per cent leave only for one to two weeks.

Figure 6.5: Distribution of respondents by duration of time spent in travels in Tajikistan

More than one year: 1.7%
6 months–1 year: 4.3%
3–6 months: 25.6%
1–2 months: 37.1%
2–4 weeks: 20.8%
1–2 weeks: 8.3%
Less than a week: 2.3%

Note: N = 606.
Those Tajiks who have settled in the Russian Federation generally maintain close ties with relatives left at home.

I have my own house near Moscow. On weekends, I go there to see my family and children who are studying there. My wife is here with me. I do not think all the time about my wife and children. Of course, I think about my parents. Not long ago, my mother came to me and stayed here for one month. My father does not come as he is working. Many relatives come to migration and visit us. (Interviewee 12)

Diaspora members try to arrange marriages for their children with families from Tajikistan in order to support hierarchical relationships of subordination and adhere to traditional age and gender roles for the Tajik family. However, for the “one-and-a half generation” (children of migrants who came to the Russian Federation with their parents), habitual questioning of obedience is rarely seen.

Fellow citizens in the Russian Federation are trying to find brides among one of “them” and grooms from Tajikistan. There are “to and from” arrangements, where they marry and marry off their children to Tajikistan and bring fiancés/fiancées from there, usually from their own community.

In the first generation of the diaspora, still the hierarchical level of relations is preserved, but among their children, the hierarchical levels of relations are constrained by new circumstances. (Interviewee 10)

Families often prefer to send the pregnant wives home, to Tajikistan, where mothers, grandmothers and aunts provide assistance and care for a newborn, as well as conduct the necessary ceremonies associated with childbirth.

I have three children; they were born in Tajikistan. My wife went to Tajikistan to give birth to children, as here she was alone. On the eighth–ninth month of pregnancy, I usually sent her home to my relatives. When the child turned three to four months old, she returned with the child to Russia. (Interviewee 12)

**Language Practices**

An overwhelming majority of the diaspora representatives are fluent in Russian, and 40.3 per cent are fluent in Uzbek. Russian language is dominant in the workplace and in public. In private conversations, representatives are usually bilingual: at home, they speak Tajik a bit more often and speak Russian with friends. In Uzbek families and in private conversations, they speak Uzbek.

Table 6.6: Language practices of diaspora representatives in different fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practices/Language</th>
<th>Tajik</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Uzbek</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>No answer; Undecided with the answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In what languages are you fluent?</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What language do you speak at home in the Russian Federation?</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What language do you speak at work in the Russian Federation?</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What language do you speak with friends in the Russian Federation?</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If you work with Tajiks, then you speak with them Tajik, with Uzbeks, Uzbek. With all the others, Russian. I did not have problems with the Russian language, as I graduated from the Russian school. (Interviewee 8)

Fluency in Russian facilitates integration into the Russian society and gradually expands the Russian language, but it also narrows the use of the mother tongue.

I am Tajik, but I rarely speak Tajik, mostly when dealing with some of my friends. More often, I speak Russian; with Tajik friends, a mix of Tajik and Russian; with other friends, English. But in the future, I would like to pass the Tajik language to the succeeding generations. In [the] future, my knowledge of the Tajik language will only get worse. Since my departure from [my] homeland, it is steadily worsening. (Interviewee 5)

My eldest grandson is turning seven years old. My children with my grandchildren go for summer to Tajikistan. Grandchildren speak a mixture of languages. On the playground – Russian. (Interviewee 2)

My eldest son was born in Tajikistan. Now he speaks only in Russian. My youngest son was born here, in Moscow, but when he was 11 years old, he started to speak Tajik. He is learning Tajik language. He listens [to] Tajik music, goes with me to see my friends, is trying to talk our dialect. He started to pray together with his mother. (Interviewee 15)

In upbringing the succeeding generations, the diaspora members face specific problems. Nowadays, the second generation very often either does not know the Tajik language or prefer to communicate in Russian in private conversations too.

Children speak Russian, although we try to speak Tajik at home. But they no longer talk with us. They spend all their time in the Internet. (Interviewee 14)

In mixed families, communication is not always in Tajik. Children who grew up in the Russian Federation often prefer to speak Russian, even if they understand Tajik because of their socialization in the Russian environment: “They are already Russians,” as most would claim. Informants often complain that the next generation’s knowledge of Tajik language is getting worse, and they no longer strive to preserve the language.

Not all families try to preserve the Tajik language in their children. It is fuelled by snobbery, emulation. (Interviewee 10)

Plans for Children’s Education

One of the questions in the questionnaire is the preferred country of the parents in terms of their children’s education: in the Russian Federation, Tajikistan or in any other countries. In order to find out the most popular choices, all answers for each child were summarized. Options when parents have not made any decision yet were excluded. As a result, a set of choices for all children (842 cases) was received. Respondents with almost equal frequency chose the Russian Federation (49%) and Tajikistan (48%) for their children’s education. Only 3 per cent of respondents would prefer the third countries for their children.
Table 6.7: Distribution of parents’ preferred country for their children’s education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for children’s education</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Another country</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total cases</strong></td>
<td>842</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 842.

Parents’ choices, as a rule, remain focused on one country, even if there are several children in the family. Thus, only 7 per cent of respondents with children pronounced preferences in different countries for different children in the family.

*I want to bring my sons to Russia for further studies. My mother hired a Russian language tutor for them. Let my daughters study at home, what for do they need Russian education? All the same, they will get married. (Interview 22)*

Almost half of the respondents would like their children to be educated in the Russian Federation (49.5%), and a little less (41%) want it in Tajikistan. Only 2 per cent of the respondents have chosen other countries.

Table 6.8: Distribution of parents’ preferred country for their children’s education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different countries for different children</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>368</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 368.

Two groups of factors associated with the choice of the Russian Federation and Tajikistan as a country for children’s further education are distinguished:

a) social and economic situation and the accessibility of education in Russia; and
b) involvement into the Russian environment.

Education of children is a value mentioned in many interviews; for many parents, providing their children with the opportunity to get a good education is a priority, and for this purpose, the respondents spend significant means. Among those respondents who have children under 18 in Tajikistan, 18 per cent spend or are planning to spend their earnings on education (payments in schools, payment for education on a contractual basis and the like). Respondents mentioned the same sentiment in interviews:

*Thus, our children have grown up, they received their education. We did not have and do not have any expensive housing, cars. It was important for us to get our children educated. (Interviewee 24)*
Education received in the Russian Federation is valued more than education in Tajikistan, but there are some problems in gaining access to education:

*People spend their last money to provide their children with a good education. Now there is a question: where to educate children? In Tajikistan, the level of education has dropped very low. In Russia, it is a big problem to enter good universities or good schools that will train them for entering these universities.* (Interviewee 18)

*Most likely, I will not be able to move my family to Russia – there is no money. It is very expensive. For me, the most important is my children’s education. For my daughters – first of all to get education, enter the university and then start a family. I will not marry them off. Let them first graduate from the university and then we’ll see.* (Interviewee 8)

These problems are becoming the most important for migrants with low socioeconomic standing. Thus, more often, respondents with higher level of income and educational attainment are planning to provide education to their children in the Russian Federation (it should be noted that, in turn, the level of income and educational attainment are interconnected on a statistically significant level).\(^\text{47}\) If in the highest-income group, 76 per cent of the respondents are planning to provide education for their children in the Russian Federation, in the lowest-income group, such plans were voiced only by 38 per cent of the respondents. Similarly, among those respondents whose educational attainment is lower than secondary school, less than half (44%) talk about plans for providing education for their children in the Russian Federation. Among the most educated respondents with at least an incomplete higher education, there are 63 per cent of such respondents.

Table 6.9: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on respondents’ income level (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>Average monthly income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15,500 and less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 329.

Table 6.10: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on respondents’ educational attainment (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>Level of education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary and lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 333.

Another important factor facilitating access to education is possessing Russian citizenship. Majority of the respondents who have the Russian citizenship (87%) are planning to provide education for their children in the Russian Federation; among those who have no Russian citizenship, only 46 per cent chose the same option.

\(^{47}\) Chi-square = 0.000 for tables 6.8–6.10, 6.12–617 and Chi-square = 0.01 in Table 6.18.
Table 6.11: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on respondents’ possession of Russian citizenship (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>No Russian citizenship</th>
<th>Holding Russian citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 334.

The more children there are in the family, the less resource are accounted for each of them. As a result, children from families with only one child (62%) have more chances of getting education in the Russian Federation; those who have one more sibling in the family (58%) have a little less chance, and children of large families have even less chances (44%).

Table 6.12: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on respondents’ number of children (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>Number of children under 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 334.

Respondents believe that to enter a university in the Russian Federation, one needs to have a good background, one that is most likely provided by Russian schools. But it is a big problem to bring their school-aged children to the Russian Federation:

> Of course, it is better to educate them in Russia, the education and training is better there, but there are a lot of problems – you need to bring children to Russia, to arrange their studies at school. It is difficult and expensive. Now I am looking for a way to train children in Tajikistan so that [sic] to prepare them for entering a college or university in Russia. (Interviewee 8)

At that, if the respondent has children under 18 living with him/her in the Russian Federation, he/she will more surely speak about continuing the education in the country than if the child or children are living in Tajikistan.

Table 6.13: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on having a child (children) under 18 in the Russian Federation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>With child/children under 18 in Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>36.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 334.
Table 6.14: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on having a child (children) under 18 in Tajikistan (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>With child/children under 18 in Tajikistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 334.

Involvement into the Russian environment refers to the second group of factors. The indicators of involvement include: (a) expenditures pattern (where respondents are planning to spend the earned money, in the Russian Federation or in Tajikistan); (b) further plans for returning to Tajikistan or continuing to live in the Russian Federation; (c) idea of whereabouts of home; and (d) speaking Russian and Tajik at home, with friends and at work.

Preferences on staying permanently are connected with the choice of the Russian Federation as a place of providing for their children’s education (83% of respondents in this group are planning to provide for their children’s education in the Russian Federation). In contrast, those who plan to temporarily stay in the Russian Federation (working for several months or years) more often choose Tajikistan (83% among those who are planning to work for a few months and 79% among those who plan to work in the Russian Federation for one to two years). The 37 per cent who want to travel further between the Russian Federation and their home country are planning to provide for their children’s education in the Russian Federation.

Table 6.15: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on long-term strategies (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>To stay in the Russian Federation for good</th>
<th>To earn money and in a few months to go back to the country of origin</th>
<th>To work for a year or so and return to the country of origin</th>
<th>To travel constantly between the Russian Federation and the country of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 308.

If the respondent is planning to live in Tajikistan in the future, he/she will more likely intend to provide for the children’s education in Tajikistan and not in the Russian Federation. About a third part (30%) who are planning to return to Tajikistan for good wants to provide for their children’s education in the Russian Federation, while the 79 per cent choose the other option.

Table 6.16: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on the respondents’ wish to return home (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>In response to the question: Would you like to return to Tajikistan for good?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 302.
The respondents who consider the Russian Federation as their home (85%) are more inclined to provide for their children’s education in the said country against 44 per cent who chose Tajikistan as their home.

Table 6.17: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on the respondents’ choice of home country (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>In response to the question: When people travel much, sometimes it is hard for them to say where their home is. Where is your home?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Tajikistan 43.9 Russia 84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 317.

Another indicator of preferences of the involvement in the social environment of the Russian Federation or Tajikistan is the expenditures pattern. Those respondents who intend to spend the main part of their savings in Tajikistan (64%) are more often likely to provide for their children’s education in the said country, while others (20%) prefer the Russian Federation and the remaining (43%) plan to spend their money on both countries.

Table 6.18: Preferences for providing children’s post-secondary education based on the country where the savings will be spent (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>In response to the question: Where are you planning to spend the main part of your savings – in Tajikistan or in the Russian Federation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Tajikistan 35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 227.

Among those who speak Russian at home (if not exclusively, but at least in combination with other languages), more than half (59%) are planning to provide for their children’s education in the Russian Federation; in contrast, among those who don’t speak Russian at home, 57 per cent assume that their children will study in Tajikistan.

Table 6.19: Preferences for providing post-secondary education based on speaking Russian at home (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children’s education</th>
<th>Speaking Russian at home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 334.

If the respondent speaks Tajik at the workplace, he/she will more likely choose Tajikistan (55%) for the children’s education, whereas among those who do not speak Tajik at work, there are 37 per cent of such respondents.
Table 6.20: Preferences for providing post-secondary education based on speaking Tajik language at work (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children's education</th>
<th>Speaking Tajik at work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 334.

Among those who communicate with friends in Tajik (at least sometimes), about half (53%) assume that their children will continue education in Tajikistan; 23 per cent of the respondents who do not communicate with friends in Tajik prefer the same choice.

Table 6.21: Preferences for providing post-secondary education based on speaking Tajik language with friends (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred country for providing children's education</th>
<th>Communicating with friends in Tajik</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N = 334.

Tajiks regard their children’s education with great importance and believe that education in the Russian Federation is of higher quality than in Tajikistan. Even if there are several children in the family, as a rule, one country is chosen to provide education for all of them. Choosing the Russian Federation or Tajikistan for providing post-secondary education is associated with two factors: (1) access to education; and (2) involvement in the social environment of the Russian Federation or Tajikistan.

1. The higher is the socioeconomic status of the respondent (educational attainment and level of income), the more likely one will plan to provide for the children’s education in the Russian Federation. Russian citizenship is positively associated with the desire to provide children’s education in the Russian Federation. The more children there are in the family, the more rarely they plan to provide education in the Russian Federation. Respondents consider schooling in the Russian Federation as an opportunity to get through in higher education institutions in the country. However, not everybody can afford to bring the family, especially those with children under 18, to the Russian Federation. If the respondent has a child or children under 18 already living in the Russian Federation, it is more likely he/she wants them to continue their education there.

2. If the respondent is strongly oriented to the Russian life, it is more likely that he/she wants to provide for the children’s education in the Russian Federation. If one plans to return to Tajikistan, he/she is more likely to choose the country for the children’s education. If one considers the Russian Federation as a home country, sees the future in it and speaks Russian at home, then he/she likely strives to provide for the children’s education in the said country. In cases where respondents speak Tajik at work and in communicating with friends, they more often prefer Tajikistan as their home country and choose it for the children’s further education.
7. DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORKS

In the Russian sociopolitical discourse under the term “diaspora,” a public organization of people of certain ethnic and cultural affiliations with formalized structures and regional hierarchy and with mutual obligations and membership is often understood. Typically, these organizations are formed by Russian citizens of Tajik origin fully integrated into the Russian society, who came to the Russian Federation during the Soviet era or in the 1990s.

Stages of Organizational Formation of the Tajik Diaspora

Several stages of organizational formation of the Tajik diaspora are distinguished:

1. Emergence of the first organizations of Tajik diaspora in the late 1980s–early 1990s, during the collapse of the Soviet Union and formation of the sovereign Tajikistan, when, due to ethnic and forced migrations, hundreds of thousands of Tajiks came from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation. This wave of emigration from the very beginning was oriented on the model of the “classic” diaspora, where communities are formally organized and aimed, first of all, at uniting Tajiks on the basis of culture, language and cooperation with the host society and authorities.

Yet in the early 1990s, there was established the Tajik cultural association Sogdiana. It was established with participation of Rajab Safarov, Suhrob Sharipov, Khokim Muhabbatov, who at that time were students of the Moscow State University. (Interviewee 1)

We, those who lived in Moscow, once decided—let’s get together and create [an] organization that will protect the rights of migrants. We came together: Hajiyev, Muhabbat, Gavhar. We decided: that’s it—we will unite Tajiks and will think about their problems. We decided that it would be a Tajik cultural center. The first meeting was held in the cinema “Mir” on Tsvetnoy Bulvar. About 500–600 people came. We organized an exhibition of folk art and crafts articles. As for Tajiks— that time all considered each other as potential enemies. Therefore, we were not sure of the success of our first meeting—it was for the first time. Many people were crying. The event passed off very well. Acquaintances met again, new people became acquainted. We organized meetings later again in the cinema “Mir” or in any other place. We arranged exhibitions. Several arrangements were conducted on the VDNKh (Exhibition of Economic Achievements) in the “Dom narodov (Peoples’ house)” ... Gradually, we began to recognize each other, to become closer. (Interviewee 3)

2. The formation of informal associations on the basis of communities of origin that began to emerge during the Soviet period. They received refugees during the conflict and confrontation of 1992–1997 and helped those who decided to stay in the Russian Federation to get settled. These communities of origin gained special influence when a massive influx of labour migrants started (1996–2003).

Networks initially are formed at the level of families then at the level of fellow countrymen. Communities of origin perform a variety of functions. Providing accommodation—it is also a task for countrymen. They accommodate countrymen in a certain area. When the police raids, police detentions happen, the communities of origin find a lawyer, apply to the

48 ILO, 2010 (pp. 37–38).
Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT). Another task of migration networks is to help with transportation and burial of the corpse of a perished countryman – what is referred to in the Tajik context as a “Cargo 200.” They will definitely take the corpse to Tajikistan. The joint organization of funeral arrangements, collection of money. (Interviewee 16)

3. A mass emergence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the local level at the end of the 1990s–early 2000s. These NGOs were established by immigrants from Tajikistan that have settled and naturalized in the Russian Federation. To a large extent, the spread of these NGOs have been affected by the formation of the state policy on nationality in the Russian Federation in 1996\(^49\) and the adoption of relevant legislation.\(^50\) Such initial organizations that were often established with participation of Russian authorities appeared in major cities of the Russian Federation and united Tajiks, as well as representatives of various nationalities of Tajikistan descent. Most often, the initiators and active participants of these NGOs were teachers, doctors, entrepreneurs, scientists, representatives of the artistic world and former law enforcement officers.

Today, in 68 regions of the Russian Federation (RF), Tajik diaspora organizations are operating ... Those diaspora representatives who have found opportunities to adapt try to help their fellow countrymen. (Interviewee 1)

The scope of activities of Tajik NGOs and national cultural centres is quite extensive and includes: (a) protecting rights of migrants from Tajikistan, as well as rights of Russian citizens of Tajik nationality; (b) preserving and developing the Tajik language, culture and traditions of Tajik people, as well as harmonizing inter-ethnic relations; (c) providing assistance to the Embassy of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation in organizing and conducting important political events of Tajikistan for Tajik migrants in the Russian Federation, such as presidential and parliamentary elections and referendums.

The regional public organization “Vatan” was established and registered in 1997... Unfortunately, we have not re-registered, but we are working. Usually we deal with protection of migrants’ rights ... Basically they all are interested in legalization, legal aspects, employment. We have more than a hundred of calls and dozens of visitors a day. We cooperate with trade unions, with our non-governmental organizations, with the House of Nationalities, with the Public Chamber. (Interviewee 18)

In our Tajik cultural center, we organize cultural events, exhibitions, concerts. Some of our especially successful projects: the programme “Let’s be friends”, “Family ceremonies and traditions” were supported by the Nekrasov library.... Another successful project – “Moscow Nowruz.”

In 2010, we established an association named a cultural centre “Asri Nur” (“The Age of the Light”). ... Our program covers issues of assisting our compatriots in the field of education, culture, cooperation, etc. For example, currently, we were given quotas in technical colleges in Russia (30 seats) on those occupations (professions) for which there are not enough specialists in Russia. For example, welders, hairdressers etc. ... We act as intermediaries, helping our guys to get education in Russia... We also organized Russian language lessons among our labour migrants. (Interviewee 11)

\(^{49}\) The Concept of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 15/06/1996, No. 909.

\(^{50}\) Within the frames of the Russian legislation, the institutional arrangement of ethnic communities is realized in the form of national-cultural associations, national-cultural autonomies, non-commercial organizations and public associations.
Typology of the Tajik Diaspora Organizations

According to S. Olimova, these are currently the most common types of Tajik diaspora organizations in the Russian Federation:

1. A public organization uniting people from Tajikistan, regardless of nationality, who came to the Russian Federation, have integrated into the Russian society and received Russian citizenship. Most often, such organizations unite intellectuals who strive to preserve their native language, culture, traditions and pass them to their children. In addition, these organizations provide assistance to labour migrants. As a rule, these organizations actively cooperate with state federation authorities and federal centres, and regularly communicate with the embassy of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation.

   Sometimes, such organizations are established by natives of the same region. For example, the regional public organization of the Tajik diaspora “Nur” was established by a group of creative intellectuals, who are natives of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) of Tajikistan and working in academic institutions and universities of Moscow. Informally, the organization began to function and carry out cultural and educational activities since 1996. In June 1999, the regional public organization of the Tajik diaspora “Nur” was legally registered in the Moscow department of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.\(^{51}\)

2. Non-profit public organizations with the mission to protect labour migrants’ rights. These are usually associated with international funds and human rights organizations.

   Our organization “Migration and Law” has overgrown from the diaspora organization on protection of migrants’ rights into the cross-national organization. We assist all migrants who apply to our organization. We have specialists who work with Moldovans, Kyrgyz, [and] Tajiks. They communicate with visitors in their native language. All the information that comes to our organization is registered, the telephones are recorded. In 2010, the ILO recognized our work along with S. Gannushkina’s organization (Civic Assistance) and the migrants’ trade union. (Interviewee 19)

3. Commercial-based organizations that use the labour of Tajik migrants. Leaders of such organizations deliver workers from Tajikistan to Russian employers, perform the patronage of labour migrants and legalize the proceeds from recruitment of workers by investing them into the local business, such as sectors of trade, services, public catering enterprises (restaurants, cafés, canteens) and other enterprises where Tajik migrants work. This type of organization combines the functions of a recruitment agency, an employer, as well as mediator between the Tajik migrants and employers, authorities and law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation. The official objectives of these organizations do not coincide with those that they realize in their activities.

   Our businessmen, to some extent, make use of labour migrants. They also use their money for their turnover. (Interviewee 18)

   Not only Russian firms but also diaspora organizations are engaged in mediation; there are many of them who shift around. (Interviewee 19)

\(^{51}\) See http://www.pamirian.ru.
There are some knowable individuals in the diaspora. They have contacts in law enforcement agencies, in the government, but unfortunately, they use these contacts to their personal advantage and not for the development of the country. Such leaders of the diaspora commercialize their activities. (Interviewee 25)

For example, one registered Tajik public organization is operating in [N]. The director of this organization makes money. Managing of a social organization gives him such opportunities: firstly, these are relations with the FMS, with the local administration, and secondly, relations with Tajikistan. More than that, he illegally presents himself as a representative of Tajik airlines and makes money. ... In general, official organizations exist solely for money. There are exceptions.... Maybe it is difficult, but it is possible to find such organizations. (Interviewee 18)

Frankly speaking, I do not much trust these organizations. Not always people working in these organizations are unselfish. It was rumored that they gouge money out of migrants. (Interviewee 22)

The syncretic character of diaspora organizations, combined with business, promote emergence of complex and ambivalent organizations and movements, such as the All-Russian Social Movement “Tajik Labor Migrants,” and Union of Tajikistanis.

4. Criminal groups engaged in illegal activities, such as human trafficking among others.

... Once I participated in a meeting of organizations where the perspective of unification was discussed. But it was just a gathering of gangsters ... Now, when I remember that meeting – from among of those who were sitting at that table as members of the Council, one is imprisoned, two of them are killed. (Interviewee 18)

Most of the above-mentioned organizations have a strong leadership character.

5. Informal, practically not institutionalized, networks of migrants. A part of these community networks reestablish social contacts of the sending society.

In Moscow, guys from all regions of our republic are working. Our guys usually socialize based on relational, acquaintance and community of origin principles. For example, fellow countrymen always and in all ways help me. (Interviewee 2)

However, there has been a “blurring” of the community networks lately. Some of their previous functions are being transferred to other types of networks, such as religious organizations (first and foremost rendering assistance, fundraising, among others) and other networks based on joint labour activities (job search, organization of work brigades and others). An expansion of virtual networks is also observed.

According to some informants, informal associations – which are formed based on labour and religious networks, becoming very active and expanding in the last ten years – are stepping forward.

The most active among networks operating in Russia are religious networks, then – community networks and after that – migrants’ networks. (Interviewee 19)

Religion for migrants is the main support. ... Where else can they go except for the mosque? I cannot say this about any public organization. (Interviewee 12)
The most active are religious networks. All the questions that we cannot settle in the diaspora organizations can be easily solved in the mosque. Communities of origin are on the second place. The main key network centres are: the mosque, the markets of the Sadovod (gardener) type, internet/media. (Interviewee 1)

Migrant networks are small; they include labour, economic networks. There are leaders, intermediaries. (Interviewee 19)

“Symbiotic networks” that are combining different functions were also mentioned.

In the market, Sadovod (gardener), there is a hoji (a Muslim clergyman), who has gathered many migrants around him. If anybody has a problem, he applies directly to him. He is responsible for collecting money for (providing) assistance to countrymen in the market or elsewhere. (Interviewee 12)

Despite the tendency to put out community networks, there is also an alternative point of view that places only community networks in the first place.

Community of origin ties are closer than religious ones. (Interviewee 2)

What networks are more active? – Communities of origin. (Interviewee 20)

A number of interviewed migrants indicated that they prefer to utilize proven and reliable forms of social contacts and mutual assistance.

Migrants engaged in construction are not connected to non-governmental and international organizations, and they do not establish such organizations. One major reason is because constructors do not have free time and are always busy with their construction tasks the whole day.

**Relationships of Diaspora Members with Diaspora Organizations**

An extensive network of officially registered Tajik organizations operates in all surveyed cities. However, diaspora representatives are not fully acquainted with the activities of these organizations. This is partly because many organizations do not perform their actual activities and mainly focus on public relations.

Officially, there are 47 of such organizations and only 3–4 work in reality (de facto). Others do not work. (Interviewee 12)

Different organizations are often accused of self-interest and unscrupulousness.

Organizations you are speaking about – they are crooks. ... I helped these organizations for the love to my people. Later, I understood what they are in reality. (Interviewee 23)

In Moscow, only 36.7 per cent of the respondents have heard about one of these organizations (they were offered a list of 13 most active organizations). The most familiar were the Union of Tajikistanis in the Russian Federation (12.9% of respondents have heard about it), Tajik Cultural Center (12.7%) and Tajik labour migrants (9.9%). However, even those who know about the existence of these organizations apply to them very rarely; in Moscow every tenth of the respondents only do so. The 1.4 per cent of respondents have applied to each of the above-mentioned organizations, as well as to the Trade Union of Labour Migrants.
The situation is better in St. Petersburg; 39.1 per cent of the respondents have heard about Tajik organizations in the city, primarily due to the reputation of Somoniyon, (26.9% of the respondents have heard about it), the diaspora of the Pamirian or peoples’ representatives of Pamir (12.6%) and Ajam (8.6%). Significantly, there are also more who have applied to these organizations: 15.4 per cent in Pamir and 4 per cent in Ajam.

In Yekaterinburg, 36.8 per cent of Tajiks have heard much about Tajik organizations. However, there are not many Tajik organizations in this city. As such, the following sound familiar: 24 per cent of the respondents have heard about the Union of Tajikistanis in the Russian Federation; 12.8 heard about Didor; and 18.4 per cent heard about Somoniyon. However, not many respondents are applying to these organizations; 1.6 per cent of the respondents applied to the first two organizations and only 0.8 per cent to Somoniyon.

The most familiar with the activities of the diaspora organizations are those Tajiks with Russian passport; in Moscow, 59 per cent of the respondents know about the existence of official organizations of the diaspora, and 52.9 per cent in St. Petersburg. In Yekaterinburg, where the diaspora composition is younger, the involvement of Russian citizens of Tajik origin in activities of such organizations is lower than among those without Russian citizenship.

More than half of the Tajiks (50.7%) have applied for help to fellow countrymen and/or to the diaspora, yet more pointed out that they have received such assistance (57.3%). It is evident that the initiative was often not from those who are in need of assistance. In cases when Tajiks could help a fellow countryman, they helped without waiting for the other to ask for help. For example, assistance in employment (as it was mentioned by 34.5% of the respondents) was rendered, as well as in housing (24.4%), solicited advice (25%; as such, the number of those who asked for advice is much less than the number of those who received advice), money (17.9%) and with solution of other problems (Table 7.1). In some cases, it is difficult to help in solving issues of interaction with authorities and law enforcement agencies (such as assistance in obtaining registration, citizenship, work permits and organizing contacts with the authorities). In these cases, the number of applications is less and their efficiency is lower.

Table 7.1: Applying for help and getting help from compatriots and/or from the diaspora (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of assistance (help)</th>
<th>Applied for help</th>
<th>Received help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary assistance</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending / receiving parcels from Tajikistan</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending children to school, kindergarten and the like</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solution of conflicts with other members of the diaspora</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration, receiving citizenship, work permit</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication with authorities (local administration, prefecture and the like)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication with law enforcement agencies (police)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good, necessary advice</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have not asked/applied</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer, undecided with the answer</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They were asked about their applications to both formal and informal networks. The question was such: “Have you applied for assistance to fellow countrymen/to diaspora? On what issues?”
For obvious reasons, most of the recently arrived labour migrants have been seeking help for the most pressing issues, such as employment, housing and financial concerns. These problems are most efficiently settled not by officially functioning diaspora organizations, but by informal networks.

Most often, assistance to migrants is rendered by relatives, by friends (54.3% of the respondents), by fellow countrymen from the same village (45.2%); significantly less by fellow countrymen from the same district (20.1%); and more rarely by people of the same nationality (9.8%), and by Muslims (3.5%).

These are just informal associations (networks, communities, teams, etc.) that provide assistance to migrants’ needs in conducting religious and ritual arrangements. Within the framework of informal associations, there are organized ceremonies, such as funeral, commemoration and carrying out religious rituals, such as mavlud, tarobeh and others. In construction work, the role of the imam (the head of the Muslim community) is often performed by a foreman. This highlights the role of informal migrant communities in the organization of the religious life of migrants.

Some five years ago, I noticed: each work brigade has its own jamaat consisting of 10–50 people. A foreman – at the same time the imam, “keeps in hands” his group, he does not drink alcoholic drinks, does not smoke, he collects money from members of the work brigade (for the common fund of the mutual aid). He negotiates job opportunities with neighbors. I know one such brigade, they made repairs at my dacha (country house). The foreman is a young man, 19 years old, he is from Kulyab. They all “form up” in front of him – even those who are older. He is competent, fluent in Russian, well understands and reads the Koran. He looks after the discipline in the team, so that to prevent conflicts. Previously it was not so. (Interviewee 6)

Migrant workers with temporary status are utilizing more informal migrant networks and organizations, such as countrymen associations, patronage teams and informal employment agents taking active part in their activities.

Formal organizations of the diaspora assist few migrants, primarily in terms of providing advice and consultations, disseminating information, giving legal protection and assistance in job placements. Another important function of these organizations is rendering assistance in transporting the bodies of deceased migrants back to Tajikistan.

In Moscow I learned that, really, diasporas help our fellow countrymen. For example, on one construction site in Moscow, where my friend worked, there happened a fire. Many of our citizens were got [sic] hurt by the fire. Many of our migrants wanted to visit and to help those injured, but they were not allowed. Then, when they applied for help to the diaspora, [and] the diaspora representative appeared and spoke on television. With the help of this representative, they received permission to transport bodies of perished and injured to a special place, and then send the corpses home. (Interviewee 22)

We settle many of our problems with the help of the diaspora. Not long ago, the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) citizen applied to the Embassy of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation (RF).

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53 Mavlud is a holiday on the occasion of the prophet Muhammad’s birthday. Tarobeh is a special prayer that is read on fasting days (Ramadan).
54 ILO, 2010 (p. 41).
He fell seriously ill, and the embassy could not place him in a good clinic – they did not have such money. Through the diaspora, they found a well-known physician – Tajik. We need to help our people, so they help.… (Interviewee 1)

However, most of the national cultural organizations and national cultural centres consider these activities as non-core, often secondary activities. They consider Russian citizens of Tajik origin as their target group and focus on kulturträger (transmitting cultural ideals) and awareness-building work. They see their mission as a kind of bridge between Tajikistan and the Russian Federation. But these conditions were not enough to improve the intensive formation of the diaspora on account of previous labour migrants.

Problems of Organization of the Diaspora

The most important problem of organizing the diaspora as a partner of the republic is the lack of harmonized interests of its different communities. The first major reason is disagreements within the diaspora.

We have the largest, but at the same time, the most fragmented and weak diaspora in Moscow. Our people brought with them localism, squabbles and bickering from home. There were some efforts to unite the diaspora – the Union of Tajikistani – but the localism does not allow to do [sic] it. (Interviewee 1)

Tajik communities are separate and uncoordinated. Attempts to unite are ineffective. There is a war of all against all. Apparently, this is our specific character. (Interviewee 18)

What is the specific character of our diaspora in comparison with other diasporas, for example such as Azeris? - Fragmentation, selfishness … of our leaders, inability to unite. (Interviewee 6)

... Here in Moscow, a lot of public organizations are registered, but they do not contact with each other, they compete with each other. (Interviewee 10)

The main thing: we are disconnected and isolated. (Interviewee 3)

The second reason that was already discussed above is localism. It is often caused not only by regional belonging, but also by civil, ethnic or linguistic identity. Natives of Pamirs, Samarkand and Khujand are particularly mentioned.

Principally, our organizations have a regional basis. (Interviewee 18)

If to talk [sic] about communities of origin, then the richest one is Pamirian. They are more solidary and rich. (Interviewee 2)

Natives of Samarkand belong both to Uzbek and Tajik diasporas. They communicate both with these and with those. (Interviewee 2)

Avlod (a patrilineal kindred group) – it is more than a region, I think. One avlod may include natives of Kulyab and Uzbeks. (Interviewee 6)

It is alarming that informants particularly emphasize the behaviour of different generations within the communities of origin.
Pamirians do well – they socialize very closely and support each other. But they socialize only with their own countrymen, Pamirians, except for the older generation. Elders – they are with us. (Interviewee 2)

It is quite possible that instead of moving towards each other, there is further separation of communities of origin. Communities of origin are often competing or openly conflicted with each other. Thereby, conflicts between communities of origin arise because of competition on the labour market, in business and in the redistribution of influence zones. Respondents also mention relationship problems between communities of origin.

... There is tension between the communities of origin. (Interviewee 6)

The contradiction becomes apparent; on one hand, a well-developed network of Tajik cultural organizations is available, and there is representation at the council level of the nationalities’ affairs in government agencies of Russian regions. But on the other hand, the needs of Tajiks living in the Russian Federation are not limited to the sustainability of the cultural identity.

Existing official organizations are poorly adapted for solving the everyday and often urgent problems faced by citizens of Tajikistan. To a large extent, on account of poor coordination of activities of these organizations, they compete for the attention of authorities of both the Russian Federation and Tajikistan.55

It is necessary to construct a dialogue not only between public authorities of Tajikistan and diaspora organizations in the Russian Federation, but also between the diaspora organizations themselves.

For the diaspora to be viable and active, it is necessary to unite or coordinate positions of different organizations. That is the greatest difficulty. (Interviewee 3)

When all come together they say beautiful words about unity, solidarity, but in reality – they all are aliens to each other. ... (Interviewee 6)

Diasporas’ agenda: first of all, unification of the diaspora. (Interviewee 19)

Our problem is that we do not respect each other. (Interviewee 24)

The most respected and influential members of the diaspora could facilitate the interaction and constructive cooperation between the different diaspora organizations. Unfortunately, some members have consciously drawn themselves back from these problems.

A small layer of the intelligentsia integrated into Russia tries not to join any communities and communities of origin. (Interviewee 6)

Along with the negative assessment of the situation, an optimistic point of view on perspectives of the diaspora consolidation was also expressed. It was based on the analysis of the socioeconomic transformations of Tajik communities.

55 Here, one of the informants comes to a conclusion that “from among of diaspora organizations, the most perspective are the communities of origin, as diasporas are often involved into political games.” (Interviewee 19)
... Gradually, our citizens are accumulating the capital. It entails a number of effects, among others, the objective tendencies for unification are appearing. In other words, one can imagine the Tajik diaspora in Russia as a saturated salt solution, where the processes of crystallization are going on. We need to wait until the complete core is formed, the others will catch up. (Interviewee 18)

Particular hopes are placed on young leaders of the new generation. They do not have many problems related to the confrontation of the 1990s and are not burdened by confrontation of different waves of emigration.

... Young people want to unite. This new generation will yet show themselves. (Interviewee 18)

Consolidation of the diaspora assumes the interpersonal and intergroup trust of its members (“But the trust is needed,” Interviewee 19). And for young leaders without a trail of previous offences and misunderstandings, it will be probably easier to work in this direction.

But in any case, it is necessary to create a platform for harmonizing the interests of diaspora organizations and, above all, the interests of their leaders, to create the atmosphere of trust.
8. HOUSEHOLDS’ ECONOMY

Income

The main source of income of the vast majority of the diaspora members (86.2% of the respondents) is their regular salary, while 17.8 per cent of the respondents have casual earnings. For the 4.8 per cent, the main income is their individual business. Other relatively stable sources of income (such as pensions, scholarships, investments, social benefits and income from deposits) make up shares of a per cent. As such, assistance of family/friends in the Russian Federation (2.5%) or from Tajikistan (1%) is more important.

Those who have permanent jobs are not squeamish about doing odd jobs; 11 per cent have side jobs. Casual earnings do not necessarily only to unskilled workers; professionals such as teachers, doctors and science employees turn to side jobs, especially those that have better pay than the base salary rate.

In addition to working in the academic institution, I have been all my life working as a tutor; I give lessons in English. It brings good, very good money. (Interviewee 9)

At the same time, for 8.3 per cent of the respondents, casual earnings are the sole source of income. As a rule, these are unskilled workers engaged in one-time or daily works.

Income Inequality

The intensive process of social stratification takes place in the diaspora.

In Tajikistan, the migration has divided into three layers: poor, average and rich migrant. –Hurshed, 43 years old, with higher education, works in a service centre in Moscow

However, currently, social stratification is relatively small. The existing inequality in income is disproportionately lower than it is in the Russian society. The decile coefficients that express the ratio between the average income of 10 per cent of the highest-income migrants and the average income of 10 per cent of the lowest-income migrants, according to the survey, make up 4.5. For comparison, in the Russian Federation, it was 16.4 (Rosstat, 2012)56 and 7.8 in Tajikistan (UNDP, 2009).

Financial Standing

For majority of the diaspora members, life in the Russian Federation is not trouble-free. Rarely any of them has difficulty with food and recurrent expenses, but every tenth of them experience difficulties with purchasing clothing and footwear. Families of Tajiks at home have almost the same material conflicts (Table 8.1).

---

Table 8.1: Financial standing of families in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan (%) (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure items</th>
<th>In response to the query: Name everything your family does not have enough money for.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, footwear</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large home appliances</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car/Transportation</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House/Apartment</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many respondents have difficulties with purchasing large household appliances, and only few of the respondents are able to afford a car, and even more so buying real estate.

As such, different groups of diaspora have different material possibilities, especially for expensive purchases (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2: Expenditures in Tajikistan and the Russian Federation by different groups of the diaspora (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In response to the query: Name everything your family has enough money for.</th>
<th>Diaspora groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core of the diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of a car</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of real estate property</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of a car</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of real estate property</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who belong to the core of the diaspora not only have higher income that allows them to do expensive expenditures in both countries, but they also prefer to spend money in the Russian Federation. But an exception is doing investments in real estate, as the cost of real estate in the Russian Federation is significantly higher than in Tajikistan.

However, in general, diaspora representatives estimate the financial standing of their families in Tajikistan a little better than in the Russian Federation. This is evident from the possibilities of buying a car and real estate property. When the diaspora members answered the question about what they already own in Tajikistan, a more optimistic picture of the financial standing of the respondent’s family members in Tajikistan is evident (Table 8.3).

Table 8.3: Distribution of answers to the question: What are the things you own now in Tajikistan? (%)(Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Money, savings, deposits</th>
<th>9.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property (house, apartment, dacha (country house)</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land (not a summer cottage)</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Store, factory, workshop and other business</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor car, other expensive things</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Almost half of the respondents have land properties in Tajikistan. Tajiks estimate land as an immutable property. If the respondent plans to return to Tajikistan later in life, he/she expressed that it would be nice to have a land property at home.

I don’t want to bring my family to Russia – it is very expensive, it is impossible to support a family here. It is especially expensive to get registration/ to receive citizenship – I’ll be not able to do it. I am in debts. There is nothing to do in a village in Russia, there people themselves are running away to the city. If they gave us the land and made it possible to move with all the people of our kishlak, then maybe I would move. I think I have to buy a plot of land in Tajikistan – for my old age [sic]. (Interviewee 22)

A part of the diaspora, especially circular and seasonal migrants, are cutting costs to the maximum in the Russian Federation and saving spare money in Tajikistan. This is probably due to some of the respondents’ sentiments that living in the Russian Federation entails making sacrifices for their family members, and those sacrifices cannot be in vain. Even more so, the bigger part of their family is living in Tajikistan (see the relevant section).

Because of the traditional responsibility of men towards the family and the expression of loyalty to the social structure of the sending society, they basically come to the Russian Federation for the earnings. Therefore, they cut down expenses for themselves and try to send home money to the maximum. They do not live in the Russian Federation; they only work (at that, by 60–65 hours per week).

I am a man and I have to earn money. If I do not send money to my family, they cannot live. Previously, my wife worked together with me in Russia. But now she has to look after our children and take care of my parents. (Interviewee 22)

Many migrants, while working here, are under pressure. They always think about the families left behind. ... They live in unbearable conditions in incomplete buildings and the like; they save on their food and send all the earned money home. (Interviewee 12)

Coming home on a leave, they spend their hard-earned money and when the money runs out, they go back to the Russian Federation. Circularity of their travels is determined not by work conditions and the way of life in the Russian Federation, but by the living expenses of their families in Tajikistan. Young workers from migrant households are in worse situations, as they are forced to start work abroad early. The whole generation has grown up, and socialization takes place in conditions of labour migration and forming a certain way of life.

Savings

Most of the Tajiks have the opportunity of saving a part of their income: 35 per cent responded that they fail to save money, while 20 per cent were turned off with the question on specific amounts that they can save up. Although among those who did not answer, there are more respondents with relatively low salary (with average of Rub 18,300; the average salary of those who were able to save up is Rub 23,200 and of those who cannot save is Rub 20,700.

Basically, the old-timers who represent the core of the diaspora save up Rub 11,500 per month at the average, whereas those belonging to the semi-peripheral part save Rub 10,800, and

57 A local term for a small rural settlement (village).
Rub 11,000 for those belonging to the peripheral part. (At the same time, those belonging to the core of the diaspora more often complained that they fail to save up any money. The social differentiation inside the core of the diaspora takes place more intensively than at its peripheral part).

**Plans on Spending Savings**

The majority of the diaspora members have a clear idea about where they are going to spend their savings. The main part of the respondents are planning to spend their savings at home or both in Tajikistan and in the Russian Federation (Figure 8.1).

**Figure 8.1: Intended country for spending savings**

![Figure 8.1: Intended country for spending savings](image)

At such, those belonging to the core of the diaspora are planning to spend their savings mainly in the Russian Federation or in both countries. In contrast, representatives of the semi-peripheral part, and especially the peripheral part of the diaspora, tend to spend their savings in Tajikistan (Table 8.4).

**Table 8.4: Intended country for spending savings among different groups of the diaspora (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diaspora groups</th>
<th>In response to the question: Where are you planning to spend a main part of your savings: in Tajikistan or in the Russian Federation?</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Tajikistan</td>
<td>In the Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core of the diaspora</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-peripheral part</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral part</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most members of the diaspora spend and are planning to spend their savings on their current expenditures. However, a significant part of them are planning to spend their savings for purchasing expensive things (home appliances, car) and investing into real estate. Fewer plan to spend their for education, health care and recreation. Almost every tenth respondent intends to spend money for family arrangements. A small number of Tajiks are interested in making long-term investments into land, cattle, business, and deposits.
Remittances

The overwhelming majority of diaspora members send money to Tajikistan, with the exception of only 17 per cent of the respondents. For the most part, these are representatives of the core of the diaspora, from whom 23 per cent do not send money to Tajikistan. Whereas from among members of the peripheral part, only 11 per cent do not send money, and 9.1 per cent only from members of the semi-peripheral part. These are low-income old-timers of the diaspora who fail to save up in the Russian Federation and spend all their income for their daily needs.

A part of the remittances is sent randomly and irregularly; 7 per cent of the respondents have not remitted money for at least six months.

A little less than a half of the respondents have remitted up to Rub 50,000 per year, while almost a quarter of the respondents sent more than Rub 100,000 (Figure 8.3).
Those with higher earnings remit more money to Tajikistan. At that, the budget of diaspora members varies significantly: if those who earn up to Rub 10,000 per month spend more than half their salary for remittances, then those with earnings from Rub 35,000 to Rub 40,000 remit less than a quarter of their salaries. Most of all, young migrants (aged 25–29 years and with secondary vocational education) are sending money at about Rub 120,000 per year.

The average annual volume of remittances sent home by a diaspora representative amounted to about Rub 84,400 (the median value is 60,000, the mode value is 100,000). Old-timers belonging to the core of the diaspora, who have been settled and are earning more, send home about Rub 98,200 at average per year; those belonging to the semi-peripheral part of the diaspora send Rub 86,700 and those belonging to the peripheral part of the diaspora send Rub 79,800.

Old-timers of the diaspora, aside from sending greater value remittances, also have fewer relatives in their care at home, compared to labour migrants (Table 8.5).

As a result, the remittance of different groups of the diaspora intensifies the social differentiation in Tajikistan.

**Structure of Spending Remittances in Tajikistan**

The majority of Tajiks send money home exclusively to members of their families and to close relatives.
Addressing remittances is initially determined by needs; remittances are spent mainly on current expenditures and purchase of essential goods and services. A significant part of the respondents also send money for purchasing home appliances and for providing education (Figure 8.5).

However, there is a big difference in expenditures made in Tajikistan by the lowest-income diaspora members who fail to save money earned in the Russian Federation, and by those who make the savings.
Table 8.6: Areas of spending remittances done in Tajikistan by those who are able and not able to save money (%)(Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditures in Tajikistan during the last 12 months</th>
<th>Able to save up money (N=171)</th>
<th>Not able to save up money (N=283)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential goods (food, clothing, payment for communal services, etc.)</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of household equipment, electronics (TV set, refrigerator, etc.)</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing of motor car</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of real estate property (apartment/house)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair the apartment/house</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (payment for school, payment for the contract with the university/college)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of a land property</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental of land parcels</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of livestock</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of materials for agricultural works (seeds, pesticides, fertilizers and the like)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments into business</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for family arrangements (wedding ceremonies, funerals)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for back debts</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan to relatives/friends</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public projects</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits to the bank</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money was not mainly spent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer; undecided with the answer</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low-income members of the diaspora send home money primarily for everyday current expenditures and purchase of household appliances. Higher-income diaspora members more often spend money for purchasing real estate properties and cars. They allocate more money significantly for education, health care and payment for family arrangements.

More well-to-do members of the diaspora are basically those who belong to the core of the diaspora. More often, they send money for family arrangements and other one-time expenditures as they are less bound by family-kindred obligations. A different behaviour is typical for representatives of the peripheral part of the diaspora, who more often significantly spend money for paying off debts, but also tend to do save cash (among them, 4.1% make deposits into banks, and 5.4% lend money to relatives and friends).

Most of the representatives of the peripheral part of the diaspora plan to spend their savings exclusively in Tajikistan. It is particularly interesting to compare plans of spending savings with their real previous expenditures (Table 8.7).
Table 8.7: Plans on spending savings versus real expenses in Tajikistan (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure patterns</th>
<th>How do you use (or are planning to use) your savings?</th>
<th>Where did you spend the money you sent to Tajikistan for the last 12 months?</th>
<th>Difference between current (future) and previous expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4 (2–3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remit to family, relatives, friends in Tajikistan / Essential goods (food, clothing, payment for communal services, etc.)*</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of household equipment, electronics (TV set, refrigerator, etc.)</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of motor car</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of real estate property (apartment/house)</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair of apartment/house</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (payment for school, payment for the contract with the university/college)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health care</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>-12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of land property</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental of land parcels</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of livestock</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of materials for agricultural works (seeds, pesticides, fertilizers and the like)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments into business</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for family arrangements (wedding ceremonies, funerals)</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment for back debts</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan to relatives/friends</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public projects</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits to the bank</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money was not mainly spent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer; undecided with the answer</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Formulation of current (future) expenses (column 2) and previous expenses (column 3).

The respondents who intend to spend their savings only in Tajikistan are planning to rationalize their expenditures pattern by increasing the proportion of investments into real estate, automobiles, expensive equipment and land while reducing the share of current urgent expenses, such as expenditures for health, education and payment of family arrangements.

In general, it is noteworthy that questions about finances and material investments in Tajikistan turned out to be very sensitive. Respondents were reluctant to provide the amount that they managed to save up from their income in the Russian Federation (20% refused to answer). Questions about the finances and financial situation in Tajikistan were particularly sensitive. The respondents willingly answered questions about their expenditures in the Russian Federation (only 1.2% did not respond), but were reluctant to talk about expenditures at home (12.8% were undecided). They were even more reluctant to talk about what they have in Tajikistan (29% refused to answer).
9. DIASPORA’S POTENTIAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAJIKISTAN

The potential opportunities of the diaspora in contributing to the development of Tajikistan consist of several factors:

- Direct investments
- Portfolio investments
- Financial assistance
- Transfer of non-material assets – educational and professional contributions (“transfer of skills”)

Willingness of Different Groups of Diaspora to Contribute in Tajikistan’s Development

The 47.7 per cent of Tajiks expressed willingness to contribute to the development of the country “if it were possible;” 35.4 per cent would not agree with such perspective and 16.8 per cent were undecided. At that, there is a difference in the attitudes of Tajiks based on their classification on the diaspora.

Figure 9.1: Distribution of answers to the question: Do you agree to contribute to the development of Tajikistan? based on classification in the diaspora

Tajiks belonging to the core of the diaspora are fractured and equally express willingness or unwillingness to contribute to various development programmes in Tajikistan.

There always was and there is a desire to help, so that the life [sic] in Tajikistan would be better, that our compatriots would live and work in better conditions. (Interviewee 11)
As to participation of the diaspora in the development of Tajikistan, I think this idea is harmful. Diaspora should not help to the country of exit [origin]. A person should have the right to choose the country of residence, and he has to assimilate there. (Interviewee 19)

You cannot involve the entire diaspora into activities on development of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT). People anyway help financially. In Russia, there are mainly migrant workers with temporary status. They transmit to Tajikistan all they earn. And that is their contribution. (Interviewee 6)

Greater enthusiasm is shown by those who belong to the semi-peripheral and peripheral parts of the diaspora.

The Tajik migrant, whether he is educated or not educated, is always looking for an option to help somehow to his kishlak. For example, the last time when I went to visit my family, the guys from my work brigade gave me Rub 8,000 and told me to distribute this money to families who were left without a breadwinner. I personally bought 10 paint cans and gave it to the school (for repairing).

– Yokub, 31 years old, with secondary special education, a tractor driver from Moscow oblast

Of even greater importance is recognizing the problems in the country. Almost half of the respondents (49%) consider that there are problems in Tajikistan, and as such prefer not to contribute to the development of the country; 31 per cent of Tajiks deny existence of such problems, and the other 20 per cent were undecided.

Those who are willing to make personal contributions to the development of Tajikistan more often recognize the existence of problems (54.3%) against those who deny these problems (49%) (Table 9.1).

Table 9.1: Distribution of respondents based on willingness to contribute to different programmes and recognition of problems for the development of Tajikistan (%)

| In response to the question: If it is possible, would you agree to contribute to various development programmes in Tajikistan? | Are there any problems in Tajikistan that will prevent you from contributing to the development of the country? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | No | No answer | Total |
| Yes | 54.3 | 34.4 | 11.3 | 100 |
| No | 49.0 | 28.4 | 22.6 | 100 |
| No answer, undecided with the answer | 33.6 | 27.0 | 39.3 | 100 |

Recognizing problems in the country is not an obstacle for lending assistance, but it is a more sensible and deliberate view of the personal involvement in such assistance.

Of course, diasporas could participate in the development of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT), but there are no proper conditions and guarantees. Corruption, illegal seizures, irresponsibleness and impunity. Nevertheless, yet diaspora supports Tajikistan, businessmen build schools, import new technological equipment. (Interviewee 15)

At the same time, many of those who deny the existence of problems, and as such refuse to contribute to the development of Tajikistan, are not willing to make personal contributions, even if there were such opportunities.
I am not sure that the diaspora can help in the sphere of education in Tajikistan or in the development of the country in the whole. For example, nobody and never [sic] helped me. If there is a desire and abilities, you will get education and make your way. I have three brothers and two sisters in our family, but only I have become a doctor of sciences, and they still remained gardeners. The same is with the country; if it is not matured for the development, no one from the outside can do anything. (Interviewee 13)

I do not think that anybody can do anything for us, Tajiks in Russia. And I don’t think that we can do anything for anybody. (Interviewee 4)

Among those who are willing to contribute to the development of the country, two groups are distinguished. The first group includes those Tajiks who are willing to contribute to the development of Tajikistan, but recognize the existence of problems in the country that may interfere with such intentions. These are more mature, well-educated Tajiks (20.2% have higher education, and 4.8% have incomplete higher education), who often see their future in the Russian Federation (40.4% intend to stay in the Russian Federation for good, and 33.5% plan to travel between the Russian Federation and Tajikistan), though relatively few of them reject the opportunity to return to the republic for good (37.8%). In contrast to the first group, there are less religious respondents: among them, there are twice less of those who attend a mosque (a church, a temple) once a week or more often (17.6%), and almost twice more of those who have not attended a mosque in a year (32.4%). This largest group includes about a quarter of the diaspora members (Table 9.2).

Currently, my contribution to the development of Tajikistan is my assistance to my relatives at home and here in Russia. Moreover, I help schoolchildren in the school in my kishlak. For the last two years I’ve been assigning a scholarships in Rub 5,000 rubles to a better student. This is for motivation of our students in studies. I want that children from poor families would also have the opportunity to study to the full extent. They invited me to all meetings of Tajik associations and I participate in them whenever possible [sic]. (Interviewee 23)
The intellectual capacity of the Tajik diaspora is huge, and only a scanty part of it is used. On all our forums, we have a lot of intellectuals. Hundreds, thousands of scientists from Tajikistan are working in Russia in different spheres. If the government of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) could seek feedback from them, the benefit would be great for both sides. Previously, the format of the meetings was between intelligentsia representatives with the Embassy representatives or with the President. (Interviewee 15)

The second group includes those who believe that there are no obstacles for making such contributions. These are mainly young men who have come to the Russian Federation not long ago (64.7% came for the first time after 2005), circular, seasonal workers and also newly arrived to the Russian Federation (only 26.9% have not left the country for more than a year, that is 1.5 times less than among all respondents and only 19.3% have been staying for 10 to 11 months). They are widely practicing religious practices (35.3% attend a mosque (church, temple) at least once a week, and only 17.6% have not attended a mosque during the year). Many of them have not decided for their future. These are representatives of the generation whose socialization took place during the rise of the independent Tajikistan. This group was the most active supporters of rendering assistance to the republic and include 15–17 per cent of the diaspora representatives.

Table 9.2: Composition of different groups of diaspora based on willingness to contribute to the development of Tajikistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If it is possible, would you agree to contribute to various development programmes in Tajikistan?</th>
<th>Are there any problems in Tajikistan that will prevent you from not contributing to the development of the country?</th>
<th>No answer; undecided with the answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Group 1: Mature, educated, aiming for integration (24–26% of diaspora representatives)</td>
<td>Group 2: Young, circular, seasonal migrants who came to the Russian Federation for the first time (15–17% of diaspora representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Group 3: Included in the first wave of emigration Subgroup 3a: No plans to return to Tajikistan (8–9% of diaspora representatives) Subgroup 3b. Have not decided with the migration strategy. (8–9% of diaspora representatives)</td>
<td>Group 4: Young, educated (with higher and general secondary education); have not decided with the migration strategy (9–11% of diaspora representatives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer, undecided with the answer</td>
<td>Group 5: Those who need help: have problems with work, and not well-settled personal life (15–18% of diaspora representatives)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who are not willing to contribute to the development of Tajikistan, in turn, are divided into two groups.

The third group, upon coming to the Russian Federation, includes those who consider these important push factors: (a) economic instability of the country; (b) political situation; and (c) a higher standard of living in the country. Unwilling to contribute to the development of the country, they recognize the existence of these obstacles, as well as corruption and lack of trust to whomever.
Now the psychology is such – Tajiks should provide enough money to support their family, avlod (clan), kishlak, country. It is a powerful inhibitive factor. And those who are in Tajikistan don’t understand that their relatives are leaving their lives and health in Russia, but all this is spent for simple consumption, for supporting corruption and inefficiency. (Interviewee 18)

Most of them came to the Russian Federation before 2005 for the first time. They are more interested in the social and political life in the Russian Federation than in Tajikistan, and more rarely send money to the republic (at that, one fifth of them do not have any family members in Tajikistan, to whom they would help). They are religious people, but they are less committed to religious practices; only 15.1 per cent go to a mosque (a church, a temple) at least once a week, and 41.3 per cent have not gone to a mosque for a year.

By all sociodemographic characteristics, they don’t stand out among the other members of the diaspora based on two exceptions. First, the proportion of women is higher among them, including those with disorderly personal life (widowed, divorced). Second, among them, there are many of those who do not have young children and not concerned about their upbringing and education. And the majority of those who have children are planning to provide them further education in the Russian Federation.

Nearly half of them will not change their decision to pull away from the future of Tajikistan: 55.6 per cent don’t want to return to Tajikistan for good, 51.6 per cent are planning to stay in the Russian Federation, and two fifths consider the Russian Federation their home. The 56.8 per cent have not gone outside of the Russian Federation for more than a year, and nearly a third of them (30.2%) are Russian citizens. Taken together, this group of “steady refuseniks” (those who pull away from their homeland) makes up about 8 to 9 per cent of the diaspora population.

I’ve never gone to the Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan (RT). I have nothing to do with Tajikistan. I don’t communicate with any organizations associated with Tajikistan or with diasporas; I don’t go to communities of origin or to any associations. I don’t need anything from the state. And I don’t participate in elections.

My acquaintances think about the future, about Tajikistan, but I don’t. I contribute into the education of my nephews, but I do not think about the country. When nephews ask me, I tell them: “The main thing that you remember me. You will look at your diploma and will remember me.” (Interviewee 9)

The second half of representatives of this group – as well as 8 to 9 per cent of the diaspora population under certain conditions, primarily in the improvement of Tajikistan’s economic situation – may change their position and take a feasible participation in the development of the country.

In a similar situation are the Tajiks who are not willing to contribute to the development of the country, but believe that there are no obstacles for doing this (group 4). These are mainly young people (52.1% are under 20 years of age and 75.3% are under 40), either with secondary education (61.6% of respondents in this group) or with higher and incomplete higher education (26.8%). Their socialization most often took place at the time of formation of the independent Tajikistan. They are more religious; at least once a week, they go to the mosque (church, temple), 31.5 per cent have not attended a mosque (church, temple), and 24.7 percent have not been to a mosque in a year.

They have not yet decided on what country they will connect their future (about half of them want to return to Tajikistan for good, and half of them do not want to return); 38.4 per cent of the respondents tend to stay in the Russian Federation for good. Under certain conditions, this group
may change its position and contribute to the development of Tajikistan. Its number is estimated at 9 to 11 per cent of the diaspora population.

Our mentality ties us up, and we are as if in the grip of that there is our home, mountains, rivers. Some people build houses in their kishlaks. But it is a prison for them and their wives. We must be able to live. While you are young, you should earn money. Young people must decide for their future. Very many guys of my age will not return to the Pamirs. We do not have much land, the climate is harsh and there are no factories or plants there. What shall we do? There is only one way out. It is difficult in Russia, but in spite of this, we are staying here.

— Haelbek, 29 years old, with higher education, builder from Moscow

Of a particular interest are the Tajiks who have not yet decided on their willingness to contribute to the development of Tajikistan, which is every fifth member of the diaspora (group 5). These are young people (45.9% under the age of 30), as well as more mature representatives (19% are aged 40 to 50 years), not the most educated representatives of the diaspora (only 10.7% have higher education and 3.3% have incomplete higher education) and not very religious (only 16.4% attend mosque (church, temple) once a week, and 34.4% have not attended mosque (church, temple) in a year). Most of them first came to the Russian Federation in 2006–2010 (43.4%) or in 2011–2013 (23%).

Though many of them have not left the Russian Federation for more than a year (43.6%) or have stayed for 10 to 11 months in a year (20.5%), they have great difficulties with their work; 38.5 per cent did not have any work during the last year, the 21.3 per cent had odd jobs as main source of income, and the earnings are 15 per cent lower than that of other diaspora representatives.

In addition to problems with employment, many of them are faced with disorderliness of personal life; 41.8 per cent live in the Russian Federation alone (without family members), 9.8 per cent are in a civil marriage, and almost half of them do not have children under 18 years of age. (And those who have children are more often planning to provide education in Tajikistan). These are those Tajiks from whom it is too early to expect for a clear answer and who themselves are in need of help. They make up 15 to 18 per cent of the diaspora.\(^58\)

How can I help?! They help me. I live with my brother. I cannot even pay zakot (tax on the property for the good of poor).

— Khikmatullo, 26 years old, with secondary education, unemployed from St. Petersburg

It is most likely to expect active involvement from those Tajiks who are willing to contribute to the country’s development, despite recognizing objective difficulties (group 1). But willingness of the second group of the diaspora – who are ready to contribute to the development of Tajikistan, but doesn’t see these difficulties – should not be overestimated. In the process of further living and working in the Russian Federation, many of them will revise their plans and get more inclined to staying in the country. It can reduce their enthusiasm for rendering assistance to Tajikistan. At the same time, these labour migrants – those who make up the peripheral part of the diaspora

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\(^58\) Except for enumerated groups, there are those who did not answer the question about existence of problems in the country, including 5 per cent of those who are willing to contribute into the development of the country and 8 per cent who are not willing.
who are willing to contribute to the development of Tajikistan – should not be disregarded. Special programmes on their engagement in the development of Tajikistan, which may be adapted to their preferences, should be developed and implemented considering their capabilities that are quite limited.

**Barriers in Making Contributions for the Development of Tajikistan**

Both those who agree to make personal contributions to the development of the republic and also those who don’t agree with such position unanimously note that the main obstacles for doing so are the corruption and economic instability in Tajikistan (Figure 9.3).

**Figure 9.3: Distribution of answers to the question: Indicate problems in Tajikistan that will prevent you from contributing to the development of the country (Multiple answers are possible)**

- Corruption 33%
- Political situation 9%
- Economic instability 31%
- I do not trust anyone 4%
- Others (Not exactly) 1%
- No answer

*I found out that corruption in Tajikistan has penetrated so deeply that now there is no way to get out of it. Officials openly say that there is no need to make any documents; you just have to pay a tribute and you can quietly work in peace. But the point is that tomorrow, another person will come to his place and then the rate will be already different, rules will be different and the like. In Russia, there are also problems with corruption; the President himself speaks about it. Russia falls behind Europe for 50 years, but we fall for another 50 years behind Russia.* (Interviewee 12)

*I wanted to return to Tajikistan and move a part of their business there. But after coming home and talking with experienced people, I understood that it is unprofitable and useless to open business there. From every side, they will demand different payments from you.*

– Abdulnabi, 46 years old, with incomplete higher education, trader from St. Petersburg

*In Tajikistan, Russian Tajiks or returned migrants do not have opportunities for the business development. For example, some of migrants have brought different equipment from Russia: mini-shops, mini-plants, processing lines. (State) authorities at the beginning of the businessman’s activities take control over benefits that he has from his business and then gradually start to “put pressure” on him in order to wring money out of him.* [sic]

– Hurshed, 43 years old, with higher education, works in a car service centre in Yekaterinburg
As such, even though such problems are mentioned more frequently, these are not considered obstacles for those who believe that they can contribute to the various aid programmes within their powers.

Table 9.3: Major problems that prevent from contributing to the development of Tajikistan (%) (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In response to the question: Are there any problems in Tajikistan that will prevent you from contributing to its development?</th>
<th>Willingness to contribute to different programmes on Tajikistan’s development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political situation</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic instability</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t trust anybody</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is the difference between those who are ready to contribute to the development of the country and those who reject such a possibility? It is in the distrust of the latter to the social and economic institutions and/or in their inability to work under the domination of shadow relations and informal practices.

We are ready to help in [the] promotion of technological innovations. But in Tajikistan, they are not interested in it, as diaspora’s offers are based on the sheer enthusiasm and nostalgia and there will be no corruptive practices. To achieve success, we have to look for like-minded people in the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) and to take into account the existing rules of doing business. (Interviewee 15)

Our migrants want to send to the republic large shipments of flour, construction materials, tools and other products, but in Tajikistan, they [are] faced with very big problems. They reach such an extent that then these migrants don’t want to return home. When you apply to your employer in Russia asking to help with sending equipment or products to Tajikistan, so that people could live better there, he replies: “Don’t tell me about your Tajikistan...” and gives a wave of his hand.

– Yokub, 31 years old, with secondary special education, tractor driver from Moscow oblast.

As such, there is a widespread point of view that corruption is not only the product of inefficient institutions’ problems, but also a consequence of poverty that forces civil servants to act contrary to the law.

In Tajikistan, corruption and swindling are very strongly developed. Therefore, recently, the President, in one of his appearances, spoke about increasing of the salary for civil servants. He stressed that if to pay wages to employees in time or to increase it, there will be less corruption. (sic) (Interviewee 22)

Interpersonal, intergroup, as well as institutional distrust is widely spread.
Preferences in Types of Assistance

Almost every fifth questioned Tajik is ready to help the country in the frames of the skills transfer programme. It is noteworthy that the greatest willingness to participate in this programme is shown by those who are the least suited to it – temporary labour migrants who are representatives of the peripheral part of the diaspora. On the contrary, those belonging to the core of the diaspora with the maximally demanded skill show the greatest restraint (Table 9.4).

Table 9.4: Readiness to render different types of assistance to Tajikistan by different groups of the diaspora (%) (Multiple answers are possible)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In response to the question: If it would be possible, what support are you ready to render to Tajikistan?</th>
<th>Diaspora group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Core of the diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To work on a short-term basis on a certain project (transfer of skills)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer; undecided with the answer</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Material and financial assistance in the development of Tajikistan is considered by the diaspora representatives rather than giving to charities, which can be non-transparent.

Although some respondents speak about their readiness to take such measures (Table 9.4), in the perspective, their actual behaviour will be more restrained.

Special attention should be given to those Tajiks who were turned off by the question about their willingness to provide various types of assistance (43.1%). They are not satisfied with this choice and not willing to participate neither in the skills transfer programme nor in providing material and financial assistance. In practice, it means that any valuable scales of financial and material assistance cannot be seriously included. It is rather necessary to create an institutional framework for the creation of a favourable investment climate in the country, taking into consideration the inclination and willingness of the Tajiks for doing business in Tajikistan.

*If there is a benefit, then there will be investments. In any field, that brings income.*

(Interviewee 15)

Who should be assisted?

Representatives of the diaspora link their assistance to the country with real problems that exist in Tajikistan: childcare, education, health care (Figure 9.4).
Figure 9.4: Distribution of answers to the question: If it would be possible, what kind of assistance would you be interested in lending to Tajikistan? (Multiple answers are possible)

All respondents recognize that the most acute problems hindering the development of Tajikistan are child-rearing and their education.

We have to develop a comprehensive approach to migration, as migrants are for years separated from their families. Nearly all children in Tajikistan are fatherless. We have to do something with this. (Interviewee 18)

70 per cent of troubles faced by Tajiks come from their own countrymen. All the lawlessness, all abuses occur through the fault of Tajiks themselves. The reason for all of this is the ignorance. Most of our young people do not have a good education. There is a saying, “If you find a dropout, make use of him.” Our problems are rooted in the school, at the university, in the madrassas. (Interviewee 23)

For teaching children, good teachers are needed. But currently they are working on construction sites in Russia. It is necessary to provide good conditions for teachers who could return to [the] universities and schools in Tajikistan.

— Hurshed, 45 years old, with higher education, works in a car service centre in St. Petersburg

Many examples of real assistance to the education system in Tajikistan were given.

In Isfara district, a group of businessmen from Russia built a school and a modern production facility for processing of agricultural products for export. In the Mastchoh district, one businessman from Russia built a good modern school. Last year in Farkhor district, a businessman from Russia built a modern school. (Interviewee 1)

We, the Tajik intelligentsia, help the education system and science in the Republic of Tajikistan through our private channels. It could be more organized and successful. But we do not any fund and money for this activity. We sent books and magazines on the President’s plane with the assistance of Ramazan Mirzoev (the former Ambassador of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation). And now we can collect new books and scientific journals for free. The problem: how to take them out. It’s expensive. (Interviewee 2)
The majority of the diaspora members consider that assistance can be rendered only at the local level.

Of course, we have to help to our kishlak. [sic] My family has always been involved in social activities in our community, in the mahalla (residential quarters), cleaning of the large irrigation canal, reconditioning of roads, repairs of schools, improvement and beautification of the territory of the mahalla. Also in [the] mahalla, there is the community development fund and my parents contribute money to this fund. I send money for this purpose, too.

– Rasul, 28 years old, with higher education, builder from Moscow

It is possible to take some measures on helping Tajikistan only at the local level. You can accumulate finances there and more or less control their use. Along with financial assistance, advices can be provided and assistance can be rendered in getting education and in the advanced vocational training. It goes hand-in-hand. Who can help, whom you can rely upon? It is clear, only on own relatives and friends. (Interviewee 10)

We need to support our mosque. We can support the mahalla; [at the] maximum, [we can help] the district. Nothing should be given to anybody else. (Interviewee 14)

A significant part of Tajiks are ready to assist mosques and religious organizations (15%). As such, the willingness to assist mosques is directly connected with the religiosity of the diaspora representatives and statistically significant: among those who visit a mosque in the Russian Federation several times a week, there are 21.9 per cent of those who are willing to assist; among those who have not visited a mosque in a year, only 5.2 per cent are willing. Lending assistance to mosques is the result of not only personal faith, but it is also a sign of trusting the religion as an institution of the Tajik society and an effective tool for incrementing the social capital of the sending community.

In our kishlak, two migrants from the same family, during the celebration of Ramadan and Kurban, provided the material assistance to 10 to 15 needy families. In Kumsangir district, the migrant by name [of] Hikmat built a two-storey hotel and a small hospital. (Interviewee 22)

The greatest interest was expressed by interviewed Tajiks who support the capital of the country (27.6% of the respondents); more rarely are those who support Sughd (10.6%) and Khatlon oblast (10.1%), districts of the republican subordination (9.4%), and GBAO (5.8%). These are the regions of Tajikistan from where the respondents have come (see Figure 2.5).

However, more than a quarter of the respondents were undecided with the answer, and for the other 16 per cent, it did not matter what regions will be assisted (“any region”). This may be a reflection of losing ties with a specific territory and also because prior to the survey, the respondents did not think about real steps on rendering assistance.

**“Skills Transfer” Programmes**

Participation in the skills transfer programmes is accepted by almost every fifth representative of the diaspora. Half of them are willing to participate in the programme for up to two months, but a significant part of the diaspora is ready to spend even more time in Tajikistan under this programme. (Usually, these are more mature, family-oriented people; young people would prefer to participate in the programme for a shorter period).
Respondents with secondary specialized/vocational education are ready to devote more time to the programme; every fourth respondent is ready to spend more than six months (only 11.1% have higher education) in the country. Respondents with higher education, who are more serious in assessing their abilities to participate in the programme, find it difficult to specify the time that they are ready to devote to such participation (29.6% were undecided with the answer compared to 11.7% of all the respondents).

Channels for Rendering Assistance

Representatives of the diaspora do not trust most government agencies or civil society institutions. As such, they are even less than willing to assist the country through private commercial organizations or by buying government securities (Figure 9.5).

Figure 9.5: Possible channels of assistance to the development of Tajikistan

Almost half of the respondents found it difficult to answer. This is largely because the majority of Tajiks prefer those channels where they can use the established relations with immediate surrounding family members and well-established social networks.

Contribution to the development of renewable energy sources

Energy supply is one of the actual problems of the republic. Diaspora representatives marked such problems as power outages and high prices. One of the promising trends that have demonstrated efficiency in countries with suitable climate is the use of solar panels. Another way is constructing mini hydropower plants (mini-HPP) that have already been developed in the republic. Most representatives of the diaspora feel positively about contributing to the development of renewable sources of energy in their home or their village, 52.1 per cent of the respondents expressed interest, 31 per cent were against it, and the other 16 per cent were undecided. At that, the greatest enthusiasm is expressed by circular migrants, and the least is by representatives of the core of the diaspora, especially those with special secondary and vocational education.

_I meet and communicate with our scientists, technicians who are constructing mini-HPP – they are natives of Ura-Tube. For bringing the spare parts to turbo machines and equipment to Tajikistan, you have to spend a lot of money for customs clearance, for giving bribes, etc. And you have to give “a share” everywhere. In any case, you have to feed these hangers-on from the state and from the power structures._

— Ali, 59 years old, with higher education, businessman from Moscow
**Investments Experience**

Diaspora representatives have very limited experience in making investments. From the diaspora representatives, 5 per cent have invested in Tajikistan’s economy, 3 per cent in the Russian economy, and 0.1 per cent in both Russian and Tajik economies.

*Our businessmen in Russia traditionally work on dried fruits, on vegetables and fruits trade. They have erected a plant and now are producing compotes. Officially, it is a Turkish company; they send their products to the USA. Even if Tajiks fruit sellers have not more than 3 per cent of raw materials from Tajikistan, all the rest is brought from far and wide. A good many people are employed in restaurants, in the hotel business, in providing services. Quite popular is construction of houses with the subsequent renting them out. Small business – transport, transportation. They buy five to six cars (Nexia) and rent them out. There is no need to be well-connected and have a crysha (criminal protection). Our people are of a too-small calibre. We are not the sort to be in need for crysha. Therefore, there is much more freedom in Russia than in Tajikistan.* (Interviewee 14)

*Business in the Russian Federation (RF)?* If the Republic of Tajikistan (RT) citizens are trying to organize and do business in the Russian Federation (RF), it is very difficult for them to do it; there are different administrative barriers, competition. While we were sitting at home, Caucasians have captured everything. (Interviewee 2)

Investments in Tajikistan were mainly made into the fields of trade, construction and agriculture. However, the size of investment is very small: the average amount of investments in Tajikistan was Rub 100,000 to Rub 116,000, or USD 2,800. The amount is probably somewhat larger; the one third of those who made investments refused to answer.

Married, more mature and educated respondents who came to the Russian Federation in the first decade of the 2000s more often have experience in making investments in Tajikistan. All of them are Tajiks or Uzbeks. Those Tajiks with Russian passport rarely made investments.

*Business of Russian Tajiks in the Republic of Tajikistan (RT): almost everyone has some business. So-so, on trifles, for the old age. Those who have relatives left in the RT, they have one foot there.* (Interviewee 14)

*Business of Russian Tajiks in Tajikistan – they invest very little, but they have business.* (Interviewee 10)

*I have not seen any serious contributions, investments of Tajiks from Russia to Tajikistan. I have not seen investments into the energy, into roads. Moneys of our people are small, but risks are high, you have to be close to [the] higher-ups; there are no guarantees. Maybe they invest unofficially, with the support of some government employees. Little is invested into the trade and transport.* (Interviewee 6)

*Business in Tajikistan? I don’t know, but many of my friends went to the Republic of Tajikistan, opened restaurants, one of them opened a plant on for production [sic] of packaging.* (Interviewee 2)

It is noteworthy that 77.8 per cent of those who have invested in Tajikistan are willing to make contributions to different programmes on the development of the republic, and those who want to make investments in the Russian Federation make up the majority (54.5%) of the respondents.
We think that remittances could be used for doing business at home, for development of the production through the Russian and Russian-Tajik companies. It could be a powerful impulse for the development of Tajikistan.

Aside from engaging in production, we could also serve as intermediaries in trading with Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan. We are thinking about such investment projects. (Interviewee 18)

Willingness to make investments

Of the respondents, 36.2 per cent would like to set up or expand their business in Tajikistan, while 13.1 per cent were turned off with the question.

Table 9.5: Respondents' readiness to do business and set production in Tajikistan (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formulation of the question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No answer; undecided with the answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to set up (or expand) your business in Tajikistan?</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are you willing to take up business production in Tajikistan (not in trade or in catering) if the country will provide you interest-free loan for 30–50% of the necessary expenditures?</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A little less (32%) are willing to engage in production in Tajikistan (not in the fields of trade and catering), if the authorities provide them an interest-free loan for 30 to 50 per cent of the necessary costs. As such, two thirds of those who have experience in making investments in Tajikistan are willing to expand their business in the country (from those who made investments in the Russian Federation, only every seventh is ready to invest in Tajikistan).

The greatest inclination to investments is demonstrated by circular and seasonal workers, mostly by the most educated ones (half of them have specialized secondary education and higher). Currently, many of them (42.1%) are employed in jobs that do not require any qualifications and 21.1 per cent are satisfied with odd jobs. They have dependents in Tajikistan and are bound to them by obligations. Therefore, they rather plan to continue their circular trips and set aside the question of returning/non-returning to Tajikistan for the future.

There are 25.1 per cent of Tajiks who are willing to set up (or extend) business in Tajikistan and ready to engage in production that is subject to creation of preferential conditions.

Considering that the projective estimates are usually too high, it can be assumed that nowadays, it is the maximum estimate of that part of the diaspora that is ready to make an immediate investment into the development of the country.

The Investment Climate in Tajikistan and the Russian Federation

Business people, while assessing the investment climate in both countries, indicated objective factors contributing to the more favourable investment climate in the Russian Federation. This result is based on the country’s vast market, transportation facilities, lower taxes, more freedom and less control (formal and informal) over small- and medium-sized businesses.
Where it is easier to do business: in the Russian Federation (RF) or in the Republic of Tajikistan (RT)? It is easier in Russia – there are a lot of loopholes in the legislation, less control. With such volumes (of business) like ours, they don’t fall within the zone of control.

Russia is large. Transportation facilities are large – transportations yield profits, without customs and related payments. Sometimes, our guys convey large quantities of goods to Khabarovsk and get 200 per cent profit.

It is easier to work in the crowd.

The investment climate in the Russian Federation (RF) is better. In Tajikistan, it is difficult to work, sometimes impossible. Tajikistan is locked between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. You cannot bring in spare parts and raw materials, nor take out final products. Two roads in China and Kyrgyzstan are very complex by physical parameters. You can only bring out something from China; nobody is looking for our goods there. With Kyrgyzstan, there is also not much business to look at. Another problem: the lack of electricity in winter. (Interviewee 14)

I came to Russia, and I am staying here because it is easier for entrepreneurs to work here than in Tajikistan. I am in Moscow since 1998. The first five years I worked on the market in Teply Stan. First, it was very difficult. I was for the first time in Moscow, I did not know the city, its principles, rules and concerns. Since 2000, the registration process was made more rigorous. Migrants had more and more difficulties. Small markets were removed from Moscow. In 2003, our market in Teply Stan was also closed. Almost 2,000 citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbeks and Tajiks, were left jobless, on the street. I had hard times and in 2004, decided to return to Tajikistan. I started my business, invested money, brought equipment and opened a plant for the oil production. After two years of working, I came to a conclusion that in Russia, in contrast to Tajikistan, despite of all existing difficulties, there is more freedom. (Interviewee 12)

In 2006, I gave up my business in Tajikistan and returned to Moscow. I closed my plant, a month later, I called my employees and told them to take all the equipment out, and at that my business at home ended. For those who worked at some time in Russia, it is very difficult to work in Tajikistan.

Once I tried to return to Tajikistan, but realized that at home, there is still less freedom for an entrepreneur than in Russia. (Interview 12)

All business people mentioned the high level of corruption and overtaxes in Tajikistan, as well as illegal seizures.

I came to a conclusion that in contrast to Tajikistan, in Russia, there is more freedom, despite of all difficulties that exist there. Even now, hundreds of people are engaged in trade on the markets and they are free. They submit a report once a year, even if it is a “zero” report; nobody checks and presses them. In Tajikistan, they come with checks every week, two to three times. In Russia, if you keep on the right side of the law, you can work in peace.

In Tajikistan, taxes are very high, but it’s not just taxes. Checks from Gosstandard, from Barki Tojik ... by three workers come: from the republican department, from the city department, from the district department, in total by three representatives, from the sanitary-epidemiological station, etc. I always tried to keep all the documentation ready.
for checking. I paid taxes on time. Of course, in addition, I paid them a certain amount; there is nothing to be done without it in Tajikistan. Whoever came with a check, I showed all the documents. But they still asked for more money. They said that the system is such in Tajikistan, and it is impossible to live with a salary of TJS 300. (Interviewee 12)

Businessmen say that guarantees for security and protection of investments in Tajikistan are needed. Protection from illegal seizures is needed. Tax benefits or even tax exemptions are also needed for those compatriots who want to invest in Tajikistan. (Interviewee 1)

Respondents also mentioned high custom duties.

I would like to help within my powers in the technological development at home. I attempted. I tried to bring some computers as a present. But I was almost stripped to the buff for these computers – there are such high customs duties. It is necessary to reduce customs duties for the technologically advanced products and goods and especially for spare parts. (Interviewee 14)

Knowledge and skills that were not in demand were also mentioned as features of the investment climate.

Fellow countrymen who work in the intellectual sphere can develop and transfer technologies and promote the intellectual development at home, bring books, technical innovations (gadgets), share experience, teach periodically, support students or do something else in this direction. There is a desire. But they don’t let us. I have very many friends who, after studying abroad, decided to return home to help in the development of the country and got a job in Tajikistan. But they place them into a room with computers where they watch movies by eight hours. When the lid comes off, they give up everything and leave the country, for example to Russia, and get a normal job. I don’t know any example when after studying abroad, an individual returned to Tajikistan and got a normal job [that is] useful for the country.

There are frequent complaints that innovations are not in demand and initiatives are suppressed.

I knew a migrant worker who brought a new rice processing equipment to his kishlak. First, his shop worked on the electricity. But he could not work because of high electricity prices set by the Barki Tojik (a state power company). Then in winter, there is no electricity. Therefore, he switched over his equipment to the use of water. Then authorities imposed penalty charges to him. According to them, his shop polluted water. He could not bear all this and returned to Russia. By this, I want to say that it is very and very difficult for migrants to set up a business in Tajikistan. (Interviewee 20)

Challenges in the institutional environment are great and marked by the majority of the respondents.

The government of Tajikistan receives money from other countries for [the] implementation of various development projects. But often, this money is appropriated and settle[d] in different pockets. We also want to develop and don’t want rights of our Tajiks to be infringed upon. For this, we should learn not to steal from ourselves and respect our rights. (Interviewee 12)

Nepotism hampers the development of Tajikistan. (Interviewee 6)
Not to disturb, not to disturb us and the country to develop – it’s the best what can do the authorities and the society. (Interviewee 5)

With Whom and How to do Business

The key question for the diaspora members is who to do business with at home. For those who would like to set up or expand their business in Tajikistan (and these are 36% of the respondents), the absolute priority is dealing with the family, relatives and friends living in Tajikistan (Table 9.6). The last resort is dealing with family, relatives and friends in the Russian Federation. Only 5 to 7 per cent of Tajiks is ready to do business with entrepreneurs or government agencies in Tajikistan.

Table 9.6: Distribution of answers of those who want to set up (expand) their business in Tajikistan and response to the question: With what people and organizations would you prefer to do business in Tajikistan? (%)

| With family, relatives and friends who live in Tajikistan | 76.2 |
| With family, relatives and friends who live in the Russian Federation | 12.6 |
| With entrepreneurs in Tajikistan | 5.0 |
| With State structures | 6.9 |
| Others | 2.3 |
| No answer; undecided with the answer | 6.5 |

Preferences towards engaging with closest friends and relatives while doing business in Tajikistan is a result of distrust of the most energetic members of the diaspora, who are representatives of small- and medium-sized businesses in the institutional environment. The interviewed business people mentioned that large businesses use the existing institutional environment, but State guarantees are required.

There is no parochial division in the big business. There is division by money (by the size of business and wealth). (Interviewee 14)

The size of business also influences the personnel policy. If representatives of small- and medium-sized businesses, as well as labour migrants, prefer to work with family members, relatives and friends, then representatives of bigger businesses prefer to hire highly qualified professionals and people who could provide favourable conditions for the business.

We employ different people. If you employ relatives, you will become a bankrupt in three weeks. In Russia, we employ more Russians so that they could settle problems with the local population. In Tajikistan, you should employ specialists and right people. (Interviewee 14)

Particularly encouraged by the perspectives of doing business in Tajikistan, the peripheral part of the diaspora (circular, seasonal migrants), among whom 46.9 per cent of the respondents would like to set up or expand business at home while 37.9 per cent do not show such desire. Business enthusiasts, who are usually young, well-educated people (half of them have secondary special/vocational or higher education, including 24.2 per cent who have higher education), are well-paid but often engaged in unskilled labour.

However, they understand that doing business in Tajikistan needs money, knowledge and contacts (krysha).
The most important, if a migrant wants to start his own business, he will need money. The money that migrants earn is not sufficient for starting own business in Tajikistan. Even those migrants who have already started their own business certainly took the credit in the bank.

– Khurshed, 43 years old, with higher education, works in a car service centre in Yekaterinburg

Even if there were normal conditions for doing business in Tajikistan, migrants still need to have good professional skills, knowledge and abilities to start their own business. Without good professional knowledge and experience, it is impossible to set up [your] own business in Tajikistan. A migrant needs specialization courses. Also, he should definitely know the active laws, decrees and resolutions...

Even if a migrant has enough money but does not have skills of setting up and doing business, he will face great difficulties and challenges. (Interviewee 15)

First of all, a migrant needs the Allah’s help. Then he should have a krysha. Krysha should, in every possible way, defend, protect and assist the migrant. If he does not have a strong krysha, he will not be able to safely set up and expand his business. A minister, a chairperson or a district police officer can be a krysha.

– Yokub, 31 years old, with secondary special education, tractor driver from Moscow oblast

In contrast, the core of the diaspora does not show such enthusiasm: only 28 per cent would like to do business in Tajikistan, while almost three times more (61.1%) don’t want to do business and more soberly weighing all the risks.

There are very many obstacles for our compatriots who want to develop and invest into the Tajikistan’s [sic] economy, to set up business in Tajikistan. Certain favourable conditions should be provided for them. (Interviewee 11)

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Nowadays, a paradoxical situation is developing: financial, material resources, human capital are concentrated in the core of the diaspora, but its representatives are very cautious in assessing their capacity to contribute to the development of the country. The willingness to help Tajikistan with particular enthusiasm is expressed by representatives of the peripheral part of the diaspora, or those who don’t have such resources or have limited scales. The policy on the diaspora engagement for the development of the country should solve two problems: promote reduction of suspicion and distrust of old-timers of the diaspora, and accumulate resources of the semi-peripheral and peripheral parts of the diaspora by supporting long-term and circular migrants, especially its educated and energetic young representatives.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Presently, the most important characteristics of transformation of the Tajik diaspora in the Russian Federation are the following: (a) rapid population growth due to labour migrants settling in the country and linking their future and the future of their families with the Russian Federation; (b) qualitative changes in its composition, accompanied by a shift in the sociodemographic profile of the diaspora; (c) transformation of long-term strategies of the migratory behaviour that includes an increase in those who are planning to stay in the Russian Federation and circular migrants, among whom the number of long-term migrants is increasing; (d) change in the behaviour of Tajiks on the labour market, accompanied by diversification of employment; and (e) accumulating the initial capital and the increasing social differentiation in the Tajik diaspora.

In the foreseeable future, the Russian Federation will remain as the predominant direction of migration from Tajikistan. The country’s push factors (the need to search job opportunities and earnings in terms of complexity of the socioeconomic situation in Tajikistan) and pull factors (availability of employment, significantly higher wages and the standard of living in Russia) will only increase its scale. Accordingly, the number and capacity of the Tajik diaspora will increase.

Development of a policy on engaging the diaspora for the development of the country is associated with the solution of the following tasks: (a) defining goals of interaction with the diaspora; (b) mapping and specifying the characteristics (profiles) of the diaspora; (c) strengthening the trust between the diaspora and government agencies; and (d) mobilizing the diaspora as a partner in the development of the country of origin. Engagement of the potential diaspora in the development of Tajikistan, along with problems in technological know-how, comes across problems of the institutional character and limited financial and material resources.

In this study, the emphasis was done on the mapping of the diaspora, identifying attitudes, life plans and migration strategies of its members and their willingness to contribute to the development of the republic, specifying possible directions and channels of rendering assistance, as well as developing key policies on the involvement of the diaspora in the development of Tajikistan.

Taking into consideration the heterogeneity of the diaspora, a selective approach assuming the development of the differentiated policy to the different groups should be a key element of the policy on the engagement of the diaspora. The most difficult task is the effective use of the financial, material and human capital, concentrated in the core of the diaspora, as well as the enthusiasm and willingness to help the republic that is inherent to members of the peripheral part of the diaspora.

Recommendations on the development of the policy in engaging the diaspora for the development of Tajikistan include these eight sets (“baskets”) of key directions for greater participation: (a) building confidence between the diaspora and Tajik authorities; (b) improving the organization and communication with the diaspora; (c) developing financial instruments in attracting resources of the diaspora; (d) developing direct investment incentives for the utilization of the diaspora’s financial resources; (e) changing the tax system for attracting material and financial resources of the diaspora; (f) increasing the efficiency of utilizing the human capital of the diaspora; (g) adding measures on increasing the symbolic capital of the diaspora; and (h) devising specific measures on utilizing the diaspora’s financial resources and social capital, in particular, through engagement in tourism programmes.

1. Implementation of measures on building confidence between the diaspora and Tajik authorities – a key policy objective in relation to the diaspora and the realization of its potential for the development of the country.

Such measures should include:

1.1. Officially recognizing the diaspora as a part of the Tajik nation and an integral component of national development programmes.

1.2. Waiving the paternalism policy and designing the policy of partnership and cooperation with the diaspora on the basis of equality. (Paternalism is possible and needed only in relation to separate groups of the diaspora for protecting the rights of the citizens of Tajikistan, supporting socially vulnerable groups, etc.).

1.3. Making amendments and addendum into the legislation of Tajikistan with the purpose of granting citizenship to diaspora members who have lost Tajik citizenship and want to regain their original nationality.

1.4. The policy clearly articulates its goals and tasks and exhibits transparency for the Tajik diaspora and its individual groups and communities. This policy should include the concept and/or long-term programme, ensuring that target parameters for each stage of its implementation are set up.

1.5. Adopting a plan of activities and joint projects on its implementation in agreement with the diaspora for the furtherance of the above-mentioned documents.

1.6. Creating negotiation platforms (conference venues) and temporary institutions for the congruence of interests of various organizations (taking into consideration the complicated relationships between diaspora organizations).

1.7. Turning down attempts at this stage to build a hierarchical system of organization of the diaspora. Building network-based relationships with various organizations of the diaspora and refraining from taking measures that can be interpreted as preferences to other individual organizations on other grounds that are different from business qualities.

1.8. Prompting response to initiatives and requests of diaspora organizations.

2. Improvement of the organization and communication with the diaspora presumes the following:

2.1. Organizing units that work with the diaspora under competent ministries and agencies and creating a special agency or an interdepartmental commission under the Government of Tajikistan for developing and monitoring the policy related to diaspora and coordinating activities of State authorities, local authorities and NGOs.

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60 Sharipov, the head of the organization “Tajik labour migrants” recognizes existence of problems faced by migrants in the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, he considers that the Russian government is more open compared to authorities of Tajikistan: “If we have any question, the President’s administration always gives an answer in the written form. But we have not received any answer from the government of Tajikistan in 12 years.” (Radio Ozodi, “UN urges Tajikistan to protect the rights of migrant workers”, April 2012, Available from http://rus.ozodi.org/archive/sadoi_hamvatan/20120401/15461/15461.html)

61 In 2011, from among 144 countries on which the data on diaspora is available, 114 countries established special governmental units on the solution of issues concerning emigrants and their families living abroad. (V. Mishra and J. Ferre, “Government views and policy priorities for international migration” Migration Policy Practice, 4(1), February–March 2014, Available from http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/MigrationPolicyPracticeJournal15_8Apr2014.pdf). In accordance with another study, from among 400 state institutions established in 56 countries that directly engage diaspora through their programmes, 77 institutions were created specifically to deal with diaspora on a formal basis. These institutions exist at various levels of government, from independent ministries to sub-offices within other departments. Over one third of those surveyed have been established since 2005 (D. R. Agunias and K. Newland, 2012; p. 10).
2.2. Organizing communications with the diaspora by means of regular consultations with the help of specially established and official advisory institutions, such as the Council of Diasporas. Such consultations also contribute to the enhancement of the knowledge and technical skills of the government agencies’ employees.

2.3. Creating an interactive and user-friendly web portal for providing online contacts with organizations and the diaspora members (including advice on legal, labour issues, etc.).

2.4. Organizing periodic meetings on the ongoing basis of (quarterly/semi-annual) Tajik embassy employees with representatives of diaspora organizations and online translation of these meetings in the Internet. Diaspora representatives should be informed about initiatives and innovations in the engagement of the diaspora’s potential for the development of the country and other issues that might be of interest. Results of discussion should be summarized and information should be brought to the attention of concerned agencies in Tajikistan.

2.5. Conducting publicity events including business forums with participation of Tajik business people in the Russian Federation.

2.6. Subsidizing some directions of flight connections with the purpose of reducing the cost of air tickets and/or giving grants to a certain number of diaspora members for travelling to Tajikistan for the realization of specific projects and activities in the country.

2.7. The Government of Tajikistan, as well as the embassy and consulates of Tajikistan in the Russian Federation, should promote strengthening the capacity of the Tajik diaspora and supporting citizens of the country through the following:

   a. supporting the efforts of Tajik diaspora in the organization of Tajik cultural centres in regions of the largest concentration of Russian citizens of Tajik origin and citizens of Tajikistan;
   b. initiating and supporting Tajik Sunday schools under the aegis of Tajik diaspora organizations (national-culturalautonomies, national and cultural centres) in the Russian Federation;
   c. providing Sunday schools and national-cultural centres in the Russian Federation with textbooks and training manuals and aids; and
   d. establishing cooperation with diaspora organizations with the purpose of monitoring conditions of children and socially vulnerable categories of Tajik citizens in the Russian Federation.

2.8. Establishing a unit that combines functions of public relations and government relations that would specialize in the information support of the policy with regards to the diaspora, as well as promoting a positive image and explaining measures undertaken by public authorities in Tajikistan.

Mobilization of financial resources of the diaspora representatives is an important strategy in increasing their potential contribution to the development in Tajikistan and is realized through attracting portfolio and direct investments.

3. Development of financial instruments for the use of financial resources of the diaspora may include:

3.1. Issuance of special obligations (bonds) for the diaspora members (possibly linking the access to these bonds with the availability of Tajik citizenship and primary residence abroad). In view of the low confidence in government securities, the possibility of issuing bonds by a specifically established fund, with the participation of a foreign private capital and/or international financial organizations, should be considered.

3.2. Facilitating access to foreign securities in Tajikistan.
3.3. Considering the possibility of attracting financial resources of the diaspora members through differentiation of long- and medium-term bank rates in convertible currencies with participation of the State, as well as providing the opportunity to withdraw funds from deposits under investment projects approved by the bank.

3.4. Improving the financial infrastructure of the remittances system with a view of its securitization and stability.

4. Investment incentives are aimed at the growth of private investments of business people (entrepreneurs) of the diaspora and oriented on stimulating the setting up and carrying out of the business, starting with small- and medium-sized businesses, as well as supporting innovations and developing both traditional and new sectors of the economy. These measures include:

4.1. Providing potential investors with access to the information about markets, legal, organizational and other conditions for doing business in Tajikistan.

4.2. Facilitating the establishment of contacts of the diaspora with business networks in Tajikistan.

4.3. Setting priority directions for investments and creating preferential conditions for such investments.

4.4. Simplifying bureaucratic procedures for investments of the diaspora.

4.5. Giving the preferential management treatment in the distribution of licenses, especially for venture companies making risky investments.

4.6. Establishment of structures and centres, including the virtual ones, that provide trainings in doing business in Tajikistan with the objective of attracting or encouraging diaspora members with previous business experience to work on such centres.

4.7. Establishing a communication system between potential investors and branch departments, local authorities and associations of local business people.

4.8. Stimulating infrastructure investments, including investments into the transport infrastructure, communications and energy (such as renewable energy sources). Taking into consideration a long recoupment period of some infrastructure projects, the public-private partnership should be developed, providing private businesses the guarantee of investments yield in specific projects.

4.9. Stimulating investments aimed at charitable projects not only by individual donors, but also supporting philanthropic organizations established by the diaspora on a collective basis (allowing to attract small savings and labour migrants), as well as establishing special funds in the country, attracting charitable funds of the diaspora members. Also providing the legal framework for activities of such organizations and transparency of their activities should be undertaken.

In the review of measures taken by 101 countries, on which the 2011 data is available, six key measures in attracting the diaspora investments realized in 46 countries were traced. These measures include: (a) tax exemptions or deferrals; (b) reduction of tariffs on goods or customs duties for diaspora companies; (c) preferential regime for loan collateral; (d) preferential regime for giving licenses; (e) optimized bureaucratic procedures for investments; and (f) obligations (bonds) for the diaspora or for mutual funds. As such, the most frequently taken measures were optimized bureaucratic procedures for investments (23% of the countries) and provision of tax exemptions or deferrals (19%). (V. Mishra and J. Ferre (2014)).
5. Improvement of the tax system for attracting material resources of the diaspora implies taking the following measures:

5.1. Granting tax benefits, exemptions or deferrals for investors from the diaspora.
5.2. Optimization, including reduction of import duties for the diaspora companies.
5.3. Reducing customs duties for technologically advanced products and goods; imposing tax exemptions on new equipment and spare parts imported to the country in priority sectors, including infrastructure projects.
5.4. Considering possibilities of giving differentiated VAT rates for goods and services in production, where business people of the diaspora are interested.

6. Improvement of the effectiveness of using the diaspora’s human capital is aimed at increasing the activities on transferring technology, innovations, researches for Tajikistan in various forms, including work of the diaspora representatives in different firms in Tajikistan and participating in scientific or professional networks. This promotes conducting research for Tajikistan, temporary or virtual return to the homeland, as well as final return home after working and gaining experience and knowledge abroad. This also presumes taking the following measures aimed at circulating knowledge and highly qualified members of the diaspora between the countries of origin and destination:

6.1. Creating a data bank of diaspora members who are willing to contribute to the development of the country through skills transfer programmes.
6.2. Developing and implementing various skills transfer programmes, including educational, professional and cultural projects where diaspora members are involved. Programmes on “skills transfer” should be differentiated by industry branches, implementation periods and target groups of the diaspora.
6.3. Developing a system of incentives for the work of professionals from the diaspora in Tajikistan on short-, medium- and long-term bases.
6.4. Organizing continuous training seminars (including webinars) on innovative methods of teaching and professional training of manpower in Tajikistan with the help of specialists of the diaspora.
6.5. Extending the cooperation of ministries and agencies of Tajikistan with diaspora members in the areas of education, science and culture, including consultations with the diaspora members in terms of developing and implementing specific socially important projects and involving them in conducting large events in Tajikistan.
6.6. Inducting (full-time) expert councils under the ministries and departments, with involvement of prominent experts from the diaspora.
6.7. Organizing academic cooperation between the Russian Federation and Tajikistan with the objective of attracting the knowledge and capacity of the Tajik diaspora, including developing joint projects of academies of the two countries (for example, through the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation).
6.8. Supporting efforts and providing minimum baseline conditions for teaching staff, healthcare workers and other professionals in various fields who are in demand and ready to return to work in Tajikistan on conditions of permanent (primary) residence in the country.
6.9. Conducting cultural events in regions of the Russian Federation involving resources of the creative intellectuals of the Tajik diaspora and providing consultations and other assistance in carrying out such activities.
6.10. Organizing professional training centres for labour migrants (many of whom will become part of the diaspora) with the involvement of specialists from the diaspora.
7. Measures on increment of the symbolic capital of the diaspora members are important because they, having a synergistic effect at minimum cost, strengthen credibility of the diaspora both in the Russian Federation and Tajikistan, to make it a real “bridge” between the States and communities and build trust between the diaspora and the Government of Tajikistan. These measures are particularly important for representatives of the “first wave,” who are sensitive to the recognition of their services, and may include:

7.1. Acknowledging the mastery and achievement in the diaspora by rewarding members with prizes, state awards, badges of honor and certificates of merit.

7.2. Covering merits of some persons in the Tajikistan media, nominating them to advisory and consultative bodies under power structures, inviting them to the republic and conducting significant events.

7.3. Providing symbolic incentives for the diaspora members’ philanthropy, organized by State authorities, local authorities and NGOs of the republic.

7.4. Establishing a system of annual awarding of Tajik citizens studying in the Russian Federation with medals and prizes for outstanding achievements in their studies, which allows establishment of contacts and constructive cooperation with the new generations of the diaspora.

8. Engaging the diaspora in tourism development programmes. Development and promotion of tourist programmes aimed at the diaspora and including specialized programmes of medical tourism, business tourism, tourist programmes to get acquainted with the cultural heritage of Tajikistan (heritage tourism) aimed at target groups of the diaspora (schoolchildren, students, young workers, pensioners or retirees and others).

The policy on engaging the diaspora’s potential for the development of the country assumes its openness and transparency. Implementation of proposed policies in relation to the diaspora will be seriously complicated, and its efficiency will be low without addressing critical tasks on specifying the policy objectives and most importantly without making changes in the institutional environment in Tajikistan (including inter alia provision of guarantees for the protection of investments and property, fighting against corruption, nepotism and others), without increasing the investment attractiveness of the country, the confidence building of the country’s financial system and improving the business climate.

A significant number of Tajiks staying in the Russian Federation on a permanent or temporary basis still consider the idea of returning to the country of origin. The overwhelming majority of Tajiks in the Russian Federation are true patriots of Tajikistan, nostalgic for their home and ready to help the republic. The certainty that nearly three quarters of the diaspora representatives consider Tajikistan their home creates favourable conditions for engaging the diaspora in the development of the country. Focusing attention, understanding, and building constructive relationships with the diaspora is needed.

Every Tajik in the Russian Federation should be reached to get through to everyone.
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**ANNEX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES**

- Interviewee No.1. E., date of birth (d.o.b.) 1969, with higher education; a journalist, writer and diplomat; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.2. K., 59 years old; doctor of sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; with Russian and Tajiks citizenship
- Interviewee No.3. H., PhD holder, head of the Tajik cultural centre; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.4. Z., 46 years old; doctor of sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences; with Russian and Tajiks citizenship
- Interviewee No.5. M., 25 years old; a student-mathematician; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.6. N., 57 years old; PhD holder, Russian Academy of Sciences; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.7. R., 35 years old; with general secondary education; driver in Tyumen, native of the Panj district, head of a migrant group; with Tajik citizenship and has a residence permit of the Russian Federation
- Interviewee No.8. U., 36 years old; Uzbek, with general secondary education; driver, intermediary in contacts of migrant groups with the external surrounding; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.9. M., 49 years old, PhD holder, an employee of the Russian Academy of Sciences; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.10. G., 37 years old; with higher education; journalist; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.11. A., 38 years old; with secondary special education; manager in the coffee bar, Halial, a religious activist; with Russian and Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.12. F., 37 years old; with higher education; economist and business person; with Tajik citizenship and has residence permit in the Russian Federation
- Interviewee No.13. M., d.o.b. 1952; PhD holder; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.14. A., 54 years old; with college education; a business person; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.15. I., 38 years old; with higher education; legal consultant; with Russian and Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.16. R., PhD holder; research associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.17; representative of one of the Tajik agencies in the Russian Federation; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.18. H., PhD holder; chairman of a regional public organization in the Russian Federation; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No. 19. G., chairperson of a foundation, a public figure; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.20. K., d.o.b. 1975; with incomplete higher education; employee of a firm; has a residence permit in the Russian Federation
- Interviewee No.21. M., d.o.b. 1983, with secondary education; master-finisher and foreman (brigadier); with Tajik citizenship and has a residence permit of the Russian Federation
- Interviewee No.22. M., 48 years old; with general secondary education; brigadier of concrete works; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.23. D., 30 years old; with higher education; a business person; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.24. A., 63 years old; with higher education; theologian; with Russian citizenship
- Interviewee No.25; representative of the consulate of Tajikistan; with Tajik citizenship
- Interviewee No.26. PhD holder; an employee of the Russian Academy of Sciences; with Russian citizenship