6

MIGRATION, INCLUSION AND SOCIAL COHESION: CHALLENGES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Introduction

The relationship between migrants and the communities in which they reside forms an integral and important part of the migration cycle. This relationship takes the form of psychological and sociological processes of adaptation between migrants and receiving communities, which affect the degree of inclusion migrants will experience, including their sense of belonging. Settling in a new community – either temporarily or permanently – may require migrants to adapt to a new culture, customs, social values and language. The extent to which migrants will in turn be progressively included in their destination country also depends on the attitudes of receiving communities, including their openness to migration and migrants.

Migrants’ inclusion has always been an important part of the migration phenomenon; however, it is today a particularly complex issue. In an increasingly globalized world, the growth in the absolute number of migrants over the past 50 years and the diversification of migrants’ origins, socioeconomic backgrounds and reasons for migrating have led to more social, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in receiving societies. As a result, the impact of migration and diversity on social cohesion has become an important concern. This is illustrated by inclusion policies adopted by some States to frame the relationship between migrants and receiving communities and preserve social cohesion. These inclusion policies have taken multiple forms over time in different countries, reflecting societal values, including attitudes on immigration and diversity.

While the question of how to live together in increasingly diverse communities has become central, the challenges in addressing migrants’ inclusion have been compounded by the many opinions and voices on the topic. Alongside migrants and States, a wide array of actors – such as civil society organizations, communities and local authorities – now play increasingly important roles in migrants’ inclusion. In addition, virtually everyone today has the ability to express publicly their opinions on immigration and migrants’ inclusion. The politicization of migration for electioneering purposes has elevated the issues to become a matter of public concern. Due in part to negative portrayals made by political parties and reported by the media, migrants have in some countries been presented as a challenge to national identity, values, economic stability and security, as well as, more broadly, a threat to social cohesion. Despite migrants’ important social and

1 Céline Bauloz, Senior Research Officer, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM; Zana Vathi, Reader in Social Sciences, Edge Hill University; and Diego Acosta, Professor in European and Migration Law, University of Bristol.
2 While this chapter focuses on destination countries, the process of migrants’ inclusion also occurs in transit countries, as well as in countries of origin for returning migrants. On migrants’ reintegration, see Newland, 2017.
3 Appave and David, 2017:159.
4 Demireva, 2017.
5 See, for instance, the survey on attitudes of Europeans towards migration and inclusion carried out in 2017 in the 28 Member States of the European Union (European Commission, 2018).
6 Crawley, McMahon and Jones, 2016. On narratives of negativity in the media, see most notably Allen, Blinder and McNeil, 2017.
economic contributions (see chapter 5 of this report), anti-immigration sentiment has resulted in instances of intolerance, discrimination, racism, xenophobia and even acts of violent extremism towards migrants, especially in countries where nationalism, patriotism and populism have been on the rise.

Despite these challenges, States have recently reaffirmed the centrality of migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion by making them a stand-alone objective in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.8 The Global Compact on Refugees likewise promotes the inclusion of refugees in the receiving country through durable solutions, such as local integration.9

In order to better understand what migrants’ inclusion entails and the challenges and opportunities it may bring, the remainder of this chapter is organized into three main parts. The first part introduces the notions of inclusion and social cohesion, before turning, in the second part, to inclusion outcomes and obstacles. The third part then explores what “the situation on the ground” is, most notably through the role played by local actors and by migrants themselves. The conclusion discusses some implications for policy responses that may help further foster migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion.

Inclusion and social cohesion: Key concepts and definitions

Defining “migrants’ inclusion” and “social cohesion” is a difficult task, as there are no universally recognized definitions. The ambiguity of these notions is exacerbated by the frequent use of various closely related terms, and the difficulty in distinguishing them (see appendix A for an illustrative list and suggested definitions of these concepts).10

In broad terms, social cohesion can be defined through the notions of “solidarity”, “togetherness”, “tolerance” and “harmonious co-existence”.11 It is not necessarily related to migration and migrants, but is more generally about the bonds tying a community together through trust and common social norms. While these bonds can be undermined by disparities in wealth and income, poverty, or intercommunal, ethnic or racial tensions, the impact of migration, and especially of diversity, on social cohesion has been increasingly questioned.12 However, empirical evidence has so far not been conclusive. If some studies suggest a negative impact of diversity in countries such as the United States of America, research in the United Kingdom and, more generally, in Europe, finds that income inequality and deprivation have a greater impact on social cohesion than does diversity.13

While the impact of migration and diversity on social cohesion is not clear-cut, social cohesion and migrants’ inclusion are closely related. Social cohesion cannot be achieved if part of the population, including migrants, is excluded in a given neighbourhood, community, city and/or country.14 As a result, and despite the lack of a

---

8 UNGA, 2018a: Annex, Objective 16.
9 UNGA, 2018b: paras. 97–99.
10 The choice of the terms “inclusion” and “social cohesion” in this chapter is in line with the terminology used in the Global Compact for Migration (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 2018a) and with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 2015). 
11 Demireva, 2017. See also Fonseca, Lukosch and Brazier, 2018; Forrest and Kearns, 2001:2129.
12 Zetter et al., 2006.
14 See Jenson, 1998, where inclusion is listed among the different dimensions of social cohesion.
universal definition, inclusion can be summarized as consisting of social cohesion and migrants’ incorporation in the various societal areas, such as education, health, employment, housing, and civic and political involvement.\(^{15}\)

Who is a migrant? An inclusion perspective

As noted in chapter 2 of this report, there are no universally agreed definitions of a migrant, but multiple understandings depending on the policy and analytical contexts. For instance, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) defines a migrant for statistical purposes as “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence”:\(^{a}\)

When talking about inclusion, the understanding of who is a migrant is often broader and extends to migrants’ descendants born in the receiving country. Although they have not migrated themselves, migrants’ descendants may still be perceived as migrants by the receiving society and self-identify as such. This is especially the case of so-called “second-generation migrants”, who may embrace both the identities of their receiving country and of their parents’ country of origin.\(^{b}\) These multiple identities are well illustrated in the testimony of Jenan, who was born in the United States to two migrant parents:

Being the daughter of two immigrants, I feel I have to work twice as hard as my friends whose families have been here for generations just so I can prove to my family it was worth it for them to come here and to make this journey and start their lives all over again. Being a child of immigrants, it means balancing two different cultures. Growing up I had a hard time accepting that I was part of these two different worlds that are so conflicting.\(^{c}\)

\(^{a}\) UN DESA, 1998.
\(^{b}\) Vathi, 2015.
\(^{c}\) Available at https://iamamigrant.org/stories/united-states/jenan.

Against this background, inclusion entails a process of mutual adaptation between migrants and receiving communities. The degree of migrants’ inclusion depends on the individual concerned and the context in which adaptation takes place. Factors affecting migrants’ process of inclusion include their demographic and personal characteristics (such as age, gender, level of education and language ability), social networks, and ability to exercise agency.\(^{16}\) Inclusion remains a highly personal and individualized experience, as it differs among migrants and family members, and can be different for various “groups” of migrants, such as refugees, high- or low-skilled migrant workers, victims of trafficking or migrants’ descendants.\(^{17}\) Likewise, the context influences one’s degree of inclusion, in terms of both geographical location and timing. Each country, society and community will necessarily approach inclusion differently, as it depends on their respective historical,

\(^{15}\) Faist, 2018:4. For another definition, see Charsley and Spencer, 2019:2. This chapter focuses on the inclusion of migrants without prejudice to the fact that some nationals may face similar inclusion challenges.

\(^{16}\) Castles et al., 2002:126 and following; Fokkema and de Haas, 2011; Charsley and Spencer, 2019.

\(^{17}\) On the difference between the inclusion of refugees and other migrants, for instance, see Castles et al., 2002:119. See also Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017: 9–10; and Vathi, 2015 concerning different migrant generations.
economic, sociocultural and political contexts. Their resulting attitudes towards migration and diversity can change over time, determining in turn the type of migration and inclusion policies States will adopt.\(^{18}\)

As a psychosociological process, inclusion is inherent to the migration experience.\(^{19}\) Although research focuses primarily on the “Global North”, inclusion transcends any North–South divide because it concerns all countries. The fact that some countries have not adopted inclusion policies, as seen mostly in the “Global South”, does not necessarily imply that migrants’ inclusion – or exclusion – does not occur in practice. It simply means that the State has not set a nationwide strategy for migrants’ inclusion. This may be because inclusion is not among the priorities of policymakers. For example, this is the case in West African countries, where other socioeconomic challenges are more pressing or resources are insufficient.\(^{20}\)

Nonetheless, as acknowledged in the Global Compact for Migration, inclusion policies can constitute important tools for countries to support migrants’ inclusion and foster social cohesion.\(^{21}\) By contrast, the absence of inclusion policies may be costly, not only for migrants who may face discrimination and be marginalized, but also more broadly for social cohesion, with a heightened risk of tensions, riots and civil unrest.\(^{22}\) As part of (im)migration or stand-alone policies, migrants’ inclusion can take different forms to frame how it should take place in a particular country according to its own values. The most prevalent national policy models of inclusion have been those of assimilation, multiculturalism and integration which, as summarized in table 1, can be differentiated according to the expected degrees of adaptation by migrants and of accommodation by the society.

---

\(^{18}\) Castles et al., 2002:112; see also Silver, 2015; Landau and Bakewell, 2018.

\(^{19}\) See most notably Berry, 1997.


\(^{21}\) UNGA, 2018a: para. 32(c).

\(^{22}\) Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012.
### Table 1. Summary of the main inclusion models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion model</th>
<th>Degree of adaptation by migrants</th>
<th>Degree of accommodation by society</th>
<th>Examples of policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Assimilation    | High                             | Low                                | White Australia policy, 1901–1966<sup>a</sup>  
|                 |                                  |                                    | Restricting “non-white” immigration and assimilating “white” immigrants<sup>b</sup> |
| Multiculturalism| Low                              | High                               | Canada, multiculturalism policy, 1971–present<sup>c</sup>  
|                 |                                  |                                    | Recognizing that “multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society”<sup>d</sup> |
| Integration     | Medium                           | Medium                             | European Union Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2016<sup>e</sup>  
|                 |                                  |                                    | Considering integration as a “dynamic two-way process”<sup>f</sup> |

**Source:**  
(a) National Museum Australia, n.d.; (b) Ibid.; Berndt, 1961; (c) Government of Canada, 2018; (d) Ibid., 1985; (e) European Commission, 2016; (f) Ibid.;5.

Assimilation considers diversity as a risk for social cohesion and requires the highest degree of adaptation by migrants and a low degree of accommodation by the receiving society. It consists of a one-way policy where migrants must fully embrace the receiving society’s national identity and values, to the detriment of their original ones.<sup>24</sup> By contrast, multiculturalism values diversity and expects a low degree of adaptation by migrants – who can retain their cultural identities – and a high degree of accommodation by the receiving society.<sup>25</sup>

While assimilation has been referred to as a “melting pot”, multiculturalism has often been associated with a “salad bowl”: a melting pot contains ingredients that melt together and become indistinguishable, whereas a salad bowl is made of diverse ingredients which co-exist side by side harmoniously. While assimilation was already the rule in Latin American countries, such as Argentina, during the mass migration of Europeans in the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century,<sup>26</sup> these two models were particularly prevalent in traditional immigration countries during the twentieth century. In broad terms, the focus was placed on assimilation from the 1920s to the 1960s, and shifted to multiculturalism in the 1970s due to the

---

23 This summary table notably builds on the work of Berry, 1997 and 2006.
24 IOM, 2019, in appendix A.
25 Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014:270.
26 See, for instance, Acosta, 2018; Bailey, 1979; Bjerg, 1988; and Sánchez Alonso, 2002.
inability of the assimilationist model to accommodate increasingly diverse societies. \(^{27}\) Although it is still followed by some States, including Canada, \(^{28}\) some have disavowed multiculturalism since the mid-1990s because it has been considered unable to counter migrants’ exclusion and perceived as a threat to national identity and values. \(^{29}\)

As a result, different models have been embraced to restore a balance between diversity and unity, claimed by some to have been lost because of multiculturalism. \(^{30}\) At the national level, the model predominantly relied on today is that of integration, which stands in between assimilation and multiculturalism. It expects medium degrees of adaptation by migrants and accommodation by the receiving society. \(^{31}\) Although no commonly agreed definition exists, it is generally accepted to be a two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live. \(^{32}\) At the local level, an interculturalist approach to inclusion has developed, which emphasizes the importance of contacts and bonds between individuals of different backgrounds, both migrants and nationals. It relies on the idea that diversity is an advantage and aims to create mutual understanding and a culture of diversity to combat discrimination and inequalities. \(^{33}\) This policy narrative finds its origins in Quebec in the 1980s in response to the Canadian multicultural policy, and has since been taken up in an increasing number of cities and neighbourhoods, in countries such as Spain or Italy. \(^{34}\)

Inclusion outcomes: Challenges and policy responses

Measuring the level of migrants’ inclusion in receiving societies (so-called “inclusion outcomes”) is complex given the various individual and contextual factors influencing inclusion (see text box below). It is nevertheless important to identify potential obstacles and design and/or re-evaluate policy responses to more effectively support migrants’ inclusion.

Measuring migrants’ level of inclusion through indicators

Indicators of integration have been developed to measure the degree of migrants’ inclusion in certain countries and rank these countries according to the effectiveness of their inclusion policies. These most notably include:

- The *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015* (MIPEX 2015), co-financed by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, European Union (EU), and led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and the Migration Policy Group (2015); and

---

\(^{27}\) Castles, 2004; Castles and Davidson, 2000.

\(^{28}\) Joppke, 2014.


\(^{30}\) Zapata-Barrero, 2017.

\(^{31}\) Bivand Erdal and Oeppen, 2013:869; see also Favell, 2005.

\(^{32}\) IOM, 2019.

\(^{33}\) Zapata-Barrero, 2017.

\(^{34}\) Ibid. On interculturalism in Italian cities, see for instance Caponio and Donatiello, 2017.
• The immigrants’ indicators developed in 2012 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with the latest edition Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration jointly produced with the EU.\textsuperscript{b}

Inclusion being highly contextual, these indicators reflect a particular understanding of what “successful integration” means.\textsuperscript{c} Both sets of indicators were devised in the context of traditional destination countries. Thus, they may not be applicable in other geographical locations, including in the increasing number of States worldwide that have also become countries of destination.

Comparisons between the countries covered through rankings or indexes also remain delicate, as the understanding of inclusion and the objectives of inclusion policies differ even among traditional destination countries. A multicultural inclusion policy will not have the same objectives as one that tends to be more assimilationist. It is thus difficult to compare how effective inclusion policies are between countries with different inclusion objectives.\textsuperscript{d}

Although not focused on inclusion, the Migration Governance Indicators also provide a useful tool for States to assess the comprehensiveness of their migration policies, including their inclusion policies. The Migration Governance Indicators are an IOM initiative, implemented with the support of the Economist Intelligence Unit, to support States in implementing the Migration Governance Framework, adopted by IOM Member States in 2015 (Council Resolution No. 1310 of 4 December 2015 on the Migration Governance Framework).\textsuperscript{e} With its 90 indicators, the Migration Governance Indicators help States identify potential gaps in their migration policies, future priorities, and good practices for well-managed migration policies, including with respect to migrants’ rights and their well-being, which are key dimensions for migrants’ inclusion.

\textsuperscript{a} Huddleston et al., 2015.
\textsuperscript{b} OECD and EU, 2018. For previous editions, see OECD, 2012; OECD and EU, 2015.
\textsuperscript{c} Castles et al., 2002:129–130.
\textsuperscript{d} Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003.
\textsuperscript{e} See https://migrationdataportal.org/overviews/mgi#0.

This section explores migrants’ inclusion outcomes and challenges in some key policy areas of inclusion, namely, language, education, labour market inclusion, family reunification, political participation and naturalization. The focus on these specific policy areas is without prejudice to the importance of others, such as health or housing. While health is subject to a specific chapter in this report (see chapter 7), housing is also an important aspect of migrant inclusion because its affordability and quality influence migrants’ well-being and social inclusion.\textsuperscript{35} If housing inclusion can be assessed on the basis of access to homeownership for some migrants,\textsuperscript{36} for others, such as refugees, mere access to decent housing is already an issue, as illustrated by the so-called migrant “crisis” in Europe in 2015–2016, which has been considered by some as a “housing crisis”.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} Phillips, 2006.
\textsuperscript{36} See, for instance, Darden, 2015.
\textsuperscript{37} Penny, 2016.
As detailed in appendix B, all the policy areas examined in this section reflect human rights to which all individuals are entitled, including migrants, with the principle of non-discrimination constituting a central pillar of migrants’ inclusion. However, migrants’ inclusion outcomes in these different policy areas remain dependent on their immigration status. While legal residence is a major first step towards inclusion, the type of permit dictates additional rights and entitlements, such as access to work and study. As it will appear, and similarly to human rights, all these policy areas are also interrelated, as each may impact on one another. Despite the emphasis sometimes placed on labour market inclusion, this reflects the need for holistic inclusion policies, covering all dimensions of migrants’ inclusion.

Language

Language is considered one of the most central aspects for migrants’ inclusion by both the receiving society and migrants themselves. In Europe, for instance, 95 per cent of Europeans are of the opinion that a certain command of the national language is important for migrants to integrate. While language can facilitate inclusion prior to departure, without or with insufficient knowledge of the language upon arrival, migrants often identify language barriers as one of the first challenges they face. For instance, after migrating from Cambodia to Thailand for a work opportunity, Sophal notes: “The first three months proved to be very difficult due to the language barrier. I couldn’t communicate with people and I was not familiar with the food.” In addition to facilitating social interactions, language is important for helping migrants navigate a new environment, including access to health care, housing and other services. It also improves their access to education, increases their likelihood of being employed, and leads to better self-reported health outcomes.

With such a pivotal role for migrants’ inclusion, language often constitutes an important area of government policy. National or local authorities sometimes support language acquisition through language courses, which can be mandatory for migrants. These language courses are at times freely available to migrants together with civic/social orientation courses (for example, in Sweden and Canada). In addition, language proficiency can be a requirement for entry or stay depending on the residence permit sought (such as family reunification) and for naturalization. For instance, as reported by the MIPEX 2015, countries with language requirements for permanent residence increased from one EU country in 1990 to 18 in 2014.

While States’ support to language acquisition is key, language requirements – on which are conditioned entry, stay or naturalization in a country – may be counterproductive for migrants’ inclusion. In fact, countries with lower language requirements turn out to be the most favourable for migrants’ inclusion. Language tests can indeed deter migrants from applying for a particular status, rather than motivating them to master the language. These tests can also exacerbate vulnerability faced by some migrants who are unable to pass them.

38 Castles et al., 2002:131.
39 European Commission, 2018:84. The survey was undertaken in the 28 member States of the European Union from 21 to 30 October 2017, with some 28,080 residents interviewed.
40 See http://iamamigrant.org/stories/cambodia/sophal. On the importance of and barriers to language learning for refugees, see Morrice et al., 2019.
41 Chiswick, 2016; Aoki and Santiago, 2018.
43 Huddleston et al., 2015:51.
44 Ibid.
due to different factors, such as age, literacy, as well as health, family or economic reasons. For instance, evidence supports that age is negatively correlated with one's ability to learn a new language.\footnote{Isphording, 2015.}

Research highlights a paradox in focusing on national language acquisition in societies that increasingly promote multilingualism.\footnote{Ros \\i Sole, 2014; Krüger Dias and Plaza Pinto, 2017.} In certain cities of the United States, for instance, such as Miami, Spanish may be more important than English to work in some sectors.\footnote{Lewis, 2013.} In some communities, research has found that moving away from language assimilation to a multilingualistic approach in schools supports migrant students’ educational outcomes and, ultimately, decreases the likelihood of discrimination and improves their sense of inclusion.\footnote{Somers, 2018; Panagiotopoulou and Rosen, 2018.}

\textit{Education}

Along with work prospects, migration can be motivated by migrants’ willingness to access higher quality education in another country.\footnote{Hagelskamp, Suárez-Orozco and Hughes, 2010; Bakewell and Bonfiglio, 2013.} Education has a positive influence on migrants’ employment and social participation in the receiving society, which tends to view migrants more positively when they have attained higher educational qualifications.\footnote{See UN CESC, 1999: para. 1; UNESCO, 2018:82–83.} For migrant children, access to primary education is a fundamental human right, regardless of their migration status (see appendix B). However, migrants’ educational outcomes are still lower than those of their native counterparts, especially for first-generation migrants. The educational performance of migrants depends on a range of factors, including their language skills, socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds, and age at migration.\footnote{Filsi, Meroni and Vera-Toscano, 2016; Corak, 2011; UNESCO, 2018.}

While policy responses are important in improving migrants’ education levels, the MIPEX 2015 notes that “[e]ducation emerges as the greatest weakness in integration policies in most countries”.\footnote{Huddleston et al., 2015:31.} Beyond countries covered in MIPEX 2015, there more generally remain issues in migrants’ access to education. This is especially striking for refugee children. Four million refugee children were out of school in 2017 out of the 7.4 million of school age under UNHCR mandate – more than half of all refugee children worldwide.\footnote{UNHCR, 2018.} As for migrant children, their full inclusion in national education systems is important, including for those whose education tends to be left to the humanitarian sector in countries with high numbers of refugees. With 1 million refugees of school age in 2018, Turkey has committed to include all Syrian refugee children previously attending temporary education centres into its national education system by 2020.\footnote{UNESCO, 2018:62.}

Challenges in accessing education also exist for other migrant children. Administrative formalities in some countries may pose obstacles for migrants to enrol their children at school, especially if they lack some documentation or are in an irregular situation. Schools’ obligations to report irregular migrant children to the authorities or provide government authorities with access to children’s data may further deter migrant
children from attending school due to fear of deportation. To ensure migrant children’s enrolment and attendance, some countries have established firewalls between immigration authorities and schools. In Germany, for example, the obligation for schools to disclose pupils’ data to the police was abolished in 2011. Simplified formalities for school enrolment, including for migrant children lacking certain identification documents, have also been put in place in some countries, such as Thailand.

Challenges for migrant children’s education go beyond access to school. Other obstacles to improve their education outcomes include the lack of education tailored to their needs and, less commonly, their segregation from natives in classrooms. The composition of classrooms plays a role, as a high concentration of migrant children negatively influences their educational outcomes. Research also suggests that digital technologies could help reduce the gap in educational achievements between migrant and native children by supporting migrant children in doing their schoolwork at home, including through access to educational material in their native language.

More generally, migrant children may experience prejudice and discrimination at school. Schools can, however, serve as spaces for promoting tolerance and social cohesion. An increasing number of countries are integrating diversity into their curricula, but teachers still need support and training to teach effectively in diverse classrooms, including through induction or mentorship programmes.

**Labour market inclusion**

With 164 million migrant workers worldwide in 2017, representing 59.2 per cent of all international migrants and 70.1 per cent of those of working age, labour market inclusion is a key policy area for States. Its importance is increasingly emphasized in terms of migrants’ economic contributions to receiving and origin societies (see chapter 5 of this report). It has, for instance, been estimated that, while migrants contributed 9.4 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015, better inclusion, including in terms of employment, could add an additional USD 1 trillion per year to the global GDP. For migrants, just as it is for non-migrants, labour market inclusion brings greater economic security, and enhances their well-being and sense of belonging in receiving societies.

Labour market inclusion consists of different dimensions, ranging from access to employment and general or targeted support, to protection of migrant workers. Among these, access to employment is an important factor. Migrants’ employment rates are commonly lower than those of non-migrants. In the European Union,

---

55 Ibid.:44.
56 UN HRC, 2018.
57 FRA, 2011:91.
60 Rodrigues, 2018.
61 UNESCO, 2018:89–90.
64 McKinsey Global Institute, 2016:1.
65 Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012:22.
66 Huddleston et al., 2015.
for instance, the unemployment rate of migrants was 13.3 per cent in 2017, compared with 6.9 per cent for the native-born. Nevertheless, substantial differences exist between countries and groups, as labour market inclusion depends on the socioeconomic situation and policies of each country, as well as on migrants’ demographic and individual characteristics (such as age, gender, language skills or qualifications) and the circumstances of their migration. Overall, for example, refugees and those who migrated for family reunification have a lower likelihood of finding a job than other migrants. To improve the employment rate of refugees, Switzerland launched a new Artificial Intelligence pilot programme in 2018. This programme relies on an algorithm that determines in which area of the country a particular asylum seeker should be placed to maximize his/her employment likelihood.

General and targeted support for migrants is important for improving migrants’ access to employment. In addition to language training, vocational training has been found to be effective in improving access, especially if it encompasses a practical on-the-job training component. Other tools considered effective include job search assistance programmes and wage subsidy programmes (that is, subsidized employment in the private sector).

The inability to have qualifications recognized or skills validated also remains an issue, as it restricts access to certain jobs and leads to overqualification in lower-skilled positions. Working below skill level may also increase the risk of distress for migrants and result in lower psychosocial well-being. This issue is not only linked to the absence of recognition programmes, but also to the lack of awareness and information about such programmes or to their cost and complexity. The establishment of a one-stop shop for recognition in some countries, such as in Denmark, can be valuable to simplify and centralize recognition programmes under one roof.

The feminization of migration: Calling for a gender-sensitive approach to inclusion

The feminization of migration is reflected in the increasing number of female migrants and changing migration patterns. Female migrants are not only migrating as part of a household, but exercise increased agency in migrating on their own, as migrant workers, students or refugees, for instance.

This feminization of migration has, however, not been accompanied by more gender-targeted policies for migrant inclusion, which would reflect the particular obstacles faced by female migrants. These barriers are particularly apparent when it comes to labour market inclusion. In the European Union,

---

67 Eurostat, 2018. In the United States of America, however, the unemployment rate of migrants (defined as foreign born) was lower (4.1%) than that of the native-born (4.4%) in 2017 (United States Department of Labor, 2018).
68 Lens, Marx and Vuji, 2018; Canganio, 2014.
69 Stanford University, 2018.
70 Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.
73 Espinoza-Castro et al., 2018.
74 IOM, 2013: 29–30; Huddleston et al., 2015:15.
75 IOM, 2013:37.
for instance, 54 per cent of women born outside the EU were employed in 2017, compared with 73 per cent of men born outside the EU and 68 per cent of women born in the reporting country. Among employed women migrants, 40 per cent were overqualified for their positions, with a high number engaged in domestic work. Refugee women are even worse off in terms of labour market inclusion, given their more precarious status and situation.

Lower educational levels and the younger age of female migrants may in part account for the difference in employment rates between female migrants and their native-born counterparts. Compared with male migrants, female migrants may also have childcare responsibilities, which they may accommodate by not working or taking on part-time or even informal employment. This impacts not only their labour market inclusion, but also their potential to act as sponsors of relatives for family reunification, because they may not have the minimum salary required to do so. The influence of cultural norms may also play a role for female migrants coming from countries where female economic participation is low.

The adoption of policies addressing the particular structural obstacles and inequalities faced by female migrants can improve their inclusion, not only in the economic sphere but also in other policy areas. Such policies can also protect female migrants from experiencing vulnerable situations that may put them at heightened risk of violence, abuse and exploitation.

---

Family reunification

Family reunification is a central component of the right to family life. On this basis, nationals and migrants, including refugees, can act as “sponsors” of family members living abroad in order for them to be reunited. Although not all migrants want to be reunited with their families in the receiving country, for those who wish to do so, family reunification can play an important part in their inclusion. Family reunification is not only about improving family life, but also social inclusion (through engagement with schools or community-
based associations) and political participation.\textsuperscript{77} Evidence also indicates that family reunion enhances migrants’ labour market inclusion.\textsuperscript{78} According to a longitudinal survey of immigrants in Canada, family members play a particularly important role in supporting and facilitating migrants’ entry and inclusion into the labour market, especially during the first four years after arrival.\textsuperscript{79}

Family reunification has become an important component of many States’ policies, especially in Western countries. Family migration accounted for 38 per cent of all permanent migration in OECD countries in 2016, representing 1.8 million family migrants, of which 1.6 million were registered under family reunification and the remainder as accompanying migrant workers.\textsuperscript{80} Family reunification is often limited to certain types of family members and subject to specific conditions.\textsuperscript{81} It is usually restricted to the immediate family members (such as spouses, children below the age of 18 and dependent relatives), which may not reflect the social configurations of migrants’ families.\textsuperscript{82} The sponsor is often required to provide proof of sufficient financial means to support his/her family members.\textsuperscript{83} As this income requirement may raise difficulties for refugees, some countries have exempted them or lowered the minimum salary required.\textsuperscript{84}

While these conditions typically relate to migration management, other requirements for family reunification that are adopted for the declared purpose of ensuring migrants’ inclusion can be counterproductive. Pre-entry language tests that sponsored family members are sometimes required to pass to be able to reunite with migrants in the receiving country are a case in point.\textsuperscript{85} These tests can be prepared with prior language courses, but they are usually expensive, not easily accessible in rural areas of the country of origin and have a disproportionate negative impact on some family members, such as the elderly or refugees, who are less likely to succeed due to their vulnerable situations.\textsuperscript{86} Rather than improving the educational achievements and labour market inclusion of sponsored migrants, they may discourage migrants from applying for family reunification or delay family reunion. Delays can undermine the potential benefits for migrants’ inclusion, as family reunion will raise more difficulties for families when occurring after a long period of separation between sponsors and their relatives.\textsuperscript{87}

\textit{Political participation}

Migrants’ participation in the political life of their receiving countries can take different forms, ranging from voting in local, national or regional elections and standing as candidates in local elections, to joining associations and political parties or being consulted through local, national or regional consultative bodies.\textsuperscript{88} Compared with other policy areas of inclusion, such as language or employment, less attention has been

\textsuperscript{77} Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012:58; Block, 2015; Bauder, 2019.  
\textsuperscript{78} Spitzer, 2018.  
\textsuperscript{79} Li, 2007.  
\textsuperscript{80} OECD, 2018a:21; see also Hooper and Salant, 2018.  
\textsuperscript{81} Block, 2015.  
\textsuperscript{82} Huddleston et al., 2015:25; Mustasaari, 2015; Spitzer, 2018. Spouses also include couples in same-sex partnerships in some countries.  
\textsuperscript{83} Huddleston et al., 2015:25.  
\textsuperscript{84} Nicholson, 2018:94–104.  
\textsuperscript{85} Huddleston et al., 2015:26.  
\textsuperscript{86} Huddleston and Pedersen, 2011.  
\textsuperscript{87} Oliver, 2013:72; Huddleston et al., 2015:28; Spitzer, 2018.  
\textsuperscript{88} Huddleston et al., 2015; Martiniello, 2006.
devoted to political participation in policymaking and research. However, migrants’ political participation can help States maintain the legitimacy of their democratic systems, realize migrants’ inclusion and promote social cohesion. It gives migrants the opportunity to have a say on policies that concern them and can increase their feeling of belonging in the receiving society.

Migrants are not significantly less politically active than nationals. Their level of political participation depends on a range of factors, including contextual/structural and individual ones. The degree of political participation that migrants can exercise depends first on the receiving country. While most countries do not currently give migrants the right to vote (especially in Africa and Asia), some offer voting rights in national elections (see text box below), and an increasing number provide them with the right to vote in local elections (for example, in Europe, the Americas, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea). By contrast, the right to stand in elections is more limited, even for countries offering the right to vote. In addition to differing political opportunities across countries, migrants’ political participation is influenced by the culture of political participation in the receiving country and the level of participation and democratic tradition in migrants’ countries of origin.

Countries where migrants can vote in national elections

Offering voting rights to migrants in national elections is much more unusual than in local ones. Only five countries in the world enfranchise migrants in national elections, regardless of their nationality: Chile, Ecuador, Malawi, New Zealand and Uruguay. The length of residence required to participate in national elections varies from 1 year in New Zealand to 15 years in Uruguay. Beyond these five countries, many others entitle migrants only of certain nationalities to vote in national elections. This is the case in the United Kingdom (where Commonwealth as well as Irish citizens can vote), most Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean (for other Commonwealth citizens), Ireland (where United Kingdom nationals can vote), and reciprocally between Brazil and Portugal.

Individual factors that influence migrants’ political participation include migrants’ demographic and personal characteristics, especially as the level of participation increases with age and the level of education. The duration of residence and naturalization also positively impact on migrants’ political participation, and second-generation migrants are thus often more active than the first generation.

While it is difficult to measure the impact of policies on migrants’ political participation, MIPEX 2015 suggests that countries with inclusive naturalization policies tend to have stronger political participation policies.

---

89 Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012:44.
92 Huddleston et al., 2015:42.
94 Ibid.:20.
95 Huddleston et al., 2015:46.
In general, however, there remains a clear discrepancy between the high diversity of receiving societies and migrants’ representation at different political levels. Beyond the State, political parties thus have a particular role to play in increasing migrants’ political representation and diversity.

Naturalization

Naturalization is the process and acquisition of nationality by a non-national. Migrants can become naturalized if they meet legal criteria and apply through appropriate channels. Although naturalization is often considered a milestone for migrants’ inclusion in the receiving country, it is not an end in itself because inclusion remains an ongoing process. That said, naturalization often provides migrants’ full access to entitlements in receiving countries (such as voting and candidacy rights). Evidence demonstrates that naturalization increases migrants’ labour market and social inclusion, their level of political participation, and their sense of belonging in the receiving country.

Given the importance of naturalization for migrants and their inclusion, it comes as no surprise that a large share of migrants are or want to become citizens of their receiving countries. However, not all migrants want to be naturalized, as it depends on a range of individual and contextual factors. Most notably, migrants from developing countries have a greater propensity to naturalize, because it ensures security to remain and eliminates the risk of being forced to return to their countries of origin, especially when these are characterized by a lower level of development, political instability or a non-democratic regime.

The most significant factor influencing migrants’ likelihood to naturalize remains the receiving country’s citizenship policies: the more inclusive such policies are, the higher the likelihood of naturalization will be. In contrast to migration/inclusion policies, all countries have adopted nationality laws regulating the acquisition of nationality by descent, birth and/or naturalization. As citizenship is closely linked to national identity, naturalization can be politically controversial in some countries. In countries that do not allow individuals to hold dual nationality, migrants may have to relinquish their nationality of the country of origin to obtain that of the receiving country, which may deter them from naturalizing. Naturalization can be even more politically delicate with large flows of migrants, including refugees, although the United Republic of Tanzania has succeeded in naturalizing more than 170,000 Burundian refugees since 2007.

While a few countries grant citizenship to migrants in exchange for financial investments (such as Antigua and Barbuda, and Malta), in most countries, naturalization is subject to specific conditions. These requirements

97 Long et al., 2017; Bauböck et al., 2013.
100 Bauböck et al., 2013; Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012:81; Bakkaer Simonsen, 2017.
101 Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012:77.
103 Huddleston et al., 2015:61; Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015:19.
104 Long et al., 2017.
105 Reichel, 2011. This also depends on whether dual nationality is allowed by the country of origin.
106 See Long et al., 2017; Kuch, 2018.
107 Long et al., 2017:3. For Malta, see the Citizenship by Investment Program: www.maltaimmigration.com.
commonly include a minimum duration of legal residency, knowledge of national language(s) and, sometimes, culture, evidence of good character and the payment of fees for the naturalization process. The length of residence required differs from one State to another. While it is on average of 7 years in countries covered in MIPEX 2015, it goes as high as 35 years in the Central African Republic. In addition to the high fees sometimes required for naturalization, the most contentious requirement relates to mandatory language and civic tests that migrants must pass in some countries. These tests sometimes require knowledge about the receiving country that even some nationals may not possess.

Situation on the ground: The role of local actors and migrants

While States can foster migrants’ inclusion through national measures and policies, inclusion happens first and foremost “on the ground”. This section first presents the role of the local level, especially cities, where everyday practices may be disconnected from national inclusion policies. While the local level is key for realizing migrants’ inclusion, the section also highlights the role of migrants themselves, who are essential actors of their own inclusion.

The role of local actors

As inclusion primarily occurs at the local level, local actors can play an important role in supporting and fostering migrants’ inclusion. These local actors are of a different nature and can range from local communities, including local resident and diaspora communities, and local civil society organizations to local authorities. Community centres provide spaces for interactions between locals and migrants in a given neighbourhood, and give access to a wide range of services and activities within the community. The Neighbourhood Houses in Greater Vancouver, for instance, provide support for employment, day and after-school care, activities for seniors, parent groups or sociocultural events. In Europe, civil society organizations were important in assisting and sustaining longer-term initiatives for the inclusion of the increased number of migrants who arrived in 2015–2016 in countries such as Austria, Germany and Sweden. This is notably illustrated by the European Prize for Civil Society, which rewards initiatives taken by organizations, including local non-profit foundations and associations, in the field of identity and integration, and which in 2016 received a total of 284 applications from organizations in 26 EU member States.

Alongside the involvement of local communities and civil society organizations, the role of local governments, especially cities, in migrants’ inclusion has attracted increased attention due to migration patterns and processes of urbanization. Urban areas are the main destinations for migrants across the world, given the high return for migrants’ human capital.

108 Huddleston et al., 2015:59; Manby, 2016:87.
109 Long et al., 2017:5. As of 2015, half of the countries included in MIPEX 2015 required migrants to pass citizenship tests (Huddleston et al., 2015:59).
110 Banulescu-Bogdan, 2012; Bauböck et al., 2013:51–52; Long et al., 2017:5.
111 Schmidtke, 2018.
112 EESC, 2017.
113 Duncan and Popp, 2017:228.
Cities have an important role to play as spaces of inclusion, because they are the main sites of migration/inclusion policy implementation. They are the ones giving life to a greater or lesser extent to States’ international obligations and commitments, especially with regard to housing, health, employment and education. Some cities deliver services to all migrants, regardless of their migration status, ensuring access to housing, health, employment and education. For instance, some cities, such as New York, have ID cards granted to all residents (“nationals” and migrants alike, including irregular migrants), which facilitate access to numerous services and serve as means of identification.

Some cities also increasingly rely on innovative and pragmatic solutions to improve migrants’ inclusion. For instance, this is the case in European cities, such as in Austria or the Netherlands, which have taken initiatives driving policy changes at the national level. Some cities in Flanders, Belgium, have developed Centres for General Welfare to respond to the increasing number of migrants and care for their needs. These centres combine a variety of services centralized under the same roof, such as housing, health care and psychosocial support for migrants. A similar one-stop shop model has been applied in Lisbon, Portugal, to improve migrants’ access to public services that are key for their inclusion.

Cities may also positively impact on migrants’ inclusion through multicultural urban planning, when undertaken to strengthen the inclusion and resilience of diverse communities. However, urban planning for migrants’ inclusion may raise more difficulties in informal urban spaces that have developed with rapid urbanization, such as (peri-urban) slums. More generally, slums often escape the reach of national and local authorities, resulting, for instance, in lack of access to basic services for residents, including migrants. As illustrated in the text box below, in the specific context of Africa, these informal settlements have predominantly been formed in cities of the Global South, although peri-urban areas are developing in the Global North as well, such as in Lisbon, Athens and Rome.

---

Migration and inclusion in the context of urban transformation in Africa

Urbanization is a significant process in Africa. In 1995–2015, Africa had the highest rate of urban change of all continents, recorded at 3.44 per cent, with an urban growth 11 times quicker than in Europe. Across the continent, rural–urban migration rates are high, with increasing rates of international migration as well. For example, in 2013, 72.3 per cent of the resident population of the Dakar area was born outside the region. However, countries were relatively unprepared to plan for the impact of rural–urban migration. In 2016, 67.8 per cent of the entire urban population in Africa lived in informal urban settlements. Compared with State-led urban planning, local initiatives appear to have the highest impact on urban space. There is thus a growing recognition of the need for a more coherent urban governance and national development plans in African countries.

---

114 Robinson, 2014; Crawford, 2016; OECD, 2018b.
115 Medina, 2015.
117 Ibid.:37.
119 UN-Habitat, 2016a: paras. 14 and 99.
Research in West Africa shows that migrants are not disadvantaged compared with non-migrants, and that inclusion in urban areas concerns locals as much as migrants. Other research is pointing to gated communities as one of the key phenomena of urbanization in Africa. After first appearing in South Africa, these gated communities have rapidly spread across the continent. Current research is focusing on the influence of these communities on achieving inclusive and sustainable urban transitions. They also raise the question of their impact on overall community cohesion, including for migrants’ inclusion, as they reinforce segregation by increasing social differences between migrants and non-migrants.

Despite the role played by cities, their importance for migrants’ inclusion, including in policy development, has yet to be duly acknowledged at the national level. Some cities have developed their own policies and actions to foster inclusion, in recognition that inclusion needs to be supported at different governance levels within a country. From this perspective, the interculturalist approach taken by some cities has been depicted as “a policy rebellion of cities against the state domination of policy in recent decades.” Far from individual instances of rebellion carried out by a few cities, the idea of interculturalist cities has gained traction over the last decade. In 2008, for instance, the Council of Europe launched the Intercultural Cities programme for supporting cities in capitalizing in diversity. At the time of writing, the programme totalled 135 participating cities in country members of the Council of Europe, as well as in Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Morocco and the Unites States of America. Participating cities are indexed according to their intercultural policies, governance and practices. Research on the results of the Intercultural Cities Index suggests a positive correlation between the scores cities obtain and local well-being: the more intercultural policies are, the better the quality of life is. While some national governments consider municipalities as key actors in policymaking and governance of migrants’ inclusion, as is the case in Turkey, in other countries, the proactive role of cities has led to frictions between city and national levels. This has been the case, for instance, with sanctuary cities that have adopted their own policies and measures to protect migrants, including those in an irregular situation. These policies have at times been adopted in reaction to restrictive national migration and citizenship policies, and have established cities as spaces of inclusion.

---

121 Ibid.:235.
124 For the list of participating cities, see www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/participating-cities. On the Intercultural Cities Index, see www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/about-the-index.
125 Joki and Wolffhardt, n.d.
126 Duncan and Popp, 2017.
127 Lippert and Rehaag, 2013.
128 Bauder and Gonzalez, 2018:125; see also Pearson, 2015.
While cities are active players in the global governance of migration, national governments are key in scaling up initiatives developed by cities and sharing good practices globally. The role of cities in organizing appropriate services to care for migrants’ needs is increasingly recognized by States in global initiatives, such as in the New Urban Agenda following the Habitat III Conference in Ecuador in 2016. Through a whole-of-government approach, the importance of the local level is also explicitly acknowledged and mainstreamed throughout the Global Compact for Migration. Objectives 15 and 16 are of particular relevance, as they both emphasize the role of the local level (including local authorities) for providing migrants’ access to basic services and empowering them and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion (see chapter 11 of this report).

Recognizing migrants’ agency

Beyond the State and local levels, migrants play a crucial role, not just as passive subjects of inclusion policies, but also as active actors of their own inclusion. Migrants’ entrepreneurship is perhaps one of the most obvious illustrations of their agency for their economic inclusion. Beyond success stories such as that of Silicon Valley in California, where half of the high-tech companies were founded by migrants, there exist many examples of migrants’ entrepreneurship (see chapter 5 of this report). For instance, Syrian refugee-owned companies have developed in response to refugees’ lack of formal employment opportunities and the need to make a living.

Migrants are not only agents of their own inclusion but also actively support other migrants, while striving, more generally, for social cohesion. Among many other examples of migrants’ initiatives, a school established by Congolese refugees in a Ugandan refugee camp has been depicted as a success for migrant children’s inclusion. Since its creation in 2009, some 800 pupils have progressed to secondary school and 40 study in universities around the world. As the founders put it, “we realize that through education you can never be called a refugee forever”.

Technology has also been used by migrants to support the inclusion of other migrants in receiving countries through YouTube videos to counter xenophobia and discrimination or with the development of smartphone applications, as illustrated in the text box below.

---

129 See also the Global Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development, Available at www.migration4development.org/en/events/global-mayoral-forum; and the Global Parliament of Majors Initiative, Available at https://globalparliamentofmayors.org/.

130 Duncan and Popp, 2017.

131 UNGA, 2018a: para. 15.

132 Wadhwa et al., 2007:31. Among the 126 companies that reported for this study, 52.4 per cent indicated that they had been founded by migrants.

133 MEDAM, 2018:106–109. For more illustrations, see UNCTAD, IOM and UNHCR, 2018.

134 Onyulo, 2018.

135 IOM, 2018.
Migrants’ use of technology for inclusion

Today, tech innovations are used to foster migrants’ inclusion, as illustrated by the many smartphone applications developed to help migrants find their way in their country or connect with diaspora communities. The potential of these “apps” has not escaped migrants’ attention, as evidenced, for instance, by the video game Survival, available on Android and iOS.

Survival was developed by young migrants, refugees and Spanish people in the Gibraltar Strait, with the support of the Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations and Omnium Lab Studios. Through this game, they share their experience of migration in the form of an “odyssey of social inclusion, going through all stages of the Migration trip”. The objective of this game app is to “educate the player about the reality of thousands of people who are facing the tragedy of migration”, putting him/her “in the shoes of these people, to try to change the focus, the perspective with which this problem is analysed in our social contexts”.

Migrants’ inclusion in communities and countries does not require relinquishing one’s identity or ties with communities and countries of origin. Migrants increasingly act as transnational actors, as explained by Daniel from Guatemala, who has been living for 30 years in Costa Rica:

My home could be a Guatemalan territorial space but with windows and doors open to Costa Rica. My home became a place where both visions and cultures can grow and live together.

That is the biggest challenge of living in another country: living a little here and a little there. You live the two visions of the world every day, one from the home country and the other one from the host country. Expressions, food, culture, world vision: the two countries intersect in everyday life.

Migrants’ transnational lives can nonetheless be at odds with expectations of migrants as “settlers”, and can result in their allegiance to the receiving country being called into question. They may be perceived as a threat to social cohesion, with the risk of being discriminated against and excluded. However, migrants’ discrimination and exclusion can entail a high cost for both migrants and receiving societies. For instance, migrants’ exclusion can affect their own well-being, as illustrated by a study on the effects of discrimination.

---

137 Available at http://iamamigrant.org/stories/costa-rica/daniel-matul-0.
at work on the well-being of Russian and Estonian migrants in Finland. Perceived discrimination accordingly predicts negative outcomes in terms of general and mental health for both groups of migrants.\textsuperscript{139} Migrants’ exclusion can also negatively impact on their contributions to trade, skills and labour supply, cultural transfer and exchange, which all consist of major benefits for receiving societies (see chapter 5 of this report).

More generally, migrants’ exclusion constitutes a risk for social cohesion. On rare occasions, social exclusion can act as a driver of radicalization to violent extremism.\textsuperscript{140} Although the likelihood remains low as terrorist attacks have not been primarily perpetrated by migrants,\textsuperscript{141} such consequences and costs entailed by migrants’ social exclusion are arguably too high and have to be addressed. These constitute an additional factor to be taken into account to strengthen migrants’ inclusion, in order to reduce the risk of radicalization for the well-being of societies and communities.

The various costs of exclusion and migrants’ agency support the need to more fully involve migrants in the formulation of migration/inclusion policies. These policies could benefit from better understanding how migrants view their inclusion process, what their needs are and what potential policy responses could more effectively support their inclusion.\textsuperscript{142} More active involvement of migrants at the policy level would also be in line with the Global Compact for Migration, which emphasizes the need to empower migrants to achieve full inclusion and social cohesion.\textsuperscript{143}

### Migrants’ views to inform inclusion policies: The potential of migrant surveys

While research increasingly incorporates migrants’ voices to better understand the impact of migration on their identities and sense of belonging, more insights would be needed on migrants’ views of their inclusion process, needs and aspirations to inform and evaluate the effects of inclusion policies on migrants’ lives.

Migrant surveys are useful tools to get a sense of migrants’ views on their inclusion, as illustrated by the multiple references to the \textit{Immigrant Citizens Survey} in this chapter. Piloted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, the survey was conducted with 7,473 migrants born outside the European Union and residing in 15 cities in seven EU member States. While the main findings of the survey are reproduced in appendix C, the survey concludes by pointing out that “surveyed immigrants today are generally as satisfied with their lives as most people in the country where they live”. This positive note should not, however, obscure the challenges to inclusion identified by migrants in the survey, and can hopefully motivate similar endeavours in the future, as attitudes towards migrants are likely to have considerably evolved since the survey was concluded in 2012.

See Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012. The main findings of the \textit{Immigrant Citizens Survey} are reproduced in appendix C.

\textsuperscript{139} Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liedkind and Perhoniemi, 2007.  
\textsuperscript{140} Koser and Cunningham, 2017.  
\textsuperscript{141} Duncan and Popp, 2017:216–220.  
\textsuperscript{142} Mustafa, 2018.  
\textsuperscript{143} UNGA, 2018a.
Conclusion

This chapter offers an overview of what migrants’ inclusion entails in policy and practice, the factors and obstacles thereto, and how it is approached by different stakeholders. However, it also illustrates the difficulty to address the question of migrants’ inclusion at the global level, as it intrinsically remains a national issue. This is reflected in the Global Compact for Migration, where the actions linked to Objective 16 on empowering migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion remain largely aspirational (see chapter 11 of this report).

While there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach to inclusion, due to its highly personal and contextual nature, three main policy implications can be drawn from this chapter to foster migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion:

- **The adoption of holistic inclusion policies has the potential to improve the effectiveness of policy responses in the field of inclusion.** As seen in this chapter, despite the emphasis sometimes placed on labour market inclusion, the different policy areas are closely interdependent, as inclusion outcomes in one specific policy area will likely impact on others. Conversely, the absence of holistic inclusion policies may be costly for both migrants and receiving societies. Single policy responses in one specific policy area will likely be ineffective in improving migrants’ overall inclusion if not complemented by measures in other areas and supported by a coherent policy strategy. The risk is not only for migrants to end up being excluded and marginalized, but to create social tensions undermining social cohesion in the receiving society.

- **More inclusive policy responses in a wide range of related policy areas leads to deeper and more sustainable inclusion outcomes.** While this may sound logical, it is particularly striking with regard to language requirements, political participation and naturalization. By contrast, more restrictive policies have the risk of being counterproductive, especially when used for migration management purposes. Conditions for family reunification that are meant to ensure that reunited family members will integrate in the receiving society, especially pre-entry language tests, can in practice limit the number of migrants benefiting from family reunification at the expense of supporting the inclusion of migrant sponsors and their relatives.

- **The important role already played by local actors and migrants calls for further strengthening their involvement in developing and (re-)evaluating national inclusion policies.** Increased involvement and empowerment of cities would help in mitigating tensions between local and national levels, because of discrepancies in how inclusion is approached. As the spaces where inclusion primarily occurs, cities and other local authorities are also the best placed to inform about the challenges of inclusion and good practices that can be implemented. As for migrants, their involvement in policymaking has so far not reflected how active they have been in practice for their own inclusion and that of other migrants. If their voices are increasingly heard today, their inclusion needs and aspirations are yet to be more thoroughly explored and taken into account to improve the effectiveness of inclusion policies.
Appendix A. Terms and definitions relating to migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion

Various terms have been used to refer to migrants’ inclusion in receiving societies and to social cohesion. The choice of one particular term depends on the interlocutor (who/which stakeholder), the particular period of time (when), and the historical, political, social, cultural and economic contexts of a particular host country or society (where).

The table below provides an illustration of some of the terms often used, together with a potential definition. These definitions are, however, only suggestions as to how these terms can be understood, as no universally agreed definitions exist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acculturation</td>
<td>“[A]cculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups.”</td>
<td>Redfield, Linton and Herskovits, 1936, in Berry, 1997:7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>“The selective and often conscious attempt to modify certain aspects of cultural practice in accordance with the host society’s norms and values.”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002:117.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>“A one-directional policy approach to integration whereby an ethnic or social group – usually a minority – adopts the cultural practices of another – usually that of the majority ethnic or social group. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, mores and behaviour normally leading the assimilating party to become less socially distinguishable from other members of the receiving society.”</td>
<td>IOM, 2019.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>“This can refer to denial of access to certain rights, resources or entitlements normally seen as part of membership of a specific society. Immigrants are often included in some areas of society (e.g. labour market) but excluded from others (e.g. political participation).”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002:118.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>“The process whereby immigrants or refugees become participants in particular subsectors of society: education, labour market, welfare system, political representation, etc. The emphasis is on active and conscious processes: that is policies of public agencies or employers, as well as on the role of the newcomers themselves. This is seen as the antithesis of exclusion and social exclusion.”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002:117–118.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Incorporation | “Incorporation of immigrants is seen by some social scientists as a fairly neutral term to refer to the overall process by which newcomers become part of a society. It is seen as avoiding the normative implications of such terms as assimilation, integration and insertion.”  
*Source: Castles et al., 2002:117.* |
| Insertion | “The process through which immigrants and refugees are brought into various social subsectors. The term originates in the French Republican Model of individual assimilation of immigrants, and carries the implication of being inserted into an unchanged social institution – in other words, that the immigrant has to assimilate to existing structures.”  
*Source: Castles et al., 2002:118.* |
| Integration | “The two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities, and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion.”  
*Source: IOM, 2019.* |
| Interculturalism | “[A] technique for bridging differences and creating bonds and social capital. That is, it promotes relations between people who share certain characteristics (bonds), as well as relations between individuals from different backgrounds (promoting interaction between people across different religions, languages, etc.) who are predisposed to respecting others’ differences […] It is a way, then, to avoid the confinement and segregation of people, which may condemn them to a timeless social exclusion.”  
*Source: Zapata-Barrero, 2017.* |
| Multiculturalism | “A model of integration policies that welcomes the preservation, expression and sometimes even the celebration of cultural diversity. This approach encourages migrants to become full members of society while retaining their cultural identities. It combines the recognition of varied backgrounds, traditions and ways of seeing the world with certain universalist values, such as the rule of law or gender equality, that override cultural differences and guarantee the same rights for all. The integration relationship is then best captured in the image of a mosaic enabling minority ethnic groupings to live side by side with the majority constituency.”  
*Source: IOM, 2019, adapted from IOM, 2017b:161.* |
### Social Cohesion

“While there is no one universal definition, social cohesion is usually associated with such notions as ‘solidarity’, ‘togetherness’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘harmonious co-existence’ and refers to a social order in a specific society or community based on a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; where the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued; those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.”


### Social Exclusion

“Social exclusion pertains to a situation in which an individual or group suffers multiple types of disadvantage in various social sectors (e.g. education, employment, housing, health).”

*Source:* Castles et al., 2002:118.

### Social Inclusion

“The process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society.”


### Transnationalism

“Transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation-states.”

Appendix B. The legal framework of migrants’ inclusion

As introduced in chapter 6, the different key policy areas of migrants’ inclusion correspond to and are grounded in some specific rights to which all individuals are entitled, including migrants. The figure in this appendix provides an overview of some of the rights that are essential for migrants’ inclusion.

All these rights are based on specific international treaties, especially those part of international human rights law and international labour law. Without prejudice to other relevant international and regional instruments, these treaties include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International human rights law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International labour law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these treaties are only legally binding for the States that have ratified them, the two Covenants of 1966 have now been ratified by virtually all States. Moreover, some of the rights in the figure below are commonly recognized to be part of customary international law. They are thus legally binding on all States, irrespective of their ratification of specific treaties or conventions. These customary rights most notably include the main pillar of migrants’ inclusion: that is, the principle of non-discrimination, which ensures that the rights of all individuals, including migrants, are not nullified or impaired on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”, including migration status.

---


145 UN HRCttee, 1989: para. 7. However, as noted by the Committee: “Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]” (ibid.: para. 13). On the customary law nature of the principle of non-discrimination, see Chetail, 2019.
Legal framework of inclusion

- Right to education
- Freedom of religion
- Right to an adequate standard of living (such as housing)
- Right to health
- Right to respect for family life, right of children not to be separated from their parents, family reunification, principle of the best interests of the child
- Right to work, decent working conditions, prohibition of forced/compulsory labour, freedom of association, right to join/form trade unions
- Right to acquire a nationality for children
- Right to vote for nationals but possibility for States to extend it to regular migrants
- Principle of non-discrimination
- Right to an adequate standard of living (such as housing)
- Right to work, decent working conditions, prohibition of forced/compulsory labour, freedom of association, right to join/form trade unions
- Right to respect for family life, right of children not to be separated from their parents, family reunification, principle of the best interests of the child
- Right to acquire a nationality for children
- Right to vote for nationals but possibility for States to extend it to regular migrants
- Principle of non-discrimination
Appendix C. Main findings of the *Immigrant Citizens Survey*

The *Immigrant Citizens Survey*[^146] was piloted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, and conducted in 2011–2012 with 7,473 migrants born outside the European Union and residing in 15 cities in seven EU member States. Survey questions concerned six dimensions of inclusion, resulting in the following key findings:

1. **Employment**
   - Problems on the labour market are often local, from few legal contracts in Southern Europe to discrimination and distrust of foreign qualifications in Northern Europe.
   - For immigrants, the major problem is job security.
   - 25–33% of working immigrants feel overqualified for their job.
   - Educated immigrants often get their foreign qualifications recognised if they apply, but few apply.
   - Most working-age immigrants want more training.
   - Immigrants have greater problems balancing training, work, and family life than most people do in the country.

2. **Languages**
   - Immigrants generally speak more languages than the average person in their country of residence.
   - For immigrants – like for most people – time is the major problem for learning a new language.
   - Getting information on learning opportunities may be more difficult for immigrants than general public.
   - Wide range of immigrants participated in language or integration courses.
   - Participants highly value courses for learning language and often for socio-economic integration.

3. **Political and civic participation**
   - Most immigrants are interested in voting (often as much as nationals are).
   - Most immigrants want more diversity in politics – and many are willing to vote in support of it.
   - Immigrants’ broader participation in civic life is uneven from city to city and organisation to organisation.
   - Whether immigrants know or participate in an immigrant NGO depends heavily on their local and national context.

4. **Family reunion**
   - Only limited numbers of first-generation immigrants were ever separated from a partner or children.

[^146]: Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.
• The majority of separated families have already reunited in most surveyed countries.

• Most separated immigrants today do not want to apply for their family, some because of family choices but others because of policy obstacles.

• Family reunion helps immigrants improve family life, sense of belonging and sometimes other integration outcomes.

5. Long-term residence
• 80–95% of immigrants are or want to become long-term residents.

• Most temporary migrants in new countries of immigration also want to become long-term residents.

• The average person applies not long after the minimum period of residence.

• Documents and powers of authorities cited as major problems for applicants in certain countries.

• Long-term residence helps most immigrants get better jobs and feel more settled.

6. Citizenship
• Around 3 out of 4 immigrants are or want to become citizens.

• The few uninterested in citizenship often either do not see the difference with their current status or face specific policy obstacles.

• Major reasons not to naturalise are difficult procedures in France and restrictions on dual nationality in Germany.

• Naturalisation more common among established immigration countries and among facilitated groups in Hungary and Spain.

• Immigrants who are eligible for naturalization often take years to apply.

• Citizenship helps immigrants feel more settled, get better jobs, and even get more educated and involved.

References*

Acosta, D.

Allen, W., S. Blinder and R. McNeil

Aoki, Y. and L. Santiago

Appave, G. and I. David

Arrighi, J.-T. and R. Bauböck

Bailey, J.P.

Bakewell, O. and A. Bonfiglio

Bakkaer Simonsen, K.
2017  Does citizenship always further immigrants’ feeling of belonging to the host nation? A study of policies and public attitudes in 14 Western democracies. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 5(3).

Banulescu-Bogdan, N.

Barslund, M. and N. Laurentsyeva

* All hyperlinks provided were operating at the time of publication.
Bauböck, R., I. Honohan, T. Huddleston, D. Hutcheson, J. Shaw and M.P. Vink

Bauböck, R. and M. Tripkovic (eds.)
2017 *The Integration of Migrants and Refugees, An EUI Forum on Migration, Citizenship and Demography.* European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence.

Bauder, H. (ed.)
2019 *Putting Family First: Migration and Integration in Canada.* UBC Press, Vancouver.

Bauder, H. and D.A. Gonzalez

Beauchemin, C. and P. Bocquier

Berndt, R.M.

Berry, J.


Bilgili, Ö., T. Huddleston and A.-L. Joki

Bivand Erdal, M. and C. Oeppen

Bjerg, M.M.
Block, L.  

Butschek, S. and T. Walter  

Canganio, A.  

Cantle, T.  

Caponio, T. and D. Donatiello  

Card, D., J. Kluve and A. Weber  

Castles, S.  


Castles, S. and A. Davidson  

Castles, S., H. de Haas and M.J. Miller  

Castles, S., M. Korac, E. Vasta and S. Vertovec  

Charsley, K. and S. Spencer  
Chetail, V.

Chiswick, B.R.

Corak, M.

Crawford, V.

Crawley, H., S. McMahon and K. Jones

Darden, J.T.

De Paola, M. and G. Brunello

Demireva, N.

Dronkers, J. and M.R. Vink
2012  Explaining access to citizenship in Europe: How citizenship policies affect naturalization rates. *European Union Politics*, 13(3).

Duncan, H. and I. Popp

Entzinger, H. and R. Biezeveld
2003  *Benchmarking Immigrant Integration*. Erasmus University Rotterdam, European Research Centre on Migration and Ethnic Relations, Rotterdam.

Espinoza-Castro, B., L.E. Vásquez Rueda, R.V. Mendoza Lopez and K. Radon
European Commission


European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)

European Migration Network

Eurostat (European Union)

Faist, T.

Favell, A.

Filsi, S., E.C. Meroni and E. Vera-Toscano
2016 Educational Outcomes and Immigrant Background. European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), JRC Technical Reports.

Fokkema, T. and H. de Haas

Fonseca, X., S. Lukosch and F. Brazier

Forrest, R. and A. Kearns

Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) (European Union)
Gagnon, J. and D. Khoudour-Castéras

Gathmann, C. and N. Keller

Government of Canada
1985 Canadian Multiculturalism Act. RSC, c. 24 (4th Supp.).


Hagelskamp, C., C. Suárez-Orozco and D. Hughes

Hainmueller, J., D. Hangartner and G. Pietrantuono

Hennebry, J.

Hooper, K. and B. Salant

Huddleston, T.


Huddleston, T., Ö. Bilgili, A.L. Joki and Z. Vankova
2015 *Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015*. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and Migration Policy Group, Barcelona and Brussels.

Huddleston, T. and J. Dag Tjaden
Huddleston, T. and A. Pedersen

International Labour Organization (ILO)


International Organization for Migration (IOM)


Isphording, I.E.

Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., K. Liedkind and R. Perhoniemi

Jenson, J.
Joki, A.-L. and A. Wolffhardt  

Joppke, C.  


Klaufus, C., P. van Lindert, F. van Noorloos and G. Steel  

Kluve, J.  

Kontos, M.  

Koser, K. and A. Cunningham  

Krüger Diaz, A.L. and J. Plaza Pinto  

Kuch, A.  

Kymlicka, W.  

Landau, L.B. and O. Bakewell  

Lens, D., I. Marx and S. Vuji  
Levitt, P.

Lewis, E.G.

Li, X.

Liebig, T. and K. Rose Tronstad

Lippert, R.K. and S. Rehaag (eds.)

Logan, J.R., S. Oh and J. Darrah

Long, K., E. Mosler Vidal, A. Kuch and J. Hagen-Zanker

Manby, B.

Martiniello, M.

Mazzucato, V. and D. Schans

McKinsey Global Institute
Medina, D.A.  

Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM)  

Modood, T.  

Morrice, L., L.K. Tip, M. Collyer and R. Brown  
2019  “You can’t have a good integration when you don’t have a good communication”: English-language learning among resettled refugees in England. *Journal of Refugee Studies* (advance access).

Mustafa, S.  

Mustasaari, S.  

National Museum Australia  

Newland, K.  

Nicholson, F.  

Okyere, S.A.  

Oliver, C.  
Onyulo, T.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)


OECD and European Union (EU)


Oyefara, J.L.

Panagiotopoulou, J.A. and L. Rosen

Papademetriou, D.G.

Pearson, M.
Penny, E.  
2016  “We Don’t Have a Refugee Crisis. We Have a Housing Crisis.” *Open Democracy*, 5 November. Available at www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/we-don-t-have-refugeecrisis-we-have-housing-crisis/.

Phillips, D.  

Public Policy and Management Institute (PPMI)  

Redfield, R., R. Linton and M. Herskovitz  

Reichel, D.  

Robinson, K.  

Rodrigues, M.  

Ros i Sole, C.  

Sánchez Alonso, B.  

Schmidtke, O.  

Scholten, P., F. Baggerman, L. Dellouche, V. Kampen, J. Wolf and R. Ypma  

Silver, H.  
Somers, T.  

Spitzer, D.L.  

Stanford University  

Thorkelson, S.  

UN-Habitat  


United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN CESCR)  

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), IOM and UNHCR  

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)  

United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)  
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)


United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
2018 Turn the Tide: Refugee Education in Crisis. UNHCR, Geneva. Available at www.unhcr.org/turnthetide/.

United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRCttee)

United Nations Human Rights Council (UN HRC)

United State Department of Labor

Vathi, Z.

Vertovec, S.

Wadhwa, V., A. Saxenlan, B. Rissing and G. Gereffi

Wiesbrock, A.

World Bank
Zapata-Barrero, R.

Zetter, R., D. Griffiths, N. Sigona, D. Flynn, T. Pasha and R. Beynon