IOM/EURASYLUM
MONTHLY POLICY
INTERVIEW SERIES ON:
“THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION:
BUILDING CAPACITIES FOR CHANGE”

February – June 2010
The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), nor those of Eurasylum Ltd. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Publisher: International Organization for Migration
17 route des Morillons
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland
Tel: +41 22 717 91 11
Fax: +41 22 798 61 50
E-mail: hq@iom.int
Internet: http://www.iom.int

© 2010 International Organization for Migration (IOM)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Foreword

Eurasylum Ltd is conducting monthly interviews of leading players in international migration and asylum affairs, within a range of policy, academic and practitioners’ area of expertise.\(^1\) Policy relevance, topicality and international resonance of the themes are the three guiding principles of the interviews.

Building on the monthly interviews, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum have been launching a special series on the ‘The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change’ from February to June 2010.

The aim of these monthly interviews was to feed into the World Migration Report 2010, which is dedicated fully to this policy theme. The special interview series was designed to collect the views of senior public policy officials, reputable academics and civil society representatives worldwide about the needs for new capacity building measures in five major areas: Migration Governance, Migration and Development, Labour Migration, Integration and Migrants’ Rights and Climate Change and Migration.

---

\(^1\) Eurasylum’s interviews may be reproduced freely on condition that both the original source and the URL are explicitly acknowledged. All interviews can be accessed at: http://www.eurasylum.org/Portal/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=4&tabid=19
## Table of Contents

**MIGRATION GOVERNANCE** .............................................. 7  
Prof. Bimal Ghosh and Ambassador Sergio Marchi:  
“Migration governance: towards a global integrated migration regime?”

**MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT** .............................. 17  
Patricia Aragon Sto Tomas and Dilip Ratha:  
“Migration and development: recent and unfolding experiences”

**LABOUR MIGRATION** ...................................................... 23  
Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu and Nand Kishore Singh:  
“The future of international labour migration”

**INTEGRATION AND MIGRANTS’ RIGHTS** ...................... 27  
Dr. Howard Duncan and Prof. Michael Keith:  
“Integration and rights of migrants: policy priorities and directions for new capacity building measures”

**CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION** ....................... 37  
Theodoros Skylakakis:  
“Climate change and migration: impacts and policy responses”
INTERVIEW I

“Migration governance: towards a global integrated migration regime?”

June 2010

Prof. Bimal Ghosh
Emeritus Professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Public Administration; former Senior UN Director

and

Ambassador Sergio Marchi
Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD); former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration of Canada

IOM/Eurasylum: According to the Final Report of the Global Commission on International Migration, migration governance can assume a variety of forms, including the migration policies and programmes of individual countries, interstate discussions and agreements, multilateral fora and consultative processes, the activities of international organizations, and the international legal and normative framework. However, a key contemporary feature of migration governance is the way in which both source and receiving countries choose to engage in regional and global cooperation mechanisms. Against this background, how would you characterize the current state of cross-national coordination of states’ responses to different aspects of migration and in what particular areas, and through which mechanisms, would you see the need for new capacity building measures to facilitate the gradual emergence of an international integrated migration regime?

Prof. Bimal Ghosh: Given that you have raised the issue of a global integrated migration regime in the context of migration governance, I believe it is useful to clarify the concept of governance itself as a point of departure. This is because governance has become an over-used, catch-all phrase — a phrase that is amorphous and innocuous enough to be conveniently used to mean many different things for many different purposes. And yet, loosely used and shorn of specificity, the phrase often remains elusive in articulating what it really stands for.

The Commission on Global Governance (1993–94), in the work of which I participated, was perhaps the first international body to delve deeply into the concept of governance. It defined global governance as a broad, dynamic, complex process of inter-active decision making that constantly evolves to changing circumstances. It is bound to respond, the Commission added, to the specific requirements of different issue areas, but it must take an integrated approach to questions of human survival and prosperity.

In other words, although governance refers to a “process”, it does not exist or operate in a vacuum. The process is closely related to a “product” or a specific goal or objective, even if the latter may change over time and vary according to the issue area.
In the migration area, I would agree that interstate cooperation constitutes a key feature of migration governance. But both are means of action; and so is the global integrated migration regime to which you refer. Their effectiveness can be truly judged only against the objectives they are expected to serve. In my writings and through the NIROMP (New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People) global project I have tried to define these objectives. Briefly stated, an integrated regime should aim at making movement of people more orderly and predictable as well as productive and humane, based on commonalty and reciprocity of interests of both origin and destination countries.

A related and immediate objective, also a stepping stone towards the wider, longer-term objective, is to redress the asymmetry or mismatch between the rising emigration pressure in sending countries and the dwindling opportunities for legal entry, especially of low skilled workers, into destination countries.

Although not incongruent with these objectives, most of the proposals for migration regime building are vocal about the importance of interstate cooperation but they are less articulate about (a) the specific objectives of such cooperation — the question of WHY? and (b) the ways in which interstate cooperation can attain these objectives — the question of HOW?

The operational implications of the twin objectives mentioned above are important. They bring out both the existing institutional inadequacy and the skill gaps that inhibit the emergence of a truly integrated global migration regime. At the global level, different international agencies dealing with migration pursue their respective policy concerns in their specific areas, more or less independently of each other. Many of the issue areas are of course closely interconnected or even interdependent. They call for a common focus under some common, overall objectives as indicated above to bind them together within an integrated framework or regime.

But this does not happen due to the regrettable absence of a really effective focal point and the institutional vacuum that persists. At the international level, the existing inter-agency coordination mechanisms are too weak for this purpose. The Global Forum for Migration and Development, however useful as a platform for exchange of information and ideas, does not have the formal mandate or the organizational structure needed for this purpose. And the pursuit of a common goal, an essential requirement of a durable regime, falls by the wayside.

This also explains why to date interstate cooperation in different migration areas has progressed at such a variable speed. In a paper, (< the around partnership of paradigm new a emergence Is Level: Global at Cooperation Inter-state Migration > 2005), prepared for the Bern Initiative, I have shown that, despite many continuing difficulties, interstate cooperation is now relatively well advanced in the areas of (a) protection of migrants rights and welfare and (b) preventive and punitive measures against unauthorized migration including trafficking and smuggling. However, a few exceptions aside, interstate cooperation has made little progress in (c) a third major area of migration management at the global level — namely, movement of people in terms of opportunities for legal entry.

Greater awareness of the interrelationship between different areas of migration management will help matters. No less important is the need to remedy the institutional deficiency that precludes systematic efforts to encourage nations to agree on a set of common goals and pursue them with vigour. Progress in this area, starting with a common commitment by origin and destination countries to
redress the migration mismatch mentioned above is critically important for the emergence of a truly integrated migration regime. Also important are systematic efforts to pull together, within a coherent framework, interstate cooperation in all three major migration policy areas I have just mentioned.

The operational requirements of a meaningful migration regime as outlined above also reveal existing skill deficiencies. If migrant sending and receiving countries share some common interests that constitute the common goods to underpin a global regime, it is equally true that individual states also have differing and even conflicting interests on many specific migration issues. Some analysts consider these differences as impediments to regime building. In reality however the diversity of interests could well be used to build a web of reciprocities between origin and destination countries. This can be done by working out trade-offs between their specific interests, as practiced in trade negotiation, making each negotiating country a net gainer at the end of the deal.

The interlocking of reciprocity need not be confined within the limits of the migration area alone but can also take place across areas, and including trade and investment flows — for example origin countries can negotiate their migrants’ access to destination countries’ labour markets in exchange of liberalization of their specific product markets, as was discussed during the Doha Round of trade talks. A meaningful migration regime can open up such avenues of action and efforts in this direction can greatly help the regime building process.

Reciprocity of interests has driven some of the existing bilateral or plurilateral agreements on migration related matters like readmission, remittances and planned recruitment. But these isolated initiatives have not taken place within a common global framework or regime; and in the absence of a previously agreed set of guiding principles they have not always been equitable. Nor have these deals been part of a continuing process that a regime can ensure.

In fact, attempts at building a migration regime have given scant attention to this line of inter-state action. A major reason for this is that the international and national agencies (in both host and home countries) responsible for migration do not have the skills and resources that are needed to set such a process in motion. Skills and innovativeness are required to systematically explore and identify the various potential areas of reciprocity and analyse their wider economic and social implications. Also needed are some knowledge of negotiation techniques and bargaining skills to work out the final agreements.

Unlike in the case of trade, there is no international forum to foster and facilitate negotiation, including working out trade-offs, on migration related issues. This constitutes another layer of institutional inadequacy to grapple with the building of a global migration regime.

Ambassador Sergio Marchi: Migration is an issue that is most reflective of the times in which we live. With globalization bringing new technologies and deepening international integration and dependency, the movement of goods, services, capital and people has been greatly increased and facilitated. Indeed, the number of migrants has doubled since 1980 alone, reaching more than 200 million people.

Furthermore, we no longer live in a world composed strictly of “sending” and “receiving” countries. Today, all nations have migrants leaving from, arriving to
and transiting through, their territories — South to North, North to North, and increasingly, South to South.

In theory, this should facilitate a more coherent form of migration policy and decision-making, given that all states have an appreciation of the migration pressures and a longing for better, more manageable approaches and solutions.

Yet, the governance model remains almost entirely national.

Advancing an international agenda on migration requires political will and commitment. It also calls for appropriate institutional capacity and architecture.

In tackling international problems, leaders increasingly recognize that they can neither talk about the forces of international trade and investment, nor on the challenges of world hunger, disease and terrorism, the dangers posed by climate change, nor indeed, about global migration and development — and then proceed to deal with them in an isolated fashion.

The need to act in much broader and interrelated terms has become evident, if we wish to provide remedies that work and better connect the many dots.

The global coordination and response to the current global financial and economic crisis — including the establishment of the G-20, and its requests and support to such bodies as the WTO, World Bank, and the IMF — perhaps best typifies this understanding, and the paradigm shift that is taking place in political governance.

As we try to apply this thinking to global mobility, there are many critical issues to be addressed. We must approach them thoughtfully and reasonably, and avoid divisive, antagonistic debate. We should attempt to define the different pieces of the global migration puzzle and how to help make them fit better and more coherently with one another.

A few considerations and questions before us:

i) Much work has been done by a number of leading intergovernmental organizations in their respective domains, including UNHCR, IOM and the ILO. Similarly, many other intergovernmental efforts have proven to be of great value in defining new perspectives and in facilitating new procedural approaches. Unlike other social and economic issues of international magnitude, however, a single, overarching intergovernmental agency responsible for global migration policy, either inside or outside the UN system, currently does not exist. Is this not the right moment to focus on those institutional and policy reforms that would be required for a truly global response to migration?

ii) Why do Ministers responsible for migration have no regular meetings in their calendar where they could come together at the global level to agree on collective action towards issues of shared concern? By rather stark contrast, for instance, Ministers of Finance meet at least twice a year at the IMF and World Bank; Ministers of Trade meet every second year at the WTO; Ministers of Health meet annually at the WHO; Ministers of Labour are invited to meet every year at the ILO; Ministers of the Environment seem to be meeting constantly in different configurations, to deal with climate change.

iii) And in such a process, how would the respective international agencies, each responsible for a piece of the global migration pie, fit in?
iv) After three years of annual sessions, is it possible to imagine the Global Forum on Migration and Development moving from a discourse mode to a more action-oriented trajectory? If so, which issues and actions would the Forum need to initially focus on for action, and how would it best be able to implement a pragmatic, best practice approach?

v) What should the role of the UN SG’s Special Representative on Migration be in the overall objective of facilitating a more active form of global leadership and coordination?

vi) How and where could civil society provide its inputs and contributions? Currently, many issues related to migration, from processing to integration, enjoy an intense collaboration with civil society, both on the ground and in policy building. How can this continue and even improve, with the eventual elaboration of a new global architecture?

A number of people believe that “global governance” could be interpreted as a “loaded” term: “frightening” and “intimidating” for some governments and agencies, as well as sometimes being negatively associated with “big government” or “unwieldy” bureaucracies. As well, a good part of the “fear” associated with the term stems from the assumption that it either immediately involves or inexorably leads to the creation of a new, supranational agency.

The other part of the “fear” equation is the reluctance on the part of most governments to cede sovereignty over migration matters. Given that migration is about the movement of people and labour, and all that this implies, state authorities have largely preferred to maintain as much national control as possible.

However, what if governments took the time to calculate their net benefits if migration were to be subjected to global cooperation and collaboration?

IOM/Eurasylum: Migration governance also entails the integration, into policymaking, of a range of distinct but interdependent policy areas such as border management and the prevention of unlawful immigration, including human smuggling and trafficking; the facilitation of selective legal immigration; the integration of lawful immigrants; a fair implementation of international refugee and human rights instruments; and the development of a constructive dialogue and partnership framework between host and source countries. To what extent do you consider that such a holistic approach to migration management is currently being implemented by major host countries and what are the key capacity building measures that could help states strike a more effective balance when (re)designing and implementing major migration policies?

Prof. Bimal Ghosh: My reply to your previous question dealing with the global aspects of migration governance also largely applies, mutatis mutandis, to your second question that refers to governance at the national level, with a focus on host countries. Although as already mentioned, most of the migration issues are intertwined, one hardly finds a truly holistic or integrated approach to deal with them.

A true holistic approach goes far beyond exchange of information or consultation between and among the various actors involved. It warrants substantive policy coherence across the various migration agencies. And policy coherence is achievable only when there is a commitment by all actors to a set of over-arching common goals. It would of course be normal for different national agencies concerned with different issues of migration to pursue their distinctive agendas,
but these must all be congruent with the over-all policy objectives. This has not been happening.

An inward-looking culture is often found deeply embedded in each migration agency. This encourages an insular approach to migration as opposed to a holistic one. Enhancing each agency’s awareness of the inter-relationship between different migration areas and sensitizing them about how this can be a source of mutual support or, alternatively, act as a serious hindrance would be of some help in fighting the insular approach.

For example, if, in the face of unmet labour demand in the host country, stringent entry restrictions are imposed by immigration authorities, the pressure for irregular migration, including human trafficking, is likely to rise; and this will make the tasks of border control more onerous and expensive. Likewise, failure to implement commitments under refugee and human rights instruments may have the perverse effect of driving them to the channel for labour immigration, even when it is unwanted, and clog that channel. To illustrate further, when border control is lax and there are large numbers of irregular migrants, the situation becomes more difficult for the agencies responsible for migrant integration and for enforcement of labour standards.

However, a holistic approach to migration management demands more than staff training or some minor institutional adjustments. It is not just a matter of building technical or institutional capacities. If a host country is serious about it, it must clearly define a set of common policy objectives for the migration area as a whole and ensure rigourous adherence to it by all migration agencies. As an essentially policy issue, it remains a matter of political will. Absent the political will, a holistic approach will make little headway. Building the necessary political consensus will be easier when the process combines top-down initiatives with bottom-up pressures.

As mentioned above in my first answer, the response to global migration has largely remained at the national level (with some regional processes). Yet, only a handful of countries have comprehensive, progressive national policies on migration. Much of the actions are ad hoc, and most of the initiatives are aimed at ‘control’, and not in facilitating entry of migrants under a transparent regime. In the whole, therefore, it is anything but holistic.

There first must be a rational discourse by political leaders and policymakers of the migration issues, rather than an emotional dialogue, which is tied to many misconceptions and fears. As long as the discussion is emotional and regressive, the system will be slow in changing. The leaders must recognize the potential positive sides of migration to the nation, while also addressing the challenges that are part of any human phenomenon.

Second, governments need to implement a transparent regime, by which people know how the decisions are made for accepting migrants, their number, and their geographical targets (if there are such, preferably not). At the same time, it should also spell out how and why migrants/applicants can also be removed/deported. A balanced response in other words. And not a ‘one-size-fits-all’, otherwise many applicants will be rejected on narrow criteria and lead to a spike in ‘illegal’ migrants.
Third, governments should be coherent about migration across all their relevant Ministries and agencies. Migration touches on so many policy areas, that it cannot be the exclusive prevue of just one single department or agency.

Fourth, governments must also focus on properly integrating migrants into the heart of their societies. Allowing migrants in is just one side of the coin. The other is to ensure that the migrants are well settled, adapting, and progressing in their new environments. Thus, issues of citizenship, services, rights, and obligations are paramount, if the society is to avoid two different ‘classes’ of people, which then can create untold hardships and tensions in the country.

IOM/Eurasylum: Migration governance further requires an active coordination, at national, regional and international levels, of different policy areas and government departments, including trade, public security, employment, health, education and the environment. To what extent do you consider that in major host countries worldwide sufficient linkages are being made between the above policy areas when devising new migration policies, regulations and programmes? And through which means, both institutional and informal, could a more integrated approach to migration policymaking be facilitated?

Prof. Bimal Ghosh: Your third question, also closely related to the two previous ones, raises the issue of migration governance in terms of policy coordination, both functional and spatial, but again the focus is on the host countries. As indicated under question 2, policy coordination among the various national migration agencies is not as close as it could or should be. This inhibits truly interactive decision making. The same is even more true of the relationship between the agencies working in the migration area and those engaged in other, related policy areas. This is because these latter policy areas fall within the competence of different ministries or departments while most (though not necessarily all) of the national migration agencies at least work within a single organizational unit. Even in a few host countries which have set up inter-ministerial committees or similar mechanisms, a fully coordinated approach is yet to emerge.

There are however some notable exceptions, though at the fringe of policy formulation. At the national level, in many host countries immigration visas for labour migrants are issued at the behest of the labour ministry. In countries that have adopted the “points system” or similar schemes immigration authorities work in collaboration with other outside agencies, including expert bodies. In most countries health ministry issues guidance, especially in times of epidemics and pandemics, to the immigration authorities on health hazards associated with inward and outward movements.

Overall, however, the coordination gaps remain serious between migration and related policy areas in most host (and home) countries. The point is often made that migration should be factored into the process of policymaking in other areas related to it. In reality, this hardly happens. For example, the same countries that are anxious to reduce their immigration may at the same time follow trade and investment policies toward origin countries that are likely to add to the pressure for emigration in them. Or, more frequently, due to the absence of policy coordination the potential that trade and investment may hold in meeting the countries’ immigration concerns remains untapped (the reference under question 1 to the discussion in the Doha Round on trade-migration reciprocity concerns an isolated case, not a policy trend). The links between gross violation of human rights and the likely outflows of refugees and unwanted migrants are often forgotten in host (as well as origin) countries.
The same kind of coordination gap is often discernible in relation to other cognate policy areas, including international security, and it is not limited to individual host countries. As the past experiences in Bosnia and Iraq showed, in planning collective military interventions for peace and security countries tend to ignore the fall-out effects on migration; they tend to remain on the back burner of strategy planning. To illustrate, there is no clear evidence that the migration effects had received any serious attention when the 1991 multilateral intervention of Iraq was being planned. And yet, significantly, the Security Council resolution (no.687) cited the massive refugee flows out of Iraq and their destabilizing effects in the region as the main justification of the military intervention under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter. It thus recognized, but only post facto, the links between human rights, migration/refugee flows and regional stability and peace. Surprisingly, in normal times there is seldom any consideration of these links.

Clearly, host countries’ prior commitment to a set of common migration objectives under a global migration regime could have helped matters. It could have served as a useful rallying point, thereby helping coordination between different policy areas. The inter-ministerial committees, where they exist, would also have had some specific bench marks to fall back upon. But such a regime does not exist today.

This notwithstanding, there is some considerable scope for improving the situation by strengthening the capacity of the ministry (or department) handling migration. This requires that those responsible in the ministry for policymaking should have a clear understanding of the global dimensions of contemporary migration and of the dynamics of the interrelationship between migration and other policy areas. If needed, they should have the possibility of drawing on the support of a small policy research group. In addition, they should have communication skills and the capacity to carry-out interactive dialogue and harmonize divergent issues and concerns and shape the resultant inputs into policy measures. Since tradition dies hard, a truly integrated approach cannot be produced simply by administrative dictate or regulatory requirement. It is a process that needs to be fostered over time and with sustained care and patience.

Ambassador Sergio Marchi: I believe I have touched on this facet already. While good governance begins at home, one of the most glaring and obvious contradictions in the governance of migration is that most States do not have comprehensive national migration policies. It is rare to find migration policies that incorporate all of the critical, inter-related disciplines such as human rights, economic, trade, security, environmental, integration and developmental considerations.

And without a critical mass of national migration policies, a commitment to global policies and approaches is even more difficult to envision.

Complicating the matter, the responsibility for migration policy within most governments is shared among a number of different ministries, which are not always on the same page. Countries must be encouraged to establish and implement transparent and coherent migration policies at the domestic level, in an effort to build a “national mindset” for migration.

Perhaps it would be desirable, and in many cases more effective, to broaden governance on regional levels and build it outwards. However, is it correct to assume that the different regional processes can be brought together like a puzzle, and that a global, or even regional-plus framework would emerge? That is, if the
differences between the regional pieces — like the different agencies comprising the GMG — would instead delay or make a coherent outcome extremely difficult.

In a similar vein, can bilateral arrangements between States on migration be brought together to give shape and guidance to other States? Clearly, greater discussion would be welcome and worthwhile on whether — and how — the bilateral and regional fronts could provide for a more international application, and lift the national ‘game’ on migration policymaking.
IOM/EURASYLUM MONTHLY POLICY INTERVIEW SERIES ON:

“The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change”

INTERVIEW II

“Migration and development: recent and unfolding experiences”

May 2010

Patricia Aragon Sto Tomas
Chair of the National Development Bank of the Philippines;
Former Secretary of Labor and Employment of the Philippines;
Former GCIM Commissioner

and

Dilip Ratha
Lead Economist, Development Prospects Group, and Manager,
Migration and Remittances, the World Bank, Washington, D.C.

IOM/Eurasylum: One of the key assumptions inherent in the Migration and Development debate is that well managed, incentive-based circular mobility between countries can enhance the positive contributions of migrants to both their home and host communities. However, the experiences of governments and migrants drawn from both circular migration (including the Mauritius-France, Ukraine-Portugal, Colombia-Spain, and Costa Rica-Nicaragua circular migration pilots) and reintegration programmes have not yet been assessed. Can you comment on some of the likely benefits of such experiments, including in terms of job matching schemes, flexible admission, visa and work permit regimes, and the financial and other incentives for return and reintegration (including reduced costs of remittance transactions)? And can you identify any capacity building measures that could help origin and receiving countries (including in the case of South-South migration) to better plan and link such programmes to national development plans and aid agreements?

Patricia Aragon Sto Tomas: I can only speak about the Philippine’s experience, which I once managed. While I am no longer directly involved in the temporary migration process, I remain in government and continue to participate in discussions about policies and operational issues regarding overseas employment.

When the Middle East required manpower for its development needs in the mid-seventies, we recognized the opportunities and the inherent problems which accompanied that development boom. Early on, we saw foreign and local recruiters offering intermediation services for unwitting jobseekers and asking an arm and a leg for it. It so happened that our surplus of underemployed and unemployed college and technical institution graduates coincided with the needed skills in the oil-rich economies. We began by regulating the process of temporary migration. We had to regulate in order to protect. We identified the actors and specified what they could do and under what terms and conditions. For instance, recruiters had to be licensed. Among others things, this meant that they had to comply with business registration requirements and pay the necessary fees for licensing. At the same time, they were asked to put up bonds held in
escrow by government in order to respond to any problems caused by their operations. They had to show that they had job orders verified and authenticated by our foreign offices in the receiving countries. We crafted standard employment contracts that prescribed minimum salaries for specific skills categories. Legal recruitment fees were also established and asking more than what was allowed constituted illegal recruitment which could lead to imprisonment. Over time, these regulations were tweaked as we found out what worked and what didn’t. A regulatory framework made it easier for receiving countries to deal with us. Deployment was predictable and we knew who to run after when things went wrong. Our regulatory bodies had tripartite boards composed of government, workers and employers or their representatives. The regulatory framework was complemented by a welfare system. We started fielding labour attaches and welfare officers whose jobs focused on helping workers in distress. Locally, we started requiring pre-departure orientation because the cultural differences often fuelled problems or misunderstandings. In the early years, there was a mandatory remittance requirement of 70 per cent of their salaries for land-based workers and 80 per cent for sea-based workers. In 1986, this requirement was repealed so that workers could send back as much as they wanted to their families, if at all. The interesting thing was that remittances grew faster without the mandatory requirements. The orderly and managed Filipino migration expanded to other areas and now extends to more than a hundred countries.

My take on this is that regulation is good but regulation plus protection is even better. As the migratory movement increased, it became more than an employment issue. It became a continuing political debate and we had to engage the host countries in discussions about recurrent issues and problems. It must be stressed that while there are international conventions pertaining to the movement of people, they are rarely binding on the countries concerned. We thus organized regular official visits, even if they did not result in agreements. However, they generated new discussions and confidence-building measures which eventually led to the signing of some agreements. We now have more than a hundred agreements with various countries and for various purposes. Where no agreements were possible, we simply had minutes of meetings that we could go back to when the need arose. Just as many problems were solved that way. I am glad for the experiments that were mentioned and I hope that they provide a sounder basis for movements across national boundaries.

The third leg of our migration management approach (the first two being regulation and protection) is reintegration. Among other things, the reintegration component recognizes the fact that contract migration is temporary. Therefore, the migrant and his/her family must be prepared for the eventual return. This includes teaching them financial planning, family solidarity, the setting up of support systems and other life skills necessary when families have to be separated because of the migration experience. We have more partners now than when we started because overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) already constitute a formidable force and are wooed by politicians and business enterprises such as banks, housing developers and retail merchants, among others. They are also allowed to vote overseas. We have played host to other countries that are building or strengthening their own capabilities and we have shown them everything that they need to see or know about our processes. There are no secrets here. My sense is that labour migration is the new face of globalization. It is a small world and perhaps world peace and understanding may be better achieved if labour and capital can move with equal ease across boundaries. And, beneath our skin, we are all the same. There will have to be rules, of course. I do not see that our migration programmes are actively linked to development assistance. The developed world is not our
main market. The US hosts most of our Filipino expatriates but most of them are permanent migrants who chose to acquire residency or immigrant status in much earlier times. Outside of the US, the countries that receive our workers the most are regularly visited for worker welfare and protection purposes. For instance, in some places where drinking liquor is prohibited for religious reasons or where unmarried men and women are not expected to associate publicly, many of our gregarious countrymen get into trouble for cultural crimes. We have sought and received pardon for them. And formal training and media campaigns continue in my country for orienting workers about being sensitive to differentials in laws and cultural practices. I have no doubt that in places where our workers are, there is a better appreciation for the Philippines and Filipinos and I am certain that for other countries involved in this movement, the experience cannot be significantly different.

Dilip Ratha:

Policymaking in the area of migration is full of presumptions such as this one. Truth is, there is more circularity in migration when there is more legal permanence, and vice versa. Migrant workers with temporary visas tend to overstay their visas; and migrants with permanent residency status tend to go back and forth.

All the benefits to circular migration you mention apply to the governments in the destination countries, but they are not necessarily applicable to either the migrant workers or even their employers. Take the example of job matching: Employers like cheap workers, but they also do not like to lose workers they have trained and hire inexperienced new workers every year. Also governments do not always make accurate forecasts of labour market needs – what sectors have skills gaps; what kind of workers are needed; how many, from where, and when exactly are they needed? Employers and migrants, therefore, have a tendency to bypass government regulations and visa restrictions.

On financial returns, it is true that workers who have only temporary visas and must return after their contract will return with their savings. But how do they know whether they “must” return? On the contrary, migrants who have permanent residency or flexible entry-exit permits earn more and contribute more to their employers in the host country. They may remit a smaller portion of their income, but their incomes, and remittances, tend to be significant.

Financial incentives offered by governments to encourage return migration tend to be too small relative to the life-cycle earnings of migrants in the destination country. Incentives for reintegration, for example, small business loans or grants, also tend to be small, besides being insensitive to the weakness of the business environment in the country of origin.

The majority – nine out of ten or more – of international migrants tend to be economic migrants who go abroad to earn an income in exchange for work. Migration policies, therefore, must recognize the realities of the labour market. Policies that violate this simple guideline often result in high costs, to the governments, the employers and the migrants.

A key area of policy intervention would be gathering information, in a forward-looking manner, about skill gaps. Educating migrants and their employers about the costs and benefits of migration would help. Small investments in simple language, cultural and financial training for migrants can facilitate their integration in the destination country. Such investments can be co-financed by sending and receiving countries, or even entirely financed by receiving countries for some professions that are in high demand. Finally, to the extent that migration often
results from economic disparities, a more coherent approach where migration policies are coordinated with those relating to aid, trade and security would work better than otherwise.

**IOM/Eurasylum:**

One of the ongoing challenges in the design of new migration and development schemes is the persistent lack of information about the costs of such schemes and the effectiveness of anticipated outcomes such as the return and reintegration strategies. The lack of such information is clearly a major obstacle to policy reform, particularly in the origin countries. In your view, what are the key measures that could be supported to help design effective indicators to measure the development relevance of such policies?

**Patricia Aragon Sto Tomas:**

Statistical indicators would be difficult to generate unless a regulatory framework exists. In the Philippines, we know how many of our people leave, and where they are going because there is a special lane for them at the airports. They are also not charged travel taxes, for which privilege they must be processed through the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and follow standard requirements. In the past, for instance, when one of our workers was taken by Iraqi rebels, we took the TV picture and compared it with records of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Labor. When the contract and the passport coincided, and within hours, we knew who the victim was and proceeded with the negotiations. We were also able to get to the family left behind almost immediately. On the ground, we have established family circles to keep the family intact and conserve the earnings of those who left.

Because of their earning capacity and political clout, local government units as well as national government work systematically, and in a coordinated way, at helping the families of overseas Filipino workers. Such services include setting up internet connections so that families can talk to each other regularly, assistance in paying bills etc. Filipino workers are also covered by social security and are insured against death, disability and medical emergencies for the duration of their overseas stint. What are the key measures to help design indicators to measure relevance of policies? Remittance is one. Family surveys are also welcome on top of the census data which specifically identifies OFWs as a distinct subset of data. Longitudinal tracking of random families would be helpful. Many of these are being done by academic and professional survey agencies, also as data for business plans and models that target OFWS. Administrative data sets such as migration cards, applications for tax exemptions (OFWS are income-tax exempt) are also valuable sources of indicators for testing policy relevance and success.

**Dilip Ratha:**

I suppose you are referring to the so-called “co-development” policies. The costs of such schemes should be easy to estimate. But you are right about the lack of information about the effectiveness of such schemes. As I said earlier, to succeed, such schemes must be consistent with the labour market realities, but often they are not. Lack of data and relevant information is a pervasive problem in the entire field of migration and I can think of more urgent data gathering priorities than in the area of return migration or reintegration. That said, it is true that the latter area remains under-explored. I am yet to see a good economic explanation of return decisions and how they are affected by barriers (for example, re-admission rules) or incentives to mobility. We should conduct a rigorous analysis of return decisions including some large scale surveys complemented by extensive conversations with policymakers in both sending and receiving countries.
Another fundamental question worth a serious investigation is how economic growth affects emigration and return migration. Migration trends often reverse in times of economic prosperity. Such reversals can occur at low levels of incomes. If incomes do not have to rise very high for emigration to turn into immigration, then a concerted effort to generate income and employment growth can yield large dividends in terms of migration outcomes.

IOM/Eurasylum: According to a report by the OECD of November 2009, the world economic and financial crisis has had a major impact on key international labour migration patterns. The report shows, in particular, that several OECD countries have recently taken action to curb migration flows; numerical limits for temporary migration have been lowered in countries such as Korea, Italy and Spain; shortage occupation lists have been reduced and labour market tests reinforced in the UK, Spain, Canada and Australia; and there is little evidence of return migration. To what extent do you consider that such trends are likely to affect the positive effects of international migration in the coming months and years?

Patricia Aragon Sto Tomas: We recognize the right of countries to restrict movements of particular categories and at specific points in time if this is contrary to their national interest. People may have the right to move but the right to enter another territory is never absolute. We have other nationals who come to the Philippines to work or open small businesses. They are welcome but they have to qualify under our requirements and they must register in order to get alien employment permits. We have to respect the laws of both receiving and sending countries relative to migration. We have our own lists too of countries which we do not allow our workers to visit or work in. We prohibit our people from working in other countries if it will expose them to danger such as war or disease or if they are being asked to perform duties inimical to health or public morals. We have in fact set up contingency plans in all countries where there are Filipinos for rescue during times of war or epidemics. All these plans are subject to revisions and dry runs to ensure that they continue to be valid for the purpose they were set up. There are cycles to migratory flows and we must be prepared for reintegration programmes whenever and wherever they are necessary.

Dilip Ratha: The curbs and quotas on migration flows have dampened the flow of new migrants, in some corridors by 40 or 60 per cent, but they have not completely stopped new migration. On the other hand, these same curbs had a perverse effect on existing migrants’ decision to return (fearing that they won’t be able to come back if they went home). As a result, the stock of migrants has continued to grow despite the economic crisis. The persistence of migration is also a result of the fact that migrant workers tend to be flexible, hard working and cheap compared to native workers, and therefore, more attractive to employers facing pressures to cut costs. The crisis has brought this tension to the fore: should we protect native workers from competition from migrant workers, or should we protect the employers who in the end will have to be the engine of recovery?

Except for cases involving terrorism or trafficking of drugs and people, it is difficult for me to imagine a situation under which curbs on migration can have positive affects on development. Not even in the case of the so-called “ethical recruitment policies” that aim to limit the loss of skill due to migration of health professionals. Migration is primarily an economic phenomenon. Mobility helps the migrants, their families, and the employers in the destination countries. Conversely, curbs on mobility hurt every one.
“The future of international labour migration”
April 2010

Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu
President of the International Organization of Employers (IOE)

and

Nand Kishore Singh
Member of the Indian Parliament;
former Secretary to the Prime Minister of India and
former Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs

IOM/Eurasylum: In your opinion, what are the best mechanisms for matching labour demand with labour supply on a global scale, while ensuring that the need to recruit more skilled people from developing countries in the future does not have adverse effects on the countries of origin, and is circular migration a realistic policy goal?

Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlu: International labour migration is regarded as the unfinished business of globalization. This is because transborder movement of persons has not enjoyed the same level of liberalization as capital and goods. The ILO World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization which collected views from business and other groups came to the same conclusion when it appealed to the international community to make efforts in this area, in order to make migration of labour a win-win situation for both countries of origin and destination.

As employers, we realize the need for Governments, Employers and Worker representatives to work together to ensure that labour migration policies and practices at the global level take into account the needs of the labour market. As the source of demand for labour, employers are well placed to give information on which specific sectors face difficulties in getting access to the skills they need from the labour market. Moreover global demographic trends indicate that the current gaps between supply and demand for labour will continue to grow as a result of ageing and declining fertility rates in countries of destination, and increasing populations in countries of origin. Wage disparities will also continue to act as pull factors thus making it easier for industrialized countries to recruit highly skilled workers from the developing world.

This brings us to the issue of brain drain. Although it is a huge problem as many countries that have invested so much in the education of their nationals do not receive adequate return on their investments, one must not lose sight of the fact that international labour migration also helps to ease the unemployment pressures in countries of origin. In certain countries, graduate unemployment and underemployment has been a major problem leading to social tensions.
Phillipines, for example, we have witnessed huge investments in the education sector as graduates have been able to secure job opportunities abroad. We must however guard against depleting scarce resources of skilled personnel in certain sectors such as health in the developing world at a time when such countries are in dire need of such specialized skills because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and other health challenges. This is why initiatives such as those adopted by the UK Government to promote ethical recruitment of healthcare workers by recruitment firms in countries such as Malawi and Ghana are worth supporting while making sure that freedom of movement is not interefered with.

In conclusion employers feel that circular migration policies can help solve some of the problems associated with labour migration such as brain drain and integration of migrants in host societies. Migrants acquire new skills, expertise and experience abroad. They can benefit their countries of origin through regular home return. Of course developed countries should ensure that they continue to invest in health skills, in particular because these are the skills that are going to be required more as their populations age.

Nand Kishore Singh:

There is need to create a more coherent international mechanism which can harmonize the interests of all stakeholders. Currently, for instance, large multinational companies act in independent silos and quite apart from information asymetry they are not congruent with the policy of national governments. A consultative mechanism which harmonizes the medium and long-term interests of all stakeholders to project emerging demands for skills could bring about better equilibrium between demand and supply. Countries of origin can also plan better and impart necessary training for more orderly management of migratory flows. A mutually beneficial compact can thus be developed and if the required skills are repetitively inculcated some migratory workforce can also return to the countries of origin, thus resulting in circular migration which can optimize benefits all around. Existing international frameworks remain incongruent and there is an absence of coordination between different entities both national and international. A concerted attempt at creating a credible international framework is an inescapable necessity. This could be done by an overarching United Nations Migration Coordination framework which could no doubt have the participation of specialized UN entities dealing with different aspects of migratory flows. Apart from government the effective participation of the corporate sector as mentioned earlier and also the Services Industry would be central to realizing these objectives.

IOM/Eurasylum:

Evidence suggests that even in the face of demographic shifts labour demand is unlikely to match labour supply. Against this background, and in addition to migration, what strategies should countries of origin adopt to optimize the use of their human resources and to what extent is migration a solution to the problems faced by ageing populations?

Prof. Wiseman Nkuhlou:

All things being equal, migrants would prefer to stay in their countries of origin. It is thus incumbent upon countries of origin to create opportunities for decent and productive employment for their citizens. This is one of the principles the ILO non-binding Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration advocates for. It is about addressing the push factors at home which force many migrants to look for opportunities abroad.
During a seminar on International Labour Migration organized by the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and the ILO in Algiers in December 2009, we were pleased to learn that a number of North African Governments such as Algeria were giving priority to the problem of youth unemployment which has been one of the root causes of emigration to Europe and to the Middle East. These measures include: promotion of entrepreneurship development, skills development and employability, adapting training and education to the needs of the job market, building the capacity of labour market institutions, promoting investments in job rich sectors promotion of youth employment programmes and support to SME development. These measures have been so successful that, according to the Algerian Ministry of Labour, the country is beginning to witness some return migration from Europe.

In addition to addressing the above issues, countries of origin should continuously review the quality and relevance of their education and training. This will greatly enhance employability of labour both at home and abroad.

The other issue in your question reflects the problems faced by ageing populations and how migration can be used to address them. Although ageing is a success story for mankind, there is no doubt that public institutions must cope with older retired populations as against declining levels of active population. Social security programmes are affected with cuts in benefits, tax increases and later retirement ages for those who are active. The other challenge relates to health care systems that have to deal with chronic illnesses associated with old age. In order to address challenges related to declining active population and ageing, governments in countries of destination must consider migration policy as one of the solutions, although not the only one. Immigration will make sure, as Kofi Annan once said, that “jobs in certain sectors in Europe do not go unfilled and services undelivered”. This means recognizing the demand for lesser skilled labour in these countries in health and aged care services, and in agriculture, construction and other sectors as well. And that means ensuring fair admission policies and protections for vulnerable foreign workers to prevent abuse and exploitation.

Nand Kishore Singh

Countries of origin need to invest in Human Resource Development more innovatively to substantially enhance capacity. This will lead to improved value added activity and given the fact that per capita income in most emerging markets are still to achieve developed countries’ standards the increased supply from gainful manufacturing and higher value added services activity could make many of these economies increasingly dependent on meeting domestic consumption needs than reliance on export of goods or encouraging outward mobility of natural persons.

The push for movement of natural persons lies in the quest to improve life quality and employment opportunities. If a more adapted development matrix, higher life quality and investment patterns can improve life quality in countries of origin then migratory pressures would ease off substantially. In short supporting a development thrust in countries of origin and improved quality of Governance is an inescapable necessity to improve outcomes and make migratory flows more acceptable to all stakeholders.

IOM/Eurasylum: How do you see the global competition for skills developing in the future? Are there any regions or countries which could face particular advantages/disadvantages?
Wiseman Nkuhlu: The global competition for talent will continue to rise in today’s globalizing world. In a global society that is knowledge based and which requires a highly qualified labour force for all sectors of the economy, countries will not hesitate to recruit talent where it exists to remain competitive. We are already seeing strong competition for talent in high-technology sectors and research. As I mentioned, the global competition for healthcare workers has increased to such levels that the WHO has been holding discussions on how to ensure equitable sharing of these workers.

As economic activities become more global, and as we see more and more growth in Foreign Direct Investment and internationalization of research and development, we are likely to see more competition and mobility for human resources especially in science and technology. The net effect is that countries that cannot offer better pay and career advancement, access to research funding and opportunities will see their bright and brightest leaving for “greener pastures” abroad. For example most OECD member countries are net beneficiaries of skilled talent from developing countries. It is small countries in the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa that are most painfully affected. This means that these African and Caribbean countries will have to implement policies aimed at retaining the best brains in order to remain competitive.

The Asian countries will remain the main source of skills in the next twenty to thirty years. Their population are younger and their quality of education good.

Africa has a young population but more resources will have to be invested to improve the quality of education and skills.

Nand Kishore Singh: The global competition for skills will take multiple forms. The traditional paradigm in gainful economic activity will alter significantly with rapid technological changes. The quest for frontiers of knowledge will alter the demand for such skills with an uneven race to match the supplies.

One important thrust area would be the impact of Global Warming and Climate Change in the pattern of economic activity and development growth models. Increased reliance on renewable energy and low emission development growth patterns will create a demand for different types of skills. At the same time many countries with aging population may require special attention for the welfare and care of older people. Rising pension bills may need higher retirement age and keeping the people healthy for a longer period has implications for medical and nutritional science. So the key areas of emerging skills could be environment related, demographically driven and entail new frontiers of medical research.
“Integration and rights of migrants: policy priorities and directions for new capacity building measures”

March 2010

Dr. Howard Duncan
Executive Director of Metropolis,
Citizenship and Immigration Canada

and

Prof. Michael Keith
Director of the Centre on Migration, Policy, and
Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford; former member
of the UK government’s Commission on Integration and Cohesion

IOM/Eurasylum: Integration and rights of migrants is a multifaceted policy concept that encompasses a range of economic, social and cultural factors. In your opinion, and drawing on the situation of different regions in the world, what are the most critical priorities/needs for the development of new institutional frameworks and capacity building measures in this policy area, distinguishing among short-term, circular and long-term migrants?

Dr. Howard Duncan:

For the better part of a generation, many states in the developed world placed their migration policy focus on measures to prevent the entry of foreign nationals to their territory. Even some states that had migrants present would deny that they were countries of immigrants, preferring to think of foreign nationals as temporary residents who would eventually return to their homelands. This attitude has given way to not only an acceptance of the fact of immigration but, in a growing number of countries, to a recognition of the desirability, even the necessity, of managed migration for economic prosperity and the maintenance of population size. This will take on a stronger edge as the West sees its historical population and economic advantages lose ground to rapidly developing economies elsewhere in the world.

Accepting immigration has encouraged governments to shift their attention from almost exclusively border control towards integration. This shift has taken many avenues including the incorporation of immigrants into the labour market, their taking on an active membership in the society of destination, rights protection for the immigrant, the bolstering of national identities and mainstream customs in the face of rapid population change, and protecting national security. The point is that immigrant integration has acquired a prominence on government agendas
that it has not had for a very long time, and some countries and their institutions are better able to take this on than others.

Governments embarking on integration initiatives need to pay careful attention to the end game, to what they hope to achieve through their interventions. The term ‘integration’ is far from univocal; what it means varies considerably from one society to another, both in terms of what is expected from the immigrant and what is expected of the host society. Integration is not an end in itself but, rather, serves other ends such as strengthening an economy through additions of labour, skills, entrepreneurship, or innovation to the workforce. Integration can serve the ends of social cohesion, of the preservation of historic national identities, national languages, religions, and cultures. Integration can enable to immigrants to find a more enriching life in their adopted country, a life free of poverty, of marginalization, of exclusion. Becoming an integrated member of a society allows one to assume the benefits of membership and the satisfaction of assuming its responsibilities and making a significant contribution to overall societal well-being. However, the specific initiatives that governments bring to integration must be tailored to the choices amongst these and other objectives underlying the drive to integrate. Common to most integration efforts are political leadership and legislative frameworks that establish expectations for both the host society and for the newcomer. Without either of these, the chances of success are greatly diminished.

As the wording of this interview question suggests, one expects different interventions according to whether the migrants are short-term, circular, or long-term. In all cases, however, one would expect the institutions of society to be prepared to offer the protections of the rights and well-being offered to persons resident in the country regardless of immigration status with the exception of those that are reserved for citizens, the right to vote perhaps. Furthermore, one should be able to expect that working conditions for the migrants would mirror those of the citizen. But full integration into the host society seems inappropriate for those who are short-term temporary workers, at least if we are to understand integration as a matter not only of basic rights protection but of developing relations with the mainstream that would facilitate a long-term stay if not permanent residence leading to naturalization. Therefore, although it is always helpful for temporary foreign workers to understand local customs, cultures, and laws, expecting them to fully integrate into the host society seems not only unnecessary but even counter-productive to the intentions of their temporary worker status. Full integration can lead to an eroding of ties to the homeland, but, if anything, workers should be encouraged to maintain their home country and family ties and be enabled to send remittances to their families and communities back home. Short-term temporary workers generally take on work elsewhere in order to provide more money for their families back home. The host state should facilitate the saving of money and its transfer to their workers’ families by offering access to bank accounts and low cost remitting.

One could say similar things about those expected to return home after a longer stay, those that are now often referred to as ‘circular migrants’. In addition to the protections that are referred to above for short-term temporary workers, those expected to return after a lengthier stay should be offered effective incentives to return, perhaps through agreements between the sending and receiving states such that those who return would be allowed to re-enter for another period of work. Such an arrangement exists between the governments of Mexico and Canada for migrant agricultural workers and is well received by the workers. If circular migration is to have the development benefits that are often cited in its
favour, many of these benefits will only be realized if the migrant actually returns home. These benefits, which are to go beyond returning with additional funds, include enhanced skills and information about the industries in which they work, enhanced language skills, enhanced networks, and perhaps a better understanding of effective organizational structures and management techniques. Technical transfer, in other words, is expected to be a result of circular migration and it is incumbent upon states that actively pursue policies of circular migration to ensure that the migrants are able to return bringing these and other benefits with them. Some of these benefits will accrue from a deeper integration and understanding of the workings of the host society and its institutions.

Long-term migrants ought to be thought of from the point of view of nation-building, and integration efforts ought to be designed to achieve this specific objective. More specifically, in addition to offering the protections mentioned above, long-term migrants should be integrated as permanent residents, offered remedial language training to further enable their participation in the host society and its workplaces, offered legal means of achieving permanent residence status and, importantly, offered the possibility of naturalization. Full societal membership ought to be the goal of integration for long-term migrants. Such an outcome requires a willingness both on the part of the migrant to adapt to the national culture, language, and legal mores and on the part of the host society to be welcoming, offering protection against discrimination, the possibility of full engagement in the institutions of society, and the option of becoming a full naturalized citizen. Long-term immigrants, once they have achieved the legal status of citizen, should be able to participate not only in the workplace and to be given the offer of the full range of health and social services, but should be able to vote in elections and to run for office. This requires a policy approach different in kind from that required for the short-term temporary worker where there is no expectation of full societal membership, either on the part of the migrant or that of the host society.

Integration and the rights of migrants emerges as a multifaceted policy concept at a particular time in history. It is located within particular moments of global economic and social change. The technological possibilities for people to travel more easily have correlated closely with the growth of economic labour demands that stretch the scales of markets across the globe.

In this context migration can be the driver of great social and economic good but also prompt some of the most acute social divisions, nationalist sentiments and political conflicts. Positively, the international movement of labour offers the potential to bring benefits to sending and receiving societies, help unlock the dilemmas of global economic development and promote the cosmopolitan sensibility that informed Immanuel Kant’s aspiration to a ‘perpetual peace’. Negatively, immigration raises dilemmas of migrant rights relative to those of other residents and emergent senses of belonging, national identity and entitlement; challenging receiving societies and on many occasions crystallizing conflicts around welfare resources, labour market competition and cultural practices.

Migration consequently challenges both the weak systems of global governance inherited from the 20th century and the future of the nation state in years to come. So the challenge of the 21st century will be to maximize the economic and cultural benefits of global flows of people without provoking revivals of the exclusionary nationalist conflicts of the 20th. Within this framework the integration and rights
of migrants emerge as one facet of debates around globalization. The logics of globalization create tensions between economic imperatives, social pressures and cultural dynamics.

There is a paradox at the heart of the regulation of flows of people across the globe that constitutes one of the greatest intellectual challenges to the way in which we conceptualize economic and social change. The logic of globalization encourages the free flow of commodities, capital, information, ideas, cultures and people. However, in practice, the international movement of people is currently much more restricted than that of commodities and capital. The shares of world exports and foreign direct investment in world GDP both exceed 20 per cent, while the share of migrants in the global population is only about 3 per cent. Because international wage differentials far exceed differences in commodity prices and interest rates, the global efficiency gains of increased migration—most of which would accrue to migrants—are significantly greater than those of further liberalizing international trade and capital flows. The World Bank estimates that increasing the share of migrants in high-income countries by 3 per cent (about 13.2 million people) would generate a global real-income gain of over USD 350 billion, exceeding the estimated gains from global trade reform by about 13 per cent. So, at a global level, there is a strong economic case for relatively free movement of labour that brings benefits to the economies of both receiving and sending countries; as well as a moral case arguing the ethical freedom of mobility for individual migrants themselves. International flows of migrant labour are consequently promoted by agencies such as the World Bank, the UN and in structures of global governance such as the World Trade Organization (WTO).

And yet across the globe the national context of labour market governance and the political imperatives of popular sentiment render a significant liberalization of international migrant flows problematic, particularly through the lens that juxtaposes ‘integration of migrants’ in receiving societies and migrant rights once they have arrived. Long-term economic benefits are challenged by the welfare externalities of migrant arrivals in receiving countries; the impact of new arrivals on schools, health systems and localities of migrant concentration. And this juxtaposition of long-term benefits and short-term costs is complicated further when the cost-benefit analysis of migration invokes different geographical scales of analysis. Our paradox is compounded by international obligations reflecting ethical principles that demand universal human rights that are also mediated by national regimes of sovereignty and citizenship that limit the flows of labour migrants, family unification, asylum-seekers and refugees that frequently impact most strikingly at the level of the subnational region or the intra-urban neighbourhood.

In the rising powers of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India and China) economic growth and the possible structural change in global power is linked closely both to the movement of labour and the integration of people to the new forms of life emerging in the metropolises (or ‘mega-cities’) of the global south. So for example the opening up of China is consequently intimately linked to the generation of mega-cities, particularly along the southern and eastern seabords in the Pearl River Delta (e.g. Guanzhou, Hong Kong, Shenzhen), the Yangzi River delta (e.g. Shanghai) and the Bohai rim (e.g. Tianjin), where historically the relationship with migrant hometowns is sustained and the citizenship rights (or hukou system) is premised on a clear distinction between rural belonging and the right to the city. Equally at the level of the single European market the flows of benefits of migrant labour might translate at the level of the nation when the costs of migrant impacts are impinging most acutely at a much more localized scale of analysis.
In these circumstances it is time to question some of the conventional distinctions between short-term, circular and long-term migrants. In the UK, many of the post-war generation of migrants from the New Commonwealth of the Caribbean and the south Asian subcontinent are entering their retirement years and may choose to spend part of the year in Britain and part in their place of birth. Their children may marry from peers in the UK (inside or outside conventional ‘ethnic’ boundaries), or from connections in their parental home place or with partners internationally. Marriage migration and the universal rights of family unification consequently have the potential to confound in scope and scale the models of global labour supply and demand.

But in a sense this challenge of defining ‘who is a migrant’ may be less the ethical starting point than the opening of the analytical solution to our dilemmas. Because once we start to place the actual and potential mobilities of 21st century humanity at the heart of our understanding of society then the lens of integration and rights of migrants begins to restructure some of the most basic ways we come to think about belonging, identity and sentimental attachment and the rational organization of rights.

IOM/Eurasylum: Building on research under way since a few years, proposals were tabled during the recent Swedish Presidency of the EU for the development of European ‘migrant integration indicators’. These proposals were driven by the fact that no clear targets, indicators and benchmarks are currently in place to measure the levels of integration and active citizenship of immigrants. Furthermore, there is a tendency to limit integration monitoring to the description of good practices, without any connection to general integration guidelines and common basic principles. In your opinion, how could the development of new monitoring frameworks and indicators be supported in the coming years, and should such instruments be region-specific or universal in their scope and applicability?

Dr. Howard Duncan: A society that is serious about the integration of its immigrants will monitor carefully its achievements and its shortcomings. Without measuring outcomes, integration efforts can disintegrate into mere rhetoric, outcomes can become perverse, and scarce funding can be wasted on ineffective programmes. Although the rationale for evaluation and monitoring is clear, it remains a neglected activity throughout the world and elusively difficult to carry-out. Programme evaluation is a complex and expensive business and especially so in areas of social policy where objectives are difficult to state precisely, where data collection is limited and expensive, and where programmes are devolved to local or non-governmental authorities. Many long hours have been spent by governments around the world to develop ways to measure integration outcomes and to determine which outcomes constitute success to an acceptable degree and which outcomes are so disappointing as to call for specific remedial measures. Policy goals stated in terms of ‘integration’, ‘social cohesion’, and the like are vague, and identifying measurable phenomena that constitute success or failure and in greater or lesser degrees of either is a policy analyst’s nightmare. Nevertheless, it is important work, not only because of the societal stakes but especially now, with high levels worldwide of government debt resulting from stimulus spending directed at the 2008–09 global recession, because government spending will increasingly be restricted to programmes that deliver measurable and tangible benefits to their people.

Defining policy and programme objectives in measurable terms is the first step; difficult as it is, it is but the first and easiest step and is primarily a conceptual
exercise. Far more difficult is collecting the data that will make possible the assessments of success or failure. In a multijurisdictional context such as the European Union or federal states such as the United States or Canada, one wants local and other subnational data that can be aggregated on a national or multinational scale. And this means that the data are collected in the same way to permit their aggregation. This is both expensive and complex. Consider something as simple as assessing the effectiveness of language training programmes: one need only look at the language abilities of the students to determine the degree of success of the programmes. But digging only a little reveals enormous practical complications for something as conceptually simple as language training. Few countries require exiting students to take a test at all. Few national jurisdictions have established standardized national testing procedures, let alone produced the tests themselves, hired examiners or contracted for their services, established processes for aggregating the results to develop a national assessment of success. Doing so is not only practically complex but extremely expensive. In most cases, standardized national testing would require a policy change in the form of a requirement that students be subjected to an “exit test”, something that could be politically controversial to say the least. And in the case of multilingual jurisdictions such as Canada or the EU, having multiple but comparable tests adds to the administrative challenges. Again, evaluating the relative success of language training is among the easiest of integration policy assessments. Establishing measures for social cohesion policy, anti-discrimination policy, workplace outcomes, education outcomes, and other social integration outcomes will be far more complex both conceptually (e.g., what to measure and how to establish causality) and administratively.

In general, data collection ought to be made part of regular programme operations and done both locally, at the site of service delivery, and nationally or regionally as in the case of the EU. But this will require programme operations to be altered significantly to make such data collection an integral part of programme delivery. Normally, those responsible for delivering programmes or services are ill-equipped to manage data collection for the simple reason that their attention lies elsewhere, and their operations are designed for service delivery and not for evaluation. Therefore, those working in programme operations will need to be offered data collection guidelines, materials, forms and so on that will not only be effective but easy to use. Furthermore, owing to the additional time that such data collection takes, the offices will need resources to take on this additional responsibility. This is no small matter. If useful and credible evaluations are to be the result, the data collection must be well-done; it must become a serious part of doing business and service providers will need to be sufficiently equipped to do so, otherwise data collection will become an impediment to business and therefore, neglected. The hard work of determining measurable objectives, stated as measurable outcomes, of developing measurement instruments for each of the “indicators”, and the broad objective of ensuring value-for-money spent will be lost if insufficient attention is paid to the collection of necessary data.

The EU’s Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration, although a significant achievement in themselves, are but the starting point for determining whether immigrants to Europe are integrating or not. The nitty-gritty hard work remains.

New monitoring frameworks should definitely be region specific. But this can only take place within settings that are nationally regulated and continentaly compatible.
We need to understand the development of new monitoring frameworks in the context of the mutualization of risk that lies at the heart of models of the welfare state. The core principle of welfare state legitimacy rests on a sharing of both the benefits of contemporary society and a collective response to its perils. In the last three decades across the globe this has been challenged by both the individualization of these costs and benefits generated by the inadvertent impact of factors such as the ageing of affluent societies (and the consequent pension time bombs, costs of looking after the elderly and the refigured proportions of working and retired populations) and the deliberate impacts of some economic policies to increase the responsibility of individual people for their own welfare (inflexible labour markets, restricted access to welfare programmes, increased focus on personal savings and pensions plans). If the latter is sometimes identified as ‘neo-liberal’ economic orthodoxy, it is the former that (coupled with migrant mobilities) also challenges the ways in which we think about welfare systems that prioritize ‘membership’ and those that prioritize criteria of universal ‘social need’.

Welfare systems that prioritize welfare needs will inevitably favour migrant populations, those that favour ‘membership’ will always disadvantage them. In this context the problematic of the integration and rights of migrants needs to be thought through in terms of the parallel dynamics of social change; the forces of ‘place shaping’ and community building that emerge in areas of migrant settlement. The economic benefits of liberal labour markets and the social and cultural benefits of cosmopolitan diversity need to be set against the challenges and insecurities of rapid social change. When we return to the different geographical scales at which these dynamics operate there is considerable evidence that it is at the level below that of the nation state that these changes and challenges are most profound.

So for example it becomes important to understand the dynamics of regional labour demand that attracts migrant labour to particular parts of the United Kingdom in the early 2000s; to some new destinations of rural migration and not just to some cities and not to others but also to some neighbourhoods and not others. And the separation of workplace and home place mean that new migrant concentrations may serve labour markets operating at one geographical scale whilst focusing costs on the particular neighbourhoods in which they cluster. On the streets of inner East London in 2010 each morning coaches pick up migrant workers at 5am and move them to the sites where there is demand that day; casualized labour working as far away from London as rural east Anglia or the south costs hotels, but returning at the end of a very long working day to the same set of ‘hostels’, rental accommodation and neighbourhoods a few hundred metres apart from one another. The way to make sense of these sorts of complex pattern is to understand their dynamics in order to generate monitoring frameworks that are both analytically meaningful and ethically transparent.

The particularities of both labour markets and settlement patterns mean that change at the level below the nation state is becoming increasingly significant across both Europe and the world more generally. We will have to come to terms with changes that are increasingly rapid, that challenge the old structures of government to produce meaningful measures of ‘stocks’ and ‘flows’ of migrants and to consolidate good practice around ‘integration’. Consequently, new monitoring frameworks should support local government across the continent in developing intelligence, good practice and innovative policy mechanisms in this area. However, this cannot be the municipal machinery of old style city government; it needs an active engagement between the mutating labour markets of the post recession era, a complex understanding of the configuration of transnational civil society
and a responsiveness on the part of state structures that was not characteristic of mainstream local government in the liberal democracies in the 20th century. The phenomena of integration consequently demand a new thinking about what local government is and how it works alongside a sense of the importance of monitoring frameworks and indicators.

**IOM/Eurasylum:** Integration policies entail the participation of a range of actors including governments (at central and local level), NGOs, employers, the media, public opinion and the immigrants themselves. How can a balance of responsibility and partnership be established to devise fair and effective integration policies, particularly in today’s recession-hit host societies?

**Dr. Howard Duncan:**

By definition, immigrant integration is not something that any organization, let alone a government, can straightforwardly deliver. It is not a matter of decision as is the setting of national interest rates or establishing levels of social welfare. It is not a matter of delivering a social good such as primary education or health care. In these sorts of case, there is a clear decision or service to be delivered and there are established authorities to do so. But immigrant integration is a social condition, not a good, not a decision. Achieving integration, therefore, is a matter different in kind from many other policy areas. Not being achievable by fiat, integration policy must take very seriously the conditions that underlie successful integration, and for the most part this means conditions underlying the development of certain kinds of social relations.

The most important contribution of government is to establish a framework of policy and legislation that sets the society’s expectations of citizens and migrants with regard to integration. This can be done in constitutions and codes of rights and obligations, in immigration legislation that clearly governs the conditions under which foreign nationals can enter and remain, in policy prescriptions that describe the nature of the welcome accorded to newcomers such as Canada’s multiculturalism policy and legislation that makes it clear that Canada is a multicultural society and that citizens are to respect the cultural differences that accompany the arrival of immigrants. Governments should enact clear anti-discrimination policy and legislation that articulate what is and is not acceptable treatment of foreign nationals by the institutions of society and what are the expectations of individual citizens. In other words, the most important role for government is to create the policy and legislative environment within which integration can take place. This is clearly not sufficient for successful integration, but it is an essential first step. These frameworks of expectations must be communicated to the public and institutions of the society by political leaders to establish their legitimacy and to signal to the public the importance that governments place on these policy prescriptions. Political leaders must make it clear that immigrants have a rightful place in the society and that in order for the society to function cohesively and prosper, these expectations must be adhered to, if necessary with the risk of legal sanctions for infringements such as discrimination in the workplace, the school system, in housing, and so on. Equally important are the expectations that the immigrants will adhere to the laws of their adopted country, will learn the language of the society, and come to participate with the intention of making the sorts of contributions to societal well-being that the societal mainstream does.

This is all at the level of a framework to guide action and attitude. But for a framework to actually work in practice, the institutions of society must be engaged as must individual citizens and immigrants. This cannot be achieved by government
action alone, for we are here talking of individual attitudes, behaviours, and decisions. For the framework’s principles to be promulgated throughout a society and become part of its culture and that of its institutions, partnerships with these institutions are more effective than communications directly from government alone. For a central government’s social policies to be effective requires that they be accepted by society’s institutions as their own and interpreted in the way intended by the government. In the case of immigrant integration it is especially effective for immigrant-run organizations to be partners with governments in the integration effort whether that be in terms of delivering integration services or in communications about the policy and legislative framework of expectations mentioned at the outset. The effectiveness in partnerships between immigrant communities and the mainstream society as represented by its government can be exceptional because integration becomes an objective that is mutually shared and understood by both newcomer and the established society. If all can see that mainstream and immigrant are working in tandem towards a common goal, the chances of friction between the two is reduced and those of success greatly enhanced. Partnership arrangements can build trust much more quickly than unilateral government action and, arguably can yield more effective programmes given the close ties to the grassroots that result. Implicit in these arrangements, however, is that there are some areas of policy implementation where direct government intervention is more appropriate than in others. Governments, to work well in partnerships, need to understand where to stand aside and let others take the lead, and it is through formal partnerships that governments will be able to have the confidence required to do so.

The recession of 2007–09, which has affected most of the developed countries in the world, has been hard on immigrants owing to the common occurrence that they are the first to lose their jobs and the last to regain them. In some societies, attitudes towards migrant workers and permanent residents harden in conditions of economic decline, with the mainstream blaming the presence of immigrants for their own job losses. Governments need to be particularly vigilant in protecting the interests of immigrants, not only to ensure that they are free from mistreatment but that the long-term interests of the society, which may well include a need for immigrants and short-term workers, are upheld and not sacrificed to short-term political interest. This recession will end and with that, employment will grow to the point that again immigrants and temporary workers are needed. In countries that see clearly what their long-term interests are, the job of attracting and integrating newcomers does not end with the arrival of recessions.

Prof. Michael Keith:

We need to be clear about what we mean in our definition of integration, our sense of expectation and our calculus of rights in the new Europe.

At a global level the recent finance led recession questions many of the institutional forms of global governance that have emerged in the post war era. More particularly the economic model of growth that has characterized the orthodoxies of the World Bank and the WTO, most commonly known as the Washington Consensus, is challenged by growing pressures of labour market mobility and a diminishing sense of commitment to a national polis demonstrated in falling electoral participation rates in most parts of the world.

It is in this context that a new settlement between state and market might emerge from the recession and a new challenge to both national identity and occasional nationalisms needs to be set alongside each other. For whilst there have been attempts to rebuild the ‘imaginary community’ of the 19th century nation state to make it fit for purpose in France or the UK it is also true to suggest that our
complex migrant mobilities render the problem of integration and belonging too easily translated into new exclusionary nationalisms and reactionary sentiments in some countries across the world that are challenged by the integration of migrant settlement. In this context it is essential to consider the lessons that might emerge from the experiences of the recent past in making the dilemmas of integration transparent in the post recession era.

In the United Kingdom a sense of the disporpotionality of costs and benefits have led to a protest movement on behalf of local government authorities that believe that the nation state has failed to register or understand both the increased complexity of home place / workplace relations and the plural geographic scales that structure the realities of migrant integration. The London Borough of Newham asks why official national statistics suggest the borough’s population is falling in 2010 when demand in the schools exceeds 15 new classes of children a year and it is difficult to register with a local doctor because the waiting lists have sometimes been closed because of excessive demand. They argue that it is because the national measurement of migrant numbers cannot pick up on the realities of 21st century life where people arrive, stay for a while and then move on much more quickly than would have once been the case.

In these circumstances we need to synthesize new forms of intelligence with new forms of governance; both new ways of knowing the demos and a new architectures of the polis. The former requires drawing together expertise that sits inside and outside the state. The latter involves thinking about the structure and working of the state itself.

In order to draw together market intelligence, recruitment trends, jobless rolls and mobility we need partnerships between private employers, community organizations and local governance that can share intelligence and respond rapidly to evidence based analysis of patterns of social change. In order to respond meaningfully to this pace of change integration policies need to draw together the deliberative wisdom of different stakeholders whilst sustaining a meaningful transparency of democratic accountability. In the United Kingdom there is currently an attempt to do both of these things through the development of strategic migration partnerships that work at the regional level, although a healthy scepticism might demand first a candid evaluation of where they succeed and where they have found challenges.

In such structures there is a danger that a euphemistic language of ‘partnership’ invokes a Panglossian deliberative world, displacing or failing to address some of the incommensurabilities in the rationing of welfare resources or the liberalization of labour markets. But in whatever structures that emerge there is a need for a clarity of institutional architecture, an imperative to situate but also to separate the intelligence based interests of all, the deliberative differences between the constituent elements of the stakeholder democracy and the ultimate accountabilities of democratic form. Only when function dictates form in this way can such partnerships devise fair and effective integration policies, particularly in today’s recession hit societies.
"Climate change and migration: impacts and policy responses"

February 2010

Theodoros Skylakakis
Member of the European Parliament;
Former Special Representative for Climate Change of Greece

IOM/Eurasyylum: What are your predictions for the impact of climate change on migration during the 21st century, and given the immense challenges which seem to lie ahead, what are the most immediate policy priorities in terms of disaster preparedness and policy coherence respectively?

Theodoros Skylakakis: We must approach this question with some fundamental truths in mind. The most important of these is the anticipated increase in world population. The current predictions amount to more than 2 billion people in the next four decades. Most of them in Asia. Are all these people going to stay at home? The answer depends on many different factors. Economic development, climate change and both traditional and human security are the most important of these factors. One way or another, those that will move are going to pass through the existing migration routes. From east to west and from south to north, and both their transit and destination countries will belong mostly to the wider Eurasian area.

Having in mind the recent global crisis, the combination of climate change and slower economic growth could urge an even larger number of people to leave their countries and seek a safer or more promising environment, than previously estimated. Climate change induced droughts, floods, wildfires, extreme weather events and natural disasters are likely to further intensify pre-existing stresses in vulnerable regions, such as food insecurity, water scarcity, reduced agricultural production, unequal access to resources and breakout of epidemics and spreading of diseases. These sorts of challenges may gradually lead to degradation of infrastructure, weakening of institutions and even generate a threat to peace and security by compounding the propensity for violent conflict. Climate change is, by far, the most important environmental challenge for migratory movements in the next decades. Allow me to repeat that the wider Eurasian area might be heavily influenced, by possible, environmentally forced, migratory movements, in the years to come. This may happen, not only directly, as Central Asia and southern Mediterranean are considered to be two of the most vulnerable regions, in terms of climate change impacts, but also indirectly, as climate change will continue to hit sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia, where a lot of people are already moving, due to natural disasters. It is more than obvious that if we pass the “tipping point”, in terms of unpredictable and destructive climate change impacts, then we could expect massive migratory inflows, from these vulnerable regions, following already existing migratory routes, into the Eurasian area.

Given the above, we obviously need a significant increase in our resources that are used for disaster preparedness, especially in Europe where our own needs
are also increasing. We also need more effective migration management, in a way that encourages legal migration and brings benefits to the economic and social development of both sending and receiving countries. Migration management improves the living conditions of millions of migrants and safeguards against potential security challenges, posed by illegal migration and criminal networks that perpetrate this phenomenon. Effective migration management is however impossible without cooperation between States. If we try to avoid the problem by passing it through to our neighbours we all end up with the worst of the possible worlds. It is like trying to cool a number of hot potatoes by trying to transfer them to each other, while no one is cooperating. We all end up with our hands burned. It would be a lot better if we cooperated to cool them in a pot of cold water. But cooperation is not easy. More often than not, on the issue of migration, states tend to follow a policy of myopic national interest, simply because they do not trust their neighbours enough.

**IOM/Eurasylum:** If there is to be an effective response to gradual changes in the environment there will need to be more coherence between development, migration and environment policies. How could this be achieved and, in particular, how could migration be mainstreamed into national adaptation plans, and how could capacity be built to improve the protection of the rights of the environmentally displaced?

**Theodoros Skylakakis:** Open dialogue and cooperation on all these levels are key factors for success. We can build upon the ‘aquis’ of certain regional and international institutions and organizations and support activities that facilitate the exchange of expertise and good practices and can contribute to building further capacity to deal with future challenges related to international migration. We should also take into account existing regional, subregional and international frameworks dealing with migration management, e.g. the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the Budapest Process and the Barcelona Process. Furthermore, a number of organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Office (ILO), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the European Union, the Eurasian Economic Community and the Council of Europe (European Committee on Migration), the OSCE as well as EUROPOL and UNODC are important contributors and partners.

National adaptation plans are in their infancy due to the uncertainty inherent in the climate change phenomenon. The best thing we can do to mainstream migration into them is to create trusted networks of legal short-term (e.g. seasonal) migration. In this way when disaster strikes and migration pressures rise we can use these networks to channel activities in a meaningful and mutually productive way, prioritizing environmental migrants that need a temporary solution to their economic needs, while the rebuilding effort is organized.

As for the rights of the environmentally displaced the best way to improve their protection is to stop using the term “environmental refugee”, since forced environmental migration is a different phenomenon from the reasons that create refugees covered by the Geneva convention and participating countries will never accept the inclusion of forced environmental migration into this convention. We should also try to create a new appropriate international legal framework, that can achieve wider acceptance.

**IOM/Eurasylum:** To what extent could environmental migration help countries to adapt to climate change through temporary labour migration which relieves pressure on degraded areas and which provides remittances to those left behind?
It is evident that in the global economic environment we should pay more attention to the economic root causes of migration, to the links between economic and migration policies and to the ways and means of maximizing the economic gains that migration could bring about, when effectively managed, to countries of origin and destination as well as to the migrants themselves.

Under these circumstances temporary labour migration which relieves pressure on degraded areas can be a very useful tool. And we can also integrate it into our development assistance policies by promising the migrants to link their remittances to their countries with development assistance for recognizable local and community projects in their places of origin. This is a new field of development cooperation, which can be very useful in the years to come. In the EU, after recognizing this need, we must shape such programmes, probably in cooperation with the IOM.

Are any of the conclusions of the Copenhagen Summit of relevance for migration policy?

Unfortunately, environmentally induced migration was out of the scope of the Copenhagen Summit. There is no direct reference to this issue in the conclusions of the summit. In my opinion, this is an important gap. If we want to tackle effectively all the climate change related issues, we must put emphasis on environmentally induced migration and incorporate this issue in a truly global agreement. Nevertheless, as we all know, we failed to sign a global agreement in Copenhagen. From my part, as a member of the Environment Committee of the European Parliament and also as a Shadow Rapporteur, appointed by the European People’s Party for the report on the White Paper, concerning a European framework for action on adaptation, I intend to put emphasis on preparing European wide policies, in order to manage environmentally induced migration.