




WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2024



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Top	The Shahrak Sabz IDP settlement was established in 2018 by IDPs fleeing drought. Upwards of 30,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) now live in the area as of February 2021. Many are concerned the lack of snow and rain in the winter months may lead to another major drought and subsequent famine this year. Escalating conflict is also affecting many of the provinces where the IDPs originate, deterring many from returning home. In 2020, IOM Afghanistan reached more than 21,600 internally displaced, disaster affected and other vulnerable families with humanitarian aid including latrines, handwashing stations, winterization, non-food items, multipurpose cash and shelter. © IOM 2021/Muse MOHAMMED
Middle	Smoke over Bucha and Hostomel, Ukraine. © IOM 2022/UNIAN
Bottom	View of informal settlements in Baidoa, some of them newly built around Howlwadaag neighborhood, Somalia. © IOM 2022/Claudia ROSEL

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WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2024



This volume is the result of a highly collaborative venture involving a multitude of partners and contributors under the direction of the editors. The *World Migration Report 2024* project commenced in May 2022 and culminated in the launch of the report in May 2024 by the Director General.

The findings, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States.

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All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this report, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain. Unless otherwise stated, this report does not refer to data or events after October 2023. This report has been produced without generative AI tools.

The stories behind the photographs can be found on page v.

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Photographs

- Chapter 1** Ehsanuddin Dilawar holds his seven-year-old son Kayhan Dilawar's hand as they disembark from a plane with fifteen-year-old Ali Aqdas Dilawar, as Afghan refugees arrive on a flight from Tajikistan at Toronto's Pearson International Airport, on Wednesday, 30 March 2022. © IOM 2022/Chris YOUNG
- Part I** People are fleeing Ukraine at the Medyka border crossing and Przemysl train station. © IOM 2022/Francesco MALAVOLTA
- Chapter 2** Women migrants walk along a highway in Yemen en route to the border with Saudi Arabia. © IOM 2022
- Chapter 3** To support her family Ifrah travelled abroad and she kept sending remittances without possibility to save some money for the future. Due to several challenges and mental health difficulties she faced, she decided to return to Ethiopia – still empty handed and without proper time to prepare for return. IOM Ethiopia supported her throughout her reintegration process. Photos have been taken in the framework of the EU-IOM Knowledge Management Hub, funded by the European Union, and its audiovisual production activity on return and sustainable reintegration. © IOM 2022/Beyond Borders Media
- Part II** IOM helps in relocating Afghan refugees from Tajikistan in coordination with the Canadian Government. © IOM 2021
- Chapter 4** Bhola slum, Dhaka, started to be built by migrants affected by river erosion, many of them lost their land to the river. Nowadays the population of the slum is a mixture of economic and climate change migrants. Bangladesh, Southern Asia. © IOM 2016/Amanda NERO
- Chapter 5** A stranded migrant prepares to embark on IOM's Voluntary Humanitarian Return flight to Ethiopia from Aden. IOM has offered this crucial lifeline to thousands of migrants in Yemen who wish to leave a dangerous situation and return to their home countries. © IOM 2022/Rami IBRAHIM
- Chapter 6** Myanmar and Cambodian migrants in Thailand. © IOM 2022/Anat DUANGCHANG

- Chapter 7** Vaccination of the flocks. Animal health is vital for the survival of people in this difficult region. Due to a major drought in 2017 in Mauritania, people in the Hodh El Chargui region are receiving a humanitarian assistance. © IOM 2018/Sibylle DESJARDINS
- Chapter 8** The second session of the 2023 International Dialogue on Migration, which took place on 5 and 6 October in Geneva, built on the outcomes of the Kampala Declaration and the SDG Summit and provided input to discussions at the Twenty-eighth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28). © IOM 2023
- Chapter 9** Tens of thousands of mobility restrictions related to COVID-19 brought cross-border travel to a standstill. © IOM 2022
- Appendices** Hawa is a born native to Koundara and has seen how much her town has changed over the course of her life due to climate change. Due to the impacts of climate change on livelihood prospects in Guinea, some Guineans have resorted to irregular migration in hopes of finding better economic opportunities abroad. © IOM 2022/Muse MOHAMMED
- References** Beyond the shore of Buka, deep in the Pacific Ocean there are no telecommunications and almost no electric power, lie a small cluster of atolls called the Carteret Islands. With a combined landmass of a little over half a square kilometre, these islands are home to 2,000 islanders who live a simplified rural lifestyle where they fish, grow food, build their homes, and rely on the resources available to them on the miniature islands. The communities who live in the tropical atolls are among the most economically, socially and physically disadvantaged populations in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. © IOM 2016/Muse MOHAMMED

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Foreword

Migration is as old as humanity itself. Throughout history, people have migrated in search of better lives, to flee conflict or seek safety, or simply to find new opportunities. It may surprise people that most migration is regular, safe and orderly – regionally focused and often directly connected to work. What captures attention in headlines is just part of the story. Migration is an issue that has been deeply affected by misinformation and politicization, and dominant narratives have strayed far away from balanced, accurate accounts of migration – both its simple truths and its complex situation-specific realities.

That is why the central aim of IOM's flagship *World Migration Report* series is to set out in clear and accurate terms the changes occurring in migration and mobility globally so that readers can better understand changes and adapt their own work. As the United Nations migration agency, IOM has an obligation to demystify the complexity and diversity of human mobility through evidence-based data, research and analysis.

The report also acknowledges IOM's continuing obligation to uphold fundamental rights and its mission to support those migrants who are most in need. This is particularly critical in the three areas in which IOM places high priority outlined in IOM's new Strategic Plan 2024–2028: Saving lives and protecting people on the move; Driving solutions to displacement; and Facilitating pathways for regular migration.

The current United Nations estimate is that there are about 281 million international migrants in the world, which equates to 3.6 per cent of the global population. But increasing numbers of people are being displaced, within and out of their country of origin, because of conflict, violence, political or economic instability as well as climate change and other disasters. In 2022, there were 117 million displaced people in the world, and 71.2 million internally displaced people. The number of asylum-seekers has risen from 4.1 million in 2020 to 5.4 million in 2022, an increase of more than 30 per cent.

Many people are locked out of regular pathways, as highlighted in chapter 4 of this report, and they sometimes resort to irregular channels that are extremely hazardous. These channels get significant media attention, and their use often undermines confidence in governance and fuels a twisted narrative that is being weaponized around the world for short-term political gain.

This report presents key global and regional migration data and trends, along with relevant thematic issues. Because we know that specific audiences, including policymakers, media, researchers, teachers and students, have varying needs when using this report to inform their work, this World Migration Report also includes an expanded range of digital tools to help ensure that it can be as useful for as wide a range of people as possible.

These innovations continue a proud history for the World Migration Report, which has won multiple international awards. More important than the awards, though, is the fact that the World Migration Report contributes to the global discourse about migration. That is always our goal – to inform global audiences about the robust evidence base that supports our work. We trust the contents and tools will help dispel myths, provide key facts and analysis, and offer new knowledge about the complex migration landscape. We also hope that the World Migration Report inspires new ideas on how you can be part of a bigger agenda, one that helps ensure migration is leveraged effectively as a solution to human development, peace and prosperity throughout the world.

The phrase “Knowledge is Power”, was first used by philosophers in the sixteenth century. In this age of instant news, web conspiracies and sophisticated political narratives, it is as relevant as ever. Through this edition of the World Migration Report, we seek to shape the conversation on migration around data, facts and truth – that way, we can tell the whole story.



A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Amy E. Pope'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Amy E. Pope
Director General

MARIE MCAULIFFE
LINDA ADHIAMBO OUCHO



WATCH YOUR STEP

1 REPORT OVERVIEW: MIGRATION CONTINUES TO BE PART OF THE SOLUTION IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD, BUT KEY CHALLENGES REMAIN¹

Introduction

It has been more than two years since the release of the *World Migration Report 2022*, which provided an overview of the global transformations intensely affecting migration and displacement around the world. While acknowledging ongoing changes related to demographic transitions, as well as economic and social transformations, the 2022 report outlined the major geopolitical, environmental and technological transformations that shape migration and mobility, sometimes profoundly. The impacts of these systemic global shifts have only intensified further in the last two-year period. For example, hardening geopolitics has seen us witness previously unthinkable conflict in terms of both scale and nature. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in early 2022 signalled a pivotal shift for the world, with some arguing that it “marked an abrupt end to 30 years of globalization and all the international cooperation that made that possible”.² The immediate impacts on Ukraine and Europe continue to be felt by millions of people, while the global impacts have touched many times more, as the consequences of the war ripple through global food security, energy security, international law, multilateralism, military strategy and alliances.³

More recently, and notwithstanding devastating conflicts in many places around the world in the last two years (such as in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen), the Hamas attack on 7 October and the conflict in Gaza have been profoundly shocking for even the most seasoned analysts, as well as long-serving humanitarians.⁴ The regional and global consequences are potentially severe, highlighting how geopolitics are changing quickly and in dangerous ways.⁵ At the time of writing (November 2023), the deaths and displacements were already very high, and the humanitarian response intensely difficult and complex.⁶

It is also fair to say that the intensification of ecologically negative human activity raised in the previous *World Migration Report* (2022 edition) has only further intensified: overconsumption and overproduction linked to unsustainable economic growth, resource depletion and biodiversity collapse, as well as ongoing climate change (including global heating) are continuing to grip the world. We are more aware than ever before of the extremely negative consequences of human activities that are not preserving the planet’s ecological systems. The potential consequences for human migration and mobility are high in terms of global consciousness as climate records

¹ Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Research and Publications Division, IOM; Linda Adhiambo Oucho, Executive Director, African Migration and Development Policy Centre.

² Maddox, 2023.

³ Coles et al., 2023.

⁴ IASC, 2023; Wright, 2023.

⁵ Khoury, 2023; Wright, 2023.

⁶ IASC, 2023; UNRWA, 2023.

continue to be broken,⁷ while the specific future impacts and scenarios continue to be contested, discussed and debated.⁸ Nevertheless, there is a strong sense that major impacts will occur without adequate preventative actions related to carbon emissions and green technology uptake, as well as more granular preparedness actions, such as disaster risk reduction work underpinned by adequate climate finance.⁹ Recent positive developments in multilateral processes on climate change, however, provide for some optimism on cooperation going forward. As do new multilateral mobility frameworks agreed by States (such as the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility).

In the previous edition we presented a chapter analysing the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in migration systems, while also pointing to the ongoing impacts of technological change across wide areas of social, political and economic life globally. Since then, we have witnessed major advances in AI, especially generative AI tools that have burst on to the world stage, impacting a wide range of sectors and occupations, with calls from some to embrace such tools,¹⁰ while others (most notably the creators of the latest generative AI tools) caution against the increasing proliferation of AI technologies throughout our societies.¹¹

The highly uneven, sustained use of AI in only some migration systems points to the heightened risk that AI technologies in migration and mobility systems are on track to exacerbate digital divides, both between States and within States.¹² A prerequisite to AI uptake is ICT digital capability, particularly the digital data capture of processes and applicants' identity data. These actions require access to ICT infrastructure and electricity, as well as skilled ICT staff, while many countries around the world lack these critical necessities, most especially least developed countries (LDCs).¹³ This is yet another domain in which differential capacity and resources widen the gap between States, adding to the digital divide and structural disadvantage experienced by LDCs in migration management. The "asymmetry of power" in AI for migration globally is an ongoing problem, likely to be exacerbated with every new advance.¹⁴

However, it is not just inequality between States that will impact migrants. The move toward greater digitalization of migration management and increased use of AI, including for visa services, border processing and identity management, will increasingly require potential migrants to be able to engage with authorities via digital channels. This poses obstacles for many people around the world who do not have access to ICT.¹⁵ Supporting access to safe, orderly and regular migration requires that digital equality is actively supported.

It is within this context that this *World Migration Report* focuses on developments in migration over the last two-year period, with an emphasis on providing analysis that takes into account historical and contemporary factors – historical in recognition that migration and displacement occur within broader long-term social, security, political and economic contexts.

⁷ Such as the worst wildfire season (Canada), the hottest summer on record (global), driest September on record (Australia).

⁸ United Nations, 2023; WEF, 2022.

⁹ Birkmann et al., 2022.

¹⁰ Carr, 2023; Doubleday, 2023.

¹¹ Vincent, 2023.

¹² McAuliffe, 2023.

¹³ Adhikari and Tesfachew, 2022.

¹⁴ Beduschi and McAuliffe, 2021.

¹⁵ ITU, 2020; McAuliffe, 2023.

What has happened in migration?

A great deal has happened in migration in the last two years since the release of the last *World Migration Report* in late 2021.

The last two years saw major migration and displacement events that have caused great hardship and trauma, as well as loss of life. In addition to the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza, as mentioned above, millions of people have been displaced due to conflict, such as within and/or from the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Myanmar. There have also been large-scale displacements triggered by climate- and weather-related disasters in many parts of the world in 2022 and 2023, including in Pakistan, the Philippines, China, India, Bangladesh, Brazil and Colombia.¹⁶ Further, in February 2023, south-east Türkiye and northern Syrian Arab Republic experienced powerful earthquakes, resulting in more than 50,000 deaths.¹⁷ By March, an estimated 2.7 million people had been displaced in Türkiye and many had been left homeless in the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁸

We have also witnessed the intensification of migration as a political tool in democratic systems around the world, notably in Europe, with some national election outcomes turning on the issues of anti-immigration and increasing cost of living.¹⁹ A rise in anti-immigrant sentiment has also been seen in other parts of the world experiencing worsening economic conditions, such as North and Southern Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East.²⁰

Notwithstanding recent events, long-term data on international migration have taught us that migration is not uniform across the world, but is shaped by economic, geographic, demographic and other factors, resulting in distinct migration patterns, such as migration “corridors” being developed over many years (see Chapter 2 of this report for details). The largest corridors tend to be from developing countries to larger economies, such as those of the United States of America, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Germany; large corridors can also reflect protracted conflict and related displacement, such as from the Syrian Arab Republic to Türkiye (the second-largest corridor in the world).

¹⁶ IDMC, 2023.

¹⁷ IOM, 2023.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Gosling, 2023.

²⁰ Allison, 2023; Fahim, 2022; Jalli, 2023; Moderan, 2023.

Key migration data at a glance

(latest available)





International
migrants^a

281 million

international migrants globally in 2020,
or 3.6 per cent of the world's population

Females^a	135 million	international female migrants globally in 2020, or 3.5 per cent of the world's female population
Males^a	146 million	international male migrants globally in 2020, or 3.7 per cent of the world's male population
Children^a	28 million	international child migrants globally in 2020, or 1.4 per cent of the world's child population
Labour migrants^b	169 million	migrant workers globally in 2019
Missing migrants^c	Around 8,500	dead and missing globally in 2023



Note: See Chapter 2 for elaboration and discussion.

Sources: ^a UN DESA, 2021.

^b ILO, 2021.

^c IOM, n.d.

^d Ratha et al., 2023.

^e UNHCR, 2023.

^f IDMC, 2023.

Migration continues to be part of the solution for many economies, societies and families around the world

Despite the toxicity of some political narratives that rely on hate and division, migration has long served many millions of people around the world well – whether in origin, in transit or in destination countries – providing opportunities and enriching their lives. However, barely a day goes by without multiple media reports – whether in traditional or newer forms of media – focusing on negative aspects of migration. While this may reflect the changing nature of migration in some parts of the world, it is important to recognize that media reporting continues to place greater emphasis on “bad” news.²¹ In addition, disinformation tactics are increasingly being used by nefarious actors with negative impacts on public, political and social media discourse on migration.²² “Normalizing” the migration narrative is a critical factor in being able to realize the benefits of migration.

In the face of negatively skewed discussions, it can be easy to lose sight of the fact that international migration remains relatively uncommon, with a mere 3.6 per cent (or 281 million) of the world being international migrants (see discussion in Chapter 2 of this report). The vast majority of people do not move across borders to live. We also know that most international migration is safe, orderly and regular.²³

Long-term research and analysis also tells us unequivocally that migration is a driver of human development and can generate significant benefits for migrants, their families and countries of origin. The wages that migrants earn abroad can be many multiples of what they could earn doing similar jobs at home. International remittances have grown from an estimated USD 128 billion in 2000 to USD 831 billion in 2022 and now far outstrip official development assistance to developing countries and foreign direct investment (see discussion of remittances in Chapter 2 of this report).

Migration can also provide an important skills boost, which can be critically important for destination countries experiencing population declines. In addition to enhancing national income and average living standards, immigration can have a positive effect on the labour market by increasing labour supply in sectors and occupations suffering from shortages of workers, as well as helping address mismatches in the job market. These positive labour market effects are not just evident in high-skilled sectors, but can also occur in lower-skilled occupations. Immigration increases both the supply of and the demand for labour, which means that labour immigration (including of lower-skilled workers) can generate additional employment opportunities for existing workers.

Research also shows that migrants provide a source of dynamism globally and are overrepresented in innovation and patents, arts and sciences awards, start-ups and successful companies. The immigration of young workers can also help with easing pressures on the pension systems of high-income countries with rapidly ageing populations. Immigration can also have adverse labour market effects (e.g. on wages and employment of nationals), but most of the research literature finds that these negative impacts tend to be quite small, at least on average.²⁴

²¹ Allen et al., 2017; McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2017.

²² Culloty et al., 2021.

²³ McAuliffe, 2020; Pope, 2024.

²⁴ Goldin et al., 2018; Ruhs, 2013.

Regular migration pathways boost public confidence in migration systems, while also protecting migrants. International migration and mobility occurring within regional and global economic, social, political and security environments increasingly reflect migration policy settings. Where, how, when and with whom people migrate often depends on the options available to them, with many of these options being determined or shaped by national-level policies as well as regional integration. Analysis of 25 years of international migrant stock data clearly shows that the regular pathways for migrants from developing countries have narrowed considerably, while pathways for those from developed countries have expanded (see Chapter 4 of this report). For increasing numbers of people around the world, therefore, irregular migration – including use of the asylum pathway – is the only option available to them.²⁵

Humanitarian crises due to displacement remain the exception, but they are also on the rise. Forced displacement is the highest on record in the modern era (see Table 1 below). The situation is further exacerbated by environmental impacts and climate change, which some scientists are predicting will force more than 216 million people across six continents to be on the move within their countries by 2050.²⁶

Meanwhile, humanitarian needs are outpacing funding support. As humanitarian needs rise and domestic fiscal pressures grow, many donor countries are under pressure to reduce their development budgets, placing development support to least developed countries at risk.²⁷ Meanwhile, the risk of further conflict has not been higher in decades, as military spending reached a new record high of USD 2,240 billion in 2022, reflecting an ongoing reduction in peace globally, as well as rising geopolitical tensions.²⁸ Humanitarian response will remain, for the foreseeable future, a major undertaking in order to support some of the most vulnerable people in the world. IOM will continue to be a major humanitarian actor in response to crises, including as a full member of the United Nations' Inter-Agency Standing Committee on humanitarian action.²⁹

The *World Migration Report* series

The first *World Migration Report* was published 24 years ago, initially as a one-off report designed to increase the understanding of migration by policymakers and the general public. It was conceived at a time when the effects of globalization were being felt in many parts of the world and in a multitude of ways. Indeed, the first report states that part of its genesis was due to the effects of globalization on migration patterns, and that the report therefore “looks at the increasingly global economy which has led to an unprecedented influx of newcomers in many countries...”.³⁰ The report highlighted the fact that, despite being an “age-old phenomenon”, migration was accelerating as part of broader globalization transformations of economic and trade processes that were enabling greater movement of labour, as well as goods and capital.

²⁵ McAuliffe et al., 2017; McAuliffe and Koser, 2017.

²⁶ World Bank, 2021.

²⁷ Development Initiatives, 2023.

²⁸ IEP, 2023; SIPRI, 2023.

²⁹ IASC, n.d.

³⁰ IOM, 2000.

Table 1 below provides a summary of key statistics reported in the first edition (*World Migration Report 2000*), as compared to this current edition. It shows that while some aspects have stayed fairly constant – the overall proportion of the world’s population that are migrants – other aspects have changed dramatically. International remittances, for example, have grown from an estimated USD 128 billion to USD 831 billion, underscoring the salience of international migration as a driver of development. Also of note in Table 1 is the rise in international migrants globally, but more strikingly, the rise in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons, all the while remaining small proportions of the world’s population.

Table 1. Key facts and figures from *World Migration Reports 2000 and 2024*

	2000 report	2024 report
Estimated number of international migrants	150 million	281 million
Estimated proportion of world population who are migrants	2.8%	3.6%
Estimated proportion of female international migrants	47.5%	48.0%
Estimated proportion of international migrants who are children	16.0%	10.1%
Region with the highest proportion of international migrants	Oceania	Oceania
Country with the highest proportion of international migrants	United Arab Emirates	United Arab Emirates
Number of migrant workers	–	169 million
Global international remittances (USD)	128 billion	831 billion
Number of refugees	14 million	35.4 million
Number of internally displaced persons	21 million	71.4 million

Sources: See IOM, 2000 and the present edition of the report for sources.

Notes: The dates of the data estimates in the table may be different to the report publishing date (refer to the reports for more detail on dates of estimates); refer to Chapter 3 of this report for regional breakdowns.

The *World Migration Report 2000*’s contribution to migration policy as well as migration studies was timely, and its success heralded the *World Migration Report* series. Since 2000, 12 world migration reports have been produced by IOM, and the report continues to focus on making a relevant, sound and evidence-based contribution that increases the understanding of migration by policymakers, practitioners, researchers and the general public. To support this objective, the series was refined in 2016, moving away from a single theme for each edition to being a global reference report for a wider audience. Each edition now has two parts, comprising:

- Part I: key data and information on migration and migrants;
- Part II: balanced, evidence-based analysis of complex and emerging migration issues.

New digital tools developed through expert collaboration

The *World Migration Report* series now incorporates a range of digital tools tailored for use in various settings. These tools have been developed in partnerships with some of the world's leading experts in migration data analysis, data visualization, education and the science–policy interface.

The *World Migration Report* interactive data visualizations were developed in recognition of the need to deliver outputs in a wide range of formats for expanded accessibility and utility. Launched in May 2021, and updated regularly, the interactive data visualizations allow users to read both the “headline” summaries on long-term trends, while also interacting with data points to explore specific time periods, corridors or countries. The new interactive format has become the centrepiece of the World Migration Report online platform, which has gone on to win multiple international design and data visualization awards.³¹ Additional tools for people working in migration and learning about migration, such as the education toolkit and the policy toolkit, demonstrate the growing salience of migration as well as the utility of the report.³² IOM partners with an extensive range of experts in developing and delivering both the report and the related tools in a wide variety of languages to increase local use.³³

World Migration Report 2024

This edition builds on the three previous reports (2018, 2020 and 2022 editions) by providing updated migration statistics at the global and regional levels, as well as descriptive analyses of complex migration issues.

Part I on “key data and information on migration” includes separate chapters on global migration trends and patterns, and regional dimensions and developments. These two chapters have been produced institutionally by IOM, drawing primarily on analyses by IOM experts, practitioners and officials around the world, based on data from a wide range of relevant organizations. The six chapters in Part II are authored by applied and academic researchers working on migration, including IOM researchers. They cover a range of “complex and emerging migration issues”, including:

- Narrowing of mobility options for people from developing countries since 1995 and the need for more regular migration pathways;
- Human security in migration;
- Gender dimensions of migration;
- Climate change, food insecurity and migration;
- Global governance of migration;
- Migration and mobility in a post-COVID world.

³¹ For information on international awards won, please see the [World Migration Report](#) webpage.

³² See <https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/about>.

³³ See the [Partner List](#) on the World Migration Report website, which includes many academic institutions, as well as leading policy think tanks and education organizations. As stated in the notes at the front of this report, this edition was not produced with the use of generative AI tools.

While the choice of these topics is necessarily selective and subjective, all the chapters in Part II of this report are directly relevant to some of the most prominent and important debates about migration in the world today. Many of these topics lie at the heart of the conundrums that face policymakers as they seek to formulate effective, proportionate and constructive responses to complex public policy issues related to migration. Accordingly, the chapters aim to inform current and future policy deliberations and discussions by providing a clear identification of the key issues, a critical overview of relevant research and analysis, and a discussion of the implications for future research and policymaking. The chapters are not meant to be prescriptive, in the sense of advocating particular policy “solutions” – especially as the immediate context is an important determinant of policy settings – but to be informative and helpful in what can be highly contested debates.

Part I

Chapter 2 provides an overview of the latest available global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, international students, refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons – as well as of international remittances. In addition, the chapter refers to the existing body of IOM programmatic data, particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, resettlement and displacement tracking. While these data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant IOM programming and operations worldwide.

Following the global overview, Chapter 3 provides a discussion of key regional dimensions of, and developments in, migration. The discussion focuses on six world regions as identified by the United Nations: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania. For each of these regions, the analysis includes: (a) an overview and brief discussion of key population-related statistics; and (b) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses, including from international organizations, researchers and analysts. To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, along with descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments”, are presented at the subregional level.

Part II

Chapter 4 – Growing migration inequality: What do the global data *actually* show?

- This chapter first appeared in the *World Migration Report 2022* and has been included in this edition due to the high demand for presentations of its analysis which underscores the importance of regular migration pathways.
- The chapter examines the questions of “who migrates internationally, and where do they go?” It analyses diverse statistical data and draws upon some of the existing body of research on migration determinants and decision-making. It shows a growing “mobility inequality”, with most international migration now occurring between rich countries to the increasing exclusion of poorer countries.
- Analysis of international migrant stock and human development index data show that between 1995 and 2020, migration from low- and medium-development countries increased, but only slightly, reconfirming existing macroeconomic analyses showing that international migration from low-income countries has historically been limited.
- However, contrary to previous understandings of international migration, the analysis indicates that there has been a “polarizing” effect, with migration activity increasingly being associated with highly developed countries. This raises the key issue of migration aspirations held by potential migrants from developing countries around the world who may wish to realize opportunities through international migration, but are unable to do so as regular pathways are unavailable to them.
- Importantly, when geographic areas of free movement are established, States and people utilize them to great benefit. For example, over the long term, nations in the visa-free Schengen area in Europe experienced much higher levels of mobility growth than non-Schengen nations. The ECOWAS protocols in West Africa have also led to increased migration within the area and decreased migration outside of that bloc.



Chapter 5 – Migration and human security: Unpacking myths and examining new realities and responses

- This chapter examines the interaction between migration, mobility and human security in contemporary settings at a time when misinformation and disinformation about migration and migrants are both increasing and increasingly effective. It draws upon conceptualizations of the topic that have evolved over recent decades.
- The most significant link between migration and security relates to the human security of migrants themselves, rather than the national security of States. The vulnerability of migrants throughout the migration cycle is evident at all stages and in a wide variety of manifestations during pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return. However, it is important to note that not all international migration is connected to, or caused by, human insecurity.
- Policies can potentially improve human security for migrants and communities, addressing international, regional, national and subnational policy considerations as shown in the six short case studies presented in this chapter. Nonetheless, there is no one-size-fits-all policy approach to improving human security, as it depends on specific challenges and how they manifest. Therefore authorities at multiple levels and non-State actors need to actively develop, implement and measure solutions that facilitate a human security approach to migration and mobility.



Chapter 6 – Gender and migration: Trends, gaps and urgent action

- This chapter provides an overview of the interactions between migration and gender across diverse geographies worldwide. It covers family migration, marriage migration and displacement, with a particular focus on labour migration, one of the main – and highly gendered – types of migration.
- The chapter explores how gender influences migration experiences, including displacement, throughout the migration cycle from pre-departure to entry and stay in destination countries and, if applicable, return to the country of origin. The showcased examples illustrate how gender may trigger diverse opportunities as well as vulnerabilities and risks for migrants.
- Drawing from the analysis of the existing gender dimensions throughout the migration cycle, four cross-cutting gender challenges are identified, complemented by promising practices or innovative interventions from different countries. These are related to stereotypes, access to information, the digital divide and regular migration pathways.
- The chapter highlights the urgency of adopting a gender-responsive approach to migration governance to empower migrants of all genders and promote gender equality more generally as the “prerequisite for a better world”.



Chapter 7 – Climate change, food insecurity and human mobility: Interlinkages, evidence and action

- This chapter explores the interlinkages between climate change, food insecurity and human mobility, highlighting the complexities of their relationships in multiple scenarios across the globe. The analysis is nuanced and goes beyond the simplistic view of human mobility as a natural consequence of climate change impacts and food insecurity.
- Evidence shows that climate change plays an important part in adding further pressure on existing systems and communities. However, it cannot be considered the sole driver of food insecurity or migration, given prevailing power dynamics, fragilities in governance, structures of globalized food production and other social factors.
- Migration appears as a coping or adaptation strategy to reduce the adverse effects of climate change. Nonetheless, in some contexts, it can be maladaptive. The outcomes of migration as an adaptation tool depend on the circumstances of the individuals or households engaging in human mobility, as well as on the involvement and agency of migrants.
- The chapter showcases the need for highly contextual interventions that address inequality and power dynamics, including a gender perspective, leveraging local and indigenous knowledge, and carefully assessing possible maladaptive consequences for vulnerable populations.



Chapter 8 – Towards a global governance of migration? From the 2005 Global Commission on International Migration to the 2022 International Migration Review Forum and beyond

- This chapter explores the implications of global migration governance as a multi-stakeholder regime under the guidance of the United Nations, building on chapters from the two previous World Migration Reports. It traces the evolution of international cooperation on migration from the Global Commission for International Migration (2005) to the 2022 International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), delving into the historical dimension and examining the influence of past recommendations.
- The chapter analyses the outcomes of the IMRF, shedding light on key tensions and contentious issues in policy discussions surrounding global migration governance. By providing a comprehensive view of the developments between 2003 and the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in 2018, the chapter explores the impact of systemic crises and geopolitical changes, emphasizing the role played by the Global Forum on Migration and Development.



- The discussion extends to the remaining limitations of the current governance architecture, particularly in the context of contemporary geopolitical challenges, offering reflections on migration governance at the regional level. Migration requires a truly whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. Developments in global governance will only benefit all persons on the move if the emerging architecture accommodates this reality.

Chapter 9 – A post-pandemic rebound? Migration and mobility globally after COVID-19

- This chapter examines the transformative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on global migration and mobility, providing an update to the chapter on COVID-19 in the *World Migration Report 2022*. It addresses the following questions: “How have travel and movement restrictions changed since the last Report? How have migration and mobility patterns evolved across the same period? And what are the most important long-term implications of these trends?”
- Human migration and mobility have rebounded significantly since the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, after three years, much of the world is still less mobile than it was in 2019. The harshest restrictions have receded, but they have left behind a more complex and restrictive migration policy landscape.
- COVID-19 has catalysed or accelerated social transformations, both temporary and structural, across regions. These transformations include: changes in consumption patterns in developed and developing countries; high inflation and global economic slowdowns; demographic changes; the ongoing importance of remittances sent by migrant workers to their families and communities; automation; digital outsourcing; and the changing role of labour mobility in the global economy.



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PART I

KEY DATA AND INFORMATION
ON MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS







2

MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW

Introduction

The significant variation and diversity in migration and displacement around the world make capturing global trends a challenge. We know from the increasing amount of information at our disposal that migration is often a highly politicized topic, making it increasingly prone to misinformation and disinformation by interest groups with political or commercial gains in mind.¹ Straightforward, accurate accounts of migration assist in enabling us to question migration myths and critically engage with mis- and disinformation materials. Against this backdrop, describing and analysing how migration around the world is changing from a range of different perspectives, including those entailing economic, social and security dimensions (and associated legal policy frameworks), must start with an understanding of fundamental metrics. Human migration may well be an age-old activity touching almost every society around the world; however, it is changing in important ways. Examining the shifts in scale, direction, demography and frequency can illuminate how migration is evolving, while also pointing to long-term trends that have been shaped by historical events, as well as more recent developments.

The latest available global estimate is that there were around 281 million international migrants in the world in 2020, which equates to 3.6 per cent of the global population.² A first important point to note is that this estimate is due to be updated over the next year, which will provide valuable insights into the long-term migration trends and the extent to which they were disrupted by COVID-19. The second point to note is that this total reflects an accumulation of migration events over many decades, while also accounting for only a small minority of the world's population, meaning that staying within one's country of birth overwhelmingly remains the norm. The great majority of people do not migrate across borders; much larger numbers migrate within countries.³

The overwhelming majority of people migrate internationally for reasons related to work, family and study, involving migration processes that largely occur without fundamentally challenging either migrants or the countries they enter. This migration is mostly safe, orderly and regular. In contrast, other people leave their homes and countries for a range of compelling and sometimes tragic reasons, such as conflict, persecution and disaster. While those who have been displaced, such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), comprise a relatively small proportion of people who have moved overall, they are often the most vulnerable and require assistance and support.

¹ McAuliffe et al., 2019; Culloty et al., 2021.

² UN DESA, 2021a. The next update to the International Migrant Stock estimates is anticipated to be released by UN DESA in the fourth quarter of 2024.

³ While there are currently no up-to-date estimates of internal migrants, United Nations estimates from nearly two decades ago (UNDP, 2009) indicate a much higher number of internal migrants than international migrants, a gap that has increased since then due to ongoing urbanization.

This chapter, with its focus on key global migration data and trends, seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of the bigger picture of migration, by providing an overview of global migration and migrants. The chapter draws upon current statistical sources compiled by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the University of Oxford.⁴ The chapter provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, international students, refugees, asylum-seekers, IDPs and missing migrants – as well as of international remittances.

The chapter also refers to the body of programmatic IOM data, particularly on assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, resettlement and displacement tracking. While these data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant programming and operations globally. As the United Nations migration agency, with activities relevant to all the themes discussed in this chapter, IOM data have the capacity to provide further insights on migration and its various dynamics, including the diverse needs of migrants.

Defining migration, migrant and other key terms

Outside of general definitions of migration and migrant, such as those found in dictionaries, there exist various specific definitions of key migration-related terms, including in legal, administrative, research and statistical spheres.^a While there is no universally agreed definition of migration or migrant, several definitions are widely accepted and have been developed in different settings, such as those set out in UN DESA's 1998 Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration (i.e. a person living for more than 12 months outside their country of birth).^b

Work by the United Nations Statistical Division and the United Nations Expert Group on Migration Statistics continues on the process under way in updating the 1998 Recommendations.^c The set of core and additional indicators on international migration and temporary mobility (see text box below) was endorsed by the United Nations Statistical Commission at its 54th session in March 2023, paving the way for revised recommendations on international migrants and mobility that are better able to account for different aspects of mobility, including migration.^d The new Recommendations are scheduled to be finalized by the Statistical Division and Expert Group for endorsement by the Commission in 2025.

⁴ To keep within the scope of this report, statistics utilized in this chapter were current as at 30 June 2023, unless otherwise stated.

Technical definitions, concepts and categories of migrants and migration are necessarily informed by geographic, legal, political, methodological, developmental, temporal and other factors. For example, there are numerous ways in which migration events can be defined, including in relation to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence and duration of stay.^e This is important when it comes to quantifying and analysing the effects of migration and migrants, however defined. We encourage readers to refer to primary sources cited in the chapter for information on specific definitions and categorizations underlying the data. Readers may also find the *IOM Glossary on Migration* (2019) to be a useful reference. The Glossary is available at the [IOM Publications Platform](#).

^a See, for example, Poulain and Perrin, 2001; World Bank, 2023a.

^b UN DESA, 1998.

^c United Nations Statistics Division, 2021.

^d United Nations Statistical Commission, 2023.

^e See, for example, de Beer et al., 2010.

International migrants: numbers and trends

UN DESA produces estimates of the number of international migrants globally. The following discussion draws on its estimates, which are based on data provided by States.⁵ The current United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration defines an “international migrant” as any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between “short-term migrants” (those who have changed their countries of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year) and “long-term migrants” (those who have done so for at least one year). However, not all countries use this definition in practice.⁶ Some countries use different criteria to identify international migrants, for example by applying different minimum durations of residence. Differences in concepts and definitions, as well as data collection methodologies between countries, hinder full comparability of national statistics on international migrants.

While the estimated number of international migrants has increased over the past 50 years, it is important to note that the vast majority of people live in the country in which they were born. In the latest international migrant estimates (dated as at mid-2020), almost 281 million people lived in a country other than their country of birth, or about 128 million more than 30 years earlier, in 1990 (153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million). The proportion of international migrants as a share of the total global population has also increased, but only incrementally (see Table 1).

⁵ Data are also provided to UN DESA by territories and administrative units. For a summary of UN DESA stock data sources, methodology and caveats, see UN DESA, 2021b.

⁶ UN DESA, 1998.

International Migrant Population Estimates – When is the next migrant stock data set due to be released?

The United Nations International Migrant Stock estimates are compiled, curated and released intermittently by the Population Division in DESA at United Nations Headquarters (New York). The latest estimates were released in January 2021, based on mid-2020 data – reasonably early in the COVID-19 pandemic and at the height of international travel restrictions. UN DESA anticipates that the next estimates will be released in the fourth quarter of 2024. More information about the Population Division’s International Migrant Stock estimates are available at www.un.org/development/desa/pd/.

Table 1. International migrants since 1970

Year	Number of international migrants	Migrants as a % of the world's population
1970	84 460 125	2.3
1975	90 368 010	2.2
1980	101 983 149	2.3
1985	113 206 691	2.3
1990	152 986 157	2.9
1995	161 289 976	2.8
2000	173 230 585	2.8
2005	191 446 828	2.9
2010	220 983 187	3.2
2015	247 958 644	3.4
2020	280 598 105	3.6


Source: UN DESA, 2008 and 2021a.

Note: The number of entities (such as States, territories and administrative regions) for which data were made available in the UN DESA International Migrant Stock 2020 was 232. In 1970, the number of entities was 135.

The available international migrant data include estimates of origin and destination links between two countries, allowing for the estimation of bilateral migration corridors globally. The size of a migration corridor from country A to country B is measured as the number of people born in country A who were residing in country B at the time of the estimate. Migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the Mexico to United States corridor is the largest in the world at nearly 11 million people. The second largest is from the Syrian Arab Republic to Türkiye, comprising mainly refugees displaced by the Syrian Arab Republic’s civil war. The corridor between the Russian Federation and Ukraine takes up spots three and five among the largest corridors in the world, which is due to a range of underpinning reasons over time (including, for example, displacement from Ukraine following Russian Federation invasions in 2014 and 2022). Discussion of refugees is included below in this chapter.

Figure 1. Top international country-to-country migration corridors, 2024



Source: UN DESA, 2021a; UNHCR, 2023a.

Notes: The corridors represent the number of international migrants (millions) born in the first-mentioned country and residing in the second. Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

Those corridors comprising mainly displaced persons are coloured orange. Revisions have been made based on large-scale displacement from Ukraine to neighbouring countries (as at end October 2023).


Why do some definitions of “international migrant” differ?

As highlighted in the text box above, there are various definitions of “international migrant” that can stem from legal, policy, demographic and other contexts. While the United Nations Statistical Commission prescribes a specific definition based on foreign-born, some analysts deploy other definitions for analytical purposes. The 2023 World Development Report (WDR), for example, chose to use a much more limited definition than that of the United Nations Statistical Commission by excluding from the UN DESA International Migrant Stock data migrants who had become citizens of the country to which they had migrated. Instead of 281 million international migrants, the WDR approach analyses a subset of 184 million migrants. This narrower approach provides a different perspective of migrants that encompasses all policy categories (including refugees) while overlaying a citizenship policy boundary even though acceptance by States of dual citizenship has increased significantly in recent years. This raises several implications, such as:

- What does it mean for those migrants and societies that have no possibility for accessing citizenship, even after years or decades of residence, compared with those that have policy approaches enabling citizenship acquisition?
- Does this definition intend to negate the important contributions of migrants who have become citizens of other countries (including dual citizens), such as the huge growth in international remittances sent by such migrants that has increasingly fuelled human development globally?
- Are conceptual barriers to civic participation reinforced and validated through a narrow “citizen”-based definition, even though non-citizen residents are increasingly able to participate in civic engagement in democratic systems particularly in municipal elections (but also in some national elections)?

There is currently a larger number of male than female international migrants worldwide and the growing gender gap has increased over the past 20 years. In 2000, the male to female split was 50.6 to 49.4 per cent (or 88 million male migrants and 86 million female migrants). In 2020 the split was 51.9 to 48.1 per cent, with 146 million male migrants and 135 million female migrants. The share of female migrants has been decreasing since 2000, while the share of male migrants has increased by 1.3 percentage points. See Figure 2 for further breakdowns by sex.


Figure 2. International migrants, by sex



Source: UN DESA, 2021a.

Examining international migrants by sex in the top 20 destination and origin countries (Figure 3) shows some clear patterns. There are more female than male international migrants in destination countries in Europe and Northern America, such as the United States of America, Canada, France, Spain and Italy, but also in India. In contrast, for most Asian countries in the top 20 – particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait – the number of male international migrants is much higher than female, which is related to the structure of economies (e.g. construction and security sector prevalence) as well as social and human security factors.⁷

Figure 3. International migrants, by sex, top 20 destination countries (left) and origin countries (right) (millions)*




Source: UN DESA, 2021a.

Note: * This includes territories.

⁷ Shah et al., 2018; Ullah et al., 2020.

Proportionally, the distribution of female and male international migrants is about equal in most top 20 destination countries (Figure 4), except in several GCC countries and Malaysia, where the share of males is much higher, as well as in Ukraine, where there is a significantly higher number of female immigrants. This pattern is broadly similar in top 20 origin countries, with only slight differences between females and males, except in a handful of origin countries such as India, the Syrian Arab Republic, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar and Egypt, where the share of male migrants as a percentage of total emigrants from these countries is significant and considerably higher than that of female international migrants.

Figure 4. International migrants, by sex, top 20 destination countries (left) and origin countries (right) – proportion*




Source: UN DESA, 2021a.

Notes: "Proportion" refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

* This includes territories.

While the international migrant worker data set managed by the ILO has not been updated for several years, it nevertheless provides some additional insights into the growing gender gap in the international migrant population.⁸ As can be seen in Figure 5, 102.4 million or almost 61 per cent of all international migrant workers resided in three subregions: Northern America; the Arab States; and Northern, Southern and Western Europe.⁹ Notably, there is a striking gender imbalance of migrant workers in two regions: Southern Asia (5.7 million males compared with 1.4 million females) and the Arab States (19.9 million males compared with 4.2 million females). The Arab States region is one of the top destinations for international migrant workers, where they comprise 41.4 per cent of the entire working population, often dominating in key sectors.

Figure 5. Geographic distribution of migrant workers by sex (millions)



Source: ILO, 2021.

Note: The figure reflects ILO geographic regions and subregions, and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Please see annex A of ILO, 2021 for more information on regional breakdowns. Please note that the rest of this chapter refers to the UN DESA geographical regions.

⁸ The current revision (at the time of writing) is based on 2019 data, released by the ILO in 2021 (see ILO, 2021).

⁹ The ILO category of “Arab States” includes the following countries and territories: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (ibid.).

International migration and long-term population trends

In some parts of the world, international migration has become a major component of population change. For high-income countries between 2000 and 2020, the contribution of international migration to population growth (net inflow of 80.5 million) exceeded the balance of births over deaths (66.2 million). Over the next few decades, migration will be the sole driver of population growth in high-income countries. By contrast, for the foreseeable future, population increase in low-income and lower-middle-income countries will continue to be driven by an excess of births over deaths.

Between 2010 and 2021, 40 countries or areas experienced a net inflow of more than 200,000 migrants each; in 17 of them, the net inflow over this period exceeded 1 million people. For several of the top receiving countries, including Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye, high levels of immigration in this period were driven mostly by refugee movements, in particular from the Syrian Arab Republic.

For 10 countries, the estimated net outflow of migrants exceeded 1 million over the period from 2010 through 2021. In many of these countries, the outflows were due to temporary labour movements, such as for Pakistan (net flow of -16.5 million), India (-3.5 million), Bangladesh (-2.9 million), Nepal (-1.6 million) and Sri Lanka (-1.0 million). In other countries, including the Syrian Arab Republic (-4.6 million), the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (-4.8 million) and Myanmar (-1.0 million), insecurity and conflict drove the outflow of migrants over this period.

Source: Abridged extract of the United Nations *World Population Prospects 2022* (UN DESA, 2022a).

International migration flows

While data on migrant stocks are widely available, data on global migration movements (flows) are much more limited. Available UN DESA estimates on global migrant stocks are extensive and global in scope; however, the database of migration flows only encompasses 45 countries.¹⁰ Capturing data on migration flows is extremely challenging for several reasons. First, while international migration flows are generally accepted as covering inflows and outflows into and from countries, there has been a greater focus on recording inflows. For example, while countries such as Australia and the United States record cross-border movements, many others only count entries and not departures.¹¹ Additionally, migration flow data in some countries are derived from administrative events related to immigration status (for example, issuance/renewal/withdrawal of a residence permit), which are then used as proxies for migration flows. Furthermore, migratory movements are often hard to separate from non-migratory travel, such as tourism or business.¹² Tracking migratory movements also requires considerable resources, infrastructure and ICT/knowledge systems. This poses particular challenges for developing countries, where the ability to collect, administer, analyse and report data on mobility, migration and other areas is often limited. Finally, many countries' physical geographies pose tremendous challenges for collecting data on migration

¹⁰ UN DESA, 2015.

¹¹ Koser, 2010; McAuliffe and Koser, 2017.

¹² Skeldon, 2018.

flows. Entry and border management, for example, is particularly challenging in some regions because of archipelagic and isolated borders, and is further complicated by traditions of informal migration for work.¹³

Conflating “migration” and “migrant”

In a general sense, migration is the process of moving from one place to another. To migrate is to move, whether from a rural area to a city, from one district or province in a given country to another in that same country, or from one country to a new country. It involves action.

In contrast, a migrant is a person described as such for one or more reasons, depending on the context (see the text box on “Defining migration, migrant and other key terms” above). While in many cases “migrants” do undertake some form of migration, this is not always the case.

In some situations, people who have never undertaken migration may be referred to as migrants – children of people born overseas, for example, are commonly called second- or third-generation migrants.^a This may even extend to situations involving statelessness, whereby whole groups of people are not able to access citizenship, despite being born and raised in a country. Such people may even be referred to as irregular migrants by authorities.^b

^a See, for example, Neto, 1995; Fertig and Schmidt, 2001.

^b Kyaw, 2017.

There are currently two main data sets on international migration flows, both of which are derived from national statistics: UN DESA’s International Migration Flows data set and OECD’s International Migration Database. Since 2005, UN DESA has compiled data on the flows of international migrants to and from selected countries, based on nationally available statistics. At the time of writing (October 2023), there had been no update to the UN DESA flows data set, with the most current being the 2015 version. The 2015 migration flows data set comprises data from 45 countries, up from 29 countries in 2008 and 15 countries in 2005.¹⁴


The OECD has been collecting international migration flow data since 2000, allowing for trend analysis to be conducted over a subset of major destination countries, depicted in Figure 6 (although data are not standardized, as explained in the note under the figure). The latest available data indicate that in 2020, there was a sharp decline in permanent migration inflows from the year before, a reflection of the border closures and movement restrictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. There were more than 8 million inflows in 2019. This dropped to around 5 million in 2020, but has since risen to reach 5.9 million in 2021, comprising both labour and humanitarian migrants; some recent estimates from the OECD indicate that 2022 saw a further increase in inflows over 2021, connected mainly to humanitarian displacement.¹⁵

¹³ Gallagher and McAuliffe, 2016.

¹⁴ For UN DESA migration flow data, as well as for the specific countries included, please see UN DESA, 2015.

¹⁵ Dumont, 2023; OECD, 2023.

Figure 6. Inflows of foreign nationals into OECD countries, permanent migration, 2001–2021 (millions)



Source: OECD, n.d.a.


Note: Data are not standardized and therefore differ from statistics on permanent migration inflows into selected countries contained in OECD's International Migration Outlook series. The 35 countries typically included in OECD statistics are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. In some years, data for particular countries are not available: data were made available for 31 countries in 2000. Notably, data for Greece have not been reported between 2000 and 2004, and data for Türkiye were reported only for 2010, 2016, 2017 and 2018. Please refer to the OECD's International Migration Outlook series for explanatory notes.

Collaboration with the private sector on new data to understand migration flows better

Over the past several years, the private sector has begun offering novel data sources useful in several areas of migration-related statistics. For example, the Data for Good at Meta programme, which builds privacy preserving datasets to advance social issues, began modelling displacement from weather-based events through a partnership with the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) starting in 2018. These tools were used by IDMC and others to triangulate official sources on displacement in the aftermath of major events such as Typhoon Hagibis, the strongest typhoon to strike mainland Japan in decades.

More recently, researchers at Harvard, the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, and Meta published an IOM Migration Research Series paper on new aggregated social media data to anticipate conflict-induced migration flows in the context of the war in Ukraine. They found that the publicly available Facebook Social Connectedness Index is a strong predictor of diaspora populations within 27 European Union Member States, which is itself predictive of displacement trajectories of those uprooted by conflict.

Facebook’s Social Connectedness Index (Ukraine to EU27 NUTS-3)



Source: Minora et al., 2023.


Additional research is currently underway from Meta and their collaborators on predicting international migration flows building upon items showcased at the 3rd International Forum on Migration Statistics. IOM and other collaborators have helped guide the development of a global dataset estimating international migration flows, forthcoming in 2024, with analysis of country-to-country trends spanning the COVID-19 pandemic years. This new international dataset is poised to provide a critical input into understanding international migration flows, most profoundly in developing countries where existing flow data is often unavailable. Partnerships like those with Meta have the potential to significantly improve the way migration statistics are calculated in the years to come.

Unsafe migration flows

Some migration routes pose many more challenges than others, for migrants as well as for authorities. Migrants' journeys can sometimes be characterized by unsafe and even deadly outcomes, often related to a range of social, political, economic, environmental and policy factors that can profoundly impact the way in which people undertake migration.¹⁶ In the wake of the tragic events of October 2013, in which more than 360 people died in the sinking of two boats near the Italian island of Lampedusa, IOM began collecting and compiling information on migrants who perish or go missing on migratory routes worldwide, as part of its Missing Migrants Project.¹⁷ Data sources include official records of coastguards and medical examiners, media stories, reports from non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, and interviews with migrants.¹⁸

The number of deaths recorded in 2023 (over 8,500) was the highest since 2016 and a significant increase over the previous three years, especially 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic and related mobility restrictions resulted in a lower overall number of deaths (Figure 7). Between 2014 and end of 2023, IOM's Missing Migrants Project recorded over 63,000 deaths and disappearances on migration routes. Year-to-year, 2023 saw an increase in deaths across the Mediterranean, Africa and Asia, with an unprecedented number of lives lost across the latter two regions.¹⁹

Figure 7. Migrant deaths by region, 2014–2023



Note: Data include recorded deaths as well as those reported as missing. See the [Missing Migrants Project](https://missingmigrants.iom.int/) webpage for details of methodology and geographic regions.

¹⁶ McAuliffe et al., 2017.

¹⁷ See <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>.

¹⁸ IOM, 2020a.

¹⁹ IOM, n.d., 2023a and 2024.

The Missing Migrants Project faces notable challenges in its data collection. For instance, most recorded deaths are of people travelling via clandestine routes, which are often at sea or in remote areas to evade detection, meaning remains are often not found. Few official sources collect and make data on migrant deaths publicly available. Relying on testimonies of fellow migrants and media sources can be problematic due to inaccuracies and incomplete coverage. Nevertheless, the project sheds light on a previously under-researched and neglected topic, highlighting the need to address this tragic ongoing issue, including in the context of the implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

COVID-19 impacts on mobility

COVID-19 has been the most severe pandemic in a century, with its combination of high transmission, virus strains and the severity of the disease forcing policymakers into previously uncharted territory. While the main focus was on responding to the global health crisis (e.g. virus testing, disease treatment, and vaccination development and programming), part of the response has involved drastic changes to freedom of movement of people all around the world, which in turn has massively impacted human mobility globally. COVID-19-related immobility became the “great disrupter” of migration.²⁰

Governments around the world implemented various measures to limit the spread of the virus and a range of restrictions was introduced from early 2020, evolving over time. New data sets emerged to track policy responses globally, such as the University of Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker,²¹ which has recorded a wide range of government responses globally, such as “stay-at-home” measures, workplace closures, school closures, restrictions on gatherings, restrictions on internal movements within a country, and international travel control measures. In addition, IOM began tracking travel restrictions globally early in the pandemic, drawing upon a range of data and reporting results via its COVID-19 Mobility Impacts dashboard.²²


Overall, COVID-19 travel restriction measures – both internal and international – were quickly put in place by the vast majority of countries around the world, with the peak occurring in late March to early April 2020 (see Figure 8). While international travel restrictions were more likely to have been enacted early in the pandemic, there was a greater variety of control measures during the initial weeks (including screening early on), probably due to governments needing to assess the severity of the crisis during a period of extraordinary uncertainty. As the severity of COVID-19 became clear, the number of both international and internal travel restrictions rose drastically.

²⁰ McAuliffe, 2020.

²¹ Hale et al., 2023.

²² See <https://migration.iom.int/>.

Figure 8. Government responses to minimize COVID-19 transmission, by number of countries




Source: Hale et al., 2023.

Notes: As at 1 January 2023. The term “international travel controls” is used by Oxford and includes screening arrivals, quarantining arrivals, banning arrivals or total border closure. It is also important to note that categories are COVID-19-related only and do not reflect other travel restrictions that may have already been in place, such as those related to visa restrictions, entry bans based on specific citizens, and departure/exit restrictions.

The impact of the COVID-19-related travel restrictions becomes very clear when air passenger data are examined. We can see from long-term air passenger figures that COVID-19 travel restrictions had a major impact on both international and domestic air travel in 2020. Total air passengers carried dropped by 60 per cent from around 4.5 billion in 2019 to 1.8 billion in 2020 (Figure 9). Air passenger numbers began to inch up in 2021 as countries relaxed mobility restrictions, and by end of 2022, total passenger figures had risen to more than 3.5 billion.

Figure 9. Air passengers carried globally, 1945–2022



Source: ICAO, 2023.

See additional data, research and analysis in the thematic Chapter 9 in this report, which provides an update on COVID-19 impacts on migration and mobility globally.

International remittances

Remittances are financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants directly to families or communities in their countries of origin. The World Bank compiles global data on international remittances, notwithstanding the myriad data gaps, definitional differences and methodological challenges in compiling accurate statistics.²³

Its data, however, do not capture unrecorded flows through formal or informal channels, and the actual magnitudes of global remittances are therefore likely to be larger than available estimates.²⁴ This issue came to the fore during the pandemic, following a much more positive outcome in 2020 for international remittance flows, contrary to initial dire projections; this was due in part to a shift from informal channels to formal channels in response to COVID-19 immobility restrictions, among other reasons.²⁵ Despite these issues, available data reflect a long-term increasing trend in international remittances in recent years, rising from around USD 128 billion in 2000 to USD 831 billion in 2022.²⁶

²³ The content of much of this subsection, unless otherwise noted, is based on and drawn from the World Bank's data in relation to migration and remittances (World Bank, n.d.a). In particular, the World Bank's annual remittances data sets (ibid.), Migration and Development Brief 38 (Ratha et al., 2023), and its 13 June press release (World Bank, 2023b) are key sources of information. Please refer to these sources, as well as the World Bank's *Factbooks on Migration and Development*, including its latest, published in 2016, for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented.


²⁴ World Bank, 2016.

²⁵ IMF, 2020; IOM, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d and 2021.

²⁶ Note that following 9/11 in 2001, some remittances were forced to shift from informal channels, such as via *hawala* systems, to formal channels. See discussion in El Qorchi et al., 2003.

International remittances have recovered from the dip in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Migrants sent an estimated USD 831 billion in international remittances globally in 2022, an increase from USD 791 billion in 2021 and significantly more than USD 717 billion in 2020.²⁷ As in previous years, low- and middle-income countries continued to receive vast sums of remittance inflows, which increased by 8 per cent between 2021 and 2022 from USD 599 billion to USD 647 billion. Since the mid-1990s, international remittances have greatly surpassed official development assistance levels defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries; they have also recently overtaken foreign direct investment (see Figure 10 below).²⁸

Figure 10. International remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries (2000–2022)



Sources: World Bank, n.d.b (remittances); World Bank, n.d.c (FDI and ODA data from World Development Indicators). (Accessed 17 June 2023).

Note: All numbers are in current (nominal) USD billion.

In 2022, India, Mexico, China, the Philippines and France were (in descending order) the top five remittance recipient countries, although India was well above the rest, receiving more than USD 111 billion, the first country to reach and even surpass the USD 100 billion mark. Mexico was the second-largest remittance recipient in 2022, a position it also held in 2021 after overtaking China, which historically had been the second-biggest recipient after India. G7 countries France and Germany remained in the top 10 of receiving countries globally in 2022, just as they have done for more than a decade (see Table 2). It should be noted, however, that the majority of inflows are not household transfers, but relate to salaries of cross-border workers who work in Switzerland while residing in France or Germany.²⁹

High-income countries are almost always the main source of international remittances. For decades, the United States of America has consistently been the top remittance-sending country in the world, with a total outflow of USD 79.15 billion in 2022, followed by Saudi Arabia (USD 39.35 billion), Switzerland (USD 31.91 billion) and Germany (USD 25.60 billion). The United Arab Emirates is also usually among the top 10 sending countries globally, but its data are not included/reported in the June 2022 World Bank data release. In addition to its role as a top

²⁷ Ratha et al., 2023.

²⁸ See, for example, OECD (n.d.b), which also contains data on official development assistance. There is a growing body of work exploring the developmental, economic and social impacts of this trend.

²⁹ Eurostat, 2020.

recipient, China (classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank) has also been a significant source of international remittances, with USD 18.26 billion reported in 2022, although this is a drop from USD 23 billion in 2021.

Table 2. Top 10 countries receiving/sending international remittances (2010–2022)
(current USD billion)

Top countries receiving remittances							
2010		2015		2020		2022	
India	53.48	India	68.91	India	83.15	India	111.22
China	52.46	China	63.94	China	59.51	Mexico	61.10
Mexico	22.08	Philippines (the)	29.80	Mexico	42.88	China	51.00
Philippines (the)	21.56	Mexico	26.23	Philippines (the)	34.88	Philippines (the)	38.05
France	19.90	France	24.07	Egypt	29.60	France	30.04
Nigeria	19.75	Nigeria	20.63	France	28.82	Pakistan	29.87
Germany	12.79	Pakistan	19.31	Pakistan	26.09	Egypt	28.33
Egypt	12.45	Egypt	18.33	Bangladesh	21.75	Bangladesh	21.50
Belgium	10.99	Germany	15.57	Germany	19.32	Nigeria	20.13
Bangladesh	10.85	Bangladesh	15.30	Nigeria	17.21	Germany	19.29


Top countries sending remittances							
2010		2015		2020		2022	
United States	50.53	United States	60.72	United States	66.54	United States	79.15
Saudi Arabia	27.07	United Arab Emirates	40.70	United Arab Emirates	43.35	Saudi Arabia	39.35
Russian Federation	21.45	Saudi Arabia	38.79	Saudi Arabia	34.60	Switzerland	31.91
Switzerland	18.51	Switzerland	26.03	Switzerland	29.64	Germany	25.60
Germany	14.68	Russian Federation	19.69	Germany	22.45	China	18.26
Italy	12.88	Germany	18.25	China	18.30	Kuwait	17.74
France	12.03	Kuwait	15.20	Kuwait	17.36	Luxembourg	15.51
Kuwait	11.86	France	12.79	Russian Federation	16.87	Kingdom of the Netherlands (the)	15.41
Luxembourg	10.66	Qatar	12.19	France	14.78	France	14.44
United Arab Emirates	10.57	Luxembourg	11.23	Kingdom of the Netherlands (the)	14.31	Qatar	12.29

Source: World Bank, n.d.b.

Notes: All numbers are in current (nominal) USD billion. The United Arab Emirates is not included for 2022 as the remittances data have not been updated.

In terms of dependency on international remittances, there is no consensus on how “overreliance” on international remittances can be defined, but dependency on remittances is mostly measured as the ratio of remittances to gross domestic product (GDP). The top five remittance-receiving countries by share of GDP in 2022 were Tajikistan (51%) followed by Tonga (44%), Lebanon (36%), Samoa (34%) and Kyrgyztan (31%) (see Figure 11). Heavy reliance on remittances can cultivate a culture of dependency in the receiving country, potentially lowering labour force participation and slowing economic growth.³⁰ Too much dependence on remittances also makes an economy more vulnerable to sudden changes in remittance receipts or exchange rate fluctuations.³¹

Figure 11. Top 10 recipient countries of international remittances by share of GDP, 2022




Source: Ratha et al., 2023.

³⁰ Amuedo-Dorantes, 2014.

³¹ Ghosh, 2006.

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 10.C commits countries to reducing the transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3 per cent.³² The 3 per cent transaction cost is intended as the global average of sending USD 200. While the cost of sending remittances has gradually declined over the last few years across several regions (see Figure 12), it still remains high and far above the SDG 10 target. In 2022, average costs were lowest in South Asia (4.6%), followed by East Asia and Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean (both around 5.8%). Sub-Saharan Africa has consistently had the highest average cost of sending remittances and in 2022 the cost was at more than 8 per cent, more than double the SDG target.

Figure 12. Average cost of sending USD 200 by region of the world, 2015–2022 (%)



Source: World Bank, n.d.a (accessed 2 July 2023).


Note: The figure reflects World Bank geographic regions. The analysis excludes the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Republics, since they operate based on the integrated payment systems of the former USSR. Remittance service providers in these countries are not comparable to those in other countries, which incur high costs when having to bridge the national payment systems in two countries.

³² United Nations, n.d.

International students

The number of internationally mobile students globally has significantly increased over the last two decades, as highlighted by data collected by UNESCO.³³ In 2001, this number was at just over 2.2 million. A decade later, the number of internationally mobile students had grown to more than 3.8 million. This number continued to increase in the following years, rising to over 6 million in 2021, nearly triple the figure 20 years prior. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic and related mobility restrictions, the number of internationally mobile students remained strong (Figure 13). Between 2020 and 2021 – at the height of the pandemic – the number of internationally mobile students increased slightly (from 6.38 million to 6.39 million), defying expectations.

Figure 13. International students globally, 2001 to 2021




Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, n.d. (accessed 15 September 2023).

³³ UNESCO Institute for Statistics, n.d.

Historically, the population of internationally mobile students has been gendered, with male students consistently outnumbering female students. In 2001, there were around 1 million internationally mobile female students (45% of the total) and 1.2 million male students (54%). While this gap has narrowed over the last 20 years, the number of internationally mobile female students remains lower than that of male students (Figure 14). In 2021, around 3 million internationally mobile students were female (47%) and males comprised around 3.4 million (52%).

Figure 14. Internationally mobile students globally by gender, 2001–2021 (millions)



Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, n.d. (accessed 15 September 2023).

Countries in Asia are the origins of the largest number of internationally mobile students in the world. In 2021, more than 1 million internationally mobile students were from China, by far the highest number globally and more than double the number of students from India, which ranks second (around 508,000). Other significant origin countries include Viet Nam, Germany and Uzbekistan (around 100,000 each), although their numbers are far fewer than the top two origin countries. The United States is the largest destination country for internationally mobile students in the world (more than 833,000). The United States is followed by the United Kingdom (nearly 601,000), Australia (around 378,000), Germany (over 376,000) and Canada (nearly 318,000).

IOM's Health Assessment Programme

IOM's Migrant Health Assessment Programme provides pre-migration health activities to beneficiaries around the world. In 2022, over 904,000 migration health assessments were conducted, of which 15 per cent were among refugees and 85 per cent were among immigrants. This represented the highest annual number of migration health assessments in the programme's history and demonstrated its remarkable caseload increase following a reduction due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

IOM's Migration Health Division delivers and promotes comprehensive, preventive and curative health programming that is beneficial, accessible and equitable for migrants and mobile populations. Bridging the needs of both migrants and IOM Member States, the Division, in close collaboration with partners, contributes towards the physical, mental and social well-being of migrants, enabling them and host communities to achieve social and economic development.

More about IOM's Migration Health function can be found at www.iom.int/migration-health.

Refugees and asylum-seekers

By the end of 2022, there was a total of 35.3 million refugees globally, with 29.4 million under UNHCR's mandate,³⁴ and 5.9 million refugees registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East.³⁵ The total number of refugees is the highest captured by modern statistical reporting that does not include historical data.³⁶ The increase in the number of refugees between 2021 and 2022 is the largest yearly increase recorded, in large part as a result of refugees from Ukraine fleeing the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion.³⁷

There were also approximately 5.4 million people seeking international protection and awaiting determination of their refugee status, referred to as asylum-seekers. In 2022 alone, almost 2.9 million asylum applications were registered in 162 countries, the highest number of individual asylum applications on record. In 2022, the global number of first-instance new individual asylum claims lodged was 2.6 million, an increase of 83 per cent over 2021. The top recipient remained the United States with around 730,400 claims, a threefold increase from the previous year. Second was Germany, with 217,800 new claims, a notable increase from the previous year.

At the end of 2022, those under 18 years of age constituted around 41 per cent of the overall 35.3 million refugee population.³⁸ Unaccompanied and separated children lodged an estimated 51,700 individual asylum applications in 2022, a significant increase (89%) from the previous year.

³⁴ The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from UNHCR, 2023a. Please refer to this document for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented. UNHCR's previous Global Trends reports, as well as its Population Statistics database (UNHCR, n.d.) are other key sources of information.

³⁵ Generally, people under the UNRWA Mandate are living in their country of birth, so are not captured as part of international migrant stock estimates (unlike people who were born in one country and have been displaced to another).

³⁶ Historical data that are not captured, for example, include 1947 Partition displacement data and Second World War displacement data. See, for example, Gatrell (2013) on historical estimates of displaced persons.


³⁷ UNHCR, 2023a.

³⁸ Ibid.

New, unresolved or renewed conflict dynamics in key countries contributed significantly to current figures and trends. Of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate at the end of 2022, the top 10 countries of origin – the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Eritrea – accounted for more than 87 per cent of the total refugee population. Many of these countries, except Ukraine, have been among the top origins of refugees for several years.

The Russian Federation’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine resulted in one of the largest displacement crises since the Second World War. Around 5.7 million Ukrainians had been forced to flee their country by the end of 2022, making Ukraine the second-largest origin country of refugees in the world after the Syrian Arab Republic. The protracted conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic meant that the country continued to be the largest origin of refugees in the world at the end of 2022 (6.5 million), although this was a decrease from 6.8 million in 2021. Moreover, the instability and violence that has made Afghanistan a major source of refugees for over 30 years has continued, with the country being the third-largest origin country in the world, with about 5.7 million refugees in 2022; this is an increase from 2.7 million in 2021. Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of the Congo comprised over half of the world’s refugee population. Figure 15 shows the trends in refugee numbers for the top five countries of origin from 2005 to 2022. The impact of the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine is clearly illustrated; in 2021, for example, Ukraine was the origin of just over 27,000 refugees.


Figure 15. Number of refugees by top five countries of origin, 2005–2022 (millions)



Source: UNHCR, n.d. (accessed 17 June 2023).
 Note: South Sudan became a country in 2011.

Consistent with the previous years, more than half of all refugees resided in 10 countries. In 2022, Türkiye was the largest host country in the world, with nearly 3.6 million refugees, mainly Syrians (see Figure 16). Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were also among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries, as the two principal hosts of refugees from Afghanistan, the second-largest origin country. Uganda, the Russian Federation, Germany, the Sudan, Poland, Bangladesh and Ethiopia comprised the rest. The vast majority (70%) of refugees and other people in need of international protection were hosted in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. According to UNHCR, the least developed countries hosted a large number of refugees; for example, one in five of all refugees globally were hosted in sub-Saharan Africa, while 90 per cent of all refugees in Asia and the Pacific were hosted in just three countries: the Islamic Republic of Iran (3.4 million), Pakistan (1.7 million) and Bangladesh (952,400).

Figure 16. Number of refugees by top five host countries, 2005–2022 (millions)



Source: UNHCR, n.d. (accessed 17 June 2023).

Note: As of 30 June 2023, the registration and formal recognition of Ukrainians in the Russian Federation were still ongoing and therefore not all those reported had the formal status of refugees (see UNHCR, 2022).

In 2022, over 339,000 refugees returned to their countries of origin, a decrease of 21 per cent from the year before. Most returns (151,300) were to South Sudan, the majority of these being from Uganda (75,500).

While there are many challenges to measuring those benefiting from local integration, UNHCR estimates that in 2022, 28 countries reported at least one or more naturalized refugee (compared with 23 countries in 2021), with a total of more than 50,800 naturalized refugees for the year – a decrease from 56,700 newly naturalized refugees in 2021, but still an increase when compared with the 23,000 reported in 2016. In 2022, most naturalizations occurred in Europe, the majority of which (approximately 23,300 refugees) were in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Around 18,700 refugees received long-term resident permits in Canada. Overall, refugees who received permanent residence or citizenship (globally) were largely from the Syrian Arab Republic (14,400), Eritrea (4,700) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (3,300).

In 2022, over 114,000 refugees were admitted for resettlement globally, double the number in 2021 (57,500) and a return to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels. Canada resettled the largest number of refugees (47,600), followed by the United States (29,000). Resettlements both to Canada and the United States increased compared with 2021, with arrivals to Canada increasing by 133 per cent and those resettled in the United States doubling (from 13,700). The largest number of those resettled to Canada were Afghans, while refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo comprised most resettlements to the United States. Resettlements to Australia also increased significantly from the previous year, quadrupling to 17,300.

Over the last 10 years, the number of refugees in need of resettlement has dramatically increased, almost doubling in size. UNHCR estimated that in 2011 there were approximately 805,000 refugees in need of resettlement, which has increased to nearly 1.5 million for 2022.³⁹ The number of resettled refugees has fluctuated over the years. In 2005, almost 81,000 refugees were resettled, compared with around 57,000 in 2021. However, in 2022, the number resettled was more than 114,000. Overall, resettlement has not kept up with the significant increase in need (see Table 3).

Table 3. Number of refugees needing resettlement and number of refugees resettled globally, from 2005

Year	Total projected resettlement needs (including multi-year planning), persons	Resettlement arrivals	Proportion resettled (%)
2005	–	80,734	–
2006	–	71,660	–
2007	–	75,271	–
2008	–	88,772	–
2009	–	112,455	–
2010	–	98,719	–
2011	805,535	79,727	9.90
2012	781,299	88,918	11.38
2013	859,305	98,359	11.45
2014	690,915	105,148	15.22
2015	958,429	106,997	11.16
2016	1,153,296	172,797	14.98
2017	1,190,519	102,709	8.63
2018	1,195,349	92,348	7.73
2019	1,428,011	107,729	7.54
2020	1,440,408	34,383	2.39
2021	1,445,383	57,436	3.97
2022	1,473,156	114,242	7.75


Source: UNHCR, n.d. (accessed 17 June 2023).

Note: Projected Global Resettlement Needs Report by UNHCR is available from 2011.

³⁹ UNHCR 2010 and 2021.

Refugee resettlement has been increasing since 2021 and returned to pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels by the end of 2022. Resettlement figures dropped sharply in 2020, in part due to the effect of the pandemic, which severely limited international movements worldwide. In 2021, the United States revised and increased its annual refugee cap, resulting in the recent uptick in resettlements to the country. However, despite the increase in refugee resettlement, various refugee crises and new displacement situations mean that resettlement needs have risen significantly. There were 16 new refugees for each refugee that was returned or resettled in 2022.⁴⁰ Moreover, an estimated 2.4 million refugees will be in need of resettlement in 2024, a 20 per cent increase from 2023.⁴¹ Figure 17 provides an overview of resettlement statistics for key countries from 2002 to 2022.

Figure 17. Number of refugees resettled by major resettlement countries in 2002–2022



Source: UNHCR, n.d. (accessed 17 June 2023).

⁴⁰ UNHCR, 2023a.

⁴¹ UNHCR, 2023b.

IOM's role in resettlement

IOM plays a key role in global resettlement. Providing essential support to States in resettling refugees and other humanitarian entrants is a fundamental purpose and is among its largest ongoing activities. Beyond traditional refugee resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes, more States are interested in or are currently carrying out other forms of admission, such as private sponsorships, academic scholarships and labour mobility schemes. IOM's movement data for resettlement assistance refer to the overall number of refugees and other persons of concern travelling under IOM auspices from various countries of departure to destinations around the world during a given period.

In 2022, more than 120,700 persons travelled under IOM's auspices through resettlement, humanitarian admissions and relocation programmes, with significant operations out of Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, Pakistan and Qatar.^a Of the beneficiaries, 49 per cent were female and 51 per cent were male. Overall, IOM assisted 30 States in conducting these operations. Of the above-mentioned figure, 710 persons in need of international protection were relocated from Greece, Italy and Cyprus to eight different European Economic Area countries, while 97 movements were conducted through complementary pathways from Eritrea, Afghanistan and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Moreover, new resettlement countries, such as Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay have provided support in welcoming refugees for resettlement, with IOM and UNHCR – through the Sustainable Resettlement and Complementary Pathways Initiative (CRISP) – assisting with building resettlement capacity and technical expertise in these countries. The top three resettlement countries in 2022 were Canada (44,772), the United States (42,365) and Australia (7,773).

IOM supports its Member States in implementing a variety of resettlement, relocation and other humanitarian admission schemes, many of which are well-established programmes, while others are ad hoc responses to specific forced migration crises.

Given the high needs and lack of available places for resettlement, IOM continues to engage with actors on increasing accessibility to safe and legal pathways. Under cooperative agreements, IOM provides stakeholders with necessary information and shares data with key partners, such as UNHCR, resettlement countries and settlement agencies. IOM works in close collaboration with UNHCR on a regular basis to verify and better align aggregate data related to resettlement, specifically around figures for departures. For more information on IOM's resettlement activities, see www.iom.int/resettlement-assistance.

^a IOM, 2023b.

Internally displaced persons

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) compiles data on two types of internal displacement: new displacements during a given period, and the total stock of internally displaced persons (IDPs) at a given point in time. This statistical information is categorized by two broad displacement causes: (a) disasters and (b) conflict and violence. However, IDMC acknowledges the challenges associated with distinguishing between disasters and conflict as the immediate cause of displacement and highlights the growing need to identify better ways to report on displacement in the context of multiple drivers.⁴²

At an estimated 62.5 million, the total global stock of people internally displaced by conflict and violence in 65 countries and territories as of 31 December 2022 was the highest on record since IDMC began monitoring in 1998. As with trends for refugees (discussed in the previous section), intractable and new conflicts have meant that the total number of persons internally displaced by conflict and violence has more than doubled since 2012.

Figure 18 shows the world's top 20 countries with the largest number of IDPs displaced due to conflict and violence (stock) at the end of 2022. Most countries were either in the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa. The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced due to conflict (nearly 6.9 million) by the end of 2022, followed by Ukraine (5.9 million). The Democratic Republic of the Congo had the third-highest number (almost 5.7 million), followed by Colombia (around 4.8 million) and Yemen (4.5 million).


In terms of proportion of national population, the Syrian Arab Republic, whose conflict has dragged on for over a decade, had over 32 per cent of its population displaced due to conflict and violence. Somalia had the second-highest proportion (22%), followed by South Sudan, Yemen and Ukraine (with over 13%). It is important to note, however, that especially for protracted displacement cases, such as in Colombia, some people who have returned to their places of origin and to their homes may still be counted as internally displaced. This is because, in some cases, a durable solution has not been achieved.⁴³ Organizations such as IDMC follow the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons framework, which stipulates eight criteria that constitute a durable solution in determining when people should no longer be considered internally displaced.⁴⁴

⁴² IDMC highlights the challenges in collecting data on displacements due to development projects, criminal violence or slow-onset disasters, as well as their efforts to overcome these difficulties. See IDMC, 2019:72–73.

⁴³ A durable solution is achieved “when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement.” See, for example, Brookings Institution and University of Bern, 2010.

⁴⁴ The criteria include: safety and security; adequate standard of living; access to livelihoods; restoration of housing, land and property; access to documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; and access to effective remedies and justice. See, for example, Brookings Institution and University of Bern, 2010; IDMC, 2019.

Figure 18. Top 20 countries with the largest populations of internally displaced persons by conflict and violence at the end of 2022 (millions)



Source: IDMC, n.d. (accessed 21 May 2023); UN DESA, 2022b.

Notes: IDP populations refer to the accumulated number of people displaced over time. The population size used to calculate the percentage of conflict IDPs is based on the total resident population of the country per UN DESA population estimates (2022).

In 2022, the global total number of persons displaced by disasters was around 8.7 million persons across 88 countries and territories. These people were reported to be still living in displacement at the end of 2022 due to disasters that occurred in 2022.


Displacements in 2022

By the end of 2022, there had been a total of 60.9 million internal displacements, 60 per cent more than in 2021 and the highest figure on record. Of these displacements, 53 per cent (32.6 million) were triggered by disasters and 47 per cent (28.3 million) were caused by conflict and violence.⁴⁵

In 2022, Ukraine (over 16 million) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (4 million) topped the list with the highest numbers of displacements caused by conflict and violence, considerably influencing global numbers as a result. They were followed by Ethiopia (2 million), Myanmar (1 million) and Somalia (621,000). Pakistan experienced the highest absolute numbers of disaster displacements in 2022 (approximately 8.2 million).⁴⁶

As shown in Figure 19, in previous years, annual disaster displacements outnumbered displacements associated with conflict and violence. IDMC notes, however, that a significant portion of the global total of displacements by disasters is usually associated with short-term evacuations in a relatively safe and orderly manner.

Figure 19. Internal displacements due to conflict and disasters, 2012–2022 (millions)



Source: IDMC, n.d. (accessed 21 May 2023).

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in a given year, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. Displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during a given year.

⁴⁵ The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from IDMC, 2023. Please refer to these documents for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented. IDMC’s previous [Global Estimates reports](#), as well as its Global Internal Displacement Database (IDMC, n.d.), are other key sources of information.

⁴⁶ IDMC highlights possible reasons for these changes, including stabilization of front lines of conflicts, ceasefires, restrictions on freedom of movement and changes in methodology for data collection.

IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix

IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) programme gathers and analyses data to disseminate critical multilayered information on displacement and population mobility. DTM's data collection and analysis enables decision makers and responders to provide these populations with better context-specific and evidence-based assistance. Data are shared in the form of maps, infographics, reports, interactive web-based visualizations and raw or customized data exports. Based on a given context, the DTM gathers information on populations, locations, conditions, needs and vulnerabilities, using one or more of the following methodological tools:

- Tracking mobility and multisectoral needs at area and location level to monitor needs and target assistance;
- Monitoring movement ("flow") trends and the overall situation at origin, transit and destination points;
- Registering displaced individuals and households for beneficiary selection and vulnerability targeting and programming;
- Conducting surveys to gather specific in-depth information from populations of interest.

DTM has been operating since 2004 and by June 2022, operating in more than 120 countries, the DTM had tracked/identified nearly 45 million IDPs, 40.4 million returnees and 6.2 million migrants. IOM's DTM database is one of the largest sources for global annual estimates on internal displacement compiled by IDMC. For more information on IOM's DTM, see <http://dtm.iom.int>.

Conclusions

It is important to understand migration and displacement, and how they are changing globally, given their relevance to States, local communities and individuals. Human migration and displacement may be age-old phenomena that stretch back to the earliest periods of human history, but their manifestations and impacts have changed over time as the world has become more globalized and we increasingly experience major global transformations in geopolitical, environmental and technological domains.⁴⁷

As every new day passes, we have more data and information on migration and displacement globally at our disposal; yet the very nature of migration in an interconnected world means that its dynamics can be difficult to capture in statistical terms. Differences in definitions, conceptualizations and cultural constructs, as well as unexpected events that pose new and unforeseen challenges can hamper our collective understandings of how migration is changing. That said, we witnessed entirely new data sets emerge quickly during COVID-19, including from IOM and other United Nations agencies, large technology companies and academic institutions.

We are also seeing how the increasing digitalization of migration and mobility – the lifeblood of which is data – is being increasingly utilized as part of ongoing efforts to develop big new data sets for capturing movements and anticipating and preparing solutions. Reducing global inequality is also supported by data collection and analysis. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration emphasizes a commitment to improving international cooperation on migration, as well as collecting migration data and undertaking research and analysis so that we may better understand trends and evolving patterns and processes, to support the development of evidence-based responses. The long-term data clearly show that the implementation of the Global Compact is an urgent and overdue priority, as global mobility inequality has deepened over the last 25 years (see Chapter 4 of this report).

The global data also show that displacement caused by conflict, generalized violence and other factors continues to trend upward to new highs. Intractable, unresolved, recurring and newly reignited conflicts and violence have led to an increase in the number of refugees around the world. While a handful of countries continue to provide solutions for refugees, overall these have been profoundly and persistently insufficient in addressing global needs and we have seen the proportion of refugees resettled drop over time. In addition, there are estimated to be more people displaced internally than ever before. The harsh reality is that we continue to read about the “new high” in global displacement (since the commencement of robust data collection) every time annual aggregated global data are released year after year. The United Nations Action Agenda on internal displacement provides a critically needed platform for highlighting and responding to this issue, which is underpinned by a combination of complex factors.

⁴⁷ McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018; McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.

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MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

The previous chapter provides an overview of migration globally, with specific reference to international migrants and migration flows. Particular migrant groups – including international students, refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – and international remittances were also discussed. Chapter 3 is focused primarily at the regional level in order to provide a more detailed picture of migration, which sets out a different but complementary perspective on migrants and movements in different parts of the world.¹

Our starting point is geographic, rather than thematic, given that geography is one of the fundamentals underpinning migration today, just as it was in the past. Notwithstanding increasing globalization, geography is one of the most significant factors shaping patterns of migration and displacement. Many people who migrate across borders do so within their immediate regions, to countries that are close by, countries to which it may be easier to travel, that may be more familiar, and from which it may also be easier to return. For people who are displaced, finding safety quickly is paramount. People, therefore, tend to be displaced to safer locations nearby, whether that is within their own countries or across international borders.

This chapter seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners, researchers and students to make better sense of international migration globally by using a geographic perspective to present regional migration overviews. The analysis in this chapter focuses on six world regions as defined by the United Nations, and used by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and other organizations:

- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Northern America
- Oceania

For each of these regions, the analysis includes: (a) an overview and brief discussion of key migration statistics based on data compiled and reported by UN DESA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC); and (b) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses from international organizations, researchers and analysts.

To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, the descriptive narratives of key features and developments are presented at the subregional level. For Asia, for example, this cascade approach allows for the presentation of insights from statistical data on Asia as a whole, followed by summary information on subregions, including Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, South-East Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. A breakdown of the regions and subregions is provided in Appendix A. These subregional overviews provide information on migration patterns from, within and to the subregions.² Beyond this, attention has been paid to particular features that exist in a subregion, such as labour migration and international remittances, irregular migration, human trafficking, and displacement (internal and international). The subregional overviews are not intended to be exhaustive, but are designed to be illustrative of key trends and recent changes in migration.

It is important to note that this chapter builds on the previous regional chapters of the World Migration Reports of 2018, 2020 and 2022 by providing an update on statistics and current issues.³ Significant changes over the two years since the last edition of the World Migration Report have been reflected in this chapter (up until the end of October 2023), which incorporates some of the recent data and information on migration. Recent events, including those related to conflict and disaster displacement events in countries such as Ukraine, the Sudan, Pakistan, Türkiye, Haiti and Malawi are discussed, as well as some of the key policy developments across the various subregions. The chapter draws on the existing evidence base, and sources are provided in endnotes and the references section. We encourage readers to refer to sources cited in this chapter to learn more about topics of interest. Thematic chapters in this volume may also be of interest, including those on migration and human security, gender and migration, COVID-19 impacts, and recent developments in the global governance of migration.


Africa⁴

Migration in Africa involves large numbers of international migrants moving both within and from the region. As shown in Figure 1, most international migration occurs within the region. The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)⁵ show that around 21 million Africans were living in another African country, a significant increase from 2015, when around 18 million Africans were estimated to be living outside of their country of origin but within the region. The number of Africans living in different regions also grew during the same period, from around 17 million in 2015 to over 19.5 million in 2020.

Figure 1 shows that since 2000, international migration within the African region has increased significantly. Since 1990, the number of African migrants living outside of the region has more than doubled, with the growth in Europe most pronounced. In 2020, most African-born migrants living outside the region were residing in Europe (11 million), Asia (nearly 5 million) and Northern America (around 3 million).

One of the most striking aspects to note about international migrants in Africa, as shown in Figure 1, is the small number of migrants who were born outside of the region and have since moved there. From 2015 to 2020, the number of migrants born outside the region remained virtually unchanged (around 2 million), most of whom were from Asia and Europe.

Figure 1. Migrants to, within and from Africa, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Africa” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Africa) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Africa” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Africa) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the African region. “Migrants from Africa” refers to people born in Africa who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

In Africa, the proportion of female and male migrants in the top destination countries is similar, with only slight differences between countries. The most visible exception is Libya, where the share of male immigrants is significantly higher than that of female immigrants. This dynamic is broadly similar in the top 10 origin countries in Africa, apart from Egypt – the top country of origin in the region – which has a far greater share of male emigrants compared to females.

Figure 2. Top 10 African destination (left) and origin (right) countries by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

Displacement within and from Africa remains a major feature of the region, as shown in Figure 3. Most refugees on the continent were hosted in neighbouring countries within the region. The top 10 countries in Africa, ranked by the combined total of refugees and asylum-seekers both hosted by and originating from that country, are shown in Figure 3. South Sudan continued to be the country of origin of the largest number of refugees in Africa (around 2.3 million) and ranked fourth globally, after the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Afghanistan. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan were the origin of the second and third largest number of refugees on the continent (more than 900,000 and over 800,000, respectively). Other origin countries of a significant number of refugees include Somalia (nearly 800,000) and the Central African Republic (more than 748,000). Among host countries, Uganda – with nearly 1.5 million – continued to be home to the largest number of refugees in Africa in 2022. Most refugees in Uganda originated from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition to producing a significant number of refugees, countries such as the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also hosted large refugee populations by end of 2022 (nearly 1.1 million and over half a million, respectively). Ethiopia, with nearly 900,000 refugees, was the third largest host country of refugees in Africa in 2022.

Figure 3. Top 10 African countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

Consistent with previous years, the majority of internal displacements in Africa in 2022 occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, with most triggered by conflict and violence. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (over 4 million) and Ethiopia (more than 2 million) had the largest internal displacements due to conflict and violence. Somalia, with 621,000 displacements caused by conflict, had the third largest in the region. The largest disaster displacements were recorded in Nigeria (around 2.4 million), followed by Somalia (1.2 million), Ethiopia (873,000) and South Sudan (596,000).

Figure 4. Top 20 African countries by internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Africa⁶

North Africa

Irregular migration to, through and from North Africa remains the defining feature of migration dynamics in the subregion, with many migrants suffering human rights abuses. North Africa is a point of departure for thousands of migrants who embark on journeys, largely along the west and central Mediterranean routes. Across the subregion, especially in countries of transit such as Libya, well-established smuggling and trafficking networks have developed over the years.⁷ In Libya, at points of maritime departure toward Europe, beatings, torture and forced labour of migrants have been well documented.⁸ Women and girls in particular are at heightened risk of gender-based violence, especially during desert crossings and at border areas.⁹ Thousands of migrants have also lost their lives. The central Mediterranean route is the deadliest route globally, with more than 20,000 migrants having died or disappeared along this route between 2014 and 2022.¹⁰ In response to these ongoing challenges along the central Mediterranean route, the European Commission proposed a European Union action plan in November 2022, which outlines “20 measures designed to reduce irregular and unsafe migration, provide solutions to the emerging challenges in the area of search and rescue and reinforce solidarity balanced against responsibility between member States.”¹¹ While some actions in the Plan – including those focused on supporting as well as facilitating the sharing of responsibility – have been welcomed by a range of actors, others, including some NGOs, have criticized it as unworkable and a recycling of old mistakes.¹²

Recent attacks on sub-Saharan African migrants living in parts of North Africa highlight xenophobia and racism in parts of the subregion. In Tunisia, for example, political rhetoric in early 2023, accusing migrants from sub-Saharan Africa of fostering crime and threatening the demographic composition and national identity of the country, led to racist violence within the country.¹³ In addition to verbal and physical abuse, some migrants lost their jobs and others were evicted from their homes.¹⁴ This rhetoric – reminiscent of the anti-immigrant political discourse in several countries across Europe in recent years – has been spurred on by some media outlets and online platforms in Tunisia.¹⁵ Several countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali organized repatriation flights for their citizens who were desperate to leave.¹⁶ The hate speech and violence against sub-Saharan African migrants prompted the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to issue a statement calling on Tunisia to “combat all forms of racial discrimination and racist violence against black Africans, especially migrants from the south of the Sahara and black Tunisian citizens.”¹⁷ A range of abuses and violence have also been documented in Libya, with a 2022 report of the United Nations Human Rights Office highlighting how migrants are routinely subjected to racism, xenophobia, criminalization and other human rights violations.¹⁸

International remittances remain significant to North Africa and are major sources of foreign exchange for several countries in the subregion. Remittances became even more important following the onset of COVID-19, as revenues from tourism – which had long been vital for countries such as Egypt – dried up due to mobility restrictions. The subregion has a long history of emigration, with large numbers of emigrants living in Europe and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. For example, Saudi Arabia was home to nearly one million Egyptians in 2020.¹⁹ In 2022, Egypt is estimated to have received more than 28 billion United States dollars (USD) in international remittances, making it the seventh largest recipient after India, Mexico, China, the Philippines, France and Pakistan.²⁰ Morocco, which ranks among the top 20 recipient countries of international remittances globally, is estimated to have received over USD 11 billion in 2022, accounting for 8 per cent of its GDP.²¹

North Africa is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with the subregion affected by both slow-onset and rapid-onset events, resulting in significant displacements in recent years. The subregion has experienced significant warming over the last several decades, while at the same time seeing its rainfall decrease during the wet season, particularly in countries such as Libya, Algeria and Morocco.²² While the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries are some of the most impacted by climate change, they are considered among the least prepared.²³ The World Bank's 2021 Groundswell report projects that without tangible action on climate and development, millions of people across North Africa could be forced to move within their countries as a result of climate change.²⁴ Already one of the most water-stressed parts of the world, climate change could further exacerbate this reality, and we are already seeing impacts on agriculture and food production in the subregion. Increased water scarcity could also escalate existing conflicts and violence. In Libya, local militias have weaponized water scarcity, including using water infrastructure for leverage against the central government and other rivals.²⁵ Moreover, the protracted conflict in Libya has left it with low adaptive capacity, and the combination of conflict and climate change impacts have disrupted food production and displaced many from their communities.²⁶ Countries such as Algeria and Morocco have experienced significant displacements triggered by droughts and wildfires. By end of 2022, wildfires induced 9,500 displacements in parts of northern Morocco, and in the same year, 2,000 displacements – also due to wildfires – were recorded in north-eastern Algeria.²⁷ Wildfires also destroyed significant swaths of land, especially in Morocco, where they ruined more land in 2022 than in the previous nine years combined.²⁸

Conflict and violence continue to cause cross-border and internal displacement, while the subregion also hosts large numbers of refugees in protracted situations. Displacement in the subregion is largely driven by conflict and violence.²⁹ In the Sudan, intense fighting between the country's military and its main paramilitary force erupted in April 2023, killing hundreds of people and forcing thousands to flee for safety, the majority within the country but others across borders, including to neighbouring countries such as South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Chad.³⁰ Prior to this, the Sudan had seen violent clashes between clans and communities over access to land and control of resources, especially in West Darfur.³¹ At the end 2022, the Sudan had more than 3.5 million IDPs and over 300,000 displacements as a result of conflict and violence.³² The Sudan also hosts one of the largest refugee populations in Africa, and in 2022, the country was home to around 1 million refugees and asylum-seekers.³³ Most came from South Sudan, Eritrea, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, in Libya, although the October 2020 ceasefire agreement between warring factions remains intact, it has not been fully implemented, and the country continues to experience political instability, albeit with a significantly reduced number of people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence.³⁴ Libya had around 135,000 conflict IDPs in 2022, the lowest since 2013.³⁵

Eastern and Southern Africa

The subregion has experienced a significant increase in intraregional migrants, driven in part by free movement arrangements. The number of migrant workers residing within East African Community (EAC) countries reached nearly 3 million in 2019, growing from just under 1.5 million in 2010.³⁶ Within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the number increased to over 3 million, doubling since 2010.³⁷ Efforts to enhance integration in the subregion – including through the East African Common Market Protocol, which entered into force in 2010 and aims to realize the free movement of persons, labour, capital, services and goods – have been vital to removing barriers to employment. While not fully implemented across all countries, many citizens of the EAC have the right to entry and work within the Community and have access to the free processing of work permits.³⁸ To further bolster integration and facilitate labour mobility within the subregion, several States within the

EAC have also advanced frameworks on mutual skills recognition, playing “an important role in providing migrant workers access to other markets.”³⁹ In 2021, IGAD member States adopted a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, which is also the first free movement protocol globally to address the movement of people across borders in response to the adverse impacts of climate change.⁴⁰ Simultaneously, and in recognition of the significance of pastoralism as one of the key forms of livelihood in the region, IGAD member States adopted a Protocol on Transhumance, which has the objective of facilitating free, safe and orderly cross-border mobility of transhumant livestock and herders.⁴¹ The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) also has protocols on free movement, but their implementation has been slow.⁴² There has been renewed impetus, however, to facilitate free movement among COMESA member States, with two task forces created to help advance the implementation of the protocols.⁴³

While free movement protocols have been instrumental in enabling people to easily move across borders, irregular migration – both within and from the subregion – remains a challenge. In Eastern Africa, irregular migration often occurs along four key routes: the southern route, towards Southern Africa (mainly to South Africa); the Horn of Africa route (movements within the Horn of Africa); the northern route, towards North Africa and Europe; and the eastern route, towards the Arabian Peninsula (mainly to Saudi Arabia).⁴⁴ Often facilitated by smugglers, the journeys migrants embark on along these routes are fraught with risks. Along the southern route to South Africa, for example, migrants encounter multiple challenges and risks, including having to make unexpected payments to brokers; they often lack sufficient funds for basics such as food; and some experience physical, sexual, psychological and other abuses.⁴⁵

Climate change induced disasters such as droughts, hurricanes and floods have devastated livelihoods in Eastern and Southern Africa, while also displacing millions of people in the subregion. By March 2023, the East and Horn of Africa subregion was experiencing a record drought, the worst in more than 40 years.⁴⁶ Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia have been most affected, with the drought coming on top of years of insecurity and conflict, particularly in Somalia and Ethiopia. The consequences have been far-reaching, and across the IGAD subregion 27 million people were highly food insecure, with predictions of a famine in Somalia in 2023.⁴⁷ By May 2023, more than 2 million people had been internally displaced due to drought in Ethiopia and Somalia (combined), while over 866,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia were living in drought-affected areas at the start of the year.⁴⁸ In response to the growing intensity of the adverse effects of climate change and its expanding geographical scale of climate-induced mobility, more than 10 States of the East and Horn of Africa subregion, supported by IGAD and the EAC, came together in September 2022 in Kampala, Uganda, and signed a historic new Declaration: the Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (KDMECC).⁴⁹ The Declaration lists 12 commitments articulated by the signatory States and five requests to the parties to the UNFCCC, under a collaborative framework that concretely addresses climate-induced mobility whilst driving forward the sustainable development of States. In Southern Africa, disasters linked to climate change, including cyclones, have become more frequent and intense.⁵⁰ Cyclone Freddy, for example, wreaked havoc in Malawi, Mozambique and Madagascar in early 2023 and was one of the longest-lasting tropical cyclones ever recorded.⁵¹ The cyclone claimed more than 500 lives, and displaced over 500,000 people in Malawi alone.⁵²

Newly emerged and longstanding armed conflicts remain significant drivers of displacement in the subregion. Eastern Africa has been beset by conflicts for decades and remains one of the most conflict-affected subregions in the world. The decades-long civil war in Somalia, increased Al-Shabab attacks as well as government counter-insurgency operations in response made 2022 the deadliest year in the country since 2018, while also triggering mass displacement.⁵³ An estimated 3.9 million people were living in internal displacement in Somalia at the end of 2022, a rise of nearly 1 million from the year prior.⁵⁴ In South Sudan, despite the 2018 peace agreement, intercommunal violence remains widespread and has resulted in considerable internal and cross-border displacement, with most internal displacements in 2022 taking place in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states.⁵⁵ The country continued to be among the largest origin countries of refugees in Africa (more than 2 million), with most residing in Uganda, the Sudan and Ethiopia.⁵⁶ At the same time, Ethiopia underwent a brutal civil war in the north of the country, resulting in significant loss of lives, destruction of property and the displacement of millions of people. The armed conflict that broke out in the Sudan in April 2023 (see North Africa section) has resulted in significant internal and cross-border displacement, forcing many Sudanese to seek refuge in Eastern African countries such as South Sudan and Ethiopia. At end of July 2023, South Sudan alone had received nearly 200,000 new refugee arrivals from the Sudan.⁵⁷ The conflict has also meant that many refugees who had been hosted by the Sudan, including from countries such as Ethiopia, have fled to neighbouring countries or returned home.⁵⁸ A November 2022 peace deal resulted in a ceasefire, restoring security in the worst-affected areas of Afar, Amhara and Tigray, although significant humanitarian needs remain.⁵⁹ The Office of the United Nations Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, together with IGAD and in partnership with United Nations agencies, have developed a Regional Prevention and Integration Strategy for the Horn of Africa, with provisions for the establishment of a Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism with the primary objective to support IGAD and strengthen the capacities of regional, national and local actors to address the linkages between climate, peace and security.

Gulf States remain key destination countries for migrant workers from the subregion, particularly those from Eastern Africa. Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are the main origin countries of migrant workers from the subregion to GCC States, with most working in hospitality, security, construction and retail.⁶⁰ Driven by high rates of unemployment and underemployment, as well as the prospect for higher wages, many young people seek employment opportunities in the Gulf.⁶¹ The Gulf's close proximity, coupled with the increasing difficulty of gaining entry to previously traditional destination countries (for example, the United Kingdom and the United States), have made GCC States attractive labour migration options. The proliferation of recruitment firms across Eastern Africa, as well as several bilateral labour agreements, have also contributed to the significant increase in labour migration to the Gulf.⁶² Regular and irregular labour migration from Eastern Africa to the Gulf are both prevalent and have increased over time, making the eastern corridor one of the busiest maritime migration routes in the world.⁶³ Labour migration to the Gulf has resulted in a substantial increase in remittances, especially to countries such as Kenya and Uganda. Remittances to Kenya and Uganda climbed to more than USD 4 billion and over USD 1.2 billion, respectively, in part due to increased inflows from GCC States.⁶⁴ Saudi Arabia now ranks only behind the United Kingdom and the United States as the third largest source of remittances to Kenya.⁶⁵ While several GCC States are implementing measures to reduce abuse of migrant workers – including reforming the Kafala system – the mistreatment and exploitation of migrant workers remains widespread.⁶⁶ Some of the most prevalent abuses include physical and sexual violence, restriction of freedom, abusive and coercive employment practices and deceptive, unfair and unsafe work environments.⁶⁷

West and Central Africa

Parts of the subregion remain hotspots of conflict, insecurity and violent extremism, with the Sahel continuing to be the most volatile. The Sahel region of Africa, which stretches from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, has long been an area of significant migration flows. The region faces ongoing crises including climate and environmental degradation, desertification, political and institutional instability, a lack of basic services, intercommunity conflicts between nomadic herders and farmers and the rapid rise of violent extremism.⁶⁸ The Sahel has long been affected by insecurity, characterized by armed conflict, military clashes and recurrent violence instigated by Islamist groups. The Central Sahel is the most affected by violence, with many civilians killed in 2022 alone.⁶⁹ The Central Sahel was thrown into further turmoil in 2021 after military coups in Burkina Faso and Mali, which resulted in their suspensions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union.⁷⁰ In 2022, there were more than 2.9 million refugees and internally displaced persons in Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger.⁷¹ Clashes have spilled over to neighbouring countries such as Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin. Moreover, children have been targeted by non-State armed groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger with hundreds, many of them girls, abducted.⁷² In addition to ongoing conflict and insecurity, West and Central Africa is affected by an interplay of other factors, including climate change and food insecurity. Rainfall in the Sahel, for example, has decreased by over 20 per cent since the 1970s, making this part of Africa one of the most prone to droughts.⁷³ At the same time, parts of the subregion have experienced significant sudden-onset disasters, which have displaced millions of people. Nigeria, for example, had the largest number of internal displacements due to disasters in sub-Saharan Africa in 2022 (more than 2.4 million).⁷⁴ This was also highest figure recorded in Nigeria in ten years.⁷⁵ The displacements were largely the result of floods between June and November 2022.⁷⁶

Each year, tens of thousands of migrants from West and Central Africa undertake highly risky irregular migration journeys, as many try to make their way to Europe. Migrant abuses are common on these journeys, including along several key routes between West and Central Africa and North Africa, the Sahara, or during sea crossings.⁷⁷ Irregular migration from West and Central Africa often occurs along the central Mediterranean route (sea crossings from North African countries and the Middle East mainly to Italy); the western Mediterranean route (consisting of several subroutes linking Morocco and Algeria to Spain); and the west African Atlantic route (from West African coastal countries and Morocco to the Canary Islands in Spain).⁷⁸ In 2022 alone, nearly 2,800 deaths and disappearances were recorded along the central Mediterranean route, the west African Atlantic route, the western Mediterranean route and other routes in West and Central Africa.⁷⁹ Due to limited search and rescue operations, these figures are very likely an underestimate. The west African Atlantic route is considered very dangerous because of the length of the journey, with migrants often stuck at sea for long periods on inadequate boats in areas of the Atlantic Ocean lacking dedicated rescue operations.⁸⁰ More than 29,000 nationals from West and Central Africa arrived in Europe along these various routes in 2022, with most (58%) arriving in Italy, 17 per cent in Spain, 21 per cent in Cyprus and Malta and 4 per cent in Greece.⁸¹

In West and Central Africa, intraregional migration remains a prominent feature of migration dynamics, with most international migrants living within the subregion. West and Central Africa was home to more than 11 million international migrants in 2020, with the large majority coming from countries within the subregion.⁸² The subregion is home to half a billion people, 40 per cent of whom are under the age of 15.⁸³ The number of young people is projected to grow further, which could be a demographic dividend or further put pressure on a subregion already struggling with high rates of unemployment, especially among young people. Moreover, West and Central Africa suffers from high levels of poverty and large gender gaps when it comes to areas such as workforce participation and education attainment.⁸⁴ Intraregional migration in West Africa – estimated to be around

70 per cent of migration flows – is to a large extent due to labour mobility and involves temporary, seasonal and permanent migration of workers, with countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana the key destinations.⁸⁵ The ECOWAS free movement protocol has played a key role in facilitating labour mobility in West Africa; in fact, all countries in the subregion are members of this regional economic community, which means that citizens of ECOWAS member States have the right to enter, reside in and establish economic activities in another member State.⁸⁶ However, while ECOWAS has made significant strides when it comes to enabling free movement, the full implementation of its protocol is yet to be realized. The protocol continues to be undermined by a range of challenges, including those related to varying national interests and poor infrastructure, among others.⁸⁷ The Economic Community of Central African States also has a protocol of free movement; however, progress on its implementation has been slow and not a priority of Central African States, several of which continue to struggle with significant political instability.⁸⁸ Nonetheless, countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon – with large lumber and oil industries – attract a significant number of migrant workers from the subregion.⁸⁹


The 2022 football World Cup highlighted some of the benefits of migration with many players of West African descent, for example, proving critical to national teams in Europe. National teams across the world comprise players of diverse backgrounds, including players representing countries in which they were not born, and others who are children of migrants. The 2022 World Cup in Qatar had the largest share of foreign-born players in the tournament's history, with 137 of the 830 players (17%) representing countries in which they were not born.⁹⁰ Countries such as Morocco and Qatar had the highest number of foreign-born players.⁹¹ Across European national teams, of players who were not foreign born, many were of African descent.⁹² For example, several star players on the French team, including Kylian Mbappé and Paul Pogba, have family links to the subregion.⁹³ However, it is important to also highlight that for the vast majority of young people in the subregion with the desire to play football in Europe, the opportunities to migrate and successfully join football clubs in regions such as Europe are extremely limited. For most, their aspirations are often fraught with significant risks and dangers. Migrant smugglers and traffickers can take advantage of their dreams to play in big leagues in Europe, luring thousands from the subregion with false hopes of becoming professional footballers.⁹⁴ Often masquerading as football agents, they charge large sums of money to facilitate their journeys to Europe, only to abandon them upon arrival; other such migrants end up as victims of forced labour or sexual exploitation, among other abuses and violations.⁹⁵

Asia⁹⁶

Asia – home to around 4.6 billion people – was the origin of over 40 per cent of the world's international migrants (around 115 million), as shown in the latest available international migrant stock data (2020).⁹⁷ More than half (69 million) were residing in other countries in Asia, a significant increase from 2015, when around 61 million were estimated to be living within the continent. As shown in the middle panel of Figure 5, intraregional migration in Asia has increased significantly over time, rising from 35 million in 1990. Considerable growth has also occurred in Asian-born migrant populations in Northern America and Europe over the last two decades. In 2020, migration from Asia to Northern America reached 17.5 million, rising slightly from 17.3 million in 2015, whereas in Europe, migration from Asia stood at 23 million in 2020, increasing from almost 20 million in 2015. Migration from Asia to Northern America and Europe drove much of the increase in the number of Asian migrants outside the region, reaching a total of more than 46 million extraregional migrants in 2020.

The number of non-Asian-born migrants in Asia has remained at relatively low levels since 1990. Europeans comprise the largest group of migrants from outside Asia in the region. These numbers include migrants from the European part of the former Soviet Union now living in Central Asia. During the same period, the number of Africans – the other sizable group of migrants in Asia – has grown.

Figure 5. Migrants to, within and from Asia, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Asia” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Asia) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Africa). “Migrants within Asia” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Asia) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Asian region. “Migrants from Asia” refers to people born in Asia who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

In Asia, the distribution of female and male migrants in the top 10 countries of destination and origin is much more variable compared to Africa. In the top destination countries, Gulf countries – including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a far greater share of male than female immigrants. Malaysia is the only non-Gulf country where the proportion of male migrants is significantly higher than that of females. India, meanwhile, has a slightly higher share of female immigrants than males. Among the top 10 countries of origin in Asia, nearly all of them – except China, the Philippines and Kazakhstan – have a higher share of male than female emigrants. Countries with a significantly high proportion of male emigrants include India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Figure 6. Top 10 Asian origin (left) and destination (right) countries by sex*




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Note: "Proportion" refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

* This includes territories.

International displacement within and from Asia is a key feature of the region, as shown in Figure 7. The Syrian Arab Republic continued to be the largest origin of refugees in the world in 2022, with over 6.5 million people displaced internationally. The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 resulted in a significant increase in cross-border displacement from the country. In 2020 and 2021, Afghanistan was the origin of 2.6 and 2.7 million refugees, respectively; by end of 2022, this number had more than doubled to nearly 5.7 million, the second largest in Asia. Myanmar was the origin of the third largest number of refugees in Asia, with most hosted in neighbouring Bangladesh where Rohingya continue to be hosted following the mass displacement events of late 2017. As also reflected in Figure 7, Türkiye continued to be the largest host country of refugees in the world (nearly 3.6 million). Syrians are the majority of refugees hosted in Türkiye. Türkiye is followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the number of refugees increased from close to 800,000 in 2021 to around 3.4 million in 2022, the result of more Afghans being displaced. Pakistan, the third largest host country in Asia, was home to 1.7 million refugees.

Figure 7. Top 10 Asian countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

In contrast to Africa, the largest internal displacements in Asia were the result of disasters, rather than conflict and violence. Pakistan, which experienced severe and widespread flooding, recorded the largest disaster displacements in the world (more than 8 million) in 2022. The second largest disaster displacements in the region were recorded in the Philippines (nearly 5.5 million) and largely triggered by tropical storm Nalgae, followed by China (over 3.6 million). India and Bangladesh also had significant disaster displacements in 2022 (see Figure 8). Myanmar had the largest internal displacements in the region driven by conflict in 2022 (over 1 million). This is the highest ever reported for the country and the result of intensifying conflict between the country's military and non-State armed groups. Myanmar also had the second largest number of conflict displacements as a percentage of population after Kyrgyzstan.

Figure 8. Top 20 Asian countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Asia⁹⁸

South-East Asia

South-East Asia is one of the most disaster-prone subregions in the world, with millions of displacements occurring each year. Several countries in the subregion are located along the region's typhoon belt or Pacific Ring of Fire, making people who live there extremely vulnerable to hazards such as floods and storms, tsunamis, earthquakes, among others.⁹⁹ Between 2020 and 2021, close to 31 per cent of disaster displacements recorded in Asia and the Pacific region occurred in South-East Asia, with countries such as the Philippines most affected.¹⁰⁰ By end of 2022, over 500,000 people in the Philippines were living in internal displacement due to disasters.¹⁰¹ In the same year, there were more than 5.4 million internal displacements due to disasters in the Philippines, the second highest figure in the world after Pakistan (which experienced over 8 million).¹⁰² A large number of these displacements were government-led pre-emptive evacuations in response to disasters such as typhoon Muifa, tropical storm Megi and tropical storm Nalgae.¹⁰³ People living in other countries in South-East Asia, such as Viet Nam and Indonesia, are also exposed to multiple hazards, with Viet Nam's entire coastline, for example, at high risk of storms and cyclones. There were more than 350,000 and over 300,000 new disaster displacements in Viet Nam and Indonesia in 2022, respectively.¹⁰⁴

Labour migration both from and within the subregion has long been a key feature of migration dynamics in South-East Asia. Countries within the subregion, such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, are major destinations for migrant workers from within the subregion. Other countries outside South-East Asia, including GCC States like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, are also significant destinations, especially for migrants from the Philippines.¹⁰⁵ Given its large emigrant population, the Philippines consistently ranks as one of the top recipients of international remittances globally. Migrants from the Philippines are estimated to have remitted over USD 38 billion in 2022, the fourth largest figure globally, accounting for 9.4 per cent of the country's GDP.¹⁰⁶ The increase in remittances to the Philippines is partly the result of the recent lifting of a ban on Filipinos from working in Saudi Arabia (in protest against abusive treatment of its migrant workers), as well as the increased demand for Filipino workers in sectors such as hospitality and health in OECD countries.¹⁰⁷ Viet Nam – with a large emigrant population within the region and in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom – also receives significant remittances; inflows to the country were around USD 13 billion in 2022, making it the second largest recipient country in the subregion.¹⁰⁸

The demand for migrant workers in destination countries, unemployment and underemployment in countries of origin and well-organized migrant smuggling networks have resulted in significant levels of irregular migration across South-East Asia. Often related to temporary labour migration, irregular migration remains prevalent in the subregion.¹⁰⁹ Countries such as Thailand and Malaysia have large numbers of migrant workers in irregular situations.¹¹⁰ Migrant smugglers exploit desperate migrants and utilize archipelagic and remote land borders to undermine the subregion's managed migration systems, offering their services to migrants whose options for regular entry may be limited. The lack of a fully functioning international protection system in the subregion also means that people exploited by smugglers may be in need of protection or have mixed reasons for seeking to move irregularly.¹¹¹ Trafficking in persons is also an ever-present reality in South-East Asia, with many migrants exposed to multiple human rights violations and abuses.¹¹² South-East Asia remains the origin of the largest number of trafficked victims in Asia.¹¹³ For some migrant workers, factors such as "gender, ethnicity,

age and geographic location” make them particularly vulnerable to trafficking, forced labour and other forms of exploitation.¹¹⁴ Globally, victims of trafficking who are women are the most detected among those trafficked for sexual exploitation (almost two thirds), while around 27 per cent are girls.¹¹⁵ Males comprise about 10 per cent of detected victims of sexual exploitation worldwide, with most reported in South-East Asia.¹¹⁶ Several countries in South-East Asia, including Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Viet Nam and Myanmar are categorized as tier 3 in the United States State Department *2022 Trafficking in Persons Report*, meaning that their governments “do not fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so”.¹¹⁷

Many vulnerable migrants in the subregion, particularly Rohingya, are increasingly embarking on risky journeys in search of protection and to escape deteriorating conditions in camps. An estimated 3,500 Rohingya embarked on sea crossings in 2022, both in the Bay of Bengal and in the Andaman Sea, a significant increase from the year before when less than 1000 people made similar journeys.¹¹⁸ Some of these crossings have been deadly and in December 2022, for example, a boat with nearly 200 Rohingya is believed to have sunk.¹¹⁹ With close to 350 dead or missing at sea recorded in 2022, it was one of the deadliest years since 2014.¹²⁰ A large number of people on these boats were women and children.¹²¹ Many, including those living in Bangladesh – which hosts the largest population of displaced Rohingya – have grown desperate to leave for a multitude of reasons, including the worsening conditions in crowded Kutupalong (the largest refugee camp in the world), lack of employment opportunities and increased crime and violence.¹²² Over several decades, Rohingya have endured persecution, violence and discrimination, including in 2017, which saw a record number of Rohingya flee to Bangladesh (more than 700,000) after the systemic violence inflicted on them in Rakhine province of Myanmar.¹²³ At the time of writing, there are ongoing plans to return some Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar as part of a pilot project between the two governments.¹²⁴ Several reports have indicated, however, that many Rohingya do not want to return to Rakhine State under current conditions, which they deem unsafe and undignified;¹²⁵ United Nations agencies and some non-governmental organizations have also expressed concern that the conditions in Rakhine State remain un conducive to the sustainable return of Rohingya refugees.¹²⁶

Southern Asia

The subregion has experienced devastating disasters in recent years, some of which have been linked to climate change. Southern Asia is extremely vulnerable to climate shocks and has experienced extreme weather events such as heatwaves and floods in recent years. Long monsoon seasons, hotter weather and increased droughts are all expected to become the “new normal” in the subregion as temperatures continue to rise.¹²⁷ In 2022, countries such as India and Pakistan experienced record-breaking heatwaves and in the same year, the monsoon-season floods left a trail of destruction, particularly in Pakistan. The 2022 floods in Pakistan – some of the deadliest in the country’s history – resulted in nearly 1,700 deaths and more than 8 million displacements.¹²⁸ Other countries, such as Bangladesh – given its location and low-lying topography – have also borne the brunt of extreme weather events, with thousands of people displaced every year due to disasters. Record-breaking floods in Bangladesh in 2022 – some of the worst in 100 years – led to dozens of deaths.¹²⁹ In 2022 alone, disasters triggered over 1.5 million displacements in Bangladesh.¹³⁰

With a very large number of migrant workers from the subregion, Southern Asia receives some of the largest inflows of remittances globally. Three countries in Southern Asia rank among the top ten recipients of international remittances in the world, underscoring the significance of labour migration from the subregion. With India estimated to have received more than USD 111 billion in 2022, it is by far the largest recipient of international remittances in the world and the first country to ever reach that figure.¹³¹ India is also the origin of the largest number of international migrants in the world (nearly 18 million), with large diasporas living in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, the United States and Saudi Arabia.¹³² Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were the sixth and eighth largest international remittance recipients in 2022 (nearly 30 billion and around 21.5 billion, respectively), also have a significant portion of their populations living abroad as migrant workers, especially in GCC States.¹³³ International remittances are also important to countries such as Nepal, where they make up nearly 23 per cent of national GDP.¹³⁴ While remittances remain a lifeline for many people in the subregion, migrant workers from these countries continue to face a myriad of risks, including financial exploitation, excessive financial debt due to migration costs, xenophobia and workplace abuses.¹³⁵

Years of political instability and conflict in Southern Asia have resulted in significant displacement, with countries in the subregion both origin and destination of some of the largest number of IDPs in the world. Millions of Afghans are either internally displaced or have fled their country over the years. More than 4 million Afghans were living in internal displacement at the end of 2022.¹³⁶ Most refugees from the country are hosted in neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. By the end of 2022, Pakistan hosted the fourth largest number of refugees in the world (more than 1.7 million), most of them Afghans.¹³⁷ At the end of the same year, the Islamic Republic of Iran was home to more than 3.4 million refugees, the vast majority also from Afghanistan.¹³⁸ Afghanistan is currently facing one of the world's largest humanitarian crises, with around 95 per cent of Afghans unable to get enough food to eat.¹³⁹ Many people are also fleeing due to fear of long-term Taliban rule, including restrictions on women and girls, such as banning girls from attending secondary school and women from working.¹⁴⁰ Despite ongoing risks, Pakistan announced in October 2023 that undocumented Afghans had to leave the country by 1 November 2023 or face expulsion.¹⁴¹ The announcement prompted both IOM and UNHCR to issue a statement calling on Pakistan “to continue its protection of all vulnerable Afghans who have sought safety in the country and could be at imminent risk if forced to return.”¹⁴² By end of October 2023, more than 100,000 Afghans had left, with most citing fear of arrest as the reason for leaving Pakistan.¹⁴³ Another country in the subregion, Bangladesh, also hosts a large number of refugees. At the end of 2021, Bangladesh ranked among the top 10 refugee hosting countries in the world, most of them Rohingya displaced from Myanmar.¹⁴⁴

Eastern Asia

As populations across Eastern Asia continue to shrink and experience significant labour shortages, some countries are increasingly turning to migrant workers. The Republic of Korea's demographic crisis deepened in 2022, as its birthrate dropped to the lowest level since records began.¹⁴⁵ With an average of 0.78 children per woman, this is also the lowest birthrate in the world.¹⁴⁶ Japan has also been undergoing population decline over the last few decades, with births falling to less than 800,000 in 2022— also the lowest on record.¹⁴⁷ The country is also facing an ageing population and a shrinking workforce. For the first time since 1961, China's population declined in 2022, while its birthrate has also continued to fall.¹⁴⁸ These demographic shifts, including rapidly declining working age populations, especially in the Republic of Korea and Japan, have raised concerns among policymakers,

prompting them to enact a range of measures – including those aimed at increasing immigration – to boost their workforce.¹⁴⁹ In an effort to fill gaps in key sectors such as agriculture, the Republic of Korea announced toward the end of 2022 that it plans to bring in about 110,000 migrant workers in 2023.¹⁵⁰ Japan is also slowly continuing to allow in foreign workers in key sectors, including through the recently announced “specified skilled worker” programme, which includes memorandums of cooperation with 14 Asian countries.¹⁵¹

Parts of Eastern Asia are hotspots for disasters (such as floods, tsunamis and earthquakes), with the subregion witnessing some of the largest displacements in the last decade. In 2022, China recorded 3.6 million internal disaster displacements, the second highest figure globally.¹⁵² Given its location on three tectonic plates, Japan is often vulnerable to volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons, among other disasters. Japan recorded 51,000 displacements due to disasters in 2022, an increase from those recorded in 2021 (14,000).¹⁵³ The country’s recurring disasters, some argue, have been exacerbated by climate change and environmental changes.¹⁵⁴ Japan’s well-established disaster risk management, however, has been effective in lessening the scale of displacements triggered by disasters.¹⁵⁵

Eastern Asia has one of the largest diasporas in the world and continues to be the recipient of large remittance inflows. With over 10 million emigrants, China remains among the largest recipients of international remittances in the world.¹⁵⁶ Remittances to the country, however, have dropped over the last two years. Mexico overtook China as the second largest recipient of international remittances in the world (after India) in 2021, and this continued in 2022, with China estimated to have received USD 51 billion, behind Mexico’s more than USD 61 billion.¹⁵⁷ The contraction of remittance flows to China has been attributed to multiple factors, including demographic shifts that have resulted in the shrinking of the working age population and the country’s zero-COVID policy, which prevented people from travelling abroad for work.¹⁵⁸

The COVID-19 pandemic had a major impact on the number of international students from and to Eastern Asia, although several countries in the subregion remain committed to becoming key destinations for international students. While China continues to be the origin of the largest number of international students in the world, these numbers have fallen since COVID-19.¹⁵⁹ In 2020–2021, for example, Chinese enrolments in the United States declined by 15 per cent (the first decline in a decade), while commencements in the United Kingdom dropped by 5 per cent.¹⁶⁰ However, since the country’s reopening, there seems to be renewed interest in studying abroad, and Chinese students are reportedly focused on moving particularly to the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada.¹⁶¹ China is also an important destination for international students, especially those from the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Pakistan and India.¹⁶² Japan and the Republic of Korea also remain committed to further attracting and increasing the number of international students in their countries.¹⁶³ In a recent government proposal, Japan announced the goal of attracting 400,000 foreign students by 2033, while also sending 500,000 Japanese students to study abroad.¹⁶⁴

Middle East

The Middle East remains a major origin of refugees and asylum-seekers, while also featuring some of the largest internally displaced populations in the world. By the end of 2022, Türkiye was home to nearly 3.6 million refugees, the largest number in the world.¹⁶⁵ Other countries in the subregion such as Lebanon and Jordan also host large numbers of refugees relative to their population. At the end of 2022, 1 in 7 and 1 in 16 persons residing in Lebanon and Jordan respectively were refugees and other people in need of international protection.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, the Middle East also continues to be the source of millions of people in need of protection. The Syrian Arab Republic was the origin of around 6.5 million refugees in 2022.¹⁶⁷ While the number of Syrian refugees declined in the first six months of 2022, the first time since 2011, almost one in five refugees globally is Syrian.¹⁶⁸ Despite the decline in the number of Syrian refugees globally, there has been a rise in xenophobia and racist attacks against them, including in countries such as Türkiye and Lebanon.¹⁶⁹ A surge in anti-immigrant sentiment, as both Türkiye and Lebanon have recently experienced worsening economic crises, has resulted in racialized assaults on Syrian migrants.¹⁷⁰ Disinformation about migrants, spurred on by incendiary rhetoric from far-right nationalist parties, has played a significant role in driving the recent attacks.¹⁷¹ Meanwhile, in February 2023, south-east Türkiye and the northern part of the Syrian Arab Republic experienced two powerful earthquakes, resulting in more than 50,000 deaths.¹⁷² By March, an estimated 2.7 million people had been displaced in Türkiye and many had been left homeless in the Syrian Arab Republic.¹⁷³ The earthquake is one of the largest disasters to impact the region in recent times; in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic, which was already facing an acute humanitarian crisis due to years of conflict, the earthquake exacerbated a situation that was already dire for many people.¹⁷⁴

Recent and protracted conflicts and violence are the leading drivers of displacement in the subregion.

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, hostilities have resulted in significant displacement and an acute humanitarian crisis. In response to armed groups from Gaza that killed or injured thousands of Israelis (and took many hostage) in the attacks of 7 October 2023, Israel declared a “state of war”, which has resulted in the heavy bombardment of Gaza.¹⁷⁵ By end of October 2023, more than 1 million people in Gaza were internally displaced and thousands had been killed as a result of the conflict.¹⁷⁶ Meanwhile, the war in Yemen, now in its ninth year, has been unrelenting, resulting in one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. An estimated two thirds of the population depend on humanitarian aid, including 4.5 million IDPs.¹⁷⁷ Despite its current humanitarian crisis, Yemen remains a key transit point, especially for migrants from the Horn of Africa going to neighbouring Gulf countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Oman. Most of these migrants – often fleeing from poverty, persecution, insecurity and conflict, among other drivers – are from Ethiopia. Migrants pass through Djibouti and Somalia before travelling by sea to Yemen and onward by land to Saudi Arabia.¹⁷⁸ A large number of migrants are exposed to extreme protection risks, both on their way to and upon arrival in Yemen; some of these include violence, exploitation and having to live in conditions lacking basic necessities.¹⁷⁹ The majority of deaths along land routes in the Middle East in 2022 occurred in Yemen, with close to 800 people (mostly Ethiopians), losing their lives on the route between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.¹⁸⁰ There has also been irregular migration in the opposite direction, with Yemenis in recent years fleeing war to countries such as Djibouti and spontaneous returns of migrants from Yemen to the Horn of Africa.¹⁸¹ Some migrants who manage to reach destinations such as Saudi Arabia or Oman find themselves forcibly returned to Yemen. Between January and April 2023, more than 300 migrants (most of them Ethiopians) were deported from Oman to Yemen.¹⁸² In the Syrian Arab Republic, more than 6.8 million people were living in internal displacement at end of 2022 due to conflict and violence.¹⁸³ The 12-year crisis has taken a toll on many and, by May 2023, more than 15 million Syrians were in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁸⁴ Other countries in the region such as Iraq have also continued to experience violence, while intercommunal violence has also displaced many people in Lebanon.¹⁸⁵

Moreover, as the economic situation in Lebanon has deteriorated, an increasing number of Lebanese are leaving the country and embarking on risky sea journeys. Of the nearly 380 recorded deaths on the eastern Mediterranean route in 2022, more than 170 died due to shipwrecks following their departure from Lebanon.¹⁸⁶

Gulf States remain significant destinations for migrant workers from around the world, and the 2022 football World Cup further underscored the importance of migrant labour to the subregion as well as rights violations. Migrants continue to comprise high proportions of the total populations in many GCC States. In the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, migrants made up 88 per cent, nearly 73 and 77 per cent of the national populations, respectively. Most migrants – many of whom come from countries such as India, Egypt, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Kenya – work in sectors such as construction, hospitality, security, domestic work and retail. Several countries in the Gulf are among the largest sources of remittances globally. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, for example, had remittance outflows of around USD 39 billion, about USD 18 billion and over USD 12 billion, respectively, among the top 20 largest worldwide.¹⁸⁷ Labour migration to the Gulf is highly gendered, and in 2019, only around 4 per cent of women migrant workers globally were living in Arab States, compared to around 20 per cent of male migrant workers.¹⁸⁸

Central Asia

Central Asia continues to be the recipient of significant international remittances, despite recent events such as the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Several Central Asian countries are heavily reliant on remittances from the Russian Federation, given the historical ties between countries and the large number of workers from countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan working in the Russian Federation, often in low-paying sectors that do not require high levels of education.¹⁸⁹ The Russian Federation has been a significant source of remittances for these countries for decades, making up more than half of the flows to countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.¹⁹⁰ International remittances to Central Asia, defying projections related to an anticipated contraction of the Russian economy,¹⁹¹ remain robust, and flows to countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan reached record levels in 2022. Uzbekistan is estimated to have received more than USD 16.7 billion in international remittances in 2022, while remittances accounted for more than 51 and 31 per cent of the GDP of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, during the same year.¹⁹²

The Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and related military conscription in 2022 resulted in a historic influx of Russians into Central Asia. In an effort to avoid the draft, hundreds of thousands of Russian men fled the country, many to Central Asian States such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Following the partial mobilization announcement in September 2022, more than 200,000 entered Kazakhstan in a span of a few days.¹⁹³ Kazakhstan's close proximity, lack of visa requirements for Russians to enter, large Russian ethnic minority and the fact that Russian is widely spoken all made it an ideal destination for those fleeing the Russian Federation.¹⁹⁴ Other key destinations for Russians fearing conscription included Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, among others. In 2023, however, Kazakhstan revised its entry rules, making it harder to enter and stay in the country, a move that was reportedly in response to the many Russians who have entered the country since September 2022.¹⁹⁵

While the Russian Federation remains the primarily destination for migrant workers from Central Asia, mobility patterns seem to be shifting, with an increasing number of migrants from the subregion moving to the European Union and Asia. In the period between 2016 and 2019, the number of central Asian citizens granted permits to study, work or live in the European Union increased by 14 per cent, while migrants from countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who moved to the Republic of Korea grew by 92 per cent from nearly 10,800 to close to 20,700.¹⁹⁶ More Central Asians have also been moving to other parts of Asia such as Türkiye.¹⁹⁷ With the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine and possible slowing down of its economy due to economic sanctions, some predict that this trend – with Central Asians increasingly choosing to migrate to other countries outside the Russian Federation – may only accelerate. Uzbekistan is already diversifying destination countries for its migrant workers, and in 2022 signed a labour migration agreement with Israel and in 2023 was in negotiations with countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom.¹⁹⁸


Across Central Asia, climate change continues to threaten lives and livelihoods and, in some cases, has been linked to the escalating tensions and conflict as well as displacement in the subregion. Over the last few decades, Central Asia has been warming faster than the global average. Desert climates have also spread in parts of the subregion.¹⁹⁹ Moreover, we have seen a declining glacier surface area in Central Asia over several decades and the melting snowcaps are, in part, responsible for disasters such as some of the recent floods and landslides.²⁰⁰ Dam failures and collapses have also significantly contributed to floods and related displacements in the subregion. Further, droughts have worsened in recent years, resulting in water shortages, including for activities such as irrigation.²⁰¹ Water management issues across borders – particularly between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have increasingly fuelled tensions and led to violent clashes.²⁰² There have also been reports of violent clashes between farmers in Uzbekistan's Namangan and Surkhandarya regions over water resources.²⁰³ Outside of climate change, conflict-related displacement has also featured in the subregion. In 2022, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan underwent a major crisis when tensions escalated and resulted in armed clashes along the disputed border between the two countries.²⁰⁴ The violence caused dozens of deaths and the destruction of markets, schools and other civilian structures.²⁰⁵ The clashes also triggered 166,000 displacements on the Kyrgyz side, more than triple the number in 2021.²⁰⁶ An estimated 137,000 people in Kyrgyzstan were also evacuated from the southern region of Batken.²⁰⁷

Europe²⁰⁸

The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)²⁰⁹ show that nearly 87 million international migrants lived in Europe, an increase of nearly 16 per cent since 2015, when around 75 million international migrants resided in the region. A little over half of these (44 million) were born in Europe, but were living elsewhere in the region; this number has increased since 2015, rising from 38 million. In 2020, the population of non-European migrants in Europe reached over 40 million.

In 1990, there were roughly equal numbers of Europeans living outside Europe as non-Europeans living in Europe. However, unlike the growth in migration to Europe, the number of Europeans living outside Europe mostly declined over the last 30 years, and only returned to 1990 levels in recent years. In 2020, around 19 million Europeans were residing outside the continent and were based primarily in Asia and Northern America (see Figure 9). As shown in the figure below, there was also some gradual increase in the number of European migrants in Asia and Oceania from 2010 to 2020.

Figure 9. Migrants to, within and from Europe, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Europe” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Europe) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Africa or Asia). “Migrants within Europe” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Europe) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the European region. “Migrants from Europe” refers to people born in Europe who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Latin America and the Caribbean or Northern America).

In Europe, the distribution of female and male migrants is about equal across both the top 10 countries of destination and origin. Unlike Africa and Asia – where most countries have slightly higher shares of male than female migrants – in Europe there are more countries with slightly higher shares of female than male migrants (in both the top destination and origin countries). Among destination countries, Ukraine has a significantly higher proportion of female immigrants than males when compared with other European countries. The Russian Federation and Ukraine also have the highest share of female emigrants among origin countries where the proportion of female emigrants is higher than males. Italy and Portugal are the only two origin countries with a larger share of male than female migrants.

Figure 10. Top 10 European destination (left) and origin (right) countries by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Note: “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in one of the largest and fastest displacements in Europe since the Second World War. Millions of Ukrainians have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and by end of 2022, Ukraine was the origin of nearly 5.7 million refugees, the second largest number in

the world after the Syrian Arab Republic (Figure 11). Close to 2.6 million Ukrainians were hosted in neighbouring countries such as Poland, the Republic of Moldova and Czechia, and another 3 million in other European countries and further afield. Germany hosts the largest number of refugees in Europe (around 2 million), 7 per cent of all refugees in the world. Most refugees in Germany at the end of 2022 originated from Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Russian Federation, Poland and France hosted the second, third and fourth largest refugee populations in the region.

Figure 11. Top 10 European countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

Ukraine recorded the largest internal conflict displacements in the world in 2022, the result of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion. Nearly 17 million displacements (around 40% of the country's population) were recorded in Ukraine by the end of 2022, the largest figure the country has ever recorded (see Figure 12). The massive number of conflict displacements in Ukraine in 2022 was also the highest in the world. The largest disaster displacements in Europe occurred in France (45,000) and Spain (31,000); in both countries, these displacements were largely triggered by wildfires.

Figure 12. Top 20 European countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022*



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

* This includes territories.

Key features and developments in Europe²¹⁰

South-Eastern and Eastern Europe

The Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has resulted in the largest displacement within Europe since the Second World War. In addition to civilians who have been injured or killed since the war began – more than 8,000 deaths and over 14,000 injured as of 9 April 2023 – millions of people have been displaced within Ukraine, while others have been forced to flee the country in search of safety and protection.²¹¹ By April 2023, more than 8 million refugees from Ukraine had been recorded across Europe, while nearly 6 million people had been internally displaced in Ukraine at end of 2022.²¹² Most refugees had fled to neighbouring countries such as Poland, Czechia, Bulgaria and Romania, among others.²¹³ By April 2023, Poland was host to more than 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees.²¹⁴ The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian refugees are women and children, as most men – between the ages of 18 and 60 – were required to remain in the country and fight. As the war continues, the situation in Ukraine remains dire for many, including those who remain in the country under threat from the fighting, while also having to contend with outages of water, electricity, heating and the disruption of key services such as medical care.²¹⁵

Largely due to the lack of decent employment prospects and the search for better paying jobs, many people have left the subregion, often to work in Western and Northern Europe. Countries such as Albania and the Republic of Moldova are some of the hardest hit; around 40 per cent of Albania's workforce, for example, is estimated to be working abroad,²¹⁶ contributing to brain and brawn drain and putting pressure on local industries and economies that constantly lose workers in both low-skilled and high-skilled sectors. High rates of poverty, wage gaps between Albania and other countries in the region, significant corruption and clientelism, among other factors, contribute to people's decisions to leave the country.²¹⁷ A similar trend can be seen in the Republic of Moldova, with around a quarter of its "economically active" population working outside the country.²¹⁸ The Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has resulted in a cost-of-living crisis across the world, including in countries in the subregion, has forced even more Moldovans to leave the country.²¹⁹ Other countries such as Bulgaria and Serbia are no exceptions and continue to see many of their young people leave.²²⁰ While many who leave are regular migrant workers who end up working in the Russian Federation or in countries within Western and Northern Europe, there has also been an increase in the number of irregular migrants from some countries in the subregion. Thousands of young Albanians, for example, have resorted to taking arduous journeys to try and reach Northern Europe, especially the United Kingdom, with many risking their lives crossing the English Channel in small boats or inflatable dinghies.²²¹

As many parts of the world experience declines in their population, countries in the subregion are among the most affected, prompting concerns and discussions about immigration policies. Due to sustained low levels of fertility and elevated rates of emigration, many countries are having to contend with shrinking populations, leading to labour shortages, including in key sectors, with significant short- and long-term implications for their economies. These realities have also put pressure on these countries' pension systems. Several of the affected countries, including Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, are among the countries the populations of which are forecast to shrink by 20 per cent or more over the next three decades.²²² Immigration has long been a policy employed by countries – particularly those in Western Europe, Northern America and Australia – to reduce the economic and social effects of declining birth rates and ageing populations. While it is widely acknowledged that immigration is important in addressing the negative impacts of population decline in several South-Eastern and

Eastern European countries, the approach has tended to focus on increasing birth rates (including through financial incentives). Immigration is often viewed with suspicion and, in several countries, even curtailed through restrictive immigration policies and political rhetoric meant to discourage migrants from either entering or settling in some of these countries.²²³

Irregular migration from, to and through South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, including by people from within and outside the subregion, remains a key challenge. Often with the assistance of smugglers, the subregion is a major transit area and characterized by mixed migration flows, particularly for migrants trying to reach Western and Northern Europe. The western Balkan route, referring to irregular arrivals in the European Union through the western Balkans, including via countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, among others in the subregion, has seen an increase in arrivals since 2018.²²⁴ Serbia continues to be the main transit hub, with nearly 121,000 registrations in 2022.²²⁵ Upon arrival in the western Balkans, the routes most used are through North Macedonia, Serbia and then direct attempts to cross into the European Union across the Hungarian border.²²⁶ The three largest nationalities arriving in the Balkans include Afghans, Syrians and Pakistanis.²²⁷ The transit period of migrants passing through the western Balkans was shorter in 2022, with many spending fewer days in each country compared to previous years.²²⁸ Other non-Balkan countries in the subregion, such as Belarus, have also in recent years been transit areas for migrants attempting to reach the European Union with some pointing to the use of irregular migrants as a political weapon and leverage (the so-called “instrumentalization” of migrants).²²⁹

Northern, Western and Southern Europe

In March 2022, following the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent displacement of millions of Ukrainians, the European Union took the unprecedented decision to activate a Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), granting Ukrainians fleeing the war a legal status that allows them to access a wide range of rights in European Union member States. The directive guarantees the same socioeconomic rights and services to those who have obtained legal status under the TPD in all European Union member States, such as access to medical care, accommodation, work, free movement as well as education.²³⁰ In some instances, displaced Ukrainians opted for a member State where they could apply for temporary protection, in recognition of their existing networks.²³¹ Ukrainians under the TPD can also visit Ukraine, if they so choose.²³² However, there has been concern that some aspects of the TPD, in terms of wording, are unclear, resulting in complications for some Ukrainians, particularly when it comes to keeping their status after short visits to Ukraine as well as accessing available assistance.²³³

Several countries across the region have passed or proposed new restrictive immigration and asylum laws while also implementing a range of measures widely viewed as undermining asylum and violating international law. Legislation introduced into Parliament by the United Kingdom Government in March 2023, for example, that would allow for the removal of people who arrive in the country irregularly and their being taken to a third country (such as Rwanda) for processing, has been widely criticized by civil society and international organizations. In response to the legislation, organizations such as UNHCR have argued that, if passed, it would breach the United Kingdom’s commitments under international law.²³⁴ The Illegal Migration Bill, it is argued, would deny protection to many people who genuinely need safety and asylum, thereby contravening the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory.²³⁵ IOM also expressed concern that parts of the Bill “would limit survivors’ ability to report trafficking and access assistance, which risks exacerbating the vulnerability of victims, giving traffickers more control over them and deepening risks of further exploitation.”²³⁶ Denmark

has also sought to implement significant restrictions on immigration. Similar to the United Kingdom, in 2022 Denmark pursued an agreement with the Government of Rwanda to outsource asylum processing to the country.²³⁷ These plans were, however, put on hold in early 2023, with a new government in power.²³⁸ In Italy, a new decree – introduced at the start of 2023 and setting out a code of conduct for rescue of ships seeking to disembark in the country – has raised concerns, including from OHCHR, as potentially preventing “the provision of life-saving assistance by humanitarian search and rescue (SAR) organisations in the Central Mediterranean”, which could lead to more deaths.²³⁹

Irregular migration remains one of the most significant migration challenges for countries in the subregion, and continues to be characterized by mixed migration flows, often with the assistance of well-established smuggling networks. Calendar year 2022 saw the largest number of irregular arrivals since 2016, with more than 189,000 arrivals in Europe via land and sea.²⁴⁰ While there was a decrease, overall, in irregular border crossing at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, there was an uptick in arrivals in 2021 and a further increase in 2022.²⁴¹ The largest number of irregular arrivals in 2022 came from Egypt (almost 21,800), the Syrian Arab Republic (nearly 21,000), Tunisia (over 18,000) and Afghanistan (more than 18,000).²⁴² Smuggling networks play key roles in enabling attempts to reach Northern, Western and Southern Europe, often charging high fees, while also exposing migrants to a multitude of risks and abuses. Some States outside the European Union have also in recent years been blamed for encouraging and even facilitating irregular migration to the subregion, using migrants as leverage or pawns for political ends.²⁴³ In response, the European Commission introduced a proposal to tackle situations where State actors enable irregular migration for political purposes to destabilize the European Union, and allows member States to “derogate from their responsibilities under European Union asylum law in situations of instrumentalization of migration.”²⁴⁴ The proposal has been criticized by civil society organizations, with some arguing that it is akin to dismantling asylum in Europe by allowing member States the potential to opt in and out of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).²⁴⁵


In recent years, several countries in the subregion have adopted feminist foreign policies, which have the potential to positively impact migrant women and girls across the world. Sweden was the first country in the world to adopt a feminist foreign policy, in 2014, although this policy was abandoned in late 2022 when a new government came to power.²⁴⁶ Several other countries, including some in Northern, Western and Southern Europe, have since adopted similar policies. Some of these include France (2019), Germany (2021), Luxembourg (2021) and Spain (2021).²⁴⁷ These policies cover a range of areas, including mainstreaming gender perspectives across all foreign policy actions and agencies, and advocating for progress in providing gender adequate resources to ensure gender equality as part of development and humanitarian aid.²⁴⁸ While the policies have been widely welcomed and have generated interest as a way to empower women and girls globally, some have also been criticized for neither directly mentioning immigration nor addressing the various needs of migrants and the specific contexts from which they come, as well as paying little attention to immigration as an issue of foreign policy.²⁴⁹ Outside Europe, Canada arguably has the most sophisticated feminist foreign policy, “the Feminist International Assistance Policy”, which, among other commitments, “advocates for progressive approaches to migration and refugee assistance.”²⁵⁰

Latin America and the Caribbean²⁵¹

Migration to Northern America is a key feature in the Latin America and Caribbean region. The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)²⁵² show that over 25 million migrants had made the journey north and were residing in Northern America (Figure 13). As shown in the figure, the Latin American and Caribbean population living in Northern America has increased considerably over time, from an estimated 10 million in 1990. Another 5 million migrants from the region were in Europe in 2020. While this number has only slightly increased since 2015, the number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean living in Europe has more than quadrupled since 1990. Other regions, such as Asia and Oceania, were home to a very small number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2020 (over 400,000 and 200,000 migrants, respectively).

The total number of migrants from other regions living in Latin America and the Caribbean has remained relatively stable, at around 3 million over the last 30 years. These were comprised mostly of Europeans (whose numbers have declined slightly over the period) and Northern Americans, whose numbers have increased. In 2020, the numbers of Europeans and Northern Americans living in Latin America and the Caribbean stood at around 1.4 million and 1.3 million, respectively. Meanwhile, around 11 million migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean originated from other countries in the region.

Figure 13. Migrants to, within and from Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. in Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Latin America and the Caribbean region. “Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to people born in Latin America and the Caribbean who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

The proportion of female and male migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean is largely about equal in the top countries of destination. The exception is the Dominican Republic, where the share of male immigrants is significantly higher than that of females. Among the top countries of origin, most have a slightly higher share of female than male emigrants, with countries such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Peru having the largest proportions.

Figure 14. Top Latin American and Caribbean destination (left) and origin (right) countries by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

Venezuelans continued to be among the largest population displaced across borders in the world in 2022 (Figure 15).²⁵³ At the end of 2022, there were more than 234,000 registered Venezuelan refugees and over 1 million with pending asylum cases. Other countries in the region, such as Nicaragua, Honduras and Cuba are also the origin of a significant number of asylum-seekers. Peru, Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica host some of the largest numbers of asylum-seekers in the subregion, as reflected in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Top 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Notes: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries. Please refer to endnote 255 on the issue of categorization of displaced Venezuelans.

Disasters triggered some of the largest internal displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2022 (Figure 16). Brazil, with 708,000 displacements largely due to floods caused by heavy rains, had the largest number of disaster displacements in the region. Colombia and Cuba recorded the second and third largest numbers of disaster displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean (281,000 and 90,000, respectively). Most displacements in Colombia were triggered by floods, while those in Cuba were largely related to Hurricane Ian. The largest conflict displacements in the region were concentrated in Colombia and Haiti, which recorded 339,000 and 106,000 displacements respectively.

Figure 16. Top Latin American and Caribbean countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

*Key features and developments in Latin America and the Caribbean*²⁵⁴

South America

Intraregional migration in South America, including for labour, remains high, while recent policy changes in some countries could have far-reaching implications for migrants in and outside the subregion. Over recent years and decades, free movement arrangements between countries in the subregion have made it possible for migrants to move to other countries within South America, mainly for work. Some of these include the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,²⁵⁵ as member States, and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname, as associated States, and the Andean Community's Migration Statute, the full members of which include the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.²⁵⁶ MERCOSUR has been key in opening up regular channels for South Americans to move to countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, while also playing a major role in facilitating regular migration and residence in these countries.²⁵⁷ Argentina had the largest number of immigrants in South America in 2020 (over 2 million), with most coming from countries within the subregion such as Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.²⁵⁸ Colombia had nearly 2 million international migrants in 2020, and like Argentina, most were from within South America, particularly from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador.²⁵⁹ Chile had the third largest number of international migrants in South America in 2020, with more than 1.6 million residing in the country.²⁶⁰ Some countries in South America have undergone major migration policy changes in the last two years, with potentially significant implications for migrants. In 2023, Brazil rejoined the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, following a change in government, a decision that was welcomed by the United Nations Network on Migration as reviving the country's "commitment to protecting and promoting the rights of all migrants living in Brazil as well as the more than four million Brazilians living abroad."²⁶¹ Chile, on the other hand, which has experienced a significant increase in the number of immigrants over the last 30 years, enacted new and restrictive immigration reforms in 2021 which have included new requirements that could make it more difficult for migrants to obtain residence permits from inside the country, while also allowing authorities to send back undocumented migrants who get into the country.²⁶² This process has, for example, resulted in flows of Haitian migrants with children born in Chile towards other countries in the region and also towards Northern America.

The situation of Venezuelan migrants (including refugees) remains challenging, with millions continuing to experience the impacts of their displacement. By end of March 2023, there were more than 7 million Venezuelan refugees and displaced migrants globally, with the vast majority – more than 6 million – hosted in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.²⁶³ By May 2023, Colombia was home to the largest number of Venezuelans (over 2.5 million), followed by Peru (more than 1.5 million) and Ecuador (around half a million).²⁶⁴ Chile and Brazil also host significant numbers, both more than 400,000.²⁶⁵ Several countries have provided asylum to Venezuelans and many have implemented arrangements to enable their stay and allow access to documentation and basic socioeconomic rights.²⁶⁶ More than 211,000 Venezuelans had been granted refugee status by March 2023; more than 1 million had lodged claims for asylum; and over 4.2 million had been issued residence permits or other types of stay arrangements.²⁶⁷ By the end of 2022, 1.6 million Venezuelans had temporary protection permits in Colombia, while 2.5 million had completed the pre-registration for temporary protection status in the country.²⁶⁸ By end of the same year, Peru had granted humanitarian residency permits to 79,600 Venezuelan asylum-seekers and

temporary residence permits to nearly 225,000 Venezuelans in an irregular migratory situation.²⁶⁹ Many Venezuelans, however, remain undocumented, preventing them from accessing job markets and social services, although countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay and others have moved to regularize millions of them.²⁷⁰ Despite the challenging conditions in which many continue to live, Venezuelans are also making significant contributions to their host countries, including as entrepreneurs and by creating jobs for themselves and locals in countries such as Colombia and Argentina.²⁷¹ Many are also helping to fill key labour gaps, including, for example, in Peru's health-care sector.²⁷²

Migration dynamics in parts of the subregion continue to be affected by internal instability and insecurity, with millions of people displaced as a result. In Colombia, while peace negotiations are ongoing, displacement due to internal violence continues, particularly in areas disputed or controlled by armed groups. At the end of 2022, 339,000 displacements due to conflict and violence had been recorded in Colombia and the country had nearly 5 million conflict IDPs.²⁷³ Fighting among armed groups intensified in 2022, contributing to further displacement. High levels of civilian targeting was also evident in the same year, with violence aimed at civilians accounting for more than 62 per cent of all organized political violence events in the country and more than 70 per cent of fatalities.²⁷⁴ Women and girls continue to be subjected to very high levels of violence in the subregion, and in Colombia many have suffered the long-term effects of gender-based violence, such as sexual harassment, human trafficking and rape.²⁷⁵ Insecurity and a surge in violence in Ecuador, particularly in the coastal region including in the country's most populous city of Guayaquil, has forced many Ecuadorians to flee the country.²⁷⁶ The current wave of violence is largely driven by international criminal networks and gangs vying for territorial control over drug trafficking routes.²⁷⁷ The violence – combined with a dire economic situation that has left many in poverty – has resulted in a significant increase in the number of Ecuadorians leaving the country, often via Colombia and through the Darien Gap in the hopes of reaching the United States.²⁷⁸ As the number of Ecuadorians leaving the country has increased, thousands have been expelled in recent years under Title 42 or deported to Ecuador.²⁷⁹ Between January and April 2023, more than 11,000 Ecuadorians were expelled from the United States under Title 42.²⁸⁰

South America faces daunting challenges related to environmental degradation, disasters and climate change – including displacement – aggravating conditions in several countries already experiencing crises related to conflict and violence. Recent reports, including from the World Meteorological Organization and IPCC, show that in addition to climate change impacts such as the rise in sea levels – especially along the Atlantic coast of South America – some countries such as Peru have also seen glacier retreat while at the same time drought conditions have negatively impacted crop yields in the subregion.²⁸¹ Indeed, the impacts of climate change are disrupting people's livelihoods, compelling some to migrate from their places of origin.²⁸² In a country such as Ecuador, it is predicted that environmental factors are likely to enhance both internal and international migration, while Peru has already advanced legislation on planned relocation – particularly along Peru's rainforest rivers – as a solution and response to the adverse impacts of climate change.²⁸³ Moreover, climate-change-linked extreme weather events continue to contribute to displacement, in a subregion already dealing with conflict and violence and other socioeconomic and political factors that have driven millions of people from their homes and communities. In Brazil, floods were largely responsible for triggering more than 700,000 displacements in 2022.²⁸⁴ Rain and floods were also responsible for most of the 281,000 disaster displacements in Colombia in 2022.²⁸⁵ In early 2023, a state of emergency was declared in Peru after cyclone Yaku caused widespread flooding in the country's northern region, resulting in deaths, destruction of property and displacement.²⁸⁶ Meanwhile, wild fires in Chile that started in January 2023 destroyed thousands of houses and prompted the evacuation of more than 7,500

people.²⁸⁷ Some countries in the region, in recognition of the climate change impacts on migration and displacement, have responded by offering avenues for protection for people who have been displaced by disasters. In May 2022, Argentina “adopted a new humanitarian visa pathway for people from the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico who were displaced due to natural events.”²⁸⁸

The number of migrants transiting through the subregion toward the United States continues to be high and has increased in diversity. The northern part of South America is a key transit area, with migrants from within and beyond the subregion – often assisted by smugglers – passing through and taking risky journeys north through Central America in the hope of reaching Northern America. Many migrants cross from Colombia to Panama through the Darien Gap (which traverses both countries), a dense tropical forest that takes migrants days to travel through, often with inadequate preparation and no access to water, health services or food.²⁸⁹ IOM documented 36 deaths in the Darien Gap in 2022, although this number is likely a very small fraction of the number of deaths that take place, since many deaths go unreported and migrants’ remains are also often not recovered.²⁹⁰ In addition to being a key destination country, particularly for migrants from within the subregion, Ecuador became a key entry point to South America for migrants of increasingly diverse nationalities, who transit through the country on their way to other destinations, particularly northward to the United States.²⁹¹ Indeed, many migrants try to reach the United States via the Andean region–Central America–Mexico migratory corridor.²⁹²

In recent years, there has been a marked increase in extraregional migrant arrivals to South America, many with hopes of reaching Northern America. Migrants from regions such as Africa and Asia are behind some of this increase and often arrive in the subregion through regular means – either with a visa or in some cases a visa is not required.²⁹³ In 2022, around 10 per cent of migrants who crossed the Darien Gap were from Africa and Asia.²⁹⁴ While the desired final destination for many of these migrants is the United States or Canada, some eventually remain within countries in South America, either by choice or circumstance, as the journey northward is often difficult and expensive.²⁹⁵ There are often significant challenges related to the integration and social cohesion of these migrants, with some ending up in precarious working and living conditions. Language and cultural barriers add to these difficulties, making it harder for these migrants to integrate compared to others from within the region. While several countries have implemented a range of measures to facilitate their regularization and integration, many migrants still struggle, and obstacles still remain when it comes to accessing economic and social rights.²⁹⁶

Central America

Central America continues to be a major area of origin and transit for migrants trying to reach the United States. After a decline at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, irregular migration to and from the subregion rebounded in 2022 to pre-pandemic levels, with smuggling networks stepping up their operations.²⁹⁷ Since the start of 2022, there has been a significant increase in the number of migrants transiting through the Central America subregion, including through the countries of Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. More than half a million migrants who arrived at the United States border in the 2022 financial year were from three Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras). Countries such as Panama and Mexico have also experienced a surge in irregular migrants, increasing by 85 and 108 per cent respectively by August 2022.²⁹⁸ Criminal violence, political instability and poverty remain some of the biggest drivers of irregular migration from the subregion, with many migrants experiencing significant risks and dangers, including extortion, sexual violence and separation from families.²⁹⁹ Over the years, and as authorities cracked down on sea and air

travel from the subregion, the Darien Gap – a treacherous remote jungle in Panama that connects South and Central America – has become a major transit area, with tens of thousands of migrants journeying through it annually. In 2022, many were Venezuelan (over 150,000), Ecuadorian (around 29,000) and Haitian (more than 22,000).³⁰⁰ The number of children trekking through the Darien Gap also increased significantly in 2022; between January and October 2022, more than 32,000 children travelled through the route, with more than half registered in Panama younger than 5 years old.³⁰¹ Overall, there were over 248,000 migrants who entered Panama in 2022 at the Darien Gap border.³⁰² More recent figures show a continuation of this trend, with many people continuing to trek through the Darien Gap in 2023. In just the first nine months of 2023, over 390,000 migrants had passed through the Darien Gap from Colombia to Panama, most of them from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and Haiti.³⁰³

Across the subregion, violence – particularly gang-related violence – has resulted in a surge in displacement, forcing hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, communities or countries.

In parts of Central America, such as Nicaragua and Honduras, the ever-deteriorating security situation, with crime and violence perpetrated by gangs and drug cartels – in addition to acute inequalities – has led many people to leave their homes. There were more than 665,000 refugees and asylum-seekers from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras worldwide at the end of 2022.³⁰⁴ These three countries also have some of the highest homicide rates in the world, as well as some of the highest incidents of sexual violence and femicide.³⁰⁵ However, there has been a significant decline in murders in El Salvador over the last two years as the Government has cracked down on gang violence.³⁰⁶ Gender-based violence, recent studies have found, is a major contributing factor to emigration from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Mexico, and forces many adolescent girls to embark on dangerous journeys in search of safety.³⁰⁷ Criminal organizations that operate within and beyond the subregion often take advantage of the desperation of many and are heavily involved in both migrant smuggling and trafficking.³⁰⁸ At the end of 2022, Guatemala and Honduras each had more than 240,000 people living in internal displacement due to conflict and violence, while El Salvador had 52,000.³⁰⁹

Now the second largest recipient of international remittances in the world (after India), Mexico's large diaspora continues to remit funds to their families and friends.

China had long been the second largest recipient of international remittances in the world, but it was surpassed by Mexico in 2021, with the Central American country estimated to have received more than USD 61 billion in 2022.³¹⁰ Compared with 2021, remittance flows to Mexico increased by 15 per cent, in part due to increased transfers to transit migrants – whose numbers have increased recently – and the decline in unemployment for Hispanics in the United States in 2022.³¹¹ Remittances are also a major source of foreign exchange for other Central American and Caribbean countries, and represented a lifeline during the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely affected them. While relatively small in terms of volume compared to flows to a country such as Mexico, remittances make up large shares of GDP in Honduras (27%), El Salvador (24%), Nicaragua (20.5%) and Guatemala (19%).³¹²

Prone to disasters linked to climate change such as floods and tropical storms, several countries in the subregion have been identified as some of the most vulnerable to extreme climate events.

The European Commission's 2022 INFORM climate change index shows that countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador are among the most vulnerable to climate shocks.³¹³ Disasters fuelled by climate change, such as Hurricanes Iota and Eta in late 2020, have also led to food insecurity in the subregion, with millions of people in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala experiencing high levels of food insecurity as a result.³¹⁴ The

ever-frequent disasters have, in addition, led to significant displacement. In late 2022, tropical storm Julia resulted in deaths, destruction of property and the displacement of tens of thousands of people across several countries, including Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.³¹⁵ Guatemala accounted for the largest share (56%) of the 72,000 new displacements that took place across eight countries as a result of the storm.³¹⁶ Tropical storm Julia made landfall just as several parts of Central America were still recovering from both Hurricanes Iota and Eta, complicating recovery efforts.³¹⁷

Caribbean

Traditionally known for emigration, with a large number of people moving to countries outside the Caribbean, migration within the subregion is also common and well established. Most intraregional migration is related to labour, with higher income countries in the Caribbean often attracting migrant workers from neighbouring islands with lower wages and where employment opportunities are limited.³¹⁸ A country such as the Bahamas, with a thriving tourism industry and higher wages, is a key destination for a significant number of migrants from the subregion. In 2020, the Bahamas had around 64,000 international migrants, with nearly 47 per cent from Haiti.³¹⁹ Barbados, another high-income country, is also a destination for migrants from within the subregion, particularly those from Guyana and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, who comprised the largest share of immigrants in the country in 2020.³²⁰ Not all intraregional migrants go to high-income countries, however. In 2020, the Dominican Republic was home to nearly 500,000 Haitians.³²¹ Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic has a long history, with many working in the construction and agriculture sectors.³²² The number of people moving from Haiti to its Caribbean neighbour has increased in recent years as the political and security situation in Haiti has deteriorated. In response to the insecurity in Haiti and an increase in Haitians entering the country, in 2022, the Dominican Republic further tightened its border while also summarily deporting tens of thousands of Haitians, prompting international and human rights organizations to issue statements urging the Government to stop the forced return of migrants.³²³ In 2022, thousands of Haitians were repatriated to Haiti by air or sea from countries such as the United States and Cuba, and in April 2023 alone, over 10,000 Haitians were repatriated, with more than 9,700 repatriated from Dominican Republic alone.³²⁴

Gang-related violence and insecurity, political persecution as well as deteriorating economic conditions in some countries in the Caribbean have resulted in significant internal and cross-border displacement. In Haiti, the escalation of intergang violence, particularly in the capital Port-au-Prince, had triggered more than 100,000 internal displacements in 2022.³²⁵ Conditions in the capital continue to be characterized by kidnappings, racketeering, acute deprivation and widespread insecurity.³²⁶ While violence and insecurity in Haiti is not a new phenomenon, it has worsened since 2021, when the country's president was assassinated.³²⁷ Criminal gangs control large swathes of the capital and women and girls have been the most affected. As the political and economic situation has deteriorated, there has been an increase in sexual violence as well as exploitation perpetrated by gangs against women and girls.³²⁸ In Cuba, a worsening economic situation – accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and tougher economic sanctions from the United States – have decimated the country's economy, including key sectors such as tourism, leaving many people in deep poverty.³²⁹ As a result, hundreds of thousands of Cubans have left the country in the 2022 fiscal year: more than 220,000 encounters with Cuban migrants were reported at the United States border with Mexico.³³⁰ 2022 saw the largest exodus of Cubans in more than 30 years, even bigger than the 1980 Mariel boatlift, when 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States over a period of 6 months.³³¹ While


many Cubans have left due to economic conditions, some have fled the country for fear of persecution, as the Government cracked down on those who participated in 2021 protests, the largest protests in Cuba in decades.³³² Some Cubans have attempted to reach the United States by sea – often on rickety boats – while others fly to either Nicaragua (which does not require an entry visa for visiting Cubans) or to a lesser degree Panama, and then ride buses up through Central America.³³³ There were more than 300 deaths and disappearances of migrants in the Caribbean in 2022, the highest number since IOM began collecting these data.³³⁴

Despite their relatively low contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, Caribbean nations are some of the most at risk from the impacts of climate change. With several small island and low-lying States, the Caribbean is extremely prone to natural hazards.³³⁵ Small island States face more frequent storms, rising sea levels and biodiversity loss.³³⁶ Some studies have projected that damages due to climate change in the Caribbean could increase from 5 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 20 per cent in 2100, if no measures are taken to blunt its impacts.³³⁷ Hurricane Ian, which made landfall in Cuba in September 2022, resulted in 80,000 displacements (largely pre-emptive evacuations). Meanwhile, Hurricane Fiona triggered 94,000 displacements, most of which took place in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico and resulted in floods and landslides.³³⁸ A recent report from the World Meteorological Organization argues that while drivers and outcomes depend highly on context, migration due to climate change is projected to increase on small islands, including in the Caribbean.³³⁹ Moreover, the recent IPCC assessment report also details that a 1 degree Celsius increase in temperature could lead to a 60 per cent increase in the number of people projected to experience severe water resource stress for Caribbean small island developing States (SIDS).³⁴⁰

Northern America³⁴¹

Migration in Northern America is dominated by migration into the region, primarily to the United States. The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)³⁴² show that nearly 59 million migrants were residing in Northern America from a variety of regions (Figure 17). This number has increased by around 3 million since 2015, when around 56 million migrants were living in the region. As of 2020, most of these migrants were from Latin America and the Caribbean (around 26 million), followed by Asia (18 million) and Europe (around 7 million). During the last 30 years, the number of migrants in Northern America has more than doubled, driven by emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, as well as by economic growth and political stability in Northern America. The number of Northern American migrants living within the region or elsewhere was very small compared with the foreign-born population in the region. In contrast to regions such as Asia and Africa, where intraregional migration is significant, more Northern American-born migrants lived outside the region (around 3 million) than had moved elsewhere within the region (a little more than 1 million) in 2020.

Figure 17. Migrants to, within and from Northern America, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Northern America” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Northern America) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Northern America” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Northern America) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Northern American region. “Migrants from Northern America” refers to people born in Northern America who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Africa).

The share of female and male immigrants in the United States and Canada is about the same, with female immigrants only slightly larger. When it comes to the proportion of emigrants, however, Canada has a much larger share of female emigrants compared to males. In the United States, there is about an equal share of female and male emigrants.

Figure 18. Main destination (left) and origin (right) countries in Northern America by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

The United States hosted the largest number of asylum-seekers and refugees in Northern America in 2022 (Figure 19). The country was home to nearly 1.8 million asylum-seekers and more than 363,000 refugees at the end of 2022. The United States was also the largest recipient of new individual asylum applications globally in the same year (over 730,000).³⁴³ Canada, meanwhile, hosted more than 113,000 asylum-seekers and nearly 66,000 refugees in 2022.

Figure 19. Number of refugees and asylum-seekers in and from Northern American countries, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country.

All internal displacements in Northern America in 2022 were triggered by disasters (Figure 20). Most occurred in the United States, where 675,000 movements were recorded, nearly half of which were prompted by Hurricane Ian. Disaster displacement numbers in Canada in 2022 were much lower than those recorded in the United States; however, we will likely see a much larger number of disaster displacements in Canada in 2023 due to the intense and widespread wildfire activity that took place in the summer months.

Figure 20. Northern American countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

Key features and developments in Northern America³⁴⁴

As labour shortages take a toll on the economies of both Canada and the United States, both countries have devised or enacted strategies to attract migrant workers to fill critical labour gaps. Demographic shifts as populations age and fertility rates decline, the COVID-19 pandemic – which halted international mobility – as well as previously more restrictive immigration policies in the United States have all contributed to a shortage of workers.³⁴⁵ In response, Canada, for example, has enacted long-term plans to recruit migrants to address its labour needs. In November of 2022, the Canadian Government announced that it would aim to attract 1.45 million immigrants between 2023 and 2025 to fill jobs in key and essential sectors, such as health care and manufacturing.³⁴⁶ In the United States, while immigration grew in 2022 and helped to boost job recoveries in areas such as construction and hospitality, the number of foreign workers still remained below pre-2017 levels.³⁴⁷ Some estimates put unfilled jobs in the United States at over 10 million, and a shortage of immigrants to address these shortages has – some argue – negatively affected the country’s economy.³⁴⁸ In an effort to address these shortages in some essential sectors, even as a more comprehensive immigration policy has been stalled for years, the current United States administration announced plans to issue almost 65,000 more H-2B temporary agricultural visas in the 2023 fiscal year.³⁴⁹

The impacts of climate change are intensifying in parts of Northern America, resulting in significant displacement, loss of lives and property damage. Climate shocks and extreme weather events such as hurricanes as well as record high temperatures are becoming more common, posing significant risks to people across the region.³⁵⁰ The 2022 IPCC report shows that Atlantic Canada and the south-eastern United States will be at risk from sea-level rise and acute hurricanes and storms, even at 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming.³⁵¹ Recent wildfires in both the United States and Canada attest to the worsening impacts of climate change. Between 2020 and 2022, for example, the acres of land burned due to wildfires in the western United States far outpaced the average of 1.2 million acres burned since 2016.³⁵² In Canada, tens of thousands of people had been displaced and millions of acres burned by June 2023, as wildfires raged for weeks.³⁵³ In addition to wildfires, parts of Northern America have borne the brunt of hurricanes. Hurricane Ian, which made landfall in Cuba before tracking toward the United States, resulted in more than 300,000 displacements, most in Florida.³⁵⁴ The United States has been taking pre-emptive measures to protect some of the communities that are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In 2022, it was announced that the Government would give money to five Native American tribes in the states of Alaska and Washington to assist with their relocation away from coastlines and rivers.³⁵⁵

Irregular migration to the United States remains an ongoing challenge and major policy issue, with increasing numbers of arrivals from atypical origin countries. There were 2.4 million encounters at the United States–Mexico border in 2022, the highest on record.³⁵⁶ “Encounters” constitute both apprehensions and expulsions, and these statistics also include many migrants who tried to enter the United States several times without authorization.³⁵⁷ For years, most irregular migrants were overwhelmingly from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras but in 2022 and for the first time, there were more encounters with migrants from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua.³⁵⁸ There were also a large number of arrivals from Haiti, Brazil and from countries outside the region such as India and Ukraine.³⁵⁹ The shift in origin country geography has also been attributed to Title 42, which suspends the right to claim asylum under United States and international law on the basis of preventing the spread of COVID-19.³⁶⁰ In May 2023, the current United States Government allowed the COVID-19 pandemic public health emergency declaration to expire, effectively ending Title 42, which had been put in place by the previous Government.³⁶¹ The United States now returns to the pre-pandemic Title 8, a decades-old immigration law, which carries “steep consequences for unlawful entry, including at least a five-year ban on re-entry and potential criminal prosecution for repeated attempts to enter unlawfully.”³⁶² At the same time, the United States announced in April 2023 the expansion of regular pathways for migrants from South and Central America, in an effort to curb irregular migration.³⁶³ Through the Safe Mobility Initiative, those who are eligible would be considered for both humanitarian and other pathways to the United States or other countries taking part in the programme.³⁶⁴ Some of the pathways available include refugee resettlement, temporary employment pathways and family reunification processes.³⁶⁵ Both IOM and UNHCR (with others) are partners with the United States in this process.


Leaders from 21 countries in Northern America and Latin America and the Caribbean signed the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection in 2022, signalling a major way forward in setting goals for cooperation on migration management across the two regions. The non-binding declaration was widely welcomed, including by international organizations such as IOM and UNHCR. It is considered an important political measure that builds on existing instruments and principles, such as the Global Compact for Migration and regional platforms such as the Regional Conference on Migration, among others, to facilitate the implementation of this Declaration.³⁶⁶ The Declaration is also a recognition that migration cannot be managed unilaterally, and migration challenges and opportunities must be addressed through international cooperation.³⁶⁷ The Declaration sets out several common goals, including: stabilizing migration movements and providing assistance to countries of origin, transit and destination, as well as return; expanding regular pathways for migration and international protection; advancing migration management that is humane; and promoting more coordinated responses to emergencies.³⁶⁸

Canada continues to resettle more refugees than any other country globally. With 47,600 resettlement arrivals in 2022, a 133 per cent increase from 2021 (20,400), Canada received the largest number of resettled refugees in the world.³⁶⁹ Many came from Afghanistan (21,300), the Syrian Arab Republic (7,600) and Eritrea (6,100).³⁷⁰ In 2022, the United States resettled 29,000 refugees, double the figure in 2021. Most were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (9,000), the Syrian Arab Republic (4,300) and Myanmar (2,900).³⁷¹ The continued low levels of refugee resettlements to the United States is, in part, a remnant of the restrictive immigration policies of the previous administration, which cut resettlement numbers, while curtailing the Government's ability to accept refugees.³⁷²

Oceania³⁷³

The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)³⁷⁴ show that almost 8.3 million international migrants from outside Oceania were living in the region. As shown in Figure 21, the foreign-born migrant population was primarily composed of people from Asia and Europe. During the last 30 years, the number of migrants in Oceania born in Asia has grown, while the number of those from Europe has remained steady. Out of all of the six global regions, Oceania had the lowest number of migrants outside its region in 2020, partly a reflection of its smaller population size compared with other regions. Migrants from Oceania living outside the region mainly resided in Europe and Northern America.

Figure 21. Migrants to, within and from Oceania, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Oceania” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Oceania) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Oceania” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Oceania) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Oceania region. “Migrants from Oceania” refers to people born in Oceania who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

The proportion of female and male immigrants in both Australia and New Zealand is about the same with only slight differences. The share of emigrants is also about equal, with the proportion of female emigrants only slightly higher.

Figure 22. Main destination (left) and origin (right) countries in Oceania by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

There were over 156,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Oceania. Most – over 54,000 refugees and nearly 91,000 asylum-seekers – were hosted in Australia. The largest number of refugees in Australia came from countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Papua New Guinea was home to the second largest number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Oceania (Figure 23). Fiji, meanwhile, was the origin of most refugees and asylum-seekers from Oceania (over 3,600).

Figure 23. Numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers in and from Oceania countries, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The figures are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

The largest internal displacements in Oceania triggered by conflict and violence occurred in Papua New Guinea, where 64,000 movements were recorded in 2022 (Figure 24). This is over eight times the number recorded in 2021 (7,500). The violence that triggered most of these displacements was related to national elections in mid-2022 and ensuing tensions. Australia recorded the largest disaster displacements in 2022 (17,000), most of these due to floods in the eastern states of New South Wales and Queensland. Papua New Guinea experienced the second largest number of disaster displacements (nearly 10,000). While disaster displacement in Tonga were much fewer than those recorded in countries such as Australia and Papua New Guinea, as a percentage of population, it experienced the largest number (more than 2%).

Figure 24. Top countries in Oceania by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022*



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

* This includes territories.

*Key features and developments in Oceania*³⁷⁵

After a comprehensive review of Australia's migration system, a government-appointed advisory group recommended major reforms to the country's immigration system in early 2023, after declaring the current system "not fit for purpose".³⁷⁶ The review, which started in September 2022 and was presented to the Government in March 2023, is the most significant review of Australia's immigration system in decades.³⁷⁷ The review found that the current programme not only falls short when it comes to attracting migrants that are highly skilled, but that it also fails to "enable business to efficiently access workers."³⁷⁸ Among the review's criticisms is the rise in "permanently temporary migration", which it said had not only harmed migrants but also confidence in Australia's programme.³⁷⁹ Temporary visas, which have been uncapped for years and have increased faster than permanent visa numbers, have not always provided a clear path to permanent residency, leaving many migrant workers in a permanently temporary state.³⁸⁰ The review also identified migrant exploitation as a key challenge, highlighting aspects linked to temporary migration, such as Temporary Skilled Immigration Income Threshold (TSMIT), which had been frozen since 2013, as playing a role in migrant exploitation.³⁸¹ Following the review, the Australian Government announced in April 2023 that it would increase TSMIT from 53,900 Australian dollars (AUD) to AUD 70,000.³⁸² In addition to calling for smooth and predictable migration, the review noted that migration – through a well-designed migration programme – can play a key role in addressing challenges such as an ageing population and stagnating productivity.³⁸³

Similar to countries in regions such as Northern America and parts of Europe, Australia and New Zealand are facing a labour squeeze and need immigration to address shortages of workers in key sectors. Both countries have long relied on immigration to fill gaps in their labour markets. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Australia enacted some of the harshest mobility restrictions in the world, resulting in a sharp reduction in the number of migrant workers entering the country. To address current labour needs, Australia announced in 2022 that it would increase the number of permanent migration visas in programme year 2022–23 from 160,000 to 195,000.³⁸⁴ This increase is expected to fill labour gaps in sectors such as health and technology. The Government is also focusing on streamlining visa processing, including providing additional funding of AUD 36.1 million for this purpose.³⁸⁵ New Zealand, meanwhile, announced significant immigration reforms to increase its available pool of labour, including easing residence permits for migrant workers in priority high-skill sectors.³⁸⁶

Relative to their population, small island States, including those in Oceania, have the highest displacement risk due to climate change. Eight of the Pacific Island countries and territories, including Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Cook Islands and Niue are among the top 15 countries and territories in the world most at-risk of such disasters.³⁸⁷ Tonga, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are ranked as the most vulnerable countries worldwide to the impacts of climate change and disasters.³⁸⁸ Disasters such as tropical cyclones, volcanic eruptions and droughts often wreak havoc and cause displacement across the subregion.³⁸⁹ In 2021, two consecutive cyclones – Ana and Bina – hit the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, triggering more 14,000 displacements.³⁹⁰ Since half their population live within 10km of the coast, Pacific small island States are also vulnerable to slow onset events such as rising sea levels and coastal erosion, with potentially significant human impacts, including displacement.³⁹¹ Responding to this challenge, governments in the Pacific have declared climate change a critical security issue for the region, and efforts have also been undertaken to advance policy responses to it, including its human mobility implications. Currently, governments across the region are considering the form and content of a regional, rights-based framework on climate mobility – the first of its kind anywhere in the world – under the oversight of the Pacific Islands Forum.

Oceania, particularly Australia, remains a top destination for international students, whose numbers are recovering after a decline in 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Australia has long been a major destination for international students, but as the country closed borders and imposed travel restrictions to contain the spread of COVID-19, the number of students entering the country sharply dropped. In 2022, the number of international students in the country seemed to be returning to pre-COVID-19 levels, with more than 619,000 student-visa-holding students, an 8 per cent increase over 2021.³⁹² And in the first quarter of 2023, over 256,000 international students arrived in Australia, a 143 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2022.³⁹³ While New Zealand receives fewer international students compared to Australia, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was also a popular destination. Before the pandemic, New Zealand enrolled around 120,000 international students, but these numbers dramatically declined during the country's pandemic-related two-year border closure.³⁹⁴ There were signs, however, that the number of international students to New Zealand is recovering, too; since the borders reopened, thousands of students have applied to enter the country for upcoming programmes.³⁹⁵

Endnotes

- ¹ All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this chapter, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain.
- ² Please note that subregions relate largely to migration dynamics and so may differ from those of UN DESA. Details are provided in Appendix A.
- ³ Updates are up until end October 2023.
- ⁴ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Africa.
- ⁵ See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data set.
- ⁶ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Africa.
- ⁷ European Council and Council of the European Union, 2023.
- ⁸ UNHCR, 2020.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Black and Sigman, 2022.
- ¹¹ European Commission, 2022.
- ¹² Danish Refugee Council, 2022; ECRE, 2022a.
- ¹³ OHCHR, 2023a.
- ¹⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁵ Moderan, 2023.
- ¹⁶ Parker, 2023.
- ¹⁷ OHCHR, 2023a.
- ¹⁸ OHCHR, 2022a.
- ¹⁹ UN DESA, 2021.
- ²⁰ World Bank, 2023a.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Fusco, 2022.
- ²³ Belhaj, 2022.
- ²⁴ Clement et al., 2021.
- ²⁵ Wehrey and Fawal, 2022.
- ²⁶ OCHA, 2021.
- ²⁷ IDMC, 2023a.
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ IOM, n.d.a; Fulton and Holmes, 2023; Harb and Elhennawy, 2023.
- ³¹ Ochab, 2022.
- ³² IDMC, 2023a.
- ³³ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ³⁴ Williams, 2023.
- ³⁵ IDMC, 2023a; IOM, n.d.b.
- ³⁶ Abebe and Mukundi-Wachira, 2023.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁹ Oucho et al., 2023.
- ⁴⁰ Brenn et al., 2022.
- ⁴¹ IGAD, 2020.
- ⁴² COMESA, 2022.
- ⁴³ Ibid.
- ⁴⁴ IOM, 2022a.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid.; IOM, 2023a.
- ⁴⁶ Terry and Rai, 2023.
- ⁴⁷ FSNWG, 2022; Terry and Rai, 2023.
- ⁴⁸ UNHCR, 2023b; IOM, 2023b.
- ⁴⁹ Member States of IGAD, EAC and States of the East and the Horn of Africa, 2022.
- ⁵⁰ Gbadamosi, 2023.
- ⁵¹ WMO, 2023.
- ⁵² OCHA, 2023a.
- ⁵³ ACLED, 2023.
- ⁵⁴ IDMC, 2023a.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ⁵⁷ UNHCR, 2023c.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ ACAPS, n.d.
- ⁶⁰ Bisong, 2021; UN DESA, 2021.
- ⁶¹ McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019.
- ⁶² Bisong, 2021.
- ⁶³ IOM, 2022a.
- ⁶⁴ World Bank, 2023a.
- ⁶⁵ Munda, 2022.
- ⁶⁶ GFEMS, 2021; Hertog, 2022; Aboueldahab, 2021.
- ⁶⁷ GFEMS, 2021.
- ⁶⁸ Council on Foreign Relations, 2023.
- ⁶⁹ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.
- ⁷⁰ IOM, 2022b; Ndiaga and Mcallister, 2022.
- ⁷¹ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ⁷² UNICEF, 2023a.
- ⁷³ André, 2022.
- ⁷⁴ IDMC, 2023a.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid.
- ⁷⁷ UNODC, 2023a.
- ⁷⁸ UNECE, 2022.
- ⁷⁹ IOM, 2023c.
- ⁸⁰ UNECE, 2022.
- ⁸¹ IOM, 2023c.
- ⁸² UN DESA, 2021.
- ⁸³ Bentil et al., 2021.
- ⁸⁴ Ibid.
- ⁸⁵ IOM, n.d.c.; Devillard et al., 2015.
- ⁸⁶ McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019.

- ⁸⁷ Arhin-Sam et al., 2022.
- ⁸⁸ IOM, n.d.d.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid.
- ⁹⁰ Osserman and Zhou, 2022.
- ⁹¹ Smith, R., 2022; Osserman and Zhou, 2022.
- ⁹² Walt, 2022.
- ⁹³ Adler, 2022.
- ⁹⁴ Nkang, 2019; Abderrahmane, 2022.
- ⁹⁵ Abderrahmane, 2022; Wolter, 2019.
- ⁹⁶ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Asia.
- ⁹⁷ See Chapter 2 for information on the next release on UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- ⁹⁸ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Asia.
- ⁹⁹ IDMC and ADB, 2022.
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁰¹ IDMC, 2023a.
- ¹⁰² Ibid.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁴ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁵ McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019; McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.
- ¹⁰⁶ World Bank, 2023a.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid.; please note that the subregion refers to the World Bank's East Asia and the Pacific subregion.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁹ McAuliffe, 2017; ASEAN, 2022.
- ¹¹⁰ ASEAN, 2022.
- ¹¹¹ McAuliffe, 2017.
- ¹¹² IOM, 2023d.
- ¹¹³ IOM, n.d.e.
- ¹¹⁴ Jespersen et al., 2022.
- ¹¹⁵ UNODC, 2023b.
- ¹¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁷ US Department of State, 2022.
- ¹¹⁸ Al Jazeera, 2023a.
- ¹¹⁹ BBC, 2022.
- ¹²⁰ UNHCR, 2023d.
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² Kean, 2022.
- ¹²³ Abdelkader, 2017; UNHCR, n.d.b.
- ¹²⁴ OHCHR, 2023b; Al Jazeera, 2023b.
- ¹²⁵ Paul, 2023.
- ¹²⁶ UNHCR, 2023e; Rahman, 2023.
- ¹²⁷ Roome, 2022.
- ¹²⁸ IDMC, 2023a; United Nations, 2022a.
- ¹²⁹ IDMC, 2023a; Mahmud, 2022.
- ¹³⁰ IDMC, 2023a.
- ¹³¹ World Bank, 2023a.
- ¹³² UN DESA, 2021.
- ¹³³ World Bank, 2023a.
- ¹³⁴ Ibid.
- ¹³⁵ McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019.
- ¹³⁶ IDMC, 2023a.
- ¹³⁷ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ¹³⁸ Ibid.
- ¹³⁹ United Nations, 2022b.
- ¹⁴⁰ Goldbaum and Akbary, 2022; United Nations, 2023a.
- ¹⁴¹ Goldbaum and Padshah, 2023.
- ¹⁴² IOM, 2023e.
- ¹⁴³ UNHCR and IOM, 2023.
- ¹⁴⁴ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ¹⁴⁵ Al Jazeera, 2023c.
- ¹⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁴⁷ Yeung and Maruyama, 2023.
- ¹⁴⁸ Ng, 2023.
- ¹⁴⁹ Yokohama, 2022.
- ¹⁵⁰ Suk and Yang, 2023.
- ¹⁵¹ Japan News, 2022.
- ¹⁵² IDMC, 2023a.
- ¹⁵³ Ibid.; IDMC, 2022a.
- ¹⁵⁴ Frost, 2023.
- ¹⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁶ UN DESA, 2021.
- ¹⁵⁷ World Bank, 2023a.
- ¹⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁵⁹ ICEF, 2022a.
- ¹⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ¹⁶¹ ICEF, 2022a.
- ¹⁶² Singh, 2023.
- ¹⁶³ Hogan, 2023; Nikkei Asia, 2023; Yamamoto, 2023.
- ¹⁶⁴ Nikkei Asia, 2023; Yamamoto, 2023.
- ¹⁶⁵ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ¹⁶⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁶⁸ Ibid.; UNHCR, 2023a.
- ¹⁶⁹ Fahim, 2022; OHCHR, 2021.
- ¹⁷⁰ Fahim, 2022.
- ¹⁷¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁷² IOM, 2023f.
- ¹⁷³ Ibid.
- ¹⁷⁴ United Nations, 2023b.
- ¹⁷⁵ IASC, 2023; IOM, 2023g.
- ¹⁷⁶ IASC, 2023; IOM, 2023h.
- ¹⁷⁷ UNHCR, 2023f.
- ¹⁷⁸ IOM, 2022c.
- ¹⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁸⁰ IOM, 2023i.

- ¹⁸¹ NRC, 2022.
- ¹⁸² IOM, 2023j.
- ¹⁸³ IDMC, 2023a.
- ¹⁸⁴ OCHA, 2023b.
- ¹⁸⁵ IDMC, 2021.
- ¹⁸⁶ IOM, 2023k.
- ¹⁸⁷ World Bank, 2023a.
- ¹⁸⁸ ILO, 2021.
- ¹⁸⁹ Schenk, 2023.
- ¹⁹⁰ World Bank, 2023a.
- ¹⁹¹ Ibid.; Bloomberg News, 2022.
- ¹⁹² World Bank, 2023a.
- ¹⁹³ Auyezov and Gordeyeva, 2022.
- ¹⁹⁴ Reuters, 2022.
- ¹⁹⁵ Ebel, 2023.
- ¹⁹⁶ Khashimov et al., 2020.
- ¹⁹⁷ ICMPD, 2023.
- ¹⁹⁸ Government of Uzbekistan, 2022.
- ¹⁹⁹ UNDP, 2022a.
- ²⁰⁰ ADB, 2022.
- ²⁰¹ Talant, 2022.
- ²⁰² IDMC, 2022b.
- ²⁰³ Ibid.
- ²⁰⁴ Davies, 2022.
- ²⁰⁵ Sultanalieva, 2022.
- ²⁰⁶ IDMC, 2023a.
- ²⁰⁷ Davies, 2022.
- ²⁰⁸ See Appendix A for details of the composition of Europe.
- ²⁰⁹ See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- ²¹⁰ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Europe.
- ²¹¹ OHCHR, 2023c; EUAA et al., 2022.
- ²¹² UNHCR, 2023g; IDMC, 2023a.
- ²¹³ UNHCR, 2023h.
- ²¹⁴ UNHCR, 2023j.
- ²¹⁵ OCHA, 2023c.
- ²¹⁶ ILO, n.d.
- ²¹⁷ OECD, 2022.
- ²¹⁸ Ibid.
- ²¹⁹ Ciurcă, 2023.
- ²²⁰ Pickup, 2020; Morris, 2022.
- ²²¹ Smith, H., 2022.
- ²²² UN DESA, 2022.
- ²²³ Neidhardt and Butcher, 2022.
- ²²⁴ IOM, 2023l.
- ²²⁵ Ibid.
- ²²⁶ Ibid.
- ²²⁷ Ibid.
- ²²⁸ IOM, 2022d.
- ²²⁹ Emmott et al., 2021.
- ²³⁰ European Commission, n.d.
- ²³¹ ECRE, 2023.
- ²³² Ibid.
- ²³³ Ibid.
- ²³⁴ UNHCR, 2022a.
- ²³⁵ Ibid.
- ²³⁶ IOM, 2023m.
- ²³⁷ Wienberg, 2022.
- ²³⁸ Ahmed, 2023.
- ²³⁹ OHCHR, 2023d.
- ²⁴⁰ IOM, 2023n.
- ²⁴¹ Ibid.
- ²⁴² IOM, 2023o.
- ²⁴³ Mentzelopoulou, 2022.
- ²⁴⁴ ECRE, 2022a and 2022b.
- ²⁴⁵ ECRE, 2022b.
- ²⁴⁶ George, 2022.
- ²⁴⁷ Pallapothu, 2021.
- ²⁴⁸ UN Women, 2022.
- ²⁴⁹ Pallapothu, 2021.
- ²⁵⁰ Government of Canada, 2021.
- ²⁵¹ See Appendix A for details of the composition of Latin America and the Caribbean.
- ²⁵² See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- ²⁵³ See the South America subregion for a detailed discussion on the millions of displaced Venezuelans. These are Venezuelans were previously categorized as “Venezuelans displaced abroad” (VDA). UNHCR identifies these Venezuelans under a separate category to reflect the ongoing displacement crisis; this category does not include Venezuelan asylum-seekers and refugees.
- ²⁵⁴ See Appendix A for details of the composition of Latin America and the Caribbean.
- ²⁵⁵ The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is suspended in all rights and obligations inherent to its status as a MERCOSUR State Party, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol.
- ²⁵⁶ MERCOSUR, n.d.; Brumat and Espinoza, 2023.
- ²⁵⁷ Selee et al., 2023.
- ²⁵⁸ UN DESA, 2021.
- ²⁵⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ²⁶¹ IOM, 2023p; Brumat and Pereira, 2023.
- ²⁶² Doña-Reveco, 2022.
- ²⁶³ R4V, n.d.
- ²⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶⁶ UNHCR, 2023i.

- ²⁶⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁶⁸ UNHCR, n.d.c.
- ²⁶⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁷⁰ IOM, 2023q; UNHCR, 2022b. Argentina and Uruguay apply the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement to regularize Venezuelan population; with this, both countries facilitate the access of thousands of immigrants to residence permits, personal documentation and social rights.
- ²⁷¹ World Bank, 2023b; Bahar et al., 2022; IOM, 2022e.
- ²⁷² Barchfield, 2023.
- ²⁷³ IDMC, 2023a.
- ²⁷⁴ ACLED, 2022.
- ²⁷⁵ ACAPS, 2023.
- ²⁷⁶ Goodwin and Escobar, 2023; Diaz, 2023.
- ²⁷⁷ Collyns, 2023; International Crisis Group, 2022.
- ²⁷⁸ Diaz, 2023; Goodwin and Escobar, 2023.
- ²⁷⁹ US Customs and Border Protection, 2023; Ecuador Times, 2023.
- ²⁸⁰ Ecuador Times, 2023.
- ²⁸¹ ECLAC, 2022; Castellanos et al., 2022.
- ²⁸² Castellanos et al., 2022.
- ²⁸³ Ibid.; Bergmann, 2021.
- ²⁸⁴ IDMC, 2023a.
- ²⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁸⁶ Reuters, 2023a.
- ²⁸⁷ IDMC, 2023b; UNICEF, 2023b.
- ²⁸⁸ MPI, 2022.
- ²⁸⁹ IOM, 2023r and 2023s; IBC, 2023.
- ²⁹⁰ IOM, 2023t.
- ²⁹¹ Álvarez Velasco, 2020; Dixon, n.d.
- ²⁹² Álvarez Velasco, 2022.
- ²⁹³ Yates, 2019.
- ²⁹⁴ Selee et al., 2023.
- ²⁹⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁹⁶ Yates and Bolter, 2021.
- ²⁹⁷ Roy, 2022.
- ²⁹⁸ OCHA, 2022a.
- ²⁹⁹ IFRC, n.d.; IOM and WFP, 2022.
- ³⁰⁰ IOM, 2023t; Roy, 2022.
- ³⁰¹ MMC, 2023.
- ³⁰² Government of Panama, 2023.
- ³⁰³ IOM, 2023u.
- ³⁰⁴ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ³⁰⁵ NRC, 2023.
- ³⁰⁶ Reuters, 2023b.
- ³⁰⁷ Wilson Center, 2022; Plan International, 2023.
- ³⁰⁸ ICG, 2023.
- ³⁰⁹ IDMC, 2023a.
- ³¹⁰ World Bank, 2023a.
- ³¹¹ Ibid.
- ³¹² Ibid.
- ³¹³ IASC and European Commission, 2022.
- ³¹⁴ Angelo, 2022; IOM and WFP, 2022.
- ³¹⁵ Al Jazeera, 2022.
- ³¹⁶ IDMC, 2023a.
- ³¹⁷ Ibid.
- ³¹⁸ Lacarte et al., 2023.
- ³¹⁹ UN DESA, 2021.
- ³²⁰ Ibid.
- ³²¹ Ibid.
- ³²² Mérancourt and Coletta, 2023.
- ³²³ OHCHR, 2022b.
- ³²⁴ IOM, 2023v.
- ³²⁵ IDMC, 2023a.
- ³²⁶ IOM, 2022f.
- ³²⁷ IDMC, 2023a.
- ³²⁸ OHCHR, 2023e; Obert, 2022.
- ³²⁹ Augustin and Robles, 2022.
- ³³⁰ Sesin, 2022.
- ³³¹ Salomon, 2022.
- ³³² Augustin and Robles, 2022.
- ³³³ Perlmutter, 2022 and 2023.
- ³³⁴ IOM, 2023w.
- ³³⁵ WMO, 2022.
- ³³⁶ UNDP, 2022b.
- ³³⁷ Ibid.
- ³³⁸ IDMC, 2023a.
- ³³⁹ WMO, 2022.
- ³⁴⁰ IPCC, 2022b.
- ³⁴¹ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.
- ³⁴² See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- ³⁴³ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ³⁴⁴ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.
- ³⁴⁵ Harnoss et al., 2022.
- ³⁴⁶ Ainsley et al., 2023.
- ³⁴⁷ DePillis, 2023.
- ³⁴⁸ Bhattarai and Gurley, 2022.
- ³⁴⁹ MPI, 2022.
- ³⁵⁰ US EPA, n.d.
- ³⁵¹ IPCC, 2022a.
- ³⁵² NOAA, n.d.
- ³⁵³ Tumin, 2023; Cecco, 2023.
- ³⁵⁴ IDMC, 2023a.
- ³⁵⁵ Flavelle, 2022.
- ³⁵⁶ Ruiz Soto, 2022.

- ³⁵⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ³⁵⁹ Spagat, 2022.
- ³⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ³⁶¹ Debusmann, 2023; Engle, 2023.
- ³⁶² Goodman, 2023; US DHS, 2023.
- ³⁶³ US DHS, 2023.
- ³⁶⁴ Movilidad Segura, n.d.
- ³⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶⁶ IOM, 2022g.
- ³⁶⁷ Selee, 2022.
- ³⁶⁸ Summit of the Americas Heads of State, 2022.
- ³⁶⁹ UNHCR, 2023a.
- ³⁷⁰ Ibid.
- ³⁷¹ Ibid.
- ³⁷² MPI, 2022.
- ³⁷³ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Oceania.
- ³⁷⁴ See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- ³⁷⁵ See Appendix A for details on the composition of Oceania.

- ³⁷⁶ Government of Australia, 2023a.
- ³⁷⁷ Boucher, 2023.
- ³⁷⁸ Government of Australia, 2023a.
- ³⁷⁹ Karp, 2023.
- ³⁸⁰ Ibid.
- ³⁸¹ Government of Australia, 2023a; Boucher, 2023.
- ³⁸² Government of Australia, 2023b.
- ³⁸³ Boucher, 2023.
- ³⁸⁴ Government of Australia, 2022.
- ³⁸⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁸⁶ Whyte, 2022.
- ³⁸⁷ OCHA, 2022b.
- ³⁸⁸ IDMC and ADB, 2022.
- ³⁸⁹ IOM and ILO, 2022.
- ³⁹⁰ IDMC, 2022b.
- ³⁹¹ IDMC and ADB, 2022.
- ³⁹² ICEF, 2023.
- ³⁹³ Knott, 2023.
- ³⁹⁴ ICEF, 2022b.
- ³⁹⁵ Ibid.



PART II

COMPLEX AND EMERGING MIGRATION ISSUES





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4 GROWING MIGRATION INEQUALITY: WHAT DO THE GLOBAL DATA ACTUALLY SHOW?¹

Introduction

International migration is strongly associated with opportunity for positive advancement, most typically in economic terms. A long-standing, influential international migration narrative is deeply intertwined with the notion of betterment, whether this relates to individual attainment, household income or community resilience and coping strategies.² People migrate for better lives. This has long been a cornerstone of international migration research, analysis and policy:

Like many birds, but unlike most other animals, humans are a migratory species. Indeed, migration is as old as humanity itself. ... A careful examination of virtually any historical era reveals a consistent propensity towards geographic mobility among men and women, who are driven to wander by diverse motives, but nearly always with some idea of material improvement.³

There are many stories of the migrant who arrived in a new country with little and managed to build a successful business, become a respected civic leader, fund the education of an entire generation of extended family members back home or personally achieve the highest levels of academic attainment through sustained hard work. Likewise, we have also read complaints from some critics about people moving to access welfare regimes or certain jobs, mostly in negative and sometimes politicized terms. While these somewhat superficial narrative examples might be quite different in framing and perspective, they are both strongly associated with attainment and the fact that migration offers the person(s) migrating some positive and tangible benefit. In other words, it is difficult to contemplate someone actively migrating into a worse situation. To have moved internationally and to be worse off is more likely to be associated with “forced migration” (otherwise referred to as displacement) and can be due to war, persecution, disaster or other reasons. Unsurprisingly, displacement is strongly related to unanticipated and profound loss.⁴

Beyond narratives of migration, international *emigration* has been a policy pursued by some national governments over many decades as part of broader economic agendas.⁵ Emigration has supported the development of international trade, diplomacy and peace, and helped to forge cultural ties as well as provide a source of foreign income. In other countries, *international* immigration has been a significant policy lever in the journey of “nation building”

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² Castles et al., 2014; Massey et al., 2005.

³ Massey et al., 2005:2.


⁴ Ayeb-Karlsson, 2020; Ibáñez and Vélez, 2008; Turton, 2003.

⁵ Lee, 2016; Premi and Mathur, 1995; Xiang, 2016.

during a period in which international competition between States has intensified and the search for “global talent” amplified.⁶

In numerical terms, the number of international migrants has grown from around 84 million globally in 1970 to 281 million in 2020, although when global population growth is factored in, the proportion of international migrants has only inched up from 2.3 to 3.6 per cent of the world’s population.⁷ However, the change in the number and proportion of international migrants has not been uniform, with significant variation in migration rates around the world. Distinct regional patterns have emerged over time (see Figure 1), often underpinned by large, historical migration corridors linked to geographic proximity as much as geoeconomic disparity.

Figure 1. International migrants by region 1990 to 2019: Migrants to, migrants within and migrants from Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)



Source: UN DESA, 2019.

Note: “Migrants to Europe” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Europe) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Africa or Asia). “Migrants within Europe” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Europe) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the European region. “Migrants from Europe” refers to people born in Europe who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Latin America and the Caribbean or Northern America).

Note: “Migrants to Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. in Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Latin America and the Caribbean region. “Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to people born in Latin America and the Caribbean who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

⁶ Alarcón, 2011; Bhuyan et al., 2015; Fargues, 2011; Moran, 2011.

⁷ UN DESA, 2021. See Chapter 2 for a discussion of definitions. While internal migration (especially urbanization) has also played a significant role in the provision of opportunities via mobility, this chapter focuses on international migration.

We can see from Figure 1 that very distinct trends have emerged at the regional level over the last 30 years, such as the strong preference of people from Latin America and the Caribbean to migrate to Northern America, and the almost doubling of migration to Europe from other regions. Within these regional pictures, additional variability is apparent at the country level, with some countries accounting for a greater share of international migrants over time (e.g. the proportion of migrants in the United Arab Emirates has risen from 71% in 1990 to 88% in 2019), while other countries face increasing emigration and declining fertility such that “depopulation” challenges are looming (Latvia, Lithuania and Bosnia and Herzegovina all experienced more than 10% declines in population since 2009).⁸

In this chapter, we examine the key questions of “who migrates internationally and where do they go?” We analyse a range of statistical data at the country and regional levels and draw upon some of the existing body of research on migration determinants and decision-making. The next section summarizes some of the key debates in international migration, including those in the development context. The following section presents an analysis of migration between 1995 and 2020,⁹ with reference to human development, before discussion in the third section on policy levers. The chapter then concludes by outlining some of the key policy and programmatic implications and challenges ahead.

Concepts and context

There has been considerable research and enquiry over many decades into the reasons underpinning migration, both internal and international, stretching back in the modern era as far as the 1880s.¹⁰ Ongoing examination of migration drivers and factors principally involves attempts to explain migration patterns as well as the structures and processes that influence and shape the movement of people from one country to another. As a result, there is a substantial body of research and analysis on the determinants of international migration that has identified multiple factors underpinning migration patterns and processes, including those related to economics and trade, social and cultural links, demography and demographic change, and safety and protection, as well as geography and proximity.¹¹

There has been a considerable focus on agency and structure, and how people contemplating migration navigate through a range of “intervening obstacles”, with the number and nature of those obstacles being related to human capability in the context of development.¹² While the populist view remains that so-called “economic migrants” are active in their pursuit of migration and exercise a considerable degree of agency, this is too simplistic. While acknowledging long-term evidence reflected in academic outputs on the political economy of migration, research and analysis in more recent decades has, for example, found wide variation in the ability of labour migrants to make choices, depending on the policy constraints and options they face; these constraints include conditions of bonded labour, as well as labour migration that involves people trading off their rights in pressurized environments.¹³ For example, the extent to which labour migrants are able to exercise self-agency and choose aspects of their migration

⁸ See the *World Migration Report 2020*, Chapter 3, for discussion.

⁹ The chapter draws upon international migrant stock data for 2020 (UN DESA, 2021) and human development index data for 2019 (UNDP, 2020), these being the latest data available at the time of drafting.

¹⁰ Ravenstein, 1885; Ravenstein, 1889.

¹¹ See for example writings on cumulative causation (Massey, 1990), neoclassical economics (Todaro, 1989), world system theory (Portes and Walton, 1981), social capital theory (Massey et al., 1987), new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985) and social network theory (Boyd, 1989).

¹² Lee, 1966; Sen, 1999.

¹³ Ruhs, 2013.

can be heavily circumscribed, although in most circumstances some choice remains, including as to whether to migrate, where to migrate, how to migrate, and whether or when to return home.¹⁴ Nevertheless, the ability of (potential) migrants to exercise choice in international migration can be extremely limited, depending on where they were born and the circumstances in which they live.

Migration and the lottery of birth

Examining the overall quality of life by country, and the ability to migrate in terms of visa access, reveals that availability of migration options is partly related to the lottery of birth and in particular the national passport of the potential migrant. For instance, some nationality groups appear to be much less likely to have access to visas and visa-free arrangements.¹⁵ Table 1 below summarizes global indices of human development (see Appendix A for a discussion of the Human Development Index), fragility and visa access for selected countries.¹⁶ The Passport Index, a global ranking of countries according to the entry freedom of their citizens,¹⁷ reveals for example that an individual's ability to enter a country with relative ease is in many respects determined by nationality. Entry access also broadly reflects a country's status and relations within the international community and indicates how stable, safe and prosperous it is in relation to other countries. The data also show two other aspects: that there are some significant differences between highly ranked human development countries and others; and that mid-ranked development countries can be significant source, transit and destination countries simultaneously. Nationals from countries with very high levels of human development can travel visa free to most other countries worldwide.¹⁸ These countries are also significant and preferred destination countries.¹⁹ Toward the bottom of the table, however, the entry restrictions in place for these countries indicate that regular migration pathways are problematic for citizens. Irregular pathways are likely to be the most realistic (if not the only) option open to potential migrants from these countries. It is also important to note that low HDI countries are also much more likely to have large populations of internally displaced persons and/or to be origin countries of large numbers of refugees.²⁰

¹⁴ Khalaf and Alkobaisi, 1999; Ullah, 2011.

¹⁵ We note here that different types of visas involve different levels of processing and scrutiny; however, the Henley index provides a useful synthesis of access to regular migration at the global level by country.

¹⁶ The Human Development Index is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and a decent standard of living. The Passport Index measures visa restrictions in place in 227 countries, territories and areas and indicates the capacity of individuals to travel to other international destinations with relative ease. The higher the rank, the more countries an individual with that passport can enter visa free. The Fragile States Index, produced by the Fund for Peace, is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. The index includes social, economic, political and military indicators.

¹⁷ Henley & Partners, 2021.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Espipova et al., 2018; Keogh, 2013; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; UN DESA, 2021.

²⁰ IDMC, 2020; UNHCR, 2020.

Table 1. Human development, fragility and passport rankings for selected countries


	Country (in HDI rank order)	Human Development Index 2019	Passport Index 2021	Fragile States Index 2020
		Rank	Rank	Rank
Very High Human Development	Norway	1	8	177
	Germany	6	3	166
	Australia	8	9	169
	Singapore	11	2	162
	Canada	16	9	171
	United States	17	7	149
	France	26	6	160
	Italy	29	4	143
	Malaysia	62	12	120
High Human Development	Sri Lanka	72	99	52
	Mexico	74	23	98
	Thailand	79	65	82
	Tunisia	95	72	95
	Lebanon	92	100	40
	Libya	105	101	20
	Indonesia	107	72	96
	Egypt	116	90	35
Medium Human Development	Kyrgyzstan	120	79	73
	Iraq	123	109	17
	Morocco	121	78	80
	India	131	84	68
	Bangladesh	133	100	39
	Cambodia	144	88	55
	Kenya	143	72	29
	Pakistan	154	107	25
Low Human Development	Uganda	159	75	24
	Sudan	170	100	8
	Haiti	170	92	13
	Afghanistan	169	110	9
	Ethiopia	173	96	21
	Yemen	179	106	1
	Eritrea	180	98	18
A number 1 ranking means:		Very high human development	Most mobile passport citizenship	Most fragile country
The lowest ranking means:		Low human development	Least mobile passport citizenship	Least fragile country

Sources: UNDP, Human Development Index 2019 (Human Development Report 2020); Henley & Partners, Passport Index 2021 (The Henley Passport Index 2021, Q2); The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index 2020.

Note: Data were the latest available at the time of writing.

We also know, however, that nationality alone does not account for evolving migration patterns, as visa and mobility policy settings are one (albeit important) factor in explaining who migrates and where people migrate over time. Within the context of the broader discussions on migration drivers and the development of discernible migration patterns over recent years and decades, models to explain migration, as shown in Figure 2, seek to account for both structural aspects and migrants' agency.

Figure 2. A model of the mechanisms that produce migration



Source: Carling, 2017.

Importantly, this model recognizes that a desire for change does not necessarily result in a desire to migrate, and that where it does exist, a desire to migrate does not necessarily result in migration – the existence of migration infrastructure²¹ (or lack thereof) is an important factor in migration outcomes, with migration infrastructure defined as diverse human and non-human elements that enable and shape migration (e.g. migration “agents” operating commercially, including smugglers; regulatory regimes and policy frameworks; technological aspects such as ICT and transport; and transnational social networks).²²

As part of this migration infrastructure, the (in)ability to access a visa can be profoundly important, not least because it is the one element that has not radically expanded over time, unlike the marked growth in “agents”, ICT, transport and connected networks.²³ On the contrary, recent analysis shows that visa access has resulted in a bifurcation of mobility, with citizens of wealthy countries much more able to access regulated mobility regimes than those from poor countries.²⁴ This is important because, wherever possible, migrants will opt to migrate through regular pathways on visas.²⁵ There are stark differences between travelling on a visa and travelling unauthorized without a visa. From a migrant’s perspective, the experience can be profoundly different in a number of important ways that can impact on the migrant as well as his/her family, including those who may remain in the origin country. First, visas denote authority to enter a country and so offer a form of legitimacy when arriving in and travelling

²¹ Xiang and Lindquist, 2014.

²² Carling, 2017.

²³ Lahav, 1999; McAuliffe., 2017a; Triandafyllidou and McAuliffe, 2018.

²⁴ Mau et al., 2015.

²⁵ Jayasuriya et al., 2016; Koser and Kuschminder, 2015; Marouf, 2017; McAuliffe et al., 2017. Please note that while “regular” migration does not necessarily require visas, the discussion refers to visas because these are often a requirement, most especially for migrants from developing countries. In addition, the term “visa” is much more widely understood than “regular” by migrants and the general public.

through a country. A valid visa provides a greater chance of being safeguarded against exploitation. Conversely, travelling without a visa puts people at much greater risk of being detained and deported by authorities, or exploited and abused by those offering illicit migration services, such as smugglers or traffickers, and having to operate largely outside of regulated systems.²⁶ Second, travelling on visas is undoubtedly much easier logistically, as the availability of travel options is far greater. In some cases, it can mean the difference between a journey being feasible or not. Third, visas provide a greater level of certainty and confidence in the journey, which is much more likely to take place as planned, including in relation to costs.²⁷

Unsurprisingly, there is thus often a strong preference for travelling on a visa. Access to visas within decision-making contexts, therefore, features heavily in the minds of potential migrants and has been shown to be a key factor when the possibilities of migrating are explored while in the country of origin.²⁸ In recent research on online job search and migration intentions, for example, the availability of visas was found to be a determining factor in how people conducted online job searches.²⁹ Similarly, changes in visa settings have been found to have an impact on potential migrants' perceptions of opportunities afforded by migration, as well as their eventual migration.³⁰

The intentions of (potential) migrants as part of individual and collective migrant decision-making processes has been a significant focus of migration research and analysis for many years, and remains of particular interest to scholars and policymakers alike.³¹ As highlighted in Figure 2 above, intentions do not always result in migration outcomes, and much of the research has adopted a tiered approach to contemplations of migration that involve different stages (such as “desire”, “exploration/planning”, “preparation” and “down/actual payment”), finding overall that as the process progresses over time, fewer and fewer people are able to maintain their desire and realize their migration intention, and those in the final “payment” category are typically very small in number and proportion.³² Intentions to migrate – even if carefully refined and nuanced – can only take us so far in understanding migration.³³

Migration and development: mobility transitions and “hump migration”

The significant limitations or obstacles facing people (especially in countries with low levels of human development) in accessing visa regimes to pursue international migration is also reflected in macroeconomic analysis of migration. One line of research on the links between “maturity” of migration and human development, for example, shows that low-income countries have low emigration rates, an explanation being that low income levels are an obstacle in accumulating the funds needed to undertake migration, acknowledging that other factors (e.g. demography) also play a role.³⁴ Resource consideration is related to the concept of “involuntary immobility”, in which people who would like to migrate internationally are unable to do so for a number of reasons, including costs.³⁵

Further, analysis of the relationship between country income and international migration shows that emigration increases with higher income levels, and that at a certain point, higher incomes enabling increased emigration can then become a stabilizing influence and reduce outward migration. In other words, as GDP per capita increases,

²⁶ McAuliffe, 2017a.

²⁷ McAuliffe et al., 2017.

²⁸ Jayasuriya, 2014; Manik, 2014.

²⁹ Sinclair and Mamertino, 2016.

³⁰ Czaika and de Haas, 2016; Gaibazzi, 2014; Jayasuriya et al., 2016; Manik, 2014; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016.

³¹ Clemens and Mendola, 2020; Lee, 1966; McAuliffe, 2017b; Neumayer, 2010; Van Hear et al., 2012.


³² McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016.

³³ Tjaden et al. (2018) examined the links between intentions and migration flows, however, this is limited to a narrow and specific geography.

³⁴ Clemens, 2014; Dao et al., 2018; Zelinsky, 1971.

³⁵ Carling, 2002.

emigration initially increases and then decreases. This phenomenon, depicted in Figure 3,³⁶ has been referred to by some analysts as the “mobility transition”.³⁷



Source: Adapted from Clemens, 2014:7–8.

Notes: Clemens found that overall higher economic development (higher income) is associated with reduced emigration. Refer to Clemens (2014) for further discussion of data analysis.

As shown in Figure 3, Clemens’s analysis estimates that emigration rates start to decrease if countries rise above GDP per capita income levels of USD 7,000–8,000, which at the time of the analysis (using 2005 GDP data) included countries such as Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji and North Macedonia.³⁸ Further, as income levels rise, emigration rates decline, as illustrated by the so-called “migration hump”.³⁹

The interaction of economic development and international migration – or “mobility transitions” – has been of intense interest to researchers and policymakers globally, as it calls into question the commonly held notion that overseas development assistance will act to “stabilize” populations and dampen emigration rates from low-income countries by providing greater opportunities at home.⁴⁰ Analysts have found that economic development of low-income countries is positively correlated with emigration: “economic growth has historically raised emigration in almost all developing countries”.⁴¹ However, more recent analysis has found that when shorter time periods

³⁶ Clemens, 2014.

³⁷ Akerman, 1976; Clemens, 2014; Dao et al., 2018; de Haas, 2010; Gould, 1979.

³⁸ See, for example, the interactive [World Bank dashboard](#) on GDP per capita (PPP).

³⁹ Zelinsky, 1971. See discussion in de Haas (2010) of the difference between “mobility transition” and “migration hump”, which has become confused/conflated over time.


⁴⁰ Clemens, 2020; de Haas, 2010 and 2020.

⁴¹ Clemens and Postel, 2018.

are examined, the relationship between country income levels and emigration is less clear, with the finding that economic growth in poor countries coincides with less emigration.⁴² This finding, however, has been hotly contested with the discussion focusing on technical errors in modelling (please see Appendix B for further background).⁴³ Importantly, much of the research and analysis on mobility transitions focuses on emigration from low-income countries, almost certainly due to the preoccupation in policy and academic spheres with (irregular) migration to very high HDI countries.⁴⁴

As can be seen from Figure 3, as country income levels rise, emigration decreases, forming a so-called “hump” pattern. However, rather than a migrant “hump” involving a trailing off of emigration rates as incomes rise, a so-called “plateau” has previously been identified by scholars who call into question the notion that emigration rates decline as countries develop over time.⁴⁵ Others have questioned the time periods applied to theorizing underlying migration dynamics related to “humps” or “mobility transitions”.⁴⁶ However, as the overall quantity and quality of data related to migrants, human development (including economic indicators), mobility and migration policy improves over time, it is possible that a divergent picture is emerging. One perspective shows that emigration to and from wealthy countries is a key feature of recent migration patterns, while migration from developing countries remains much more limited. This is highlighted in recent analyses, with particular reference to the very wide confidence bands evident in Figure 4, meaning that we cannot be certain that emigration declines with higher incomes; however, emigration prevalence is non-linear (meaning that there is not a straightforward positive relationship between emigration rates and country income levels).

Figure 4. Emigration prevalence, 1960 to 2019



Source: Clemens, 2020.

⁴² Benček and Schneiderheinze, 2020.

⁴³ Vermeulen, 2020.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Carling et al., 2020; Czaika and Hobolth, 2016; de Haas, 2020; and Tjaden et al., 2018, which do not address emigration from highly developed countries.

⁴⁵ Martin and Taylor, 1996.

⁴⁶ See, for example, discussion in de Haas, 2010; and Clemens, 2020.

Who migrates internationally and where do they go? International migration globally between 1995 to 2020

In seeking to answer this question, it is important to acknowledge that the ability to offer a perspective at the global level – as part of this World Migration Report – is challenging. As widely acknowledged over many years, statistics to support our collective understanding of international migration patterns and trends are not as well developed as those available in other domains. However, there has been renewed interest in and action on migration statistics, with several major initiatives launched or under way in recent years.⁴⁷

While migration flow statistics are limited to specific, narrow geographies (see Chapter 2 for discussion),⁴⁸ a global picture on international migration patterns and trends can be drawn from international “foreign-born” migrant population data.⁴⁹ Analysis of long-term migrant stock trends allows for insights into where people migrate to, and which countries they emigrate from.⁵⁰ The UN DESA statistical estimates are widely acknowledged as the main data source on international migrants globally, with separate databases compiled on various categories of migrants (such as migrant workers, missing migrants, internally displaced persons, refugees and asylum seekers).⁵¹

Since this chapter re-examines international migration from the perspective of opportunity (or lack thereof), the circumstances of forced displacement are set to one side, in recognition of the lack of choice and the related losses associated with being forcibly displaced. Data on international displacement (refugees and asylum seekers) have, therefore, been subtracted from the international migrant statistics collected by UN DESA in order to produce an estimated total of international migrant stock minus forcibly displaced.⁵² For a full description of the methods, see Appendix C.

For this analysis, we have also used HDI, which allows for a complementary perspective to that provided by macroeconomic analysis based on country income data. Such macroeconomic contributions to our understanding of global migration have analysed migration-related data against economic indicators, such as gross domestic product or the average income of a household. The outcome of this research has been fruitful, but there is a substantial body of literature suggesting that migration is motivated by income considerations as well as a range of other factors.⁵³ Just as development is more than economic, opportunity to improve well-being beyond economic aspects affects migration trends worldwide. Our analysis, therefore, draws upon the broad set of indicators represented in the HDI (see discussion of the HDI in Appendix A). More specifically, our analysis utilizes HDI and migrant stock data from 1995 to 2020. Beginning the analysis in 1995 allows for the inclusion of more countries that did not have reportable data when the HDI was first published; it also allows for geopolitical changes in Eastern Europe following the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. At the time of writing, the most current migrant stock data available are from 2020. However, the effects of COVID-19 on migrants and migration are likely to be significant and may have important impacts on migration patterns well into the future (see Chapter 5 for further discussion).

⁴⁷ See, for example, the [International Forum on Migration Statistics](#) (co-led by IOM, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD, and UN DESA), the [Global Migration Data Analysis Centre](#) and the [UN Expert Group on Migration Statistics](#).

⁴⁸ Migration flow estimates are published by UN DESA for 47 countries (see UN DESA, 2021) and annually by the OECD for its 30+ member States.

⁴⁹ See UN DESA, 2021.

⁵⁰ Abel and Sander, 2014; IOM, 2017 and 2019.

⁵¹ See Chapter 2 of this report for analysis and data sources.

⁵² We note that this may not include disaster and other displacement outside of the categories of refugees and asylum seekers; however, this type of displacement is not consolidated in any existing data set.

⁵³ See discussion earlier in this chapter.

Who has migrated?

As noted above, while the global number of international migrants has increased substantially over the past 25 years, rising from approximately 161 million migrants in 1995 to 281 migrants in 2020, the proportion of international migrants has only slightly increased, rising from 2.8 to 3.6 per cent of the global population over the intervening years. Table 2 shows the difference between 1995 and 2020, disaggregated by United Nations region.⁵⁴ While absolute numbers of immigrants have increased by tens of millions across all regions, the share of international migrants as a proportion of each region's population has only marginally increased in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, while Europe, Northern America and Oceania have seen the proportion of international migrants rise by around 4 percentage points or more in each.

Table 2. Immigrants by United Nations region, 1995 and 2020

Region	Year	Immigrant stock (millions)	Immigrant share of population (%)
Africa	1995	10.1	1.4
	2020	15.8	1.2
Asia	1995	39.2	1.1
	2020	71.1	1.5
Europe	1995	50.8	7.0
	2020	81.7	10.9
Latin America and the Caribbean	1995	6.2	1.3
	2020	13.3	2.0
Northern America	1995	30.7	10.4
	2020	53.3	14.5
Oceania	1995	4.9	16.8
	2020	9.0	21.2

Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Table 3 shows both emigrants (origin) and immigrants (destination) further disaggregated at the country level, with the top 20 countries for each category listed in descending order. Countries in Europe and Asia feature as both origin and destination countries for tens of millions of migrants.

⁵⁴ A breakdown of UN regions can be found in Appendix A of Chapter 3 of this report.

Table 3. Top 20 countries of origin and destination, by number (millions) and proportion of total population

Origin						Destination					
1995			2020			1995			2020		
Country	Emigrants	(%)	Country	Emigrants	(%)	Country	Immigrants	(%)	Country	Immigrants	(%)
Russian Federation	11.38	7.1	India	17.79	1.3	United States of America	24.60	9.3	United States of America	43.43	13.1
India	7.15	0.7	Mexico	11.07	7.9	Russian Federation	11.91	8.0	Germany	14.22	17.0
Mexico	6.95	7.0	Russian Federation	10.65	6.8	Germany	7.28	9.0	Saudi Arabia	13.00	37.3
Ukraine	5.60	9.9	China	9.80	0.7	India	6.69	0.7	Russian Federation	11.58	7.9
Bangladesh	5.37	4.5	Bangladesh	7.34	4.3	France	5.96	10.3	United Kingdom	8.92	13.1
China	4.70	0.4	Pakistan	6.14	2.7	Ukraine	5.77	11.3	United Arab Emirates	8.43	85.3
United Kingdom	3.61	5.9	Ukraine	6.05	12.2	Saudi Arabia	4.94	26.5	France	8.09	12.4
Pakistan	3.33	2.6	Philippines	6.01	5.2	Canada	4.69	16.1	Canada	7.81	20.7
Kazakhstan	3.30	17.2	Poland	4.82	11.3	Australia	4.11	22.9	Australia	7.41	29.1
Italy	3.20	5.3	United Kingdom	4.62	6.4	United Kingdom	3.99	6.9	Spain	6.63	14.2
Germany	3.04	3.6	Indonesia	4.58	1.6	Kazakhstan	2.89	18.3	Italy	6.13	10.1
Turkey	2.73	4.5	Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	4.49	13.6	Pakistan	2.46	2.0	Ukraine	4.57	10.4
Philippines	2.43	3.4	Kazakhstan	4.20	18.3	China, Hong Kong SAR	2.09	34.4	India	4.48	0.3
Indonesia	1.93	1.0	Romania	3.98	17.1	Côte d'Ivoire	2.02	14.2	Thailand	3.53	5.1
Portugal	1.91	15.9	Germany	3.85	4.4	United Arab Emirates	1.78	73.6	Kazakhstan	3.39	18.1
Morocco	1.88	6.5	Egypt	3.57	3.4	Italy	1.70	3.0	Malaysia	3.08	9.5
Poland	1.76	4.4	Turkey	3.28	3.7	Israel	1.55	29.5	Kuwait	2.98	69.8
Belarus	1.74	14.7	Morocco	3.25	8.1	Jordan	1.53	33.4	China, Hong Kong SAR	2.85	38.1
Republic of Korea	1.68	3.6	Italy	3.25	5.1	Argentina	1.51	4.3	Jordan	2.69	26.4
Afghanistan	1.67	8.5	Viet Nam	3.07	3.1	Uzbekistan	1.43	6.3	Japan	2.49	2.0

HDI:

Low Medium High Very High

Sources: UNDP, 2020; UN DESA, 2021.

Note: Uzbekistan did not receive an HDI score until 2000. At that time, the HDI classified Uzbekistan as a medium HDI country. As per UN DESA definitions, emigrants are "foreign born" such that major political changes (e.g. 1947 Partition, dissolution of the Soviet Union) can be reflected in data (further discussion of definitions can be found in Chapter 2). Some categories of international migrant are not included (see methods in Appendix C).

Between 1995 and 2020, only a few countries changed from being among the top 20 migrant origin countries (with Portugal, Belarus, the Republic of Korea and Afghanistan included among the top 20 in 1995, but replaced by 2020 by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Romania, Egypt and Viet Nam). We can see, however, that there are far fewer medium HDI countries of origin by 2020 and no low HDI countries; however, this relates in part to the development progress by countries and their recategorization (discussed further below). The prevalence of high and very high HDI countries as origin countries is quite stark by 2020, accounting for 16 of the 20 top origin countries.

In terms of destination countries as at 1995 and 2020, compared with the top 20 origin countries, there was greater change evident, with five countries dropping out of the list (Pakistan, Côte d'Ivoire, Argentina, Israel and Uzbekistan), being replaced by Spain, Thailand, Malaysia, Kuwait and Japan. With the exception of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, India, Jordan and Ukraine, all of the destination countries in both the 1995 and 2020 top 20 lists experienced increases in numbers and proportions of immigrants over this period. Further, Table 3 shows the substantial increase in numbers of immigrants experienced in many destination countries, most notably in the United States of America, Saudi Arabia, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. This highlights that while it may be useful to discuss international migrants at the global and regional levels, there are distinct long-term country-to-country corridors that account for large proportions of international migration, potentially masking the extent to which migration remains highly uneven globally.⁵⁵

Migration trends through the prism of human development

Current data indicate that most international migrants (79.6% or 190 million) reside in very high HDI countries. We can see, for example, that all of the top 10 countries of destination in Table 3 are very high HDI countries, and the majority of the remaining top destination countries in Table 3 are also very high HDI (with the rest being high HDI countries). This is consistent with long-term trends and existing knowledge that shows that international migration has developed over time as a means for households, families and communities to realize opportunities, including substantial increases in household income via international remittances.⁵⁶


The current data also highlight that most of the top 20 origin countries are very high (8) or high (8) HDI countries. By 2020, the remaining four origin countries were medium HDI countries.

This is also shown in Figure 5 below, which clearly highlights that international migrants are concentrated in very high and high HDI countries, being most pronounced for immigrants, but also showing significant prevalence among emigrants. In other words, there is a lot more migration occurring in the more developed countries in the world, with lower numbers and proportions in medium and low HDI categories. Interestingly, and contrary to the mobility transitions analysis discussed above (see Figure 3), the very high HDI countries combined have produced a high proportion of emigrants relative to the aggregate population (4.6%), which is higher than high, medium and low HDI categories. Further, in numerical terms, very high HDI countries produced 76 million migrants, second only to high HDI countries (86 million).

⁵⁵ Migration corridors are discussed in detail and graphically present in the *World Migration Report 2020*, Chapter 3 (IOM, 2019).

⁵⁶ Clemens and Pritchett, 2008; de Haas, 2005; Ratha, 2013.

Figure 5. Immigrants and emigrants by Human Development Index country category, 2020




Sources: UN DESA, 2021; UNDP, 2020.

Note: Some categories of international migrant are not included (see methods in Appendix C).

This snapshot in Figure 5 shows that many more emigrants were born in wealthier countries and seem to have moved to other wealthier countries. Other earlier analysis, however, seems to show very different patterns to Figure 6 below, in which 2005 HDI data are used.⁵⁷

Figure 6. Association between Human Development Index scores and immigrant/emigrant stocks, 2005



Source: de Haas, 2010:4, reproduced in de Haas, 2020.

Note: Categorization by author (not UNDP's HDI 4 categories).

⁵⁷ de Haas, 2010 and 2020.

In Figure 6, the association between HDI and international migrants is represented, although an author-created fifth category of “very low HDI” based on HDI scores is used (not among UNDP’s four categories), and “average migration values” are applied rather than aggregated migrant stock and population data by category.⁵⁸ Figure 6 shows that emigrants as a percentage of population are lower from high and very high HDI categories compared with medium HDI, which appears consistent with the “mobility transitions” analysis (Figure 3), but different to the current empirical evidence in Figure 6 above.

Lower levels of emigration from low HDI countries is apparent in both figures; however, the two sets of bivariate analyses highlight different rates of emigration from wealthier countries. To explore the difference between the emigration data for high HDI categories represented in Figures 5 and 6, we first looked at changes since 1995. Overall, there appear to be two important but distinct change processes occurring:

- Significant changes in HDI classification; and
- Intensifying migration to, as well as from, highly developed countries.

These are now discussed in turn.

Human development index changes since 1995: the up and up

The HDI was developed by economist Mahbub ul Haq and first used by UNDP in 1990 as the centrepiece of its 1990 Human Development Report in an effort to better encompass human aspects in the analysis of development, previously dominated by economic indicators.⁵⁹ Initially, the HDI covered 130 countries, increasing to 163 in 1995 and progressively reaching a total of 189 countries (see Table 4). All countries that have been reclassified over time have moved into a higher classification in accordance with HDI methods, with the exception of the Syrian Arab Republic (dropping from medium to low in 2015).⁶⁰ By 2019, 66 countries (or 34%) were classified as very high HDI, and a further 53 (or 27%) were high HDI.⁶¹

Table 4. Number of countries in HDI classifications, 1995 to 2019

Classification	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019
Very High	23	31	43	48	62	66
High	27	36	45	57	54	53
Medium	59	62	54	46	46	37
Low	54	60	59	52	41	33
No data	49	23	11	9	9	6

Source: UNDP, 2020.

⁵⁸ de Haas, 2010.

⁵⁹ Stanton, 2007.

⁶⁰ See discussion on methods in Stanton, 2007 and UNDP, 2020.


⁶¹ Refer to Wolff et al., 2011, for criticism of HDI methods and UNDP, 2011, for the UNDP’s response.

So, in part, we can see that reclassification of countries helps explain different migration patterns at different points in time. However, when keeping the 1995 HDI classifications constant (i.e. not adjusting outputs for reclassifications over time), we can also see that there are specific underlying migration dynamics occurring beyond reclassification issues.

Figure 7 below shows the “stepladder” phenomenon over time, even when 2019 classifications are applied across all years (represented by the black dotted lines), so that:

- There is a marked increase in “migration to” by HDI category (graphs on the left of the series), so that very few people migrate to a low HDI country, more migrate to a medium HDI country, more again to a high HDI and the largest number to a very high HDI country (even when applying 2019 categories).
- There is a distinct pattern across Figure 7, which shows that “migration from” one HDI classified country to another category (graphs on the right) also follows the “stepladder” principle of moving up. However, reclassifications have clearly impacted on this pattern over time, resulting in a more pronounced emphasis on the very high HDI category.
- Of particular interest is the “migration within” data (middle graphs), which show significant differences by HDI classification: higher levels of migration to a country with the same HDI classification occur for low to low HDI countries and very high to very high HD countries. We can also see the impact of reclassification, most pointedly for very high HDI countries. Nevertheless, emigration both to and from very high HDI countries is a distinct and clear feature in current migration trends.

Figure 7. Migrants to, between and from each of the four HDI categories (low, medium, high and very high), 1995–2020



– Overall total based on 2020 HDI classifications

Sources: UNDP, 2020; UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: “Migration to” plots refer to migration to that HDI category from the other HDI category countries; “Migration from” plots refer to migration from that HDI category to the other HDI categories. The data points at the five-year intervals in the colour bands reflect the HDI categorization at that time; the black dotted lines use 2020 HDI classifications across all data points (i.e. 1995 through to 2020). Some categories of international migrant are not included (see methods in Appendix C).

Two important conclusions can be drawn from these data:

1. It is clear that migration from high and very high human development countries to other high and very high countries is pronounced and has increased significantly since 1995 (even accounting for recategorization of countries).
2. A question arises as to whether the degree of shift relevant to the migration “hump” model is as relevant today as it previously has been – the bivariate data analysis shows correlations that would benefit from deeper examination.

Of particular relevance is the important factor of policy, and how countries’ visa and mobility policies have evolved over time. As highlighted in the discussion above (and modelled in Figure 2), such policies can enable migration options to be transformed from “impossible dreams” into concrete options, and recent research has pointed to growing mobility inequality.⁶² To explore this further we examine mobility agreements at the regional level (e.g. the Schengen agreement and the ECOWAS free movement protocol).

Why is understanding migration patterns important for policy development processes?

Migration policies are developed and administered predominantly at national level and are often influenced by the geopolitical relations between countries at the bilateral level (i.e. between two entities) and can result in visa-free arrangements agreed between two (or more) countries. Examples of bilateral agreements include the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand,⁶³ the Agreement on Mutual Abolition of Visa Requirements between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea,⁶⁴ and the Agreement between the European Community and Barbados on the short-stay visa waiver,⁶⁵ although many hundreds of similar bilateral arrangements currently exist.⁶⁶

Policies help countries to create systems that respond to changes within a country (e.g. skills shortages), as well as outside a country (e.g. bilateral relationships), and determine who can access a country. Data are therefore important to determine trends and flows from, to and within a region in order to inform policy processes. Countries with the available resources, knowledge and expertise are able to capture, analyse and present data for policy responses, especially with regard to regular migration. On the other hand, data on irregular migration occurring outside of, or in contravention of, regulated systems are based on estimations and predictions of available small-scale data sets that can be used to inform the policy development process. However, for States to develop migration policy processes, such as bilateral visa agreements or bilateral labour migration agreements, they require systematic procedures to consider relevant data and trends in origin and destination countries guided by a comprehensive analytical framework.⁶⁷ To a large extent, the focus is necessarily on migration dynamics, trends and data at the country level, as the main focus is on bilateral negotiations and agreement-making.

⁶² Mau et al., 2015; Triandafyllidou et al., 2019.

⁶³ Australian Productivity Commission and New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2012.

⁶⁴ Government of the Russian Federation and Government of the Republic of Korea, 2020.

⁶⁵ European Community and Barbados, 2009.

⁶⁶ European Union, 2021.

⁶⁷ de Haas, 2011.

Importantly, visa policies are designed as control measures for mobility, allowing each individual country to exercise its exterritorial control over potential entrants (e.g. business travellers, tourists, students and migrant workers).⁶⁸ Given the volume and complexity of country-specific policies on the entry and stay of non-nationals, most analysis undertaken around the world is conducted at the country level (i.e. focusing on a single country). The DEMIG project,⁶⁹ however, analysed the evolution of migration policies since the 1850s with the aim of evaluating their impact on international migration patterns and trends. Researchers found that visa policies had evolved between 1995 and 2019, resulting in border control, entry and exit policies that were more restrictive over time.⁷⁰ Other analysis points to destination countries formulating agreements that grant free visa access to their allies, while imposing restrictions on poorer countries or those they deem unfriendly.⁷¹ This may create more opportunities for citizens in high HDI countries to migrate, in comparison with those in developing countries, who face more restrictions. On a long-term basis, this could lead to systemic inequality between countries and further deepen mobility inequality between countries and regions, while placing greater migration “pressures” that could significantly increase human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Strictly enforced laws and requirements may dissuade some migrants from selecting one destination over another,⁷² while countries with weaker regulatory regimes may unwittingly create an environment in which irregular migration thrives due to a lack of effective regulation and adequate resources. Ensuring a safe environment for regular migration to take place is important to reduce the risks faced by migrants who would otherwise have little choice but to move irregularly. Free movement of persons, goods and services and a labour environment based on a mutual understanding between member States can reduce some migration-related risks within regional blocs.

Regional agreements facilitating mobility

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Schengen area have illustrated how mobility agreements achieved through multilateral approaches, which build upon bilateral arrangements, can open up further mobility opportunities and support development and greater equality, while reducing pressures (including those related to trafficking and smuggling). They have, however, evolved differently through time, with clear contrasts in the way free movement is implemented.

The European Union Schengen agreement has seen gradual progress since 1985, with the process of removing internal border checks between member States taking place at the same time that the external border has been strengthened around the Schengen area. Notwithstanding events (such as the large-scale movement of people into and through the Schengen area in 2015–16 and the COVID-19 pandemic) that exerted considerable pressure on aspects of European Union border, entry and asylum/refugee policies, the Schengen agreement has remained intact, providing mobility opportunities for 400 million European citizens.⁷³

⁶⁸ Mau et al., 2015.

⁶⁹ Determinants of International Migration: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of Policy, Origin and Destination Effects (DEMIG) was conducted in 45 countries in Western Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Australia and New Zealand. See EC, 2016 and de Haas et al., 2016.


⁷⁰ de Haas et al., 2019.

⁷¹ Czaika and Neumayer, 2017.

⁷² Helbling and Leblang, 2018.

⁷³ European Commission, 2020.

Figure 8. Schengen area member States




Source: ArchaeoGLOBE Project, 2018.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

The significance of the Schengen mobility agreement can be seen in Figure 9. Though Schengen countries made up only 39 per cent of countries classified as very high HDI in 2020 globally (26 out of 66), and a fraction of the total population of the aggregated total populations in very high HDI countries, the proportional growth in very high HDI country migration was much higher for Schengen countries than non-Schengen countries between 1995 and 2020.

Figure 9. Migration between very high HDI countries



Sources: UNDP, 2020; UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: The data points at the five-year intervals in the colour bands reflect whether the migration corridor (i) did not feature Schengen countries; (ii) featured a Schengen country either at origin or destination; or (iii) featured Schengen countries at both origin and destination. Designation as a Schengen country coincides with implementation of Schengen area policies (see Schengen Visa Info, 2020). All Schengen countries are very high HDI countries.

In ECOWAS, the process of achieving free movement in the region has been an ongoing process since 1979. In the initial years, free movement of goods, services, people and labour occurred with limited restrictions. However, as countries in the region began to develop and as conflict arose in some member States, cross-border movements became more restrictive as countries responded with national laws that undermined the notion of free movement. The conflict in Liberia over competition for resources and the rise of irregular migration between member States has weakened some of the implementation strategies adopted, as security was prioritized over the benefits of trade.⁷⁴ ECOWAS also lacked an established and efficient mechanism that could monitor trafficking of persons, weapons and drugs, among other issues. The approach to reduce irregular migration from West African States, however, has not been to restrict mobility, but to generate greater awareness of the risks of irregular migration, as well as to enhance the opportunities available within the region and facilitated by mobility, especially for the youth.

⁷⁴ Opanike and Aduloju, 2015.

Figure 10. ECOWAS member States




Source: ArchaeoGLOBE Project, 2018.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

Figure 11 illustrates how migration involving ECOWAS countries is almost completely made up of migration between regional member States of the economic organization. The scale of migration is smaller compared with the Schengen zone, and the majority of countries in ECOWAS are classified as low HDI, but despite these differences, the same dynamics manifest in similar proportions. Out of the 10 million international migrants moving to or from ECOWAS countries in 2020, more than 6 million moved within ECOWAS. When people have the ability to move in order to obtain access to a greater range of opportunities, many will do so.

Figure 11. Migration between low HDI countries



Sources: UNDP, 2020; UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: The data points at the five-year intervals in the colour bands reflect instances in which the migration corridor (i) did not feature an ECOWAS country; (ii) featured an ECOWAS country at either origin or destination; or (iii) featured an ECOWAS country at both origin and destination. With one exception, membership in ECOWAS has been consistent throughout the timeframe examined here (ECOWAS, 2021). ECOWAS includes Ghana (medium HDI); non-ECOWAS does not include India and Pakistan.

Conclusions

The long-term narrative of migration has been based on the notion of opportunity, that people who migrate internationally do so in order to forge better lives. Migration has become strongly associated with attainment, with social and economic progress of individuals, of families, of communities and of nations. While this may have reflected a long-term reality stretching back well before the modern era, there may be reason to conclude that international migration no longer affords opportunity to the degree it has historically. Current data suggest that instead of serving as a stepladder of opportunity, international migration pathways for millions of people in developing countries have further narrowed.

Our analysis of global international migrant stock and HDI data show that between 1995 and 2020, migration from low and medium HDI countries increased, but only slightly. The combination of migration aspirations and migration infrastructure (or lack thereof) did not result in high growth rates of international migration from low and medium HDI countries, even when accounting for recategorization of HDI ratings over time. This is consistent with existing macroeconomic analyses, which show that international migration from low-income countries has historically been very limited.

On the other hand, the analysis in this chapter shows that contrary to previous understandings on the migration of people from high income countries – namely, that as country income levels increase above a threshold, international migration rates decline – the scale and proportion of outward migration from high and very high HDI countries has increased significantly. In fact, this bivariate analysis of migration stock across the last quarter century indicates that there has been a “polarizing” effect, with migration activity increasingly being associated with highly developed countries. This correlation raises the key issue of visa access and related migration policies, especially in the context of migration aspirations (Figure 2) held by potential migrants around the world who may wish to realize opportunities through international migration, but are unable to do so. New research shows that citizens of wealthy countries are much more able to access regulated mobility regimes than those from poor countries.⁷⁵

The need to reassess migration as a stepladder of opportunity has implications for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.⁷⁶ In an environment in which restrictive migration-related policies, such as border management, entry requirements and stay limitations, have become more prominent across the globe, it appears that there are systemic risks to the full realization of the SDGs and gains in human development (as flagged in the Human Development Report 2019). The situation has been further complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which is temporarily stalling migration and mobility across the globe and forcing all countries to re-evaluate their migration and border policies for the new post-pandemic world.

⁷⁵ Mau et al., 2015. This is also consistent with the prediction of Zelinsky (1971) in his theory of mobility transitions.

⁷⁶ The Global Compact for Migration guides source, transit and destination countries by providing strategies that will create an enabling environment in which safe and orderly migration can take place in a more regular manner.

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5 MIGRATION AND HUMAN SECURITY: UNPACKING MYTHS AND EXAMINING NEW REALITIES AND RESPONSES¹

Introduction

The recent events in Ukraine have highlighted in stark terms the links between national security, energy security, food security and the catastrophic effects on the human security of Ukrainians but also for many other societies around the world. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, conflict and violence in one country or region is more likely than ever to have ripple effects in other parts of the world. At a time when food crop supply chains are the most globalized in history,² the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has highlighted the devastating impacts on food and human security for many parts of the developing world.³

As outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this report, Europe, Asia, Africa and South America continue to experience mass displacement of people caused by conflict and violence as well as for other reasons, such as (climate-related) disasters and political and economic crises.⁴ Human rights frameworks established decades ago provide sound and effective standards for safeguarding human security, including those of migrants, with migration and mobility being embedded in core human rights treaties and frameworks spanning decades.⁵ The protection of migrants has also been advanced through broader global processes, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and, more recently, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Nevertheless, ongoing global transformations related to geopolitical upheavals, technological advances and environmental degradation are eroding human security and altering migration and security dynamics.⁶ These transformations are also occurring at a moment when multiple crises are affecting the world, with some analysts arguing we have entered an era of “permacrisis”.⁷ Though some interest groups promulgate the myth that international migration undermines the national security of countries or communities, evidence demonstrates that the most significant links between migration and security relate to human security, rather than national security.⁸ In fact, human security is being challenged right throughout the migration cycle – from pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return – and across a wide variety of migration and mobility settings regardless of policy category.⁹

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² Khoury et al., 2016.

³ Ben Hassen and El Bilali, 2022.

⁴ These chapters include data and analysis of Ukrainian and other displacement around the world.

⁵ See discussion in the *World Migration Report 2018* chapter on global migration governance (Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017).

⁶ McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.

⁷ Spicer, 2022; Turnbull, 2022.

⁸ See discussion in the *World Migration Report 2018* chapter on violent extremism (Koser and Cunningham, 2017).

⁹ Such as labour migration, family reunification, conflict or disaster displacement, international students.

In this chapter, we set out to re-examine migration and human security at a time when misinformation and disinformation about migration and migrants are both increasing and increasingly effective.¹⁰ In the face of deliberately skewed negative discussions on migration and migrants, one can lose sight of the fact that human endeavours to improve peace and prosperity in modern times that are underpinned by migration have been on the whole successful. It is also easy to lose sight of the fact that international migration remains a relatively uncommon phenomenon, with a mere 3.6 per cent of the world's population being international migrants (see Chapter 2 of this report for details).¹¹ Further, most international migration takes place in safe, orderly and regular conditions; migration can also improve human security, sometimes significantly so. However, we cannot shy away from another important fact: some migration processes are detrimental to the human security of migrants, which is why the international community is committed to the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration.

The next section describes key concepts related to migration and human security, providing a brief summary of the increasing securitization of migration. We then examine the links between migration, mobility and human security, before outlining how migrants' human security is affected throughout the migration cycle, in pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return processes. The chapter then discusses policies that facilitate a human security approach, before outlining the implications for policy and practice.

Concepts and context

Definitions reflect specific perspectives that can be applied to a set of circumstances, a group or groups of people or events. They help make sense of the world around us and are central to analysis, policy frameworks and practical responses, especially in the face of change and emerging problems. While there are specific definitions of migration-related terms that are technical in nature and apply to a range of contexts, including legal, administrative, research and statistical contexts,¹² for the purpose of this chapter, a migrant is defined as “a person who moves away from his or her usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons”.¹³ This definition is particularly relevant to human security analysis as it encompasses all forms of migration, even the most coercive (such as human trafficking and refugee displacement), which often result in the profound insecurity of those affected.

The concept of security in international relations has for many decades been rooted in national or State security terms, primarily involving political independence and territorial integrity of nation States.¹⁴ Threats to the security of States and their populations primarily revolved around external military threats, which was particularly relevant until 1990, as can be seen in Figure 1, which shows global trend data on the number of deaths due to State-based conflicts.¹⁵ More recently, and particularly since the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the issues of global food security and energy security are also being increasingly linked to national security discussions. As well, climate security is very high on the agenda and increasingly being discussed as a national and international security issue.¹⁶

¹⁰ See discussion in the *World Migration Report 2022* chapter on disinformation on migration (Culloty et al., 2021).

¹¹ UN DESA, 2021.

¹² McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2017.


¹³ IOM, 2019a.

¹⁴ Baldwin, 1997.

¹⁵ And also highly relevant prior to 1945 with respect to the First World War, in particular.

¹⁶ Little, 2022; United Nations, 2021; Vivekananda et al., 2020.

Figure 1. Deaths in State-based conflict (global), 1946–2020



Source: OVID, 2021.

With the end of the Cold War, the space to reconsider concepts of security in multilateralism opened up in two key ways. First, “new threats” to national security expanded beyond the military realm (see discussion in the subsection below). Second, the ability to extend beyond the traditional priorities of “peace and security” into human development through a conceptual bridge of “human security” became possible. “New dimensions of human security” became a key focus of the United Nations, allowing discussion and treatment of human development to be brought into broader dialogues of global and national security.¹⁷ This laid the groundwork for the Commission on Human Security (see text box below), leading to the Global Commission on International Migration (see Chapter 8 in this report).

¹⁷ UNDP, 1994 and 2022a.

2003 United Nations Commission on Human Security: How far have we come?

The Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001 in response to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for a world "free from want" and "free from fear". The Commission consisted of 12 international leaders, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata (former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and Professor Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel Economics Prize Laureate), building upon the seminal work of Mahbub ul Haq in the 1994 Human Development Report.^a The Commission argued for an "international migration framework of norms, processes and institutional arrangements to ensure ... order and predictability".^b Central to the framework would be the need to balance the sovereignty and security of States with the human security of people, the Commission arguing that the seventeenth-century construct of State-centric security was no longer fit for the twenty-first century. The key policy conclusions on migration included recognition of the need for:

- A United Nations-led high-level commission on migration to explore options, areas of consensus and ways forward on human security in migration.
- Concerted efforts to identify and implement solutions to cross-border displacement, both in humanitarian and development terms.
- A better acknowledgement and understanding of the security risks arising during large-scale forced population movements.
- Substantial improvements in the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

So, what progress has been made since the May 2003 Commission? A summary analysis of developments on the Commission's migration-related policy conclusions is in Appendix A.

^a UNDP, 1994.

^b Commission on Human Security, 2003:52; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003.

In this chapter and its examination of the connections between human migration and human security, and consequent vulnerabilities that can arise, we draw upon the definition articulated at the 2012 United Nations General Assembly, which reflected the consensus that human security is considered:

The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.¹⁸

Given this definition, the first and most obvious connection between human migration and human security is that a lack of human security can cause migration and displacement, but some forms of migration can themselves be a cause of (additional) human insecurity. In fact, human (in)security is a critical issue when examining migrants' experiences right the way through the migration cycle: this topic is examined in the next section.

¹⁸ United Nations, 2012.

Securitization of migration: A brief summary

The security risks posed by migration have long been acknowledged by leaders, as societies have sought to protect themselves from threats, while at the same time seeking increased prosperity through trade, finance and cultural exchange underpinned by migration.¹⁹ Today, it is clear that migration directly affects some of the defining elements of a State, that is, a permanent population and a defined territory.²⁰ The regulation of migration (entry and stay) is therefore considered a prerogative of sovereign States, supplemented by international cooperation on migration governance.²¹ As States' capacities and appetites for wider and more comprehensive regulation increased following the Second World War – including in previously unregulated spheres, such as telecommunications, media and broadcasting, environmental protection and conservation and public health, among many others – the concepts of “regular” and “irregular” migration from a State perspective emerged.²² The first sustained analysis focused on irregular labour migration,²³ due to political and geopolitical change following the oil crisis in the early 1970s and the related contractions of national economies in Europe and elsewhere.²⁴ However, irregular migration was initially conceptualized in a completely different way (see text box below).

A very different way of thinking about irregular migration

One of the earliest conceptualizations of irregular migration was radically different to current thinking. Early researchers such as Gould defined irregular migration as different from permanent migration, whereby irregularity related to migration that was “not wholly permanent, in that further movement is likely but neither the time nor the direction of such movement is presently known and both are beyond the control of those involved”.^a Gould’s irregularity was related to time and predictability, not regulatory norms.^b

^a Gould, 1974:417.

^b Gould and Prothero, 1975.

Importantly, human security and insecurity as it relates to migration emerged in the modern era of nation States after the Second World War. In this context, the primary focus was refugees, as articulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. As an important component of international human rights law – together with customary international law concerning the principle of non-refoulement and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights²⁵ – the Refugee Convention and related Protocol of 1967 reflect recognition by the international community of the need, as part of the multilateral system of States, to safeguard human security from threats caused by displacement. That said, there is widespread recognition that the focus on upholding human security in migration and displacement has diminished, especially since the 1990s.²⁶ The protection of migrants (including refugees), therefore, remains a highly salient issue, related to both humanitarian and development aspects, as discussed in the next section.

¹⁹ Watson, 2009.

²⁰ As per article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.

²¹ Ferris and Martin, 2019; McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.

²² McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.

²³ Brennan, 1984.

²⁴ Massey et al., 1998.

²⁵ Other key instruments include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture.

²⁶ Goodwin-Gill, 2005; Youdina and Magnoni, 2016.

At around this time, in the mid-1990s, a school of academic thought – the Copenhagen School – conceptualized “securitization” as the characterization of danger and threats of a particular kind, via a “speech act” that moved security from the military realm to other realms, such as international migration.²⁷ The process of securitization has been described as using threat language when describing an issue to enable “justifying the adoption of extraordinary measures”.²⁸ The end of the Cold War in particular, and the related demise of a powerful external threat to the security of the West, enabled the emergence of threats, or perceived threats, that involved non-State actors. This had implications for a range of global and international issues, particularly issues that it was increasingly difficult for States to regulate and that involved actors operating largely beyond the reach of States’ control, such as terrorism, human trafficking, migrant smuggling and irregular migration. Migration increasingly became not only an issue of socioeconomic management for States, but also of national security. Further, one of the effects of the events of 9/11 was that it reinforced the trend towards securitizing migration, which directly resulted in increased migration control, significant investment in border intelligence systems and substantial institutional responses, most notably in the United States, but more generally throughout the Western world.²⁹

These developments are also intertwined with changes in political systems and media coverage. There is widespread recognition that the “toxicity” of the migration debate has further intensified over the last few years, with a politics of fear and division increasingly framing discussions.³⁰ Disruption and disinformation are increasingly deployed as part of tactical pursuits of power around the world, with negative impacts on public, political and social media discourse on migration, displacement and migrants (including refugees), and ultimately on societal values and democratic systems.³¹ A recent report on human security by the United Nations highlights that a growing paradox has emerged in which people around the world have been, on average, living healthier, wealthier and better lives for longer than ever, but also have been feeling less secure. An estimated six out of every seven people across the world already felt insecure in the years leading up to COVID-19, with the pandemic further intensifying this feeling globally.³²

Media and disinformation about migration

Bad actors is a generic term for those who intentionally create and propagate disinformation. They may be States, corporations, social movements or individuals, and their motivations span a spectrum of political, ideological and financial interests. They also vary considerably in terms of the audiences they target and the levels of coordination involved. Amplifiers are the media pundits, politicians, celebrities and online influencers who help popularize disinformation – whether intentionally or not – by spreading it among their large networks. Finally, hyperpartisan media are ideological outlets that frequently amplify disinformation. In the United States of America, for example, hyperpartisan media regularly give credence to disinformation stories and thereby push disinformation agendas on topics from economics to international relations. Disinformation campaigns against migrants are heavily aligned to right-wing political and media actors, including the resurgence of far-right, nationalist and xenophobic ideologies.

²⁷ Waever, 1995; Stritzel, 2014.

²⁸ Ullah et al., 2020; Waever, 1995.

²⁹ Faist, 2004; Koser, 2005.

³⁰ Fisher, 2017; Kaufmann, 2017; Tagliapietra, 2021.

³¹ Morgan, 2018; McAuliffe et al., 2019.

³² UNDP, 2022a.

To date, much of the popular discussion on disinformation has focused on content. However, focusing on content alone can obscure the operation of coordinated disinformation campaigns whereby a network of bad actors cooperates to manipulate public opinion.

Source: Abridged extract of Culloty et al., 2021.

Understanding the links between migration, mobility and human security

To get a sense of the breadth and nature of human insecurity in the context of migration and mobility, it is useful to examine key data, including global indices. Human insecurity connected to disaster (such as floods, typhoons or wildfires), for example, affects countries around the world regardless of development levels, with both developed and developing countries exposed to significant and growing risks.³³ The consequences of disaster-related crises, however, tend to be more profound in developing countries, which can lack the resources to invest in both risk reduction programming and disaster (and post-disaster) response.³⁴ Further, there is strong recognition that the world is currently gripped by a range of interlinked crises that are seriously impacting least developed countries, with profound negative implications for millions of people globally.³⁵

Table 1 correlates data for selected countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), Human Freedom Index (HFI), Global Peace Index (GPI), Fragile States Index (FSI), IDPs (conflict and violence), new internal displacements (disaster), and refugees and asylum-seekers. Several key aspects are evident in Table 1. First, countries that rank highly on the HFI tend to perform well on the HDI, a composite measure of countries' performance across several dimensions, including health, education and standard of living. However, it is notable that some very high HDI countries rank poorly on human freedom.

Second, the table shows that countries that rank highly on the GPI also tend to perform well on the HDI. While there are some exceptions – countries such as Bhutan, Cambodia, Ghana and Senegal rank relatively highly on the GPI, compared to their ranking on the HDI – the general trend suggests that higher human development goes hand-in-hand with high levels of peace.

Third, countries that rank towards the bottom of the FSI – indicating that they are more stable – seem to have high levels of human development, while those that are highly fragile – in almost all cases – have a low HDI. Also clear, however, is that not all countries that are stable (with a low FSI score) have high human development. In other words, stability does sometimes coexist with low HDI, suggesting perhaps that stability is a necessary but not a sufficient factor for development.

Fourth, countries that score high on the peace index also produce fewer refugees and asylum-seekers and have a lower number or are without conflict-induced IDPs. The number of refugees and asylum-seekers originating from countries such as Singapore, Chile or the Republic of Korea in 2021 starkly contrasts with the number from less peaceful countries such as Myanmar, Ethiopia, Yemen and South Sudan. This reality is especially acute in countries such as the Syrian Arab Republic, where protracted conflict means that more than half the population is still forcibly

³³ For a discussion of migrants caught in countries in crisis, see Majidi et al., 2019.

³⁴ MICIC, 2016; Majidi et al., 2019.

³⁵ United Nations, 2022a.

displaced.³⁶ The glaring differences in the number of refugees and asylum-seekers – between high income, peaceful countries and more fragile and less developed countries – are also visible in the number of conflict-induced IDPs. Less secure countries, perhaps unsurprisingly, have a much larger number of conflict-induced IDPs, with countries such as Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Somalia together having millions of IDPs, while more stable countries, such as Costa Rica, Malaysia and Bhutan all recorded zero conflict-induced IDPs in the same year.

Fifth, the data on new internal disaster displacements show a very different pattern, highlighting that disaster displacement is more linked to geographical issues than to development issues connected to any of development, human freedom or human rights, peace or fragility. We can see that, new displacements occurred across the spectrum of HDI ranked countries. The growing impacts of climate-change related disaster displacement is resulting in more countries being affected over time, and far outstripping the number of countries affected by internal displacement due to conflict and violence. Further discussion on internal displacement is in Chapter 2 of this report.

Table 1. Development, freedom, peace, State fragility and displacement (selected countries)

Country (in HDI rank order)	Human Development Index (HDI), 2021 Rank	Human Freedom Index (HFI), 2022 Rank	Global Peace Index (GPI), 2022 Rank	Fragile States Index (FSI), 2022 Rank	Refugees and asylum- seekers (country of origin), 2021	Number of IDPs (conflict and violence), 2022	New internal displacements (disaster), 2022
Switzerland	1	1	11	174	21	*	66
Australia	5	11	27	168	33	*	17000
Germany	9	18	16	167	309	*	630
Singapore	12	44	9	165	134	*	*
Canada	15	13	12	172	186	*	15000
United Kingdom	18	20	34	150	370	*	1900
Republic of Korea	19	30	43	159	1013	*	30000
United Arab Emirates	26	127	60	152	378	*	*
France	28	42	65	162	318	*	45000
Saudi Arabia	35	159	119	95	3727	*	*
Portugal	38	24	6	164	469	*	4500
Chile	42	32	55	144	10049	*	1500
Romania	53	38	31	133	5868	*	160
Costa Rica	58	35	38	149	1229	*	1600
Malaysia	62	82	18	122	22039	*	156000
Mauritius	63	50	28	154	549	*	140
Thailand	66	104	103	86	3391	41000	22000
Barbados	70	46	*	141	355	*	*
North Macedonia	78	47	36	111	5826	110	*

³⁶ UNHCR, 2022a.

Country (in HDI rank order)	Human Development Index (HDI), 2021 Rank	Human Freedom Index (HFI), 2022 Rank	Global Peace Index (GPI), 2022 Rank	Fragile States Index (FSI), 2022 Rank	Refugees and asylum- seekers (country of origin), 2021	Number of IDPs (conflict and violence), 2022	New internal displacements (disaster), 2022
Peru	84	56	101	87	12573	73 000	24000
Mexico	86	98	137	84	134 346	386 000	11 000
Tunisia	97	113	85	93	6 233	*	2 000
Libya	104	155	151	21	24 812	135 000	*
South Africa	109	77	118	79	4 207	*	62 000
Indonesia	114	85	47	100	14 954	72 000	308 000
Kyrgyzstan	118	87	91	66	5 818	4 000	1 700
Bhutan	127	86	19	96	7 189	*	*
Bangladesh	129	139	96	38	88 133	427 000	1 524 000
Ghana	133	66	40	108	23 424	*	2 700
Cambodia	146	116	62	50	12 920	*	28 000
Myanmar	149	135	139	10	1 154 392	1 498 000	13 000
Syrian Arab Republic	150	165	161	3	6 983 867	6 865 000	21 000
Papua New Guinea	156	75	94	55	1 143	91 000	9 600
Côte d'Ivoire	159	105	108	31	72 560	302 000	2 500
Nigeria	163	124	143	16	466 770	3 646 000	2 437 000
Uganda	166	118	121	25	19 708	4 800	34 000
Senegal	170	87	70	78	32 597	8 400	12 000
Ethiopia	175	148	149	13	288 338	3 852 000	873 000
Afghanistan	180	*	163	8	2 694 434	4 394 000	220 000
Yemen	183	164	162	1	73 055	4 523 000	171 000
Mali	186	119	150	14	207 687	380 000	24 000
South Sudan	191	*	159	3	2 367 800	1 475 000	596 000
Somalia	*	158	156	2	836 241	3 864 000	1 152 000
A number 1 ranking means:	Very high human development	Very high freedom	Very high peacefulness	Most fragile country			
A high number means:	Low human development	Very low freedom	Very low peacefulness	Least fragile country			

Sources: Human Development Index 2021: UNDP, 2022b; Human Freedom Index 2022: Vásquez et al., 2022; Global Peace Index 2022: IEP, 2022; Fragile States Index 2022: FFP, 2022; Refugees and asylum-seekers: UNHCR, n.d.; IDPs: IDMC, 2023; new internal displacements: IDMC, 2023.

Note: * means ranking not available for that country.

While displacement internally and across borders is clearly associated with increased insecurity, international migration outside of displacement – and particularly in terms of human development that encompasses economic, social and political aspects – also has significant human security implications. The long-term trend data show that there is growing “mobility inequality”, with most international migration now occurring between rich countries at the exclusion of poorer countries (see Chapter 4 in this report).

Human security throughout the migration cycle

This section situates the analysis of human security from migrants’ perspectives rather than from a State perspective. This enables an important rights-based aspect to be articulated, supplementing the more dominant State-based framing around migration and (national) security.³⁷ The section draws upon extensive research and analysis undertaken with (and by) migrants across the globe, providing examples of manifestations of human security and insecurity along the spectrum of migrants’ agency, including from cross-border displacement and human trafficking to labour and international student migration. As we witnessed during COVID-19, people from all walks of life were impacted negatively by pandemic-induced immobility, but those with resources were often better able to respond to the resulting increased vulnerabilities.


In this section, human security and insecurity throughout the migration cycle are described, with examples relevant to each of the different stages: pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return. It is important to note that not all international migration is connected to, or caused by, human insecurity. Many people who choose to migrate do so in search of an enriching opportunity, to become immersed in new cultures and places, or possibly out of a sense of adventure; that said, this type of migration can only be undertaken by those who have both the aspirations and ability to do so,³⁸ and many with the aspirations to migrate are unable to do so because they do not have the ability to realize their ambition, resulting in their “involuntary immobility”.³⁹

³⁷ See discussion in the previous section on the securitization of migration.

³⁸ Carling and Schewel, 2018.

³⁹ Carling, 2002.

Figure 2. Human security throughout the migration cycle



Notes: This figure provides examples of how human security and insecurity is relevant to different stages of migration. It is not intended to be exhaustive.

* "extreme human insecurity" includes, for example, conflict, persecution, disaster (such as floods and wildfires); "eroding or low human security" includes, for example, poverty, human rights abuses, severe economic downturn and spiking inflation or unemployment; see the definition of human security earlier in this chapter.

Pre-departure

Before people have left their home communities, human insecurity can loom large in the minds of many. This is most relevant for people caught in conflict or disaster and needing to find safety by moving to a much safer place within their own country or a neighbouring one. Displaced persons are often the ones facing the most extreme insecurity in the pre-departure phase, and, in recognition of this, a range of international treaties as well as humanitarian assistance programming are long standing, well developed and widely recognized (although underfunded).⁴⁰ There is also recognition of the limits of the international community's reach and influence, especially as it relates to people who remain within a country (including IDPs) who face extreme insecurity, including in the form of gross human rights abuses.⁴¹

For those not facing such grave conditions, decisions about whether to migrate internationally can nevertheless feature considerations of aspects of human security. Access to travel documents and visas – which determine migration journeys – is important within decision-making contexts, and has been shown to be a key factor when the possibilities of migrating are explored while in the country of origin. In recent research on migration intentions, for example, the availability of visas was found to be a determining factor in how people conducted online job searches.⁴² Similarly, changes in visa settings have been found to have an impact on potential migrants' contemplations of migration, as well as their eventual migration.⁴³ This can be seen, for example, in the changes that occur after visa restrictions are removed for specific groups, including by citizenship.⁴⁴ While there is a myriad of examples, such changes have been prominent when visa liberalization has occurred in key destination countries or regions, such as in the United States in the 1960s, and within Europe as Schengen arrangements expanded over time, taking in an increasing number of countries.⁴⁵ Importantly, there are services that can be provided after people have made the decision to migrate and before they embark on migration journeys. Pre-departure information and training, for example, for people who are about to migrate, can assist in supporting their security and well-being during the migration process as well as their initial integration post-arrival.⁴⁶

Illiteracy, insecurity and displacement of Afghans

Afghanistan is an impoverished country with a low rate of literacy, especially for women, and long-term civil conflicts. The combination of these features explains the multifaceted nature of insecurity leading to the displacement of many Afghans for decades.^a

In 1979, only 18 per cent of people 15 years or older were recorded as literate, increasing to 31 per cent by 2011 and to 37 per cent in 2021.^b Despite the slow but promising progress over the last two decades, there is a substantial gender literacy gap; in 2018, around 55 per cent of men, compared to 30 per cent of women, were literate.^c Several reasons explain this deprivation. In addition to the long-term civil war,

⁴⁰ United Nations, 2022b.

⁴¹ OHCHR, 2022.

⁴² Sinclair and Mamertino, 2016.

⁴³ See, for example, Jayasuriya, 2016, on the labour migration of Sri Lankans with international protection needs to Gulf countries through labour migration pathways available to them.

⁴⁴ Czaika and de Haas, 2014.

⁴⁵ Ortega and Peri, 2013.

⁴⁶ IOM, 2018.

Afghanistan has been struggling with universal poverty^d without having reliable resources to invest in development and education planning. The high population growth rate has also led to a young population and accordingly a large number of school-age children, but there has been significant unmet demand for education. Indeed, despite the progress made during 2001–2021,^e education attainment, particularly for women, has negatively been affected under the Taliban's rule. Education for boys and girls beyond the 6th grade was suspended in August 2021.^f

Severe restrictions are in place for women and girls, limiting their participation in education, work, and social and political life. This has created a situation where women do not have any hope other than escaping from the society. The unexpected takeover by the Taliban resulted in fear and concern about the higher education sector. Consequently, many university professors, lecturers and students left Afghanistan. The laws imposed by the Taliban, including gender segregation, have reduced the number of female students and increased the costs of private universities, and many are being closed. Moreover, many students in Afghanistan are unable to continue their studies due to economic insecurity. There is a fear of persecution among ethnic groups, particularly Hazara people and students, as evidenced by the incidence of suicide bombing in one of their education centres in Kabul's Dashti Barchi neighbourhood, a Hazara resident area, on 30 September 2022 killing close to fifty female students who were sitting for a practice exam.^g

The interrelationship of illiteracy, lack of access to developmental infrastructure, poverty and insecurity in Afghanistan has led to the displacement and forced migration of a large proportion of the population both within and from the country to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan for decades.^h Displacement, in turn, has disrupted education development. Despite the improvement of education of Afghan migrants and refugees in such receiving countries as the Islamic Republic of Iran,ⁱ with the arrival of a large number of documented and undocumented Afghans since August 2021, their enrolment in public education has been faced with challenges.

Educational deprivations are serious for human security, and illiteracy is considered as insecurity.^j One of the reasons for and consequences of illiteracy is displacement. Afghans have been struggling with illiteracy, poverty and insecurity connected to their displacement over three decades. Thus, access to and improvement of education, particularly for women, is one of the ways out of this vicious cycle.

Source: Hosseini-Chavoshi and Abbasi-Shavazi, 2023.

^a Schmeidl, 2019; Iqbal and McAuliffe, 2022.

^b UNESCO, 2022.

^c Samim, 2020.

^d UNDP, 2021.

^e Batha, 2022; Farr, 2022.

^f Qazizai and Hadid, 2022.

^g Putz, 2022; AFP, 2022.

^h Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005.

ⁱ Hugo et al., 2012.

^j Commission on Human Security, 2003.

Transit

Where possible, migrants will choose to transit through countries on visas and with identity documents.⁴⁷ There are stark differences between travelling on a visa and travelling without a visa when one is required. From a migrant's perspective, the experience can be profoundly different in a number of important ways that can impact the human security of the migrant and the migrant's family, including those who may remain in the country of origin. First, visas denote authority to enter a country and offer legitimacy when arriving in and travelling through a country. A valid visa provides a greater chance of being safeguarded against exploitation. Conversely, travelling without a visa puts people at much greater risk of being detained and deported by authorities, or exploited and abused by those offering illicit migration services, such as smugglers or traffickers, who operate largely outside of regulated systems. Second, transiting on visas is more likely to be safer and more certain, and offers migrants greater choice over such aspects as length of journey, travel mode and with whom to travel (if anyone).

While most migration journeys are straightforward, some can result in abuse and even death.⁴⁸ It is unsurprising, then, that there is often a strong preference for travelling on a visa. However, in many locations around the world, informal migration journeys are typical and there may be no opportunity to access visa regimes; as well, some citizens have very limited ability to access travel documents, such as passports, which are often a prerequisite to visa access. Further, in acute disaster and conflict situations people have to move quickly and often find themselves in hazardous situations, facing perilous journeys and extreme vulnerability in transit; these types of movements can quickly become major humanitarian concerns, with local, national and international humanitarian organizations assisting displaced populations.

Migrants can also become stranded during transit (or in destination countries), with major implications for their security.⁴⁹ During COVID-19, for example, thousands of migrants were stranded in countries without comprehensive social protection regimes, placing them at risk of starvation and homelessness.⁵⁰ Charities, non-governmental organizations (including migrant groups), United Nations agencies and local communities around the world came to the assistance of stranded migrants to support their immediate needs, most especially during the initial, acute phase of the pandemic, when severe lockdowns and travel restrictions were sometimes implemented without much warning.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Please note that while "regular" migration does not necessarily require visas, the discussion refers to visas because these are often a requirement, most especially for migrants from developing countries. In addition, the term "visa" is more widely understood than "regular migration" by migrants and the general public.

⁴⁸ See Chapter 2 for discussion of the IOM Missing Migrants project, which tracks the numbers of missing and dead migrants during transit.

⁴⁹ Gois and Campbell, 2013.

⁵⁰ McAuliffe et al., 2021a; McAuliffe, 2020.

⁵¹ Kolet et al., 2021; McAuliffe, forthcoming.

Entry

Entering another country usually involves crossing an international border and, in most cases, being assessed by authorities against requirements for entry.⁵² Borders can be welcoming places for migrants, but they can also be places of intense scrutiny, and of potential exploitation and abuse. For many migrants, entering another country and passing through border control points can be particularly intimidating and stressful experiences, especially for those travelling on “weak” passports or seeking to cross without documentation (such as displaced stateless persons).⁵³ For others, grave insecurity can result from so-called “pushbacks” in land and maritime settings whereby migrants (including refugees and asylum-seekers) are not only denied entry but are pushed back across the border immediately after entry, placing them in highly vulnerable situations (including risking their lives, especially at sea).⁵⁴

Because borders are central to the concept and practice of State sovereignty, the entry of non-nationals is often highly regulated, with normative frameworks needing to balance State interest and safeguard migrants’ rights.⁵⁵ Some analysts have argued that the dominant approach by many States – with a focus on managing borders to combat organized crime and other criminality – has had the effect of subordinating human rights protections in border spaces, notwithstanding that international initiatives to counter human trafficking necessarily include a focus on the physical border and entry processes.⁵⁶ In fact, smooth arrival processes and well-managed border and entry processes can effectively support human security through the provision of safe, transparent and clear processes that are free from corrupt practices.⁵⁷ For instance, people seeking to enter another country may be vulnerable because of the situations they left behind (where they may have been persecuted persons), the way in which they travelled (such as irregular, smuggled or trafficked persons), or the conditions they face on arrival (such as xenophobia or discrimination);⁵⁸ well-managed borders allow such migrants in vulnerable situations to be more readily identified and assisted.

Closed borders during displacement events or crises significantly increase human insecurity, sometimes posing grave risks to human life. During the acute phase of COVID-19, for example, total border closures placed migrants at extreme risk of serious human insecurity, including refoulement, lack of access to asylum procedures and in some situations heightened risk of virus infection.⁵⁹ The denial of entry, such as through interdictions and pushback operations of maritime arrivals, highlights the extreme risks to human security and the potential for loss of life at entry.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the intensity of negotiations among international actors during displacement crises, particularly those involving conflict and violence, highlight the critical importance of borders in human security.⁶¹ Opening up borders in such extreme situations can mean saving hundreds or even thousands of lives.

⁵² A significant exception to this is in relation to mobility arrangements between States, such as Europe’s Schengen agreement or West Africa’s free movement protocol.

⁵³ See discussion on passport strength in McAuliffe et al., 2021a.

⁵⁴ Doty, 2011; Gonzalez Morales, 2021.

⁵⁵ Chetail, 2020.

⁵⁶ Taran, 2000.

⁵⁷ OHCHR, 2021.

⁵⁸ Bauloz et al., 2021; IOM, 2019b; OHCHR, 2021.

⁵⁹ Chetail, 2020; McAuliffe, 2020.

⁶⁰ IOM, 2022a.

⁶¹ De Lauri, 2022.

Hear My Voice: Insecurity of migrant children

In June 2019, attorney Warren Binford traveled to the US Customs and Border Protection facility in Clint, Texas. She was there on a routine visit to monitor the government's compliance with the Flores Settlement Agreement, which governs how long and under what conditions migrant children can be held in detention facilities. She ended up interviewing dozens of children over a few days, and gathered stories so shocking – of hungry, cold and sick children sleeping on concrete floors under Mylar blankets – that they became international news.

After that visit, Binford started a non-profit dedicated to strengthening legal protections for children in custody. On its website, visitors can read sworn testimony from dozens of children and teenagers. But Binford ran into a problem: she says the children's stories were just too harrowing to hold an audience. "People were so depressed. They would call me and say, 'I can't do it. I bawl my eyes out. It's too much.' And so then it was like, 'OK. How do we help people to access this knowledge that the children have given us in the children's own words?'"

Her solution: a picture book. *Hear My Voice/Escucha Mi Voz*, published in both English and Spanish, features excerpts of the testimonies, paired with art by award-winning illustrators who are Latinx.

"Having these really fabulous artists come together and illustrate the book helps to create a more accessible point of entry into these children's lives, and who they are, and why they came to the United States", Binford says. One illustration shows a border crossing, with two children riding on a woman's shoulders across the Rio Grande. "One day in the morning we passed a wire fence with a big sign that said, 'Welcome to the United States'", the child narrator says. "My little sister and I came from Honduras", reads a page with illustrations of children sleeping in a wire cage. The artist has depicted them with birds' heads.

Binford is hoping that *Hear My Voice/Escucha Mi Voz* will be suitable for families to read and talk about together. "The children's book allows it to be a little kinder and gentler accounting of the children", she explains. "And by creating this mosaic from different declarations [it] helps to give a sense of who these children are collectively".

Source: Abridged excerpt of Kamenetz, 2021.

Stay

"Regular" stay increases human security because when a migrant has permission to reside in a country – whether to study, to work, to be part of a family or for protection reasons – they have a legitimacy that provides a degree of practical protection in day-to-day life. For example, it is more difficult for unscrupulous employers, landlords, corrupt officials and others to exploit people who have regular, documented immigration status.⁶² Regular migrants are able to live in communities more openly and freely than undocumented or irregular migrants, with greater access to public and social services such as education, health and transportation.⁶³

⁶² Crépeau, 2018.

⁶³ Bauloz et al., 2019.

Migrants may face discrimination in destination countries in a wide variety of settings, including in workplaces, schools and universities, health-care environments and social settings. Discrimination acts to impair the mental and physical health of migrants, and in some cases can have severe impacts.⁶⁴ The increase in misinformation and disinformation on migration and migrants has fuelled discriminatory sentiment and xenophobia, resulting in online hate speech and also physical violence towards ethnic minorities in some communities.⁶⁵ Effective antidiscrimination policies are an important preventative measure to help support human security and social cohesion in societies, including migrant populations.⁶⁶

Improving the human security of migrants during their stay also improves the overall human security of the population. During COVID-19, for example, access to regularization programmes, access to public health services (such as vaccination and treatment services), as well as support from community and diaspora groups, proved essential in achieving broader public health objectives and ensuring no one was left behind.⁶⁷

Gender, migration and human security: West and Central Africa

There are many women and girls who migrate in West and Central Africa, with many experiencing a range of gender-based risks. Women in West and Central Africa migrate for various reasons, including in search of economic opportunities, to reunite with their families and to further their education.^a In West Africa, nearly half of all migrant workers within and from the region are female.^b

Economic factors remain the primary driver of migration. While women migrants are engaged in both formal and informal employment activities, the majority continue to be employed in the informal economy, including in areas such as trade and domestic work.^b Female migrants from and within the subregion face several security challenges and risks, both during migration and following arrival in destination countries. Sexual exploitation and violence during migration journeys, precarious employment conditions in destination countries and low wages are some of the challenges that many experience.^c

^a Bisong, 2019; IOM, 2020a.

^b ILO, 2020.

^c Tyszler, 2019.

⁶⁴ Szaflarski and Bauldry, 2019; Vearey et al., 2019.

⁶⁵ Culloty et al., 2021; Urquhart, 2021.

⁶⁶ Bauloz et al., 2019.

⁶⁷ Armocida et al., 2020; IOM, 2020b.

Return

The return of migrants to countries of origin and their reintegration into communities are part of the migration cycle, and can be particularly challenging for migrants' human security. Migrants who return may have been living overseas for many years, if not decades, and may face obstacles – such as financial, social and legal obstacles – to smooth reintegration into local communities.⁶⁸ They may be returning after working for years in another country, after completing higher education or temporary assignment, or after a failed migration or asylum application. Return migration, therefore, covers a wide spectrum of situations and may not necessarily be voluntary.⁶⁹ From a human security perspective, return can result in extreme hardship and risk of internal displacement, even where voluntary, although these risks can be even higher when migrants are forced to return to their country of origin.⁷⁰

The circumstances of the return – both prior to returning and after return – are critical from a human security perspective and migrants' rights can be at risk in several ways. One of the most fundamental is the forced return of migrants against the principle of non-refoulement,⁷¹ which presents grave human rights risks for the returning migrant and is, therefore, a key principle of international human rights law.

Policies that facilitate a human security approach

This section builds on the previous section's analysis of human security and insecurity in the different stages of the migration cycle, examining how policies can improve human security for migrants and communities, addressing international, regional, national and subnational policy considerations. It is important to acknowledge that some policies that significantly foster or improve human security (or reduce human insecurity) do not always directly address the regulation of emigration and immigration.

Before we examine policies from the governance level perspective, we also need to acknowledge that responses and priorities concerning human security and migration often reflect historical and contemporary emigration, immigration and displacement dynamics and policies within countries and regions. There is no one-size-fits-all policy approach to improving human security, as it depends on what and how specific challenges are manifesting. While this chapter is not able to cover the breadth of impacts around the world, the short case studies in Appendix B help to show the diversity of human security issues and impacts being felt by different countries. These studies each represent one country per United Nations region, and focus on a particular human security issue:

- Burkina Faso (Africa): internal displacement due to conflict and violence.
- Canada (Northern America): leading the way on gender equality in migration.
- Colombia (Latin America and the Caribbean): regularization programming.
- The Philippines (Asia): initiatives to counter human trafficking.
- New Zealand (Oceania): multiculturalism and integration to counter extremist violence.
- Switzerland (Europe): inclusion of irregular migrants.

⁶⁸ Arowolo, 2000; Battistella, 2018.

⁶⁹ Mbiyozo, 2019.

⁷⁰ Da Rosa Jorge, 2021; Kleist, 2020.

⁷¹ Non-refoulement is the "prohibition for States to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise return a person to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would risk being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance, or of suffering another irreparable harm". For further detail see IOM, 2019a.

From the case studies, we can see that human security and migration impacts and implications differ by country. In Burkina Faso, for example, conflict resulting from political instability and the rise of violent extremism had displaced more than 1.5 million persons by end of 2021.⁷² This represents a challenge for national and international actors that struggle to provide food and shelter. In New Zealand, two terror attacks linked to white supremacist ideology prompted the Government to reconsider its counter-terrorism policies and enhance training on multiculturalism and diversity. In Switzerland, the Zurich municipality, unable to get broader cantonal support for the introduction of a regularization programme, introduced a “city card” which effectively provides access to essential services such as health care to undocumented migrants living in the city and nearby. In the Philippines, sustained efforts to combat human trafficking meant the country retained a tier 1 ranking in the United States trafficking in persons report for the seventh consecutive year and gained praise for its approach to the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims. In Colombia, COVID-19 heightened political tensions and the conditions of precarity among its growing population of displaced persons, prompting a mass regularization initiative that has increased human security significantly for millions of Venezuelans in vulnerable situations. Finally, in Canada, new programmes, mechanisms and resources have been developed to address gendered inequality in migration management and improve integration outcomes for migrant women and migrants from minority gender groups. Further details are in Appendix B.

Policies across different levels of governance

The governance of migration is a complex and multi-layered process structured around State sovereignty, which is central to migration policy design and implementation.⁷³ In other words, most migration policy is situated at the national level.⁷⁴ Notwithstanding this, international normative instruments exist, and they have been designed to determine or shape how States govern migration and mobility. International instruments such as treaties act to outline specific requirements of State Parties. Some are migration specific, such as the Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, while others, such as the core international human rights treaties, apply equally to all individuals and thus guarantee a minimum set of rights to all, including migrants. Appendix C provides a summary of global multilateral treaties related to migration and migrants. There also exist international non-binding State-negotiated texts (such as the Global Compact for Migration) and State consultative mechanisms (such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development), which are designed to inform and guide policymaking at the national level. A detailed discussion of these multilateral processes and related outcomes is provided in Chapter 8 of this report.

The international governance framework on migration obliges States to uphold the human rights of migrants, for example, by refraining from arbitrary immigration detention and by upholding the principle of non-refoulement. Elements of the framework also summon States to protect the human rights of migrants from third-party violation, for example by calling on them to regulate the activities of recruitment agencies to guarantee ethical recruitment practices, or by mandating that antidiscrimination legislation is enacted. The international level, therefore, is central to the consideration of migrants’ human security because it encompasses agreed norms and informs standards that can be replicated (or even enhanced) at other levels of governance, including by regional, national and subnational authorities.

⁷² IDMC, 2022.

⁷³ Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2018.

⁷⁴ McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.

At the regional level, migration governance also encompasses legal frameworks and policies, complemented by organizational structures, consultative mechanisms and other processes. Regional approaches shape how mobility takes place within regions (geographic or geopolitical) and address issues pertaining to human security (including rights) through binding and non-binding instruments. In some regions, migration-related agreements have been finalized and implemented by regional structures and groupings. Examples of this include the access to national labour markets for all nationals of the ECOWAS region without the need for employment visas or permits (see text box below), or the right to residence across the MERCOSUR region for nationals of their member States. In the case of the European Union, policymaking at a regional level has harmonized entry requirements and created residence categories for migrants. It has also created minimum employment rights standards, and mandated anti-discrimination legislation.

West Africa protocols on free movement

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975 and currently comprises 15 member States. The process of achieving free movement in the region started in 1979, with the signing of the first protocol on free movement, right of residence and establishment, which resulted in the abolition of entry visas for those moving between ECOWAS nations. This was followed in 1986 by the implementation of the “second phase”, which provided a right to residence across ECOWAS, including the right to work.

Over the years, the implementation of the protocols has encountered several obstacles, such as regional conflicts, the securitization of borders and increasing pressure to deter irregular migration originating in the region. Despite these, the overall strategy has not been to curtail regional mobility but has instead focused on raising awareness of the dangers associated with irregular migration and promoting regional migration as an alternative. The effects of the protocols are evident in research on international migration trends between 1995 and 2020, which indicate that ECOWAS free movement has had a long-term impact on migration activity within the region.^a By 2020, out of the 10 million international migrants that had moved to or from ECOWAS countries, more than 60 per cent moved within the region.^a

^a McAuliffe et al., 2021b.

At the national level, there are a wide range of policies that impact the human security of migrants. For example, visa policies determine who can enter and transit through territories, under which conditions, and for what purposes. Immigration legislation creates different categories of migrants, with residence conditions and entitlements attached to them. The ability of migrants to enter, transit and stay in countries through regular channels is a key determinant of human security, as access to rights – such as health care, housing, decent work and social protection – is often predicated upon immigration status. Irregular migrants, or those with temporary or precarious statuses, face difficulties or exclusion in accessing those rights and may be exploited in the labour market because of their status. They may also be subjected to additional forms of insecurity, such as immigration detention, and forced to return to their country of origin. Additional forms of support for migrants are therefore needed, depending on their situations.

South Africa policy developments for community-centred approaches

As part of South Africa's planned one-stop border posts that will be managed under the newly established Border Management Authority, migration management will be clustered into three main subsets:

1. Management of regular migrants: visa exemptions, valid visas or visas at point of entry.
2. Management of irregular migrants: including asylum-seekers, refugees, stateless people, smuggling, trafficking and cross-border crime.
3. Management of border communities.

This approach will allow South Africa to better manage its borders and ports of entry in a “triage” fashion. It has been developed based on lessons learned within the region and elsewhere on the continent relating to the management of border communities. Under it, people living within the “border law enforcement area” (commonly called a “border zone” and defined as the area within a 10km radius of land and sea points of entry) would be permitted to cross the border at informal community crossing points for personal and professional reasons, without the need for visas or exit and entry stamps. Border guards within border zones will identify people that fall within the border community. These people will be exempt from usual entry requirements.

This community-centred approach would enable members of border communities to engage in cross-border activities – such as connecting with their families on either side of the border, buying and selling goods and accessing services – without hindrance.

Sources: Republic of South Africa, 2020 and 2022.

Countries also shape the experiences of their nationals moving abroad. Countries of origin for large numbers of migrant workers may sign bilateral labour agreements with countries of destination to help safeguard the well-being of their nationals abroad. In certain cases, like in the Philippines for instance, migration may be prohibited to countries where human security cannot be guaranteed. Other policies may include the provision of welfare and consular assistance or the facilitation of safe return and reintegration.

Philippines' Overseas Workers Welfare Administration programmes

The Philippines Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is the lead government agency responsible for safeguarding the welfare and well-being of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). A membership structure, the OWWA provides services to OFWs throughout all stages of the migration cycle. Since 1983, it has delivered pre-departure orientation seminars, tailored to OFW destinations. The seminar provides relevant information for their adaptation to the new work environment and culture in the destination country. It also provides specific training to certain migrant workers groups, such as domestic workers and seafarers.

It also runs a welfare programme for OFWs experiencing economic risks or insecurities in destination countries. Services range from legal assistance to psychosocial counselling and include visitations in hospital or prisons. Finally, the OWVA also runs a reintegration programme, providing assistance to returned Filipino migrants with their immediate and long-term needs, including housing, financial literacy training and employment counselling.

Source: Republic of the Philippines (the), n.d.a.

Although migration policies are often conceived at the national level, they are often implemented in a decentralized manner. In some systems, it is the subnational level that both sets and implements aspects of migration policy. More commonly, it is local level authorities (particularly city or municipality authorities) that are responsible for the provision of services to migrants, a key aspect for the security and well-being of migrant communities. In some cases, these local level authorities have discretion in interpreting and implementing national policies. In certain cases, they may openly oppose restrictive national policies, such as immigration detention or the exclusion of irregular migrants from health-care services. This is the case for “sanctuary cities” in the United States and beyond, which seek to protect the rights of migrants regardless of their immigration status, including by providing access to health care, shelter, integration and education services. Other municipalities have created specific programmes to protect migrants from exposure to potential harm in reporting crime. As described in the text box below, what started as a local level policy in Amsterdam has gone on to be expanded into a national approach, exemplifying how local approaches can also shape national policies.

“Free in, free out”: Dutch “firewall protection” for irregular migrants who are victims of crime

“Free in, free out”^a is an internal policy of the Dutch national police to ensure the safe reporting of crimes by migrant victims. It was initially implemented as a local policy of the Amsterdam municipality, as a recognition that immigration enforcement poses a significant challenge to the successful outreach to victims of crimes who are migrants, and that this has a subsequent impact on the community welfare.

The policy stipulated that migrants should feel comfortable to approach law enforcement officials to report crimes, without being questioned about their immigration status, or fearing any repercussions in the case that their irregularity is disclosed. Following its success in the capital, the policy was adopted in Utrecht and Eindhoven before being adopted nationally, as part of the transposition of the European Union’s Victims’ Rights Directive.

^a Timmerman et al., 2020.

Measuring policy implementation

Attempting to align migration policies to individual stages of the migration cycle proves challenging because most policy impacts migrants at multiple stages. Such is the case of national and regional policies aimed at countering migrant smuggling. While their primary objective is to protect the territorial sovereignty of States and promote

regular migration, the disproportionate use of force and militarization of borders can, for example, result in pushbacks at land and sea, effectively denying migrants the right to seek asylum, breaching the prohibition of collective expulsion and undermining the principle of non-refoulement.⁷⁵ Additionally, the same policies may, directly or indirectly, criminalize the provision of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants, further compounding their vulnerabilities in places of transit and destination.⁷⁶ In some instances, these policies and practices have not reduced smuggling, but have forced those smuggling and being smuggled to take on greater risks to cross international borders. This intensifies precarity and vulnerability.

Several attempts have been made to measure the comprehensiveness of different aspects of migration governance and policy structures. For example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), in place since 2007 and rolled out in 56 countries across six continents, identifies and measures integration policies across eight areas: labour market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, health care, family reunion, permanent residence and anti-discrimination.⁷⁷ The Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) is one of the most holistic attempts to measure and compare such governance.⁷⁸ It is a framework measuring policies across multiple stages of the migration cycle. It was developed in 2016 by IOM in collaboration with Economist Impact to support governments in assessing the comprehensiveness of their migration policies, structures and practices, and to identify gaps and areas that need to be strengthened. The 90+ indicators are based on the six principles and objectives of the IOM Migration Governance Framework, grounded in target 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals, and aligned to the 23 objectives of the Global Compact for Migration.⁷⁹ At the time of writing, 92 countries and 52 subnational authorities had undertaken an assessment,⁸⁰ while others were embarking on an assessment. These completed assessments represent a baseline measure from which governments can work to improve their migration policies. Additionally, 18 countries have conducted follow-up assessments, contributing towards a longitudinal database that will help measure progress in areas of migration governance.

However, the MGI is limited insofar as it focuses on the existence of migration governance structures, with limited assessment of how policies are implemented and no assessment of the outcomes of those policies. As such, other tools are necessary to move beyond simply measuring whether frameworks are in place, and to understand how countries manage migration in practice. One way of measuring policy implementation may lie in developing Global Compact for Migration indicators.

On 7 June 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Progress Declaration of the International Migration Review Forum. Paragraph 70 of the Declaration calls on the Secretary-General to propose, for the consideration of Member States, a set of indicators to measure progress related to the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration at a national level. In its 2022–2024 workplan,⁸¹ the United Nations Network on Migration is mandated by its Executive Committee to develop such indicators drawing on the global indicator framework for the SDGs and 2030 Agenda targets, as well as other relevant frameworks. For this purpose, a new workstream of the United Nations Network on Migration has been created, co-led by IOM and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and tasked with developing such indicators and conducting consultations with Member States and relevant stakeholders by the end of 2023.

⁷⁵ Gonzalez Morales, 2021.

⁷⁶ Carrera et al., 2018.

⁷⁷ MIPEX, 2020; Solano and Huddleston, 2020.

⁷⁸ IOM, 2019c.

⁷⁹ IOM, 2022b.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ United Nations Network on Migration, 2023.

Conclusions

The unprecedented pace of recent change in geopolitical, environmental and technological spheres has led some analysts and commentators to coin or use phrases such as the “age of accelerations”, the “fourth industrial revolution”, and the “age of change”.⁸² COVID-19 has further amplified the sense of uncertainty brought about during momentous change, that has been further underscored by “unthinkable” events actually occurring before our eyes, such as war and mass displacement in Europe. The looming spectre of devastating climate change impacts around the world is also adding to the profound sense of insecurity being felt by people all around the world.⁸³

Against this challenging backdrop, this chapter has examined migration and human security in contemporary settings, drawing upon conceptualizations of the topic that have evolved over recent decades. Rooted in human rights and protection, the human security of migrants (including those who have been displaced) is a fundamental aspect of migration and mobility: for many people working in migration policy, research and practice, it is considered the fundamental aspect. Part of the reason for this extends beyond the normative framework, and into the practical realms of peace and security (and lack thereof) as well as uneven human development resulting in systemic global inequality.

The topic of human security is important because, as highlighted in this analysis, we continue to witness the linking of migration and security through misinformed “threat” narratives that seek to paint international migrants as endangering countries and communities. The rhetoric framing migration in national or State security terms emerged decades ago as part of discursive rationales for extreme (at times militarized) responses to migration. More recently, a related line of this disinformation narrative has been amplified through tech platforms, often fuelled by alt-right groups operating transnationally (see text box above). The key and growing reality is, however, that the most significant link between migration and security relates to the human security of migrants themselves. The vulnerability of migrants throughout the migration cycle is evident at all stages and in a wide variety of manifestations during pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return.

That is not to say that all migration negatively impacts human security; far from it. As outlined in this chapter, migration and mobility can positively enhance people’s lives, and can save lives in the direst of situations. However, there do remain many situations in which migrants can be extremely vulnerable and have their security diminished or degraded during migration. In these circumstances, authorities at multiple levels (international, regional, national, local) need to actively develop, implement and measure policies that facilitate a human security approach to migration and mobility.

The issue of human security is at the core of global frameworks such as the SDGs and the Global Compact for Migration. However, it is clear that while regulatory and policy actors are central and critical to facilitating human security, they also need the support, partnership and focus of non-State actors, including civil society, private sector, non-governmental organizations and researchers in realizing positive action to improve the human security of migrants and communities around the world. Working together across sectors affords the greatest possibility of responding to human insecurity needs that extend beyond humanitarian settings.

⁸² Friedman, 2016; Schwab, 2017; Mauldin, 2018.

⁸³ UNDP, 2022a and 2022b.

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6 GENDER AND MIGRATION: TRENDS, GAPS AND URGENT ACTION¹

Introduction



Reading the testimonies of two migrants, can you guess their gender?

“I was working in [the Kingdom of] Saudi Arab[ia] for five years. ... I came back to Bangladesh in 2019. Upon return, I started to work in a small local factory. ... I also go to the government employment office, as I am interested to go abroad again. Working in a foreign country enables us to have savings for the future.”

Testimony 1: migrant from South Asia.

Excerpt from GAATW, 2021.

“We were a group of boys and girls traveling together. We spent 40 days in the desert. ... By the time we got to Libya, many of us had been kidnapped. ... I was stuck for seven months in Libya. It was very bad. We saw our friend being violated. It was a bad, bad experience. ... The rebels kidnapped us because they want to make money off Africans.”

Testimony 2: migrant from West Africa.

Excerpt from WRC, 2019.

Any guess about the gender of the two migrants in the above testimonies is linked to gender biases shaped by centuries of gender norms and stereotypes that have been – more or less unconsciously – internalized by most people. It has been estimated that only 10.3 per cent of the global population has no social gender norms bias.² While gender biases are more apparent in societies embracing patriarchal and conservative social norms, they remain prevalent worldwide. Stereotypically, men are generally considered breadwinners, remittance senders and decision makers within families. Women are associated with caregiving, unpaid work and vulnerability. Looking at the two testimonies above, these gender norms and biases are likely to lead to testimony 1 being attributed to a

¹ Céline Bauhoz, Senior Research Officer, IOM; Margaret Walton-Roberts, Professor, Wilfrid Laurier University and Balsillie School of International Affairs; Rose Jaji, Senior Researcher, German Institute of Development and Sustainability and University of Zimbabwe; Taehoon Lee, Junior Economist, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

² UNDP, 2022.

man and testimony 2 to a woman, particularly given the “breadwinner” role of testimony 1. However, testimony 1 is from a woman, and testimony 2 is from a young man.

Gender norms and biases affect many aspects of day-to-day life. However, they take on a specific importance for migrants, influencing their migration experience to the extent that migration has been described as a gendered phenomenon.³ Alongside a range of other overlapping factors such as age, race, ethnicity, nationality, disability, health and socioeconomic status, gender impacts the different opportunities migrants may have and the various obstacles and risks they may face in pursuing them.⁴ By setting out different roles and expectations for migrants of specific genders, the social norms of countries of origin, transit and destination may influence, for instance, who can stay and migrate in a household, the motivations and options for migration, the preferred destination countries, the type and means of migration, the goal and objective of migration, the sector of employment or the disciplines studied, the status afforded by legislations of countries, including in terms of rights and benefits, and the list goes on. These gender dimensions of migration in turn impact societies in countries of origin, transit and destination. Similarly, in displacement contexts, gender considerations underpin individuals’ trajectories, experiences and protection, and even their very decision to flee when related to gender-based discrimination and violence that may, in some countries, lead to international protection, including refugee status.

Gender-related challenges, obstacles and risks for migrants often mask broader systemic and structural gender inequalities that must be better understood and addressed in order to ensure that individuals of all genders have the same opportunities to migrate and to experience migration in a safe, orderly and regular manner. Among these, gender inequalities in terms of decision-making power and the gender segmentation of the global economy are of particular importance in explaining gender migration patterns. While gender equality has improved worldwide, progress is reported by the United Nations Development Programme to be slowing and even reversing in some countries since the COVID-19 pandemic, thus negatively impacting human development.⁵ Discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics continues, with an increased polarization over the past decade between countries with high and low levels of acceptance.⁶ Key definitions are provided in Appendix A.

The legal principle of non-discrimination, including on grounds of gender,⁷ underpins decades of policy and legal developments on gender equality. These include, at the global level, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action; the 2006 Yogyakarta Principles and their 2016 additional Principles Plus 10 relating to sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression and sex characteristics; and the 2015 Agenda for Sustainable Development and in particular Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) number 5.⁸ In the specific context of migration, global migration initiatives have recognized the need to adopt a gender-sensitive approach to migration, especially with respect to women and girls.⁹ The most recent examples are the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which commit to gender equality and gender responsiveness.¹⁰

³ Piper, 2008.

⁴ Boyd and Grieco, 2003; Lutz and Amelina, 2021.

⁵ UNDP, 2020 and 2022. See also UN Women and UN DESA, 2022.

⁶ Flores, 2021.

⁷ UNGA, 1948; United Nations, 1966a and 1966b.

⁸ United Nations, 1979 and 1995; ICJ, 2007 and 2017; UNGA, 2015.

⁹ Bauloz, 2017.

¹⁰ UNGA, 2018a and 2018b; see also UNGA, 2016.

Against this background, this chapter aims to describe and analyse how gender intersects with international migration and considers what can be done to improve gender equality in migration. Given the breadth of the topic, the chapter does not purport to be comprehensive but to provide an overview of some important gender dimensions in migration to increase the understanding of the multifaceted interactions between gender and migration. A particular focus is placed on labour migration, because it is one of the main types of migration (nearly 70% of the international migrant population of working age are estimated to be migrant workers),¹¹ with highly gendered trends due to the gender segregation of the global economy. The chapter also covers other “types” of migration that are highly gendered, such as family migration, including marriage migration.¹² It also considers the gendered drivers of displacement and gendered impacts on refugees, as well as, more broadly, the interactions between gender and irregularity of status. In recognition of the context-specific nature of the topic, the chapter provides illustrations of diverse geographies worldwide.

The first section outlines historical context, including the “feminization of migration”. The second section then explores the diverse and multiple ways that gender impacts migrants’ experiences throughout the migration cycle, from departure from the country of origin to entry and stay in transit and destination countries and, if applicable, return to the country of origin. The third section then discusses the urgent need to adopt a gender-responsive approach to migration governance, and identifies four cross-cutting challenges that need to be addressed, highlighting examples of promising practices and interventions. Finally, the chapter concludes with reflections on the complexity of understanding the multifaceted interconnections between migration and gender, and the importance of gender-responsive migration governance for gender equality more broadly.

Current context: From the feminization of migration to the growing global gender gap in migration

Migration, as with any other aspect of an individual’s life, remains structured by gender norms that ascribe certain roles and expectations to people based on physiological sex at birth. Because of these ascribed roles, migration tended to be depicted as male dominated, with women and girls considered as “tied movers”, migrating as spouses and daughters or subsequently through family reunification. Migration researchers engaged more deeply with migration and sex-based roles as feminist theories about the social construction of gender were advanced in the 1980s and 1990s. These theoretical advances marked a turn in understanding how gender and migration interact at individual, household and societal levels, and how gender identities, roles and relations influence migrant agency, decision-making, patterns of migration, as well as experiences throughout the migration cycle.¹³

¹¹ ILO, 2021a.


¹² Due to space constraints, the chapter does not cover international student mobility, although this type of mobility is also underpinned by gender considerations. On gender and international student mobility, see for instance Raghuram and Sondhi, 2021.

¹³ Boyd, 2021.

Research on women's international migration from the 1980s noted the increasing presence of women migrating independently, especially as migrant workers, leading to the introduction of the concept of the feminization of migration.¹⁴ This notion was consequently elevated as a mantra in migration and gender research, one seldom questioned since the 1990s.¹⁵ However, a deeper examination of migration trends and patterns requires nuancing this view. Although global data sets do not provide information on migrants of diverse genders, as the collection of gender-disaggregated data remains uncommon, global sex-disaggregated data remain useful to better understand demographic trends from a gender binary perspective.

History attests that there was a steady increase in the number of international female migrants from 1990.¹⁶ However, evidence points to a growing gender gap globally over the past two decades.¹⁷ As highlighted in the previous world migration report (Figure 1 below), the share of female migrants has been decreasing since 2000, from 49.4 per cent to 48.1 per cent. The gap between female and male international migrants increased from 1.2 percentage points in 2000 to 3.8 percentage points in 2020.

Figure 1. International migrants, by sex, 2000–2020



Source: IOM, 2021b, based on UN DESA, 2021.

¹⁴ Donato and Gabaccia, 2015.

¹⁵ Boyd, 2021.


¹⁶ Donato and Gabaccia, 2016.

¹⁷ IOM, 2021b:27–28.

Hence, though the number of female migrants has increased over the years, migration is not more feminized. On the contrary, it has become more masculinized when considering the share of female and male international migrants at the global level.

These global trends and patterns, however, mask wide variation by regions of origin and destination. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, although migration has been more female led in certain regions of the world, there has been no marked feminization of migration for the past three decades, except, to a certain extent, for emigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean and immigrants to North America. By contrast, some regions have experienced a substantial masculinization of migration, especially in terms of emigration from South Asia, as well as immigration to Middle East and North Africa.


Figure 2. Share of female and male international migrants, by regions of origin, 1990–2020



Source: Abel, 2022, based on UN DESA, 2021.

Note: Regional categorization as done by the author.

Figure 3. Share of male and female international migrants, by regions of destination, 1990–2020



Source: Abel, 2022, based on UN DESA, 2021.

Note: Regional categorization as done by the author.


Labour migration corridors constitute the main driver behind both the global gender gap and the wide variations in gender patterns of migration across regions worldwide. First, labour migration constitutes the main form of migration and displays an even greater gender gap than does the overall international migrant population. According to the latest available data, migrant workers represented the majority of migrants worldwide in 2019, accounting for 62 per cent of the international migrant population.¹⁸ Out of the 169 million migrant workers at that time globally, 99 million were males (58.5%) and 70 million females (41.5%), resulting in a global gender gap of 29 million individuals.¹⁹

¹⁸ ILO, 2021a; IOM, 2021b.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Second, labour migration corridors drive the geographic distribution of migrant workers and, thus, of international migrants across the world's regions. As shown in Figure 4 below, and similar to the share of male and female international migrants by regions of destination (Figure 3), there is a stark imbalance in the demographics of migrant workers in the Arab States, North Africa and, to a lesser extent, in sub-Saharan Africa, where male migrant workers are disproportionately represented.

Figure 4. Geographic distribution of migrant workers by sex, 2019




Source: IOM, 2021b, based on ILO, 2021a.

Note: The figure above reflects ILO geographic regions and subregions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Please see Annex A of ILO, 2021a for more information on regional breakdowns.

The disproportionate representation of male migrant workers in the Arab States is underpinned by the fact that, as illustrated in Figure 5, in 2020, 18 out of the top 20 male dominant migrant corridors were to the Middle East (and primarily from South Asia). In contrast, the top 20 female-dominant migrant corridors in 2020 and outlined in Figure 6 were more diverse, although predominantly from South and South-East Asia.


Figure 5. Top 20 male dominant migrant corridors, 2020



Source: Abel, 2022 based on UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: Ordered by share of male migrants, where the size of the male migrant population of the migration corridor exceeds 100,000 persons.
Regional categorization as done by the author.

Figure 6. Top 20 female dominant migrant corridors, 2020



Source: Abel, 2022 based on UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: Ordered by share of female migrants, where the size of the female migrant population of the migration corridor exceeds 100,000 persons.


Regional categorization as done by the author.

Regional migration patterns and country-to-country migration corridors reflect regional economic demand in occupational sectors that may be gender segregated. The Gulf countries are major destinations for male migrant workers: nearly 83 per cent of all migrant workers in the Arab States region in 2019 were male,²⁰ primarily working in the industry sector as construction workers, due to an ever-rising demand since the oil shock of 1973. For female migrant workers, their main destinations and the top migration corridors reflect the high prevalence of female migrants in the service sector, especially in domestic work and as health-care workers. Figure 7 shows this gendered segregation and its intensification between 2013 and 2019, with male migrants increasingly working in the industry sector (from 19.8% to 35.6%) and female migrants in the service sector (from slightly less than 74% to nearly 80%).²¹

²⁰ The term Arab States is used by the ILO in its regional disaggregation.

²¹ ILO, 2021a.

Figure 7. Global distribution of international migrant workers, by broad category of economic activity and sex, 2013 and 2019



Source: ILO, 2015 and 2021a.

These patterns demonstrate that the mantra of the feminization of migration must be nuanced. Not only is the migration gap increasing between female and male international migrants, but the gender patterns of occupational labour segregation remain prevalent worldwide and will likely be exacerbated, according to global historical trends in gendered labour segregation by sector of activity.²²

Data provide a useful overview of migration trends and patterns; however, they are unable to account for the gendered vulnerabilities and inequalities experienced by migrants and their families that are perpetuated by the gender segregation of the global economy and the ensuing gendered labour migration corridors. The implications of gender roles and dynamics are more far reaching, going beyond numbers, beyond binary understandings of gender, and beyond any specific form of migration.


Beyond numbers: Gender dimensions throughout the migration cycle

This section explores how gender influences migration experiences, including displacement, throughout the migration cycle, from pre-departure to entry and stay in destination countries and, if applicable, return to the country of origin; a typology used in previous editions of the World Migration Report.²³ Although migration and displacement do not necessarily follow a linear approach, conceptualizing the gender dimensions along the different stages of the migration cycle offers a useful framework of analysis. Recognizing the importance of other factors, including age, these gender dimensions summarized in Figure 8 below are approached through the prism of gender inequalities, highlighting how gender may trigger diverse opportunities, vulnerabilities and risks for migrants. This section should be understood as offering examples of the countless ways gender and migration interact, since it would be impossible to comprehensively cover all of these opportunities, vulnerabilities and risks.

²² ILO, 2022.

²³ See, for example, McAuliffe et al., 2021; and Beduschi and McAuliffe, 2021.

Figure 8. Gender dimensions throughout the migration cycle



Pre-departure

As explored in this subsection, gender impacts the pre-departure phase of migration in multiple ways, from the aspirations and decision to migrate at the individual and household levels and the drivers of migration and displacement to the ability to access to information and the types of information channels used. Migration policies and legislation of countries of origin can be highly gendered, including emigration bans and limitations; bilateral agreements and facilitations for labour migration can likewise be highly gendered, and can be pivotal in fuelling irregular migration in gendered ways, including gendered risks of human trafficking.

Individuals' initial aspirations and ensuing decisions to stay or migrate are already influenced by gender norms prevailing in their countries of origin. The traditional figures of the man breadwinner and woman caregiver tend to persist worldwide to a greater or lesser degree, intersecting with individuals' life cycles in terms of age, marital status, and the fact of having children. For example, in West Africa, the migration of (young) men is considered an intergenerational responsibility and an expression of manhood, providing an opportunity for upward social and economic mobility upon return, including for marriage.²⁴ In Afghanistan and Pakistan, some ethnic groups consider migration as a rite of passage into adulthood, including through irregular and unsafe migration routes.²⁵ The takeover by the Taliban in Afghanistan in August 2021 and the restrictions they have since adopted, especially towards women and girls, have, however, somewhat nuanced the predominantly male-led migration patterns, with an increase in the number of women and girls displaced in often unsafe conditions.²⁶ In some families, women (especially young women) may be pressured into immobility to look after family members or resort to family or marriage migration as a socially acceptable form of migration.²⁷ Independent migration may be considered shameful for their families, at times associated with liberal lifestyle, behaviours and overt sexuality.²⁸

However, although not considered matriarchal, some societies have a long-standing culture of feminized migration, such as in Cabo Verde or West Java, Indonesia.²⁹ Even in societies with a traditional approach to gender roles, women's migration has become a household strategy to address economic needs in the context of the growing demand for migrant labour, for example in the care sector. Beyond the well-known case of the Philippines since the 1980s,³⁰ Peruvian women have been migrating independently to Argentina to work in the service sector, being more likely to secure a job than their husband.³¹ Seasonal or circular migration is also a strategy used by some migrant women to balance the need for income and their care duties as mothers and wives, as reported by migrant women from Hungary, for instance.³²

²⁴ Concerning Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Senegal: Beqo, 2019; Bylander, 2015; Hoang, 2011; Prothmann, 2017; Mondain and Diagne, 2013.

²⁵ Monsutti, 2007; McAuliffe, 2017; Hahn-Schaur, 2021; Ahmad, 2008.

²⁶ UNHCR, 2023; McAuliffe and Iqbal, 2022.

²⁷ UN Women, 2015; Bouchoucha, 2012; Cooke, 2008; Cerrutti and Massey, 2001.

²⁸ Walton-Roberts, 2012; Boyd, 2006; Dannecker, 2005.

²⁹ Åkesson et al., 2012; Iqbal and Gusman, 2015.

³⁰ UN Women, 2015.

³¹ Rosas, 2013; Pedone et al., 2012.

³² Eröss et al, 2020.

Gender dimensions of migration, environment and climate change

Gender is a determining factor of the needs and priorities of climate migrants and will be key for the design of inclusive policies that not only tackle inequality and discrimination but also vulnerability to climate change. Women are disproportionately affected by climate change because they tend to be on average poorer, less educated, have a lower health status and limited direct access to or ownership of natural resources. Both the process (actual movements) and the outcomes (rural–rural or rural–urban migration, out-migration) of climate-induced migration are also likely to be highly gendered (Chindarkar, 2012). Although the link between gender and climate-induced migration is still under investigation, gender remains fundamental in the decision-making process of migration since the assigned roles to men and women in family, community and society are also a defining feature of vulnerability to climate change.

In fact, given their unequal access to resources and information, women and men have different vulnerabilities to climate change. The gendered process plays out differently in diverse societies depending on local cultural norms that entail gender roles, age, class and ethnicity. The masculinization of migration is a response to the social inequality exacerbated by climate change as strongly related to livelihood, risk exposure and weak adaptive capacity of individuals and groups. The loss of livelihood is indeed the triggering event that sets a migratory plan into motion: men tend to migrate when farming becomes uncertain and once the household income is kept on the decrease (Miletto et al., 2017).

Source: Braham, 2018.

For some, migration also offers an avenue to escape traditional gender norms and societal pressures. For instance, marriage migration allows women to avoid prevailing social norms dictating their age of marriage or whether they can remarry after divorce.³³ For migrants with diverse sexual orientation, gender identities and expression, and sex characteristics in South-East Asia, discrimination in families and societies can be a driver of migration alongside economic advancement.³⁴ At an extreme, gender-based discrimination can take the form of abuses, violence and persecution, and can force individuals to flee their country of origin, sometimes resulting in obtaining international protection elsewhere (see next subsection).

Migration decisions are also highly contingent on one's access to information, and on the type of information that can be accessed, which can be highly gendered. Four main sources of information can be identified: social networks, media coverage, awareness-raising interventions and pre-orientation programmes. While these are highly context specific, some overall gendered patterns and implications can be identified. Most notably, while social networks, including diasporas, play an important role for migrants of all genders, networks relied upon by migrant women vary: some women tend to favour family networks as a trusted source of information, while others turn to women's networks for gendered information or get the support of returned migrant women.³⁵ On their part, media coverage and awareness-raising interventions often focus on the danger and risks of migration, which may discourage women and girls from migrating but may have a more limited effect on men and boys.³⁶ Finally, except in some countries

³³ Chen, 2021.

³⁴ ILO and UN Women, 2022.

³⁵ Sha, 2021; ECDGMHA et al., 2017; Dannecker, 2005.

³⁶ Hennebry et al., 2016; Hahn-Schaur, 2021; ECDGMHA et al., 2017.

in South and South-East Asia, pre-orientation programmes tend to be designed based on a one-size-fits-all model that may thus be less effective in addressing gender vulnerabilities in migration.³⁷

Migration policies and legislation of countries of origin may hinder individuals' migration along gender lines. Bans on emigration and limitations through pre-emigration clearance to certain countries (primarily the Gulf countries) have been adopted by countries of origin, especially in South and South-East Asia, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.³⁸ While presented as protective measures for their nationals, these bans and limitations have primarily targeted women, restricting their labour migration in specific work sectors (primarily in domestic work). Such restrictions can be based on their age or that of their children, and can also involve the express approval of a male guardian.

At the same time, bilateral labour agreements (BLAs) and memorandums of understanding (MoUs) have increasingly been adopted among countries of origin and destination to facilitate labour migration and regulate regular labour migration, especially in low-skilled occupations such as agriculture, construction and domestic work. Often presented as “triple win” solutions for countries of origin, countries of destination and migrants themselves, these agreements, however, tend to reinforce the gender segregation of labour globally by facilitating labour migration to countries in need of workers in highly gendered occupations, in addition to creating gendered vulnerabilities due to their lack of a gender approach to protection (see subsection on stay, below).³⁹ Although the extent to which these agreements impact migration flows and migrant stocks is unclear, it is noteworthy that the majority of the top 20 migration corridors for male and for female migrants (Figures 5 and 6) involve countries with BLAs or MoUs.⁴⁰

To facilitate labour migration, some countries also proactively support their nationals to prepare for migration in specific occupation sectors. Often presented as a model for labour migration, the Philippines has set up a whole apparatus for supporting the recruitment of Filipinos abroad and their protection in destination countries. This started back in the 1970s with the launch of an overseas employment programme, especially to countries in the Middle East experiencing labour shortages in the construction sector in the midst of the oil boom.⁴¹ Issues of labour protection experienced by overseas Filipino workers prompted the country to complement its policy of facilitation of labour migration with one focusing on the protection of its nationals, starting from mid-1970s onwards and culminating in 2022 with the establishment of the Department of Migrant Workers.⁴² The Department provides a range of e-services prior to migration and maintains a list of licensed recruitment agencies to aid in protecting workers from fraudulent recruitment agencies and exploitation.⁴³

Yet, in most countries, visa application processes remain cumbersome and not easily accessible, if not dangerous. For instance, Syrian women applying for family reunification with their male spouses who had been granted refugee status in Germany may risk their lives while collecting the necessary documents and reaching German embassies in neighbouring countries due to the closure of diplomatic representation in the Syrian Arab Republic.⁴⁴ While the increasing move to online application processes may address some of these situations, they also raise issues for

³⁷ Asis and Mendoza, 2012; ElDidi et al., 2021; Watanabe, 2019.

³⁸ Total bans on migration to the Gulf countries were also imposed by Kenya in 2012 and on domestic workers by Ethiopia in 2013 (both overturned). Shivakoti et al., 2021; Weeraratne, 2023; Joseph et al., 2022; Henderson, 2022; Kavurmaci, 2022; Lynn-Ee Ho and Ting, 2022; Walton-Roberts et al., 2022.

³⁹ Lim, 2016; Hennebry et al., 2022.

⁴⁰ Chilton and Posner, 2017.

⁴¹ Asis, 2017.

⁴² Mones, 2022.

⁴³ Republic of the Philippines, n.d.; UNODC, 2015.

⁴⁴ Damir-Geilsdorf and Sabra, 2018.

individuals from countries with less connectivity and where women tend to be disproportionately without access to information and communications technologies (ICT) compared to men.⁴⁵

Gendered obstacles to migration coupled with restrictive regular migration pathways may fuel irregular migration, which enhances the risk of abuse, exploitation and human trafficking. The risks along irregular migration routes are manifold, from violent smugglers to human traffickers exploiting migrants' vulnerabilities.⁴⁶ Accounting for 60 per cent of all identified victims of trafficking worldwide in 2020, the specific gender-related vulnerabilities of women and girls are well known, especially to trafficking for sexual exploitation but also for forced labour, with women and those with diverse gender identities and expressions more likely to be subjected to physical and extreme violence from traffickers compared to men.⁴⁷ The lower proportion of men and boys identified among victims of trafficking should, however, not mask some of their specific vulnerabilities, especially to forced labour, sexual exploitation, forced criminal activities and mixed forms of exploitation. Although the identification of men victims increased in 2020, men may not self-identify as victims or may be ashamed to identify themselves as such, especially in cases of sexual exploitation.⁴⁸ Similar identification issues may arise with transgender and non-binary individuals being primarily trafficked for sexual exploitation.⁴⁹

Entry

Gender considerations inform migrants' experience of and ability to enter a transit or destination country, both in terms of physical border crossing and normative and policy frameworks governing entry.

Borders are physical manifestations of national sovereignty and can become sites of discrimination and violence.⁵⁰ Gender biases can also be found in digital technologies implemented for identity and security checks at border points, such as for facial recognition, which has a higher propensity for misrecognizing individuals with darker skin complexions and women.⁵¹ Similarly, AI-based emotion recognition used to assess migrants' credibility has also proven to be racially and gender biased, misinterpreting some microgestures made by migrants who have previously experienced trauma and, in cases of migrants of diverse gender identities, who may have been used to conceal or feel uncomfortable revealing their gender identity.⁵²

Migration policies and legislation also determine migrants' opportunities for regular entry along gender lines. Gender norms and stereotypes emerge across the three main regular pathways: labour migration, family migration and international protection.⁵³

⁴⁵ ITU, 2022; McAuliffe, 2023.

⁴⁶ Bauloz et al., 2021.

⁴⁷ UNODC, 2022; CEDAW, 2020.

⁴⁸ UNODC, 2022; WRC and UNICEF, 2021.

⁴⁹ CTDC, n.d.

⁵⁰ Freedman et al., 2023.

⁵¹ Beduschi and McAuliffe, 2021.

⁵² Hall and Clapton, 2021.

⁵³ A fourth pathway, international student mobility, has not been included in this chapter.

Labour migration policies are not gender neutral: they perpetuate gender inequalities experienced in countries of origin, integrate societal gender biases and impact the opportunities and outcomes for migrant workers along the lines of gender identity.⁵⁴ Permanent and temporary labour migration permits tend to be granted according to skill levels that often remain highly gendered. For example, women working in traditionally feminized occupations, such as in the fields of health (for example, nurses) or education (for example, teachers), are less likely to obtain a working permit than men in male-dominated skilled occupations, especially when migration policies define skill levels based on the applicant's salary, which is often lower for women than men.⁵⁵ Highly skilled labour migration often associated with permanent or longer-term residence permits tends to focus on global talent acquisition in employment fields where men are often overrepresented, such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM).⁵⁶ Skilled occupations predominantly held by women, such as those health and education, are often in regulated professions where migrants' international qualifications may not be recognized. This can result in women entering more easily accessible lower-skilled migration channels, including through BLAs and temporary labour migration schemes (particularly evident in care work), which then contributes to their downward occupational mobility and vulnerability in sectors with lower levels of protection, such as care, where States typically underinvest in welfare provisions.⁵⁷ When migrating for domestic work, women have also faced restrictions on their sexual and reproductive rights, for instance when asked by recruitment agencies in some countries to take a pregnancy test before and after arrival.⁵⁸

Family migration has traditionally been highly feminized due to enduring gender norms in countries of origin, with women often following their husband migrant. Family migration policies reinforce these gender inequalities by tying family members to the first migrant sponsor.⁵⁹ Moreover, for family reunification, restrictive entry requirements may be difficult to meet due to gender inequalities in the country of origin, often disproportionately impacting women as sponsored family members.⁶⁰ This is the case, for instance, with regard to pre-entry language tests, as the necessary language skills are closely related to gendered levels of education and to the financial means to access language courses. Migrants with diverse gender identities face challenges in family reunification in a number of countries where a traditional binary understanding of sex in relation to spouses and partners remains in place.⁶¹ Even in countries recognizing same-sex partnerships, the need to present a marriage certification or proof of civil union may bar migrants' family reunification, especially for those coming from countries where same-sex marriage is not legalized, and relationships may even be criminalized.⁶²

Seeking international protection can be a highly gendered experience. First, gender-related risks in the country of origin may justify individuals being granted international protection in the country of destination, such as refugee status.⁶³ These gender-based risks have tended to be recognized for women and girls, as well as individuals of diverse gender identities in case of sexual violence (such as rape, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy and abortion and forced or underage marriage), physical violence (such as honour killing, genital mutilations and corporal punishments

⁵⁴ Briddick, 2021; Kofman, 2013.

⁵⁵ For the European Union and the United Kingdom, for instance, see: European Union, 2021; de Lange and Vankova, 2022; Kofman, 2013.

⁵⁶ In the United States, for example, slightly more than 72 per cent of beneficiaries of the temporary H-1B visa for specialized occupations, especially in STEM, in fiscal year 2021 were men (US Department of Homeland Security, 2022).

⁵⁷ Boucher, 2021; Dodson, 2021; Walton-Roberts, 2020; Spitzer, 2022; Piper, 2022; Hennebray et al., 2022.

⁵⁸ Mehzer et al., 2021.

⁵⁹ Pajnik and Bajt, 2012.

⁶⁰ Bauloz et al., 2019.

⁶¹ Freier and Fernández Rodríguez, 2021; Tryfonidou and Wintemute, 2021; Nusbaum, 2015.

⁶² Malekmian, 2022, concerning family reunification of refugees in Ireland.

⁶³ United Nations, 1951 and 1967. See UNHCR, 2002 and 2012; CEDAW, 2014.

imposed because of discriminatory laws and social mores), or other serious violations of their human rights (such as arbitrary detention) or an accumulation of various discriminations.⁶⁴ Second, gendered considerations underpin refugee status determination, which centres on evidence and credibility assessment. In cases of gender-related persecution, past experiences of gender-based harm and discrimination, as well as the sensitive, intimate and sometimes concealed nature of gender identities and expressions, may affect the coherence and consistency of applicants' statements.⁶⁵ In other cases, gender stereotypes of vulnerability for women and girls have been found to negatively impact men asylum-seekers, who tend to be more easily viewed as "bogus" refugees.⁶⁶ These stereotypes can also affect vulnerability assessments for refugee resettlement, access of vulnerable individuals to referral mechanisms to appropriate services (such as for potential victims of trafficking), and service provision in humanitarian settings.⁶⁷

"I felt like I was born again": First non-binary person granted United Kingdom refugee status

Refugee status has been granted over a person's non-binary status for the first time in a UK court, following a landmark ruling. The judgment, in the upper tribunal, was decided in the case of Arthur Britney Joestar from El Salvador after concluding that they would face persecution for their identity if they returned to their home country. ... The UK ruling states that Joestar would be likely to face specific threats, including physical and sexual violence, if they returned to El Salvador.

Joestar, 29, now settled in Liverpool, came to the UK in October 2017 to escape daily abuse in their home country. "When I walked along the streets, people threw rubbish at me from their windows – once, someone threw a plastic bag full of urine at me," they said. "In El Salvador, non-binary people are in so much danger – I've seen corpses. Anything could have happened to me. I could have been tortured, raped, shot, killed."

In one incident, in the capital San Salvador, Joestar was stopped by police. "One of the policemen started asking about my hair, telling me I wasn't normal, that they wanted to teach me how to be a man. Then they punched me on the chest and pushed me to the floor. I'm not sure what was worse – the attack or when I was just left there and no one came to help me. I had a lot of bruises, my arms were bleeding and I was crying. But no one cared. It was really terrifying," they said.

Joestar had previously been refused asylum in the UK. The first claim, in November 2018, was dismissed by the first-tier tribunal which said the police brutality "amounted to no more than discrimination" and occurred only once. The second, in February 2020, on the basis of non-binary identity was initially refused but upheld on appeal.

"The way the judge handled the case: she just understood me – all the tiny details ... she saw the whole picture," they said. "At the end, she turned to look at me and started speaking to me in Spanish, to tell me she granted me the right to stay in this country and the right to be who I want to be. I just started to cry. I felt like I was born again."

⁶⁴ See for instance IOM, 2021b; UNHCR, 2002 and 2012.

⁶⁵ EUAA, 2018. See also Manganini, 2020.

⁶⁶ Griffiths, 2015.

⁶⁷ Turner, 2020.

...

Joestar hopes the case will help others. “All the injustice I suffered, maybe it’s worth it, to show people there is something positive to take from all the suffering. I just hope that soon people can see us and we can finally say we’re not invisible.”

Abridged excerpt from Kelly, 2020.

Finally, gender plays an important role in the experiences and vulnerabilities of irregular migrants, including rejected asylum-seekers and those placed in immigration detention pending removal. Beyond the traumatic psychological experience of immigration detention regardless of gender, women and migrants of diverse genders are at risk of sexual and gender-based violence.⁶⁸ This is especially the case for transgender migrants, who have been reported to be 15 times more likely to be sexually assaulted compared to other detained individuals.⁶⁹ Transgender women migrants are particularly at risk as they are often placed in detention facilities with men.

Stay

Migrants’ experiences of staying in destination countries are diverse and depend on various factors, including their initial drivers of migration, migration status and ensuing inclusion processes, which can all be highly gendered. While this subsection explores some of the key inclusion outcomes for migrants in terms of labour market, remittances, education and training, housing, health and social cohesion, these outcomes remain closely tied to the benefits and entitlements granted to migrants depending on the duration of their right to stay in the destination country. Gender inequalities thus tend to be perpetuated, if not exacerbated, during migrants’ stay, given the greater obstacles that women face to access long-term and permanent permits and residency – often preconditions for citizenship – due to gender biases embedded in policies and legislation governing entry.

Employment outcomes, a key factor for migrant inclusion, are intrinsically linked to the skills-based approach to work permits taken by migration policies. Lower-skilled labour is not only highly gendered occupationally but often characterized by precarious – often temporary – migration status and working conditions that create and reinforce gender vulnerabilities. Typical examples are men migrant workers in the agricultural sector and women migrant workers in the care and domestic work sectors. Although widely acclaimed as “essential workers” during the COVID-19 pandemic, such workers experience highly vulnerable conditions, living in close proximity to their employer (on-farm housing for agricultural workers and employers’ homes for domestic workers), depending on employers for access to goods and services, and entitled to a lower level of labour protection than workers in other occupations.⁷⁰ The migration of women domestic workers from South Asia and South-East Asia to the Gulf countries is often governed by BLAs that do not secure migrants’ rights to labour protection in the destination country nor consider the specific vulnerabilities of women.⁷¹ This contributes to the highly precarious situation of migrants covered by the Kafala system, which ties them to their employer, excludes them from the protection of labour laws and can lead to major abuses and rights violations.⁷² In Lebanon, for instance, migrants’

⁶⁸ United Nations Human Rights Council, 2019.

⁶⁹ IDC, 2016; IOM, 2021b.

⁷⁰ Spitzer, 2022.

⁷¹ Rajan and Joseph, 2020.

⁷² Almasri, 2022.

sexual, reproductive and maternal rights are unprotected, particularly in cases when workers become pregnant and employers terminate their contracts, leading to possible deportation or irregular status.⁷³

From a migrant perspective, employment in destination countries can be a highly gendered experience. The lower rate of labour force participation for women migrants compared to men migrants (estimated globally at 59.8% and 77.5%, respectively, in 2019)⁷⁴ is partially attributed to the division of labour in migrant households, where women migrants tend to experience “involuntary inactivity” when married or due to care responsibilities for children.⁷⁵ This is also closely interlinked to gender norms and the dependency situation created by family migration policies, when women migrants are tied to their migrant worker husbands with, in some countries such as South Africa, no right to work.⁷⁶ Research also highlights the role of gender equality in countries of origin in terms of employment and wage levels for migrant mothers in destination countries, with migrant women from North Africa faring worse in France compared to those from sub-Saharan Africa and Europe.⁷⁷

Gender-related obstacles to finding employment may push migrants to resort to informal work, as shown by the preponderance of women informal workers, including women migrants: estimates of the number of women in informal employment (as a percentage of total women in employment) are as high as 89.7 per cent for Africa and 64.1 per cent for Asia and the Pacific.⁷⁸ Occupations range from street vendors to waste pickers and home-based workers, such as garment workers and domestic workers.⁷⁹ A study on Latin America and the Caribbean, for instance, found that in 7 of the 15 countries covered, 9 out of 10 domestic workers were employed informally.⁸⁰ Migrants working in the informal economy experience higher levels of precarity, being excluded from social protection, and are more likely to face abuses, violence, exploitation and human trafficking.⁸¹

While women migrants seem overall to be disadvantaged compared to men migrants in terms of labour market inclusion, evidence points to women migrants’ patterns of remitting a larger proportion of their salaries than men migrants.⁸² Even though earning generally less than men, women migrants remit approximately the same amount, if not more, than men.⁸³ They also appear to remit more through in-person cash transfers than men, due to their overrepresentation in the informal economy, where they are less able to access diverse financial services and have less access to both digital services and the skills to use them. This gendered imbalance was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic with the move to digital services, which raised more difficulties for women migrants to remit.⁸⁴

⁷³ Mehzer et al., 2021.

⁷⁴ ILO, 2021a.

⁷⁵ OECD and European Commission, 2018; Donato et al., 2014.

⁷⁶ Reis, 2020; Ncube et al., 2020.

⁷⁷ Achouche, 2022.

⁷⁸ ILO, 2018:25.

⁷⁹ WIEGO, n.d.

⁸⁰ WIEGO, 2022.

⁸¹ Jaji, 2021.

⁸² UN Women, 2020.

⁸³ Ibid.; Platt et al., 2017.

⁸⁴ UN Women, 2020; Lim and Datta, forthcoming.

Beyond the labour market and financial inclusion, gendered patterns can also be seen in education and training, housing and health. While education and training empower migrant women, family and professional responsibilities and language barriers undermine their access to education and adult learning.⁸⁵ In the case of children in the specific context of refugee camps, families may prioritize the education of boys over that of girls, due to social norms.⁸⁶ When displacement provides new education opportunities for girl refugees, physical access to school may be dangerous because of harassment and discrimination. Migrant women in precarious socioeconomic situations, including due to lower incomes, may also experience less access to housing compared to migrant men, or lower rates of securing housing that is adequate and safe.⁸⁷ As can be seen in research on France, loss of income may further push migrant women into homelessness, with a significant likelihood that they will fall victim to prostitution rings or to resort by themselves to sex work to regain their financial autonomy.⁸⁸

All these aspects impact migrants' mental and physical health in destination countries. While migration can overall increase health outcomes for migrants, migrant women tend to have worse health than migrant men and different health needs.⁸⁹ The causes are grounded in gender inequalities, including in terms of access to health-care services, with acute implications for those in irregular situations, especially for sexual and maternal health care.⁹⁰

Migrants' mental health can also be highly gendered. In the case of separated families, connections with children and other family members in the origin country play an important role, especially for women, and have been facilitated by digital technologies.⁹¹ As has been shown by research on migrant women from Latin and Central America in the United States, digital technologies enable mothers to continue their caregiving role at a distance despite feelings of emotional distress.⁹² Indeed, caregiving responsibilities are not drastically redistributed within households when mothers are away, although fathers in the country of origin may come to temporarily fill the caregiving role, as can be seen in Indonesia and the Philippines.⁹³ While migrants' transnational ties are an important source of comfort and support, this may not be the case for transgender and non-binary migrants, especially refugees who may have cut ties with their relatives back home and be further socially excluded in destination countries due to their gender, without appropriate support from health and social services.⁹⁴

Gender discrimination and stigmatization in countries of destination often overlap with racial and cultural stereotypes, supported by rising anti-immigrant discourses in some countries of destination.⁹⁵ Migrant men from Muslim countries have, for instance, been portrayed as threats because of alleged dangerous masculinity in diverse regions, such as in Europe following incidents of sexual harassment in Germany in 2015.⁹⁶ Stereotypes of women's hypersexuality in destination countries have also impacted migrant women, such as Venezuelan women in Peru and

⁸⁵ Women in Diaspora Communities as Champions of Learning to Live Together, 2019.

⁸⁶ North, 2019.

⁸⁷ Chapman and Gonzalez, 2023.

⁸⁸ Infomigrants, 2023.

⁸⁹ Lindsjö et al., 2021.

⁹⁰ Trapolini and Giudici, 2021.

⁹¹ Bauloz, 2021.

⁹² Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 2016; Pineros-Leano et al., 2021; Cook Heffron et al., 2022.

⁹³ Lam and Yeoh, 2018.

⁹⁴ Hermaszewska et al., 2022.

⁹⁵ See for instance the IOM statement on the situation of migrants in Tunisia (IOM, 2023b).

⁹⁶ Herz, 2019; Wyss, 2022.

Brazilian women in Portugal, stigmatizing them as prostitutes and leading to heightened risks of experiencing sexual harassment and gender-based violence.⁹⁷

Gender-based violence in displacement settlements

Although not representing the majority of refugees worldwide, some 6.6 million refugees are estimated to live in settlements, among whom 4.6 million are in managed camps and 2 million in informal settlements, often in protracted displacement situations.^a

While poverty and destitution are major drivers of gender-based violence, living in settlements exacerbates gender vulnerabilities, with increased risks of intimate partner violence. Insecurity and close proximity also lead to increased risks of gender-based violence, especially rape, when women and girls move in and around settlements, collecting wood for cooking and getting water at water points, for instance.^b In al-Hol camps in the Syrian Arab Republic, instances of rape and torture have been reported against women and girls, with cases of slavery committed by the ISIS.^c In other contexts, transactional sex is at times resorted to as a coping mechanism to secure a livelihood.^d

A study focusing on the Rohingya population living in a camp in Bangladesh highlights the interlinkages between the masculinity crisis that Rohingya men can experience in the camp and increased gender-based violence.^e Stereotypical constructions of masculinity based on identity, wealth, power, education and breadwinner status starkly contrast with Rohingya men's experience in the refugee camp, which may lead to deep feelings of dissatisfaction and to increased gender-based violence, especially within households.

Gender-based violence is, however, not limited to women and girls, as men and boys also tend to be victims, as reported in the context of Kakuma refugee camp, for instance.^f Rape and other sexual violence can be a tactic of torture and humiliation during armed conflicts, sometimes continuing in camp settings, and often accompanied with stigmatization and discrimination within communities of destination, as victims of sexual violence are still predominantly considered to be women and girls.^g

^a UNHCR, n.d.

^b Johnstone and Perera, 2020.

^c Kube and Lee, 2022.

^d World Vision Canada, n.d.

^e Safa et al., 2023.

^f UN Women, 2022.

^g Refugee Law Project, 2013.

⁹⁷ Esposito, 2020; Pérez and Freier, 2023.

Return

As with the other stages of the migration cycle, return to the country of origin is underpinned by gender dimensions that influence the varied reasons for migrants of all genders to return (or not), their experiences and their circumstances post-return. As is the case in other stages of the migration cycle, the gender dimensions of migration status and the type of permit in destination countries play a role in the decision to return and the experiences upon return, including in terms of reintegration.

In migrant households with persons of different genders, the decision to return is also a function of gender roles and dynamics. In sociocultural contexts where the division of family and household labour is gendered, more women than men are likely to return when family members in the country of origin need care.⁹⁸ Return migration is also an outcome of low life satisfaction in the country of destination, with gender mediating how men and women interpret life satisfaction.⁹⁹ For instance, income disparities between women and men that tend to favour men can lead to gendered experiences of life satisfaction and differences in the impetus for return migration. Attachment to the family has also been shown to play a stronger role for some women compared to men, motivating their return home.¹⁰⁰

Gendered income differences also suggest that men are more likely to return due to “return of innovation”,¹⁰¹ which occurs after migrants have acquired relevant skills and adequate capital for investment in the country of origin. Men’s return of innovation is facilitated by investment policies and incentives in the country of origin designed to attract diaspora investment, such as in Ghana, where migrant capital is mobilized and integrated into domestic development policies.¹⁰² Ghana encourages investment and return, as illustrated by its declaration of 2019 as “The Year of Return”, targeting the Ghanaian and African diaspora at large. A similar policy is followed by Senegal, which depicts returned Senegalese businesspeople as the “ideal returnees”.¹⁰³ The framing of development in economic terms in countries such as Ghana and Senegal, among many other African countries, means that it is mostly men who are able to take advantage of policy incentives put in place to lure return migration for development purposes. As illustrated in the case of Romanian migrants who returned from Italy, it is also mostly men who can transfer substantial sums of money and use the skills and networks they have acquired in the country of destination and those they created there to facilitate their reintegration.¹⁰⁴

Considering that migrants returning to their countries of origin often face a relatively higher unemployment rate, women who return without additional skills or upskilling are likely to face labour market reintegration challenges.¹⁰⁵ Migrant men are likely to return with higher skills which contribute to their “successful return”. These patterns of successful return underscore the importance of the – often highly gendered – types of occupation held by migrants in their country of destination, that frame their successful return and reintegration in the country of origin.

⁹⁸ UN Women, 2018.

⁹⁹ Schiele, 2021.

¹⁰⁰ IOM, 2020.

¹⁰¹ Cerase, 1974.

¹⁰² Kleist, 2013.

¹⁰³ Sinatti, 2019.

¹⁰⁴ Vlase, 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Kurniati et al., 2017.

Women are more likely to engage in “return of failure”, that is, return occurring while migrants’ “migration goals” have not been met.¹⁰⁶ For women migrants, this is often due to their gender roles within the family and household, and is exacerbated by the job insecurity and economic precarity that many migrant women, especially those in low-skilled occupations, experience. The COVID-19 pandemic brought the gender dimension of return migration into sharp focus. Migrant women were disproportionately affected by the pandemic because most work in the services sector (79.9% against 56.4% men),¹⁰⁷ and this sector was the most affected by travel restrictions and lockdowns. Income loss led to economic precarity and insecurity, including the loss of secure accommodation, which in turn, in some cases, exposed migrant women to heightened risks of sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁰⁸ After losing their employment in the informal sector in Thailand, for example, migrant women who returned to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic during the COVID-19 pandemic experienced heightened discrimination and gender inequality in terms of unpaid care work and vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence.¹⁰⁹ While the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic on migrant women may have prompted their return, migrant women’s lower income – or lack of income – seems to have also created obstacles for them to afford the costs of return, as can be seen in a survey of overseas Filipino workers.¹¹⁰

The case of Ethiopian women primarily working as domestic migrants, who returned from the Gulf countries after escaping exploitation or being deported due to irregular status, provides a telling example of the reintegration difficulties associated with return of failure.¹¹¹ Their reintegration journey is paved with obstacles, including coping with trauma from their time in destination countries and stigma from their communities for not meeting their migration goals.¹¹² These have in turn undermined their labour market inclusion in an already difficult socioeconomic context.

Categorizations of specific return situations as successful return or return of failure remain, however, highly context specific. Returns that could be termed as failures may not be considered so due to prevailing gender norms and have even been resorted to by some migrant men as a strategy to reclaim their masculinity and the social status associated with their gender in their country of origin. This has been the case, for instance, for some married migrant men from Africa in the United Kingdom, whose spouses earn more than them and who have seen their breadwinner status threatened. These migrant men have decided to return to their countries of origin where they enjoy a high social status by virtue of their gender, irrespective of the income gained abroad.¹¹³ Return migration for purposes of reclaiming masculinity was also observed among South Korean men who returned to their country of origin in response to the perceived marginalization of their masculinity in the United States.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁶ Cerase, 1974; Jaji, 2021.

¹⁰⁷ ILO, 2021a.

¹⁰⁸ Jaji, 2021.

¹⁰⁹ Cámbara, 2022.

¹¹⁰ IOM, 2021c.

¹¹¹ Adugna, 2022.

¹¹² *Ibid.*; Nisrane et al., 2020.

¹¹³ Pasura and Christou, 2018.

¹¹⁴ Suh, 2017.

Return migration may also entail the negotiation of different gender norms between countries of destination and origin. Some migrant men in the Gulf countries have been found to have internalized more traditional and patriarchal gender norms and transferred them into their households upon return.¹¹⁵ Migrant women returning to their country of origin may also experience issues in re-adapting to the social norms of their communities of origin.¹¹⁶ This is particularly evident when return migrants' occupations and lifestyles in the country of destination would lead to stigma and socioeconomic exclusion, if disclosed. Such disclosure can happen through transnational social networks through which information is channelled between destination and origin countries. For example, both returned migrant women and men could face stigma if they worked as sex workers, even if as victims of human trafficking,¹¹⁷ or freely lived their diverse gender identities in the country of destination.¹¹⁸ The intersection of gender and sexuality thus influences reintegration.

Gendered difficulties in labour market reintegration and social inclusion in turn negatively impact returned migrants' health, together with health problems that migrants, especially women, have when coming back to their country of origin.¹¹⁹ These health issues can be highly gendered as linked to experiences in countries of destination, deportation or return decisions and stigmatization upon return. These gendered health issues are compounded by gendered barriers to health-care access, including in terms of lack of information and discrimination related to sex work abroad, including as victims of human trafficking.

Promoting gender-responsive migration governance: The need for urgent action

Diverse strategies have been adopted to tackle gender equality, with more recent calls being made for adopting a gender-responsive approach, including in the Global Compact for Migration. A gender-responsive approach to migration governance entails adopting and implementing transformative policies and programming that tackle not only gender discrimination experienced by migrants but also the underlying structural gender inequalities. As illustrated in Figure 9, this approach is at the opposite end of a gender-biased one that actively discriminates based on gender, and goes a step further than the gender-specific one, which does not deal with more profound systemic inequality issues.

¹¹⁵ Joseph et al., 2022; Samari, 2021; Tuccio and Whaba, 2018.


¹¹⁶ Liu, 2020.

¹¹⁷ Ong et al., 2019.

¹¹⁸ Alcalde, 2019.

¹¹⁹ European Union–IOM Knowledge Management Hub and Samuel Hall, 2023.

Figure 9. Continuum of gender approaches



Source: Adapted from Gender + Migration Hub, n.d.

Ensuring gender-responsive governance, in turn, requires evidence-based design and implementation of migration policies. While statistical data play a central role in informing migration policies, a gender data gap exists today, undermining a better understanding of the gender dimensions of migration and gender inequalities throughout the migration cycle.¹²⁰ Calls have been made for gender-disaggregated data capturing individuals' self-identified genders, with Canada being the first country to include a mandatory question on gender in its 2021 population census, followed by New Zealand in 2023.¹²¹ Investing further in sex-disaggregated data, however, remains essential, given social norms that may hinder some countries from moving to gender disaggregation and the difficulties that may be entailed for individuals to self-identify as gender diverse. Migration data are today not all disaggregated by sex, including when it comes to bilateral data on asylum and refugee patterns and remittances, among others, undermining the possibility of undertaking any comprehensive gender analysis to inform migration policies, operations and programming.¹²² Undertaking a gender analysis also calls for combining quantitative data with qualitative data, including voices of migrants of diverse genders, to more comprehensively understand the gendered needs, priorities and vulnerabilities that need to be addressed to improve gender equality.¹²³

¹²⁰ Abel, 2022.

¹²¹ United Nations, 2020; IOM, 2021d; Hennebry et al., 2021; Government of Canada, 2022; Government of New Zealand, 2023.

¹²² Abel, 2022.

¹²³ CARE, 2023.

Nevertheless, exploring some key gender dimensions at each stage of the migration cycle highlights the extent to which migration is beset by gendered obstacles, challenges and vulnerabilities for men, women and gender-diverse individuals, often reflecting broader systemic gender inequalities. While an exhaustive mapping of gender-responsive migration policies and interventions is beyond the scope of this chapter, four key challenges cutting across the whole migration cycle and drawing from the previous sections are identified below and highlighted in Figure 10. All relate to gender norms that more broadly underpin structural gender inequalities and require adopting and implementing gender equality policies and interventions, including education and awareness-raising.¹²⁴ Each challenge is complemented by a promising practice or innovative intervention selected across a wide range of geographies. These most notably showcase the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach and of local initiatives and practices that often involve migrants of all genders or are designed in a gender-responsive manner, and that can be leveraged at the local, national, regional and global levels of migration governance.

Figure 10. Cross-cutting gender challenges throughout the migration cycle

	Pre-departure	Entry	Stay	Return
Stereotypes	Migration decisions and opportunities to migrate (at individual, household and structural levels) shaped by breadwinner and caregiver stereotypes	Migration pathways for family migration, labour migration and international protection are based on gendered stereotypes	Labour markets are gendered, and social inclusion depends on stereotypes such as stigmatizing masculinities and hypersexualization	Stereotypes impact on how returning migrants are perceived as successful or failures, with implications for health access and outcomes
Access to information	Information on emigration, regular pathways and rights in countries of destination	Information on emigration, including online application processes	Information on recruitment and inclusion services	Information and support on reintegration, including labour market and health
Digital divide	Online information services for migration	Online application processes	Online recruitment platforms, digital money (e.g. remittances), social connections and others	Online reintegration services
Regular migration pathways	Limited regular pathways exacerbate gender vulnerabilities; irregular migration risks are highly gendered	Restrictive requirements hinder migration based on skills and contribute to family separation	Rights and benefits often limited along gender lines (e.g. by BLAs), which exacerbates vulnerabilities in gendered occupations and fuels informal work	Gendered patterns of migrant return as either success or failure impacts health outcomes.

¹²⁴ UNDP, 2020.

Cross-cutting challenge 1. Addressing gendered stereotypes of migrants

Traditional gender stereotypes of the man as breadwinner and woman as caregiver have important impacts on migrants and, when coupled with rising anti-immigration discourses, nurture portrayals of women migrants as intrinsically vulnerable and victims, and men migrants as security threats and bogus refugees.¹²⁵ Without downplaying the vulnerable situations in which women may find themselves, these stereotypes disproportionately impact men migrants who may be in vulnerable situations, negate women migrants' agency, contribute to render gender-diverse migrants more invisible and disempower migrants in contrast to their vast contributions to origin and destination societies.¹²⁶

Gender stereotypes of migrants are relayed by diverse actors, from politicians to humanitarian actors and the media. However, working with the media can be key in shaping balanced and positive perceptions. In 2021, as part of the joint ILO–UN Women Safe and Fair Programme, the ILO partnered with the Alliance of Indonesian Journalists Jakarta to organize media engagement programmes for promoting the safe and fair migration of all Indonesian women.¹²⁷ A Media-Friendly Glossary on Migration, focused particularly on women migrant workers, is also available for journalists in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹²⁸ In addition to providing a list of key relevant terms and rights-based definitions, the glossary offers a list of inclusive terminology with terms to avoid using, as they may perpetuate gender stereotypes of migrants (Table 1).

Table 1. Inclusive terminology summary

Avoid	Prefer
Alien, economic migrant, or foreign worker	Migrant worker
Helper, maid, servant, auntie	Domestic worker
Host country, receiving country	Country of destination, destination country, State of destination
Illegal migrant	Irregular-status migrant, undocumented migrant
Labour import/export	Labour migration
Protecting women	Protection of women's rights
Sending country, home country	Country of origin, State of origin
Slave	Person in forced labour
Unskilled work	Elementary occupation
Victim	Survivor

Source: Adapted from ILO, 2020.

¹²⁵ Ward, 2019; Gereke et al., 2020; Delgado Moran, 2020; Holloway et al., 2022.

¹²⁶ McAuliffe et al., 2019.

¹²⁷ ILO, 2021b.

¹²⁸ ILO, 2020.

Cross-cutting challenge 2. Improving gender-equal access of migrants to information

Access to information throughout the migration process can be highly gendered. While the examples in this chapter focused on information for prospective migrants in countries of origin, this also applies to migrants in countries of transit and destination, and upon return to countries of origin. It is even more difficult for transgender and other gender-diverse migrants to access information, often relying on informal sources.¹²⁹ Access to accurate information, including on migrants' rights, is essential to decrease gender-based vulnerabilities throughout the migration cycle.

Among diverse interventions that may support a gender-responsive provision of information on migration, migrant resource centres (MRCs) have been established in countries of origin and destination as a one-stop-shop for information. In origin countries, they combine diverse services under one roof – from pre-departure orientation and community awareness to personalized online, phone or in-person counselling and even, in some cases, support for returned migrants – resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of irregular and unsafe migration, increased awareness of regular migration pathways and effectively providing information on assistance while migrating.¹³⁰ While supporting all migrants irrespective of their gender, some of these MRCs, such as in Bangladesh, provide gender-sensitive and tailored support to women before migrating and upon return.¹³¹ In Indonesia, an Integrated Gender Responsiveness One Roof Services Office was launched in 2021 as the first pilot in the ASEAN region.¹³² It relies on a multi-stakeholder partnership between the Government, migrant workers unions and women's crisis centres to ensure gender-responsive services to prospective migrant workers.

Cross-cutting challenge 3. Bridging migrants' gender digital divide

Today's digital society, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, raises considerable gender inequalities: women and girls constitute the majority of the estimated 2.7 billion people worldwide who are unconnected, with major variations in women using the Internet across least developed and developed countries.¹³³ For migrants, access to and usage of digital solutions and digital literacy and skills often depend on connectivity in their country of origin, and on gender roles, as digital tools may be associated with men in the household division of labour.¹³⁴

A number of initiatives have been adopted to decrease the gender digital divide worldwide, from basic digital skills development to STEM education programmes for women, including migrants and refugees.¹³⁵ As the leader in new technological developments and digitalization, the private sector is important in fostering gender digital inclusion. In the financial sector, some financial technology companies are moving towards migrant-centric and gender-smart designs for digital remittances that are affordable, accessible and promote financial resilience.¹³⁶ Among other similar initiatives, and together with the United Nations Capital Development Fund, Ping Money – a financial technology company licensed in the United Kingdom and funded by Gambian migrants, offering digital remittances services to migrants from the Gambia – has worked on formalizing remittances channels, including by offering the possibility for migrants in the United Kingdom to directly pay water and electricity bills for their families in the Gambia and

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Dennison, 2022; ICMPD, n.d.

¹³¹ Raus and Roma, 2020.

¹³² ILO, 2021c.

¹³³ ITU, 2022.

¹³⁴ McAuliffe, 2023; Saïd, 2021.

¹³⁵ See for instance Poya, 2021; AFS Intercultural Programs, 2022.

¹³⁶ Ogba et al., 2021. See also Singh, 2021; GSMA, 2018.

launching a mobile wallet for families receiving remittances.¹³⁷ A comprehensive market scanning revealed gender differences in Gambian households, with women less aware of mobile money. Considering gender dynamics at play – whereby information tended to reach women through their male relatives more effectively – Ping Money launched a brand awareness campaign through football sponsorships, the main sport in the Gambia.¹³⁸ This not only resulted in increasing the number of men clients but also that of women who were encouraged to use mobile money services by their men relatives.

Cross-cutting challenge 4. Enhancing regular migration pathways in a gender-responsive manner

Existing regular migration pathways raise diverse challenges throughout the migration cycle with important gender implications.

Enhancing regular migration pathways in a gender-responsive manner would require diversifying the types of pathways and improving their quality, especially in terms of migrants' rights and entitlements. In terms of diversification, regularization schemes of irregular migrants in destination countries are often not considered regular migration pathways, although they are intrinsically complementary, filling the gaps in and the flaws of regular pathways when those create situations of irregularity.¹³⁹ Regularization schemes have long been adopted by States in different forms, sometimes targeting irregular migrants working in specific sectors (such as domestic work or the fishing industry) or more broadly implemented for humanitarian and integration reasons.¹⁴⁰ Although not gender-specific, these schemes effectively reduce vulnerabilities associated with irregularity, including gender ones.¹⁴¹ A recent illustration is that of the temporary protection status adopted by Colombia in 2021 to regularize the status of Venezuelans irregularly in the country, with more than 1.8 million permits granted so far.¹⁴²

While the quality of family migration pathways can be addressed by revising entry requirements and ensuring entitlements, rethinking BLAs in a gender-responsive and rights-based manner is today essential, including for a gender-responsive implementation of the Global Compact for Migration.¹⁴³ BLAs are an important source of the continued gender segregation of labour worldwide, and are not accompanied by the necessary protection of migrants' rights, exacerbating gender vulnerabilities, including to exploitation. As highlighted in the Guidance on bilateral labour migration agreements, produced by the United Nations Network on Migration, a gender-responsive approach to BLAs calls for rights-based agreements that explicitly protect migrants according to international labour and human rights law instruments rather than including a vague mention of national laws, as it often is the case.¹⁴⁴ For instance, the Agreement on Labour Cooperation between Canada and the Republic of Honduras explicitly lists international labour principles and rights that must be secured into each party's labour laws and practices, rather than assuming they are already part of those laws and practices.¹⁴⁵ While not referring to gender, such a rights-based approach is a first step towards gender-responsive BLAs when duly grounded in the principle of non-discrimination, including on gender grounds, and extending to any additional gender-relevant international instruments, such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.¹⁴⁶

¹³⁷ Hossain et al., n.d.

¹³⁸ Ogba et al., 2021.

¹³⁹ Triandafyllidou et al., 2019.

¹⁴⁰ OSCE, 2021.

¹⁴¹ Rojas Coppari and Poirier, forthcoming.

¹⁴² Government of Colombia, n.d.

¹⁴³ UNGA, 2018a, objective 5, para. 21(a), read in light of the gender-responsiveness guiding principle; UN Women, 2021.

¹⁴⁴ United Nations Network on Migration, 2022. See also Lim, 2016.

¹⁴⁵ Government of Canada, 2013.

¹⁴⁶ Lim, 2016; United Nations, 1979.

IOM's new Gendered Migration Research Policy Action Lab (GenMig) is designed to bring together stakeholders from around the world to address these challenges and more (see text box below).

GenMig

GENDER AND MIGRATION RESEARCH POLICY ACTION LAB

A multi-stakeholder initiative leveraging impact research to support gender-responsive policies, operations, programming and practices in migration



Designed as a highly collaborative venture, GenMig focuses on impact knowledge and research for supporting gender-responsive policies, operations, programming and practices. GenMig leverages the global knowledge and expertise of IOM and its partners to drive actions for addressing gendered vulnerabilities and empowering migrants of all genders in line with the Sustainable Development Agenda and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

As an innovation incubator, GenMig brings together a global network of partners from research institutions, governments, United Nations agencies and intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector committed to gender equality. Find out more about GenMig, including how to join the partner network, here: www.iom.int/gender-and-migration-research-policy-action-lab.

Conclusion

This chapter has explained the interactions between migration and gender, although providing an overview of the gender dimensions of migration is a challenging exercise. First, gender is not a neutral term today, influenced by the gender biases possessed by the overwhelming majority of the global population, including gender backlash and anti-gender movements, which have been growing over the past decade.¹⁴⁷ Approaching the notion of gender through a rights-based approach enables a more neutral analysis, highlighting discrimination and focusing on rights protection without promoting the rights of one gender over the others. From this perspective, and as apparent in this chapter, a gender-responsive approach is not only about women's rights but more broadly about striving for gender equality, although today's reality remains that of disproportionate gender discrimination against women and persons with diverse gender identities, including throughout the migration cycle. This discrimination cannot be isolated from wider practices of State underinvestment in care provision and social protection, resulting in women and other minority groups being recruited into these sectors to augment weak State welfare provisioning.¹⁴⁸ This is happening in contexts where women and other minority groups face structural and systemic barriers to accessing the pathways to full rights and access to citizenship.

Second, as migration is intrinsically a gendered phenomenon, the interconnections between migration and gender are diverse, if not infinite. Taking a migrant's perspective, however, enables a better understanding of gendered experiences throughout the migration cycle, which are shaped by diverse opportunities and obstacles related to prevailing gender norms. Far from positing a deterministic view of the role of gender in migration, migrants' perspectives showcase the agency of migrants in navigating gender norms and roles and coping with existing discrimination in countries of origin, transit and destination.

Third, the interactions between migration and gender cannot be understood without taking into account other factors that intersect in shaping migrants' migration decisions, trajectories and experiences, as neither migrant groups nor gender groups are homogenous. Among other factors, age and life cycle play important roles, alongside structural factors such as migration policies underpinned by gender norms and biases. Limited and restrictive regular migration pathways end up exacerbating existing vulnerabilities relating to the division of labour in households and highly gendered sectors of work, creating distinct challenges in terms of irregularity and informality.

Today, the importance of addressing gender inequalities in migration cannot be underestimated. Just as the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the interdependency of our individual fates, gender inequalities in migration underscore broader systemic gender inequalities that deny human development for all. Adopting a gender-responsive approach to migration governance is thus a necessity to empower migrants of all genders and further gender equality more generally as the "prerequisite for a better world".¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ UN WGDAGW, 2020.

¹⁴⁸ Gamage and Stevanovic, 2019.

¹⁴⁹ United Nations, 2021.



PABLO ESCRIBANO
DIEGO PONS GANDDINI

7 CLIMATE CHANGE, FOOD INSECURITY AND HUMAN MOBILITY: INTERLINKAGES, EVIDENCE AND ACTION¹

Introduction

Climate change is widely considered an “existential threat to humanity”, in the words of United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres.² Its impacts are being increasingly felt, albeit unevenly, by communities and countries worldwide.³ In recent years, different editions of the World Migration Report have explored the linkages between human mobility, the environment and climate change, accompanying the growth in scientific literature devoted to this topic,⁴ with specific focuses on migration as adaptation,⁵ and on the links between slow-onset climate change and migration.⁶ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that:

since AR5 [the fifth assessment report of 2014] there is increased evidence that climate hazards associated with extreme events and variability act as direct drivers of involuntary migration and displacement and as indirect drivers through deteriorating climate-sensitive livelihoods.⁷

Extreme environmental events – both attributable and non-attributable to climate change – have contributed to a rise in food insecurity worldwide. Multiple causes underpin food insecurity, including lack of food, lack of purchasing power, inadequate distribution and poor use of food at the household level.⁸ The number of people worldwide considered to be experiencing acute food insecurity and in need of urgent assistance rose to over 257 million in 2022, a 146 per cent increase since 2016.⁹ In light of this increase, and the worsening impacts of climate change, there is an urgent need to assess the connections between climate change, food insecurity and human mobility worldwide.

¹ Pablo Escribano, regional migration, environment and climate change specialist, IOM; Diego Pons Ganddini, assistant professor, Colorado State University.

² United Nations News, 2018.

³ Pörtner et al., 2022.

⁴ Together with seminal works such as Afifi et al., 2013; Black et al., 2011; Black, 2001; Dun and Gemenne, 2008; Myers, 1993.

⁵ Oakes et al., 2019.

⁶ Traore Chazalnoel and Randall, 2021.

⁷ Pörtner et al., 2022:52.

⁸ FAO et al., 2013.

⁹ FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises, 2023. As noted there, these figures must be understood in a context of expansion of the total population assessed. Phases 1 to 5 of the Food Security Phase Classification/Cadre Harmonise framework include: phase 1: none/minimal; phase 2: stressed; phase 3: crisis; phase 4: emergency; phase 5: catastrophe/famine.

What do we mean by “climate change” and “food insecurity”?

The IPCC defines climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. Note that the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 1, defines climate change as ‘a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods’. The UNFCCC thus makes a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities altering the atmospheric composition and climate variability attributable to natural causes”.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defines “food insecurity” as a situation that exists when people lack secure access to sufficient amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development, and an active and healthy life. It may be caused by the unavailability of food, insufficient purchasing power, inappropriate distribution, or inadequate use of food at the household level. Food insecurity, poor conditions of health and sanitation and inappropriate care and feeding practices are the major causes of poor nutritional status. Food insecurity may be chronic, seasonal or transitory.

Sources: FAO et al., 2013; IPCC, 2022.

Measuring the impact of climate change on food insecurity is a complicated task. Extreme climate events can cause food insecurity and are rendered more common due to climate change; however, the causal relationships between food insecurity and anthropogenic climate change are still limited by a lack of long-term data and the complexity of food systems.¹⁰ The unequal globalization of food supplies, including crop species production, supply and transportation, along with the specialization of the food industry, renders direct attribution virtually impossible.¹¹ Non-climatic factors that have an impact on global food security, including the global COVID-19 pandemic,¹² and conflict – such as the ongoing war in Ukraine – also need to be recognized.¹³

Human mobility, used here as an umbrella term, is a multicausal phenomenon, that often derives from a wide variety of factors interacting with each other.¹⁴ This umbrella term includes forced and voluntary forms of movement that can occur in the context of climate and environmental change. This terminology is aligned with the ongoing contribution of IOM,¹⁵ which has developed comprehensive working definitions of key terms relevant to the climate–migration nexus (see Appendix A). These definitions are not normative, nor are they internationally agreed upon, but they seek to provide a broad framing of the topic for working purposes. This is particularly useful when discussing human mobility in the context of sudden- and slow-onset climate impacts, as mobility can take many forms and can be linked to multiple interacting factors.

¹⁰ Bezner Kerr et al., 2022.

¹¹ Campi et al., 2021.

¹² Grosso, 2022.

¹³ Montesclaros and Sembiring, 2022.

¹⁴ United Kingdom Government Office for Science, 2010; McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2017.

¹⁵ See, for example, IOM, 2021a; IOM, 2022.

In the context of the current climate emergency and rising food insecurity, this chapter explores the interlinkages between climate change, food insecurity and human mobility, highlighting the complexities of the relationships between the three concepts in multiple scenarios. The next section assesses the different ways that climate change and food security influence human mobility, under what circumstances and through what channels. The following section explores the extent to which migration and human mobility form part of the solution to address climate change impacts and food security scenarios. The final section discusses approaches for developing policies and practices that have the potential to manage increasing risk, especially those impacting the most vulnerable communities. We include migrant voice text boxes throughout the chapter to underscore the human impacts at the local level.

From climate change to food insecurity: Compounding and direct drivers of human mobility

The impacts of climate change on food insecurity and human mobility are nuanced and complex, as highlighted in Figure 1. Extreme processes associated with climate change, including sudden- and slow-onset events and environmental degradation,¹⁶ have the potential to affect food systems at every level of the supply chain. In parallel, global food insecurity has dramatically increased during the last 10 years, partially as a result of changes in the climate, but also due to an increase in conflict (both frequency and intensity) and economic slowdowns, compounded by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁷ Direct impacts of climate-related events on food security are most visible with sudden-onset disasters (such as hurricanes or floods), which tend to destroy community infrastructure or damage agricultural landscapes.

Slow-onset climate events usually associated with anthropogenic climate change (such as drought, rising sea levels, or land degradation), although less visible, also contribute to food insecurity by altering livelihoods and reducing population well-being, usually over a long period of time.¹⁸ The direct and indirect impacts resulting from sudden- and slow-onset climate events are often compounded by social vulnerabilities, as in the case of food insecurity. Extreme and subtle climate events associated with climate change can be both direct and indirect drivers of migration and can, therefore, affect human mobility in a non-linear way.¹⁹


¹⁶ See key terms in Appendix A.

¹⁷ FAO et al., 2021.

¹⁸ Pörtner et al., 2022.

¹⁹ Ibid.

Figure 1. Links between environmental change, ecosystems and human mobility



EXAMPLES:

- 1 Cyclone destroying mangrove > jeopardizing protection from future hazards
- 2 Loss of agricultural land > crop yield decrease
- 3 Sea level rise and salt-water intrusion > freshwater resources affected
- 4 Loss of crops > famine and malnutrition
- 5 Epidemics > public health risks (and potential social unrest)
- 6 Tourism affected > job losses

¹ Ecosystem services are the direct and indirect contributions of ecosystems to human well-being. These services are grouped into four categories: Provisioning, Regulating, Cultural, and Supporting services. Supporting services, as overarching services, are not represented in this diagram.

The arrows' width does not represent an exact number (this is a conceptual diagram).

When it comes to identifying both the impacts of climate change on human mobility, and the causes of changes in climate, a key challenge is current, natural climate variability. Climate variability – including variability that operates at interannual and decadal scales – can mask or enhance the current effects of human-induced changes in the climate system. Additionally, while some of the impacts of climate change have been associated with both food insecurity and human mobility, it remains difficult to isolate climate factors from other dynamics (such as non-climatic environmental processes, or social, economic and political factors).

The IPCC framework defines climate risk as the interaction between climatic hazards, climatic exposure and climatic vulnerability. Following this definition means that when assessing exposed food systems, climate risk analysis must consider the vulnerabilities of the exposed populations (including their sensitivity to the hazard and their adaptive capacity). These vulnerability factors include income level, access to land and land tenure security, the fragility of food production systems, access to water for irrigation, access to information, and loss and damage from sudden- or slow-onset climate events.²⁰ Food systems exposed to climate hazards in vulnerable contexts are therefore at risk of experiencing several climate stressors, “with the largest effects being decreased crop yields and livestock productivity, as well as declines in fisheries and agroforestry in areas already vulnerable to food insecurity.”²¹

While studies in various countries suggest a link between rainfall variability and food insecurity, creating conditions for increased migration in vulnerable areas,²² research in African regions note that the intertwined impacts of global heating and social, economic and political factors on human mobility is not automatic but remains diverse.²³ The range of impacts of climate hazards on human mobility is further explored in the next sections, where case studies of conditions of heightened vulnerability suggest multiple scenarios of climate-driven mobility. Within these scenarios, the IPCC recognizes the following potential outcomes: adaptive migration (as a relative choice at the individual and household level); involuntary migration and displacement, planned relocation and immobility.²⁴

Sudden-onset climate hazards

Sudden-onset disasters impact people’s lives profoundly, often without warning, making the most basic of needs difficult or impossible to meet for entire communities. There are many different examples of how climate-related floods, hurricanes, wildfires and other sudden disasters have resulted in food insecurity. Floods affected food security, for example, in several locations in Africa between 2009 and 2020.²⁵ In some countries of South Asia (such as Bangladesh, India and Pakistan), extreme floods are becoming more frequent and are expected to increase in magnitude as well, causing heavy damage to rice plantations, affecting mostly vulnerable minorities of the population.²⁶

²⁰ Bezner Kerr et al., 2022.

²¹ Fanzo et al., 2018.

²² Warner and Afifi, 2014.

²³ Schraven et al., 2020.

²⁴ Cissé et al., 2022.

²⁵ Reed et al., 2022.

²⁶ Mirza, 2011.

In 2022, Pakistan suffered what the Prime Minister called the worst floods in its history, destroying thousands of hectares of farmland, significantly impacting food production in the country and driving almost a quarter of that year's global disaster displacements.²⁷ In Nigeria, a study revealed that floods increased the number of food insecure households by 92.8 per cent, turning communities into food insecure sites, further delaying developmental goals.²⁸ In Afghanistan, a study found similar results, suggesting that increased exposure to flooding decreased calorie and micronutrient consumption, with other associated impacts on household income even after the flooding event.²⁹

Migrant voices

“We are now struggling. Many years ago, things were better. We knew when the rains would start and end, but now nobody knows.... Rainfall was very favourable in the last 10–20 years compared to today. One could cultivate small parcels of land and harvest a lot. Today, the rainfall is very unpredictable; we would rather farm larger land sizes and harvest little.... Because of a severe drought, my family and I moved permanently to the river some distance away. But this was difficult because of fighting going on in that area and eventually we moved because of it” (Woman from the Sudan, Fugnido Camp, Ethiopia).

Source: Tamer et al., 2012.

Hurricanes have also been associated with a rise in food insecurity in Haiti, with severe impacts being correlated with moderate to severe household hunger.³⁰ In the United States, hurricane Harvey had a impact on food insecurity, with different groups affected differently; in particular, it had a stronger impact on displaced persons.³¹ Surveys in Ghana have also highlighted the impact of wildfires on food insecurity, both in terms of transitory food insecurity in the lean season following a crop-destroying wildfire, and in the long term, through negative effects on soil productivity.³² In Sahelian countries such as Mali, Senegal and Burkina Faso, rainfall variability and the early cessation of rainfall are linked to food security threats and food deficits.³³

²⁷ Cabot, 2022; IDMC, 2023.

²⁸ Akukwe et al., 2020.

²⁹ Oskorouchi and Sousa-Poza, 2021.

³⁰ Kianersi et al., 2021.

³¹ Fitzpatrick et al., 2020.

³² Kpienbaareh and Luginaah, 2019.

³³ Schraven et al., 2020.

Slow-onset climate hazards

Just as is the case with the effects of sudden-onset hazards, the effects of slow-onset hazards like drought or rising sea levels (usually associated with the long-term influence of global temperature increases) can only be properly understood if we take an integrated approach to understanding their cross-scale interactions with food security and human mobility.³⁴ Growing evidence points to drought as the main cause of shortage in world grain production,³⁵ and drought remains an important driver of human mobility in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and South America.³⁶ The vulnerability associated with drought in these locations will be different according to the social, geographical and temporal contexts of those affected. An assessment in the Middle East revealed that drought events impact agricultural production and food security, but that food security in this region is also affected by livestock health, population growth and the availability of agricultural products.³⁷ Slow-onset climatic processes have been associated with both international and (especially) internal mobility, with case studies identifying populations leaving areas affected by various slow-onset hazards.³⁸ For instance, in the Americas:

rural to urban migration in Northern Brazil, or international migration from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador to North America, are partly a consequence of prolonged droughts, which have increased the stress of food availability in these highly impoverished regions.³⁹

Identifying the impacts of climate change on drought frequency and food insecurity requires acknowledging that rural and urban areas may experience hazards differently and may have different coping mechanisms.⁴⁰ In detangling the complex relationships between food security, drought and migration, it is important to acknowledge the anticipated increased frequency of extreme heat events in urban areas that threaten habitability in tropical and semi-arid regions of the world.⁴¹

Migrant voices

“It’s really sad to see it. We are facing droughts and it makes it so difficult for us to grow our traditional foods like breadfruit. You can see from the distance that the sea is covering the land and pretty soon we will not be able to grow there. I am a strong believer of ‘if there’s a will, there’s a way’ because we don’t want to lose our land, we want to protect it by any means available to us.” (Nika, mayor of the remote outer atoll of Likiep in the Marshall Islands).

Source: IOM, 2022.

³⁴ He et al., 2019.

³⁵ Gottfriedsen et al., 2021.

³⁶ Pörtner et al., 2022.

³⁷ Hameed et al., 2020.

³⁸ Pörtner et al., 2022.

³⁹ Castellanos et al., 2022.

⁴⁰ Sam et al., 2019.

⁴¹ Dodman et al., 2022.

Aside from drought, rising sea levels and related effects have the potential to heavily impact food production and food security in coastal areas, such as in Bangladesh, where dedicated adaptation efforts are required to limit disasters.⁴² In coastal Cameroon, rising sea levels affect crop productivity and output through coastal erosion, flooding of coastal lowlands and saltwater introduction.⁴³ Small island developing States are particularly exposed to sea-level rise; analysis in Kiribati, for instance, has highlighted that “rising sea levels, salinisation of aquifers, coastal erosion, changing biodiversity, increasingly frequent ‘king tides’ and drought” are increasing, affecting the well-being and food security of local populations.⁴⁴

Although food insecurity partially derived from disasters remains a global challenge, its intensity is felt differently, as it intersects with multiple other variables.⁴⁵ Food insecurity particularly threatens smallholder farmers in developing countries around the world, due to their limited adaptive capacity and dependence on subsistence agricultural outputs for consumption.⁴⁶ In these cases, food insecurity is embedded in larger vulnerability dynamics that incorporate differentiated climate-related risks. The vulnerability of people encountering food insecurity is not evenly distributed: factors such as gender and age shape people’s experiences. Children are more likely to suffer from malnutrition, for instance, and, as a result of traditional gender disparities, women and girls are likelier to have poorer capacities to cope with climate change.⁴⁷ Human mobility outcomes further depend on the different impacts of various hazards. Climate-vulnerable households can be affected by both sudden-onset hazards like floods and by slow-onset hazards like rising sea levels, further complicating risk assumptions.⁴⁸

Multicausality of human mobility

The multicausality of climate change, food insecurity and human mobility, as well as the relationships between them, are very complex. Available evidence suggests that different levels of food security are related, at least partially, with the decision to migrate, and that they remain heavily shaped by gender and income levels.⁴⁹ In some cases, food insecurity directly links climate disasters with the decision to migrate. However, food insecurity itself may be impacted by other factors, including social inequalities among affected communities, which shape individuals’ vulnerability and climate sensitivity levels.⁵⁰ In the central dry zone of Myanmar, for instance, food insecurity and flood risks are a function of income, food production systems, transportation and access to water for irrigation, in addition to loss and damage from floods and droughts.⁵¹ In Chile, studies in the semi-arid region of Monte Patria highlighted that “uneven resource access, limited political bargaining power and the perceived impossibility to earn a sufficient income in the agricultural economy are locally considered as more important reasons for engaging in mobilities than considerations about climate change”; in particular, households and workers use preexisting labour migration channels to take themselves out of the municipality and towards the construction sector, to achieve higher education or to work in the mining industry.⁵²

⁴² Awal and Khan, 2020.

⁴³ Abia et al., 2021.

⁴⁴ Cauchi et al., 2019.

⁴⁵ Cissé et al., 2022.

⁴⁶ Nkomoki et al., 2019.

⁴⁷ Bezner Kerr et al., 2022; Bleeker et al., 2021.

⁴⁸ Rosalia and Hakim, 2021.

⁴⁹ Smith and Floro, 2020; Smith and Wesselbaum, 2022.

⁵⁰ Samim et al., 2021; Warner and Affi, 2014.

⁵¹ Boori et al., 2017.

⁵² Wiegel, 2023.

The intersection of climate impacts, displacement and conflict dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin has been well documented. There, reduced access to resources, compounded by the impacts of climate change, have strong impacts on livelihoods and food security, creating conditions for conflict and driving mobility.⁵³ But climate change–migration–conflict dynamics are highly contextual: in Ghana, for instance, non-climatic and ecological conditions reinforce potential climate-induced conflicts, triggering migration and farmer–herder conflicts.⁵⁴ And in Colombia, Myanmar and the United Republic of Tanzania, migration appears to be driven by structural vulnerabilities in areas with low resilience, and food security emerges “as a product of environmental changes (droughts and floods), [and] as a mediating factor detonating violent conflict and migration in vulnerable populations”⁵⁵

Migrant voices

“We come from the Izabal Department of Guatemala. We come from a rural community. I work in agriculture, sowing corn. There was also an okra plantation at some point. We mostly work on our land. We live on basic grains, crops, and from selling our products to buy the sustenance of our children, living day to day. When a disaster strikes, we are vulnerable. With these storms that came, these hurricanes [Eta and Iota in November 2020] we were hugely hit, which left us more vulnerable than we were. We are in a situation where we don’t know where to go”.

Source: IOM, n.d.

In Guatemala’s Dry Corridor area, coffee cultivation, dependence on low-skilled labour and poverty levels are associated with food insecurity. In addition, the impact of consecutive drought, ill health and lack of income to buy medicine further exacerbate vulnerability.⁵⁶ In Guatemala, the majority of very poor and poor households in the Dry Corridor area acquire their food by purchasing it with income derived from working at coffee farms or in the sugar cane industry (more than 80%), while some grow it (less than 5%) and some collect it from wild sources (1–10%),⁵⁷ showing the intricacies and non-linearities of the climate–food security–migration nexus, and entry points for adaptation to avoid food insecurity outcomes (see the figure in Appendix B).⁵⁸ However, a recent study in Guatemala suggests that climate (for example, exposure to drought) is not the main variable directly associated with the decision to migrate.⁵⁹ Similarly, in Honduras modest prices are paid to small-scale coffee farmers, which are then used to buy food. Hondurans in those areas are affected when coffee prices decrease, such as when international coffee prices hit historic lows in September 2018, with an impact on international migration to the United States.⁶⁰ The impact of climate change on food security through a reduced availability of wild plant food sources has been assessed in southern Africa as a cause for concern under high emission scenarios.⁶¹

⁵³ Ehiane and Moyo, 2022.

⁵⁴ Issifu et al., 2022

⁵⁵ Morales-Muñoz et al., 2020.

⁵⁶ Beveridge et al., 2019.

⁵⁷ See FEWSNET, 2016.

⁵⁸ Pons, 2021.

⁵⁹ Depsky and Pons, forthcoming.

⁶⁰ Reichman, 2022.

⁶¹ Wessels et al., 2021.

Estimating future impacts

Estimating future patterns of climate change-induced migration remains challenging, in part because sudden- and slow-onset climate events have not been considered in many of the models of climate migration, except for the Groundswell Report, which addresses water scarcity, declining crop productivity and rising sea levels as drivers of migration.^a A useful summary is provided in the IOM paper prepared for the Twenty-eighth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28).^b With increased global mean temperatures as a consequence of greenhouse gases produced by industrialized countries, tipping points triggering mobility among low-income households may emerge.^c Some of the current models projecting migration changes do not necessarily capture these “tipping points” of climate phenomena that influence climatic conditions, like El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), that account for a great portion of climate variability in several regions of the world. Future migration models tend to focus on the potential impact of long-term trends of water availability for crops and crop yields, mostly considering temperature and precipitation variables. These models have limited applications for predicting rapid-onset disasters potentially related to food security outcomes and human mobility, as in the recent case of Eta and Iota in Central America.^d

^a Clement et al., 2021.

^b IOM, 2023.

^c Cissé et al., 2022.

^d Shultz et al., 2021.

Immobility and poverty traps

While climate change is clearly linked to food insecurity and increased mobility, as the previous section has shown, climate hazards and food insecurity do not inevitably lead to the increased mobility of affected populations. In different scenarios, climate hazards can result instead in increased immobility, with distinct socioeconomic implications. In a region of Guatemala, for instance, a study found “no correlation between migration to the US and severe food insecurity in households, but the correlation became significant if the level of food insecurity was moderate, suggesting that families in extreme hardship did not have the resources to migrate.”⁶² In many settings, immobility is driven by multiple factors, including the availability of resources, gender dynamics and place attachment, in a continuum ranging from “people who are financially or physically unable to move away from hazards (i.e. involuntary immobility) to people who choose not to move (i.e. voluntary immobility) because of strong attachments to place, culture, and people”.⁶³

Looking at international movements, future projections suggest that climate change can induce “decreases in emigration of lowest-income levels by over 10% in 2100 and by up to 35% for more pessimistic scenarios including catastrophic damages”.⁶⁴ In Zambia, vulnerability to climate change acts for some groups as a barrier to migrate, as “poor districts are characterized by climate-related immobility”.⁶⁵ Persistent poverty means that some families cannot bear the financial cost of migration, and therefore remain trapped in climate-vulnerable areas. In Bangladesh, residents of climate-vulnerable villages who would like to relocate from their current residence are sometimes

⁶² Castellanos et al., 2022.

⁶³ Cissé et al., 2022, drawing upon Carling’s (2002) concept of “involuntary immobility”.

⁶⁴ Benveniste et al., 2022.

⁶⁵ Nawrotzki and DeWaard, 2018.

unable to do so because of financial barriers, lack of access to information, lack of social networks and unavailability of working-age household members.⁶⁶ In these circumstances, well-planned and supported climate mobility, including relocation, may enable increases in well-being and positive outcomes.

Migrant voices

“Extreme weather from the North took my house, washed it away. I was left living in sand, right now my house is made of sand and sheet metal that I had made, but we have nowhere to go. We are poor, we are poor people” (Ricarda Flores, in Tabasco, México).

Source: Ortuño, 2022.

The complexities of mobility discussed above are important because they nuance a simplistic view of human mobility as a natural consequence of climate change impacts and food insecurity. As summarized by the IPCC, “specific climate events and conditions may cause migration to increase, decrease or flow in new directions”.⁶⁷ Similarly, it would be inadequate to surmise that food security adaptation efforts in a particular region or in response to a particular event will automatically lead to reduced mobility. Climate adaptation and food security policies can offer alternatives and resources to members of exposed households, who may opt to engage in safer and more regular forms of migration. In northern Thailand, research has shown that, given local circumstances and migration trajectories, successful climate adaptation interventions do not prevent migration.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the most food-insecure populations are not likely to have the capacities and resources to migrate. Evidence suggests that migration is “mostly driven by structural vulnerabilities and unsustainable development pathways”.⁶⁹ As a result, and as discussed in later sections, the objective of policy approaches should not be to prevent migration, but to address adverse drivers and enable migration as a possible choice that allows for achieving global development goals, rather than treating migration as a necessity undertaken to avoid calamities.

Food insecurity and climate change: To what extent can migration be part of the solution?

In the past, adaptation to both slow-onset and sudden-onset climatic hazards was perceived mostly as a local-level process of adjustment that reduced vulnerability to climate variability and change.⁷⁰ More recently, empirical case studies have emerged that highlight how some affected individuals, households and communities have used migration as an autonomous and spontaneous adaptation tool when climate change adversely affects habitability, climate-dependent livelihoods, or food security.⁷¹ In anticipation of displacement or in the face of displacement, some governments have also put into practice planned relocation programmes, with variable results, such as in the

⁶⁶ Siddiqui et al., 2017.

⁶⁷ Cissé et al., 2022.

⁶⁸ Rockenbauch et al., 2019.

⁶⁹ Gautam, 2017; Mazenda et al., 2022.

⁷⁰ Nicholls et al., 2017.

⁷¹ Gemenne and Blocher, 2017; Wiederkehr et al., 2018; Porst and Sakdapolrak, 2018.

Caribbean.⁷² The relationship between migration and adaptation in the context of climate change is nuanced, and outcomes are indeed diverse and complex:

Properly supported and where levels of agency and assets are high, migration as an adaptation to climate change can reduce exposure and socioeconomic vulnerability (medium confidence). However, migration becomes a risk when climate hazards cause an individual, household or community to move involuntarily or with low agency (high confidence). Inability to migrate (i.e. involuntary immobility) in the face of climate hazards is also a potential risk to exposed populations (medium confidence).⁷³

The outcomes of migration as adaptation depend upon the circumstances of the individuals or households engaging in human mobility, and on the involvement and agency of the migrants, regardless of the reasons for migration.⁷⁴ Evidence suggests that the better off the individual or household is socioeconomically, the better the outcomes for the sending and receiving communities and households.⁷⁵ However, displacement associated with limited agency – once adaptation in place is no longer successful, or when government actions are insufficient and when climate impacts surpass the coping capacity of vulnerable communities – can yield negative outcomes in terms of loss of livelihoods and overall well-being.⁷⁶ Evidence also indicates that displacement in these cases is usually associated with unanticipated and profound loss.⁷⁷

Adaptive migration: What does the evidence say?

Migration appears as a coping or adaptation option among other strategies when households are confronted with the impacts of climate hazards.⁷⁸ Communities faced with socioeconomic challenges at home may keep searching for work opportunities elsewhere as a viable livelihood pathway, more so when faced with structural poverty, limited access to land and land ownership, and in the face of detrimental climatic conditions affecting their crops.⁷⁹ In low- and middle-income countries, adaptive migration seems more likely to be from rural to urban.⁸⁰ Long-term international migration to high-income countries from low-income countries suggests that households and individuals migrate to realize financial opportunities and increase household income in the country of origin via remittances.⁸¹ From a food security perspective, migrant communities from around the world provide income to the communities of origin to buy food through remittances.⁸² Evidence suggests that these mobilities in South Asia have promoted climate resilience in sending communities.⁸³

⁷² IOM, 2021b.

⁷³ Pörtner et al., 2022.

⁷⁴ McInerney et al., 2022; Dodman et al., 2022.

⁷⁵ McInerney et al., 2022; Cissé et al., 2022.

⁷⁶ Castellanos et al., 2022.

⁷⁷ Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2022; Turton, 2003.

⁷⁸ Traore Chazalnoel and Randall, 2021.

⁷⁹ Gautam, 2017.

⁸⁰ Cissé et al., 2022.

⁸¹ McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.

⁸² Crush and Caesar, 2017.

⁸³ Cissé et al., 2022.

Remittances help households to adapt as well as facilitate agricultural adaptation, which ensures greater food security.⁸⁴ In northern Thailand, adaptation innovation in small-scale farming has been related to translocal migration networks.⁸⁵ In Nepal, remittance-recipient households are more likely to invest a part of their savings in flood preparedness if the women staying behind have access to capacity-building interventions that aim to strengthen autonomous adaptation measures such as precautionary savings and flood preparedness.⁸⁶

Families with access to remittances can adapt better to livelihood and food crises in comparison to families that do not have access to remittances.⁸⁷ In India, studies show a strong influence of climate impacts on internal migration from Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, with most remittances being used for daily consumption of goods, including food.⁸⁸ In Burkina Faso, even where rainfall variability has a negative impact on food security, remittances are found to enhance food security.⁸⁹ In Bangladesh, evidence indicates that households adapt to climate stressors by combining local-level adaptation measures with the migration of one or a few members of their households.⁹⁰

Adaptive migration should not substitute for investment in adaptive capacity-building in situ. However, with adequate support and inclusion in guiding strategies, it certainly has the potential to benefit communities in exposed locations to build adaptive capacity, and thus support the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. Such an approach faces many challenges. For instance, the outcomes of migration as adaptation are largely mediated by the perception of migrants in the receiving communities and by how policy approaches seek to shape these perceptions. Projections of large numbers of migrants, increasing in future climate scenarios, can cause a misinterpretation of the scale of migration, leading to xenophobia and triggering potential security concerns, despite little evidence that migrants pose security threats at State or international levels.⁹¹

Research has focused more on understanding how migration and environmental change relates to climate assessments at the origin of the migrating communities, and less on the receiving communities.⁹² Research on migration from Zimbabwe to South African cities suggests that migrants face a high level of malnutrition upon arrival, associated with the difficulties of accessing regular income and the opposition of receiving communities to their presence, often resulting in limited access to regular income.⁹³ These scenarios raise key questions for further research to understand how rapidly growing cities can feed their populations, including those affected by climate hazards.⁹⁴ In addition, there is a need to understand how the current policies that promote seasonal migration (for example, the movements of agricultural migrant workers) ensure food security to the migrants after arrival.⁹⁵ However, this is the context of the broader issue about the extent to which seasonal labour migration arrangements involving

⁸⁴ Tacoli, 2009.

⁸⁵ Rockenbauch et al., 2019.

⁸⁶ Banerjee et al., 2019.

⁸⁷ Ezra, 2001.

⁸⁸ Bharadwaj et al., 2021.

⁸⁹ Tapsoba et al., 2019.

⁹⁰ Siddiqui et al., 2017.

⁹¹ Cissé et al., 2022.

⁹² Findlay, 2011.

⁹³ Crush and Tawodzera, 2017.

⁹⁴ Crush, 2013; Mususa and Marr, 2022.

⁹⁵ Weiler et al., 2017.

climate-affected origin communities (such as small island developing States) can actually be considered an adaptive solution to climate hazards.⁹⁶

Without adequate adaptation interventions and urban planning, the infrastructure of urban centres receiving climate-related migrants will also be at increased and compounding risk, including the risk of failure in the face of sudden-onset disasters. This is due to increased exposure to climatic events in these urban areas, but also due to low adaptive capacity in place (for example, in expanding informal settlements in risk-prone urban areas).⁹⁷ Migrants arriving in coastal cities may be vulnerable to rising sea levels.⁹⁸ Different large urban centres are already exposed to water scarcity, a situation that can only worsen without adaptive action as water demand rises in line with the arrival of new migrants and with increasing climate change impacts.⁹⁹

Another important and recent area of research interest on adaptive migration is the evaluation of transitional food security. There is a need to undertake further research to document the food security situation of migrants during their journey.¹⁰⁰ Earlier research revealed that climate hazards affect migrants on the move who suffer from food insecurity, such as migrants in transit through Mexico to the United States.¹⁰¹

Although mobility together with the use of remittances as a form of adaptation has been used by some to minimize vulnerabilities, there is also evidence that, in some contexts, this kind of migration is maladaptive. Studies have highlighted, for example, the potential impact of remittances on changes in land use, including deforestation and forest degradation, resulting in further environmental damage.¹⁰² In three locations of north-eastern Cambodia, for example, “migration causes labour shortages and welfare issues, but does not necessarily improve food security”, possibly appearing as a maladaptive option to climate change, in that the responses end up creating more vulnerability.¹⁰³ Other studies in India find that changing social structures as a result of migration and the prevalence of traditional gender roles have actually worsened food security outcomes for women-headed households, offsetting gains in women’s autonomy.¹⁰⁴ The diversity of experiences and migration outcomes in terms of climate adaptation and food security requires carefully crafted policies that address the situation of the most vulnerable, prevent forced movements, and leverage the positive impacts of mobility for climate adaptation and food insecurity at a local level.

Prevention and preparedness: Evidence for policies

Policymakers need to consider a responsive approach to ensure that policies address the complex interactions between mobility, climate and food security. Paying attention to research and emerging evidence – especially when that research questions, confirms or dismisses underlying assumptions – enables policymakers to better understand how climate risks can translate into food insecurity, and how this may or not result in different outcomes, including displacement and involuntary immobility. The potential positive impacts of mobility on food security can also be

⁹⁶ Kitara and Farbotko, 2023.

⁹⁷ Cissé et al., 2022.

⁹⁸ C40 Cities and McKinsey Sustainability, 2021.

⁹⁹ He et al., 2021.

¹⁰⁰ Aragón Gama et al., 2020.

¹⁰¹ Orjuela-Grimm et al., 2022.

¹⁰² Mack et al., 2023.

¹⁰³ Jacobson et al., 2019.

¹⁰⁴ Choithani, 2019.

better understood and leveraged if attention is paid to the different ways that it affects various groups, including migrants themselves, their households and communities of destination. Failing to acknowledge such nuances may mean that underlying causes of food insecurity are overlooked, potentially leading to policies resulting in poor or even counterproductive outcomes.¹⁰⁵ Complex analyses are required to avoid oversimplifications such as assigning the full causality of food insecurity to climate change.¹⁰⁶

Climatic risk and income volatility exist everywhere, but they are particularly challenging for poor populations in developing countries: “risk is costlier for households close to subsistence, because a small negative shock can rapidly transition into malnutrition and underdevelopment traps”.¹⁰⁷ Successful interventions to address food security and support climate adaptation require deep and inclusive engagement with local vulnerability contexts, as well as understanding and addressing local shocks that affect particular populations either continuously or simultaneously.¹⁰⁸

Current policy frameworks on climate change and human mobility

Many policy frameworks seek to address the complexities behind climate change and human mobility.¹⁰⁹ As the main international framework addressing the governance of international migration, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration provides specific recommendations regarding disasters, environmental degradation and climate change.¹¹⁰ The Global Compact identifies food security as an area of work for States to “minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin”, while recommending the adoption of adequate policies and mechanisms to enable safe migration pathways in the form of “admission and stay of appropriate duration based on compassionate, humanitarian or other considerations for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin owing to sudden-onset natural disasters and other precarious situations” and “solutions for migrants compelled to leave their countries of origin owing to slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change, and environmental degradation”.¹¹¹

With regard to climate change governance, one of the outcomes of the Twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (COP27), was the agreement to establish institutional arrangements to set a fund for loss and damage compensation under the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. These arrangements were informed by gaps in the current funding landscape, including in terms of “displacement, relocation, migration, insufficient climate information and data”.¹¹² This system potentially offers an opportunity to begin to manage the impact of climate change on the most vulnerable households, and to address the losses and damage incurred not only as a result of climate change but also as a result of the subsequent mobility and immobility. The work on human mobility under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is undertaken by the Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage, but more effort is needed to mainstream mobility in adaptation

¹⁰⁵ Zavaleta et al., 2018.

¹⁰⁶ Sandstrom and Juhola, 2017; Jacobson et al., 2019.

¹⁰⁷ Demont, 2020.

¹⁰⁸ Hoffmann, 2022.

¹⁰⁹ See Table 1.1 of the Groundswell report for a description of the most relevant frameworks (Clement et al., 2021).

¹¹⁰ United Nations General Assembly, 2018.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² UNFCCC, 2022.

planning. To this end, different countries have started to integrate mobility dimensions in their adaptation planning, which bodes well for the future.¹¹³

Considerations of human mobility have also been increasingly incorporated into the disaster risk reduction agenda, under the umbrella of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. There, human mobility is considered both in terms of evacuations and planned relocation, but the vulnerabilities of migrant populations are also noted, and the need to integrate migrant contributions in disaster risk reduction is highlighted.

These approaches are underpinned by the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, which establishes the importance of considering the situation of migrants and vulnerable communities. While no specific goal addresses directly the climate–migration nexus, it is a topic relevant to several different objectives, notably those surrounding food security and hunger, resilient communities, migration policies and climate issues. Human-rights-based approaches to the climate–migration nexus have also progressed rapidly in recent years, including through the catalysing role of the Nansen Protect Agenda on cross-border disaster displacement, the integration of disasters into the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (and the more recent Action Agenda on Internally Displaced Persons), and various regional approaches to the question of rights and climate mobility.¹¹⁴

To be successful, policies on the climate–food security–migration nexus need to consider the availability of resources for action, and to envision the conditions under which migration can be a viable coping strategy.¹¹⁵ Poor and impoverished communities sometimes lack the resources necessary to adapt, even when they may have information and intention to do so. Policy frameworks – and their implementation – accordingly have to recognize enabling factors and institutional environments that facilitate policy adoption (and reduce obstacles to implementation), including institutional capacity and governance, leveraging expertise from various areas of government action.¹¹⁶ Policies oriented towards local, national and international governance can all influence the outcomes of climate-related mobilities.¹¹⁷ In addition, policies intended to promote food security in climate-vulnerable countries should extend beyond merely technical and economic aspects of agriculture, and also address sociocultural dimensions,¹¹⁸ including efforts to incorporate traditional knowledge and diverse gender perspectives.¹¹⁹

Designing inclusive policies

Approaches that address links between climate hazards and food security by incorporating lessons from Indigenous knowledge and by paying attention to local context can help to shape inclusive policy.¹²⁰ For instance, studies in Aceh Province of Indonesia have shed light on the use of traditional buildings made of drifting logs; these buildings can be used both under normal conditions and also during floods, as a mechanism to maintain household and communal activities and protect community food supply needs, which are increasingly under threat due to shortages of raw materials and relocation away from the river.¹²¹ Similarly, in the field of financial inclusion, localized

¹¹³ SLYCAN Trust, 2022.

¹¹⁴ Bellinkx et al., 2022.

¹¹⁵ Gemenne and Blocher, 2017; Bosetti et al., 2021.

¹¹⁶ Traore Chazalnoel and Randall, 2021.

¹¹⁷ Cissé et al., 2022.

¹¹⁸ Mosso et al., 2022.

¹¹⁹ File and Derbile, 2020.

¹²⁰ He et al., 2019.

¹²¹ Bakhtiar et al., 2021.

and contextualized interventions have been shown to be better able to reduce the probability of food shortages.¹²² There is much more to learn from local and Indigenous knowledge, not only in order to be more inclusive, but also to be successful in sustainable ways.

Critical reviews of adaptation interventions have highlighted the diversity of outcomes that they can have on vulnerability, including some unintended negative consequences:

- Interventions can reinforce vulnerability through elite capture of processes, with reliance on powerful insiders and disregard for affected populations' perspectives, including the exacerbation of conflict and tensions;
- Interventions can redistribute vulnerability, for instance, shifting risk in coastal areas, affecting access to resources for different groups and reshaping power dynamics;
- Interventions can create new sources of vulnerability, by addressing a short-term risk while introducing new long-term problems, such as undertaking poorly planned relocation exercises.¹²³

Evidence also indicates that policies are more effective when they include gender-responsive capacity development.¹²⁴ Policies that focus on enhancing farmer education levels, empowering women, promoting generational knowledge exchange, and providing emergency food support in the lean season or following extreme weather events have proven successful to improve local adaptation.¹²⁵ Case studies in Mali, Bangladesh, Asia's lowlands and Central America highlight, with local nuances, the added value of contextualized interventions and gender mainstreaming with affected populations; however, mobility components are not always integrated in these approaches.¹²⁶

Information alone is not enough. Solutions must also be financed.

Evidence and information play a key role in ensuring climate resilience, and remain an important axis of priorities to address food insecurity in subsistence agriculture settings. However, reviews have also found a relatively limited application of analytical outputs in African agricultural development, indicating a need for more locally relevant information products combined with practical support.¹²⁷ Information availability (for example, climate forecasts and agricultural best practices) is therefore not enough, as this information needs to be based on local needs and must be supported by funding provided to local actors so they can implement evidence-based solutions. Case studies in Central America show that regions where the livelihoods of communities are based on climate-sensitive subsistence crops tend to have fewer resources to promote innovation and action for adaptation;¹²⁸ in such cases, even when locally relevant information is available, therefore, adaptation and innovation will be impossible, or at best only slowly implemented.

¹²² Karki Nepal and Neupane, 2022.

¹²³ Eriksen et al., 2021.

¹²⁴ Bezner Kerr et al., 2022.

¹²⁵ Alpizar et al., 2020.

¹²⁶ For Mali, see Traore et al., 2022; for Bangladesh, see Kashem et al., 2014; for Asia's lowlands, see Ismail et al., 2013; for Central America, see Alpizar et al., 2020.

¹²⁷ Ziervogel and Zermoglio, 2009.

¹²⁸ Bouroncle et al., 2017.

The development of early warning systems has received strong political backing in recent years, and different models have been developed for their application in vulnerable areas, such as Kenya's arid north, taking into consideration local circumstances and famine risks.¹²⁹ Drought early warning systems measure and report on key drivers of drought, "with the preferred use of meteorological and remotely sensed drought indices."¹³⁰ Scope remains to improve the usefulness of such systems by orienting indexes towards local circumstances, development approaches and human welfare.

To be successful, food security approaches that are based on agricultural innovation and new technology must consider existing capacities and the potential to further embed existing power asymmetries based on the different resources available to manage climate risks.¹³¹ In sub-Saharan Africa, increased efforts are required to address the technological needs of adaptation, given the "minimal documentation of current applications and prospects of digitalization for sustainable agricultural practices in Africa, particularly in an increasingly urbanized era".¹³² Leading developmental agencies are pursuing other approaches to food security as well, in order to manage climate risk associated with food production for adaptation in place. These include forecast-based finance, microinsurance programmes and anticipatory actions.¹³³ The financial sustainability, implementation and adoption of these types of programmes by stakeholders under climate change are still under investigation, given the uncertainties of climate scenarios and the increasing climate hazards worldwide as they relate to financial risk distribution.¹³⁴

Addressing power asymmetries, land distribution and human mobility

The prevailing model under which the globalized food industry produces food is primarily aimed at increasing food security from the individual to the national and international levels. But the complexities around the climate–food security–migration nexus require us to question this model. Evidence suggests that it has resulted in the alienation of large populations in developing countries from the means of production – including access to land – and in promoting policies that contribute to environmental degradation.¹³⁵

The prevailing model has resulted in further entrenching systemic power asymmetries, such as a reduced role for smallholder farmers. When considering food production and human mobility dynamics, unequal access to land, limited coping capacities of smallholders, and exclusion and discrimination dynamics can become significant drivers of displacement.¹³⁶ Studies undertaken in South-East Asia, for example, have found that the rise of megaplantations and their associated power dynamics have led to human and non-human displacement in multiple landscapes.¹³⁷ Similar processes have been identified in Guatemala, where studies found that "in the northern provinces of Petén and Quiché, 36% and 63% of oil palm expansion occurred over former basic grain farmland, while 16% and 22% displaced fallow land, and 17% and 12% displaced tropical forests, just between 2010 and 2019".¹³⁸ Thus, in this case, the expansion of the oil palm industry disrupted local food systems in areas of subsistence agriculture and

¹²⁹ Mude et al., 2009.

¹³⁰ Belesova et al., 2019.

¹³¹ Bouroncle et al., 2017; Pons, 2021.

¹³² Balogun et al., 2022.

¹³³ WFP, 2019.

¹³⁴ Elerts, 2019.

¹³⁵ Al-Sayed, 2019.

¹³⁶ Carte et al., 2019.

¹³⁷ Kenney-Lazar and Ishikawa, 2019.

¹³⁸ Hervas, 2021.

displaced local populations. And in northern Ghana, studies have shown that uncertain land ownership has negative consequences for food security, which is in turn linked to migration as a coping mechanism.¹³⁹

There are promising practices to address food insecurity at the local level and prevent displacement. These include promotion of land tenure security of adequate agricultural land; farmer empowerment groups; gender-responsive components; and the expansion of dietary diversity through crop diversification and agroforestry initiatives. In Zambia, for instance, “policies supporting livestock development programs such as training of farmers in animal husbandry, as well as policies increasing land tenure security and empowerment of farmers groups, have the potential to enhance household food and nutrition security”.¹⁴⁰ Securing the land tenure of indigenous groups has been identified as a critical priority to prevent environmental degradation and to improve food security outcomes of vulnerable communities.¹⁴¹

Policies centred on human well-being

Forward-looking policy responses can also be designed to acknowledge that human mobility is likely to increase in upcoming years due to the rate of environmental change and associated food and water crises,¹⁴² and that will consider the potential vulnerability of immobile populations. Preparing future migrants and communities can reduce migrants’ vulnerabilities, increase the positive outcomes experienced by origin and destination communities, and ensure the fulfilment of human rights, particularly given the potential protection gaps that migrants will face without adequate policies in place. This has been emphasized in numerous statements and resolutions by human rights bodies around the world, with a recent example highlighting the important role of State actors:

Faced with migrant workers and others who mobilize for reasons directly or indirectly associated with climate change, States must guarantee due process during the procedure leading to the recognition of their migratory status, and in any case guarantee their human rights, such as the safeguard of non-refoulement while their status is determined.¹⁴³

Policies are also needed to protect migrant communities and promote the fulfilment of their human rights, both while in transit and once they arrive at their destinations. As in-country rural to urban migration compounds with international migration to urban centres, the expansion of safe housing will continue to be a focus of new policies.¹⁴⁴ Policies in this arena need to consider access to public assistance for recently arrived migrant communities. Evidence suggests that non-citizens and children of non-citizens are more likely to be exposed to high levels of food insecurity and require specific attention.¹⁴⁵ Work is increasingly being done to examine the mental health impacts of environmental hazards and mobility, including through prevailing gender dynamics. These were important issues after Hurricane Katrina in the United States, and also in the framework of rural–urban migration processes in Jamaica,¹⁴⁶ for example.

¹³⁹ Nara et al., 2020.

¹⁴⁰ Nkomoki et al., 2019.

¹⁴¹ ILC, FAO and GLTN, 2021.

¹⁴² Carney and Krause, 2020.

¹⁴³ IACHR and REDESCA, 2021.

¹⁴⁴ C40 Cities and McKinsey Sustainability, 2021.

¹⁴⁵ Carney and Krause, 2020.

¹⁴⁶ Bleeker et al., 2021.

The well-being of seasonal and temporary migrants in the agricultural sector should also be a greater focus of human-centred policies. Different analysis of the well-being of agricultural migrant workers, in particular in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shed light on the prevalence of conditions of vulnerability and of human rights abuses.¹⁴⁷ A comprehensive approach to the food security–human mobility nexus in the context of climate change requires that authorities and employers improve the conditions of migrants in the agricultural sector. These migrant workers – as demonstrated during COVID-19 – can be some of the most essential contributors to the fundamental functioning of societies around the world, and yet they can be some of the most marginalized and exploited.¹⁴⁸

Migrant voices

“It gives me much shame to be without food. One is always thinking of how to get what one needs for tomorrow. For example, if I buy a chicken, I always divide it in half, half for one day, and half for the next day. So yes, one is worried that food will run out.” (Migrant woman who arrived in the United States).

Source: Carney and Krause, 2020.

All of these examples demonstrate that, as discussed above, the outcome of any particular instance of climate mobility is highly dependent on the circumstances in which that movement takes place.¹⁴⁹ It is extremely dangerous, even in the attempt to justify and promote climate action, to simplify the narrative around climate change and migration. Doing so risks “occlud[ing] the multiple forces that lead young Sahelian migrants”, in one particular instance, to emigrate, and diverts attention from potential responses.¹⁵⁰ Similarly, an analysis of United Kingdom media shows an oversimplification of climate change mobility, removing it from context, with the potential to augment xenophobic voices and undermine integration and social cohesion.¹⁵¹ In order to mobilize resources for climate adaptation and food security interventions, discourses that leverage potential negative reactions towards migrants must be prevented.

¹⁴⁷ Caxaj et al., 2022.

¹⁴⁸ McAuliffe et al., 2021.

¹⁴⁹ Oakes et al., 2019.

¹⁵⁰ Ribot et al., 2020.

¹⁵¹ Sakellari, 2019.

Conclusions

Recent research on the climate–food security–migration nexus showcases the complexities of the relationships between the three phenomena. In many instances, food insecurity fuelled by worsening climate extremes indeed appears as an underlying driver of migration; however, the relationship is complex. Food insecurity is driven by multiple factors, among which climate change plays an important part by adding further pressure on existing systems and communities. Yet multiple examples show how climate extremes cannot be considered the sole drivers of food insecurity or migration, given prevailing power dynamics, fragilities in governance, structures of globalized food production and other social factors. Furthermore, different adaptation strategies can often be employed before households opt for migration. Migration also takes many forms, depending on the context in which it occurs, with variable outcomes in terms of adaptation and food security. In some cases remittances appear to contribute to better climate adaptation and food security results; in other examples, local dynamics prevent these achievements, in an overall framework where internal migration can result in worsening situations and international migration pathways remain scarce and difficult to access for the most vulnerable populations.

This complexity informs the identification of potential areas for policy development to prevent catastrophe and support resilience by improving the outcomes of food security interventions, addressing the adverse drivers of migration and considering the situation of migrants in transit and at destination. Research and evidence point to the need for highly contextual interventions that address inequality and related power dynamics, including from a gender perspective, leverage local and Indigenous knowledge, and carefully assess possible maladaptive consequences for vulnerable populations. Policymaking on climate migration is evolving quickly, under the umbrella of innovative research and guiding international frameworks, notably the Global Compact for Migration and the adaptation and loss and damage tracks of the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. As it does so, attention to human rights obligations and practices are critical to bridge protection gaps for the most vulnerable. In this setting, oversimplifying discourses – for example, discourses that remove agency from migrants and leverage potential fear of migration to justify climate action and food security interventions – risk advancing xenophobic messages.

With this in mind, and considering the multiple interactions between climate change, food security and human mobility, potential non-exhaustive areas of intervention can be identified to advance an innovative agenda that targets the situation of the most vulnerable:

- It is crucial to assess the multicausality of shocks by recognizing the intricacies of the connections between climate change, food security (and food insecurity), and human mobility at large. The assessment must give adequate attention to local realities, gender dynamics, power asymmetries, and the conditions in which climate change exacerbates existing challenges. Policies that fail to address local social and economic realities may create climate adaptation strategies that reproduce, rather than alleviate, vulnerabilities.
- It is also necessary to assess the impacts of migration on both the receiving and sending communities, as well as the impacts on the communities and individuals that remain in place. This assessment should consider the ongoing and expected transition from rural to urban areas (within and across political boundaries) and the level of preparedness that exists in receiving communities, in terms of their legal frameworks and climate change adaptation plans. Any agenda that emerges from this assessment can be informed by emerging research carried out in different geographies, and has the potential to identify enabling conditions that can lead to positive migration outcomes – in terms of climate adaptation and food security – depending on local circumstances.

- Evidence and information, however, is not enough, and the role of climate finance in practically supporting disaster risk reduction and other preventative and adaptation strategies is critical to putting evidence and knowledge into action. Resources on the ground are needed to enable people to successfully face future climate change impacts, whether they remain in place or move in response.
- Finally, innovative solutions need to analyse the local contexts of vulnerability, and place human well-being at the forefront of those solutions, considering migration as a viable mechanism to manage climatic risk. The role of the food industry in delivering policies aimed at reducing global hunger can be revisited in line with multiple practices affecting community well-being, reducing food security and directly driving displacement. Policies oriented towards innovation and technology for climate risk management need to be assessed to recognize the limitations they impose on smallholder farmers and on smallholders' ability to innovate, when resources for action are limited. This process, however, should not try to refit these considerations into old policies, but rather should begin a new, in-depth, inclusive process with affected communities.

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8

TOWARDS A GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION? FROM THE 2005 GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TO THE 2022 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW FORUM AND BEYOND¹

Introduction

With its foundations dating back to the early 2000s and grounded in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was a groundbreaking milestone in the history of global migration governance.² As the Secretary-General of the United Nations noted, two years after its adoption, “the implementation of the Global Compact is not an even process and will mean different things to different States”;³ in fact, the recognition of different capacities and priorities is one of the main strengths of the Global Compact for Migration. The 2022 International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) was another milestone, as, for the first time, United Nations Member States and stakeholders discussed progress towards the objectives of the Global Compact for Migration, ending with a unanimous adoption of a Progress Declaration.⁴

This chapter builds on chapters in two previous World Migration Reports that chronicled the story of migration governance as the last big multilateral issue being included in the work of the United Nations. A chapter of the *World Migration Report 2018* on global migration governance provided a definition of migration governance and outlined key aspects of the architecture relevant to the global governance of migration. It also described key dialogues and initiatives from the beginning of the century that were instrumental to the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 and to subsequent intergovernmental negotiations. The *World Migration Report 2020* offered a procedural and substantive analysis of the development and adoption of the Global Compact for Migration, as well as of the Global Compact on Refugees, including complementarity, coherence and gaps between the two compacts. It also outlined the implications of the compacts and of the establishment of the United Nations Network on Migration for global migration governance.⁵ These chapters, together with the first chapter of the *World Migration Report 2022*, outlining the key technological, geopolitical and environmental transformations that have shaped migration governance particularly since the start of the pandemic, offer a comprehensive overview of how migration evolved until 2021.⁶

¹ Andrea Milan, data manager, IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre; Amanda Bisong, policy officer, Centre for Africa-Europe Relations; Paddy Siyanga Knudsen, independent researcher.

² Guild, 2021; Klein Solomon and Sheldon, 2019; Newland et al., 2019.

³ United Nations, 2020.

⁴ United Nations, 2022a.

⁵ Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017; Newland et al., 2019.

⁶ McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.

This chapter picks up where the chapter of the *World Migration Report 2020* that focused on global migration governance left off: specifically, the implications of this new architecture on the subsequent development of international cooperation on migration. It focuses on the 2022 IMRF, while adding historical depth by investigating the extent to which recommendations from the 2005 report of the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM) – the most important United Nations report on international migration prior to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants – are reflected in current international cooperation around migration governance. This chapter also highlights remaining limitations of the current architecture in responding to the complexities and realities of migration in the current geopolitical climate, complemented by some reflections on migration governance at the regional level, without discussing migration governance at either national or local levels.⁷

After a framing section, the third part of this chapter looks at the evolution of international cooperation on migration in the fifteen years between the GCIM launch (2003) and the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration by Member States (2018), highlighting key events and processes, including the centrality of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and the impact of systemic crises and geopolitical changes. The fourth section takes a critical look at the outcomes of the IMRF. It is followed by a section that digs deeper into selected contentious issues and key tensions in policy discussions on global migration governance that emerged at the forum. The chapter ends with a reflection on expectations, challenges and opportunities from the first IMRF to the year 2030.

Migration governance at the global level: A multi-stakeholder regime

Global migration governance has evolved from international cooperation on migration towards its current multi-stakeholder regime under the guidance of the United Nations.⁸ Member States reiterated throughout the negotiations for the Global Compact for Migration that migration governance is a core element of national sovereignty, and emphasized the role of international cooperation on migration under the framework of the Global Compact for Migration.⁹

Defining migration governance

According to the GCIM, “in the domain of international migration, governance assumes a variety of forms, including the migration policies and programmes of individual countries, inter-State discussions and agreements, multilateral [forums] and consultative processes, the activities of international organizations, as well as relevant laws and norms”.^a More recently, and building also on subsequent definitions,^b IOM defined migration governance as: “The combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (subnational, national, regional and international) and the

⁷ For an overview of recent national migration governance trends worldwide in relation to the Global Compact for Migration, please refer to IOM, 2022. Through the Migration Governance Indicators Initiative, IOM has assessed migration governance in dozens of countries and local authorities worldwide: see IOM, n.d.a.

⁸ Thouez, 2019.

⁹ The Global Compact for Migration starts with “We, the Heads of State and Government and High Representatives, meeting in Morocco on 10 and 11 December 2018, reaffirming the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and determined to make an important contribution to enhanced cooperation on international migration in all its dimensions, have adopted this Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration”.

relevant processes that shape and regulate States' approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities, and promoting international cooperation".^c

^a GCIM, 2005:65.

^b Such as in Betts, 2011.

^c IOM, 2019.

Unlike other areas of globalization – such as trade, for instance – there is no single regime governing human mobility at the global level.¹⁰ Global discussions around the governance of migration take place in different global and regional forums concurrently, and global governance of migration has been described as unstable, flexible, changing, fragmented and weak at best or non-existent in some areas.¹¹ Nevertheless, the United Nations General Assembly's New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016, the subsequent elaboration of the Global Compact for Migration in 2018 and the unanimous approval of the IMRF Progress Declaration four years later represent key milestones on the path towards global migration governance.¹² These milestones reflect the progress made by States and other actors in working towards a more integrated approach to migration governance, building on years of collaboration outside formal United Nations processes, particularly through the Global Forum on Migration and Development. The flexibility and the non-binding legal nature of the global migration governance regime arise from the desire of States to agree on a global framework for international cooperation on migration without legally binding commitments that could have presented political challenges at the national level. The flexibility of global migration governance also reflects the centrality of regional dialogue and consultations that have played a vital role in the establishment of today's global migration institutions after the Second World War and that have continued to play a central role since then.¹³

In the last two decades, the number and range of actors involved in shaping global migration governance has been increasing, as reflected in the participation of significant numbers of non-State actors in the IMRF.¹⁴ These stakeholders were already present, vocal and visible in the process leading up to the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees, advocating for rights and protection, including the human rights of migrants.¹⁵ Migrant groups and migrant-led organizations were pivotal to the inclusion of the voices of migrants in global dialogues, thanks to their advocacy for the importance of inclusive governance.¹⁶ Additionally, the private sector has promoted innovative and practical solutions to challenges faced by migrants, through groups such as the Tent partnership for refugees, Concordia, the Global Skills Partnership and the GFMD business mechanism. Actions led by the private sector at the global level have spearheaded policy changes implemented in line with key objectives of the Global Compact for Migration. These actors have contributed to building the current multi-stakeholder

¹⁰ Sykes, 2013.

¹¹ Kainz and Betts, 2021; Sahin-Mencutek et al., 2022.

¹² Duncan, 2019; McAdam, 2019.

¹³ Lavenex and Piper, 2022; Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017.

¹⁴ These non-State actors include non-governmental organizations, academic, scientific and knowledge-based institutions, the private sector, trade unions, faith-based, migrant and youth organizations, diaspora communities and other relevant stakeholders. See IOM, n.d.b.

¹⁵ Rother, 2022.

¹⁶ Piper, 2015.

architecture of migration governance at the global level, increasing the demand for transparency, a rights-centred approach and adopting innovative policy measures in collaboration with States and international agencies.¹⁷

Within States, local and regional governments are increasingly influential in shaping the global migration agenda, collaborating to create the narratives that sustain it.¹⁸ Cities have become central actors in the global discussions on migration, which reflects the fact that their cooperation and activities directly affect the lives of migrants who live in urban areas.¹⁹ For example, the Mayors Migration Council has played a central role in discussions around climate governance, reception and integration. In addition to global, national and local migration governance, transgovernance across levels is emerging in many States, where actors move from one level of governance to another in order to push for their interests or ensure that their interests are protected.²⁰

From the Global Commission on International Migration to the Global Compact for Migration

The Global Commission on International Migration: Lead-up and outcome

Building on international cooperation that can be traced back to the end of the First World War, the 1994 Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo devoted a chapter to international migration. Among other things, that chapter encouraged more cooperation and dialogue between countries.²¹ Following up on the chapter, three surveys were sent by the United Nations to its Member States in 1995, 1997 and 1999, to gather views on a possible international conference on international migration; however, a number of governments expressed serious reservations about convening such a conference.²²

Several dialogues and initiatives were instrumental in building momentum and confidence towards greater action at the global level in the 2000s and early 2010s, including the Global Migration Group (GMG) as a key United Nations interagency mechanism.²³ The beginning of the century marked a turning point in the attitude of States towards international cooperation on migration, resulting in a remarkable acceleration of progress: the first Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants was appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Council in 1999; the Berne Initiative and the regular IOM forum called the International Dialogue on Migration were launched in 2001; in his 2002 report on strengthening the United Nations, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan identified migration as a United Nations priority;²⁴ and in May 2003 the final report of the United Nations Commission on Human Security stated that “a high-level and broad-based commission should explore available options and areas of consensus, including alternative institutional arrangements” in relation to global migration

¹⁷ Appleby, 2020.

¹⁸ Stürner-Siovitz, 2022.

¹⁹ Schweiger, 2023.

²⁰ Thouez, 2019. Also reflected in the increasing number of countries participating in Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) assessments at multiple governance levels. See IOM, n.d.a.

²¹ Betts and Kainz, 2017; Lebon-McGregor, 2020.

²² United Nations, 2001.

²³ Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017.

²⁴ United Nations, 2002.

governance.²⁵ These changes happened at a time when economists and international financial institutions shed light on the previously underestimated positive effect of migration and remittances on development.²⁶

In December 2003, together with a number of governments, the Secretary-General launched the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). While the Commission carried out its tasks in full independence, and commissioners and co-chairs acted in their personal capacity, Member State involvement was important to its success and impact, including through Regional Consultative Processes on migration (RCPs).²⁷

The GCIM was composed of 19 members, drawn from all regions and bringing together a wide range of migration perspectives and expertise. Its three-fold mandate outlined three objectives.²⁸ First, as the first-ever global panel on international migration, it aimed to place international migration on the global agenda. Second, it was tasked with analysing gaps in current policy approaches to migration. Third, it was asked to present recommendations on how to strengthen national, regional and global governance of international migration, translating the complex reality and politics of international migration into principles for action that would reflect shared objectives and a common vision for all United Nations Member States.

The commission adopted a broad consultative approach to carry out its tasks, organizing five regional hearings, and commissioning 8 regional and 13 thematic reports as well as 56 papers.²⁹ The final report of the Global Commission, called “Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action”, included six principles of action, supported by a set of recommendations. Each principle had a dedicated chapter elaborating its importance and key recommendations (see Table 1). The governance chapter of the GCIM report highlighted that good migration governance at the national level is a basis for more effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation between States, and it identified four key challenges associated with migration governance at the national level: policy coherence; interministerial coordination; capacity and resources; and cooperation with other States. As we will see in the following sections, these remain key challenges for many States worldwide.

²⁵ Commission on Human Security, 2003:45.




²⁶ For example, De Haan, 1999; Ratha, 2003.



²⁷ Lavenex and Piper, 2022.

²⁸ IOM, n.d.b.

²⁹ Ibid.

Table 1. Key Global Commission on International Migration recommendations and Global Compact for Migration objectives


GCIM principle for action	Summary of recommendations	Aligned Global Compact for Migration objectives
<p>1 Migrating out of choice</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Account for increasing migration in the formulation of migration policies. Pursue realistic and flexible approaches to international migration pathways, including temporary migration and labour migration pathways. Create jobs with decent work conditions and sustainable livelihoods. 	
<p>2 Reinforcing economic and developmental impact</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Promote human capital formation and cooperate to provide appropriate pay, working conditions and career prospects to the global pool of professionals. Encourage the transfer and investment of remittances through formal systems conducive to growth and competitiveness. Leverage the developmental impacts of return migration and circular migration. 	
<p>3 Addressing irregular migration</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engage in an objective debate about the negative consequences of irregular migration and its prevention. Address the conditions that promote irregular migration and take actions to resolve the situation of migrants with irregular status. Strengthen efforts to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking. 	

GCIM principle for action	Summary of recommendations	Aligned Global Compact for Migration objectives
<p>4 Strengthening social cohesion through integration</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fully respect the rights of migrants; ensure compliance with minimum labour standards; protect migrants against exploitation and abuse. Promote the full integration of migrants into society, paying special attention to empowering, and protecting the rights of migrant women and children. Address international migration in an objective and responsible manner. 	 <p>4 LEGAL IDENTITY AND DOCUMENTATION, 6 RECRUITMENT AND DECENT WORK, 7 REDUCE VULNERABILITIES, 16 INCLUSION AND SOCIAL COHESION, 17 ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION</p>
<p>5 Protecting the rights of migrants</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure State responsibility to protect those on its territory is practised, reducing the pressures that induce people to migrate, protecting migrants in transit and safeguarding human rights in destination countries. Ensure that all migrants can benefit from decent work and are protected from exploitation and abuse. Strengthen the normative framework of international migration and ensure that the provisions of that framework are applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 	 <p>2 MINIMIZE DRIVERS, 6 RECRUITMENT AND DECENT WORK, 7 REDUCE VULNERABILITIES</p>
<p>6 Enhancing governance: coherence, capacity and cooperation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish coherent national migration policies based on agreed objectives that are consistent with international law, including human rights law. Cooperate with other States and with regional and international organizations to formulate national migration policies, including through bilateral agreements and contributions of resources and expertise. Ensure that RCPs on migration have worldwide coverage, engage civil society and the private sector, and are not focused solely on migration control. 	 <p>11 MANAGE BORDERS, 14 CONSULAR PROTECTION, 23 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION</p>

Migration governance after the Global Commission on International Migration

About fifteen years passed between the launch of the GCIM in 2003 and the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration in 2018, and almost two decades between the launch of the GCIM and that of the IMRF in 2022. During this period, several global processes contributed to current global migration governance. Figure 1 presents a timeline of some key events and frameworks, though it should be noted that not all international frameworks gathered universal support, and that the figure does not represent key processes such as international dialogues on migration, RCPs and IOM Councils that prepared the way for, and fed into, the events shown.³⁰ Whether within the United Nations system or outside of it, these key processes played an instrumental role in setting the agenda on migration at the global level.³¹ Migration and its governance has also been shaped by a number of technological (“fourth industrial revolution”), geopolitical and environmental transformations.³²

Figure 1. Key international events and processes 2003–2022



³⁰ Klein Solomon, 2005.

³¹ See for instance the contribution from the GFMD at GFMD, n.d.a.

³² For a discussion of the effect of these transformations on migration and on migration governance, see McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.

Impact of the Global Commission on International Migration

The work of the GCIM set the basis for other processes that followed after the publication of the GCIM report in December 2005. From the three-fold mandate of the GCIM to the report recommendations, its wide implications for migration governance are visible in the Global Compact for Migration and IMRF processes. Nevertheless, States were and remain reluctant to delegate formal regulatory authority over migration to a global supranational authority, and some have observed that “discussions about international governance of migration thus have tended to focus on institutional architecture for cooperation and/or common underlying principles.”³³ Others have identified four key limits to national migration governance – minimal intergovernmental cooperation; insufficient policymaking coordination; lack of capacity to maximize migration benefits (especially in lower income States); a lack of international policy coherence – and have argued for GCIM implementation in place of national governance systems.³⁴

The Global Commission on International Migration and its results

The GCIM 2005 report, “Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action”, highlighted the Commission’s key issues regarding migration and development: migration, economic growth and the labour market, irregular migration, migrants in society; migrant protection, as well as migration governance. Some proposals were also outlined alongside key conclusions, with a clear stance and emphasis on migration policies.

The Commission’s principal conclusion was that migration policies must be based on shared objectives and have a common vision. It therefore proposed a comprehensive, coherent and global framework based on six principles for action and 33 related recommendations.

The GCIM report concluded that “the international community has failed to realize the full potential of international migration and has not risen to the opportunities and challenges of migration”. The Commission recommended that “greater coherence, cooperation and capacity are required for the more effective governance of migration, at the national, regional and global levels”.^a

The sixth action from the GCIM report – “Creating coherence: The governance of international migration” – remains relevant today. This action was centred on three pillars: strengthened capacity at the national level, improved engagement between States at the regional level, and more robust cooperation between States and international actors at the global level. The six recommendations under this principle consider the intersection between international migration and development within the wider policy arenas of trade, aid, State security, human security and human rights.

^a UN DESA, 2005:2–3.

³³ Newland, 2005:6.

³⁴ Süßmuth and Morehouse, 2012.

The GCIM report highlighted that human security concerns associated with international migration need to be addressed more fully, particularly in light of other key policy issues, including State security, aid, trade and human rights. The emphasis on human security has had an impact on leveraging political momentum at the global level to address migration challenges and to provide protection to vulnerable migrants.

The report also provided a strong basis for global cooperation to which States – and the international community in general – responded in different ways: some have upheld the ideas of the report, and engaged in clusters to address migration challenges; others have not taken up GCIM recommendations, or depart from those recommendations with regard to contentious issues (such as the migrants' rights perspective). It is well recognized that the GCIM set the agenda for the first United Nations General Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, influencing the chair's conclusions and thus setting the agenda for subsequent work on global governance. The GCIM also stimulated the debate on global governance of migration among States; however, it did not result in a formal, coherent, multilateral framework governing migration.³⁵

The Global Forum on Migration and Development and its importance

Established upon the proposal of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the 2006 HLD, the GFMD is a State-led, informal and non-binding process that helps shape the global debate on migration and development. The GFMD was created as a space for constructive dialogue on international migration between States, and it also provides a whole-of-government and whole-of-society platform that enables governments to engage with a wide range of actors: civil society, the private sector, youth, migrants and diaspora, the United Nations system, academia and municipalities, among others. Its main aim is to inform and influence policy and practice through informal dialogue – including on sensitive issues – while generating consensus among actors and seeking innovative solutions. Its three core mechanisms for stakeholder engagement (that is, the business mechanism, the civil society mechanism and the mayors mechanism) have played a pivotal role in ensuring that these perspectives informed the Global Compact for Migration negotiations and of the discussions on its implementation. Over the years, it has helped build multi-stakeholder international cooperation by facilitating the building of trust between States and non-State actors.

A glimpse at migration governance and the 2030 Agenda

Through the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015, migration was recognized, for the first time in a major international document on development, as a powerful driver for sustainable development for migrants and communities. Migration was highlighted as a cross-cutting issue across all 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with one particular target (10.7) under SDG 10 aiming to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”. In addition, other SDG targets and indicators show the importance of specific aspects of migration, which are embedded in their scope and implementation.

³⁵ Ibid.

The GFMD was instrumental in getting migration included in the 2030 Agenda, including through a dedicated ad hoc working group on the 2030 Agenda (which later became the GFMD Working Group on Sustainable Development and International Migration, covering both the 2030 Agenda and the Global Compact for Migration). GFMD engagement in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda is evident through its annual reports, since 2017, to the High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), with inputs in the form of analysis and recommendations on the implementation of the SDGs and respective targets.

The emphasis on migration in the SDGs was a wake-up call for governments to be more inclusive, and to integrate migration into development, but also to identify gaps and challenges in data, policy, responses and practical measures in addressing development challenges. Over the years, this emphasis on migration has required capacity-building in terms of guidance at the national and subnational levels in migration mainstreaming at local and national level planning, where links between migration and development in the context of the SDGs had to be better understood for implementation. It has also meant looking at migration beyond its policy and across governance sectors.

Despite not being a formal United Nations forum, the GFMD played an instrumental part in the lead-up to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, through a position that was communicated to the United Nations Secretary-General. It also played a critical role in the lead-up to the Global Compact for Migration, hosting a range of dialogues and thematic workshops. This was achieved through its work on developing ideas and generating consensus to support the creation of that compact, including workshops, roundtables and, most importantly, a thematic recollection of the GFMD outcome documents from 2007 to 2017.

In fact, as recognized in the preamble of the Global Compact for Migration, the contributions of the GFMD paved the way for its elaboration.³⁶ Comparing the GFMD thematic recollection 2007 to 2017 (the GFMD contribution to the Global Compact for Migration process) with the final text of the Global Compact for Migration shows that over 50 policy options and practical actions proposed by the GFMD were echoed in the Global Compact for Migration objectives. A detailed analysis shows that the language of the Global Compact for Migration text is often similar to that of GFMD thematic reflections, especially in the case of practical actions (such as pathways for regular migration and the fight against human trafficking).³⁷ Furthermore, the Global Compact for Migration is explicit in calling on the GFMD to host an annual informal exchange on implementation of the Global Compact for Migration.³⁸

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: A closer look

The discourse around the global governance of migration has come a long way, in the face of some resistance to a fully contextualized understanding of migration. The Global Compact for Migration represents a monumental step forward towards a whole-of-society, multilateral approach to migration governance that integrates migration policymaking and analysis into a broader context. For the first time, Member States have a common framework to discuss progress on migration governance. The Compact encourages concerted and coordinated efforts towards

³⁶ United Nations, 2018a.

³⁷ GFMD, n.d.b.

³⁸ Ibid.

a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, emphasizing that migration is a global issue. Before 2018, scholars had described the need for a more organic process for international cooperation on migration governance, stemming “from strategic deliberations around improving existing policies and practices rather than through a top-down, institutional approach at the global level”;³⁹ the consultations and process towards the adoption of the Global Compact for Migration in 2018 were an organic process of this type.

The United Nations Network on Migration

To support the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, the United Nations Secretary-General established in 2018 a Network on Migration that is mandated to ensure effective, timely and coordinated system-wide support to Member States (Global Compact for Migration, paragraph 45). The Global Compact for Migration prescribes the objectives of the network, which prioritizes the rights and well-being of migrants and their communities of destination, origin and transit. It is guided by working principles including inclusivity, an orientation to results and accountability; as well, it prescribes a human rights-based, gender-responsive and child-sensitive approach. It replaces the Global Migration Coalition of 2006.

With IOM as its coordinator and secretariat, the Network comprises an executive committee, members (that is, United Nations system entities: currently 39 organizations) and workstreams. The workstreams provide technical advice to the Network, focusing on specific issues and facilitating joint action at the regional and country levels. In the current workplan (2022–2024), there are 14 workstreams, including 5 new ones introduced in 2022 following recommendations from the Progress Declaration of the IMRF. The workstreams and the Migration Multi-partner Trust Fund also have members from civil society, academia, diaspora organizations, private sector representatives and trade unions.

The United Nations Network on Migration also supports country- and regional-level United Nations migration coordination mechanisms, national plans to implement the Global Compact for Migration, national development plans and sectoral plans. The Network also tracks State commitments on Global Compact for Migration implementation through the Pledging Dashboard.

Nevertheless, there are some challenges to its universal implementation. First, the Global Compact for Migration is non-binding, and not all Member States voted in favour of the adoption of the Compact. There are a number of countries that are central to the migration landscape that are still reluctant to implement the Global Compact for Migration, while other countries that did not vote in favour of its adoption at the General Assembly are now engaged in its follow-up process. Second, this country-led process rightly positions States as the leaders of the implementation process, putting the Global Compact for Migration into practice through national implementation plans. States were encouraged to engage in inclusive and participatory processes based on whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches; however, the approach is left to the national process of each country, and differs among States. At the regional level, support for implementation of the Global Compact for Migration is expected from formal regional mechanisms, regional economic communities and RCPs. Through the quadrennial regional reviews to inform the IMRF, both States and regional forums inform the global process by sharing their reports on

³⁹ Süßmuth and Morehouse, 2012.

the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, following the guidelines provided by the United Nations Network on Migration.⁴⁰

Since the GCIM, the global architecture of migration governance has changed, largely due to the institutionalization of international cooperation through formal United Nations channels. The existence of the Global Compact for Migration, despite its limitations, is without question critical for a global approach to migration challenges. The implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, and the institutional structures around it, have borrowed from various processes and forums stretching back to the HLD, GFMD and GCIM recommendations. Special emphasis has been placed throughout on the exchange of practices and peer learning, with emerging efforts to support the development of State-led frameworks.

While the current setup has its challenges, it also embeds opportunities within the structure of the Global Compact for Migration to sustain momentum in terms of addressing migration challenges at the global level. These challenges (and opportunities) mainly relate to dedicated financing for national plans to implement the Global Compact, and blended financing options,⁴¹ engagement of non-governmental agencies as well as non-State actors in agenda setting and implementation through national, regional and global discussions,⁴² and robust monitoring and review processes in the form of regional reviews and the IMRF.

Where do we stand today? The lead-up to, and lessons learned from, the International Migration Review Forum

As the first ever intergovernmentally negotiated United Nations agreement on managing international migration, the Global Compact for Migration establishes a blueprint for international cooperation on migration. In 2021, the first series of quadrennial preparatory regional reviews preceding the IMRF covered five regions: Africa, the Arab States, Asia, Europe and the Americas. These regional reviews were hosted, with the support of the United Nations Network on Migration, by United Nations regional commissions in the case of Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); in the case of Africa, Morocco hosted the meeting for UNECA Member States. The reviews were attended by government representatives and other stakeholders, and focused on national, subregional and continental progress towards the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. Undertaken during a period when parts of the world were still under COVID-19 restrictions, the IMRF roundtables and regional reviews were hybrid or virtual. While this allowed a wider audience to connect to the important gatherings, they followed standard United Nations procedures that do not always allow for an open and constructive debate, as they are centred on statements being read out by representatives of Member States. Furthermore, the context of the pandemic highlighted new priorities and emerging challenges for migration governance.

⁴⁰ For more information on the Global Compact for Migration regional reviews, see United Nations Network on Migration, n.d.a.

⁴¹ For more information on pooled financing for the Global Compact for Migration, see United Nations Network on Migration, n.d.b.

⁴² For more information on regional and national chapters see United Nations Network on Migration, n.d.c.

Stakeholder contributions in the lead-up to the International Migration Review Forum

Between 2020 and 2021, 86 Member States, regional mechanisms and other actors submitted voluntary reports reviewing the status of their implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. An analysis of these 86 reports revealed the difficulty in tracking the implementation of a non-binding agreement lacking a formal, systematic mechanism for review.^a It also underscored the importance of data and evidence for policy processes, as well as the centrality of issues such as return, trafficking, decent work and vulnerable migrants. Despite the limitations of voluntary reporting, an analysis of these reports is useful to assess the overall focus of Member States' monitoring and reporting, including those objectives that have received less attention (e.g. missing migrants, discrimination, remittances). The analysis also highlights the need for clearer monitoring framework and process.

In November 2021, the GFMD held a stakeholders' hybrid forum with 180 delegates from 81 GFMD Member States, three GFMD mechanisms, youth groups and 25 organizations in attendance, because the Global Compact for Migration calls on the GFMD to report on the findings, best practices and innovative approaches to the IMRF.^b This forum provided the basis for the GFMD report on the Global Compact for Migration (published May 2022).

^a Lebon-McGregor, 2022.

^b GFMD, n.d.a.

In January 2022, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a report on Global Compact for Migration implementation, to inform the IMRF, as required by the United Nations General Assembly.⁴³ In addition to inputs from Member States, stakeholder consultations and discussions with groups within the United Nations system, the Secretary-General's report also drew on the outcomes from the Global Compact for Migration regional reviews.

The inclusive process in the lead-up to the IMRF also involved multiple stakeholders providing inputs, comments and responses to various versions of the Progress Declaration.⁴⁴ Non-State actors called for a critical look at the progress, challenges and gaps in the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, citing the need for both a more dynamic and progressive dialogue with all stakeholders and a robust monitoring framework, in order to achieve a more meaningful review of the full Global Compact for Migration. This seemed especially important because of the limitations of voluntary reporting without an agreed framework, and without means of independent verification.⁴⁵


Furthermore, analyses by scholars and other stakeholders including representatives of civil society and the GFMD articulated contributions to the Progress Declaration and outlined the lessons to be drawn from the IMRF process, including the need for a stronger voice for migrants.

⁴³ United Nations, 2021a.

⁴⁴ Civil Society Action Committee, n.d.

⁴⁵ Rajah et al., 2022.

Figure 2. International Migration Review Forum pledges by type



Source: United Nations Network on Migration, n.d.d.

The Pledging Initiative was conceived to help build momentum for the review and implementation of the Global Compact for Migration in the context of the IMRF.⁴⁶ Pledges are measurable commitments made by Member States and other stakeholders, such as local authorities and civil society organizations, with the purpose of advancing the implementation of one or more of the guiding principles, objectives, or actions of the Global Compact for Migration. As of January 2023, 233 pledges had been received and displayed on the online dashboard.⁴⁷ Objective 7 of the Global Compact for Migration, focused on reducing vulnerabilities, has had the highest number of pledges towards its achievement (133 pledges).

The first IMRF resulted in an intergovernmentally unanimously agreed Progress Declaration that outlines progress, challenges and gaps in the implementation of the Global Compact, as well as a set of recommended actions.⁴⁸

As part of the IMRF, in May 2022, the President of the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly hosted an informal multi-stakeholder hearing with over 250 representatives from non-State actors covering all regions.⁴⁹ The focus was on assessing progress, gaps and challenges in the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, as well as cementing commitments and recommendations to advance the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. The forum also proposed concrete recommendations for action, and it emphasized the “nothing about us without us” inclusive approach that puts migrant voices at the core of migration governance.

Among other things, the IMRF showed a growing recognition of the importance of RCPs, in line with earlier discussions at the GFMD. Through the GFMD and other forums, there has been multi-stakeholder discussions to clarify and advance the role of RCPs in realizing the objectives of the Global Compact for Migration, bringing Global Compact for Migration stakeholders closer to RCPs. The Secretary-General’s 2022 report highlights the

⁴⁶ See United Nations Network on Migration, n.d.d.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ United Nations, 2022a.

⁴⁹ Rajah et al., 2022.

IMRF as an opportunity to harness the power of multilateralism to provide concrete guidance on the promotion of inclusive societies, enhanced diversified pathways, opportunities for regularization and sustainable reintegration as well as reducing vulnerabilities. All these issues are within the scope of RCPs and their role in supporting efforts that ensure participation of and measures at national and subnational levels.

Key tensions in policy discussions on global migration governance

The Global Compact for Migration and the IMRF Progress Declaration reflect both advancement and a compromise between States. Pre-existing migration governance indicators introduced improvements towards measuring global migration governance in a more systematic way:⁵⁰ even without an agreed reporting framework, 15 countries referred to information collected through the IOM Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) initiative in their Global Compact for Migration reviews.⁵¹ Nevertheless, global migration governance is often characterized by agreements breaking down, exclusions and exemptions for particular situations and States, international conventions and norms not being applied, and roles being suspended.⁵² Tensions still exist between States and other actors on priorities and steps to be taken towards advancing global governance.⁵³ The fluidity of concepts and policy categories that do not necessarily reflect the reality and needs of migrants pose a challenge when generating solutions. The difficulty of agreeing, at the global level, on concrete measures to implement the Global Compact for Migration in a gender-responsive way – despite the availability of best practices and guidance material⁵⁴ – is also a reflection of different priorities among Member States.

From a civil society perspective, in an effort to reduce barriers to civil society engagement in IMRF processes, the Action Committee IMRF assessment paper identified eleven commitments and action points that call for more receptive and more inclusive measures to be taken by Member States, international organizations, and other stakeholders.⁵⁵

Another tension relates to the ways that countries of destination, origin and transit are separated and treated differently in policy discussions.⁵⁶ In fact, all regions of the world include States that are simultaneously countries of destination, origin and transit for migrants, and have to deal with the challenges and opportunities associated with all directions of migration flow.

Achieving a compromise or revisiting some of the current policy categories of migrant populations is difficult given the current geopolitics. This is especially so with regard to the protection of persons on the move or internally displaced persons (see text box below). Rather than revisiting or updating existing regimes such as the international protection regime, States are seeking ways to create new approaches to govern emerging challenges. This is

⁵⁰ For example, through SDG indicator 10.7.2 on “Number of countries with policies to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people” as well as the Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) initiative. See also Mosler Vidal and Laczko, 2022; IOM, 2022.

⁵¹ IOM, n.d.a.

⁵² van Riemsdijk et al., 2021; Pécoud, 2021b.

⁵³ Ricorda, 2022.

⁵⁴ See Gender + Migration Hub, n.d.; IOM, 2023.

⁵⁵ Civil Society Action Committee, 2023.

⁵⁶ Triandafyllidou, 2022.

the case in the area of climate-related displacement, large movements of persons due to displacement or even conflict-related displacements.⁵⁷

Some of the tensions emerging at the regional and national level disrupt cooperation at the global level. Regional responses or the priorities of hegemony (that is, politically and economically dominant countries within regions) often spill over to the global scene and, in effect, determine the direction of the global governance of migration or the emphasis placed on cooperation between States on migration. Regional responses have been central to States' reactions to displacement and large movements, but innovation observed in specific regions has not been reflected in global action. For example, in response to the Venezuelan crisis, countries in South America and the Caribbean adopted measures to protect the rights of migrants and refugees, including measures aimed at regularizing their stay and access to the labour market. However, efforts to include regularization of stay or access to labour markets in global agreements have not been successful. Thus, cooperation at the regional level is fuelled by crisis management and common interests to resolve regional challenges, but there is still reluctance at the global level when it comes to including such approaches in global agreements.

Annual global figures published by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show that approximately two thirds of the world's displaced people are internally displaced persons (IDPs). Despite calls for the inclusion of IDPs in both compacts,⁵⁸ the Global Compact for Migration does not include a reference to IDPs, and the Global Compact on Refugees only makes minor references to the issue of internal displacement, making IDPs "a troubling gap".⁵⁹ In this context, the Office of the Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement was established in 2022 to mobilize action on protracted displacement, and to bring about a change in how the United Nations system and other actors engage on this issue (see text box below).

Steps towards the protection of internally displaced persons

There were 59.1 million internally displaced people – 53.2 million because of conflict and violence, and 5.9 million as a result of disasters – throughout the world at the end of 2021, across 141 countries and territories.^a IDPs include persons who are forced to move or leave their homes to avoid the effects of armed conflict or violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.^b IDPs are often stuck in situations of "protracted displacement".

The United Nations has taken several measures towards addressing the plight and situation of IDPs. Recognizing the growing number of persons displaced within national borders and the need for urgent action, in 1992 the Secretary-General appointed a representative on IDPs to evaluate existing legal protections and the institutional mechanism for IDPs. Continuous discussions on the situation of IDPs led to a set of guiding principles on internal displacement in 1998, and their subsequent adoption into national and regional legal instruments.

⁵⁷ Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017.

⁵⁸ On IDPs and the Global Compact for Migration, see Jimenez-Damary, 2018. On the Global Compact on Refugees and IDPs, see Rushing and Clarey, 2017.

⁵⁹ Aleinikoff, 2018:617.

Tensions around addressing internal displacement partly arise from governments underestimating the consequences of inaction. Even when the importance of action is recognized and political will on the part of States exists, capacity gaps and operational constraints frequently stymie progress. In addition, State responsibility to their displaced citizens is often sidelined as a result of competing domestic priorities, and also because of the limited accountability and transparency of State actors that fail to respond to, or even in some cases cause, internal displacement.^c As a result, there are as yet no concrete solutions to the problem of providing protection and assistance to IDPs.^d

The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants mentioned “the need for reflection on effective strategies to ensure adequate protection and assistance for internally displaced persons and to prevent and reduce such displacement.” But this was not further developed in either the Global Compact for Migration or the Global Compact on Refugees, apart from a discussion of displacement as part of the commitment of States to minimize the drivers compelling people to move (objective 2 of the Global Compact for Migration). In the Global Compact on Refugees, displacement is only referenced with regard to implementing the comprehensive refugee response framework.

Encouraging signs of increasing political focus at the global level towards the plight of IDPs include the establishment of a United Nations Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Internal Displacement in 2019, to find concrete solutions to internal displacement, and the subsequent launch of the Secretary-General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement. The panel’s report identified 10 innovative and concrete recommendations aimed at preventing, responding to, and achieving solutions to internal displacement. The recommendations underscore the need to share responsibility across States and among all actors, including the private sector and civil society organizations, in underpinning solutions to end displacement.^e Acknowledging the complexities of displacement requires that international actors move beyond a humanitarian model towards an approach based on a humanitarian–peace–development nexus that strengthens public systems and services as a whole, targeting displaced persons and their destination communities. In addition, the recommendations emphasize the need for displaced persons to be part of the dialogue and engaged in jointly designing solutions to ending displacement. The need for international solidarity at the global level is essential to addressing the challenges faced by displaced persons.

In 2022, following up on the report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Internal Displacement, the United Nations Secretary-General launched an Action Agenda on internal displacement with three goals: “to support internally displaced people to find durable solutions to their displacement; to better prevent new displacement crises from emerging; and to ensure those facing displacement receive effective protection and assistance”.^f

^a IDMC, 2022.

^b United Nations, 1998.

^c Desai et al., 2021.

^d United Nations, 2021b; IDMC, 2022.

^e United Nations, 2021b.

^f United Nations, 2022b.

Labour migration governance is another area of contestation and fragmentation. While most States acknowledge the need for migrant labour given labour shortages, they fall short of taking steps to protect migrant workers or provide necessary pathways to facilitate their recruitment, entry and stay in countries where their skills are needed, particularly in “low skill” sectors. Globally, migrant workers at all skill levels face impediments and challenges because of gaps in or non-existent regulation and lack of cooperation between States; a limited number of bilateral labour agreements between countries include the kinds of worker protections advocated by activists, scholars and non-governmental organizations.⁶⁰ Migrant workers in the informal sector are subject to exploitation by employers and recruiters; this is especially true for women and girls, who face multiple and intersecting layers of discrimination. Several objectives of the Global Compact for Migration (2, 5, 6, 16, 18 and 21) commit States to promoting the global governance of labour mobility, yet insufficient measures by some States still undermine the welfare and human rights of migrant workers.

As international migration continues to play a prominent role in shaping political agendas and geopolitics in States and regions, polarizing political discussions often focus on simplistic, binary options, without considering flexible solutions for all parties including migrants. In response, current approaches to migration governance, including at the global level, need to be reconsidered in order to address these tensions.⁶¹

The way forward: Expectations, challenges and opportunities for future editions of the International Migration Review Forum

Paragraph 102 of the Global Compact on Refugees states that indicators to measure its success would be developed ahead of the first Global Refugee Forum in 2019. In contrast, the Global Compact for Migration, as a “collective commitment to improving cooperation on international migration” (paragraph 8), only included eight paragraphs on implementation (40–47), with no information on how its implementation or success would be monitored. This left the Global Compact for Migration implementation monitoring question to the 2022 IMRF.

The IMRF reminded the international community that the Global Compact for Migration will be the blueprint for much stronger international cooperation in the 2020s, especially compared to what existed before the 2010s, based on common understanding, shared responsibility and unity of purpose among the vast majority of United Nations Member States. Moving forward, three aspects of the IMRF Progress Declaration can lay the ground for a further strengthening of international cooperation on migration, in the lead-up to the next IMRF in 2026, and towards the third IMRF in 2030 that will take place in a crucial year for the United Nations and the international community.

First, paragraph 70 of the Progress Declaration requests “the Secretary-General, in his next biennial report, to propose, for the consideration of Member States, a limited set of indicators, drawing on the global indicator framework for the SDGs and targets of the 2030 Agenda as contained in General Assembly resolution 71/313 of 6 July 2017 and other relevant frameworks, to assist Member States, upon their request, in conducting inclusive reviews of progress related to the implementation of the Global Compact”. This request opens up the possibility for a clearer and more systematic approach towards reporting on implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, starting from the next IMRF. The United Nations Network on Migration has already activated a new dedicated workstream with the difficult task of creating a limited set of indicators for a global framework that

⁶⁰ Chilton and Woda, 2022.

⁶¹ Pécoud, 2021a and 2021b.

includes 10 guiding principles and 23 objectives, possibly drawing on the methodology used to track progress on SDG indicator 10.7.2. No official baseline has been set; as a consequence, Member States may look, during the IMRF in 2026, for the international community to build a baseline against which progress will be assessed from 2030, a year that will also mark the end of the SDG era. The development of indicators remains a critical element that is watched closely by the international community – particularly from civil society – to support Member States in effectively implementing the Global Compact for Migration.

Second, the latter part of the same paragraph requests that the Secretary-General “include a comprehensive strategy for improving disaggregated migration data at the local, national, regional and global levels”. Such a strategy can build on several years of work in this space, especially by IOM and the United Nations Expert Group on Migration Statistics.⁶²

Third, in paragraph 76, Member States also requested “the Secretary-General, with the support of the Network and other relevant actors, to include actionable recommendations on strengthening cooperation on missing migrants and providing humanitarian assistance to migrants in distress, including by collaborating with humanitarian actors, in his next biennial report, with the aim of preventing loss of life in transit”. The United Nations Network on Migration has already set up a workstream to develop such recommendations in a participatory way.

In upcoming years, the international community is expected to work towards a post-2030 United Nations framework for international cooperation and action. The incremental progress towards global migration governance since the turn of the century, and its acceleration since 2015, are paving the ground for human mobility to become a more central issue for the post-2030 United Nations framework. Throughout the 2020s and beyond, the Global Compact for Migration is expected to be an enabling framework for countries to work together on migration governance, solve some of the tensions outlined in this chapter, and navigate global challenges.

The reality of migration is that it requires a truly whole-of-government, whole-of-society governance approach. Developments in global migration governance will only benefit all persons on the move if the emerging architecture accommodates this reality.

⁶² See United Nations, 2018b; Mosler-Vidal, 2021.

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9

A POST-PANDEMIC REBOUND? MIGRATION AND MOBILITY GLOBALLY AFTER COVID-19¹

Introduction

The impact of COVID-19 on human populations cannot be overstated. The pandemic caused 12 per cent of worldwide deaths in 2020/2021.² In Western Europe, the 2020 mortality increase was the highest since the Second World War, and in Eastern Europe it was the highest since the break-up of the Soviet Union.³ COVID-19 vaccines were able to prevent approximately 19.8 million excess deaths.⁴ But this did not prevent COVID-19 from altering overall life expectancy in many countries: life expectancy at birth declined for males in the United States of America by 2.2 years, in Lithuania by 1.7 years, and comparable declines were recorded in 11 countries for males and 8 countries for females.⁵ Even though the worst of the pandemic is over in most places, successive waves of new variants continue to disrupt everyday life (see Figure 1 and Appendix A).

This chapter focuses on the transformative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on global migration and mobility, providing an update to the chapter on COVID-19 in the previous World Migration Report.⁶ The chapter asks: How have travel and movement restrictions changed since the last report? How have migration and mobility patterns evolved across the same period? What are the most important long-term implications of these trends? The chapter reveals that human migration and mobility have rebounded considerably since the nadir of the pandemic in mid-2020, but remain below 2019 levels for most of the world. This prolonged reduction, together with increased variation in overall levels of human migration and mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic, has had a transformative impact.

¹ Alan Gamlen, Professor, The Australian National University; Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Research and Publications Division, IOM; S. Irudaya Rajan, Chairperson, International Institute of Migration and Development.

² IISD, 2022. In addition, during 2020/2021, around 15 million excess deaths were reported across the world (ibid.). An estimate produced via a machine-learning model for 223 countries and regions showed that the excess deaths is two to four times higher than the reported number of confirmed deaths due to COVID-19 (*The Economist*, n.d.).


³ Aburto et al., 2022.

⁴ Watson et al., 2022.

⁵ Aburto et al., 2022.

⁶ See McAuliffe et al., 2021a, which analysed the first 12 months of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure 1. Examples of the broad impacts of COVID-19




Source: See Appendix A for details.

A labyrinth of travel restrictions

One of the earliest and most important responses to COVID-19 by States has been the imposition of travel restrictions, both internal and international. International travel restrictions were implemented particularly quickly and extensively, and they have persisted well beyond the acute phase of the pandemic in many places: far more so than other COVID-19 restrictions (Figure 2).⁷ On 1 January 2020 almost no States had international travel controls, but by 1 April almost all States had them. This level of border closure persisted for almost three years, until January 2023. By comparison, other pandemic control measures – including internal mobility restrictions, school and workplace closures, stay home orders and restrictions on gatherings – have been both less widespread and less durable than international travel restrictions.

Figure 2. Government responses to minimize COVID-19 transmission, by number of countries, January 2020 to January 2023



Source: Hale et al., 2023.

Note: As at 1 January 2023. The term “international travel controls” is used by Oxford, and includes screening arrivals, quarantining arrivals, banning arrivals or total border closure. It is also important to note that categories are COVID-19-related only and do not reflect other travel restrictions that may have already been in place, such as those related to visa restrictions, entry bans based on specific citizens, and departure or exit restrictions.

⁷ The Oxford Government Response Tracker documented policies from January 2020 through to the end of December 2022.

At the regional level, there have been significant differences in COVID-19 response measures, particularly travel restrictions (see Appendix B). Over a sustained period, Asia maintained the highest rates of all types of restriction throughout the first two years of the pandemic, whereas Africa experienced gradual declines in all types except international travel restrictions. The patterns in Europe differ markedly from elsewhere, with easing of international and internal travel restrictions during the summer holidays in mid-2020 and mid-2021, and a sharp drop in all restrictions from May 2022. But the wider story is consistent across world regions: more than three years after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, there are many more COVID-19-related restrictions on mobility than existed in December 2019, and in some world regions, international travel is still tightly controlled. For example, on 1 January 2023 over 30 African States maintained international travel controls that did not exist prior to the pandemic.

The imposition of international travel restrictions early in the acute phase of the pandemic underscored how migration has been increasingly “securitized” by States, sometimes at the expense of human rights and proportionality of responses to national emergencies.⁸ Some analysts anticipated that States might use the pandemic to undermine human rights through the imposition and continuation of extraordinary measures well beyond the COVID-19 public health emergency:

[A] state of emergency can sometimes be used as a pretext for abuses, such as arbitrary detention, censorship, or other authoritarian measures. ... There are increasing concerns that some governments might capitalize on emergency powers to undermine democratic principles, eliminate dissent, and violate the principles on necessity and proportionality. Most problematic are expansions of executive powers and repressive measures, which might continue after the national emergency in the respective countries.⁹

The current situation bears out such fears. Over two and a half years after the global pandemic was declared, and more than 20 months after the first vaccines were rolled out, several countries still imposed significant international travel and movement restrictions, despite substantially reduced public health risks. So-called “zero-covid” policies continued in some locations, with commentators pointing to population control measures being given priority over economic and social recovery.¹⁰

⁸ Chetail, 2020; McAuliffe, 2020; Ponta, 2020.

⁹ Ponta, 2020.

¹⁰ Syailendrawati et al., 2022; Lu, 2022.

Stranded migrants during the COVID-19 crisis

The impacts on migrants who had become stranded due to travel restrictions and were unable to return home or move elsewhere were profound for some groups, particularly those who were already in exploitative or otherwise vulnerable situations prior to COVID-19. By mid-July 2020, an estimated 2.75 million international migrants had become stranded globally, with the highest numbers stranded in the Middle East and North Africa region (and Gulf countries especially).¹¹

Immediate impacts involved loss of employment due to COVID-19 lockdowns and other measures (including in countries without adequate social protection systems), falling into irregular status and facing detention or deportation, major health-related impacts such as the increased risk of COVID-19 infection and illness, and major family-related disruptions. In many cases, the effects of these impacts were discernibly gendered due, for example, to underlying structural differences in labour markets and gender power differentials connected to temporal and geographic aspects. For instance, domestic migrant workers were particularly hard hit during the pandemic, the majority of whom continue to be female (and who have been migrating along specific corridors for decades).¹² See the migrant's voice text box below for a female domestic worker's experience of becoming stranded during COVID-19.

One of the more dominant and recurring findings of migration research globally relates to the significant differences experienced by migrants of different genders in terms of the overall burden of care, with consequent mental and physical health impacts.¹³ While there has been little in the way of focus on stranded migrants as a distinct cohort, the added pressure of being stranded – and often without support – heralded some gender-based responses from women's groups in different locations around the world. In India, for example, self-inspired responses of women's groups included voluntary community kitchens that provided free meals to stranded migrants, some of which continued for almost five months.¹⁴

Indirect but nevertheless profound gender-related impacts on safety and well-being connected to COVID-19 measures are likely to be felt for generations to come. In some Indian municipalities, for example, child-protection authorities reported that COVID-19 resulted in an increase in (girl) child marriages due to disrupted education, household economic shocks, increasing reliance on marriage payments, disruptions to local government services and programmes and increased guardian-related deaths due to COVID-19.¹⁵

¹¹ IOM, 2020.

¹² See, for example, ADB and UN Women, 2022; Almasri, 2022; Power, 2020.

¹³ ADB and UN Women, 2022.

¹⁴ Kolet et al., 2021.

¹⁵ Thangaperumal et al., 2022.

Migrant's voice: Trapped during COVID-19

Htoo Gay War quit her job as a domestic worker in January [2020] because her employer refused to allow her to take one day off each week – just before Thailand reported its first case of the novel coronavirus pandemic. Three months later, the pregnant 30-year-old from Myanmar has been unable to find a new job as Thailand has declared a state of emergency, shutting malls, schools and bars to curb the spread of the virus, which has infected some 3,000 people.

“I want to go home to be with my parents, because at least they can take care of me while I’m out of work and don’t have any money”, she said from the central province of Pathum Thani.

“But I can’t go back now that the borders are closed”, she said, adding that her family are scraping by on her husband’s salary of 8,000 baht (\$247) per month.

Thailand has about 2.8 million registered migrant workers mainly from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos, government figures show. But the United Nations estimates that 2 million more work informally across the country.

At least half a million migrant workers in Thailand have been left unemployed as a result of the coronavirus crisis, estimates the Migrant Working Group, a network of non-governmental organisations promoting migrant rights.

Source: Abridged extract from Wongsamuth, 2020.

A rebound in movements


The restrictions discussed above caused major disruptions to all forms of human mobility, from air travel within and between countries, to local community visits to workplaces and stores. All these forms of mobility have rebounded considerably, but at very different rates for different countries and for different forms of mobility. By December 2022, all forms of air travel had recovered significantly but remained well below 2019 levels.¹⁶ International passenger numbers were still between 1 and 49 per cent lower than before the pandemic, while domestic passenger numbers sat 9 to 42 per cent lower in all world regions except North America, where they were 6 per cent higher than in 2019. Local community mobility – consisting of visits to transit stations, workplaces, pharmacies, grocery stores, and places of retail and recreation – has rebounded more vigorously than air travel, but there are striking differences among countries. In general, less developed countries have experienced a much more rapid resurgence of community mobility, while the recovery of community mobility in more developed countries has been more muted.

¹⁶ ICAO, 2022. Where relevant, reference to geographic regions used by ICAO has been included in the discussion. See notes under Figures 4 and 5.

Air travel

Air passenger numbers have risen rapidly since early 2020 when lockdowns brought the world to a halt, but many airlines remained decimated even in late 2022. International air-travel passenger numbers were still below 2019 levels in all world regions. In Africa, they were still down by 10 per cent and in Europe by 25 per cent. One reason is that would-be travellers and migrants still face more complex and riskier regulatory environments than they did in 2019, involving long visa backlogs, the possibility of sudden border closures, reduced airline capacity, and sky-high prices. It often makes the most sense to delay travel plans. In Asia and the Pacific, these factors are compounded by the large distance between international borders in a region characterized by large national territories and widely dispersed archipelagos. In this world region, the number of international air passengers is still 49 per cent lower than in 2019, far lower than in any other world region.

Figure 3. International air travel passengers compared to 2019, by region




Source: ICAO, 2022.¹⁷

Note: The figure reflects ICAO geographic regions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Please refer to ICAO (2022) for more information.

¹⁷ ICAO, 2022: "Regional breakdown follows ICAO's six (6) statistical regions (Doc 9060). The same key impact indicators are presented under four (4) paths of two (2) scenarios, in comparison to: Baseline scenario, 2019 level and 2020/2021 level by international and domestic, as well as month, quarter and year. To avoid double counting: Number of 'international' passengers departing from each country and territory are aggregated in each region; Gross passenger operating revenues of all airlines serving 'international' routes from each country and territory are aggregated at regional level." ICAO, 2022:45: "2022 figures and estimates herein reflect the latest operational data and schedules filed by airlines but are subject to substantial changes, and will be updated with the situation evolving and more information available."

The recovery of domestic air travel passenger numbers is more geographically uneven. In some cases, international movement has been replaced by internal mobility. Domestic passenger numbers have rebounded to 6 per cent above 2019 levels in North America, but they remain well below pre-pandemic levels in Latin America and the Caribbean (down 9%), Africa (down 15%), and Europe (down 23%). They are a full quarter below 2019 levels in the Middle East, where complex political and security challenges deter people from moving between cities and regions within several major countries. Domestic passenger numbers are still 42 per cent below 2019 levels in Asia and the Pacific, where domestic travel often involves moving between distant, isolated islands or cities.

Figure 4. Domestic air travel passenger numbers compared to 2019, by region



Source: ICAO, 2022.

Note: The figure reflects ICAO geographic regions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Please refer to ICAO (2022) for more information.

It is important to note that in some parts of the world, land and sea travel for domestic and international mobility can be more significant than air travel. While, unlike air travel, there are no global data available on this transportation sector for comparative purposes, studies show that livelihood strategies were deeply affected by COVID-19 immobility. The text box below, for example, highlights key findings and responses to the impact of COVID-19 on cross-border traders in East Africa.

The impacts of COVID-19 on cross-border trade in the East African Community

Women SMEs [small medium enterprises] constitute about 74% of the traders. The estimation of the trade value in some Partner States is approximately US\$ 145.4 million in Rwanda and US\$ 606.6 million in Uganda. Cross-border trade is also estimated to account for the livelihood of about 60% of EAC residents hence its significance. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been increased restrictions on the movement of goods and people across borders threatening the livelihoods of traders & their families, and reduced revenue for the Partner States.

...

... Cross-border trade provides an important source of income for cross-border communities, and vulnerable groups, including women and smallholder farmers. Many of these communities live subsistence existences and require weekly trade across the border to purchase essentials to survive. The majority of informal cross-border trade consists of perishable agricultural products such as tomatoes, peppers, cassava, fish, and eggs. Traders receive very short notice – a couple of days in most cases – to prepare for border closures. The result is spoiled stock and hefty losses for traders.

...

Strengthening of Joint Border Communities with regards to procedures for ease of movement of persons, goods, and service between borders ... will help to ensure that livelihoods amongst the local communities is not disrupted. ... The EAC Region must cooperate to coordinate and harmonize COVID-19 border requirements and regulations to reduce delays, while not undermining the safety of trade. A Regional response plan plays a crucial role in coordinating the responses to the pandemic of the Partner States. It facilitates free and timely flow of cross-border trade. ... Financial institutions should lower conditions for accessing finances by women. ... Government should provide a government COVID-19 recovery fund and programs that are targeting specifically women cross border traders. This will help to boost finances for women whose businesses have been affected by the outbreak of COVID-19.

Source: Abridged extract from EALA, 2021.


Community mobility

In early 2020, most human beings were forced to stop all forms of mobility, including “community mobility” consisting of visits to transit stations, workplaces, grocery and pharmacy stores, and places of retail and recreation.¹⁸ Community mobility has since rebounded at different rates in different places. In general, by December 2022, it was clear that less developed countries were rebounding faster than more developed ones, which is the opposite of what intuition might suggest.

¹⁸ Using Google data on these categories of visits, we analysed community mobility trends for six major countries, one from each United Nations Region, ranked here by Human Development Index Score (HDI). Nigeria: Africa, population 211 million, HDI 0.535. Papua New Guinea (PNG): Oceania, population 9.8 million, HDI 0.558. India: Asia, population 1.4 billion, HDI 0.633. Brazil: Latin America, population 214 million, HDI 0.754. Italy: Europe, population 59 million, HDI 0.895. Canada: Northern America, population 38 million, HDI 0.936). Population figures are from UN DESA, 2022. HDI figures are from UNDP, 2022.

Community mobility rebounded with striking vigour in much of the developing world. In Nigeria, all types of visits plummeted by an average of 48 per cent in April 2020, but rebounded to an average of 59 per cent above pre-pandemic levels in the first half of October 2022. Despite its different geography, Papua New Guinea showed similar trends: all kinds of visits initially dropped by a monthly average of 19 per cent in April 2020, but subsequently shot up to around double their pre-pandemic levels in the first half of October 2022. In India, visits dropped by an average of two thirds during April 2020, but climbed back to a third above pre-pandemic levels in the first half of October 2022. This may be because many developing countries depend heavily on primary industries, which require moving physical objects, so that clearing pandemic backlogs may involve temporary mobility spikes. A more tentative and intriguing hypothesis is that some structural transformation may explain this vigorous resurgence of community mobility, perhaps related to large-scale outflows from urban to rural areas, which may drive longer-term changes in the relationship between cities and their regional hinterlands.

Figure 5. Changes in community mobility since before the pandemic, selected countries



Source: Google, 2022.

Note: This chart shows the average percentage difference (relative to the period before the pandemic) in visits to pharmacy and grocery stores, retail and recreation places, workplaces and transit stations. All trendlines are 28-day moving averages. Further information on Google mobility data is available at Google, 2022.

The rebound of community mobility has been much more subdued in more developed countries. In Italy, most forms of community mobility remained 1 to 8 per cent below pre-pandemic benchmarks on average in early October 2022, with the exception of visits to grocery and pharmacy stores, which rose to a fortnightly average of 19 per cent above pre-pandemic levels. In Canada, visits to retail and recreation areas, grocery stores, and pharmacies had only rebounded to slightly above pre-pandemic levels. Remarkably, in the first half of October 2022, visits to transit stations remained 21 per cent lower than before the pandemic. Visits to workplaces remained 17 per cent lower on average than pre-pandemic levels during the first half of October. These last two figures in particular probably reflect a structural shift towards remote working in developed countries (see discussion on counter-urbanization in the next section).

An interesting case is Brazil, which combines the characteristics of both developing and developed countries. Here, “essential” mobility bounced back robustly: compared to pre-pandemic baselines, visits to workplaces were 58 per cent higher on average during the first half of October 2022. Visits to pharmacies and grocery stores were 26 per cent higher on average for the same period, mirroring the trends of less developed countries. However, “non-essential” mobility had only just recovered to 2019 levels, similar to trends in more developed countries. Visits to transit stations averaged 4 per cent above pre-pandemic baselines in early October 2022, while visits to places of retail and recreation were up just 7 per cent.

As well as temporary disruptions, the pandemic has caused structural shifts in how people move around their communities. In all six countries, “essential” visits to grocery stores and pharmacies have rebounded most vigorously. But for other forms of community mobility, there are sharp differences between the developed and developing worlds. In less developed countries, pandemic recovery is more likely to require mobility, whereas in more developed countries community mobility has declined, partly because such countries have both the occupations and the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure to enable remote work.

Post-pandemic transformations

The strong grip of COVID-19 on our lives has loosened, along with “normalcy” being restored in the daily workings of most socioeconomic and cultural institutions, mirroring the pre-pandemic era. However, there have been visible social transformations (temporary and structural) driven by the pandemic, and the domino effect of these changes can be observed across regions. For instance, decisions taken by different developed countries and pharmaceutical companies to safeguard their interests had a large domino effect on developing countries in terms of shortages of vaccines and unequal distribution of health-care products and services, which in turn caused declines in the quality of general health care and hampered recovery in affected countries.¹⁹ The pandemic also induced long-term changes to consumption patterns in developed and developing countries. For example, prior to COVID-19 in the United States, retail products and services such as groceries and health care were resistant to e-commerce platforms. However, during the pandemic the adoption curve bent significantly upward, changing consumption patterns and thereby widening the use of e-commerce platforms to include daily grocery shopping, resulting in estimated e-grocery sales of approximately 150 billion United States dollars (USD) in 2020.²⁰

¹⁹ Cati, 2022.

²⁰ Walton, 2020.

Another major post-pandemic phenomenon was the coupling of high inflation and global economic slowdown. In the second quarter of 2022, Global GDP growth began to stagnate at around 3 per cent, and was projected to further slowdown to 2.25 per cent in 2023.²¹ The key factor in the global growth slowdown is the ongoing tightening of monetary policies in major economies, in response to high inflation.²² The effect of the Russian Federation–Ukraine war has put additional upward pressure on prices, particularly for energy and food. These changes have been influenced or aggravated by lower migration. In conventional migrant-origin regions this has resulted in rising unemployment, inflation,²³ and intensification of State control.²⁴ (As an example of country-level insights, see the text box below for discussion on COVID-19 research in India.) In more developed migrant-destination countries, the impacts of lower migration have been historically low levels of unemployment, resulting in acute skills and labour shortages and the added inflationary pressure of rising wages. The impact of the post-pandemic transformations will depend on the longevity of these effects and the recovery path of different regions. Only time will tell how these post-pandemic transformations will affect future migration and mobility patterns.

Post-pandemic ambiguity in India: a case for regional specificity and new methods of analysis

The impact of the pandemic has been severe on both internal and international Indian emigrant workers, particularly low-skilled emigrants on short-term contracts, migrants working within the informal economy and undocumented workers.^a The exact impact has varied by the occupation and income level of workers.

India has a national diaspora of around 18 million Indians abroad, the world's largest.^b India is also the world's largest recipient of remittances, at USD 87 billion in 2021.^c Loss of jobs along with wage theft and lack of social security during the pandemic has plunged many Indian migrants into deep debt and insecurity.^d Amidst the global panic, reverse migrants had to incur huge expenses on air tickets, COVID-19 tests and quarantine centres.^e According to the Ministry of External Affairs, over 1,385,670 Indian nationals were repatriated by the Government within six months of the nationwide lockdown.^f Many more international migrants returned without government support.

The size and speed of internal migration also dropped considerably during and after the pandemic, resulting in a crisis of mobility.^g The pandemic has had an overwhelming effect on internal labour migration patterns and has reshaped work in both rural and urban areas. There has been a decline of almost 10 per cent in blue-collar workforce mobility towards cities, which has drastically cut the labour supply for major industries.^h The official estimate of reverse internal migration is 51.6 per cent for men and 11 per cent for women.ⁱ Though women outnumber men in internal migration, a disproportionately high percentage of female migration is identified as migration as a dependant (which excludes securement of jobs post-migration). This could explain the gender gap observed. There is insufficient data to properly capture the effects of the pandemic on migration in India. Data omission is severe regarding gender minorities, especially the transgender community.

²¹ OECD, 2022.

²² Ibid.

²³ Condon et al., 2022.

²⁴ Barriga et al., 2020.

Some advocate for a region-specific approach for India to tackle the issue of reverse migration, on the basis that the pandemic has affected different states differently.ⁱ The continuing and immediate effects of the pandemic require an analysis that addresses the structural conditions, complexity, uncertainty and regional specificity to help us rethink development and migration. In order to understand post-pandemic transformations and to form effective policy interventions, the delayed demographic effect of pandemic migration, mortality and fertility trends needs to be extensively studied using an inclusive approach.

^a Srivastava, 2021.

^b UN DESA, 2021.

^c World Bank, 2021b.

^d Kumar and Akhil, 2021.

^e Government of India, 2020.

^f Rajan et al., 2020.

^g World Bank, 2020.

^h Bhattacharyya and Menon, 2021.

ⁱ Mishra, 2022.

^j Dreze, 2020.

Growth slowdown and remittances: a heavy burden for some?

The World Bank predicted that global remittance figures would decline by 20 per cent due to COVID-19 in April 2020, revised to 14 per cent in October 2020, in comparison to pre-pandemic levels.²⁵ However, remittance flows ended up declining by just 2.4 per cent globally, with USD 540 billion going to low- and middle-income countries in 2020,²⁶ just 1.6 per cent below 2019 levels.²⁷ In 2021, remittance flows grew by 7.3 per cent to reach USD 589 billion.²⁸

After controlling for economic activity and other pandemic measures, remittances responded positively to COVID-19 infection rates in migrant countries.²⁹ In short, migrants seem to send more money to support their family when the COVID-19 infection rate goes up, which functioned as an automatic stabilizer for the home country (in terms of their output and consumption). This phenomenon stands in opposition to the World Bank's prediction of a pandemic-induced decrease in remittances, but is consistent with the Bank's long-term observations that remittances are counter-cyclical: when other economic indicators go down, migrants send more money, to help their struggling families and communities at home. In addition, studies have established a long-term relationship between remittances and real GDP, wherein a 10 per cent increase in remittances was associated with 0.66 per cent permanent increase in GDP.³⁰

Some analysts point out that the increase in remittances could also reflect the switch in the mode of sending remittances from informal channels to formal channels that was induced by pandemic restrictions.³¹ Prior to the pandemic, evidence suggests that significant proportions of remittances were being transferred to families through

²⁵ World Bank, 2020.

²⁶ The remittance inflows rose by 6.5 per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean, 5.2 per cent for South Asia and 2.3 per cent for the Middle East and North Africa.

²⁷ World Bank, 2021a.

²⁸ World Bank, 2021b.

²⁹ Kpodar et al., 2021.

³⁰ Francois et al., 2022.

³¹ Kpodar et al., 2021.

informal channels (such as *hawala* or *hundi* or *fei-chien* networks, or in person).³² However, with lockdown measures, greater digitalization and reduced remittance transfer fees, migrants have undergone a behavioural switch, and have started relying more on formal channels to remit their transfers, as shown in the text box below.³³ Using flight arrival data, one study found that lower numbers of flight arrivals were associated with an increase in official remittances, after controlling for other factors.³⁴ A study using Mexican data revealed that the largest rise in remittances and bank accounts were registered in municipalities that were heavily dependent on informal channels during pre-pandemic times.³⁵

African money transfer firms thrive as pandemic spurs online remittances

Having fled an economic implosion in his native Zimbabwe, Brighton Takawira was able to support his mother back home with modest earnings from a small perfume business he set up in South Africa.

Then the pandemic struck. Borders closed. The buses he had used to send his cash stopped running. The pandemic gave remittance companies an advantage over their main competition in Africa: the sprawling informal networks of traders, bus drivers and travellers used by many migrants to send money home.

“I had to send something, even a few dollars”, said Takawira, though it meant sometimes going without bread. So he tried out an online remittance company on a friend’s recommendation.

He is one of many African migrants being pushed towards digital transfer services, often for the first time, during the pandemic.

This is fuelling a boom for Africa-focused money transfer companies, despite predictions from the World Bank of a historic 20% drop to \$445 billion in remittances to poorer countries this year due to a pandemic-induced global economic slump.

“We saw an increase of transfers as the diaspora wanted to help their family”, said Patrick Roussel, who heads mobile financial services for the Middle East and Africa at French telecom company Orange – a dominant player in French-speaking Africa. “We’ve seen an influx of new customers, and we see them mainly coming to us from the informal market”, said Andy Jury, chief executive of Mukuru, the company Takawira now uses.

Like Takawira, many had to dip into savings or make other sacrifices to do so, analysts and company officials say.

Jury and other industry executives say that shift is likely to last as digital remittance services are typically cheaper, faster and safer than informal networks, which are difficult for governments to regulate. Mukuru, which focuses mainly on African remittances and allows customers to send both cash and groceries, has seen a roughly 75% acceleration in growth compared to last year.

³² El Qorchi et al., 2003.

³³ Fernandes et al., 2022.

³⁴ Quayyum et al., 2021.

³⁵ Dinarte et al., 2021.

Remittances to sub-Saharan Africa officially totalled \$48 billion last year, according to the World Bank. Experts, however, say that figure tells only part of the story. Much of the money Africans ship home via informal networks is absent from official data. As those networks ground to a halt during lockdowns, formal money transfer businesses – particularly digital platforms – were suddenly the only game in town.

Source: Abridged extract from Bavier and Dzirutwe, 2020.

The resilience and recovery of remittances have not been universal. East Asia and the Pacific posted a decline of 7.9 per cent in remittances; in Europe and Central Asia they fell by 9.7 per cent, and in sub-Saharan Africa³⁶ by 12.5 per cent.³⁷ Several South Asian economies underwent international remittance shocks when oil prices collapsed in the initial phase of the pandemic, causing a sharp economic contraction across the Gulf region where many South Asian migrants reside.³⁸ This led to a sudden drop in foreign exchange earnings, which coincided with an increase in structural unemployment, and led to worsening welfare for millions of low-income families.³⁹ However, international remittance inflows to all major South Asian countries (India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) increased in 2021, with Pakistan recording the greatest growth over 2020 (19.6% compared to 8.0% for India and 2.2% for Bangladesh). A study of eight ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries recorded a decline in income in 73 per cent of sampled households in 2021.⁴⁰ Thailand experienced an economic contraction of 6.5 per cent, which pushed the poverty rate up to 8.8 per cent.⁴¹

It has long been recognized that migrants make transnational contributions to their homelands and kin abroad that go far beyond remittances.⁴² The pandemic has drawn attention to the increasingly important role that contributions of time, money, expertise and connections from diaspora groups can make to the alleviation of human suffering.⁴³ Such contributions have been steadily growing in recent years, facilitated by the expanding ability of highly dispersed community members to maintain a sense of congregation using digital social media tools, which have become increasingly pervasive. A key reason for the growing attention paid to “diaspora humanitarianism” since 2020 has been that this trend has accelerated, with the rise of remote work providing a huge stimulus to tech companies that provided tools for online-only collaboration during COVID-19 lockdowns.⁴⁴ In addition, lockdowns severely restricted the ability of conventional humanitarian organizations to access crisis zones and provide assistance.⁴⁵

³⁶ The decline in remittance flow to sub-Saharan Africa was significantly affected by a 28 per cent decline in remittance flows to Nigeria. Exclusion of Nigeria from calculations show a 2.3 per cent increase in remittance inflow (World Bank, 2021b).

³⁷ World Bank, 2021a.

³⁸ Arezki et al., 2020.

³⁹ Withers et al., 2022.

⁴⁰ Morgan and Trinh, 2021.

⁴¹ World Bank, 2021c.

⁴² Newland and Patrick, 2004; McAuliffe et al., 2019.

⁴³ Horst et al., 2015.

⁴⁴ Bursztynsky, 2020.

⁴⁵ *The Lancet*, 2020.

As a result, those in need in many parts of the world have had to depend almost exclusively on the contributions of friends and family living in more stable circumstances. The result has been, in some cases, a sense in crisis zones of having been abandoned by mainstream international humanitarian organizations, and a sense of increased solidarity with and dependence upon immediate family and community members, wherever they may be. This has also resulted in migrant groups, including refugee-led organizations, needing to become increasingly self-reliant, as international humanitarian responses have been deeply affected by COVID-19, as highlighted in the text box below.

Stories from the frontlines: Refugee-led organizations in the shadow of COVID-19

My name is Mary Tal, and I am a lawyer who grew up in the West African nation of Cameroon. I worked for Human Rights Defense Group before I became a refugee myself and had to flee home in 1998. When I was granted asylum in Cape Town, South Africa, I found my calling of serving fellow refugee women which led us to founding the Whole World Women Association (WWWA) in 2007. WWWA works to empower refugee women and children from all over the African continent through leadership and societal integration training, promoting HIV/AIDS awareness, providing legal assistance and protecting refugee rights.

When the COVID-19 pandemic reached South Africa in March 2020, our work changed completely in ways we were not prepared for. To name a few challenges, funding for the essential services we usually provided became scarce, our clients suffered from mental and emotional fatigue, and misinformation about COVID-19 circulated. Another challenge that broke my heart was knowing that some single mothers who we work with died from the virus leaving behind orphans. Other single mothers lost their jobs, the only source of income for their children. In response to these challenges, we at WWWA are providing food, masks, and sanitation supplies to the thousands of refugee women we support. We have also committed to supporting the children of our clients who have passed away for six months, and are helping their families pay for burial costs and to find a way to connect the children with their families, many of whom live in other countries. We cannot do this work alone. There needs to be better policies for supporting those who are most vulnerable during the pandemic. Our voices need to be heard by decision makers in order to humanise policies and better help refugee-led organisations support their communities.

Source: Abridged extract from *The Elders*, 2020.

In countries that experience political and climate challenges, such as the Sudan, COVID-19 increased the socioeconomic vulnerability of internal migrants.⁴⁶ Research on seasonal migrant workers in Eastern Sudan reported the inability to send remittances as a major constraint since the start of the pandemic,⁴⁷ and identified inflation as a significant ongoing threat to livelihoods.⁴⁸ Most Middle Eastern and North African countries have experienced high inflation,⁴⁹ and the price of staple foods has increased by more than 20 per cent in countries such as Djibouti,

⁴⁶ Eastern Sudan faces political issues since the Sudanese Revolution in 2018, recurrent political instability related to the Tigray conflicts and the resulting sudden influxes of refugees, as well as climate challenges such as repeatedly high rainfalls (Amin, 2020).

⁴⁷ Jourdain et al., 2022.

⁴⁸ UNDP, 2020.

⁴⁹ Messkoub, 2022.

the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.⁵⁰ The coming years will likely see ongoing uncertainty, transformations and counter-transformations.⁵¹ It is therefore important to monitor the recovery process closely, and to develop migration, diaspora and remittance policies that are holistic and shock resistant.

In a comparison between pandemic disruption and the global financial crisis, remittances to developing countries have fared far better in the pandemic. However, the recession in major destination countries was deeper during the pandemic than during the global financial crisis. A study showed that a 1 per cent increase in the number of COVID-19 cases per million population led to a 0.03 percentage point increase in remittances, on average.⁵² Regional specificities and recovery measures underscore how pandemic-induced changes in migration and labour-mobility patterns are influencing the post-pandemic economy. Internal policy measures such as cash transfers work along with remittance inflows to safeguard economies against crises. In Latin America, there was an increase in public spending of 2.9 per cent from 2019 to 2020.⁵³ Cash transfers were widely deployed as a post-COVID-19 policy measure in this region.⁵⁴ Regional employment has not fully rebounded to pre-COVID levels, but the difference is now small.⁵⁵ Meanwhile, international tourism began to recover in the Caribbean.⁵⁶ According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates in July 2022, growth in Latin America and the Caribbean is at 3 per cent, a significant reduction from 2021, but a healthy level by global standards.⁵⁷

On the other hand, European Union countries as well as OECD countries that are not members of the European Union are the origin of 55 per cent of remittances sent globally.⁵⁸ In particular, the United States, Switzerland, Germany, France and Luxembourg are among the top ten remittance-sending countries globally.⁵⁹ In the migrant-destination countries, inflationary pressures were on the rise mainly due to increasing energy and commodity prices, production bottlenecks and rising demand.⁶⁰ According to the IMF, a quick recovery of economic activity in many of the regions has increased core inflation relative to levels before the crisis.⁶¹ The inflationary pressures have been the strongest in countries where demand (especially of consumer goods) has recovered the fastest.⁶²

⁵⁰ World Bank, 2021d.

⁵¹ World Economic Forum, 2022a.

⁵² Quayyum et al., 2021.

⁵³ ECLAC, 2021.

⁵⁴ The four countries in the region with the highest spending on transfers in 2020 as a percentage of GDP are Mexico (8.6%), Chile (11.5%), Argentina (12.9%) and Uruguay (15.1%) (Solorza, 2021).

⁵⁵ Maurizio, 2022.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Adler et al., 2022.

⁵⁸ EMN and OECD, 2020.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ World Bank, 2022.

⁶¹ Adrian and Gopinath, 2021.

⁶² Ibid.

Automation, digital outsourcing and the changing role of labour mobility in the global economy

Between its catastrophic impacts on the global airline industry and its lasting changes to patterns of community mobility as mentioned above, the long tail of COVID-19 is reshaping the role of mobility in economies everywhere. In particular, falling mobility rates have gone hand-in-hand with rising rates of digitalization and automation, in a mutually reinforcing pattern.⁶³

Growing digital transformation has major effects on migrants and migration processes. Because of the pandemic, migrants now increasingly rely on digital sources for information and remittance transfers while governments increasingly rely on new digital systems to manage migration.⁶⁴ Adapting to online service provision has been a key focus during the pandemic health crisis, especially to cater to migrant populations and other vulnerable groups. For example, 14 out of 27 European Union countries adopted or switched to online health-care service provision, including videos and tutorials in different languages, as well as online consultations.⁶⁵ While these integration technologies can support migrant populations, the designs, development and implementation of these technologies must centre human rights, and human rights must not be restricted by the limits of technical feasibility.⁶⁶

Meanwhile, increasing digital transformation is itself partially a result of changing migration and mobility trends due to the pandemic. For example, a key impact of movement restrictions has been to drastically reduce labour supplies to major economic centres. In the international context, this means fewer immigrants to the main destination countries, while in the domestic context it means fewer internal migrants and commuters to dense urban areas. These reduced levels of migration and mobility have led to extremely tight labour markets in cities across the developed world. In theory, a smaller supply of immigrant labour should lead to higher wages in destination regions. It should come as little surprise therefore that many labour economists have declared the post-pandemic period a golden era for workers, involving plentiful job vacancies, rising wages, so-called “quiet quitting” (in which employees put less effort into their work), and a “great resignation”.⁶⁷

In theory, higher wages should in turn stimulate innovation, as firms reduce their dependence on costlier (immigrant) labour by investing in labour-saving technologies. This too is a prominent feature of the post-pandemic economy. On one hand, this has involved automating tasks in agriculture, manufacturing and non-tradeable services such as retail, hospitality and health care that, in the several decades prior to the pandemic, had become highly dependent on migrant labour.⁶⁸ For example, despite an overall downturn in the technology start-up sector, AgTech firms such as United States-based FarmVise are attracting increasing venture capital to develop their autonomous weeding robots, based on demographic projections in which farmers are ageing and migrant workers are increasingly difficult to source.⁶⁹

⁶³ McAuliffe et al., 2021b.

⁶⁴ McAuliffe, 2021; United Nations Network on Migration, 2020.

⁶⁵ European Commission, 2022.

⁶⁶ McAuliffe et al., 2021a.

⁶⁷ Williams, 2021.

⁶⁸ Adrian and Gopinath, 2021.

⁶⁹ Heater, 2022.

On the other hand, automation has involved “digital outsourcing” from the higher-skilled sectors of service and knowledge economies. As firms struggle to find savings in the economic aftermath of the pandemic, one of the easiest decisions is to cut expenditure on business travel and downtown office space, while investing more in digital transformation in the hope of increasing productivity. The resulting digital outsourcing involves firms adopting online labour platforms to allow for tasks to be performed remotely, including legal and financial services, data analytics, software development and design, translation, transcription, image annotation and content moderation.⁷⁰

At the domestic level, increased digital outsourcing is contributing to much higher rates of working from home, and thus lower levels of commuter mobility. A widely cited econometric study suggested that remote work will persist because the pandemic jolted firms past the inertia tying them to unnecessary in-person work patterns, while reducing the stigma of working from home, catalysing a wave of innovative remote-work technologies, showing employees that remote work could be more satisfying, and demonstrating to employers that it could also be cheaper.⁷¹ During 2020/2021, there was strong evidence of counter-urbanization – internal migration away from cities – especially in high-income countries. In the United States, an estimated 37 per cent of jobs can be worked from home,⁷² and during the pandemic this allowed the average outflow of people from urban neighbourhoods to double in 2020.⁷³ Such reversals to decades of relentless urbanization went hand in hand with decreased mobility within and between cities, driven by mobility restrictions accelerating the adoption of remote work.

As part of these trends, “work from home” is metastasizing into “work from anywhere”, with substantial implications for the role of labour mobility in the global economy. At the international level, the rise of online digital labour platforms has accelerated a trend of firms in more developed countries outsourcing tasks to workers in less developed countries. Even before the pandemic, the bulk of labour demand on such platforms originated in countries such as Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, while the resulting work itself was largely performed in countries such as India, the Philippines and Ukraine.⁷⁴ Prior to COVID-19, so-called “digital nomad” communities – predominantly comprised of professionals dependent on digital media – advocated for an alternative mode of work with the aid of ICT. However, COVID-19 presented an opportunity for non-nomads to experience the digital nomadic life, while digital nomads reflected on COVID-19’s negative impacts on their highly valued “freedom to move”, forcing them to reassess the viability of nomadism.⁷⁵

These patterns are not uniform or universal; for example, there is much geographical variation in patterns of rural–urban migration and remote working since the pandemic. In 2020, Spain experienced net migration losses of 6 per cent from high density areas, and a drop of 15.4 per cent in urban migration; in contrast, sparsely populated regions saw net migration gains, and have now rebounded to pre-pandemic patterns.⁷⁶ Similarly, in the United Kingdom,⁷⁷ with the implementation of the Government’s European Union exit strategy in July 2021, there was a visible increase in mobility intensity across urban areas, which came close to pre-pandemic levels.⁷⁸ In 2020 Australia saw a net loss of 11,200 individuals from capital cities to less populated rural regions, along with a 52 per cent

⁷⁰ ILO, 2021a.

⁷¹ Barrero et al., 2021.

⁷² Dingel and Neiman, 2020. These jobs mainly include financial work, business management, professional and scientific services.

⁷³ Whitaker, 2021.

⁷⁴ ILO, 2021a.

⁷⁵ Ehn et al., 2022.

⁷⁶ González-Leonardo et al., 2022.

⁷⁷ There was a mobility decline of 44 per cent, with the sharpest decline in the cities exceeding 50 per cent in 2020 (Rowe et al., 2023).

⁷⁸ González-Leonardo et al., 2022.

decrease in the use of public transport, and a reduction in demand for commercial space in cities of 24 per cent.⁷⁹ However, remote work cannot be extended to labour-intensive, tourism-heavy economies.⁸⁰ Tourism-dependent countries such as Aruba, the Maldives, Thailand, Antigua and Barbuda, Cambodia and Costa Rica have introduced policies and special funds to spur domestic and international tourism because tourism declined so drastically as a result of pandemic movement restrictions.⁸¹ They are not alone. International tourism rebounded by 4 per cent in 2021, but it remains far below pre-pandemic levels.⁸²

Health care and demographic effects: a scattered picture

There has been widespread criticism of pandemic interventions to control the movement of migrants, which have created barriers to accessing health and social services in countries of destination.⁸³ During the peak of the pandemic, internally displaced persons (IDPs) were unable to follow prescribed public health measures; combined with their already precarious living conditions, this led to markedly higher infection rates.⁸⁴ Rising racism and xenophobia sparked discussions on the status of migrants and the differences that arise in the provision of services.⁸⁵ However, the complexity of multi-pronged policy responses and the absence of recorded data at the global level makes it impossible to measure the overall impacts on migrants during the pandemic.

That said, many countries made robust efforts to address the specific needs of migrants during the pandemic (see text box on COVID-19 and regularization, below). Basic or emergency health care was guaranteed to migrant workers, irrespective of their status, in Argentina, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and 20 Member States of the European Union, amongst others.⁸⁶ Undocumented migrants were provided with free access to emergency health services related to COVID-19 in quite a few countries and municipalities around the world, including in Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, France, Finland, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Spain, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Switzerland.⁸⁷ Some countries provided targeted public health materials and information for migrant populations. Migrants in Norway reported that they received sufficient pandemic information through official channels, which was correlated with high levels of trust in government and official sources.⁸⁸ Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have made recruitment companies take responsibility for migrants' health insurance prior to departure, and have issued administrative circulars setting out guidelines for both employers and employees.⁸⁹

⁷⁹ Byrne, 2021.

⁸⁰ According to World Tourism Organization estimates, the pandemic disrupted tourism by lowering international travel by 73 per cent in 2020 (UNWTO, n.d.).

⁸¹ Babii and Nadeem, 2021.

⁸² UNWTO, n.d.

⁸³ IFRCRCS, 2018.

⁸⁴ Ag Ahmed et al., 2021.

⁸⁵ WHO, 2021.

⁸⁶ FRA, 2011.

⁸⁷ Ibid. Note that these examples are not exhaustive: other countries may have also provided free access. Several countries also offered the possibility for undocumented migrants to remain without penalty; others instituted regularization programmes, which enabled access to health services.

⁸⁸ Madar et al., 2022.

⁸⁹ ESCWA, 2020.

COVID-19 and regularization

The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in some countries taking exceptional measures to respond to the heightened needs of irregular migrants. Early in 2020, Portugal acted quickly by temporarily regularizing the status of all migrants. This was followed by Italy who implemented a targeted regularization for migrant workers in key sectors of the economy. In February 2021, Colombia announced that it will regularize more than 1.7 million Venezuelans in its territory. ... Other countries which introduced regularizations as a response to COVID-19 include: the Dominican Republic, Malaysia and Thailand.

Source: IOM, 2021.

The wider health impacts of COVID-19 have demographic implications that may reshape future migration significantly. The pandemic disrupted child immunization programmes in several world regions, increasing the vaccination gap by 8 million, and led to the postponement of 60 lifesaving mass immunization campaigns in 50 countries affecting 228 million people.⁹⁰ Around 10.5 million children lost one or more caregivers.⁹¹ The health impacts of the pandemic have fallen more heavily on the developing world, in ways that will shape future demography and migration.

Major economies have been affected by both excess mortality and changing fertility patterns.⁹² France recorded its lowest birth rate since World War II.⁹³ Chinese authorities registered 15 per cent fewer babies in 2020:⁹⁴ annual births declined from 14.65 million in 2019 to 12 million in 2020, with a further decline to 10.62 million in 2021.⁹⁵ The resulting population crunch from lower fertility is set to cause future economic and debt crises. Governments will soon seek to repay debts they racked up to provide social support and financial stimulus during the pandemic. But because of lower birth rates, there will be fewer taxpayers to shoulder this burden. This will hamper growth and force many countries to simultaneously raise fertility, recruit more migrant workers in key sectors, and invest in more in automation of key jobs.

⁹⁰ WHO, 2022a.

⁹¹ Cha, 2022.

⁹² Bosley and Jamrisko, 2021.

⁹³ Horobin, 2021.

⁹⁴ Bloomberg, 2021.

⁹⁵ Yang et al., 2022.

Conclusion

Human migration and mobility have rebounded remarkably since the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, when most of humanity stopped moving all at once. However, the sharp rate of rebound masks a massive underlying shift: almost three years after COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, much of the world is still less mobile than it was before the pandemic, a fact with profound medium- to long-term implications for populations, societies and economies around the world.

The emergency phase of the pandemic has passed, but a “long tail” of infections and public health responses continues to disrupt migration and mobility. The harshest restrictions have receded, but they have left behind a more complex and restrictive migration policy landscape, one with new risk profiles for different categories of movers, to the frustration of those seeking a return to the hypermobile 2019 world.

Against this background, migration and mobility flows have rebounded, but not to pre-pandemic levels. International airline passenger numbers remain stubbornly below their 2019 baselines, especially in Europe, and in Asia and the Pacific, where they are 25 to 49 per cent lower. Domestic air travel is a more mixed picture: it was not affected as badly as international air travel and it has recovered more quickly, but people in different world regions have had very different experiences of pandemic restrictions on domestic flights. Community mobility, fascinatingly, has rebounded vigorously in lower income countries, but sluggishly in higher income ones.

Through these changes to migration and mobility, the pandemic has catalysed or accelerated some major long-term social transformations. For example, in migrant origin countries, the pandemic has highlighted the ongoing importance of remittances sent by migrant workers to their families and communities in the homeland. Remittances declined far less during the worst of the pandemic than even the most optimistic experts predicted, and they rebounded far more quickly, suggesting once again that such flows are not only large in size but also disproportionately important because they are countercyclical: when other economic indicators went down during the pandemic, remittances stayed firm and soon rose.

In destination countries, persistently lower levels of migration and mobility are also having profoundly transformative effects. For instance, they are forcing employers to adapt to less flexible labour markets than they had become accustomed to over the previous decades. Firms are being forced to reduce their dependence on distant labour sources and invest more into “digital outsourcing” (in which human labour is performed remotely at a lower cost) and automation (in which the need for human labour is reduced or cut entirely from certain tasks).

It may seem counter-intuitive to predict lower levels of demand for migrant labour while unemployment remains at historically low levels, and employers across the developed world are lobbying governments to increase immigration. However, the current tight labour market in rich countries is not the result of increasing demand for immigration, but is rather the result of drastically falling supply of migrant workers, and this is forcing firms to make decisions that will lock in levels of demand that, while much higher than in mid-2020 while COVID-19 was raging, will probably be significantly lower than pre-pandemic levels.

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Appendices

Chapter 3

Appendix A. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Regions and subregions

Please note that this table reflects the UN DESA geographic regions and subregions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Africa				
Eastern Africa ^a	Middle Africa ^b	Northern Africa ^c	Southern Africa ^d	Western Africa ^e
Burundi	Angola	Algeria	Botswana	Benin
Comoros	Cameroon	Egypt	Eswatini	Burkina Faso
Djibouti	Central African Republic	Libya	Lesotho	Cabo Verde
Eritrea	Chad	Morocco	Namibia	Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia	Congo	Sudan	South Africa	Gambia
Kenya	Democratic	Tunisia		Ghana
Madagascar	Republic of the Congo			Guinea
Malawi	Equatorial Guinea			Guinea-Bissau
Mauritius	Gabon			Liberia
Mayotte	São Tomé and Príncipe			Mali
Mozambique				Mauritania
Réunion				Niger
Rwanda				Nigeria
Seychelles				Saint Helena
Somalia				Senegal
South Sudan				Sierra Leone
Uganda				Togo
United Republic of Tanzania				
Zambia				
Zimbabwe				

^a Eastern Africa has been combined with the Southern Africa subregion in this chapter, although the countries, territories and areas remain the same.

^b This subregion has been renamed "Central Africa" in this chapter and combined with Western Africa.

^c This subregion has been renamed "North Africa".

^d This subregion has been combined with Eastern Africa.

^e This subregion has been renamed "West Africa" and combined with Central Africa (UN DESA Middle Africa) in this chapter.

Asia				
Central Asia	Eastern Asia	South-Eastern Asia ^f	Southern Asia	Western Asia ^g
Kazakhstan	China	Brunei Darussalam	Afghanistan	Armenia
Kyrgyzstan	China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	Cambodia	Bangladesh	Azerbaijan
Tajikistan	China, Macao Special Administrative Region	Indonesia	Bhutan	Bahrain
Turkmenistan	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Lao People's Democratic Republic	India	Cyprus
Uzbekistan	Japan	Malaysia	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Georgia
	Mongolia	Myanmar	Maldives	Iraq
	Republic of Korea	Philippines	Nepal	Israel
		Singapore	Pakistan	Jordan
		Thailand	Sri Lanka	Kuwait
		Timor-Leste		Lebanon
		Viet Nam		Oman
				Qatar
				Saudi Arabia
				Syrian Arab Republic
				Türkiye
				United Arab Emirates
				Yemen

^f This subregion has been renamed "South-East Asia".

^g This subregion has been renamed "Middle East".

Europe ^h			
Eastern Europe ⁱ	Northern Europe	Southern Europe	Western Europe
Belarus	Channel Islands	Albania	Austria
Bulgaria	Denmark	Andorra	Belgium
Czechia	Estonia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	France
Hungary	Faroe Islands	Croatia	Germany
Poland	Finland	Gibraltar	Liechtenstein
Republic of Moldova	Iceland	Greece	Luxembourg
Romania	Ireland	Holy See	Monaco
Russian Federation	Isle of Man	Italy	Netherlands (Kingdom of the)
Slovakia	Latvia	Malta	Switzerland
Ukraine	Lithuania	Montenegro	
	Norway	North Macedonia	
	Sweden	Portugal	
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	San Marino	
		Serbia	
		Slovenia	
		Spain	

^h Some countries in this subregion, particularly members of the European Union, may have been included both in the discussion of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, as well as the subregional discussion on Northern, Western and Southern Europe within the chapter.

ⁱ Northern, Western and Southern Europe are combined in the chapter, excluding the following countries in Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and North Macedonia, which have been included in South-Eastern Europe in the chapter, under the subregion South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

Latin America and the Caribbean		
Caribbean	Central America ^j	South America
Anguilla	Belize	Argentina
Antigua and Barbuda	Costa Rica	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Aruba	El Salvador	Brazil
Bahamas	Guatemala	Chile
Barbados	Honduras	Colombia
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba	Mexico	Ecuador
British Virgin Islands	Nicaragua	Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Cayman Islands	Panama	French Guiana
Cuba		Guyana
Curaçao		Paraguay
Dominica		Peru
Dominican Republic		Suriname
Grenada		Uruguay
Guadeloupe		Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Martinique		
Montserrat		
Puerto Rico		
Saint Kitts and Nevis		
Saint Lucia		
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Turks and Caicos Islands		
United States Virgin Islands		

^j The subregion “Central America” has been combined with Mexico and the Caribbean in this chapter.

Northern America
Bermuda
Canada
Greenland
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
United States of America

Oceania			
Australia and New Zealand	Melanesia	Micronesia	Polynesia
Australia	Fiji	Guam	American Samoa
New Zealand	New Caledonia	Kiribati	Cook Islands
	Papua New Guinea	Marshall Islands	French Polynesia
	Solomon Islands	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Niue
	Vanuatu	Nauru	Samoa
		Northern Mariana Islands	Tokelau
		Palau	Tonga
			Tuvalu
			Wallis and Futuna Islands

Legend:

Region
Subregion ⁱ
Country, territory, or area ^{ii,iii}

Notes: For methodology as well as explanatory notes, see UN DESA, 2020.

- ⁱ Subregions utilized within the chapter may differ from those utilized by UN DESA Statistical Division either by name, or by countries, territories and areas included within.
- ⁱⁱ "The names of countries or areas refer to their short form used in day-to-day operations of the United Nations and not necessarily to their official name as used in formal documents. These names are based on the United Nations Terminology Database (UNTERM), which can be found at <https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/portal/welcome>. The designations employed and the presentation of material at this site do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations [or the International Organization for Migration (IOM)] concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries" (UN DESA, n.d.).
- ⁱⁱⁱ The entities included in this table, which the previous chapter draws upon, comprise countries, as well as territories, areas and special administrative regions. Please note that this table is not intended to be fully comprehensive.

Chapter 4

Appendix A. Opportunity, migration and the Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI), as published annually in the UNDP's Human Development Report, is premised on the view that people are not generally driven by a singular desire to gain increased income, but instead puts forward the idea that people seek the "capabilities to exercise their freedoms to be and do what they aspire to in life".¹ Grounded in the work of Amartya Sen and developed by Mahbub ul Haq, the HDI takes a "a people-centred view" by incorporating three streams of data, each representing some of the basic opportunities conducive to expanding human capabilities.² First, the education of a country or a subnational jurisdiction is measured, mostly in terms of years of schooling for children. Second, health is measured by the life expectancy of a child at birth. Third, the HDI utilizes an economic indicator, represented by the average income measured in the context of the local currency (purchasing power parity or PPP). By integrating these three categories into a single index, the HDI seeks to obtain a more nuanced perspective of the qualities that contribute to individual and collective well-being in a society.

The HDI's limitations are well known. Reducing the index to health and education, and then quantifying these categories based on a limited series of variables, can risk oversimplification. The classification system – the numerical cut-offs for determining country's level of development – can be perceived as arbitrary. Most pointedly, the HDI can be politicized, as some countries make concerted pushes to receive superior scores on one or more of the indicators.³ However, economic indices are prone to worse sorts of manipulation, as most recently evidenced by the suspension and review of the World Bank's Doing Business Report, an annual overview that features an index of business regulations and economic factors, but which has been criticized for methodological irregularities and for neglecting the role of social protection systems in human development.⁴

The use of the HDI in this chapter recognizes, first, that the introduction of numerous variables does not inevitably lead to a more accurate representation of development. The simplicity of the HDI is one of its virtues. Second, regarding the classification systems, while these can sometimes be found to be arbitrary, they do help the human mind to conceptualize patterns in development.⁵ Finally, while the politicization of the HDI is inevitable, it remains an index of record for journalists, scholars and policymakers alike to provide an accurate measure for understanding the opportunities available to people around the world.⁶

The 2009 edition of the Human Development Report featured a thematic focus on migration, remarking, "better policies towards human mobility can enhance human development".⁷ From an HDI perspective, the decision to migrate does not rest solely on the realization of greater incomes, or as an investment for future potential earnings. Migration, instead, is a strategy engaged to secure access to some of the basic goods – health and education – that lead to increased opportunities for oneself and one's children. Notwithstanding the attempt at quantifying global internal migration, a fraught exercise given the definitional vagaries and the paucity of reliable migration event data, the Human Development Report 2009 demonstrated that migration can be analysed in the context of a wider set of variables and that doing so can result in robust evidence for migration with policy implications.

¹ UNDP, 2019.

² Ibid.; Sen, 1985; Stanton, 2007.

³ Wolf et al., 2011.

⁴ Davis and Kruse, 2007; World Bank, 2020.

⁵ Davis et al., 2012.

⁶ Stanton, 2007.

⁷ UNDP, 2009.

Appendix B. How I ended up in a scientific spat about migration figures and what I learned from it

By Maite Vermeulen

Note: This is an abridged extract of the original article published in the now defunct publication *The Correspondent*. The full text can still be accessed here: <https://thecorrespondent.com/747/how-i-ended-up-in-a-scientific-spat-about-migration-figures-and-what-i-learned-from-it/98789433039-1dadd2ed>.

I have to tell you how the debunking of an important theory about migration was itself debunked. You probably had to read that sentence twice, and I get that...I learned a lot from this experience. About how science works, and how we as journalists contend with that. About what expertise actually is, and why it is so limited. And about certainty, doubt and being right. So buckle in and brace yourself for a story about that time I said I was wrong – and turned out to be mistaken.

How it all started: the migration hump

It all started a few months ago when I read a new study about the migration hump. I was immediately interested, since “the hump” is a well-known, very influential theory about the relationship between migration and development. Basically, the theory states that as poor countries become richer, outward migration increases rather than decreases. This may seem counter-intuitive: we might expect that when countries get richer, reasons to leave will diminish because life there is better now, right? But the migration hump shows that this is only the case above a certain income level, starting from about USD 7,000 to USD 10,000 per person per year.

Many poor countries are a long way away from that, which means that economic development in those countries will lead to more migration, not less. That’s because migration costs money, and when people who were previously very poor have some, they are more likely to leave. Come up with a graph comparing income and emigration, and you’ll see a more or less hill-shaped curve showing the lowest rate of emigration in poor countries, the highest rates in middle-income countries, and falling rates for rich countries: the migration hump.

I frequently reference the migration hump in my articles, especially to criticize European migration policy. And there’s a reason for that: the European Union is spending more and more money on development aid to reduce migration. But the migration hump shows that this policy is based on a misconception: if more aid leads to more development in poor countries, that funding will cause net migration to increase, not decrease. And then that new study came across my desk, released under the MEDAM research project. The researchers were quite blunt: their analysis of migration data showed that the migration hump was an oversimplification. In actual fact, their models produced opposite results. They calculated that when a poor country becomes richer, emigration to rich countries goes down. Their explanation was that their method was different: instead of comparing emigration in poor and rich countries, they compared countries with themselves, over time. Why? Because a comparison between poor and rich countries overlooks the differences between those countries: differences that can affect income as well as migration.

I had colleagues and migration experts with more knowledge of econometrics take a look at the new paper; I spoke to the researchers, and then decided to write an update. The research looked convincing, and I wanted to hold myself accountable, because a theory I had often cited in my pieces did not seem to hold up. I thought that was the end of my hump saga. But then I was tagged in a Twitter thread by Michael Clemens, a leading development economist at the Center for Global Development. The new research, he tweeted, was based on a statistical error.

Clemens and his calculations

There was nothing wrong with my article as such, Clemens told me in a private message. “The problem is with the research itself.” All very friendly, of course. But I wasn’t so sure. Could I have seen this coming? Should I have done something differently? What could I learn from this?

I took another in-depth look at the paper, and delved into Clemens’s criticism. I looked at his charts, tables, formulas. The only slight problem was I didn’t understand any of it. This wasn’t really all that strange, because Clemens’s criticism targets researchers’ statistical methods. If you don’t have a degree in econometrics, the analysis is almost impossible to follow. In fact, it’s almost impossible for people who have studied advanced statistics. My colleague Sanne Blauw – with a PhD in econometrics – called me after spending three hours analysing both papers: “I think I more or less understand Clemens’s criticism.”

I asked more experts for assistance: professors and PhD students who could explain the statistics to me, who had experience with time series and cross-sectional panel data, who knew more about spurious regressions and non-stationary variables. I had long phone calls with Michael Clemens and Claas Schneiderheinze, one of the researchers who authored the original MEDAM paper. I can’t say I’ve completely mastered the maths. But here’s what I now understand of the discussion.

What I learned from this

Whether or not this paper is based on a statistical error (this discussion will probably be settled in academic journals in the next few months), all this commotion makes me wonder about my relationship with science as a journalist: what it is – or what it should be. Every single person – including a journalist – has a limited framework that shapes their ability to understand something. I went to university, but I never took advanced statistics. Nor do I understand topics like the nitrogen cycle, Japanese grammar or the mathematics behind climate models. There is simply so much more that we don’t know than what we do.

Sometimes that doesn’t matter. I don’t have to understand Newton to say something meaningful about poverty alleviation. But often it does matter, even if we don’t realize it. As journalists, when our own knowledge and skills fall short, we rely on experts to fill in the gaps. But even for those experts, what they don’t know extends far beyond what they do know. Especially when it comes to statistics. Many biologists, medical professionals, psychologists, economists or social scientists hire specialized colleagues to run their statistical analyses. And those specialists design models that are so complicated that only a handful of people can really understand them, or provide critical commentary. The mathematical calculations behind the models are so far removed from reality that results pop out like a rabbit out of a top hat: we have no idea how it works, but the outcome is self-evident.

Who knows how the statistical stage magic actually works? We can draw an obvious parallel with the epidemiological models being used to predict the course of the coronavirus pandemic: who has any idea exactly how those models work?

And that's how a journalist – or policymaker – can end up in a tricky situation when two experts are making contradictory claims. Can you place two non-stationary variables on one side of a panel data regression without losing the long-term trend? Yes you can; no you can't! How on earth can a journalist possibly figure out who is right? The only solution seems to be cumulative knowledge: asking all the smart people you can find to give it their best shot too. At its very best, that's how science should work.

And when that happens, it often turns out not to be about what's true or false. Instead, it's about which question we want to answer. The MEDAM paper answers an interesting question – just not the question of whether or not the migration hump holds true. And maybe the researchers subconsciously fell into a pitfall that science has created for itself: contentious studies that debunk something major are considered more prestigious than studies that confirm the prevailing assumptions. Just think about it: this was a study that I (a journalist) decided to focus attention on. I probably wouldn't have taken such a close look if their model had once again supported the famous migration hump.

This discussion shows that the best thing we can do is to keep being critical: constantly doubting, questioning and admitting that what we know – and what experts know – is limited. Had I dug deeper I might have been able to raise some questions about the data set used in the MEDAM paper. But then again: there is no such thing as an unproblematic data set when it involves something as complicated as migration figures. And the concept that two non-stationary variables cannot be regressed if you are controlling for a cointegrated third variable – that's not a question I could even have imagined asking in the context of this paper. And neither have many, many scientists, because the MEDAM paper has been read and widely acclaimed by lots of other smart people.

Actually, I've started thinking that journalists, scientists and policymakers are all in the same boat here: we would love for the world to be simpler than it can be. We want to be able to capture it in a nice, neat model, and then wrap it all up in a nice, neat article. But reality is so much more capricious and complex than any model can capture.

Seeing more shades of grey is also a way to understand the world better – but it's not quite as simple to put into a pithy headline. It's easier to just say: I was right after all.

Appendix C.

For the purposes of this chapter, in order to determine an estimated number of migrants who inhabit a jurisdiction due to factors not related to forced migration, we utilized the forced migration data base produced by UNHCR along with international migrant stock numbers produced by UN DESA.⁸ Since these United Nations agencies collect data and make estimations based on disparate methods, sources and time frames, it is worth mentioning a few details about the computations featured in this chapter.

For each country in each year, the stock of forced migrants – made up of those legally designated as refugees by UNHCR plus UNHCR's estimate of asylum seekers – is subtracted from the overall migrant stock. In cases where a country's number of forced migrants (from UNHCR) exceeds the total migrant stock of an origin or destination country, the number of “non-forced-migrants” is reduced to zero to avoid a nonsensical “negative” stock.

To calculate migrant stock as a proportion of population, different computations are required in the case of emigration (the movement of people away from an origin country) than in situations of immigration – the movement of people to a destination country. In both cases, we used migrant stock data and population data, published most recently by UN DESA in 2020.

In cases of immigration, calculating the migrant stock for an HDI classification follows the equation:

$$\text{Proportion}_{\text{immigrant}} = \frac{\text{sum of migrant stocks living in destination countries}}{\text{sum of total populations}}$$

For cases of emigration, diaspora populations have to be included in the denominator of the formula to ensure correct proportionality. Thus, the equation for each HDI classification is:

$$\text{Proportion}_{\text{emigrant}} = \frac{\text{sum of migrant stocks from origin countries}}{\text{sum of migrant stocks from origin countries} + \text{sum of total populations}}$$

Since the accurate, anonymous and consistent collection of migration flow data remains difficult, the use of migrant stock has become a standard, if indirect way to assess migration flows.⁹ As with previous studies using bilateral migrant stock data, we are bound by the same limitations, most prominent of which is an assumption that migrants are leaving their country of birth or citizenship, which might not always be the case.¹⁰ By measuring migrant stocks in discrete intervals over time, one has a broad sense of movements of people between places, at least in the form of snapshots over time. As noted by Clemens, measuring migrant stock in this way does not account for migrant deaths, one of the other pillars of demographic change. A more precise term for the calculations completed in this chapter would be to call this the “incidence” of migration. To avoid technical jargon for a broader readership, we have chosen to avoid this discussion in the main text, while recognizing the conceptual distinctions here.

⁸ UNDP, 2019; UN DESA, 2021; UNHCR, 2020.

⁹ Clemens, 2020.

¹⁰ Abel, 2016.

Chapter 5

Appendix A. United Nations Commission on Human Security

The Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001 in response to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for a world "free from want" and "free from fear". The Commission consisted of 12 international leaders, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata (former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and Professor Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel Economics Prize Laureate), building upon the seminal work of Mahbub ul Haq in the 1994 Human Development Report.¹¹ The Commission argued for an "international migration framework of norms, processes and institutional arrangements to ensure ... order and predictability."¹²

The table below summarizes major developments on the key migration-related policy recommendations in the 2003 report of the Commission.

Recommendations in the 2003 report	Major developments	Ongoing actions
The need for a United Nations-led high-level commission on migration to explore options, areas of consensus and ways forward on human security in migration.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Commission on International Migration established in December 2003, and reported at the end of 2005 • United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) declaration of December 2003 for the first high-level dialogue (HLD) on migration • United Nations HLDs in 2006 and 2013 • United Nations Global Migration Group established in 2006 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The United Nations Network on Migration now leads the implementation of the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
Identify and implement solutions to cross-border displacement, both in humanitarian and development terms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) • United Nations Declaration of 2016 that established the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Compact on Refugees implementation ongoing • Global Compact for Migration implementation ongoing

¹¹ UNDP, 1994.

¹² Commission on Human Security, 2003:52.

Recommendations in the 2003 report	Major developments	Ongoing actions
That the security risks arising during large-scale forced population movements need to be acknowledged and better understood.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major developments arising from the large-scale movements in 2015 and 2016 from Türkiye to and through Europe, including the 2016 United Nations Declaration on Refugees and Migrants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing, with a stronger focus on displacement related to climate change
Substantially improve the protection of IDPs.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement established by the United Nations Secretary-General in 2019 • IDP HLP report finalized in 2021 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Nations Secretary-General's Action Agenda on IDPs finalized in 2022 and being implemented • United Nations Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement appointed in mid-2022 to lead the Action Agenda on IDPs

Appendix B. Country case studies by United Nations region

Country case study (Latin America): Colombia. Regularization programming

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	51.52 million
Human Development Index category ^b	High
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 314.46 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 6 104
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	1.905
<i>Percentage of population</i>	3.70%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	3.02
<i>Percentage of population</i>	5.94%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	30 424
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	4 807 000

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Since 2015, more than six million people have fled the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from an unfurling socioeconomic, political and humanitarian crisis.¹³ On 8 February 2021, the Colombian Government, with assistance from the Government of the United States in the form of funding and equipment, announced the start of a large regularization programme.¹⁴ It is estimated that at least 56 per cent of the 1.7 million Venezuelans living in Colombia at the end of 2020 did not have regular status.¹⁵ For qualifying applicants, a temporary protection permit (TPP) was granted, which guarantees temporary protection status (TPS) for 10 years, as well as access to basic services such as education, housing and health care.

In addition to providing temporary, long-term legal status to Venezuelans living in irregular situations in Colombia as of the end of January 2021,¹⁶ TPS was also extended to Venezuelans who would enter Colombia with a passport through an officially recognized border checkpoint for the following two years, until January 2023.¹⁷ Since the

¹³ United Nations Network on Migration, 2022.

¹⁴ US Embassy Bogota, 2021.

¹⁵ DRC, 2021.

¹⁶ Torrado, 2021.

¹⁷ Presidencia de Colombia, 2021.

dissolution of diplomatic ties between Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in February 2019,¹⁸ as well as the domination of armed groups along the countries' shared borders,¹⁹ official channels to document rights violations of displaced peoples are far and few between.

Temporary protection granted to Venezuelan migrants represents a new policy category provided by the Colombian Government and provides a solution for many Venezuelans fleeing the crisis in their home country.²⁰ Although described by the office of the Colombian presidency as apolitical and humanitarian,²¹ it represents a response to the growth in the number of irregular Venezuelan migrants and the low acceptance rate – only 0.04 per cent – of asylum claims prior to 2021.²²

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

While notable benefits of TPS for Venezuelan nationals in Colombia have included a reduction in the threat of trafficking,²³ as well as the possibility of formal employment,²⁴ several challenges remain. Despite the possibility of transitioning from informal to formal labour markets, xenophobia and discrimination still impede Venezuelans from attaining formal labour contracts. Particularly for Venezuelan women in Colombia, unemployment reached nearly 35 per cent in 2021 – up 6 per cent from 2019,²⁵ and higher than unemployment for Colombian women – due to both the economic weakening caused by COVID-19,²⁶ and disproportional demand for jobs outweighing the supply of available employment opportunities.²⁷ Other impediments lie within the integration processes themselves, with many reporting difficulties accessing education, health services and even adequate housing in certain parts of the country.²⁸

Some critics have argued that by addressing all Venezuelan displacement in Colombia as an issue of migratory management, the TPS disadvantages those fleeing the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela who may have otherwise qualified for international protection in line with existing legal frameworks (such as the Cartagena Declaration). This might present challenges in dealing with the gap between rights afforded to refugees and those provided to Venezuelans under TPS, and could impact how other governments respond to regional humanitarian needs.²⁹

Finally, one of the reasons why Venezuelans are often smuggled out of the country, when fleeing violence and persecution, is that presenting themselves at official border points can be dangerous.³⁰ The inability to document one's presence at a formal border point, which is a requirement to be granted TPS for new arrivals, may result in a new group of irregular migrants.

¹⁸ MMC, 2022a.

¹⁹ HRW, 2020.

²⁰ Selee and Bolter, 2021.

²¹ Presidencia de Colombia, 2021.

²² Castro, 2021.

²³ US Department of State, 2021.

²⁴ Castro, 2021.

²⁵ Woldemikael et al., 2022.

²⁶ Reuters, 2022.

²⁷ Bahar et al., 2018.

²⁸ Ble and Villamil, 2022.

²⁹ Freier and Jara, 2021.

³⁰ MMC, 2022b.

Good practices

Colombia's implementation of TPS has been commended as being carried out at unprecedented magnitude and speed.³¹ It is also an important step in securing human rights and durable solutions for migrants.³² By November 2022, over 1.6 million TPPs had been approved.³³ With permits, card holders can officially access the nationalized health system. As well, they can access financial services, such as opening a bank account, purchasing a home and accessing a loan,³⁴ which, despite its incipient legality prior to the issuing of cards, many banks and financial providers refused, insisting on formal identification documents and credit histories.³⁵

The successful regularization of Venezuelans in Colombia could, in many ways, be attributed to the unified, government-led effort, directed by the office of the presidency and with the support provided by the Government of the United States, to provide status to a substantial population of irregular, undocumented migrants within its borders.³⁶ Colombia's temporary protection scheme is the largest-scale effort of its kind to offer protection to a single nationality of displaced people and has been acclaimed a significant example of an effective response to displacement.³⁷

³¹ United Nations Network on Migration, 2022.

³² DRC, 2021.

³³ Gobierno de Colombia, 2023.

³⁴ Presidencia de Colombia, 2022.

³⁵ Woldemikael et al., 2022.

³⁶ Selee and Chavez-González, 2022.

³⁷ Selee and Bolter, 2021.

Country case study (Northern America): Canada. Gender Equality in Migration

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	38.16 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Very high
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 1 988.34 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 51 988
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	8.05
<i>Percentage of population</i>	21.30%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	1.29
<i>Percentage of population</i>	3.41%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	193 336
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	280

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the Canadian agency responsible for migration, has a long-established tradition of promoting gender equality within migration management and governance mechanisms that, in turn, directly impact the lives of migrants. Particularly with gender-sensitive frameworks and processes that seek to directly support migrant women and gender diverse populations, such as the Gender Results Framework (GRF)³⁸ and Gender-based Analysis+ (GBA+),³⁹ approaches are applied to better understand the ways certain populations are particularly vulnerable and heavily disenfranchised throughout migratory processes, specifically in destination countries such as Canada.

These structures have led to pilot projects, such as the Racialized Minority Newcomer Women Pilot,⁴⁰ the Home Child Care Provider Pilot and the Home Support Worker Pilot,⁴¹ which seek to not only to support women's employment through the creation of new opportunities, but also recognize the central role that women play in the reproductive care economy. Further initiatives that protect and support gender equality include the Rainbow Refugee Assistance Partnership and the Assistance to Women at Risk Program,⁴² which support the creation of migration pathways for vulnerable individuals fleeing violence and persecution. Once in Canada, settlement programmes through the IRCC offer myriad support systems to vulnerable populations as they integrate into a new

³⁸ Government of Canada, n.d.a.

³⁹ Government of Canada, n.d.b.

⁴⁰ Government of Canada, 2022.

⁴¹ Government of Canada, n.d.c.

⁴² RSTP, 2019; Government of Canada, 2014.

country, such as childcare, transportation assistance, women-only employment and language support programmes, pathways to report domestic abuse and other gender-based violence prevention.⁴³

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The GRF reports that unpaid work, the proportion of people in part-time jobs and low-wage employment disproportionately impact women.⁴⁴ Within these data sets, it may be necessary to incorporate additional demographic data to identify intersectional factors leading to poor outcomes, as well as possible ameliorations.

According to data from January 2021, labour underutilization had increased from 1 per cent to 18.4 per cent,⁴⁵ with many of those affected being temporary migrants. COVID-19 associated lockdowns and employment restrictions had a harder impact on women, youth, racialized communities and migrants; this has led to calls for devoting more attention to the efficacy of settlement services, which are currently struggling as a result of the pandemic.⁴⁶ This has also reinvigorated discussions on the need to facilitate the transition from temporary to more permanent residence status for some migrant groups, which, aside from better labour market integration, affords stronger worker protections.

Good practices

Many programmes, mechanisms and resources have been instrumentalized to advocate for gender equality in migration management. The focus has been on creating tangible opportunities, including employment pathways and protections, for those most disadvantaged by gendered inequalities upon settlement in Canada, such as LGBTQIA+ individuals. These initiatives include the introduction of pedagogic programming to train internal staff on the importance of inclusivity, respect and the differences between gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation, as is the case with the Gender Diversity and Inclusivity Online Training Course.⁴⁷ Furthermore, a commitment to inclusive language in official communication platforms has held steadfast, particularly through the introduction of a gender neutral designation, or an “X” instead of a selected binary gender, on official documents.⁴⁸ For many migrants, these supports provide valuable protection from violence and prejudice resulting from gendered inequalities.

⁴³ Government of Canada, 2022.

⁴⁴ Government of Canada, n.d.a.

⁴⁵ Statistics Canada, 2021.

⁴⁶ Yalnizyan, 2021.

⁴⁷ University of Alberta, n.d.

⁴⁸ Government of Canada, 2019.

Country case study (Europe): Switzerland. Inclusion of irregular migrants

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	8.69 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Very high
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 801.64 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 91 992
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	2.49
<i>Percentage of population</i>	28.8%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	0.71
<i>Percentage of population</i>	8.26%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	125 938
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	4

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Some cities around the world have decided to recognize individuals without immigration status as part and parcel of the functioning of the city themselves. While this approach doesn't typically provide legal status to an undocumented migrant, it enables access to services and facilitates proof of city membership. The city of Zurich created such an urban identity card programme called Züri City Card (ZCC),⁴⁹ which will cost a total of CHF 3.2 million.⁵⁰ Pushback from rural municipalities circumscribed within the canton of Zurich has prevented the cantonal government from implementing a regularization programme such as Geneva's Operation Papyrus, launched in 2017.⁵¹ Instead, the city of Zurich, where it is estimated that more than 10,000 undocumented migrants reside, will offer cardholders the possibility to access public services without the fear of being reported to immigration authorities.⁵² In specific terms, the identity card confirms identity and place of residence, providing a form of local membership, while officially affirming an entitlement to access essential services, including health care.⁵³

⁴⁹ ZCCA, n.d.

⁵⁰ SWI, 2022.

⁵¹ RCG, n.d.

⁵² Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.a.; Cachin, 2021.

⁵³ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.b.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The inspiration for Zurich's city initiative to support and protect undocumented migrants come from the United States "sanctuary cities" that create spaces within cityscapes to allow irregular migrants to access services without fear of being reported to immigration authorities.⁵⁴ Importantly, the ZCC was conceived by local actors who then formed an association (Züri City Card Association) and presented to the city government of Zurich. The Züri City Card Association was hesitant initially to cooperate with the cantonal government as the city and canton handle issues of irregular migration very differently.⁵⁵ In turn, key challenges throughout the implementation process of this initiative focused specifically on this interaction between city officials, societal actors, canton and confederation levels, as multilevel governance does not exist within the City of Zurich.⁵⁶

While the City of Zurich has attempted to take on a coordination role between the Züri City Card Association and cantonal and confederation authorities, local civil society organizations, such as the Sans-Papiers Anlaufstelle Zürich (SPAZ),⁵⁷ have taken on a large role in supporting undocumented migrants with access to services. This includes claiming social assistance, securing rental accommodation and accessing health care.⁵⁸ As the pilot phase of the ZCC is set to last four to five years, after the positive local referendum vote from May 2022, successful implementation of the initiative over the long term is a crucial next step for the city government to ensure that this identification tool can successfully recognize undocumented migrants for the role they play in the community.

Good practices

While support for the initiative could not be found within the canton of Zurich at large, this city-proposed project gained success based on the "horizontal venue shopping" that the Züri City Card Association engaged in, which led to the identity card finding its way onto the city's local political agenda.⁵⁹ Importantly, many migrants who have come to Switzerland without status, or who have lost status once in the country, do not have the right to apply for residency, despite the integral role they play in Switzerland's economy: SPAZ expressed how the Swiss economy could potentially "fall apart" without the support of undocumented migrants' labour.⁶⁰

The initiative has allowed more than 10,000 undocumented migrants living in the city of Zurich over the course of the pilot programme to have a strengthened sense of security when accessing essential services and seeking social support.⁶¹ While regular pathways for migration for many, particularly for those working in low-wage sectors,⁶² remain narrow, support within local contexts is more important than ever. Inspired by the ZCC, discussions have commenced on the creation of a similar card in the nation's capital city of Bern, as well as in Basel.

⁵⁴ Vitiello, 2022.

⁵⁵ Kaufmann and Strebel, 2020.

⁵⁶ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.b.

⁵⁷ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.a.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Kaufmann and Strebel, 2020:14.

⁶⁰ SPAZ, n.d.

⁶¹ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.a.; Cachin, 2021.

⁶² Ibid.

Country case study (Africa): Burkina Faso. Internal displacement due to conflict and violence

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	22.10 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Low
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 19.74 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 893
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	0.72
<i>Percentage of population</i>	3.5%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	1.60
<i>Percentage of population</i>	7.43%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	34 423
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	1 882 000

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Beginning in 2015, a worsening security situation in the central Sahel caused by overlapping attacks on civilians from armed groups associated with the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, as well as other smaller non-State armed groups, has driven widespread displacement.⁶³ In Burkina Faso, this violence is mainly in the north of the country, at the borders with the Niger and Mali, and has resulted in serious humanitarian issues.

The number of new conflict displacements has grown, and in 2021, 682,000 new internal displacements resulting from conflict and violence brought the total number of IDPs to nearly 1.6 million.⁶⁴ Further, a military coup in January 2022 caused additional new displacements, estimated by the national reporting mechanism, CONASUR, to be more than 160,000.⁶⁵ The displacement effects of a second coup, which took place on 30 September 2022, are not yet clear.⁶⁶

⁶³ IDMC, 2022.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ NRC, 2022; CONASUR, 2022 and 2021.

⁶⁶ Al Jazeera, 2022.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The largest and most pressing challenge to date is finding suitable space to house over 1.5 million IDPs and an additional 3.5 million Burkinabè within the country in need of humanitarian assistance.⁶⁷ According to the African Development Bank Group, two IDP camps have been constructed in the northeastern part of the country, with displaced persons from Barga and Titao, and which accommodate 6,000 and 10,000 IDPs, respectively. With a substantial need for increased capacity to house those fleeing conflict, and with hastily dwindling resources, the situation is looking more dire than ever.⁶⁸

UNHCR and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) both lack a significant portion of the funding needed to adequately provide their humanitarian response plans for 2022, with the former raising 20 per cent of its required budget,⁶⁹ and the latter, only 15 per cent.⁷⁰ As a result, shelter, food and medical assistance have been drastically reduced and civilians are lacking needed humanitarian aid.

Currently, 60 per cent of the country is under the Government's control;⁷¹ this, coupled with the two coups in 2022, have generated high levels of instability in the country, which in turn risks increasing violent extremism and aggravating humanitarian needs. Following the September 2022 coup, the United Nations Secretary-General called on all actors to engage in productive dialogue.⁷²

Good practices

In early 2021, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) launched the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, which incorporated a grant of USD 500,000 for the construction of additional shelter and the provision of food and other essentials to 40,000 individuals.⁷³ While a step in the right direction, the country will undoubtedly need further international assistance to support the one in five Burkinabè in need of humanitarian aid.⁷⁴ According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) nearly three quarters of all households displaced in the country have been displaced for more than 12 months, and 34 per cent of them for more than 24 months.⁷⁵

Improvements in coordination have allowed for the ability to respond to the humanitarian situation to be strengthened in many ways. Through a bolstered focus on methodology, which includes geographic analysis and community needs (like food, shelter, education and health) in a given area. This coordination also engages directly with national structures, to determine the functionality of resources and weak points to be addressed.⁷⁶ Humanitarian coordination has also successfully been seen in certain instances, such as in the case of USAID, local NGOs and the World Food Programme working together to address malnutrition through the provision of emergency food assistance.⁷⁷

⁶⁷ IDMC, 2022; AfDB Group, 2022.

⁶⁸ AfDB Group, 2022.

⁶⁹ UNHCR, 2022b.

⁷⁰ MSF, 2022.

⁷¹ Booty, 2022.

⁷² Lamarche, 2020.

⁷³ AfDB Group, 2020.

⁷⁴ OCHA, 2023.

⁷⁵ IOM, 2022c.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ USAID, n.d.

Country case study (Asia): the Philippines. Initiatives to counter human trafficking

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	113.88 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Medium
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 394.09 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 3 461
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
Millions	0.23
Percentage of population	0.20%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
Millions	6.09
Percentage of population	5.43%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	1 387
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	635 000

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

In July 2022, for the seventh year in a row, the Philippines was ranked Tier 1 in the US Department of State's trafficking in persons (TIP) report,⁷⁸ which acknowledges high levels of compliance with the minimum standards to eradicate the trafficking of human beings set out under the United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.⁷⁹ The Philippines has introduced effective counter-trafficking initiatives in order to quell labour and sex trafficking present in the country. National counter-trafficking legislation was adopted in 2003,⁸⁰ in the form of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, and the subsequent establishment of the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. The legislative framework severely penalizes perpetrators of all forms of trafficking and formally recognizes the vulnerability of those trafficked.⁸¹

In 2022, the Philippines identified 1,802 victims of trafficking, of whom nearly 70 per cent (1,251) were female and 31 per cent (551) were male.⁸² According to the TIP report for 2022, trafficking over the course of the last five years has had a propensity to target not only the most vulnerable within the Philippines, but also Filipino nationals abroad.⁸³ Women and children are often recruited into trafficking networks as sex workers, domestic workers and in other forms of forced labour, while men and boys tend to be recruited into forced labour in the agricultural, fishing and construction sectors.

⁷⁸ Republic of the Philippines, 2022.

⁷⁹ United States Congress, 2000.

⁸⁰ Gutierrez, 2012.

⁸¹ Republic of the Philippines, 2003.

⁸² US Department of State, 2022.

⁸³ Ibid.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

Specific challenges that authorities and practitioners face in the fight against trafficking include effective criminalization of traffickers and trafficking operations, as well as ensuring that sufficient resources are provided to both government authorities and organizations that are leading the charge of civil society actors against trafficking.

The 2022 TIP report recommends the overall expansion of resources dedicated to law enforcement, as well as the widening of judicial facility and capacity, so that traffickers can be promptly convicted and thus indicted for their crimes. Impediments to convicting traffickers were traced to slow-moving courts, lack of effective training of court officials and a limited number of prosecutors to try cases. Additional recommendations include putting greater emphasis on inter-agency and inter-organizational collaboration to provide support, including funding, to NGOs in their specialized programming and reintegration efforts. These include job training and placement for adult victims, as well as psychological and physical support for all victims.⁸⁴

Good practices

While the defence and support of victims has always been central to rehabilitation and reintegration, the 2022 TIP report found the Philippines to have advanced in this regard as compared to past years. First, victims who served as witnesses to trials and suffered further trauma were provided specialized support and assistance throughout the entire criminal justice process. In 2020 and 2021, 11 trafficking victims (in 2020) and 1 (in 2021) were placed into witness protection programme to ensure their physical safety and as recognition of the risks associated. Second, police and prosecutors continued to prioritize recorded rather than live testimony in courtrooms, to ensure that benevolence is foregrounded towards victims of trafficking. Furthermore, the use of other forms of evidence, such as digital tracing and financial records have been incorporated into court proceedings that once depended heavily on testimony from victims.

Having been approved by law in December 2021 and put into effect in February 2022, the Department of Migrant Workers is a new government agency that has been created as a result of the merging of seven previous agencies. Its main task is the employment and reintegration of Filipino workers.⁸⁵ The department will become fully operational in 2023 and will serve to maximize job opportunities for Filipino citizens upon their return from abroad and to stimulate national development after a two-year, COVID-19-induced slump.⁸⁶ This may in the future facilitate the implementation of the TIP report recommendation regarding support for labour market reintegration for victims of human trafficking.

⁸⁴ Republic of the Philippines, n.d.b.

⁸⁵ Republic of the Philippines, n.d.c.

⁸⁶ Depasupil, 2022.

Country case study (Oceania): New Zealand. Multiculturalism and integration to counter extremist violence

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	5.13 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Very high
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 249.89 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 48 781
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
Millions	1.38
Percentage of population	28.7%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
Millions	0.81
Percentage of population	15.93%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	2 505
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	150

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

New Zealand is a highly diverse country and, according to the 2013 census, over a quarter of the population identified with a non-European ethnicity.⁸⁷ Diversity and inclusion policies and strategies make space for celebration of difference and inclusion of all citizens, such as the adaptation of multiculturalism in school curriculum and the inclusion of ethnic representation and sensitivity in the mandate of public media.⁸⁸ Despite this, it has been documented that minority ethnic groups, such as Asians, experience harsh discriminations in everyday life.

On 15 March 2019, the country's southern city of Christchurch saw violent terrorist attacks take place in two mosques, killing a total of 51 people.⁸⁹ A country in grief has since attempted to uncover the reasons for such violence, and to find ways to combat it, with some arguing that counter-terrorist efforts in the country focused on Islamic terrorism while ignoring evidence of growing support for white supremacist ideology.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The incorporation of preventative measures that seek to combat violent extremism within the country can be seen clearly in the country's practice of migration integration. New Zealand Immigration follows a settlement programme that focuses on five core outcomes, and each step is deemed essential for holistic integration: employment,

⁸⁷ Stats NZ, 2015.

⁸⁸ Queen's University, 2020.

⁸⁹ BBC News, 2020.

education and training, English language, inclusion, and health and well-being.⁹⁰ One of the main challenges faced by authorities and practitioners to date is how to maintain the country's multicultural demographic whilst supporting all ethnicities to experience the same degree of integration. According to a 2021 survey on community perceptions of migrants and immigration, New Zealanders' perception of their country as welcoming to migrants decreased from 82 per cent in 2011 to 66 per cent in 2021. The core reasons identified for this decline were racism and discrimination.⁹¹

With the aim of quelling extremism within different communities of New Zealanders, the Prime Minister committed authorities and government officials to tackling the problem from all angles. Addressing the growth of violent extremism through online channels, the Government (with the Government of France) launched the Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online, building upon the tech sector's Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism.⁹²

Good practices

In the wake of the Christchurch events, New Zealand's Counter-terrorism Coordination Committee developed a national strategy aimed at countering terrorism and violent extremism through a framework that begins with an aim of reduction and then moves onto themes of readiness, response and recovery.⁹³ In the categories of readiness, response and recovery, a victim-centred approach is adopted, foregrounding the importance of partnership in the readiness both to respond and to recover.⁹⁴ Key messages included in this national strategy are the strengthening of social inclusion, safety and equal participation.⁹⁵

In June 2022, the Prime Minister launched the Centre of Research Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, or He Whenua Taurikura (in Māori), which translates to "a country at peace".⁹⁶ Here, independent and New Zealand-specific research into the causes and effects of violent extremism and terrorism is funded, so that a strong stance towards prevention can be taken in the island nation. And to combat the spread of racism, the country has begun the National Action Plan Against Racism, which directly reflects the country's multicultural history, the ongoing path of diversity and the trajectory of New Zealand as a country that will lead the charge against racism in its many forms around the world.⁹⁷ With local communities, businesses, institutions and individuals in the forefront, workshops are sponsored around the country to engage directly with definitions and practices of xenophobic behaviour and belief systems, as well as with national and international support mechanisms that protect all individuals from forms of harm, discrimination and violence.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ New Zealand Immigration, n.d.

⁹¹ Government of New Zealand, 2021.

⁹² GIFCT, n.d.

⁹³ ODESC, 2020.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Government of New Zealand, 2022.

⁹⁷ Government of New Zealand, n.d.

⁹⁸ *Belong Aotearoa*, n.d.

Appendix C. Global multilateral treaties and State Parties

Thematic area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into force	No. of State Parties
Human rights	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	1948	1951	153
	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)	1966	1976	173
	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)	1966	1976	171
	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)	1966	1969	182
	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)	1979	1981	189
	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)	1984	1987	173
	Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	1989	1990	196
	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW)	1990	2003	58
	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)	2006	2008	186
	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	2006	2010	71
Refugee law	Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)	1951	1954	146
	Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees	1967	1967	147
Trafficking and smuggling	United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)	2000	2003	191
	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing UNTOC (Palermo Protocol)	2000	2003	181
	Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing UNTOC (Smuggling Protocol)	2000	2004	151

Thematic area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into force	No. of State Parties
Labour and services ^a	Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (ILO Convention No. 97)	1949	1952	53
	Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO Convention No. 143)	1975	1978	29
	Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (ILO Convention No. 189)	2011	2013	36
	Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)	1944	1947	193
Modes of movement	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as Amended (SOLAS)	1974	1980	168
	International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as Amended (SAR)	1979	1985	114
	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)	1982	1994	169
	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	1992	1994	198
Climate change	Paris Agreement	2015	2016	195

Notes: Conventions are listed under a primary thematic area. Some conventions relate to more than one theme; in such cases, they are listed only once. Unless otherwise noted, information on adoption, entry into force, and State Parties were accessed in September 2022.

^a The ILO Eight Fundamental Conventions, noted in the body of the chapter, are accessible at ILO, n.d.

Chapter 6

Appendix A. Key terms and definitions

gender The socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for individuals based on the sex they were assigned at birth.

Source: IOM, 2023a.

gender equality The equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of all individuals of all genders. Equality does not mean that all individuals are the same, but that rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on one's sex assigned at birth, physical sex characteristics, gender assigned by society, gender identity or gender expression. Gender equality also requires that the interests, needs and priorities of all individuals should be taken into consideration.

Source: IOM, 2023a.

gender norms Gender norms are ideas about how men and women should be and act. We internalize and learn these “rules” early in life. This sets-up a life-cycle of gender socialization and stereotyping. Put another way, gender norms are the standards and expectations to which gender identity generally conforms, within a range that defines a particular society, culture and community at that point in time.

Source: UN Women, n.d.

gender role A set of societal norms dictating what types of behaviors are generally considered acceptable, appropriate or desirable for a person based on their actual sex or perceived sex or gender.

Source: IOM, 2021a.

transgender [A term] used by some people whose gender identity differs from what is typically associated with the sex they were assigned at birth. Trans, transgender and non-binary are “umbrella terms” representing a variety of words that describe an internal sense of gender that differs from the sex assigned at birth and the gender attributed to the individual by society, whether that individual identifies as a man, a woman, simply “trans” or “transgender,” with another gender or with no gender.

Source: IOM, 2021a.

non-binary An adjective describing people whose gender identity falls outside the male–female binary. Non-binary is an umbrella term that encompasses a wide variety of gender experiences, including people with a specific gender identity other than man or woman, people who identify as two or more genders (bigender or pan/polygender) and people who don't identify with any gender (agender).

Source: IOM, 2021a.

For definitions of other relevant terms, see IOM, 2021a and 2023a.


Chapter 7

Appendix A. Key definitions

Environmental migration	is the movement of persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are forced to leave their places of habitual residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move within or outside their country of origin or habitual residence.
Climate migration	is a subcategory of environmental migration; it defines a singular type of environmental migration, where the change in the environment is due to climate change. Migration in this context can be associated with greater vulnerability of affected people, particularly if it is forced. However, migration can also be a form of adaptation to environmental stressors, helping to build resilience of affected individuals and communities.
Trapped populations	do not migrate, yet are situated in areas under threat ... at risk of becoming “trapped” or having to stay behind, where they will be more vulnerable to environmental shocks and impoverishment.
Planned relocation	in the context of disasters or environmental degradation, including when due to the effects of climate change, is a planned process in which persons or groups of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or place of temporary residence, are settled in a new location and provided with the conditions for rebuilding their lives.
Slow-onset events	The impacts of climate change include slow-onset events and extreme weather events, both of which may result in loss and damage. Slow-onset events, as initially introduced by the Cancun Agreement (COP16), refer to the risks and impacts associated with increasing temperatures; desertification; loss of biodiversity; land and forest degradation; glacial retreat and related impacts; ocean acidification; sea-level rise; and salinization.
Adaptation	Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.
Mitigation	Climate change mitigation refers to efforts to reduce or prevent emission of greenhouse gases. Mitigation can mean using new technologies and renewable energies, making older equipment more energy efficient, or changing management practices or consumer behavior.

Note: The source for each of these definitions can be found by following each hyperlinked term.

Appendix B. Pathways of food security for poor and extreme poor farmers in Guatemala



Source: Pons, 2021.

This diagram shows how climate variability and climate change can affect the sources of food for very poor and poor households in Guatemala’s Dry Corridor area. It accounts for individuals who buy their food, grow their food, or acquire their food from wild sources. It also identifies entry points for adaptation mechanisms in each case to avoid food insecurity. Very poor and poor households generate their income from casual labour as “unskilled labour”, such as on coffee farms, and acquire additional food from natural sources such as forests or water bodies. Food security is achieved through a combination of the different pathways.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Pons, 2021.

Chapter 9
Appendix A.

Health (non-virus)	Environmental	Social	Economic	Education
Following the decrease in access to HIV-testing during 2020-2021, ^a WHO approved HIV-self test became available for USD 1 in low- and middle-income countries, making it the lowest marked price to date. ^b	Pandemic related single-use plastic generated from personal protection equipment, increases in online shopping, and take-out containers, amounted to 8 million tons of waste globally, with implications for our oceans. ^c	The United Nations has identified the prevalence of domestic violence during COVID-19 as the “shadow pandemic”. Reports suggest younger women, women with children, unemployed women, and women in rural areas are more vulnerable to abuse. ^d	Global working hours declined in 2020, recovering in 2021 among high- and upper-middle-income countries. Lower-middle and low-income countries continue to experience challenges in recovery, whereby such losses create a greater divide between countries. ^e	In COVID-19 recovery plans, in-person schooling is critical in reversing learning losses across the globe. According to UNICEF, learning losses have resulted in up to 70 per cent of 10-year-olds in low- and middle-income countries being unable to read, this is up 53 per cent compared to pre-pandemic levels. ^g
Decreased mobility during the pandemic resulted in fewer road traffic collisions globally, however, there occurred increased severity in injury and death due to speeding, minimal crowds, open roads, and alcohol and drug use. ^h	The use of energy decreased in 2020 shifting the power mix to renewable energy during this year, however, the mix has reverted to pre-pandemic trends. ⁱ	There occurred an increased risk of child marriages during COVID-19 due to limited educational opportunities, conditions of economic precarity, disruptions to social services, and the passing of a caretaker! ^j	According to the World Bank, there are between 657 million and 676 million estimated to be living in extreme poverty in 2022. This is approximately 75 million to 95 million more than pre-pandemic forecasts. ^k	A global report on education claims girls were less likely to access remote learning. Barriers to learning at a distance included the influence of gender norms as well as connectivity and accessible technology! ^l
According to WHO, the pandemic resulted in a 25% increase in the occurrence of mental health conditions like anxiety and depression, where young people and women were more impacted. ^m	The term “anthropause” emerged in 2020 due to the decline in human impact on the environment. While some wildlife benefited from reduced disturbance, the pause in human activity during these years may have impeded protection efforts for at-risk animals. ⁿ	Overall, increases in care duties as a result of the pandemic created a larger divide between men and women. ^o According to the ILO, more than 2 million mothers across the globe left the workforce in 2020. ^p	Experts estimate the flow of global remittances to reach USD 5.4 trillion in 2030 owing to increased digitalization. Global remittances grew in 2021, where the MobileRemit Africa report observed a 48 per cent increase in transfers via mobile networks. ^q	Enrolment patterns in higher education have stabilized with the return to in-person teaching and learning, suggesting that higher education will not undergo a complete digital transformation. ^r
A 2021 report examining the impact of the pandemic in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi and Uganda, finds that the disruption to sexual and reproductive health services led to increases in pregnancies, gender-based violence and dangerous abortions. ^s	At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, air quality was more likely to improve in regions where mobility policies were stricter. ^t Air pollution has also been connected to higher rates of COVID-19 mortality. ^u	To account for limitations in social gatherings during the pandemic, online religious worship gained traction, though it does pose issues of digital accessibility. ^v A survey found that while group activities declined in 2020, the pandemic did not have a significant impact on individual religious or spiritual engagement. ^w	In assessing the prevalence of videoconferencing platforms at work, increased fatigue among workers is a key finding. ^x Additionally, scholars are questioning how to instil corporate values, build relationships, and how to solve gender inequity and exclusion on such platforms. ^y	UNESCO’s Global Monitoring of School Closures finds that lower-income countries reported the longest duration of school closures between May 2020 and June 2021. Learning losses also corresponded to the length of school closures in some low- and middle-income countries, raising concerns about the growing learning gap globally. ^z

^a DiNenno et al., 2022.

^b WHO, 2022b.

^c Peng et al., 2021.

^d UN Women, 2021.

^e ILO, 2021b.

^f Ahlgen et al., 2022.

^g UNICEF, 2022.

^h Yasin et al., 2021.

ⁱ Olabi et al., 2022.

^j Thangaperumal et al., 2022.

^k Mahler et al., 2022.

^l UNESCO, UNICEF and World Bank, 2021.

^m WHO, 2022c.

ⁿ Rutz et al., 2020; Yuhas, 2021.

^o World Economic Forum, 2022b.

^p ILO, 2022.

^q IFAD, 2022.

^r Abdrasheva et al., 2022.

^s APHRC et al., 2021.

^t Zhang et al., 2022.

^u Ravindra et al., 2022.

^v Edelman et al., 2021.

^w Lacasse and Cornelissen, 2022.



^x Nanyang Technological University, 2022.


^y Karl et al., 2021.

^z UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2022.

Appendix B.

Government responses to minimize COVID-19 transmission in Africa, Asia and Europe, by number of countries (January 2020 to January 2023)





Source: Hale et al., 2023.

Note: As at 1 January 2023. The term “international travel controls” is used by Oxford, and includes screening arrivals, quarantining arrivals, banning arrivals or total border closure. It is also important to note that categories are COVID-19-related only and do not reflect other travel restrictions that may have already been in place, such as those related to visa restrictions, entry bans based on specific citizens, and departure or exit restrictions.



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