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5 MIGRATION AND HUMAN SECURITY: UNPACKING MYTHS AND EXAMINING NEW REALITIES AND RESPONSES¹

Introduction

The recent events in Ukraine have highlighted in stark terms the links between national security, energy security, food security and the catastrophic effects on the human security of Ukrainians but also for many other societies around the world. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, conflict and violence in one country or region is more likely than ever to have ripple effects in other parts of the world. At a time when food crop supply chains are the most globalized in history,² the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has highlighted the devastating impacts on food and human security for many parts of the developing world.³

As outlined in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this report, Europe, Asia, Africa and South America continue to experience mass displacement of people caused by conflict and violence as well as for other reasons, such as (climate-related) disasters and political and economic crises.⁴ Human rights frameworks established decades ago provide sound and effective standards for safeguarding human security, including those of migrants, with migration and mobility being embedded in core human rights treaties and frameworks spanning decades.⁵ The protection of migrants has also been advanced through broader global processes, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and, more recently, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Nevertheless, ongoing global transformations related to geopolitical upheavals, technological advances and environmental degradation are eroding human security and altering migration and security dynamics.⁶ These transformations are also occurring at a moment when multiple crises are affecting the world, with some analysts arguing we have entered an era of "permacrisis".⁷ Though some interest groups promulgate the myth that international migration undermines the national security of countries or communities, evidence demonstrates that the most significant links between migration and security relate to human security, rather than national security.⁸ In fact, human security is being challenged right throughout the migration cycle – from pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return – and across a wide variety of migration and mobility settings regardless of policy category.⁹

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² Khoury et al., 2016.

³ Ben Hassen and El Bilali, 2022.

⁴ These chapters include data and analysis of Ukrainian and other displacement around the world.

⁵ See discussion in the *World Migration Report 2018* chapter on global migration governance (Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017).

⁶ McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.

⁷ Spicer, 2022; Turnbull, 2022.

⁸ See discussion in the *World Migration Report 2018* chapter on violent extremism (Koser and Cunningham, 2017).

⁹ Such as labour migration, family reunification, conflict or disaster displacement, international students.

In this chapter, we set out to re-examine migration and human security at a time when misinformation and disinformation about migration and migrants are both increasing and increasingly effective.¹⁰ In the face of deliberately skewed negative discussions on migration and migrants, one can lose sight of the fact that human endeavours to improve peace and prosperity in modern times that are underpinned by migration have been on the whole successful. It is also easy to lose sight of the fact that international migration remains a relatively uncommon phenomenon, with a mere 3.6 per cent of the world's population being international migrants (see Chapter 2 of this report for details).¹¹ Further, most international migration takes place in safe, orderly and regular conditions; migration can also improve human security, sometimes significantly so. However, we cannot shy away from another important fact: some migration processes are detrimental to the human security of migrants, which is why the international community is committed to the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration.

The next section describes key concepts related to migration and human security, providing a brief summary of the increasing securitization of migration. We then examine the links between migration, mobility and human security, before outlining how migrants' human security is affected throughout the migration cycle, in pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return processes. The chapter then discusses policies that facilitate a human security approach, before outlining the implications for policy and practice.

Concepts and context

Definitions reflect specific perspectives that can be applied to a set of circumstances, a group or groups of people or events. They help make sense of the world around us and are central to analysis, policy frameworks and practical responses, especially in the face of change and emerging problems. While there are specific definitions of migration-related terms that are technical in nature and apply to a range of contexts, including legal, administrative, research and statistical contexts,¹² for the purpose of this chapter, a migrant is defined as “a person who moves away from his or her usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons”.¹³ This definition is particularly relevant to human security analysis as it encompasses all forms of migration, even the most coercive (such as human trafficking and refugee displacement), which often result in the profound insecurity of those affected.

The concept of security in international relations has for many decades been rooted in national or State security terms, primarily involving political independence and territorial integrity of nation States.¹⁴ Threats to the security of States and their populations primarily revolved around external military threats, which was particularly relevant until 1990, as can be seen in Figure 1, which shows global trend data on the number of deaths due to State-based conflicts.¹⁵ More recently, and particularly since the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, the issues of global food security and energy security are also being increasingly linked to national security discussions. As well, climate security is very high on the agenda and increasingly being discussed as a national and international security issue.¹⁶

¹⁰ See discussion in the *World Migration Report 2022* chapter on disinformation on migration (Culloty et al., 2021).

¹¹ UN DESA, 2021.

¹² McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2017.


¹³ IOM, 2019a.

¹⁴ Baldwin, 1997.

¹⁵ And also highly relevant prior to 1945 with respect to the First World War, in particular.

¹⁶ Little, 2022; United Nations, 2021; Vivekananda et al., 2020.

Figure 1. Deaths in State-based conflict (global), 1946–2020



Source: OVID, 2021.

With the end of the Cold War, the space to reconsider concepts of security in multilateralism opened up in two key ways. First, “new threats” to national security expanded beyond the military realm (see discussion in the subsection below). Second, the ability to extend beyond the traditional priorities of “peace and security” into human development through a conceptual bridge of “human security” became possible. “New dimensions of human security” became a key focus of the United Nations, allowing discussion and treatment of human development to be brought into broader dialogues of global and national security.¹⁷ This laid the groundwork for the Commission on Human Security (see text box below), leading to the Global Commission on International Migration (see Chapter 8 in this report).

¹⁷ UNDP, 1994 and 2022a.

2003 United Nations Commission on Human Security: How far have we come?

The Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001 in response to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for a world "free from want" and "free from fear". The Commission consisted of 12 international leaders, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata (former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and Professor Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel Economics Prize Laureate), building upon the seminal work of Mahbub ul Haq in the 1994 Human Development Report.^a The Commission argued for an "international migration framework of norms, processes and institutional arrangements to ensure ... order and predictability".^b Central to the framework would be the need to balance the sovereignty and security of States with the human security of people, the Commission arguing that the seventeenth-century construct of State-centric security was no longer fit for the twenty-first century. The key policy conclusions on migration included recognition of the need for:

- A United Nations-led high-level commission on migration to explore options, areas of consensus and ways forward on human security in migration.
- Concerted efforts to identify and implement solutions to cross-border displacement, both in humanitarian and development terms.
- A better acknowledgement and understanding of the security risks arising during large-scale forced population movements.
- Substantial improvements in the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs).

So, what progress has been made since the May 2003 Commission? A summary analysis of developments on the Commission's migration-related policy conclusions is in Appendix A.

^a UNDP, 1994.

^b Commission on Human Security, 2003:52; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2003.

In this chapter and its examination of the connections between human migration and human security, and consequent vulnerabilities that can arise, we draw upon the definition articulated at the 2012 United Nations General Assembly, which reflected the consensus that human security is considered:

The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.¹⁸

Given this definition, the first and most obvious connection between human migration and human security is that a lack of human security can cause migration and displacement, but some forms of migration can themselves be a cause of (additional) human insecurity. In fact, human (in)security is a critical issue when examining migrants' experiences right the way through the migration cycle: this topic is examined in the next section.

¹⁸ United Nations, 2012.

Securitization of migration: A brief summary

The security risks posed by migration have long been acknowledged by leaders, as societies have sought to protect themselves from threats, while at the same time seeking increased prosperity through trade, finance and cultural exchange underpinned by migration.¹⁹ Today, it is clear that migration directly affects some of the defining elements of a State, that is, a permanent population and a defined territory.²⁰ The regulation of migration (entry and stay) is therefore considered a prerogative of sovereign States, supplemented by international cooperation on migration governance.²¹ As States' capacities and appetites for wider and more comprehensive regulation increased following the Second World War – including in previously unregulated spheres, such as telecommunications, media and broadcasting, environmental protection and conservation and public health, among many others – the concepts of “regular” and “irregular” migration from a State perspective emerged.²² The first sustained analysis focused on irregular labour migration,²³ due to political and geopolitical change following the oil crisis in the early 1970s and the related contractions of national economies in Europe and elsewhere.²⁴ However, irregular migration was initially conceptualized in a completely different way (see text box below).

A very different way of thinking about irregular migration

One of the earliest conceptualizations of irregular migration was radically different to current thinking. Early researchers such as Gould defined irregular migration as different from permanent migration, whereby irregularity related to migration that was “not wholly permanent, in that further movement is likely but neither the time nor the direction of such movement is presently known and both are beyond the control of those involved”.^a Gould’s irregularity was related to time and predictability, not regulatory norms.^b

^a Gould, 1974:417.

^b Gould and Prothero, 1975.

Importantly, human security and insecurity as it relates to migration emerged in the modern era of nation States after the Second World War. In this context, the primary focus was refugees, as articulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention. As an important component of international human rights law – together with customary international law concerning the principle of non-refoulement and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights²⁵ – the Refugee Convention and related Protocol of 1967 reflect recognition by the international community of the need, as part of the multilateral system of States, to safeguard human security from threats caused by displacement. That said, there is widespread recognition that the focus on upholding human security in migration and displacement has diminished, especially since the 1990s.²⁶ The protection of migrants (including refugees), therefore, remains a highly salient issue, related to both humanitarian and development aspects, as discussed in the next section.

¹⁹ Watson, 2009.

²⁰ As per article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.

²¹ Ferris and Martin, 2019; McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.

²² McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.

²³ Brennan, 1984.

²⁴ Massey et al., 1998.

²⁵ Other key instruments include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention Against Torture.

²⁶ Goodwin-Gill, 2005; Youdina and Magnoni, 2016.

At around this time, in the mid-1990s, a school of academic thought – the Copenhagen School – conceptualized “securitization” as the characterization of danger and threats of a particular kind, via a “speech act” that moved security from the military realm to other realms, such as international migration.²⁷ The process of securitization has been described as using threat language when describing an issue to enable “justifying the adoption of extraordinary measures”.²⁸ The end of the Cold War in particular, and the related demise of a powerful external threat to the security of the West, enabled the emergence of threats, or perceived threats, that involved non-State actors. This had implications for a range of global and international issues, particularly issues that it was increasingly difficult for States to regulate and that involved actors operating largely beyond the reach of States’ control, such as terrorism, human trafficking, migrant smuggling and irregular migration. Migration increasingly became not only an issue of socioeconomic management for States, but also of national security. Further, one of the effects of the events of 9/11 was that it reinforced the trend towards securitizing migration, which directly resulted in increased migration control, significant investment in border intelligence systems and substantial institutional responses, most notably in the United States, but more generally throughout the Western world.²⁹

These developments are also intertwined with changes in political systems and media coverage. There is widespread recognition that the “toxicity” of the migration debate has further intensified over the last few years, with a politics of fear and division increasingly framing discussions.³⁰ Disruption and disinformation are increasingly deployed as part of tactical pursuits of power around the world, with negative impacts on public, political and social media discourse on migration, displacement and migrants (including refugees), and ultimately on societal values and democratic systems.³¹ A recent report on human security by the United Nations highlights that a growing paradox has emerged in which people around the world have been, on average, living healthier, wealthier and better lives for longer than ever, but also have been feeling less secure. An estimated six out of every seven people across the world already felt insecure in the years leading up to COVID-19, with the pandemic further intensifying this feeling globally.³²

Media and disinformation about migration

Bad actors is a generic term for those who intentionally create and propagate disinformation. They may be States, corporations, social movements or individuals, and their motivations span a spectrum of political, ideological and financial interests. They also vary considerably in terms of the audiences they target and the levels of coordination involved. Amplifiers are the media pundits, politicians, celebrities and online influencers who help popularize disinformation – whether intentionally or not – by spreading it among their large networks. Finally, hyperpartisan media are ideological outlets that frequently amplify disinformation. In the United States of America, for example, hyperpartisan media regularly give credence to disinformation stories and thereby push disinformation agendas on topics from economics to international relations. Disinformation campaigns against migrants are heavily aligned to right-wing political and media actors, including the resurgence of far-right, nationalist and xenophobic ideologies.

²⁷ Waever, 1995; Stritzel, 2014.

²⁸ Ullah et al., 2020; Waever, 1995.

²⁹ Faist, 2004; Koser, 2005.

³⁰ Fisher, 2017; Kaufmann, 2017; Tagliapietra, 2021.

³¹ Morgan, 2018; McAuliffe et al., 2019.

³² UNDP, 2022a.

To date, much of the popular discussion on disinformation has focused on content. However, focusing on content alone can obscure the operation of coordinated disinformation campaigns whereby a network of bad actors cooperates to manipulate public opinion.

Source: Abridged extract of Culloty et al., 2021.

Understanding the links between migration, mobility and human security

To get a sense of the breadth and nature of human insecurity in the context of migration and mobility, it is useful to examine key data, including global indices. Human insecurity connected to disaster (such as floods, typhoons or wildfires), for example, affects countries around the world regardless of development levels, with both developed and developing countries exposed to significant and growing risks.³³ The consequences of disaster-related crises, however, tend to be more profound in developing countries, which can lack the resources to invest in both risk reduction programming and disaster (and post-disaster) response.³⁴ Further, there is strong recognition that the world is currently gripped by a range of interlinked crises that are seriously impacting least developed countries, with profound negative implications for millions of people globally.³⁵

Table 1 correlates data for selected countries on the Human Development Index (HDI), Human Freedom Index (HFI), Global Peace Index (GPI), Fragile States Index (FSI), IDPs (conflict and violence), new internal displacements (disaster), and refugees and asylum-seekers. Several key aspects are evident in Table 1. First, countries that rank highly on the HFI tend to perform well on the HDI, a composite measure of countries' performance across several dimensions, including health, education and standard of living. However, it is notable that some very high HDI countries rank poorly on human freedom.

Second, the table shows that countries that rank highly on the GPI also tend to perform well on the HDI. While there are some exceptions – countries such as Bhutan, Cambodia, Ghana and Senegal rank relatively highly on the GPI, compared to their ranking on the HDI – the general trend suggests that higher human development goes hand-in-hand with high levels of peace.

Third, countries that rank towards the bottom of the FSI – indicating that they are more stable – seem to have high levels of human development, while those that are highly fragile – in almost all cases – have a low HDI. Also clear, however, is that not all countries that are stable (with a low FSI score) have high human development. In other words, stability does sometimes coexist with low HDI, suggesting perhaps that stability is a necessary but not a sufficient factor for development.

Fourth, countries that score high on the peace index also produce fewer refugees and asylum-seekers and have a lower number or are without conflict-induced IDPs. The number of refugees and asylum-seekers originating from countries such as Singapore, Chile or the Republic of Korea in 2021 starkly contrasts with the number from less peaceful countries such as Myanmar, Ethiopia, Yemen and South Sudan. This reality is especially acute in countries such as the Syrian Arab Republic, where protracted conflict means that more than half the population is still forcibly

³³ For a discussion of migrants caught in countries in crisis, see Majidi et al., 2019.

³⁴ MICIC, 2016; Majidi et al., 2019.

³⁵ United Nations, 2022a.

displaced.³⁶ The glaring differences in the number of refugees and asylum-seekers – between high income, peaceful countries and more fragile and less developed countries – are also visible in the number of conflict-induced IDPs. Less secure countries, perhaps unsurprisingly, have a much larger number of conflict-induced IDPs, with countries such as Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Somalia together having millions of IDPs, while more stable countries, such as Costa Rica, Malaysia and Bhutan all recorded zero conflict-induced IDPs in the same year.

Fifth, the data on new internal disaster displacements show a very different pattern, highlighting that disaster displacement is more linked to geographical issues than to development issues connected to any of development, human freedom or human rights, peace or fragility. We can see that, new displacements occurred across the spectrum of HDI ranked countries. The growing impacts of climate-change related disaster displacement is resulting in more countries being affected over time, and far outstripping the number of countries affected by internal displacement due to conflict and violence. Further discussion on internal displacement is in Chapter 2 of this report.

Table 1. Development, freedom, peace, State fragility and displacement (selected countries)

Country (in HDI rank order)	Human Development Index (HDI), 2021 Rank	Human Freedom Index (HFI), 2022 Rank	Global Peace Index (GPI), 2022 Rank	Fragile States Index (FSI), 2022 Rank	Refugees and asylum- seekers (country of origin), 2021	Number of IDPs (conflict and violence), 2022	New internal displacements (disaster), 2022
Switzerland	1	1	11	174	21	*	66
Australia	5	11	27	168	33	*	17000
Germany	9	18	16	167	309	*	630
Singapore	12	44	9	165	134	*	*
Canada	15	13	12	172	186	*	15000
United Kingdom	18	20	34	150	370	*	1900
Republic of Korea	19	30	43	159	1013	*	30000
United Arab Emirates	26	127	60	152	378	*	*
France	28	42	65	162	318	*	45000
Saudi Arabia	35	159	119	95	3727	*	*
Portugal	38	24	6	164	469	*	4500
Chile	42	32	55	144	10049	*	1500
Romania	53	38	31	133	5868	*	160
Costa Rica	58	35	38	149	1229	*	1600
Malaysia	62	82	18	122	22039	*	156000
Mauritius	63	50	28	154	549	*	140
Thailand	66	104	103	86	3391	41000	22000
Barbados	70	46	*	141	355	*	*
North Macedonia	78	47	36	111	5826	110	*

³⁶ UNHCR, 2022a.

Country (in HDI rank order)	Human Development Index (HDI), 2021 Rank	Human Freedom Index (HFI), 2022 Rank	Global Peace Index (GPI), 2022 Rank	Fragile States Index (FSI), 2022 Rank	Refugees and asylum- seekers (country of origin), 2021	Number of IDPs (conflict and violence), 2022	New internal displacements (disaster), 2022
Peru	84	56	101	87	12573	73 000	24000
Mexico	86	98	137	84	134 346	386 000	11 000
Tunisia	97	113	85	93	6 233	*	2 000
Libya	104	155	151	21	24 812	135 000	*
South Africa	109	77	118	79	4 207	*	62 000
Indonesia	114	85	47	100	14 954	72 000	308 000
Kyrgyzstan	118	87	91	66	5 818	4 000	1 700
Bhutan	127	86	19	96	7 189	*	*
Bangladesh	129	139	96	38	88 133	427 000	1 524 000
Ghana	133	66	40	108	23 424	*	2 700
Cambodia	146	116	62	50	12 920	*	28 000
Myanmar	149	135	139	10	1 154 392	1 498 000	13 000
Syrian Arab Republic	150	165	161	3	6 983 867	6 865 000	21 000
Papua New Guinea	156	75	94	55	1 143	91 000	9 600
Côte d'Ivoire	159	105	108	31	72 560	302 000	2 500
Nigeria	163	124	143	16	466 770	3 646 000	2 437 000
Uganda	166	118	121	25	19 708	4 800	34 000
Senegal	170	87	70	78	32 597	8 400	12 000
Ethiopia	175	148	149	13	288 338	3 852 000	873 000
Afghanistan	180	*	163	8	2 694 434	4 394 000	220 000
Yemen	183	164	162	1	73 055	4 523 000	171 000
Mali	186	119	150	14	207 687	380 000	24 000
South Sudan	191	*	159	3	2 367 800	1 475 000	596 000
Somalia	*	158	156	2	836 241	3 864 000	1 152 000
A number 1 ranking means:	Very high human development	Very high freedom	Very high peacefulness	Most fragile country			
A high number means:	Low human development	Very low freedom	Very low peacefulness	Least fragile country			

Sources: Human Development Index 2021: UNDP, 2022b; Human Freedom Index 2022: Vásquez et al., 2022; Global Peace Index 2022: IEP, 2022; Fragile States Index 2022: FFP, 2022; Refugees and asylum-seekers: UNHCR, n.d.; IDPs: IDMC, 2023; new internal displacements: IDMC, 2023.

Note: * means ranking not available for that country.

While displacement internally and across borders is clearly associated with increased insecurity, international migration outside of displacement – and particularly in terms of human development that encompasses economic, social and political aspects – also has significant human security implications. The long-term trend data show that there is growing “mobility inequality”, with most international migration now occurring between rich countries at the exclusion of poorer countries (see Chapter 4 in this report).

Human security throughout the migration cycle

This section situates the analysis of human security from migrants’ perspectives rather than from a State perspective. This enables an important rights-based aspect to be articulated, supplementing the more dominant State-based framing around migration and (national) security.³⁷ The section draws upon extensive research and analysis undertaken with (and by) migrants across the globe, providing examples of manifestations of human security and insecurity along the spectrum of migrants’ agency, including from cross-border displacement and human trafficking to labour and international student migration. As we witnessed during COVID-19, people from all walks of life were impacted negatively by pandemic-induced immobility, but those with resources were often better able to respond to the resulting increased vulnerabilities.


In this section, human security and insecurity throughout the migration cycle are described, with examples relevant to each of the different stages: pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return. It is important to note that not all international migration is connected to, or caused by, human insecurity. Many people who choose to migrate do so in search of an enriching opportunity, to become immersed in new cultures and places, or possibly out of a sense of adventure; that said, this type of migration can only be undertaken by those who have both the aspirations and ability to do so,³⁸ and many with the aspirations to migrate are unable to do so because they do not have the ability to realize their ambition, resulting in their “involuntary immobility”.³⁹

³⁷ See discussion in the previous section on the securitization of migration.

³⁸ Carling and Schewel, 2018.

³⁹ Carling, 2002.

Figure 2. Human security throughout the migration cycle



Notes: This figure provides examples of how human security and insecurity is relevant to different stages of migration. It is not intended to be exhaustive.

* "extreme human insecurity" includes, for example, conflict, persecution, disaster (such as floods and wildfires); "eroding or low human security" includes, for example, poverty, human rights abuses, severe economic downturn and spiking inflation or unemployment; see the definition of human security earlier in this chapter.

Pre-departure

Before people have left their home communities, human insecurity can loom large in the minds of many. This is most relevant for people caught in conflict or disaster and needing to find safety by moving to a much safer place within their own country or a neighbouring one. Displaced persons are often the ones facing the most extreme insecurity in the pre-departure phase, and, in recognition of this, a range of international treaties as well as humanitarian assistance programming are long standing, well developed and widely recognized (although underfunded).⁴⁰ There is also recognition of the limits of the international community's reach and influence, especially as it relates to people who remain within a country (including IDPs) who face extreme insecurity, including in the form of gross human rights abuses.⁴¹

For those not facing such grave conditions, decisions about whether to migrate internationally can nevertheless feature considerations of aspects of human security. Access to travel documents and visas – which determine migration journeys – is important within decision-making contexts, and has been shown to be a key factor when the possibilities of migrating are explored while in the country of origin. In recent research on migration intentions, for example, the availability of visas was found to be a determining factor in how people conducted online job searches.⁴² Similarly, changes in visa settings have been found to have an impact on potential migrants' contemplations of migration, as well as their eventual migration.⁴³ This can be seen, for example, in the changes that occur after visa restrictions are removed for specific groups, including by citizenship.⁴⁴ While there is a myriad of examples, such changes have been prominent when visa liberalization has occurred in key destination countries or regions, such as in the United States in the 1960s, and within Europe as Schengen arrangements expanded over time, taking in an increasing number of countries.⁴⁵ Importantly, there are services that can be provided after people have made the decision to migrate and before they embark on migration journeys. Pre-departure information and training, for example, for people who are about to migrate, can assist in supporting their security and well-being during the migration process as well as their initial integration post-arrival.⁴⁶

Illiteracy, insecurity and displacement of Afghans

Afghanistan is an impoverished country with a low rate of literacy, especially for women, and long-term civil conflicts. The combination of these features explains the multifaceted nature of insecurity leading to the displacement of many Afghans for decades.^a

In 1979, only 18 per cent of people 15 years or older were recorded as literate, increasing to 31 per cent by 2011 and to 37 per cent in 2021.^b Despite the slow but promising progress over the last two decades, there is a substantial gender literacy gap; in 2018, around 55 per cent of men, compared to 30 per cent of women, were literate.^c Several reasons explain this deprivation. In addition to the long-term civil war,

⁴⁰ United Nations, 2022b.

⁴¹ OHCHR, 2022.

⁴² Sinclair and Mamertino, 2016.

⁴³ See, for example, Jayasuriya, 2016, on the labour migration of Sri Lankans with international protection needs to Gulf countries through labour migration pathways available to them.

⁴⁴ Czaika and de Haas, 2014.

⁴⁵ Ortega and Peri, 2013.

⁴⁶ IOM, 2018.

Afghanistan has been struggling with universal poverty^d without having reliable resources to invest in development and education planning. The high population growth rate has also led to a young population and accordingly a large number of school-age children, but there has been significant unmet demand for education. Indeed, despite the progress made during 2001–2021,^e education attainment, particularly for women, has negatively been affected under the Taliban's rule. Education for boys and girls beyond the 6th grade was suspended in August 2021.^f

Severe restrictions are in place for women and girls, limiting their participation in education, work, and social and political life. This has created a situation where women do not have any hope other than escaping from the society. The unexpected takeover by the Taliban resulted in fear and concern about the higher education sector. Consequently, many university professors, lecturers and students left Afghanistan. The laws imposed by the Taliban, including gender segregation, have reduced the number of female students and increased the costs of private universities, and many are being closed. Moreover, many students in Afghanistan are unable to continue their studies due to economic insecurity. There is a fear of persecution among ethnic groups, particularly Hazara people and students, as evidenced by the incidence of suicide bombing in one of their education centres in Kabul's Dashti Barchi neighbourhood, a Hazara resident area, on 30 September 2022 killing close to fifty female students who were sitting for a practice exam.^g

The interrelationship of illiteracy, lack of access to developmental infrastructure, poverty and insecurity in Afghanistan has led to the displacement and forced migration of a large proportion of the population both within and from the country to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan for decades.^h Displacement, in turn, has disrupted education development. Despite the improvement of education of Afghan migrants and refugees in such receiving countries as the Islamic Republic of Iran,ⁱ with the arrival of a large number of documented and undocumented Afghans since August 2021, their enrolment in public education has been faced with challenges.

Educational deprivations are serious for human security, and illiteracy is considered as insecurity.^j One of the reasons for and consequences of illiteracy is displacement. Afghans have been struggling with illiteracy, poverty and insecurity connected to their displacement over three decades. Thus, access to and improvement of education, particularly for women, is one of the ways out of this vicious cycle.

Source: Hosseini-Chavoshi and Abbasi-Shavazi, 2023.

^a Schmeidl, 2019; Iqbal and McAuliffe, 2022.

^b UNESCO, 2022.

^c Samim, 2020.

^d UNDP, 2021.

^e Batha, 2022; Farr, 2022.

^f Qazizai and Hadid, 2022.

^g Putz, 2022; AFP, 2022.

^h Abbasi-Shavazi et al., 2005.

ⁱ Hugo et al., 2012.

^j Commission on Human Security, 2003.

Transit

Where possible, migrants will choose to transit through countries on visas and with identity documents.⁴⁷ There are stark differences between travelling on a visa and travelling without a visa when one is required. From a migrant's perspective, the experience can be profoundly different in a number of important ways that can impact the human security of the migrant and the migrant's family, including those who may remain in the country of origin. First, visas denote authority to enter a country and offer legitimacy when arriving in and travelling through a country. A valid visa provides a greater chance of being safeguarded against exploitation. Conversely, travelling without a visa puts people at much greater risk of being detained and deported by authorities, or exploited and abused by those offering illicit migration services, such as smugglers or traffickers, who operate largely outside of regulated systems. Second, transiting on visas is more likely to be safer and more certain, and offers migrants greater choice over such aspects as length of journey, travel mode and with whom to travel (if anyone).

While most migration journeys are straightforward, some can result in abuse and even death.⁴⁸ It is unsurprising, then, that there is often a strong preference for travelling on a visa. However, in many locations around the world, informal migration journeys are typical and there may be no opportunity to access visa regimes; as well, some citizens have very limited ability to access travel documents, such as passports, which are often a prerequisite to visa access. Further, in acute disaster and conflict situations people have to move quickly and often find themselves in hazardous situations, facing perilous journeys and extreme vulnerability in transit; these types of movements can quickly become major humanitarian concerns, with local, national and international humanitarian organizations assisting displaced populations.

Migrants can also become stranded during transit (or in destination countries), with major implications for their security.⁴⁹ During COVID-19, for example, thousands of migrants were stranded in countries without comprehensive social protection regimes, placing them at risk of starvation and homelessness.⁵⁰ Charities, non-governmental organizations (including migrant groups), United Nations agencies and local communities around the world came to the assistance of stranded migrants to support their immediate needs, most especially during the initial, acute phase of the pandemic, when severe lockdowns and travel restrictions were sometimes implemented without much warning.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Please note that while "regular" migration does not necessarily require visas, the discussion refers to visas because these are often a requirement, most especially for migrants from developing countries. In addition, the term "visa" is more widely understood than "regular migration" by migrants and the general public.

⁴⁸ See Chapter 2 for discussion of the IOM Missing Migrants project, which tracks the numbers of missing and dead migrants during transit.

⁴⁹ Gois and Campbell, 2013.

⁵⁰ McAuliffe et al., 2021a; McAuliffe, 2020.

⁵¹ Kolet et al., 2021; McAuliffe, forthcoming.

Entry

Entering another country usually involves crossing an international border and, in most cases, being assessed by authorities against requirements for entry.⁵² Borders can be welcoming places for migrants, but they can also be places of intense scrutiny, and of potential exploitation and abuse. For many migrants, entering another country and passing through border control points can be particularly intimidating and stressful experiences, especially for those travelling on “weak” passports or seeking to cross without documentation (such as displaced stateless persons).⁵³ For others, grave insecurity can result from so-called “pushbacks” in land and maritime settings whereby migrants (including refugees and asylum-seekers) are not only denied entry but are pushed back across the border immediately after entry, placing them in highly vulnerable situations (including risking their lives, especially at sea).⁵⁴

Because borders are central to the concept and practice of State sovereignty, the entry of non-nationals is often highly regulated, with normative frameworks needing to balance State interest and safeguard migrants’ rights.⁵⁵ Some analysts have argued that the dominant approach by many States – with a focus on managing borders to combat organized crime and other criminality – has had the effect of subordinating human rights protections in border spaces, notwithstanding that international initiatives to counter human trafficking necessarily include a focus on the physical border and entry processes.⁵⁶ In fact, smooth arrival processes and well-managed border and entry processes can effectively support human security through the provision of safe, transparent and clear processes that are free from corrupt practices.⁵⁷ For instance, people seeking to enter another country may be vulnerable because of the situations they left behind (where they may have been persecuted persons), the way in which they travelled (such as irregular, smuggled or trafficked persons), or the conditions they face on arrival (such as xenophobia or discrimination);⁵⁸ well-managed borders allow such migrants in vulnerable situations to be more readily identified and assisted.

Closed borders during displacement events or crises significantly increase human insecurity, sometimes posing grave risks to human life. During the acute phase of COVID-19, for example, total border closures placed migrants at extreme risk of serious human insecurity, including refoulement, lack of access to asylum procedures and in some situations heightened risk of virus infection.⁵⁹ The denial of entry, such as through interdictions and pushback operations of maritime arrivals, highlights the extreme risks to human security and the potential for loss of life at entry.⁶⁰ On the other hand, the intensity of negotiations among international actors during displacement crises, particularly those involving conflict and violence, highlight the critical importance of borders in human security.⁶¹ Opening up borders in such extreme situations can mean saving hundreds or even thousands of lives.

⁵² A significant exception to this is in relation to mobility arrangements between States, such as Europe’s Schengen agreement or West Africa’s free movement protocol.

⁵³ See discussion on passport strength in McAuliffe et al., 2021a.

⁵⁴ Doty, 2011; Gonzalez Morales, 2021.

⁵⁵ Chetail, 2020.

⁵⁶ Taran, 2000.

⁵⁷ OHCHR, 2021.

⁵⁸ Bauloz et al., 2021; IOM, 2019b; OHCHR, 2021.

⁵⁹ Chetail, 2020; McAuliffe, 2020.

⁶⁰ IOM, 2022a.

⁶¹ De Lauri, 2022.

Hear My Voice: Insecurity of migrant children

In June 2019, attorney Warren Binford traveled to the US Customs and Border Protection facility in Clint, Texas. She was there on a routine visit to monitor the government's compliance with the Flores Settlement Agreement, which governs how long and under what conditions migrant children can be held in detention facilities. She ended up interviewing dozens of children over a few days, and gathered stories so shocking – of hungry, cold and sick children sleeping on concrete floors under Mylar blankets – that they became international news.

After that visit, Binford started a non-profit dedicated to strengthening legal protections for children in custody. On its website, visitors can read sworn testimony from dozens of children and teenagers. But Binford ran into a problem: she says the children's stories were just too harrowing to hold an audience. "People were so depressed. They would call me and say, 'I can't do it. I bawl my eyes out. It's too much.' And so then it was like, 'OK. How do we help people to access this knowledge that the children have given us in the children's own words?'"

Her solution: a picture book. *Hear My Voice/Escucha Mi Voz*, published in both English and Spanish, features excerpts of the testimonies, paired with art by award-winning illustrators who are Latinx.

"Having these really fabulous artists come together and illustrate the book helps to create a more accessible point of entry into these children's lives, and who they are, and why they came to the United States", Binford says. One illustration shows a border crossing, with two children riding on a woman's shoulders across the Rio Grande. "One day in the morning we passed a wire fence with a big sign that said, 'Welcome to the United States'", the child narrator says. "My little sister and I came from Honduras", reads a page with illustrations of children sleeping in a wire cage. The artist has depicted them with birds' heads.

Binford is hoping that *Hear My Voice/Escucha Mi Voz* will be suitable for families to read and talk about together. "The children's book allows it to be a little kinder and gentler accounting of the children", she explains. "And by creating this mosaic from different declarations [it] helps to give a sense of who these children are collectively".

Source: Abridged excerpt of Kamenetz, 2021.

Stay

"Regular" stay increases human security because when a migrant has permission to reside in a country – whether to study, to work, to be part of a family or for protection reasons – they have a legitimacy that provides a degree of practical protection in day-to-day life. For example, it is more difficult for unscrupulous employers, landlords, corrupt officials and others to exploit people who have regular, documented immigration status.⁶² Regular migrants are able to live in communities more openly and freely than undocumented or irregular migrants, with greater access to public and social services such as education, health and transportation.⁶³

⁶² Crépeau, 2018.

⁶³ Bauloz et al., 2019.

Migrants may face discrimination in destination countries in a wide variety of settings, including in workplaces, schools and universities, health-care environments and social settings. Discrimination acts to impair the mental and physical health of migrants, and in some cases can have severe impacts.⁶⁴ The increase in misinformation and disinformation on migration and migrants has fuelled discriminatory sentiment and xenophobia, resulting in online hate speech and also physical violence towards ethnic minorities in some communities.⁶⁵ Effective antidiscrimination policies are an important preventative measure to help support human security and social cohesion in societies, including migrant populations.⁶⁶

Improving the human security of migrants during their stay also improves the overall human security of the population. During COVID-19, for example, access to regularization programmes, access to public health services (such as vaccination and treatment services), as well as support from community and diaspora groups, proved essential in achieving broader public health objectives and ensuring no one was left behind.⁶⁷

Gender, migration and human security: West and Central Africa

There are many women and girls who migrate in West and Central Africa, with many experiencing a range of gender-based risks. Women in West and Central Africa migrate for various reasons, including in search of economic opportunities, to reunite with their families and to further their education.^a In West Africa, nearly half of all migrant workers within and from the region are female.^b

Economic factors remain the primary driver of migration. While women migrants are engaged in both formal and informal employment activities, the majority continue to be employed in the informal economy, including in areas such as trade and domestic work.^b Female migrants from and within the subregion face several security challenges and risks, both during migration and following arrival in destination countries. Sexual exploitation and violence during migration journeys, precarious employment conditions in destination countries and low wages are some of the challenges that many experience.^c

^a Bisong, 2019; IOM, 2020a.

^b ILO, 2020.

^c Tyszler, 2019.

⁶⁴ Szaflarski and Bauldry, 2019; Vearey et al., 2019.

⁶⁵ Culloty et al., 2021; Urquhart, 2021.

⁶⁶ Bauloz et al., 2019.

⁶⁷ Armocida et al., 2020; IOM, 2020b.

Return

The return of migrants to countries of origin and their reintegration into communities are part of the migration cycle, and can be particularly challenging for migrants' human security. Migrants who return may have been living overseas for many years, if not decades, and may face obstacles – such as financial, social and legal obstacles – to smooth reintegration into local communities.⁶⁸ They may be returning after working for years in another country, after completing higher education or temporary assignment, or after a failed migration or asylum application. Return migration, therefore, covers a wide spectrum of situations and may not necessarily be voluntary.⁶⁹ From a human security perspective, return can result in extreme hardship and risk of internal displacement, even where voluntary, although these risks can be even higher when migrants are forced to return to their country of origin.⁷⁰

The circumstances of the return – both prior to returning and after return – are critical from a human security perspective and migrants' rights can be at risk in several ways. One of the most fundamental is the forced return of migrants against the principle of non-refoulement,⁷¹ which presents grave human rights risks for the returning migrant and is, therefore, a key principle of international human rights law.

Policies that facilitate a human security approach

This section builds on the previous section's analysis of human security and insecurity in the different stages of the migration cycle, examining how policies can improve human security for migrants and communities, addressing international, regional, national and subnational policy considerations. It is important to acknowledge that some policies that significantly foster or improve human security (or reduce human insecurity) do not always directly address the regulation of emigration and immigration.

Before we examine policies from the governance level perspective, we also need to acknowledge that responses and priorities concerning human security and migration often reflect historical and contemporary emigration, immigration and displacement dynamics and policies within countries and regions. There is no one-size-fits-all policy approach to improving human security, as it depends on what and how specific challenges are manifesting. While this chapter is not able to cover the breadth of impacts around the world, the short case studies in Appendix B help to show the diversity of human security issues and impacts being felt by different countries. These studies each represent one country per United Nations region, and focus on a particular human security issue:

- Burkina Faso (Africa): internal displacement due to conflict and violence.
- Canada (Northern America): leading the way on gender equality in migration.
- Colombia (Latin America and the Caribbean): regularization programming.
- The Philippines (Asia): initiatives to counter human trafficking.
- New Zealand (Oceania): multiculturalism and integration to counter extremist violence.
- Switzerland (Europe): inclusion of irregular migrants.

⁶⁸ Arowolo, 2000; Battistella, 2018.

⁶⁹ Mbiyozo, 2019.

⁷⁰ Da Rosa Jorge, 2021; Kleist, 2020.

⁷¹ Non-refoulement is the "prohibition for States to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise return a person to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would risk being subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, or would be in danger of being subjected to enforced disappearance, or of suffering another irreparable harm". For further detail see IOM, 2019a.

From the case studies, we can see that human security and migration impacts and implications differ by country. In Burkina Faso, for example, conflict resulting from political instability and the rise of violent extremism had displaced more than 1.5 million persons by end of 2021.⁷² This represents a challenge for national and international actors that struggle to provide food and shelter. In New Zealand, two terror attacks linked to white supremacist ideology prompted the Government to reconsider its counter-terrorism policies and enhance training on multiculturalism and diversity. In Switzerland, the Zurich municipality, unable to get broader cantonal support for the introduction of a regularization programme, introduced a “city card” which effectively provides access to essential services such as health care to undocumented migrants living in the city and nearby. In the Philippines, sustained efforts to combat human trafficking meant the country retained a tier 1 ranking in the United States trafficking in persons report for the seventh consecutive year and gained praise for its approach to the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims. In Colombia, COVID-19 heightened political tensions and the conditions of precarity among its growing population of displaced persons, prompting a mass regularization initiative that has increased human security significantly for millions of Venezuelans in vulnerable situations. Finally, in Canada, new programmes, mechanisms and resources have been developed to address gendered inequality in migration management and improve integration outcomes for migrant women and migrants from minority gender groups. Further details are in Appendix B.

Policies across different levels of governance

The governance of migration is a complex and multi-layered process structured around State sovereignty, which is central to migration policy design and implementation.⁷³ In other words, most migration policy is situated at the national level.⁷⁴ Notwithstanding this, international normative instruments exist, and they have been designed to determine or shape how States govern migration and mobility. International instruments such as treaties act to outline specific requirements of State Parties. Some are migration specific, such as the Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, while others, such as the core international human rights treaties, apply equally to all individuals and thus guarantee a minimum set of rights to all, including migrants. Appendix C provides a summary of global multilateral treaties related to migration and migrants. There also exist international non-binding State-negotiated texts (such as the Global Compact for Migration) and State consultative mechanisms (such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development), which are designed to inform and guide policymaking at the national level. A detailed discussion of these multilateral processes and related outcomes is provided in Chapter 8 of this report.

The international governance framework on migration obliges States to uphold the human rights of migrants, for example, by refraining from arbitrary immigration detention and by upholding the principle of non-refoulement. Elements of the framework also summon States to protect the human rights of migrants from third-party violation, for example by calling on them to regulate the activities of recruitment agencies to guarantee ethical recruitment practices, or by mandating that antidiscrimination legislation is enacted. The international level, therefore, is central to the consideration of migrants’ human security because it encompasses agreed norms and informs standards that can be replicated (or even enhanced) at other levels of governance, including by regional, national and subnational authorities.

⁷² IDMC, 2022.

⁷³ Caponio and Jones-Correa, 2018.

⁷⁴ McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.

At the regional level, migration governance also encompasses legal frameworks and policies, complemented by organizational structures, consultative mechanisms and other processes. Regional approaches shape how mobility takes place within regions (geographic or geopolitical) and address issues pertaining to human security (including rights) through binding and non-binding instruments. In some regions, migration-related agreements have been finalized and implemented by regional structures and groupings. Examples of this include the access to national labour markets for all nationals of the ECOWAS region without the need for employment visas or permits (see text box below), or the right to residence across the MERCOSUR region for nationals of their member States. In the case of the European Union, policymaking at a regional level has harmonized entry requirements and created residence categories for migrants. It has also created minimum employment rights standards, and mandated anti-discrimination legislation.

West Africa protocols on free movement

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975 and currently comprises 15 member States. The process of achieving free movement in the region started in 1979, with the signing of the first protocol on free movement, right of residence and establishment, which resulted in the abolition of entry visas for those moving between ECOWAS nations. This was followed in 1986 by the implementation of the “second phase”, which provided a right to residence across ECOWAS, including the right to work.

Over the years, the implementation of the protocols has encountered several obstacles, such as regional conflicts, the securitization of borders and increasing pressure to deter irregular migration originating in the region. Despite these, the overall strategy has not been to curtail regional mobility but has instead focused on raising awareness of the dangers associated with irregular migration and promoting regional migration as an alternative. The effects of the protocols are evident in research on international migration trends between 1995 and 2020, which indicate that ECOWAS free movement has had a long-term impact on migration activity within the region.^a By 2020, out of the 10 million international migrants that had moved to or from ECOWAS countries, more than 60 per cent moved within the region.^a

^a McAuliffe et al., 2021b.

At the national level, there are a wide range of policies that impact the human security of migrants. For example, visa policies determine who can enter and transit through territories, under which conditions, and for what purposes. Immigration legislation creates different categories of migrants, with residence conditions and entitlements attached to them. The ability of migrants to enter, transit and stay in countries through regular channels is a key determinant of human security, as access to rights – such as health care, housing, decent work and social protection – is often predicated upon immigration status. Irregular migrants, or those with temporary or precarious statuses, face difficulties or exclusion in accessing those rights and may be exploited in the labour market because of their status. They may also be subjected to additional forms of insecurity, such as immigration detention, and forced to return to their country of origin. Additional forms of support for migrants are therefore needed, depending on their situations.

South Africa policy developments for community-centred approaches

As part of South Africa's planned one-stop border posts that will be managed under the newly established Border Management Authority, migration management will be clustered into three main subsets:

1. Management of regular migrants: visa exemptions, valid visas or visas at point of entry.
2. Management of irregular migrants: including asylum-seekers, refugees, stateless people, smuggling, trafficking and cross-border crime.
3. Management of border communities.

This approach will allow South Africa to better manage its borders and ports of entry in a “triage” fashion. It has been developed based on lessons learned within the region and elsewhere on the continent relating to the management of border communities. Under it, people living within the “border law enforcement area” (commonly called a “border zone” and defined as the area within a 10km radius of land and sea points of entry) would be permitted to cross the border at informal community crossing points for personal and professional reasons, without the need for visas or exit and entry stamps. Border guards within border zones will identify people that fall within the border community. These people will be exempt from usual entry requirements.

This community-centred approach would enable members of border communities to engage in cross-border activities – such as connecting with their families on either side of the border, buying and selling goods and accessing services – without hindrance.

Sources: Republic of South Africa, 2020 and 2022.

Countries also shape the experiences of their nationals moving abroad. Countries of origin for large numbers of migrant workers may sign bilateral labour agreements with countries of destination to help safeguard the well-being of their nationals abroad. In certain cases, like in the Philippines for instance, migration may be prohibited to countries where human security cannot be guaranteed. Other policies may include the provision of welfare and consular assistance or the facilitation of safe return and reintegration.

Philippines' Overseas Workers Welfare Administration programmes

The Philippines Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) is the lead government agency responsible for safeguarding the welfare and well-being of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). A membership structure, the OWWA provides services to OFWs throughout all stages of the migration cycle. Since 1983, it has delivered pre-departure orientation seminars, tailored to OFW destinations. The seminar provides relevant information for their adaptation to the new work environment and culture in the destination country. It also provides specific training to certain migrant workers groups, such as domestic workers and seafarers.

It also runs a welfare programme for OFWs experiencing economic risks or insecurities in destination countries. Services range from legal assistance to psychosocial counselling and include visitations in hospital or prisons. Finally, the OWVA also runs a reintegration programme, providing assistance to returned Filipino migrants with their immediate and long-term needs, including housing, financial literacy training and employment counselling.

Source: Republic of the Philippines (the), n.d.a.

Although migration policies are often conceived at the national level, they are often implemented in a decentralized manner. In some systems, it is the subnational level that both sets and implements aspects of migration policy. More commonly, it is local level authorities (particularly city or municipality authorities) that are responsible for the provision of services to migrants, a key aspect for the security and well-being of migrant communities. In some cases, these local level authorities have discretion in interpreting and implementing national policies. In certain cases, they may openly oppose restrictive national policies, such as immigration detention or the exclusion of irregular migrants from health-care services. This is the case for “sanctuary cities” in the United States and beyond, which seek to protect the rights of migrants regardless of their immigration status, including by providing access to health care, shelter, integration and education services. Other municipalities have created specific programmes to protect migrants from exposure to potential harm in reporting crime. As described in the text box below, what started as a local level policy in Amsterdam has gone on to be expanded into a national approach, exemplifying how local approaches can also shape national policies.

“Free in, free out”: Dutch “firewall protection” for irregular migrants who are victims of crime

“Free in, free out”^a is an internal policy of the Dutch national police to ensure the safe reporting of crimes by migrant victims. It was initially implemented as a local policy of the Amsterdam municipality, as a recognition that immigration enforcement poses a significant challenge to the successful outreach to victims of crimes who are migrants, and that this has a subsequent impact on the community welfare.

The policy stipulated that migrants should feel comfortable to approach law enforcement officials to report crimes, without being questioned about their immigration status, or fearing any repercussions in the case that their irregularity is disclosed. Following its success in the capital, the policy was adopted in Utrecht and Eindhoven before being adopted nationally, as part of the transposition of the European Union’s Victims’ Rights Directive.

^a Timmerman et al., 2020.

Measuring policy implementation

Attempting to align migration policies to individual stages of the migration cycle proves challenging because most policy impacts migrants at multiple stages. Such is the case of national and regional policies aimed at countering migrant smuggling. While their primary objective is to protect the territorial sovereignty of States and promote

regular migration, the disproportionate use of force and militarization of borders can, for example, result in pushbacks at land and sea, effectively denying migrants the right to seek asylum, breaching the prohibition of collective expulsion and undermining the principle of non-refoulement.⁷⁵ Additionally, the same policies may, directly or indirectly, criminalize the provision of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants, further compounding their vulnerabilities in places of transit and destination.⁷⁶ In some instances, these policies and practices have not reduced smuggling, but have forced those smuggling and being smuggled to take on greater risks to cross international borders. This intensifies precarity and vulnerability.

Several attempts have been made to measure the comprehensiveness of different aspects of migration governance and policy structures. For example, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), in place since 2007 and rolled out in 56 countries across six continents, identifies and measures integration policies across eight areas: labour market mobility, education, political participation, access to nationality, health care, family reunion, permanent residence and anti-discrimination.⁷⁷ The Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) is one of the most holistic attempts to measure and compare such governance.⁷⁸ It is a framework measuring policies across multiple stages of the migration cycle. It was developed in 2016 by IOM in collaboration with Economist Impact to support governments in assessing the comprehensiveness of their migration policies, structures and practices, and to identify gaps and areas that need to be strengthened. The 90+ indicators are based on the six principles and objectives of the IOM Migration Governance Framework, grounded in target 10.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals, and aligned to the 23 objectives of the Global Compact for Migration.⁷⁹ At the time of writing, 92 countries and 52 subnational authorities had undertaken an assessment,⁸⁰ while others were embarking on an assessment. These completed assessments represent a baseline measure from which governments can work to improve their migration policies. Additionally, 18 countries have conducted follow-up assessments, contributing towards a longitudinal database that will help measure progress in areas of migration governance.

However, the MGI is limited insofar as it focuses on the existence of migration governance structures, with limited assessment of how policies are implemented and no assessment of the outcomes of those policies. As such, other tools are necessary to move beyond simply measuring whether frameworks are in place, and to understand how countries manage migration in practice. One way of measuring policy implementation may lie in developing Global Compact for Migration indicators.

On 7 June 2022, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Progress Declaration of the International Migration Review Forum. Paragraph 70 of the Declaration calls on the Secretary-General to propose, for the consideration of Member States, a set of indicators to measure progress related to the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration at a national level. In its 2022–2024 workplan,⁸¹ the United Nations Network on Migration is mandated by its Executive Committee to develop such indicators drawing on the global indicator framework for the SDGs and 2030 Agenda targets, as well as other relevant frameworks. For this purpose, a new workstream of the United Nations Network on Migration has been created, co-led by IOM and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and tasked with developing such indicators and conducting consultations with Member States and relevant stakeholders by the end of 2023.

⁷⁵ Gonzalez Morales, 2021.

⁷⁶ Carrera et al., 2018.

⁷⁷ MIPEX, 2020; Solano and Huddleston, 2020.

⁷⁸ IOM, 2019c.

⁷⁹ IOM, 2022b.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ United Nations Network on Migration, 2023.

Conclusions

The unprecedented pace of recent change in geopolitical, environmental and technological spheres has led some analysts and commentators to coin or use phrases such as the “age of accelerations”, the “fourth industrial revolution”, and the “age of change”.⁸² COVID-19 has further amplified the sense of uncertainty brought about during momentous change, that has been further underscored by “unthinkable” events actually occurring before our eyes, such as war and mass displacement in Europe. The looming spectre of devastating climate change impacts around the world is also adding to the profound sense of insecurity being felt by people all around the world.⁸³

Against this challenging backdrop, this chapter has examined migration and human security in contemporary settings, drawing upon conceptualizations of the topic that have evolved over recent decades. Rooted in human rights and protection, the human security of migrants (including those who have been displaced) is a fundamental aspect of migration and mobility: for many people working in migration policy, research and practice, it is considered the fundamental aspect. Part of the reason for this extends beyond the normative framework, and into the practical realms of peace and security (and lack thereof) as well as uneven human development resulting in systemic global inequality.

The topic of human security is important because, as highlighted in this analysis, we continue to witness the linking of migration and security through misinformed “threat” narratives that seek to paint international migrants as endangering countries and communities. The rhetoric framing migration in national or State security terms emerged decades ago as part of discursive rationales for extreme (at times militarized) responses to migration. More recently, a related line of this disinformation narrative has been amplified through tech platforms, often fuelled by alt-right groups operating transnationally (see text box above). The key and growing reality is, however, that the most significant link between migration and security relates to the human security of migrants themselves. The vulnerability of migrants throughout the migration cycle is evident at all stages and in a wide variety of manifestations during pre-departure, transit, entry, stay and return.

That is not to say that all migration negatively impacts human security; far from it. As outlined in this chapter, migration and mobility can positively enhance people’s lives, and can save lives in the direst of situations. However, there do remain many situations in which migrants can be extremely vulnerable and have their security diminished or degraded during migration. In these circumstances, authorities at multiple levels (international, regional, national, local) need to actively develop, implement and measure policies that facilitate a human security approach to migration and mobility.

The issue of human security is at the core of global frameworks such as the SDGs and the Global Compact for Migration. However, it is clear that while regulatory and policy actors are central and critical to facilitating human security, they also need the support, partnership and focus of non-State actors, including civil society, private sector, non-governmental organizations and researchers in realizing positive action to improve the human security of migrants and communities around the world. Working together across sectors affords the greatest possibility of responding to human insecurity needs that extend beyond humanitarian settings.

⁸² Friedman, 2016; Schwab, 2017; Mauldin, 2018.

⁸³ UNDP, 2022a and 2022b.

Appendix A. United Nations Commission on Human Security

The Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001 in response to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for a world "free from want" and "free from fear". The Commission consisted of 12 international leaders, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata (former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and Professor Amartya Sen (1998 Nobel Economics Prize Laureate), building upon the seminal work of Mahbub ul Haq in the 1994 Human Development Report.⁸⁴ The Commission argued for an "international migration framework of norms, processes and institutional arrangements to ensure ... order and predictability."⁸⁵

The table below summarizes major developments on the key migration-related policy recommendations in the 2003 report of the Commission.

Recommendations in the 2003 report	Major developments	Ongoing actions
The need for a United Nations-led high-level commission on migration to explore options, areas of consensus and ways forward on human security in migration.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Commission on International Migration established in December 2003, and reported at the end of 2005 • United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) declaration of December 2003 for the first high-level dialogue (HLD) on migration • United Nations HLDs in 2006 and 2013 • United Nations Global Migration Group established in 2006 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The United Nations Network on Migration now leads the implementation of the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
Identify and implement solutions to cross-border displacement, both in humanitarian and development terms.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) • United Nations Declaration of 2016 that established the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Compact on Refugees implementation ongoing • Global Compact for Migration implementation ongoing

⁸⁴ UNDP, 1994.

⁸⁵ Commission on Human Security, 2003:52.

Recommendations in the 2003 report	Major developments	Ongoing actions
<p>That the security risks arising during large-scale forced population movements need to be acknowledged and better understood.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major developments arising from the large-scale movements in 2015 and 2016 from Türkiye to and through Europe, including the 2016 United Nations Declaration on Refugees and Migrants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing, with a stronger focus on displacement related to climate change
<p>Substantially improve the protection of IDPs.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement established by the United Nations Secretary-General in 2019 • IDP HLP report finalized in 2021 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • United Nations Secretary-General's Action Agenda on IDPs finalized in 2022 and being implemented • United Nations Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement appointed in mid-2022 to lead the Action Agenda on IDPs

Appendix B. Country case studies by United Nations region

Country case study (Latin America): Colombia. Regularization programming

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	51.52 million
Human Development Index category ^b	High
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 314.46 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 6 104
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	1.905
<i>Percentage of population</i>	3.70%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	3.02
<i>Percentage of population</i>	5.94%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	30 424
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	4 807 000

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Since 2015, more than six million people have fled the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela from an unfurling socioeconomic, political and humanitarian crisis.⁸⁶ On 8 February 2021, the Colombian Government, with assistance from the Government of the United States in the form of funding and equipment, announced the start of a large regularization programme.⁸⁷ It is estimated that at least 56 per cent of the 1.7 million Venezuelans living in Colombia at the end of 2020 did not have regular status.⁸⁸ For qualifying applicants, a temporary protection permit (TPP) was granted, which guarantees temporary protection status (TPS) for 10 years, as well as access to basic services such as education, housing and health care.

In addition to providing temporary, long-term legal status to Venezuelans living in irregular situations in Colombia as of the end of January 2021,⁸⁹ TPS was also extended to Venezuelans who would enter Colombia with a passport through an officially recognized border checkpoint for the following two years, until January 2023.⁹⁰ Since the

⁸⁶ United Nations Network on Migration, 2022.

⁸⁷ US Embassy Bogota, 2021.

⁸⁸ DRC, 2021.

⁸⁹ Torrado, 2021.

⁹⁰ Presidencia de Colombia, 2021.

dissolution of diplomatic ties between Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela in February 2019,⁹¹ as well as the domination of armed groups along the countries' shared borders,⁹² official channels to document rights violations of displaced peoples are far and few between.

Temporary protection granted to Venezuelan migrants represents a new policy category provided by the Colombian Government and provides a solution for many Venezuelans fleeing the crisis in their home country.⁹³ Although described by the office of the Colombian presidency as apolitical and humanitarian,⁹⁴ it represents a response to the growth in the number of irregular Venezuelan migrants and the low acceptance rate – only 0.04 per cent – of asylum claims prior to 2021.⁹⁵

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

While notable benefits of TPS for Venezuelan nationals in Colombia have included a reduction in the threat of trafficking,⁹⁶ as well as the possibility of formal employment,⁹⁷ several challenges remain. Despite the possibility of transitioning from informal to formal labour markets, xenophobia and discrimination still impede Venezuelans from attaining formal labour contracts. Particularly for Venezuelan women in Colombia, unemployment reached nearly 35 per cent in 2021 – up 6 per cent from 2019,⁹⁸ and higher than unemployment for Colombian women – due to both the economic weakening caused by COVID-19,⁹⁹ and disproportional demand for jobs outweighing the supply of available employment opportunities.¹⁰⁰ Other impediments lie within the integration processes themselves, with many reporting difficulties accessing education, health services and even adequate housing in certain parts of the country.¹⁰¹

Some critics have argued that by addressing all Venezuelan displacement in Colombia as an issue of migratory management, the TPS disadvantages those fleeing the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela who may have otherwise qualified for international protection in line with existing legal frameworks (such as the Cartagena Declaration). This might present challenges in dealing with the gap between rights afforded to refugees and those provided to Venezuelans under TPS, and could impact how other governments respond to regional humanitarian needs.¹⁰²

Finally, one of the reasons why Venezuelans are often smuggled out of the country, when fleeing violence and persecution, is that presenting themselves at official border points can be dangerous.¹⁰³ The inability to document one's presence at a formal border point, which is a requirement to be granted TPS for new arrivals, may result in a new group of irregular migrants.

⁹¹ MMC, 2022a.

⁹² HRW, 2020.

⁹³ Selee and Bolter, 2021.

⁹⁴ Presidencia de Colombia, 2021.

⁹⁵ Castro, 2021.

⁹⁶ US Department of State, 2021.

⁹⁷ Castro, 2021.

⁹⁸ Woldemikael et al., 2022.

⁹⁹ Reuters, 2022.

¹⁰⁰ Bahar et al., 2018.

¹⁰¹ Ble and Villamil, 2022.

¹⁰² Freier and Jara, 2021.

¹⁰³ MMC, 2022b.

Good practices

Colombia's implementation of TPS has been commended as being carried out at unprecedented magnitude and speed.¹⁰⁴ It is also an important step in securing human rights and durable solutions for migrants.¹⁰⁵ By November 2022, over 1.6 million TPPs had been approved.¹⁰⁶ With permits, card holders can officially access the nationalized health system. As well, they can access financial services, such as opening a bank account, purchasing a home and accessing a loan,¹⁰⁷ which, despite its incipient legality prior to the issuing of cards, many banks and financial providers refused, insisting on formal identification documents and credit histories.¹⁰⁸

The successful regularization of Venezuelans in Colombia could, in many ways, be attributed to the unified, government-led effort, directed by the office of the presidency and with the support provided by the Government of the United States, to provide status to a substantial population of irregular, undocumented migrants within its borders.¹⁰⁹ Colombia's temporary protection scheme is the largest-scale effort of its kind to offer protection to a single nationality of displaced people and has been acclaimed a significant example of an effective response to displacement.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁴ United Nations Network on Migration, 2022.

¹⁰⁵ DRC, 2021.

¹⁰⁶ Gobierno de Colombia, 2023.

¹⁰⁷ Presidencia de Colombia, 2022.

¹⁰⁸ Woldemikael et al., 2022.

¹⁰⁹ Selee and Chavez-González, 2022.

¹¹⁰ Selee and Bolter, 2021.

Country case study (Northern America): Canada. Gender Equality in Migration

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	38.16 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Very high
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 1 988.34 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 51 988
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	8.05
<i>Percentage of population</i>	21.30%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	1.29
<i>Percentage of population</i>	3.41%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	193 336
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	280

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the Canadian agency responsible for migration, has a long-established tradition of promoting gender equality within migration management and governance mechanisms that, in turn, directly impact the lives of migrants. Particularly with gender-sensitive frameworks and processes that seek to directly support migrant women and gender diverse populations, such as the Gender Results Framework (GRF)¹¹¹ and Gender-based Analysis+ (GBA+),¹¹² approaches are applied to better understand the ways certain populations are particularly vulnerable and heavily disenfranchised throughout migratory processes, specifically in destination countries such as Canada.

These structures have led to pilot projects, such as the Racialized Minority Newcomer Women Pilot,¹¹³ the Home Child Care Provider Pilot and the Home Support Worker Pilot,¹¹⁴ which seek to not only to support women's employment through the creation of new opportunities, but also recognize the central role that women play in the reproductive care economy. Further initiatives that protect and support gender equality include the Rainbow Refugee Assistance Partnership and the Assistance to Women at Risk Program,¹¹⁵ which support the creation of migration pathways for vulnerable individuals fleeing violence and persecution. Once in Canada, settlement programmes through the IRCC offer myriad support systems to vulnerable populations as they integrate into a new

¹¹¹ Government of Canada, n.d.a.

¹¹² Government of Canada, n.d.b.

¹¹³ Government of Canada, 2022.

¹¹⁴ Government of Canada, n.d.c.

¹¹⁵ RSTP, 2019; Government of Canada, 2014.

country, such as childcare, transportation assistance, women-only employment and language support programmes, pathways to report domestic abuse and other gender-based violence prevention.¹¹⁶

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The GRF reports that unpaid work, the proportion of people in part-time jobs and low-wage employment disproportionately impact women.¹¹⁷ Within these data sets, it may be necessary to incorporate additional demographic data to identify intersectional factors leading to poor outcomes, as well as possible ameliorations.

According to data from January 2021, labour underutilization had increased from 1 per cent to 18.4 per cent,¹¹⁸ with many of those affected being temporary migrants. COVID-19 associated lockdowns and employment restrictions had a harder impact on women, youth, racialized communities and migrants; this has led to calls for devoting more attention to the efficacy of settlement services, which are currently struggling as a result of the pandemic.¹¹⁹ This has also reinvigorated discussions on the need to facilitate the transition from temporary to more permanent residence status for some migrant groups, which, aside from better labour market integration, affords stronger worker protections.

Good practices

Many programmes, mechanisms and resources have been instrumentalized to advocate for gender equality in migration management. The focus has been on creating tangible opportunities, including employment pathways and protections, for those most disadvantaged by gendered inequalities upon settlement in Canada, such as LGBTQIA+ individuals. These initiatives include the introduction of pedagogic programming to train internal staff on the importance of inclusivity, respect and the differences between gender identity, gender expression and sexual orientation, as is the case with the Gender Diversity and Inclusivity Online Training Course.¹²⁰ Furthermore, a commitment to inclusive language in official communication platforms has held steadfast, particularly through the introduction of a gender neutral designation, or an “X” instead of a selected binary gender, on official documents.¹²¹ For many migrants, these supports provide valuable protection from violence and prejudice resulting from gendered inequalities.

¹¹⁶ Government of Canada, 2022.

¹¹⁷ Government of Canada, n.d.a.

¹¹⁸ Statistics Canada, 2021.

¹¹⁹ Yalnizyan, 2021.

¹²⁰ University of Alberta, n.d.

¹²¹ Government of Canada, 2019.

Country case study (Europe): Switzerland. Inclusion of irregular migrants

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	8.69 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Very high
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 801.64 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 91 992
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	2.49
<i>Percentage of population</i>	28.8%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	0.71
<i>Percentage of population</i>	8.26%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	125 938
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	4

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Some cities around the world have decided to recognize individuals without immigration status as part and parcel of the functioning of the city themselves. While this approach doesn't typically provide legal status to an undocumented migrant, it enables access to services and facilitates proof of city membership. The city of Zurich created such an urban identity card programme called Züri City Card (ZCC),¹²² which will cost a total of CHF 3.2 million.¹²³ Pushback from rural municipalities circumscribed within the canton of Zurich has prevented the cantonal government from implementing a regularization programme such as Geneva's Operation Papyrus, launched in 2017.¹²⁴ Instead, the city of Zurich, where it is estimated that more than 10,000 undocumented migrants reside, will offer cardholders the possibility to access public services without the fear of being reported to immigration authorities.¹²⁵ In specific terms, the identity card confirms identity and place of residence, providing a form of local membership, while officially affirming an entitlement to access essential services, including health care.¹²⁶

¹²² ZCCA, n.d.

¹²³ SWI, 2022.

¹²⁴ RCG, n.d.

¹²⁵ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.a.; Cachin, 2021.

¹²⁶ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.b.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The inspiration for Zurich's city initiative to support and protect undocumented migrants come from the United States "sanctuary cities" that create spaces within cityscapes to allow irregular migrants to access services without fear of being reported to immigration authorities.¹²⁷ Importantly, the ZCC was conceived by local actors who then formed an association (Züri City Card Association) and presented to the city government of Zurich. The Züri City Card Association was hesitant initially to cooperate with the cantonal government as the city and canton handle issues of irregular migration very differently.¹²⁸ In turn, key challenges throughout the implementation process of this initiative focused specifically on this interaction between city officials, societal actors, canton and confederation levels, as multilevel governance does not exist within the City of Zurich.¹²⁹

While the City of Zurich has attempted to take on a coordination role between the Züri City Card Association and cantonal and confederation authorities, local civil society organizations, such as the Sans-Papiers Anlaufstelle Zürich (SPAZ),¹³⁰ have taken on a large role in supporting undocumented migrants with access to services. This includes claiming social assistance, securing rental accommodation and accessing health care.¹³¹ As the pilot phase of the ZCC is set to last four to five years, after the positive local referendum vote from May 2022, successful implementation of the initiative over the long term is a crucial next step for the city government to ensure that this identification tool can successfully recognize undocumented migrants for the role they play in the community.

Good practices

While support for the initiative could not be found within the canton of Zurich at large, this city-proposed project gained success based on the "horizontal venue shopping" that the Züri City Card Association engaged in, which led to the identity card finding its way onto the city's local political agenda.¹³² Importantly, many migrants who have come to Switzerland without status, or who have lost status once in the country, do not have the right to apply for residency, despite the integral role they play in Switzerland's economy: SPAZ expressed how the Swiss economy could potentially "fall apart" without the support of undocumented migrants' labour.¹³³

The initiative has allowed more than 10,000 undocumented migrants living in the city of Zurich over the course of the pilot programme to have a strengthened sense of security when accessing essential services and seeking social support.¹³⁴ While regular pathways for migration for many, particularly for those working in low-wage sectors,¹³⁵ remain narrow, support within local contexts is more important than ever. Inspired by the ZCC, discussions have commenced on the creation of a similar card in the nation's capital city of Bern, as well as in Basel.

¹²⁷ Vitiello, 2022.

¹²⁸ Kaufmann and Strebel, 2020.

¹²⁹ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.b.

¹³⁰ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.a.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Kaufmann and Strebel, 2020:14.

¹³³ SPAZ, n.d.

¹³⁴ Stadt Zürich Präsidialdepartement, n.d.a.; Cachin, 2021.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

Country case study (Africa): Burkina Faso. Internal displacement due to conflict and violence

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	22.10 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Low
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 19.74 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 893
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	0.72
<i>Percentage of population</i>	3.5%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	1.60
<i>Percentage of population</i>	7.43%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	34 423
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	1 882 000

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

Beginning in 2015, a worsening security situation in the central Sahel caused by overlapping attacks on civilians from armed groups associated with the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda, as well as other smaller non-State armed groups, has driven widespread displacement.¹³⁶ In Burkina Faso, this violence is mainly in the north of the country, at the borders with the Niger and Mali, and has resulted in serious humanitarian issues.

The number of new conflict displacements has grown, and in 2021, 682,000 new internal displacements resulting from conflict and violence brought the total number of IDPs to nearly 1.6 million.¹³⁷ Further, a military coup in January 2022 caused additional new displacements, estimated by the national reporting mechanism, CONASUR, to be more than 160,000.¹³⁸ The displacement effects of a second coup, which took place on 30 September 2022, are not yet clear.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ IDMC, 2022.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ NRC, 2022; CONASUR, 2022 and 2021.

¹³⁹ Al Jazeera, 2022.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The largest and most pressing challenge to date is finding suitable space to house over 1.5 million IDPs and an additional 3.5 million Burkinabè within the country in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁴⁰ According to the African Development Bank Group, two IDP camps have been constructed in the northeastern part of the country, with displaced persons from Barga and Titao, and which accommodate 6,000 and 10,000 IDPs, respectively. With a substantial need for increased capacity to house those fleeing conflict, and with hastily dwindling resources, the situation is looking more dire than ever.¹⁴¹

UNHCR and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) both lack a significant portion of the funding needed to adequately provide their humanitarian response plans for 2022, with the former raising 20 per cent of its required budget,¹⁴² and the latter, only 15 per cent.¹⁴³ As a result, shelter, food and medical assistance have been drastically reduced and civilians are lacking needed humanitarian aid.

Currently, 60 per cent of the country is under the Government's control;¹⁴⁴ this, coupled with the two coups in 2022, have generated high levels of instability in the country, which in turn risks increasing violent extremism and aggravating humanitarian needs. Following the September 2022 coup, the United Nations Secretary-General called on all actors to engage in productive dialogue.¹⁴⁵

Good practices

In early 2021, the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) launched the Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, which incorporated a grant of USD 500,000 for the construction of additional shelter and the provision of food and other essentials to 40,000 individuals.¹⁴⁶ While a step in the right direction, the country will undoubtedly need further international assistance to support the one in five Burkinabè in need of humanitarian aid.¹⁴⁷ According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) nearly three quarters of all households displaced in the country have been displaced for more than 12 months, and 34 per cent of them for more than 24 months.¹⁴⁸

Improvements in coordination have allowed for the ability to respond to the humanitarian situation to be strengthened in many ways. Through a bolstered focus on methodology, which includes geographic analysis and community needs (like food, shelter, education and health) in a given area. This coordination also engages directly with national structures, to determine the functionality of resources and weak points to be addressed.¹⁴⁹ Humanitarian coordination has also successfully been seen in certain instances, such as in the case of USAID, local NGOs and the World Food Programme working together to address malnutrition through the provision of emergency food assistance.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁰ IDMC, 2022; AfDB Group, 2022.

¹⁴¹ AfDB Group, 2022.

¹⁴² UNHCR, 2022b.

¹⁴³ MSF, 2022.

¹⁴⁴ Booty, 2022.

¹⁴⁵ Lamarche, 2020.

¹⁴⁶ AfDB Group, 2020.

¹⁴⁷ OCHA, 2023.

¹⁴⁸ IOM, 2022c.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ USAID, n.d.

Country case study (Asia): the Philippines. Initiatives to counter human trafficking

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	113.88 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Medium
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 394.09 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 3 461
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
Millions	0.23
Percentage of population	0.20%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
Millions	6.09
Percentage of population	5.43%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	1 387
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	635 000

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

In July 2022, for the seventh year in a row, the Philippines was ranked Tier 1 in the US Department of State's trafficking in persons (TIP) report,¹⁵¹ which acknowledges high levels of compliance with the minimum standards to eradicate the trafficking of human beings set out under the United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.¹⁵² The Philippines has introduced effective counter-trafficking initiatives in order to quell labour and sex trafficking present in the country. National counter-trafficking legislation was adopted in 2003,¹⁵³ in the form of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, and the subsequent establishment of the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. The legislative framework severely penalizes perpetrators of all forms of trafficking and formally recognizes the vulnerability of those trafficked.¹⁵⁴

In 2022, the Philippines identified 1,802 victims of trafficking, of whom nearly 70 per cent (1,251) were female and 31 per cent (551) were male.¹⁵⁵ According to the TIP report for 2022, trafficking over the course of the last five years has had a propensity to target not only the most vulnerable within the Philippines, but also Filipino nationals abroad.¹⁵⁶ Women and children are often recruited into trafficking networks as sex workers, domestic workers and in other forms of forced labour, while men and boys tend to be recruited into forced labour in the agricultural, fishing and construction sectors.

¹⁵¹ Republic of the Philippines, 2022.

¹⁵² United States Congress, 2000.

¹⁵³ Gutierrez, 2012.

¹⁵⁴ Republic of the Philippines, 2003.

¹⁵⁵ US Department of State, 2022.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

Specific challenges that authorities and practitioners face in the fight against trafficking include effective criminalization of traffickers and trafficking operations, as well as ensuring that sufficient resources are provided to both government authorities and organizations that are leading the charge of civil society actors against trafficking.

The 2022 TIP report recommends the overall expansion of resources dedicated to law enforcement, as well as the widening of judicial facility and capacity, so that traffickers can be promptly convicted and thus indicted for their crimes. Impediments to convicting traffickers were traced to slow-moving courts, lack of effective training of court officials and a limited number of prosecutors to try cases. Additional recommendations include putting greater emphasis on inter-agency and inter-organizational collaboration to provide support, including funding, to NGOs in their specialized programming and reintegration efforts. These include job training and placement for adult victims, as well as psychological and physical support for all victims.¹⁵⁷

Good practices

While the defence and support of victims has always been central to rehabilitation and reintegration, the 2022 TIP report found the Philippines to have advanced in this regard as compared to past years. First, victims who served as witnesses to trials and suffered further trauma were provided specialized support and assistance throughout the entire criminal justice process. In 2020 and 2021, 11 trafficking victims (in 2020) and 1 (in 2021) were placed into witness protection programme to ensure their physical safety and as recognition of the risks associated. Second, police and prosecutors continued to prioritize recorded rather than live testimony in courtrooms, to ensure that benevolence is foregrounded towards victims of trafficking. Furthermore, the use of other forms of evidence, such as digital tracing and financial records have been incorporated into court proceedings that once depended heavily on testimony from victims.

Having been approved by law in December 2021 and put into effect in February 2022, the Department of Migrant Workers is a new government agency that has been created as a result of the merging of seven previous agencies. Its main task is the employment and reintegration of Filipino workers.¹⁵⁸ The department will become fully operational in 2023 and will serve to maximize job opportunities for Filipino citizens upon their return from abroad and to stimulate national development after a two-year, COVID-19-induced slump.¹⁵⁹ This may in the future facilitate the implementation of the TIP report recommendation regarding support for labour market reintegration for victims of human trafficking.

¹⁵⁷ Republic of the Philippines, n.d.b.

¹⁵⁸ Republic of the Philippines, n.d.c.

¹⁵⁹ Depasupil, 2022.

Country case study (Oceania): New Zealand. Multiculturalism and integration to counter extremist violence

Key statistics

Total population (2021) ^a	5.13 million
Human Development Index category ^b	Very high
GDP (2021) ^c	USD 249.89 billion
GDP per capita (2021) ^c	USD 48 781
Immigrants (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	1.38
<i>Percentage of population</i>	28.7%
Emigrants abroad (2020) ^d	
<i>Millions</i>	0.81
<i>Percentage of population</i>	15.93%
Refugees and asylum-seekers hosted (2021) ^e	2 505
IDPs (as at end of 2022) ^f	150

Sources: (a) UN DESA, 2022; (b) UNDP, 2020; (c) World Bank, n.d.; (d) UN DESA, 2021; (e) UNHCR, n.d.; (f) IDMC, 2023.

Major impacts on populations

New Zealand is a highly diverse country and, according to the 2013 census, over a quarter of the population identified with a non-European ethnicity.¹⁶⁰ Diversity and inclusion policies and strategies make space for celebration of difference and inclusion of all citizens, such as the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum and the inclusion of ethnic representation and sensitivity in the mandate of public media.¹⁶¹ Despite this, it has been documented that minority ethnic groups, such as Asians, experience harsh discriminations in everyday life.

On 15 March 2019, the country's southern city of Christchurch saw violent terrorist attacks take place in two mosques, killing a total of 51 people.¹⁶² A country in grief has since attempted to uncover the reasons for such violence, and to find ways to combat it, with some arguing that counter-terrorist efforts in the country focused on Islamic terrorism while ignoring evidence of growing support for white supremacist ideology.

Key challenges for authorities and practitioners

The incorporation of preventative measures that seek to combat violent extremism within the country can be seen clearly in the country's practice of migration integration. New Zealand Immigration follows a settlement programme that focuses on five core outcomes, and each step is deemed essential for holistic integration: employment,

¹⁶⁰ Stats NZ, 2015.

¹⁶¹ Queen's University, 2020.

¹⁶² BBC News, 2020.

education and training, English language, inclusion, and health and well-being.¹⁶³ One of the main challenges faced by authorities and practitioners to date is how to maintain the country's multicultural demographic whilst supporting all ethnicities to experience the same degree of integration. According to a 2021 survey on community perceptions of migrants and immigration, New Zealanders' perception of their country as welcoming to migrants decreased from 82 per cent in 2011 to 66 per cent in 2021. The core reasons identified for this decline were racism and discrimination.¹⁶⁴

With the aim of quelling extremism within different communities of New Zealanders, the Prime Minister committed authorities and government officials to tackling the problem from all angles. Addressing the growth of violent extremism through online channels, the Government (with the Government of France) launched the Christchurch Call to Eliminate Terrorist and Violent Extremist Content Online, building upon the tech sector's Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism.¹⁶⁵

Good practices

In the wake of the Christchurch events, New Zealand's Counter-terrorism Coordination Committee developed a national strategy aimed at countering terrorism and violent extremism through a framework that begins with an aim of reduction and then moves onto themes of readiness, response and recovery.¹⁶⁶ In the categories of readiness, response and recovery, a victim-centred approach is adopted, foregrounding the importance of partnership in the readiness both to respond and to recover.¹⁶⁷ Key messages included in this national strategy are the strengthening of social inclusion, safety and equal participation.¹⁶⁸

In June 2022, the Prime Minister launched the Centre of Research Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, or He Whenua Taurikura (in Māori), which translates to "a country at peace".¹⁶⁹ Here, independent and New Zealand-specific research into the causes and effects of violent extremism and terrorism is funded, so that a strong stance towards prevention can be taken in the island nation. And to combat the spread of racism, the country has begun the National Action Plan Against Racism, which directly reflects the country's multicultural history, the ongoing path of diversity and the trajectory of New Zealand as a country that will lead the charge against racism in its many forms around the world.¹⁷⁰ With local communities, businesses, institutions and individuals in the forefront, workshops are sponsored around the country to engage directly with definitions and practices of xenophobic behaviour and belief systems, as well as with national and international support mechanisms that protect all individuals from forms of harm, discrimination and violence.¹⁷¹

¹⁶³ New Zealand Immigration, n.d.

¹⁶⁴ Government of New Zealand, 2021.

¹⁶⁵ GIFCT, n.d.

¹⁶⁶ ODESC, 2020.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Government of New Zealand, 2022.

¹⁷⁰ Government of New Zealand, n.d.

¹⁷¹ *Belong Aotearoa*, n.d.

Appendix C. Global multilateral treaties and State Parties

Thematic area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into force	No. of State Parties
Human rights	Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide	1948	1951	153
	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)	1966	1976	173
	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)	1966	1976	171
	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)	1966	1969	182
	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)	1979	1981	189
	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)	1984	1987	173
	Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)	1989	1990	196
	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW)	1990	2003	58
	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)	2006	2008	186
	International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance	2006	2010	71
Refugee law	Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)	1951	1954	146
	Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees	1967	1967	147
Trafficking and smuggling	United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)	2000	2003	191
	Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing UNTOC (Palermo Protocol)	2000	2003	181
	Protocol Against Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing UNTOC (Smuggling Protocol)	2000	2004	151

Thematic area	Treaty	Adopted	Entered into force	No. of State Parties
Labour and services ^a	Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (ILO Convention No. 97)	1949	1952	53
	Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO Convention No. 143)	1975	1978	29
	Convention Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers (ILO Convention No. 189)	2011	2013	36
	Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)	1944	1947	193
Modes of movement	International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, as Amended (SOLAS)	1974	1980	168
	International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, as Amended (SAR)	1979	1985	114
	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)	1982	1994	169
	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	1992	1994	198
Climate change	Paris Agreement	2015	2016	195

Notes: Conventions are listed under a primary thematic area. Some conventions relate to more than one theme; in such cases, they are listed only once. Unless otherwise noted, information on adoption, entry into force, and State Parties were accessed in September 2022.

^a The ILO Eight Fundamental Conventions, noted in the body of the chapter, are accessible at ILO, n.d.

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