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Cover photo: To support her family Ifrah travelled abroad and she kept sending remittances without possibility to save some money for the future. Due to several challenges and mental health difficulties she faced, she decided to return to Ethiopia – still empty handed and without proper time to prepare for return. IOM Ethiopia supported her throughout her reintegration process. Photos have been taken in the framework of the EU-IOM Knowledge Management Hub, funded by the European Union, and its audiovisual production activity on return and sustainable reintegration. © IOM 2022/Beyond Borders Media

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# 3

## MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

The previous chapter provides an overview of migration globally, with specific reference to international migrants and migration flows. Particular migrant groups – including international students, refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – and international remittances were also discussed. Chapter 3 is focused primarily at the regional level in order to provide a more detailed picture of migration, which sets out a different but complementary perspective on migrants and movements in different parts of the world.<sup>1</sup>

Our starting point is geographic, rather than thematic, given that geography is one of the fundamentals underpinning migration today, just as it was in the past. Notwithstanding increasing globalization, geography is one of the most significant factors shaping patterns of migration and displacement. Many people who migrate across borders do so within their immediate regions, to countries that are close by, countries to which it may be easier to travel, that may be more familiar, and from which it may also be easier to return. For people who are displaced, finding safety quickly is paramount. People, therefore, tend to be displaced to safer locations nearby, whether that is within their own countries or across international borders.

This chapter seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners, researchers and students to make better sense of international migration globally by using a geographic perspective to present regional migration overviews. The analysis in this chapter focuses on six world regions as defined by the United Nations, and used by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and other organizations:

- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Northern America
- Oceania

For each of these regions, the analysis includes: (a) an overview and brief discussion of key migration statistics based on data compiled and reported by UN DESA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC); and (b) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses from international organizations, researchers and analysts.

To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, the descriptive narratives of key features and developments are presented at the subregional level. For Asia, for example, this cascade approach allows for the presentation of insights from statistical data on Asia as a whole, followed by summary information on subregions, including Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, South-East Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. A breakdown of the regions and subregions is provided in Appendix A. These subregional overviews provide information on migration patterns from, within and to the subregions.<sup>2</sup> Beyond this, attention has been paid to particular features that exist in a subregion, such as labour migration and international remittances, irregular migration, human trafficking, and displacement (internal and international). The subregional overviews are not intended to be exhaustive, but are designed to be illustrative of key trends and recent changes in migration.

It is important to note that this chapter builds on the previous regional chapters of the World Migration Reports of 2018, 2020 and 2022 by providing an update on statistics and current issues.<sup>3</sup> Significant changes over the two years since the last edition of the World Migration Report have been reflected in this chapter (up until the end of October 2023), which incorporates some of the recent data and information on migration. Recent events, including those related to conflict and disaster displacement events in countries such as Ukraine, the Sudan, Pakistan, Türkiye, Haiti and Malawi are discussed, as well as some of the key policy developments across the various subregions. The chapter draws on the existing evidence base, and sources are provided in endnotes and the references section. We encourage readers to refer to sources cited in this chapter to learn more about topics of interest. Thematic chapters in this volume may also be of interest, including those on migration and human security, gender and migration, COVID-19 impacts, and recent developments in the global governance of migration.


## Africa<sup>4</sup>

Migration in Africa involves large numbers of international migrants moving both within and from the region. As shown in Figure 1, most international migration occurs within the region. The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)<sup>5</sup> show that around 21 million Africans were living in another African country, a significant increase from 2015, when around 18 million Africans were estimated to be living outside of their country of origin but within the region. The number of Africans living in different regions also grew during the same period, from around 17 million in 2015 to over 19.5 million in 2020.

Figure 1 shows that since 2000, international migration within the African region has increased significantly. Since 1990, the number of African migrants living outside of the region has more than doubled, with the growth in Europe most pronounced. In 2020, most African-born migrants living outside the region were residing in Europe (11 million), Asia (nearly 5 million) and Northern America (around 3 million).

One of the most striking aspects to note about international migrants in Africa, as shown in Figure 1, is the small number of migrants who were born outside of the region and have since moved there. From 2015 to 2020, the number of migrants born outside the region remained virtually unchanged (around 2 million), most of whom were from Asia and Europe.

Figure 1. Migrants to, within and from Africa, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Africa” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Africa) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Africa” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Africa) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the African region. “Migrants from Africa” refers to people born in Africa who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

In Africa, the proportion of female and male migrants in the top destination countries is similar, with only slight differences between countries. The most visible exception is Libya, where the share of male immigrants is significantly higher than that of female immigrants. This dynamic is broadly similar in the top 10 origin countries in Africa, apart from Egypt – the top country of origin in the region – which has a far greater share of male emigrants compared to females.

Figure 2. Top 10 African destination (left) and origin (right) countries by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

Displacement within and from Africa remains a major feature of the region, as shown in Figure 3. Most refugees on the continent were hosted in neighbouring countries within the region. The top 10 countries in Africa, ranked by the combined total of refugees and asylum-seekers both hosted by and originating from that country, are shown in Figure 3. South Sudan continued to be the country of origin of the largest number of refugees in Africa (around 2.3 million) and ranked fourth globally, after the Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Afghanistan. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan were the origin of the second and third largest number of refugees on the continent (more than 900,000 and over 800,000, respectively). Other origin countries of a significant number of refugees include Somalia (nearly 800,000) and the Central African Republic (more than 748,000). Among host countries, Uganda – with nearly 1.5 million – continued to be home to the largest number of refugees in Africa in 2022. Most refugees in Uganda originated from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In addition to producing a significant number of refugees, countries such as the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also hosted large refugee populations by end of 2022 (nearly 1.1 million and over half a million, respectively). Ethiopia, with nearly 900,000 refugees, was the third largest host country of refugees in Africa in 2022.

Figure 3. Top 10 African countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

Consistent with previous years, the majority of internal displacements in Africa in 2022 occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, with most triggered by conflict and violence. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (over 4 million) and Ethiopia (more than 2 million) had the largest internal displacements due to conflict and violence. Somalia, with 621,000 displacements caused by conflict, had the third largest in the region. The largest disaster displacements were recorded in Nigeria (around 2.4 million), followed by Somalia (1.2 million), Ethiopia (873,000) and South Sudan (596,000).

Figure 4. Top 20 African countries by internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.



## *Key features and developments in Africa<sup>6</sup>*

### North Africa

**Irregular migration to, through and from North Africa remains the defining feature of migration dynamics in the subregion, with many migrants suffering human rights abuses.** North Africa is a point of departure for thousands of migrants who embark on journeys, largely along the west and central Mediterranean routes. Across the subregion, especially in countries of transit such as Libya, well-established smuggling and trafficking networks have developed over the years.<sup>7</sup> In Libya, at points of maritime departure toward Europe, beatings, torture and forced labour of migrants have been well documented.<sup>8</sup> Women and girls in particular are at heightened risk of gender-based violence, especially during desert crossings and at border areas.<sup>9</sup> Thousands of migrants have also lost their lives. The central Mediterranean route is the deadliest route globally, with more than 20,000 migrants having died or disappeared along this route between 2014 and 2022.<sup>10</sup> In response to these ongoing challenges along the central Mediterranean route, the European Commission proposed a European Union action plan in November 2022, which outlines “20 measures designed to reduce irregular and unsafe migration, provide solutions to the emerging challenges in the area of search and rescue and reinforce solidarity balanced against responsibility between member States.”<sup>11</sup> While some actions in the Plan – including those focused on supporting as well as facilitating the sharing of responsibility – have been welcomed by a range of actors, others, including some NGOs, have criticized it as unworkable and a recycling of old mistakes.<sup>12</sup>

**Recent attacks on sub-Saharan African migrants living in parts of North Africa highlight xenophobia and racism in parts of the subregion.** In Tunisia, for example, political rhetoric in early 2023, accusing migrants from sub-Saharan Africa of fostering crime and threatening the demographic composition and national identity of the country, led to racist violence within the country.<sup>13</sup> In addition to verbal and physical abuse, some migrants lost their jobs and others were evicted from their homes.<sup>14</sup> This rhetoric – reminiscent of the anti-immigrant political discourse in several countries across Europe in recent years – has been spurred on by some media outlets and online platforms in Tunisia.<sup>15</sup> Several countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso and Mali organized repatriation flights for their citizens who were desperate to leave.<sup>16</sup> The hate speech and violence against sub-Saharan African migrants prompted the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to issue a statement calling on Tunisia to “combat all forms of racial discrimination and racist violence against black Africans, especially migrants from the south of the Sahara and black Tunisian citizens.”<sup>17</sup> A range of abuses and violence have also been documented in Libya, with a 2022 report of the United Nations Human Rights Office highlighting how migrants are routinely subjected to racism, xenophobia, criminalization and other human rights violations.<sup>18</sup>

**International remittances remain significant to North Africa and are major sources of foreign exchange for several countries in the subregion.** Remittances became even more important following the onset of COVID-19, as revenues from tourism – which had long been vital for countries such as Egypt – dried up due to mobility restrictions. The subregion has a long history of emigration, with large numbers of emigrants living in Europe and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. For example, Saudi Arabia was home to nearly one million Egyptians in 2020.<sup>19</sup> In 2022, Egypt is estimated to have received more than 28 billion United States dollars (USD) in international remittances, making it the seventh largest recipient after India, Mexico, China, the Philippines, France and Pakistan.<sup>20</sup> Morocco, which ranks among the top 20 recipient countries of international remittances globally, is estimated to have received over USD 11 billion in 2022, accounting for 8 per cent of its GDP.<sup>21</sup>

**North Africa is vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, with the subregion affected by both slow-onset and rapid-onset events, resulting in significant displacements in recent years.** The subregion has experienced significant warming over the last several decades, while at the same time seeing its rainfall decrease during the wet season, particularly in countries such as Libya, Algeria and Morocco.<sup>22</sup> While the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries are some of the most impacted by climate change, they are considered among the least prepared.<sup>23</sup> The World Bank's 2021 Groundswell report projects that without tangible action on climate and development, millions of people across North Africa could be forced to move within their countries as a result of climate change.<sup>24</sup> Already one of the most water-stressed parts of the world, climate change could further exacerbate this reality, and we are already seeing impacts on agriculture and food production in the subregion. Increased water scarcity could also escalate existing conflicts and violence. In Libya, local militias have weaponized water scarcity, including using water infrastructure for leverage against the central government and other rivals.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, the protracted conflict in Libya has left it with low adaptive capacity, and the combination of conflict and climate change impacts have disrupted food production and displaced many from their communities.<sup>26</sup> Countries such as Algeria and Morocco have experienced significant displacements triggered by droughts and wildfires. By end of 2022, wildfires induced 9,500 displacements in parts of northern Morocco, and in the same year, 2,000 displacements – also due to wildfires – were recorded in north-eastern Algeria.<sup>27</sup> Wildfires also destroyed significant swaths of land, especially in Morocco, where they ruined more land in 2022 than in the previous nine years combined.<sup>28</sup>

**Conflict and violence continue to cause cross-border and internal displacement, while the subregion also hosts large numbers of refugees in protracted situations.** Displacement in the subregion is largely driven by conflict and violence.<sup>29</sup> In the Sudan, intense fighting between the country's military and its main paramilitary force erupted in April 2023, killing hundreds of people and forcing thousands to flee for safety, the majority within the country but others across borders, including to neighbouring countries such as South Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia and Chad.<sup>30</sup> Prior to this, the Sudan had seen violent clashes between clans and communities over access to land and control of resources, especially in West Darfur.<sup>31</sup> At the end 2022, the Sudan had more than 3.5 million IDPs and over 300,000 displacements as a result of conflict and violence.<sup>32</sup> The Sudan also hosts one of the largest refugee populations in Africa, and in 2022, the country was home to around 1 million refugees and asylum-seekers.<sup>33</sup> Most came from South Sudan, Eritrea, the Syrian Arab Republic and Ethiopia. Meanwhile, in Libya, although the October 2020 ceasefire agreement between warring factions remains intact, it has not been fully implemented, and the country continues to experience political instability, albeit with a significantly reduced number of people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence.<sup>34</sup> Libya had around 135,000 conflict IDPs in 2022, the lowest since 2013.<sup>35</sup>

### Eastern and Southern Africa

**The subregion has experienced a significant increase in intraregional migrants, driven in part by free movement arrangements.** The number of migrant workers residing within East African Community (EAC) countries reached nearly 3 million in 2019, growing from just under 1.5 million in 2010.<sup>36</sup> Within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the number increased to over 3 million, doubling since 2010.<sup>37</sup> Efforts to enhance integration in the subregion – including through the East African Common Market Protocol, which entered into force in 2010 and aims to realize the free movement of persons, labour, capital, services and goods – have been vital to removing barriers to employment. While not fully implemented across all countries, many citizens of the EAC have the right to entry and work within the Community and have access to the free processing of work permits.<sup>38</sup> To further bolster integration and facilitate labour mobility within the subregion, several States within the

EAC have also advanced frameworks on mutual skills recognition, playing “an important role in providing migrant workers access to other markets.”<sup>39</sup> In 2021, IGAD member States adopted a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, which is also the first free movement protocol globally to address the movement of people across borders in response to the adverse impacts of climate change.<sup>40</sup> Simultaneously, and in recognition of the significance of pastoralism as one of the key forms of livelihood in the region, IGAD member States adopted a Protocol on Transhumance, which has the objective of facilitating free, safe and orderly cross-border mobility of transhumant livestock and herders.<sup>41</sup> The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) also has protocols on free movement, but their implementation has been slow.<sup>42</sup> There has been renewed impetus, however, to facilitate free movement among COMESA member States, with two task forces created to help advance the implementation of the protocols.<sup>43</sup>

**While free movement protocols have been instrumental in enabling people to easily move across borders, irregular migration – both within and from the subregion – remains a challenge.** In Eastern Africa, irregular migration often occurs along four key routes: the southern route, towards Southern Africa (mainly to South Africa); the Horn of Africa route (movements within the Horn of Africa); the northern route, towards North Africa and Europe; and the eastern route, towards the Arabian Peninsula (mainly to Saudi Arabia).<sup>44</sup> Often facilitated by smugglers, the journeys migrants embark on along these routes are fraught with risks. Along the southern route to South Africa, for example, migrants encounter multiple challenges and risks, including having to make unexpected payments to brokers; they often lack sufficient funds for basics such as food; and some experience physical, sexual, psychological and other abuses.<sup>45</sup>

**Climate change induced disasters such as droughts, hurricanes and floods have devastated livelihoods in Eastern and Southern Africa, while also displacing millions of people in the subregion.** By March 2023, the East and Horn of Africa subregion was experiencing a record drought, the worst in more than 40 years.<sup>46</sup> Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia have been most affected, with the drought coming on top of years of insecurity and conflict, particularly in Somalia and Ethiopia. The consequences have been far-reaching, and across the IGAD subregion 27 million people were highly food insecure, with predictions of a famine in Somalia in 2023.<sup>47</sup> By May 2023, more than 2 million people had been internally displaced due to drought in Ethiopia and Somalia (combined), while over 866,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia were living in drought-affected areas at the start of the year.<sup>48</sup> In response to the growing intensity of the adverse effects of climate change and its expanding geographical scale of climate-induced mobility, more than 10 States of the East and Horn of Africa subregion, supported by IGAD and the EAC, came together in September 2022 in Kampala, Uganda, and signed a historic new Declaration: the Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change (KDMECC).<sup>49</sup> The Declaration lists 12 commitments articulated by the signatory States and five requests to the parties to the UNFCCC, under a collaborative framework that concretely addresses climate-induced mobility whilst driving forward the sustainable development of States. In Southern Africa, disasters linked to climate change, including cyclones, have become more frequent and intense.<sup>50</sup> Cyclone Freddy, for example, wreaked havoc in Malawi, Mozambique and Madagascar in early 2023 and was one of the longest-lasting tropical cyclones ever recorded.<sup>51</sup> The cyclone claimed more than 500 lives, and displaced over 500,000 people in Malawi alone.<sup>52</sup>

**Newly emerged and longstanding armed conflicts remain significant drivers of displacement in the subregion.** Eastern Africa has been beset by conflicts for decades and remains one of the most conflict-affected subregions in the world. The decades-long civil war in Somalia, increased Al-Shabab attacks as well as government counter-insurgency operations in response made 2022 the deadliest year in the country since 2018, while also triggering mass displacement.<sup>53</sup> An estimated 3.9 million people were living in internal displacement in Somalia at the end of 2022, a rise of nearly 1 million from the year prior.<sup>54</sup> In South Sudan, despite the 2018 peace agreement, intercommunal violence remains widespread and has resulted in considerable internal and cross-border displacement, with most internal displacements in 2022 taking place in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Unity states.<sup>55</sup> The country continued to be among the largest origin countries of refugees in Africa (more than 2 million), with most residing in Uganda, the Sudan and Ethiopia.<sup>56</sup> At the same time, Ethiopia underwent a brutal civil war in the north of the country, resulting in significant loss of lives, destruction of property and the displacement of millions of people. The armed conflict that broke out in the Sudan in April 2023 (see North Africa section) has resulted in significant internal and cross-border displacement, forcing many Sudanese to seek refuge in Eastern African countries such as South Sudan and Ethiopia. At end of July 2023, South Sudan alone had received nearly 200,000 new refugee arrivals from the Sudan.<sup>57</sup> The conflict has also meant that many refugees who had been hosted by the Sudan, including from countries such as Ethiopia, have fled to neighbouring countries or returned home.<sup>58</sup> A November 2022 peace deal resulted in a ceasefire, restoring security in the worst-affected areas of Afar, Amhara and Tigray, although significant humanitarian needs remain.<sup>59</sup> The Office of the United Nations Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa, together with IGAD and in partnership with United Nations agencies, have developed a Regional Prevention and Integration Strategy for the Horn of Africa, with provisions for the establishment of a Regional Climate Security Coordination Mechanism with the primary objective to support IGAD and strengthen the capacities of regional, national and local actors to address the linkages between climate, peace and security.

**Gulf States remain key destination countries for migrant workers from the subregion, particularly those from Eastern Africa.** Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are the main origin countries of migrant workers from the subregion to GCC States, with most working in hospitality, security, construction and retail.<sup>60</sup> Driven by high rates of unemployment and underemployment, as well as the prospect for higher wages, many young people seek employment opportunities in the Gulf.<sup>61</sup> The Gulf's close proximity, coupled with the increasing difficulty of gaining entry to previously traditional destination countries (for example, the United Kingdom and the United States), have made GCC States attractive labour migration options. The proliferation of recruitment firms across Eastern Africa, as well as several bilateral labour agreements, have also contributed to the significant increase in labour migration to the Gulf.<sup>62</sup> Regular and irregular labour migration from Eastern Africa to the Gulf are both prevalent and have increased over time, making the eastern corridor one of the busiest maritime migration routes in the world.<sup>63</sup> Labour migration to the Gulf has resulted in a substantial increase in remittances, especially to countries such as Kenya and Uganda. Remittances to Kenya and Uganda climbed to more than USD 4 billion and over USD 1.2 billion, respectively, in part due to increased inflows from GCC States.<sup>64</sup> Saudi Arabia now ranks only behind the United Kingdom and the United States as the third largest source of remittances to Kenya.<sup>65</sup> While several GCC States are implementing measures to reduce abuse of migrant workers – including reforming the Kafala system – the mistreatment and exploitation of migrant workers remains widespread.<sup>66</sup> Some of the most prevalent abuses include physical and sexual violence, restriction of freedom, abusive and coercive employment practices and deceptive, unfair and unsafe work environments.<sup>67</sup>



## West and Central Africa

**Parts of the subregion remain hotspots of conflict, insecurity and violent extremism, with the Sahel continuing to be the most volatile.** The Sahel region of Africa, which stretches from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, has long been an area of significant migration flows. The region faces ongoing crises including climate and environmental degradation, desertification, political and institutional instability, a lack of basic services, intercommunity conflicts between nomadic herders and farmers and the rapid rise of violent extremism.<sup>68</sup> The Sahel has long been affected by insecurity, characterized by armed conflict, military clashes and recurrent violence instigated by Islamist groups. The Central Sahel is the most affected by violence, with many civilians killed in 2022 alone.<sup>69</sup> The Central Sahel was thrown into further turmoil in 2021 after military coups in Burkina Faso and Mali, which resulted in their suspensions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union.<sup>70</sup> In 2022, there were more than 2.9 million refugees and internally displaced persons in Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger.<sup>71</sup> Clashes have spilled over to neighbouring countries such as Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Benin. Moreover, children have been targeted by non-State armed groups in Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger with hundreds, many of them girls, abducted.<sup>72</sup> In addition to ongoing conflict and insecurity, West and Central Africa is affected by an interplay of other factors, including climate change and food insecurity. Rainfall in the Sahel, for example, has decreased by over 20 per cent since the 1970s, making this part of Africa one of the most prone to droughts.<sup>73</sup> At the same time, parts of the subregion have experienced significant sudden-onset disasters, which have displaced millions of people. Nigeria, for example, had the largest number of internal displacements due to disasters in sub-Saharan Africa in 2022 (more than 2.4 million).<sup>74</sup> This was also highest figure recorded in Nigeria in ten years.<sup>75</sup> The displacements were largely the result of floods between June and November 2022.<sup>76</sup>

**Each year, tens of thousands of migrants from West and Central Africa undertake highly risky irregular migration journeys, as many try to make their way to Europe.** Migrant abuses are common on these journeys, including along several key routes between West and Central Africa and North Africa, the Sahara, or during sea crossings.<sup>77</sup> Irregular migration from West and Central Africa often occurs along the central Mediterranean route (sea crossings from North African countries and the Middle East mainly to Italy); the western Mediterranean route (consisting of several subroutes linking Morocco and Algeria to Spain); and the west African Atlantic route (from West African coastal countries and Morocco to the Canary Islands in Spain).<sup>78</sup> In 2022 alone, nearly 2,800 deaths and disappearances were recorded along the central Mediterranean route, the west African Atlantic route, the western Mediterranean route and other routes in West and Central Africa.<sup>79</sup> Due to limited search and rescue operations, these figures are very likely an underestimate. The west African Atlantic route is considered very dangerous because of the length of the journey, with migrants often stuck at sea for long periods on inadequate boats in areas of the Atlantic Ocean lacking dedicated rescue operations.<sup>80</sup> More than 29,000 nationals from West and Central Africa arrived in Europe along these various routes in 2022, with most (58%) arriving in Italy, 17 per cent in Spain, 21 per cent in Cyprus and Malta and 4 per cent in Greece.<sup>81</sup>

**In West and Central Africa, intraregional migration remains a prominent feature of migration dynamics, with most international migrants living within the subregion.** West and Central Africa was home to more than 11 million international migrants in 2020, with the large majority coming from countries within the subregion.<sup>82</sup> The subregion is home to half a billion people, 40 per cent of whom are under the age of 15.<sup>83</sup> The number of young people is projected to grow further, which could be a demographic dividend or further put pressure on a subregion already struggling with high rates of unemployment, especially among young people. Moreover, West and Central Africa suffers from high levels of poverty and large gender gaps when it comes to areas such as workforce participation and education attainment.<sup>84</sup> Intraregional migration in West Africa – estimated to be around

70 per cent of migration flows – is to a large extent due to labour mobility and involves temporary, seasonal and permanent migration of workers, with countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana the key destinations.<sup>85</sup> The ECOWAS free movement protocol has played a key role in facilitating labour mobility in West Africa; in fact, all countries in the subregion are members of this regional economic community, which means that citizens of ECOWAS member States have the right to enter, reside in and establish economic activities in another member State.<sup>86</sup> However, while ECOWAS has made significant strides when it comes to enabling free movement, the full implementation of its protocol is yet to be realized. The protocol continues to be undermined by a range of challenges, including those related to varying national interests and poor infrastructure, among others.<sup>87</sup> The Economic Community of Central African States also has a protocol of free movement; however, progress on its implementation has been slow and not a priority of Central African States, several of which continue to struggle with significant political instability.<sup>88</sup> Nonetheless, countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Gabon – with large lumber and oil industries – attract a significant number of migrant workers from the subregion.<sup>89</sup>


**The 2022 football World Cup highlighted some of the benefits of migration with many players of West African descent, for example, proving critical to national teams in Europe.** National teams across the world comprise players of diverse backgrounds, including players representing countries in which they were not born, and others who are children of migrants. The 2022 World Cup in Qatar had the largest share of foreign-born players in the tournament's history, with 137 of the 830 players (17%) representing countries in which they were not born.<sup>90</sup> Countries such as Morocco and Qatar had the highest number of foreign-born players.<sup>91</sup> Across European national teams, of players who were not foreign born, many were of African descent.<sup>92</sup> For example, several star players on the French team, including Kylian Mbappé and Paul Pogba, have family links to the subregion.<sup>93</sup> However, it is important to also highlight that for the vast majority of young people in the subregion with the desire to play football in Europe, the opportunities to migrate and successfully join football clubs in regions such as Europe are extremely limited. For most, their aspirations are often fraught with significant risks and dangers. Migrant smugglers and traffickers can take advantage of their dreams to play in big leagues in Europe, luring thousands from the subregion with false hopes of becoming professional footballers.<sup>94</sup> Often masquerading as football agents, they charge large sums of money to facilitate their journeys to Europe, only to abandon them upon arrival; other such migrants end up as victims of forced labour or sexual exploitation, among other abuses and violations.<sup>95</sup>

## Asia<sup>96</sup>

Asia – home to around 4.6 billion people – was the origin of over 40 per cent of the world's international migrants (around 115 million), as shown in the latest available international migrant stock data (2020).<sup>97</sup> More than half (69 million) were residing in other countries in Asia, a significant increase from 2015, when around 61 million were estimated to be living within the continent. As shown in the middle panel of Figure 5, intraregional migration in Asia has increased significantly over time, rising from 35 million in 1990. Considerable growth has also occurred in Asian-born migrant populations in Northern America and Europe over the last two decades. In 2020, migration from Asia to Northern America reached 17.5 million, rising slightly from 17.3 million in 2015, whereas in Europe, migration from Asia stood at 23 million in 2020, increasing from almost 20 million in 2015. Migration from Asia to Northern America and Europe drove much of the increase in the number of Asian migrants outside the region, reaching a total of more than 46 million extraregional migrants in 2020.

The number of non-Asian-born migrants in Asia has remained at relatively low levels since 1990. Europeans comprise the largest group of migrants from outside Asia in the region. These numbers include migrants from the European part of the former Soviet Union now living in Central Asia. During the same period, the number of Africans – the other sizable group of migrants in Asia – has grown.

Figure 5. Migrants to, within and from Asia, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Asia” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Asia) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Africa). “Migrants within Asia” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Asia) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Asian region. “Migrants from Asia” refers to people born in Asia who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

In Asia, the distribution of female and male migrants in the top 10 countries of destination and origin is much more variable compared to Africa. In the top destination countries, Gulf countries – including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a far greater share of male than female immigrants. Malaysia is the only non-Gulf country where the proportion of male migrants is significantly higher than that of females. India, meanwhile, has a slightly higher share of female immigrants than males. Among the top 10 countries of origin in Asia, nearly all of them – except China, the Philippines and Kazakhstan – have a higher share of male than female emigrants. Countries with a significantly high proportion of male emigrants include India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Figure 6. Top 10 Asian origin (left) and destination (right) countries by sex\*



Source: UN DESA, 2021.


Note: "Proportion" refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

\* This includes territories.



International displacement within and from Asia is a key feature of the region, as shown in Figure 7. The Syrian Arab Republic continued to be the largest origin of refugees in the world in 2022, with over 6.5 million people displaced internationally. The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 resulted in a significant increase in cross-border displacement from the country. In 2020 and 2021, Afghanistan was the origin of 2.6 and 2.7 million refugees, respectively; by end of 2022, this number had more than doubled to nearly 5.7 million, the second largest in Asia. Myanmar was the origin of the third largest number of refugees in Asia, with most hosted in neighbouring Bangladesh where Rohingya continue to be hosted following the mass displacement events of late 2017. As also reflected in Figure 7, Türkiye continued to be the largest host country of refugees in the world (nearly 3.6 million). Syrians are the majority of refugees hosted in Türkiye. Türkiye is followed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the number of refugees increased from close to 800,000 in 2021 to around 3.4 million in 2022, the result of more Afghans being displaced. Pakistan, the third largest host country in Asia, was home to 1.7 million refugees.

Figure 7. Top 10 Asian countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

In contrast to Africa, the largest internal displacements in Asia were the result of disasters, rather than conflict and violence. Pakistan, which experienced severe and widespread flooding, recorded the largest disaster displacements in the world (more than 8 million) in 2022. The second largest disaster displacements in the region were recorded in the Philippines (nearly 5.5 million) and largely triggered by tropical storm Nalgae, followed by China (over 3.6 million). India and Bangladesh also had significant disaster displacements in 2022 (see Figure 8). Myanmar had the largest internal displacements in the region driven by conflict in 2022 (over 1 million). This is the highest ever reported for the country and the result of intensifying conflict between the country’s military and non-State armed groups. Myanmar also had the second largest number of conflict displacements as a percentage of population after Kyrgyzstan.

Figure 8. Top 20 Asian countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

## *Key features and developments in Asia<sup>98</sup>*

### South-East Asia

**South-East Asia is one of the most disaster-prone subregions in the world, with millions of displacements occurring each year.** Several countries in the subregion are located along the region's typhoon belt or Pacific Ring of Fire, making people who live there extremely vulnerable to hazards such as floods and storms, tsunamis, earthquakes, among others.<sup>99</sup> Between 2020 and 2021, close to 31 per cent of disaster displacements recorded in Asia and the Pacific region occurred in South-East Asia, with countries such as the Philippines most affected.<sup>100</sup> By end of 2022, over 500,000 people in the Philippines were living in internal displacement due to disasters.<sup>101</sup> In the same year, there were more than 5.4 million internal displacements due to disasters in the Philippines, the second highest figure in the world after Pakistan (which experienced over 8 million).<sup>102</sup> A large number of these displacements were government-led pre-emptive evacuations in response to disasters such as typhoon Muifa, tropical storm Megi and tropical storm Nalgae.<sup>103</sup> People living in other countries in South-East Asia, such as Viet Nam and Indonesia, are also exposed to multiple hazards, with Viet Nam's entire coastline, for example, at high risk of storms and cyclones. There were more than 350,000 and over 300,000 new disaster displacements in Viet Nam and Indonesia in 2022, respectively.<sup>104</sup>

**Labour migration both from and within the subregion has long been a key feature of migration dynamics in South-East Asia.** Countries within the subregion, such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, are major destinations for migrant workers from within the subregion. Other countries outside South-East Asia, including GCC States like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, are also significant destinations, especially for migrants from the Philippines.<sup>105</sup> Given its large emigrant population, the Philippines consistently ranks as one of the top recipients of international remittances globally. Migrants from the Philippines are estimated to have remitted over USD 38 billion in 2022, the fourth largest figure globally, accounting for 9.4 per cent of the country's GDP.<sup>106</sup> The increase in remittances to the Philippines is partly the result of the recent lifting of a ban on Filipinos from working in Saudi Arabia (in protest against abusive treatment of its migrant workers), as well as the increased demand for Filipino workers in sectors such as hospitality and health in OECD countries.<sup>107</sup> Viet Nam – with a large emigrant population within the region and in countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom – also receives significant remittances; inflows to the country were around USD 13 billion in 2022, making it the second largest recipient country in the subregion.<sup>108</sup>

**The demand for migrant workers in destination countries, unemployment and underemployment in countries of origin and well-organized migrant smuggling networks have resulted in significant levels of irregular migration across South-East Asia.** Often related to temporary labour migration, irregular migration remains prevalent in the subregion.<sup>109</sup> Countries such as Thailand and Malaysia have large numbers of migrant workers in irregular situations.<sup>110</sup> Migrant smugglers exploit desperate migrants and utilize archipelagic and remote land borders to undermine the subregion's managed migration systems, offering their services to migrants whose options for regular entry may be limited. The lack of a fully functioning international protection system in the subregion also means that people exploited by smugglers may be in need of protection or have mixed reasons for seeking to move irregularly.<sup>111</sup> Trafficking in persons is also an ever-present reality in South-East Asia, with many migrants exposed to multiple human rights violations and abuses.<sup>112</sup> South-East Asia remains the origin of the largest number of trafficked victims in Asia.<sup>113</sup> For some migrant workers, factors such as "gender, ethnicity,

age and geographic location” make them particularly vulnerable to trafficking, forced labour and other forms of exploitation.<sup>114</sup> Globally, victims of trafficking who are women are the most detected among those trafficked for sexual exploitation (almost two thirds), while around 27 per cent are girls.<sup>115</sup> Males comprise about 10 per cent of detected victims of sexual exploitation worldwide, with most reported in South-East Asia.<sup>116</sup> Several countries in South-East Asia, including Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Viet Nam and Myanmar are categorized as tier 3 in the United States State Department *2022 Trafficking in Persons Report*, meaning that their governments “do not fully meet the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so”.<sup>117</sup>

**Many vulnerable migrants in the subregion, particularly Rohingya, are increasingly embarking on risky journeys in search of protection and to escape deteriorating conditions in camps.** An estimated 3,500 Rohingya embarked on sea crossings in 2022, both in the Bay of Bengal and in the Andaman Sea, a significant increase from the year before when less than 1000 people made similar journeys.<sup>118</sup> Some of these crossings have been deadly and in December 2022, for example, a boat with nearly 200 Rohingya is believed to have sunk.<sup>119</sup> With close to 350 dead or missing at sea recorded in 2022, it was one of the deadliest years since 2014.<sup>120</sup> A large number of people on these boats were women and children.<sup>121</sup> Many, including those living in Bangladesh – which hosts the largest population of displaced Rohingya – have grown desperate to leave for a multitude of reasons, including the worsening conditions in crowded Kutupalong (the largest refugee camp in the world), lack of employment opportunities and increased crime and violence.<sup>122</sup> Over several decades, Rohingya have endured persecution, violence and discrimination, including in 2017, which saw a record number of Rohingya flee to Bangladesh (more than 700,000) after the systemic violence inflicted on them in Rakhine province of Myanmar.<sup>123</sup> At the time of writing, there are ongoing plans to return some Rohingya from Bangladesh to Myanmar as part of a pilot project between the two governments.<sup>124</sup> Several reports have indicated, however, that many Rohingya do not want to return to Rakhine State under current conditions, which they deem unsafe and undignified;<sup>125</sup> United Nations agencies and some non-governmental organizations have also expressed concern that the conditions in Rakhine State remain un conducive to the sustainable return of Rohingya refugees.<sup>126</sup>

## Southern Asia

**The subregion has experienced devastating disasters in recent years, some of which have been linked to climate change.** Southern Asia is extremely vulnerable to climate shocks and has experienced extreme weather events such as heatwaves and floods in recent years. Long monsoon seasons, hotter weather and increased droughts are all expected to become the “new normal” in the subregion as temperatures continue to rise.<sup>127</sup> In 2022, countries such as India and Pakistan experienced record-breaking heatwaves and in the same year, the monsoon-season floods left a trail of destruction, particularly in Pakistan. The 2022 floods in Pakistan – some of the deadliest in the country’s history – resulted in nearly 1,700 deaths and more than 8 million displacements.<sup>128</sup> Other countries, such as Bangladesh – given its location and low-lying topography – have also borne the brunt of extreme weather events, with thousands of people displaced every year due to disasters. Record-breaking floods in Bangladesh in 2022 – some of the worst in 100 years – led to dozens of deaths.<sup>129</sup> In 2022 alone, disasters triggered over 1.5 million displacements in Bangladesh.<sup>130</sup>



**With a very large number of migrant workers from the subregion, Southern Asia receives some of the largest inflows of remittances globally.** Three countries in Southern Asia rank among the top ten recipients of international remittances in the world, underscoring the significance of labour migration from the subregion. With India estimated to have received more than USD 111 billion in 2022, it is by far the largest recipient of international remittances in the world and the first country to ever reach that figure.<sup>131</sup> India is also the origin of the largest number of international migrants in the world (nearly 18 million), with large diasporas living in countries such as the United Arab Emirates, the United States and Saudi Arabia.<sup>132</sup> Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were the sixth and eighth largest international remittance recipients in 2022 (nearly 30 billion and around 21.5 billion, respectively), also have a significant portion of their populations living abroad as migrant workers, especially in GCC States.<sup>133</sup> International remittances are also important to countries such as Nepal, where they make up nearly 23 per cent of national GDP.<sup>134</sup> While remittances remain a lifeline for many people in the subregion, migrant workers from these countries continue to face a myriad of risks, including financial exploitation, excessive financial debt due to migration costs, xenophobia and workplace abuses.<sup>135</sup>

**Years of political instability and conflict in Southern Asia have resulted in significant displacement, with countries in the subregion both origin and destination of some of the largest number of IDPs in the world.** Millions of Afghans are either internally displaced or have fled their country over the years. More than 4 million Afghans were living in internal displacement at the end of 2022.<sup>136</sup> Most refugees from the country are hosted in neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. By the end of 2022, Pakistan hosted the fourth largest number of refugees in the world (more than 1.7 million), most of them Afghans.<sup>137</sup> At the end of the same year, the Islamic Republic of Iran was home to more than 3.4 million refugees, the vast majority also from Afghanistan.<sup>138</sup> Afghanistan is currently facing one of the world's largest humanitarian crises, with around 95 per cent of Afghans unable to get enough food to eat.<sup>139</sup> Many people are also fleeing due to fear of long-term Taliban rule, including restrictions on women and girls, such as banning girls from attending secondary school and women from working.<sup>140</sup> Despite ongoing risks, Pakistan announced in October 2023 that undocumented Afghans had to leave the country by 1 November 2023 or face expulsion.<sup>141</sup> The announcement prompted both IOM and UNHCR to issue a statement calling on Pakistan “to continue its protection of all vulnerable Afghans who have sought safety in the country and could be at imminent risk if forced to return.”<sup>142</sup> By end of October 2023, more than 100,000 Afghans had left, with most citing fear of arrest as the reason for leaving Pakistan.<sup>143</sup> Another country in the subregion, Bangladesh, also hosts a large number of refugees. At the end of 2021, Bangladesh ranked among the top 10 refugee hosting countries in the world, most of them Rohingya displaced from Myanmar.<sup>144</sup>

## Eastern Asia

**As populations across Eastern Asia continue to shrink and experience significant labour shortages, some countries are increasingly turning to migrant workers.** The Republic of Korea's demographic crisis deepened in 2022, as its birthrate dropped to the lowest level since records began.<sup>145</sup> With an average of 0.78 children per woman, this is also the lowest birthrate in the world.<sup>146</sup> Japan has also been undergoing population decline over the last few decades, with births falling to less than 800,000 in 2022— also the lowest on record.<sup>147</sup> The country is also facing an ageing population and a shrinking workforce. For the first time since 1961, China's population declined in 2022, while its birthrate has also continued to fall.<sup>148</sup> These demographic shifts, including rapidly declining working age populations, especially in the Republic of Korea and Japan, have raised concerns among policymakers,

prompting them to enact a range of measures – including those aimed at increasing immigration – to boost their workforce.<sup>149</sup> In an effort to fill gaps in key sectors such as agriculture, the Republic of Korea announced toward the end of 2022 that it plans to bring in about 110,000 migrant workers in 2023.<sup>150</sup> Japan is also slowly continuing to allow in foreign workers in key sectors, including through the recently announced “specified skilled worker” programme, which includes memorandums of cooperation with 14 Asian countries.<sup>151</sup>

**Parts of Eastern Asia are hotspots for disasters (such as floods, tsunamis and earthquakes), with the subregion witnessing some of the largest displacements in the last decade.** In 2022, China recorded 3.6 million internal disaster displacements, the second highest figure globally.<sup>152</sup> Given its location on three tectonic plates, Japan is often vulnerable to volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons, among other disasters. Japan recorded 51,000 displacements due to disasters in 2022, an increase from those recorded in 2021 (14,000).<sup>153</sup> The country’s recurring disasters, some argue, have been exacerbated by climate change and environmental changes.<sup>154</sup> Japan’s well-established disaster risk management, however, has been effective in lessening the scale of displacements triggered by disasters.<sup>155</sup>

**Eastern Asia has one of the largest diasporas in the world and continues to be the recipient of large remittance inflows.** With over 10 million emigrants, China remains among the largest recipients of international remittances in the world.<sup>156</sup> Remittances to the country, however, have dropped over the last two years. Mexico overtook China as the second largest recipient of international remittances in the world (after India) in 2021, and this continued in 2022, with China estimated to have received USD 51 billion, behind Mexico’s more than USD 61 billion.<sup>157</sup> The contraction of remittance flows to China has been attributed to multiple factors, including demographic shifts that have resulted in the shrinking of the working age population and the country’s zero-COVID policy, which prevented people from travelling abroad for work.<sup>158</sup>

**The COVID-19 pandemic had a major impact on the number of international students from and to Eastern Asia, although several countries in the subregion remain committed to becoming key destinations for international students.** While China continues to be the origin of the largest number of international students in the world, these numbers have fallen since COVID-19.<sup>159</sup> In 2020–2021, for example, Chinese enrolments in the United States declined by 15 per cent (the first decline in a decade), while commencements in the United Kingdom dropped by 5 per cent.<sup>160</sup> However, since the country’s reopening, there seems to be renewed interest in studying abroad, and Chinese students are reportedly focused on moving particularly to the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada.<sup>161</sup> China is also an important destination for international students, especially those from the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Pakistan and India.<sup>162</sup> Japan and the Republic of Korea also remain committed to further attracting and increasing the number of international students in their countries.<sup>163</sup> In a recent government proposal, Japan announced the goal of attracting 400,000 foreign students by 2033, while also sending 500,000 Japanese students to study abroad.<sup>164</sup>

## Middle East

**The Middle East remains a major origin of refugees and asylum-seekers, while also featuring some of the largest internally displaced populations in the world.** By the end of 2022, Türkiye was home to nearly 3.6 million refugees, the largest number in the world.<sup>165</sup> Other countries in the subregion such as Lebanon and Jordan also host large numbers of refugees relative to their population. At the end of 2022, 1 in 7 and 1 in 16 persons residing in Lebanon and Jordan respectively were refugees and other people in need of international protection.<sup>166</sup> Moreover, the Middle East also continues to be the source of millions of people in need of protection. The Syrian Arab Republic was the origin of around 6.5 million refugees in 2022.<sup>167</sup> While the number of Syrian refugees declined in the first six months of 2022, the first time since 2011, almost one in five refugees globally is Syrian.<sup>168</sup> Despite the decline in the number of Syrian refugees globally, there has been a rise in xenophobia and racist attacks against them, including in countries such as Türkiye and Lebanon.<sup>169</sup> A surge in anti-immigrant sentiment, as both Türkiye and Lebanon have recently experienced worsening economic crises, has resulted in racialized assaults on Syrian migrants.<sup>170</sup> Disinformation about migrants, spurred on by incendiary rhetoric from far-right nationalist parties, has played a significant role in driving the recent attacks.<sup>171</sup> Meanwhile, in February 2023, south-east Türkiye and the northern part of the Syrian Arab Republic experienced two powerful earthquakes, resulting in more than 50,000 deaths.<sup>172</sup> By March, an estimated 2.7 million people had been displaced in Türkiye and many had been left homeless in the Syrian Arab Republic.<sup>173</sup> The earthquake is one of the largest disasters to impact the region in recent times; in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic, which was already facing an acute humanitarian crisis due to years of conflict, the earthquake exacerbated a situation that was already dire for many people.<sup>174</sup>

### **Recent and protracted conflicts and violence are the leading drivers of displacement in the subregion.**

In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, hostilities have resulted in significant displacement and an acute humanitarian crisis. In response to armed groups from Gaza that killed or injured thousands of Israelis (and took many hostage) in the attacks of 7 October 2023, Israel declared a “state of war”, which has resulted in the heavy bombardment of Gaza.<sup>175</sup> By end of October 2023, more than 1 million people in Gaza were internally displaced and thousands had been killed as a result of the conflict.<sup>176</sup> Meanwhile, the war in Yemen, now in its ninth year, has been unrelenting, resulting in one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. An estimated two thirds of the population depend on humanitarian aid, including 4.5 million IDPs.<sup>177</sup> Despite its current humanitarian crisis, Yemen remains a key transit point, especially for migrants from the Horn of Africa going to neighbouring Gulf countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Oman. Most of these migrants – often fleeing from poverty, persecution, insecurity and conflict, among other drivers – are from Ethiopia. Migrants pass through Djibouti and Somalia before travelling by sea to Yemen and onward by land to Saudi Arabia.<sup>178</sup> A large number of migrants are exposed to extreme protection risks, both on their way to and upon arrival in Yemen; some of these include violence, exploitation and having to live in conditions lacking basic necessities.<sup>179</sup> The majority of deaths along land routes in the Middle East in 2022 occurred in Yemen, with close to 800 people (mostly Ethiopians), losing their lives on the route between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.<sup>180</sup> There has also been irregular migration in the opposite direction, with Yemenis in recent years fleeing war to countries such as Djibouti and spontaneous returns of migrants from Yemen to the Horn of Africa.<sup>181</sup> Some migrants who manage to reach destinations such as Saudi Arabia or Oman find themselves forcibly returned to Yemen. Between January and April 2023, more than 300 migrants (most of them Ethiopians) were deported from Oman to Yemen.<sup>182</sup> In the Syrian Arab Republic, more than 6.8 million people were living in internal displacement at end of 2022 due to conflict and violence.<sup>183</sup> The 12-year crisis has taken a toll on many and, by May 2023, more than 15 million Syrians were in need of humanitarian assistance.<sup>184</sup> Other countries in the region such as Iraq have also continued to experience violence, while intercommunal violence has also displaced many people in Lebanon.<sup>185</sup>

Moreover, as the economic situation in Lebanon has deteriorated, an increasing number of Lebanese are leaving the country and embarking on risky sea journeys. Of the nearly 380 recorded deaths on the eastern Mediterranean route in 2022, more than 170 died due to shipwrecks following their departure from Lebanon.<sup>186</sup>

**Gulf States remain significant destinations for migrant workers from around the world, and the 2022 football World Cup further underscored the importance of migrant labour to the subregion as well as rights violations.** Migrants continue to comprise high proportions of the total populations in many GCC States. In the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, migrants made up 88 per cent, nearly 73 and 77 per cent of the national populations, respectively. Most migrants – many of whom come from countries such as India, Egypt, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Kenya – work in sectors such as construction, hospitality, security, domestic work and retail. Several countries in the Gulf are among the largest sources of remittances globally. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, for example, had remittance outflows of around USD 39 billion, about USD 18 billion and over USD 12 billion, respectively, among the top 20 largest worldwide.<sup>187</sup> Labour migration to the Gulf is highly gendered, and in 2019, only around 4 per cent of women migrant workers globally were living in Arab States, compared to around 20 per cent of male migrant workers.<sup>188</sup>

### Central Asia

**Central Asia continues to be the recipient of significant international remittances, despite recent events such as the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.** Several Central Asian countries are heavily reliant on remittances from the Russian Federation, given the historical ties between countries and the large number of workers from countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan working in the Russian Federation, often in low-paying sectors that do not require high levels of education.<sup>189</sup> The Russian Federation has been a significant source of remittances for these countries for decades, making up more than half of the flows to countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.<sup>190</sup> International remittances to Central Asia, defying projections related to an anticipated contraction of the Russian economy,<sup>191</sup> remain robust, and flows to countries such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan reached record levels in 2022. Uzbekistan is estimated to have received more than USD 16.7 billion in international remittances in 2022, while remittances accounted for more than 51 and 31 per cent of the GDP of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, during the same year.<sup>192</sup>

**The Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and related military conscription in 2022 resulted in a historic influx of Russians into Central Asia.** In an effort to avoid the draft, hundreds of thousands of Russian men fled the country, many to Central Asian States such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Following the partial mobilization announcement in September 2022, more than 200,000 entered Kazakhstan in a span of a few days.<sup>193</sup> Kazakhstan's close proximity, lack of visa requirements for Russians to enter, large Russian ethnic minority and the fact that Russian is widely spoken all made it an ideal destination for those fleeing the Russian Federation.<sup>194</sup> Other key destinations for Russians fearing conscription included Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, among others. In 2023, however, Kazakhstan revised its entry rules, making it harder to enter and stay in the country, a move that was reportedly in response to the many Russians who have entered the country since September 2022.<sup>195</sup>

**While the Russian Federation remains the primarily destination for migrant workers from Central Asia, mobility patterns seem to be shifting, with an increasing number of migrants from the subregion moving to the European Union and Asia.** In the period between 2016 and 2019, the number of central Asian citizens granted permits to study, work or live in the European Union increased by 14 per cent, while migrants from countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan who moved to the Republic of Korea grew by 92 per cent from nearly 10,800 to close to 20,700.<sup>196</sup> More Central Asians have also been moving to other parts of Asia such as Türkiye.<sup>197</sup> With the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine and possible slowing down of its economy due to economic sanctions, some predict that this trend – with Central Asians increasingly choosing to migrate to other countries outside the Russian Federation – may only accelerate. Uzbekistan is already diversifying destination countries for its migrant workers, and in 2022 signed a labour migration agreement with Israel and in 2023 was in negotiations with countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom.<sup>198</sup>


**Across Central Asia, climate change continues to threaten lives and livelihoods and, in some cases, has been linked to the escalating tensions and conflict as well as displacement in the subregion.** Over the last few decades, Central Asia has been warming faster than the global average. Desert climates have also spread in parts of the subregion.<sup>199</sup> Moreover, we have seen a declining glacier surface area in Central Asia over several decades and the melting snowcaps are, in part, responsible for disasters such as some of the recent floods and landslides.<sup>200</sup> Dam failures and collapses have also significantly contributed to floods and related displacements in the subregion. Further, droughts have worsened in recent years, resulting in water shortages, including for activities such as irrigation.<sup>201</sup> Water management issues across borders – particularly between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – have increasingly fuelled tensions and led to violent clashes.<sup>202</sup> There have also been reports of violent clashes between farmers in Uzbekistan's Namangan and Surkhandarya regions over water resources.<sup>203</sup> Outside of climate change, conflict-related displacement has also featured in the subregion. In 2022, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan underwent a major crisis when tensions escalated and resulted in armed clashes along the disputed border between the two countries.<sup>204</sup> The violence caused dozens of deaths and the destruction of markets, schools and other civilian structures.<sup>205</sup> The clashes also triggered 166,000 displacements on the Kyrgyz side, more than triple the number in 2021.<sup>206</sup> An estimated 137,000 people in Kyrgyzstan were also evacuated from the southern region of Batken.<sup>207</sup>

## Europe<sup>208</sup>

The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)<sup>209</sup> show that nearly 87 million international migrants lived in Europe, an increase of nearly 16 per cent since 2015, when around 75 million international migrants resided in the region. A little over half of these (44 million) were born in Europe, but were living elsewhere in the region; this number has increased since 2015, rising from 38 million. In 2020, the population of non-European migrants in Europe reached over 40 million.

In 1990, there were roughly equal numbers of Europeans living outside Europe as non-Europeans living in Europe. However, unlike the growth in migration to Europe, the number of Europeans living outside Europe mostly declined over the last 30 years, and only returned to 1990 levels in recent years. In 2020, around 19 million Europeans were residing outside the continent and were based primarily in Asia and Northern America (see Figure 9). As shown in the figure below, there was also some gradual increase in the number of European migrants in Asia and Oceania from 2010 to 2020.

Figure 9. Migrants to, within and from Europe, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Europe” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Europe) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Africa or Asia). “Migrants within Europe” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Europe) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the European region. “Migrants from Europe” refers to people born in Europe who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Latin America and the Caribbean or Northern America).



In Europe, the distribution of female and male migrants is about equal across both the top 10 countries of destination and origin. Unlike Africa and Asia – where most countries have slightly higher shares of male than female migrants – in Europe there are more countries with slightly higher shares of female than male migrants (in both the top destination and origin countries). Among destination countries, Ukraine has a significantly higher proportion of female immigrants than males when compared with other European countries. The Russian Federation and Ukraine also have the highest share of female emigrants among origin countries where the proportion of female emigrants is higher than males. Italy and Portugal are the only two origin countries with a larger share of male than female migrants.

Figure 10. Top 10 European destination (left) and origin (right) countries by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Note: “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

The Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 resulted in one of the largest and fastest displacements in Europe since the Second World War. Millions of Ukrainians have been displaced to neighbouring countries, and by end of 2022, Ukraine was the origin of nearly 5.7 million refugees, the second largest number in

the world after the Syrian Arab Republic (Figure 11). Close to 2.6 million Ukrainians were hosted in neighbouring countries such as Poland, the Republic of Moldova and Czechia, and another 3 million in other European countries and further afield. Germany hosts the largest number of refugees in Europe (around 2 million), 7 per cent of all refugees in the world. Most refugees in Germany at the end of 2022 originated from Ukraine and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Russian Federation, Poland and France hosted the second, third and fourth largest refugee populations in the region.

Figure 11. Top 10 European countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: "Hosted" refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); "abroad" refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

Ukraine recorded the largest internal conflict displacements in the world in 2022, the result of the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion. Nearly 17 million displacements (around 40% of the country's population) were recorded in Ukraine by the end of 2022, the largest figure the country has ever recorded (see Figure 12). The massive number of conflict displacements in Ukraine in 2022 was also the highest in the world. The largest disaster displacements in Europe occurred in France (45,000) and Spain (31,000); in both countries, these displacements were largely triggered by wildfires.

Figure 12. Top 20 European countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022\*



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

\* This includes territories.

## *Key features and developments in Europe<sup>210</sup>*

### South-Eastern and Eastern Europe

**The Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has resulted in the largest displacement within Europe since the Second World War.** In addition to civilians who have been injured or killed since the war began – more than 8,000 deaths and over 14,000 injured as of 9 April 2023 – millions of people have been displaced within Ukraine, while others have been forced to flee the country in search of safety and protection.<sup>211</sup> By April 2023, more than 8 million refugees from Ukraine had been recorded across Europe, while nearly 6 million people had been internally displaced in Ukraine at end of 2022.<sup>212</sup> Most refugees had fled to neighbouring countries such as Poland, Czechia, Bulgaria and Romania, among others.<sup>213</sup> By April 2023, Poland was host to more than 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees.<sup>214</sup> The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian refugees are women and children, as most men – between the ages of 18 and 60 – were required to remain in the country and fight. As the war continues, the situation in Ukraine remains dire for many, including those who remain in the country under threat from the fighting, while also having to contend with outages of water, electricity, heating and the disruption of key services such as medical care.<sup>215</sup>

**Largely due to the lack of decent employment prospects and the search for better paying jobs, many people have left the subregion, often to work in Western and Northern Europe.** Countries such as Albania and the Republic of Moldova are some of the hardest hit; around 40 per cent of Albania's workforce, for example, is estimated to be working abroad,<sup>216</sup> contributing to brain and brawn drain and putting pressure on local industries and economies that constantly lose workers in both low-skilled and high-skilled sectors. High rates of poverty, wage gaps between Albania and other countries in the region, significant corruption and clientelism, among other factors, contribute to people's decisions to leave the country.<sup>217</sup> A similar trend can be seen in the Republic of Moldova, with around a quarter of its "economically active" population working outside the country.<sup>218</sup> The Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine that has resulted in a cost-of-living crisis across the world, including in countries in the subregion, has forced even more Moldovans to leave the country.<sup>219</sup> Other countries such as Bulgaria and Serbia are no exceptions and continue to see many of their young people leave.<sup>220</sup> While many who leave are regular migrant workers who end up working in the Russian Federation or in countries within Western and Northern Europe, there has also been an increase in the number of irregular migrants from some countries in the subregion. Thousands of young Albanians, for example, have resorted to taking arduous journeys to try and reach Northern Europe, especially the United Kingdom, with many risking their lives crossing the English Channel in small boats or inflatable dinghies.<sup>221</sup>

**As many parts of the world experience declines in their population, countries in the subregion are among the most affected, prompting concerns and discussions about immigration policies.** Due to sustained low levels of fertility and elevated rates of emigration, many countries are having to contend with shrinking populations, leading to labour shortages, including in key sectors, with significant short- and long-term implications for their economies. These realities have also put pressure on these countries' pension systems. Several of the affected countries, including Poland, Serbia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, are among the countries the populations of which are forecast to shrink by 20 per cent or more over the next three decades.<sup>222</sup> Immigration has long been a policy employed by countries – particularly those in Western Europe, Northern America and Australia – to reduce the economic and social effects of declining birth rates and ageing populations. While it is widely acknowledged that immigration is important in addressing the negative impacts of population decline in several South-Eastern and

Eastern European countries, the approach has tended to focus on increasing birth rates (including through financial incentives). Immigration is often viewed with suspicion and, in several countries, even curtailed through restrictive immigration policies and political rhetoric meant to discourage migrants from either entering or settling in some of these countries.<sup>223</sup>

**Irregular migration from, to and through South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, including by people from within and outside the subregion, remains a key challenge.** Often with the assistance of smugglers, the subregion is a major transit area and characterized by mixed migration flows, particularly for migrants trying to reach Western and Northern Europe. The western Balkan route, referring to irregular arrivals in the European Union through the western Balkans, including via countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia, among others in the subregion, has seen an increase in arrivals since 2018.<sup>224</sup> Serbia continues to be the main transit hub, with nearly 121,000 registrations in 2022.<sup>225</sup> Upon arrival in the western Balkans, the routes most used are through North Macedonia, Serbia and then direct attempts to cross into the European Union across the Hungarian border.<sup>226</sup> The three largest nationalities arriving in the Balkans include Afghans, Syrians and Pakistanis.<sup>227</sup> The transit period of migrants passing through the western Balkans was shorter in 2022, with many spending fewer days in each country compared to previous years.<sup>228</sup> Other non-Balkan countries in the subregion, such as Belarus, have also in recent years been transit areas for migrants attempting to reach the European Union with some pointing to the use of irregular migrants as a political weapon and leverage (the so-called “instrumentalization” of migrants).<sup>229</sup>

### Northern, Western and Southern Europe

**In March 2022, following the Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and subsequent displacement of millions of Ukrainians, the European Union took the unprecedented decision to activate a Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), granting Ukrainians fleeing the war a legal status that allows them to access a wide range of rights in European Union member States.** The directive guarantees the same socioeconomic rights and services to those who have obtained legal status under the TPD in all European Union member States, such as access to medical care, accommodation, work, free movement as well as education.<sup>230</sup> In some instances, displaced Ukrainians opted for a member State where they could apply for temporary protection, in recognition of their existing networks.<sup>231</sup> Ukrainians under the TPD can also visit Ukraine, if they so choose.<sup>232</sup> However, there has been concern that some aspects of the TPD, in terms of wording, are unclear, resulting in complications for some Ukrainians, particularly when it comes to keeping their status after short visits to Ukraine as well as accessing available assistance.<sup>233</sup>

**Several countries across the region have passed or proposed new restrictive immigration and asylum laws while also implementing a range of measures widely viewed as undermining asylum and violating international law.** Legislation introduced into Parliament by the United Kingdom Government in March 2023, for example, that would allow for the removal of people who arrive in the country irregularly and their being taken to a third country (such as Rwanda) for processing, has been widely criticized by civil society and international organizations. In response to the legislation, organizations such as UNHCR have argued that, if passed, it would breach the United Kingdom’s commitments under international law.<sup>234</sup> The Illegal Migration Bill, it is argued, would deny protection to many people who genuinely need safety and asylum, thereby contravening the 1951 Refugee Convention, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory.<sup>235</sup> IOM also expressed concern that parts of the Bill “would limit survivors’ ability to report trafficking and access assistance, which risks exacerbating the vulnerability of victims, giving traffickers more control over them and deepening risks of further exploitation.”<sup>236</sup> Denmark

has also sought to implement significant restrictions on immigration. Similar to the United Kingdom, in 2022 Denmark pursued an agreement with the Government of Rwanda to outsource asylum processing to the country.<sup>237</sup> These plans were, however, put on hold in early 2023, with a new government in power.<sup>238</sup> In Italy, a new decree – introduced at the start of 2023 and setting out a code of conduct for rescue of ships seeking to disembark in the country – has raised concerns, including from OHCHR, as potentially preventing “the provision of life-saving assistance by humanitarian search and rescue (SAR) organisations in the Central Mediterranean”, which could lead to more deaths.<sup>239</sup>

**Irregular migration remains one of the most significant migration challenges for countries in the subregion, and continues to be characterized by mixed migration flows, often with the assistance of well-established smuggling networks.** Calendar year 2022 saw the largest number of irregular arrivals since 2016, with more than 189,000 arrivals in Europe via land and sea.<sup>240</sup> While there was a decrease, overall, in irregular border crossing at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, there was an uptick in arrivals in 2021 and a further increase in 2022.<sup>241</sup> The largest number of irregular arrivals in 2022 came from Egypt (almost 21,800), the Syrian Arab Republic (nearly 21,000), Tunisia (over 18,000) and Afghanistan (more than 18,000).<sup>242</sup> Smuggling networks play key roles in enabling attempts to reach Northern, Western and Southern Europe, often charging high fees, while also exposing migrants to a multitude of risks and abuses. Some States outside the European Union have also in recent years been blamed for encouraging and even facilitating irregular migration to the subregion, using migrants as leverage or pawns for political ends.<sup>243</sup> In response, the European Commission introduced a proposal to tackle situations where State actors enable irregular migration for political purposes to destabilize the European Union, and allows member States to “derogate from their responsibilities under European Union asylum law in situations of instrumentalization of migration.”<sup>244</sup> The proposal has been criticized by civil society organizations, with some arguing that it is akin to dismantling asylum in Europe by allowing member States the potential to opt in and out of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).<sup>245</sup>

**In recent years, several countries in the subregion have adopted feminist foreign policies, which have the potential to positively impact migrant women and girls across the world.** Sweden was the first country in the world to adopt a feminist foreign policy, in 2014, although this policy was abandoned in late 2022 when a new government came to power.<sup>246</sup> Several other countries, including some in Northern, Western and Southern Europe, have since adopted similar policies. Some of these include France (2019), Germany (2021), Luxembourg (2021) and Spain (2021).<sup>247</sup> These policies cover a range of areas, including mainstreaming gender perspectives across all foreign policy actions and agencies, and advocating for progress in providing gender adequate resources to ensure gender equality as part of development and humanitarian aid.<sup>248</sup> While the policies have been widely welcomed and have generated interest as a way to empower women and girls globally, some have also been criticized for neither directly mentioning immigration nor addressing the various needs of migrants and the specific contexts from which they come, as well as paying little attention to immigration as an issue of foreign policy.<sup>249</sup> Outside Europe, Canada arguably has the most sophisticated feminist foreign policy, “the Feminist International Assistance Policy”, which, among other commitments, “advocates for progressive approaches to migration and refugee assistance.”<sup>250</sup>




## Latin America and the Caribbean<sup>251</sup>

Migration to Northern America is a key feature in the Latin America and Caribbean region. The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)<sup>252</sup> show that over 25 million migrants had made the journey north and were residing in Northern America (Figure 13). As shown in the figure, the Latin American and Caribbean population living in Northern America has increased considerably over time, from an estimated 10 million in 1990. Another 5 million migrants from the region were in Europe in 2020. While this number has only slightly increased since 2015, the number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean living in Europe has more than quadrupled since 1990. Other regions, such as Asia and Oceania, were home to a very small number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2020 (over 400,000 and 200,000 migrants, respectively).

The total number of migrants from other regions living in Latin America and the Caribbean has remained relatively stable, at around 3 million over the last 30 years. These were comprised mostly of Europeans (whose numbers have declined slightly over the period) and Northern Americans, whose numbers have increased. In 2020, the numbers of Europeans and Northern Americans living in Latin America and the Caribbean stood at around 1.4 million and 1.3 million, respectively. Meanwhile, around 11 million migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean originated from other countries in the region.

Figure 13. Migrants to, within and from Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. in Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Latin America and the Caribbean region. “Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to people born in Latin America and the Caribbean who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

The proportion of female and male migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean is largely about equal in the top countries of destination. The exception is the Dominican Republic, where the share of male immigrants is significantly higher than that of females. Among the top countries of origin, most have a slightly higher share of female than male emigrants, with countries such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Peru having the largest proportions.

Figure 14. Top Latin American and Caribbean destination (left) and origin (right) countries by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. "Proportion" refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

Venezuelans continued to be among the largest population displaced across borders in the world in 2022 (Figure 15).<sup>253</sup> At the end of 2022, there were more than 234,000 registered Venezuelan refugees and over 1 million with pending asylum cases. Other countries in the region, such as Nicaragua, Honduras and Cuba are also the origin of a significant number of asylum-seekers. Peru, Mexico, Brazil and Costa Rica host some of the largest numbers of asylum-seekers in the subregion, as reflected in Figure 15.

Figure 15. Top 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries by total refugees and asylum-seekers, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Notes: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries. Please refer to endnote 255 on the issue of categorization of displaced Venezuelans.

Disasters triggered some of the largest internal displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2022 (Figure 16). Brazil, with 708,000 displacements largely due to floods caused by heavy rains, had the largest number of disaster displacements in the region. Colombia and Cuba recorded the second and third largest numbers of disaster displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean (281,000 and 90,000, respectively). Most displacements in Colombia were triggered by floods, while those in Cuba were largely related to Hurricane Ian. The largest conflict displacements in the region were concentrated in Colombia and Haiti, which recorded 339,000 and 106,000 displacements respectively.

Figure 16. Top Latin American and Caribbean countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

## *Key features and developments in Latin America and the Caribbean<sup>254</sup>*

### South America

**Intraregional migration in South America, including for labour, remains high, while recent policy changes in some countries could have far-reaching implications for migrants in and outside the subregion.** Over recent years and decades, free movement arrangements between countries in the subregion have made it possible for migrants to move to other countries within South America, mainly for work. Some of these include the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,<sup>255</sup> as member States, and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname, as associated States, and the Andean Community's Migration Statute, the full members of which include the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.<sup>256</sup> MERCOSUR has been key in opening up regular channels for South Americans to move to countries such as Argentina and Uruguay, while also playing a major role in facilitating regular migration and residence in these countries.<sup>257</sup> Argentina had the largest number of immigrants in South America in 2020 (over 2 million), with most coming from countries within the subregion such as Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.<sup>258</sup> Colombia had nearly 2 million international migrants in 2020, and like Argentina, most were from within South America, particularly from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador.<sup>259</sup> Chile had the third largest number of international migrants in South America in 2020, with more than 1.6 million residing in the country.<sup>260</sup> Some countries in South America have undergone major migration policy changes in the last two years, with potentially significant implications for migrants. In 2023, Brazil rejoined the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, following a change in government, a decision that was welcomed by the United Nations Network on Migration as reviving the country's "commitment to protecting and promoting the rights of all migrants living in Brazil as well as the more than four million Brazilians living abroad."<sup>261</sup> Chile, on the other hand, which has experienced a significant increase in the number of immigrants over the last 30 years, enacted new and restrictive immigration reforms in 2021 which have included new requirements that could make it more difficult for migrants to obtain residence permits from inside the country, while also allowing authorities to send back undocumented migrants who get into the country.<sup>262</sup> This process has, for example, resulted in flows of Haitian migrants with children born in Chile towards other countries in the region and also towards Northern America.

**The situation of Venezuelan migrants (including refugees) remains challenging, with millions continuing to experience the impacts of their displacement.** By end of March 2023, there were more than 7 million Venezuelan refugees and displaced migrants globally, with the vast majority – more than 6 million – hosted in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>263</sup> By May 2023, Colombia was home to the largest number of Venezuelans (over 2.5 million), followed by Peru (more than 1.5 million) and Ecuador (around half a million).<sup>264</sup> Chile and Brazil also host significant numbers, both more than 400,000.<sup>265</sup> Several countries have provided asylum to Venezuelans and many have implemented arrangements to enable their stay and allow access to documentation and basic socioeconomic rights.<sup>266</sup> More than 211,000 Venezuelans had been granted refugee status by March 2023; more than 1 million had lodged claims for asylum; and over 4.2 million had been issued residence permits or other types of stay arrangements.<sup>267</sup> By the end of 2022, 1.6 million Venezuelans had temporary protection permits in Colombia, while 2.5 million had completed the pre-registration for temporary protection status in the country.<sup>268</sup> By end of the same year, Peru had granted humanitarian residency permits to 79,600 Venezuelan asylum-seekers and

temporary residence permits to nearly 225,000 Venezuelans in an irregular migratory situation.<sup>269</sup> Many Venezuelans, however, remain undocumented, preventing them from accessing job markets and social services, although countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay and others have moved to regularize millions of them.<sup>270</sup> Despite the challenging conditions in which many continue to live, Venezuelans are also making significant contributions to their host countries, including as entrepreneurs and by creating jobs for themselves and locals in countries such as Colombia and Argentina.<sup>271</sup> Many are also helping to fill key labour gaps, including, for example, in Peru's health-care sector.<sup>272</sup>

**Migration dynamics in parts of the subregion continue to be affected by internal instability and insecurity, with millions of people displaced as a result.** In Colombia, while peace negotiations are ongoing, displacement due to internal violence continues, particularly in areas disputed or controlled by armed groups. At the end of 2022, 339,000 displacements due to conflict and violence had been recorded in Colombia and the country had nearly 5 million conflict IDPs.<sup>273</sup> Fighting among armed groups intensified in 2022, contributing to further displacement. High levels of civilian targeting was also evident in the same year, with violence aimed at civilians accounting for more than 62 per cent of all organized political violence events in the country and more than 70 per cent of fatalities.<sup>274</sup> Women and girls continue to be subjected to very high levels of violence in the subregion, and in Colombia many have suffered the long-term effects of gender-based violence, such as sexual harassment, human trafficking and rape.<sup>275</sup> Insecurity and a surge in violence in Ecuador, particularly in the coastal region including in the country's most populous city of Guayaquil, has forced many Ecuadorians to flee the country.<sup>276</sup> The current wave of violence is largely driven by international criminal networks and gangs vying for territorial control over drug trafficking routes.<sup>277</sup> The violence – combined with a dire economic situation that has left many in poverty – has resulted in a significant increase in the number of Ecuadorians leaving the country, often via Colombia and through the Darien Gap in the hopes of reaching the United States.<sup>278</sup> As the number of Ecuadorians leaving the country has increased, thousands have been expelled in recent years under Title 42 or deported to Ecuador.<sup>279</sup> Between January and April 2023, more than 11,000 Ecuadorians were expelled from the United States under Title 42.<sup>280</sup>

**South America faces daunting challenges related to environmental degradation, disasters and climate change – including displacement – aggravating conditions in several countries already experiencing crises related to conflict and violence.** Recent reports, including from the World Meteorological Organization and IPCC, show that in addition to climate change impacts such as the rise in sea levels – especially along the Atlantic coast of South America – some countries such as Peru have also seen glacier retreat while at the same time drought conditions have negatively impacted crop yields in the subregion.<sup>281</sup> Indeed, the impacts of climate change are disrupting people's livelihoods, compelling some to migrate from their places of origin.<sup>282</sup> In a country such as Ecuador, it is predicted that environmental factors are likely to enhance both internal and international migration, while Peru has already advanced legislation on planned relocation – particularly along Peru's rainforest rivers – as a solution and response to the adverse impacts of climate change.<sup>283</sup> Moreover, climate-change-linked extreme weather events continue to contribute to displacement, in a subregion already dealing with conflict and violence and other socioeconomic and political factors that have driven millions of people from their homes and communities. In Brazil, floods were largely responsible for triggering more than 700,000 displacements in 2022.<sup>284</sup> Rain and floods were also responsible for most of the 281,000 disaster displacements in Colombia in 2022.<sup>285</sup> In early 2023, a state of emergency was declared in Peru after cyclone Yaku caused widespread flooding in the country's northern region, resulting in deaths, destruction of property and displacement.<sup>286</sup> Meanwhile, wild fires in Chile that started in January 2023 destroyed thousands of houses and prompted the evacuation of more than 7,500



people.<sup>287</sup> Some countries in the region, in recognition of the climate change impacts on migration and displacement, have responded by offering avenues for protection for people who have been displaced by disasters. In May 2022, Argentina “adopted a new humanitarian visa pathway for people from the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico who were displaced due to natural events.”<sup>288</sup>

**The number of migrants transiting through the subregion toward the United States continues to be high and has increased in diversity.** The northern part of South America is a key transit area, with migrants from within and beyond the subregion – often assisted by smugglers – passing through and taking risky journeys north through Central America in the hope of reaching Northern America. Many migrants cross from Colombia to Panama through the Darien Gap (which traverses both countries), a dense tropical forest that takes migrants days to travel through, often with inadequate preparation and no access to water, health services or food.<sup>289</sup> IOM documented 36 deaths in the Darien Gap in 2022, although this number is likely a very small fraction of the number of deaths that take place, since many deaths go unreported and migrants’ remains are also often not recovered.<sup>290</sup> In addition to being a key destination country, particularly for migrants from within the subregion, Ecuador became a key entry point to South America for migrants of increasingly diverse nationalities, who transit through the country on their way to other destinations, particularly northward to the United States.<sup>291</sup> Indeed, many migrants try to reach the United States via the Andean region–Central America–Mexico migratory corridor.<sup>292</sup>

**In recent years, there has been a marked increase in extraregional migrant arrivals to South America, many with hopes of reaching Northern America.** Migrants from regions such as Africa and Asia are behind some of this increase and often arrive in the subregion through regular means – either with a visa or in some cases a visa is not required.<sup>293</sup> In 2022, around 10 per cent of migrants who crossed the Darien Gap were from Africa and Asia.<sup>294</sup> While the desired final destination for many of these migrants is the United States or Canada, some eventually remain within countries in South America, either by choice or circumstance, as the journey northward is often difficult and expensive.<sup>295</sup> There are often significant challenges related to the integration and social cohesion of these migrants, with some ending up in precarious working and living conditions. Language and cultural barriers add to these difficulties, making it harder for these migrants to integrate compared to others from within the region. While several countries have implemented a range of measures to facilitate their regularization and integration, many migrants still struggle, and obstacles still remain when it comes to accessing economic and social rights.<sup>296</sup>

## Central America

**Central America continues to be a major area of origin and transit for migrants trying to reach the United States.** After a decline at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, irregular migration to and from the subregion rebounded in 2022 to pre-pandemic levels, with smuggling networks stepping up their operations.<sup>297</sup> Since the start of 2022, there has been a significant increase in the number of migrants transiting through the Central America subregion, including through the countries of Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. More than half a million migrants who arrived at the United States border in the 2022 financial year were from three Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras). Countries such as Panama and Mexico have also experienced a surge in irregular migrants, increasing by 85 and 108 per cent respectively by August 2022.<sup>298</sup> Criminal violence, political instability and poverty remain some of the biggest drivers of irregular migration from the subregion, with many migrants experiencing significant risks and dangers, including extortion, sexual violence and separation from families.<sup>299</sup> Over the years, and as authorities cracked down on sea and air

travel from the subregion, the Darien Gap – a treacherous remote jungle in Panama that connects South and Central America – has become a major transit area, with tens of thousands of migrants journeying through it annually. In 2022, many were Venezuelan (over 150,000), Ecuadorian (around 29,000) and Haitian (more than 22,000).<sup>300</sup> The number of children trekking through the Darien Gap also increased significantly in 2022; between January and October 2022, more than 32,000 children travelled through the route, with more than half registered in Panama younger than 5 years old.<sup>301</sup> Overall, there were over 248,000 migrants who entered Panama in 2022 at the Darien Gap border.<sup>302</sup> More recent figures show a continuation of this trend, with many people continuing to trek through the Darien Gap in 2023. In just the first nine months of 2023, over 390,000 migrants had passed through the Darien Gap from Colombia to Panama, most of them from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and Haiti.<sup>303</sup>

**Across the subregion, violence – particularly gang-related violence – has resulted in a surge in displacement, forcing hundreds of thousands of people from their homes, communities or countries.**

In parts of Central America, such as Nicaragua and Honduras, the ever-deteriorating security situation, with crime and violence perpetrated by gangs and drug cartels – in addition to acute inequalities – has led many people to leave their homes. There were more than 665,000 refugees and asylum-seekers from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras worldwide at the end of 2022.<sup>304</sup> These three countries also have some of the highest homicide rates in the world, as well as some of the highest incidents of sexual violence and femicide.<sup>305</sup> However, there has been a significant decline in murders in El Salvador over the last two years as the Government has cracked down on gang violence.<sup>306</sup> Gender-based violence, recent studies have found, is a major contributing factor to emigration from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador and Mexico, and forces many adolescent girls to embark on dangerous journeys in search of safety.<sup>307</sup> Criminal organizations that operate within and beyond the subregion often take advantage of the desperation of many and are heavily involved in both migrant smuggling and trafficking.<sup>308</sup> At the end of 2022, Guatemala and Honduras each had more than 240,000 people living in internal displacement due to conflict and violence, while El Salvador had 52,000.<sup>309</sup>

**Now the second largest recipient of international remittances in the world (after India), Mexico's large diaspora continues to remit funds to their families and friends.**

China had long been the second largest recipient of international remittances in the world, but it was surpassed by Mexico in 2021, with the Central American country estimated to have received more than USD 61 billion in 2022.<sup>310</sup> Compared with 2021, remittance flows to Mexico increased by 15 per cent, in part due to increased transfers to transit migrants – whose numbers have increased recently – and the decline in unemployment for Hispanics in the United States in 2022.<sup>311</sup> Remittances are also a major source of foreign exchange for other Central American and Caribbean countries, and represented a lifeline during the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely affected them. While relatively small in terms of volume compared to flows to a country such as Mexico, remittances make up large shares of GDP in Honduras (27%), El Salvador (24%), Nicaragua (20.5%) and Guatemala (19%).<sup>312</sup>

**Prone to disasters linked to climate change such as floods and tropical storms, several countries in the subregion have been identified as some of the most vulnerable to extreme climate events.**

The European Commission's 2022 INFORM climate change index shows that countries such as Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador are among the most vulnerable to climate shocks.<sup>313</sup> Disasters fuelled by climate change, such as Hurricanes Iota and Eta in late 2020, have also led to food insecurity in the subregion, with millions of people in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala experiencing high levels of food insecurity as a result.<sup>314</sup> The

ever-frequent disasters have, in addition, led to significant displacement. In late 2022, tropical storm Julia resulted in deaths, destruction of property and the displacement of tens of thousands of people across several countries, including Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.<sup>315</sup> Guatemala accounted for the largest share (56%) of the 72,000 new displacements that took place across eight countries as a result of the storm.<sup>316</sup> Tropical storm Julia made landfall just as several parts of Central America were still recovering from both Hurricanes Iota and Eta, complicating recovery efforts.<sup>317</sup>

## Caribbean

**Traditionally known for emigration, with a large number of people moving to countries outside the Caribbean, migration within the subregion is also common and well established.** Most intraregional migration is related to labour, with higher income countries in the Caribbean often attracting migrant workers from neighbouring islands with lower wages and where employment opportunities are limited.<sup>318</sup> A country such as the Bahamas, with a thriving tourism industry and higher wages, is a key destination for a significant number of migrants from the subregion. In 2020, the Bahamas had around 64,000 international migrants, with nearly 47 per cent from Haiti.<sup>319</sup> Barbados, another high-income country, is also a destination for migrants from within the subregion, particularly those from Guyana and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, who comprised the largest share of immigrants in the country in 2020.<sup>320</sup> Not all intraregional migrants go to high-income countries, however. In 2020, the Dominican Republic was home to nearly 500,000 Haitians.<sup>321</sup> Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic has a long history, with many working in the construction and agriculture sectors.<sup>322</sup> The number of people moving from Haiti to its Caribbean neighbour has increased in recent years as the political and security situation in Haiti has deteriorated. In response to the insecurity in Haiti and an increase in Haitians entering the country, in 2022, the Dominican Republic further tightened its border while also summarily deporting tens of thousands of Haitians, prompting international and human rights organizations to issue statements urging the Government to stop the forced return of migrants.<sup>323</sup> In 2022, thousands of Haitians were repatriated to Haiti by air or sea from countries such as the United States and Cuba, and in April 2023 alone, over 10,000 Haitians were repatriated, with more than 9,700 repatriated from Dominican Republic alone.<sup>324</sup>

**Gang-related violence and insecurity, political persecution as well as deteriorating economic conditions in some countries in the Caribbean have resulted in significant internal and cross-border displacement.** In Haiti, the escalation of intergang violence, particularly in the capital Port-au-Prince, had triggered more than 100,000 internal displacements in 2022.<sup>325</sup> Conditions in the capital continue to be characterized by kidnappings, racketeering, acute deprivation and widespread insecurity.<sup>326</sup> While violence and insecurity in Haiti is not a new phenomenon, it has worsened since 2021, when the country's president was assassinated.<sup>327</sup> Criminal gangs control large swathes of the capital and women and girls have been the most affected. As the political and economic situation has deteriorated, there has been an increase in sexual violence as well as exploitation perpetrated by gangs against women and girls.<sup>328</sup> In Cuba, a worsening economic situation – accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic and tougher economic sanctions from the United States – have decimated the country's economy, including key sectors such as tourism, leaving many people in deep poverty.<sup>329</sup> As a result, hundreds of thousands of Cubans have left the country in the 2022 fiscal year: more than 220,000 encounters with Cuban migrants were reported at the United States border with Mexico.<sup>330</sup> 2022 saw the largest exodus of Cubans in more than 30 years, even bigger than the 1980 Mariel boatlift, when 125,000 Cubans arrived in the United States over a period of 6 months.<sup>331</sup> While


many Cubans have left due to economic conditions, some have fled the country for fear of persecution, as the Government cracked down on those who participated in 2021 protests, the largest protests in Cuba in decades.<sup>332</sup> Some Cubans have attempted to reach the United States by sea – often on rickety boats – while others fly to either Nicaragua (which does not require an entry visa for visiting Cubans) or to a lesser degree Panama, and then ride buses up through Central America.<sup>333</sup> There were more than 300 deaths and disappearances of migrants in the Caribbean in 2022, the highest number since IOM began collecting these data.<sup>334</sup>

**Despite their relatively low contribution to greenhouse gas emissions, Caribbean nations are some of the most at risk from the impacts of climate change.** With several small island and low-lying States, the Caribbean is extremely prone to natural hazards.<sup>335</sup> Small island States face more frequent storms, rising sea levels and biodiversity loss.<sup>336</sup> Some studies have projected that damages due to climate change in the Caribbean could increase from 5 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 20 per cent in 2100, if no measures are taken to blunt its impacts.<sup>337</sup> Hurricane Ian, which made landfall in Cuba in September 2022, resulted in 80,000 displacements (largely pre-emptive evacuations). Meanwhile, Hurricane Fiona triggered 94,000 displacements, most of which took place in the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico and resulted in floods and landslides.<sup>338</sup> A recent report from the World Meteorological Organization argues that while drivers and outcomes depend highly on context, migration due to climate change is projected to increase on small islands, including in the Caribbean.<sup>339</sup> Moreover, the recent IPCC assessment report also details that a 1 degree Celsius increase in temperature could lead to a 60 per cent increase in the number of people projected to experience severe water resource stress for Caribbean small island developing States (SIDS).<sup>340</sup>

## Northern America<sup>341</sup>

Migration in Northern America is dominated by migration into the region, primarily to the United States. The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)<sup>342</sup> show that nearly 59 million migrants were residing in Northern America from a variety of regions (Figure 17). This number has increased by around 3 million since 2015, when around 56 million migrants were living in the region. As of 2020, most of these migrants were from Latin America and the Caribbean (around 26 million), followed by Asia (18 million) and Europe (around 7 million). During the last 30 years, the number of migrants in Northern America has more than doubled, driven by emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, as well as by economic growth and political stability in Northern America. The number of Northern American migrants living within the region or elsewhere was very small compared with the foreign-born population in the region. In contrast to regions such as Asia and Africa, where intraregional migration is significant, more Northern American-born migrants lived outside the region (around 3 million) than had moved elsewhere within the region (a little more than 1 million) in 2020.

Figure 17. Migrants to, within and from Northern America, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Northern America” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Northern America) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Northern America” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Northern America) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Northern American region. “Migrants from Northern America” refers to people born in Northern America who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Africa).

The share of female and male immigrants in the United States and Canada is about the same, with female immigrants only slightly larger. When it comes to the proportion of emigrants, however, Canada has a much larger share of female emigrants compared to males. In the United States, there is about an equal share of female and male emigrants.

Figure 18. Main destination (left) and origin (right) countries in Northern America by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

The United States hosted the largest number of asylum-seekers and refugees in Northern America in 2022 (Figure 19). The country was home to nearly 1.8 million asylum-seekers and more than 363,000 refugees at the end of 2022. The United States was also the largest recipient of new individual asylum applications globally in the same year (over 730,000).<sup>343</sup> Canada, meanwhile, hosted more than 113,000 asylum-seekers and nearly 66,000 refugees in 2022.

Figure 19. Number of refugees and asylum-seekers in and from Northern American countries, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country.

All internal displacements in Northern America in 2022 were triggered by disasters (Figure 20). Most occurred in the United States, where 675,000 movements were recorded, nearly half of which were prompted by Hurricane Ian. Disaster displacement numbers in Canada in 2022 were much lower than those recorded in the United States; however, we will likely see a much larger number of disaster displacements in Canada in 2023 due to the intense and widespread wildfire activity that took place in the summer months.

Figure 20. Northern American countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

### Key features and developments in Northern America<sup>344</sup>

**As labour shortages take a toll on the economies of both Canada and the United States, both countries have devised or enacted strategies to attract migrant workers to fill critical labour gaps.** Demographic shifts as populations age and fertility rates decline, the COVID-19 pandemic – which halted international mobility – as well as previously more restrictive immigration policies in the United States have all contributed to a shortage of workers.<sup>345</sup> In response, Canada, for example, has enacted long-term plans to recruit migrants to address its labour needs. In November of 2022, the Canadian Government announced that it would aim to attract 1.45 million immigrants between 2023 and 2025 to fill jobs in key and essential sectors, such as health care and manufacturing.<sup>346</sup> In the United States, while immigration grew in 2022 and helped to boost job recoveries in areas such as construction and hospitality, the number of foreign workers still remained below pre-2017 levels.<sup>347</sup> Some estimates put unfilled jobs in the United States at over 10 million, and a shortage of immigrants to address these shortages has – some argue – negatively affected the country’s economy.<sup>348</sup> In an effort to address these shortages in some essential sectors, even as a more comprehensive immigration policy has been stalled for years, the current United States administration announced plans to issue almost 65,000 more H-2B temporary agricultural visas in the 2023 fiscal year.<sup>349</sup>

**The impacts of climate change are intensifying in parts of Northern America, resulting in significant displacement, loss of lives and property damage.** Climate shocks and extreme weather events such as hurricanes as well as record high temperatures are becoming more common, posing significant risks to people across the region.<sup>350</sup> The 2022 IPCC report shows that Atlantic Canada and the south-eastern United States will be at risk from sea-level rise and acute hurricanes and storms, even at 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming.<sup>351</sup> Recent wildfires in both the United States and Canada attest to the worsening impacts of climate change. Between 2020 and 2022, for example, the acres of land burned due to wildfires in the western United States far outpaced the average of 1.2 million acres burned since 2016.<sup>352</sup> In Canada, tens of thousands of people had been displaced and millions of acres burned by June 2023, as wildfires raged for weeks.<sup>353</sup> In addition to wildfires, parts of Northern America have borne the brunt of hurricanes. Hurricane Ian, which made landfall in Cuba before tracking toward the United States, resulted in more than 300,000 displacements, most in Florida.<sup>354</sup> The United States has been taking pre-emptive measures to protect some of the communities that are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. In 2022, it was announced that the Government would give money to five Native American tribes in the states of Alaska and Washington to assist with their relocation away from coastlines and rivers.<sup>355</sup>

**Irregular migration to the United States remains an ongoing challenge and major policy issue, with increasing numbers of arrivals from atypical origin countries.** There were 2.4 million encounters at the United States–Mexico border in 2022, the highest on record.<sup>356</sup> “Encounters” constitute both apprehensions and expulsions, and these statistics also include many migrants who tried to enter the United States several times without authorization.<sup>357</sup> For years, most irregular migrants were overwhelmingly from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras but in 2022 and for the first time, there were more encounters with migrants from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua.<sup>358</sup> There were also a large number of arrivals from Haiti, Brazil and from countries outside the region such as India and Ukraine.<sup>359</sup> The shift in origin country geography has also been attributed to Title 42, which suspends the right to claim asylum under United States and international law on the basis of preventing the spread of COVID-19.<sup>360</sup> In May 2023, the current United States Government allowed the COVID-19 pandemic public health emergency declaration to expire, effectively ending Title 42, which had been put in place by the previous Government.<sup>361</sup> The United States now returns to the pre-pandemic Title 8, a decades-old immigration law, which carries “steep consequences for unlawful entry, including at least a five-year ban on re-entry and potential criminal prosecution for repeated attempts to enter unlawfully.”<sup>362</sup> At the same time, the United States announced in April 2023 the expansion of regular pathways for migrants from South and Central America, in an effort to curb irregular migration.<sup>363</sup> Through the Safe Mobility Initiative, those who are eligible would be considered for both humanitarian and other pathways to the United States or other countries taking part in the programme.<sup>364</sup> Some of the pathways available include refugee resettlement, temporary employment pathways and family reunification processes.<sup>365</sup> Both IOM and UNHCR (with others) are partners with the United States in this process.




**Leaders from 21 countries in Northern America and Latin America and the Caribbean signed the Los Angeles Declaration on Migration and Protection in 2022, signalling a major way forward in setting goals for cooperation on migration management across the two regions.** The non-binding declaration was widely welcomed, including by international organizations such as IOM and UNHCR. It is considered an important political measure that builds on existing instruments and principles, such as the Global Compact for Migration and regional platforms such as the Regional Conference on Migration, among others, to facilitate the implementation of this Declaration.<sup>366</sup> The Declaration is also a recognition that migration cannot be managed unilaterally, and migration challenges and opportunities must be addressed through international cooperation.<sup>367</sup> The Declaration sets out several common goals, including: stabilizing migration movements and providing assistance to countries of origin, transit and destination, as well as return; expanding regular pathways for migration and international protection; advancing migration management that is humane; and promoting more coordinated responses to emergencies.<sup>368</sup>

**Canada continues to resettle more refugees than any other country globally.** With 47,600 resettlement arrivals in 2022, a 133 per cent increase from 2021 (20,400), Canada received the largest number of resettled refugees in the world.<sup>369</sup> Many came from Afghanistan (21,300), the Syrian Arab Republic (7,600) and Eritrea (6,100).<sup>370</sup> In 2022, the United States resettled 29,000 refugees, double the figure in 2021. Most were from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (9,000), the Syrian Arab Republic (4,300) and Myanmar (2,900).<sup>371</sup> The continued low levels of refugee resettlements to the United States is, in part, a remnant of the restrictive immigration policies of the previous administration, which cut resettlement numbers, while curtailing the Government's ability to accept refugees.<sup>372</sup>

## Oceania<sup>373</sup>

The latest available international migrant stock data (2020)<sup>374</sup> show that almost 8.3 million international migrants from outside Oceania were living in the region. As shown in Figure 21, the foreign-born migrant population was primarily composed of people from Asia and Europe. During the last 30 years, the number of migrants in Oceania born in Asia has grown, while the number of those from Europe has remained steady. Out of all of the six global regions, Oceania had the lowest number of migrants outside its region in 2020, partly a reflection of its smaller population size compared with other regions. Migrants from Oceania living outside the region mainly resided in Europe and Northern America.

Figure 21. Migrants to, within and from Oceania, 1990–2020




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Migrants to Oceania” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Oceania) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Oceania” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Oceania) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Oceania region. “Migrants from Oceania” refers to people born in Oceania who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).

The proportion of female and male immigrants in both Australia and New Zealand is about the same with only slight differences. The share of emigrants is also about equal, with the proportion of female emigrants only slightly higher.

Figure 22. Main destination (left) and origin (right) countries in Oceania by sex




Source: UN DESA, 2021.

Notes: This is the latest available international migrant stock data at the time of writing. “Proportion” refers to the share of female or male migrants in the total number of immigrants in destination countries (left) or in the total number of emigrants from origin countries (right).

There were over 156,000 refugees and asylum-seekers in Oceania. Most – over 54,000 refugees and nearly 91,000 asylum-seekers – were hosted in Australia. The largest number of refugees in Australia came from countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Papua New Guinea was home to the second largest number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Oceania (Figure 23). Fiji, meanwhile, was the origin of most refugees and asylum-seekers from Oceania (over 3,600).

Figure 23. Numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers in and from Oceania countries, 2022




Source: UNHCR, n.d.a.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum-seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum-seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The figures are based on 2022 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum-seekers in and from countries.

The largest internal displacements in Oceania triggered by conflict and violence occurred in Papua New Guinea, where 64,000 movements were recorded in 2022 (Figure 24). This is over eight times the number recorded in 2021 (7,500). The violence that triggered most of these displacements was related to national elections in mid-2022 and ensuing tensions. Australia recorded the largest disaster displacements in 2022 (17,000), most of these due to floods in the eastern states of New South Wales and Queensland. Papua New Guinea experienced the second largest number of disaster displacements (nearly 10,000). While disaster displacement in Tonga were much fewer than those recorded in countries such as Australia and Papua New Guinea, as a percentage of population, it experienced the largest number (more than 2%).

Figure 24. Top countries in Oceania by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2022\*



Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2022.

Notes: The term “displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2022 not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2021 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.

\* This includes territories.

### *Key features and developments in Oceania*<sup>375</sup>

**After a comprehensive review of Australia's migration system, a government-appointed advisory group recommended major reforms to the country's immigration system in early 2023, after declaring the current system “not fit for purpose”.**<sup>376</sup> The review, which started in September 2022 and was presented to the Government in March 2023, is the most significant review of Australia's immigration system in decades.<sup>377</sup> The review found that the current programme not only falls short when it comes to attracting migrants that are highly skilled, but that it also fails to “enable business to efficiently access workers.”<sup>378</sup> Among the review's criticisms is the rise in “permanently temporary migration”, which it said had not only harmed migrants but also confidence in Australia's programme.<sup>379</sup> Temporary visas, which have been uncapped for years and have increased faster than permanent visa numbers, have not always provided a clear path to permanent residency, leaving many migrant workers in a permanently temporary state.<sup>380</sup> The review also identified migrant exploitation as a key challenge, highlighting aspects linked to temporary migration, such as Temporary Skilled Immigration Income Threshold (TSMIT), which had been frozen since 2013, as playing a role in migrant exploitation.<sup>381</sup> Following the review, the Australian Government announced in April 2023 that it would increase TSMIT from 53,900 Australian dollars (AUD) to AUD 70,000.<sup>382</sup> In addition to calling for smooth and predictable migration, the review noted that migration – through a well-designed migration programme – can play a key role in addressing challenges such as an ageing population and stagnating productivity.<sup>383</sup>

**Similar to countries in regions such as Northern America and parts of Europe, Australia and New Zealand are facing a labour squeeze and need immigration to address shortages of workers in key sectors.** Both countries have long relied on immigration to fill gaps in their labour markets. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, Australia enacted some of the harshest mobility restrictions in the world, resulting in a sharp reduction in the number of migrant workers entering the country. To address current labour needs, Australia announced in 2022 that it would increase the number of permanent migration visas in programme year 2022–23 from 160,000 to 195,000.<sup>384</sup> This increase is expected to fill labour gaps in sectors such as health and technology. The Government is also focusing on streamlining visa processing, including providing additional funding of AUD 36.1 million for this purpose.<sup>385</sup> New Zealand, meanwhile, announced significant immigration reforms to increase its available pool of labour, including easing residence permits for migrant workers in priority high-skill sectors.<sup>386</sup>

**Relative to their population, small island States, including those in Oceania, have the highest displacement risk due to climate change.** Eight of the Pacific Island countries and territories, including Tonga, Vanuatu, Fiji, Solomon Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Cook Islands and Niue are among the top 15 countries and territories in the world most at-risk of such disasters.<sup>387</sup> Tonga, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are ranked as the most vulnerable countries worldwide to the impacts of climate change and disasters.<sup>388</sup> Disasters such as tropical cyclones, volcanic eruptions and droughts often wreak havoc and cause displacement across the subregion.<sup>389</sup> In 2021, two consecutive cyclones – Ana and Bina – hit the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, triggering more 14,000 displacements.<sup>390</sup> Since half their population live within 10km of the coast, Pacific small island States are also vulnerable to slow onset events such as rising sea levels and coastal erosion, with potentially significant human impacts, including displacement.<sup>391</sup> Responding to this challenge, governments in the Pacific have declared climate change a critical security issue for the region, and efforts have also been undertaken to advance policy responses to it, including its human mobility implications. Currently, governments across the region are considering the form and content of a regional, rights-based framework on climate mobility – the first of its kind anywhere in the world – under the oversight of the Pacific Islands Forum.

**Oceania, particularly Australia, remains a top destination for international students, whose numbers are recovering after a decline in 2020 and 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.** Australia has long been a major destination for international students, but as the country closed borders and imposed travel restrictions to contain the spread of COVID-19, the number of students entering the country sharply dropped. In 2022, the number of international students in the country seemed to be returning to pre-COVID-19 levels, with more than 619,000 student-visa-holding students, an 8 per cent increase over 2021.<sup>392</sup> And in the first quarter of 2023, over 256,000 international students arrived in Australia, a 143 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2022.<sup>393</sup> While New Zealand receives fewer international students compared to Australia, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was also a popular destination. Before the pandemic, New Zealand enrolled around 120,000 international students, but these numbers dramatically declined during the country's pandemic-related two-year border closure.<sup>394</sup> There were signs, however, that the number of international students to New Zealand is recovering, too; since the borders reopened, thousands of students have applied to enter the country for upcoming programmes.<sup>395</sup>

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this chapter, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain.
- <sup>2</sup> Please note that subregions relate largely to migration dynamics and so may differ from those of UN DESA. Details are provided in Appendix A.
- <sup>3</sup> Updates are up until end October 2023.
- <sup>4</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Africa.
- <sup>5</sup> See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data set.
- <sup>6</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Africa.
- <sup>7</sup> European Council and Council of the European Union, 2023.
- <sup>8</sup> UNHCR, 2020.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>10</sup> Black and Sigman, 2022.
- <sup>11</sup> European Commission, 2022.
- <sup>12</sup> Danish Refugee Council, 2022; ECRE, 2022a.
- <sup>13</sup> OHCHR, 2023a.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> Moderan, 2023.
- <sup>16</sup> Parker, 2023.
- <sup>17</sup> OHCHR, 2023a.
- <sup>18</sup> OHCHR, 2022a.
- <sup>19</sup> UN DESA, 2021.
- <sup>20</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> Fusco, 2022.
- <sup>23</sup> Belhaj, 2022.
- <sup>24</sup> Clement et al., 2021.
- <sup>25</sup> Wehrey and Fawal, 2022.
- <sup>26</sup> OCHA, 2021.
- <sup>27</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>30</sup> IOM, n.d.a; Fulton and Holmes, 2023; Harb and Elhennawy, 2023.
- <sup>31</sup> Ochab, 2022.
- <sup>32</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>33</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>34</sup> Williams, 2023.
- <sup>35</sup> IDMC, 2023a; IOM, n.d.b.
- <sup>36</sup> Abebe and Mukundi-Wachira, 2023.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>39</sup> Oucho et al., 2023.
- <sup>40</sup> Brenn et al., 2022.
- <sup>41</sup> IGAD, 2020.
- <sup>42</sup> COMESA, 2022.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup> IOM, 2022a.
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid.; IOM, 2023a.
- <sup>46</sup> Terry and Rai, 2023.
- <sup>47</sup> FSNWG, 2022; Terry and Rai, 2023.
- <sup>48</sup> UNHCR, 2023b; IOM, 2023b.
- <sup>49</sup> Member States of IGAD, EAC and States of the East and the Horn of Africa, 2022.
- <sup>50</sup> Gbadamosi, 2023.
- <sup>51</sup> WMO, 2023.
- <sup>52</sup> OCHA, 2023a.
- <sup>53</sup> ACLED, 2023.
- <sup>54</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>55</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>56</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>57</sup> UNHCR, 2023c.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>59</sup> ACAPS, n.d.
- <sup>60</sup> Bisong, 2021; UN DESA, 2021.
- <sup>61</sup> McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019.
- <sup>62</sup> Bisong, 2021.
- <sup>63</sup> IOM, 2022a.
- <sup>64</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>65</sup> Munda, 2022.
- <sup>66</sup> GFEMS, 2021; Hertog, 2022; Aboueldahab, 2021.
- <sup>67</sup> GFEMS, 2021.
- <sup>68</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, 2023.
- <sup>69</sup> Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, n.d.
- <sup>70</sup> IOM, 2022b; Ndiaga and Mcallister, 2022.
- <sup>71</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>72</sup> UNICEF, 2023a.
- <sup>73</sup> André, 2022.
- <sup>74</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>77</sup> UNODC, 2023a.
- <sup>78</sup> UNECE, 2022.
- <sup>79</sup> IOM, 2023c.
- <sup>80</sup> UNECE, 2022.
- <sup>81</sup> IOM, 2023c.
- <sup>82</sup> UN DESA, 2021.
- <sup>83</sup> Bentil et al., 2021.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>85</sup> IOM, n.d.c.; Devillard et al., 2015.
- <sup>86</sup> McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019.

- <sup>87</sup> Arhin-Sam et al., 2022.
- <sup>88</sup> IOM, n.d.d.
- <sup>89</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>90</sup> Osserman and Zhou, 2022.
- <sup>91</sup> Smith, R., 2022; Osserman and Zhou, 2022.
- <sup>92</sup> Walt, 2022.
- <sup>93</sup> Adler, 2022.
- <sup>94</sup> Nkang, 2019; Abderrahmane, 2022.
- <sup>95</sup> Abderrahmane, 2022; Wolter, 2019.
- <sup>96</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Asia.
- <sup>97</sup> See Chapter 2 for information on the next release on UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- <sup>98</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Asia.
- <sup>99</sup> IDMC and ADB, 2022.
- <sup>100</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>101</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>103</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>104</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>105</sup> McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019; McAuliffe and Triandafyllidou, 2021.
- <sup>106</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>107</sup> Ibid.; please note that the subregion refers to the World Bank's East Asia and the Pacific subregion.
- <sup>108</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>109</sup> McAuliffe, 2017; ASEAN, 2022.
- <sup>110</sup> ASEAN, 2022.
- <sup>111</sup> McAuliffe, 2017.
- <sup>112</sup> IOM, 2023d.
- <sup>113</sup> IOM, n.d.e.
- <sup>114</sup> Jespersen et al., 2022.
- <sup>115</sup> UNODC, 2023b.
- <sup>116</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>117</sup> US Department of State, 2022.
- <sup>118</sup> Al Jazeera, 2023a.
- <sup>119</sup> BBC, 2022.
- <sup>120</sup> UNHCR, 2023d.
- <sup>121</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>122</sup> Kean, 2022.
- <sup>123</sup> Abdelkader, 2017; UNHCR, n.d.b.
- <sup>124</sup> OHCHR, 2023b; Al Jazeera, 2023b.
- <sup>125</sup> Paul, 2023.
- <sup>126</sup> UNHCR, 2023e; Rahman, 2023.
- <sup>127</sup> Roome, 2022.
- <sup>128</sup> IDMC, 2023a; United Nations, 2022a.
- <sup>129</sup> IDMC, 2023a; Mahmud, 2022.
- <sup>130</sup> IDMC, 2023a
- <sup>131</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>132</sup> UN DESA, 2021.
- <sup>133</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>134</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>135</sup> McAuliffe and Khadria, 2019.
- <sup>136</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>137</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>138</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>139</sup> United Nations, 2022b.
- <sup>140</sup> Goldbaum and Akbary, 2022; United Nations, 2023a.
- <sup>141</sup> Goldbaum and Padshah, 2023.
- <sup>142</sup> IOM, 2023e.
- <sup>143</sup> UNHCR and IOM, 2023.
- <sup>144</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>145</sup> Al Jazeera, 2023c.
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>147</sup> Yeung and Maruyama, 2023.
- <sup>148</sup> Ng, 2023.
- <sup>149</sup> Yokohama, 2022.
- <sup>150</sup> Suk and Yang, 2023.
- <sup>151</sup> Japan News, 2022.
- <sup>152</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>153</sup> Ibid.; IDMC, 2022a.
- <sup>154</sup> Frost, 2023.
- <sup>155</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>156</sup> UN DESA, 2021.
- <sup>157</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>158</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>159</sup> ICEF, 2022a.
- <sup>160</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>161</sup> ICEF, 2022a.
- <sup>162</sup> Singh, 2023.
- <sup>163</sup> Hogan, 2023; Nikkei Asia, 2023; Yamamoto, 2023.
- <sup>164</sup> Nikkei Asia, 2023; Yamamoto, 2023.
- <sup>165</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>166</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>167</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>168</sup> Ibid.; UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>169</sup> Fahim, 2022; OHCHR, 2021.
- <sup>170</sup> Fahim, 2022.
- <sup>171</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>172</sup> IOM, 2023f.
- <sup>173</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>174</sup> United Nations, 2023b.
- <sup>175</sup> IASC, 2023; IOM, 2023g.
- <sup>176</sup> IASC, 2023; IOM, 2023h.
- <sup>177</sup> UNHCR, 2023f.
- <sup>178</sup> IOM, 2022c.
- <sup>179</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>180</sup> IOM, 2023i.



- <sup>181</sup> NRC, 2022.
- <sup>182</sup> IOM, 2023j.
- <sup>183</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>184</sup> OCHA, 2023b.
- <sup>185</sup> IDMC, 2021.
- <sup>186</sup> IOM, 2023k.
- <sup>187</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>188</sup> ILO, 2021.
- <sup>189</sup> Schenk, 2023.
- <sup>190</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>191</sup> Ibid.; Bloomberg News, 2022.
- <sup>192</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>193</sup> Auyezov and Gordeyeva, 2022.
- <sup>194</sup> Reuters, 2022.
- <sup>195</sup> Ebel, 2023.
- <sup>196</sup> Khashimov et al., 2020.
- <sup>197</sup> ICMPD, 2023.
- <sup>198</sup> Government of Uzbekistan, 2022.
- <sup>199</sup> UNDP, 2022a.
- <sup>200</sup> ADB, 2022.
- <sup>201</sup> Talant, 2022.
- <sup>202</sup> IDMC, 2022b.
- <sup>203</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>204</sup> Davies, 2022.
- <sup>205</sup> Sultanalieva, 2022.
- <sup>206</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>207</sup> Davies, 2022.
- <sup>208</sup> See Appendix A for details of the composition of Europe.
- <sup>209</sup> See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- <sup>210</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Europe.
- <sup>211</sup> OHCHR, 2023c; EUAA et al., 2022.
- <sup>212</sup> UNHCR, 2023g; IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>213</sup> UNHCR, 2023h.
- <sup>214</sup> UNHCR, 2023j.
- <sup>215</sup> OCHA, 2023c.
- <sup>216</sup> ILO, n.d.
- <sup>217</sup> OECD, 2022.
- <sup>218</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>219</sup> Ciurcă, 2023.
- <sup>220</sup> Pickup, 2020; Morris, 2022.
- <sup>221</sup> Smith, H., 2022.
- <sup>222</sup> UN DESA, 2022.
- <sup>223</sup> Neidhardt and Butcher, 2022.
- <sup>224</sup> IOM, 2023l.
- <sup>225</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>226</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>227</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>228</sup> IOM, 2022d.
- <sup>229</sup> Emmott et al., 2021.
- <sup>230</sup> European Commission, n.d.
- <sup>231</sup> ECRE, 2023.
- <sup>232</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>233</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>234</sup> UNHCR, 2022a.
- <sup>235</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>236</sup> IOM, 2023m.
- <sup>237</sup> Wienberg, 2022.
- <sup>238</sup> Ahmed, 2023.
- <sup>239</sup> OHCHR, 2023d.
- <sup>240</sup> IOM, 2023n.
- <sup>241</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>242</sup> IOM, 2023o.
- <sup>243</sup> Mentzelopoulou, 2022.
- <sup>244</sup> ECRE, 2022a and 2022b.
- <sup>245</sup> ECRE, 2022b.
- <sup>246</sup> George, 2022.
- <sup>247</sup> Pallapothu, 2021.
- <sup>248</sup> UN Women, 2022.
- <sup>249</sup> Pallapothu, 2021.
- <sup>250</sup> Government of Canada, 2021.
- <sup>251</sup> See Appendix A for details of the composition of Latin America and the Caribbean.
- <sup>252</sup> See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- <sup>253</sup> See the South America subregion for a detailed discussion on the millions of displaced Venezuelans. These are Venezuelans were previously categorized as “Venezuelans displaced abroad” (VDA). UNHCR identifies these Venezuelans under a separate category to reflect the ongoing displacement crisis; this category does not include Venezuelan asylum-seekers and refugees.
- <sup>254</sup> See Appendix A for details of the composition of Latin America and the Caribbean.
- <sup>255</sup> The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is suspended in all rights and obligations inherent to its status as a MERCOSUR State Party, in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of article 5 of the Ushuaia Protocol.
- <sup>256</sup> MERCOSUR, n.d.; Brumat and Espinoza, 2023.
- <sup>257</sup> Selee et al., 2023.
- <sup>258</sup> UN DESA, 2021.
- <sup>259</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>260</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>261</sup> IOM, 2023p; Brumat and Pereira, 2023.
- <sup>262</sup> Doña-Reveco, 2022.
- <sup>263</sup> R4V, n.d.
- <sup>264</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>265</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>266</sup> UNHCR, 2023i.

- <sup>267</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>268</sup> UNHCR, n.d.c.
- <sup>269</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>270</sup> IOM, 2023q; UNHCR, 2022b. Argentina and Uruguay apply the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement to regularize Venezuelan population; with this, both countries facilitate the access of thousands of immigrants to residence permits, personal documentation and social rights.
- <sup>271</sup> World Bank, 2023b; Bahar et al., 2022; IOM, 2022e.
- <sup>272</sup> Barchfield, 2023.
- <sup>273</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>274</sup> ACLED, 2022.
- <sup>275</sup> ACAPS, 2023.
- <sup>276</sup> Goodwin and Escobar, 2023; Diaz, 2023.
- <sup>277</sup> Collyns, 2023; International Crisis Group, 2022.
- <sup>278</sup> Diaz, 2023; Goodwin and Escobar, 2023.
- <sup>279</sup> US Customs and Border Protection, 2023; Ecuador Times, 2023.
- <sup>280</sup> Ecuador Times, 2023.
- <sup>281</sup> ECLAC, 2022; Castellanos et al., 2022.
- <sup>282</sup> Castellanos et al., 2022.
- <sup>283</sup> Ibid.; Bergmann, 2021.
- <sup>284</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>285</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>286</sup> Reuters, 2023a.
- <sup>287</sup> IDMC, 2023b; UNICEF, 2023b.
- <sup>288</sup> MPI, 2022.
- <sup>289</sup> IOM, 2023r and 2023s; IBC, 2023.
- <sup>290</sup> IOM, 2023t.
- <sup>291</sup> Álvarez Velasco, 2020; Dixon, n.d.
- <sup>292</sup> Álvarez Velasco, 2022.
- <sup>293</sup> Yates, 2019.
- <sup>294</sup> Selee et al., 2023.
- <sup>295</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>296</sup> Yates and Bolter, 2021.
- <sup>297</sup> Roy, 2022.
- <sup>298</sup> OCHA, 2022a.
- <sup>299</sup> IFRC, n.d.; IOM and WFP, 2022.
- <sup>300</sup> IOM, 2023t; Roy, 2022.
- <sup>301</sup> MMC, 2023.
- <sup>302</sup> Government of Panama, 2023.
- <sup>303</sup> IOM, 2023u.
- <sup>304</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>305</sup> NRC, 2023.
- <sup>306</sup> Reuters, 2023b.
- <sup>307</sup> Wilson Center, 2022; Plan International, 2023.
- <sup>308</sup> ICG, 2023.
- <sup>309</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>310</sup> World Bank, 2023a.
- <sup>311</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>312</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>313</sup> IASC and European Commission, 2022.
- <sup>314</sup> Angelo, 2022; IOM and WFP, 2022.
- <sup>315</sup> Al Jazeera, 2022.
- <sup>316</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>317</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>318</sup> Lacarte et al., 2023.
- <sup>319</sup> UN DESA, 2021.
- <sup>320</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>321</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>322</sup> Mérancourt and Coletta, 2023.
- <sup>323</sup> OHCHR, 2022b.
- <sup>324</sup> IOM, 2023v.
- <sup>325</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>326</sup> IOM, 2022f.
- <sup>327</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>328</sup> OHCHR, 2023e; Obert, 2022.
- <sup>329</sup> Augustin and Robles, 2022.
- <sup>330</sup> Sesin, 2022.
- <sup>331</sup> Salomon, 2022.
- <sup>332</sup> Augustin and Robles, 2022.
- <sup>333</sup> Perlmutter, 2022 and 2023.
- <sup>334</sup> IOM, 2023w.
- <sup>335</sup> WMO, 2022.
- <sup>336</sup> UNDP, 2022b.
- <sup>337</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>338</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>339</sup> WMO, 2022.
- <sup>340</sup> IPCC, 2022b.
- <sup>341</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.
- <sup>342</sup> See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- <sup>343</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>344</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.
- <sup>345</sup> Harnoss et al., 2022.
- <sup>346</sup> Ainsley et al., 2023.
- <sup>347</sup> DePillis, 2023.
- <sup>348</sup> Bhattarai and Gurley, 2022.
- <sup>349</sup> MPI, 2022.
- <sup>350</sup> US EPA, n.d.
- <sup>351</sup> IPCC, 2022a.
- <sup>352</sup> NOAA, n.d.
- <sup>353</sup> Tumin, 2023; Cecco, 2023.
- <sup>354</sup> IDMC, 2023a.
- <sup>355</sup> Flavelle, 2022.
- <sup>356</sup> Ruiz Soto, 2022.

- <sup>357</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>358</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>359</sup> Spagat, 2022.
- <sup>360</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>361</sup> Debusmann, 2023; Engle, 2023.
- <sup>362</sup> Goodman, 2023; US DHS, 2023.
- <sup>363</sup> US DHS, 2023.
- <sup>364</sup> Movilidad Segura, n.d.
- <sup>365</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>366</sup> IOM, 2022g.
- <sup>367</sup> Selee, 2022.
- <sup>368</sup> Summit of the Americas Heads of State, 2022.
- <sup>369</sup> UNHCR, 2023a.
- <sup>370</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>371</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>372</sup> MPI, 2022.
- <sup>373</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Oceania.
- <sup>374</sup> See Chapter 2 for information on the next release of UN DESA international migrant stock data.
- <sup>375</sup> See Appendix A for details on the composition of Oceania.

- <sup>376</sup> Government of Australia, 2023a.
- <sup>377</sup> Boucher, 2023.
- <sup>378</sup> Government of Australia, 2023a.
- <sup>379</sup> Karp, 2023.
- <sup>380</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>381</sup> Government of Australia, 2023a; Boucher, 2023.
- <sup>382</sup> Government of Australia, 2023b.
- <sup>383</sup> Boucher, 2023.
- <sup>384</sup> Government of Australia, 2022.
- <sup>385</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>386</sup> Whyte, 2022.
- <sup>387</sup> OCHA, 2022b.
- <sup>388</sup> IDMC and ADB, 2022.
- <sup>389</sup> IOM and ILO, 2022.
- <sup>390</sup> IDMC, 2022b.
- <sup>391</sup> IDMC and ADB, 2022.
- <sup>392</sup> ICEF, 2023.
- <sup>393</sup> Knott, 2023.
- <sup>394</sup> ICEF, 2022b.
- <sup>395</sup> Ibid.

## Appendix A. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Regions and subregions

Please note that this table reflects the UN DESA geographic regions and subregions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Africa				
Eastern Africa <sup>a</sup>	Middle Africa <sup>b</sup>	Northern Africa <sup>c</sup>	Southern Africa <sup>d</sup>	Western Africa <sup>e</sup>
Burundi	Angola	Algeria	Botswana	Benin
Comoros	Cameroon	Egypt	Eswatini	Burkina Faso
Djibouti	Central African Republic	Libya	Lesotho	Cabo Verde
Eritrea	Chad	Morocco	Namibia	Côte d'Ivoire
Ethiopia	Congo	Sudan	South Africa	Gambia
Kenya	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Tunisia		Ghana
Madagascar				Guinea
Malawi	Equatorial Guinea			Guinea-Bissau
Mauritius	Gabon			Liberia
Mayotte	São Tomé and Príncipe			Mali
Mozambique				Mauritania
Réunion				Niger
Rwanda				Nigeria
Seychelles				Saint Helena
Somalia				Senegal
South Sudan				Sierra Leone
Uganda				Togo
United Republic of Tanzania				
Zambia				
Zimbabwe				

<sup>a</sup> Eastern Africa has been combined with the Southern Africa subregion in this chapter; although the countries, territories and areas remain the same.

<sup>b</sup> This subregion has been renamed "Central Africa" in this chapter and combined with Western Africa.

<sup>c</sup> This subregion has been renamed "North Africa".

<sup>d</sup> This subregion has been combined with Eastern Africa.

<sup>e</sup> This subregion has been renamed "West Africa" and combined with Central Africa (UN DESA Middle Africa) in this chapter.

Asia				
Central Asia	Eastern Asia	South-Eastern Asia <sup>f</sup>	Southern Asia	Western Asia <sup>g</sup>
Kazakhstan	China	Brunei Darussalam	Afghanistan	Armenia
Kyrgyzstan	China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region	Cambodia	Bangladesh	Azerbaijan
Tajikistan	China, Macao Special Administrative Region	Indonesia	Bhutan	Bahrain
Turkmenistan	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	Lao People's Democratic Republic	India	Cyprus
Uzbekistan	Japan	Malaysia	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Georgia
	Mongolia	Myanmar	Maldives	Iraq
	Republic of Korea	Philippines	Nepal	Israel
		Singapore	Pakistan	Jordan
		Thailand	Sri Lanka	Kuwait
		Timor-Leste		Lebanon
		Viet Nam		Oman
				Qatar
				Saudi Arabia
				Syrian Arab Republic
				Türkiye
				United Arab Emirates
				Yemen

<sup>f</sup> This subregion has been renamed "South-East Asia".

<sup>g</sup> This subregion has been renamed "Middle East".

Europe <sup>h</sup>			
Eastern Europe <sup>i</sup>	Northern Europe	Southern Europe	Western Europe
Belarus	Channel Islands	Albania	Austria
Bulgaria	Denmark	Andorra	Belgium
Czechia	Estonia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	France
Hungary	Faroe Islands	Croatia	Germany
Poland	Finland	Gibraltar	Liechtenstein
Republic of Moldova	Iceland	Greece	Luxembourg
Romania	Ireland	Holy See	Monaco
Russian Federation	Isle of Man	Italy	Netherlands (Kingdom of the)
Slovakia	Latvia	Malta	Switzerland
Ukraine	Lithuania	Montenegro	
	Norway	North Macedonia	
	Sweden	Portugal	
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	San Marino	
		Serbia	
		Slovenia	
		Spain	

<sup>h</sup> Some countries in this subregion, particularly members of the European Union, may have been included both in the discussion of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, as well as the subregional discussion on Northern, Western and Southern Europe within the chapter.

<sup>i</sup> Northern, Western and Southern Europe are combined in the chapter, excluding the following countries in Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and North Macedonia, which have been included in South-Eastern Europe in the chapter, under the subregion South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.

Latin America and the Caribbean		
Caribbean	Central America <sup>i</sup>	South America
Anguilla	Belize	Argentina
Antigua and Barbuda	Costa Rica	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)
Aruba	El Salvador	Brazil
Bahamas	Guatemala	Chile
Barbados	Honduras	Colombia
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba	Mexico	Ecuador
British Virgin Islands	Nicaragua	Falkland Islands (Malvinas)
Cayman Islands	Panama	French Guiana
Cuba		Guyana
Curaçao		Paraguay
Dominica		Peru
Dominican Republic		Suriname
Grenada		Uruguay
Guadeloupe		Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
Haiti		
Jamaica		
Martinique		
Montserrat		
Puerto Rico		
Saint Kitts and Nevis		
Saint Lucia		
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines		
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)		
Trinidad and Tobago		
Turks and Caicos Islands		
United States Virgin Islands		

<sup>i</sup> The subregion “Central America” has been combined with Mexico and the Caribbean in this chapter.

<b>Northern America</b>
Bermuda
Canada
Greenland
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
United States of America

<b>Oceania</b>			
Australia and New Zealand	Melanesia	Micronesia	Polynesia
Australia	Fiji	Guam	American Samoa
New Zealand	New Caledonia	Kiribati	Cook Islands
	Papua New Guinea	Marshall Islands	French Polynesia
	Solomon Islands	Micronesia (Federated States of)	Niue
	Vanuatu	Nauru	Samoa
		Northern Mariana Islands	Tokelau
		Palau	Tonga
			Tuvalu
			Wallis and Futuna Islands

Legend:

Region
Subregion <sup>i</sup>
Country, territory, or area <sup>ii,iii</sup>

Notes: For methodology as well as explanatory notes, see UN DESA, 2020.

- <sup>i</sup> Subregions utilized within the chapter may differ from those utilized by UN DESA Statistical Division either by name, or by countries, territories and areas included within.
- <sup>ii</sup> "The names of countries or areas refer to their short form used in day-to-day operations of the United Nations and not necessarily to their official name as used in formal documents. These names are based on the United Nations Terminology Database (UNTERM), which can be found at <https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/portal/welcome>. The designations employed and the presentation of material at this site do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations [or the International Organization for Migration (IOM)] concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries" (UN DESA, n.d.).
- <sup>iii</sup> The entities included in this table, which the previous chapter draws upon, comprise countries, as well as territories, areas and special administrative regions. Please note that this table is not intended to be fully comprehensive.



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