NOTES ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Emerging issues and responses

Thematic report

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ACP Observatory on Migration

The ACP Observatory on Migration is an initiative of the Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States, funded by the European Union, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in a Consortium with 15 partners and with the financial support of Switzerland, IOM, the IOM Development Fund and UNFPA. Established in 2010, the ACP Observatory is an institution designed to produce data on South–South ACP migration for migrants, civil society and policymakers and enhance research capacities in ACP countries for the improvement of the situation of migrants and the strengthening of the migration–development nexus.

The Observatory was established to facilitate the creation of a network of research institutions and experts on migration research. Activities are starting in 12 pilot countries and will be progressively extended to other interested ACP countries. The 12 pilot countries are: Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Republic of Tanzania.

The Observatory has launched research and capacity-building activities on South–South migration and development issues. Through these activities, the ACP Observatory aims to address many issues that are becoming increasingly important for the ACP Group as part of the migration–development nexus. Documents and other research outputs and capacity-building manuals can be accessed and downloaded free of charge through the Observatory’s website (www.acpmigration-obs.org). Other upcoming publications and information on the Observatory’s activities will be posted online.
NOTES ON MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

Emerging issues and responses
FOREWORD

Dear readers,

During his opening statement at the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in October 2013, United Nations Secretary General Mr Ban Ki Moon remarked that “the face of migration is changing; today, migrants are coming from, and going to, more places than ever before”. Emerging movements and new perspectives challenge our traditional conceptions of migration and call for innovative solutions in policymaking.

It goes without saying that South–South migration is an old phenomenon. Historically, cross-border movements and intraregional migration have shaped societies in the six ACP regions. South–South migration remains an important social practice nowadays. During his remarks, the UN Secretary General pointed out that “four of every ten migrants are living in developing countries”. Today, the importance of South-South migration is acknowledged by all partners of the migration and development community.

Yet, many resources remain untapped to improve the situation of South-South migrants and multiply their contribution to development, partly due to the limitations of the evidence base.

This report of the ACP Observatory on Migration describes global trends of South–South migration and identifies relevant practices to harness the potential impact of South–South migration on development. It also aims at recommending policy options based on good practices identified in ACP countries.

The topics selected for this report have been chosen to provide an input for different debates on migration, such as the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). I am very pleased to note that attention is focused on emerging issues that have become increasingly important for ACP migrants and societies. It is only through innovation and forward-looking initiatives that we will be able to tackle the challenges ahead of us.

I would like to invite all members of the international community to carefully read the documents published by the ACP Observatory on Migration as they offer a fresh look into one of the most defining features of our societies. I believe it is time to look at each other and to learn from what ACP countries are doing in terms of migration and development and this thematic report paves the way for such an enriching approach.

The researchers of the ACP Observatory and different members of its network have contributed to this document. I would like to thank the authors and editors of the thematic documents included in this report.

I wish you a very fruitful read.

Muhammad Mumuni
Secretary General
ACP Group of States
TABLE OF CONTENTS

vii. List of tables, graphs and figures

I. Setting the scene

1. South–South extraregional migration: 
   An overview of emerging trends

13. South–South return migration: 
   Challenges and opportunities

27. Slowly, but surely: 
   The environment, climate change and migration in ACP countries

II. Labour migration, development and remittances

39. Facilitating labour migration for development: 
   Opportunities and challenges of South–South labour migration

49. Remittances in the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

61. Migration, remittances and development in Africa: 
   The case of lusophone countries

73. Money money services: «A bank in your pocket»: 
   An overview of trends and opportunities

III. The social and cultural side of South–South migration

85. Transnational families and the social and gender impact of mobility in ACP countries

97. The migration of children in ACP countries: 
   Of their own free will or involuntary?

107. Migration girls in West Africa: 
    The case of Senegal

IV. Tackling the vulnerabilities

119. The right(s) thing to do: 
    Migration, development and human rights in ACP countries

129. Global phenomenon, invisible cases: 
    Human trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific

137. The evidence behind the picture: 
    Irregular migration in ACP countries and the global South

151. Bibliography and further readings
LIST OF TABLES, GRAPHS AND FIGURES

Maps:
Map 1: Cross-border movements in response to the humanitarian crisis in Libya .......... 18
Map 2: Percentage of people older than 15 years old with an account at a formal financial institution in the world (2014) ...................................................................... 77
Map 3: Number of live mobile money services for the unbanked by country (December 2013) ............................................................................................................ 78

Figures:
Figure 1: Return preparation .............................................................................................................. 20
Figure 2: What protection is there for children affected by mobility in West Africa? ............. 98

Tables:
Table 1: Human capital gained by returnees .................................................................................. 24
Table 2: African lusophone countries: differences in geography, sociopolitical environment and development .............................................................................................................. 65
Table 3: African lusophone countries: differences in migration patterns ...................................... 67
Table 4: African lusophone countries: main data on remittances .................................................. 68
Table 5: Regional representation of child victims of trafficking .................................................... 100

Graphs:
Graph 1: Remittances inflows (million Euros), 2010 estimates ...................................................... 50
Graph 2: Remittances-receiving ACP countries amongst the top 30 worldwide in percentage of GDP, 2009 .................................................................................................................. 51
Graph 3: Remittances outflows (million Euros), 2009 estimates ..................................................... 52
Graph 4: Remittances-sending ACP countries amongst the top 30 worldwide in percentage of GDP, 2009 .................................................................................................................. 52
Graph 5: Main destinations for sub-Saharan African emigrants, 2005 ......................................... 62
Graph 6: Evolution of the international migrant stock in African sub-regions (1975–2010) (five-year, %) .................................................................................................................. 63
Graph 7: World top 25 recipients of remittances, percentage of GDP, 2008 .................................. 64
Graph 8: Remittances outflows (USD millions), 1975–2009 .......................................................... 69
Graph 9: Remittances inflows (USD millions), 1975–2009 ............................................................ 69
Graph 10: Remittances net flows (USD millions), 1975–2008 ....................................................... 69
Graph 11: Remittances as a share of GDP, 2008 (in %) ..................................................................... 70
Graph 12: Remittances outflows and net flows (USD millions), 1975–2008 Angola and South Africa .......................................................................................................................... 71
Graph 13: Ratification of international human rights treaties in ACP countries, 1965 to 2013 as of 15 April 2013 (cumulative ratifications) ............................................................... 124
Graph 14: Ratifications of international human rights treaties worldwide, 1965 to 2013 .... 124
South–South extraregional migration: An overview of emerging trends

International migration from the South towards other regions is often simplified as South-North (or low-income to high-income) movements (De Haas, 2007; Minvielle, 2010). Reality is indeed much more complex and new and atypical extraregional migration corridors between Southern regions rapidly emerge.

This background note aims to provide a general overview of the current major South–South extraregional migration patterns and corridors. After presenting some data on current extraregional migration trends, the paper highlights possible implications of extraregional movements by looking at few available country examples of mobility among Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and Asia. Finally, some recommendations and good practices are being pointed out both at research and policy level.

It is estimated that roughly half of all migrants originating from Southern countries reside in another developing country. The United Nations estimate that South–South migrants at up to 73 million people (UN DESA, 2012). However, the number is likely to be higher considering the existing general lack of data on migration in developing countries and the fact that official data normally underestimate the number of irregular migrants. According to the 2009 UNDP Human Development Report, about 200 million international migrants are moving along the lines of South–South migration corridors, almost as much as 2010 figures on all international migrants (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; UNDP, 2009). South–South migration is overwhelmingly intraregional and extraregional mobility is relatively small compared to it. Nevertheless, extraregional migration represents an important trend which needs to be taken into consideration.

Several examples of South–South extraregional migration can be found in the nineteenth and twentieth century history, mainly related to colonial and post-colonial linkages. For instance, in the framework of the British colonial rule, ethnic Indians established communities both in the Caribbean and in Africa, which currently host 13 per cent of the Indian diasporas (Naujkos, 2009). Therefore, (post-) colonial, linguistic and cultural ties have always been a key element of extraregional mobility, as demonstrated for example by anecdotal evidence of Angolan and Mozambican refugees in Brazil (Tourinho Baptista, 2008; Baeninger and Guimarães Peres, 2011).

The term extraregional migration has commonly been adopted (IOM, OAS). It might also be referred to as extracontinental (FLACSO, UNHCR), interregional (ECLAC) or intercontinental migration.

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1 Document prepared by Livia Manente, Research Assistant, ACP Observatory on Migration.
2 The term ‘region’ is used in this paper according to the UN classification of ‘World geographical regions’, such as Africa, America, Asia, Europe and Oceania (UN Statistics Division), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49region.htm.
3 As the ACP Observatory on Migration adopts a human development approach to study South–South migration and development issues, the UNDP definition of ‘South’ is adopted. Please note that this paper does not take into consideration Asian and African migration to the Middle East and Gulf countries, while several references to Argentina will be made, although according to the UNDP definition this country should not be classified as ‘South’.
4 Nevertheless, it has to be taken into consideration that further emerging South–South extraregional migration corridors that have not been studied yet are likely to exist. There is for instance anecdotal evidence of labour migration from Brazil to African lusophone countries under the umbrella of Brazilians companies operating in Africa. See for instance www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/world/americas/brazil-gains-in-reaching-out-to-africa.html.
Nevertheless, several new factors which deeply influenced and modified South–South extraregional migration patterns have developed in the last decades. South–South extraregional migration is often driven by oil-based economic development, as in the case of Gulf countries, or linked to the rise of Southern countries’ economies, as in the case of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), whose expanding labour markets increasingly attract international migrants. Furthermore, increasing South–South cooperation is creating new links among often geographically and culturally distant developing countries. Finally, the adoption of restrictive migration policies and/or the tightening of borders in Western countries are also believed to be a factor influencing the rising of South–South extraregional mobility (CEAM-OAS, 2010a). Scarce literature can be found on this subject, often focused on very specific cases. Therefore, an analysis of this phenomenon at a more global level would be desirable both for research and policymaking purposes.

1. Extraregional migration in the South: the case of China and sub-Saharan Africa

In recent years, the People’s Republic of China is not only the source of a large number of the world’s international migrants but increasingly a destination for labour migrants, including sub-Saharan Africans. The main factors behind this emerging migratory phenomenon are both China’s continuing economic growth and its increasing political and diplomatic linkages with African countries. In this framework, migrants seem to play a crucial role in the emerging Sino-African trade system (Fowale, 2008; Skeldon, 2011; Østbø Haugen, 2012).

Chinese migration to Africa

The framework for Chinese migration to Africa is represented by the Chino-African diplomatic and commercial links which culminated in the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. This agreement set the basis for a wave of economic migration from China to Africa. It has to be noticed that although the number of Chinese in Africa is growing, the African continent is the one with the lowest rates of Chinese immigration (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009).

Data concerning the length of this phenomenon are extremely limited and there are no conclusive figures, as on the one side African population data collection is extremely weak and on the other side data produced by Chinese statistics are often speculative (ibid.). It could be assumed that the number of ethnic Chinese in Africa is likely to be between 270,000 and 510,000 (Ma Mung, 2009; Skeldon, 2011), while other studies affirm that the Chinese Diaspora in Africa reaches at least 500,000 people including the secondary generations (ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD, 2006; Mohan and Kale, 2007).

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5 In 2010, the World Bank ranked China as the fourth largest country of emigration, with 8.3 million China-born people living outside the country, including 3 million people in Macao, China and Hong Kong, China (Macao and Hong Kong considered as territories of destination) (Skeldon, 2011).
6 The University of Sussex’s 2007 Global Migrant Origin Database estimates the number of Chinese migrants in Africa at 48,692 people but other studies highlight much higher figures, which makes difficult determining the exact magnitude of this phenomenon. For example; while Chinese authorities estimated that 78,000 Chinese were working in Africa in 2007, other sources like the Xinhua Chinese Official press agency estimated the total numbers of Chinese in Africa at 750,000 (Mohan and Kale, 2007; Politzer, 2008).
Chinese migration to Africa is primarily economically driven (Mohan and Kale, 2007) and its rapid growth is linked to the large increase in Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) there. The main destination countries are those with significant oil resources like Nigeria and Sudan, but sizeable and long-standing Chinese communities in South Africa, Lesotho, Mauritius, The Reunion and Madagascar also have to be mentioned (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009).

Chinese migrants in Africa could be roughly divided into four different categories\(^7\) according to their profile and migration project (Politzer, 2008):

\[\textit{Temporary labour migrants}\]

The opportunity of working for Chinese firms operating in Africa is the main reason which leads Chinese nationals to migrate to the continent. According to Chinese governmental sources, there are more than 800 Chinese companies currently operating in 49 countries in Africa in the sectors of infrastructure, engineering, construction, public work, oil and mining operations (Politzer, 2008). These firms generally bring low-cost and low-skilled labour force directly from China for fixed period overseas. Temporary workers are hired via two different channels: either they are recruited by companies officially licensed to send workers abroad or they are employed semi-legally by specialized agencies who sign agreements with manufacture companies in Africa with Chinese ownership. These agencies charge high fees to migrant workers, sometimes equivalent to a year’s salary and often make false promises concerning wages and benefits. Furthermore, migrants are often recruited by illegal travel agencies who provide them with a tourist visa and promise them work in an inexistent factory which the migrants only realize once in Africa (Gong, 2007).

\[\textit{Entrepreneurs}\]

Entrepreneurship is a typical characteristic of Chinese migration and state-backed migrants who operate as petty entrepreneurs are also a growing presence in Africa (Tsihibambe, 2010 quoting Ma Mung, 2009). They usually operate in trade, services (e.g. restaurants and clothes shops) and light manufacturing. These entrepreneurs come both from mainland China and other Chinese migrant communities in Europe (notably France, Italy and Spain). They tend to adopt quite frugal lifestyles and to settle in a specific part of the African cities offering their services to local population and possibly setting the bases for future Chinatowns (Politzer, 2008). As for the engineering and construction sector, the use of African labour force is extremely rare and the typical pattern involves a Chinese male workers emigrating alone who is later joined by their family members according to the labour needs. In some cases, Chinese entrepreneurs possibly hire workers among the semi-legal Chinese immigrants mentioned above (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009).

\[\textit{In-transit migrants}\]

Africa is also becoming a new migration corridor for Asian migrants in general on their way to Western countries (Liberti, 2008). These migrants tend to use African countries as temporary locations for the next stage of their journey, either by gathering funds and legal documentation to enter North America or Europe or by joining the trans-Mediterranean migration corridor to Southern Europe. Asian migrants normally enter African countries legally by using a tourist or

\(^7\) Such categories have to be considered as a rough guide, since migrants could belong to more than one of move to one typology to another during their stay.
business visa and then overstay. Due to their informal status, an estimation of the total number of Asian, and notably Chinese, in-transit migrants in Africa is therefore very difficult (Politzer, 2008).

Agricultural workers

Even if there are no official figures on this phenomenon, it has been noticed that a growing number of workers from rural China is also moving to Africa. In a 2007 speech, the Head of the Chinese Export-Import Bank, Mr. Li Ruogu, invited Chinese farmers forced off their land by spreading urbanization to emigrate to Africa in order to put into practice their agricultural skills and become landlords (Chen, 2007). The Bank also committed to support Chinese rural migration to Africa with investments and projects development (Bristow, 2007).

African migration to China

South–South migration to China is mainly intraregional, with a large number of both regular and irregular migrants moving to the country from Vietnam, the Korean peninsula and other Southeast Asian countries. However, China is also experiencing immigration from other areas where it has been developing economic and political interests.

In particular, an increasing number of African migrants has been registered in China as a result of the Chinese growing engagement in Africa. In fact, in Asia, China is currently considered the first remittance-sending country to Africa (IOM, 2009).

It is believed that more than 20,000 Africans are currently living in Southern China, but little academic or empirical research on this matter is currently available. According to the Guangzhou Daily, for example, the number of African migrants is increasing at an annual rate of 30 or 40 per cent since 2003 (Politzer, 2008). Similarly, according to the Chinese state media 130,000 Africans were residing in Guangzhou in 2008 (Sautman, 2006). Among Africans in China, four main typologies of migrants could be distinguished according to their motives for migrating: (Fowale 2008; Politzer, 2008).

Accurate estimates of the number of Africans living in China are difficult to find and official statistics are not available. More than 10,000 Africans were believed to live only in the city of Guangzhou in 2006, although according to other estimations there are more than 20,000 Africans living in the city (Li et al, 2009). However, these data are far from being certain. A report of the Guangzhou Daily for example estimated the number of Africans in the city at 100,000 (Politzer, 2008). Similarly, according to the Chinese state media 130,000 Africans were residing in Guangzhou in 2008 (Sautman, 2006; Østbø Haugen, 2012).

8 According to the University of Sussex’s 2007 Global Migrant Origin Database only 3,078 African citizens were living in China in 2000/2004. Such difference in data is probably due the fact that in the 2007 version of the database there were no data on China, as mentioned at the Migrating out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium (RPC) webpage www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_migrant_origin_database.html.

9 As in the case of Chinese migrants in Africa, please note that such categories are not static.
Businesspersons

The majority of African migrants in China appear to be traders. Businessmen tend to stay only temporary in the country, and their presence is aimed either at buying cheap Chinese goods that they can resell in Africa or to establish extraregional trades in raw materials like oil and minerals (Fowale, 2008; Politzer, 2008).

Students

China’s overseas development aid programme to Africa includes also government scholarships for studying in Chinese universities. This category is becoming a significant extraregional migrant group and African citizens represent the 2.3 per cent of the total number of students enrolled in Chinese universities. In 2006 for instance, almost 4,000 African students attended Chinese universities, 40 per cent more than in the previous year according to the Chinese Ministry of Education (Fowale, 2008; Politzer, 2008).

English teachers

In recent years, an increasing demand for English language classes has created employment opportunities for Anglophone Africans, who joined the group of American, Australian, Canadian and European expatriate teachers in China.

Informal workers

A forth category is represented by a mixed group made of migrants who ends up working in the informal sector. A growing number of irregular migrants is also operating in the third sector, providing services working as domestics, delivers of home-cooked food, or guides and agents for African businessmen (Østbø Haugen, 2012).

African migrants may also move from a group to another. For what concerns gender balance, anecdotal evidence suggests that African migrants in China are overwhelmingly males, even if the presence of Nigerian and Cameroonian women has been detected. Women tend to be more frequent among students and itinerants traders rather than among undocumented migrants (Østbø Haugen, 2012). Africans enter in China legally on a tourist or business visa, sometimes obtained with the help of brokers who charge up to USD 2,000 but the main problem for Africans under the current Chinese immigration law is obtaining the extension of their work visa.

Empirical research pointed out that African migrants generally consider China as a best second option in their migratory project. Attracted by the relative easiness for entering, many Africans admit considering China as an outpost on their way to other destinations like Japan, Europe, United States and Australia. Often African migrants have poor information about China before leaving their country. In particular, misinformation about Chinese geography and difficulties for obtaining a job are common (ibid.).

African migrants in China face several forms of discrimination, social exclusion and racism, as for instance difference in salaries or in privileges in comparison with Western or Asian workers (Fowale, 2008). Furthermore, mobility of African migrants through the country is deeply affected.
by the Chinese immigration law. Adopted in 1985, the Law on ‘Control of the Entry and Exit of Aliens’ is not adequately able to respond to the situation of high immigration pressure China is currently experiencing. The mentioned Law punishes foreigners without a valid visa with jail terms, and irregular migrants are required to pay the costs of detention, release and repatriation. This legal framework is also considered to have led to the spread of a black market for visas and corruption among the Chinese police, whose officials often ask African migrants to pay a bribe once they are picked up without valid documents (Østbø Haugen, 2012).

2. Extraregional migration in the South: Routes towards Latin America and the Caribbean

South–South migration patterns are rapidly emerging in Latin America and in the Caribbean, where a growing number of migrants coming from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa has been registered in the last few years (IOM, 2011). A high number of international migrants arrive in Latin America trying to make their way to Canada or the United States, while a growing percentage of asylum-seekers has also been registered. In fact, in 2010 between 5 and 40 per cent of total asylum applications in different Latin American countries were submitted by Asian and African nationals (UNHCR, 2010). The majority of African and Asian migrants arrive on South America coasts, notably Brazil, Colombia and to a lesser extent Argentina. However, migration of Asians and Africans to Central America is becoming more frequent. In particular, the number of migrants who reached Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama notably increased during the last few years (CEAM-OAS, 2010a).

A sensitive aspect of these increased migration flows is its irregularity. A report of the Special Committee on Migration Issues of the Organization of American States (OAS) published in 2010 defined the phenomenon of irregular extraregional migration to Latin America as “new and growing” and indicated Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Somalia in Africa and Bangladesh, China and Nepal in Asia as the major origin countries of migrants (CEAS-OAS, 2010b).

The reasons for choosing these new South–South migration corridors are often related on the one side to the tightening of European immigration policies and the proximity to the United States (CEAM-OAS, 2012a; Marcelino, 2012). Furthermore, it has to be pointed that the expanding economy of Latin American countries is increasingly attracting labour migrants. Finally, Latin America and the Caribbean are often considered as a less xenophobic and more receptive societies, especially by African citizens (The Miami Herald, 2009). Policy responses have been adopted in several countries in order to facilitate the protection of migrant’s social and human rights although discrimination and exclusion are often reported (IOM, 2011).

According to the figures published in 2012, since the last semester of 2011 the number of African migrants who reach Latin America and the Caribbean has been declining. On the contrary, an increase of the arrivals of Asian migrants to the region has been registered (Trimiño/UNHCR, 2012).
Asian migration to Latin America and the Caribbean

In recent years, large groups of migrants proceeding from South Asia reached Latin America and the Caribbean. As anecdotal evidence suggests, the presence of migrants from Bangladesh, China, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka increased roughly by 300 per cent between 2008 and 2010 in Ecuador according to Ecuador’s Dirección Nacional de Migración (IOM, 2012). This data has probably been deeply influenced by the free movement migration policy adopted by the Ecuadorian Government in 2008 and then abolished in September 2010, but similar trends have been registered also in other countries of the region. In the first months of 2012 for example, numerous migrants from India and Sri Lanka reached Mexico via Guatemala, a choice probably influenced by the softening of visa requirements in this country (Trimiño/UNHCR, 2012).

The proximity to the United States makes Central America and the Caribbean a strategic area for transit movements. It is estimates that the majority of irregular migrants moving to the Caribbean are Chinese nationals. Approximately 200,000 Chinese citizens are smuggled by organized rings and syndicates every year to Central America and the Caribbean in the attempt of reaching the United States in a second phase (Thomas-Hope, 2002). However, nationals from other South Asian countries are also migrating to the Caribbean. In Aruba for instance, according to the 2000 census, the largest group of Asian migrants come from the Philippines, even if the Chinese immigration to the island has increased significantly in the last years (Eelens, 2005).

The growing presence of Chinese immigrants in the Caribbean must be understood in the framework of the increasing economic interaction between the People’s Republic of China and the Caribbean community and Common Market (CARICOM). China is building up a progressive economic presence in the region, with a Chinese foreign direct investment of USD 8.6 billion in 2009 (Bernal, 2010). Excluding the case of transit and irregular migration, many similarities can be found between the patterns of the Chinese migration to Africa and to the Caribbean.

Many of the Chinese new immigrants work either as traders and small-business owners or as temporary labour force in the Chinese companies contracted by the Governments of the region for the upgrading of roads or for the construction of low-income housing in the framework of the Chino-Caribbean development aid agreements. In Suriname for example, Chinese stores are spreading all over the country, and about 40,000 Chinese are estimated to currently live in the country either regularly or are undocumented (The New York Times, 2011). Chinese presence is rising also in Latin America. Notably, in Brazil the Chinese community currently represents the sixth biggest foreign community in the country. This is due to the growth of some strategic sectors of the Brazilian economy (such as the textile, the agriculture and the ITC) attracting Chinese and Korean labour migrants (IOM, 2012).

African migration to Latin America

New transatlantic migration corridors from Africa to Latin America have been rising since the mid 2000’s. This phenomenon is linked to variety of factors acting together, including the tightening of US and European borders after 11 September, the extension and porosity of both maritime and land borders and the lack of state capacity to monitor irregular migrants and visa overstayers

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10 Adopted by the Ecuadorian Government on 20 June 2008, the Universal visa freedom policy permitted to enter the country for a 90-days tourist stay without any visa requirement.
together with a relatively open migratory policy of Latin America countries (Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011). In fact, although the inflow of African migrants in the region started during the nineties, the turning point of this phenomenon is considered the year 2006 especially for the case of Argentina, which adopted that a lenient law on immigration in 2004 and a General Law of Refugee Recognition and Protection two years later (Minvielle, 2010; Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011).

African migration to Latin America is predominantly oriented towards Brazil and Argentina, but a sizeable flow of African migrants has been registered also in other countries of the region as for example Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay (Reuters 2009; Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011). It might be possible that African migrants consider Latin America as a transit pit stop, envisaging reaching the United States or Canada as final destination (Minvielle, 2010). The choice of Argentina and Brazil as a destination in African migratory projects are probably due, apart from their geographical position, to their symbolic capital, their socioeconomic stability and the perception of economic opportunities combined to a migratory normative less aggressive than in other countries. Other specific incentives could be on the one side the fact the that Argentina is commonly considered as a ‘European-style’ country, while on the other side Brazil is the second country in the world in terms of black population, with 65-million afro-descendants (Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011). Finally, it has to be noticed that in some cases migrants embark in African ports without knowing the destination of their ship, especially when fleeing from their home countries as in the case of nationals from Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea among others (Blanco, 2007; La Nación, 2009; The Miami Herald, 2010). Currently, Africans are now the largest refugee group in Brazil, while more than 3,000 African migrants are estimated to live in Argentina (Reuters, 2009).

Africans who migrate to Latin America are overwhelmingly young and male, while the number of women widely changes according to the country of origin. They are predominantly West African citizens, notably Senegalese and to a less extent Nigerians, but migrants from Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe are also increasingly following this new migration route (Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011; IOM Buenos Aires, 2011). The Organization of American States (OAS) identifies Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Somalia as the main countries of origin (CEAM-OAS, 2010b).

African migration to Latin America is heterogeneous in many regards, such as country of origin, religion, migratory status, educational profiles and access to communication and transportation (Maffia, 2010). The complexity and informality of this migration corridor does not allow making a clear distinction among documented and undocumented migrants. It is therefore appropriate to speak about mixed migrants, recognizing variable and overlapping reasons for migrating (UNHCR, 2010).

It is believed that African migrants reach Latin America using different methods and mainly land on Brazilian sole. Either they reach Brazilian ports by cargo ships as stowaways hidden into the rudder of a ship or with the crew’s complicity or by airplane. This is usually the case of Senegalese migrants, who take advantage if a special protocol existing between their country and Brazil. The most common route detected up to now is the one which connects Dakar (Senegal) and Fortaleza (Brazil), or alternatively
Dakar-Cabo Verde-Fortaleza or São Paulo. Organized networks who facilitate the entrance of African migrants into Brazil by providing support at the arrival and during the border-crossing are believed to be spreading in Senegal (Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011). These migrants who arrive by boat are mainly low educated unaccompanied minors, normally between 15 and 17 years. They face a journey of 17 to 21 days hidden in the winch, the cellar or the engine room of a cargo ship and the number of those who die before reaching the Americas is unknown (IOM, 2012). Other migratory routes and destinations are also emerging. Some African migrants first move to the Republic of South Africa and transit then through Brazil in order to reach Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela or Colombia. An international route which connects South Africa with Dubai and then Moscow with the Habana has also been detected (IOM, 2012).

For reasons not yet clearly determined, the majority of migrants tend to continue their journey to Argentina. It is estimated that in the last few years roughly 3,000 African migrants entered in Argentina, half of them proceeding from Senegal by crossing the country's broad, porous and rarely patrolled borders either by bus or by boat (IOM, 2012). This is the case of the so-called triple frontera, the natural border among Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay represented by the Iguazu River, crossed by migrants by night on fast Zodiacs, probably with the help of local smuggling networks (Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011).

The level of education of the majority of Africans who reach Latin America countries is generally higher than the one of Asian migrants, but they usually end up working in the informal sector. As the access to the legal labour market is extremely difficult, African migrants integrate into the informal labour market working in the production of handicrafts, in restaurants and especially as street vendors (IOM, 2012). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that this activity is often linked to the presence of entrepreneur Asian immigrants in the region, as the jewelry sold by on crossroads or outside bus and train stations is overwhelmingly Chinese or South-Korean (Minvielle, 2010).

3. Conclusions: The way forward

As pointed out in this paper, South–South extraregional migration is a complex phenomenon presenting significant regional differences. Economic linkages among developing countries are likely to increase in the next decades - not least due to the rising importance of the BRICS countries - and may confirm current and lead to new extraregional South–South migratory flows. From the cases analysed in this paper some key conclusions can be drawn:

- Lack of knowledge: Need for better data

Academia, media, institutions and public opinion are increasingly aware of the phenomenon of extraregional migration11, but studies on the topic are almost non-existent. In fact, available academic and empirical research and literature on South–South extraregional population

11 See for instance the series of seminars on migrant flows from Africa to Argentina organized by IOM Buenos Aires in 2011. Further information can be found at the following link: www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/media/press-briefing-notes/pbnAM/cache/offence/lang/en?entryId=29411.
movements is limited to a restricted number of publications, often focused on a very specific corridor or nationality. **Reliable databases on numbers, origins, gender and type of extraregional migrants in developing countries and comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon are therefore required.**

- A major research Agenda in African countries should be to **monitor Chinese labour migration** through primary data collection on its level, types and characteristics (Mohan and Kale, 2007).

- African migration to China is relatively recent and academic literature on this topic extremely scarce (Østbø Haugen, 2012). Both quantitative and qualitative research on this trend is therefore highly recommended.

- The emerging phenomenon of extraregional migration towards Latin America and the Caribbean deserve to be further studied. In the last few years, the **Organization of American States (OAS)** promoted debates and surveys on extraregional migration trends to Latin America aimed at “analyz[ing] the background, magnitude and impact of irregular extracontinental migration flows, exchang[ing] experiences about the responses of different countries and international organizations to this type of irregular flows from within and outside the region; and promot[ing] dialogue and cooperation on this topic among the Member States of the Organization”. Emerging migration trends between Africa and Latin America have been further discussed within the **interregional workshop** on “Examining development, institutional and policy aspects of migration between Africa, Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean” organized in September 2012 by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The workshop promoted the debate on migration dynamics between Africa, Europe and Latin America with a special focus on human rights and development (ECLAC, 2012).  

- **Promoting migration policies addressing new extraregional migration flows**

Increasing South–South extraregional migration entails **new challenges for the destination countries**, including the **lack of services and structures** to meet migrants’ needs, the **lack of interpreters** and the **absence of diplomatic missions** of the countries of origin (CEAM-OAS, 2010a). Many developing countries perceive themselves only as emigration countries with little policy attention given to the needs and rights of immigrants. Instead, **there is an urgent need to develop States’ capacities to cater to these emerging migration flows effectively.**

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12 Further information about the workshop can be found at the following links: [www.cepal.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/celade/agenda/9/44329/P44329.xml&xsl=/celade/tpli/p3f.xsl&base=/celade/tpl/top-bottom_dam.xslt](www.cepal.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/celade/agenda/9/44329/P44329.xml&xsl=/celade/tpli/p3f.xsl&base=/celade/tpl/top-bottom_dam.xslt) and [www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/8/46188/W_InternationalMig_FINAL.pdf](www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/8/46188/W_InternationalMig_FINAL.pdf).
Policymakers’ awareness on South–South extraregional migratory flows patterns should be increased through workshops and knowledge-sharing.

Extraregional migration emerging destination countries should develop adequate legal frameworks in order to efficiently manage the legal, political and humanitarian challenges related to these new migratory flows (Østbø Haugen, 2012).

Inter and intraregional dialogue on this subject should be strengthened. Immigration policies towards Chinese immigration enacted by African stated should be coordinated at regional level (Mohan and Kale, 2007) while discussions about African migration to China should be included in the Sino-African agenda. Similarly, the dialogue between Latin American and African states should be strengthened (Marcelino and Cerrutti, 2011).

Governments should aim to guarantee the protection of human rights of extraregional, as well as all, migrants. In the case of asylum-seekers, the procedures for the refugee status determination and the non-refoulement principle should be respected (Trimiño/UNHCR, 2012).

Integration in hosting societies should be fostered by adopting adequate asylum and migration policies and by promoting bilateral labour agreements with origin countries in order to encourage job matching skills.

Assistance and protection to temporary and non extracontinental migrants including access to shelter, food, health services, education and legal protection should be guaranteed (FLACSO, 2011).

Due to factors like language, skin colour, culture and habits Extraregional migrants may have to face higher vulnerable situation in comparison with regional migrants. Officers from legislative institutions and officers of destination countries in direct contact with extraregional migrants should therefore be trained in order to efficiently face migrants’ specific needs (FLACSO, 2011).

Cultural mediators and interpreters should be trained and national campaigns for integration aimed at sensitizing hosting societies organized (Marcelino and Cerutti, 2011).
Among the different stages of the migration process, return is the one which is least well understood. The motives guiding return cannot be easily categorized and are highly context dependent (Bastia, 2011). Scholars and policymakers have focused on understanding and analysing decisions for departure, failing to acknowledge that migration is a multidimensional process involving not only emigration, but different stages which include settlement in the host country and the possibility of return. Like departure, return also entails a complex decision-making process involving a wide array of factors.

Following large-scale events such as the global economic downturn, which has affected mainly economically developed nations, and the humanitarian crisis in Libya, the return of millions of migrants to their homeland has raised the awareness of policymakers, scholars and civil society, including in ACP countries. This background note provides a concise overview of the process of South–South return migration. The first section focuses on the definition and background regarding the topic of return migration and provides different typologies of return migrants based on the work of Gmelch (1980). Section two provides an overview of return trends in ACP countries. The third section discusses the concept of sustainable return and reintegration in countries of origin and provides an overview of current policies and best practices. The last section describes the types of impacts of return migrants on their countries of origin and the background concludes with a list of policy recommendations for ACP and other countries.

1. Definition and background

Return migration is defined by Gmelch (1980) as ‘movement of emigrants back to their homeland to resettle’. It must be distinguished from circular migration and re-emigration. Furthermore, most research on return migration has focused on North–South and North–North return; as it is a common assumption that South–North migration is more significant than mobility among the countries in the South. Still, South–South return migration is as important (Bastia, 2011).

In the case of intraregional migration, clearly distinguishing between circular migration, re-emigration and return migration is a more complex process than in the case of South–North migration. The high degree of ‘border porosity’ allows greater circulation rendering the process of return more common but also more difficult to differentiate precisely between return migration and circular migration.

13 Document prepared by Maria José Oomen, former Junior Researcher at the ACP Observatory on Migration.
Nation-state borders have structured how we conceive the process of return migration, and the definition proposed by Gmelch (1980) does not adequately grasp the entire process of migration in regions with highly mobile populations where migration is part of both cultural and historical traditions. The question is: what factors determine the degree of permanency of return migration and resettlement? Especially for intraregional mobility, this is a difficult question to answer and more research is needed on the topic.

The process of return migration is poorly understood due to three main reasons:

(i) Urbanization processes around the world have lead to the assumption that migration is a unidirectional process involving movements only from rural to urban areas;

(ii) Fieldwork carried out in a single place at a time portrayed the migration process as ‘static’; and

(iii) return is not adequately quantified since most countries focus their efforts on collecting data on emigration and immigration of foreigners and do not count foreign citizens who return (Gmelch, 1980).

From a human development perspective, questions regarding the voluntariness as well as the sustainability of return arise, particularly when return takes place in response to humanitarian crises and violent conflicts. Many recent studies and theories have shed light on the misconceptualization of return as the end of a migration cycle. When discussing return migration it is relevant to point out that one must distinguish between its impact on larger processes of social development and those at the individual level. Distinguishing between macro and micro-level impacts allows us to understand for instance, how motivations to return at the individual level interplay with those guided by events at a macro-level. Besides focusing on micro and macro return motivations, it is also relevant to focus on other aspects which influence return such as the maintenance of transnational linkages between receiving and origin countries. In as much as social networks reduce the costs and risks of departure; they also support migrants in their preparation for return.

Typologies of return migrants

On the basis of the work and research carried out by Gmelch (1980), three main types of return migrants can be distinguished:

(i) Temporary migrants: returnees who intended temporary migration;

(ii) Forced returnees: returnees who intended permanent migration but were forced to return; and

(iii) Voluntary returnees: returnees who intended permanent migration but chose to return.

In the first typology, migrants’ time of return is determined by the objectives they have set as part of their migration project. This categorization is not exhaustive but remains broad enough to place different and new typologies which might emerge as a consequence of new migration patterns and trends.
In the case of the typology presented here, (ii) forced returnees and (iii) voluntary returnees tend to overlap due to the different definitions and understandings of what constitutes ‘forced return’ in specific contexts and circumstances. The degree of agency (or voluntariness) with regards to the decision to return varies, and in many cases it is problematic to distinguish when return is a conscious choice or it is forced upon the migrants be it by either the specific circumstances, such as economic or humanitarian crises, or governmental regulations. The degree of voluntariness present in the decision to return and its underlying motivations is context dependent. In the case of the massive expatriation of Malian migrants due to the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, for example, categorizing these returnees as ‘return migrants’ may be difficult due to the low degree of agency and choice exercised by these migrants with regards to their expel from Côte d’Ivoire (Calenda, 2012). This example illustrates the inherent difficulty of categorizations and how typologies and categorizations in general must always be referred to within specific examples, otherwise they lose both their analytical and practical value. Furthermore it is important to point out that this categorization is based solely on the motivations which guide return. These categorizations help us understand and analyse certain aspects of the return process, however, fail to acknowledge contributing factors and can lead to a biased understanding of this process.

Migrants who intended temporary migration (typology i) have generally embarked out on a journey with specifically set goals and with a clear idea of when they plan to return (Baalen and Müller, 2008; Dustmann, 2001; Stark at al., 1997; Djajic and Milbourne, 1988). According to these studies there are three types of return motives: first, migrants have preferences regarding the location where they have a higher wage differentials in their consumption patterns, this tends to be the home country. Their relative gains in monetary terms in the country of origin only increases with migration to a country where they have access to higher wages. The second return motive is based on the case in which migrants have moved to a country with higher wages in comparison to their country of origin; through their access to higher wages abroad, migrants have a higher purchasing power in their country of origin whereby increasing their incentives to return. In the case of Angolan refugees which in recent years have returned to their country of origin (from 2002 onwards), the reverse happens. Their desire to return is very much related to a higher economic development in Angola in comparison to the refugee host countries14 where they remained as a result of the civil war (Melo, A., 2013). Finally, the human capital accumulated abroad, in most cases, has the potential of having higher returns on their home country. However, the case study on Turkish migrants in Germany by Baalen and Müller (2008) on return intentions, aims to account for the ‘dynamic inconsistency’ in the development of return

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14 The refugee host countries where the majority of Angolan refugees went to were: Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo, Namibia and Botswana.
intentions as well as compare intended versus actual return. They conclude that an inherent and dynamic inconsistency with regards to motivations, preparedness and intentions to return is present among the majority of migrants in their sample. Migrants tend to have high expectations regarding the amounts they can save abroad and the time they realistically need to attain these saving projections. In order to realistically accumulate these desired saving amounts they need to constantly re-evaluate their plans and in many instances postpone their return.

Sometimes, the unexpected happens and migrants face return before planned, or in the case of those who intended to stay abroad permanently, they are simply forced to return. Recent as well as ongoing events such as the humanitarian crisis in Libya and the global economic crisis are relevant examples of circumstances which have led to large-scale and mainly unforeseen return.

2. South–South return trends

Although in the last two years massive return has been taking place as a result of the Libyan crisis, South–South return trends not linked to humanitarian crises are visible in other regions. This section will describe relevant return flows ranging from the case of Haitians in Dominican Republic, Angolan refugees throughout Africa, Sudanese displaced persons who faced return to their origin as a result of the division of their country, and Malian migrants returning from Côte d’Ivoire. In the case of Latin America, where some of the most complex migration dynamics have been taking place, the return of Haitians from the Dominican Republic has increased since the beginning of 2012 in line with policies from the Dominican government as well as IOM in assisting their support and reintegration (Velton, 2012). The earthquake which hit Haiti in January 2010 generated massive displacement of its nationals to the neighbouring country. Although many contemplated settling in Dominican Republic, they have not found suitable employment and living conditions and face return.

In the case of Angola, the civil war which lasted twenty six years finally ended in 2002, with an estimated 4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 128,664 refugees in neighbouring countries up until April 2002 (Brinkman, 2003; Hansen, 1981). IOM reported on the large numbers who sought international protection due to the resulting humanitarian crisis, consequently an estimated 400,000 Angolan refugees were helped return and reintegrate into the socioeconomic welfare in Angola after the peace accords (Melo, A., 2013). A recent study A. Melo (2013) which maps and explores return and reintegration of Angolans stresses the importance which returnees place on the possibility of conducting activities which support their socioeconomic reintegration and well-being (ibid.).

Another case which has generated massive return has been the end of the war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Movement in 2005 as well as the subsequent division of the country into Sudan and South Sudan has generated massive return. An estimated 2.4 million displaced persons and refugees have returned to Southern Sudan and three areas in transition: Abyei, Southern Kodofan and Blue Nile (Pantuliano, 2009).
In Mali, as mentioned earlier, return migration only became a relevant phenomenon in the sociopolitical agenda in the previous decade. The attention increased with the repatriation of Malians from Côte d’Ivoire in response to the civil war. For dominant migration discourses in Mali, return has been viewed as an interruption of the migration process, something which negatively affects migrants’ reintegration, since the majority does not count with the necessary social capital and resources. A study by Outtara (2010) showed that the majority of those repatriated were trapped in the informal market and unable to transfer the skills they acquired as part of their migration experience.

The political situation in Libya since the end of February 2011 has resulted in the worst migration crisis\(^{15}\) in the region since the first Gulf War. According to IOM’s 10 months report on the Libya Crisis (2012), at the end of December 2011, this massive exodus has had striking implications for Libya’s highly dependent economy on foreign labour since up until the crisis there were 1.8 million migrant workers in the country. Furthermore, it also affected the neighbouring region as well as many sub-Saharan and Asian countries where many of the migrants originated from.

In recent years the number of total migrants in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA hereafter) region grew, with Northern African countries, which were traditionally sending and transit countries, increasingly becoming destination countries. In the case of Libya, migrants were estimated to represent 10.4 per cent of the total resident population in 2010, with an estimated 1 to 1.5 million irregular migrants in 2006 (Human Rights Watch, 2006; IOM, 2011). The majority of migrants originate primarily from West Africa and the Horn of Africa, although Egyptians, Tunisians, Algerians and Bangladeshis also represent an important share of the total migrant population (IOM, 2012).

Before the events of the Arab Spring, Tunisians and Egyptians constituted a major migrant group, however as of the first stock of migrants which fled Libya between 22 and 25 February, 81 per cent were Egyptian (IOM, 2012). The majority of returnees were the main breadwinners of their family, and 93.7 per cent stated they remitted money back to Egypt. After the crisis in Libya, the wide majority intended permanent return (ibid).

Tunisians also represented an important migrant group, with a total of 137,000 Tunisian migrants fleeing Libya up until January 2012. Tunisia has also been a main recipient of third country nationals (TCNs hereafter), since 43 per cent of all migrants fleeing Libya exited through the Tunisian border. The largest group of migrant workers affected by the Libyan crisis however is made up of sub-Saharan Africans (see map 1 for detailed statistics). As a whole there were a total of 215,106 returnees from sub-Saharan Africa, among which the majority fled through the Libyan border directly to Chad and Niger (IOM, 2012).

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\(^{15}\) The term ‘migration crisis’ is used to describe ‘large-scale, complex migration flows resulting from a crisis and typically involving significant vulnerabilities for the individuals and communities affected’ (IOM, 2012, p. 5).
The long-term impacts of the unforeseen and massive return of migrants to their countries of origin are still to be seen. **Reintegration and readjustment in the countries of origin are among some of the immediate concerns governments face. Particularly in the case of forced return, these can be problematic and will be discussed in detail in Section 3.** The massive contraction in remittances, which have represented important shares of GDP in many sub-Saharan countries, are major concerns for many migrants’ countries of origin, which are characterized by high unemployment and poverty rates. In the majority of the migrants’ home countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad, are experiencing food crises and political instability (IOM, 2012). The unexpected and sudden massive return of labour migrants will only add pressure to the vulnerable situations their countries of origin currently face.

3. Sustainable return and reintegration in countries of origin

What does sustainable return entail? The most basic definition focuses on the absence of re-emigration or desire to re-emigrate once returned to the origin. In line with this approach, a comparative study on best practices regarding reintegration measures by the European Commission Directorate-General Home Affairs (2012) defines sustainable return as ‘the absence of migration after return because the returnee is fully integrated socially and economically in the home country’. However, in today’s globalizing world, where individuals, let alone entire communities are largely interdependent, this definition provides only an increasingly unlikely scenario and does not fully account for current trends of increasing degrees of mobility across the world. Most migrants maintain professional and social networks abroad and can thus be considered sustainable returnees, particularly if they draw upon their international contacts upon return and can have positive impacts on broader development of the community (Anarfi and Jagare, 2005). Although many factors have an impact on defining whether return is sustainable or not, a study by Black and Gent (2005) suggests that the most important factors are related to...
the degree of voluntariness of return and the socioeconomic environment in the home country. If return was forced, as in the situation of many of the migrants who fled the Libyan crisis, re-emigration is likely to take place.

Research and experience from policymakers show that three key factors determine sustainable return: economic, social and psychosocial reintegration into the society of origin. If the social, economic and political environment at home is unfavourable, re-emigration is also likely. In this context return is not sustainable, since the cause of re-emigration is due to the failure of reintegration. Still, re-emigration for example in the context of circular migration need not be a sign of failure in terms of defining the sustainability of return. Some communities, such as those pertaining to the Andean region in South America reflect mobility as an inherent part of their history. Recent studies emphasize on this intrinsic historical and cultural aspect as a major determinant on circular migratory movements from the Andean valleys of Bolivia, which have been major attraction hubs as well as sources for migration movements in Bolivia (Cortes, 2004; de la Torre, 2004, Hinojosa Gordonava, 2009). Hinojosa Gordonova (2009) describes circular migration of the Bolivian community as habitus\textsuperscript{16}, a way of life, a worldview which allows for a more sustainable use of resources, and aimed not only for the maintenance and survival of a family, but for an entire community or society. In this regard, the definition of sustainable return on the basis of no re-emigration does not hold, since constant mobility, as a habitus can provide for expanding capabilities and better quality of life.

Upon return, the readjustment and reintegration of migrants can be problematic, particularly if their return is in response to unforeseen and unplanned circumstances, such as the case of the Libyan migration crisis. The specific institutional, political and economic conditions returnees face at home have an important and in many cases determining effect on the role migrants can play at home as agents of change. Whether or not migrants become agents of change is positively related to how well they are prepared to return (Cassarino, 2004). In order for return to be successful this preparation requires prior planning, resources and willingness. Return is most successful for migrants found in typology (i), i.e. those which intended temporary return, since they have clear-set goals regarding from the moment of their departure. Particularly in the case of labour migrants their return is coupled commonly with productive economic projects in order to ensure their future livelihoods (ibid).

Furthermore, there are different types of return preparation ranging from resource mobilization to preparedness. Resource mobilization refers to tangible (primarily economic) as well as intangible resources (social networks, knowledge and ideas) which can be used during the migration experience, and also includes resources migrants drew upon, such as their social capital, prior to the migration project. Preparedness refers to both migrants’ willingness to return as well as the degree to which they are actually economically and

\textsuperscript{16} Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of habitus described a set of ‘socially learned dispositions, skills and ways of acting’ as a result of a complex interaction between an individual’s social upbringing and their individual position within society.
psychologically ready to do so. Clearly, preparedness is intrinsically linked to migrants’ desires and choice to return, and in the case of migrants who were forced to return, their degree of preparedness tends to be very low. Figure 1 provides a visual explanation of the process of return preparation. It shows how returnees’ preparedness as well as their resources mobilization is interdependent on the circumstances present in both the receiving and origin countries.

Figure 1: Return preparation

![Flowchart showing the process of return preparation](source: J.P. Cassarino, 2004)

Return is not merely a voluntary act, it also entails resource mobilization and time. Although migrants may express their desire to go back to their country of origin, this does not necessarily mean that they are ready to return.

Emphasizing on migrants’ willingness and preparedness to return adds another dimension to our general understanding of the process of return. Firstly, return is not merely a voluntary act, it also entails resource mobilization and time. Although migrants may express their desire to go back to their country of origin, this does not necessarily mean that they are ready to return (i.e. in terms of resources mobilization and preparedness both emotionally and psychologically). Secondly, focusing on returnees’ role as agents for development, returnees’ ‘level of preparedness’ for return varies both in terms of the type of migration experience they had as well as if the experiences was optimal or not. For instance, a labour migrant who had a positive experience abroad will have a higher ‘level of preparedness’ than a labour migrant with the opposite experience.

Return and reintegration programmes

Return is being increasingly incorporated into migration management policies of governments across the world and has attracted much attention in the international policymaking discourse. This understanding of return reflects the idea that migration is a process which should be managed and reinforces the centrality of the state and its borders. For many state discourses return can be merely reduced to the process of removal of unauthorized migrants and rejected asylum-seekers (Cassarino, 2008). IOM and the governments of many host countries consider Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) to be more beneficial than deportation, since it involves the migrant in the decision-making process. In 2010, IOM ensured the return of 31,134 migrants, out of which approximately 50 per cent received reintegration assistance. The approach of the AVRR programme involves a wide variety of migrant categories ranging from rejected asylum-seekers, refugees whose asylum has been rejected and victims of trafficking, unaccompanied minors and regular labour migrants. The AVVR programme analyses the effectiveness of the return project on the basis of the sustainability of the migrant’s return and their reintegration. Advice and counselling prior to return is offered to migrants either by IOM or its partners (IOM, 2011).
Although AVRR was conceived out of the European experience and the majority of cases encompasses North–South return from the European Union (EU hereafter), Norway and Switzerland, there is evidence that it is also taking place in the context of South–South return. AVRR is increasingly being implemented in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific. In the African continent, the two main host countries for AVRR beneficiaries are Morocco and the United Republic of Tanzania. Morocco is an important recipient of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa due to its location as a transit route towards Europe. This is mainly related to the increasing pressure the Spain and the EU have exerted on Morocco and other North African countries to curb illegal immigration into Europe.17 In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, in 2011 3,658 migrants returned to their countries of origin through the AVVR programme, the majority returning from host countries within the region. The large numbers are mainly related to the AVRR programme implemented for irregular Ethiopian migrant in the United Republic of Tanzania (IOM, 2011).

Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama, Belize, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are also experiencing the return of immigrants to their origin (IOM, 2012). The governments of Central America and the Caribbean are coordinating efforts to provide adequate return assistance to migrants originating from within the region. These initiatives are carried out within the framework of the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) set up in 2003 (IOM, 2011). The return of migrants from other regions has been more difficult and there is a need for greater agreements among regions as well as funding. The Dominican Republic and Mexico are the main host countries amongst others, where AVRR was implemented. In the case of the Dominican Republic, AVRR was implemented solely to assist Haitians migrants. In contrast, in the case of Mexico, it involved migrants from several nationalities from within the region as well as some cases of extraregional migrants (IOM, 2011).

The UNHCR implements a Voluntary Repatriation Programme for refugees. This programme aims to assist return of refugees in different vulnerable situations, such as those who wish to return after long periods of exile and ideally once there is no danger to their personal security, as well as refugees whose asylum has been denied and consequently must return to their countries of origin. UNHCR has developed a 4Rs framework of repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction. This framework emphasizes an integrated approach involving actors and institutions of all the different phases of the post conflict recovery. A good example of orchestrated efforts among governments, institutions and international actors is in the case of Angolan refugees mentioned. Adequate return and repatriation schemes have been possible through coordinated action between the governments of Angola and those of host countries as well as IOM.

17 Under a 1992 agreement between Morocco and Spain, Morocco agreed to take back immigrants who had illegally entered Spain from its territory. In practice, the agreement has mainly applied to Moroccans, however since 2002 there has been an increasing presence of sub-Saharan Africans entering Spain via Morocco (Goldschmidt, 2006).
Despite much support for the work carried out in repatriation schemes, skepticism has risen with regards to repatriation of refugees to countries with ongoing crisis such as the recent case of repatriations of Afghani and Iraqi refugees from Iran to their countries of origin. Although many opt for voluntary repatriation, upon return to their countries of origin, they are often confronted with a situation of desolation, war, unemployment and insecurity. This questions the sustainability of repatriation schemes in relation to countries at war such as Afghanistan and Iraq (Van Engeland-Nourai, 2008).

International initiatives to support reintegration and resettlement are visible, particularly in response to the massive return of migrants in response of the Libyan crisis. In the case of Chad, ACTED (Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development) and ProNatura have launched a six month pilot project in support of the socioeconomic reintegration of Chadian returnees from Libya. It will set up farms in order to grow crops and train stakeholders in response to capacity building needs (ACTED website, 2012). The insurance and success of such initiatives depends on the close coordination between international agencies such as ACTED and ProNatura together with the governments of sending and receiving countries as well as those of donor countries.

Reintegration policies are considered most successful when they are based on the protection of returnees’ rights and the provision of an environment which promotes their human and socioeconomic development; specifically policies which tackle the reasons for their departure in the first place. Return is most sustainable when coupled with assistance mechanisms which support the creation of socioeconomic opportunities and prevent the exclusion and separation of returnees and non-migrant communities. In this regard, ensure that returnees and non-migrants mutually benefit from each other’s combined efforts, skills and experiences. Besides the economic aspects of reintegration, sustainable return is also based on returnees’ degree of social and political reintegration. Many policies which have been considered ‘best practices’ aim to link pre-departure and post-arrival situation in order to provide adequate assistance.

In post-conflict states such as Angola, Rwanda, Burundi and Southern Sudan, land and property rights are increasingly receiving more attention than ever before, especially in relation to the return, reintegration and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons (UN-Habitat/UNHCR, 2004; Huggins, 2009). Despite the fact that the cases of return of the countries Burundi and Rwanda do not represent the phenomenon of labour migration, the policies of reintegration and resettlement implemented by both its governments are worth mentioning. In terms of reintegration and resettlement policies, it is important during land disputes to support reintegration of returnees, and peace in the case of post-conflict societies.

Due to its violent history, millions of Rwandans have at one point or another faced displacement either within their country or to a second and/or third country. Some returned to the to the Eastern province of Umutara, others tried to go back to the land their family owned, choosing the most convenient land properties the Hutu vacated as they fled. Hutu refugees which feared
arrest or death could not return and remained in Rwanda in IDP camps together with the genocide’s militia. Rwandans refugees and asylum-seekers continue to return today both voluntarily and involuntarily (Huggins, 2009). In 2006, thousands were evicted from Western United Republic of Tanzania most of which have attempted to resettle with their kin, however the process remains that their land claims have a waiting period of a minimum of two years (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

In the Burundi conflict more than one sixth of its population has been displaced both inside and outside of the country. (Huggins, 2009). The large majority of displaced persons remained in the vicinity of their place of origin and have managed to successfully reclaim their lands. Decisions to stay vary; some worry for their security, others find higher living standards in the camps and are better off than elsewhere. Approximately 300,000 returned from the United Republic of Tanzania between 2002 and 2008 (Pagonis, 2008). In the majority of cases their land had been given to others by the government, or their relatives had sold it to others or even divided the land among those who remained. Studies in 2006 show that only 25 per cent of the 44,915 people who returned faced many issues regarding resettlement and access to land (Huggins, 2009; Umwari, 2007). The failure to adequately manage the massive return of its citizens is very much linked Burundian refugees’ forced repatriation schemes and the negative approach towards Burundian asylum-seekers, labeling them ‘illegal immigrants’. A legal framework needs to be developed in order to adequately assist the return and reintegration of Burundians from the United Republic of Tanzania.

4. Impact of return migration on home societies

The impact of return migration on communities of origin and larger development processes is increasingly gaining attention. Policymakers have focused mainly on the transfer of human capital upon return, and although the potential of financial investments of returnees is also recognized, more emphasis and tailored policies must be developed to provide a climate of sustainable return in the countries of origin. In the case of West Africa, particularly Ghana and Nigeria, return migration has become feasible only in recent years due to a change in the political and economic climates (Anarfi and Jagare, 2005). In order to foster a sustainable return of migrants, adequate policies must be set in place, this section will draw upon different cases in order to point out how policy implications can make return migration more attractive and sustainable.

Remittances’ potential for economic development has been heavily cited, and in many cases considered a panacea for many developing countries. Although their positive impact cannot be denied, it is important to bear in mind that remittances are private transfers, and although clever and well-directed policies can have positive effects for community development, there are limitations. Similarly, returnees’ contributions to human development must be recognized. Planned return in many cases entails migrants bringing back to their home country some, if not all of their savings, which they can spend or invest in the home country. This can have a positive effect on poverty alleviation and improvement in the general economic environment in the country of origin. It is worth mentioning that it has been estimated that the international flow of remittances to

The success of poverty-reduction projects involving funds from returnees is highly dependent on the willingness, contribution and leadership of local policymakers working together with and supporting returnees.

18 Before the conflict ended and the peace processes began, there were more than one million Burundian refugees (UNHCR/WFP, 2007), the majority in the United Republic of Tanzania.
home countries is almost equal to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and development aid and according to research carried out by Sander (2003), already by 1995 remittance flows were higher than the total Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). In this regard migrants’ return, if in favorable conditions and coupled with them bringing back savings, can lead to economic growth and investment (Black et al., 2005).

Migrants’ families generally play a determinant role in migration decisions, and many studies have shown how migration is considered a family-subsistence strategy. Remittances are mainly sent to family members back home, accordingly family-related motives are among the three most popular decisions to return (Amarfi and Jagare, 2005). For example in the case of Ghanaians returning from Côte d’Ivoire, 33 per cent of returnees decided to return in relation to family matters (Black et. al., 2003). The amount returnees manage to save and the nature of their investments tends to be highly influenced by family matters (Amarfi and Jagare, 2005).

Transnational migrants have shown to positively contribute to economic development in their home communities both during their time abroad as well as upon return. The success of poverty-reduction projects involving funds from migrants or returnees is highly dependent on the willingness, contribution and leadership of local policymakers (Kakbi et. al., 2004).

Benefits returnees can bring to the home society need not only be monetary. In recent years governments have focused on the relevance of human capital returnees bring back home and benefit the home community. Although much was written on the troubles of ‘brain drain’, now emphasis has been placed on ‘brain gain’ upon return, particularly of the highly skilled. However, focus should be shifted to incorporate the ‘brain gain’ from the low skilled as well, since this stratum of the emigrant population has the potential to contribute to society if the right policies are in place. For example, in their study, Black et. al. (2003) found that around 70 per cent of less-skilled Ghanian returnees studied during their time abroad. Although indeed elite returnees tend to have gained higher levels of human capital during their time abroad, mainly in terms of education, the low-skilled have higher potential than what is generally recognized by policymakers, see table I (Amarfi and Jagare, 2005).

Table 1: Human capital gained by returnees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human capital gained</th>
<th>Less-skilled</th>
<th>Elite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Studied abroad</td>
<td>206 (68%)</td>
<td>265 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended higher level of education than at home</td>
<td>94 (31%)</td>
<td>239 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked abroad</td>
<td>242 (80%)</td>
<td>258 (85%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported gaining work experience</td>
<td>184 (61%)</td>
<td>254 (84%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Black et al. (2003).
5. Policy recommendations

Social reintegration

- In order to provide a successful reintegration on the long run, examine the root causes of irregular migration, in order to address these and prevent re-emigration in response to unanswered needs of the population.
- Structure projects which explicitly answer reintegration needs at an economic, social and psychosocial level. Return and reintegration counsellors can assist.
- Aim to include and cooperate with other actors of civil society in policies of reintegration, in order to balance the assistance provided to returnees with that to the local community and also to promote cooperation and social cohesion among the different groups.

Productive return

- In the scheme of promoting ‘productive’ return, closely combine efforts and cooperation with agencies, non-governmental organizations and the private sector on micro-credit schemes and business development.
- Focus on ensuring the quality of immediate opportunities for returnees in their incorporation into the (formal) labour market, training courses in the fields of enterprise development, job-hunting as well as other programmes which may facilitate their reintegration into the labour market.
- Ease the communication as well as access to communication technologies to migrants and their family and social networks in the country of origin.
- Aim to establish a policy based on transnational social work, or social work which goes beyond national borders, and aims to pool efforts between social workers in host and origin country in order to smooth the difficulties of the return process and provide direct assistance during departure, upon arrival and also for reintegration.

Human rights

- Humanitarian organizations involved in return and reintegration could provide support by ensuring that all legislative, judicial and administrative reforms are transparent and guarantee genuine consultative processes with all stakeholders, and that all outcomes are in line with traditional community rights to land.
- In November 2012, IOM adopted a Migration Crisis Operational Framework with the aim of institutionalizing IOM’s capacity to respond to migration crises and to address current gaps with regards to migration in the international humanitarian system. This framework was born mainly in response to the Libyan humanitarian crisis and seeks to help States fulfill their roles and responsibilities in protecting mobile populations. This framework is a clear example of good practice which can be replicated in individual countries and regions. It aims to provide assistance to labour migrants found in vulnerable situations and not covered under current international protection because their displacement is not related to situation of extreme despair or war.
- Legal, judicial and administrative land reforms need to advocate for and ensure that the legislative framework safeguards women’s rights in accordance with international legal norms, particularly in the cases of inheritance and matrimonial law.
Land tenure and urban planning

Adequately addressing land issues is crucial for the entire reintegration and resettlement process and needs to be considered an immediate priority by all stakeholders. **Adequate legislative, judicial and administrative reforms must be developed.** These must ensure respect for land rights of legitimate owners in rural and urban areas, and promote resettlement and reintegration and prevent future land disputes and provide adequate compensation.

**Legal frameworks and close coordination between sending and receiving countries in order to manage return processes must be established.** These allow countries of origin to rightly assess, formulate and develop its policies of reintegration and resettlement.

**Coordinated and sustained efforts between the international agencies such as the UN and IOM, NGOs and donor governments** must be ensured in order to provide technical expertise with regards to land tenure.

**Adequate advice on urban planning** should be provided particularly in regions with high levels of return.
In the history of mankind, people have always migrated to cope with environmental changes. Now more than ever, the environment, the detrimental effects of climate change, and their links to migration are brought to public attention. This is of particular relevance for the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. The link between migration and the environment is twofold: migration can be induced by environmental change while at the same time migration flows can impact on the environment. Environmental change, in most cases, does not directly displace people. Instead, it interacts with economic, sociocultural and political push- and pull-factors and increases an already high vulnerability stemming from economic weakness and a high dependence on the environment (Black et al., 2011; Kniveton et al., 2009; Laczko and Aghazarm, 2009).

Six out of the twenty countries with the highest level of displacement following natural disasters in 2008 were ACP countries, accounting for almost 700,000 people in Africa alone (IDMC and OCHA, 2009). Yet the bulk of migration influenced by environmental change is expected to be triggered by slow-onset changes, such as increased droughts, heat waves and floods, among others. The environmental degradation of livelihoods is expected to cause higher volumes of internal rural-rural or rural-urban movements (Gemenne, 2011; Laczko and Aghazarm, 2009). Comprehensive data on this relationship is lacking, especially for ACP countries, making it difficult to devise national and regional adaptation plans. This is key if migration is not only to be considered as the last option, but as a possible adaptation strategy.

This background note aims to shed light on the concepts, observation and data challenges in relation to migration and environment in ACP countries, outline available prominent facts and figures in ACP countries, highlight the effects of the migration - environment nexus on human development and provide recommendations for policymakers in ACP countries.

1. Concepts, observations and data challenges

**What is migration in the context of environmental degradation and climate change?**

The definitions regarding migration in the context of the environment and climate change are highly contested. The terms “climate refugee” or “environment refugee”, which are widely used in the media, are rejected by many scholars, international organizations and governments, because on the one hand they are legally inaccurate and on the other hand might have implications for the existing levels of protection for political refugees (Renaud et al., 2011; Zetter, 2009). The

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19 Document prepared by Judith Schicklinski, freelance writer, and Zameer Noorali, National Focal Point United Republic of Tanzania, ACP Observatory on Migration.
Foresight Report (Government Office for Science, 2011) has proposed a definition (see box), which is intentionally broad to include all phenomena of migration influenced by environmental change, be it voluntary or forced\(^{20}\), internal or international, permanent or temporary. This definition is also used by the ACP Observatory.

Regarding the expected numbers of ‘environmental migrants’ worldwide, it must be acknowledged that due to a lacking broadly agreed methodological approach, existing numbers are all estimates and are based on two sources (Black, 2011; Gemenne, 2011). Several possibilities for the mitigation of environmental degradation and climate change exist, which, together with adaptation measures to build the resilience of States, households and individuals can alter the necessity or incentives to move (Zetter, 2009). At the same time, mitigation and adaptation measures may themselves displace a significant number of people via resettlement (De Sherbinin et al., 2011).

**What is climate change? How is it related to the environment?**

The changes in climate, which the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) mentions in its definitions of climate change (see box), are assumed to exacerbate environmental degradation. The resulting changes and impacts can be differentiated into “climate processes” or slow-onset changes such as desertification, sea-level rise, changes in rainfall patterns (overall increases or decreases as well as changing seasonality) or soil degradation through a decrease in water resources and an increase in wind-and water-induced soil erosion (Bilsborrow, 2009). The second type is “climate events” or sudden-onset hazards such as increased frequency of droughts and floods (Brown, 2008; McLeman, 2011).

As many of these impacts concern regions in tropical areas, coastal zones or semi-arid drought-prone areas, many ACP countries are already experiencing severe and diverse impacts of climate change on their environments which are expected to increase in the future. Such changes can only be observed through a change in the average climatic conditions, which are measured observing a range of proxy variables over a certain period of time (Zetter, 2009). Predictions for future changes are difficult to extrapolate and are mainly based on the establishment of different scenarios, depending on future demographic and economic development and efforts to decrease greenhouse-gas emissions, among others (Brown, 2008).

**Data collection challenges**

Much of the slow onset migration influenced by environmental change is expected to occur within state boundaries. Besides documenting cross-border movements, most ACP countries have also censuses recording internal migration patterns. Yet, the great majority of these migration statistics do reveal different migration drivers and the influence of environmental change on them.

\(^{20}\) This differentiation should not be seen as a clear-cut division but should instead be considered as a continuum, see Renaud et al., 2011; Brown, 2008.
In addition to this, migration influenced by environmental change is a cross-cutting issue that affects several areas of international governance. Therefore, there is no single authority which is concerned with migration and climate change (McAdam, 2011). This complicates coordination of data collection across countries and hinders the comparative value of data.

2. Facts and figures: present situation and past trends in ACP countries

How are the environment, climate change and migration interconnected in the ACP regions?

This section gives an overview on key figures and trends, on the effects of the environment and climate change on migration and on the impact of migration movements on the environment, while looking at possible future developments. Due to the complex relationship between migration and environmental change, examples from the ACP regions, also from island States and land-locked countries will be used to demonstrate some of the causal relationships between the two. Ironically, the ACP Group of States, out of which half (40 countries) are Least Developed Countries (LDCs), are the least responsible for climate change. And yet now range amongst the most vulnerable and affected countries (UN-OHRLLS, 2009). This is due to already high environmental and population pressures combined with low economic power. Without appropriate mitigation and adaptation strategies, supported by the international community, including well-planned mobility, these countries will face more migration-induced environmental degradation and more people will resort to badly prepared migration. Migration has always been an adaptation strategy to climate change in most ACP countries and can become part of the solution in the face of climate change.

In ACP countries, the majority of the rural population depend on agriculture, pastoral farming or fishing. Deforestation and overexploitation of land result in soil degradation and erosion, constituting one of the most urgent problems for these people. Contrary to the widespread assumption that rapid on-set environmental disasters lead to the greatest amount of migration, in ACP countries migration influenced by environmental change is generally caused by slow-onset changes (Naik, 2009).

Competition over natural resources (such as water or land) may result in pastoral mobility influenced by environmental change, and competition for resources as well as changes in land use can lead to disputes (Ramphal Centre, 2011). Within the ACP countries not all population groups are likely to be equally affected by climate change. Lacking the means to migrate, the poorest will suffer if they are trapped in areas that are most vulnerable to climate change induced fast-onset events, such as low-lying river deltas or coastal zones. They also possess less coping strategies, such as planned migration.

“It is estimated that two-thirds of African land is already degraded to some degree and land degradation affects at least 485 million people or sixty-five per cent of the entire African population” (UNECA, 2008:6).

Myths:
Most migrants whose decision to move was influenced by environmental change:
- flee environmental disasters;
- cross borders and continents, moving from developing to developed countries.

Facts:
Most people move:
- linked to slow-onset environmental changes;
- influenced by environmental change internally or regionally within the South;
- towards environmentally vulnerable areas.
... and some may not move at all due to a lack of resources.
in the case of slow-onset changes. Less poor people are also affected since they migrate in quite significant numbers towards these more vulnerable delta regions, especially large coastal cities, which are often poorly adapted to climate change (Black et al., 2011).

Seasonal and circular migration has always been used as an adaptation strategy to cope with the natural annual change of seasons. This is particularly the case in rural areas at early stages of environmental degradation in reaction to slow-onset changes (Kniveton et al., 2009).

Women now make up almost half of world-wide migrants (UN DESA, 2009). Yet, in the case of migration influenced by environmental change, the evidence base as far as gender is concerned is very weak: different studies in different regions report either a majority of male or female migrants (Naik, 2009). In planned migration, however, usually a male family member is chosen to migrate in order to increase the family’s income, increasing women’s vulnerability, as they often stay behind in the degraded environment. In the 2004 tsunami in Asia, more women than men died in Indonesia, India and Sri Lanka because they were less informed and stayed behind to look for their family (Oxfam International, 2005).

West Africa

Environmental changes can alter already existing migration patterns: In Mali, internal labour migration partly replaced international movements during the drought years between 1982 and 1989, and in Burkina Faso drought led to increasing food prices which further impoverished inhabitants and disabled them to migrate (Kniveton, 2009; Naik, 2009).

Farmers or cattle herders, rely heavily on the ecosystem for their livelihood, causing extreme vulnerability to environmental degradation, including climate change. Thus, seasonal and circular intraregional migration has long been a coping strategy to recurrent fast and slow-onset environmental changes (Naik, 2009).

Senegal is highly vulnerable to gradual degradation processes, such as droughts, desertification, soil degradation, erosion and deforestation (Jäger et al., 2009). Rainfall has declined persistently since the late 1960s. Rural households use regional rural-urban seasonal migration as income diversifying strategy with one family member migrating to the city at the end of the growing season (Kniveton et al., 2009).

Niger, a land-locked country in the Sahel, with three quarters of the country being covered by deserts, faces interrelated accumulating environmental problems exacerbated by climate change. Extreme weather events, such as floods, droughts, extreme temperatures and stormy winds, are becoming more frequent. These changes cause water scarcity, soil degradation and water and wind erosion of lands. Negative impacts on agriculture and cattle breeding, the country’s main income sources are immense (Republic of Niger et al., 2006). Pastoralists’ natural coping strategy of moving with their herds following the rain becomes less efficient. Conflicts between these pastoralists and sedentary farmers about soil and water resources are intensifying. Pastoralists then revert to overgrazing or seeking new income-generating activities, such as selling firewood. This leads to deforestation, which further deteriorates the environment (Warner et al., 2009a).

In the densely populated region of Agulu-Nanka in south-eastern Nigeria, gully erosion affects about 2.5 million people. The menace has already started in the 19th century and has been aggravated by the clearing of the original vegetation, the development of infrastructure and the increasing changes in climate patterns. These changes lead to flooding and sudden erosion with devastating effects on the local population. Human and livestock life, houses and land have been lost and people have been displaced permanently (Leighton et al., 2011).
Central Africa

In Central Africa, deforestation, resulting partly from forced migration movements, entails an irreversible loss of biodiversity (Bilsborrow, 2009).

East Africa

In the Horn of Africa, decline in rainfall over the past two decades combined with conflict has led to food scarcity, since pastoralists’ traditional routes have been cut by ongoing fighting. This, in turn, has led to cross-border armed conflicts over scarce key resources such as pasture and water arose in Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda (IOM, 2009a).

In Kenya, in the Lake Turkana region, recurrent droughts have destroyed pastoralists’ livelihoods in the already semi-arid region. In an initiative by IOM, alternative sources of livelihood were found in cooperation with the Kenyan Ministry of Fisheries Development: Pastoralists were provided the means to start deep lake fishing, to grow drought-resistant crops and to construct shallow wells and water pans for better water harvesting (IOM, 2010a).

Recently, it was shown that while in Kenya improved soil quality reduces temporary labour migration flows, it slightly increased migration in Uganda. This contradicts the widespread opinion that soil degradation automatically triggers migration away from rural areas, confirming the complexity of the climate change-migration nexus (Cray, 2011).

The countries of the Greater Horn of Africa still struggle with the aftermath of the 1980s and 1990s drought-related large population movements. In the case of Ethiopia these movements were directed by the government to resettle populations away from rural areas in the Highlands, creating one of the largest mass movements of people anywhere in the world. The region faced yet another drought, this time the worst one in 60 years. In the 1990s food prices tripled and famine, exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in Somalia, caused intraregional mass migration flows mainly from Somalia to Kenya. As a result the world’s largest refugee camp (in Dadaab) was established, hosting more than 447,000 refugees (IOM 2011c). In 2009 drought was followed by displacement of people and livestock in northern United Republic of Tanzania. Movements are predominantly internal rural-urban, perpetuating existing problems in urban slums. In 1994, during Rwanda’s civil war, over 400,000 people fled to the United Republic of Tanzania causing the border village of Kasulo to boom from 1,000 residents to become the United Republic of Tanzania’s second most densely populated area. For survival, trees were chopped down causing deforestation and soil erosion (Permanent Mission of Greece in Geneva and IOM, 2009). Severe droughts have affected most parts of the country, making an increase in cross border migration, particularly to Mozambique and Kenya, more likely.

Apart from being exposed to seasonal floods, coastal erosion and heavy rainfalls, Madagascar is the most vulnerable African country to tropical cyclones whose frequency has increased in the last years. The island was hit by six cyclones in 2006 and 2007, and by three in 2008. They did not only trigger storm losses but also erosion, leading to the destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods. Migration has become a survival strategy. Local communities, although highly attached to their land, have asked for assistance with voluntary relocation to nearby safer areas in order to remain as close as possible to their rice fields (IOM, 2009a; c).
Southern Africa

**Mozambique**, with about 2,700 kilometres of coastline, many international rivers ending there and parts of the land area lying under sea level, is extremely vulnerable to the adverse effects of environmental degradation and climate change (Jäger et al., 2009; MICOA, 2007). After independence in 1975 and during the subsequent civil war, forced population resettlement was part of both, the Frelimo and the Renamo government policy. In the last ten years, the country has not only been haunted by droughts, but was also hit by flooding and tropical cyclones several times (2000, 2001, 2007, 2008), devastating many low-lying deltas (IOM, 2009a). Subsistence farmers and fishers, living along the Zambezi River were the most affected, displacing hundreds of thousands of people. The majority of inhabitants that were resettled to higher areas still depend on international aid since their crops had been destroyed for two consecutive years (Warner et al., 2009b). This resettlement created additional strains on the environment and further predictions indicate a continued trend in increasingly unpredictable levels of precipitation, extreme events and weather patterns (Warner et al., 2009a).

In **Angola**, between 1960 and 2006 the average annual rainfall seems to have decreased. Yet, rainfall patterns also appear to become more intense and unpredictable. Seasonal flooding is a periodic phenomenon. In 2009 the country suffered from one of the severest floods in many years. The southern region was hit by heavy rainfall and flooded, making more than 80,000 people homeless and leading to internal migration (Angola Today, 2011; British Red Cross, 2009; IOM, 2009a).

**Lesotho** is a particularly vulnerable country, characterized by a highly variable climate. Furthermore, 85 per cent of the population lives in rural settings, earning their living through subsistence agriculture. Droughts occurred periodically, yet between 1979 and 1996 incidences of droughts were at their gravest in almost 200 years with the longest drought lasting from 1991 to 1995. Related environmental stresses include soil erosion, land degradation and desertification, which are aggravated by climate change (Ministry of Natural Resources Lesotho et al., 2007).

Diminishing crop production and crop failure can then lead to food insecurity. In the Southern Lowlands the coping strategy of pastoralists has been to migrate to nearer towns for work during years of low agricultural productivity. As a consequence, large-scale rural-urban migration of young people is occurring and the effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate this trend (Ministry of Natural Resources Lesotho et al., 2007).

**Caribbean**

In the Caribbean half of the population lives within 1.5 kilometres of the coast where important infrastructure and economic activities are located (Gallina, 2010). With most Caribbean cities located on the coast, there is an increased likelihood of being vulnerable to the common cyclones, hurricanes and floods occurring even more often and in a more intense manner due to climate change. Weather events, including droughts and heat waves, are expected to arise more often (IOM, 2009a).

Furthermore, deforestation exacerbates people’s vulnerability during hurricanes and floods since it makes landslides more probable (Jäger et al., 2009). In June 2011 the first major rainfall of the Atlantic hurricane season caused flooding and landslides in Haiti. Displaced persons in emergency camps often relocate temporarily for a longer or shorter period of time during the hurricane season. Agricultural productivity being the main source of livelihood, landslides are a major threat to well-being of communities (Martin, 2009).
The Pacific

The low-lying Small Island States of the Pacific are already affected by climate change induced sea-level rise and by increasing tropical cyclones, floods, storms and landslides. Displacements occur in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu (Gallina, 2010). The islands will suffer from accelerated erosion of their coastlines, where the majority of the population lives. Further sea-level rise threatens freshwater supplies through saltwater intrusion, and increases vulnerability to waterborne diseases and deteriorated drinking water (Leighton et al., 2011).

Timor-Leste experiences a number of extreme weather events during the year. Climate change is predicted to cause heavier and more fluctuant rainfall and to make the country hotter and drier, affecting the main income source of subsistence agriculture in rural areas. Deforestation leading to erosion and a fast population growth are other major problems whose accumulating effects increase the risk of environmentally induced displacement (IOM, 2009a; UNDP, 2008).

Papua New Guinea is the region’s largest and most populated country with a constantly rising population, which is still mainly rural. This makes the country particularly sensitive to environmental change: it is likely that urbanization will be chosen as an adaptation strategy to climate change, exacerbating people’s vulnerability, since most cities are located at the coast and already face flooding. Internal forced displacement has already begun: in December 2008, flooding caused by abnormally high tides on the northern coast led to the displacement of 75,000 people. There is the risk of flash flooding across the highlands and coastal flooding along the south coast (ADP, 2009). Due to salt water intrusion, stocks of emergency food supplies have been running low in the low-lying Carteret Island, leading to resettlement to Bougainville, a higher situated island (UNHCR, 2010).

In the Small Island Developing State (SIDS) of the Solomon Islands, climate change is the most important developmental and environmental issue. The majority of the population is situated in low-lying coastal areas threatened by sea level rise. More than 80 per cent of Solomon Islanders live in rural areas mostly depending on subsistence agriculture and fisheries. Temperature changes, salt-water intrusion and flooding as well as the increased intensity and frequency of tropical cyclones negatively impact on agriculture. Coastal erosion further reduces the area of arable land. A lot of coastal communities have already moved several times to higher areas within the last 15 years because of flooding and storms. In recent years, an increased number of people have also moved to Honiara (Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Meteorology Honiara / GEF / UNDP, 2008).

3. The impact of migration, the environment and climate change on human development

Apart from the direct impacts of environmental change on human development, migration influenced by environmental change has its own effects on human development in the regions of origin as well as in the regions of destination (Boko et al. 2007; Black et al. 2008; Mimura et al., 2007). These two impacts shall be examined more in detail in this section.

Impact of migration influenced by environmental change in the regions of origin

As discussed by Bilsborrow (2009), the out-migration of young men in Kenya has had a negative impact on the labour-intensive agricultural sector. The loss of human capital, due to environmental degradation, has reduced the performance and agricultural output, leaving those left behind
with reduced levels of economic productivity and diminished incomes. Apart from such possible negative impacts on human development of those staying behind, the **diversification of household incomes** through out-migration can positively influence the adaptive capacity of households, their resilience and development opportunities, for example through transfer of knowledge and skills, remittances or technology, as in the case of Guinea (Barnett and Webber, 2009; Tacoli, 2011). In such cases, migration can serve as a development strategy. At the same time, remittances can also lead to increased polarization between those households who do and those who do not receive remittances and can therefore have ambivalent impacts on development (Tacoli, 2011).

**Impact of migration influenced by environmental change in the regions of destination**

The impact of migration influenced by environmental change on regions of destination depends on a variety of factors. One of the common fears about this type of migration is a mass influx of people into a region. These movements are expected to cause increased pressure on the environment and on scarce resources, such as freshwater or arable land, and population movements may thus lead to environmental degradation. This is a real threat, for example if camps for people displaced by sudden-onset disasters are not well managed, (e.g. poor waste management, uncontrolled felling of trees or mining) or if intensified land use leads to land degradation and crop failure (Permanent Mission of Greece Geneva and IOM, 2009; Boko et al. 2007). Such negative impacts could also occur in cases of an influx of migrants into urban areas with a lack of infrastructure, which can lead to insanitary livelihoods, health risks and pollution as well as an increased vulnerability to impacts of climate change for people living in slums (Permanent Mission of Greece Geneva and IOM, 2009). However, such negative impacts are not inevitable. Research shows that good management of camp sites for the displaced or resettled persons and the involvement of the migrant community as well as the local community in the activities can bring positive development opportunities for the region of destination. To improve the rights of persons displaced by natural disasters, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee has developed the IASC Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters, a tool for governments and international non-governmental humanitarian organizations to be followed in their disaster preparedness, response and recovery activities (IASC, 2009).

### 4. Good practices, conclusions and recommendations

Current migration policies often focus exclusively on reducing migration instead of being interdisciplinary and cross-cutting, trying to increase its benefits and reduce its costs (Barnett and Webber, 2009; GFMD, 2010). So far, few countries have elaborated specific policy measures to respond to the movements of people influenced by environmental change and none have a pro-active resettling policy for those affected by environmental disasters (Laczko and Aghazarm, 2009).

#### 4.1 Good practices

**Mobility as an adaptation strategy**

In **Kenya**, the IOM projects *Mitigating Resource Based Conflict among Pastoralist Local Communities Including Refugee Host Community in Northern Kenya through Strengthening Youth Capacities to Adapt to Climate Change and Emergency Livestock Support to Refugee Hosting Communities Affected by Protracted and Extreme Climatic Conditions in North West Kenya*
are currently implemented. They aim at reducing the impact of drought-induced cross-border conflict amongst pastoralists by promoting pastoralists’ internal and cross-border mobility needs as a climate change adaptation strategy and by supporting governments to develop a regional normative framework on migration and mobility.

In the **Solomon Islands**, the ongoing project by UNDP, the Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Meteorology and Disaster Management (MECMD) through its Climate Change Division, and of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) on *Enhancing resilience of communities in Solomon Islands to the adverse effects of climate change in agriculture & food security* is composed of community-based adaptation initiatives, institutional strengthening to promote climate resilient policy frameworks for the agricultural sector and climate change adaptation knowledge sharing.

... in disaster risk reduction

In the **Federated States of Micronesia** and the **Republic of the Marshall Islands**, a Disaster Mitigation, Relief and Reconstruction Programme, implemented by IOM, aims at providing humanitarian assistance for reconstruction and recovery after disasters. Emergency response capacity shall be increased by working with governments and concerned communities (IOM, 2009d).

In **Timor-Leste** the project “IOM Support to Disaster Risk Reduction in Timor-Leste, Phase II” aims at strengthening governmental institutions in their preparation and response to natural disasters, as well as at supporting community-based disaster risk management.

**Research and capacity building**

The **Global Environmental Migration Project**, of the United Kingdom’s Foresight Programme, has explored global patterns and impacts of migration on development over the next 50 years that will arise from environmental change, mainly in areas most affected by environmental change and migration. Its final project report has recently been published (Government Office for Science, 2011).

The **Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR)** project was funded by the European Commission and was realized by environmental scientists and migration experts. In 23 small-scale case studies around the world, the link between climate change and migration was explored. New large-scale specialized research, for example more specialized household surveys, should be the next research step to obtain more nationally representative studies.

Migration as a proactive adaptation strategy needs to be integrated more systematically into the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) for LCDs (GFMD, 2010).

**Disaster Risk Reduction:**

“The conceptual framework of elements considered with the possibilities to minimize vulnerabilities and disaster risks throughout a society, to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse impacts of hazards, within the broad context of sustainable development” (UN/ISDR, 2004:17).

The **Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)** is the best known legally non-binding international instrument on disaster prevention, containing five priority areas of action for the period of 2005-2015 (IOM, 2010b).

The **Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement** provide an existing protection framework.
4.2 Recommendations

Supporting a stronger evidence base and capacities

- **Policy-oriented research on migration influenced by environmental change** should have a stronger focus on internal South–South migration, those immobile and those moving to environmentally vulnerable areas, in particular cities, giving greater weight to slow-onset environmental changes and examine how migration can be used as an adaptation strategy to climate change. In order to improve data collection and research methodologies, researchers need to work more interdisciplinary.

- An independent **Commission on Migration and Environment Data (CMED)**, made up by international organizations such as IOM and UN agencies, could be created to develop a **Global Database on Migration influenced by environmental change**. This tool would contain practical guidelines on standardizing definitions, making better use of existing data sources, sharing them systematically, developing internationally comparable indicators of migration influence by environmental change, assembling a description of existing laws, policies and programmes pertaining to this type of migration at the national, regional and global level and suggesting policy solutions (Laczko and Aghazarm, 2009).

- **Capacities** of officials, communities and other stakeholders need to be strengthened to prevent forced displacement.

Integrate migration as an adaptation strategy into existing (policy) frameworks

- Climate change **adaptation strategies** (CCAs) allow people to remain in their original settlements by reducing vulnerability to and building resilience against climate change. CCAs include the adaptation of agricultural practices (e.g. drought resistant crops), the building of infrastructure like coastal barriers and dykes, voluntary labour migration and the planning of resettlement if it is impossible to remain (Martin, 2010). Voluntary temporary or circular labour can diversify family income and improve livelihood conditions of the region by transmitting financial and social remittances. To prevent misuse of remittances by beneficiaries, funds can be channeled through a remittances pool, allowing the government to subsidize and orientate sustainable development projects for migrants and their respective communities while assuring a participatory development process at both micro and macro level. This may lead to encourage environmental conservation and the return of migrants. In this case migration can be a beneficial strategy for climate adaptation as well as for development (Leighton et al., 2011). Therefore, policy measures need to **facilitate voluntary movements** out of vulnerable regions by providing **micro-finance schemes** and **education**, by facilitating remittances, knowledge and skill-transfer to vulnerable communities and access to labour markets, by developing international temporary and circular labour migration schemes for environmentally vulnerable communities, particularly at less advanced stages of environmental degradation (GFMD, 2010; Barnett and Webber, 2009) and by reducing the barriers to return migration.

Regional organizations can play an important role in promoting multi-stakeholder cooperation across countries to assure more policy coherence, e.g. via assisting governments in developing national legislation, regional labour migration agreements, regional cooperation on DRR and CCA and regional disaster response systems (Barnett and Webber, 2009).
One adaptation strategy especially to fast-onset events is the strengthening of bilateral, regional and international disaster response systems. **Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies (DRRs)** identify three areas of action: the compilation of risk assessments, the establishment of early warning systems and the incorporation of risk reduction elements into national development plans (GFMD, 2010).

The Caribbean Development Bank plans to establish a catastrophe insurance mechanism in form of a multi-donor trust fund, to protect micro finance institutions and the livelihoods of micro credit borrowers from natural disasters.

Existing **social networks** also play an important role for the access by temporary or seasonal migrants to the labour markets of the regions of destination (Tacoli, 2011).

The ongoing **urbanization** trend in ACP countries results in the increase of the number of migrants settling in cities. These are mainly found in coastal and lowland zones, thus exposed to a higher risk of climate change related events. By establishing **stricter implemented land zoning and building codes**, the mainly poor migrants could be detained from settling in the most perilous areas. These low-cost alternatives would not address root causes but could contribute to preventing relocation at a later stage (GFMD, 2010).

**Housing, Land and Property (HLP) rights:** Neither does the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) mention displacement and human rights, nor does the 1951 Refugee Convention incorporate the rights of ‘environmental migrants’. While the mitigation dimension ranges high on international and national political agendas, adaptation strategies are still less addressed. This stands in contrast to the fact that climate change already triggers or is a contributing factor to migration, with a high probability of influencing even more on migration patterns in the future. In order to prevent conflict and to create sustainable solutions, it is thus indispensible to take into consideration human rights issue, such as HLP rights (Displacement Solutions, 2009).

Since the majority of climate-induced migration will take place within national borders, the HLP rights need to be mainstreamed into national planning processes, via incorporating them for example into key documents like the **National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)** (Displacement Solutions 2009; USAID, 2010).

One example of community involvement can be found in Papua New Guinea. The Integrated Carterets Relocation Programme of the **community-driven initiative Tulele Peisa** was created to find HLP solutions in the currently ongoing resettlement process from the Carteret Islands to the island of Bougainville (Displacement Solutions, 2009).

**Resettlement should only be a strategy of last resort, ideally conducted with adequate time for preparation, following the proactive Resettlement with Development (RwD) approach** (Barnett and Webber, 2009).

CCA and DRR are integrated into development projects, e.g. in Mauritius, Senegal, Mali, Zimbabwe, Timor-Leste, Haiti and Mozambique, aiming at raising national decision and policymakers’ awareness of the necessity of integrating migration into national adaptation strategy and of investing in CCA and DRR (IOM, 2009a).

Movements to environmental risk areas in urban and costal flood zones in ACP countries necessitate urban planning, including access to water, sanitation and food in cities in the South (Government Office for Science, 2011).
Facilitating labour migration for development: 
*Opportunities and challenges of South–South labour migration*  

1. Introduction

Human mobility is an age-old phenomenon that has become an important issue in political and development debates. However, the focus is biased towards South–North movements of migrants, while South–South 22 migration stocks are about as numerous. Moreover, intraregional migration and movements to other developing countries are particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa (65% in 2010) and Asia. **Over 80 per cent of South–South migration was expected to take place between neighbouring countries in 2005** (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Mobility among countries in the South is likely to increase further as the BRICS countries (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa) continue to rise in importance in the global economy (Wickramasekara, 2011). Yet immigration in developing countries is a phenomenon that has not captured much attention.

**International migration is mostly an issue of labour mobility** 23 of people moving in search of better opportunities. According to the ILO (2010b), about half of all international migrants are working. Applied to developing countries, **about 36 million migrants would have moved to another developing country for employment in 2010** (ILO, 2010b). It is important to focus on the needs of this specific group of migrants to leverage their contribution to human development.

Continuing with key figures and trends on regional labour migration in the South in part two, the third section of this paper highlights examples of regional labour mobility frameworks in the South. The fourth section then sketches out opportunities and challenges linked to regional labour migration among developing countries. 24 The paper closes with a section on important policy issues and recommendations.

2. Key trends of intra and interregional labour migration in the South

Regional labour mobility has been a feature of life in many developing countries for a long time. **Two important types of regional labour migration among developing countries can be observed:** firstly, intraregional mobility systems and secondly migration of workers between two regions or continents. Overall it can be observed that concrete data on labour migrants is difficult to find in particular for developing countries or has not been analysed sufficiently yet. It is important to keep in mind that migration patterns change and are not static (Skeldon, 2010).

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21 Document prepared by Susanne Melde, Research Officer, ACP Observatory on Migration for the thematic Global Forum on Migration and Development meeting in West Africa in October 2011.

22 The definition of UNDP is used here, meaning that developing countries are all those except the ones with a very high Human Development Indicator (see www.acpmigration-obs.org/the%20South).

23 This paper does neither focus on forced migration nor internal labour mobility, although they are important phenomena in particular in developing countries and the latter presents a large poverty reduction potential.

24 The links between labour migration and human development, including its impacts, are beyond the scope of this paper. Please see the background papers of previous Global Fora on Migration and Development meetings for a discussion: www.gfmd.org/documents-library.html.
Undocumented migration, the increased participation of women as labour migrants, short- and medium-term and cross-border movements are widespread. **South–South labour migration also takes place due to environmental degradation**, pushing people to move to find fertile ground to sustain livelihoods. Limited land availability to sustain traditional livelihood strategies can lead to migration across borders.

Wage differentials between countries in the South and thus the potential economic gains from labour mobility may be smaller, yet more than four out of five migrants moved to another developing country with a higher human development index (UNDP, 2009). An important aspect to keep in mind is the largely informal nature of labour markets in developing countries (up to 70-80% in Africa, for example), which has repercussions on how labour mobility takes place and on the rights and working conditions of migrants. The economic and financial crises affected certain destination countries and many foreign workers lost employment (Ratha et al., 2009). The effects on labour migrants depend on the type of sector, their gender and the country they work in.

**Sub-Saharan Africa is leading in terms of intraregional migration.** The Maghreb countries are often only considered transit countries for sub-Saharan African migrants on their way to Europe, yet many Maghreb countries have become destination countries as well (Touzenis et al., 2009). In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), intraregional migration is increasing in importance and more and more feminized (OAS, 2011). Interregional migration from and to Latin American and Caribbean countries from other countries in the South also takes place. The Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) are an important destination of temporary foreign contract workers from South Asia, South-East Asia and the Middle East. Women tend to predominantly work as domestic workers in the GCC countries. Nonetheless, they only represent a minority of all international migrants in the Middle East (38% in 2010, UN PD, 2010). Migrant workers from Central Asian countries predominantly move to the Russian Federation for work. 43 per cent of Asian migrants stayed within the region in 2000, went to Oceania (3%) or Africa (1%; DRC, 2007). Interregional migration also occurs between China, India and Africa (Skeldon, 2011).

In terms of skill levels, **South–South labour mobility concerns workers holding different skills, including highly skilled ones and informal job markets.** It is important to note that important immigration poles exist in the South, such as Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2010).

**Sub-saharan Africa leads in terms of intraregional migration.**

**Most South–South labour migration concern lower skilled workers.**

The movement of large numbers of skilled migrants, often referred to as ‘brain drain’, also occurs towards countries in the South (17.5% in 2005), such as the GCC countries (9.6 million in 2000), Malaysia, Taiwan Province of China, Singapore and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China (4 million in the latter two countries) and South Africa (1.3 million highly skilled immigrants in 2000)25 (Docquier and Marfouk, 2005; Clemens, 2006). The circulation of skills in the South therefore seems an important emerging issue to tackle. In particular young migrants, many of them skilled (Assal, 2010; IOM, 2010), need to be the center of regional labour mobility schemes in the South.

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25 Including 1,557 doctors and more than 400 nurses from other SADC countries in 2000, plus more than 400 Cuban doctors between 1996 and 2009.
3. Regional labour mobility frameworks in the South

In addition to bilateral arrangements, regional integration with links to migration and development is taking place in regional groupings all over the world. Yet the free movement of people often stays merely an objective. Implementation is lacking behind the free movement of goods and trade and labour migration provisions are often missing in mobility arrangements. This potential for deepening regional integration, fostering technology transfers and thus enhancing trade competitiveness presents a vast opportunity by removing obstacles to movement, in particular for labour migrants. Some regional bodies adopted a number of specific instruments to facilitate labour mobility, like the Andean Community (CAN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while other free movement provisions only exist on paper.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is quite advanced in terms of regional integration and freedom of movement of persons, right of residence and establishment, which is enshrined in a Protocol. The ECOWAS Commission adopted its Common Approach on Migration in 2008, entailing provisions to foster the harmonization of policies, the protection of migrant workers, promoting regular migration and gender-sensitive policies, among others. Obstacles to an effective implementation of the Free Movement Protocol include the need to harmonize immigration laws; a lack of knowledge of the content of the respective declarations and protocols by administrators, border officials and the wider public; the absence of appropriate structures and resources to apply the provisions; and the need to redefine the regional labour needs as most movements tend to take place outside the legal and policy frameworks (Touzenis et al., 2009).

The Member States of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) adopted the Protocol on free movement of persons, services, labour and right of establishment. Yet Burundi is the only COMESA country that ratified it by October 2011, highlighting the need to implement the protocol. As part of the tripartite dialogue with the South African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC), a Regional Consultative Process (RCP) is planned to ensure migration issues and harmonization are included (COMESA, 2011a; b).

The Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons of SADC has been signed by nine Member States, yet at least nine need to both sign and ratify it for it to come into effect. With growing intraregional migration, discussions have refocused on the Protocol in recent years (Crush, 2011b).

Examples include the 1979 Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Annex II of the Common Market Protocol of the East African Community (EAC) which came into effect in 2010, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, Labour and Services, the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005), the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market, the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Single Market and Economy (CSME) of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

Some examples of good practices are discussed below. The scope of this paper does not allow for a full analysis of all regional groupings.
Important regional frameworks in LAC countries include the **Single Market and Economy (CSME) of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)**, where the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas stipulates the rights to free movement of establishment, the right to provide services and for certain skills categories to seek employment across the region. Between 1997 and June 2010, about 4,000 persons had moved as a result of the freedom of movement in the CSME, countering fears of massive mobility. Positions in key sectors, such as education and health care, were filled through intraregional mobility, with four out of five migrants having received tertiary education. CSME States are competing with other countries for highly skilled migrants. At the same time, 75,000 work permits were issued to nationals from outside the Caribbean who filled existing skills shortages (Mac Andrew, 2011). Most are probably from other countries in the South and highlight the need to encourage the circulation of skills among countries in the South.

The **Common Market in Southern American countries (MERCOSUR)**, plus member candidates such as Venezuela, Colombia and Bolivia, allows MERCOSUR nationals to be granted residence status and an employment permit solely on the basis of nationality and without having to provide a valid job offer. In addition, Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay regularized undocumented migrants, which mostly concerned MERCOSUR nationals (Ayuso, 2010).

In Arab countries, a study from 2010 (ALO et al.) concluded that labour mobility has greatly contributed to regional economic and social integration. Nonetheless, demand and supply in Arab origin and destination countries need to be better linked through the existing labour market systems to foster the potential for human development. Demographic growth and low employment rates of young persons necessitate policy actions on integrating the mobility of young people in national and regional development plans. Enhancing student mobility could provide an opportunity to foster regional integration, circulation of knowledge and technology as well as to reduce the vulnerability to irregular migration (ALO et al., 2010).

**Other frameworks in the South include Regional Consultative Processes (RCP)** such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD-RCP), covering the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, that seeks to promote the free movement of goods, services, and people within the sub-region. While not specifically created to address labour migration, many RCPs cover aspects related to the regional mobility of workers. Global and regional human rights treaties and declarations equally apply to migrant workers.

### 4. Opportunities and challenges of South–South labour migration

Labour mobility represents an important policy aspect that merits more attention and action in a South–South context. **Challenges and opportunities** of this type of movement are presented to provide an overview of the issues at stake. Potential challenges include the following:

- Labour migration systems often focus on emigration of workers to developed countries only, which face different challenges. Immigration in the South tends to be forgotten.

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28 In other cases, such as artisans and domestic workers, the Caribbean Vocational Qualification system is still being put in place, thus inhibiting workers of these categories to move freely in the CSME.

29 Examples include the South American Conference on Migration (SACM), the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA), and for West Africa (MIDWA or Dakar Follow-up), the Intergovernmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC), the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (Colombo Process), the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia (Abu Dhabi Dialogue), and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime in the Asia-Pacific region.
Contrary to public perception, restrictions are imposed by developing countries on immigrants to almost the same degree as developed countries and equally favour the highly skilled (UNDP, 2009). Certain groups may be barred from movement, such as women in some countries.

The high degree of informality in many labour markets in developing countries poses particular challenges, in particular for the protection of the rights of migrant workers. The presence of porous borders may pose a security challenge but may also increase the undocumented mobility of migrant workers thereby increasing the tendency for them to enter informal labour markets. The low degree of creation of formal employment, coupled with external shocks, such as food, energy, financial and economic crises as well as political tensions can represent important push factors for migration.

Social systems are often not developed enough and are difficult to access by migrant workers. However, migration in itself can provide social protection.

South–South labour mobility entails a number of important opportunities that should be leveraged:

- Intraregional migration entails less distance and less costs. More studies are needed to assess how migrant workers move within the South. Although probably less highly skilled workers migrate between developing countries, the larger numbers of migrants and the poverty reduction potential of albeit smaller remittances could potentially offset the smaller differences in wages. Porous borders and free movement as part of regional integration could mean higher (informal) remittances, investments in origin countries and lesser social costs through the ability to return more frequently.

- Cultural and possibly linguistic differences tend to be smaller between neighbouring countries, easing integration and potentially reducing psychosocial effects.

- Regional labour markets could offer a new entity of analysis and cooperation linking demand and supply, including through GATS Mode 4 (Murrugarra et al., 2011) (see chapter 5.4).

- The reduction of costs of migration, such as high costs for travel documents and high remittance transfer costs, can imply important poverty reduction gains for larger parts of migrants than those that have the resources to migrate to developed countries.

- Recognition of qualifications may be less of an issue for lesser skilled migration and easier among countries with similar educational systems. Regional integration, such as in CARICOM, can offer an opportunity to address the issue.

5. Programmatic and policy responses: The importance of coherent and evidence-based labour migration policies at national and regional levels

5.1 The evidence base: The need for data and needs assessments on labour mobility

Due to porous borders and large informal movements, labour mobility among developing countries is more difficult to assess. Nonetheless, a number of sources exist that can be exploited. They include official statistics, such as Labour Force Surveys (LFS) and specific migration surveys. LFSs should include labour migration modules, such as the one developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO). Administrative records, consulates and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of both origin and destination countries and employers and private placement agencies can also provide information (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2011; Crush, 2011b; Martin, 2011).

**Tackling the poor quality of most information, as well as the lack of human and financial resources and institutional capacity to exploit them, need to be part of the approach to foster the evidence base** (Shitundu, 2006). Key recommendations include making better use of existing sources, design new sources disaggregated by sex, age and occupation, capacity building and improve inter-institutional coordination and cooperation on labour migration statistics and data sharing among countries in a region (Schachter, 2009; Martin, 2011). When devising a new labour mobility initiative, links need to be made to existing policies and development plans. The ILO developed the International Standard Classification of Occupations to ensure comparability between countries (Martin, 2011), which is often still missing in practice. Providing national data according to this classification could increase comparability.31

Migration Profiles, first developed by the European Union and prepared for countries in Africa, the Mediterranean, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Balkans and Black Sea countries by IOM, ICMPD and the European University Institute, are a useful tool and include information on labour migration trends and policies. The Organization of American States (2011) released a first report of the Continuous Reporting System on International Migration in the Americas (SICREMI in Spanish) with OECD. The report contains information on labour migration and could be a model for other continents.

### 5.2 Strengthening legal access to labour markets

To effectively link demand and supply, **labour markets need to be assessed at national, municipal and local level prior to developing a labour mobility strategy**. Job openings can provide an indication of current needs, while training needs will provide an insight into the needed planning and development of a human resource strategy. Matching labour needs with supply can entail a win-win situation for migrants and countries involved. Based on the demand identified, skills can be fostered in an overall human resource strategy. In particular lower skilled workers and the poor should be targeted to maximize the poverty reduction potential of South–South labour mobility, which is still largely underutilized (Murruggarra et al., 2011). Labour market observatories, such as the Regional Labour Observatory for Central America and the Dominican Republic and the Interactive Map of Temporary Employment Programs for Migrant Workers (MINPAT in Spanish) launched by the Organization of American States, are good practices that can be replicated in other countries. Dissemination of information on international vacancies is crucial for any labour migration strategy.

In addition to identifying needs and demand, **bilateral, multilateral and regional programmes and approaches can be developed to enable legal labour mobility**. Key stakeholders beyond public local and national administrations in origin and destination countries need to be consulted and involved in a transparent way. They include representatives of the private sector, civil society and migrants themselves. Mutual trust is an important precondition for effective cooperation, which also applies to the involvement of other international actors (IOM, ILO and OSCE, 2008). Objectives, interests and procedures need to be clearly defined in the overarching regional or bilateral regulatory framework and interventions be coherent throughout the migration cycle to foster realistic expectations (Holzmann and Pouget, 2010).

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More coherence is needed to avoid duplication of efforts and jeopardizing the sustainability of initiatives by different international donors and international organizations. To increase synergies, a national or regional inter-institutional entity on labour mobility can be founded, which is in charge of coordinating multilateral and bilateral projects as well as mainstreaming into national and regional development plans (Martin, 2011).

5.3 Decreasing costs of migration and fostering remittances

As South–South migration tends to involve less costs due to shorter distances, other existing barriers to mobility for in particular the poor need to be lifted. Geographic distance and remote locations can increase the costs for migration. Access to loans with adequate interest rates for the poor can provide a possibility to ensure that even those usually ‘unbanked’ and living far away from economic centers can participate in labour mobility.

High costs to obtaining travel documents can further impede large parts of societies to move. Passports can cost over USD 300 and in some countries their costs can make up between 10 and 60 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product per capita, which acts as an obstacle to migration. Other procedural constraints, such as long waiting times and only centralized entities issuing passports in origin countries and long and expensive visa granting procedures in destination countries, can hinder the possibility to take up employment abroad. Processes can further be prone to corruption for speeding up lengthy procedures, further contributing to high costs for migration (Murrugarra et al., 2011).

In some cases, certain groups of society are inhibited from moving freely and legally abroad, such as women. These limitations disproportionally affect poorer parts of society and lifting them could entail significant improvements to the opportunities for them (Murrugarra et al., 2011).

Given that intra and interregional mobility in the South is as important as South–North movements, but differs in terms of skills levels and type of mobility, remittances are probably severely undercounted. Due to porous borders, cross-border migration, large informal labour markets and high transfer costs for using official transfer channels, these migrants tend to resort to mostly informal means of sending money and in kind transfers, such as goods. Innovative practices exist, for instance through mobile phone transfers and savings as used in Kenya, enabling electronic transfers, fostering financial literacy and access to financial tools for migrants and their families, developing specific financial tools tailored to the needs of women and men and strengthening diaspora bonds (Melde and Schicklinsky, 2011). Lowering the fees for monetary transfers can benefit either the migrant not having to pay high fees or the receiver as the person(s) will be able to access larger amounts, with a potential pro-poor effect if access to knowledge and banking products is given (McKensie and Gibson, 2011).

Due to their highly informal nature, South–South remittances remain largely unknown. An effort is required to measure these transfers and promote the use of formal channels.

32 For more recommendations please see the background note on Remittances in ACP Countries by the ACP Observatory on Migration.
5.4 Fostering the protection of migrant workers for human development

Human rights and migration are closely linked. **Grave human rights violations and absence of human rights protection are important drivers of migration.** On the other hand, human rights of migrants directly influence their ability to realize the human development potential of mobility for migrants, host societies and families in the country of origin (Wickramasekara, 2010).33

**People on the move tend to be more vulnerable in terms of contracting HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases;** to violence, especially women; to labour exploitation; to smuggling of migrants and/or trafficking in persons and to social exclusion, discrimination, racism and xenophobia. This highlights the need to devise special measures for migrant workers in the country, with a gendered approach, enabling them to access basic social services such as health care and to avoid stigmatization, exclusion and xenophobia. **Origin countries’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs can play an important role in supporting and protecting the rights of migrant workers.** A good practice are the ‘consular cards’ issued by Nicaraguan consulates in Costa Rica, which enable migrants to access education and health care and acquire residence status (Martin, 2011).

**Domestic workers, due to their hidden and often unregulated work space, need particular protection.** The majority are women and girls, with many of them being migrant workers (ITUC, 2010). The recently adopted ILO Convention on Domestic Workers and the accompanying Recommendation34 need to be enforced accordingly to protect this ‘invisible’ workforce.

There are also other means of protection, such as dissemination of information on labour migration procedures to migrants in a language they understand and in a way they can access this information,35 regulating private recruitment agencies, promoting codes of conducts for private employment agencies of migrant workers36 establishing an enabling legislative framework safeguarding the rights of migrant workers and mechanisms to monitor and enforce these regulations, using skills development and learning as a tool to empower migrants and enabling family reunification to counter negative social impacts (IOM, ILO and OSCE, 2008).37

**Social security is another important aspect of protection and a return incentive.** Complementary social security agreements can be devised, covering the portability of pensions, social security and health benefits (IOM, ILO and OSCE, 2008). A good practice is the regional Agreement on Social Security by CARICOM with the aim to harmonize social security legislation in Member States (CARICOM Secretariat, 2010).38

5.5 Gender-sensitive policies

The needs and realities of women and men migrating may differ to a great extent. **Any labour mobility approach therefore needs to be based on sex-disaggregated data and taking into account the different challenges faced by men and women.** In the case of South Africa for

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35 Good practices include Migrant Resource Centers, such as the Migration Information and Management Centre (CIGEM) in Bamako, Mali, funded by the EC.

36 Such as the Kenyan Association of Private Employment Agencies (KAPEA).

37 For more details, please see [http://iom.ch/jahia/Jahia/pid/2056](http://iom.ch/jahia/Jahia/pid/2056).

38 Model legislation was developed by the CARICOM Secretariat to support the equality of treatment of residents of the CARICOM States. The Agreement applies to employees of transnational companies, workers on ships and other international transportation enterprises, diplomatic personnel, officials of international organizations and self-employed workers (Caribbean Community Secretariat, 2010).
instance, a study found women migrant workers to be more likely to work in the informal sector and carrying out unskilled work. This entails important repercussions on the stability of employment. The seasonal nature of work can also lead to women not being counted in statistics. Higher risks can also include vulnerability to HIV as temporary workers in the informal sector (Williams et al., 2011). Differences also include sending patterns of remittances (UN Women and IOM, 2010). These aspects highlight that a universal approach to migrant workers is not possible to ensure gender equity and equality.

5.6 Youth unemployment, informal labour markets and the creation of employment

In most developing countries about half the population is younger than 25 years (UN PD, 2010). Many migrants in developing countries are young and educated, yet as a consequence of the global economic and financial crisis, joblessness among young people has increased even more (Byung-jin et al., 2010; ILO, 2010a). Underemployment and lack of jobs can make mobility an opportunity for furthering studies and skills development, yet also a necessity if no other options are available. This can force young persons to use dangerous routes and fall prey to transnational organized crime, including smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons and cross-border recruitment for armed conflicts (UNOWA, 2006). Child labour is a linked issue as children risk being trafficked for labour exploitation. Making migration safe for children above the minimum working age can greatly protect them (van de Glind, 2010).

The large degree of informality in many labour markets necessitates different approaches as most employment strategies seem to be targeted to the rather limited formal jobs sector. Creating employment, tackling corruption and creating an enabling environment for productive activities, in particular for young people, is critical for making mobility a choice (UNOWA, 2006). Realistic information on the risks of mobility can help to decrease the negative effects on young people guided by ‘migration myths’. Social media and communication tools can help to enable young people to make informed choices (Casco, 2011). Engaging the private sector, non-state actors and cooperation among higher education institutes can be key tools, including at regional level.

Trade in the framework of the World Trade Organization is another area that can help to foster jobs creation, economic growth and increased foreign direct investments. Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) enables the temporary movement of natural persons for the provision of services. Mode 4 could be used for negotiations within and among regions to widen the scope of movement for lower skilled migrants as they represent the majority in developing countries and most States already face a shortage of highly skilled workers (Panizzon, 2010; Melde and Ionesco, 2011).

5.7 Fostering networks and engagement of diasporas in the South

Transnational links have proven to be very beneficial for migrants generally. Social networks are a way of decreasing costs in terms of better access to up-to-date information, providing loans to finance migration, offering assistance upon arrival and mitigating the social impact of mobility. The larger the network and over time mobility becomes accessible for also poorer parts of society, enabling an important complement to pro-poor policies (Murrugarra et al. 2011).
The circulation of human and social capital and skills among developing countries has not been recognized yet. Outreach should include diasporas residing in the South. The bias towards South–North migration has left the potential of diaspora members, their contacts and transnational engagement largely out of sight (Crush, 2011a). The topic is starting to generate more interest. There is a clear need for outreach and dialogue with diasporas in the South to enable an exchange and transfer of human and social capital, skills, ideas and technology.

39 See for instance Chikanda, A., 2011. ‘The Engagement of the Zimbabwean Medical Diaspora’, Migration Policy Series No. 55, the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP), Idasa, Cape Town and Southern African Research Centre, Queens University, Toronto. The ACP Observatory has launched studies on the diasporas in ACP countries from Nigeria and Kenya.
Remittances in the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

Remittances may be the most tangible part of the migration – development nexus. They however do not just concern financial transfers, but also social remittances - a range of contributions by migrants and diaspora members. This background note aims to shed light on the definition, challenges of remittance data collection, outline the key remittance trends in ACP countries, highlight important issues and provide recommendations for policymakers from ACP countries.

1. Definition and related data collection challenges

Until recently, international financial remittances were defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers (IMF, 2009a, b; World Bank, 2010a). Based on recommendations by a Technical Working Group on improving remittance data led by the United Nations (UN), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2006, migrants’ transfers are not included in the definition anymore and workers’ remittances were replaced by the concept of ‘personal transfers’. Therefore, since 2009 the IMF considers remittances being composed of only two components in their Balance of Payments Statistics: (1) ‘compensation of employees’ and (2) ‘personal transfers’. It is important to highlight that the income of short-term migrants (living abroad for less than 12 months) are included in this definition, although it may never be transferred (at least not entirely) to the origin country.

Formal financial remittance flows

A complete aggregation and comparison of data from a number of countries, such as the ACP States, is not possible. It is important to state that despite the clear definition in the IMF (2009b) Guide for Compilers and Users of international remittances statistics, data entry on remittances varies from country to country. This can be due to the varying availability of data, different national contexts, use of citizenship instead of residency status and for simplification of data processing. Some states do not report data on remittance outflows or inflows to the IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, which is the main source for the internationally comparable dataset of the Migration and Remittances Factbook produced by the World Bank. Other challenges include the use of different methodologies, outdated information and the lack of inclusion of data on remittances from other operators besides banks, such as money transfer operators (MTOs, e.g. Western Union), post offices and mobile MTOs (Irving et al., 2010; World Bank, 2010a).

40 Document prepared by Susanne Melde, Research Officer, and Judith Schicklinski, Junior Researcher, ACP Observatory on Migration.

41 In addition, three items are considered supplementary, but not mandatory for remittances statistics: personal remittances (the sum of personal transfers and net, or ‘take home’, compensation of nonresident workers), total remittances (the sum of personal remittances and social benefits), and total remittances and transfers to nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISHs, also includes donations). They are cumulative measures of different items. To ensure consistency of time series, workers’ remittances will be included in the statistics as a supplementary item (see IMF, 2009a, b; Reinke, 2007).
Even less is known about South–South remittances. It is an area in need of further research, together with internal remittances that are also hardly looked at. Yet due to large internal movements in ACP countries, these may play an important but so far overlooked role in poverty reduction and income. More attention is needed to this phenomenon.

Informal remittance flows

The data inconsistencies among countries described above only concern formal monetary transfers by migrants. However, it is believed that remittance flows could be up to 50 per cent higher if the money sent through unofficial channels would be accounted for in the official statistics. As a consequence of the large and mostly unknown informal transfers, some sub-Saharan African countries do not report official remittance transactions in their Balance of Payments. Reliable information on informal flows needs to be collected through representative surveys of receiving and sending households (World Bank, 2010a). In addition, commodity remittances in the form of consumer items are not part of the official statistics, yet play an important role for instance between Nigeria and neighbouring West African countries and should be investigated in remittance surveys.

Social remittances

Social remittances are defined as the ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending communities (Levitt, 1998). Social remittances include innovative ideas, valuable transnational networks, knowledge, political values, policy reforms, and new technological skills.

2. Figures and key trends in ACP countries

Remittance inflows

Considering that ACP countries make up more than half of the developing countries, they only receive a relatively small amount of officially recorded remittances: about 9 per cent of remittances to developing countries in 2010 (see graph 1 on the left). On a global scale, in 2010 ACP countries are believed to only having received 6.7 per cent of all remittances worldwide (World Bank, 2010b and own calculations based on World Bank data). The World Bank estimated that in 2010, ACP countries received 21.4 billion Euros in remittances (see graph 1, World Bank, 2010b data with UN exchange rate of November 2010). However,
18 countries did not report any data, including countries who probably receive large remittance flows (the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Somalia and Zimbabwe; Mohapatra et al., 2010). Therefore, every fifth ACP country is not covered in these figures. Together with the unknown extent of informal flows, remittances inflows in ACP countries are likely to be considerably higher.

Nigeria is the only ACP country among the top 10 remittance-receiving countries worldwide and receives a third of all remittances to ACP countries (an estimated 7.2 billion Euros in 2010; World Bank, 2010b with UN exchange rate of November 2010).

Graph 2: Remittances-receiving ACP countries amongst the top 30 worldwide in percentage of GDP, 2009

![Graph 2: Remittances-receiving ACP countries amongst the top 30 worldwide in percentage of GDP, 2009](image)


Remittances play a very important role in relative terms in many ACP countries. Among the global top 10 remittance receiving countries as a percentage of GDP, four are ACP countries (Tonga; Lesotho; Samoa and Guyana). Tonga and Lesotho are only superseded by Tajikistan and thus among the top 3 worldwide. Among the top 30 globally, 13 are ACP countries (see graph 2 above; World Bank, 2010b).

Due to remittances being more stable and predictable than other financial flows, their decline during the global financial crises of 2008–2009 was modest compared to a 40 per cent decline in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), trust funds, private debt and portfolio equity flows to developing countries (Gallina, 2010; Mohapatra et al., 2010). From 2008 to 2009, remittances to ACP States decreased by 4.1 per cent, which is lower than the world average (-6.1%) or to developing countries overall (-5.5%). Remittances increased by 4 per cent between 2009 and 2010 and thus recovered from the impact of the global financial and economic crises (Own calculations based on World Bank 2010b data).

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43 No data was available for inflows to Angola, the Bahamas, the Central African Republic, Chad, Cook Islands, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu and Zimbabwe.
Remittance outflows

Despite often hardly receiving any attention, ACP countries are also sending countries of remittances. Of all officially recorded remittance outflows from developing countries, 7 per cent or 2.7 billion Euros are transferred from ACP countries (see graph 3).\(^4\) Globally, they only represented 1.5 per cent of all estimated outflows (World Bank, 2010b and own calculations based on World Bank data).

Three out of the ten leading remittance sending countries in terms of percentage of GDP are ACP countries (Guinea-Bissau, Guyana and Tonga). Among the leading 30 sending countries of remittances globally, 8 are from the ACP Group (see graph 4 below; World Bank, 2010b). However, outflows are linked to economic sectors attracting FDI, with most profits not remaining in the countries.

Since 2008, remittance outflows increased by 16 per cent, after having decreased by 16.8 per cent between 2007 and 2008 (Own calculations based on World Bank 2010b data). This may indicate that remittance outflows from ACP countries were affected to a larger extent by the financial crises than remittance inflows. Nonetheless, like remittance inflows, outflows have recovered to pre-crisis levels.

**Graph 4:** Remittances-sending ACP countries amongst the top 30 worldwide in percentage of GDP, 2009

Remittance outflows have increased almost ten-fold over the past decade (own calculations based on World Bank 2010b data), which could be linked to better data collection, increasing numbers of immigrants in ACP States and/or outflows of profits from key industry sectors.

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\(^4\) No data was reported from Barbados, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Cook Islands, Comoros, DRC, the Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Kiribati, Madagascar, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Mauretania, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.
In 2009, in the majority of ACP countries for which data is available, inflows of remittances exceeded outflows of remittances as a share of GDP. Notable exceptions are Botswana, the Seychelles, the Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, pointing to important numbers of immigrants or data inconsistencies.

In seven ACP countries, remittances outflows exceeded inflows in 2009.

West Africa

The remittances received by the 16 countries of the West African region account for 43.4 per cent of all funds received from ACP emigrants, thus representing the largest share of remittances of all six ACP regions (World Bank, 2011b data).

Yet, the fraction of global remittance flows to the region remains small. Estimated remittance inflows of 9.3 billion Euros in 2010 only represent a marginal share of four per cent of all flows to developing countries (World Bank, 2010b).

Absolute figures and relative importance of remittances vary greatly between countries in the region: Whereas only one ACP country ranges amongst the top 30 remittance-receiving countries worldwide in absolute terms (Nigeria), five West African countries are to be found amongst the top 30 remittance-receiving countries in relative terms as share of GDP (Togo; Cabo Verde; Guinea-Bissau; Senegal and The Gambia; World Bank, 2010b).

Official development aid (ODA) still exceeds remittances in all countries except in Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo (Gallina, 2010 based on UNDP, 2009).

Central Africa

In the eight countries belonging to Central Africa, remittances do not exceed ODA and are low compared to the other five ACP regions. This is firstly due to a lack of data reported for half of the countries. Out of the recorded remittances going to the remaining four countries (125.3 million Euros), Cameroun receives by far the biggest share (86%; World Bank, 2010b). Many transfers are believed to be sent to rural areas (IFAD, 2007).

In contrast to emigrants from Western and Eastern Africa, in 2005 emigrants from this region tended to predominantly move to other African countries in which workers incomes are inferior to the emigrants income in OECD countries (Migration DRC, 2007). In addition, it is estimated that the large majority of intraregional transfers passes through informal channels not appearing in the statistics, even more than in other regions (Gallina, 2010).

East Africa

Remittance inflows into the 14 Eastern African countries are small in absolute terms when compared to other ACP regions (an estimated 4.7 million Euros in 2010). Sudan’s high remittance inflows represent 48.9 per cent of the total (World Bank, 2010b).

Informal estimates are believed to be as high as 80 per cent of all flows to Uganda (UN-OHRLLS and OSAA, 2006) and in a study on the United Republic of Tanzania-Uganda remittance corridor, 60 per cent of those surveyed indicated they prefer sending money through informal systems, such as bus drivers, money changers and sex workers crossing the border regularly (IOM, 2009b).

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45 According to the classification of regions by the Secretariat of the ACP Group of States.
46 Central African Republic, Chad, DRC and Equatorial Guinea.
Inflows exceed outflows by large with the exception of the United Republic of Tanzania where they are more than three times higher (10.8 million Euros in inflows vs. 36.2 million Euros in outflows for 2009, World Bank, 2010b data with UN exchange rate for 10/2009).

**Internal remittance flows need to receive more attention.** In the case of Kenya, in 2009 more than half of all respondents of a survey by the Central Bank of Kenya and Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya (2009) claimed to have received internal transfers, compared to 16.5 per cent in 2006.

### Southern Africa

Transfers sent by emigrants to the ten countries in Southern Africa have a **modest weight in the countries GDP** with the notable exception of Lesotho (25% as a share of GDP; World Bank, 2010b). In absolute terms, South Africa is the leading recipient (and sending) country in the region (725.8 million Euros), followed by Lesotho with about half of the amount.

Important **differences in sending patterns exist between men and women**, with women sending less, which is linked to lower wages and different employment status (or lack thereof; Dodson et al., 2008).


On the outflows side, in absolute terms, the **highest sums of remittances are sent from South Africa** (770 million euros), exceeding inflows and highlighting its importance as an immigration country in the region (World Bank, 2010b). In spite of not hosting a large share of the region’s immigrants, **Angola sends high sums of remittances abroad, even exceeding those of South Africa in relative terms as a share of GDP** (1% of Angola’s GDP compared to 0.4% of South Africa’s). This can be due to high profits from the mining industry, inaccurate statistics or underreporting.

**Informal channels** are the preferred option in this region as well, being as high as almost 90 per cent in Lesotho (Crush et al., 2010) or estimated to be the almost exclusive way in studies of the South Africa – Zimbabwe corridor (Kerzner, 2009).

### Caribbean

As far as remittance inflows are concerned, the Caribbean received almost 5.6 billion Euros (World Bank, 2010b), or **more than a quarter of all ACP remittances** in 2010 despite only consisting of 16 countries. In Jamaica, many receive remittances not only from family members, but also significant amounts from friends (ippr and GDN, 2010).

Five countries (Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Grenada and the Dominican Republic) **rank among the top 30 remittance-receiving countries worldwide** in relative terms (World Bank, 2010b).

**Remittances inflows are much higher than ODA** with the exception of Suriname and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

Concerning remittances outflows, available data suggests that the amount is **more than ten times smaller than inflows**, with an estimation of almost 470 million for 2009. Nevertheless, three countries range amongst the top 30 remittance-sending countries in relative terms (Guyana, Jamaica and Belize; World Bank, 2010b).
The Pacific

Available data for this region suggests the **important role of migration**. In Tonga, remittances take up a share of about 28 per cent of GDP, in Samoa about 22.3 per cent, placing these two countries amongst the top 10 remittance-receiving countries in relative terms (World Bank, 2010b; see graph 2 above).

**In absolute terms, officially recorded remittance inflows to the region are marginal** (290 million euros in 2010; World Bank, 2010b). Eight out of 15 countries did not report remittance inflows for 2010, of which most are very small countries that may not add too much to the overall figure.

**A varied picture needs to be drawn when comparing remittances and ODA:** Whereas remittances exceeded ODA in Fiji, Samoa and Tonga per capita (USD) in 2007, ODA was higher in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Gallina, 2010 based on UNDP, 2009 data).

3. The impact of remittances on development and poverty reduction

Remittances are private capital or in kind flows and no recipient household can be obliged to use its private monies for the development of the country. **They cannot replace policies promoting development**, providing employment opportunities and strengthening the local economy. They are **not a substitute for public flows** such as Official Development Assistance (ODA) targeted at the poorest parts of societies, debt relief or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the private sector.

While remittances can reduce poverty, foster human development and increase income, **promoting emigration as the development strategy to increase remittances inflows cannot offer a sustainable solution** (Melde and Ionesco, 2010). All policies, programmes and research on remittances should take a human rights - centered approach to migration and remittances.

The impact of remittances on human development greatly depend on an **enabling political, economic and legal environment** (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007; de Haas, 2010). These economic and political conditions as well as the institutional capacities need more attention in most ACP countries.

**Macroeconomic effects of remittances**

- Key source of **foreign currencies**;
- In some cases, remittances can support an **upgrade of a country’s creditworthiness for external borrowing** and this way facilitating access to global capital markets;
- Promotion of the **development of the financial sector** if the necessary conditions are in place, which can contribute to economic growth (Ghosh, 2006; Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007);
- **Exports may become less competitive** by making the currency more expensive or the exchange rate less favourable (OSCE, IOM and ILO, 2006; Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal, 2010);
- Possible macroeconomic dependence on remittances and source of **inflation**.

Remittances can only complement development policies and ODA and FDI, but not replace them.

Remittances are not the solution to development.

**Prerequisite:** minimum economic, political and legal framework conditions.
Potential microeconomic and human development effects of remittances

- **(Additional) source of income** such as for almost 40 per cent of respondents of a survey of households in Angola, with 16 per cent of households entirely depending on remittances as income (Alvarez Tinajero, 2010);

- **Poverty reduction** by improving the standard of living and family welfare (Bakewell, 2009; Ghosh, 2006; Luthria, 2009; UNCTAD, 2011), access to food, water, health care and education, in particular for children, and thus impacting on fundamental human rights. In this vein, girls can be empowered by being able to attend school in societies where their access to education is very limited (Docquier et al, 2008);

- **Potentially decreasing child labour** by offering income to use as financial resources for health care, education and for consumption (Yang, 2009);

- Can provide a source of **funding during shocks and after disasters, for unexpected expenditures**, such as health emergency care and funerals, and for areas affected by climate change/environmental degradation and can thus help to mitigate the impact as in Senegal (UNDP, 2009; UN OHRLLS and OSAA, 2006);

- **Countercyclical, stable source of finance** during times of crises, such as 2008–2009 during the global financial and economic turmoil;

- **Generating economic activities** through (increased) demand for goods and services through more available income, enabling access to micro- and small credits for entrepreneurs (UN-OHRLLS and OSAA, 2006) and investments in houses and businesses (Ratha et al, 2011);

- Increased **dependence on remittances as sources of income**, as in 21 per cent of surveyed Kenyans in 2009, up from 14.3 per cent in 2006. For young people, these transfers have become the main income (60.1% in 2009, 54.6% in 2006; Central Bank of Kenya and FSD Kenya, 2009);

- **(Negative) social and economic effects** on children and family members due to often decreasing amounts sent over time and possible dependency on remittances. Furthermore, in Jamaica the absence of parents increased the school drop-out rate among children, whereas in other countries it increased the likelihood of school attendance (ippr and GDN, 2010);

- The **social obligation to remit** may lead migrants to live in precarious conditions to save as much money as they can for their families and relatives. Migration may affect the realization of their human rights in a negative way. Under-employment in destination countries may also hamper the enjoyment of personal freedoms of migrants;

- **Remittances may increase or decrease inequality** between households receiving migrants and those that do not.

Overall it is important to state that the impact of remittances cannot be generalized and depends on the country context, migration patterns and individual situations. Migrants also contribute to the economies and societies in host countries.
Important initiatives concern diaspora engagement in promoting community development by pooling together remittances, such as ‘hometown associations’ (HTAs) of Haitian migrants in the United States of America or local infrastructure development in the Senegal River Valley in West Africa stretching across Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal (Bakewell, 2009; Ghosh, 2006).

Other forms of diaspora contributions to their origin country and communities include the recognition of market and trade opportunities, including of ‘nostalgia’ goods; investment in capital markets (such as deposit accounts, securitization of remittance flows, transnational loans, diaspora bonds, diaspora mutual funds and microinsurance); diaspora tourism; donations; volunteering returns and advocacy roles, such as through voting from abroad (Newland, 2010). Social networks, supporting the traditional transnational networks of migrants, play an increasingly important role.

4. Recommendations and good practice examples

4.1 Remittance data collection

Despite the overwhelming attention granted to remittances, data collection still faces several shortcomings (IFAD, 2007). Capacity-building of national statistical offices is needed and has been the focus of several activities of the ACP Observatory on Migration. In addition, household surveys on remittances have been carried out in Cameroon and Trinidad and Tobago to learn more about informal flows and sending patterns and eventually lead to adapted policy development;

Information is also needed on the potential effects of remittances on inequalities and the impact of the global financial crises;

Data collection on remittances needs to be coordinated better at national level (within the central bank and among different national entities) and with major ACP destination countries;

Remittance outflows often seem to be forgotten in compiling statistics and analysing them. Nonetheless, in some ACP countries, like the United Republic of Tanzania, they are large in scope and should receive more attention in all ACP countries.

4.2 Facilitating the transfer of remittances

High transfer costs, in particular intraregionally, remain an obstacle for migrants to sending money through official channels (IFAD, 2010). On the World Bank website comparing the costs of transfers in USD (as of 10 March 2011), the three most expensive corridors concern the United Republic of Tanzania – Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania – Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania – Uganda. These high intra-ACP costs can be linked to the requirement of MTOs to be linked to a commercial bank, the mandatory conversion of remittances into the national currency or legislation on exchange rates, granting banks control

Diaspora contributions go beyond remittances and include the transfer of knowledge, skills, ideas and technology.

Need for improved data collection & coordination of ACP South–South remittance data; examples of Benin-led proposal for an International Migrant Remittances Observatory for LDCs and the Africa Institute for Remittances.

Technical tools, such as the T21 Model, can produce different scenarios for different policy options (IOM, 2009a).

Good practice: Transfer-costs-comparison websites, where fees are not provided by the institutions, but researchers/consumers: http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/ or www.sendmoneypacific.org.
Financial literacy and information need to be strengthened to foster informed decisions and access to financial tools and banking services for the general population. Having a savings account in the origin country may increase remittances by 25 per cent. Mistrust in financial institutions is also cited as an obstacle, which needs to be addressed through policies and self-regulation. A good practice example is the financial literacy project implemented by IOM with the bank BANPRO in Nicaragua, where 4,000 people benefit from a personal financial educational session on the importance of remittances, budgeting, savings, credit and insurance;

Linking remittances to financial products, for instance through cooperation between private actors and public authorities can help to create a more sustainable link to financial institutions. Options include savings accounts, pension funds and microfinance products, as recommended for Timor-Leste (Shuaib, 2008; Alvarez, 2009);

Regulating financial operators involved in remittance transfers, including banks and new service providers such as mobile MTOs, should be strengthened with a view to decreasing the costs of sending money (Irving et al., 2010) and sharing information on transactions from and to ACP countries. Self-regulation, such as through an international remittances costumer charter, can help to promote transparent markets and adequate consumer protection. The Bank for International Settlements’ and the World Bank’s General Principles (2007) provide a guiding framework;

Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT) laws often hinder formal remittance flows as they are not clear to remittance service providers and create confusion (Mohapatra et al, 2010). Information campaigns or abolishing provisions affecting remittances may be considered;

In case of a predominant migration corridor between two countries, formalizing remittances can be achieved by improving regulations between the two countries.

4.3 Gender

Due to different sending patterns, use and needs, access to financial services and financial tools tailored to the needs of women are needed. Women tend to spend more on health and education, remit higher parts of their salary and more regularly.
4.4 Strengthening innovative financial tools

Diaspora bonds and other options for diaspora engagement should be strengthened (Newland, 2010; Mohapatra et al, 2010). Investments back home are of interest to diasporas as financial systems in origin countries are more stable and should thus be fostered, such as in the area of housing in Kenya (Melde and Ionesco, 2010; Orozco, 2011; Ratha et al, 2011);

Access to formal channels can also be impeded through legislative barriers such as provisions requiring immigrants to provide documentation on their legal status in the host country (Kerzner, 2009). Innovative channels can be promoted to overcome this obstacle;

Extend mobile technology from domestic to cross-border remittances, such as the Tangaza Kenya set up by Kenyan diaspora members, which offers domestic and international mobile transfer services;

Every fourth person in Kenya saves on their mobile phone through M-PESA operating domestically in Kenya (Central Bank of Kenya and FSD Kenya, 2009), which could provide a great potential to increase savings for the ‘unbanked’;

Electronic transfers like the ones supported through the pilot project of IOM and the Universal Postal Union in the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda can be made possible through improved technology (Melde and Ionesco, 2010).
Migration, remittances and development in Africa: The case of Lusophone countries

Africans mostly migrate within the continent and constitute only 9 per cent of the population that migrates internationally (UN DESA, 2009). Migration in Africa, in addition to intraregional, is unstable, largely fuelled by conflict and environmental changes, displaying high volumes of seasonal movements and growing rates of female participation. Among others, these factors contribute to the fact that African countries receive a comparatively small amount of remittances, when compared to other benefiting areas in the developing world.

This document addresses the situation regarding international migration and financial remittances of a group of African countries united by a common language and history, although separated by many factors – the African lusophone countries, namely Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. In the first section, a brief overview of current trends in African international migration and remittances will be made. In the second section, the specific case of the African lusophone countries will be singled out, featuring some development indicators, trends in international migration and remittances. Lastly, some final remarks will be set.

1. African migration: Past and current trends

Africa has a long tradition of migration. In the past, this was determined by the pursuit of security, search of fertile land for agriculture and, later, by the dynamics of trade between the East and West coasts through the Sahara. Later, the colonial regime has changed the motivation and composition of migration flows through the introduction and implementation of various economic and political structures, setting boundaries and imposing taxation.

Today, African migrants, as the majority of migrants, are not an easily identifiable group, with similar origins, motivations and destinations. And as Jonsson (2009:6) puts it:

As migration researchers are beginning to accumulate more empirical knowledge of migration on the African continent, the picture that emerges is increasingly complex. This might obscure our interpretation of historical patterns which then appear more simple and linear, in contrast to the perceived current complexity. So, the observation of growing complexity may just as well derive from the fact that we have more data now than we did in the past.

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48 For information on remittances in ACP countries, their impact on development, please see Background Note 2.
International migration patterns

Intraregional migration. Today, African migrants move within their country, and when they surpass their boundaries, they mainly move to neighbouring countries (graph 5). The Western, Southern and Northern African regions stand out for a high intensity of labour movements, triggered by attractive poles like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, South Africa and Libya. In relative terms to the native population, some small countries are mostly immigration countries, examples being the archipelagos of the Comoros and Seychelles.

Graph 5:  Main destinations for sub-Saharan African emigrants, 2005


Instability of migration. Another feature, particularly in the region south of the Sahara, is the instability of migration flows (graph 6). According to a survey done by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), between 1975 and 2005 the African region that had shown greater instability of migration was Central Africa, with a variation of stock growth rates as: 1.6 per cent (1975–1980), -4.4 per cent (1980–1985), -0.6 per cent (1985–1990), 12 per cent (1990–1995), -12.9 per cent (1995–2000), 2.4 per cent (2000–2005) and 0.6 per cent (2005–2010). Countries with greater instability were Central African Republic and Angola.

Between 1975 and 2005 Central African Republic and Angola were the most unstable countries in terms of migration flows.

On the opposite side, the Western African region was the least volatile in migration terms, with mostly positive growth rates. Countries like Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia and Burkina Faso distinguished themselves by a large immigrant population (when reported to total population).

The reasons for the instability of flows between 1975 and 1985 are essentially political (years of independence from European powers) and economic (introduction of structural adjustment programs and their social costs). The following decades of instability are mainly explained by conflicts.
**Conflicts.** History has shown that conflicts do not confine to one country; replication in neighbouring countries is almost sure and fast. In Africa, examples are the civil war in Liberia (1989), which spread to Sierra Leone (1991), who later drew on in the coup and civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (1999 and 2002), which shook the stability of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Burkina Faso.

Positive migration growth rates in the Western African region, expressed in graph 6, mean that more immigration than emigration is taking place, which seems a paradox given the number of conflicts referred to above. But this is explained by the fact that the population fleeing from those conflicts migrate to other countries within their own sub-region, hence explaining the high rates of immigration. This has not occurred in the Eastern African region, where the Rwandan genocide (1994) and lasting instability in the Horn of Africa have caused people to move towards the center (hence the negative values, from 1990-95 until recent years). The instability is explained partly by the effects of the conflicts that came from East and North, that is, the conflict in Sudan and its direct influence on the stability of Chad and the Central African Republic. In the North, the rates are essentially negative, since the outflows occur mainly to nearby Europe and the conflicts in parts of Sudan (e.g. Darfur) continue.

The negative growth of the stock of immigrants in Southern Africa, between the 1980s and the new century may be explained by the fact that apartheid extended itself until 1990, when Namibia conquered independence, and the first free elections in South Africa only took place in 1994.

The positive growth of the stock of immigrants observed in almost all sub-regions in this century will be a consequence of the prevalence of peace, some economic progress, political stability and progress within some blocks of regional integration.

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49 In this work, the division of Africa follows the one made by UN DESA (2009), except that we include Egypt and exclude Réunion and St. Helena islands (as they are dependencies of France and the UK, respectively).
Financial Remittances

Remittances are the most obvious link between migration and development, distinguishing itself from other external funding flows for its stability, predictability and for directly benefitting families. A review of the main challenges related with concepts and data collection (particularly relevant in Africa, given the relevance of the informal channels used by migrants), key trends and impacts on development and poverty reduction in Africa, was recently made by Melde and Schiklinski (2011).

The importance of remittances. They are the largest, most stable and predictable flow of external financing in many developing economies. As we can see in graph 7, remittances represent 9 to 35 per cent of the GDP in nine ACP countries’ economies, including four African ones: Lesotho, Togo, Cabo Verde and Senegal. And the fact that Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the largest unrecorded remittances inflow (around 50% larger than the recorded inflow) still has to be considered.

Financial services. The main problems in this respect are the lack of access to financial services, high transfer costs (with huge differences between the North/South and the South/South corridors) and a deficient institutional environment in terms of regulation, competition and innovation.

Utilization and distribution. At the macroeconomic level, remittances are an important source of foreign exchange and savings. At the household level, they are mostly used in everyday expenses, education and health.

Graph 7: World top 25 recipients of remittances, percentage of GDP, 2008

2. The case of African Lusophone countries

The African lusophone countries are Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. These countries share a common history, which results from centuries of colonial rule from Portugal. This colonial relationship has only ceased in the mid 1970s, after a conflict (particularly in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau) that lasted until the transition of Portugal to democracy in 1974. Today, these countries form an entity designated as PALOP (“Portuguese Speaking African Countries”). They are also a prominent part of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), an intergovernmental organization formed in 1996 by Portugal, Brazil, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe, later joined by Timor-Leste in 2002.

Geography, sociopolitical environment and development

Despite the many commonalities resulting from history, these countries constitute a highly heterogeneous group in terms of geography, sociopolitical environment and development level. They are spread through Western Africa (Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau), Central Africa (Angola and São Tomé and Príncipe) and Eastern Africa (Mozambique). They include two archipelagos (Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe), one medium-sized country (Guinea-Bissau) and two large countries (Angola and Mozambique). They are affiliated to five different regional blocks: Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), as well as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). Population dimension, GDP per capita, human development index and sociopolitical environment are very different (table 2).

**Table 2:** African lusophone countries: differences in geography, sociopolitical environment and development

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,247,000</td>
<td>16,000,000</td>
<td>3,623</td>
<td>143º</td>
<td>Mostly stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>518,000</td>
<td>2,705</td>
<td>121º</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>173º</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>8,802,000</td>
<td>20,000,000</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>172º</td>
<td>Mostly stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>916</td>
<td>131º</td>
<td>Most mostly stable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International migration patterns

Past and current international migration is very different in these countries, regarding size, origin, destination and proportion of skilled flows (table 3). Despite the limitations of data accuracy and updating, some of the main characteristics are:

- **Angola**, except for the post-independency period, is characterized by relatively small out-migration; today is becoming a pull region, receiving African as well as other immigrants.
- **Cabo Verde** has a long tradition of emigration, with a large diaspora mainly in Europe and the USA. It recently witnessed increasing inflows, from West African migrants in their way to Europe.
- **Guinea-Bissau** displayed a strong increase of out-migration since the 1980s.
- **Mozambique** has a small out-migration, mainly linked with the Southern African migration system.
- **São Tomé and Príncipe’s** migration flows are large in relative terms, although small quantitatively.

As occurs in the broad African framework, outmigration flows have been unstable and many were related with conflict. This has particularly occurred in Angola and Mozambique, from the moment of independence to the end of their civil wars, and in Guinea-Bissau, following independence and the 1998–1999 uprising. Some of the refugee and migrant flows went to bordering countries, in line with the intraregional African migration trends, whilst others went to Europe. In recent decades, forced and economic migrations involved different sets of individuals and groups, namely colonizers and natives, ethnic and mixed-origin groups, skilled and low-skilled workers, whose motivations, strategies and destinations varied.

Despite their specificities, it may be argued that African lusophone countries maybe integrated in a common international migration system, in this case the lusophone migratory system (Baganha, 2009). Generally speaking, several elements of the migration systems approach (Kritz et al., 1992), which has been often applied to colonial and postcolonial settings, contribute to understand migration in lusophone countries.

The Portuguese colonial history of African lusophone countries is an important component that contributes to understanding migration flows in and out those countries.

The lusophone migratory system was initially conceived to understand the Portuguese case, since many of its migratory connections, either outward or inward, involved other Portuguese-speaking countries (Baganha, 2009). According to Baganha, the system was firstly composed only of Portugal and Brazil, being subsequently enlarged to the African lusophone countries, mainly after their independence in the mid 1970s. It may now be argued that the system has acquired greater complexity with time, explaining today not only the movements from and to Portugal, but also flows involving the remaining countries.
When viewed in detail, the largest flows of the past occurred between Portugal and Brazil (a connection that is still well alive nowadays), given the longer period of intensive colonial relationship between them. In the African context, the first significant movements led Portuguese settlers to the colonies after the mid twentieth century, followed by a sustained current from Cabo Verde to Portugal initiated in the late 1960s. The bulk of the flows to Portugal occurred after the decolonization in the mid 1970s, first as a politically induced movement (its peak being the retornados, coming mainly from Angola and Mozambique) and then mostly as economic migration (although political motives and conflicts always kept relevance) (Baganha, 2009).

Along the time, although flows from PALOP to Portugal never ceased, they gradually became smaller. Nowadays, as a consequence of past flows, Portugal is one of the three main destinations of every African lusophone country, except for Mozambique, and is one of the three main origins, except for Guinea-Bissau (Table 2). Moreover, also Angola, Cabo Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe have close migratory relationships between themselves, following connections started during the colonial period (table 2).

As stated by the migration systems theory, this common framework does not conceal the integration in other migration systems. This occurs with Portugal (Baganha, 2009) and with other lusophone countries, which send and receive migrants from other parts of the world. In some cases, such as Mozambique, the links with other migration systems (in this case, the Southern African one) explain the majority of the flows.

The prospects for the 21st century look very different from the past. Besides the reduction of flows to Portugal, a major change is the situation in Angola. The recent economic prosperity of this country seems to have altered its migration status.

### Table 3: African lusophone countries: differences in migration patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>3,3</td>
<td>Portugal, Zambia, Namibia</td>
<td>25,6%</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>35,8</td>
<td>Portugal, United States, France</td>
<td>69,1%</td>
<td>2,2</td>
<td>São Tomé e Príncipe, Angola, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>Senegal, Portugal, Gambia</td>
<td>29,4%</td>
<td>1,2</td>
<td>Senegal, Guinea, Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4,1</td>
<td>South Africa, United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi</td>
<td>42,0%</td>
<td>2,1</td>
<td>South Africa, Portugal, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>13,6</td>
<td>Portugal, Cabo Verde, France</td>
<td>35,6%</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>Angola, Cabo Verde, Portugal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within the lusophone system, the migratory current with Portugal was reverted: whilst the flows from Angola to Portugal gradually vanished, the number of Portuguese moving to Angola has boomed in the last decade, completely altering the migratory relationship between the two countries.\(^{50}\) Angola is also attracting an increasing number of migrants from other African countries and elsewhere.

### Remittances flows

As a consequence of different migration patterns, also remittances vary, according to their volume, impact and countries involved (table 4 and graphs 4 to 6). Due to limitations in data accuracy, particularly relevant when studying remittances in the African context (Melde and Schiklinski, 2011) available figures are mainly indicative.

#### Table 4: African lusophone countries: main data on remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inward flows, 2007</th>
<th></th>
<th>Outward flows, 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US million</td>
<td>per capita, USD</td>
<td>Main origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>Europe (62%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Europe (80,5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Europe (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Europe (90,5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>US million</th>
<th>Per migrant, USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>10,695</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>537</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Either measured in total volume or per capita, remittances inflows, outflows and net flows differ largely. In total volume (graphs 4 to 6), net flows are positive and generally increasing in all countries but Angola, whilst in the latter they are becoming increasingly negative.\(^{51}\) Considering per capita figures, inward flows differ from 5 USD in Mozambique up to 262 USD in Cabo Verde (table 3). Outward flows, per migrant, differs from 92 USD in São Tomé and Príncipe up to 10,695 USD in Angola. This means that while most of the lusophone countries stand out as classic remittance receiving countries, being Cabo Verde the most exemplary case, Angola’s role as a remittance sending country is increasing.

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\(^{50}\) See Portuguese Observatory of Emigration ([www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/home.html](http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.pt/np4/home.html)). Unfortunately, no data is available on return migration of Angolan citizens.

\(^{51}\) Given the lack of data from the World Bank (2010) on remittance inflows to Angola, only available for 1996 and 2008 (graph 8), estimates of net remittance flows in this country are only calculated for these years (graphs 8 and 10). It must yet be noted that estimates about remittances inflows to Angola are disputable, since the numbers provided by the World Bank are much lower than others provided by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (cited in Alvarez Tinajero, 2010: 78): whilst the former indicates an amount of 82 million USD, representing 0.1 per cent of the country’s GDP, in 2008, the latter points to an overall amount of 969 million USD, representing 2 per cent of the country’s GDP, in 2007.
Graph 8: Remittances outflows (USD millions), 1975–2009


Graph 9: Remittances inflows (USD millions), 1975–2009


Graph 10: Remittances net flows (USD millions), 1975–2008

With regards to the main origin of remittances (table 3), Europe is the most relevant one, representing 62 per cent for Cabo Verde, 80 per cent for Guinea-Bissau, 34 per cent for Mozambique and 90 per cent for São Tomé and Príncipe (World Bank and UNDP 2009). No data on origin of remittances is available for Angola. Portugal stands out as the main European country of origin of these flows, although African immigrants are far from being the main remitters from this country. The under-representation of these immigrants’ remittances in Portugal, compared to their proportion in the immigrants’ stock, suggests a less intensive propensity to remit or, more probably, a limited use of formal channels, given their scarcity and cost (Tolento et al., 2008; Alvarez Tinajero, 2010). Among the African lusophone countries, Mozambique is the one most involved in South–South migration, a large part of the remittances coming from South Africa.

As share of GDP, remittances represent more than 9 per cent in Cabo Verde and only 0.1 per cent in Angola (graph 11). Another important aspect on the different amounts of remittances is the different relation of each national currency - kwanza, Cabo Verdean escudo, franc, metical, dobra - to the US dollar.

Graph 11: Remittances as a share of GDP, 2008 (in %)


Research on the impacts of remittances in development is still limited. Some of the available studies are about Cabo Verde (Tolento et al., 2008), Guinea-Bissau (Có, 2004; Carreiro, 2007; Quintino, 2010) and Angola (Alvarez Tinajero, 2010). In the cases of Cabo Verde and Angola, the major conclusions coincide with others in the African framework: remittances are one of the main transnational links between the diasporas and the home country, proceeding mainly in the families’ framework; they constitute an important financial support for many families, used mostly for everyday expenses, education and health; their use in the productive framework is still limited; and the recourse to informal channels is considerable, sometimes amounting to half of the migrants. The case of Guinea-Bissau stands out for the important role of collective agents, since a large fraction of remittances is channelled by hometown associations, usually linked to specific ethnic groups, allowing a positive (although mild) impact on local development.

52 This position belongs by a large distance to Brazil, which accounts for more than half of remittances, with a much lower proportion of immigrants (about a quarter in 2010) (see Peixoto and Marques, 2006).
Generally speaking, the discussion between the mutual impacts of migration and development is still recent in most of the African lusophone countries (see Forum Gulbenkian Imigração, 2007). Among them, the situation in Cabo Verde seems better, since a long tradition of transnational practices and migration-related policies, addressing diasporas and remittances, exist (see, for example, Góis, 2008).

To conclude, the situation of Angola among the African lusophone countries deserves particular attention, since the country is becoming a major country of destination for immigrant workforce, a situation that was once limited to South Africa in the Centre and South of the continent. This new migration status is reflected in the evolution of remittances outflows and net flows in both countries (graph 12).

Graph 12: Remittances outflows and net flows (USD millions), 1975–2008 Angola and South Africa


Research is needed on the impact of recent economic, social and political changes in Angola, including a high economic growth rate, on migration and remittances. Although remittances inflows have been studied (Alvarez Tinajero, 2010), not much is known about the characteristics of remittances outflows (who sends money, where and why). It has been hypothesized that the large volume of outward remittances could partly result from the high profits from the mining industry (Melde and Schiklinski, 2011).

Further evidence adds that another part of the outward flows result from migration to Angola of skilled workers and professionals from European or other countries. Data available from the Portuguese Observatory of Emigration website⁵³ indicates that, in 2009, the amount of money sent by Angolan immigrants in Portugal to their home country was 8.4 times smaller than the correspondent amount sent by Portuguese in Angola to Portugal: the first amounted to 12.3 million Euros, while the second totalled 103.5 million Euros.

3. Final remarks

Africa lives between the old and uncompromising tradition of free movement of people and the attempt to regulate and map out movements, both out of the continent (imposed by host countries’ immigration policies) and within the continent (led by national governments, in order to better understand migration and to take advantage of it for development).

In the African case, heterogeneity prevails: the international migration status of specific countries varies, as well as the motivation for flows. Remittances had up to now a limited impact on development, given its limited volume (despite a significant informal flow) and scarce use for productive purposes. However, at the micro level, they are often decisive for the well-being of many families.

In the future, when considering South–South migration flows, the discussion needs to focus on:

- Concrete efforts to improve and harmonize information systems;
- Diasporas within Africa;
- Coordination of migration policies between countries and sub-regions;
- Integration of migration in development strategies, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs);
- Coherence between strategies, policies and action;
- Geographic and institutional barriers to financial services;
- Improvement of the social, economic and political environment.

In the African lusophone countries, several differences on international migration and remittances trends stand out, despite the similarities with the broad African framework and the common – although partial – integration in the lusophone migration system (Baganha, 2009).

In this respect, a major distinction must be made between:

- Cabo Verde, with a long tradition of emigration, as well as policy learning related with diasporas and remittances, and where immigration is starting to occur;
- Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe, with a high impact of emigration;
- Mozambique, the most inserted in the intraregional African migration flows;
- Angola, which may become one of the major pull regions in the continent.

In the lusophone African context, the discussion needs to focus on:

- Improvement and harmonization of information systems;
- Specific experiences of each of the countries concerned;
- Possibility of migration changes (sending, receiving and transit contexts);
- Adaptation of policies and institutions to specific needs;
- Coordination of migration policies, within each sub-region, within African lusophone countries, within CPLP, and with the major origin and sending countries;
- Integration of migration and remittances in development strategies;
- Improvement of the social, economic and political environment.
Money money services: «A bank in your pocket»:
An overview of trends and opportunities

1. Introduction

“In a remarkably short period of time, internet and mobile technology have become a part of everyday life for some in the emerging and developing world. Cell phones, in particular, are almost omnipresent in many nations. People around the world are using their cell phones for a variety of purposes, especially for calling, texting and taking pictures, while smaller numbers also use their phones to get political, consumer and health information» (Pew Research Center, 2013).

Mobile technologies are changing economic life in developing countries, where many people are using cell phones for a range of financial transactions, such as receiving and sending money transfers. Indeed, mobile money is already being used by banks and mobile network operators to provide millions of unbanked consumers a way to store and access money digitally. The limited information available suggests that for millions of consumers in developing countries, mobile money is transforming lives by providing access to financial services and the ability to pay and be paid electronically—sometimes for the first time in their lives. Mobile financial services, known as “mobile money”, allow unbanked people to use their phones as a bank account: to deposit, withdraw and transfer money with their handset. People can also use mobile systems to pay utility bills and pay for goods in merchant shops.

Developing countries are severely constrained by limited infrastructure and the difficulties of accessing financial institutions. Consequently, more than 2.5 billion adults—about half of the world’s adult population—are unbanked (World Bank, 2014). The reasons behind the exclusion of such a large number of people are related to barriers such as cost, travel distances and documentation requirements for opening a bank account in developing countries. However, of the world’s 7 billion people, there are now 6 billion phone subscribers: over one billion of the unbanked people in the world have access to a mobile phone (GSMA, 2013). “Across UN-designated Least Developed Countries (LDCs), including 40 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, mobile phone penetration in 2011 was at 30 per cent while access to a formal bank account was at 14 per cent in average” (UNCDF, 2013). Mobile money services have been deployed in developing countries as a means of extending financial services to the unbanked, but more robust research is needed on the direct link between the use of mobile money services and easier access to financial services.

“Mobile money” services started in Kenya in 2007 through M-PESA (“M” for “mobile”, “pesa” for “money” in Swahili), a popular mobile money service offered by a local mobile network operator, Safaricom. Since then, the mobile money industry has rapidly expanded, particularly

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54 Document prepared by María Paula Subia and Nicole Martinez, Junior Researchers, ACP Observatory on Migration.
55 “The world’s most impoverished and vulnerable countries. The least developed countries (LDCs) are a group of countries that have been classified by the UN as “least developed” in terms of their low gross national income (GNI), their weak human assets and their high degree of economic vulnerability”. Available from: www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/least_developed_countries.htm.
56 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sao Tome et Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zambia.
57 http://www.safaricom.co.ke/.
in developing economies in Africa and South Asia such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. It has been optimistically described by policymakers, the media and above all mobile phone companies as a prospective means to economic development and poverty reduction, even without the support of an adequate evidence base.

As the use of mobile phones for money transfer is relatively recent, there are no comprehensive studies on the subject apart from for analysis focusing on specific countries, sectors, and case studies. The present document is based on existing publications on the subject. In particular, the case of Kenya receives a specific attention. Sources combine academic publications with a majority of non-academic documents covering this topic, including studies by the mobile money industry. This Background Note will introduce the main concepts related to mobile money and subsequently provide an overview of its main trends and features in developing countries, drawing primarily on information from the case of Kenya. Finally, this paper will present a preliminary assessment of the impact of mobile money on human development, as well as some general conclusions.

2. Definitions

The definition of “mobile money” varies across the communication industry as it covers a wide scope of overlapping applications (Dermish et al., 2011; GSMA, 2013). In general, mobile money is a term describing electronic financial services performed via a mobile phone. There are three major mobile money services: “mobile banking”, “mobile payments” and “mobile transfers” (see the explanation below). It is worth noting that the term “mobile banking” is often confused and used interchangeably with the overall category of “mobile money” in research and literature. However, mobile banking is only one type of mobile money service: it allows customers of a financial institution to access their accounts and to perform transfers and payments. This service is therefore only available to people who possess a formal bank account. Mobile banking is a financial service often available in developed countries, but not in most developing countries due to the low level of financial inclusion through official financial systems/banks.

In the case of developing countries, other mobile money services are mostly used by people who do not have personal bank accounts. Indeed, customers often rather use “mobile payment” and “mobile transfer” services, which are available from their mobile phones without the need for a bank account. In practical terms, these two services are accessible from an electronic account, linked to the SIM card in the mobile phone. This electronic account is known as “mobile wallet” and is protected by a personal identification number (PIN), with accounts debited or credited as soon as the transaction takes place. To transact, mobile phone users need to deposit cash into their mobile wallet at the outlet of an agent of a local mobile telecommunications company. The agent will get the money from the customer and transmit it to the company through his/her own mobile phone. If mobile phone users wish to withdraw cash from their mobile wallet, they also need to go to a mobile money agent outlet.

In the framework of these mobile money services, the sender’s and receiver’s mobile wallets are not linked to their individual bank accounts but to their SIM cards. The balances of all their mobile wallets are maintained by the mobile network operator.

Mobile payment (also known as “m-commerce”) is a service allowing unbanked people to purchase or sell goods and services at a merchant shop/store (or remotely) using their mobile wallet through their mobile phone, instead of cash. Unbanked mobile phone users can also pay utility bills via their mobile wallet. In the case of a face-to-face payment at a merchant shop,
Mobile money services: “A bank in your pocket”: An overview of trends and opportunities

Mobile financial transactions are done in the following manner: first, the customer gives the merchant his mobile phone number. The merchant then requests payment via the telephone service provider website or by SMS with the customer’s mobile number. The telephone service provider then sends an SMS to the customer with a Bill Reference Number. The customer authorizes the payment by replying to the SMS with his customer 6-digit Security PIN and the Bill Reference Number. Finally, the telephone service provider sends a payment notification with details to both the merchant and the customer.

**Mobile transfer** (also known as money transfer “person-to-person” - “P2P”- or “mobile remittances”) is a service that **allows unbanked people to send or receive small sums of money to/from any other mobile phone user** (even if they are subscribed to different telephone service providers) **across the country, from urban to remote rural areas, and across international borders**. In practical terms, the customer must first deposit cash into his mobile wallet. Then, on the phone menu, the customer selects the option Send Money, and enters the recipient’s phone number, the amount he wishes to send and his 6-digit Security PIN. The sender can confirm that all the information entered is correct. The receiver will get a text message that he can show to a local mobile company agent to receive the money in cash.

Until now, mobile money services were mainly used to send or receive remittances to provide financial support to family members living in different households. Yet, unexpected and innovative uses of mobile money services have also emerged, such as paying school fees, public transportation, taxi drives, paying for social events such as funerals and weddings, and making informal loans repayments (Omwansa, 2009). Another innovative extension of the mobile wallet is the use of the prepaid airtime58 scratch cards (also known as “e-vouchers”) as a sort of virtual currency, in the rural areas of Nigeria, Kenya and the Philippines (Omwansa, 2009). For instance, prepaid airtime can be used as a means of exchange with local merchants instead of paying with cash. Another example is the case of workers who are given a part of their salary in cash and the rest in the form of a prepaid scratch card that can be traded for cash with local merchants or others.

3. Data and facts

   **a. History of mobile money**

Mobile money was initially made popular by Safaricom and Vodafone’s M-Pesa (“M” for “mobile”, “pesa” for “money” in Swahili) in Kenya, which started in 2007. The M-Pesa application is installed on the SIM cards of customers and works on all handset brands. It is free to register and the user does not need to have a bank account. Safaricom receives fees for withdrawals and transfers, but keeps deposits into the mobile wallets free. The transfer service was quickly picked up for use as an informal savings account system and electronic payment mechanism for bills, goods and services.

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58 Prepaid airtime is the amount of time that can be spent talking on a mobile.
A mobile money agent in rural United Republic of Tanzania for MMT M-PESA


With M-Pesa, Kenya is at the forefront of the mobile money revolution: the number of agents across the country increased by 40 per cent in 2013. It is now estimated that 24.8 million subscribers use mobile money services, like M-Pesa, in Kenya (Communication Commission of Kenya, 2013). According to the Pew Research Center’s 2013 survey report, the number of Kenyans using mobile wallets to make or receive payments is higher than any of the other 24 countries surveyed: 50 per cent of the Kenyan adult population uses mobile money services (Pew Research Center, 2013).

Mobile money services have spread rapidly in many developing countries. However, only a handful of these initiatives have reached a sustainable scale, in particular GCASH and Smart Money in the Philippines; Wizzit, MTN Mobile Money and FNB in South Africa; MTN Mobile Money in Uganda; Vodacom M-PESA and Airtel in the United Republic of Tanzania; Celpay Holdings in Zambia and MTN Mobile Money, Orange Money in Côte d’Ivoire.

The Philippines was one of the earliest adopters of mobile money services when SMART Communications launched SMART Money in 2001. The service, which uses SIM Tool-Kits, enables customers to buy airtime, send and receive money domestically and internationally via mobile, and pay for goods using a card. In 2004, Globe Telecom launched GCASH. This service provides a cashless method for facilitating money remittances, settle loans, disburse salaries or commissions and pay bills, products and services via text message.

In South Africa, MTN Mobile Money was launched in 2005 as a joint venture between the country’s second largest network operator MTN and a large commercial bank, Standard Bank.

In Uganda, MTN was the first operator to launch mobile money services in 2009 and remains, by far, the market leader (Intermedia, 2012). By law, each mobile money provider has to partner with a bank. However, users do not need a bank account to use mobile money services.

In the United Republic of Tanzania, Airtel was the first mobile network operator to introduce a phone-to-phone airtime credit transfer service, “Me2U,” in 2005 (Intermedia, 2013). Airtel partners with Citigroup and Standard Chartered Bank to provide m-money services, including bill payments, payments for goods and services, phone-to-phone and phone-to-bank money transfers, and mobile wallets. In 2008, Vodacom Tanzania launched the second East African implementation of the Vodafone m-money transfer platform, M-Pesa.
Finally, in Côte d’Ivoire two mobile operators, Orange and MTN, are competing head to head in the mobile money market (CGAP, 2012). Orange Money was launched in 2008 by Orange in partnership with BICICI (BNP Paribas), and MTN Mobile Money was launched in 2009 by MTN in partnership with SGBCI (Société Générale) (GSMA, 2014).

b. A quick overview in figures

There are 2.5 billion unbanked adults in the world. While in developed countries between 80 and 90 per cent of adults have formal bank accounts, the percentage drops to between 39 and 20 per cent in developing countries (see figure 2). The difference is even wider when it comes to credit cards: half of adults have them in developed countries while only 7 per cent in developing countries (World Bank, 2014).

By contrast, mobile money is now available in most developing countries. At the end of 2013, there were 219 mobile money services operating in the world. Eighty-four countries have mobile money services (see figure 3), which accounts for about 40 per cent of all countries in the world. It is worth noting that 52 per cent of mobile money services are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, mobile money services significantly expanded outside Sub-Saharan Africa and expanded in nine new markets: the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, Jamaica, Tajikistan, Togo and Vietnam. Moreover, 19 mobile money services launches are expected to be launched in Latin America in 2014 (GSMA, 2013).

Map 2: Percentage of people older than 15 years old with an account at a formal financial institution in the world (2014)

Source: Adapted from World Bank, 2014.
4. Opportunities and challenges

Mobile money transfer services can be seen as having an impact at the microeconomic and macroeconomic levels with related effects and opportunities.

a. Microeconomic level

Mobile money services are highly accessible to all segments of society for three reasons: they are faster, more convenient and cheaper than formal financial services.

- Making money transfers faster and more convenient through a wide territorial outreach

Mobile phones are introducing financial services in remote areas where conventional banks have been physically absent or remain too expensive. The formal financial sector in developing countries suffers from structural weaknesses and restrictive conditions (prices, documentation required) that practically exclude rural and low-income populations from accessing it. The main reason why banks do not offer their services to the majority of people in developing countries, and especially in rural areas, is related to the high transaction costs faced by banks to set up branches or ATM machines in areas with low infrastructure levels. The unprecedented growth and popularity of mobile money in many ACP countries is due to the affordability of mobile phone systems compared to formal banking costs. Indeed, according to an analysis in ten countries carried out by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), on average, mobile money

59 Analysed services: Afghanistan: M’Paisa; Brazil: Bradesco and Caixa; Cambodia: WING Money; Cote d’Ivoire: MTN Mobile Money, Orange Money; India: Eko; Kenya: M’PESA and Zap; Pakistan: easypaisa; Philippines: GCash and Smart Money; United Republic of Tanzania: M’PESA, Zap; South Africa: MTN Mobile Money, WIZZIT.
services are at least 19 per cent cheaper than traditional banks. The cost of formal banking in many African countries is especially high: in some countries the minimum deposit can be as high as 50 per cent of GDP per capita. Consequently, unbanked people in the ACP countries often use informal financial services. For instance, when a factory worker needs to send money to his or her relatives in a remote village, the affordable option is to send it with bus or taxi drivers through letters and parcels.

Moreover, in LDCs, where basic infrastructure like electricity, roads and telephone lines is sorely lacking, modern technologies like mobile phones have powerful potential to improve the standard of living of the poorest populations. Unlike banks, mobile money services are accessible anytime and from/to anywhere. They remove the need for physical offices for depositing or withdrawing money. Senders and recipients do not have to commute to a money transfer company (such as MoneyGram or Western Union) office, they do not have to fill out forms, and do not have to wait in lines to complete the transaction or to receive money. The entire process is avoided by using a code sent and received via SMS. Mobile transfer makes it easier for internal migrant workers in urban areas to send remittances to their remote rural communities, which may have difficult access to transportation and financial services. Mobile transfers could represent a more secure method of transferring funds than informal remittance channels, avoiding the need to carry cash during long and expensive trips with the risk of the cash getting lost or stolen (Omondi, 2013).

• Lowering the cost of remittances

Sending remittances via money transfers companies (MTC), such as Western Union, MoneyGram, Money Express, is widely considered expensive. Globally, sending remittances costs an average of 8.36 per cent of the amount sent. “Africa in particular is one of the most expensive remittance markets in the world. The average fee to send remittances to Africa is 12 per cent. What is more, the average fee for intra-Africa remittances is 25 per cent. In Nigeria, where most migrants send money home from outside the country, the fee is 10 per cent” (World Bank, 2011). For instance, a Nigerian migrant living in another sub-Saharan country who sends money back home would pay USD 20 in fees, when in general migrants send small amounts of money. The high cost of sending remittances through formal channels is partly related to costly currency conversions and strict regulations on cross-border transfers (meant to curb illicit money flows but in practice also prohibiting open markets and competition). Besides, the non-existence of multiple money transfer companies puts the burden of high fees on the customer and pushes those who cannot afford them to use informal remittance channels. By contrast, mobile money services allow unbanked people to transfer different small amounts of money both within and from outside the country at lower costs compared to bank transfers and MTCs.

b. Macroeconomic level

Mobile money services have the potential (a) to improve households’ income and thus to facilitate safe savings and human capital investments; (b) to formalize the informal cash economy by facilitating trade; and (c) to be a funding platform of development projects or post-conflict operations in several ACP countries.

• Improving households’ income and facilitating safe savings and human capital investments

The reduction of remittances’ costs would increase the frequency and magnitude of remittances and thus affect households’ incomes. This could increase household’s savings since mobile money services provide safe storage mechanisms. Based on the evidence collected in Kenya (GSMA,
2013), it is known that many consumers often use their mobile wallets to save funds at least for short periods of time and are more likely to be able to have the cash needed in case of weather emergencies for instances. Besides, mobile money services would also encourage human capital and physical investments. For instance, through cheaper transfers across distances, households are more likely to send their members to distant locations and to invest in skills that are likely to earn a return.

- **Formalizing the informal cash economy by facilitating trade**

By making it easier for people to pay for, and to receive payment for goods and services, mobile money services give more visibility to money flows as remittances move from informal channels to formal channels. Indeed, the use of mobile money may encourage the formalization of the informal cash economy which, adequately channelled, can in turn have an impact on economic development by making local markets more dynamic (diversification of goods and production) (Afful, 2012). In the long run, mobile money services can facilitate and contribute to improvements in payment of taxes and utilities, which could in turn strengthen governance and infrastructure, and foster international trading through an increased offer of financial services (Scott et al., 2004: 7-8).

- **Facilitating cash transfer programmes for development projects or emergency operations in ACP countries**

Cash transfer programmes for development projects in ACP countries could be funded through mobile money services. Mobile money services can facilitate social transfer payments from governments to citizens for humanitarian uses. These mobile transfers have proliferated in various sectors, such as electricity, agriculture and emergency response. Regarding the agriculture sector, mobile money is a potentially important tool for agriculture development projects since the access to financial services is usually a key constraint to success. Mobile money services can be useful for immediate humanitarian responses. For instance, in Haiti\(^\text{60}\), six months after the earthquake, in June 2010, USAID and the Gates Foundation announced a Challenge Fund Competition to encourage the launch of mobile money services to deliver cash assistance to victims of the country’s devastating earthquake. With respect to NGOs, mobile money services can:

- “Reduce operational costs, especially when the same beneficiary group needs to receive recurrent payments.
- Mitigate some of the risks associated with cash transfers, especially security and liquidity management.
- Provide direct contact with beneficiaries through mobile phones, allowing for more communication potentially leading to increased accountability.
- Reduce logistics and improve programme efficiency: in practical terms, instead of sending beneficiaries’ names and payment instructions to the finance department or transfer agent, NGOs and international organizations programme managers access an online platform and send the payment notification to the beneficiaries’ mobile phones” (HPN, 2012).

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\(^{60}\) In Haiti, mobile money systems followed a ‘bank-led’ model, which consisted of a partnership between a bank and a mobile network operator (MNO). Two MNOs dominate the market, Digicel, which chose to partner with Scotiabank to roll out a mobile money service called Tcho Tcho, and Voilà, which worked with Unibank to launch T-Cash.
Finally, it is worth noting that beneficiaries using mobile money systems do not need to collect their payment in full. Instead, they can keep a residual balance on their mobile wallet and thus better manage their expenditure. Safe storage of money was invaluable for many beneficiaries displaced in camps after the Haitian earthquake. Finally, regarding food security assistance, people in developing countries often prefer cash and vouchers to traditional food assistance, because they offer more choice and variety (World Food Programme, 2012).

c. Challenges

It is worth considering that mobile money services might also imply some challenges, highlighted by several scholars:

- **A complex replication of the Kenyan M-Pesa’s success**

  The success of M-Pesa took place in a country with a specific population base, economic activity, urban-rural family connections and reasonably extensive bank infrastructure. Safaricom benefitted from strong penetration rates, market dominance and the millions to spend. The replication of the M-Pesa model outside of Kenya should take into consideration these specificities and be adapted to local contexts.

- **Need of more reliable and accurate data about the impact of mobile phones on access to financial services and remittances**

  While limited information is available and companies involved in mobile money highlight the potential impact of mobile technology on the access to financial services, the impact of mobile money on micro and macroeconomic outcomes remains a field to be further researched. To overcome the difficulties in accessing data and the restrictive rules of non-disclosure and privacy, researchers could partner with mobile phone providers and local institutions (Aker and Mbiti, 2010) (Aker and Mbiti, 2011).

- **Being a “transformative” development tool**

  The term “transformative” is understood as a process to make finance and access to markets and services more inclusive. This approach differs from a perspective of limiting mobile money services to a way of extending formal banking, with the involvement of existing banking institutions. Certain entities introduce mobile money services as a way of banking the unbanked through the banks maintaining the predominance and focus on these financial institutions.

  However, reality shows that mobile communication operators are more innovative than traditional banks in the field of financial services. Mobile operators are already serving mass markets in these countries, which banks are not: they understand and adjust to the needs of markets better than banks. This “transformative” role of mobile money services will depend in large measure on whether stakeholders (private sector, governments, international organizations, NGOs, etc.) invest in partnerships and approaches that are appropriate for specific contexts. Several questions remain on the limitations and actual extent of the effects of mobile money services on the welfare of their users in developing countries and, undoubtedly, communication technology cannot replace investments in public goods such as education, power supply, roads and water.
5. Impact on human development of ACP countries

a. Facilitating remittance flows to enhance local development

In the past, considerable literature on financial inclusion has linked the economic growth and social development of developing economies to the access to financial services by its rural and poor populations. Banking the unbanked would lead to better decision-making, more efficient markets, and various others development goals. Financial inclusion has been seen as having a multiplier impact on the lives of people drawn into the formal financial system, leading to social inclusion. The logic behind this thinking was that when the poor people get access to financial services, their cash flow management gets better, their financial planning is enhanced and their savings are increased.

Using the same perspective, mobile money services could be considered a development tool due to the specificities presented above, including the wide territorial outreach (even where roads and other infrastructures are not present), the technological advantage, the potential transparency, the reduction of costs and the increase of accessibility. Mobile money services would encourage more migrants to remit money, which would improve households’ income and thus facilitate safe savings and human capital investments. By increasing the GDP rate per capita thanks to the productivity gains associated with mobile phone communications, mobile money could have the potential to increase incomes (Afful, 2012; Gencer, 2011).

b. Reconfiguring social and communal life

The use of mobile money services is creating new forms of social and communal life (Kusimba et al., 2013). On one hand, sending and receiving mobile money is part of a culture of entrustment (Shipton, 1989): most users in African countries use mobile money as a social and economic tool through which they create relationships by sending funds, airtime gifts and vouchers to family or friends. A wide range of mobile money services includes social gifting, assisting friends and relatives, organizing savings groups, and contributing to ceremonies and rituals. “New forms of social interaction around mobile money recast long-standing traditions of reciprocity and are subject to cultural rules” (Kusimba et al., 2013).

On the other hand, mobile money transfers can have particular impacts on familial bonds and relationships. With the option to send remittances electronically, immediately and affordably, their frequency may increase; yet as the funds do not need to be delivered in person, working persons earning salaries may return less often to their home villages.

c. Empowering rural women by increasing their financial autonomy

Besides the economic aspects of people’s lives, mobile money services may also have a particular impact on social and family structures. For instance, through altering bargaining power, mobile money services may have the unintentional consequence of empowering rural women by increasing their financial autonomy: “Especially among poorer segments of the population, remittances and transfers received (and sent) via M-Pesa are less visible than those transmitted by other means, such as delivery by a friend or relative [hence] the use of M-Pesa could allow women to thwart the complete control of finances by male family members” (Morawczynski, 2009). Women could be able to preserve a greater portion of received transfers, which could positively affect the “allocation of household spending” (Jack and Suri, 2010).
d. Improving food security and nutrition through funding development assistance projects

Mobile money has the potential to be a tool for development assistance projects. For instance, the World Food Programme is using innovative ways to deliver food security assistance, such as scratch cards (“e-vouchers”) delivered to mobile phones by text message. Virtual vouchers can be redeemed for food items or “spent” in selected shops. They are used to tackle hunger in places where there is plenty of food in the marketplace but where poor people cannot afford to buy it. Besides, cash and vouchers can sometimes cut down the costs of transporting and storing food. They may also benefit the local economy because beneficiaries spend the money in local markets.

6. Conclusions

This general overview of mobile transfer systems shows that mobile money services take advantage of their ubiquitous, real-time mobile communications networks and bring financial services into rural villages and everyday retail stores, thus alleviating the lack of banking infrastructure and filling a huge niche in developing countries. The rapid adoption of mobile money services can lead to both positive outcomes and unintended consequences, several of them not fully identified yet. Indeed, by making money transfers faster, safer and more convenient as well as lowering the cost of remittances, mobile money services can contribute to local development. They can improve household incomes, savings and human capital investments; formalize the informal cash economy; facilitate cash transfer programmes for development projects or emergency operations. At the same time, mobile money services may reconfigure social and communal life.

Some questions remain on the limitations and actual extent of the effect of mobile money transfer services on the welfare of their users in developing countries. It will therefore be essential to produce more reliable and accurate data about the relevance and impact of mobile remittances on people’s lives in developing countries.

Transnational families and the social and gender impact of mobility in ACP countries

The intraregional phenomenon of transnational family formation and reunification across African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States reflects a global issue that has not been addressed much on the migration and development agenda. In overall migration policies and debates, the social impacts of migration have received limited attention so far. In particular the positive and negative social effects of mobility on families whose members are based in more than one country need to be taken into consideration.

The most striking observation is the little existing research on transnational families in the South, with most literature on transnational family migration focusing on South–North movements. This phenomenon remains largely unknown due to limited data on its scope coupled with a lack of an adequate policy and legal framework in many countries. There is also a possible link between South–North and South–South transnational family migration.

Transnational families and ties are constantly established, maintained, re-configured and curtailed over time and borders. This background note therefore starts by discussing the definition of ‘transnational family’ and ‘transnationalism’. The second part presents some general types of social impacts of mobility on different members of a transnational family and tries to discuss the possible application in a South–South and ACP migration context. The brief then provides some conclusions, recommendations and good practices for policymakers in ACP countries. No generalizations are possible, as the social impact depends on different factors, such as social class, gender and access to legal entry, cultural practices, the integration into the global economy, political changes and geographical distance (Orellana et al., 2001).

1. Definition and data on social impacts of mobility on ‘transnational families’

Families in western societies are understood as at least two members of a household living in the same residence, related by blood, marriage or adoption (see for instance Bauman, 1997). This can therefore include small units such as (single) parents and their children, or wider relatives living in the same dwelling or being generally related to each other. Those members of the household not related to the other members are not considered as being part of the family.

In South Africa,
- 1 out of 4 households had one member working abroad,
- 4 out of 10 in rural areas (SAMP, 2004)

This number is even higher for
- rural households in Tanzania (50-60%)
- and Mali (80%) (Tacoli, 2002)

Transnational families in the South are largely neglected in research and policy, calling for an increased focus on this perspective

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62 Document prepared by Susanne Melde, Research Officer at the ACP Observatory on Migration. The author would like to thank Ms. Tracy Cudjoe, Focal Point, ACP Observatory on Migration, Trinidad and Tobago, for her research assistance.

63 This traditional conception of ‘family’ thus leaves out more contemporary forms such as cohabitation as well as non-family living arrangements, which are consequently not covered by this Note. Studying changing family compositions in ACP countries due to potentially lesser marriage rates would need to be covered by more research. The note equally does not cover ‘astronaut’ parents developed by Skeldon (1994) as it mostly relates to South–North migration of Asian families with one parent staying behind in the origin country.
Whereas a **Western concept of family** tends to include only small, nuclear units centered on the married couple, in **many African societies, communities and cultures ‘family’ may extend to a large kinship network** in the same village or community.

In West Africa, for instance, families are built around descent, thus brothers and sisters living together. Once married, the spouse moves in with the bride or groom, depending on the prevailing rule of lineage. They do not constitute separate households per se but may represent relatively autonomous units of production and consumption. **Spouses are often not considered to be part of the family** (Oyewumi, n.d.) yet are often still bound by kinship ties, which makes the distinction family/non-family sometimes rather difficult.

These larger families can also exist across borders. The definition of ‘**transnational families**’ developed by Bryceson and Vuorela (2002:3, see text box) indicates the need for a **common link and bonds** between members of a family that are dispersed in more than one country.

**‘Transnationalism’** in itself is defined as ‘the process whereby people establish and maintain socio-cultural connections across geopolitical borders.’ (IOM, 2011 in ACP Observatory, 2011) ‘Transnational families’ can then be understood as collective kinship relations with ‘residential nodes’ (Bjeren, 1997: 237) in at least two countries. These residential units are not static but may change over time in terms of composition through family members immigrating, emigrating and returning. In addition, the households may change due to family formation and changing working arrangements (Zontini, 2002, cited in Zontini, 2007). The element of **transnationalism** of these families therefore challenges the notion of shared residency in families being separated geographically, but maintaining social, cultural, reproductive and income links across borders (Zontini, 2007). The following are some examples of transnational families:

- Fathers leaving families behind to work abroad and unite with wife and children later on;
- Children and young people going to (boarding) school abroad and/or studying abroad (sometimes referred to as ‘parachute kids’; Ong, 1999) and for instance their mothers accompanying them, such as in East and Southeast Asia\(^{64}\) (Huang and Yeoh, 2005);
- (Single) women working abroad, for instance as maids, having to leave their children behind;
- Family reunification;
- One family member returning to care for the elderly;
- A child being sent away to live with relatives,\(^ {65}\) etc.

**Transnational families** is a dynamic phenomenon in ACP countries but the lack of reliable data on family migration disaggregated by sex and age continues to be a challenge.

An important element of families, the sharing of material and financial resources such as income (Bauman, 1997; Schmalzbauer, 2010), becomes transnational in families residing in more than one country. One or more family members, be it a parent(s), siblings or adult children, may be earning income abroad and send parts of it as remittances to family members in other countries. These recipients may focus on the functions of reproduction, socialization and consumption (Parreñas, 2001).

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64 The United Nations definition of South–Eastern Asia includes Timor-Leste, a Pacific ACP country.
65 For the case of children in West Africa, please see a case study on Senegal (Coulibaly-Tandian, 2012).
Migrants, in particular women, are often engaged in both reproduction and income earning activities, which is an important element of maintaining transnational families. Kinship and care work circulating in the families are supporting factors in this regard (Zontini, 2007). Creating, keeping these ties alive and breaking with other members of the family are the basis of transnational families (Bryceson and Vourela, 2002). Geographical distance does not preclude the subjective maintenance of close family relations in terms of emotions and trust (Zontini, 2007).

2. Background and types of social impacts of transnational family life

Transnational families are a common feature of migration, not just in ACP countries. They range from global professional elites to poor migrant workers and are linked to the increase in migration worldwide, but also overall globalization of production (Zontini, 2007). While it was long believed that migrants tend to take a unilateral decision to migrate, this has been complemented by a family perspective over the past years (GFMD, 2010).

Among transnational families, the largest and less privileged group is represented by migrant workers, in particular low-skilled ones. In this group, the development of transnational families is a phenomenon among others closely linked to the global care chain and growing business competition under globalization. The demand for cheap and flexible caretakers in developed countries is often filled by women from developing countries (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011; Zontini, 2007). As these workers most of the times live with the family they work for and due to increased immigration restrictions in many destination countries, including developing countries, many of these care workers have to leave their families in the origin country (Hochschild, 2001; Parreñas, 2001).

The chain does not only include passing domestic tasks from western women to migrant women from the South. The ‘global economy of care’ (Parreñas, 2005) also includes migrant women then needing non-migrant women to take care of their own family (Zontini, 2007; Kofman and Raghuram, 2009; Hujo and Piper, 2010). This is an important South dimension. Women from poorer ACP countries may work for families in better situated families and countries, such as African immigrant women in South Africa and migrant care workers in other emerging countries in Asia and Latin America (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011). This link between South–North entailing repercussions on possibly rural-urban and South–South migration has not been extensively looked at yet. It seems an important phenomenon to analyse, in particular given the rising importance of a class of ‘newly rich’ and the middle class reported in many African and emerging countries creating demand for migrant domestic workers both from within countries and abroad (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011).

Changing values and identity issues

Migrants’ values may change, and their return or diaspora activities may alter traditional culture and norms (Chappell and Sriskandarajah, 2007). New cultures and customs at destination can lead to a reassessment of the migrant’s own ideas and life style, which can affect the interaction
with other family members, both at destination and other countries that family members may reside in. The effect of transnational family life can also include changing norms, such as considering a transnational lifestyle as normal (IOM, 2010b). Socialization may take place based on at least two sociocultural contexts – those of the origin and destination(s). Children that may never return to their parents’ country of origin may grow up in a context where the ever-present culture, people, values and (nostalgia) goods are from the origin country of their parents (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004).

This can lead to issues related to ‘identity’, being the ‘immigrant’ and ‘other’ at destination despite considering themselves part of the society and ‘those that left’ in the origin community. This ‘kind of doubled otherness’ (Vuorinen, 2003: 71) is being defined as ‘different’ everywhere and often based on ethnicity, mother tongue and other criteria. This ‘forced otherness’ (Vuorinen, 2003: 72) may be quite a challenge in particular for middle-aged migrants who do not fully feel they ‘arrived’ in the host society. Younger children, who often learn new languages a lot faster and are thus harder to distinguish as immigrants by language may not consider it as a problem, despite the possible difficulties of defining who they are and where they belong (Vuorinen, 2003).

Changing family structures and social networks

The decision to migrate can be based on where members of the family or community or circle of friends migrated to. Migration can be part of the resource and security strategy of a family, where different family members are assigned different tasks. These can range from taking up higher education (often young men) to taking care of children of migrants or other family members that migrated (often women), as in the case of Somalis in Egypt and North America, thus combining South–South and South–North migration within a family. Resources, such as income, legal status and education of individual family members are factors that can be taken into consideration in collective decisions to determine ‘which family member lives with whom and where’ (Al-Sharmani, 2007: 5).

Migration may impact on traditional social networks, by altering both the actual composition of groups and networks, and by altering the power which each member holds. ‘Broken’ households may lead to new social problems (Chappell and Sriskandarajah, 2007). Care regimes within households and wider family networks may change from parents to grandparents or relatives, from children to parents taking care of children of adult migrants.

The social impact of migration on members of transnational families

- Families as a whole

The impact of migration depends on the member of the family and can differ substantially through gendered differences in power, status and age (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; de Haas and Fokkema, 2009). The decision of who will migrate may be taken jointly by the family, only the head of the family or the migrant without consulting the other members. Tasks are being re-negotiated within the family and possibly based on changed power positions of the different members. Those with financial resources or parental authority may have more to say than others (Al-Sharmani, 2007). While some members may arrive at greater freedom and empowerment from family and wider social constraints through migration, others, for instance if assigned the care of children, the sick or the elderly, can feel that obligations were shared unevenly between those that migrate and those that do not (Al-Sharmani, 2007). This difference can even amount to exploitation, when the more affluent members of a family rely on an extended kinship network for cheap labour at destination (Bagwell, 2008).
Parental power can diminish when children know the local language better and often speak like native-speakers faster than their parents (Orellana et al., 2001; Vuorinen, 2003). This often also leads to faster integration and can represent a notion of changing and new power for children vis-à-vis their parents by acting as mediators and interpreters in the public (Vuorinen, 2003).

The impact of transnational family life can also be tense in the case of remittance-receivers. Those remitting may feel a certain ‘social obligation to remit’ (Melde and Schicklinski, 2011: 6), while those on the receiving end may feel dependent on (an)other family member(s). In some cases recipients may lose incentives to engage in productive work, as has been reported anecdotally for husbands of female migrants from Cabo Verde in Italy. Although this migration does not concern South–South mobility, it highlights an important economic dependency on the performance of one migrant for the well-being of an entire family.

• Migrants at destination

Social effects on migrants and their family members in the host country may be quite frequent due to the feeling of loneliness, depression, exclusion and missing of emotional contact with family and friends. Prolonged separation from other family members is a factor often underestimated. Transnational contacts can help to sustain mental and psychological health as they can play an important role for the psychological well-being, social support and identity of migrants (Mahalingam, 2006; GFMD, 2010).

Undocumented migrants often endure hardships to ensure their children are offered a better life (style), education and health care and relief them from the burden to support the family through work, for instance subsistence farming (Pribilsky, 2004). Often migrants do not expect any problems and sacrifices when settling in the destination country, which can complicate the integration process (Huang and Yeoh, 2005).

Another aspect of migrating is the possible increase of social power due to a privileged status among the family members by providing income, having been chosen to migrate or migrating in itself which can always entails losses in income and (work) status. These personal gains and losses directly influence the social status within a family.

The factors race, class and gender may change through the migration process. Gender roles may be changed through changing heads of households, reinforced or reinvented or create tensions with the predominant ones in the host country (IOM, 2010c). A migrant may suddenly find him- or herself being part of the ethnic minority or majority in the host country. Those carrying out low-skilled work may in fact by highly skilled in their home countries (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004).
• Partners/couples

From the existing evidence of South–North migration, partners are often affected in a gendered way by transnational family experiences. Some find that families where mothers emigrated are more affected by negative stress than when the father migrates. In the latter couples redefined roles and arrangements for the family life and the relationship of the partners improved due to the increased need to cooperate and coordinate despite the hardships throughout the process (Pribilsky, 2004). However, when men migrate, wives often assume the care role, which hardly ever occurs the other way around. Mothers often rely on alternative care networks, most often consisting of other women (Schmalzbauer, 2010).

Spouses moving without their partners may also have to re-adjust to the life of a de facto ‘single’, despite only for the period abroad. Whether the man or the wife migrated, this may include taking on domestic chores traditionally by men seen as female roles. Women would take on the extra responsibilities of the head of household such as ensuring the farming production and other income generating activities and managing income, including remittances (Pribilsky, 2004). Thus the phenomenon of transnational families questions the material inequalities between men and women predominant in many societies, including ACP countries (Parreñas, 2005). Poorer and land-less family members may be asked to substitute for the emigrant partner. The redefinition of roles can lead to exchange between the couple on these new roles, such as men calling for advice on cooking and washing clothes (Schmalzbauer, 2010). This however may entail negative feedback from others from the society at origin, considering men cleaning, cooking and doing the laundry as having lost the ‘respect’ of their wife and children (Pribilsky, 2004: 318).

These processes of negotiating (gender) roles in the family are by no means easy, but could lead to greater freedom of women and men from traditional gender roles (Zontini, 2007). Transnational family life can present a means to leave an unsatisfactory and abusive relationship (Zontini, 2002 cited in Zontini, 2007).

The challenges of transnational space include keeping the marriage alive despite living apart from each other and remaining faithful to the partner during the long absences. Migration can be a factor for spousal abandonment, separation and divorce. Fear of abandonment can be an issue related to the stigma around losing a husband and not being able to provide economically for children. An absent partner can lead to feelings of loneliness, depression and loss of motivation for partners staying behind (Pribilsky, 2004; Huang and Yeoh, 2005). Polygamous marriages, where for instance men take a new wife in the destination country or reunite in the destination country with another wife only, can lead to resentment among the other wives.

How affected one is by transnational family life varies as well. Those at destination may be busy with settling in and understanding a different way of life, where at origin remaining in touch may be a lot more cumbersome (such as by trying to establish a phone connection or travelling a long ways to receive remittances). Deliberately not communicating with the partner is a way of pressuring the other or reacting to behaviour by the spouse that is being disapproved that way (Pribilsky, 2004). The other partner often takes on the role of mediator between the absent parent and the children, explaining the absence abroad and its reasons. Therefore, often not the amount of power changes, but more its manifestations (Pribilsky, 2004).
• Mothers/women

‘Transnational motherhood’ (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997) is especially draining for mothers who have to leave their children behind in the origin country. This may be due to immigration restrictions or the nature of the work, such as living with a family in the case of maids, which also applies to a South–South context. Many of these mothers need to get used to the painful family separation and the feeling of not ‘being a good mother’. Most societies stress the key link between mothers and their children, which increases the burden of mothers migrating as single breadwinner (Parreñas, 2001; 2005; Schmalzbauer, 2010).

However, by children being one of the main reasons for their migration to support them economically, offering them better education, health care and a higher life standard in general, some mothers question the conventional idea of ‘mothering’ (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila, 1997; Parreñas, 2001). Contrary to many migrant fathers, Filipina domestic workers are found to still provide care and take on responsibility for their children from across thousands of kilometers away, including destinations in the Middle East, the Americas and Asia (Parreñas, 2005). At the same time they can realize their own aspirations, an important aspect of the increasing ‘feminization’ of migration.

• Fathers/men

Just as women, many men migrate to support their children. ‘Transnational fatherhood’ becomes difficult as the common cultural notions of the relationship between fathers and children being built on respect, and not a very close bond, is difficult to uphold over long distances. This is the case of Filipino transnational families, including in the South (Parreñas, 2005). Some may try to enforce a rather patriarchal relationship, which proves difficult in light of long absences and when children hardly or do not know their father at all prior to emigration. This complicated relationship may then last until adolescence. Other fathers may distance themselves from their children, also in light of not knowing how to best approach them (Pribilsky, 2004).

Yet transnational family life can also offer men to break-out of the traditional discipline-based relationships to care and establish an emotional bond with their children. This could be considered more modern and progressive than traditional father-children ties (Pribilsky, 2004). However, Parreñas (2005) found in Filipino transnational families the patriarchal conventions were more often reinforced than contested.

• Children/following generations

The separation of the family across transnational space can particularly negatively affect children staying behind (GFMD, 2010). This can include psycho-social difficulties such as feelings of abandonment, low self esteem, anger, depression and/or material obsession that could result in behavioral problems (Bakker, Elings-Pels and Reis, 2009). If children, in particular adolescents, are not involved in the decision-making process of who migrates and where, feelings of resentment towards their parents or father in particular may be the consequence, especially when the education goals for them did not materialize or were devaluated due to high youth unemployment (de Haas and Fokkema, 2009). Missing their parents may be a very painful experience for children of an emigrant(s) (Pribilsky, 2004).

Other challenges include inadequate nutrition, shelter, clothing, proper adult supervision and care (IOM, 2010a). Children may also feel obliged to adapt to the ‘host family’ they are staying
with, in particular when these do not receive any material reimbursement from the children. The children may however contribute to the housework and other labour. Reactions and **coping mechanisms also differ by gender** as boys tend to externalize their feelings, while girls internalize their pain, such as in cases in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Some children may also have to take on the role of parents for other siblings, the so-called ‘parentification’ (Bakker, Elings-Pels and Reis, 2009:10). Children staying behind may also have to drop out of school to work to make up for the missing income by parents who migrated and which cannot be offset by remittances, as observed in Haiti (Bakker, Elings-Pels and Reis, 2009). Migration can also be used as a **disciplinary measure** by parents or communities in transnational families, threatening or using the threat of sending children back to the origin country (Orellana et al., 2001).

**Lower school performance**, even **losing the right to education** in case of undocumented migrants, **no access to health care** and the inability to register newborns are also noticeable effects of migration on children (GFMD, 2010). According to IPPR (2010), the evidence on the effects of absent parents on school attendance of children is not conclusive as the lower school enrollment of younger children in Jamaica is not clearly attributable to migration as the only cause. A higher vulnerability to sexual abuse and exploitation once one or both parents are absent has been found for cases in the Caribbean (Bakker, Elings-Pels and Reis, 2009).

If **family reunification** takes place at a certain point, it can be perceived as both a **gain and loss** as the relationship with the person who took the place of the parents in the care for the child(ren) can be lost in this process or become transnational as well (Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2001). Transnational childhoods of moving back and forth between countries are a phenomenon to take into consideration, while few may actually have the resources to do so and many may only be able to stay in contact via phone or electronic communication (Orellana et al., 2001; Suárez-Orozco and Suárez-Orozco, 2001; Parreñas, 2005).

However, as usually the context matters and generalizations run the **risk of stigmatizing transnational family arrangements**. ‘Broken’ families and migrant parents, especially mothers, are often blamed for behavioural and educational problems of children, which may have occurred without the migration process as well. **Ending the transnational character of family life is often not an option due to the dependence on remittances** as an income. The poorest often also do not have the means to reunite the family and are thus more affected by family disintegration (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011). ‘Abandonment’ may also be a very strong word in situations where children are **provided emotional support** through regular phone calls, letters, audio tapes, video recordings and care packages, in addition to remittances which are often the primary reason for the migration in the first place. The **role of the extended family** in care arrangements and assuming parental roles and responsibilities should not be underestimated (Pribilsky, 2004; Parreñas, 2005).

**Children in families where the mother emigrated seem to be affected** more than in transnational families were the father is away. This can be attributed to the **difficulty to accept the changed role of mothers as more of an economic provider and less of a caretaker** (Parreñas, 2005; Schmalzbauer, 2010).

In contexts of large out-migration, **mobility in itself can become a social benchmark in adolescence**. The formation of transnational families can therefore influence others as well as

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66 Another interesting effect is the large out-migration of care workers on the ability to care for the children staying in the origin country. With high emigration rates of tertiary educated as in the Caribbean not enough care workers remain to supervise children (Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011).

67 This impact is gendered as well. In the Caribbean, it was found that when the mother emigrates, the rates of abuse of a physical, emotional or sexual nature are higher for the children staying in the origin country.
children of transnational families in aspiring to migrate themselves as the realization of a dream. This can include marrying and having children themselves first (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004; Pribilsky, 2004). In other cases it can include second or third-generation transnational migrants who never migrated but after marriage or when having children may activate the links to their transnational past (IOM, 2010b). This can include looking for a spouse or teaching certain values to their children (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004).

- The elderly

Grandparents, in particular grandmothers, can take on a care role in nurturing their grandchildren until they are reunited with their parents. Depending on their availability, health and work they are engaged in, grandparents may in some cases be of support to both parents, in particular if the father stays behind, and grandchildren (Cheianu-Andrei et al., 2011). Grandparents may also play an important role in hosting grandchildren during the summer or take care of them while the parents are at work (Vuorinen, 2003). It is however not studied if they also have to migrate for paid work in the case of death of parents, including through HIV/AIDS, or in case of care for grandchildren with the disease (Kofman and Raghuram, 2009).

Migration may impact the elderly and other family members staying behind psychologically as well. The migration of their children exposes the elderly to a wide range of emotions generated by loneliness and helplessness. However, taking care of their grandchildren may make them feel better and compensates for their feelings of loneliness. In societies where children are considered a provision for one’s old age, the emigration of children can lead to a loss of trust and confidence by their elderly parents. Nonetheless, new information technology can facilitate transnational caregiving.

Migrants abroad may also worry about their parents who stayed in the origin country, wanting or not to move to the destination country as well. The rural/urban divide may play a role, such as parents having lived in the country side all of their life may not be ready to move to a city apartment in another country when they are old (Vuorinen, 2003).

- The social impact of modern telecommunication

Migration may also lead to the strengthening of social networks through information technology, including keeping in touch with family members residing in other countries. Whereas a few decades ago information and communication technology (ICT) was rudimentary and expensive, today many transnational families can benefit from phones, computers, internet-based tools such as digital cameras, video chat and international phone cards. Skype is probably the most common means to virtually connect in lieu of geographical proximity. ICTs and social networks help to overcome geographical distance, national boundaries and time by reinforcing (emotional) connectivity and identities of individuals and family members.

Despite the majority of migrants being lower-skilled and thus economically not the most affluent, they adopted ICT means of communicating early on. This can be linked to the fact that new

The elderly are often forgotten, yet take on roles as both caregivers and receivers in transnational families (Kofman and Raghuram, 2009)

Bacigalupe and Lambe (2011) go as far as calling ICT’s ‘a new family member’ in transnational families, a source of social capital, fostering discourses and helping to create a sense that loved ones are present. This can include messaging between cell phones creating a feeling of co-presence and transnational caregiving.
phone technologies have overcome access barriers that other technologies, such as radio, newspapers, land phone lines and the internet faced. Cell phones are nowadays widespread, even in remote locations where often cell phone stands exist for the use of whole villages and communities, including in many ACP countries (Bacigalupe and Lambe, 2011). However, still not every family has access to phones and internet in many ACP countries as it concerns a question of access/coverage and available resources.

3. Recommendations and good practices

3.1 Research
Despite being a global phenomenon, transnational families and social policies in the South are under-researched. As South–South mobility takes place in very different framework, studies are needed to shed light on this important dimension (Hujo and Piper, 2010; IOM, 2010b). Whereas the topic itself merits more evidence from ACP countries, a few subjects should be prioritized:

- The topic of child migration and children staying in the origin country while their parent(s) emigrated has received increased attention in the Caribbean, but not in other ACP regions yet.

- In addition to children, the elderly should be focused on in studies as in many ACP societies children are an insurance for the retirement age and by migrating they may be able to provide remittances and transnational care, but feelings of loneliness may be difficult to overcome. The elderly may also migrate themselves, but little is known about their experiences, identity issues and choices and dilemmas of where to live. Due to the rapid changes in ICTs, their access and use of them may also be hampered if not supported by younger family members. How care regimes work for them at an old age should also be the topic of research.

- Second generation immigrants may not have visited or lived in the origin country of their parent(s), but may continue to be involved in transnational family life.

- This also applies to transnational relationships where partners originate in different countries and when language and the sense of belonging may become difficult (Zontini, 2007).

- Whereas contemporary forms of ‘family’, such as cohabitation, are common in many western countries, the understanding and structure of families in ACP countries may have very well changed as well. These ‘new’ forms of ‘family’ could be studied with a view to determine changing compositions and needs.

3.2 Use of ICTs

- The price of the use of the internet and cell phones has fallen dramatically over the past years. Nonetheless, some regions are still not covered by signals (such some island parts in Cabo Verde) and some people in ACP countries still do not have access to ICTs in remote locations. To ease communication in general, and with transnational family members, the cell phone and internet coverage in remote locations could be increased through innovative and new technologies.

3.3 Support of different transnational family members

- Children should be considered as actors in the migration process. After a ‘feminization’ of migration, the participation and agency of children should be promoted in research and policies (Orellana et al., 2001; Hujo and Piper, 2010). Children of transnational families can
be supported by programmes, including volunteer organizations, both inside and outside school. Psychological and social services are particularly important (UN GA, 2011) as is the protection of their basic social and economic rights irrespective of their status. This applies to both children staying in the origin country, those reunited with their parent(s) and those migrating alone. Access to education and health care for migrant children is of particular importance (IOM, 2010a) as is support to child-headed households (Bakker, Elings-Pels and Reis, 2009).

**Working immigrant parents** can be supported by providing childcare services and other social services. This can allow family reunification and thus support the psychosocial well-being of the family. In addition, contact with and the support of the local community at destination can help to support the integration process. Female headed households should receive particular attention.

**Migrant parents** should stay in contact with the school of their children to reinforce their educational and supervisor role and to strengthen the support role of the institution and teachers. **Schools** could develop extra-curricular activities for children staying behind (Cheianu-Andrei et al., 2011).

Parents should also appoint legal guardians to allow for the protection of their children and the elderly in medical emergencies (Cheianu-Andrei et al., 2011).

**Elderly migrants** and the elderly staying behind may also need counselling and other supportive social services (Zontini, 2007). Having a ‘neutral’ third party to seek advice from may support any member of a transnational family, home or abroad. In addition, their care work should be supported by governments to avoid stigmatization and assist the many transnational families, which are part of the world of today.

**Countries of origin** should develop comprehensive policies to support families and caregivers of children of migrant workers in their child-rearing responsibilities.

### 3.4 Migration legislation and social policies

Whereas most countries support family reunification, many immigration laws, including in the South, may contribute to the establishment of transnational families. Therefore **immigration laws** should be assessed towards their impact on families (Zontini, 2007; IOM, 2010b). Some temporary work programmes favour mothers with children staying behind to ensure their return, which may underestimate the social costs for the families involved.

In addition, the demand for care workers in developed countries entails significant repercussions not only on their families in
Enabling **visits and return** as well as protecting the human right to **family reunification** is important for the individuals’ well-being (UN GA, 2011). This can ease the strains of being separated geographically. Travel restrictions do not only exist towards developed countries, but also among ACP countries. The reduced stress by access to their usual family structures may also increase their health, productiveness and psychological well-being (GFMD, 2010).

**Legal frameworks** should be developed to ensure every child staying behind is assigned a legal representative (Cheianu-Andrei et al., 2011).

### 3.5 South–South cooperation

South–South cooperation is needed to **harmonize policies and institutional approaches** in ACP countries:

- Promoting **partnerships**, in particular at the subregional and bilateral level (GFMD, 2010);
- **Sharing of experiences**, evidence and social protection mechanisms;
- **Strengthening the legal protection of migrants, children, the elderly and other family members** (Bakker, Elings-Pels and Reis, 2009).
The migration of children in ACP countries:
*Of their own free will or involuntary?*68

### The question of child migration has been of interest to researchers and public decision makers for many years.** However, far from being new, the phenomenon is not in general studied in its entirety. Part of this vast subject is, in fact, a subject of discussion, namely the exploitation, abuse and trafficking of children; these being considered as vulnerable dependents and not as leading actors in their migratory journey.

However, the lack of information concerning the characteristics of migrant children is a major gap in the understanding of the subject. Although no precise figures are known concerning child migration, UN DESA estimated in 2011 that 33 million international migrants were under 19 years of age, thus representing 15 per cent of all international migrants (UN DESA, 2011). When it comes to geographic distribution, young people represent a larger group of migrants in developing countries than in the countries of the North (MacKenzie, 2006).

In 2010, one quarter of migrants in the South were under 20 years of age, 10 per cent higher than the world average (UN DESA, 2011). The proportion of young migrants is particularly high in Africa (28%). These data tell us about the urgent need to increase the political attention that is paid to young migrants in countries in the South.

The lack of information concerning the general trends of child migration, as well as the impacts it can have on children, affects decision-making at all levels and endangers children’s rights and futures. It is therefore becoming urgent to take the diversity of situations through which children can be affected by migration into consideration, in order to reflect, in a more comprehensive manner, on possible solutions.

This report will thus consider the dynamics of child migration and the impacts it can have both on children migrating alone and with their families, as well as on those who remain in the country, those born in the country of destination and those who return to their country of origin.

### 1. Definition and observations

Before going further, it seems necessary to explain a few definitions, in order to clarify the key concepts that will be used subsequently.

**Children/minors**

The definition used in this report will be the one given by Article 1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child69. This states that:

*A child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.*

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68 Document prepared by Olivia Tiffoche, former Junior Researcher at the ACP Observatory on Migration.
This definition remains open to discussion, given that the vision that emerges does not appear to match the view that many communities hold concerning childhood. It seems more plausible to maintain that the concept of childhood varies according to the social, cultural, historic, religious and rational norms that govern a given community, given that the place of children is not the same in each of them.

**Categorization of children affected by migration**

Children may be affected by migration in a number of ways, and its impacts will be different depending on their particular situations. For ease of comprehension, this report will deal more specifically with four categories of children:

1. Children migrating with their parents, members of their family or relatives;
2. Unaccompanied migrant children;
3. Children of migrants remaining in their country of origin;
4. Children born to migrant parents in their country of destination.

**Concept of ‘mobile children’**

The child welfare organization Terre des Hommes refers to ‘mobile children’ when summarizing the various situations in which a child may be affected by migration. This concept refers to the displacement of children between different geographic and social spaces, as well as these children’s experiences during their movements (see graph). It helps with an understanding of how a migratory experience, of any type, may transform their identity and conditions of existence.70

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**Figure 2: What protection is there for children affected by mobility in West Africa?**

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70 A relevant comment made by the Terre des Hommes organization: ‘It is important not to objectify each profile. (…). The significance of this categorization is not to lose sight either of the variety of links between childhood and mobility, or of the need to work upstream and downstream of situations of mobility, in several places and times during a child’s life.’
Main factors of migration: passive children or children at the heart of the migratory process?

If children can effectively be part of the migratory decision-making process, what are the main factors that can influence their choice? A multitude of factors can be cited. An economic and social opportunity envisaged by the child itself or by its family should be considered in the first instance. Work is, in fact, the main reason that leads to them migrating. However, more cultural rites, such as the transition into adulthood, must also be taken into account (Jeffrey and McDowell, 2004; Punch, 2007). In some societies, such as in the Caribbean, children are even considered to be the most mobile actors (Fog Olwig, 2002). Their movements are then experienced as a real cultural tradition.

Regional differences must also be noted when talking about child migration due to specific cultural and social aspects. Consequently, children and adolescents form the largest group of migrants in Africa. In fact, they represent half of the international migrants in the region. In Latin America and in the Caribbean, they represent 18 per cent (Cortina and Hovy, 2009).

2. Children and migration: a future in development

It is difficult to generalize about, or even categorize, the experiences of the millions of children affected, directly or indirectly, by migration. However, this is needed for an overall understanding of the phenomenon. The study of the impact of migration on children will therefore be divided into four distinct categories.

a. Unaccompanied migrant children: exploitation or ‘chosen’ migration?

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that in 2009, 215 million (ILO, 2010) boys and girls worldwide were subjected to child labour according to the definitions of the ILO’s Convention 138 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children.71

However, special situations are not so simple to identify. In many communities, it is considered normal for children to work and help their families meet their needs. The children themselves then see their work as contributing to family life. When a family agrees by mutual consent, responsibilities assigned to children may lead them to migrate.

Fostering or the de facto migration of children in West Africa

Fostering is a common custom there, whereby children, mainly girls, are sent to live with members of their family living some distance away. Children therefore migrate for the purpose of helping with tasks in the host family (HRW, 2007). This practice is seen as normal and socially acceptable, and is not considered as child labour but as necessary support in countries where protection and insurance systems do not exist. However, this social norm leads to numerous situations of exploitation and abuse that parents often cannot imagine. The same system exists in different parts of the world, such as in Haiti with the Restavek.72

71 According to Article 1 of this convention, ‘a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’.

72 Restavek: children sent by their parents to live with other members of their family or individuals having no family relationship with them in order to help with domestic work. (Sommerfelt, 2002; Hoffmann, 2012).

‘My mother sent me to look for tomatoes, and it started to rain so I couldn’t get home. (This lady) told me that she loved me and gave me gifts. So I decided I wanted to stay there’

Fog Olwig, 2012: 938
The foundation of a cultural tradition of migration: example of child mobility in the Caribbean

As Karen Fog Olwig (2012) stresses, child mobility in the Caribbean is an important foundation of the migratory tradition, itself being an integral aspect of most societies in this region. In fact, while Caribbean children generally grow up in family homes, this does not necessarily mean that they live with their own parents. However, **Caribbean children can enter different social spheres more easily than their parents, due to their submission to adult authority.**

Migration of children is an integral component of Caribbean societies, far from the western clichés concerning the latter. Children are thus seen as real social actors contributing to the informal ‘care chain’ prevalent in this region.

**The benefits of child migration**

The extent to which migration is a positive or negative experience depends on a wide range of different factors according to the context, the people encountered and according to the various points on the journey (Punch, 2009). Although situations of exploitation should not be underestimated, **consideration should also be given to the benefits children may derive from migration**, including better education or training, better economic and social opportunities and better access to health services (Dottridge, 2011). The Asociación Grupo de Trabajo Redes (2004) surveyed migrant children that had become domestic servants in three Peruvian cities (Lima, Cajamarca and Pucallpa), and most of them referred to positive situations in which they were treated with ‘affection, patience and love’ by their employers (Testimony of Milulka, age 15, in May 2004; AGTR, 2004, p.27). What they had learned was particularly valued, and some even stressed the opportunities and amenities to which they had access due to living and working in an urban area.

The main risks associated with the migration of unaccompanied children: the specific case of trafficking and statelessness

**Smuggling and trafficking of children**

The trafficking of children, in the same way as that of adults, is a subject that occupies international organizations, governments and numerous non-governmental organizations throughout the world, due both to its magnitude and its dramatic consequences. However, although of tremendous interest, **official figures are very difficult to come by**, due to the clandestine nature of smuggling and trafficking in general. In 2002, the ILO estimated that 1.2 million children were subject to trafficking; with this figure including both internal trafficking and international trafficking (ILO, 2002). In its report, the ILO also set out a geographic representation that is useful in understanding the extent of the phenomenon in countries in the South:

**Table 5: Regional representation of child victims of trafficking**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region (of origin)</th>
<th>Trafficked children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia Pacific</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
<td>550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition economies</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed, industrialized economies</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (rounded)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,200,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ILO, UNICEF, UN.GIFT. Book 1, Training manual on the fight against the trafficking of children for the purpose of exploitation of their labour, sexual and other forms of exploitation.
Today it is estimated that 2.5 million people are victims of trafficking, 22 to 50 per cent of whom are children (ILO, 2005). Beyond a general lack of figures, studies published on the subject unfortunately only give an often all too vague overview of the situation, focusing as they do on one aspect or on one particular region (Bastia, 2005).

Child trafficking is considered to be one of the worst forms of child labour according to the ILO’s Convention no. 182, 1999. However, this struggle, once again based on a western-centric definition, must not prevent the social and cultural aspects of child migration from being taken into account. In fact, the smuggling and trafficking of children is part of the general context of population movements, often for economic reasons, and their boundaries are sometimes difficult to identify.

For further information on this subject, the first background note published by the ACP Observatory is specially dedicated to human trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific.\(^{73}\)

**Statelessness**

A stateless person is considered to be ‘a person not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’ according to Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons\(^{74}\), which is the main international legal instrument established for the protection of stateless persons.

However, the acquisition or non-acquisition of a nationality is essential for all human beings as it gives access to rights, as well as an identity. For example, children, in addition to not having access to basic services such as health care, may be confronted with discrimination or social exclusion due to their lack of nationality. However, the main problem is the fact that these children, without any official papers, have no proof of their status as minors.

**b. Children remaining in their country of origin**

In most cases of economic migration, only those capable of working are designated for migration by their families; the idea being to return most of the funds raised to the family that remains in the country, and therefore to spend as little as possible. For certain families, the underlying idea is therefore to obtain sufficient funds before returning and, for example, starting a local business in the country of origin. In these conditions, and due to the many restrictions on immigration that make any such attempt complex, migrant parents may decide not to take their children with them. The latter are then often entrusted to other members of the family. The consequences of such a situation, which differ according to personal circumstances, depend primarily on the duration of the parents’ migration (Castañeda and Busk, 2011).

‘I miss my father, mother and sister. I wonder why they don’t live with my grandparents and me. I want to grow up quickly so I can live with them.’

*Interview with a migrant child; Liu and Zhu, 2011: 457*
The positive impacts of money transfers

When a migratory plan actually leads to funds being sent, it is important to consider the positive impacts this has on the family remaining in the country. The most significant impacts that can be expected with regard to children are access to education and a reduction in the education gap between genders, a reduction in child labour and, above all, a general improvement in their health. Transfers of funds are, in fact, most often used to meet basic subsistence needs and improve living conditions (IOM, 2006).

In Mexico, a study shows that children from families receiving transfers of funds complete between 0.7 and 1.6 more years of school than children from families that do not have a family member living in a foreign country. It has also been found that an increase in the number of families receiving funds in a town leads to a better level of health and schooling (Duryea et al., 2005). However, this relationship is not always confirmed, and depends on the family’s choices.

Variable living conditions according to the situation of the people responsible for the children

Away from their parents, the role of the people looking after the children becomes fundamental for their development. However, these appointed ‘guardians’ do not always have the resources to accommodate an extra person in their home, and remain social and economic actors who, for the most part, do not have the necessary time and resources to devote to them. Children are therefore often neglected, mistreated and even abused by the people supposed to be protecting them and looking after their development in the place of their parents. This is what some people call the Cinderella Syndrome (Archambault and de Laat, 2009).

Psychological aspects: an undeniable loss of reference points and a family relationship under tension

While many studies look at the economic aspects of migration, it seems worthwhile to look at the issue of the psychological costs that family separation may cause.

While parents who migrate consider that the funds they send their family are a means for them to remain in contact, children separated from their parents are more concerned about the lack of emotional resources they experience on a daily basis. From the child’s point of view, separation is, in fact, perceived as abandonment, regardless of the reasons or circumstances that have led to it. A UNICEF report thus indicates that children separated from their parents due to migration are twice as likely as other children to experience psychological problems, even though their economic situation is more advantageous. The main psychological problems are a feeling of abandonment, sadness, discouragement and even despair, anger and lack of self-confidence, which can sometimes turn into violent behaviour (UNICEF, 2011).

As Grinberg and Grinberg (1984) summarize it, families often pay for the transfer of funds with the psychological trauma generated by migration and family separation.

c. Children migrating with their family

The migration of children with one or both of their parents is an interesting aspect which has nevertheless not been studied sufficiently, since the child is considered to be protected from the numerous risks that migration may involve by its family. However, although this type of migration is often idealized by a description of children in better health and working hard at school, this observation is not always verified and, once more, depends on the context surrounding the migratory process. Two categories in particular need to be differentiated, namely the children of legal migrants and those of illegal migrants. The former, although subject to many forms
of discrimination, in principle have unrestricted access to basic services and therefore to better opportunities. The latter live a life that is more closed in on themselves and their family, imitating their parents’ behaviour due to their feeling of permanent insecurity. Two themes will be emphasized in this report, namely the place given to education in the country of destination and the question of acculturation for children who have experienced two cultures before their adolescence.

**Education: a priority for the family**

Many studies focus on the academic success of migrant children. These refer to children who, in general, arrive with a strong will to succeed, but this view obscures the day-to-day lives of many of them in public schools that are often overcrowded, sometimes violent and where their integration takes place at the cost of numerous obstacles such as the language barrier, segregation, etc.

The migration of children with their parents is considered in itself as a family investment, through the opportunity of a better education, which is the main route to the future economic success of the second generation. This idea is mostly associated with North–South migration. However, it should be noted that such scenarios may also be taken into account in the context of urban migration.

**The attitude of parents with regard to their children’s success therefore appears to be crucial.** Regional variations need to be considered at this point. Several studies have, in fact, shown that parents of Asian origin attach more importance to educational outcomes than their counterparts in Latin America (Kao and Tienda, 1995; Fuligni, 1997).

To these differences must be added the involvement or non-involvement of parents in their children’s education. This is a key point, and one that is affected by the long hours the parents spend at work and during which children are left unsupervised (Cooper et al., 1999; Phelan et al., 1993; Suárez-Orozco et Suárez-Orozco, 2001).

In addition, it should not be forgotten that migration must also benefit those remaining in the country. If the gains made by parents do not live up to expectations, children will find themselves required to participate in ‘family duties’, thus becoming economic actors themselves.

**Assimilation or rejection: a choice between several cultures**

Acculturation is the process of cultural and psychological change that occurs following intercultural contact (Berry, 2003). It is a phenomenon that has been subject to a great deal of study during migrations, given that it modifies a group’s normal relationships, as well as the attitude of individuals in relation to their cultural identity (Phinney, 2003). It is of even more significance for children, since it changes their individual behaviour at an age when they are forming an integrated identity (Erikson, 1980).

However, the long-term consequences of the process of acculturation are extremely diverse, and depend on social and personal variables that relate as much to the original society as they do to the host society (Berry, 1997). Four acculturation strategies are used by any individual, depending on the desire they have to maintain their cultural heritage and identity and to
become involved in the society as a whole (Berry et al., 2006), i.e. assimilation75, separation76, marginalization77 and integration78. The results of the Berry, Phinney, Sam, Vedder study (2006) involving 7,997 adolescents aged between 13 and 18 (5,366 of whom were first and second generation immigrants) in thirteen developed countries79 are interesting to analyse in terms of culturization and acculturation, despite the fact that the study did not directly concern South–South migration. What should be learned from this study is that the ethnic environment in which a child finds itself plays a significant part in the way in which children master the cultures with which they are in contact.

d. Children returning to their country of origin: a difficult experience

The problems encountered by children returning to their parents’ country of origin is one of the least studied aspects of child migration. However, this is becoming a social phenomenon of great importance in many countries in the South, especially as a result of the economic crisis that began in 2007 and the general return of many economic migrants The information provided in this part mainly comes from two studies found on this subject: one describing the experience of Chinese children returning to rural areas (Liu and Zhu, 2011) and the other focusing on the more specific case of refugee children repatriated to their country of origin (Malawi) after the conflicts ended (Cornish et al., 1999).

Second generation migrants: difficult reintegration

Just as we have seen when a child migrates to a destination country, the key problem faced by a child returning to its country of origin (or that of its parents) is that of its integration into a society, the customs of which appear strange to it, and even foreign for children born in another country or who don’t remember anything about their country of origin because they left it when they were still very young. They encounter a variety of circumstances involving readaptation depending on the length of their migration, the reasons that caused them to leave, the cultural and social differences between the areas of residence and whether or not they are accompanied by their parents (Donna and Berry, 1999). Consequently, for example, children born in the country of destination or who have spent a large part of their childhood there show greater reluctance to adapt to their new environment (survey conducted by Liu and Zhu, 2011).

Returning may be even more difficult for refugees repatriated to their country of origin. Rogge (1994) also emphasizes the fact that repatriation is an experience that is as stressful as fleeing from this country, even for the second generation born in the country of refuge, who sometimes find that their new ‘home’ is a strange, even frightening, place. It is important to take this aspect into account in the context of South–South migration, since the vast majority of migratory journeys that take place there are forced.

However, it is important to note that returning to the country of origin may also be the result of the child having suffered a bad experience during its migration, or not having adapted to the

75 Assimilation tallies with a low interest in maintaining a link with their own culture, combined with a preference for interaction with the destination society.
76 Separation is expressed by a desire to maintain their own culture by limiting contact with others.
77 Marginalization exists when contact with the original culture is not maintained, nor is there any desire to interact with others.
78 Integration can be summarized both by the two cultures being maintained and a desire to integrate into society as a whole.
79 Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA.
promised life. In this case, returning is essential for their well-being. This is often also the case for unaccompanied migrant children, due to their feeling of security when they return to their family.

**Representation of the country of birth at the heart of the identity question**

The results of the Cornish, Peltzer and MacLachlan survey (1999) show that the majority of the children who took refuge in Zambia and who returned to Malawi either changed their group identity, considering themselves to be Malawians once they arrived in the country, or were not sure of their own identity. As one of the children interviewed said: ‘I am a Malawian because I am here but I still feel Zambian because I was born there’ (Cornish et al., 1999, p.274). These results thus prove that children returning to their country/village of origin experience ambiguous and stressful acculturation with regard to their own identity. Above and beyond the family cocoon, the role of the reception and support structures once children have returned to the country must not therefore be underestimated.

3. Conclusion: the impact of the children migration study for a better understanding of adult migration

The challenge of this report was to demonstrate the scale of the impacts that child migration can have in countries in the South, but also to understand the main themes of this in order to provide a better response to the needs of this particular category of migrants. Paying attention to the reasons and factors driving migration thus becomes an essential issue in realizing that, putting aside western-centric prejudices, this type of migration may be perceived as necessary, even socially recognized, in societies where intergenerational support, for example, plays a leading role.

The issue to be addressed is why we should pay attention to child migration? The answer is because it is a social phenomenon of increasing magnitude that has impacts on human development on the one hand, and on the other hand because the presuppositions concerning this issue do not describe the complexity of the situation. Therefore, it is difficult to supervise correctly so that everyone can profit from the many benefits it can deliver.

In addition, it is important to consider the issue from a longer-term viewpoint, bearing in mind that migrant children’s experiences have an effect on their way of interacting with society throughout their lives. Consequently, it is not only because the children of today are the adults of tomorrow that it is important to consider them, but also because, in addition to being ‘beings in the making’ (Holloway and Valentine, 2000), they are active agents, inventing their culture and their relationship with society rather than learning those of others (Hirschfeld, 2002).

4. Recommendations and good practices

4.1 Data collection: integrating children as actors in their own situation

Generally speaking, there is a lack of data concerning the impact that migration can have on children according to the different circumstances they experience. It has been particularly difficult in this report to find data about migrant children returning to their countries of origin, bearing in mind that existing data generally only focus on the ‘second generation’ migrants who return ‘to the country’.

The active participation of migrant children is essential for collecting data, but also for the legislation in place concerning them. It is time to consider children as full economic, social and cultural agents, with their own agenda and prospects (Anderson, 1999; Hirschfeld, 2002).
4.2 International protection relating to the well-being of the child and family

Each responsible State needs to ratify all the international conventions that refer to the rights of children and the family, as well as those relating to migrants’ rights, and to promote their effective implementation at national level.

Legislators must consider the special needs of migrant and returning children who, on the one hand, have the same rights as any other child according to the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, and, on the other hand, are affected, directly or indirectly, by the migratory process, giving them special rights that need to be taken into account urgently (Terre des Hommes, 2011).

The fight against child smuggling and trafficking must, above all, be a national priority. To achieve this, the media, researchers and activists from a variety of associations must cooperate, for example by organizing training sessions or discussion forums.

Family unification must be ensured so as not to compromise the benefits of migration. When reunification is impossible due to migration, additional policies or transnational programmes must be set up in order to overcome the constraints of separation.

The authorities responsible for child protection must review the core of their system: The best interest of the child; ethical, legal and social basis for all policies or decisions affecting children (Kopelman, 1997). The main questions remain: who determines the child’s best interest and how? And, above all, how can this best interest interact with the child’s right to express its wishes?

Education must be promoted for all: it is the first step towards social advancement and promises better opportunities in numerous domains such as health, equality between sexes or democratization (UNESCO, 2009).

4.3 Promoting regional cooperation

Given the importance of South–South migration, in particular intraregional migration, it is urgent to regionalize policies linked to immigration. Agreements could, for example, be reached concerning the reception and training of foreign labour or insertion programmes could be contemplated in towns and regions where there is a high level of immigration.
Migration girls in West Africa: 
The case of Senegal

Children, both girls and boys, are known to have been migrating for various reasons throughout history. These kinds of movements are widespread and deeply rooted in the history and sociology of daily life in West Africa and its people. However, in recent years, various issues, such as the scale of and trends in the flow of migration, the involvement of young children and the large number of girls opting to migrate, have confirmed the lack of protection of these migrants as being one of the key concerns of policymakers, national and international child protection agencies, researchers and the media.

The United Nations (2012) reports that globally there were 33.3 million international migrants aged 19 and under in 2010 and they accounted for 16 per cent of the entire migrant population. Children aged 19 and under in Africa represent 28 per cent of all international migrants and nearly one in three migrants in West Africa. Most of these migrant minors are girls (53.6% in West Africa and 50.5% in Senegal; UN, 2012). The scale of child migration and the various types of abuse to which they are exposed explains to some extent the rising number of local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) trying to lend support to these migrants.

There has been some research on child migration and initiatives taken in this area but few take account of the gender issue, even though all sides stress the serious vulnerability of migrant girls and their greater exposure to abuse.

The twofold aim of this paper is firstly to show the general migration trends for minor girls in West Africa, describing a few categories of girls and their motivating factors, primarily based on the situation in Senegal, and secondly to provide recommendations in this area.

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80 Document prepared by Oumoul K. Coulibaly-Tandian, doctoral graduate in sociology and migration and gender relationships, who is also an independent consultant under which heading she has worked in cooperation with a variety of institutions, including the GERM (Migration Study and Research Group), the IDRC, the Gender Laboratory of the IFAN and the Migration and Development Working Group of the CONGAD.

81 A child is regarded as anyone under the age of 18, Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC (1989).

82 Senegal has ratified the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights of the Child, although neither of these pacts is binding. The decision to take various infant-related initiatives, such as setting up a Ministry of Early Childhood, also underscores the greater awareness of a long neglected issue but child protection initiatives are still severely limited.

83 In addition to the major international agencies, such as UNICEF, Plan International, Terre Des Hommes and Caritas, various research groups like GREFELS, local associations and NGOs, generally work on the protection of children’s rights. With support from the Ministry of Employment and professional organizations, the International Labour Organization and the Women’s Committee of the CNTS (Senegal’s National Workers’ Federation) launched a reception, counselling and information centre for young female domestic servants, most of whom are migrants, on 26 May 2011 in Dakar. Press reports are appearing almost every day both in the print media and over the Internet.

84 The choice fell on Senegal not only because it is the country I am most familiar with but also, and above all, because irrespective of one or two differences, it has a lot of features in common with other countries in the sub-region in terms of migration of young girls and boys.
Accordingly, the emphasis of this paper lies on providing a short description of empirically observed situations and experiences relating to the migration of young girls within and towards Senegal and in other countries in the sub-region, such as Côte d’Ivoire or Togo, in light of the literature available on this subject. Owing to its descriptive nature, the paper only analyses key issues of the migration of girls, such as the impact the flows of migration have on the girls and the households involved. To a limited extent gender relations are being analysed. This section does not deal with the issue of trafficking in persons, as it is already covered by another chapter in this publication.

1. Concepts and observations

To put the approach of the paper into context, a definition should be offered of some of the concepts used here, such as “unaccompanied minors” (see text box), “minor” and “migrant”.

**Minor:** generally speaking a minor is understood to mean any person who, under the law of the relevant country, has not yet reached the age of majority. The age may vary from one country to another but it is generally set at 18 or a maximum of 21 years. However, the minimum ages for people to get married or to work may be under 18 and may be different for boys and girls.

The concept of minor may in some cases be synonymous with the concept of child defined by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as “*Every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier*”. On this basis, I define minor girls as any girl under 18. The concept of “minor” is used rather than “child” because child may and generally does refer to people below the age of 15.

**International migrant:** any person who changes his or her usual place of residence for more than 3 or 6 months (UN, 1998, recommended by the ACP Observatory, 2011).

2. Major trends in the migration of girls

In West Africa like in the rest of the world, child migration is very widespread and is large in scale. Irrespective of whether the pattern of migration is at domestic, cross-border or West African sub-regional level, the number of girls involved is significant and sometimes higher than the number of boys.

According to UNICEF, the population aged 10-17 accounts for the majority bulk of the migration of boys and girls combined. However, the under 10 years old represent a significant share, as a result of the support systems within families, which put their children, mainly girls, in the care of their close relatives to be educated. However, the large percentage of under 10 years old is also explained by the number of very young children, barely five years old (Jacquemin, 2009),

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85 A young person in this case is understood to mean any person under the age of 25. A distinction is made between “young” and “child” to distinguish between young adults aged between 18 and 25 and minors under the age of 18, the age of legal majority in most African countries.
Migration of girls in West Africa: The case of Senegal

who migrate to find work in the so-called conventional sectors or turn to prostitution. The age of migrant girls varies not only by category, conditions and factors motivating the departure but equally depends on whether they left by themselves or with their parents.

However, the ages of migrant girls and boys do not apparently differ to any great extent. Talibs in Senegal, Mali and the Gambia, who figure large in the population of boys migrating within or across borders, generally migrate towards the age of five. Other boys who migrate to seek employment in the Côte d’Ivoire plantations, for example, work as street hawkers, or undertake other activities in the various West African towns and cities, are usually more than five years old. Broadly speaking, then, both girl and boy migrants are aged between 8 and 17 in the case of most occupations when they set off in search of work.

Whatever the age and gender, child migration is undertaken on a voluntary or forced basis but it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between voluntary and forced migration. As many of the girls and boys are very young when they leave their villages, the voluntary nature of these migration patterns is somewhat debatable. Furthermore, those leaving voluntarily may subsequently find themselves in constrained situations.

a. Motivating factors or reasons for migrating mentioned by girls

Some observers (Bop, 2010) believe the very young age of the girls and the large scale of their migration are the outcome of structural adjustment policies, whereas others (Jacquemin, 2009) believe the concept of family in many cultures has historically led parents to send their children to other family members. Therefore these policies are believed to have only changed the phenomenon and may have exacerbated the situation.

The many motivating factors the young girls cite are inextricably linked and permeate each other but are also the outcome of various economic, social, political and cultural forces (Fall and Massart, 2007; Massart, 2009; TDH, 2009; Imorou, 2010; Ndao, 2010). And yet, these movements are first and foremost influenced by economic considerations, as a reflection of the poverty suffered by many African families in both rural and urban areas. People mainly rely on natural resources for their survival in most rural areas in Africa, in particular agriculture and related activities like cattle breeding.

The crisis affecting the farm sector in recent years has deteriorated the food security situation and increased other socioeconomic difficulties in these areas. The impact of climate change like drought, unpredictable rainfall, soil infertility in some areas, rudimentary farming practices, among others, have led to a sharp fall or even a stagnation in farm production, a huge decline in farmable areas and yields (Ndiaye, 2007).

In view of this situation, rural communities are seeking alternative livelihood means, including child migration, involving both girls and boys. They generally migrate to work and help their

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86 These boys are placed at a very early age in the care of Koranic masters, who are supposed to educate them, teach them the Koran and the tenets of Islam in general but these young people often end up being used for other financial and sometimes sexual ends.

87 Terre Des Hommes
families left behind in the villages. Referred to by CONAFE\textsuperscript{88} -Senegal (2006), an IRD\textsuperscript{89} survey carried out in the Fatick region, in central Senegal, included 10,136 children, 5,090 of which were girls and 5,046 boys, and 33.9 per cent worked. This survey showed that more girls than boys are engaged in work. Some of them migrate by themselves, while others follow next of kin or leave with their parents.

In the minds of African people, allowing children to leave home or sending them away offers them more opportunities and a way of escaping poverty while also providing assistance to the family. This migration might only produce a paltry of resources but what little there is serves to strengthen the families’ convictions about the benefits of migration, despite the risks involved. Hence parents, the main beneficiaries of these remittances, have a large responsibility in this process.

Apart from economic considerations, other factors include the search for better training and educational opportunities, curiosity about the outside world, individualization strategies, armed conflicts, natural disasters, human rights violations (Imorou, 2010), emulation and the influence of tradition. Another factor is the porosity of African borders making it tremendously easy for children and adults, for that matter, to move around.

In some cases, the children are even involved in the decision to migrate which may therefore be the outcome of rational and strategic decisions of their own. Other children have no choice but to leave home to seek employment in areas requiring only traditional so-called female skills involving work as domestic servants.

b. Migration experiences and categories of migrant girls

UNICEF points to four kinds of child migration: children who remain in their country of origin, those who migrate by themselves, those who migrate with their parents and those born in the country of destination.

The migrant girls under consideration here tend to be more in the \textit{unaccompanied minors} category, even though some attention is paid to \textit{girls who migrate with their parent}. Moreover, the \textit{movements} tend to be more \textit{internal}, within their own countries, and, to a lesser extent, at \textit{international level, mainly on a cross-border basis}. \textit{The scales and durations} of the migratory activities also tend to \textit{vary}.

Domestic work continues to be the main occupation taken up by migrant girls. And, depending on the countries, the category of migrant girls, their departure conditions and arrival status, young female domestics may receive a salary, paid monthly or not. They are also engaged in just this one type of work or together with another occupation, officially, or otherwise.
In order to make it easier to understand our categorization, we shall stress that “little domestic workers”, whether they be internal or cross-border migrants, are understood here to mean girls officially pursuing this occupation in families they are living with, or otherwise, and receiving a monthly wage. Accordingly, those who are not officially regarded as domestic servants and/or do not receive a monthly wage, are placed in other categories, as shown here. In other words, the “little domestic workers” referred to here fall into the category of “paid little maids” as defined by Jacquemin (2009) for Côte d’Ivoire.

Moreover, there are dominant trends but it is no longer possible to refer to ethnic and regional specialities to explain the origin of working migrant girls.

**Internal migration**

These young girls primarily migrate from rural to urban areas (Imorou, 2010). They usually start off in their own districts, particularly when they are very young and over the years they may move to other regions, generally the capitals in their home countries. Two kinds of internal migration can be observed, seasonal or long term, and each one covers various categories of migrants.

- **Seasonal migration:**
  - **“Little domestic workers”**

  Seasonal “little domestic workers” covers:

  - Students who leave to work in the city during their school holidays. Some of them, owing to convenience this offers, a desire to emulate their peers or compulsion, end up dropping out of school to work full time as domestic servants. This is one of the main causes of dropping out of school in Senegal, particularly in the Fatick region. These students working as domestics are aged between 6 and 14 (CONAFE-Senegal, 2006).
  
  - Those who have dropped out of school or never went to school for other reasons, such as the accessibility of the school structures, poverty preventing parents from being able to afford school materials and/or compelling them to send their girls out to work in order to survive and the extent to which a girl’s education is considered as important as compared to a boy’s or not.

- **Long-term migration:**
  - **“Little domestic workers”**

  “Little domestic workers” refers to girls who live away all year, returning to their villages only for family ceremonies or major religious and/or cultural festivities. In the light of the cases observed in Senegal, particularly in Dakar, this category apparently accounts for the majority of domestic staff. These girls are generally aged between 10 and 17.

  - **Entrusted girls**

  These young girls placed in the care of next of kin or acquaintances who do not have any children, or girls, or are quite simply financially better-off and likely to offer them education and a brighter

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90 Girls here refers to girls who, even if they spend the day or week in the family where they work, return to another place, their home, in the evening or on the weekend, which is generally a room rented with other domestics in working class areas of the city. Hence they do not live with their employers but return home every evening or every weekend or even every fortnight. This distinction has to be made to draw attention to girls who live with the families they are working for and return to their villages only for temporary periods. They may be “little domestic workers” or “placed in the care of another family”.

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Migration of girls in West Africa: The case of Senegal
future. They are sometimes related to their host family but not always. They are generally “placed” when they are very young, often before the age of 10. This is equal to the “little niece” category in the Côte d’Ivoire, as described by Mélanie Jacquemin (2009).

Entrusting a family member is the oldest form of movement of children in West Africa. It concerns more young girls than young boys, and the girls can and must help with household and other tasks. Both poverty and solidarity of support systems within families explain this development. Nonetheless, children are not always placed in other families for unselfish motives, as parents are always hoping that their child and they themselves will gain in cash or in kind benefits from it. In many cases, such as in Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and Senegal, it concerns another form and another status for the female domestic servants, which calls into question the concept of solidarity to justify placing these girls in a non-kinship family which is normally supposed to offer them a better future. Some children are even “sold” in the guise of entrusting them to someone else.

Those “placed” owing to a bond of solidarity between families, *a priori* never return to their original family, as they are supposed to have become fully fledged members of their host family. Accordingly, they have little or no ties with their biological parents, particularly when the “adopted” mother has no children.

Others are placed in other families to work have to be paid but not always every month. Some of them are not rewarded on a regular basis but when they return to the village they are paid in kind, as the host family then fills their “suitcases”, also offering money and gifts to the girls and their parents. However, the person for whom they work regularly will provide some money to send to their family or to cover their personal needs. It is not easy to classify these girls.

**“Young girl vendors”**

These street vendors operate alone or as assistant vendors in the streets, along major roads or in the markets. They sell different types of produce, such as locally produced juices (Fléchette and Aduayi-Diop, 2005), water and prepared meals, among others. Most of the girls are placed in the care of other families, or are “little domestic workers” who are taken on especially for this type of work or also perform domestic duties (Aduayi-Diop, 2004).

These girls may combine different statuses and hiring practices, such that a girl may simultaneously be placed in a family, and act as a domestic servant and vendor in the same family or be placed in one family and be a domestic servant and/or vendor in another.

**Girls who migrate with their parents**

These are girls who generally migrate with their mothers because, according to some research (Bopp, 2011), after a certain age, the men remain in the villages while their wives migrate to the cities to find work. They work as domestic servants or help their mothers working as home laundresses, scavenging or selling cereal products and/or looking after their younger siblings while their mothers are out working. They are rarely more than 8 or 10 years old, after which age they more often than not set off to work as domestic servants and/or vendor’s assistants in other families.

The girls do not migrate alone so cannot be classed as “unaccompanied minors” but they may be just as vulnerable and exposed to other forms of exploitation, particularly when they work as domestic servants or street vendors. Even so, they are rarely covered by protection programmes and initiatives.
To conclude this examination of categories and statuses observed in the context of intrastate migration mention should be made of the “rented child” category defined by Jacquemin (2009) in reference to Côte d’Ivoire. These are children who are placed in other families but in return for a payment. This is a category whose members have the characteristics of both a domestic servant and the characteristics of a child placed in a family, as within this context the girl carries out the essential part of the duties associated with domestic work and/or vendor’s assistants. A tacit financial agreement is concluded beforehand between the host family and the girl’s family. These girls are paid every month or upon their return. Jacquemin nonetheless points to the many host families who fail to respect the agreement, exploiting the girls, thus compelling the parents to take back their girls or seek other means of protection.

Intra-African migration:

- “Little domestic workers”

TDH (2009) has provided a description and analysis of a case involving young girls in the 8-14 age category migrating from Akébou in Togo to Accra in Ghana, to work as domestic servants. They are generally placed by intermediaries. Some girls in Togo migrate internally, primarily towards Lomé, while others, the majority according to TDH, set off for Ghana and particularly Accra. Setting off alone, with the assistance of others or under compulsion these girls head for Accra as the prime destination for various reasons, such as its position within easy reach of Akébou and its socioeconomic and historic ties with this region.

TDH has also shown that the migration of these girls are primarily economically motivated on the basis of rational decisions to migrate to Accra but their departures are also planned, resulting from processes carefully prepared beforehand by the families and migrants with “assistans from their own area of origin.

- Beggars or beggars’ guides:
  - Beggars’ guides

These are girls from Mali who their parents place in the care of blind people for financial compensation, while the work involves acting as a guide in Dakar91. The girls are very young, hardly 10 years of age, or even less. These girls seem to be chosen precisely because they are so young and in addition to their obedient natures (Bop, 2011) the minors are likely to soften the hearts of and attract generous donors.

Due to their young age, these girls are more likely to arouse the sympathy of people who will give more generously than they would in the case of adult beggars, for example. They spend their days crisscrossing the neighbourhoods and, above all, the roads in downtown Dakar to lead their employer (the blind beggar) around in search of charity.

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91 Beggars from neighbouring countries are attracted to Senegal because of the reputation the Senegalese people have for strictly complying with the religious ordinances to give alms.
- **Beggars**

For some time now, young Tuareg girls from Niger or Mali have been seen begging in Dakar, Thiès and Saint-Louis with their mothers. These, too, are very young girls, about 5 years old and sometimes less. As in the case of the girls guides of beggars the young age of these beggars appeals to people’s sympathies. The girl beggars are also instrumentalized but this time by their mothers. As they do not speak the local languages, they tend to resort to aggressive begging, grabbing holding of passers-by and only letting go when they receive a coin or two.

Girls from Senegal’s interior regions also arrive in Dakar accompanied by their parent(s) to take up begging, sometimes alone or with their mothers. Save the Children Sweden claims that in the year 2000 Senegal had over 39,000 child beggars, aged 14 or under, working alone or accompanying an adult. CONAFE-Senegal believes the figure is much higher. A distinction has to be made here between girl beggars and beggars’ guides with the Talibes, who are generally boys but beg as well.

- **Young Guinean brides**

These girls migrate to Senegal to join their husbands, who are often vendors in the food trade. As well as carrying out domestic duties, they sometimes help their husbands selling. They are usually very young, between 10 and 15 years old. The incidence of early marriage is extremely high in Guinea, as in many other African countries, particularly amongst the Peul community.

These girls arrive in Senegal, alone, to join husbands who they may hardly know or not at all and are generally much older than the girls themselves. As they do not speak most of the local languages, particularly Wolof, this tends to exacerbate their social and psychological isolation when they first migrate.

- **Displaced people**

These are girls who migrate by themselves or with all or some of their family members to flee from armed conflicts, particularly in Casamance, in the case of Senegal. They mainly head for Guinea-Bissau, Gambia or other regions in Senegal. Children and women are the ones most affected as during any armed struggle. The ages of these girls displaced by conflicts varies from newborn to the majority age.

**c. Impact of domestic work and lack of rights protection**

After looking at migration motivations and types of girl migrants, this section concerns the effects of domestic work on the minors. Some leave of their “own free will” or at the request of their parents, while others are held by adults who exploit these girls economically or sexually.

They work in the homes of private individuals and carry out most of the domestic duties in these homes (cooking, laundering, cleaning, looking after children, elderly people, the disabled, etc.).
They do not have any set working hours, and live-in girls do not have any defined hours, sometimes starting very early in the morning and finishing very late in the evening. Those who do not live in their employer’s home work comparatively shorter hours, but some employers make them work long hours so they arrive home late, only to have to return to work early the next morning. They are all poorly paid and work in harsh conditions. This confinement makes them more vulnerable and exposed to various types of exploitation, abuse and mistreatment. They also face other risks, such as rape, unwanted pregnancies, clandestine abortions, infanticide, STDs and HIV and clandestine prostitution. They often have to contend with sexual harassment and sometimes end up getting raped by a member of the family for whom they work or in the places where they stay. Domestic servants are also often wrongly or rightly accused of stealing, while some employers use this as an excuse for not paying their employees.

The incidences of trafficking or exploitation experienced by many domestic servants apparently do not deter those aspiring to leave or discourage their families. The continuing eagerness to opt for migration is attributed to various reasons, such as a lack of information, the secrecy surrounding experienced migration dramas and the dire poverty of the families. Either the prospective migrants and their parents are unaware of all the risks, or the family’s tribulations, together with an eagerness to head for the city and discover another universe, are severe to the point that the young girls, encouraged by their next of kin, continue to migrate, even when they and their families know the risks.

In the absence of any way of halting the process, owing to such factors as the economic benefits, albeit small, for the families, the need to improve the living and working conditions of these girls, both minors and those of majority age, is being increasingly recognized in national, regional and international fora.

Some families themselves try to develop protection strategies, such as preventing the girls from migrating until they are a bit older (Jacquemin, 2009), or no longer entrusting them with intermediaries, who may direct them towards prostitution rings, or changing host families when these mistreat their girls and/or refuse to pay them. Young female domestic servants are increasingly standing up to their employers, particularly when they reach a certain age, and are more often inclined to refuse certain working conditions. For example, they no longer have any qualms about changing employers, a situation that, paradoxically, incites employers to opt for younger girls who are more compliant.

The social and economic value of domestic work has been increasingly recognized in recent years. In spite of the dire working conditions, ill-treatment, exploitation and other types of abuse, these migration patterns enable these young girls to acquire economic resources, which are invariably shared between the migrant, her family and the rest of the community.

Seasonal workers employed as domestic servants during school holidays are able to use what they earn to buy clothes and school materials when they return home, and purchase gifts for their close family members. This means less expenditure for their parents, who may be able to keep part of the money.
In short, families continue to be the main beneficiaries of the income generated by child migration. However, the income does not create any significant change in their living conditions, particularly as the migrants’ financial contribution continues to be very low but more symbolic than anything else. Even so, it helps to further the socioeconomic progress of these girls and their comparative empowerment. Thanks to the emancipatory benefits of their remittances (Simmel, 1987), which are crucial to the survival of their families, these girls are able to redefine the power relationships to some extent on a small scale within their families.

These girls also build up social capital, learn skills related to hygiene, sanitation and cooking, while gaining new linguistic abilities. They also help create new role models as a result of adopting urban fashions, changing their attitudes towards their families and embracing new customary rules. There is also a change of attitude in matrimonial and demographic terms (Lesclingand, 2004). Working in an urban environment means they may, if they so wish, get married later on and once they are married they will be familiar with the birth control methods required to decide on the number and time in between having their children. They may also become new role models of social success in their native villages.

3. Conclusions and recommendations

3.1 Conclusions

Migrant girls have different profiles and are of different ages according to the motivations, departure conditions and their category of migrant girls. While some girls leave home before or towards the age of 5, most of the migrant girls under consideration here are in the 10-17 age group. These girls mainly work as domestic servants, a category to be found in all African countries (including Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Ghana and Nigeria). Depending on the countries, regions and the spatial scale of the migration patterns, they are placed on the basis of different systems and may have different statuses successively or simultaneously.

These girls start work at a very young age even though article L. 145 of the Senegalese Employment Code, for example, specifies that “children may not be employed in any undertaking, even as apprentices, before the age of 15, unless an exception is granted pursuant to a decision by the Minister of Employment, in the light of local circumstances and the duties they might be required to perform. A decision by the Minister of Employment lays down the type of activities and categories of companies prohibited to young people and the age limit to which the prohibition applies “.

Pursuant to the Senegalese state’s ratification, in 1999, of the International Labour Organization’s Convention 182, pursuant to the Law 99-72, of 14 January 1999, the Government of Senegal re-affirmed its commitment to combat the worst forms of child labour, including domestic work and begging. In spite of the availability of legislative, and judicial, national and international frameworks, children, both girls and boys, are generally working in unauthorized sectors where they are exposed to abuse of all kinds.

Notwithstanding the continuing gender differences, girls are reported to migrate just as much as boys and at varying ages. However, they do not always set off in the same conditions as boys nor are they engaged in the same work activities. They are also subject to social supervision. However, they may all be faced with trafficking situations but the girls are more vulnerable.
Nonetheless, the migration of children, girls and boys, has to be seen against the entire background of its empirical complexity (Ndao, 2009), which points to multiple and diverse dynamic processes and the various and varying effects on these girls and their families. The migration of children is not good or bad in itself, as it may be effective for learning, the development of human, financial and social capital, the redistribution of resources, but they do render these girls vulnerable (Massart, 2009).

Accordingly, by confining themselves to the trafficking issue, some child protection programmes and measures help to stigmatize migration and fail to consider the educational and emancipatory benefits of the process (Lesclingand, 2011, TDH, 2009). However, approaches that adopt a “positive” attitude\(^92\) (Massart, 2009, Ndao, 2009), highlighting the skills, strategies and tactics applied by these young migrants as well as the contribution migration makes, should not overlook the down side as various factors and working conditions may transform this migration into trafficking and a type of modern slavery.

3.2 Recommended action and advocacy

Before migration of girls takes place:

- **Facilitate economic and human development in the areas of origin by:**
  - Tackling the issue of the number girls dropping out of school, which may be both a cause and an outcome of migration;
  - Creating and improving technical education centres for girls outside the school system in their villages;
  - Developing vocational training tailored to their circumstances and at the request of their regions;
  - Raise awareness of parents, the main recipients of the remittances, on the risks girls have to contend with in an urban environment, particularly when they are “isolated”, and multiplying information campaigns;
  - Encouraging parents to register births, as many children in African villages do not have birth certificates, thus making it possible to find out their exact ages\(^93\) and making it easier to gather this information in the census.

As migration of girls takes place:

- **Data collection and research**
  - Undertaking in-depth quantitative and qualitative research to quantify the migration process as a result of data gathering and analysis, and facilitate exchanges of information between states, and to identify more effectively the actual causes and motivating factors, and the experiences and, above all, taking into account the specific features of each country, each community, each group of migrant girls, etc.;

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\(^92\) The champions of this “positive” attitude support the idea that these movements are a result of family and even individual survival strategies, thus the struggle of children in search of various advantages such as financial resources for themselves and their families, well-being and training.

\(^93\) They often lie about their age, while their lack of identity papers makes the work of the relevant organizations more difficult and may end up misleading certain employers.
Disseminating the research findings and involving the media more in prevention and awareness-raising campaigns, focused on the risks of girls suffering abuse, by offering the press documented and reliable materials;

Ensuring official narratives, research and measures are consistent with the experiences, expectations and needs of the target populations: the migrant girls themselves and their families.

Gender

Improving the extent to which gender issues are included in child protection agreements and programmes.

Agency

- Refraining from the tendency to underestimate personal and rational decision-making in the context of migration without overlooking the constraints and all the types of abuse girl migrants have to contend with;
- Taking account of self-protection strategies for girls.

Law and protection

- Conducting advocacy campaigns for the ratification of international conventions, including the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families and the Convention concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers;
- Monitoring the measures taken and ensuring the enforcement of existing conventions;
- Paying more attention to an often overlooked category, girls who migrate with their mothers and are just as vulnerable as other migrants.

Cooperation between various stakeholders

- Involving civil society more in programmes for protecting the rights of these girls;
- Promoting and lending more support to local organizations, such as associations launched by former domestic workers.

To conclude, the issue of migrant girls undertaking domestic work provides an opportunity re-examine the question of power relationships between women.
The right(s) thing to do:
*Migration, development and human rights in ACP countries*94

1. Introduction

Effective protection and respect for migrant’s human rights, as established by international, regional and national legislation, is necessary in order to ensure that the individual conduct secure and productive lives. It is also necessary to ensure respect of the rule of law and a larger productive and well-functioning society. Nonetheless, **migrants’ human rights violations are still widespread and commonplace in international migration** (GMG, 2008). Violations of rights can be both the cause and the consequence of migration, making respect for human rights a significant issue at the country of origin, in transit and at the destination country among ACP countries.

The issue with regards to the implementation of the international human rights conventions at national level is that it often distinguishes between citizens and non-citizens. Through citizens’ rights the power (and possible arbitrariness) of the state was limited. **Today citizenship is based on the understanding that rights and political membership are linked to being a member of a nation-state** (Basok et al., 2006), which per definition does not include migrants while residing in another country. Citizenship guarantees the existence of the State’s power over its nationals (Siciliano, 2012: 121). While with the rise of importance of non-state actors, such as transnational corporations, the role of the state has been affected, it is still the principle duty-bearer towards citizens and their protection. At the same time, **state sovereignty also defines who can enter a country and thus become part of the jurisdiction of a country, in this case migrants**. Therefore, there clearly are human rights aspects to traditionally sovereign questions about the admission, treatment, and removal of non-nationals. Reconciling these disparate elements of human rights of migrants and sovereignty has not been very successful so far (Goodwin-Gill, 2000: 164).

While not a new topic, neither an issue which lacks support in hard law, **implementation of international and regional standards still to some extent pose a significant challenge**. This background note will therefore provide an overview of some of the main aspects of the rights of migrants to outline the debate and issues at stake, while taking a focus on ACP countries. Good practices will be presented, together with recommendations on how to foster a rights-based approach to migration and development.

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94 Document prepared by Leila Marzo, former Junior Researcher, and Susanne Melde, Research Officer, at the ACP Observatory on Migration. The authors would like to thank Olivier Ferrari, Christina Oelgemöller, Monika Peruffo and Kristina Touzenis for their insightful comments on an earlier draft.
2. Human rights of migrants

International migration law, of which part is stipulating the human rights of migrants, has been compared to a puzzle, with many pieces that need to be put together to get the full picture (Lillich, 1984: 122). The legal regime governing human mobility is divided into different subcategories. These are: (1) the law of international treaties, (2) customary law and (3) soft law, meaning non-binding instruments adopted by States and intergovernmental organizations (Chetail, 2012).95

2.1 International human rights treaties relevant to migration

There are nine core human rights treaties.96 Migrants are thus entitled to fundamental rights as human beings which are enshrined in the main Human Rights Covenants listed above, while certain subgroups of migrants are covered by the protection stipulated in special treaties. These include labour migrants,97 trafficked persons and smuggled migrants,98 refugees and asylum-seekers,99 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and those rights covered by consular and diplomatic law.100 Trade law,101 maritime and air law are also applicable to certain persons on the move (Chetail, 2012). Thus not only human rights law is relevant but also thematic or group-focused international agreements.

In addition, several agreements have been concluded at the regional levels. Some focus on human rights102 and others on rights related to free movement.103 Given the large number of regional groupings that ACP countries belong to, with several being members of various, and the

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95 These can include declarations and recommendations by international bodies that provide guidance on the interpretation of international conventions and foster intergovernmental cooperation.

96 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (entry into force: 1969); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (entry into force: 1976); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entry into force also in 1976); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (entry into force in 1981); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (entry into force: 1987); Convention on the Rights of the Child (entry into force: 1990); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (entry into force: 2003); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (entry into force in 2008); International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (entry into force in 2010).

97 International agreements include ILO Convention No 29 concerning Forced Labour (entry into force: 1932); ILO Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1950); Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1951); ILO Convention No 97 concerning Migration for Employment (1952); Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (1957); ILO Convention No 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (1959); ILO Convention No 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1960); ILO Convention No 118 concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security (1964); ILO Convention No 143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (1978); ILO Convention No 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (2000).


100 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961); Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1967).

101 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS, 1995).


predominance of intraregional mobility, the regional component seems to be another relevant level of engagement for rights issues in ACP countries. **Harmonization of existing national laws, with regional frameworks and protocols in place, should thus be considered a priority in parallel with international obligations** (see Oucho et al., 2013 for the East African Community).

A key issue in international migration law is the **ratification of treaties versus their implementation.** Once an international treaty is signed, usually by the Head of State, a state can no longer take actions which go against the obligations in the instrument. Through ratification at national level the state has an obligation to implementation. Ratification thus means that new legal instruments need to be passed at national level and existing laws amended if contrary to the treaty purpose. The passing of national laws does however not guarantee their actual implementation for different reasons. In some cases, countries sign and ratify a convention without the political will or capacities to realize and protect those rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005).

### 2.2 Customary law

Certain human rights norms are considered *jus cogens*, or obligatory norm, in international law. The **principles of non-discrimination and equality before the law** are such mandatory norms. These fundamental rights mean that no one should be discriminated against when it comes to the applicability of national laws. The principle of equality before the law thus applies to migrants as well and has been emphasized several times by regional and international monitoring bodies. **Differential treatment of migrants/non-nationals** – which is different from the principle of non-discrimination – is justifiable if it is **proportionate for the implementation of a State’s immigration policy**, thus leaving a large room for manoeuvre to States (Chetail, 2012). In practice, this often leads in particular to irregular migrants not being entitled to the same rights as lawful residents due to the irregular status of the migrants through having gained unlawful entry to a country.

The Inter-American Court on Human Rights considered that **undocumented workers could not be discriminated against in the enjoyment of their labour and social security rights** (Chetail, 2012; Weissbrodt and Divine, 2012). **Argentina is a good example of how foreigners are treated equally in their 2004 migration law, including irregular migrants. This policy has functioned as a model for migration law reforms in other countries in the South American region.**

### 3. The importance of protecting the rights of migrants

Having seen the legal framework, this section highlights the **main aspects that make migrants a group with a need for a higher level of protection:** their vulnerability, exclusion and their involvement in the informal sector, connected to the two previous aspects.

### 3.1 Vulnerability

Migrants constitute in many cases a vulnerable group. Not only do they suffer an **inadequate juridical protection** in many countries, but their vulnerability can also be linked to a list of **adverse economic, social and institutional factors that impede migrants’ enjoyment of rights** (Ghosh, 2003). For example, they might not master the official language(s); they can be unfamiliar with the host state’s legal system and administration; and they can be detached from their

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traditional supports and family. The vulnerability of migrants can even result in their death, where for example there have been numerous articles in the press describing many cases of migrants drowning in unsafe vessels or suffocating to death in overcrowded truck ships that give cause for deep human rights concerns (Bhabha, 2005).

Migrants, however, are a heterogeneous category. Not all of them face the same vulnerability regarding the protection of other rights that some specific groups are entitled to (GMG, 2008). Some of the most vulnerable migrants are children, refugees, women, disabled, irregular migrants, elderly migrants and those with disabilities.

3.2 Exclusion – occupying the space of ‘nonexistence’

Exclusion can mean discrimination, which is prohibited in all Human Rights treaties (GMG, 2008). Conversely, racial and xenophobic discrimination have ended up being part of the everyday lives that affect migrants, both documented and undocumented (Rodriguez, 2005).

A study on Senegalese migrants in Côte d’Ivoire and Gambia (Coulibaly et al., 2013) shows the reality of inequalities that migrants face by comparison to the nationals of the country in essential areas such as health and education. For example, the study found that migrants from Senegal in Côte d’Ivoire and Gambia end up paying twice the price to access health services as a penalty for not being a full citizen. In this way, citizenship clearly implies exclusion of non-members and this exclusion can be described as a space ‘where people are but where they do not exist’, what Coutin calls a space of nonexistence (2003).

3.3 Vulnerability and exclusion related to work in the informal sector

As a consequence of the vulnerable position of migrants, and related to their feeling of exclusion, migrants in many cases end up getting involved in the informal sectors of the economy where they face abuse and violation of their rights as a result of their undocumented status. What is more, exploitation often starts before they have even left home. In many countries in the South, unregulated recruitment agencies target the vulnerable, demanding huge loans to cover their fees for arranging travel and placing them in work (Rylance, 2010).

This abuse of migrant workers is present all over the globe, and is hard to combat because many companies are increasingly moving their production activities to the informal sector where legal requirements of pay and working conditions are not followed. Since undocumented workers have practically no power, their employers can pay lower wages and offer no job security or safety in the workplace (Mattila, 2001). Further, since human rights violations against migrants in the informal sector are not visible in the public sphere, they are particularly difficult for civil society to monitor. One of the main measures to protect basic worker rights are the International Labour Organization (ILO) standards. They establish a worldwide minimum level of protection from inhumane labour practices through the adoption and implementation of these measures. Many activities to protect working rights have been taken up by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), such as the launching of the campaign to combat human trafficking, ‘We are All workers-We have rights and duties’ in Jordan, to help sensitize the public on this issue (IOM, 2013).
4. Links between migration, development and human rights

Human rights have been considered a key issue in the migration – development debate, including in fora such as the annual, state-led and informal Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). Nonetheless, similar to the ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights into development cooperation, often human rights are mentioned without fully integrating them conceptually and in practice. To ensure a proper rights-based approach to migration and development would mean to consider e.g. access to education for migrants not a goal, but an entitlement. In this case, if migrants are barred from entering schools or other social and health services, to give an example, they would need to have effective access to redress.

A ‘rights-based approach to migration’, founded on references to international legal obligations by states parties to international human rights conventions (see for instance Elias, 2010), was also not transferred effectively to the migration and development debate. This normative approach has been particularly promoted by the ILO, with a focus on workers’ rights due to its mandate (Grugel and Piper, 2007).

Patrick Taran (2009) highlights the tension between the protection of migrants’ rights as an expression of normative values in many industrialized states and the inherent logic of the neoliberal profit-maximization dictum that hinders their actual implementation in practice:

*Rights and social protection carry costs, an implication that confronts the logic of globalized economic competition. Limitations in the exercise of rights by migrant workers are directly linked to assuring that their labour remains a competitive advantage.* (2009: 152)

Taran further draws out ‘a broader clash between value systems’ (2009: 157), being a rights-based approach and an economic interest-driven approach where political and economic spheres intersect.

5. Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990) in ACP countries

As mentioned previously, one of the main obstacles in protecting migrants’ rights is the implementation and enforcement of existing human rights instruments. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW hereafter) also suffers from a lack of ratification. This section will look into the ratification of the (ICMW in ACP countries and look at why these countries have presented so little interest in ratifying this convention.

The ICMW covers the entire migration process of migrant workers and members of their families. It extends them rights and protection at all stages: preparation, recruitment, departure and transit; stay in States of employment; and their return to and resettlement in their countries of origin or in States of residence (Art. 1). It has been described by de Guchteneire and Pécoud, as a ‘more precise interpretation of human rights in the case of migrant workers’ (2009: 8). Figure 2 represents the number of ratifications of UN international human rights treaties per year in the ACP countries and provides an idea of the attention it has had from these states. Regarding the ICMW, a total of 17 ACP countries have acceded or
ratified it out of the 46 ratifications it currently has (data from 15 April 2013). Figure 3 gives the general picture of ratifications of the treaties at a global level. From comparing both graphs one can see that ACP countries do not ratify less than other countries.

Graph 13: Ratification of international human rights treaties in ACP countries, 1965 to 2013 as of 15 April 2013 (cumulative ratifications)

Graph 14: Ratifications of international human rights treaties worldwide, 1965 to 2013

Many reasons could be mentioned here which would clarify why there has been this slow level of ratification and implementation of the ICMW in ACP countries. Some reasons to consider are for example, that some African countries do not ratify the ICMW because they are more interested in the existing agreements at the regional level. In West Africa there are a series of treaties of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These aim at managing
migrants flows, so the ICMW is then perceived either as redundant (as these other treaties already deal with migrants’ rights) or as inefficient (as these regional agreements are better implemented). The ECOWAS provides, for example, for the acquisition of community citizenship and provisions for the regularization of illegal migrants. Nevertheless, undocumented migrant workers – who compose the majority of migrants in a country like Nigeria – are nevertheless excluded (Adedokun, 2003).

In the Asia Pacific region, very active NGOs have managed to promote the ICMW but its content remains unclear to many policymakers. The ICMW has very little visibility in the public sphere and as a consequence, states often have misleading ideas on its impact on their policies and practices in the field of migration (Piper and Iredale, 2004). As for the Caribbean States, they are still at the beginning of realizing the full implications of existing migration dynamics (Barrow-Giles and Marshall, 2003) and many of them have not ratified the ICMW despite being a region facing many migration issues.


Many are the examples that could be given to illustrate the violation of migrants’ rights around the globe. This section presents three South–South migration case studies from African, Pacific and Caribbean countries where human rights and human development have been affected in one way or another. These have been selected for being cases that occurred very recently and because they well exemplify various migrants’ human rights issues, covering several types of migration: from internally displaced migrants due to natural disasters, like in the case of Papua New Guinea, to stateless persons in the Dominican Republic, to victims of human trafficking in Gabon. In no way does this selection signify that the countries mentioned are the only ones that struggle with adherence to and implementation of Human Rights standards.

6.1 Pacific: Internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Manam Island, Papua New Guinea

There is a lack of reliable information about the number of displaced persons due to natural disasters and their human rights concerns (OHCHR, 2011). The case study presented here exemplifies some of the human rights issues that IDPs in Papua New Guinea (PNG) are facing after having been evacuated from their island. This was due to the 2004 volcanic eruption that displaced a total of 9,000 inhabitants in Manam Island. The population from this island was sent to camps with no possibility of returning as, in 2005, 85 per cent of the island was covered in ash.

The volcano is still active today, with the most recent eruption being in January 2013 (Dawnport, 2013). The main human rights concerns here are the conditions that displaced persons live in and the problems they have to face, such as gender-based violence and discrimination issues, reported sexual abuse and domestic violence as well as clashes with the local community claiming the land they were on was theirs (OHCHR, 2011). All of these issues worsen as time passes. There is the serious risk that protracted displacement situations lead to more critical rights issues, such as lack of access to basic services (e.g. health and education).
6.2 Caribbean: Haitian descendants in Dominican Republic – a case of statelessness

Most of the Haitians that first arrived in the Dominican Republic migrated in search of a job in the sugar cane plantations. Haitian labourers have been described as the ‘backbone’ of the Dominican Republic’s wealth (Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 2004: 88).

Haitian descendants range from Haitian immigrants who have lived in the Dominican Republic for many decades, to second and third generation ‘Haitian-Dominicans’- people of Haitian descent who were born in the Dominican Republic (Wooding and Moseley-Williams, 2004: 16). One of the major preoccupations in the country is the non-recognition of the nationality of some of these Haitian descendants, who were born in the Dominican Republic, and also that they do not have Haitian citizenship. This denial of nationality and cause of statelessness has brought many conflicts, as this is denying the right to equality before the law, to a name and to recognition of their legal personality – rights which are set out in the American Convention on Human Rights which has been ratified by the Dominican Republic (Wooding, 2006).

6.3 Africa: Trafficking of Nigerian migrant workers in Gabon

Hardly any reports have been written on the situation of trafficked persons in Gabon. This country is considered mostly a destination country for victims of human trafficking. The US Department of State places Gabon under Tier 2, which means that it is a country whose government does not fully comply with the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act’s minimum standards, but is making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. Many of the migrants trafficked to Gabon are from West African countries and the majority arrive from Benin, Togo, Nigeria and Guinea (US Department of State, 2012). Victims are typically trafficked into the country by boat, arriving on deserted beaches. The journey some of these migrants make by boat sometimes has a tragic ending, such as the case of the recent boat found on the Nigerian coast, where 166 migrants were on board and more than 40 did not survive.

In the case of Nigerians, the great majority of those who are trafficked are migrant workers who originally chose to leave Nigeria in search of a better life, but immigration restrictions did not allow them to do it in a regular, legal and transparent way, so they turn to smugglers to facilitate their travel and work placement abroad (Nwogu, 2006). Girls that are trafficked to Gabon generally work in domestic servitude, market vending and restaurants (US Department of State, 2012). In all, the dimension of trafficking-migration necessitates legal protection of the rights of migrant workers.

107 According to UNHCR there are at least 12 million stateless people worldwide who need to become citizens.
109 Tier Placement is based more on the extent of government action to combat trafficking than on the size of the problem. The US Department places each country in the TIP Report (2012: 37) onto one of the four existing tiers.
110 For the TVPA minimum standards see: www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164236.htm.
7. Conclusions, recommendations and good practices

In ACP and other developed and developing countries, human rights issues are not specific to migrants, but of general concern. It may therefore be more valid to approach for instance workers’ rights in a holistic way, keeping the specific vulnerability of migrant workers in mind when designing specific instruments to enforce existing laws and international obligations (Melde, 2011).

In addition, it is important to understand that migrants’ rights are not just important because of the need and obligation to protect the individual human being, but also because of the link these have with development. It has been recognized that without the protection of human rights the human development potential of migration will be hampered, even if this claim is still far from being a reality today.

As South–South migration flows are greater than South–North flows (Hujo and Piper, 2007), it is very important that the ACP Group of States set their preferences towards protecting the rights of migrants, at the country of origin, transit and destination. The regional level seems to be of particular importance, both in terms of regional human rights frameworks and given that almost all six ACP regions have enacted or drafted free movement protocols. Nonetheless, these protocols do not replace Human Rights obligations, but simply represent a specific legal framework for movement.

The key recommendations are:

7.1 Legal Framework

There is no need to have more international legal instruments to protect the right of migrants, but there is an urgent need to intensify the efforts across the board to ensure that the Human Rights commitments that States entered into at the international level are effectively put into practice at the national legislative level (GMG, 2008: 25).

There is need to harmonize national legislation with the relevant international agreements and regional free movement protocols (Coulibaly et al., 2013).

Regional or bilateral agreements, such as ECOWAS, do not provide a comprehensive framework for the protection of migrants’ rights, and cannot therefore be considered a substitute for the International Convention on Migrant Workers or other international or regional legal instruments pertaining to rights (Cholewinski, 1997).

Dual citizenship should be encouraged in order to protect migrants’ rights and support their integration in countries of destination, while keeping links with their country of origin. It could also help development in the country of origin in various ways; by facilitating cross-border labour mobility and increase remittance inflows (Nalane et al., 2012; Oucho et al., 2013). In addition, dual citizenship can potentially allow for enhanced political participation at home by the diaspora, through securing the right to vote (Marcelino et al., 2013).

Good practice: Concerning the case of labour migrants, which are a very big part of contemporary migration and directly or indirectly linked to the world of labour (ILO, 2004), a good practice on their treatment are the migration laws from Rwanda (Immigration Law
2006), which is the State considered as the one having the most comprehensive and versatile immigration legislation among the East African Community countries, regulating both citizen and foreign labour in the country. The Rwandan law does not grant preferential treatment to foreigners or nationals as it governs locals and nationals, and internal as well as international migrants without discrimination (Oucho et al., 2013).

7.2 Increase the awareness on the human rights of migrants

There might be now an opportunity to put the human rights of migrants at the top of the agenda through the international discussions that are taking place, such as the United Nations High-level Dialogue (HLD) on Migration and Development in October 2013 and the annual Global Forum on Migration and Development.

In order to protect the rights of migrants it is very important that they themselves have a good understanding of what rights they are entitled to and have credible knowledge of the situation they are in (Mehta and Gupte, 2003). NGOs and migrants’ associations, such as the Senegalese associations in The Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire, often play a key role in awareness-raising among migrants.

7.3 Cooperation between stakeholders and further research

Cooperation between Governments in countries of origin, transit and destination, civil society and migrants themselves is essential to ensure that international Human Rights Instruments are implemented (GMG, 2008).

In order to protect migrants from their vulnerability and exclusion, an example could be if migrant associations could establish voluntary health insurance and social protection schemes for the migrants that, in the vast majority, are participating in the informal labour market (Coulibaly et al., 2013). However, it needs to be kept in mind that the provision of these services remains the main responsibility of the State.

Further research is needed in the area of human rights and migration, as well as their link with development. A study on Nigerian diasporas (Olatuyi et al., 2013) proposed that more State involvement is needed to seek appropriate measures to redress the violation of the diasporas rights in the host community, to help their participation in the development of their countries.
Global phenomenon, invisible cases: 
*Human trafficking in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific*¹¹²

Trafficking in persons (TiP) constitutes a grave crime against the individual. The absence of comprehensive data presents a major issue, including in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Many cases go unreported as victims are too afraid to testify, cannot escape exploitation, are expelled once identified or do not seek official protection. TiP from refugee camps and shelters after disasters is also of concern. Trafficking does not only occur across international boundaries, but also internally.

1. The concept and the international legal framework

Trafficking in persons is defined in the 2000 *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children* (Palermo Protocol), supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as

> ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs’.

What are the shortcomings of this definition of trafficking in persons?

- Does not specify if trafficking routes are internal or international;
- Focuses primarily on prevention of crime rather than protection of human rights;
- Limited obligations to address the rights of victims;
- Trafficking in persons may also involve illegal crossing of borders.

Ratifications of the Palermo Protocol and other relevant international instruments

Of the 79 ACP countries, 52 States signed and ratified and 19 accessed to the Palermo Protocol that entered into force in 2003 (UN, 2011). Almost all ACP countries ratified the 1930 ILO Convention No. 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, the 1957 ILO Convention No. 105 concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour and the 1999 ILO Convention No. 182 on the Prohibition and Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (UN, 2011). Trafficking and in particular child trafficking are increasingly recognized as key issues in ACP countries.¹¹³

Most cases of trafficking in persons remain unknown: only 0.4% of all estimated victims are identified (U.S. DOS, 2010).

What is Trafficking in Persons (TiP)?

1. **Action:** recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons;

2. **Means:** use of force, deception, coercion, abuse of power, position of vulnerability and absence of informed consent;

3. **Purpose:** Exploitation as the purpose of Trafficking in Persons.

The recruitment, transportation, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation is considered TiP as well.

¹¹² Document prepared by Susanne Melde, Research Officer, and Brahim El Mouaatamid, Research Assistant, ACP Observatory on Migration.

Smuggling of migrants and TiP are not the same. Smuggling is an organized way of irregularly entering another country and violating that State’s laws, whereas trafficking constitutes a crime against an individual (IOM, 2010a). However, smuggling can result in TiP when an individual is exploited in the end.

2. Figures and key trends in ACP countries

Data on trafficking in persons is difficult to collect due to the clandestine nature of TiP. Existing data can provide at best indications on trends yet may over- or underestimate the real scope of TiP due to methodological weaknesses or lack of representativeness. No generally accepted criteria for the identification of trafficking cases exist.Trafficked persons may not seek protection, do not want to be considered as victims or are not able to report to the authorities out of fear of reprisal from the trafficker or being deported (Gould, 2010; Laczko and Danailova-Trainor, 2009; Surtees and Craggs, 2010).

Causes of trafficking in ACP countries can be (perceived) poverty, weak governance, armed conflict, misinformation and lack of protection from discrimination. Large family size, lack of educational opportunities and unemployment can also make a person vulnerable to TiP. The demand for inexpensive labour, adoption, traditional practices (e.g. early and forced marriages) and trafficking during and after conflicts act as pull factors as well, which tend to be overlooked in research and policy (UNICEF, 2005; Laczko and Danailova-Trainor, 2009).

Costs of TiP include human rights infringements, potential negative human development outcomes due to coercion, deception and exploitation, lost remittances (Laczko and Danailova-Trainor, 2009) and several billions of USD in annual profits for traffickers;¹¹⁴

Human development can counter TiP by addressing some of the factors of vulnerability to TiP, yet also lead to more migration and trafficking as people may aspire a better life abroad.

East Africa

Trafficking flows in East Africa are intra and interregional, but also directed towards Europe and increasingly the Gulf States (IOM database, 2011; U.S. DOS, 2010);

Women from Ethiopia are trafficked through Kenya and Tanzania to avoid Ethiopian recruitment regulations protecting their rights and are then abused as domestic workers in Lebanon (Adepoju, 2005);

Girls from India and South Asia have reportedly been trafficked to Kenya (Adepoju, 2005);

In recent research, no cases of men being trafficked from East Africa and the Horn of Africa to South Africa have been identified as such, yet the distinction between trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants is often blurred (IOM, 2009).

¹¹⁴ USD 9.7 billion in Asia/Pacific; USD 1.3 billion in LAC and USD 158 million in sub-Saharan Africa (Belser, 2005).
Central Africa

- **Trafficking is often linked to West Africa** as origin or destination, as in the case of child trafficking networks (U.S. DOS, 2010), yet also to South Africa and Europe;
- Trafficking cases from **Cameroon** were reported to Switzerland and South Africa, whereas the **DRC is a country of origin for trafficking within Central and to Southern Africa** and faces internal trafficking (IOM database, 2011).

West Africa

- **Trafficking in children** takes place extensively in the region, including internal trafficking (IOM database, 2008 and 2011);
- **Nigeria** is the only ACP country among the top 10 countries of origin of international TiP worldwide (UNODC, 2006b);
- **Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal are the main origin, transit and destination countries** of women and children trafficked to Europe, the Gulf States, other African countries and internally; in the case of Nigeria some were trafficked to Tajikistan, Turkey and Iraq; Ghanaian boys are trafficked internally for exploitation in the fishing industry (IOM database,* 2011).
- It is important to note that data from the IOM trafficking database is project-specific, capturing data only from victims who seek help and where IOM programmes exist. Thus the numbers and the elaboration may not be entirely representative of the local reality nor is the total population of trafficked persons at a given time known. Yet it provides useful information on the socio-economic background of victims and the trafficking process.

Southern Africa

- In Southern Africa, **intraregional trafficking**, including of children, takes place from and to almost all countries (Adepoju, 2005; Bermudez Gauer, 2008; IOM database, 2011; IOM, 2003);
- **South Africa is a main destination country for trafficking** in the region, including from other sub-Saharan African countries; but also for trafficking from Thailand, China and Eastern Europe, and faces internal trafficking (Adepoju, 2005; Bermudez Gauer, 2008; IOM database, 2011; IOM, 2003);
- A study found a high level (71%) of awareness of internal trafficking in South Africa (Bermudez Gauer, 2008);
- **Male refugees in South Africa** have been found to traffic women there for sexual exploitation, taking their earnings and helping them to apply for refugee status in return (IOM, 2003).

The Pacific

- The Pacific region is a source, transit and destination for TiP, including of children; from and to Asia, to the United States and U.S. overseas territories, yet more data is needed to shed light on the phenomenon (UN ESCAP, 2009; U.S. DOS, 2010);
- **Timor-Leste is a destination country of trafficking** of women and men from Asia (U.S. DOS, 2010; IOM database, 2011);
- **Papua New Guinea is an origin, destination and transit country** of trafficking in men, women and children for sexual exploitation and forced labour from and to Asian countries, yet internal trafficking is occurring in addition to the South–South trafficking flows (U.S. DOS, 2010).

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*Boys who were trafficked internally in Ghana to work in the fishing industry. © IOM 2003 - MGH0007*

**Trafficking myth:**
- Only TiP of women and girls;
- Only for sexual exploitation.

**Fact:**
- Men and boys are trafficked as well (44%, ILO, 2005);
- Also includes other forms of economic exploitation (87% in LAC and 84% in SSA, Belser, 2005).
Caribbean

The Caribbean is a region of origin, transit and destination of trafficking in women, men and children, both intraregionally and extraregionally, including from and to South and Central America, South and East Asia as well as from sub-Saharan Africa to the region (ECLAC, 2009; U.S. DOS, 2010);

The region has been found to be a transit route for trafficking towards North America (via Eastern Caribbean countries) and Europe via the EU Overseas Departments (Gallina, 2010);

Internal trafficking exists in some countries as well (Guyana and Jamaica; IOM, 2005b);

Children trafficked for domestic work, including the restaveks in Haiti, are of particular concern (Gallina, 2010).

3. Existing national and regional frameworks

Innovative examples of legislations exist in all ACP regions, highlighting the political will to combat this exploitation. Of the 79 ACP countries, Mauritius and Nigeria have reached tier 1, which means that they fully comply with the minimum standards of the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. Most are ranked in tier 2 (50, of which half are on the tier 2 watch list) and only 8 are listed under tier 3 for a lack of efforts to comply with the US standards (Haiti and Somalia are considered special cases, for 17 ACP countries not data is available; U.S. DOS, 2010).

Since the entry into force of the Palermo Protocol in 2003 and until 2009, at least 23 ACP countries introduced anti-trafficking laws and some countries have developed legislation to combat child trafficking. In about 15 countries other legislation counters TiP (IOM, 2005; 2010b; UNODC, 2009; see also the IOM Database on Migration Law for national legislations).

Upon request by the UN General Assembly, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2009b) developed a Model Law against Trafficking in Persons to assist countries in revising and amending existing legislation and adopt new legislation. It can be adapted to the individual country needs to implement the provisions of the Palermo Protocol.


The East African countries Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania have specific anti-TiP legislations in place. Other countries drafted laws or are applying other legislations, for instance to fight child abduction and stealing (UNODC, 2009; Government of Kenya, 2010).
In 2008, Mozambique was the first Southern African country to adopt anti-trafficking legislation in the region. In Zambia, the Criminal Code includes a provision against trafficking, yet not a definition. The Prevention of Organized Crime Act (POCA) of Namibia prohibits TiP. All countries have legislations in place that combat trafficking, even in the absence of specific TiP laws. The SADC Ministers responsible for combating TiP adopted the ten-year Regional Strategic Plan of Action on Combating TiP, especially Women and Children, in May 2009 (SADC, 2009; UNODC, 2009; U.S. DOS, 2010).


In the Caribbean, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Suriname passed counter-trafficking legislations. The Cabinet of Trinidad and Tobago approved the Policy Framework laying the ground for legislation in 2010 (IOM, 2005; 2010). The Secretariat of the Organization of American States (OAS) created an Anti-Trafficking in Persons Unit offering training and assistance to Member States (UN HRC, 2010). In 2002, the Interamerican Commission of Women of the OAS adopted a Resolution 225 on Fighting TiP, Especially Women, Adolescents and Children.

In the Pacific, Papua New Guinea finalized the draft Bill against People Smuggling and TiP and prepares to submit it to Parliament. The draft Law to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons in Timor-Leste is reviewed by the Inter-Agency Trafficking Working Group (IOM PNG; IOM Timor Leste). The Bali Process on People Smuggling, TiP and Related. Transnational focuses inter alia on inter-agency responses, developing model legislation on combating TiP and training.

4. Recommendations and good practice examples

4.1 Data and research: A global issue requiring national data

Baseline information on TiP is needed from several sources for evidence-based policy approaches. Mechanisms for data collection and information exchange need to be created or improved, including on the experience of returnees and internal trafficking.

An example for common criteria to identifying cases of trafficking are the 67 indicators developed by ILO and the EU under the Delphi approach (another example: IOM and FM.I, 2009).

Data management on TiP touches upon issues of data quality and comparability, the context of data collection, the representativeness of statistics, confidentiality of information and institutional Codes of Conduct (Surtees and Craggs, 2010).

Mozambique was the first Southern African country to adopt TiP legislation.

A Counter-Trafficking Model Legislation, based on existing laws in Belize, Guyana and Jamaica, is also available for the Caribbean (IOM, 2008a).

Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste recently presented draft TiP legislation.

Need for data and research on TiP and human development as well as re-trafficking to foster policy coherence.


3 Pillars of the Palermo Protocol TiP response:
- Prevention,
- Prosecution and
- Protection.
Addressing basic needs such as providing shelter, food, clothing and medical and psychological care.

Research and policy should avoid treating and labeling trafficked persons as ‘victims’ as it may overlook their own choice and agency in the process (IOM, 2009; Gould, 2010).

Information and communication technologies are changing demand and recruitment of trafficked persons (UN HRC, 2010). Research is needed to assess these negative side-effects of the internet and develop policy-oriented recommendations.

4.2 Human rights - based approach to trafficking

A comprehensive normative and institutional structure, based on a clear definition of TiP is needed. Effective enforcement is often lacking but needed to deter traffickers.

Protection and assistance to victims need to be prioritized. Witness protection, such as the Guidelines by ECOWAS (2009), safety and security are important incentives to allow victims to testify. Victims should not be criminalized and be protected from stigmatization and xenophobia. Rehabilitation and social integration measures are particularly important for children who were trafficked and forced to become child soldiers (IOM, 2008; UNHCR, 2010).

Campaigns to register children should be devised to reduce the risk of TiP. In cooperation with UNICEF, the Ministry of Home Affairs of Namibia opened offices at hospitals and created mobile units to provide birth certificates and identity documents to children (HRC, 1989; U.S. DOS, 2010).

Promoting regular migration channels and promoting, respecting and fulfilling the rights of migrant workers can help to address the human rights and development challenges of TiP, especially in sectors where many trafficked persons are forced to work (UNODC, 2006a).

Men and boys are affected by trafficking in persons as well.

Perceived poverty, inequality and discrimination are key drivers of TiP.

Sustainable returns are needed through monitoring and protective measures to avoid re-trafficking (Jobe, 2010).

The ‘Buy Responsibly Campaign’ launched in 2009 seeks to include consumers by raising awareness on the demand for forced labour and exploitation.

4.3 Gender

Protection against gender-based violence and discrimination of women and girls is needed.

Gender-sensitive responses also need to increase awareness on tackling the situation of men and boys in protection and assistance (UN HRC, 2010). As a good practice, the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development provides equal provisions for girls and boys.

4.4 Policy coherence: Human trafficking as a human development issue

Measures to decrease the vulnerability to trafficking can include measures to enhance human development, such as investment in basic social services, education campaigns in schools, vocational training and offering alternatives to parents with large families. Micro-credit schemes for parents can offer the means to protect their children. Job training for young people is of particular importance in light of high youth unemployment and the effects of the financial crises. In Cameroon, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs specifically targets girls through an education programme in the Northern province (UNICEF, 2003).
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other development tools in ACP countries, as is the case in several African countries and Haiti, can be the basis for developing comprehensive counter-trafficking strategies at national level that also tackle corruption.

4.5 Fostering multi-stakeholder cooperation across countries

Cooperation between origin, transit and destination countries needs to be fostered, such as in the Cooperation Agreement on Combating Transborder Trafficking of Children signed in 2000 between Mali and Côte d’Ivoire (UNICEF, 2005).

Multi-stakeholder engagement should include NGOs and other civil society organizations, international organizations and the private sector. One example is the Government of Zimbabwe, OASIS Zimbabwe and IOM providing protection, advice and assistance, such as shelters, to trafficking victims and their families (IOM, 2009).

Regional organizations, such as the African Union through the AU.COMMIT campaign to implement the Ouagadougou Action Plan, or ECOWAS, can play an important role in promoting policy coherence and assisting governments in developing national legislations.

At the national level, task forces such as the Nigerian National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons (NAPTIP), including law enforcement, immigration and prosecution officials, is a good example of creating inter-ministerial agencies.

Capacities of officials working on trafficking-related issues need to be built to increase the knowledge on existing legal framework and programmes. International organizations, such as UNICEF, UNODC, UNHCR, ILO and IOM, offer trainings in many ACP countries.

The media plays a key role in disseminating information through campaigns, such as the MTV EXIT (‘End Exploitation and Trafficking’) campaign of raising awareness through concerts, TV and radio spots in Ethiopia and Timor-Leste, sponsored by the USAID and supported by IOM in Dili, Timor Leste (IOM, 2008 and 2011).

4.6 Monitoring and evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation of counter-trafficking measures need to be assessed regarding their effectiveness and potential unintended side effects, such as stigmatization of all returning trafficked persons or migrants in general (Laczko and Danailova-Trainor, 2009).
1. Introduction

Irregular migration is one of the most sensitive issues at the center of current migration debates, both at bilateral and multilateral level. Much has been written on South–North irregular migration, while little attention has been given to irregular migration within the South. As in the case of labour and regular migration, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries tend to be perceived merely as transit or second best option countries in a final attempt to reach Europe, Northern America and Australia and New Zealand respectively. However, evidence from ACP countries shows that irregularity is an important aspect of South–South migration presenting a series of specificities which are often overlooked.

UN DESA (2012) estimated that the number of international migrants moving – both regularly and irregularly - between developing countries is almost the same as those going to the North (73 million versus 74 million in 2010). However, figures of international migrants in the South are likely to be higher, due to the general lack of information and inaccuracy of data on irregular migration. Consequently, irregular migration in the South and its specificities are key elements to be taken into consideration both at the research and policymaking level.

After having defined irregular migration and its characteristics, this background note therefore aims at providing a general overview of the main irregular migration patterns in ACP countries and some emerging trends. Some good practices and recommendations tailored to countries in the South will finally be provided.

2. Understanding irregular migration: concepts and definitions

Irregular migration is perceived by destination countries as the entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations, while from the perspective of the sending countries, the irregularity is when a person leaves the country without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfil the administrative requirements for leaving the country (IOM, 2011). Often confused with other phenomena, irregular migration is a particularly politically sensitive issue, since on the one hand it undermines the legitimate functioning of government authority to regulate the entry and stay of non-nationals in its territory, while on the other hand, irregular migrants are in vulnerable situations, suffering all kinds of dangers, hardships and infringements of their human rights (IOM, 2008).

Defining irregular migration can be particularly challenging, as no consensus on this term currently exists at international level. However, definitions do matter, as an erroneous understanding and labelling of this phenomenon can bring lack of clarity on its characteristics and consequently undermine both the protection of migrants and the adoption of effective and coherent policies. This section is therefore aimed at reviewing the different definitions of irregular migration and

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to analyse to what extent it is related to the phenomena of mixed movements, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.

Irregular migration is defined by the International Organization on Migration as ‘a movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries’ (IOM, 2011: 34). An irregular migrant (or a migrant in irregular situation) is therefore ‘a person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country’ (IOM, 2011: 54). Hence, not only entering a country without authorization but also overstaying a visa implies being in an irregular situation, even if the entry has occurred through regular channels (ICHRP, 2010).

In different degrees of nuances, this phenomenon is often referred to with a variety of other terms, namely clandestine migration, defined as ‘secret or concealed migration in breach of immigration requirements’ (IOM, 2011: 14) and non-documented or undocumented migration, referring to the situation of migrants who lack a legal status in a transit or host country (ICHRP, 2010; PICUM, 2012).

The term “illegal migration” is negatively politically charged, as it carries a devaluing, discriminating, criminalizing and dehumanizing connotation. Commonly used by the media, this term fuels public distrust and anger towards migrants as well as the assumption that irregular migrants are involved in criminal activities (ICHRP, 2010; ACP Observatory, 2011; PICUM, 2012; International Detention Coalition, 2013).

Irregular migration is driven by complex forces, including the lack of livelihood opportunities in the country of origin combined with the lack of regular migration opportunities and the demand of cheap labour in destination countries (GCMI, 2005). Reasons for migrating irregularly can be multiple, including restrictive migration policies in the countries of transit and destination and/or poor understanding of the travel requirements of those countries, among others. In some cases, undocumented migration is chosen due to the high costs to obtain travel documents and visa granting or other procedural constraints, as for instance long waiting times and only centralized entities issuing passports, not always accessible to the population residing in rural areas or far from the capital (Murrugarra et al., 2011).

The condition of irregularity is not static but can vary over the course of the migratory experience (Santos et al., 2013). Asylum-seekers fleeing persecution can for instance be forced to used irregular migration channels, but should be recognized as refugees in countries of destination and no longer have irregular status. On the contrary, it is also possible to pass from a condition of regularity to an irregular one. Not only migrants can enter the destination country regularly and then overstay, but also those who have regularized their status can return to a condition of irregularity. This is particularly true in the South, where limited access to services, freedom of movement and lack of opportunities may push refugees to move on irregularly from the country which originally recognized them as refugees - so-called secondary movements (IOM, 2009). This is also the case when blanket refugee status recognition is lifted. In Tanzania for instance, the cessation of refugee status recently left thousands of Burundi migrants with an irregular status.
For instance, a significant - although unknown - number of refugees of Burundian, Congolese, Eritrean and Rwandan origin are believed to move irregularly from the Dadaab and Kakuma refugees camps in Kenya in order to look for better opportunities elsewhere outside the country, namely in Southern Africa (UNHCR and IOM, 2010a).

a) Irregular migration and mixed movements

Mixed migration flows are defined as “complex population movements including refugees, asylum-seekers, economic migrants and other migrants” (IOM, 2011). Mixed migration is therefore a broad term in which different groups of migrants can overlap, travelling along the same routes and with the same means of transport but with different motivations and objectives (UNHCR and IOM, 2010a).

The main characteristics of mixed migrations flows are therefore a) the multiplicity of factors driving such movements, including the seeking of protection and a better livelihood, or a combination of both; b) the different profiles and needs of migrants involved (IOM, 2008).

Mixed movements are therefore somehow linked to the phenomenon of irregular migration, in the sense that those movements often (but not always) involve irregular travel, meaning that migrants move without the requisite documentation and arrive at their destination in an unauthorized manner (UNHCR, 2007; IOM, 2009). Inversely, not all irregular migrants are necessarily involved in mixed migration flows, as for instance migrants who overstayed their visa or migrants violating the rules on sojourn of non-nationals (e.g. migrants working on a tourist visa).

b) Irregular migration and smuggling of migrants

Irregular migration is often incorrectly used as a synonym of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons (TiP). Furthermore, smuggling and trafficking are often confused as being the same (Garrett and Mahoney, 2006).

Although an interrelation between irregular migration and smuggling exist in some cases, it is fundamental to emphasize the differences among these terms.

Article 3(a) UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime (2000) defines smuggling of migrants as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (United Nations, 2000).

Migrants may not be aware of the risks of smuggling, a dangerous and harmful experience which often represents the only option for migrating to seek better opportunities or escape persecution or difficult economic situations in the absence of sufficient regular migration channels. In this context, migrants requesting the services of a smuggler – often referred to as ‘facilitator’, ‘broker’, ‘guide’ or ‘agent’ – may perceive the latter as a positive figure despite the criminal act smuggling entails.

116 See for instance Schloenhards (2001) who refers to “the phenomenon commonly known as trafficking in migrants or people smuggling”.

Migrant’s voices:
“I left Gambia for Libya because of poverty. I am the oldest brother, so my duty was to make sacrifices and help my family.”
(Interview with a Gambian migrant, 2011).
While smuggling always implies irregular migration, it is important to stress that irregular migration is not always linked to smuggling. In fact, migrants can enter a country in an irregular way without any help from a smuggling network or enter the country regularly and then overstay.

Smuggling should not be perceived as the cause of irregular migration, but rather as the consequence of the lack of legal migration opportunities and restrictive policies (De Haas, 2007). Furthermore, differently from the common perception, smugglers are not always part of large international organized criminal networks but instead tend to be independent small or medium size groups which operate locally (De Haas, 2007).

c) Irregular migration and trafficking in persons

Smuggling of migrants must be distinguished from trafficking in persons, is defined under international law as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” according to Article 3(a) of the Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime.

Smuggling of migrants refers therefore to the facilitation of irregular transit across borders, while cross-border trafficking is the movement of migrants to be forced into an exploitative situation. To clearly distinguish these two phenomena, the motive and perspective of the smuggler or trafficker should be taken into consideration. In fact, while the intent of a smuggler is to facilitate irregular border crossing in order to earn money from this ‘service’, a trafficker aims at obtaining financial gain from the exploitation of the persons he is trafficking (Garrett and Mahoney, 2006).

Although the international debate often focuses on the irregular migration aspects of trafficking, it is important to highlight that this crime cannot be considered as a manifestation of irregular migration, as it involves both international and internal migration and can be perpetrated also through regular migration channels (Cherti et al., 2013).
3. Irregular migration in ACP countries: trends, figures and routes

a) Africa

Irregular migration patterns in Africa are extremely complex due to the imposition of artificial borders by colonial powers often not recognized by the population, the difficulties of border control and the high level of informal migration within the continent. Apart from undocumented migration within and from the continent, African countries are increasingly becoming a destination for low-skilled Asian migrant workers from Bangladesh, China, India and Pakistan, among others. Often recruited to work in Africa by illegal travel agencies, these workers are frequently brought to the destination country continent on a tourist visa in exchange of high fees (Gong, 2007). African countries might also be used as transit points to Europe for an unknown number of Asian migrants, who usually enter on a tourist or business visa and then join the African migration routes (Liberti, 2008; Politzer, 2008).

Five major macro-routes classified per sub-region used by migrants in mixed flows can be identified within the African continent. However, it is fundamental to stress not only that this classification per sub-region is merely indicative, but also that the migration process may last several years and include several stages of regular migration, as for instance within the ECOWAS area (Van Moppes, 2006). Furthermore, many locations can simultaneously be a place of origin, destination and transit.

i. The Northern routes

- The Libyan corridor

Among the estimated 1.8 million migrant workers living in Libya before the 2011 crisis, more than half (1 to 1.5 million) were in an irregular situation (IOM, 2012).

The city of Agadez, in central Niger is the current major junction of migration routes connecting Sub-Saharan and Mediterranean Africa (De Haas, 2007). Migrants proceeding from Western Africa, namely Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin reach Agadez from Niger’s capital Niamey, while Central African migrants arrive through Nigeria. According to recent figures, 42 per cent of migrants transiting through Agadez are from Niger, followed by Nigerians (33,5%); Ghanaians (15,30%), Senegalese and Malians (4,6%) (Tabapssi, 2010).

The crossing of the Sahara desert towards North Africa may include different stop-overs, which can vary in length from a few weeks to several years. From Agadez, the Libyan route continues towards Dirkou oasis in Northern Niger and Sebha oasis in Southern Libya. Migrants proceeding from Darfur, Ethiopia and Eritrea enter through Kufra oasis in the South-eastern part of the country (De Haas, 2007).

The journey usually takes place in big trucks or pick-ups, in which migrants are crammed in extremely precarious and dangerous conditions, and it is facilitated by different connection men (also referred to as tchzga or cokser) organized per nationality or ethnicity. Prices start from 25 Euros, which rapidly increases up to more than 200 Euros including bribes for border police and army (Liberti, 2008).

- The Algerian/Moroccan corridor

This route connects Agadez (Niger) with Tamanrassett, in southern Algeria and continues north to Maghnia, from where irregular migrants eventually enter in Morocco through Oujda, in the
north-east part of the country (Liberti, 2008). Traditionally a country of emigration and transit, in the last decade Morocco became a major destination hub for Sub-Saharan migrants, partially as a result of the externalization of the European borders (Cherti and Grant, 2013). Furthermore, the instability faced by neighboring countries since the rise of the Arab Spring is likely to have an impact on the increasing number of irregular migrants reaching the country (ibid.).

Nigeria, Mali, Senegal, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Cameroun are believed to be the main nationalities of irregular migrants residing in Morocco (Machichi et al., 2008; Cherti and Grant, 2013), whose undocumented status deeply affects their daily life. In particular, the lack of work or residence permit obliges migrants to live in a clandestine status which exposes them to labour exploitation as well as different types of discrimination (including for instance higher rents compared to locals) and violence (Cherti and Grant, 2013; MSF, 2013).

ii. The Western Africa route

In Western Africa, undocumented migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, but also from Asia, move together with regular migrants in the region in the framework of the ECOWAS protocol, which makes it impossible to quantify the number of migrants transiting and residing irregularly in the region (Van Moppes, 2006; Tabapssi, 2010).

Thanks to both its growing economy and its strategic geographical position for migrants en route to the Maghreb, Niger is a major migration hub within West Africa being at the same time an origin, destination and transit country. The main countries of origin are Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Senegal, Chad and Sudan. Out of the estimated 202,163 international migrants residing in the country in 2010, only 10 per cent have a regular status (Tabapssi, 2010). (Tabapssi, 2010).

As a result of the increased restriction of European and North Africa migration policies, Mauritania, Cabo Verde and Senegal became new transit and eventually or destination countries (De Haas, 2007; Mohamed-Saleh, 2008; Ndiaye and Robin, 2010). Irregular migrants in Mauritania mainly proceed from neighboring countries as Senegal and Mali, but anecdotal evidence of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals has also emerged (Mohamed-Saleh, 2008). At the same time, Mauritania is also an origin country with a high number of labour migrants informally moving to Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo (Salem, 2010).

iii. The Eastern African route

Mixed migration flows from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia toward Yemen and Gulf States across the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea also represent an important flow with some 107,500 African migrants and asylum-seekers arriving by sea from Obock, Djibouti and Bosasso to Yemen registered in 2012 (Van Moppes, 2006; UNHCR, 2013). Djibouti itself has become a de facto destination country for several thousands of undocumented migrants (RMMS, 2013).

While in the past years, Somali asylum-seekers constituted between a quarter and a third of all arrivals to Yemen, the number of Ethiopians has been rapidly increasing and currently dominates irregular migration flows into Yemen, with roughly 84,000 irregular arrivals only in 2012, meaning 80 per cent of the total irregular arrivals (UNHCR, 2013; RMMS, 2013).

A very low percentage of Ethiopian undocumented migrants intend to seek asylum. They are usually considered economic migrants by Yemenite authorities, and they often try to travel onward to Gulf States (RMMS, 2013). Their irregular status exposes them to the risk of exploitation, violence and sexual abuse in both transit and destination countries (UNHCR, 2013; RMMS, 2013).
iv. The Southern route

Mixed movements from East Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region to the southern part of the continent by land, sea and to a less extent by air have been rising over the past decade, although their magnitude is largely unknown (UNHCR and IOM, 2010). Estimated 17,000 to 20,000 people travel irregularly from Somalia and Ethiopia per year (Horwood/IOM, 2009). While South Africa is the main destination, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are also becoming alternative destinations (IOM, 2013). The most popular transit countries include Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Ministry of Home Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2008; IOM, 2013). Over four million million undocumented migrants are believed to live in this country, but this figure is a mere estimation (UNHCR and IOM, 2010a). While a substantial number of migrants travel by water, sea travel has decreased in popularity due both to piracy and increased patrolling by authorities. Overland travel seems, therefore, to be the most common (IOM, 2013).

Irregular migration from the Great Lakes region is also poorly researched and documented. A significant number of undocumented migrants from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have been settling in the northwest regions of Tanzania in the past years. Figures are, however, extremely inaccurate, rising up to ‘hundreds of thousands of persons’ in 2008 (Ministry of Home Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2008). Since the 1990s, mixed movements from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been growing, with 30,000 to 40,000 Congolese estimated to live in South Africa in 2010 (UNHCR and IOM, 2010a). Burundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been identified as the main transit country used by Congolese migrating to South Africa (IOM, 2013). In comparison with Somali and Ethiopian migrant groups, DRC ones tend to travel as family units comprising more women, children and elderly (IOM, 2013).

Irregular and mixed movements from other countries of origin to southern Africa states also have to be mentioned. The presence of Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani irregular migrants along the southern routes has been reported, probably moving onwards from the Gulf States (UNHCR and IOM, 2010a; IOM, 2013).

b) Caribbean

Irregular migration in the Caribbean has been increasing in the last decade. Several countries in the region are rapidly turning from origin and transit locations into final destinations as a result of both restrictive migration policies in the United States and the economic prosperity that several Caribbean countries are currently experiencing (Thomas-Hope, 2003; Kairi Consultants, 2013; Anatol et al., 2013). Two main trends of irregular migration can currently be identified in the region, as in recent years the traditional intraregional movements have been flanked by a growing phenomenon of undocumented extraregional migration in the past five years (Kairi Consultants Ltd., 2013).

i. Intraregional migration

The Caribbean region has always been characterized by high level of mobility, further encouraged by the existing disparities among the different Caribbean countries in terms of GDP, standards of living and human development (Thomas-Hope, 2003). Due to the region’s morphology, irregular migration within the Caribbean logically occurs mainly by boat, with Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica being the main countries of origin (Thomas-Hope, 2003). Bahamas and
the Turks and Caicos Islands\textsuperscript{117}, but also Antigua, Anguilla\textsuperscript{118} and the U.S. Virgin Islands are major destinations within the region for Haitians and Dominicans. Minor - but significant if compared with the total population of the countries involved - irregular movements also exist in the south-eastern part of the region, with citizens from Guyana, Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Dominica moving irregularly to Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados. Interregional movements usually involve relatively short but dangerous journeys usually organized by smugglers, which take place in small boats and which may involve multiple stages (ibid.).

Irregular migration between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is of particular importance with hundreds of Haitians crossing the border daily. These migrants are mainly labour migrants, irregularly hired as a cheap labour force primarily in the cane-cutting sector but also other agricultural sectors like coffee and rice production as well as construction, manufacturing and tourism (Ferguson, 2006). The total number of Haitians currently living and working in the Dominican Republic is unknown, also because the phenomenon of short-stay labour migration is increasing. Estimates vary between 500,000 and 700,000 people in the past decade, of whom only 4,000 holding a visa or a work permit (Achieng, 2006; Ferguson, 2006).

\textbf{ii. Extraregional migration}\textsuperscript{119}

In the past years, the Caribbean region has been experiencing increasing irregular migration from outside the region, a trend which has been registered in Latin and Central America in general and which has been defined by the Organization of American States as “new and growing” (CEAS-OAS, 2010; FLACSO 2011). Initially intended as strategic transit points towards Northern America, the Caribbean islands often become the final destination of undocumented migrants proceeding from Asia and Africa.

Most Asian irregular migrants residing in the Caribbean are believed to be Chinese nationals, with approximately 200,000 people smuggled into the region every year in the framework of the increasing economic interaction between the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the People’s Republic of China (Thomas Hope, 2002; Manente, 2012). In general, the presence of Asian undocumented migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal, China, India, Iraq and Sri Lanka in the Central America region has been registered (FLACSO, 2011). More recently, flows from the Middle East have been identified, namely from the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon into Trinidad and Tobago (Kairi Consultants Ltd., 2013), while anecdotal evidence of Vietnamese and Indonesian irregular migrants in the country also exists (Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013).

Despite African migration being mainly oriented towards South America, thus representing a transatlantic migration corridor which connects the Senegalese coasts with the Brazilian ones, a sharp increase of undocumented migrants from Africa moving to the Caribbean has been registered in the past few years. Both air and sea routes connecting the African continent with Trinidad and Tobago through Venezuela and Brazil seem to exist (Waldropt-Bonair, 2013). In fact, Trinidad and Tobago is currently facing a major increase of irregular arrivals from West African countries, namely Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal and Liberia (Kairi Consultants Ltd., 2013).

The Caribbean islands are also a common destination for migrants moving from Latin American countries as for instance Colombia, Venezuela and Guyana, who often enter on a tourist or

\textsuperscript{117} British Overseas Territory.
\textsuperscript{118} British Overseas Territory.
\textsuperscript{119} For a more in-depth overview on extraregional migration in the South, please consult the ACP Observatory Background note 8 (Manente, 2012), \url{www.acpmigration-obs.org/sites/default/files/EN-BN%2008%20extrag.pdf}.
student visa and then overstay (Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013). Although no absolute figures are available, an important gender difference can be observed. While irregular migrants proceeding from African countries are overwhelmingly male, the majority of irregular migrants from Latin America are female (Kairi Consultants Ltd., 2013; Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013).

c) Pacific

Little information regarding irregular migration in the Pacific region is available. The number of international migrants in Asia and the Pacific was estimated at 31.5 million in 2010 (UN DESA, 2011), of whom up to one in four is believed to be in an irregular situation (Castles and Miller, 2009). Irregular migration within the region is rapidly growing, and it is therefore an issue of concern, with an estimated number of 3.8 million irregular migrants in Southeast Asia in the past decade (Graeme, 2005).

With regard to the Pacific Islands, migratory movements are mainly oriented towards Australia and New Zealand, the leading destination for migrants from Pacific countries (IOM, n.d.). For this reason, little attention is given to irregular migration in the Pacific Island context, even though it is rapidly becoming not only a new destination hub but also the location for offshore camps for irregular migrants as a result of Australian borders externalization policies. Anecdotal evidence of migrants from China, Kiribati and Tuvalu, who reached the Marshall Islands irregularly, was reported in the last years, while the presence of undocumented migrants from different Asian countries was also registered in New Caledonia and Fiji (Schloenhardt, 2001). Papua New Guinea seems to be an important transit point for irregular migration within the Pacific (Schloenhardt, 2001). Furthermore, the growing mining, natural gas and related construction sectors is increasingly attracting Asian migrant workers who joined the local labour market either evading immigration controls or entering as short-term migrants (Cifuentes Montoya and Sai’l Au, 2013). The country is increasingly becoming a destination country also as a result of increasing border control in the Torres Strait operated by Australia, a trend confirmed by the Regional Settlement Agreement signed between Australia and Papua New Guinea in July 2013. Strongly criticized by UNHCR, the media and civil society organizations, under this agreement, asylum-seekers irregularly arriving by boat to Australians coasts, will be moved to detention centers in Papua New Guinea while waiting for the assessment of their asylum claims (BBC, 2013). Similarly, in the framework of the so-called Pacific Solution implemented by Australia, Nauru is currently hosting 400 asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories and Sri Lanka who recently protested the poor conditions in the detention centers and the uncertainty regarding the length of their detention (Amnesty International, 2012; BBC, 2013; The Guardian, 2013). After its independence in 1999, Timor Leste has been attracting an unknown number of irregular migrants, mainly Indonesians and Filipinos but also Chinese, Bangladeshi, Indian, Malaysian and Africans citizens (Hamilton, 2004; Regional Thematic Working Group on International Migration including Human Trafficking, 2008; ACEP, 2013; Fundasaun Mahein, 2013).

Despite the general concerns regarding undocumented arrivals by boat in the region, it is important to notice that these involve a relatively small number of migrants. In fact, air routes are also very common, and often migrants enter on a tourist visa and then overstay (IOM, n/a; Schloenhardt, 2001 and Castles and Miller, 2009). In Timor Leste for instance, a recent qualitative study showed that the majority of the migrants interviewed were in an irregular situation due to the expiring of their tourist visa or residence permit, although some had entered the country irregularly through its terrestrial and maritime borders (Santos et al., 2013).
4. Understanding irregular migration in ACP countries: different regions, recurrent trends

When analysing irregular migration in ACP countries, the specificities of African, Caribbean and Pacific States must be taken into account in order to fully understand this phenomenon. Mobility has always been a fundamental feature for African societies and economies, whose system was subverted by the imposition of artificial borders during the colonial period (UNHCR and IOM, 2010). The arbitrary nature of African borders imposed by the colonial powers makes the distinction between internal and international migration muddled, as such borders often separated members of the same community (Bakewell and De Haas, 2007). In Nigeria, for instance, the movement of members of the same ethnic group across the borders to neighboring countries is considered by law as an international movement. However, in the perception of these persons travelling to another area inhabited by members of their own ethnic group, the (Western imposed) border does not exist - a phenomenon that can be defined as “intra-ethnic migration” (Oyeniyi, 2013). Similarly, strong cultural and religious linkages as well as family relationships between the population of East Timor and Indonesian citizens living in the Indonesian province of West Timor exist. Members of both groups move regularly from one country to the other, always through irregular channels (Fundasaun Mahein, 2013). Finally, the influence of the Islamic religion and culture can lead Muslim migrants to disregard the irregular character of undocumented migration. As Mohammed secretly left the Mecca for Yatrib (Medina) in 622 A.D., (irregular) migration can be considered as a virtuous and rewarding act aimed at building a better future (Salem, 2010).

Irregular migration can be driven by a variety of push factors, often in combination. Reasons for migrating usually include the lack of opportunities in the country of origin and a social system unable to provide an adequate education and health care, combined with a general lack of safety due to conflict situations, political instability and environmental changes. Differently from the common perception, irregular migration is not a desperate escape from poverty, but it is intended as a veritable investment often planned and supported by the family of origin (Tabapssi, 2010).

While reasons for migrating are widely investigated, less attention is given to pull factors both at the research and policy level. Irregular migration often occurs due to an underlying structural demand for cheap migrant workers in destination countries during periods of economic growth. In Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, irregular migrants are mainly young economic migrants. Attracted by the availability of jobs, these undocumented migrant workers provide services to labour-starved sectors, working for extremely low wages and exposed to abuse and exploitation (Waldropt-Bonair, 2013). Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, undocumented Haitians are filling the gaps left by local workers. Easy to exploit and non-unionized, these workers are usually expelled when the labour demand is lower, especially at the end of the cane-cutting session (Achieng, 2006; Ferguson, 2006). In Timor Leste irregular migrants are overwhelming young male adults driven by economic reasons, working in the construction and in the third sectors. Also in this case, their irregular status leads to vulnerability and abuse, including retention of documents and not payment of wages (Santos et al., 2013).

Whenever irregular movements occur, migrants are a risk of exploitation at all stages of their experience. During their journey, undocumented migrants and refugees are under a constant risk of extortion and violence by smugglers and other agents (Thomas-Hope, 2002), and they are vulnerable to the risk of official sanctions, including deportation and detention. Disrespect of the non-refoulement principle by national authorities is widely perpetrated. Serious concerns
regarding conditions in detention center all over the ACP region are widely reported, ranging from the uncertainty regarding the prolonged detention period, unhealthy living conditions and spread of diseases to violation of human rights including torture, mutilation and sexual violence (Waldropt-Bonair, 2013; Migreurop, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2006; Laughland, 2013). In the host and transit countries, non-access to services including health care and social security is a major issue for irregular migrants, who often see themselves obliged to live in precarious living conditions and to hide due to a constant fear of raids, arrest and expulsion (Thomas-Hope, 2002; El Yessa, 2008; MSF, 2013). Migrants’ physical and psychological health is also at risk due to their frequent contact with violence at all the stages of their migration process (IOM, 2013). Irregular migrants’ vulnerability is particularly high for women, who often have to face a triple discrimination based on their gender, foreign origin and irregular status (PICUM, 2012). Furthermore, restrictive immigration policies and border controls as well as the lack of legal migration opportunities can lead migrants to taking on great risks during their clandestine journeys, including reliance on smugglers and increasingly dangerous and remote travel by sea or through deserts.

5. Conclusions, recommendations and good practices

As shown in this background note, despite the existing differences among African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, a series of common trends and challenges related to irregular migration exist, as irregularity and lack of documentation often prevent migrants from benefitting of the advantages of migration, exposing them to a wide range of vulnerability and abusive situations both at the psychological and physical level.

Irregular migration is an extremely complex issue which can be approached from a wide range of perspectives. Therefore, comprehensive recommendations are impossible to elaborate. Nevertheless, the list below is aimed at providing initial proposals for better addressing this phenomenon in the interest of migrants as well as origin, transit and destination countries.

a) Recommendations at research level

Research on irregular migration tends to focus on the South–North corridors, while little attention is given to informal movements within the ACP regions. Further research on irregular migration in the South is therefore recommended, as the lack of data can wrongly lead to the assumption that irregular migration movements are always destined for the North.

Concrete and updated data on irregular migration are fundamental in order to adopt effective migration policies. Non-governmental and local organizations can play a key role in gathering quantitative and qualitative information about undocumented migrants and their efforts should be supported by the national authorities (PICUM, 2005; UNHCR, OAS and IOM, 2009; UNHCR and IOM, 2010b).

The specificities of ACP countries should be taken into consideration when researching irregular migration in the South, including migrants’ perception and reasons for moving, porosity and arbitrarily of borders and the influence of religious and cultural traditions. In particular, the concept of “intra-ethnic” migration (Oyeniyi, 2013) should be taken into consideration when analysing the patterns of irregular migration in ACP countries.

Migrants’ voices: “I thought migration was going to be the solution to our problems, but soon the whole dream became a nightmare." Interview with a Nigerian migrant, 2011)
Stakeholders are encouraged to follow up on the findings of already existing research and implement the recommendations formulated in such studies (UNHCR and IOM, 2010b).

b) Recommendations at policy level

The fundamental discrepancy between the official discourses of “combating irregular migration” and the sustained demand for cheap irregular migrant labour has to be addressed (De Haas, 2008). Establishment of regular migration opportunities through the formulation of labour migration agreements between origin and destination countries should be adopted. Possible options include for instance temporary, seasonal or circular labour migration programmes (IOM, 2008; UNHCR and IOM, 2010).

Legal channels for migration should be fostered, as strengthening of border control and repressive measures including mass expulsions do not lead to a decrease of irregular migration, but inversely fuel the spread of new, complex and dangerous migration routes as well and reinforce the role of smuggling networks.

The dialogue between sending, transit and receiving countries should be promoted in order to guarantee the harmonization of laws and policies for the protection of migrants and to draw up mutually beneficial frameworks for their protection.

Trade unions can play a key role in advocating for human rights’ respect, improvement of undocumented migrants working and living conditions and access to social security, as currently happening in Timor Leste and Morocco (PICUM, 2005; Santos et al., 2013, Organisation démocratique du travail, 2013).

The social and economic presence of undocumented migrants should be acknowledged in hosting countries and regularization programmes should be implemented in order to avoid exploitation and abuse. Regularization facilitates the social integration of migrants, formally recognizing their significant contribution to the labour market (PICUM, 2005; IOM, 2008; UNHCR, OAS and IOM, 2009; UNHCR and IOM, 2010b; Waldropt-Bonair, 2013).

Destigmatization of irregular migration in public discourse is needed. States are encouraged to adopt national and regional measures to combat xenophobia, discrimination, threats and attacks against undocumented migrants. This could include for instance information campaigns on the positive contribution of migration and close cooperation with the media. (IOM, 2008; UNHCR, OAS and IOM, 2009; UNHCR and IOM, 2010b).

Good practice: In Morocco, the Democratic Organization of Migrant Workers has been established as an independent section of the Democratic Organization of Labour (Organisation démocratique du travail – ODT). The first trade union of undocumented workers in Africa and directly managed by migrants, its objectives are to: defend the rights of migrant workers of all origins living in the country, raise awareness on the precarious situation of undocumented workers, promote the right to education, social security, equal pay and equal work conditions; demand regularization of undocumented workers and promote integration of migrants within the Moroccan society.
The evidence behind the picture: Irregular migration in ACP countries and the global South

The CAP Model
The International Detention Coalition Community Assessment and Placement model (CAP) is a five-step conceptual and practical framework designed for policymakers to ensure that detention of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers is only used as a final option in exceptional cases after all other alternatives have been tried or assessed as inadequate in the individual case. 
Source: IDC, 2011.

The effectiveness of detention centers should be seriously questioned, as on the one hand this system implies high costs for the host country and on the other hand it criminalizes undocumented migrants exacerbating the human cost and suffering of those involved, especially in the case of vulnerable migrants such as pregnant women or children. Alternative solutions, including open or in some cases semi-open facilities allowing migrants to leave the premises or release with registration and reporting requirements should be taken into consideration. In the case detention centers are maintained, human rights respect and decent standards of living must be guaranteed (UNHCR, OAS and IOM, 2009; UNHCR and IOM, 2010b).

Voluntary return programmes should be preferred to deportation and expulsion and returnees should be involved in awareness campaigns on the risks and challenges of irregular migration targeting potential migrants. (IOM, 2008; UNHCR, OAS and IOM, 2009).

Capacity building activities for front line officers to identify and refer vulnerable migrants to appropriate services, including the asylum application process as well as direct assistance and protection for children and victims of trafficking, should be carried out in transit and destination countries.

The needs of particularly vulnerable migrants in irregular situations as for instance women and children, but also sick migrants and elders, survivors of shipwrecks and stranded migrants and trafficked should be paid particular attention and direct assistance provided.

Policies aimed at fighting social exclusion and gender inequality against undocumented women should be prioritized and migration management practices putting women at risk of violence and abuse should be avoided (PICUM, 2012). Children protection should be guarantee regardless their migration status (UNHCR, OAS and IOM, 2009).
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The evidence behind the picture: *Irregular migration in ACP countries and the global South*

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The ACP Observatory on Migration has compiled in this thematic report thirteen background notes looking at innovative aspects of South–South migration. Based upon research carried out during three years, these documents analyse emerging aspects of migration in ACP countries. Four major approaches are covered: Setting the scene on South–South migration; labour migration, remittances and development; the social and cultural side of South–South migration; and the vulnerabilities and challenges faced by migrants.

The chapters of this report include an overview of available information on each topic as well as innovative policy responses implemented in ACP countries. The objective is to inform the public debate on the latest trends of South–South migration and to promote discussions on potential measures and opportunities available to overcome present and future challenges in migration governance.