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Migration and its links to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*

Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Katy Long and Marta Foresti¹

To say that we live in an age of migration – one in which the international movement of people across borders contributes significantly to economic and social development across the globe – is to state the obvious. Remittances to low- and middle-income countries, for instance, reached a new high of USD 466 billion in 2017, more than three times the size of official development assistance.² Yet despite this recognition of the scope of global migration’s impact on development, there has been far less discussion regarding how to incorporate migration into plans for meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, migration is explicitly identified as a factor influencing development in SDG Target 10.7, which sets out a goal aimed at reducing global inequality through the facilitation of “orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”, alongside a few other targets which refer to aspects of migration (see next paragraphs).³

However, it is increasingly recognized by development practitioners and policymakers that migration is not a stand-alone but a cross-cutting issue. Migration policy impacts all aspects of development policy,

from health and education provision to citizenship and governance reforms, yet there has been relatively little consideration of how migration is likely to impact the wider SDG agenda.

This special issue of *Migration Policy Practice* addresses this gap, by exploring just how migration intersects with a number of key development areas. It draws from a series of 12 policy briefings by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) that analyse the interrelationships between migration and key development areas, namely, poverty, decent work, urbanization, gender, education, health, social protection, water and sanitation, energy, citizenship, technology and climate change.

Migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development⁴

The 2030 Agenda is well placed to reflect and exploit the links between migration and development. For migration, the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs represent an incredibly important step in development policymaking. The SDG targets are the first to formally recognize migration in international development frameworks and processes. Migration is not only included but is also celebrated as an important contribution to sustainable development: the SDG declaration states the “positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development”, in addition to highlighting the specific vulnerabilities migrants may face.⁵ As we show in this edited volume, migration intersects with a range of development areas, which in turn are also closely linked.

Alongside Target 10.7, the cornerstone of migration in the 2030 Agenda, the SDGs also recognize the economic value of migrants. Migrant workers are expressly considered in a number of goals, including SDG 8 on economic growth and decent work; issues of trafficking are noted as part of SDG 5 on gender

* This introduction builds on M. Foresti and J. Hagen-Zanker, *Exploring the Relationship between Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2018).

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2 World Bank, *Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook (Transit Migration)*, Migration and Development Brief 29 (April 2018). Available from www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-29 (accessed 1 October 2018).

3 United Nations General Assembly, “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015). Available from www.refworld.org/docid/57b6e3e44.html (accessed 2 October 2018).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

equality, SDG 8 and SDG 16 on peaceful societies; SDG 10 calls for a reduction in the transaction costs of remittances; and migrant status is mentioned in SDG 17 as a factor for disaggregation during review and follow-up.

But while migration and remittances are covered by some targets, the relationship between migration and development has not been consistently covered. As the articles in this special issue show, migration is actually relevant to many of the other SDGs too, even when not explicitly mentioned, because of the ways in which migration and migrant status intersect with questions of health, social protection and even citizenship. This means if countries are to achieve the SDGs, they need to consider the impact of migration beyond the migration-specific targets and develop strategies that support the inclusion of migrants within broader development plans.

Exploring the many links between migration and the Sustainable Development Goals: Overview of the special issue of *Migration Policy Practice*

The five articles that follow this introduction look into a specific area in which migration intersects with development, setting out the case for including migration in SDG planning in persuasive terms.

First, Michael Clemens – taking a historical lens – argues that there is an urgent need to stop thinking of migration as a consequence of poor development outcomes and instead see rising migration as not only the result of improved development but also a catalyst for further positive change.

Next, Katy Long, Elisa Mosler Vidal and Amelia Kuch set out the case for why ensuring long-term migrants' access to citizenship is crucial in order to prevent this group's exclusion from community opportunities for development and social protection, which can otherwise result in multigenerational marginalization.

In the third article in this issue, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Elisa Mosler Vidal discuss the importance of social protection and make a strong case for why migrants' access to social protection, including through improved portability of benefits, also helps strengthen State governance and increase the resources available to support development in host and origin countries.

Next, Fiona Samuels explores the particular challenges faced in incorporating migrant populations into health-care responses and explains why such inclusion is vital if public health SDGs are to be met.

Finally, Marta Foresti steps back from the specific issues raised in these different development silos to deliver an overview of how migration and its links to development fits into not only the SDGs but also the wider global political process, including the Global Compact for Migration, the terms of which were agreed in July 2018.

Key conclusions from the analysis

Taking the articles in this special issue as a collective whole, three main conclusions emerge about the relationship between migration and different development areas:

1. Migration is a powerful poverty reduction tool, which can contribute to the achievement of the SDGs.

As the articles by Clemens, Hagen-Zanker and Mosler Vidal, and Samuels in this special issue show, migration can clearly reduce poverty for migrants themselves, their families, and their origin and host countries, as well as improve other development outcomes for both individual migrants and their communities. Migration allows migrants and their families to benefit from increased income and knowledge, which enables them to spend more on basic needs (e.g. health care) and make investments in their futures (e.g. through education). In origin countries, migration can lead to increased wages and greater economic growth through higher incomes, spending, knowledge and technology transfer, and investment of migrant households. In host countries, migrants can fill labour gaps and contribute to services and the fiscal balance. However, these analyses also show that migration is not always able to achieve its full development potential. Poor urban migrants often work in the informal sector where the rewards of migration are lower.⁶ Likewise, the ability of low- and semi-skilled labour migrants to access decent work is highly

6 P. Lucci, D. Mansour-Ille, E. Easton-Calabria and C. Cummings, "Sustainable cities: Internal migration, jobs and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", ODI Briefing (London, ODI, October 2016).

constrained.⁷ In relation, the high costs involved in different stages of the migration process reduce financial payoffs, and the restrictions on mobility prevent those who would benefit the most from migrating in a regular and orderly way.⁸ Restrictions on full inclusion in host communities – for instance, prohibitions on acquiring citizenship – can also limit the extent to which migrants and their families are able to enjoy access to development gains (see Long, Mosler Vidal and Kuch in this special issue). More predictable, inclusive and orderly migration processes would allow migrants, their families and host areas to better reap the benefits from migration.

2. Migrants provide an opportunity for the provision of services and greater development in host countries.

Migrants often offer opportunities for better service provision and make vital contributions for host countries. Migrants contribute to host communities as workers and consumers. These potential benefits are stifled when access to basic services is denied or limited, undercutting the potential positive benefits of migrant contributions to development (see, for example: Long, Mosler Vidal and Kuch on access to citizenship; Hagen-Zanker and Mosler Vidal on social protection in this issue).

For instance, granting access to health care and health services is crucial to ensure the health of migrants and their contributions as workers, and it also has important benefits for the general population in host countries (see Samuels in this issue). The entire population benefits from a reduced risk of communicable diseases when migrant children are vaccinated alongside host communities. Importantly, migrants often directly contribute to providing health and care services, with many countries increasingly reliant on migrant labour.⁹ Concerning social protection, migrants can make important

contributions to the fiscal balance of host countries, as they tend to make greater contributions in terms of taxes and other payments than the benefits they receive (see Hagen-Zanker and Mosler Vidal in this series).¹⁰

3. The specific risks and vulnerabilities of migrants are often overlooked.

The risks and vulnerabilities of migrants throughout the migration process are often overlooked in development processes, the 2030 Agenda included. Migrants experience both migration-specific vulnerabilities – that is, experienced by migrants only – and migration-intensified vulnerabilities – when migration exacerbates a disadvantage that can be experienced by all (see Samuels in this series).¹¹ The inability of many migrants, and in some cases even their descendants, to access full and equal citizenship rights in host countries (even after many years of residency) is one example of the specific exclusion of migrants from wider communities that can in turn significantly increase their vulnerability and limit opportunities to benefit from wider development projects (see Long, Mosler Vidal and Kuch).

Conclusion

As the articles by guest authors in this special issue of *Migration Policy Practice* demonstrate, migration is a critical component of any development agenda, with impact that reaches far beyond those areas where it is explicitly referenced in the SDGs. Migration – and the inclusion of migrants in development plans – can influence patterns of economic growth, health care, education and the effectiveness of social protection programming. This central importance of migration to broader plans for global development should be understood both in terms of its potential positive impact (e.g. remittances as a source of development income) and the need to manage carefully the negative development effects that migration can amplify, particularly when poorly managed or chaotic (e.g. in public health).

7 R. Mallett, “Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI Briefing (London, ODI, September 2018).

8 J. Hagen-Zanker, H. Postel and E. Mosler Vidal, “Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI Briefing (London, ODI, September 2017).

9 O. Tulloch, F. Machingura and C. Melamed, “Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI Briefing (London, July 2016); T. O’Neil, A. Fleury and M. Foresti, “Women on the move: Migration, gender equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI Briefing (London, ODI, July 2016).

10 J. Hagen-Zanker, “Four steps to ensure the mobility of social security for migrants”, Blog and Videos section, Migration Data Portal, International Organization for Migration (IOM) Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC) (12 April 2018). Available from <https://migrationdataportal.org/blog/four-steps-ensure-mobility-social-security-migrants>

11 R. Sabates-Wheeler and M. Waite, “Migration and social protection: A concept paper” (Sussex, University of Sussex, 2003).

Nevertheless, acknowledging the importance of migration to development in general and to the achievement of the SDGs in particular is, as these articles suggest (see, for example, Clemens), likely to generate considerable political controversy. At a moment when migrants—in nearly every corner of the globe—are often viewed by native populations with deep suspicion, ensuring that managing migration does not become merely a synonym for reducing migration is likely to prove politically challenging. However, as the articles in this special issue makes clear, if development strategies can be implemented in ways that include migrants, the entire global community will benefit. The alternative—attempting to pursue development and the SDGs without fully embracing the role migration can play, or even actively attempting to limit or reverse migration flows—is likely to not only prove far more challenging but comes at the loss of important development benefits. ■

Migration is a critical component of any development agenda, with impact that reaches far beyond those areas where it is explicitly referenced in the SDGs.



Migration as a form of development: New kinds of regulations to create shared benefits

*Michael A. Clemens*¹

Migration from low-income countries is traditionally seen to arise from failed development in the countries that migrants leave. In the countries where migrants arrive, migration is often seen as a harm to workers and societies, to be minimally tolerated on moral or pragmatic grounds. Migration policy then becomes little more than a question of *how many* migrants can be tolerated before they become *too many*.

This approach is short-sighted and misinformed. Migrants do not simply move to escape development failure; many use the opportunities that arise from development success to invest in migration. Migrants do not simply compete with others at their destination, but they contribute to the complexity and division of labour that is the taproot of the wealth of nations.²

Migration shapes and is shaped by economic development, and migration is one channel by which economic actors reach their fullest potential. In short, migration is an aspect of development itself. This article discusses how migration and development foster each other, and specifies how policy to regulate migration that is made without this fundamental understanding can go badly astray.

None of this means that migration is automatically beneficial to all groups, or necessarily beneficial to any group. Those are not true of any form of development. Development in all its forms is an uneven, risky, occasionally brutal process. Entrepreneurship is part of development, but entrepreneurship by one firm can be costly for other firms. Educational investment is part of development, but acquisition of new skills

by previously excluded social groups increases competition for other groups that already have those skills. Similarly, migration is part of development, but native workers and earlier immigrants can face limited competition from newer arrivals.

There are winners and losers from all types of economic development. The unfolding of economic prosperity always and everywhere has required upheaval and stressful change. That change has often had disproportionate impacts on different groups – and these disproportionate impacts must and can be addressed with policy. Mitigating such risks has required innovation. But, that innovation withers when nearly all migration-related policy choices are focused on the single goal of minimizing migration.

It is already well understood that migration and development are linked,³ as is outlined in the introductory section of this special issue. The next step is to understand migration as a form of development itself, and not merely as something that may or may not support development. Migration as a form of development requires innovation: new kinds of regulation to maximize benefits. In this century, migration policy must evolve into a tool that shapes how migrants move, not simply how many. These new regulations must be built: created, evaluated and adapted.

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2 For example, see: A. Alesina, J. Harnoss and H. Rapoport, “Birthplace diversity and economic prosperity”, *Journal of Economic Growth*, 21(2):101–138; D. Bahar and H. Rapoport, “Migration, knowledge diffusion and the comparative advantage of nations”, *Economic Journal*, 128(612):F273–F305.

3 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Financing for Development Office, “Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development”, final text of the outcome document adopted at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13–16 July 2015) and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 69/313 of 27 July 2015, available from www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf; United Nations General Assembly, “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015), available from www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

Development causes migration

Sustained advances in a country's overall economic development tend to cause *greater* emigration. This runs contrary to the common assumption that more development will help keep people at home – an assumption many ministries and international agencies worldwide operate under when making policy for migration and development. Several donor States and international organizations have explicitly stated that they intend their development assistance for poor countries to address the “root causes of migration”. Billions of dollars in aid are now directed towards creating economic opportunity in the origin countries, to lower perceived emigration demand and keep people at home.⁴

The historic record is clear. Economic development in poor countries has almost universally been accompanied by much higher emigration rates. As the poorest countries' economies become larger and more complex, rates of emigration tend to *rise*, not fall.⁵

It is true that greater earning opportunities at home tend to deter migration somewhat – all else equal. But as development proceeds, all else is *not* equal. In poor countries, any deterrent effect of higher incomes at home is overwhelmed by other forces. Poor countries begin from such low levels of income that even if their economies grow well, it can take generations to erode standard of living differences relative to richer countries. But economic growth rapidly increases the number of people who can afford the many direct costs of migration.

Economic growth is accompanied by several other forces that tend to indirectly inspire and facilitate migration. Two of the most important of these forces are changing demographic structure and rising education, so that growing countries have more youths with higher economic aspirations entering the labour force. The connection between migration and demographic change is the principal reason that improvements in public health, as countries develop, broadly cause more emigration. Child mortality tends to fall as countries develop, and fertility tends to fall later, leading to a concurrent surge of young jobseekers into the labour force. This rising emigration pressure is thus an echo of development *success*.⁶

Education can raise both the ability to migrate and the desire to migrate (e.g. by imparting a broader outlook and higher aspirations). The key again is understanding that many poor families treat migration as an investment – like education itself.⁷

For all of these reasons, emigration rates in middle-income countries (e.g. Colombia and Algeria) are typically much *higher* than emigration rates in low-income countries (e.g. Mali and the Lao People's Democratic Republic). This has been true across history: the times of greatest emigration from Sweden, Greece or the Republic of Korea were not the periods those countries plunged into development failure but the periods when they began the ascent to relative development success.

These facts are counterintuitive to many, but the economic evidence is clear.⁸ Figure 1 shows the average relationship, across all countries, between a country's real income per capita on the horizontal axis and its emigration rate, for all countries in the world today. Here a country's emigration rate is the fraction of all people born in that country who live in a different country.

4 Examples of aid programmes with this explicit goal are in: M.A. Clemens and H.M. Postel, “Deterring emigration with foreign aid: An overview of evidence from low-income countries”, IZA–Institute of Labor Economics, Growth and Labour Markets in Low Income Countries (GLM|LIC) Programme, GLM|LIC Synthesis Paper No. 8 (November 2017), available from https://glm-lic.iza.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/glmlic_sp008.pdf


5 H. de Haas, “Turning the tide? Why development will not stop migration”, *Development and Change*, 38(5):819–841; M.A. Clemens, “Does development reduce migration?”, in: *International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development* (R.E.B. Lucas (ed.)) (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), pp. 152–185; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Perspectives on Global Development 2017: International Migration in a Shifting World* (Paris, 2017).

6 T.H. Dao, F. Docquier, C. Parsons and G. Peri, “Migration and development: Dissecting the anatomy of the mobility transition”, IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 10272 (Bonn, IZA–Institute of Labor Economics, 2016).

7 T.W. Schultz, “Investment in human capital”, *American Economic Review*, 51(1):1–17.

8 Details of this data analysis in: Clemens and Postel (2017).

Figure 1: Level of emigrant stock versus level of real income, all countries, 2013



Note: The dotted lines show a 95 per cent confidence interval for that average. All numbers are for the year 2013, the most recent year in which both series are available for almost all countries.

The figure shows the cross-section relationship between real GDP per capita (on the horizontal axis) and the emigration rate (on the vertical axis). GDP per capita is adjusted for price differences between countries. The emigration rate is the fraction of people born in each country that live in any other country. The solid line is a moving average across countries at a similar income level.

The figure shows that middle-income countries have about triple the emigration rates, relative to their populations, of low-income countries. This is radically at odds with any conception of migration as arising from development failure in poor countries. “I want to use our aid budget,” the United Kingdom’s Minister of International Development said, for “creating jobs in poorer countries so as to reduce the pressure for mass migration to Europe.”⁹ But sustained creation of decent jobs in poor countries requires their economic development into middle-income countries. Middle-income countries have

emigration rates that are *hundreds of percent higher*, on average, than emigration rates in the poorest countries. Further economic development is typically associated with rising emigration until countries reach roughly the neighbourhood of USD 10,000 in GDP per capita (adjusted to represent purchasing power at US prices). Countries that are poor today will take two or three generations to get there, in the most optimistic scenario.¹⁰

Conceiving of development as a substitute for migration leads to ineffective real-world policy effort and waste of real-world resources. There is no evidence to suggest successful development is frequently accompanied by substantially lower rates of emigration. Development policy can be more successful when it rests on the fundamental understanding that migration manifests and constitutes development, and is designed to shape that process in ways that maximize its benefits to everyone affected.

9 UK Minister of International Development Priti Patel quoted in James Slack, “My fury at our wasted aid” (*Daily Mail*, 13 September 2016). Available from www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3788162/My-fury-wasted-foreign-aid-International-development-secretary-Priti-Patel-pledges-major-overhaul-12billion-budget.html

10 Clemens and Postel (2017).

Migration causes development

Cross-country gaps in productivity are so large that even modest movements of people have outsize impacts on the global economy. The world economy is about USD 3 trillion per year more productive than it would have been had migrants stayed in their home countries.¹¹ Migration raises the productivity of labour. The average migrant is much more economically productive in the country of destination than in the country of origin – *hundreds of percent* more productive.¹²

Even modest reductions in current migration barriers would raise global economic productivity by several trillion dollars more. Allowing just 1 in 20 current residents of low- and middle-income countries to work in the richest countries would raise global economic production by more than the elimination of all remaining policy barriers to international trade and all remaining barriers to capital flows combined.¹³

These massive global economic benefits are unevenly shared between migrant origin countries and migrant destination countries. But origin countries, on average, do not lose when destination countries gain. Migration typically brings large, indirect, long-term benefits to origin countries as well. It builds networks that bring new technologies, skills, trade, investment and modern social norms to countries of migrant origin. Migrants create human networks that give life to new kinds of business. For example, the migration of technology workers from India to the United States was crucial to the growth of the high-technology sector in India. Migration of people between countries

is part and parcel of the complexification of their economies, without which economic development does not occur.¹⁴

Concern remains acute that skilled migration, in particular, often inflicts net economic harm on countries of origin by sapping them of human capital, the so-called “brain drain”. Some have even called for restrictive “ceilings” on the migration of skilled people from the poorest countries, claiming that such restrictions would cause economic development in some measure.¹⁵ Clearly, sudden, large-scale movements of skilled workers, such as by nurses and teachers, can have short-term effects on service delivery in areas of origin. But this does not imply that effective or appropriate policy is to obstruct or tax skilled migration.

Skilled migration has important offsetting positive effects on development, such as by opening new trade and investment markets for countries of origin, benefits that are lost when skilled migration is restricted. What’s more, the opportunity for skilled migration itself helps generate more human capital by motivating others, including non-migrants, to invest in education – though these aspirations can be frustrated when opportunities to migrate are constricted.¹⁶

For countries of migrant destination, migration typically brings economic growth, youth, trade, investment and entrepreneurship, especially to stagnant economies and ageing populations. It raises the economic productivity of regions that receive more migrants, as migrant workers on average tend to

11 J. Woetzel, A. Madgavkar, K. Rifai, F. Mattern, J. Bughin, J. Manyika, T. Elmasry, A. Di Lodovico and A. Hasyagar, *People on the Move: Global Migration’s Impact and Opportunity* (San Francisco, McKinsey Global Institute, 2016). Available from www.mckinsey.com/~media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/Employment%20and%20Growth/Global%20migrations%20impact%20and%20opportunity/MGI-People-on-the-Move-Full-report.ashx

12 M.A. Clemens, C. Montenegro and L. Pritchett, “The place premium: Bounding the price equivalent of migration barriers”, *Review of Economics and Statistics* (forthcoming).

13 M.A. Clemens (2011), “Economics and emigration: Trillion dollar bills on the sidewalk?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 25(3):83–106.

14 For migration related to trade and technology transfer, see: D. Bahar and H. Rapoport, “Migration, knowledge diffusion and the comparative advantage of nations”, *Economic Journal* (forthcoming); W.R. Kerr, “Ethnic scientific communities and international technology diffusion,” *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 90(3):518–537. For migration related to investment, see: B.S. Javorcik, Ç. Özden, M. Spatareanu and C. Neagu, “Migrant networks and foreign direct investment”, *Journal of Development Economics*, 94(2):231–241. For migration in relation to the transfer of norms, see: M. Beine and K. Sekkat, “Skilled migration and the transfer of institutional norms”, *IZA Journal of Migration*, 2(1):9; M. Beine, F. Docquier and M. Schiff, “International migration, transfer of norms and home country fertility”, *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique*, 46(4):1406–1430.

15 P. Collier, *Exodus: How Migration Is Changing Our World* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013).

16 J. Carling and K. Schewel, “Revisiting aspiration and ability in international migration”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44:6, 945–963. DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2017.1384146

complement native workers and encourage business investment.¹⁷ Immigration by low-skilled workers tends to raise the productivity of high-skilled natives by more than it raises the productivity of low-skilled natives. It thus causes native workers to invest in more schooling.¹⁸

As a whole, economic research on global migration suggests that global migration is a powerful driver of economic development, inextricably linked to other forms of economic development like technological change and educational advancement. But for any given person or even any given country, such effects are far from automatic. Maximizing those benefits and sensibly sharing them require smart and evidence-based policies (see also Foresti in this special issue).

How not just how many: The need for massive and iterative innovation

Migration does not stand apart from the development process. Migration is a feature of development. Domestically, the physical movement of people has been an inseparable feature of historical development – within the United States, Europe, China, Africa and beyond – as economies there have grown from isolated and rural, to interconnected and primarily urban. Within countries, the physical movement of people has been a tremendous engine of trade, entrepreneurship, education and the spread of ideas.

But those positive effects did not arise automatically. They required generations of extensive policy innovation within countries. The world needs analogous innovation to capture the vast potential benefits of international mobility. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development rightly

commits countries to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”. But the 2030 Agenda does not explicitly point out that if countries generally succeed in developing – and meeting their Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – this is likely to cause rising migration pressure for generations to come, and it does little to specify *how* countries can build “well-managed” policies to regulate migration. The tools to do that are poorly understood and mostly absent.

Today, at the international level, we mostly lack the institutions and policies that countries have developed internally to harness the economic benefits of domestic mobility, though the Global Compact for Migration is a first attempt at filling this gap (see Foresti in this special issue). Filling this gap will require tremendous innovation, in both the public and private sectors. Innovation of this kind is necessary to create new lawful channels for migration that offer visible, mutual benefits, political feasibility, and a complement to enforcement efforts at and behind the border to reduce irregular migration.

One example of an innovation to play this role is the idea of a Global Skill Partnership (GSP).¹⁹ A GSP is an upfront agreement between employers and/or governments in destination countries and professional training centres in origin countries. These parties agree on a practical and equitable way for the benefits of migrants’ professional service at the destination to finance training at the origin – training for both migrants and non-migrants.

Such an agreement turns skilled migration from a threat into an opportunity. It allows mutual gains by taking advantage of large international differences in both professional earnings and training costs. It also maximizes the mutual benefit of migration by ensuring that destination countries get precisely the skills they need from migrants who can integrate quickly; origin countries strengthen their human capital with finance and technology for training non-migrants; and migrants get the professional opportunities migration

17 For migration and national-level growth, see: E. Boubtane, J.C. Dumont and C. Rault, “Immigration and economic growth in the OECD countries 1986–2006”, *Oxford Economic Papers*, 68(2):340–360. For migration and trade, see: G. Peri and F. Requena-Silvente, “The trade creation effect of immigrants: Evidence from the remarkable case of Spain”, *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique*, 43(4):1433–1459. For migration and local-level productivity, see: G. Peri, “The effect of immigration on productivity: Evidence from US states”, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 94(1):348–358; E. Lewis and G. Peri, “Chapter 10: Immigration and the economy of cities and regions”, in: *Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics* (G. Duranton, J.V. Henderson and W.C. Strange (eds.)) (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2015), volume 5, pp. 625–685.

18 J. Hunt (2017), “The impact of immigration on the educational attainment of natives”, *Journal of Human Resources*, 52(4):1060–1118.

19 M.A. Clemens (2015), “Global Skill Partnerships: A proposal for technical training in a mobile world”, *IZA Journal of Labor Policy*, 4(1):2. Available from <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40173-014-0028-z>. A brief summary can be accessed at www.cgdev.org/publication/global-skill-partnerships-proposal-technical-training-in-mobile-world-brief

can bring. Such an arrangement for the training and migration of nurses, for example, would directly contribute to several of the SDGs – for health (SDG 3), education (SDG 4), employment (SDG 8) and global partnership (SDG 17).

GSPs are nothing like “the answer”. No simple “answer” exists or will exist. Many other innovations of this kind, designed to shape migration for mutual gain rather than purely to reduce it, are an essential part of any serious policy agenda to regulate migration in this century. Countless more are needed, as the regulation of migration shifts from its near exclusive focus on how many may move to shaping how they move.

This need is enormous and urgent, the policy tools we now have are inadequate and the time to start innovating is now. The critical first step is to understand that migration lies at the heart of development. Migration cannot be “developed away”, because it is part of how countries develop. From Sweden in the 1880s, to Italy in the 1920s, to the Republic of Korea in the 1970s, to Mexico in the 1990s, to Nigeria today, development and *emigration* have gone hand in hand. They will continue to do so, because migration is part of development, a feature of the development process. Policies to promote development require tools to ensure that this century’s chapter of that centuries-old story works as well as possible for everyone involved. The longer we focus nearly all public policy resources on minimizing migration, the longer we will lack the tools to unlock its potential. ■

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Citizenship: A crucial link between migration and development*

Katy Long, Elisa Mosler Vidal and Amelia Kuch¹

Introduction

Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 calls on States to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”. While SDG 16 does not explicitly mention migration, the question of how to include migrants in communities is extremely pertinent to the goal of building “more peaceful and inclusive societies”.

This article argues that one legal mechanism essential to support such inclusion is the granting of citizenship and/or permanent residency to long-term immigrants. The link between citizenship and development outcomes has often been neglected, particularly in relation to long-term immigrants’ access to citizenship in a host country. However, as this article explores, access to citizenship and/or permanent residency is crucial to ensure migration has a positive impact on development, and is therefore an important area to address in pursuit of delivering on the SDGs.

Gains from citizenship

Migrants clearly gain from access to citizenship. Evidence shows the positive effect naturalization has on labour market outcomes, with migrants’ gaining greater employability and higher wages

after naturalization.² This is partly because the new status removes restrictions on public-sector and other jobs, and partly because a naturalized migrant is perceived as less risky to hire. In Germany, a study found that immigrant women experienced higher wages and improved labour-market outcomes after naturalization, mainly because they were able to switch to jobs with permanent contracts and in larger firms.³ These effects are important for integration prospects; labour-market integration enables greater economic and social inclusion, through improved access to decent accommodation and health care.⁴

However, while labour-market outcomes are important markers of migrants’ integration, they are only one aspect of it. There is also evidence of a positive relationship between naturalization and political integration. For example, a study across 19 European countries showed that citizenship acquisition increased political participation, especially for migrants who grew up in non-democratic settings.⁵ In Switzerland, naturalization improved political integration as immigrants attained higher levels of political knowledge.⁶

* This article is based upon a briefing paper prepared by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI): K. Long, E. Mosler Vidal, A. Kuch and J. Hagen-Zanker, “Citizenship, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI Briefing (London, ODI, September 2017).

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2 R. Bauböck, I. Honohan, T. Huddlestone, D. Hutcheson, J. Shaw and M.P. Vink, *Access to Citizenship and Its Impact on Immigrant Integration: European Summary and Standards* (Florence, Italy, European University Institute, 2013); F. Peters and M. Vink, “Chapter 19: Naturalization and the socio-economic integration of immigrants: A life course perspective”, in: *Handbook on Migration and Social Policy* (G.P. Freeman and N. Mirilovic (eds.)) (Cheltenham, United Kingdom, and Northampton, Massachusetts, Edward Elgar, 2016).

3 C. Gathmann and N. Keller, “Returns to citizenship? Evidence from Germany’s recent immigration reforms”, IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 8064 (Bonn, IZA–Institute of Labor Economics, 2014).

4 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/European Union, *Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In* (Paris, OECD, 2015).

5 A. Just and J.C. Anderson, “Immigrants, citizenship and political action in Europe”, *British Journal of Political Science*, 42(3):481–509.

6 J. Hainmueller, D. Hangartner and G. Pietrantuono, “Naturalization fosters the long-term political integration of immigrants”, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS)*, 112(41):12651–12656.

Protection through citizenship

Most importantly, the acquisition of citizenship and/or permanent residency can help guard against several negative development outcomes that can arise from holding only temporary legal status as a migrant, or from holding no formal legal status despite long-term residency. Second-generation migrants, who – thanks to legal prohibitions – are unable to acquire full citizenship or permanent status, are a group meriting particular attention, especially as they may have very limited connections to their parents’ “home” countries.

Acquisition of permanent residency or citizenship can become an essential protection against deportation and discrimination if immigration policy changes at a later date, even for those who arrived in a destination country legally. The recent Windrush scandal in the United Kingdom – in which lifelong British residents who had immigrated from the Caribbean as children were subject to deportation due to failures in government record-keeping – is one example of how lack of formal citizenship status can negatively impact development many decades after migrants’ arrival.⁷

More broadly, the inability of long-term migrants, including second-generation “migrants” born in their host countries, to acquire citizenship in their host communities can result in exclusion and deprive migrants of fundamental rights, as well as contribute to intercommunity tensions and conflict. The case of Turkish migrants and their descendants in Germany, who until the 1990s were unable to become citizens under German law and who, as a result, often struggled to integrate into German communities, is one well-known example of barriers to citizenship preventing full inclusion.⁸

In the most extreme cases, violence and civil unrest can follow government decisions to strip citizenship from the descendants of migrants. In 2013, for example, the Dominican Republic’s Constitutional Court revoked citizenship for children born to foreign parents as far back as 1929, as part of a long-running “anti-Haitianismo” political movement in the country

inspired by racial, linguistic and socioeconomic prejudice.⁹ This affected a large proportion of the 240,000 Dominicans of Haitian descent in the country, who were left without the right to work, services and more, and provoked huge social and political disquiet.¹⁰

The lack of ability to claim citizenship can have consequences for migrants’ ability to access development and social welfare programmes (see also Hagen-Zanker and Mosler Vidal, and Samuels, in this issue). Decisions by States to limit entitlements – such as entitlements to health, education and social welfare – to permanent residents and citizens are, in the first instance, relatively uncontroversial. However, second-generation migrants who are unable to claim citizenship can be particularly affected by limited access to subsidized education or health-care programmes. This issue has been especially prominent in the United States, where 20 states now allow undocumented immigrant students (many of whom arrived as young children and were unaware of their legal status until required to prove citizenship) to benefit from reduced in-state college tuition rates.¹¹

Acquiring citizenship

The benefits to migrants and their wider communities in allowing access to citizenship are clear. However, in many States, granting citizenship to migrants is politically contentious. This is especially true if there are large numbers of migrants who are eligible to naturalize, as this may stoke fears that social identity and cohesion could be lost. “Demographic bomb” narratives are the core of a number of political debates all over the world, including fears expressed about Palestinian Israelis, the Roma in Central Europe and the Latinos in the United States.

7 BBC, “Windrush generation: Who are they and why are they facing problems?” (*BBC*, 18 April 2018). Available from www.bbc.com/news/uk-43782241 (accessed 10 September 2018).

8 See for example: P. Ehrkamp, and H. Leitner, “Beyond national citizenship: Turkish immigrants and the (re)construction of citizenship in Germany”, *Urban Geography*, 24(2):127–146.

9 Z. Hindin and M. Ariza, “When nativism becomes normal” (*The Atlantic*, 23 May 2016). Available from www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/05/dominican-republic-la-sentencia/483998/ (accessed 21 August 2017).

10 P. Constable, “Plight of Dominican Haitians ignites outrage among diverse immigrants” (*The Washington Post*, 23 June 2015). Available from www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/plight-of-dominican-haitians-ignites-outrage-among-diverse-immigrants/2015/06/23/7d1c85b4-19b8-11e5-bd7f-4611a60dd8e5_story.html?utm_term=.8a6d7e248a64 (accessed 19 July 2017).

11 G. Mendoza/National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), “Tuition benefits for immigrants” (NCSL, 2015). Available from www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/tuition-benefits-for-immigrants.aspx (accessed 19 July 2017).

There is near universal agreement that granting citizenship to immigrants should be contingent on a demonstration of long-term engagement in their host communities, usually demonstrated through long-term residency, language skills and cultural proficiency. Only very few States, including Myanmar and Lebanon, have a total or near total ban on naturalization. However, in practice, many countries make naturalization difficult for long-term migrants, through a combination of stringent criteria, high fees and arbitrary administrative procedures.

This problem is compounded when a State understands membership in explicitly ethnic or indigenous terms. In these situations, such as in many Gulf States, ideas of collective national identity have led citizenship to be strictly restricted. Some States have taken involved measures to protect this “national” ideal. For instance, in 2014, Kuwait attempted to buy Comoros passports for stateless Bedouin groups in its territory, in order to avoid having to recognize them as Kuwaiti citizens.¹²

In the case of mass influx of refugees, the politics of granting citizenship is still more complex. Host States did not choose to admit these newcomers; they do so as a humanitarian – and allegedly temporary – measure. Offering hundreds of thousands of refugees citizenship en masse is usually politically fraught, especially in States like Lebanon, where intercommunity politics is already extremely fragile and demographic shifts could incite serious violence.

Furthermore, the ability to apply for permanent residency or citizenship is universally premised on having arrived as a regular migrant and remained in the country as such. For millions of migrants who do not hold, or cannot prove, legal status, this can create an insurmountable obstacle.

While this group includes irregular migrants, it is not limited to them. Migrants who have travelled to live and work in countries where there are reciprocal rights of free movement, for instance, may not always have the paperwork to prove their right to residency or citizenship. This has recently become an issue, for instance, for EU citizens in the United Kingdom in the wake of Brexit negotiations, as well as for the “Windrush generation” of Caribbean migrants who arrived in the United Kingdom in the 1950s.

In some cases, constitutional bars prevent migrants who do not belong to a specified racial or religious group from becoming citizens of the country in which they have settled. The Constitution of Liberia, for instance, specifies that all applicants for citizenship must be “negro or of negro descent”, effectively barring non-black residents from acquiring citizenship. This excludes Liberia’s Lebanese population, who have been settled in the State since the 1960s. Gender discrimination can also intersect with migration to create barriers to citizenship, particularly for the children of mixed citizen–migrant marriages. Nationality laws currently prevent women married to foreigners from passing on their citizenship to their children in 26 States.¹³

A number of countries – mostly developed States – also require applicants to pass a citizenship exam. Some of these exams have been deliberately designed to be difficult for immigrants to pass, with questions on trivia that are irrelevant to migrants’ everyday inclusion. The Danish citizenship test, for instance, was revised in 2016, as part of a raft of measures intended to cut immigration after a surge of support for anti-immigrant political parties.¹⁴ It includes questions such as “Which Danish restaurant gained a third Michelin star in February 2016?”

Additionally, the monetary cost of applying for citizenship varies considerably. In Japan, although cultural requirements are strictly enforced, the naturalization process is free. However, Kenya levies a fee of KSH 500,000 (USD 4,800), 3.5 times Kenya’s per capita GDP. One consequence of such high costs is that permanent residency and citizenship become unaffordable “luxuries” for less wealthy migrants; the high cost of US naturalization (USD 680), for example, is one reason a number of migrants chose not to apply for citizenship even when they can meet other criteria.¹⁵

12 A.A. Abrahamian, *The Cosmopolites: The Coming of the Global Citizen* (New York, Columbia Global Reports, 2015).

13 (Office of the) United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Background note on gender equality, nationality laws and statelessness 2018” (8 March 2018). Available from www.refworld.org/docid/5aa10fd94.html (accessed 24 September 2018).

14 E. Delman, “How not to welcome refugees” (The Atlantic, 27 January 2016). Available from www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/01/denmark-refugees-immigration-law/431520/ (accessed 31 August 2017).

15 P. Taylor, A. Gonzalez-Barrera, J. Passel and M.H. Lopez, “Chapter 4: Reasons for not naturalizing”, in: *An Awakened Giant: Hispanic Electorate Is Likely to Double by 2030* (Washington, D.C., Pew Research Center, 14 November 2012). Available from www.pewhispanic.org/2012/11/14/iv-reasons-for-not-naturalizing/ (accessed 19 July 2017).

Partly in response to such concerns, as well as to broader anxieties about how lack of legal identification documents can hinder access to important services such as banking and housing, some local authorities have developed local forms of citizenship based on residency. In the United States, for instance, both San Francisco and New York offer identity cards to all residents, regardless of legal status. Such inclusive practices are closely linked to the “sanctuary cities” movement, in which local authorities limit their cooperation with federal immigration orders.¹⁶ In Europe, since 1997, the City of Barcelona has been explicit about its ambition to grant equal citizenship to all persons based on “the acquisition of rights instead of the concept of nationality”, granting “the same citizen rights and duties to all persons living in Barcelona” (“...mateixos drets i deures de ciutadania per a totes les persones que viuen a Barcelona, vinguin d’on vinguin”).¹⁷

Conclusion

As this article has shown, access to citizenship is an integral dimension of social inclusion, and a key link between migrant and long-term development outcomes. Migrants who lack secure permanent legal status may suffer a deprivation of other essential rights including access to justice, basic services and work (see Hagen-Zanker and Mosler Vidal on social protection in this issue). Opaque and arbitrary naturalization processes – sometimes deliberately intended to exclude migrants – may contribute to official corruption and bribery. Migrants’ lack of access to permanent residency and/or citizenship status can cement their political exclusion, resulting in their marginalization. In the long term, discriminatory policies can foster civil unrest and even contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict, especially when they exclude second and subsequent generations of settled migrants.

In light of this, a number of steps should be taken to secure access to citizenship for migrants in pursuit of the SDGs. First, pathways to permanent residency and citizenship should be made available to all long-term migrants, without being contingent on meeting any other ethnic, religious or ascriptive criteria.

Second, second-generation migrants should have automatic access to permanent residency and citizenship in their host communities. In particular, States should not ask second-generation migrants to complete a naturalization process, which is often bureaucratic and prohibitively costly.


Third, governments of host and origin countries should remove any gender bars on citizenship that prevent women from passing on their citizenships to their children, and allow and facilitate the holding of multiple citizenships.

Ultimately, providing migrants such access to citizenship, although politically controversial, is integral to the SDGs and to the securing of positive development outcomes for not only migrants but also the communities they live in. For citizenship not only protects migrants from exclusion; it also provides the legal basis for long-term inclusion, and the economic, social and political benefits that follow. ■

The inability of long-term migrants, including second-generation “migrants” born in their host countries, to acquire citizenship in their host communities can result in exclusion and deprive migrants of fundamental rights.

16 J.C. Lee, R. Omri and J. Preston, “What are sanctuary cities” (*New York Times*, 6 February 2017). Available from www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html (accessed 29 August 2017).

17 Ajuntament de Barcelona, *Pla Barcelona Interculturalitat [Barcelona Interculturality Plan]* (Barcelona, 1997); Ajuntament de Barcelona, *Pla de Treball d’Immigració 2012–2015 [BCN Immigration Plan 2012–2015]* (Barcelona, 2012), available from www.bcn.cat/novaciutadania/pdf/pla_immigracio/pla_immigracio_ca.pdf



Social protection: Unlocking migrants' contributions towards sustainable development*

Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Elisa Mosler Vidal¹

This article outlines how social protection coverage of international migrants varies considerably and touches on the main barriers to social protection coverage for migrants. As this article then shows, the exclusion of migrants from social protection systems has a wider bearing on States' abilities to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and should be addressed through a series of policy reforms.

Social protection policies and programmes aim to reduce poverty and vulnerability and to enhance the capacity of people to manage economic and social risks, such as unemployment, sickness, disability and old age. It can encompass both social assistance programmes not conditional on having previously made contributions (e.g. cash transfers to poor households) and social insurance programmes, which are conditional on past contributions (e.g. contributory old-age pensions). Social protection has been shown to have positive effects on the development outcomes of recipients, their families and communities more broadly. Particularly for cash transfers, there is a large evidence base showing positive impacts on reducing monetary poverty and child labour, improving health and education outcomes, and stimulating investment in productive assets (e.g. agricultural tools).²

The importance of social protection as a key poverty reduction tool is increasingly recognized. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies social protection as a priority area, calling for countries to implement social protection systems and mobilize

funds to implement social protection programmes.³ Given its positive impacts on other areas of development, social protection can be seen as an accelerator for achieving several targets across the 2030 Agenda, specifically under Goal 1 (no poverty), Goal 10 (reduced inequalities) and others.

However, the provision of social protection of migrants is often still left off policy agendas. Most migrants around the world are of working age and do indeed work.⁴ Many of these individuals have no access at all to social protection, and while others may acquire social protection rights in the countries they work in, such as for pensions and health care, they may not be able to transfer these when returning home or moving to another country.⁵ For certain categories of migrants, such as those in low-income countries, those with irregular status and/or those working in the informal economy, access to social protection can be especially poor.

This should be cause for concern. International migrants are particularly vulnerable without social protection, as this can compound other risks they face. For example, migrants are more likely to work in insecure, poorly remunerated and dangerous employment,⁶ lacking the access to sickness benefits or workplace injury benefits they are more likely to need with the type of work they are doing. Furthermore, health issues, workplace accidents or other shocks

* This article builds on J. Hagen-Zanker, E. Mosler Vidal and G. Sturge, "Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", ODI Briefing (London, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2017).

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2 F. Bastagli, J. Hagen-Zanker, L. Harman, V. Barca, G. Sturge, T. Schmidt and L. Pellerano, *Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say. A Rigorous Review of Programme Impact and of the Role of Design and Implementation Features* (London, ODI, 2016).

3 Target 1.3 calls to "Implement nationally appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including floors, and by 2030 achieve substantial coverage of the poor and the vulnerable". Targets 3.8 and 8.b are also relevant in this regard.

4 Out of 258 million migrants officially counted in 2017, 74 per cent were aged 20 to 64 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), *2017 International Migration Report* (New York, United Nations, 2017), available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf).

5 R. Holzmann and J. Wels, "Status and progress in cross-border portability of social security benefit", IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 11481 (Bonn, IZA-Institute of Labor Economics, 2018).

6 R. Mallett, "Decent work, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", ODI Briefing (London, ODI, 2018).

can be an immense financial setback to migrants, also reducing their ability to send remittances. Without their own safeguards against poverty, risk and vulnerability, migrants cannot act as agents of development for others. By providing migrants with access to social protection, those migrants will be better equipped to help fill labour market needs, increasing their earning potential and the remittances they may send home. As the international community moves forward in implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the development potential of migrants should be recognized and amplified by extending social protection to them (see Foresti in the series).

Migrants' coverage of social protection

Detailed data breaking down migrants' legal coverage or uptake of social protection (also known as effective coverage) at the national level is often not available, or it is not comparable between countries. However, attempts have been made to estimate coverage at the global level. Based on data from 2013, it is estimated that 23 per cent of regular migrants had legal coverage through a bilateral social protection agreement or similar arrangement between origin and destination countries, granting access to programmes and making social security benefits portable across borders.⁷ This varies by country of origin and destination: data from 2000 showed 90 per cent of migrants moving between high-income countries were covered, compared with less than 1 per cent of those moving between low-income countries.⁸

Fifty-three per cent of regular migrants moved between countries without an agreement but still had access to some social protection in their host countries. The majority of these migrated between low- and lower-middle-income countries, where national social protection systems are generally weak. This means that while these migrants are legally covered, in practice the type of support they receive is likely to be limited in scope and value.

Nine per cent of regular migrants did not have any access to social protection as they were neither covered by an agreement nor entitled by host-country law.

Finally, it was estimated that 14 per cent of migrants were undocumented and had no access to social protection. This means that almost a quarter of all migrants, most of whom are in the global South, had no or limited social protection access.

Barriers to greater coverage

A range of key factors affect legal and effective social protection coverage of migrants, and these often interact with other issues including gaps between policy design and implementation, practical barriers to participation and political sensitivity.

First, migrants may lose eligibility for social protection in their home countries if they work in another country, or they can be legally ineligible for social protection in host countries. Although many countries have committed to equality of treatment between citizens and migrants, this is not always followed in practice. Some limit access by residency and/or citizenship requirements. For example, many countries in the Gulf do not provide pensions to migrant workers. In addition, some requirements mean access to social protection is cut off for certain groups of migrants, such as the self-employed or those earning too little. For example, while Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) gives migrants the same social protection status as others, in practice it is difficult for seasonal migrant workers to meet eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits.⁹ Further, irregular labour migrants and those working in the informal economy tend not to be covered by social protection systems. Finally, asylum seekers and refugees outside high-income countries are also rarely covered, though some may receive some ad hoc protection.

Second, the portability of benefits is often constrained. Migrants might want to return to their countries of origin or move to another country upon retirement,

7 Holzmann and Wels (2018).

8 This refers mainly to all benefits that stem from contributory payments or residency criteria in a country. In practice, bilateral social security arrangements tend to focus mostly on long-term benefits such as old-age, survivor's and disability pensions, and sometimes health-care benefits (R. Holzmann, J. Koettl and T. Chernetsky, "Portability regimes of pension and health care benefits for international migrants: An analysis of issues and good practices", Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0519 (Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2005).

9 R. Holzmann and Y. Pouget, "Social protection for temporary migrant workers: Conceptual framework, country inventory, assessment and guidance", a study prepared for the Global Forum of Migration and Development, World Bank and Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration, Marseille (2010).

taking their pensions with them. If a migrant can withdraw social protection benefits while residing in another country, the benefits are considered “portable”. Some of the world’s largest migrant-sending and -receiving countries – such as Bangladesh, China, Mexico and the Russian Federation – have almost no arrangements in place for social protection portability.¹⁰ Some countries limit the portability of pensions by applying different rates to people from different countries or banning payments to selected countries. For example, Germany and the United Kingdom apply reduction rates to pension payments for nationals of countries with which they have no social security agreement.¹¹ Therefore, even if a migrant is legally eligible to contribute to and receive benefits from the host country’s social insurance system, their entitlements may not be transferrable when they move back home or to another country. This increases migrants’ vulnerability and reduces their incentives to contribute to social insurance systems.

Third, even when there are social protection arrangements in place for migrants, implementation and enforcement of these can be ineffective. The administration and financing of well-intentioned portability agreements can be beyond the capacity of underfunded national social protection departments. Furthermore, administering social protection to migrants can be complicated. For example, if benefits are means-tested, it may be necessary to obtain information on the financial situation of the migrant worker’s family abroad, which can be costly or even impossible to secure.¹² In addition, employers do not always enforce relevant social protection arrangements, knowingly or otherwise. For example, while Moroccan migrant workers can accrue portable social protection and retirement benefits in Spain, many employers do not provide migrants with relevant documentation.¹³

Finally, even if programmes are accessible and implemented effectively, knowledge gaps, language and financial barriers, time constraints and lack of documentation can affect migrant take-up. A study on Canada found Mexican and Jamaican workers had difficulty accessing health benefits due to lack of information on services, language barriers and their long working hours.¹⁴ Social protection can also incur direct financial costs such as monthly contributions, which can be a barrier to migrants with low incomes.

Opportunities for meeting the Sustainable Development Goals

Access to social protection for migrants is not just a matter of fairness, though this is important too given migrants have often contribute to social protection through taxes and other contributions, which they are subsequently prevented from drawing upon. More importantly, access can have a range of positive developmental impacts in host and origin countries, which can contribute to delivering the 2030 Agenda.

For migrants, access to social protection can be an important instrument to reduce their vulnerability and to manage economic and social risks, particularly those related to the workplace (e.g. accidents and injuries). Jobs with social protection entitlements tend to be more likely formal and better paid. This means migrant workers have greater security and are better able to send regular remittances to countries of origin, while worse working conditions tend to result in lower remittances.¹⁵ Remittances are used by migrant families in origin countries to finance basic needs and goods and services, and may also include investments in assets such as housing and education,¹⁶ with positive impacts on a range of SDGs including SDG 3 on health and SDG 4 on education (see also Samuels in this series).

As migrants contribute to host communities and countries as workers and consumers, their access to social protection can boost demand, fiscal receipts and more. These potential benefits are stifled when

10 C. van Panhuys, S. Kazi-Aoul and G. Binette, “Migrant access to social protection under bilateral labour agreements: A review of 120 countries and nine bilateral arrangements”, Extension of Social Security Working Paper No. 57 (Geneva, International Labour Organization (ILO), 2017).

11 Holzmann et al. (2005).

12 International Social Security Association (ISSA), *Handbook on the Extension of Social Security Coverage to Migrant Workers* (Geneva, 2014).

13 J. Arango and P. Martin, “Best practices to manage migration: Morocco-Spain”, *International Migration Review*, 39(1):258–269.

14 J. McLaughlin, “Trouble in our fields: Health and human rights among Mexican and Caribbean migrant farm workers in Canada”, unpublished dissertation (Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada, 2009).

15 Mallett (2018).

16 J. Hagen-Zanker, H. Postel and E. Mosler Vidal, “Poverty, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI Briefing (London, ODI, 2017).

access to basic services and social protection is denied or limited, undercutting the potential positive benefits of migrant contributions. Granting access to health care and health services is crucial to ensure the health of migrants and their contributions as workers (see also Samuels in this issue).

By filling labour gaps and paying taxes, migrants also contribute to the fiscal balance of host countries. As migrants tend to be younger and less likely to draw on social protection benefits than host populations, migrations often make a positive fiscal contribution, meaning the taxes and other financial contributions they pay outweigh the benefits and services they receive. This is shown in a study on the United Kingdom, which reveals that revenues generated from EU migrants between 1995–2001 are greater than expenditures for EU migrants and outweigh expenditures for non-EU migrants in most years.¹⁷ Other studies have similar findings, including a study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which found a slightly positive or no impact on the fiscal balance for migrants to developing countries.¹⁸ Migrants' contributions to government finance and productivity more broadly¹⁹ have indirect impacts on further SDGs, including SDG 8 on growth and decent work, and SDG 9 on productivity and innovation.

Preventing access to social protection or portability of benefits, on the other hand, can have negative impacts for migrants, as it increases migrants' vulnerabilities. Non-portability also makes circular migration less attractive and could reduce return migration as migrants may choose not to return to their home countries if they cannot take accrued benefits with them. This could potentially deprive origin countries of significant beneficial development effects of migration (see also Clemens in this series).²⁰

17 C. Dustmann and T. Frattini, "The fiscal effects of immigration to the UK", *The Economic Journal*, 124(580):F593–F643.

18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/ILO, *How Immigrants Contribute to Developing Countries' Economies* (Paris, OECD, 2018).

19 S. Gelb and A. Krishnan, "Technology, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", ODI Briefing (London, ODI, 2018).

20 J. Hagen-Zanker, E. Mosler Vidal and G. Sturge, "Social protection, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", ODI Briefing (London, ODI, 2017).

Policy implications

The 2030 Agenda highlights the importance of social protection in reducing poverty and inequalities. Migrants often have specific needs and vulnerabilities (as Samuels discusses in the next article), yet their coverage of social protection is patchy. Most migrants moving to high-income countries have some degree of access to and portability of social protection. However, those coming from low-income countries, those with irregular migration status and/or those working in the informal economy are often not covered.

Improving social protection for migrants goes hand in hand with better governance of migration, in particular, of labour mobility. Providing legal channels for migrants and granting access to social protection systems expands the base of potential contributors. At the same time, increasing social protection coverage is tightly linked with bringing migrant workers into the formal economy²¹ and, as such, also increases the ability of States to govern migration more effectively. Increased formalization of workers also leads to higher tax contributions and a more productive workforce.²² Additionally, effective coverage and portability are also crucial to ensure well-being and prevent vulnerability throughout a migrant's life. In these ways, migrant social protection improves development outcomes of migrants and their families, and helps boost migrants' contributions to their countries' growth and development. Thus, granting migrants access to social protection is directly linked to supporting many SDG targets.

The Global Compact for Migration has highlighted the importance of migrants' access to social protection and portability of benefits in Recommendation 22, which calls to "establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits". Policymakers should use this momentum to increase migrants' eligibility through new agreements and enable more migrants to practically participate in social protection programmes. Furthermore, it is important to extend and improve social protection portability for migrants and to strengthen capacities of national and regional bodies to design and enforce social protection arrangements more effectively (see Foresti in this special issue).

21 ISSA (2014).

22 Ibid.

With a quarter of migrants with no access to social protection and over half with only partial access, preserving the status quo means forgoing significant development gains of migration. As the international community moves towards greater recognition of migrants' contributions to sustainable development, taking proactive steps on migrant social protection is one way for this to concretely happen. ■

By providing migrants with access to social protection, those migrants will be better equipped to help fill labour market needs, increasing their earning potential and the remittances they may send home.



Migration, health and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development

Fiona Samuels¹

Section 1: Introduction

As is recognized in various international agreements (e.g. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;² Article 66 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;³ and Articles 3, 17 and 25 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child⁴), all people have a right to health irrespective of their migration and/or legal status.⁵ Migrants have received some attention in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but none specifically link migrants and health. However, as others have shown,⁶ not only do some SDG 3 targets have particular resonance for migrants, but many targets in the non-health-related goals also have links with migration and health.

Target 3.1, for instance, identifies the need to “reduce the global maternal mortality ratio to less than 70 per 100,000 live births”. With studies showing that some migrants experience higher maternal mortality and morbidity compared to host communities, ensuring they have appropriate access to health services becomes critical. In the non-health-related goals, the fifth goal – “achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls” – has various targets that are relevant to migrant women and girls and directly impact their health and well-being, including: eliminating all forms of violence against all women and girls, including trafficking and sexual and other types

of exploitation (5.2), eliminating all harmful practices, such as child, early and forced marriage, and female genital mutilation (5.3); and ensuring universal access to sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights (5.6).

In this article, the author argues that migrants have specific risks and vulnerabilities related to health, and that if migrants are not considered, or if services are not appropriately tailored, they will “be left behind”. This means that SDG 3 will not be achieved and other SDGs are also likely to fall short. Thus, section 2 discusses migrant health-related vulnerabilities and risks; section 3 examines some opportunities for addressing these vulnerabilities; and section 4 presents some concluding points.

Section 2: Health vulnerabilities faced by migrants

The “healthy immigrant effect” is a well-established phenomenon showing that migrants tend to be “young, fit and healthy when they embark on their migrant journeys”.⁷ Similarly, studies have shown that the frequency of diseases is lower among migrant populations and the general health status of migrants is higher than equivalent native populations, at least for the first 5–10 years, after which it may start to decline.⁸ Despite this, it has also been well established that migrants face a number of health-related vulnerabilities along the whole migration journey.

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2 See: www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

3 See: www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx

4 See: www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx

5 See also: International Organization for Migration (IOM), *International Migration, Health and Human Rights* (Geneva, 2013). Available from <https://publications.iom.int/books/international-migration-health-and-human-rights>

6 For example, see: O. Tulloch, F. Machingura and C. Melamed, “Health, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, ODI Briefing (London, ODI, 2016). Available from www.odi.org/publications/10477-health-migration-and-2030-agenda-sustainable-development

7 IOM, *Migration in the 2030 Agenda* (Geneva, 2017), p. 43. Available from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_in_the_2030_agenda.pdf

8 For example, see: A. Constant, T. García-Muñoz, S. Neuman and T. Neuman, “A “healthy immigrant effect” or a “sick immigrant effect”? Selection and policies matter”, IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 9338 (Bonn, IZA–Institute of Labor Economics, 2015), available from <http://ftp.iza.org/dp9338.pdf>; S. Kennedy, M.P. Kidd, J.T. McDonald and N. Biddle, “The healthy immigrant effect: Patterns and evidence from four countries”, *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 16(2):317–332.

Vulnerabilities along all stages of the migration journey

Migration trajectories consist of various phases and can include the pre-migration phase; the migration journey, which can include short- or long-term transit; the arrival and integration or destination phases; and the return phase to communities of origins, also often in preparation for remigration.⁹ In each of these phases, people face a range of potential health risks and also possible access to health benefits and protective factors.

In the pre-migration phase, events and trauma that a potential migrant may have faced, for instance, as a result of conflict, will affect their mental health and well-being; the health status of the migrant is also likely to be affected by the epidemiological and disease profile of the origin country, as well as the level and quality of health services. During the migration journey, the migrant is also likely to be exposed to health risks which may vary according to the duration of the journey, the means of transport and their exposure to pathogenic or environmental factors along transit routes.¹⁰ Upon arrival and/or integration, a range of factors influence both positively and negatively the health status of migrants, including policies and service provider attitudes.

The return phase can also create health risks and benefits, depending on the epidemiological and diseases profile of the home country and the service environment, and also on the experience of the migrant in the host country (they may have been exposed to injury or diseases, for instance, and arrive home with limited support services available). Alternatively, they may have acquired new knowledge and behaviours related to health, which could also benefit their communities of origin.¹¹

Other cross-cutting variables that might affect health risk and outcomes along the migration journey include gender and age. Thus, women, men and sexual minorities may face different health risks and outcomes, as may children, adolescent and older people. It has been well documented that women and girls are more at risk of sexual violence, sexual exploitation, trafficking and sexual slavery, as well as more generally gender-based violence in all stages of the migration process and especially during forced displacement and when fleeing contexts of conflict and war.¹² This clearly will have impacts on their current and future health and well-being, including in relation to their mental health and psychosocial welfare. The particular vulnerabilities of children, boys and girls, and especially unaccompanied minors, have also been in the spotlight recently and again; particularly, if they have faced sexual coercion and exploitation, they are likely to face long-lasting negative effects on their health and well-being.¹³

Barriers to accessing health services in host countries

Evidence shows that migrants continue to face a range of barriers when accessing health services in host countries, barriers that can also vary by age and gender. Barriers include language difficulties, unaffordable costs of health services, discrimination, negative attitudes and bias from health providers (intentional and unintentional), lack of female health staff (for female migrants), lack of knowledge about or difficulties in accessing health entitlements or health insurance (if available), and fear of deportation for some.¹⁴

9 For example, see: C. Zimmerman, L. Kiss, M. Hossain, "Migration and health: A framework for 21st century policy-making", *PLoS Medicine*, 8(5):e1001034; IOM (2017), p. 43.

10 For example, see: C. Lynch and C. Roper, "The transit phase of migration: Circulation of malaria and its multidrug-resistant forms in Africa", *PLoS Medicine*, 8(5):e1001040.

11 For example, see: A.A. Davies, R.M. Borland, C. Blake and H.E. West, "The dynamics of health and return migration", *PLoS Medicine*, 8(6):e1001046.

12 A. McAlpine, M. Hossain and C. Zimmerman, "Sex trafficking and sexual exploitation in settings affected by armed conflicts in Africa, Asia and the Middle East: Systematic review", *BMC International Health and Human Rights*, 16:34.

13 For example, see: J. Freccero, D. Biswas, A. Whiting, K. Alrabe and K.T. Seelinger, "Sexual exploitation of unaccompanied migrant and refugee boys in Greece: Approaches to prevention", *PLoS Medicine*, 14(11):e1002438.

14 D. Biswas, M. Kristiansen, A. Krasnik and M. Norredam, "Access to healthcare and alternative health-seeking strategies among undocumented migrants in Denmark", *BMC Public Health*, 11:560; S.F. Dias, M. Severo and H. Barros, "Determinants of health care utilization by immigrants in Portugal", *BMC Health Services Research*, 8:207; W.J. Hall, M.V. Chapman, K.M. Lee, Y.M. Merino, T.W. Thomas, B.K. Payne, E. Eng, S.H. Day and T. Coyne-Beasley, "Implicit racial/ethnic bias among health care professionals and its influence on health care outcomes: A systematic review", *American Journal of Public Health*, 105(12):e60–76.

Studies note, for instance, how interpreters are often not available, and even if they are, misunderstandings can still arise; similarly, some refugees perceive service providers as being disrespectful, having no time for them and not explaining processes sufficiently well.¹⁵ All of this can lead to refugees' being reluctant to seek out health services, which, in turn, can have negative effects both on their own health status and also that of the host community. Social norms that migrants travel with and, in many cases, have been seen to become more stringent in host communities may also restrict access to health services, particularly for women whose mobility outside the home may be limited and who may need to seek permission from males before accessing such services.

Section 3: Opportunities for meeting the Sustainable Development Goals in relation to migrant health

Despite it being increasingly accepted that rather than burden health systems, migrants are in fact playing a vital contribution to these health systems and, in many countries, account for a significant share of health-care providers,¹⁶ there is still a need for improving policies to ensure that health systems are migrant-friendly and inclusive. In this section, the author puts forward some opportunities to ensure this.

Universal health coverage

Universal health coverage (UHC) is a target in itself in SDG 3 (3.8), but it is also a critical mechanism for addressing health vulnerabilities of migrants and also arguably contributes to the achievement of all targets in SDG 3. As defined by the World Health Organization (WHO),¹⁷ "UHC means that all people

and communities can use the promotive, preventive, curative, rehabilitative and palliative health services they need, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that the use of these services does not expose the user to financial hardship".

Providing UHC in itself is not only a major financial undertaking, particularly in developing countries that may already struggle to provide basic health services, but it is technically, administratively and politically challenging. Further including migrant population would add another level of challenges, because of, among other things, issues of citizenship and other barriers to accessing health services (see Long, Mosler Vidal and Kuch's article in this special issue).

Nevertheless, there are examples of pioneers, notably Thailand, which was the first country in the world to integrate the needs of all migrants into its health system through a health insurance scheme for all residents, including regular and undocumented migrants. Cognizant of the large migrant population and its contribution to the economy (constituting 6% of population, or nearly 4 million, and making up 5% of the Thai labour force) and considering health care a human right and concerned that without health services migrants would exacerbate control efforts against communicable diseases, the Government of Thailand extended UHC (introduced in 2002 for Thais) to include all migrants. However, despite this progressive scheme, uptake remains relatively low. Reasons advanced for this include language and cultural barriers, fear of discrimination, fear of losing employment due to absences and poor employer compliance with the scheme. Thus, careful consideration would be needed to improve implementation and uptake among migrants, including approaches to address language and other cultural barriers affecting health-seeking behaviours, to provide relevant and timely information and to monitor uptake among migrants, among other things.¹⁸

15 For an overview, see for example: E. Mangrio and K. Sjögren Forss, "Refugees' experiences of healthcare in the host country: A scoping review", *BMC Health Services Research*, 17(1):814. DOI:10.1186/s12913-017-2731-0.

16 For example, see: United Kingdom, National Health Service (NHS), "NHS staff from overseas: Statistics" (available from <https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7783>). There is also a large body of literature exploring health-care workers' migration from low- and middle-income countries to high-income countries (HICs), which, while occurring as "brain drain" in developing countries, allows HICs to benefit (for example, see: Y.A. Misau, N. Al-Sadat and A.B. Gerei, "Brain-drain and health care delivery in developing countries", *Journal of Public Health in Africa*, 1(1):e6).

17 See: www.who.int/health_financing/universal_coverage_definition/en/

18 Tulloch, Machingura and Melamed (2016), available from www.odi.org/publications/10477-health-migration-and-2030-agenda-sustainable-development; R.L.L.R. Guinto, U.Z. Curran, R. Suphanchaimat, N.S. Pocock, "Universal health coverage in 'One ASEAN': Are migrants included? *Global Health Action*, 8(1); V. Tangcharoensathien, A.A. Thwin and W. Patcharanarumol, "Implementing health insurance for migrants, Thailand", *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 95(2):146–151.

Flexible health systems and whole-of-government responses

Much scholarship exists exploring the nature of health systems, how they can be understood, what makes for strong and effective health systems at different levels, and how they can be strengthened, among other things.¹⁹ Defined as “consisting of all people, institutions, resources, and activities whose primary purpose is to promote, restore, and maintain health”,²⁰ one shortcoming of health systems is that they are largely considered within geopolitical boundaries and/or are delimited by nation State borders.

This clearly has implications for migrant populations, particularly those in transit locations and those who reside in host communities without legal documentation (though it is possible to overcome this challenge, see the case of Thailand above). As such, there is growing awareness of the need for a flexible approach to health systems, making them migrant-inclusive through, for instance, addressing cross-border issues of access to services, and/or cross-jurisdictional networking, thereby also protecting the right of migrants to continued access to health services. Similarly, there is increasing awareness of the need for multi-partner and intersectoral approaches in relation to health and health systems, given the ways in which different sectors (e.g. education; water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)) can impact health, including the health of migrants.

Several approaches exist which exhibit some of this intersectionality and cross-border initiatives:

- In terms of cross-border initiatives, the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance programme²¹ – which covers Cambodia, China, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand and Viet Nam – is an example of a programme that includes migrants in early warning and risk reduction/management systems (responding to SDG 3d). The goals of this programme are to:

(a) improve cross-border infectious disease outbreak investigation and response by sharing surveillance data and best practices in disease recognition and reporting; (b) develop expertise in epidemiological surveillance across the countries; and (c) enhance communication and cooperation between the countries.²²

- The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Partnership on Health and Mobility in East and Southern Africa (PHAMESA) is another cross-jurisdictional approach engaging 11 countries with the aim to improve the management of migration health and reduce migrants’ vulnerability to HIV by responding to their health needs throughout all phases of the migration process. PHAMESA focuses primarily on labour migrants and mobile workers, forced migrants, and irregular migrants in the context in which they live and work, including their families and host communities.²³

Section 4: Conclusion

This article has shown that migrants can face a range of health-related risks and vulnerabilities along the migration journey. In particular, challenges accessing health services in host countries – which can range from policies not being migrant inclusive to health provider attitudes being stigmatizing towards migrants – often leave migrants extremely vulnerable. This does not necessarily mean, however, that migrants do not make valuable contributions to host economies, including in the health sector; additionally, the healthy immigrant effect is a well-established phenomenon.

Nevertheless, while examples of efforts to include migrants in health policies do exist and UHC is one mechanism that, if appropriately implemented with consideration of migrants, could be critical in ensuring that “no one is left behind”, more is needed. Additionally, approaches that transcend borders and offer opportunities for flexible health systems, which are too often circumscribed by State boundaries, could also be explored further.

19 For example, see: F. Samuels, A.B. Amaya, R. Rodríguez Pose and D. Balabanova, *Pathways to Progress: A Multi-level Approach to Strengthening Health Systems*, ODI Development Progress Dimension Paper 01 (London, ODI, 2014). Available from www.odi.org/publications/9096-pathways-progress-multi-level-approach-strengthening-health-systems

20 See: www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/health-systems/about

21 See: www.mbdnet.org/

22 IOM (2017).

23 See: <http://southafrica.iom.int/programmes/partnership-on-health-and-mobility-in-east-and-southern-africa-phamesa>

Given that migrants may have particular vulnerabilities related to the targets outlined in SDG 3, and indeed in some of the other non-health-related SDGs and targets, it is critical that their needs are considered and that policies and services are tailored appropriately. Finally, if countries have strong public health surveillance and if inclusive, accessible and quality public health services are also targeted at migrants, everyone benefits including members of host communities. ■

If countries have strong public health surveillance and if inclusive, accessible and quality public health services are also targeted at migrants, everyone benefits including members of host communities.



Migration for sustainable development: The Global Compact for Migration as a platform for action

Marta Foresti¹

This article explores migration as a strategy and a tool for achieving sustainable development and how the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) should be used by policymakers and other actors as a platform for action.

Migration is a strategy to help achieve economic and social development objectives for migrants as well as for host communities (as also argued by Clemens in this special issue). As such, migration and sustainable development are interdependent and can support each other in a virtuous cycle. As a force and a form of development, migration can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and can generate growth and prosperity as well as opportunities for all.²

Despite a growing body of evidence highlighting the benefits and also the obstacles for migration to contribute to development outcomes, this relationship remains at best poorly understood and at worse ignored in policymaking circles and, as a result, often overlooked by programmes and strategies at global and national levels³: it is striking, for example, that up until recently migration rarely featured as a priority or even a theme in most bilateral of multilateral development agencies' strategies and plans, let alone in their operational programmes. In addition, in Europe and beyond, the dominant political rhetoric points to development aid as a mechanism to reduce or stem irregular migration flows, which fundamentally ignores the evidence of the positive

relationship between levels of development and growth and migration patterns.⁴

The GCM is the first ever internationally agreed framework to better manage global human mobility. Following two years of broad and far-reaching consultations and at time tense political negotiations among States,⁵ it will finally be adopted by most United Nations (UN) Member States (with the exception of the United States and Hungary) in December 2018. The GCM is a non-binding agreement laying out 23 objectives and commitments on various dimensions of global migration governance and management. It is grounded in the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants⁶ adopted by Member States at the UN General Assembly in 2016 in response to the so-called "refugee and migration crisis" of 2015.

The implementation of the GCM will offer an opportunity to address the misconceptions around migration and development and to advance pragmatic, fact-based principles and commitments to govern migration in ways that can be conducive to improved development outcomes.⁷

Importantly, migration is one of the many forms of economic and social development and, as such, it is not a "guarantee" of positive outcomes. While the evidence is clear about the potential benefits of migration for development, in practice it is a matter of policy options and choices whether and how this translates into concrete opportunities for migrants

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2 ODI, *Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (London, ODI, 2018). Available from www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12422.pdf

3 M. Foresti and J. Hagen-Zanker, "Migration and development: How human mobility can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals", *ODI Briefing note* (London, ODI, 2018). Available from www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/12421.pdf

4 M.A. Clemens and H.M. Postel, "Can development assistance deter emigration?" *CGD Policy Brief* (Washington, D.C., Center for Global Development (CGD), 2018), available from www.cgdev.org/publication/can-development-assistance-deter-emigration; H. de Haas, "Turning the tide? Why development will not stop migration", *Development and Change*, 38(5):819–841.

5 M. Foresti, "Global migration: The politics behind the deal", blog published on Medium (20 February 2018). Available from <https://medium.com/@marta.foresti/global-migration-the-politics-behind-the-deal-1e03ddd3a516>

6 See: <https://refugeemigrants.un.org/declaration>

7 Various authors, "Sustainable development and the GCM – non-paper", submitted during the GCM negotiations in 2018, unpublished.

and host communities (see also Clemens in this special issue).⁸ The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the forthcoming GCM represent unique platforms for collaborative action, policy formulation and innovation to translate the potential of migration into benefits and opportunities for all.

Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: Why migration is key to achieve all Sustainable Development Goals

Sustainable development is defined in the 2030 Agenda in holistic terms, recognizing that “eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, combating inequality within and among countries, preserving the planet, creating sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth and fostering social inclusion are linked to each other and are interdependent”.⁹ It is important to frame the role of migration in achieving development outcomes in similar terms: not only as a standalone objective or set of targets, but also as a means to achieve most of the goals, and more broadly to enhance development outcomes. It also means that in practice migration is therefore linked and interdependent with these other aspects of economic and social development.

Recent research by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has highlighted the multiple dimensions of the relationship between migration and the SDGs.¹⁰ In a series of 12 briefings, the research explores the multiple linkages between migration and development outcomes in key areas, such as poverty reduction, climate change, gender equality, decent work, access and contribution to basic services, and more (see also the introduction to this special issue).

Central to the 2030 Agenda are not only the 17 SDGs but also – for the first time in a global development framework – an emphasis on partnership and

international cooperation between all States, beyond traditional north/south divides. In the 2030 Agenda, Member States have committed to “setting out together on the path towards sustainable development, devoting ourselves collectively to the pursuit of global development and of ‘win-win’ cooperation which can bring huge gains to all countries and all parts of the world”. Such partnerships and collaborative efforts will also be key to ensure the successful integration of migration and development policies, both of which require international cooperation and partnership between different actors.¹¹ This is especially important as the value of multilateralism and international cooperation comes under increased scrutiny and skepticism, as demonstrated by the United States and Hungary leaving the negotiating table and by Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2018. While State sovereignty will always be the cornerstone of migration policies, the very fact that international migration involved people moving between countries requires some degree of cooperation to ensure effective and sustainable solutions/approaches.

Finally, and crucially, the 2030 Agenda is supported by the necessary political “traction” in different Member States and in the multilateral system. Agreed in 2015 as a follow-up to the popular Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the SDGs underpin most national and international efforts to address the challenges and opportunities posed by sustainable development at different levels. This broad policy platform, coupled with their political visibility and “positive” framing, can be a useful entry point to address the realities of human mobility as part of the development process, beyond the negative rhetoric that accompanies them in many countries.

The Global Compact for Migration as a platform for action on migration for development

Relying on the SDGs and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda has not however been enough to secure concrete actions and results and to bring human mobility to the heart of the development endeavour. In fact, so far, progress seems slow and the migration and development communities have talked past each other. Several papers have been written, debates are being held and strategies are being developed, but action is thin on the ground.

8 M. Clemens, C. Huang, J. Graham and K. Gough, “Migration is what you make it: Seven policy decisions that turned challenges into opportunities”, CGD note (Washington, D.C., CGD, 2018). Available from www.cgdev.org/publication/migration-what-you-make-it-seven-policy-decisions-turned-challenges-opportunities

9 United Nations (UN) General Assembly, “Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015, A/RES/70/1 (21 October 2015), paragraph 13. Available from www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

10 ODI (2018).

11 UN General Assembly (2015), paragraph 18.

The forthcoming adoption of the GCM and especially its implementation offer a unique opportunity to make some real progress, as suggested above. However, all will depend of the concrete policy choices that States will make in the months and years ahead to ensure that development policies and plans take account and make the most of the realities of human mobility, and that in turn migration policies do not become so restrictive as to hamper development outcomes and increased prosperity for those who move.

First, the text of the GCM offers a number of entry points to anchor concrete proposals on migration for development. Sustainable development is one of the guiding principles underpinning the GCM, recognizing the role of migration to achieve development outcomes: *“The Global Compact is rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and builds upon its recognition that migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the sustainable development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. Migration contributes to positive development outcomes and to realizing the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially when it is properly managed. The Global Compact aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievement of all Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the impact this achievement will have on migration in the future.”*¹²

During the negotiations, an additional objective was included in the first draft of the GCM, suggested mainly by African States, focusing on the needs and realities of low- and middle-income countries. This resulted in Objective 23 of the GCM, where Member States commit to aligning the implementation of the GCM, the 2030 Agenda and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, recognizing that migration and sustainable development are multidimensional and interdependent. Finally, Commitment 2 recognizes the role of development policies and the 2030 Agenda to mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that can compel people to leave their countries or the significance of the political and diplomatic process leading up to the agreement of the text cannot be exaggerated. When the GCM process started two years ago, many were skeptical about the likelihood

of the Compact seeing the light of the day. Others believed that the text would have to be watered down as to become hollow. Instead, States engaged, discussed and found ways to compromise, and, as a result, the text includes a number of potentially useful pointers for action, for example, on alternative to child detention, on measures to address the needs of migrants in vulnerable situations, on disaster-induced migration, and on labour and skills mobility.

So while not perfect and the result of many necessary compromises, the final text offers a comprehensive but non-binding menu of options for States and others to act upon, to test new forms of international cooperation, and to explore solutions and pragmatic ways forward. This is key when it comes to sustainable development, which, like international migration, rests on the willingness and ability of States to cooperate to address global challenges and improve people’s lives. It is especially important that during the negotiations, Member States recognized the need to root the GCM within the framework of the 2030 Agenda and the synergies that exist between the two policy processes. It is now for the UN system to make the most of the existing implementation mechanisms and monitoring processes to ensure consistency.

Beyond these general principles, the text of the GCM includes a number of specific entry points and objectives directly related to development outcomes, including the need to expand access to basic services to migrants; to invest in skills development and job creation; to create conditions for migrants and the diaspora to contribute to sustainable development in all countries; and to promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances. In practice, this offers Member States and other actors a menu of options to choose from and act upon. They can do so by investing in specific initiatives such as the Global Skill Partnership¹³ (see also Clemens in this special issue) or various efforts to reduce the cost of remittances to 3 per cent¹⁴ by supporting coalitions between States

12 UN, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Final Draft (11 July 2018). Available from www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/migration.pdf

13 M. Clemens, “Global Skill Partnerships: A proposal for technical training in a mobile world”, CGD Brief (Washington, D.C., CGD, 2017). Available from www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/global-skill-partnerships-proposal-technical-training-in-mobile-world-brief.pdf

14 Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development, “Remittances”, World Bank Group Issue Brief Series (Washington, D.C., World Bank Group, 2016). Available from www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Remittances_WBG_IATF-Issue-Brief.pdf

and actors dedicated to specific agendas, for example, around youth employment or promoting the role of women migrant workers in the labour market.¹⁵ Finally, some initiatives are already underway and gathering momentum: mayors are mobilizing to ensure that cities can continue to host and integrate migrants who in turn contribute to the economic and social development of local communities (see also Long, Mosler Vidal and Kuch in this special issue).

Finally, from an implementation perspective, how to do development is as important as what to do. First, be smart and innovative. The focus should be on building coalitions and partnerships between countries and cities, with development organizations and actors, and with the private sector. States should identify and work towards realistic, and politically viable, objectives that adapt to specific needs and opportunities. It will be important to avoid blueprint approaches and unrealistic promises. Second, be globally inspired but locally led. While the aspirations of the GCM and the SDGs are global and grounded in international cooperation, actions need to be locally led and rooted in specific contexts, countries, regions and markets where specific development opportunities and challenges exist.

How to ensure the Global Compact for Migration achieves what it sets out to do

Like all globally negotiated frameworks, there are limits to what the GCM can achieve, as well as some specific risks to avoid. Here it is key to learn the lessons from several years of development practice and policy formulation, as well as from the evidence on the nature of the migration and development nexus.

First and foremost, it is necessary to contrast the emerging narrative in some countries – mostly responding to domestic political pressures – that development aid can be effective at reducing or deterring irregular migration: the evidence suggests that this is not a realistic objective, which risks damaging public support (see Clemens in this special

issue).¹⁶ There is the risk that viewing migration through a development lens may reinforce or replicate unhelpful dichotomies of donors and recipients or origin and host countries. Instead, the GCM is an opportunity to frame development and migration relationships between countries as reciprocal and mutual under a global framework. Development happens along migration journeys, with opportunities and challenges also emerging in so-called “transit countries” where development programmes and interventions can also make a difference.

Secondly, development is not the holy grail or silver bullet to address all migration challenges. On its own, it cannot ensure that all opportunities are seized. However, it can be part of a comprehensive strategy to better manage migration and make the most of its economic and social benefits. It is also important to recognize the core principles and objectives of development policies, such as reducing poverty and inequality, and to ensure that migration priorities are not seen as interfering (or, worse, competing) with those.

The GCM offers a concrete opportunity for countries and other key actors to work together to shape migration and development in mutually beneficial ways, ensuring that the movement of people can happen in a safe and orderly manner, and thereby contributing to sustainable development across the globe. Significant demographic and economic pressures mean that the meaningful question is not how much migration can be prevented with development policy. It is rather how better migration governance can bring about shared, sustainable development outcomes. ■

The GCM is an opportunity to frame development and migration relationships between countries as reciprocal and mutual under a global framework.

15 T. O’Neil, A. Fleury and M. Foresti, “Women on the move: Migration, gender equality and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” ODI Briefing (London, ODI, 2016). Available from www.odi.org/publications/10476-women-move-migration-gender-equality-and-2030-agenda-sustainable-development

16 M.A. Clemens and H.M. Postel, “Can development assistance deter emigration?” CGD Brief (Washington, D.C., CGD, 2018). Available from www.cgdev.org/publication/can-development-assistance-deter-emigration


Publications



Migration Health Annual Report 2017

2018/24pages
English

The International Organization's (IOM) Migration Health Division acts with Member States, UN agencies and other partners in the international community to meet the operational challenges of migration, advance understanding of migration health issues, encourage social and economic development through migration, and work towards ensuring respect of the human dignity and well-being of migrants. This report provides a snapshot of IOM's health activities in 2017 and presents key achievements under three broad themes: (a) partnerships in migration health; (b) migration health in the context of crisis; and (c) disease prevention and response. The report illustrates IOM's growing multidimensional migration health activities and partnerships in 2017, and demonstrates IOM's commitment to advancing the health of migrants and their families worldwide, as well as supporting IOM Member States in addressing migration health challenges.



Migration and the 2030 Agenda:

A Guide for Practitioners

2018/156 pages
English, French, Spanish

This guide is designed to serve government actors, both national and local, involved in any process of Sustainable Development Goal implementation, including those working specifically in migration, and those working in other sectors who are interested in integrating migration. It is also for government actors working in the migration field who wish to integrate the SDGs into their work.

The focus of this guide is to help policymakers implement the migration aspects of the SDGs. Policymakers can use this guide to integrate migration into local or national development planning, by designing and implementing interventions that relate to migration in the context of the SDGs. These interventions may take the form of legislation, policies, programmes, projects or other activities, and may relate to core migration topics or integrate migration into activities in another sector. For example, policymakers may use this guide to design interventions that directly address human trafficking, as well as interventions in the health sector that help protect victims of trafficking.

For actors with experience in migration mainstreaming, this guide offers a new approach that is based on the 2030 Agenda. For those with no experience in migration mainstreaming, it offers an introduction on how migration and development are linked in the context of the SDGs, and how to take action around these connections.

It is accompanied by two complementary tools that help illustrate linkages between migration and the SDGs: (i) a comprehensive booklet which outlines the linkages between migration and each SDG and (ii) a poster which summarizes these linkages.



Migration Policy Practice (Vol. VIII, Number 2, May 2018–August 2018)


2018/36 pages
ISSN 2223-5248
English

The new edition of *Migration Policy Practice*, guest-edited by Gabriella Sanchez from the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, focuses on issues of child migration. It seeks to respond to the Call to Action launched earlier this year by UNICEF, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Eurostat and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to prioritize actions to address evidence gaps in children’s migration data.

While the visibility of children in migration has increased, this has not always translated into the collection, availability or production of sound data and research concerning children’s experiences and perspectives.

This special issue of *Migration Policy Practice* brings together the perspectives, experiences and recommendations of scholars and practitioners working with children and on migration in different regions of the world. Authors include Bina D’Costa from the UNICEF Office of Research; Jasper Tjaden from the IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC); Blanca Navarrete from Derechos Humanos Integrales en Acción (DHIA) and Melissa Vértiz Hernández from Grupo de Trabajo sobre Política Migratoria; Alina Potts from the Global Women’s Institute at George Washington University; Jennifer Podkul and Cory Shindel from Kids in Need of Defense (KIND); and Gabriella Sanchez from the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute.

Their contributions are in line with the Call to Action, which recognizes the importance of “reliable, timely and accessible data and evidence [as] essential for understanding how migration and forcible displacement affect children and their families – and for putting in place policies and programmes to meet their needs.”



Psychosocial Support and Dialogue in the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon

2018/164 pages
English

Following a series of consultative workshops held in Damascus in 2012, the International Organization for Migration began to implement its psychosocial support activities in the Syrian Arab Republic with a programme focused on capacity-building and support of national psychosocial practitioners and humanitarian responders, who were often operating without the necessary capacity.

The programme, funded by the Italian Cooperation, envisaged different training paths for psychosocial professionals in the Syrian Arab Republic. Among these was a one-year Executive Master’s programme in Psychosocial Support and Dialogue, designed in collaboration with the Lebanese University.

The course was organized in three pedagogical pillars:

- a. Concepts and practices of psychosocial support in conflict situations;
- b. Historical roots of the Syrian conflict, principles and practices of conflict mediation, transformation and dialogue; and
- c. Use of culture and cultural activities in both psychosocial and conflict mediation processes.

Over 40 students submitted reports of their guided fieldwork, which were analysed by a group of experts appointed by the Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa. In each chapter of this resulting publication, the three authors elaborate a critical review of the theses, aiming to assess the effectiveness and challenges characterizing the different approaches described with specific reference to the geographical and social contexts of the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. The findings of the three chapters will allow practitioners and scholars working in relevant fields to benefit from the critical analysis built by the expert authors, while adding value to the information and data collected through the master’s students’ fieldwork in areas that continue to be of difficult access for researchers.



Call for authors/Submission guidelines

Since its launch in October 2011, Migration Policy Practice has published over 196 articles by senior policymakers and distinguished migration policy experts from all over the world.

Past authors have included, *inter alia*:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) and Special Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil society activities in the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global Forum on Migration and Development; Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje, Chair of the GFMD 2013–2014; Mark Cully, Chief Economist at the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations; Khalid Koser, Chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration; Khalid Malik, Director of the Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs (2010–2014); Ali Mansoor, Chair of the GFMD 2012; Andrew Middleton, Director of Culture, Recreation and Migrant Statistics, Australian Bureau of Statistics; Najat Maalla M'jid, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (2008–2014); Robert A. Mocny, Director of the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), formerly US-VISIT, US Department of Homeland Security; Imelda M. Nicolas, Secretary of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), Office of the President of the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary-General of the Terre des Hommes International Federation; Kelly Ryan, Coordinator of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees – IGC, Geneva; Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament (2012–2014); David Smith, Director of Economic Analysis Unit, Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; Sir Peter D. Sutherland, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Migration (2006–2017); Ambassador William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM); Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US Department of State.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

- Not exceed five pages and be written in a non-academic and reader-friendly style;
- Cover any area of migration policy but discuss, as far as possible, particular solutions, policy options or best practice relating to the themes covered;
- Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant public administrations, or civil society, in other countries.

Articles giving account of evaluations of specific migration policies and interventions, including both findings and innovative methodologies, are particularly welcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

Solon Ardittis (sardittis@eurasylum.org)
Frank Laczko (flaczko@iom.int)

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