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Introduction

Marie McAuliffe and Martin Ruhs¹

International migration is a complex phenomenon that touches on a multiplicity of economic, social and security aspects affecting our daily lives in an increasingly interconnected world. Migration is a term that encompasses a wide variety of movements and situations that involve people of all walks of life and backgrounds. Migration has helped improve people's lives in both origin and destination countries and has offered opportunities for millions of people worldwide to forge safe and meaningful lives abroad. Not all migration occurs in positive circumstances, however. We have, in recent years, seen an increase in migration and displacement occurring due to conflict, persecution, environmental degradation and change, and a profound lack of human security and opportunity. While most international migration occurs legally, some of the greatest insecurities for migrants, and much of the public concern about immigration, is associated with irregular migration.

In this context, the *World Migration Report 2018* seeks to use the body of available data and research to contribute to more evidence-based analysis and policy debates about some of the most important and pressing global migration issues of our time. By their very nature, the complex dynamics of global migration can never be fully measured, understood and regulated. However, as this report shows, we do have a continuously growing and improving body of data and evidence that can help us make better sense of the basic features of migration in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world.

The *World Migration Report* series, which commenced in 2000, has been refined to focus on two key contributions for readers: part I – key information on migration and migrants (including migration-related statistics); and part II – balanced, evidence-based

analysis of complex and emerging migration issues. The two parts are intended to provide both overview information that helps to explain migration patterns and processes globally and regionally, and insights and recommendations on major issues that policymakers are or soon will be grappling with. Refinement of the series is also in recognition that as the focus on and complexity of migration intensifies, a series that provides both overview information on migration and migrants as well as analyses of more topical issues is likely to be an important resource for a greater number of people.

In this special issue of *Migration Policy Practice*, we provide excerpts of selected chapters of the *World Migration Report 2018* to give you a taste of its contents. The chapters have been selected in consultation with the co-editors, Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko, and provide snippets of key information and analysis. We encourage readers to access the full report on topics of interest at www.iom.int/world-migration-report-2018.

In the first article, an institutionally authored chapter by IOM, we provide key information on global migration trends. Drawing on key data at the global level, the article looks at the changes in the number of international migrants globally over time as well as how migration flows in certain geographic regions have evolved. The chapter provides the big picture on migration and migrants, drawing on a range of global statistics and other information.

In the next article, we provide highlights of the report chapter on migration research and analysis. A chapter designed to assist those who are drawing on the vast amount of material produced on migration – including analysts, policy officers, researchers and students – provides insights into how such material is produced and the key strengths and weaknesses of material produced by different sectors.

This year will see the negotiation and finalization of the global compact on migration, so it is timely that an overview of the development of global governance of migration is presented. In an article based on their chapter for the report, Susan Martin

¹ Marie McAuliffe is the Head of the Migration Policy Research Division and co-editor of the *World Migration Report 2018*. Martin Ruhs is Chair in Migration Studies and Deputy Director of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI). He is also the co-editor of the *World Migration Report 2018*.

and Sanjula Weerasinghe review some of the major global norms and institutions relevant to the global governance of migration and discuss themes and recent developments.

The article devoted to migration journeys by Marie McAuliffe, Adrian Kitimbo, Alexandra Goossens and AKM Ahsan Ullah highlights the importance of understanding migration from migrants' perspectives, principally by listening to and learning from migrants through rigorous research. With a focus on people who have fewer means and more restricted choices, the article presents key information on migrants' self-agency, decision-making, (mis)information as well as risk and reward.

The media plays an important role in shaping how and what people, including policymakers and migrants themselves, think about migration. In an excerpt of a chapter that critically discusses media reporting on migrants and migration, William Allen, Scott Blinder and Robert McNeil draw on existing research in different countries to answer four key questions: What do media around the world say about migration and migrants? What impacts does this coverage have on what members of the public, policymakers and migrants themselves think and do? How does the

practice of journalism itself contribute to coverage? What implications arise from recent experiences of media and migration for future research and practice?

With greater recognition of the increasing role cities play in migration, the final article provides an update to the *World Migration Report 2015*, which was devoted entirely to this topic. Building on the foundations of the *World Migration Report 2015*, the chapter looks at the role of the modern city in migration governance, taking advantage of some of the recent research on the evolving nature of cities and of their roles in the world. Authors Howard Duncan and Ioana Popp highlight the continuing growth in the influence of cities over migration trajectories, both international and internal, arguing that the role of cities demands greater attention from both scholars and policymakers.

Finally, we would like to thank the contributors to this issue of *Migration Policy Practice*, as well as co-editors Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko for inviting us to edit this special issue. It has provided an important opportunity to share key parts of IOM's flagship publication at an important time in history as we witness the increasing relevance of and interest in international migration globally. ■

Migration and migrants: A global overview¹

Introduction

Human migration is an age-old phenomenon that stretches back to the earliest periods of human history. In the modern era, emigration and immigration continue to provide States, societies and migrants with many opportunities. At the same time, migration has emerged in the last few years as a critical political and policy challenge in matters such as integration, displacement, safe migration and border management.

It is important to understand international migration and its various manifestations in order to effectively address evolving migration dynamics, while at the same time adequately accounting for the diverse and varied needs of migrants. International movement is becoming more feasible, partly thanks to the digital revolution, distance-shrinking technology and reductions in travel costs.² Factors underpinning migration are numerous, relating to economic prosperity, inequality, demography, violence and conflict, and environmental change. While the overwhelming majority of people migrate internationally for reasons related to work, family and study, many people leave their homes and countries for other compelling reasons, such as conflict, persecution and disaster. Overall, displaced populations such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) comprise a relatively small percentage of all migrants; however, they often capture and demand collective attention and action as they frequently find themselves in highly vulnerable situations. These are the people who are often most in need of assistance.

This chapter, with its focus on key global migration data and trends, seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of the bigger picture of migration, by providing an overview of information on migration and migrants.

The chapter draws upon sources of data compiled by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The chapter provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). *Please refer to the full chapter for a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs – as well as of remittances. The full chapter also highlights the growing body of programmatic IOM data on the following aspects of migration: missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, migrant health, resettlement, displacement tracking, diaspora mapping and human trafficking. While not global or representative, these data can usefully contribute to drawing insights into migration and its various dynamics, including the diverse needs of migrants.*

This chapter also highlights the challenges in achieving comparability and uniformity in data collection that make a comprehensive analysis of global migration trends difficult. Recent and ongoing efforts to collect and improve data have led to an expansion in available migration data. However, issues of fragmentation, and lack of uniformity and comparability, remain key challenges in developing a truly global picture of all key aspects of migration.³ Similarly, defining migration and migrants is complex.

1 This chapter of the *World Migration Report 2018* was produced by IOM.

2 See, for example, [chapter 6](#) (on transnational connectivity) of the *World Migration Report 2018*.

3 In general, explanatory notes, caveats, limitations and methodologies on specific sources of data can be extensive and are therefore not included in this chapter. However, sources have been clearly identified so that readers can refer to them.

Outside of general definitions of *migration* and *migrant*, such as those found in dictionaries, there exist various specific definitions of key migration-related terms, including in legal, administrative, research and statistical spheres.^a There is no universally agreed definition of migration or migrant, however, several definitions are widely accepted and have been developed in different settings, such as those set out in UN DESA’s 1998 *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration*.^b

Technical definitions, concepts and categories of migrants and migration are necessarily informed by geographic, legal, political, methodological, temporal and other factors. For example, there are numerous ways in which migration events can be defined, including in relation to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence and duration of stay.^c This is important when it comes to quantifying and analysing the effects of migration and migrants (however defined). We encourage readers to refer to primary sources cited in the chapter for information on specific definitions and categorizations underlying the data.

^a See, for example, Poulain and Perrin, 2001.

^b UN DESA, 1998.

^c See, for example, de Beer et al., 2010.

International migrants: Numbers and trends

UN DESA produces estimates of the number of international migrants globally. The following discussion draws on its estimates, which are based on data provided by States.⁴ The *United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration* defines an *international migrant* as any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between “short-term migrants” (those who have changed their country of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year) and “long-term migrants” (those who have done so for at least one year). Some countries use different criteria to identify international migrants by, for example, applying different minimum durations of residence. Differences in concepts and definitions,

as well as data collection methodologies between countries, hinder full comparability of national statistics on international migrants.

Overall, the estimated number of international migrants has increased over the past four-and-a-half decades. The total estimated 244 million people living in a country other than their country of birth in 2015 is almost 100 million more than in 1990 (when it was 153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million; see Table 1).⁵ While the proportion of international migrants globally has increased over this period, it is evident that the vast majority of people continue to live in the country in which they were born. Most international migrants in 2015 (around 72%) were of working age (20 to 64 years of age), with a slight decrease in migrants aged less than 20 between 2000 and 2015 (17% to 15%), and a constant share (around 12%) of international migrants aged 65 years or more since 2000.

Table 1. International migrants, 1970–2015

Year	Number of migrants	Migrants as a % of world’s population
1970	84,460,125	2.3%
1975	90,368,010	2.2%
1980	101,983,149	2.3%
1985	113,206,691	2.3%
1990	152,563,212	2.9%
1995	160,801,752	2.8%
2000	172,703,309	2.8%
2005	191,269,100	2.9%
2010	221,714,243	3.2%
2015	243,700,236	3.3%

Source: UN DESA, 2008 and 2015a.


Note: The number of entities (such as States, territories and administrative regions) for which data were made available in the 2015 UN DESA *Revision of International Migrant Stock* was 213. In 1970, the number of entities was 135.

4 Data are also provided to UN DESA by territories and administrative units. For a summary on UN DESA stock data sources, methodology and caveats, please see UN DESA, 2015b. Please note that since the publishing of the Report, UN DESA has released a new revision of the international migrant stock dataset, available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/index.shtml


5 UN DESA, 2008.

Snapshot of International Migrants

The international migrant population globally has increased in size but remained relatively stable as a proportion of the world's population



52% of international migrants are male, 48% are female



Most international migrants (72%) are of working age (20–64) years


*Age groups above 75 years omitted (male 4.5%, female 6.8%).

Note: Snapshot based on infographics by IOM's Migration Research Division and Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (IOM, 2017d), which draw on UN DESA data (UN DESA, 2015a).

Europe and Asia hosted around 75 million migrants each in 2015 – 62 per cent of the total global international migrant stock combined (see Figure 1). When compared with the size of the population in each region, shares of international migrants in 2015 were highest in Oceania, North America and Europe, where international migrants represented, respectively, 21 per cent, 15 per cent and 10 per cent

of the total population.⁶ In comparison, the share of international migrants is relatively small in Asia and Africa (1.7% each) and Latin America (1.5%). However, Asia is the region where growth in the resident migrant population between 2000 and 2015 was most remarkable, at over 50 per cent (around 25 million people, in absolute terms).⁷

Figure 1. International migrants, by major region of residence, 2000 to 2015 (millions)



Source: UN DESA, 2015a. Datasets available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml (accessed 22 June 2017).

The United States of America has been the main country of destination for international migrants since 1970.⁸ Since then, the number of foreign-born people residing in the country has almost quadrupled — from less than 12 million in 1970, to 46.6 million in 2015. Germany has been the second top country of destination per UN DESA estimates since as early as 2005, with over 12 million international migrants residing in the country in 2015. Prior to 2005, the Russian Federation had been the second largest host country of international migrants for roughly 15 years, since the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991. A list of the top 20 destination countries of international migrants is provided in the left-hand column of Figure 2.

6 UN DESA, 2015a.


7 Ibid.

8 UN DESA, 2008; UN DESA, 2015a.

The list of largest migrant source countries is shown in the right-hand panel in Figure 2. Nearly half of all international migrants worldwide in 2015 were born in Asia,⁹ primarily originating from India (the largest country of origin), China, and other South

Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Mexico was the second largest country of origin, followed by a number of European countries that have sizable numbers of emigrants.

Figure 2. Top 20 destinations (left) and origins (right) of international migrants in 2015 (millions)



Source: UN DESA, 2015a. Datasets for the 2015 Revision available at www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

In regard to the distribution of international migrants by countries' income group,¹⁰ about two thirds of international migrants resided in high-income economies in 2015 – around 157 million. This compares with 77 million foreign-born who resided in middle-income countries (about one third of the total migrant stock) and almost 9 million in low-income countries in the same year.

UN DESA estimates of foreign-born populations do not reflect immigration status or policy categories (such as students, highly skilled migrants, or refugees). Capturing such attributes is inherently difficult for several key reasons. First, a person's immigration status can be fluid and change quickly, arising from circumstances and legal-policy settings. For example, many international migrants who may be described as "undocumented" or "irregular" enter countries on valid visas and then stay in contravention of one or more visa conditions. In fact, there are many paths to irregularity, such as crossing borders without authorization, unlawfully overstaying a visa period, working in contravention of visa conditions, being born into irregularity, or remaining after a negative decision on an asylum application has been made.¹¹ Second, countries have different immigration policy settings and different ways of collecting data on migrants, which makes it difficult to establish a harmonized approach to capturing irregular migrant stocks globally. The pace of change in the migration policy arena also poses an extra dimension of complexity, as people may slip into and out of "irregularity". Various analysts use different methods to produce intermittent estimates of irregular migrant populations. However, the estimation exercise can often be imprecise. This is partly a reflection of the problematic nature of quantifying irregular migrant populations, given the often clandestine nature of irregularity, the difficulty in accessing administrative data on immigration status, and the fact that a migrant's status can change.¹²

International migration flows: Definitions, numbers and gaps

While data on migrant stocks are widely available, data on global migration movements (flows) are much more limited. Available UN DESA estimates on global migrant stocks are extensive and global in scope; however, the database of migration flows only encompasses 45 countries.¹³ Capturing data on migration flows is challenging for several reasons. First, while international migration flows are generally accepted as covering inflows and outflows into and from countries, there has been a greater focus on recording inflows. Additionally, migration flow data in some countries are derived from administrative events related to immigration status (for example, issuance/renewal/withdrawal of a residence permit) and are thus used as a proxy for migration flows. Furthermore, migratory movements are often hard to separate from non-migratory travel, such as tourism or business. Tracking migratory movements also requires considerable resources, infrastructure and IT/knowledge systems. This poses particular challenges for developing countries, where the ability to collect, administer, analyse and report data on mobility, migration and other areas is often limited. Finally, many countries' physical geographies pose tremendous challenges for collecting data on migration flows. Entry and border management, for example, is particularly challenging in some regions because of archipelagic and isolated borders, and it is further complicated by traditions of informal migration for work.¹⁴

There are currently two main international datasets on international migration flows, both of which are derived from national statistics: UN DESA's International Migration Flows dataset and OECD's International Migration Database.¹⁵ Since 2005, UN DESA has compiled data on the flows of international migrants to and from selected countries, based on

10 Per World Bank Country Income Group Classifications, in *World Bank Country and Lending Groups*. Available from <http://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> (World Bank, n.d.a).

11 Gordon et al., 2009.

12 Koser, 2010.

13 Laczko, 2017.

14 Gallagher and McAuliffe, 2016.


15 Other projects have made contributions to the monitoring of migration flows at a regional (non-global) level. Of note, the *Migration Modelling for Statistical Analyses (MIMOSA)* project (commissioned by Eurostat) measured migration flows (immigration and emigration) as well as population stocks in Europe (de Beer, van der Erf and Raymer, 2009; Raymer et al., 2011). The *Integrated Modelling of European Migration (IMEM)* project (Raymer et al., 2013) notably presents bilateral migrant flow data disaggregated by age and gender, but is also limited to countries in Europe.

nationally available statistics. The latest revision (2015) comprises data from 45 countries that collect this information (only 43 on emigration flows). Progress in extending the dataset is encouraging; however, the ability to conduct trend analysis is limited.¹⁶

Researchers and analysts have made numerous attempts to better understand global or regional

migration flows by using changes in migrant stock data as a proxy for flow data. Guy Abel and Nikola Sander recently undertook a sophisticated approach to this issue by analysing changes in international migrant stocks to estimate migration flows, visualizing data using circular plots.¹⁷ Figure 3 provides an update to this work by presenting estimated migration flows between 2010 and 2015.¹⁸

Figure 3. Estimated regional migration flows, 2010–2015



Source: UN DESA, 2015a. Datasets for the 2015 revision of International migration flows to and from selected countries available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/empirical2/migrationflows.shtml

Note: The direction of the flow is indicated by the arrowhead. The size of the flow is determined by the width of the arrow at its base. Numbers on the outer section axis, used to read the size of migration flows, are in millions. So, for example, between 2010 and 2015, there was an increase of around 4 million people in Northern America who were born in Asia.

16 For a summary of UN DESA migrant flow data sources, methodology and caveats, please see UN DESA, 2015d.

17 Abel and Sander, 2014.

18 Prepared by Guy Abel in 2017.

The OECD data on migration flows have been collected since 2000, which allows for limited trend analysis.

Typically, migration flow data of the sort described above encompass people who have migrated (or are residing) regularly on a visa or entry permit. Most such data do not capture irregular migration flows, which involve “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving country”.¹⁹

It is important here to distinguish irregular migration (flows) from irregular migrants (stocks), as they are interlinked, but conceptually and practically distinct, although the two terms are often incorrectly used interchangeably. As mentioned earlier, a person may, for example, enter a country regularly on a valid visa (thereby *not* engaging in irregular entry) and then overstay or contravene a visa condition, for example, and thus *become* irregular. *Please refer to the full chapter's Appendix C for a discussion of irregular migration flows.*

Data gaps and challenges

There are several key gaps and challenges associated with the collection and analysis of data on migration. The following section provides a brief overview of some of these key gaps and challenges. However, there is an important body of work that explores these issues in greater detail and we encourage readers interested in the topic to refer to this work.²⁰

Our knowledge and understanding of the scale of international migration is primarily derived from estimates of the stock of international migrants, or the number of people living in a country other than their country of birth at a specific point in time. However, the availability and quality of migrant stock data vary considerably between countries and regions due to limitations in data collection, such as failure to disaggregate key characteristics. For example, censuses, which are an important source of data for measuring migrant stock, are generally performed only every decade or so. They often only record immigrants and not emigrants, and do not

document age, or year of migration.²¹ For example, some countries do not record country of birth, instead focusing on citizenship. This lack of uniformity in concepts and definitions of international migrants at international and national levels makes it difficult to estimate global migrant stock figures.

Data on migration flows are more limited than migrant stock data. Despite increasing efforts to aggregate data on migration flows from national sources, and to improve their comparability and standardization, data on these dynamics of international migration are not available for most countries in the world.²² The UN DESA has compiled flow data for only 45 countries, while the OECD reports migration flows for some of its members. However, in both datasets, the duration used to define a migration event, and the coverage of population at risk, can vary, thereby hampering analysis. There is even less information on the scale, patterns and dynamics of irregular migration flows, due to the clandestine and fluid nature of this form of migration.²³

Knowledge on the global scale and characteristics of labour migration is primarily based on estimates compiled by the ILO. These figures likely underestimate the true scale, due to a range of factors, such as the frequent undercounting of short-term labour migration movements. As with global migrant stocks, estimates of migrant workers and their respective characteristics suffer from statistical, definitional and methodological complexities. Estimates of global remittances are available annually through the World Bank but, again, there are caveats and considerable limitations associated with the available figures.

Several actors – notably, UNHCR, IDMC, UNODC and IOM – continue to improve the availability and coverage of global data on populations in situations of vulnerability (such as refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and victims of trafficking), even though data collection in the context of conflicts, violence and disasters is inherently challenging. Methodological, operational and political complexities arise due to the nature of emergencies, as well as the characteristics, vulnerability and “visibility” of the populations being

19 IOM, 2017a.

20 See, for example, Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006; Raymer and Willekens, 2008; de Beer et al., 2010; Kraler and Reichel, 2011.

21 Willekens, 2016.

22 UN DESA, 2015c; Vezzoli, Villares-Varela and de Haas, 2014; Lemaitre et al., 2007; Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006.

23 Kraler and Reichel, 2011.

measured. The shortage of quantitative data on movements associated with environmental change, including climate change, however, represents a key gap. The multicausal nature of such movements presents particular challenges. Evidence on long-term trends associated with disasters, such as duration of displacement and subsequent movements and trajectories, is also scarce. These gaps have been recognized and efforts are under way to innovate and overcome these barriers.

Conclusion

In recent years, there has been an undeniable increase in available information and knowledge, as well as interest in migration globally. Spurred in part by large-scale movements of migrants (including refugees) and a growing interest in international cooperation on migration, governments, international organizations and other actors are engaged in ongoing efforts to build a stronger evidence base on the scale and characteristics of migration globally. There are also noteworthy gaps in knowledge at the global level. As this chapter illustrates, the available information is in many ways limited and fragmented, with more known about certain countries and regions than others. There are myriad complexities associated with collecting and comparing data on specific facets of migration. Even so, and despite evolving migration drivers and patterns, there is momentum for improving the availability and quality of global data on international migration through innovation and concerted effort, aided in part by its inclusion in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda²⁴ and technological transformations.

Notwithstanding the data gaps and challenges in providing a global big picture, several high-level conclusions can be drawn.

While we know that most people in the world continue to live in the country in which they were born, more people are also living in other countries, especially those within their region. At the same time, many are migrating to high-income countries that may be further afield. International migrants constitute a small – albeit growing – portion of the world's total population. Global data on irregular migrant stocks, on the other hand, are unavailable.

Innovations and improvements are required for a better understanding of global trends in regular migration flows, so that coverage can expand beyond the 45 or so countries for which information exists. There is also growing recognition that people around the world are dying while migrating, particularly when using clandestine channels that rely on the services of smugglers and traffickers. This type of information is relatively new, and its quality and coverage require improvement. ■

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Migration research and analysis: Growth, reach and recent contributions¹

Introduction

As the interest in migration has risen over time, so too has the amount of information published on this increasingly complex and most pressing global issue. Ideally, the knowledge originating from rigorous analysis and research on migration should be the prime source and starting point for informing policymakers, practitioners, students, scholars and the public about migration and how it is changing. However, the growth in publically available material on migration makes this increasingly hard. In an era of “information overload”, it can be challenging to identify, collect and digest relevant and robust material on migration.

This chapter provides an overview of research and analysis on migration being undertaken and published by a range of actors such as academics, governments, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. Understanding the variety, nature and characteristics of the different types of research and analysis being produced on migration is important for anybody working on migration policies, studying migration, or wanting to develop an informed opinion on migration.

The chapter shows that there has been a dramatic increase in the research and analysis of migration. While it is impossible to retrieve, count and classify every single piece of research on migration, we provide an account of basic quantitative aspects, such as estimates of the volume of articles/books published in recent years. Our qualitative analysis summarizes topics from a sample of academic articles, as well as key content from a set of intergovernmental organizations’ flagship publications. We also provide basic measures of “reach” and “impact” of published material. *Please refer to the full chapter for a discussion*

of key material produced on migration (including by selected journals) in 2015 and 2016, including on reach and impact.

Main producers of migration research and analysis

Ideally, researchers create new knowledge that is supported by strong evidence and is useful for others. Research findings are produced for, and disseminated to, different target audiences. Traditional academic work can be highly technical and narrowly focused, although academic researchers are increasingly encouraged to disseminate their work beyond academic spheres.²

A key strength of academic publications is that they have usually been peer-reviewed by experts in the field, which typically enhances the robustness and credibility of the research. The growing number of outlets for academic publications is, however, characterized by a wide range of quality standards applied in peer-review processes. Arguably, one of the weaknesses of academic research is that the pressure to publish has contributed to a large quantitative – although not always a corresponding qualitative – increase in academic output in recent years. Appendix A of chapter 2 of the *World Migration Report 2018* provides a summary of academic publishing, including details of peer-review processes, citations and impact assessment.

Within the many thousands of peer-reviewed journals currently being produced covering all disciplines, topics and research fields,³ we identified over 130 migration-related journals publishing in English, French or Spanish.⁴ Mainstream academic publishers tend to publish in English, which has both the advantage of standardizing outputs and the downside of excluding those who are not able to submit manuscripts with an acceptable level of English.

1 This chapter of the *World Migration Report 2018* was produced by IOM.


2 McAuliffe, 2016.

3 Ware and Mabe, 2015.

4 A list of the journals can be found on the IOM website on the research page (www.iom.int/migration-research).

Number of academic publications on “immigration” or “emigration”

The figure below shows the search results of the query “immigration” or “emigration” in Scopus – the largest database of academic peer-reviewed literature. Journal articles constitute the largest share of publications, with a clear and constantly increasing trend peaking in 2015. The long-term trend suggests an increasing scholarly production on migration matters: is this just a reflection of the general expansion of academic literature production, or is migration research developing for specific reasons?



Source: www.scopus.com

Note: Querying the term “migration” alone returns figures that are more than 10 times higher. However, these include usage of the term “migration” in disciplines that are irrelevant to the current research, such as computer science (data migration), biology (cell migration), zoology (bird or fish migration) and many others. Using the Scopus advanced search, we excluded subject areas such as chemistry, physics, astronomy, neuroscience and so forth.

Historically, government administrative data on persons entering and/or leaving a country’s territory constitute the earliest sources of information on international migration.⁵ The earliest scholarly work on migration in the modern era, however, was on internal migration dynamics based on national census data collected by authorities in the United Kingdom.⁶ To this day, data enumerated by population censuses, population registers, representative surveys and other official statistical sources often constitute the basis for migration-related databases. The centrality of migration-related data within a government context is recognized, for example, by the IOM Development Fund, which supports (among other things) capacity-building of Member States on migration-related statistics.

Beyond statistical data collection, administration and reporting, some governments are also significant contributors of information on migration, particularly in the form of policy-related materials, such as evaluations, studies and discussion papers. They may also commission research with partners in academia, applied researchers, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. The increasing relevance of migration has led to governments providing funding for empirical work, thereby opening up new research areas and broadening the scope of migration studies.⁷ This has led to some criticism of government-commissioned research being overly focused on policy issues and for, at times, suggesting “simplistic, short-term remedies to complex, long-term social issues”,⁸ or of researchers being used to legitimize immigration policy.⁹ There has also been some evidence of researchers being pressured into “produc[ing] politically useful results”

5 Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006.

6 Ravenstein, 1885.

7 Castles, 2010.

8 Ibid.

9 Boswell, 2008.

in policy-related research more generally.¹⁰ It is also important to note that research commissioned by governments can provide useful and rigorous examinations of migration – particularly in partnership with academic and other researchers, who can bring different perspectives, knowledge and analytical approaches to the examination of complex, multifaceted migration issues, including by drawing upon administrative data that might not otherwise be accessible.

Indeed, some have argued that there should be much greater efforts to collaborate, and that “researchers need a better understanding of the policy process [...] and policy makers should become more involved in the conceptualisation and conduct of research”.¹¹

As publishers and institutional authors, intergovernmental organizations make specific contributions to our collective understanding of migration and mobility. In some circumstances, such organizations may be the only source of information, and multiple references to publications by intergovernmental organizations are therefore often found in academic literature. A commercially published edited volume or article on an aspect of international migration or displacement, for example, can typically refer to material from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and/or the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), among others.

The mandates, missions or competencies of some of the organizations (such as IOM and UNHCR) are focused on specific forms of migration and displacement, while others have responsibilities relevant to particular aspects: UN DESA for data; the ILO for migrant workers; OHCHR for migrants’ rights; UNICEF for migrant children; and UNODC for transnational criminal aspects (such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling). Their various mandates enable these intergovernmental organizations to collect significant quantities of data and/or access data from States. These organizations also convene and report

on dialogues and conferences related to migration and mobility, in addition to generating and publishing background, technical, operational, state-of-the-art and agenda-setting research and analysis, including on global statistical data. As with other publishers, intergovernmental organizations are not immune to criticism related to quality, framing and agenda-setting. However, there is clearly also recognition of the responsibility of producing rigorous and robust data and research. Intergovernmental organizations, for example, routinely work in collaboration with leading migration-related data analysts and researchers as a means of drawing on critical skills and expertise.

The role of think tanks in informing policymaking is capturing increasing political and academic attention.

As major contributors to grey literature, and in an era of increasing contestability of policy advice to governments, think tanks have emerged as important producers of migration-related information and analysis. This has become particularly pronounced as the interest in mobility, migration and displacement globally has increased, and governments have sought to adapt to increasingly dynamic and complex environments.

Research conducted or reported by think tanks, however, is of variable quality. While it is necessary for think tanks to establish and maintain networks to ensure that their research is relevant, the need to avoid undue pressure from interest groups, political parties, media and lobbyists is central to credibility. That said, the think tank sphere is characterized by a diversity of voices and agendas. Think tanks tend to act as brokers of policy knowledge, centres of research and incubators of new ideas, including by providing advisory services to governments and civil society, conducting training activities, publishing research reports, collaborating with the media and undertaking advocacy work. Many think tanks produce high-quality work and thus play an important role in generating and disseminating new data and information about migration.

10 The LSE GV314 Group, 2014.

11 Black, 2001.

Blogging: Growth, utility and concerns

In the last two decades, there has been a massive increase in the amount of material being produced on the Internet, particularly in the form of blogs. Blogs (short for “weblogs”) first appeared in the mid-1990s and are typically concise articles posted on a host website. While there are no definitive data on blogs globally, estimates suggest that numbers have risen significantly in recent years, from 35.8 million in 2006 to 173 million in 2011.^a

The rise of blogs has enabled individuals to communicate directly with very large numbers of people, at little or no cost. In more recent years, blogs have been increasingly utilized by think tanks, governments, non-governmental organizations, academics (individuals and institutions), political parties and international organizations (among others) to disseminate information.^b Part of the expansion and diversification of blogs is due to the desire to reach new audiences and to provide users with alternative ways of accessing material^c or of influencing people who may be beyond the reach of traditional political media.^d The unregulated nature of blog publishing has raised concerns about an increasing dominance of opinion over facts and analysis, and the potential for false information to be promulgated in an increasingly “post-truth” world.^e There have been high-profile instances of blogs being used to present misinformation, and even of bogus blogs re-posting analysts’ material without permission.^f It is unclear how much agenda-setting occurs in the “blogosphere”. Equally, however, there is recognition of the increasing significance of research-related blogs in academia as well as in policy spheres.^g

Research-related blogs tend to draw upon the findings of empirical research and, rather than replacing other publishing outlets (such as academic journals), they have become an additional form of dissemination, potentially enhancing the accessibility of research findings in policy and public spheres. Such articles can provide useful and more easily digested research-related material and, although concerns about rigour may remain, blogs that seek to summarize peer-reviewed empirical research are more likely to make a solid contribution towards our understanding of migration. Indeed, more generally, empirical research has revealed that the perceived credibility and trustworthiness of the blogger have an impact on readers’ receptiveness to information.^h

^a Statista, 2017.

^b Farrell, 2012; Wortham, 2007.

^c Cavanagh, 2009; Chong, 2010.

^d Farrell, 2012.

^e Weinberger, 2011.

^f Williamson and Eisen, 2017.

^g Aldred et al., 2008; Mewburn and Thomson, 2013.

^h Chu and Kamal, 2008.

Conclusions

This chapter has provided an overview of the key written contributions of some of the main producers of migration research and analysis to our collective understanding of migration. We found that there has been a significant increase in the interest in migration as a topic over time, including by some of the major producers of research and analysis, reflecting the growing salience of the topic globally. We also found that different types of migration-related output have different strengths and weaknesses, which are important to understand when reading and utilizing such material, particularly in informing policymaking. Academic research and analysis, for example, may involve greater rigour than other forms; however, the long lead times involved can diminish their usefulness

for policymakers, who often need material more quickly than academic publishing regimes can accommodate. Conversely, the merits of grey literature, especially when compared with academic peer-reviewed research, include shorter production times, greater access to unpublished research and data, and the ability to draw on expertise in academic and policy spheres.¹² Grey literature also tends to be freely accessible. On the other hand, it is sometimes of inconsistent (and poor) quality and review standards, with irregular publication schedules and

12 Pappas and Williams, 2011.

a lack of standard bibliographical identifiers.¹³ It has also been criticized as being used to set agendas or legitimize policy.¹⁴ As with potential merits, however, these drawbacks do not necessarily apply to all such publications.

There is a case to be made for playing to the strengths of the different types of material on migration. Some of the highest quality blogs on migration, for example, are based on carefully elaborated and conducted studies and insightful analysis drawing on years of research. The fact that it is becoming more common for senior migration academics to maintain their own blog and/or write blog articles for other publishers indicates some recognition in the academic community of the utility of this form of communication and dissemination. This is also reflected by the growing use of altmetrics, which measure a journal article's reach in non-academic publishing, including via blogs. At the same time, it is often difficult to assess whether blogs and other forms of grey literature, including substantial research reports, make influential contributions to our collective understanding of migration or whether they are another agenda-setting tool more suited to advocacy. In the academic environment, the number of citations provide an indicator of the value – or lack thereof – of an individual article; impact factors provide a similar tool for assessing scientific journals over time. Similar systematic assessments are not available for grey literature, and its variability and diversity are recognized as weaknesses as well as strengths. Technology is available, however, to assist publishers of online grey literature in assessing the level of interest in a series or even an individual article, report or study.

The information garnered for this chapter (including that from blog editors) has shown that, somewhat surprisingly, some online migration-related research and analysis has had extraordinary reach. The fact that some material can be so widely viewed, read or downloaded confirms the need for the quality of published material on migration to be further strengthened. There is no good reason, for example, why material outside academia cannot be peer-reviewed; in the quest for a more robust evidence base to inform migration policy and practice, tools for improving the overall quality of published research and

analysis are important. Similarly, there is no apparent reason why measuring reach via views/downloads/altmetrics could not be embraced by more publishers of migration research and analysis, especially in the non-academic sphere. At the same time, it is desirable that academic publishing try to embrace the best features of grey literature – namely accessibility and speed. Open access is one such solution, and the use of other communication strategies, such as blogs, can certainly enhance accessibility. Efforts are also being made to shorten publication times, with an increasing number of high-quality journals being able to provide peer review in two or three weeks. However, this means adding tight deadlines to an already voluntary, unpaid, highly skilled workforce of academic reviewers.

As we have seen, both white and grey literature are complementary and useful sources of information on migration. We have highlighted some of their strengths and weaknesses, and have suggested a few initial actions that could help expand their reach to achieve a more balanced discourse on migration. We underline that the analysis in the current chapter relates to contributions from a subset of academic journals and intergovernmental organizations. Although we think that the picture that emerges provides a fair account of recent research and analysis on migration, it does not purport to be exhaustive. We expect to extend the breadth of this analysis in future editions of the World Migration Report, including these and other sources in order to provide a more complete description of the empirical contributions to the migration discourse over time.

Finally, we encourage policymakers, practitioners, researchers and others to explore and exploit the wealth of written material on migration with a critical eye. We also underscore the importance of activities and initiatives that bridge the gap between the research and policy spheres by bringing migration scholars, researchers, practitioners and policymakers together, including through workshops, conferences, briefing sessions, and related consultations. The opportunity to listen and share knowledge on migration can support new lines of thinking and help craft more effective policy responses. ■

13 Banks, 2012; Pappas and Williams, 2011; Schöpfel, 2011; Rucinski, 2016.

14 Boswell, 2008; Sageman, 2014.

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Global migration governance: Existing architecture and recent developments

Susan Martin and Sanjula Weerasinghe¹

Introduction

In recent decades, there have been incremental and substantial efforts to improve the global governance of migration, building on the norms and institutions developed over the course of the last century. In the *2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants* (New York Declaration) – the negotiated outcome of the most high-profile plenary meeting to take place on human movements at the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) – States committed to set in motion a process of intergovernmental negotiations leading to the adoption of a global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration. In an area in which global governance has lagged other transnational issues, this development is particularly noteworthy. It reflects the extent to which confidence in multilateral approaches has been built by efforts to strengthen international cooperation through informal dialogues and initiatives that allowed States to consult and share information. Yet, as at other times in history, it is also emblematic of the need for global cooperation in the face of underlying political, demographic, environmental and socioeconomic drivers of migration.

This chapter describes key aspects of the existing architecture relevant to the global governance of migration and reviews recent developments. It focuses on movements of people across international borders and on governance at the global level – that is, governance relevant to, or open to participation by, all UN Member States. In this context, governance encompasses the following substantive rules and norms, processes for decision-making, and mechanisms for implementation and monitoring:

1. Binding laws and norms, non-binding normative frameworks, and agreements among States to cooperate on various aspects of migration;

2. Institutional actors and institutional frameworks and mechanisms; and
3. Processes such as dialogues and initiatives that have taken place at the global level or that relate to governance at the global level.²

There are advantages to enhancing the global governance of migration. Managing movements of people across international borders cannot be achieved through unilateral State action alone; rather, the development and implementation of migration policy benefits from international cooperation in addressing the complex drivers and processes of migration. By definition, international migration involves at least two countries – origin and destination – and increasingly implicates numerous other countries that serve as transit points, competitors for talent, collaborators in combating organized crime and movement of terrorists, and participants in the global financial system that moves remittances.

In the face of global cooperation and coordination problems a more effective system of global migration governance has the potential to improve collective responses and create opportunities for mutual benefits. Such a system can bring States together to discuss issues of mutual concern; identify common goals and strategies; create the space for learning and understanding; and allow States to coordinate and cooperate, including in the development and implementation of systems, processes and initiatives. Global norms, including principles, rules and guidance, whether legally binding or not, establish benchmarks against which State behaviour can be measured. Even when they are not widely ratified or adhered to, global norms can affect State behaviour. Ultimately, the benefits stemming from the global governance of migration should also be judged by the extent to which such a system enhances the realization of rights and the well-being of migrants. In this sense, the system for global migration governance and any

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2 See Appendix A of *chapter 5* of the *World Migration Report 2018* for a definition of “global governance” and definitions of other key terms used in this article.

improvements to it should necessarily be grounded in a recognition and acceptance that migrants, like everyone else, are entitled to inalienable rights.³

The global governance of migration remains fragmented, with robust international law in some areas, significant gaps in others, and inadequate decision-making processes and mechanisms for implementation of policies. The legal and institutional frameworks are strongest and oldest for refugees, with a widely ratified UN convention and a clear lead agency, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). International treaties on human trafficking and migrant smuggling are also relatively widely ratified. By contrast, the various instruments to protect migrant workers have received less support. While migrant workers, and indeed all migrants, are covered under core international human rights instruments, normative gaps also remain, especially with regard to access to territory and stay for migrants in highly vulnerable situations, including those who do not qualify for protection as refugees.⁴

A number of factors have impeded progress in establishing a more coherent system of global migration governance. The first is concern articulated by a number of States about the effect on their sovereignty. Migration is understood to affect sovereignty directly by its impact on the integrity of borders, economic growth, social relationships, demography, cultural values and – in rare cases – political stability. These impacts are felt not only by countries of destination, but also by origin and transit countries. Concerns about loss of sovereignty in the context of international cooperation are significant, but often misconstrue the nature of global governance systems. Recognition of the sovereign rights of States to manage migration is likely to be a core feature of any system of global migration governance. Even when States agree to the free movement of people across their borders, they retain the right to reinstate border controls when they believe national interests dictate such action.

Second, migration is often a contested issue in domestic politics. Publics are divided as to whether

migration is a problem or an opportunity.⁵ Interest groups tend to take more consistent stances in favour of, or opposed to, enlarging or contracting immigration, but they may cancel each other out in public immigration debates. Moreover, even among those who see migration as an opportunity, there are concerns that governments are increasingly unable to manage it well in the context of deepening globalization.⁶

Third, and related, effective international cooperation requires States to consider the interests of other countries, which is difficult when States are conflicted about their own interests with regard to migration. When States are unclear about what they want to achieve through their own migration policies, it is difficult for them to engage constructively with others in international forums.

Fourth, there is a natural asymmetry in the process of building a global migration governance system. Most destination countries tend to be global or regional hegemony in relationship to the countries of origin from which people migrate. This is equally true for South–South and South–North migration. Destination countries are generally wealthier and are often also strategically and militarily dominant. In negotiations, the destinations can have disproportionate power to define the terms by which their visas will be allocated.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, migration is fundamentally about people, in contrast to the global regimes to address movement of capital and goods. For the system of global migration governance to benefit States, migrants and societies, the very people to be regulated have to be engaged in developing and improving relevant frameworks, institutions and processes. However, incorporating migrants into such a system is exceedingly difficult, particularly since it is not always clear who can represent migrants' interests in any given context.

Given these barriers, progress in establishing international norms, procedures and rules of decision-making has been slow, focused mostly on building confidence among States and between States and other partners.

3 On grounding claims about “better” global migration governance, see, for example, Betts, 2011; Martin, 2014 and 2015; and Betts and Kainz, 2017; See also, Koser, 2010.

4 This is not to say that significant implementation and enforcement gaps do not exist in practice under existing frameworks.

5 See, for example, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2014

6 Ibid.

Yet, the proliferation of regional and cross-regional consultative processes is well under way, having begun in the mid-1980s and expanded subsequently. Moreover, global meetings on migration have also become important mechanisms for cooperation, as evident in the 2006 and 2013 High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development (HLD) and the 2016 UN High-level Meeting.

In contrast to movements associated with persecution, torture, trafficking and smuggling, there is less convergence and cooperation at the global level on laws and norms for migrant workers. To regulate international movements related to labour and services, States have primarily adopted bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements at regional and subregional levels, including under broader frameworks for free movement. Nonetheless, a number of relevant laws exist at the global level: the 1990 *Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families* (ICRMW); the 1949 *Migration for Employment Convention (Revised)* (ILO Convention No. 97); and the 1975 *Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers* (ILO Convention No. 143). Although individually these instruments are not widely ratified, about 86 States have ratified at least one of the three; together, they “comprise an international charter on labour migration, providing a comprehensive framework covering most issues of treatment of migrant workers and members of their families.”⁷

In terms of institutional architecture, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), UNHCR and the International Labour Organization have the most robust normative and/or operational mandates related to the global governance of migration. The Global Migration Group (GMG) and the SRSG also play important roles, as do a host of other institutional actors.

Efforts to improve global governance (2001–2016)

During the twenty-first century, there have been recurrent efforts to improve global migration governance through formal UN mechanisms as well as through informal State-led mechanisms.

This section briefly examines three sets of such activities: (1) dialogues and consultative processes to build confidence and consensus among States; (2) mini-multilateral normative initiatives to enhance protection of migrants; and (3) efforts to ensure that migrants are included in decision-making on other, related global issues.

The last two decades have seen a marked increase in global-level dialogues and consultative mechanisms on international migration, as awareness has grown of its multidimensional and transnational nature and of the need for multilateral cooperation on various aspects of the issue. Table 1 highlights key dialogues and consultations held at the global level since 2001, organized by States or the UN, and presents an overview of major outputs or outcomes. These dialogues and initiatives are not without criticisms at the substantive and procedural levels.⁸ Nonetheless, the growing salience and priority of governing migration at the global level is reflected in the fact that past reluctance and disagreements have shifted somewhat towards increased cooperation with greater recognition of the benefits to be gained from global discussions and action.

The 2016 UN High-level Meeting deserves special attention. The summit came in the aftermath of several major refugee and migration crises affecting many parts of the world. The large-scale movements of people from and through the Middle East and North Africa into Europe brought particular attention to the issue, but significant movements of Central Americans through Mexico into the United States and people from Bangladesh and Myanmar into other Southeast Asian countries also raised its global visibility.

The New York Declaration, States committed to a “more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States.”⁹ And, despite the fears of many advocates for refugees, the declaration strongly endorsed the existing normative framework for refugee protection. These statements were a significant achievement in themselves, as “[t]he 19 September summit was the first time ever that the UN General Assembly had expressed a collective

7 Cholewinski, 2012.

8 See, for example, Newland, 2005.

9 UNGA, 2016.

commitment to sharing responsibility for refugees.”¹⁰ The New York Declaration gave UNHCR principal responsibility for drafting the compact on refugees, which is to be included in the High Commissioner’s annual report to the GA in 2018.¹¹

The development of The Declaration also called for promulgation of a global compact for safe, regular and orderly migration. The process for developing the migration compact is led by the President of the UNGA, who named the governments of Mexico and Switzerland as co-facilitators. The UN Secretariat and IOM are jointly servicing the negotiations, the former providing capacity and support and the latter extending technical and policy expertise.¹² The global compact on migration is to set out “a range of principles, commitments and understandings among Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions.”¹³

A further major outcome of the 2016 UN High-level Meeting related to institutional arrangements for global migration governance. The New York Declaration endorsed IOM’s entry into the UN, “which will assist and protect migrants more comprehensively, help States to address migration issues and promote better coherence between migration and related policy domains.”¹⁴ Member States expressed their wish that IOM’s admission as a related organization would not change its mission or mode of operation.¹⁵

From a policy and UN coordination perspective, however, as a member of the UN family of agencies, IOM should be better positioned to bring greater attention, coherence and more effective responses to migration issues within the overall UN system and among its Member States.

Finally, the New York Declaration called for a State-led, consultative process to improve protection and

assistance for migrants in vulnerable situations and to give favourable consideration to implementing the recommendations of the Nansen Initiative on cross-border movements in the context of natural disasters and climate change, and the MICIC Initiative. These two initiatives represent what are called mini-multilateral approaches to norm-building to fill gaps in binding international law, particularly ones that are unlikely to be filled by new conventions or treaties.¹⁶ Sir Peter Sutherland, the former SRSG on international migration, argued strongly that such “willing coalitions of States, working with other stakeholders, can begin to tackle ... priorities and gradually broaden the consensus on what a functioning international architecture for migration should look like in 2018 and beyond.”¹⁷

Nansen Initiative Agenda for the Protection of Cross-border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change

The State-led Nansen Initiative was launched by Norway and Switzerland in light of broad consensus surrounding the need to address the normative gap for the protection of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters, including those related to climate change. Focused on the protection of people, but with a wider scope, including the need to address issues of international cooperation and solidarity, the Nansen Initiative’s aim was to develop a more coherent and consistent approach at the international level and help the international community develop an effective normative framework.^a As a State-led, bottom-up, intergovernmental consultative process, the Initiative built a global evidence base and consensus on the needs of such people, and in October 2015 launched an Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, which was endorsed by 109 government delegations.

To assist States and other stakeholders to improve preparedness and responses to address cross-border displacement, the Protection Agenda conceptualizes a comprehensive approach – a toolbox that not only focuses on protecting those who cross borders,

10 Ferris, 2016.

11 UNGA, 2016.

12 UNGA, 2017.

13 UNGA, 2016.

14 UNGA, 2016.

15 According to the UN, “The term ‘related organization’ has to be understood as a default expression, describing organizations whose cooperation agreement with the United Nations has many points in common with that of Specialized Agencies”. See, for example, United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, n.d.

16 Naim, 2009.

17 SRSG, 2017.

but also presents measures to manage risks in the country of origin. The Agenda compiles a broad set of effective practices and highlights three priority areas for action at the national, (sub)regional and international levels:

- (a) Collecting data and enhancing knowledge on cross-border displacement;
- (b) Enhancing the use of humanitarian protection measures for those who cross borders in the context of disasters and climate change; and
- (c) Strengthening the management of disaster displacement risk in the country of origin by:
 - (i) Integrating human mobility within disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies and other relevant development processes;
 - (ii) Facilitating migration with dignity as a potentially positive way to cope with the effects of natural hazards and climate change;
 - (iii) Improving the use of planned relocation as a preventative or responsive measure to disaster risk and displacement; and
 - (iv) Ensuring the needs of persons displaced internally in disaster situations are specifically addressed in relevant laws and policies on disaster risk management and internal displacement.

For more on the Nansen Initiative, including its Protection Agenda, see: www.nanseninitiative.org/. For more on the successor to the Nansen Initiative, the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), see: <http://disasterdisplacement.org/>

^a Kälin, 2012.

MICIC Initiative Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster

The MICIC Initiative has also been praised as an important effort at mini-multilateralism. Launched at the 2014 GFMD in Sweden by its co-chairs the United States and the Philippines, the Initiative was a response to a series of calls to action, including at the 2013 HLD where former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted the need to address the plight of migrants caught in situations of conflict or natural disaster. These calls stemmed from recognition – evidenced most acutely during the 2011 Libyan crisis, when over 800,000 migrants fled the country in a matter of months – that migrants can fall through the cracks of preparedness and response efforts in the context of crises and that this is an issue of global concern.^b

Following its launch, a committed working group – comprised of the co-chairs, the governments of Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica and Ethiopia, the European Commission, IOM (which also served as the secretariat), UNHCR, the Office of the SRSG, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) – undertook a broad and inclusive evidence-gathering and consultative process. The MICIC Initiative's main outcome, the non-binding and voluntary Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster, launched at the UN in New York and Geneva in June 2016, provides practical guidance to States, international organizations, private sector actors and civil society on better ways to protect migrants prior to, during, and in the aftermath of conflicts or natural disasters. The document entails 10 fundamental and cross-cutting precepts (Principles); 15 targeted suggestions organized by theme and by phase (Guidelines); and a non-exhaustive selection of illustrative practices (Practices).

The MICIC Initiative and its Guidelines have been regarded as a useful model, both in terms of process and outcome, for tackling issues of concern to the global community of States. Like the Nansen Initiative, the salience and relevance of the MICIC Initiative for addressing the needs and protection of migrants has been recognized in the 2016 New York Declaration.

For more on the MICIC Initiative, see: <https://micicinitiative.iom.int/>

^b For more on the impacts of crises on non-citizens, see, for example, Weerasinghe et al., 2015.

There are a number of reasons to be optimistic about mini-multilateralism as a way to fill persistent gaps in protection. Martin, observing these processes from the inside, concluded that informal, non-binding, State-led processes for reform are seen by States as pragmatic approaches to norm-filling.¹⁸ The ad hoc nature of these processes allows them to address emerging issues and concerns more effectively than more formal mechanisms that are often tied to specific mandates. Because States are leading these efforts, there is a built-in constituency for ensuring their implementation. Moreover, these processes have been highly inclusive in terms of regional scope and participation.

GMG Principles and Guidelines on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations within Large and/or Mixed Movements

Since 2016, the GMG Working Group on Human Rights and Gender Equality, has been leading efforts to develop a set of principles and guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations within large and/or mixed movements. The framework, which has been developed through a multi-stakeholder, expert process, seeks to provide guidance to States and other stakeholders on how to implement obligations and duties to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of persons in vulnerable situations within large and/or mixed movements who might not fulfil the conditions of the refugee definition. The precarious nature of large and/or mixed movements places some migrants in particular situations of vulnerability and they are therefore, in need of specific protection interventions.

For more on the Principles and Guidelines on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations, see: www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Migration/Pages/Draftsforcomments.aspx

In addition to these migration-specific developments, States, usually within the UN framework, have committed to integrate migration and human mobility more generally, often for the first time, into other global governance areas. Four major global meetings merit attention, as they highlight the

ways in which migration governance intersects with governance of other transnational issues, including development, climate change, disaster risk reduction and urbanization. Although it is too soon to tell if significant progress will be made in implementing the commitments made with regard to migration, getting migration into these agendas has been one of the most significant achievements of the past two years.

Conclusion

At some future time, there may be a paradigm shift that opens broad, new, as yet unnamed opportunities for international cooperation that would more closely mirror the trade and capital regimes – migration’s counterparts in globalization – and result in less fragmentation. At present, what we have is a slow, albeit accelerating process of change, in which States are building confidence in the process, exhibiting greater willingness to engage in multilateral action, and establishing mechanisms for enhancing international cooperation in diverse aspects of migration.

In many ways, the progress attained to date in improving global migration governance is remarkable. In an era of increasing nationalism, in which publics and politicians alike rail against globalization, States have been willing to cooperate in formulating strategies and approaches to address one of the great transnational issues on the global agenda. Despite great reluctance only a decade ago to engage with migration in the context of the UN, most¹⁹ States are now willing to negotiate UN resolutions, declarations and global compacts, to hold summits and shepherd the entry of IOM into the UN system as its migration agency.

Admittedly, global governance in the migration area still lags the systems in place to manage the international flow of capital and goods. Migration governance more generally also lacks the strong normative bases that guide responses to refugees and UNHCR’s activities. Yet, even here, there has been progress in gaining universal recognition that the rights and safety of migrants must be at the centre of any actions taken to manage movements of people across international borders. Significantly, States affirmed in the New York Declaration that they

18 Martin, 2016.

19 An important exception is the United States under the Trump administration, which has pulled out of the negotiations over the global compact on safe, orderly and regular migration.

“will fully protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status; all are rights holders” and that their “response will demonstrate full respect for international law and international human rights law and, where applicable, international refugee law and international humanitarian law.”²⁰ Equally salient, the Declaration emphasized the benefits, not just the costs of international migration, and the important contributions that migrants make to their countries of origin and destination.

Notwithstanding the progress to date, there is no assurance – as States weigh the practical advantages and, in some cases, the political costs of strengthening global migration governance – that they will forge a more coherent system that enables them to make and implement mutually beneficial decisions on the movement of people across international borders. Yet, without such agreement, States are unlikely to find solutions to global-level cooperation and coordination problems or to benefit from common opportunities.

Providing continued institutional support to address these issues and implement the outcomes of the global compacts will be a challenge. The entry of IOM into the UN system is promising, but by no means sufficient. A principal obstacle to IOM assuming this role as the global leader on migration is its financing mechanism. Its “projectized” funding model has meant that IOM has necessarily had to focus on its operational programmes, with few resources available for policy-related work. Improving global migration governance, however, requires a stream of funds untied to operations that will allow IOM to enhance its role in protecting the rights and safety of migrants and in assisting States and other entities to develop and implement policies that contribute to safe, orderly and regular movements of people worldwide. A further impediment in the view of critics is the non-normative basis for IOM’s activities.²¹

Coordination among the various institutions with mandates, programmes and interest in migration issues will be another important challenge. The GMG potentially can serve an important role in this regard, but it is neither staffed nor funded to meet the challenges ahead. Many of the members of the GMG have a narrow focus, and few resources (sometimes

only one or two staff) devoted to migration, while some have little or no field presence. On the positive side, GMG has engaged in stock-taking exercises related to, for example, crisis-related migration and rescue at sea. These have identified areas of strengths and weaknesses within UN agencies to tackle these problems and provided recommendations to the heads of agencies on priorities for improvement. However, moving from stock-taking to coordinated action will require a new level of engagement by the GMG, such as in monitoring implementation of its recommendations. Strengthening the SRSG’s office will also be a challenge. The staffing of the office has been very limited and largely reliant on external sources of funding from private foundations and donor governments.²²

The principal State-led global initiative on international migration, the GFMD, which has entered its eleventh year of operation, may also need to grapple with a range of complexities. The GFMD was created as an ad hoc, State-led, non-binding venue for discussion and consultation outside the UN. During this first decade, it has largely played a confidence-building role in enabling government officials responsible for migration to get to know and learn from each other. Whether it will continue to succeed, however, depends largely on its agenda in the years ahead.

International migration is an important global issue that requires a more effective system of global governance. States have demonstrated willingness during the past decade, since the first HLD and establishment of the GFMD, to explore ways to enhance their cooperation both within and outside of the UN. At the same time, international organizations charged with helping States manage the movement of people and protect their rights have also shown greater willingness to cooperate among themselves and with States. The entry of IOM into the UN family is but the latest manifestation. Nonetheless, barriers to global migration governance abound and will grow if States turn inward and xenophobia is not addressed. Countering these forces will be difficult

20 UNGA, 2016.

21 See, for example, Guild and Grant, 2017.

22 Significant resources to date have come from the MacArthur Foundation, which recently eliminated its funding programme on international migration.

but not impossible.²³ The step-by-step process of consultation, cooperation and confidence-building that has taken place to date has shown that progress can occur, albeit in incremental ways. It remains the most promising path towards global migration governance. ■

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
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Understanding migration journeys from migrants' perspectives

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Introduction

Today, just as happens every day, many thousands of people throughout the world will be setting off on journeys in the hope of being able to forge safe and meaningful lives in a new country. Some will be carrying passports containing visas issued by the country to which they are heading, many having gone through visa application processes to secure the right to start a new phase of their lives in another country. These people will most likely be able to choose many aspects of this new phase: their new job or vocation; the city in which they intend to live; the mode of travel they will take; the timing and length of their journey; with whom they go; and how long they intend to stay. They should be considered the luckier ones, and more likely than not, they will be citizens of developed countries.

Today, just as happens every day, many others will be setting off on journeys they know will be long and dangerous – so much so that they may allow themselves the realization that they may be abused, exploited or even die en route. These people will most likely be facing considerable uncertainty about the journey ahead and, if they do make it to their destination, what awaits them in their new country. Many will not have visas in their passports and some won't even have a passport or travel document. They may know in general terms how to get to various places along the way; on whom they can rely to help them; how much different legs of the journey might cost; and the modes of travel they will need to take. Equally, many things will remain unclear. These are not the luckier ones, and more likely than not, they will be from developing countries and fragile States, some having had their lives up-ended by civil conflict, persecution or various other forms of disaster.

While our introductory remarks are squarely rooted in the realities of the day, migration is a constant in human history and has long been related to livelihoods, culture and disastrous events, as well as exile. Central to any discussion on migration are the people who migrate – who they are, how they migrate, and why they migrate – which is often deeply connected to the circumstances in which they find themselves and the degree of choice they have in contemplating and undertaking migration. There is increasing recognition of the importance in better understanding how migrants contemplate migration options (including *not* migrating) and undertake migration journeys. This recognition is in part fuelled by the increasing visibility of dangerous and sometimes deadly migration journeys. IOM's Missing Migrants project, for example, has found that more than 46,000 migrants have died during migration journeys since 2000.² Concerns for migrants' safety and rights has grown at the international level, as demonstrated by the September 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which has a significant focus on these two issues.³ The Declaration includes a commitment to adopt a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018, which in and of itself is an indicator of the heightened concerns regarding *unsafe, disorderly and irregular* migration. One of the key points to note is that the Declaration and commitment to agree upon such a compact have in part been in reaction to the mass migration to and through Europe in 2015, during which migrants (including refugees) demonstrated significant determination in reaching particular destinations such as Germany, Sweden and Austria.

This chapter discusses the importance of understanding migration from migrants' perspectives, principally by listening to and learning from migrants through rigorous research. While all migrants make decisions before and during their journeys – some decisions being of greater

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2 IOM, 2017.

3 UNGA, 2016.

consequence than others, and even involving life and death scenarios – this chapter focuses more on people who have fewer means and more restricted choices. The contemplations of those with significant degrees of freedom, such as the millionaire Chinese manufacturer migrating to Australia in retirement, is less of a focus, partly because those with wider choices are less likely to find themselves in situations of vulnerability. The chapter discusses migration journeys and how migrants consider migration before and during such travel, acknowledging that there is a great diversity of experiences, but that nevertheless, some important aspects can be drawn from current migration research and practice. Overall, we argue that better understandings of migrants' choices about migration and migration journeys are of fundamental importance to more effective policymaking on migration.

Considerations of self-agency in migration

There has been considerable research and enquiry into the reasons underpinning migration, both internal and international, over many decades. All general migration theories involve a consideration of migrant agency (or a lack thereof) to varying degrees, and there is recognition that greater emphasis on migrants' roles, decision-making and behaviour before and during migration is increasingly important in helping to explain how migration occurs. In other words, the extent of migrants' self-agency is becoming a crucial aspect in any attempt to make sense of migration patterns, processes and consequences.⁴

Historically, and particularly in the aftermath of World War II, a binary construct explaining migration in terms of people's agency – forced migration versus voluntary migration – tended to dominate policy as well as research. Subsequently, and particularly over the last two decades, there has been widespread recognition that a continuum of agency exists, rather than a voluntary/involuntary dichotomy.⁵ In this context, how migrants contemplate and undertake migration, including those who may have extremely limited ability to choose where to go and how to get there, has emerged as a critical issue in migration research and policy.

In the context of labour migration, there has been a considerable focus on agency and structure, and how people contemplating migration navigate through a range of "intervening obstacles".⁶ While the popular view remains that so-called "economic migrants" are active in their pursuit of migration and exercise a considerable degree of agency, this is too simplistic. The extent to which labour migrants are able to exercise agency and choose aspects of their migration can be heavily circumscribed, although in most circumstances some choice remains, including as to whether to migrate – the main point of concern in most studies on migrants' agency – where to migrate, how to migrate, and whether or when to return home.⁷

Migration and the lottery of birth

Examining the overall quality of life by country, and the ability to migrate in terms of visa access, reveals that access to regular migration options is in some ways related to the "lottery of birth". It appears, for instance, that some nationality groups are much less likely to have access to visas. Table 1 summarizes global indices of human development, fragility and visa access of selected countries.⁸ The Visa Restrictions Index, a global ranking of countries according to the travel freedom of their citizens,⁹ for example, reveals that an individual's ability to enter a country with relative ease is in many respects determined by nationality. Visa access also broadly reflects a country's status and relations within the international community and indicates how stable, safe and prosperous it is in relation to other countries. The data also show two other aspects: that there are some significant differences between highly ranked human development countries and others;

4 McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2017.

5 de Haas, 2011; Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1998.

6 Lee, 1966.

7 Khalaf and Alkobaisi, 1999; Ullah, 2010.

8 The Human Development Index is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: life expectancy, education and a decent standard of living. The Visa Restrictions Index measures visa restrictions in place in 218 countries and indicates the capacity of individuals to travel to other countries with relative ease. The higher the rank, the more countries an individual can enter visa free. The Fragile States Index, produced by the Fund for Peace, is an annual ranking of 178 nations based on their levels of stability and the pressures they face. It includes social, economic, political and military indicators.

9 Henley & Partners, 2017.

and that mid-ranked development countries can be significant source, transit and destination countries simultaneously. Nationals from countries with very high levels of human development can travel visa free to around 85 per cent of all other countries worldwide.¹⁰ These countries are also significant and preferred

destination countries.¹¹ Toward the bottom of the table, however, the visa restrictions in place for these countries indicate that regular migration pathways are problematic for citizens. Irregular pathways are likely to be the most realistic (if not the only) option open to potential migrants from these countries.

Table 1. Human development, fragility and visa rankings, selected countries

	Country (in HDI rank order)	Human Development Index 2016	Fragile States Index 2016	Visa Restrictions Index 2017
		Rank	Rank	Rank
Very High Human Development	Norway	1	177	4
	Australia	2	172	7
	Switzerland	2	174	6
	Germany	4	165	1
	Denmark	5	175	3
	Singapore	5	161	4
	Canada	10	169	6
	United States	10	159	3
	Sweden	14	171	2
	United Kingdom	16	162	4
	France	21	158	4
	Italy	26	148	3
	Greece	29	130	6
High Human Development	Malaysia	59	115	13
	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	69	47	95
	Turkey	71	79	52
	Sri Lanka	73	43	95
	Lebanon	76	40	96
	Mexico	77	107	26
	Thailand	87	74	67
	Tunisia	97	88	73
	Libya	102	25	99
Medium Human Development	Egypt	111	38	88
	Indonesia	113	86	79
	Iraq	121	11	103
	Morocco	123	89	78
	India	131	70	87
	Bangladesh	139	36	95
	Pakistan	147	14	102
Low Human Development	Syrian Arab Republic	149	6	101
	Haiti	163	10	86
	Sudan	165	4	97
	Yemen	168	4	98
	Afghanistan	169	9	104
	Ethiopia	174	24	96
	Eritrea	179	18	98
	Somalia	n/a	1	100
	A number 1 ranking means:	Very high human development	Most fragile country	Most mobile passport citizenship
	The lowest ranking means:	Low human development	Least fragile country	Least mobile passport citizenship

Source: UNDP, 2016; FFP, 2016; Henley & Partners, 2017.

Note: Somalia is not included in the HDI. According to UNDP, to include a country in the HDI requires recent, reliable and comparable data for all three dimensions of the Index. For a country to be included, statistics should ideally be available from the national statistical authority through relevant international data agencies.

10 Ibid.

11 Esipova, Ray and Pugliese, 2017; Keogh, 2013; McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; UN DESA, 2016.

Migrant-centric approaches: What can (potential) migrants tell us

How potential and actual migrants contemplate migration journeys at various stages is of keen interest to migration researchers as well as policymakers. The existing evidence on this topic points to a number of important considerations. First, there have long been acknowledged distinctions between the *desire* to migrate, the *intention* to migrate and *actual migration behaviour*.¹² While research on migrants' aspirations and intentions can contribute to our understanding of possible future migration trends, a desire or intention to migrate does not necessarily (or often) translate into actual migration. A recent example of this is reflected in the latest results of the *Gallup Survey on Migration Intentions*, which illustrate the significant differences between aspirations, intentions and realization. Conducted annually since 2005, the latest survey results indicate that an estimated 710 million adults (14% of the world's adult population) would like to migrate to another country if they had the opportunity. The figures reduce dramatically, however, when it comes to migration plans (66 million) and to actual preparations (23 million, or 0.4% of the world's adult population).¹³

Second, how migrants think about and undertake migration occurs in dynamic and sometimes fast-paced environments, so that people may need to respond to changes in circumstances quickly. The dynamic nature of migration settings requires that we continue to invest in researching migrants' views and experiences, rather than see it as a "one-off" exercise.

Third, there has been less of a focus on people who do not want to migrate, partly because remaining at home is often considered the norm. However, there are indications that pressures on people and communities to migrate internationally may be increasing in some circumstances.¹⁴ The longer-term development of "cultures of migration" may pose problems for an increasing number of communities in the future that would prefer to remain at home, but are less able to do so.¹⁵

(Mis)information

Information is central to migrants' contemplations and perceptions of migration, whether considering their options, choosing a destination, or determining the safest and most financially feasible routes. Information is also central to considerations of returning home. The quality and validity of information available plays a crucial role for a journey to be successful, however this is defined. Extensive research shows that the source of information is a very important aspect for migrants when deciding whether they can trust it or not and how much weight to give it.¹⁶ Information can come from social connections such as families, friends and other networks, both at home and in destination countries; and research over several decades confirms that information provided by those close to the migrant (in social, not geographic terms) is most valued.¹⁷ Several recent studies confirm this understanding, finding that information from close social connections is considered by migrants, before and during journeys, as the most important source, because it is information they can trust.¹⁸

Conversely, as social connections are more trusted than official sources, it may happen that valid information, such as government information about migration policies, may not be perceived as accurate by migrants and is less likely to shape migration decisions. Moreover, in some cases, distrust in the government or corrupt practices of government officials may impact on how information is perceived. This is particularly relevant to information campaigns (including deterrent messaging) by destination countries aimed at potential irregular migrants. Some research has found that information campaigns are generally ineffective and that asylum seekers do not know much about (European) destination countries.¹⁹ However, it also appears that migrants seem to recognize that not all governments are the same, and that some are much more likely to provide accurate information on migration than others in specific circumstances. Research conducted in Indonesia in late 2014, for example, found that 39 per cent of Afghan respondents indicated that "their most trusted source of information to inform

12 Stark, 1981; Carling, 2002.

13 Esipova, Ray and Pugliese, 2017.

14 Bylander, 2014.

15 Mescoli, 2013; Ball, Butt and Beazley, 2017; Mbaye, 2017.

16 Wall, Campbell and Janbek, 2015.

17 Pickering et al., 2016; Komito and Bates, 2011.

18 Kuschminder and Koser, 2016; Maroufof, 2017; Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016.

19 Gilbert and Koser, 2006; UK Home Office, 2004.

them of their onward journey to Australia was the Australian Government”.²⁰

The transmission of information is also evolving and recent dramatic advances in telecommunication technologies have transformed the nature of information exchange. Social media and real-time telecommunications applications (such as Facebook, Skype, Viber, WhatsApp and other instant messaging applications) are providing new ways of sharing information on the potential risks and rewards of making journeys. This appears to be influencing migration decision processes and having an impact on migration patterns, as exemplified by the large-scale movements of people to Europe in 2015.

Further, social media provide a platform for contact between people seeking to migrate and those advertising migration services, both lawful and unlawful (e.g. travel services and recruitment agencies, as well as smugglers selling fraudulent identity documents and visas). Although many are aware that the information provided may not be accurate, prospective migrants may use social media to locate smugglers.²¹

A strong preference for visas

Where possible, migrants will choose to migrate through regular pathways on visas.²² As highlighted in our opening remarks, there are stark differences between travelling on a visa and travelling without a visa. From a migrant’s perspective, the experience can be profoundly different in a number of important ways that can impact on the migrant as well as his/her family, including those who may remain in the origin country. First, visas denote authority to enter a country and so offer a form of legitimacy when arriving in and travelling through a country. A valid visa provides a greater chance of being safeguarded against exploitation. Conversely, travelling without a visa puts people at much greater risk of being detained and deported by authorities, or exploited and abused

by those offering illicit migration services, such as smugglers or traffickers, and having to operate largely outside of regulated systems.

Second, travelling on visas is undoubtedly much easier logistically, as the availability of travel options is far greater. In some cases, it can mean the difference between a journey being feasible or not, most especially in relation to air travel, which tends to be heavily monitored and controlled at departure, transit and entry points. Third, visas provide a greater level of certainty and confidence in the journey, which is much more likely to take place as planned, including in relation to costs. Travelling on visas is more likely to be safer, more certain and more easily able to accommodate greater choice, such as length of journey, travel mode and with whom to travel (if anyone).

It is unsurprising then that there is often a strong preference for travelling on a visa. Access to visas within decisionmaking contexts, therefore, features heavily in the minds of potential migrants and has been shown to be a key factor when the possibilities of migrating are explored while in the country of origin. In recent research on online job search and migration intentions, for example, the availability of visas was found to be a determining factor in how people conducted online job searches.²³ Similarly, changes in visa settings have been found to have an impact on potential migrants’ contemplations of migration, as well as their eventual migration.

Knowledge of the availability of visas is found to be relevant in a range of different settings, including those where the underlying reasons for wanting to migrate may be due to a multitude of circumstances and factors. In Sri Lanka, for example, the use of labour migration pathways to States within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been found to be associated with underlying protection needs. In the absence of accessible protection options, people have sought to migrate using the options that are available to them, and in this case, that has meant migrating as labour migrants.²⁴

Risk and reward

Most people may have preferences for law-abiding behaviour, including for authorized, visa-related

20 Pickering et al., 2016.

21 Frouws et al., 2016.

22 Please note that while “regular” migration does not necessarily require visas, the discussion refers to visas because these are often a requirement, most especially for migrants from developing countries. In addition, the term “visa” is much more widely understood than “regular” by migrants and the general public.

23 Sinclair and Mamertino, 2016.

24 Jayasuriya, 2016.

travel, but what happens when regular pathways and authorized entry are not available? We can see from Table 1 that for some people, there can be little hope of securing a visa to travel to most countries. Afghans, for example, currently rank last on the Visa Restrictions Index, meaning that access to regular migration pathways to preferred destinations is severely restricted. In the absence of accessible regular migration options to many countries, people are more restricted in their ability to migrate internationally, with remaining at home; migrating to less desirable, but accessible countries; and irregular migration options (to preferred destinations) being more feasible. This may result in “involuntary immobility”,²⁵ whereby people who would prefer to migrate are not able to do so, or in people resorting to high-risk journeys through irregular migration. For some people, there may be variations in between these extremes, such as migrating to countries that may not necessarily be preferred, but are at least accessible. This appears to be a stark reality for many; while the United States may be the most preferred destination country in the world, most people who migrate internationally do not get to the United States, but instead pursue other options. This is supported by current data on international migrants, for example, which show that in some regions, intraregional migration far outstrips outmigration from the region. This is most notable within Africa, where migration within the region accounts for the vast majority of current migration and is partly related to regional free movement agreements.

Besides, there is now clear recognition of the increasing pressure being placed on the international protection system, which provides asylum seekers with a lawful, but nevertheless irregular migration option for many people who are unable to access visa-related travel. From migrants’ perspectives, irregular asylum migration can sometimes be the only option available and is one that is being increasingly exploited by migrant smugglers, many of whom are driven by profits at the expense of migrants’ well-being.²⁶ Particular corridors have become extremely dangerous as smuggling and trafficking networks have expanded to take advantage of people with very few options. The international protection system risks becoming a “funnel” for people who may not have

protection needs under the Refugee Convention, but may nevertheless be extremely vulnerable at home and during migration journeys.

Along with the risks and how people contemplate dangerous journeys, the potential rewards need to be acknowledged. For some communities, the rewards can be long term, allowing the next generation and their children access to better education, health services and living standards, while at the same time supporting family members and communities in origin countries. For other groups, including those that may have been marginalized economically, socially or politically in their home countries, international migration has become a survival strategy whereby family and community members engage in migration to access resources and safety, often along kinship or ethnic lines.²⁷

In this chapter, we have examined how migrants think about migration journeys in different settings, drawing on emerging findings from a significant body of work on the topic. We are seeing more research being done in origin and transit countries, most especially in relation to irregular migration. One of the most interesting aspects and emerging tensions concerns the consideration of migrants as actors with (expanding) agency within research domains, including the traditional categories of “forced” migrants, such as refugees. This builds on the recognition in recent decades of the move away from the binary forced-voluntary construct towards a continuum of migrant agency. The ways in which migrants are accessing and utilizing information from a range of sources continues to be of interest, and research is showing that it is an area that is evolving rapidly, including the consumption of social media as well as the changing nature of contact with people who facilitate migration journeys, such as recruitment agents and migrant smugglers. The issue of increasing transnational connectivity and migrants’ communication patterns is discussed in chapter 6 of the *World Migration Report 2018*.

Within the context of the 2018 global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration, a more nuanced understanding of potential and actual migrants’ perspectives and considerations allows for deeper reflection of sustainable policy responses that are more able to incorporate population support and

25 See Carling’s discussion of involuntary immobility (Carling, 2002).

26 Carling, 2016; McAuliffe and Koser, 2015.

27 Monsutti, 2005.

stabilization, and enhanced human security during journeys, as well as expanding visa-related travel options. In this context, we find the following points to be relevant for research and policy:

- **Researchers need to take more notice of migrants' agency, understanding how people contemplate migration vis-à-vis policy categories** and place less emphasis on the policy categories that are central to regulated systems. Rather than citizenship, skills or other attributes to meet visa requirements, for example, the ability to pay for illicit migration services and enact strategies to manage risky journeys appear to be increasingly more significant in determining who moves and where, raising broader issues for the regulation and management of migration and support for populations in home and host countries.
- Reconciling aspirations to migrate as well as increasing pressures to migrate in some communities with the need for States to manage regulated entry and stay of migrants continues to be challenging. **Further investment in the formulation of innovative and practical ideas on how regular pathways can be enhanced without inadvertently creating overwhelming increases in "demand" for migration is a priority.** Understanding how migrants contemplate migration and migration journeys is central to the development of effective approaches.
- The dynamic nature of migration settings, supported by increased transnational connectivity via more sophisticated and accessible telecommunications technology, **requires that we continue to invest in understanding migrants' views and experiences** by undertaking longitudinal surveys rather than seeing surveys as an occasional, "one-off" exercise.
- As the pressures on people and communities to migrate internationally may be increasing in some circumstances, the longer-term development of much stronger "cultures of migration" may pose problems for an increasing number of communities in the future who would prefer to remain at home, but are less able to do so. It is important, therefore, to **better understand the factors that are involved in preferences to not migrate** (including in conflict and other perilous environments). This will assist in being able to better support people who would prefer to remain in their communities. ■

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Media reporting of migrants and migration

William Allen, Scott Blinder and Robert McNeil¹

Introduction

In this chapter, we aim to address four key questions:

- What do media around the world say about migration and migrants?
- What impacts does this coverage have on what members of the public, policymakers and migrants themselves think and do?
- How does the practice of journalism itself contribute to coverage?
- What implications arise from recent experiences of media and migration for future research and practice?

Background and context

Arguably, humans have always communicated about migration in whichever ways were available to them: even petroglyphs in Azerbaijan, some 10,000 years old, depict humans on the move.² Fleeing persecution, travelling to improve one's economic situation, talking about homelands, foreigners and exile: these kinds of ideas and stories appear throughout history.³ But what makes migration – and, particularly, media coverage of the issue – so important now?

One reason might be rising levels of anti-immigration rhetoric and recent gains by anti-immigration political parties in many countries. Across Europe, for example, some voters have moved away from mainstream parties towards “challenger parties” on the basis of their migration policies, especially those who are more politically right-wing.⁴ Negative, even hostile,

coverage of migration has accompanied similar rises in anti-immigration parties and political rhetoric.⁵

Political debates often scapegoat migrants by reducing the complex causes, impacts and types of migration into easily repeated stories or phrases.⁶ But laying blame solely on the media alone for negative attitudes towards migration would oversimplify as well. Other factors, including demographic change, actual or imagined socioeconomic impacts, and wider policies (such as economic austerity) are also likely to play some part.⁷

Media coverage around the world

Immigration sentiment

How positive or negative is media coverage about migration? Much of the research evidence shows media associating bad news⁸ with migrants around the world. During 2013–2014, unfavorable print and online coverage of migration in six countries with very high human development levels (such as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) was more than twice as visible as favourable content.⁹ This gap was particularly pronounced in Australia and the United Kingdom, while less so in Canada and Switzerland. Meanwhile, media content in sampled countries with lower levels of human development (such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam) also showed significantly more unfavourable content than favourable. Among these countries, Malaysian and Thai media were the most likely to have negative content. Furthermore, media in both sets of countries were most negative towards irregular migration.¹⁰

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2 Cherry and Leppard, 2015.

3 Anderson, 2013.

4 Hobolt and Tilley, 2016.

5 Wodak, KhosraviNik and Mral, 2013.

6 Greenslade, 2005.

7 For more comprehensive views of immigration attitude formation, see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014.

8 Philo, Briant and Donald, 2013.

9 McAuliffe, Weeks and Koser, 2015.

10 McAuliffe, Weeks and Koser, 2015.

More detailed studies of particular national media often confirm this general trend. For example, Danish and, to a more moderate extent, Dutch newspapers published more negative than positive content about migration between 2003 and 2010.¹¹ Similar analysis of migrants in German news (print and broadcast television) between 1998 and 2005 showed that these media tended to portray these groups negatively, too.¹²

But there are reasons to be cautious about this narrative of negativity. First, negativity is not unique to migration coverage, as journalists generally tend to emphasize problems across most topics. Second, there are exceptions to the bad news trend. There has been some movement towards more positive – or at least more neutral – coverage of migration issues across several destination and origin countries that does not seem to be attributable to any particular event.¹³ Media in specific countries, such as Switzerland and Viet Nam, also demonstrated noticeable increases in positive content, even if the overall media landscape appears to be more polarized.¹⁴ Newspapers in New Zealand have also shown “more nuanced and sympathetic reporting after 2000”.¹⁵ Furthermore, as explored in greater detail later, changes in traditional media (as well as the proliferation of social media outside of conventional journalism) provide opportunities for migrants to produce and promote their own content highlighting positive aspects of migration.

Framing migration: Competing issues, different approaches

Migration coverage is not only positive or negative, but also presents a variety of different issues, narratives and viewpoints. For the purpose of this chapter, these techniques can be broadly thought of as different ways to frame migration, although we recognize that the framing concept is itself not always well defined.¹⁶ Identifying how matters are framed is important because, as explored later, media frames affect how people think about migration.

Traditional media in the United States and Europe often cast migration as an issue of “law and order” or security.¹⁷ For example, this link became more visible in Italian media from the 1970s to the 1990s.¹⁸ British media also have depicted immigrants as “illegal”,¹⁹ and asylum seekers and refugees as “bogus” or linked to terrorist threats.²⁰ Meanwhile, from 1999 to 2014, English-language newspapers in Malaysia and Thailand also tended to refer to immigrants as “illegal” – a pattern particularly strong in the Malaysian case.²¹ Recent research argues that economic aspects, which emphasize the costs and fiscal impacts of migrants in destination countries, are significant – equalling if not exceeding concern about crime.²² Generally, these aspects of legal status, criminality and economic impacts mix and interrelate in media content about immigration, as found in Spanish newspaper coverage of Latin American migrants.²³

Another approach involves dividing migrants from the “native” population, portraying them as threats to national identity, culture or cohesiveness. The Latino Threat Narrative, documented in US media,²⁴ portrays immigrants from Latin America as incapable of successful integration.²⁵ Local media in Guangzhou, China, also tend to portray African immigrants as threats to public safety and “racial purity” – a narrative that spills into online domains, too.²⁶ Meanwhile, media also increasingly link populist rhetoric against Islam with broader questions about culture and immigration, as seen in public debate in Norway related to the July 2011 white supremacist terror attacks in Utøya and Oslo.²⁷

11 van Klingeren et al., 2015.

12 Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009.

13 McAuliffe, Weeks and Koser, 2015.

14 Ibid.

15 Spoonley and Butcher, 2009.

16 Cacciatore, Scheufele and Iyengar, 2016.

17 Suro, 2011.

18 Sciortino and Colombo, 2004.

19 Blinder and Allen, 2016.

20 Esses, Medianu and Lawson, 2013.

21 Anderson, 2013.

22 Caviedes, 2015.

23 Igartua, Cheng and Muñiz, 2005.

24 Chavez, 2013.

25 In the United States of America, the kind of narrative that divides people by race is not new, as Flores (2003) shows in media coverage about deportation campaigns affecting Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the 1920s and 1930s.

26 Lan, 2016.

27 Wiggen, 2012.

In contrast to narratives of threat, division and inhuman qualities, other studies demonstrate an explicitly humanitarian frame that “portrays immigrants as victims of an unfair system”.²⁸ Several cases demonstrate this way of covering immigration in Western European media, including those in Belgium,²⁹ France³⁰ and the Netherlands.³¹ Interestingly, this kind of frame actually dominated press coverage in the Republic of Korea over the 1990–2008 period, which reported that “immigrants have mostly been portrayed as vulnerable victims”.³² It also appears in coverage about emigration, too (see the text box ‘Emigration in Bangladeshi and Romanian media’). Usually, however, this frame appears with the other approaches mentioned above. For example, Malaysian press outlets cast asylum seekers and refugees as both threats and victims, depending on the publications’ ideological leanings.³³

Migrant-led media and journalism

In the midst of reporting that emphasizes migrants’ differences in relation to the host or native population, it is important to explore how migrants themselves access, produce and share media content. Newsrooms that are now catering to different migrant audiences – as well as digital technologies that disrupt and circumvent traditional media altogether – produce new opportunities and challenges for covering immigration. Research comparing Spanish- and English-language media in the United States, for example, shows that the former cover immigration issues more positively than the latter – with potential effects on what their audiences subsequently think.³⁴

“Immigrant journalism” does not take a single approach. Instead, it varies in style, formality, motivation and degree of ties to the home country.³⁵ Chinese media in Canada and the United States,³⁶

Venezuelan journalists in Florida,³⁷ or historically Black newspapers’ coverage of West Indian immigrants to the United States in the early twentieth century³⁸ all demonstrate how migrants can relate to – and communicate with – host countries in different ways. For example, refugees use Twitter and Facebook to directly communicate their own experiences, indicating that: “a seeming shift towards a self-staged testimony appears to offer a potential autonomous self-management of social media presence by the refugees themselves”.³⁹ This technique can extend to other media and geographic regions. As argued later, however, the extent to which these messages and ways of producing coverage are effective depends on the purpose at hand.

Impacts of media coverage on public perceptions, policymaking and migrants

Media coverage, in all its forms, relates to the wider world. Media provide important sources of information that affect how people act, what people think, how policymakers prioritize agendas, and how migrants make decisions.

Media coverage and public opinion about migration

“The press”, we are reminded, “is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”⁴⁰ The previous section showed how media coverage of migration varies around the world – and not just within traditional newspapers, but in other media, too. But what impacts do these various portrayals and approaches have on what people think, on policy developments and on migrants themselves?

In the early twentieth century, Walter Lippmann suggested that what we think about an issue is based on the “pictures in our heads” that we either create ourselves, through direct experience, or receive from other sources.⁴¹ Whether explicitly or not, this idea has formed the basis of much research into how media influence what people think: does changing

28 Thorbjornsrud, 2015.

29 Van Gorp, 2005.

30 Benson, 2013.

31 Bos et al., 2016.

32 Park, 2014.

33 Don and Lee, 2014.

34 Abrajano and Singh, 2009.

35 Shumow, 2014.

36 Zhou, Chen and Cai, 2006.

37 Shumow, 2012.

38 Tillery and Chresfield, 2012.

39 Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016.

40 Cohen, 1963.

41 Lippmann, 1997.

pictures similarly change perceptions and opinions?⁴² One aspect of these perceptions involves how many migrants there are in the country. People regularly overestimate minority groups' actual numbers.⁴³ This can occur because people perceive immigrants as threatening (and exaggerate that threat) or because they receive and use incorrect information. The media often promote these feelings and information, especially on symbolic issues such as immigration, where individuals may not have direct experience of all types of migration and refugee issues.⁴⁴

Changing the information available to people can make a difference in attitudes towards immigration.⁴⁵ For example, survey experiments in Europe and the United States found that accurate information about migrant populations influences perceptions. Researchers provided factual information about the number of migrants in their respective countries to a random subset of participants. In most countries, people who were given the accurate information were less likely to say that their country had too many immigrants, compared to those who were not given that information.⁴⁶ This difference was particularly pronounced in Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom, but less so in France and the Russian Federation.⁴⁷

Another aspect involves understanding more about the nature of migrant populations: why migrants are arriving, and where they come from. For example, when the British public thought of migrants as asylum seekers or labour migrants, official figures actually showed that students were the largest group at the time – but this group is rarely covered in the media.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, in Finland, a substantial minority (22%) of citizens thought that most migrants came not from

the Russian Federation (the correct geographic origins of most migrants in the country) but from Somalia or other places.⁴⁹ In this case, Finns who relied on print media were more accurate in their perceptions than those who primarily used television sources.

These differences between perceptions and reality are important in shaping public opinion about immigration. Also, different ways of portraying reality may impact perceptions (see the text box 'Are numbers or narratives more convincing among migrants?'). Studies in Europe and the United States have revealed that people tend to be more opposed to migration when they think that their country hosts a large population of migrants.⁵⁰ These perceptions, rather than the real size of the foreign-born population, are correlated with anti-immigrant views.⁵¹ Also, citizens who perceive migrants to be from different (and less privileged) groups than the host country also tend to be more negative about migration, as confirmed by studies in Finland,⁵² Spain⁵³ and the United States.⁵⁴ It is safe to say that media coverage plays an important role in providing information about the size and nature of migrant populations, which in turn seems likely to have an impact on public opinion.

Impacts on migration and migrants

Confronted with largely negative media portrayals in host countries, migrants can react in several ways. Sometimes, as found among Latin American migrants in the United States, they emphasize themselves as hardworking people who are different from "other" criminal migrants: "[...] these immigrants need to show that they have the traits of productive citizens [...] because this counters the negative images of themselves in the media."⁵⁵ Meanwhile, media that reflect discrimination against foreigners can cultivate perceptions among immigrants that public opinion in the host country is similarly biased. South American immigrants in Chile, who typically viewed the Chilean media (which included negative stereotypes about

42 There are differences between perceptions and opinions – notably, that the latter indicate evaluation of an attitude object while the former simply refer to general awareness or to cognitive links between an entity and associated characteristics. For the purpose of this chapter, these terms may be used interchangeably to broadly indicate the idea of "what people think". For more detail, see Fiske and Taylor (2016).

43 Herda, 2010.

44 Vliegthart et al., 2008.

45 Grigorieff, Roth and Ubfal, 2016.

46 Transatlantic Trends, 2014.

47 Providing information about migrants' share of the population did not change perceptions in Poland, while it actually slightly increased the percentage of people in Sweden who said that there were too many immigrants (Transatlantic Trends, 2014).

48 Blinder, 2015.

49 Herda, 2015.

50 Alba, Rumbaut and Marotz, 2005; Hooghe and de Vroome, 2015.

51 Strabac, 2011.

52 Herda, 2015.

53 Igartua and Cheng, 2009.

54 Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008.

55 Menjivar, 2016.

other Latin American people), were more likely to think that Chilean society was more discriminatory, even if they themselves had not personally experienced this.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, exposure to Western media can change migrants' perceptions of their home countries, too. For example, Chinese students in the United States became more sceptical and critical of their own government after reading news coverage about censored issues such as ethnic disputes or poor national economic performance.⁵⁷ Also, online forums and websites catering to diaspora members can provide venues for discussion about – and with – countries of origin, as seen on Zimbabwean social media, where participants disagree with and contradict one another on issues relating to national identity or historical events.⁵⁸

Conclusion: Implications and future research

The future of media and migration

It is clear that the media contribute to our thinking about migration, but the extent to which they drive actions in any direction depends on many factors that vary in different contexts. Indeed, consensus about the power of the media has shifted over the decades.⁵⁹

Our overview of what the media say about migration, their impacts and some of the journalistic factors that contribute to coverage, presents several implications and areas for future research:

1. More research needs to be done into the role of media in transit and origin countries – and particularly migrants' own use of, and preferences for, different types of media. This is especially important for understanding how and to what extent information sources shape perceptions.
2. Further evidence on whether and how different types of messages and emotions shape public perceptions and policy activity on mobility would be valuable both within and beyond the world of research. Applied studies can help a range of groups develop communication interventions that

are more effective for the audiences and topics at hand.

3. There needs to be more attention given to different media systems and how they may (or may not) produce different kinds of content regarding migration.
4. The presence of highly differentiated experiences around the world suggests that greater levels of public debate about the appropriate role of media in specific contexts will move forward the conversations already happening in policy, civil society and research. ■

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Migrants and cities: Stepping beyond World Migration Report 2015

Howard Duncan and Ioana Popp¹

The recent international context

Migrants and their relationship to cities have been the focus of an unusually large number of activities in the international community over the past two years.

The Habitat III conference, which took place in Quito, Ecuador, in October 2016, gave a very high degree of prominence to migration in its New Urban Agenda. The conference participants agreed that all inhabitants, including migrants, whether living in formal or informal settlements, be enabled to lead decent, dignified and rewarding lives and to achieve their full human potential. This commitment recognizes the fact that, although migration takes many forms, all migrants are rights holders, whether that migrant is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his or her habitual place of residence; regardless of the person's legal status; whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; whatever the causes for the movement are; or whatever the length of the stay is.²

More recently, the United Nations adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which launched processes to develop two global compacts to respond to the perceived migration and refugee crises in different areas of the world. One of the compacts will be on refugees and the other will focus on ways to promote safe, orderly and regular migration. Elements of these compacts may well include a recognition of the efficacy of, and responsibilities for, cities with respect to migration and integration.

An updated image of cities

Migration has nearly become synonymous with urbanization, given the dominance of the city as the destination of most migrants. Some cities are finding it difficult to manage the rapid growth in their populations, while others are trying to find their way as their residents leave for cities elsewhere. The urban agenda has been growing in academic circles for a number of decades and, with regard to migration, has perhaps been most advanced by such scholars as Saskia Sassen,³ Manuel Castells,⁴ and Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Çağlar.⁵ Sassen alerted us to the global city (as distinct from the older concept of the world city) and the impact that it has, well beyond its country's borders – in particular, as a result of the globalization of finance and other industries through information and communication technology (ICT), and the consequent weakening of the State, often over-stated but nonetheless real. Global cities and the firms that power them can operate beyond the reach of national policy and regulation. Scholars have for some time been shifting their concentration from States to local authorities in furthering our understanding of migration and other phenomena, noting the increased efficacy of the city in determining migration flows, partly due to ICTs and other aspects of globalization.⁶ Glick Schiller and Çağlar in their recent collection, *Locating Migration: Rescaling Cities and Migrants*,⁷ extend this recent approach, some of it building upon the earlier insight of Castells, to see cities as spaces of flows rather than as static physical settlements, and with migrants as significant agents in the evolution of a city's character.

These developments are not of merely academic interest. They suggest that cities may be more influential and capable than even their own officials

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2 United Conference on Housing and Sustainable Development (Habitat III), 2016.

3 Sassen, 1991.
4 Castells, 1996.
5 Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2010.
6 Skelcher, Sullivan and Jeffares, 2013; Buch et al., 2013; Combes, Démurger and Li, 2017.
7 Glick Schiller and Çağlar, 2010.

realize. National governments need to build into their migration and integration policy frameworks a robust role for city administrations and other local actors, and cities need to acknowledge their degree of influence and note that responsibility for migration and the migrants who live in their cities is not that of national jurisdictions alone. Cities have become significant determinants of global migration flows and their patterns – because, once again, it is the city that most rewards a migrant’s human capital.⁸

Despite this reality, the migration literature and data collection continue to emphasize *countries* as sources and destinations, the role of national migration and integration policy, national employment statistics, and other national-level phenomena. We have long heard that it is cities that are responsible for the lion’s share of integration, but we hear less of the city’s role in determining migration flows themselves. This lack of recognition has resulted in a significant gap in both research and migration policy development – a gap wherein those who are arguably the major determinants of migration flows are largely absent from the policy discussions. The point of emphasis is not the older point of whether cities are sufficiently equipped to manage the arrival and integration of migrants. The fundamental point here is that cities are not part of national migration policy development, despite the fact that they are increasingly among the principal determinants of migration.

Migration, urbanization and challenges to governance

As the principals in the global competition for talent, cities are the main draw, but they are restricted in exercising and directing their influence, due to their limited authority over migration policy, tax revenues and, hence, programmes to attract, support and retain migrants.

Sanctuary cities

Some cities have simply asserted themselves with regard to some aspects of migration policy by, for example, directly promoting their city as a preferred destination for migrants or, along an entirely different

line, declaring themselves to be a *sanctuary city*, in open defiance of national law with respect to the treatment of those in a country illegally.

The existence of Sanctuary Cities is, perhaps, a result of the lack of involvement of cities in setting immigration policy and determining how such policy is implemented. These examples of cities exerting a degree of autonomy over migration affairs reflect the current lack of involvement of cities in national migration policy development and point to the need for local–national partnerships (such as those mentioned in the WMR 2015) to be developed.⁹

Slums in the world’s megacities

The discussion of local migration-related governance challenges tends to start from how cities can manage population growth – especially growth that brings with it increased diversity. Nowhere is this challenge more keenly felt than in the world’s megacities, most of which are in developing countries. In 2016, there were over 30 megacities in the world – cities with at least 10 million residents – led by Tokyo with over 38 million residents.¹⁰ Many of the world’s megacities have large slums – some with over 1 million residents. The world’s largest slum – Neza-Chalco-Itza, in Mexico City – has over 4 million residents and is referred to as a “megaslum”.¹¹ The governance problems associated with slums are legion and well documented; suffice it to say that, in slums, one experiences inadequate, crowded and unsafe housing, a lack of basic infrastructure and public utilities, such as safe drinking water, sanitation services, garbage removal, adequate streets and roads, even for the passage of emergency vehicles, access to affordable transportation, and more. These conditions lead to risks of disease, violence, lack of education and other opportunities for human development, and elevated harms from natural disasters.

Finding ways to turn internal rural-tourban migration into a net positive for the world’s megacities and other large cities is becoming increasingly urgent, especially with few signs that such migration will abate. In other words, it is unlikely that the solution will be to slow, let alone stop, the movement of people to the city.

8 Price and Benton-Short, 2007. See also Scott and Storper, 2003 for another classic treatment.

9 Chen, 2015.

10 UN DESA, 2016.

11 See <https://borgenproject.org/category/slums/>

But the challenge of upgrading slums immediately meets the challenge of doing so inclusively.

The UN-Habitat Participatory Slum Upgrading Programme is an example of the interest in *inclusive urban development* in its desire for empowering “key urban actors, especially slum dwellers themselves, to contribute to the incremental eradication of urban poverty at community, city-wide and national levels”. Inclusive development in general seeks to involve all stakeholders in development decision-making processes, with the aim that development goals (such as those expressed through per capita GDP growth rates) not be achieved at the expense of the poorest members of a society. Having the residents of slums involved in the development process should not only enhance economic outcomes and improve living conditions but also enhance the quality of governance in the city. Having the migrant residents of a slum engaged in its development can be a powerful means of integrating them into the life of the city; it is a way for migrants to take partial responsibility for their own integration, assuming a greater degree of agency as opposed to remaining in a condition of vulnerability.

Peri-urban settlements in developing countries have grown with rapid urbanization – through both internal and international migration – and are presenting challenges that, while similar to those of urban slums, are markedly different, owing to their location not only outside the city limits but often outside the legal jurisdiction of the city. Peri-urban slums can be even less formal than urban slums, with even fewer services and resources. As a result, living conditions (including sanitary conditions) can be much worse than in urban slums, employment is often distant and difficult to access, and the reach of urban planners tends not to extend as far as the periurban settlements, leaving a major gap in governance. Being at or beyond the periphery of a city, peri-urban areas can be virtually ungoverned, not only leaving problems unsolved and needs unmet, but also leaving these settlements vulnerable to control by organized criminal groups.¹² These informal settlements can be found on the periphery of cities throughout much of the developing world. Much has been written on this phenomenon in South Asia, Africa and Latin America, and this growing body of literature speaks not only of the difficulties that migration to peri-urban regions produces but also

of the resourcefulness and innovations that can arise from these settlements.¹³ The Mathare Valley Slums in Nairobi, Kenya offer an example of how the residents of what is regarded as an illegal and impermanent settlement have responded to the lack of official governance over the settlement by creating their own economic and informal governance mechanisms.¹⁴

The growth of peri-urban areas is not only found in developing countries but also on the periphery of cities in the Global North in a more recent variant on urban sprawl. The accelerating cost of housing, together with migration into Europe, has, for example, led to the establishment of many peri-urban settlements. Academic researchers are turning more of their attention to these informal and illegal settlements, which are stressing the governance capacities of neighbouring cities such as Lisbon, Athens and Rome.¹⁵

Shrinking cities

At the opposite end of the spectrum of growing cities are cities that are shrinking as a result of a combination of outmigration and low fertility levels, leaving them not only with smaller populations and therefore smaller tax bases but often with older populations as well. Nearly 1 in 10 cities in the United States is shrinking¹⁶ and this is replicated in many other countries in both the Global North and the Global South as people move elsewhere for economic or other advantages. Often, it is the very large cities that are attracting people from smaller urban centres – for example, in Japan where many are leaving medium-sized cities for greater fortunes in Tokyo.¹⁷ In other cases, such as in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, overall national population decline is resulting in population decline in some cities. Among developing countries, it is the cities of China and India that are experiencing the greatest shrinkages.¹⁸ Some cities that experience population decline bounce back, as is well illustrated by the city of London, United Kingdom. Although the city experienced a period of decline when its population in 1991 dropped to 6.4 million

12 Amerasinghe and Marshall, 2017; Shivendra and Ramaraju, 2013.

13 Narain, Anand and Banerjee, 2013.

14 Thorn, Thornton and Helfgott, 2015.

15 Raposo, Crespo and Lages, 2017; Salvati et al., 2014.

16 *The Economist*, 2015.

17 Takahashi and Sugiura, 1996.

18 The Robinson Rojas Archives, 2008.

from nearly 9 million in 1939, its economic fortunes then reversed, followed by a population recovery, and it is now projected to become a megacity before 2020.¹⁹ American cities such as Detroit have become well known for their population decline (figure 1) and, in partnership with State of Michigan authorities, are making strong efforts to attract migrants to the city to reverse this long-term trend. Modest success has been achieved with many of the new arrivals being from Muslim-majority countries; Detroit now boasts the largest Arab-American community in the United States.²⁰ The economic and demographic fortunes of cities such as Detroit are highly intertwined, and the future of this and other cities that have experienced population decline must be observed for lessons learned. Although there is reason for optimism in the experiences of London and New York, which also suffered a steep population loss in the 1970s, the harsher reality for many future and currently shrinking cities is that historically low fertility rates mean that some of these cities will need to develop strategies to manage the effects of permanent population loss.²¹

Governance: Beyond policy to urban planning

Jurisdictional change takes time, especially if it requires amendments to a constitution. Granting municipalities greater authority over revenue generation, land use determination and infrastructure development (some of the standard responsibilities of local governments) will not happen quickly if allocating authorities is a zero sum proposition. Urban planning is an aspect of governance often neglected in discussions of managing migration, which tend to consider higherlevel policy; more attention needs to be paid to this highly important but quotidian aspect of governance.

Declaring a policy of, for example, migrant inclusion, openness to migrant entrepreneurs and support for their integration is one thing, but it is in planning that concrete implementation begins. Plans embody priorities for allocating resources, and they frame decisions made by administrators and elected officials. A policy of inclusion may be thwarted by city plans that do not allow migrant-owned business or places of worship to be established. The planning process itself can be an act of inclusion by ensuring

the representation of migrant communities or businesses or religious, cultural and other institutions on planning committees. The participation of migrant and minority groups at the planning table will not only be itself an act of inclusion but, more importantly, will ensure that the interests and needs of these communities are understood and appreciated from a planning perspective.

Planning for diversity

Planning theory offers what has been called “multicultural planning” as a set of principles to guide urban planners in their work to incorporate migration and diversity into their planning and plans.

In brief, multicultural planning is the planned alteration of the built environment and/or planning processes in response to the multi-ethnic composition and orientation of the local population.²² Traditional forms of urban planning tend to homogenize the residents, seeking to serve the broad public good. Multicultural planning takes the diversity of a population directly into account, noting the distinct interests of its composite groups, where they live, work and carry out their lives. In many large cities in North America, for example, migrants from Asia are settling directly into the suburbs, foregoing the earlier initial stay in an inner-city enclave.²³ The development pressures on suburbs in Los Angeles, Toronto or Vancouver, not only with respect to housing but also to business development and other activities with strong implications for land use, require a different way of thinking about the suburbs, with a different approach to planning and those involved in the process.

Minority ethnic retail areas provide a significant challenge for urban planners, given the complexity of the uses to which ethnic communities may put these areas, which can go well beyond shopping for goods. Zhixi Cecilia Zhuang’s recent work on these districts in Toronto offers strong directions for planners.²⁴ It is in the small aspects of daily life, such as shopping and moving about through one’s community and engaging with one’s fellow residents, that a city’s degree of inclusiveness is revealed.

19 GLA Intelligence, 2015.

20 Arab American Institute, 2012.

21 Pallagst, 2014.

22 Van der Horst and Ouwehand, 2011.

23 Hiebert, 2015; Gold, 2015; Li, 2008.

24 Zhuang, 2015.

City plans are often developed for 10–25-year periods and, therefore, represent the long-term strategic planning of the sort necessitated by demographic change. Although migration trends can sometimes shift unexpectedly, often (especially with managed migration systems) they can be predicted to no small extent, and this allows for more effective longer-term urban planning. This is particularly useful with regard to high-capital-cost infrastructure development such as for transportation, housing, electricity, water and sanitation systems, communications, and the location of commercial and retail sectors. Stable and predictable immigration trends, together with research findings on settlement patterns for new arrivals to the city, offer advantages to planners tasked with mapping out the long-term future of a city.

Looking ahead

A Global North bias in the discussion?

These concerns of urban planning and the incorporation of multiculturalism into planning spring largely from the experiences of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The discussion on migration and cities, including its urban planning aspects, can be deeply slanted towards the concerns of fully developed societies and their mature economies. When this happens, these discussions may leave out the situations faced by cities in developing countries, whether those cities are modestly sized or megacities. Many cities in developing countries face the challenges of slums, which, by their nature, are unplanned. Slums are not only places of poverty; they also lack basic services, including drinkable water, sanitation, electricity and public transportation. They may include areas unreachable by motor vehicles (including ambulances) and may be considered ungovernable and beyond the reach of planning initiatives.

With regard to the local management of migration effects, it is, once again, the cities in the world's wealthier countries that will fare best as they have a greater resource capacity, including for planning, and they have a higher capacity to manage migration flows than countries in the Global South.

To these cautionary remarks should be added the fact that fully developed countries can learn from the experiences of those less wealthy. As was remarked briefly with regard to slums, there are innovations being developed by the less wealthy. Such innovations

are of value in their own right but also demonstrate the potential of a less formal approach to city management – an approach that leaves more room for residents, including migrants, to develop solutions to local problems, ideas for economic advancement, and the means to strengthen social cohesion.

Some implications

Each of the areas discussed here, however briefly, warrants further examination by academic, government and civil society researchers, as well as by local and national policy officials, and by the international community, which is becoming increasingly engaged in these matters. Further discussions on the themes covered in this chapter, with emphasis on the following, are warranted:

- Cities as determinants of migration flow patterns and what this means for governance: how national and local governments should collaborate on setting immigration levels, on the global competition for talent, on best practices for settlement and integration, and on the role of non-governmental actors, including the business community and civil society organizations, in managing migration for social and economic benefits for the cities of destination.
- The challenges specific to cities of migration in the Global South, including megacities and slums, such as coping with very rapid population growth and pressures on infrastructure and basic services, the expansion of slums and peri-urban settlements, and the lack of an adequate planning capacity.
- Migration and urban planning, including planning explicitly for diversity: introducing *urban planners* into discussions of the challenges faced by cities in both the Global North and South, with respect to migration – discussions designed to elicit best practices in long-term urban planning for migration.

The emergence of cities as world leaders in determining migration patterns is the result of continuing urbanization, now a fully global phenomenon. It is not only global cities or larger cities that attract migrants; indeed, as larger cities become in some ways less livable, due to congestion and crowding, some smaller cities will become increasingly sought after as destinations, and these cities, perhaps with less experience in managing migration and integration, will benefit from the learned wisdom

of others. This chapter is a call for enhanced mutual exchanges of knowledge and experience among cities, their elected leaders, their policy officials, their planners, and the many institutions within them whose actions contribute to the outcomes of the migration processes. Urbanization, long-term history would suggest, is not going to be reversed, making it ever more appropriate for cities to be represented at national migration policy tables. ■

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World Migration Report 2018

2017/364 pages

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
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
The Syndicate publication comprises two components: Syndicate members' "Top 3 reads" for policymakers, and 26 short technical papers on a range of salient topics, including global migration governance challenges, safeguarding migrant workers' rights, combatting migrant smuggling and human trafficking, regular migration pathways, return and reintegration, improving migration narratives and mobilizing partners for action. The papers unpack policy conundrums posing obstacles to safe, orderly and regular migration, and offer ideas for and examples of evidence-based, effective and sustainable solutions.



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The registration of irregular migrants and asylum seekers and collection of biometric data in European Union Member States has become increasingly relevant for migration and border management in the European Union. Exchange of data between national authorities in the European Union is facilitated by three main databases – European Asylum Dactyloscopy (Eurodac); (b) Schengen Information System (SIS II); and (c) Visa Information System (VIS) – and supervised by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and data protection authorities of European Union Member States. Eurodac stores, processes and compares the digitalized fingerprints of asylum seekers, migrants apprehended at the European Union external border, and undocumented migrants apprehended within European Union Member States (the latter are not stored). The Eurodac regulation requires all countries to comply with their obligation to collect and transmit biometric data of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers to allow for a robust asylum process, according to European Union data protection legislation and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. The introduction of the “hotspot” approach with the European Agenda on Migration (May 2015) – aimed to facilitate registration and identification of large numbers of migrants and asylum seekers arriving to Europe – contributed to a substantial increase of registration rates in Greece and Italy in 2016, relative to previous years. Facilitating the functioning of the asylum, emergency relocation and return process in full compliance with fundamental rights, the “hotspot” approach seems to be a model for effective migration data management, highlighting the benefits of collaboration between relevant agencies and the existence of harmonized procedures. The proposal, currently under scrutiny, to expand the functions of the Eurodac system beyond asylum processing to irregular migration and return – as set out in two recent Communications by the European Commission – will imply the need for careful consideration of data protection and fundamental rights issues.



Call for authors/Submission guidelines

Since its launch in October 2011, Migration Policy Practice has published over 179 articles by senior policymakers and distinguished migration policy experts from all over the world.

Past authors have included, *inter alia*:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) and Special Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil society activities in the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global Forum on Migration and Development; Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje, Chair of the GFMD 2013–2014; Mark Cully, Chief Economist at the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations; Khalid Koser, Chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration; Khalid Malik, Director of the Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs (2010–2014); Ali Mansoor, Chair of the GFMD 2012; Andrew Middleton, Director of Culture, Recreation and Migrant Statistics, Australian Bureau of Statistics; Najat Maalla M'jid, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (2008–2014); Robert A. Mocny, Director of the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), formerly US-VISIT, US Department of Homeland Security; Imelda M. Nicolas, Secretary of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), Office of the President of the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary-General of the Terre des Hommes International Federation; Kelly Ryan, Coordinator of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees – IGC, Geneva; Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament (2012–2014); David Smith, Director of Economic Analysis Unit, Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; Sir Peter D. Sutherland, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Migration (2006–2017); Ambassador William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM); Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US Department of State.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

- Not exceed five pages and be written in a non-academic and reader-friendly style;
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To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

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