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
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A Syrian refugee shows his home town of Hama on his phone while enroute to Canada. Photo: Muse Mohammed © IOM 2015

CONTENTS

2 Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

4 How transnational connectivity is shaping irregular migration: Insights for migration policy and practice from the 2015 irregular migration flows to Europe

Marie McAuliffe

11 The most open system for labour immigration – has it worked?

Bernd Parusel and Kristof Tamas

16 A new strategy: Coherent and complementary integration and development policies

Özge Bilgili

22 Beyond displacement: Migration trends in the Arab region

Karoline Popp, Karima el Korri and Jozef Bartovic

27 Publications

31 MPP Readers' Survey

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International Organization for Migration (IOM)



Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko¹

Welcome to the new issue of *Migration Policy Practice*, which focuses on a range of themes including migration and IT connectivity, Sweden's labour immigration system, new migration and development strategies, and migration trends in the Arab region.

The lead article, by Marie McAuliffe (Australian National University, on leave from the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection), examines how global telecommunications transformations are affecting the international migration and asylum system. This is a timely article that coincides with the Global Forum on Migration and Development Thematic Workshop on Migration, Connectivity and Business to be held in Bangkok on 29 March. The article describes the ways in which information and communications technology revolution is enabling the creation of faster and more affordable unregulated migration pathways, particularly through the many smartphone apps that are available for people travelling to and through Europe. The IT revolution has also enhanced both the States' abilities to monitor their borders and detect and prevent immigration fraud associated with entry, and the researchers' potential to analyse migration trends in remote locations, with greater accuracy and in shorter time frames.

The second article, by Bernd Parusel and Kristof Tamas (Swedish Migration Studies Delegation, or Delmi), discusses Sweden's liberal, demand-driven policy for labour immigration from non-member countries of the European Union (EU) that was first introduced in 2008. The policy, which was praised by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as the most open labour migration

system among its member countries, aims to facilitate recruitment for occupations with labour shortages and to provide employers with better opportunities to hire from non-EU countries. The system has recently been evaluated by the Swedish Migration Studies Delegation, which has concluded that despite its flexibility, the system has often led migrant workers to vulnerable positions and has enabled employers to circumvent existing labour market regulations on decent working conditions and salaries.

The third article, by Özge Bilgili (United Nations University–Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology, and the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance), revisits the ongoing debate on how to channel migrant remittances in a productive manner, increase migrant investments in their countries of origin, and improve mechanisms such as temporary return for knowledge and exchanges of experience. The author argues that in order to facilitate migrant empowerment and to increase migrants' voluntary social and economic transfers to their home countries, policies need to improve migrants' integration into the host countries by giving them access to more rights and institutional roles. Linking integration and development is an innovative and potentially effective way of approaching future migration and development strategies.

The last article, by Karoline Popp (International Organization for Migration (IOM)), Karima el Korri and Jozef Bartovic (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA)), discusses the key findings of the 2015 *Situation Report on International Migration: Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region*, which was published recently by ESCWA and IOM. The report shows that, in general, borders in the region are closing rather than opening, and that Syrian nationals specifically have been progressively running out of countries permitting visa-free entry. This will affect and alter current migration routes, in keeping with the rapid shifts in routes that have taken place in the past. Furthermore, mobility trends may be reinforced among the large and youthful populations of North Africa in particular, whose ambitions and aspirations

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are not met by local opportunities. In any scenario, migration, mobility, and displacement in the Arab region will remain closely interrelated with and will impact neighbouring regions.

We thank all the contributors to this issue of *Migration Policy Practice* and invite readers to spare a couple of minutes to participate in a survey which aims to help us identify our readers' profiles, the institutions they represent and their primary interests in our journal. Should you wish to participate in this survey, please [click here](#). ■



How transnational connectivity is shaping irregular migration: Insights for migration policy and practice from the 2015 irregular migration flows to Europe

Marie McAuliffe¹

With more than 1 million migrants having entered Europe in 2015, most of them by sea and around half of them Syrian refugees, it is time to re-examine how global telecommunications transformations are affecting the international refugee protection system. The implications for migration policy and practice are potentially profound, and it also calls into question our current migration research and analysis capabilities.

Commentary on the flows to Europe last year rightly pointed to significant push factors driving migration, such as the Syrian civil war; the challenging refugee hosting situations in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan; and the ongoing difficulties people face living in countries with struggling economies and dysfunctional governance. Pull factors have also been acknowledged, including the safety and security of destination countries, their strong and stable economies and the more open policies of governments accepting refugees, such as in Germany and until recently Sweden and Denmark.

And yet there has been less focus on the “enabling” factors that facilitate movements. Enabling factors are critically important in how they shape migration, and one of the most significant factors is telecommunications technology (McAuliffe, 2013). Advances have brought about a global transformation in connectivity. Distant lands and virtual realities are now more accessible than ever. The world is increasingly more accessible, and our global connectivity has profound implications for how people think about and undertake migration.

The changing context of the international protection system

The world has changed fundamentally in the almost 70 years since the largest refugee crisis in Europe in the aftermath of World War II that provided the impetus for the development of the Refugee Convention. Seventy years ago, people were not able to be as connected in their day-to-day lives. There was no Internet. There were no mobiles or fax machines. Postal services were slow and often disrupted. Telegram and telephone communication was limited and costly. Paolina Roccanello arrived in Melbourne in April 1947, from Italy, with her mother on the *SS Misr* in the shadow of the war. They were lucky to be reunited with her father who had emigrated to Australia eight years before, expecting his family to follow soon after. For all their war-time separation they received only one of his letters, which had taken five years to reach them (Huxley, 2007). Such were the times.


After World War II, refugee movements beyond war-torn Europe were regulated by States, principally through United Nations, which coordinated repatriation, returns and resettlement of refugees to third countries. In today’s terms, movements were slow, highly regulated and very selective. Information for refugees was largely under the monopoly of States, and opportunities for migrating to other regions were limited to formal channels. Things are very different now.

Some 70 years on, conflict and persecution may still be occurring at frustrating and tragic levels but the context has changed. While the international protection system has evolved incrementally over time, it risks lagging further behind. The “appification” of migration has taken off, making migration processes fundamentally different in specific but important ways.

Firstly, mobile phone technology has become the norm, linking migrants to families, friends, humanitarian organizations and smugglers, and equally linking smugglers to agents, corrupt officials, and their networks of fellow smugglers in dispersed locations (Khalaf, 2016).

¹ Marie McAuliffe is a Sir Roland Wilson PhD scholar at the School of Demography at the Australian National University (ANU), on leave from the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection. The views of the author do not necessarily reflect those of any of the organizations, institutions or foundations she is affiliated with. This article expands on a short piece that first appeared in the ANU’s Policy Forum in January 2016 (McAuliffe, 2016).

Global Internet and mobile telephone access, 1995–2014



Source: World Bank statistics derived from the International Telecommunication Union data. See <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators#>

The telecommunications revolution is enabling the creation of unregulated migration pathways that are fast and affordable for an increasing number of people. There are many apps available for people travelling to and through Europe. For example, InfoAid has been set up by a Hungarian couple to provide real-time advice on how to cross borders. Other apps help refugees integrate, such as Refugermany and Arriving in Berlin. Connectivity is supporting movements to safer regions for many, but pathways can be extremely dangerous and at times deadly. In 2015, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that 3,770 people died while attempting to migrate across the Mediterranean Sea (IOM, 2016).

Secondly, and for the first time in decades, large numbers of refugees and other migrants in transit and host countries such as Turkey are not sitting and waiting for resettlement or return. They are taking matters into their own hands, principally because they can. Information, advice and money can be shared quickly, and the constraints of geography more easily overcome. The massive and sudden growth in movements through the Eastern Mediterranean route to Greece in 2015 was aided by strong connectivity. In 2014, about 50,000 people arrived by sea to Greece; in 2015 it was around 850,000 (IOM, 2016).

Telecommunications has helped shape the size, composition, speed and geography of the European flows, which primarily comprise Syrians but have increasingly included Afghans, Pakistanis, Iranians, Iraqis and others, too (OECD, 2015). As tends to be the case, key populations in need of protection are often the ones who “spearhead” flows because of their desperate need to move to safety and improved security, but they are often joined by other groups who typically are not found to be in need of international protection under the Refugee Convention. Following in the footsteps of Syrians, a range of other groups began to travel using the same irregular pathways, resulting in a huge increase in scale and diversity. Real-time coverage of movements and operations enable migrants – refugees, asylum-seekers and others – to access useful information on where, when and how to travel.

This greater connectivity manifests itself in the irregular movement of people (flows) as well as their final destinations (stocks). The strong preference for Germany over other European countries has not been by chance. Migrants themselves have decided as sharing of information increases. In the context of limited access to visas alongside much

greater demand, unregulated asylum pathways risk becoming a funnel for refugees and non-refugees alike (McAuliffe and Koser, 2015). Ultimately, many of the asylum-seekers who travelled to Europe in 2015 will be found not to be refugees (Koser, 2015), and one of the significant challenges will concern return migration, its impacts, and the consequences both for the migrants affected and the societies they live in and have come from.

Implications for migration policy and practice

The migration patterns and processes occurring within national and regional economic, social, and security environments to some extent reflect migration policy settings. Where, how, when and with whom people migrate often depends on the options available to them, with many of those options being determined by policy, both directly and indirectly. In migration, as in many other areas of State regulation, it is challenging to find the right policy balance between influencing behaviour and responding to changes in behaviour. Policymakers must also consider foreign policy, national and international legal obligations (including human rights obligations), border security, and trade implications.

As one of the more complex and challenging areas of migration policy, asylum and refugee policies are riddled with tensions. Negotiating competing aspects of national interest with those of international interest (at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels) can produce challenging policy conundrums. Some of these conundrums are being keenly felt in Europe now, as States struggle to reach consensus on how to manage the sharp increase in irregular migration. Equally, there has been much contemplation about how to combat migrant smuggling and manage borders more effectively without undermining humanitarian credentials and legal obligations.

It is easy to understand why migration policymakers and practitioners tend to focus on solutions first and foremost, which can take on crisis tones, especially when the political dimensions are added to the mix. There is a vital need, however, to invest in more sophisticated analyses of the factors underpinning and enabling migration. Academia has undoubtedly contributed an enormous amount in this area; however, it has at times been limited by its own set of systems and practices (Cherney et al., 2012; Foster et al., 2015), and has struggled at times to see beyond its own orthodoxies. Likewise, policy innovations

can be stifled by strong traditions and prevailing paradigms. The focus on borders, entry and stay may have at times unnecessarily limited capacity for deeper contemplation of issues facing migrants and migration management.

Technology too has played a role in shaping policy responses. Recent investments in analytics technology, for example, has significantly enhanced States' abilities to monitor their borders and detect and prevent immigration fraud associated with entry. As the analytics director in the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection commented, the agency is "sitting on a 'platinum mine' of data, with records of more than 500 million border crossings and gigabytes of unstructured intelligence" that provide the raw material for analytical functions. He argued, however, that the investment in people, not systems, accounted for the Department's ability to build and test its border risk identification system (Tay, 2012).

Similar investments seem not to have been made in the development of analytical capability to better understanding the fundamental shifts in migration processes, including in relation to how migrants think about and assess migration options (be they regular or irregular) in an era of unprecedented connectivity. Nor has there been sufficient development in the analysis of evidence and data that is collected on a day-to-day basis by immigration authorities. We often hear discussion of migration policy as well as migration research, but how often do we hear consideration of migration analysis? It is a big gap that few acknowledge.²

Continued investments also need to be made in developing technologies that can be used by migrants to avoid dangerous and possibly deadly migration pathways as well as abuse and exploitation – there is enormous potential in this area, and lots of important work is underway, for example, on information and communications technology to combat human trafficking (US Mission to ASEAN, 2015). One of the challenges is managing the intersections between regulating safe migration in a way that does not further undermine border management priorities and facilitate irregular migration. The application of technology, therefore, needs to be managed very carefully.

2 The issue was raised and discussed in a paper prepared by Dr Khalid Koser in 2014, to support Australia's Chair of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees, and followed discussions with and feedback from immigration officials (see References).

Working with (and against) non-State actors

Initial signs in Europe and elsewhere are that some concerned citizens are not waiting for their governments to respond to the large increases in irregular migration but are instead taking matters into their own hands, sometimes without necessarily considering the implications for flows. Initiatives like Techfugees have received widespread support in the tech community, and yet there are real risks that some of its work may act to facilitate movements of people in an already troubled and complex environment. Techfugees clearly has noble ideas, as – according to its developers – this initiative has been “designed to foster and spread tech solutions for refugees fleeing death and destruction in their homelands” (Butcher, 2015), but as migration policymakers and practitioners know, providing targeted assistance is fraught with risk and complexity. There is a very real possibility that the pool of people who benefit from the facilitation provided by Techfugees will expand well beyond those “fleeing death and destruction”.

Techfugees in some ways appears to be a combination of naivety, determination and enthusiasm. Mike Butcher, the leader of the team that developed the initiative, commented that while non-governmental organizations “struggle”, “governments are hobbled by indecision”, and technology at least “allows refugees a degree of freedom to organise and help themselves” (Khalaf, 2016). Mr Butcher is overly simplistic about the reasons governments are hobbled, which are related more to the complexity of the issues involved than indecision. Initiatives like Techfugees need at least to be taking advice from migration practitioners and listening to policymakers.

Some commentators have also been naïve or perhaps disingenuous in their analysis of the impact of technology on irregular migration, for example by declaring “technology may not lower the number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean...” (Khalaf, 2016). Technology is undoubtedly assisting movement and providing more options for people who want to migrate. The implications for policymakers is that the increasing use of telecommunications technology by non-State actors, such as tech specialists, migrants and smugglers, is further complicating (and potentially eroding) the ability of governments to regulate and manage migration. Smugglers operate with no regard for the law, taking comfort from being largely beyond the reach of authorities.

Managing irregular migration in an era of unprecedented connectivity

So what can be done to better regulate movement and ensure more certain, safe and sustainable migration, recognizing that turning back the clock on connectivity is both impossible and highly undesirable? Firstly, we need to acknowledge that we inexcusably remain data-poor in an age of such great global connectivity, in addition to being analytically challenged. We need to take stock of the data we have as well as harness new data collection and research technologies. In order to be of most benefit, it is critical that such initiatives are undertaken from a migrant perspective so that we are better able to understand how megatrends are affecting the lives and aspirations of both potential and actual migrants. Such approaches could be usefully focused on providing answers to how we might better prevent dangerous illicit migration in safe and sustainable ways.

Secondly, greater emphasis needs to be placed on improving conditions in home countries, including not only to reduce conflict and persecution but also to improve countries’ economies and governance so that more people are able to forge safe and meaningful lives at home. Advances in technology are aiding development, but more emphasis needs to be placed on global connectivity to support education and health, income generation, and human security. While still one of the lowest ranked countries, Afghanistan has seen mobile telephone subscriptions rise from 5 per cent in 2005 to 75 per cent in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). Harnessing this new reach has enormous potential for development and is being pursued by initiatives such as Mobile for Development.

Thirdly, there needs to be much greater accountability of States that fail to meet their obligations to protect their citizens and residents. Technology can assist in bringing abuses to light, such as through EyeWitness to Atrocities, an app to report war crimes. Calls for more proactive diplomacy to head off potential security and political crises that precipitate human displacement are increasing (Malloch-Brown, 2016). Perhaps the 2015 flows to Europe will provide further incentives for European destination countries and those hosting refugee populations, such as Turkey, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanon, to bring origin countries to account. Although, as some commentators have also noted, the potential bilateral gains can be all too attractive: “Turkey has mixed the generosity of its asylum policies with the bargaining

style of the bazaar, raising its price to keep refugees away from Europe itself” (Malloch-Brown, 2016).

Fourthly, rethinking solutions to enhance stability and improve the lives of people who have already been displaced is critical. This would necessarily involve more support to refugee host countries. But just as importantly, deeper thinking about the policy implications of greater mobility is required, as is contemplation of refugees as a potential demographic bonus for highly industrialized countries, rather than a burden. This is a tactical as well as strategic issue given two key factors: large numbers of irregular migrants will continue to migrate to safer and more prosperous destinations; and many industrialized countries will increasingly need to rely on immigration to meet economic demand as their populations continue to age. This neat and yet uneasy confluence of circumstances needs careful management and strong political leadership to fully realize the enormous potential it offers.

Implications for migration research

Greater connectivity has significant implications for research. It provides enormous potential for researchers interested in harnessing new technology (Fussell, 2012), enabling them to conduct research in remote locations, with greater accuracy and in shorter periods. On the other hand, these changes are likely to deepen the existing disconnect between research and policy on key aspects of asylum-seeking and international protection. For example, the debate that continues in research spheres about whether or not asylum-seekers choose particular destination countries (Crawley, 2010; Gilbert and Koser, 2006; Havinga and Böcker, 1999) will become increasingly irrelevant as asylum-seekers themselves move through some destination countries in preference for others. That significant numbers of asylum-seekers are able to choose specific destination countries should be beyond question, as demonstrated by the 1.1 million asylum-seekers who lodged claims in Germany in 2015 (Pandey, 2016). And yet, there is still resistance to this notion, despite the nature of movement and the migration processes involved having no connection to whether or not a person is or is not a refugee (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016).

The implications for research include that in the pursuit of deeper understandings of migratory patterns and processes of asylum-seekers there is likely to be considerable benefit in making more allowance for

aspects of migrant agency, and to acknowledge the profound changes global connectivity afford migrants in terms of agency. To assume that there is no or very little ability of asylum-seekers to actively seek asylum in specific countries severely limits empirical and theoretical developments in this topical area of research. Importantly, it also risks further polarization and undermines the credibility of researchers who would otherwise have useful contributions to make to policy deliberations.

Conclusion

We now have, at our disposal, the technology, resources and intellect to move towards an improved global governance of migration. States, international partners, researchers and analysts who are more determined to see glimpses of the world through the eyes of migrants, and more clearly understand unregulated migration pathways and our interconnected prosperity, are likely to be at a strategic advantage. However, seizing that advantage requires a willingness to see beyond the ever-polarizing positions on asylum-seeking and refugee migration and to acknowledge why a system that has built-in incentives to migrate is now crashing up against unprecedented connectivity enabling migration to be realized on a massive scale. Those who can simultaneously see the big picture from both migrants’ and States’ perspectives will be more easily able to see emerging issues that can be shaped in positive and constructive ways to the benefit of refugees and States. ■

“Technology is undoubtedly assisting movement and providing more options for people who want to migrate.”

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The most open system for labour immigration – has it worked?

Bernd Parusel and Kristof Tamas¹

Since 2008, Sweden has been using a liberal, demand-driven system for labour immigration from non-EU countries. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) praised it as the most open labour migration system among its member countries. It was introduced to facilitate recruitment to occupations with labour shortages and to provide employers with better opportunities to hire from abroad. Seven years later, Delmi (the Swedish Migration Studies Delegation) analysed the impact of the Swedish system in a comprehensive anthology. A main finding is that Sweden needs to strengthen the rights of immigrant workers and that its labour immigration policy needs to be revised.

Introduction: Sweden's liberal system for labour immigration

Competition among industrialized countries for talented immigrants has increased substantially in recent years. At the same time, national immigration policies have become increasingly selective.² Many States try to attract migrants with high skill levels while at the same time restricting access for low-skilled and unskilled migrants. This trend is particularly visible in the European Union (EU), where many Member States have taken steps to increase their attractiveness for highly qualified workers.³ It is unclear, however, whether these strategies have succeeded. Statistics from Eurostat shows that the number of residence permits issued to highly skilled migrants from non-EU countries has

more or less stagnated since 2009, at a level between roughly 32,000 and 40,000 permits each year for the entire EU.⁴ The EU Blue Card, a special permit system for the highly skilled, is a system that has not garnered significant success and is now being revised.

In this context of selective policies and a one-sided focus on particular skills, the Swedish system for labour immigration from outside the EU stands out as quite unique. Labour immigration opportunities are neither restricted to persons with certain skills or workers in shortage occupations, nor are there any quantitative limitations to recruitment from abroad. Since the rules were liberalized in 2008, immigration of migrant workers has been almost entirely dependent on the recruitment needs of Swedish employers. They can decide whether or not they need to recruit from abroad, and the controlling powers of government agencies are limited to a minimum. The previous agency-based labour market needs test was abolished.

According to the current system, if an employer has a vacancy, they are first obliged to advertise the position publicly and EU-wide. If there is no response, or if an employer still prefers to recruit somebody from abroad, they may employ a job applicant from any country in the world. After consulting the responsible labour union about the terms of employment, the Swedish Migration Agency accepts and processes applications for residence and work permits. The terms and conditions for the job must be based on the applicable collective agreements or, in the absence of such agreements, on what is customary for the occupation at hand. Permits are granted for the time of employment, or – in case the position is permanent – for a maximum of two years, with the possibility of an extension. During the first two years, the residence permit is linked to a specific employer and a clearly defined occupation. After that, the foreign worker may change employer, but not occupation. After a total time of four years, a permanent residence permit can

1 Bernd Parusel is Delegation Secretary of the Swedish Migration Studies Delegation (Delmi), and Expert at the Swedish Migration Agency. Kristof Tamas is Director and Head of Secretariat of the Swedish Migration Studies Delegation.

2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/European Union, *Matching Economic Migration with Labour Market Needs* (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2014), p. 250.

3 European Commission/European Migration Network, *A Descriptive Analysis of the Impacts of the Stockholm Programme 2010–2013* (Brussels, European Migration Network, 2014). Available from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/annual-policy/2013/emn_descriptive_analysis_stockholm_2010_to_2013_final_22may2014.pdf

4 Eurostat Database, First Permits Issued for Remunerated Activities by Reason, Length of Validity and Citizenship [migr_resocc], last update: 30 November 2015.

be granted, which then allows for full labour market access. Moreover, labour migrants who stay at least one year have access to welfare and the health care system on equal terms with the rest of the population. They are also allowed to bring close relatives, such as spouses or partners as well as children up to the age of 21.

Another particularity is that Sweden dovetails the immigration of asylum-seekers with labour migration. Asylum-seekers normally have access to the labour market from the beginning of their stay in Sweden. When they are found not to be in need of protection, they may apply – within two weeks from receiving a final negative decision on their asylum claim – for a residence permit for work purposes. Such a permit is issued whenever an asylum-seeker has been working for at least four months before rejection, and when the employer guarantees that the contract is ongoing. The type of work in question, as well as whether the job is full-time or not, are considerations that do not matter so long as the working conditions are in line with collective agreements and if the monthly salary is at least SEK 13,000 (approximately EUR 1,400). This possibility for an “immigration status change” was originally introduced in 2008, and further facilitated in 2014.

Intensive debate about wage-dumping and abuse

Ever since the current system came into force, the situation of labour immigrants has been subject to intense debate in the Swedish media and in research. Sweden has been positively referred to as the world’s most open country with regard to migration policy,⁵ but attention has also been drawn to shortcomings and problems with the new system, such as exploitation of migrants, wage-dumping and the recruitment of foreign workers to jobs for which there is no domestic labour shortage.⁶ Recently, the Swedish Migration Studies Delegation (Delmi), an independent, government-appointed committee that initiates studies on migration, integration and asylum processes, published an extensive analysis and evaluation of the Swedish system. The Delmi report posed the question whether the outcomes of the

reform corresponded to the original intentions of the legislator, namely if it has contributed to facilitated recruitment of workers in occupations with shortages. The report also looks at how the foreign workers have been treated after their arrival.⁷

Quantitative evolution of labour immigration to Sweden

In 2009, the first year that the current legislation was in effect, approximately 18,000 residence permits were granted on labour market grounds. The number has varied between 16,000 and 20,000 annually since then. Perhaps surprisingly, these figures do not point towards substantially increased labour immigration to Sweden. While the number of incoming workers was at low levels in 2005 and 2006, when around 6,000 permits were granted annually, the number of labour migrants was higher even in earlier periods, such as in 2000, where just under 15,800 permits were granted.

When they are examined more closely, the statistics from the Swedish Migration Agency shows that labour immigration has clearly risen in some professions with low qualification requirements, where it has not previously been possible to obtain a work permit. The labour immigrants arriving in Sweden primarily belong to three rather different categories of workers. Roughly speaking, these are seasonal workers (most often pickers of wild berries), data specialists, and people working in cleaning business and the restaurant industry. We can also see that there seems to be, as Catharina Calleman and Petra Herzfeld Olsson put it in the Delmi report, an “international division of labour” among the immigrants to Sweden: berry pickers and other workers in comparable positions come from Thailand; data specialists mainly from India; specialist chefs mainly from China; and so on. This gives us an idea about international networks and contact routes.

Reasons for migrant workers to choose Sweden

As shown in Charlotta Hedberg’s chapter in the Delmi report, seasonal labourers view berry picking in Sweden as a way to supplement their income, since agriculture in Thailand is becoming an increasingly unreliable source of income. Temporary migration to Sweden is thus often part of a “household strategy”.

5 OECD, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers – Sweden* (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2011).

6 Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO), *Fusk och Utnyttjande – om Avregleringen av Arbetskraftsinvandringen* (Stockholm, LO, 2013).

7 C. Calleman and P.H. Olsson, *Arbetskraft från hela Världen – Hur blev det med 2008 års Reform?* (Stockholm, Swedish Migration Studies Delegation (Delmi), 2015).

The labourers are generally not interested in settling down permanently in Sweden. Rather, they could be called “circular migrants”, in the sense that they return to their home country (with or without repeating the cycle again later).

Also, among the highly skilled labourers, many will only stay for a short period. They often travel between different units of multinational companies for limited assignments, as “intra-corporate transferees”. Evidence in the Delmi report provided by Henrik Emilsson and Karin Magnusson suggests that companies’ driving forces play a clearer role in these cases than in other forms of labour immigration. The companies’ goal is to gain access to certain expertise for a limited time. For the highly skilled labourers that choose to stay for a longer period of time, decisive motivations to come to Sweden are stated to be at least two – Sweden’s welfare system, and also the prospects of a good balance between work and private life.

For the third large group of labour immigrants, the motivations appear to be very complex. They mainly work in sectors with low entry requirements, primarily the service sector, for example restaurants, large-scale households and cleaning. A significant proportion of migrants in these jobs come from countries topping the list over numbers of asylum-seekers, and the rules regarding work permits seem to give people who want to escape violence and insecurity a chance to come to Sweden legally. The line between asylum and work permits seems, in many cases, unclear to the members of this group, as Olle Frödin and Anders Kjellberg write.

Working conditions of immigrant workers

Employers’ organizations and labour unions have had very different views of the Swedish labour immigration system. While the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise has been generally positive, the labour unions have criticized the rules. In the media, there have been discussions of exploitation and abuse, about forced labour and human trafficking. The criticism has led to different types of control measures and legislation against abuse. While the Delmi report does not provide any definitive answers to whether or not labour immigrants are working under conditions in accordance with the formal terms of their contracts or not, several contributing authors bring up the subject. Their evidence suggests

that immigrants often end up with worse conditions than what they were offered. Some groups appear to receive the salary stipulated in the applicable collective agreement, while others are forced to sign away their basic salary or to enter into double contracts. Within certain highly skilled professions, labour immigrants have a significantly lower income than the industry average. The immigrants within low-skill sectors are often employed in workplaces with no collective agreements, where labour unions are unable to exercise oversight on the terms of employment.

Asylum-seekers who have been working during the processing of their applications for protection seem to be particularly vulnerable. Sometimes they are paid a salary far below the levels stipulated in collective agreements; sometimes they are unable to report any income at all, and in other cases, they have received large deductions from their salary due to a debt to the employer.

Explanations for shortcomings

One explanation for the shortcomings that have arisen could lie in the design of the relevant legislation. The employers are allowed to decide for themselves whether there is a need for labour from countries outside of the EU, and the labourer is tied to a single employer during the first two years of his or her stay. The employer is also the one to decide whether the work permit is to be extended. This puts the labourer in a position of dependence, which also affects his or her negotiating position, both when entering the employment contract and throughout his or her employment. In part, the existing problems can also be explained by the fact that employment offers, which are a precondition for the granting of residence and work permits, are not legally binding.

It is also possible to find exogenous explanations for the problems associated with the Swedish system. Global inequality, primarily in economic terms – and also in relation to oppression, persecution or unbearable working conditions in the migrants’ home countries – means that the individual labourer does not necessarily feel exploited when working in Sweden. Many seem to be willing to take on work at very low salaries.

Another factor is the Swedish labour market model, which is based on the idea of strong unions that safeguard the interests of workers. However, in several

of the industries where many labour immigrants are employed, the level of unionization is relatively low, and it is by no means always the case that a collective agreement exists to regulate working conditions. Those arriving with temporary work permits may also be unfamiliar with the Swedish model, or for various reasons be disinterested in or skeptical of labour unions.

According to several contributors to the Delmi book, part of the labour migration to Sweden is in fact not demand-driven, as legislators intended, but supply-driven. This means that it may be the needs of the immigrant that most strongly determine the creation of a job opportunity. In addition – at least when it comes to the immigrants working in sectors with low entry requirements – many were already in Sweden when they applied for a work permit.

All in all, it is not guaranteed that the regulatory framework can really ensure correct implementation of the prescribed legal provisions and terms of employment, and this can have drastic – and unbalanced – consequences. If exploitation is discovered, this primarily affects the migrants, since they will lose their residence permit. No significant responsibility is placed on the employer.

Solutions and lessons learned

The authors of the anthology propose a number of solutions to the problems and unwanted side effects of the Swedish system. First and foremost, employment offers, which are the basis for the granting of residence permits, should be made legally binding on employers. Alternatively, a special legal type of employment for immigrant workers could be introduced. When it comes to seasonal workers, increased monitoring of the employment conditions and increased workplace inspections are proposed, to ensure that labourers do not have to return home in debt. Overall, there should be a stricter approach against poor working conditions. Cross-border dialogue should also be conducted between national labour market authorities in different countries, such as Sweden and Thailand.

Other proposals include the reintroduction of the previous agency-based labour market needs assessments, or using other ways of ensuring that employers try to hire from within Sweden and the EU before they are allowed to recruit from third countries. Such measures, aiming at safeguarding

and improving the rights of migrant workers, may on the one hand lead to fewer migrant workers being received in Sweden. On the other hand, those who do immigrate will have a stronger position on the labour market and better integration prospects.


Last but not least, the possibilities for rejected asylum-seekers, who have established themselves on the labour market, to change their immigration status and stay in Sweden as legal labour migrants should be improved. This would allow their employers to keep their workforce, and the asylum-seekers could continue their integration into society.

From an international perspective, it can be concluded that the Swedish system for labour immigration is interesting and attractive because of its simplicity and flexibility, with minimized State interference and a strong role for employers. It has proven to be unbalanced, however. Migrant workers have often ended up in vulnerable positions, and employers have been able to circumvent existing labour market regulations regarding decent working conditions and salaries. Thus, for an otherwise strong welfare State as Sweden, the findings in the Delmi report are clearly unsettling. It will therefore be important to revise the current regulations in a way that improves the rights and status of immigrant workers, and that also creates incentives for employers to make well-conceived decisions regarding recruitment from abroad. The lessons we have learned from the Swedish experience should also influence ongoing international policy discussions, where the creation of orderly and fair systems for labour migration is a top priority. ■

“... the Swedish system for labour immigration is interesting and attractive because of its simplicity and flexibility... It has proven to be unbalanced, however.”

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A new strategy: Coherent and complementary integration and development policies

Özge Bilgili¹

In the past couple of decades, we have seen the return of the migration and development nexus discussions among academics and policymakers. A lot of emphasis is put on mitigating the negative effects of migration and at the same time enhancing its positive effects on development. This perspective has opened up discussions on how to channel migrant remittances in a productive manner, increase migrant investments in their origin countries, and improve the mechanisms such as temporary return for knowledge and experience exchange. It is expected that through these channels, economic and social achievements can be attained at different levels, including the individual, community and national levels. What is striking within the debate of migration and development nexus is the tendency of considering migrants as agents of development, without acknowledging the conditions under which migrants aspire to and have the capacity to engage in activities that can link their migration experience with development-related efforts, be it on the micro or macro level.

Migration and development nexus in need of a new strategy

Policies aiming to link migration and development have two main strategies. First, they target certain migrant groups who are identified as more willing to engage in their countries of origin. Second, these policies prepare and improve the practical mechanisms that make it easier for migrants to engage with their home countries. For the latter case, we can think of improving the formal channels through which migrants can send remittances. These efforts seek to make it easier, faster, cheaper and more secure to send money from one location to another. For the first

case, we can refer to the idea that migrant investors or migrant organizations are directly addressed in specific policies and programmes to support their potential or already existing wishes to contribute back to their origin countries.

In this paper, I argue that as valuable as these two strategies are, they are limited. They are limited in the sense of putting to the fore the potential of linking migration and development more strongly. A third and complementary strategy needs to focus on the improvement of migrants' economic, social and cultural well-being in the host country. This strategy should be built upon the idea that as much as migrants' integration in the host country is important for its own sake, it is equally important because only by improving the well-being of migrants in the host country we can also enhance migrants' potential to engage in activities that can help foster development in the home countries.

Treating migrants' integration in the host country and involvement in transnational activities (e.g. sending remittances, temporary return visits) oriented towards the home country as separate issues leads to an incomplete view of migration and ultimately to ineffectual policies (Mazzucato, 2008). To introduce coherent and complementary integration and development policies, we need to bridge this divide and understand migrant livelihoods and their reasons for maintaining contact with their homelands from a transnational perspective.

Rather than migration resulting in a linear integration transition from home to host country, we need to explore the possibility that migrants craft a combination of home and host country orientations (Levitt and Glick Schiller, 2004). Especially in a time of massive changes in communication technologies, fast and cheaper travel options and increasing interaction between communities across countries, migrants can live lives that can continuously connect their host and home countries, but this is certainly easier for some migrants than others. In this paper, based on my research on Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan first-generation migrants living in the Netherlands, I illustrate that migrants who are

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economically, socially and legally better integrated in the country are also the ones who engage more in economic and social activities related to their home countries. Consequently, I argue in this paper that integration and development are two sides of the same coin and should complement each other.

Migration and Development: A World in Motion Project

In my previous research, I investigated the experiences of Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrants living in the Netherlands. This research was part of the IS Academy's Migration and Development: A World in Motion project initiated and funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and executed by the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance. The data for the project consist of 1,022 household surveys (247 Moroccan, 351 Ethiopian, 165 Burundian and 259 Afghan households). These households were distributed across 11 provinces of the Netherlands. In line with the concentration of migrant populations in bigger cities and urban areas, the majority of surveys were conducted in Noord Holland and Zuid Holland where the largest cities of the Netherlands, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, are located. The project aimed at contributing to the Netherlands' long tradition of evidence-based policymaking and has given the opportunity of presenting the experiences of distinct and understudied migrant groups (with the exception of Moroccans) in the Netherlands.

Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands

Afghanistan, Burundi, Ethiopia and Morocco are migrant-sending developing countries that show diversity in terms of their migration history and patterns in the Netherlands.

Compared with the other migrant groups in this study, the Moroccan community is the largest migrant group with 356,000 first- and second-generation migrants. Moroccans constitute 2.1 per cent of the total Dutch population. The Afghan community is the next largest in size with around 40,000 people. The Ethiopian migrant community is one of the largest and the oldest within the African migrant community with about 12,000 individuals. Finally, although the Burundian migrant community is the smallest (3,000 individuals), in relative terms, it has grown substantially in the past decade.

The Moroccans are known as family and labour migrants, while the other groups consist primarily of individuals who have fled their countries of origin for political and security reasons in the initial phases of emigration, but are now also strongly characterized also by family and student migration (especially from the Ethiopians) (CBS, 2010).

In the remainder of this section, based on the empirical results of my research, I describe the inherent linkages between integration and home country engagement and highlight how crucial it is to support migrant integration, not for migrants and the wider society's well-being in general but for development.

Migrants' experiences on integration and home country engagement

The host country: The new home for good

One of the very clear results of this project is that a substantial majority of the migrants do not have intentions to return permanently back to their home countries.² Despite the challenges they may face in the labour market in terms of finding a job or making frequent contacts with the Dutch society, most migrants consider the Netherlands as their new home. Only a small minority of Afghans (8%) and Burundians (9%) consider going back permanently.³ Surprisingly though, a much larger proportion of the respondents are positive about going back to the home country on a temporary basis.⁴ More than 42 per cent of the migrants, with the exceptions of Moroccans, are interested in temporary return.

2 Respondents were first asked whether they were planning to permanently stay in the Netherlands. Those who stated that they were not planning to stay in the Netherlands were asked whether they were planning to go back to their countries of origin. Thus, in our study, those who were not planning to stay permanently in the Netherlands and instead were planning to return permanently to their origin countries were considered as those who intend to permanently return.

3 The high rate of permanent return intentions among Ethiopians can be explained by the fact that more than 30 per cent of Ethiopians are in the Netherlands for study purposes.

4 Respondents were asked whether they would want to return to the country of origin temporarily (different than short visits), since intention to return permanently and return temporarily were not mutually exclusive.

Table 1: Intentions to return permanently or temporarily to the country of origin (%)

	Moroccans	Afghans	Ethiopians	Burundians
Permanent return***				
Yes	21.4	8.0	58.8	9.1
No	78.7	92.0	41.2	90.9
n	178	212	233	121
Temporary return***				
Yes	26	53	47	42
No	73	47	53	58
n	168	211	260	99

Note: *** is 0.01 significance level.

These descriptive results are crucial for two points. First, they show migrants intend to settle permanently in the Netherlands. Thus, we cannot undermine the significance of migrants' integration in the host country: as much as migrants may have easier opportunities to maintain contact with their home countries, this does not necessarily mean that they will want to move back permanently. However, this context does not exclude the more positive attitude towards going back to the home country temporarily (Bilgili and Siegel, 2015a). In this regard, we need to realize that we are dealing with a pool of migrants who need to integrate into the host country and who, at the same time, wish to remain involved with their home countries.

Sociocultural life: Linking the host- and home-country lives

The research showed in a consistent way that migrants maintain strong connections with their families and friends in their home countries through visits, Skype calls, emails and other social media, even if they are also in frequent contact with Dutch society. On a descriptive level, almost 90 per cent of migrants have contact with their families and friends in the home country and about three quarters of all migrants have frequent social contact with the native Dutch population (Bilgili and Siegel, 2015b). This means that migrants are able to make time for both contexts depending on their wishes. And being more oriented towards the home country is not a hindrance for social integration in the Netherlands (Bilgili, 2014).

What is essential to understand from an integration and development perspective is that migrants who interact more with the host society may learn more about different features of the new culture, and reflect more intensively on existing practices (Levitt, 1999).

Those who have obtained a higher level of sociocultural integration can be considered as "purposeful innovators" who actively absorb new ideas and practices to expand and extend their cultural repertoire. Given the difference in their approach, this group may be likely to have more versatile, productive and innovative practices and knowledge to transfer (Sturge, Bilgili and Siegel, 2016).

In this regard, more socioculturally integrated migrants may transfer social remittances and have different types of knowledge and information to share with their families and friends in their home countries.

Economic life: More stable jobs, more remittances back home

The research I conducted on the links between economic integration and remittances sending behaviour has revealed that it is also a misconception that involvement in the home country while being abroad is a sign of powerlessness, poverty and lack of integration. The current picture shows that those who are active and perform well in the Dutch labour market are in fact the ones who are more involved in their home countries (Bilgili, 2015).

In particular, I was able to show that if migrants' jobs are not stable, if they do not have jobs with a limited contract or no contract at all, they are less likely to send money back home, and when they do, they also remit lesser amounts. The research has shown that migrants with a permanent contract are two times more likely to remit, and five times more likely to remit for investment-related purposes than consumption (Bilgili, 2015). In this regard, the main conclusion to be drawn is that economic integration and economic homeland engagement are not alternatives to each other but can complement each other.

Linking integration and development policies: Engaged, mobile dual citizens

“What I do here [the Netherlands] is geared towards improving the situation in Burundi. I am working with a Dutch programme with a Dutch organization and a local company of organization for partnership to finance projects.” (Burundian, male, 41)

“I do send money to Afghanistan...If I have more money and they request it, I would send them more money, but if I don’t have much, I will send as much as I can afford. I do too have a family here, and they need to be fed too.” (Afghan, male, 35)

In line with the citations from qualitative interviews,⁵ the main results discussed reveal that the contacts migrants keep with their home countries are a part of their lives in the Netherlands, and migrants’ lives are defined both in relation to their contacts in their home countries and in the Netherlands. Consequently, it is important to recognize that more and more people live their lives simultaneously here and there, and integration succeeds as long as migrants have the ability to choose the way they make their lives. Especially in a context of such globalized world, integration does not need to deny migrants’ continuous economic, cultural and social relations with their home countries.

In this section, I argue that when discussing the potential linkages between migration and development, we need to bring in the role of the integration policies in a more comprehensive way. Including integration policies in the debate may have positive consequences for all parties, including the origin and destination countries as well as the migrants themselves. There are several ways in which integration and development policies intersect. Targeted integration policies that support migrants’ economic, legal, and social integration can enhance migrants’ capacity and aspirations to contribute back to their home countries.

Legal integration: Opting for dual citizenship

First of all, legal status matters. When migrants feel that they have a stable legal position in the host country and are not afraid of losing their right to come back to the host country, they make more frequent trips back to the home country. Dual citizenship is significantly positively linked to return visits compared with having only home-country citizenship. In other words, dual citizenship is strongly linked to more mobility, allowing migrants to be simultaneously embedded in multiple contexts. Having only origin-country citizenship can be considered a precarious legal status in the Netherlands, and this makes it more difficult for migrants to make visits. This result illustrates how legal integration can in fact be an influential precondition for homeland engagement and enhance social remittances transfer.

Dual citizenship is more relevant and well-fitting for migrants’ ways of living. From a policy perspective though, the topic of dual citizenship is not that straightforward. In many European countries, dual citizenship is seen as a threat to national identity and considered to undermine States (Koser, 2007; Bloom and Feldman, 2011). Hence, there are several challenges that needed to be recognized. While dual citizenship is important as it gives opportunities and access to multiple contexts, at times it also challenges the interests of the host and home countries. The policy challenges are concerned with which State should take responsibility for particular aspects of migrant lives (Levitt, 2003; Faist, 2010). Which State is responsible for migrants’ protection and representation and in which ways should States communicate in order to solve these challenges? Not negotiating these social, economic, and political rights and responsibilities causes uncertainty and fuels the debate on the legitimacy of multiple embeddedness, and undermines the crucial link between integration and development.

Economic and sociocultural integration: Civic engagement in multiple contexts

On a social level, too, there are multiple ways in which targeted integration policies may enhance migrants’ ability and willingness to do more in relation to the home country while at the same time improving their situation in the host country. When migrants have easy access to associations, right to have their own organizations and engage actively in political affairs in the host country, they learn the “know-how” of

5 In total, 20 exploratory in-depth interviews were conducted with Afghan, Burundian, Ethiopian and Moroccan first-generation migrants living in the Netherlands in 2012. These interviews aimed to help the author develop a better understanding of migrants’ experiences and to interpret better the quantitative analysis results of the research, and hence are not a main component of the research.

the host country, interact more with host country institutions, and get exposed to new cultural and social settings (Lindley, 2009).

If migrants seem to be less involved in civic life or to participate less in cultural activities in the Netherlands, this cannot directly be interpreted as “little interest in integration” as discussed in the public discourse. With regard to sociocultural integration, in my previous research, I have shown that media and art consumption and engagement in associations in the home and host countries are positively related to each other. This means that those who are more involved in the sociocultural life of their home countries are also likely to be more involved in these dimensions of life in the Netherlands (Bilgili, 2014). Therefore, it is important to emphasize that migrants transfer different levels of cultural capital from one context to the other. In this respect, more support is needed to encourage migrants to engage in civic life in general be it in the host or the home country.

Finally, for the migration and development debate which is highly concentrated on economic development, it is crucial to incorporate economic integration in discussions. There are multiple ways in which economic integration policies for migrants can complement development policies. Besides solely focusing on increasing employment rates, tackling overqualification problem and giving migrants stable jobs that put them in a secure economic position are crucial for improving migrants’ financial capacity to remit or make investments in the origin country. Moreover, vocational training and other types of skill training for migrants can be linked to temporary return migration programmes that boost migrants’ knowledge and skill transfer to their home countries on a temporary basis. Such programmes can target also the unemployed migrants and provide opportunities to migrants to maintain contacts with their home countries while at the same time taking off the pressure in the host country’s labour market temporarily. In a way, more flexible, innovative programmes that identify the needs of the migrants on the one hand and the host and home countries on the other hand are needed. Finally, it is of great importance that information on such return programmes is disseminated and that migrants are actively directed to these sources of information (Black et al., 2004).

Linking integration and development policies is a new way of approaching the migration and development policies, and most certainly comes with its own challenges. However, these challenges can push us to rethink how we think about migrants’ integration and which integration policies in different policies can not only improve migrants’ lives in the host country but also their potential involvement with their home countries.


Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that integration and development policies can be shaped in such a way as to benefit both the host and home countries through these new ways of living. This means that to empower migrants and to increase their voluntary social and economic transfers to their home countries, policies also need to target migrants’ better integration in the host country by including them in society and giving them access to more rights and institutions. Above all, the role of the policy needs to be focused on enabling environments to increase migrants’ capabilities for more contribution. That said, I conclude by stressing that this approach should not fall into the trap of targeting migrants as agents of development and putting false responsibilities on individuals. Ultimately, opting for a more transnationally involved way of living is the choice of migrants, and theirs alone. ■

**“... economic integration
and economic homeland
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Beyond displacement: Migration trends in the Arab region

Karoline Popp, Karima el Korri and Jozef Bartovic¹

Refugee camps, rubber boats in the Mediterranean Sea, and treks of men, women and children displaced by war and violence: images like these fill daily news reels and are typically associated with migration in the Arab region. The global attention notwithstanding, migration in, to, and from the Arab region remains misunderstood and underresearched. The recently released *2015 Situation Report on International Migration: Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region* offers an in-depth and comprehensive overview of the migration realities shaping the region's countries and societies. Prepared and published by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the report brings together the expertise of the agencies of the regional Working Group on International Migration in the Arab region.² This article draws on and summarizes the main findings of the report.

Migration in the Arab region is characterized by three main, interrelated patterns: regular and irregular migration for work; forced migration and internal displacement; and mixed migration. While being necessarily a simplification of a complex reality,

these three patterns can be mapped onto the three principal subregions that make up the Arab region.³

Labour mobility is the predominant migration pattern seen in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), where migrant workers – or temporary foreign workers as they are sometimes known – can make up between 30 per cent and 85 per cent of the local labour force. Both high- and low-skilled categories of workers make a critical contribution to GCC economies, but low-skilled workers, and women migrants in particular, experience the greatest vulnerabilities to human rights violations. Overall, the GCC subregion was estimated to host over 22.3 million international migrants in 2013, whereby the shift from predominantly Arab to predominantly Asian countries of origin in the last two decades is the most notable trend. As an Arab least developed country, Yemen is a significant exception in the Gulf region in this regard, as a country shaped by long-standing patterns of mixed and irregular labour migration from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and to the Gulf, as well as forced migration and displacement.

The Maghreb is characterized by mixed migration flows in which economic, social and political drivers of migration combine in complex ways, blurring simple dichotomies between forced and voluntary forms of migration. In mixed flows, different categories of migrants share the same modes and means of travel, and often experience similar risks and vulnerabilities, and inadequate access to protection and assistance. Migration routes from West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Mashreq converge in the Maghreb, and North

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2 The Working Group on International Migration in the Arab region was created in 2013 under the umbrella of the UN Regional Coordination Mechanism. It consists of the International Labour Organization, IOM, the League of Arab States, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNAIDS, the United Nations Development Programme, the Economic Commission for Africa, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, ESCWA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, and the World Health Organization. ESCWA, the League of Arab States and IOM co-chair the Group.

3 Note on terminology: "Arab region" typically encompasses a larger set of countries than the region described by "Middle East and North Africa". For analysis in the *2015 Situation Report*, the term "Arab region" was used, and figures include data for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), the Mashreq (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and the Syrian Arab Republic) and the Arab least developed countries (Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen).

Africa more generally. The Maghreb is not only a region of transit, but also – even if often ignored – a region of destination. This is the case for Libya in particular, which has long been a magnet for migrant workers from neighbouring countries, sub-Saharan Africa and further afield. The ongoing turmoil in Libya has made the situation of migrant workers more dangerous and precarious, and has resulted in the large-scale displacement of migrant workers from Libya in 2011, and more recently contributed to the unprecedented rise in boat crossings to Italy. Approximately 150,000 individuals landed in Italy from the North African coast in 2015, and at least 3,700 lost their lives in the Mediterranean in the same period.⁴

Countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic are marked by internal displacement and forced migration, primarily as a consequence of the ongoing crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic and the conflict and instability in Iraq. It should not be forgotten, however, that forced migration and internal displacement are also significant in other parts of the Arab region, especially in countries such as Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.

A significant proportion of the 60 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide are in the Arab region. The increase in internal and cross-border displacement has made the region the world's largest producer and host of forcibly displaced populations.⁵ In total, there are more than 5 million Palestinian refugees, the largest refugee group worldwide and historically displaced for the longest period, while the number of Syrian refugees has surpassed 4 million in 2015. The region is also witness to extensive internal displacement: 6.6 million internally displaced persons within the Syrian Arab Republic; 3.3 million in Iraq; 3.1 million in Sudan; 1.1 million in Somalia; and 435,000 in Libya.⁶ In Yemen, the number of internally

displaced has increased from 454,000 in November 2014 (as stated in the *2015 Situation Report*) to 2.4 million in February 2016.⁷

The report places special emphasis on the unprecedented scale of forced displacement witnessed in the Arab region, and its impacts on displaced populations and the affected societies and economies. Given the sheer scale and the protracted nature of many of the crises and the ensuing displacement, exclusively humanitarian responses are woefully insufficient. Important questions are being asked about ways to integrate humanitarian and development responses, about the need to enable access to livelihoods and self-sufficiency for displaced populations, and to balance and manage the needs of displaced populations and the host communities they live alongside.

By examining five key areas of development – health; education and opportunities for young people; labour markets, human capital and remittances; environmental sustainability; and social cohesion and stability – the report analyses the interplay between displacement and development and draws on practical examples of challenges and opportunities from around the region. Beyond minimizing the negative consequences of displacement for host communities, there is incipient evidence of development opportunities where the right policy mix harnesses skills, capacities, supply and demand, and resources made available through aid.

Looking at the region as a whole, it may come as a surprise to the casual observer of recent media reporting on the movement of Syrians, Iraqis and other groups to Europe, but the Arab region is one of net in-migration: migration to the Arab region outweighs migration from the Arab region. In 2013,⁸ with over 30 million international migrants or 8.24 per cent of the total population of the Arab region, the Arab region hosted one of the largest migrant populations in the world (Figure 1). According to the most recent data released by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

4 IOM Missing Migrants Project. Available from <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/>

5 UNHCR, "Worldwide displacement hits all-time high as war and persecution increase" (18 June 2015). Available from www.unhcr.org/558193896.html

6 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, March 2016, available from www.internal-displacement.org/global-figures. For Libya, also see: Humanitarian Response Plan 2016, available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/libya_hrp_final_19_11_2015.pdf. For Iraq, also see: IOM Iraq Displacement Tracking Matrix (March 2016), available from <http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page>

7 Protection Cluster Yemen, Task Force on Population Movements, 7th Report, February 2016. Available from <http://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/task-force-population-movement-7th-report-february-2016>

8 However, due to data limitations, 2013 data does not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees in the region at that time.

(UN DESA), the total migrant stock for countries of the Arab region is close to 35 million.⁹ Migrants to the region are predominantly Asians, in particular from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines. Relative to extraregional migration to the Arab region, migrant flows among Arab countries have exhibited a downward trend since 1995. That progressive decline has, however, recently been reversed by an upsurge in forced displacement to neighbouring countries, especially as a result of the Syrian crisis.

Conversely, in 2013 the estimated global stock of migrants from Arab countries was 21.9 million people migrated, almost double the 12 million recorded in 1990.¹⁰ Most of this migration takes place within the region – in other words, most migrants from the Arab region stay in the Arab region. The main destination countries for migrants from the Arab region vary: Saudi Arabia and the United States are the most popular among migrants from the GCC; migrants from the Maghreb mainly head for Europe; whereas those from the Mashreq move to other Arab countries and the United States. Those from Arab least developed countries mostly remain in less developed regions.

As elsewhere in the world, migration has climbed up the policy agendas for governments across the region. Since the beginning of 2012 – the time period charted by the report – significant policy changes and reforms have taken place in numerous Arab countries. Developments in migration governance have included the adoption of new policies, the review of outdated laws, and engagement in bilateral, regional and global policy dialogues on migration. They touched a wide range of aspects of migration, such as labour migration, domestic workers, human trafficking, engagement of expatriates and many more.

The region has seen some progressive steps in migration governance. To mention but a few, Morocco

has launched a comprehensive set of reforms in the areas of immigration, asylum and human trafficking, including conducting a year-long regularization campaign. Trafficking legislation was recently passed in numerous countries, including the Comoros, Iraq, Kuwait and Sudan. Tunisia has granted Tunisian expatriates the right to vote. Meanwhile, Egypt has been working on legislation against migrant smuggling that draws a clear distinction between prosecuting perpetrators and protecting smuggled migrants. Bahrain revised its labour law to increase protections and mitigate discrimination against migrant workers. Progress, however, has been uneven, and some reforms have not been adequately implemented. Furthermore, some change has even been regressive, while many deeply problematic policies, structures and practices, such as the *kafala* system, remain in place in many countries and result in serious violations of human rights of migrants.

In attempting a future outlook on migration for the region, it seems evident that all patterns of migration will remain relevant, although opportunities for legal mobility within and from the Arab region may be shrinking, while forced movements are here to stay. In general, borders in the region are closing rather than opening, and Syrian nationals specifically have been progressively running out of countries permitting visa-free entry. This will affect and alter current migration routes, in keeping with the rapid shifts in routes that have taken place in the past. Furthermore, mobility trends may be reinforced among the large and youthful populations of North Africa in particular, whose ambitions and aspirations are not met by local opportunities. In any scenario, migration, mobility and displacement in the Arab region will remain closely interrelated with and will impact neighbouring regions.

Summary outline of the 2015 Situation Report on International Migration: Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region

Chapter 1 provides an overview of the principal migration patterns in the Arab region with labour migration followed by forced displacement and mixed migration flows being the most distinctive patterns of population movement.

Chapter 2 summarizes international migration trends in the Arab region based on 2013 data from UN DESA, the World Bank, open source information and academic literature. It describes trends at the

9 Authors' calculation is based on UN DESA Trends in International Migration Stock, The 2015 Revision, available from www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015_Highlights.pdf (2015 data is for Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, the territory of Western Sahara, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania and Somalia).

10 See footnote 5. This figure does not fully reflect the number of Syrian refugees in other Arab countries at the time.


regional, subregional and country levels, describing migrant flows to and from Arab countries, migration of specific sociodemographic groups and remittance flows. It uses disaggregated data by sex and age wherever they are available.

Chapter 3 presents an overview of developments in migration governance in the Arab region between January 2012 and April 2015. It outlines national policy developments by thematic areas such as labour migration, human trafficking and irregular migration, health, forced migration, expatriate engagement, nationality and statelessness. This chapter also discusses international cooperation on migration, emphasizing the role of governance in protecting human rights.

Chapter 4 explores the link between development and forced migration. It highlights the need to go beyond a humanitarian approach and coordinate holistic responses across areas including health, education, environmental sustainability, labour markets, human capital, remittances and social cohesion. The chapter examines the nature and effects of different kinds of forced migration in the Arab region, and looks at ways of mitigating the negative impact on development, promoting peacebuilding and reconstruction, and encouraging good governance and respect of the rights of refugees and other displaced populations as well as host communities.

The report is available for free download in [English](#) and [Arabic](#). ■

Figure 1. International migrant stock in Arab countries, 1990–2013



Source: IOM and ESCWA, *2015 Situation Report on International Migration: Migration, Displacement and Development in a Changing Arab Region* (IOM, Cairo and Geneva; ESCWA, Beirut, 2015).

Crowdfunding for migration, asylum and human rights projects worldwide

Create new futures

Fund your business, development, humanitarian or research project through your Diaspora and other supporters and benefactors



Crowdfunding is an increasingly popular and successful mechanism to generate funding for worthwhile projects and initiatives.

MigFunder (www.migfunder.com/), the first and only crowdfunding platform dedicated solely to migration, refugee and human rights initiatives worldwide, was launched three months ago.

The platform caters to migrants looking to create (or grow) their businesses abroad or in their countries of origin, as well as to migrant organizations, public agencies, non-governmental organizations, and individuals looking to launch a development or humanitarian initiative in support of immigrant and refugee communities worldwide, or a research project/conference in the field of migration, asylum or human rights policy.

This is a pioneering initiative that will contribute potentially to reducing the effects of budget cuts and underfunding in major refugee, migration


and human rights programmes around the world. MigFunder was established by a group of European migration policy experts, including former senior government officials, reputable researchers and IT developers, who set out to extend the facilities and benefits of a crowdfunding platform to the specific needs of immigration, refugee and human rights affairs worldwide.

MigFunder targets, primarily but not exclusively, members of the diaspora who are willing and able to support viable business projects from their compatriots, as well as development, humanitarian and research initiatives in the countries of immigration or origin.

Current campaigns on MigFunder originate from organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Doctors of the World, the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS), Business in the Community Ireland and Quist Solicitors, among others. Most are concerned with the current refugee crisis.

For any further information, or to submit a campaign, please contact
Solon Ardittis (sardittis@migfunder.com) or **Don Ingham** (dingham@migfunder.com).

Publications



Migration in Nigeria: A Country Profile 2014
2016/136 pages/English

Migration has become an increasingly important issue affecting many countries, and it is important for accurate and reliable migration data to be produced by government to inform policy making. In Nigeria, the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Migration and Development, consisting of different government ministries, was established during the process of developing the profile to ensure ownership of the whole process of production and usage of the data.

A migration profile for Nigeria was first published in 2009 to provide a quick reference tool and support evidence-based policymaking on migration. The 2014 country migration profile for Nigeria is therefore an update of the 2009 version. With improved inter-agency collaboration and information-sharing through the TWG on Migration and Development, the process of compiling the 2014 country migration profile for Nigeria was better coordinated and conducted in a more effective manner.

The updated migration country profile is a quick reference tool carefully compiled by the TWG on Migration and Development in Nigeria to support evidenced-based policymaking on migration. It contains statistical overview, trends and analysis of migration issues in the country. The profile is divided into four parts, namely, migration trends and migrant characteristics, impact of migration, migration governance, and key findings and policy implications and recommendations.

The recommendations on the interventions that need to be in place and the need for constant update of the national migration profile are also further explained in the report.



Ulyana's Grote Avontuur
2016/12 pages/Dutch

IOM increasingly assists families with minor children on their return to their countries of origin.

As an effort to recognize the right of children to be informed about the return procedure and the role that IOM plays, IOM in the Netherlands has developed a comic story about voluntary return and reintegration. The comic targets 10- to 17-year-olds of diverse ethnic backgrounds from different countries of origin. The comic story explains IOM's role in the return procedure and takes into account the steps from pre-departure to departure as well as post-arrival.

The comic strip features the life of Ulyana (10 years old) and her three friends, namely, Nelson (17 years old), Fazia (15 years old) and Huan (13 years old), in an asylum-seekers centre in the Netherlands, and their thoughts about their current situation. As Ulyana and her friends reflect on their life at the centre and their future, and share good memories about their countries of origin, she realizes that returning to one's home country is not a bad thing at all, especially if that means reuniting with relatives and getting to know them more.

The comic story can be used by parents as a tool to explain to their children their decision to return to their countries of origin and make children understand the steps of the return procedure. It is also one way of instilling in children the value of appreciating return to one's home country. The comic strip is available in print and electronic versions.



Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Policy Brief Series Issue 2 | Vol. 2 | February 2016
2016/8 pages/English
ISSN 2410-4930

The question of how to regulate international migration-related challenges in the context of rapid-onset natural disasters is attracting increasing interest from academics and policymakers alike. However, the fact that the issue is not addressed directly by international law or policy has sometimes led to the erroneous conclusion that no law or policy exists. Against this backdrop, this policy brief points to a range of applicable law, policy and practice at the national level in the Americas and which offers a prospective basis for further legal and policy development in this area.



Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Working Paper Series | No. 1/2016
2016/16 pages/English
ISSN 2415-1106


This working paper presents the methodological basis for the Migration, Environmental and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project, funded by the European Union. Migration as adaptation has been widely discussed but remains empirically understudied. The authors call for a reconceptualization of the migration–adaptation nexus and a deeper understanding of how migration affects adaptive capacities. Research should analyse migration as one possible adaptation strategy among many others, acknowledging both the positive and negative outcomes, and should focus on adaptation for whom: the migrants themselves, community of origin and community of destination.

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the advantages and challenges of the proposed methodological approaches. For an increased understanding and to provide empirical evidence for policymaking, the authors suggest putting migration corridors at the heart of the analysis and recommend employing a mixture of both traditional qualitative and quantitative methods.



Migrantes en México – Vulnerabilidad y Riesgos
2016/54 pages/Spanish


México recibe importantes flujos de migrantes en tránsito, que en su mayoría tienen como destino final los Estados Unidos de América, y de migrantes temporales y transfronterizos. Este estudio explora su vulnerabilidad y exposición a la violencia y violaciones a sus derechos humanos, así como a desastres causados por fenómenos ambientales. El propósito es identificar en las principales áreas de destino y de tránsito de los flujos migratorios los riesgos a los que se ven expuestos los migrantes; las tendencias y posibles escenarios futuros con relación a la migración en el país; y las principales condiciones de vulnerabilidad existentes para los migrantes en los distintos grupos demográficos, de acuerdo a su situación migratoria. Se describen también las estructuras nacionales para responder a situaciones de emergencia y se analiza la forma en la que se incluyen o excluyen a los migrantes y extranjeros dentro de los esfuerzos de gestión de riesgos, prevención de crisis, preparación, respuesta y recuperación. Dada la complejidad del sistema migratorio en México, el estudio analiza con mayor detalle el caso particular de la región del Soconusco, en el estado de Chiapas y en la frontera con Guatemala, una de las principales áreas de atracción de migrantes temporales, permanentes y transfronterizos en México, y al mismo tiempo parte de la principal ruta de tránsito que han tomado desde hace más de tres décadas los centroamericanos que migran de manera indocumentada a los Estados Unidos de América. El estudio es parte del programa de capacitación institucional de la Iniciativa MICIC (Migrants In Countries In Crisis).



Review of Nigerian Legislation Policy Regarding ILO Convention 189 Concerning Decent Work for Domestic Workers
2016/32 pages/English

The report shows that many of the provisions of Decent Work for Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) (ILO C-189) are already established in national legislation and/or policy. However, the assessment could not determine to what extent these existing provisions are actually being applied to give effect to the Convention. There are several important gaps that require remedy for compliance with the respective provisions of the Convention. However, the review notes that these existing gaps could be effectively remedied following and with support of ratification.


The review concluded that the ratification of ILO C-189 is also more than feasible; it is indeed urgent to ensure adequate protection and decent work for domestic workers, whether nationals or migrants. Given a significant degree of legislative accord with the provisions of the Convention, ratification could be accomplished in short order with consent and support of the concerned stakeholders in Nigeria.



Review of Nigerian Legislation Policy Regarding ILO Convention 181 on Private Employment Agencies
2016/26 pages/English

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of where Nigerian legislation and policy already incorporates provisions of the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181) (ILO C-181), or where dispositions are missing, to give full effect to the Convention standards. This review and its accompanying matrix show that many provisions of ILO C-181 are already established in legislation and/or policy and that these are presumably applied or are intended to be applied. Several gaps, however, require remedy for compliance with the Convention.

The report concluded that ratification of ILO C-181 is more than feasible; it would be most timely and appropriate. Given the significant degree of legislative accord with the provisions of the Convention, ratification could be proposed and accomplished in short order with consent and support of the concerned stakeholders in Nigeria.




Review of Nigerian Legislation Policy in View of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment
2016/66 pages/English

The report provides a comprehensive assessment of where Nigerian legislation and policy incorporate the provisions of the four Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) Protocols on Free Movement, Residence and Establishment of persons or where legislative or other dispositions are missing to give full effect to the Protocols. The review indicated that many provisions of these Protocols are established in national legislation and/or policy and concluded that much is already accomplished in domesticating these ECOWAS Protocols.

However, this review also found that a significant number of provisions, particularly applying to immigration law and regulations, were not reflected or may be contradicted in Nigeria's Immigration Act. This is not surprising, given that the Immigration Act in force and its accompanying regulations date back to 1963. Several lacunae and divergences were also identified in labour and employment law and policy.

These important gaps require remedy for Nigeria to: (1) comply with its ECOWAS treaty commitments; (2) guarantee the rights and protections for ECOWAS Community citizens in Nigeria; and (3) support respect for the rights and welfare of Nigerians circulating, residing and establishing employment or business activity in other ECOWAS Member States. Of immediate concern is the lacuna in domesticating provisions of the Protocols related to immigration law, regulations and policy that are not resolved in the Immigration Bill under consideration by the National Assembly.



Eighteen Stories from Around the World: Diaspora In Action

2016/28 pages

English

Engaging diaspora communities with their countries of origin is an important aspect of IOM's global work. Many members of overseas diaspora communities remain connected with their country of origin. They contribute to their new country, but can also be powerful development actors. IOM's Migration and Development projects aim to exchange knowledge and skills for the reconstruction and development of countries of origin. IOM has over 30 years of experience with programmes involving temporary assignments of overseas diaspora communities based on knowledge exchange in countries of origin. In the Netherlands IOM in particular builds on good results gained since 2004 during Migration and Development projects such as a health focused project in Ghana (MIDA Ghana health), diaspora engagement in Cabo Verde (Dias de Cabo Verde), Migration for Development in the Western Balkans (MIDWEB) and three phases of Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) since 2006. The publication *Eighteen Stories from Around the World* contains 18 stories from the diaspora, host institution and government perspectives. It shows the involvement of the diaspora experts, the sustainable bridges that are built and the linkages arising between institutions in the Netherlands and the countries of origin, e.g. between hospitals, academic institutions and local governments.

MPP Readers' Survey

Migration Policy Practice (MPP) was launched three years ago and the editors would now like to invite readers to spare a couple of minutes to participate in a short readers' satisfaction survey.

The purpose of this survey, which can be taken anonymously, is to help us identify our readers' profiles, the institutions they represent and their primary interests in our journal. The survey's responses will contribute, in particular, to adjusting and improving, as appropriate, *MPP's* content and style, and thus the reader's experience.

Should you wish to participate in this survey, please [click here](#).

Thank you.





Call for authors/Submission guidelines

Since its launch in October 2011, *Migration Policy Practice* has published over 110 articles by senior policymakers and distinguished migration policy experts from all over the world.

Past authors have included, inter alia:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) and Special Adviser to the President of Benin; *John K. Bingham*, Global Coordinator of civil society activities in the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global Forum on Migration and Development; *Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje*, Chair of the GFMD 2013-2014; *Mark Cully*, Chief Economist at the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; *António Guterres*, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; *Khalid Koser*, Chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration; *Khalid Malik*, Director of the Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); *Cecilia Mamlström*, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs; *Ali Mansoor*, Chair of the GFMD 2012; *Andrew Middleton*, Director of Culture, Recreation and Migrant Statistics, Australian Bureau of Statistics; *Najat Maalla M'Jid*, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; *Robert A. Mocny*, Director of US-VISIT, US Department of Homeland Security; *Imelda M. Nicolas*, Secretary of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), Office of the President of the Philippines; *Ignacio Packer*, Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes International Federation; *Kelly Ryan* (Coordinator of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees – IGC, Geneva); *Martin Schulz*, President of the European Parliament; *David Smith*, Director of Surveys and Reporting, Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; *Sir Peter D. Sutherland*, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Migration; *Ambassador William Lacy Swing*, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM); *Myria Vassiliadou*, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; *Catherine Wiesner*, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US Department of State.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

- Not exceed five pages and be written in a non-academic and reader-friendly style.
- Cover any area of migration policy but discuss, as far as possible, particular solutions, policy options or best practice relating to the themes covered.
- Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant public administrations, or civil society, in other countries.

Articles giving account of evaluations of specific migration policies and interventions, including both evaluation findings and innovative evaluation methodologies, are particularly welcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

- **Solon Ardittis** (sardittis@eurasylum.org); and
- **Frank Laczko** (flaczko@iom.int)