Socio-cultural activities organized by IOM in Djamassinda as a part of social cohesion initiatives. © IOM 2017/Amanda NERO

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Welcome to the summer 2020 issue of *Migration Policy Practice* – which includes four articles on very different themes of interest to policymakers. Following on from our last edition, which focused on the implications of COVID-19 for migration, the first article in this issue looks at how COVID-19 is affecting irregular migration and the collection of data on migrant deaths. The article by Julia Black highlights two key trends. First, it shows that contrary to what might be expected, irregular migration continues and has even increased along certain migratory routes, such as the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa to Italy and the route from West Africa to the Spanish Canary Islands. However, despite the rising figures, the number of migrant deaths reported has instead fallen in 2020. This may not reflect the true numbers as collecting data on migrant deaths has become more difficult during the COVID-19 pandemic: search-and-rescue efforts along key migration corridors such as the Central Mediterranean have diminished. Collecting said data accurately is especially important given the global commitment made by most countries to promote safe migration. One of the key migration-related targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is to facilitate migration that is safe and orderly.

Related to this theme, Richard Lewis in his article discusses the challenges in promoting the integration of migrants. He highlights that a key question in this discussion is how to make newcomers feel welcome. He cites a survey indicating that a majority of Europeans feel relatively positive about immigrants. Indeed, 57 per cent report “feeling comfortable” about their presence. Despite this, however, many immigrants in Europe still do not feel “welcome”.

Lastly, Magdalena Ulceluse’s article reminds us of the importance of considering migration policies and practices at the local level. In many countries, policy and programme innovation often takes place at the local level in the absence of national strategies. A local perspective is also important given that many migrants originate from specific communities or are concentrated in particular areas. The article presents a case study from Bosanci in Romania. The village has a high emigration rate, and Ulceluse discusses the initiatives which have been taken at the local level to attract and retain the emigrant population of Bosanci.

Another article in this issue focuses on the SDGs and migration. One of the key objectives of the SDGs is to ensure that “nobody is left behind”. This means that in the case of migrants, it is necessary to obtain data on key SDG indicators which is disaggregated by migratory status. It is difficult to answer questions such as “How many of the poor are migrants?” or “How many of those in poor health are migrants?” without such data. Elisa Mosler Vidal’s article explains why it is important to disaggregate SDG indicators by migratory status, then suggests data sources which could be used for this purpose.
COVID-19 has significantly restricted the movement of people around the world, but it has not ended irregular migration. Despite the difficulties of collecting data on migrant deaths during a global pandemic, IOM’s Missing Migrants Project has continued to record a significant number of deaths in 2020. Indeed, along some migratory routes – such as the route from Africa to the Spanish Canary Islands – the number of reported fatalities is higher than in 2019. COVID-19 and the ensuing responses aimed at controlling the spread of the pandemic, including border closures and other measures, have likely increased the risks along some migratory journeys by pushing people into more perilous and deadly situations – where humanitarian support and rescue are increasingly unavailable. Despite widespread mobility restrictions, several routes have seen an increase in migration flows in 2020 compared to previous years. The Central Mediterranean route and the overseas route from the Horn of Africa to Yemen are particularly worrisome, as both notoriously hazardous routes have seen an increase in crossings but a decrease in recorded deaths, indicating that there may be hindrances to data collection in these areas.

This article provides an overview of the migrant deaths and disappearances documented in the first seven months of 2020, highlighting high-risk migration routes. It also discusses the data-collection challenges exacerbated by the ongoing pandemic, including due to travel restrictions and decreased monitoring capacities on irregular migration routes across the world. Examples are drawn from maritime routes to Europe, including Mediterranean Sea crossings and attempts to reach the Spanish Canary Islands, as well as from the ongoing Rohingya crisis in South and South-East Asia and the maritime route from the Horn of Africa to Yemen.

The article concludes with a call for States to collect better data on the risks that migrants face on their journeys worldwide, and to provide safe legal migration options for all. Most governments have agreed to promote safe legal migration routes through a global migration framework (the Global Compact for Migration) and development agenda (2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development). Implementing such recommendations has become more challenging during a global pandemic – and yet more urgent along the migratory routes discussed throughout this article.

Migrant deaths and disappearances during the COVID-19 pandemic: Global figures

Deaths during transit

Nearly 1,500 deaths and disappearances during migration were recorded in the first seven months of 2020 despite the outbreak of COVID-19 and the ensuing border closures implemented in most countries. Deaths during transit were recorded in every major region of the world, as shown in Figure 1, largely on irregular migration routes which have been more heavily restricted than in previous years because of the pandemic. Although 2,409 fatalities during migration were recorded in the same period in 2019, the data is not strictly comparable due to extensive COVID-related data-collection challenges, discussed in the following section.
As in previous years, the Mediterranean comprised the largest percentage of deaths recorded during migration in any region thus far in 2020. An estimated 423 fatalities occurred between January and July 2020, more than half of which (237) represent lives lost at sea without a trace. These disappearances at sea translate into unresolved loss for hundreds of family members who may never know the fate of their missing relatives – adding up to more than 14,000 disappearances at sea and 21,000 fatalities recorded in total on maritime routes to Europe since 2014.

Of particular concern is the Central Mediterranean route, where more than two thirds of fatalities (290) were recorded in the first seven months of 2020. The large number of deaths on this route is mainly attributable to the fact that the number of attempted crossings here has nearly doubled compared to 2019:3 between January and July 2020, 23,049 attempted crossings via the Central Mediterranean were reported, compared to 11,770 recorded during the same period in 2019 (IOM, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c).4 On both the Eastern and Western Mediterranean routes, the number of attempted crossings in the first seven months of 2020 remains far lower than in previous years (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2020; IOM, 2020a, 2020b; Turkish Coast Guard Command, 2020).

This can be linked to two main factors. First, the continuing instability and lack of rule of law in Libya means that mobility restrictions have not been implemented to the extent seen in other countries bordering the Mediterranean. The situation of migrants in Libya – which has historically been a destination country for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa (Brachet, 2011) – is extremely dangerous, with widespread reports of xenophobia and arbitrary detention in poor conditions (Global Detention Project, 2018; Horwood and Forin, 2019; IOM, 2020d). This means that those who may have initially arrived in Libya hoping to find work can choose to migrate onward via the Central Mediterranean.

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3 "Attempted crossings" figures are comprised of the number of arrivals in Italy and Malta, the number of interceptions at sea by the Libyan authorities, and the number of estimated deaths at sea.

4 It should be noted that while the number of people using this route to reach Europe has increased compared to 2019, the figure remains below the equivalent period in any year since at least 2013, and far below the more than 100,000 migrants who arrived in Italy via the Central Mediterranean each year between 2014 and 2017.
Second, 2020 has been marked by an increased number of Tunisians attempting to cross the Central Mediterranean, though the reasons for this trend remain unclear. A total of 5,357 Tunisians arrived in Italy by sea between January and July 2020, a figure likely to surpass the previous peak in 2017 when 6,151 Tunisians arrived between January and December (IOM, 2020b). Similarly, the number of interceptions of migrants at sea by the Tunisian authorities from January to July 2019 is three times higher compared to the same period in 2020, with 3,977 interceptions recorded this year, 58 per cent of whom are Tunisian nationals (FTDES, 2020).

While the number of confirmed fatalities on maritime routes to Europe is low compared to the equivalent period in previous years, as shown in Figure 2, there has been a marked increase in the number of deaths recorded on the route from Western Africa and Morocco to the Spanish Canary Islands. A total of 201 deaths were recorded in the first seven months of 2020, compared to 59 recorded in the same period of 2019 and far fewer in all previous years since at least 2014. This is linked to a significant increase in people arriving via this route to the Canary Islands this year, with 3,269 arrivals recorded as of 31 July 2020, compared to 2,698 in all of 2019 and 1,307 in 2018 (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2020).5

This data should be interpreted with caution however: there is significant evidence that these figures undercount the true number of lives lost, due at least in part to a lack of dedicated search-and-rescue presence in the Mediterranean and other overseas maritime routes to Europe. A major challenge to data collection is the phenomenon of “invisible shipwrecks” – vessels reported missing en route to Europe for which no hard evidence can be found – which has become increasingly frequent since the search-and-rescue presence of European and non-governmental actors diminished in mid-2017. In the Mediterranean Sea – where IOM has documented more than 20,000 deaths since 2014 – a lack of State-led search and rescue means that migrants are increasingly lost at sea without a trace. So far in 2020, more than 300 people are believed to have been lost on maritime routes to Europe in such invisible shipwrecks. The largest confirmed case involves a ship that disappeared off the coast of Libya on 9 February, which likely claimed the lives of over 90 migrants.

5 These figures remain far below the nearly 90,000 migrants who arrived in the Canary Islands on this route between 2001 and 2008 (Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 2020).
Most recently, a boat carrying at least 63 migrants disappeared en route to the Spanish Canary Islands on 18 July. Several additional shipwrecks which were reported in July and August remain unconfirmed, owing to the difficulty in verifying reports from the few actors who do conduct search and rescue in relevant maritime regions. It is likely that some may never be verified due to a lack of concrete evidence, not to mention that many such shipwrecks go unreported and therefore uninvestigated.

Adding credence to this argument are the bodies of at least 26 people who were found on the Libyan coast in June 2020 alone. Many of these bodies were found in an area which was not near any known shipwreck, indicating that their lives may have been lost in an unreported invisible shipwreck. In July and August, the remains of several people were spotted at sea by Sea-Watch and Mediterranea, non-governmental organizations who are among the few still operating in the Central Mediterranean.

Challenges to measuring migrant mortality: Data gaps linked to the COVID-19 pandemic

Due to the lack of official mortality statistics disaggregated by migratory status, collecting data on migrant deaths in any context has long been challenging (IOM, 2017). However, the outbreak of COVID-19 has exacerbated these challenges, in terms of migrant deaths due to both the virus and COVID-related travel restrictions. The latter in particular has created difficulties as migrants may be pushed to higher-risk irregular routes, along with the fact that such restrictions decrease opportunities to actively monitor migration routes for cases involving migrant deaths.

Deaths due to COVID-19 likely impact migrants disproportionately. Many migrants work in health care or other critical sectors where home-based work is not possible, and low-skilled migrants who are often housed in crowded dormitories are particularly vulnerable. In Saudi Arabia and Singapore, which are among the few countries whose health ministries publish official data on COVID infections disaggregated by migratory status, 75 and 95 per cent of the cases reported, respectively, were among migrants (Saudi Arabia Ministry of Health, 2020; Singapore Ministry of Health, 2020). Migrants in often-crowded detention centres are also likely vulnerable to contracting the virus, though data is scarce here too. At least 3 migrants have died from COVID-19 in immigration centres in the United States, along with 1,175 detainees with active infections as of 13 July 2020 (US CBP, 2020). Another 930 cases were reported among employees of contractors who run private detention centres in the United States in July (Rosenberg, 2020).

COVID-19 restrictions also have far-reaching implications for migrants on the move, including displacing people to more hazardous routes. For example, COVID-19 restrictions in Asia have left hundreds of Rohingya migrants stranded at sea as States fearing contagion refuse to allow them to disembark. While it is difficult to know the true death toll on these boats, one such stranding left an estimated 70 dead in April after the boat was refused entry for months (MSF, 2020). During the 2015 Bay of Bengal crisis, which saw Rohingya boats similarly stranded, IOM (2020a) documented over 500 deaths at sea.

These containment measures have also meant that it is often difficult to access information on routes which are known to be risky. One such case is the route from the Horn of Africa to Saudi Arabia via the Gulf of Aden sea crossing. There is strong evidence that the overseas crossing – which has led to the loss of at least 800 lives since 2014 – is seeing heavy use in 2020: between January and June 2020, IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (2020e) recorded 31,617 sea arrivals in Yemen. No deaths have been recorded on this sea crossing this year, despite the fact that these arrivals in Yemen top the 23,696 arrivals recorded on sea routes to Europe in the first half of 2020 – where 478 deaths were recorded during the same period. The challenges of accessing information in Yemen, as well as the increased travel restrictions in the Horn of Africa and Saudi Arabia, have made anecdotal reports of deaths on this route incredibly difficult to verify. Notably, for example, Human Rights Watch (2020) reported a large number of migrant deaths in Yemen in April 2020 due to xenophobic expulsions of migrants castigated as disease carriers.

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6 A more in-depth discussion of COVID-related impacts on migrants is available from the Migration Data Portal (IOM, 2020f).
Conclusions and recommendations

Despite the outbreak of COVID-19 – or, in some cases, because of it – migrant deaths have continued in the first seven months of 2020. Despite mobility restrictions, many irregular routes have seen an increase in attempted crossings, including the Central Mediterranean, the route from West Africa and Morocco to the Spanish Canary Islands, and the Gulf of Aden route from the Horn of Africa to Yemen. The available data indicates that fewer deaths have occurred during migration in 2020 than in previous years, but there is significant evidence that shows this is due to an issue of underreporting rather than of a shift to safer migration. The increasing number of invisible shipwrecks which disappear without a trace, as well as the continuing lack of official mortality data disaggregated by migratory status, means that it is nearly impossible to get a sense of the impact the ongoing pandemic has had on migrants both in countries of destination and on the move.

Gathering more and better-quality data on missing migrants is especially important at a time when States have committed to achieving safe migration. This is exemplified by Sustainable Development Goal 10.7, which calls on States to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration”, as well as the commitment to promote safe migration under the 2030 Agenda. Furthermore, most countries have committed to “save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants” under Objective 8 of the Global Compact for Migration.

Ultimately, States bear the responsibility of collecting such data through their commitments to making migration safer for all. Better data can help provide evidence for policies aimed at reducing risks en route and supporting vulnerable migrants in countries of destination and transit. COVID-19 has made collecting such data much more challenging but also more urgent along migratory routes worldwide.

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Local government responses to emigration: The case of Bosanci, Romania

Magdalena Ulceluse

Introduction

Local governments in sending countries have become increasingly active in creating their own strategies and policies in response to emigration, often in the absence of a national migration strategy. This should not be surprising, since it is at the local level where both the negative and the positive effects of emigration are experienced. Moreover, it is often the inability or unwillingness of States to develop effective responses to emigration that prompts local governments to formulate their own strategies, with an emphasis on pragmatism, trust and participation (Scholten and Penninx, 2016). However, we know little about the types of policies and strategies that local governments in sending countries devise, the objectives of these policies, and how they go about implementing them.

The purpose of this article is to understand the measures that local governments enact in response to emigration, taking as an example the specific case of Bosanci, a village in Romania. This is based on data collected within the Integrative Mechanisms for Addressing Spatial Justice and Territorial Inequalities in Europe project, funded by the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 programme. The data is based on 16 interviews conducted with residents and 2 interviews conducted with local government representatives in May 2019.

The article is divided into two sections. The first section explores the types of measures the local government in Bosanci has implemented in response to the significant emigration from the village. The second section reflects on the implications of these findings on policy.

Emigration and local government responses

Romania does not have a long-term strategy in relation to emigration, beyond preserving the Romanian identity abroad and strengthening ties with diaspora associations. Yet, in locations experiencing significant emigration flows, local governments themselves have started to take active measures to tackle (the effects of) emigration. The local government in Bosanci, Romania, is a case in point. The village is located in the county of Suceava, in the North-East macroregion and one of the largest sending areas in the country. In 2018, the village had a population of approximately 6,000 inhabitants, a third of which have emigrated in recent years, according to local government estimates.

The local government, which considers that Romania should be doing more to attract and retain its emigrant population, has implemented several direct and indirect measures with the objective of incentivizing the return of its inhabitants living abroad. These measures can be divided broadly into four dimensions: investments in local infrastructure, creating a business-friendly environment and employment opportunities, nurturing relations with the diaspora, and restoring trust in local institutions. Each type of measure is briefly illustrated below.

Investments in infrastructure

One dimension of the local government’s strategy to promote return migration is represented by investments in infrastructure. As a representative has mentioned, they have been in developing mode, with 4 European Union–funded projects, 3 projects funded through the State budget and 10 projects funded through the local budget, all geared towards improving the local infrastructure and making the village an attractive place to return to. As such,
Bosanci has undergone a process of modernization, which includes extending the street pavement, the renovation of the firehouse and one of the schools, the building of a medical clinic – the first in the village – and improvements in the provision of electricity, running water, gas, and a sewage system in some parts of the community. Other upgrades are the introduction of street lighting and the creation of bus stations, sidewalks, parks and a children’s playground. These might not seem like much, but in a country where almost a third of the population does not have running water, they are considered significant advancements. Thus, these efforts have not been lost on the residents, many of whom point to the new administration as an agent of modernization and development in the face of the emigration challenge.

Creating jobs and a business-friendly environment

An attractive location alone, however, is not sufficient to encourage return migration, especially when one of the main reasons for migration among the respondents in the project is the need to find (better) employment opportunities. Thus, another prerequisite for emigrants to return is the availability of (good) employment opportunities within the village. To that end, the local government has implemented several measures meant to brand Bosanci as a business-friendly environment and generate employment opportunities. One such measure is the allocation of land for transport companies that have opened in the village and need parking spots to further expand. The expectation is that by facilitating the expansion of these companies – and consequently the creation of additional jobs – emigrants will be incentivized to return.

Another measure concerns collaborations with the County Board of Businesswomen for Small and Medium Enterprises over Diaspora A.C.A.S.A. and StartUp 4 Diaspora, local projects providing seed funding to members of the diaspora who want to start a business in Suceava. These collaborations and other measures have resulted in an increase in the number of businesses in the village, which now include greenhouses, stores selling construction materials, interior design shops, car repairs, hairdressers, pharmacies and groceries, among others. According to a local government representative, about 200 businesses had been registered in the village at the time of the interview, placing Bosanci in the top three administrations in terms of number of businesses in the county.

These changes have not gone unnoticed among the residents, who opine that “seeing the new developments in the village, the emigrants might want to return – they feel like something is being done for them. And this new local government is trying to get them back” (Female, 18, High School).

Nurture relations with the diaspora and restore trust in local institutions

Perhaps a less visible measure of the local government, but by no means less potentially effective, concerns the nurturing of relations with members of the diaspora and restoring trust in local institutions. Particularly for high-skilled emigrants – although this also holds true for much of the country in general – aspirations and ideology join economic factors in influencing the decision to emigrate. Cases of corruption and lack of progress have eroded Romanians’ trust in institutions and their potential for change. Thus, economic opportunities may not be enough to convince emigrants to return – they must be accompanied by perceived changes in leadership. Measures towards this end have included increased interaction with the residents of the village and an open-door policy, where they can approach members of the local government to voice their concerns.

Additionally, the local government has been fostering relations and collaborations with the members of the Bosanci diaspora, along with the local governments in the host countries where they reside. To that end, it has organized information meetings for start-up programmes for members of the diaspora, held meetings with returnees concerning their needs, and liaised with local government representatives in host countries like Belgium and Austria, for information and cultural exchange.

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8 More information can be found here: [http://startup4diaspora.ro](http://startup4diaspora.ro).
Direct measures for return migration/investments in the village

Lastly, the most direct measure to incentivize return migration concerns the allocation of plots of land to young emigrants (under the age of 35) to build their houses on. The parcels of land are offered for a small fee that covers the administrative task of dividing them, and building must start within two years. Otherwise, the offer is retracted. This measure is motivated by the fact that many residents in the village emigrate in order to accumulate money that would allow them to buy land and build a house. This is because owning a house is a rite of passage in many parts of Romania, including Bosanci. According to a local government representative, the purpose of the measure is to encourage return emigrants to invest in the village and then come home to their investment. At the time of the interview in May 2019, there had been 150 applications for plots of land, with the demand expected to increase significantly.

Implications for policy

This policy brief has shown that local governments in sending countries not only respond to local challenges brought about by emigration but also actively pursue local migration-related agendas. In the village of Bosanci, where a third of the population has emigrated, the local government has adopted a multidimensional strategy, whose final objective is to incentivize return migration. In the process of making the village a more attractive place for emigrants, it has increased the quality of life and conditions in the village for residents as well.

References

Institutul National de Statistica

Scholten, P. and R. Penninx
Abstract: There are several references to migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and migration is a cross-cutting theme across the Sustainable Development Goals. The inclusion of migration presents countries with a series of new data challenges, such as disaggregating indicators by migratory status. To date, this challenge has not been overcome: as 2030 approaches, policymakers still do not know whether migrants are being left behind in SDG progress (and to what extent), using available statistics. First, the article examines the need to identify migrants in statistics and to produce SDG indicators disaggregated by migratory status. Second, it focuses on how best to assist countries to disaggregate SDG indicators by migratory status, then introduces key components and steps to do this. The article ends by summarizing some open questions for migratory status disaggregation and calling for collaboration among diverse actors on the topic going forward.

Introduction

There are several direct references to migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including Target 10.7 which calls on countries to “facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”. Meanwhile, migration can be indirectly linked to most Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and its motto to “leave no one behind” is a clear call for sustainable development to include migrant groups.

While the inclusion of migration in the 2030 Agenda is a key opportunity to advance good migration governance, it also presents countries with a series of new data challenges and reporting requirements, as large amounts of migration-relevant data are required for SDG monitoring. Relevant data frameworks and practices have largely not yet risen to these challenges; many SDG indicators that relate to migration have relatively underdeveloped methodologies, and countries find it difficult to regularly produce relevant data. This is linked to the wider lack of quality data on migration, as recognized most recently in Objective 1 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (IOM, 2018a).

One specific challenge is the need to disaggregate SDG indicators by migratory status. Target 17.18 calls for greater support to developing countries to increase significantly the availability of “high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, [and] migratory status”. This call is part of a growing understanding in the world of development data that disaggregation is an important way to ensure inclusiveness and prevent discrimination. There are many key dimensions of disaggregation, such as sex, age and disability. Disaggregation is one of the nine pillars of the “data revolution” (UNSD, 2020), calling for sustainable development to improve the quality and availability of statistics.

Disaggregation of data by migratory status presents a formidable challenge to many national statistical offices (NSOs) around the world. As countries have made efforts to monitor SDG indicators, and many have set up dedicated platforms for SDG tracking, the levels of disaggregation of reported indicators by migratory status remain low, particularly in low-income countries. The global SDG database shows that out of 24 SDG indicators recommended for disaggregation by migratory status, only 1 is duly disaggregated.

* A previous version of this paper was presented at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)’s fourth Expert Meeting and Workshop on Statistics for Sustainable Development Goals in April 2020.

1 Elisa is Research and Data Officer at IOM’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC). Her work focuses on analysis across migration topics, with a specialization on migration in the 2030 Agenda.

2 Promoting greater data disaggregation is also a key goal of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (in particular, Objective 1).
disaggregated – 8.8.1 on work-related injuries. This means that even as we rapidly approach 2030, we still do not know what the effects of the SDGs are on migrants, and whether they are being left behind (and to what extent).

This article discusses the need to disaggregate SDG indicators by migratory status – and how this data could be used. Following this, the paper explores some steps that countries can take to disaggregate SDG data by migratory status, based partly on ongoing work of IOM’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC).

Why disaggregate by migratory status?

Disaggregated data is fundamental to understand migrants’ characteristics across sectors, such as health, education, employment and others, to support policymaking for the SDGs and beyond. Once disaggregated data is available, policymakers can look beyond averages to explore how migrants’ outcomes may be different to those of non-migrants, examine whether and how any inequalities between these groups change over time, and explore possible reasons behind them.

Where data is disaggregated, there are often urgent policy messages. Foreign-born women across European countries are more likely to die during or after pregnancy than native-born women; maternal mortality of foreign-born women in France is 2.5 times higher than for their native-born counterparts – 3.5 times higher for women born in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 2018). In 34 OECD countries in 2015, 42 per cent of foreign-born citizens were in or at risk of poverty compared to 23 per cent of natives (ACOSS and UNSW, 2018; Eurostat, 2020a; United States Census Bureau, 2016). In 2018, more than 1 in 3 non-citizens in 27 European countries lived in an overcrowded household, compared to 1 in 5 citizens (Eurostat, 2020b). Disaggregation can be a simple and invaluable tool for policymakers to inform programmes, as it can provide a strong evidence base to learn where interventions may need to proactively target and reach migrants – so that nobody is left behind. There is a general paucity of data (IOM, 2020a) on migrant well-being and integration across countries, which disaggregation could help address. Thus, disaggregated data can provide valuable evidence in topics ranging from affordable housing to access to clean energy, enabling policymakers to treat migration as a cross-cutting theme when designing policies in these sectors.

Disaggregated data can still have value beyond SDG implementation and national policymaking. The Global Compact for Migration is composed of 23 objectives – from decent work to access to basic services – yet has no follow-up and review framework. Having disaggregated data across policy areas will give policymakers stronger evidence on which to base many Global Compact for Migration interventions (IOM, 2020b).

How to disaggregate by migratory status?

In many ways, disaggregating data by migratory status can be more challenging than by dimensions such as sex or age. Many migrants are part of hidden populations that are not easily counted, and the most vulnerable may rarely appear in official statistics. The general dearth of quality migration data and relative underdevelopment of relevant frameworks mean that often, data on migrants is poorer than on other population groups, presenting a particular issue when focusing on this disaggregation. Further, as explored below, some important concepts relevant to disaggregation lack internationally agreed-upon definitions.

As the focus on data disaggregation continues to grow, some guidance specifically on disaggregation by migratory status has been developed. While a key first step, much of this is not yet designed to fit individual country needs and capacities. In response, GMDAC is working to strengthen the capacity of practitioners to disaggregate SDG indicators by migratory status – by first producing user-friendly guidance (IOM, 2020c) on this. While steps may vary across contexts, below are some key components to begin doing this.

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1 This is an IOM analysis based on data from the IAEG database. Note that at the national level, more indicators may be disaggregated.

4 For example, the Expert Group Meeting on Improving Migration Data in the Context of the 2030 Agenda released guidance on a stepwise approach (UNSC, 2019) to data disaggregation by migratory status, and other efforts focus on disaggregation of specific data sources. Another example is GMDAC’s “A pilot study on disaggregating SDG indicators by migratory status” (IOM, 2018b).
Identify indicators to disaggregate

The Inter-Agency and Expert Group (IAEG) on SDG indicators recommends that 24 indicators be disaggregated by migratory status to capture characteristics that are key to understanding the living conditions of migrants in receiving countries. However, many more can be disaggregated – while some cannot easily be disaggregated at the global level as they are composite indicators or collected by different States, individual countries may be able to disaggregate additional indicators on their own. There is, overall, a very wide range of SDG indicators spanning sectors that policymakers may wish to disaggregate.

Often resources will not permit all SDG indicators to be disaggregated – or not all will be relevant. It may be necessary to identify and prioritize indicators that are most relevant to migration in certain contexts. Any such prioritization process should be inclusive, involving data producers and users across the government as necessary. Data disaggregation by migratory status can require high levels of collaboration, including between representatives from NSOs, relevant line ministries and migration policymakers.

Consider disaggregation needs: Concepts and definitions

Next, the exact disaggregation needs of indicators must be identified, based on an assessment of who may be most at risk of being left behind in the area covered by each indicator. The most accepted standard variables of migratory status disaggregation are country of birth (to distinguish between foreign-born and native-born populations) and country of citizenship (to distinguish between foreigners and citizens).

It is possible to go beyond this. If there is a need to distinguish between first- and second-generation migrants, this may be done by disaggregating by country of birth of the person and country of birth of the parents. Further, there are many additional variables that cover diverse migrant subgroups, which would provide data with even richer detail for policymakers. Examples include reason for migration, duration of stay in the country, and classification as refugees and asylum seekers, internal migrants or internally displaced persons (IDPs). Note that harmonized internationally agreed-upon definitions do not yet exist for all of these. It is possible to further disaggregate using nationally defined variables, including, for example, particular legal categories of migrants. This is how disaggregation may be most responsive to a country’s needs and most directly link back to migration policy. However, as these are generally not internationally comparable, they should be considered only in addition to the above standard variables. Finally, as far as possible, disaggregation of migration data by other dimensions

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5 “These indicators are selected based on several criteria: (a) the indicator measures whether there is equal treatment and non-discrimination between migrants and non-migrants in terms of access to basic services including essential health care, basic education and social protection; (b) the indicator assesses how well migrants are integrated into the host society, in terms of their education level, labour market outcomes, employment conditions and poverty; and (c) the indicator measures whether migrants are more likely to be subject to violence compared to non-migrants” (UNSD, 2017).

6 Various IOM tools to identify migration-related SDG priorities may be helpful to this end (IOM, 2018c).

7 This is as defined at the United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Improving Migration Data in the Context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, in a stepwise approach (UNSC, 2019). Note that for relevant data sources, the United Nations Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses Revision 3 also considers the year or period of arrival as a core question.

8 There is a recognized need to facilitate the harmonization of relevant definitions and categories to ensure comparability, and this is an active area. For example, the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS) identified 12 priority SDG indicators to be disaggregated by forced displacement categories (UNSC, 2020a).

9 For example, in its SDGs information system, the Italian NSO (Istat, 2019) has taken steps (UNSC, 2020b) to disaggregate several indicators by country of citizenship, and further distinguish between first- and second-generation migrants by using the categorization of the Invalsi (National Institute for the Evaluation of the Education and Training System).
such as age, sex, occupation, employment status and more should be considered, to help policymakers gain further insights into migrant populations.

**Design a tailored course of action for disaggregation**

If the aim is to disaggregate an SDG indicator that is already monitored, first there is a need to assess the existing disaggregation throughout the data life cycle. Often, for example, at the subnational level, data collected is disaggregated, but this detail is lost in national-level reporting. If the aim is to disaggregate an SDG indicator that is not yet monitored or to adjust data for an existing indicator, there is a need to consider both the available migration data and the desired indicator’s metadata to assess how best to do this. This involves assessing what existing data may be used towards the indicator in a targeted data-mapping exercise, focusing as far as possible on data already collected in censuses, surveys and administrative records. It is also possible to explore proxy indicators using existing data if necessary. Table 1 shows selected diverse disaggregated indicators collected in different countries – many of these could be used as proxy SDG indicators. If there are resources available, new data collection could be considered to monitor the indicator.

Table 1: National-level examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plurinational State of Bolivia</td>
<td>Literacy rate (per 100) of those aged 15 years or over, by non-migrant and migrant population*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Child mortality rate, by nationality and gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Income, by migration status*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Victims of domestic violence, by place of birth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: *This includes internal migrants.

As SDG indicators can use different data sources, there is a need to consider specific disaggregation issues. Many indicators use demographic and health surveys (DHS) and other household surveys, where a common challenge for disaggregation is sample size. The often-limited sample sizes make it difficult to identify certain groups – such as migrants – as sampling methodologies were not originally designed for analysis of specific population subgroups.

Given the larger sample sizes needed for effective disaggregation by migratory status and other migrant subgroups, setting up new survey instruments can be expensive. Exploring the use of administrative data sources or census microdata for SDG indicators can be a helpful alternative – in particular, as Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) data can already disaggregate indicators by nativity status for many countries (IOM, 2018b). Note that combining multiple data sources for indicators makes disaggregation more challenging, as comparisons across sources usually cannot be made given that methodologies may vary. Any potential risks to migrant individuals and groups need to be considered, and appropriate ethical and data-protection concerns must be addressed using necessary safeguards in data systems and processes. The pathways to disaggregation will look different across countries, sectors and data sources. In 2020, IOM will release guidance compiling and building on several resources, to help direct this process for key SDGs, along with the most common data sources used.

**Plan data dissemination, communication and mainstreaming into SDG data initiatives**

There are several other important considerations concerning data disaggregation, such as reporting and communications. It is important to ensure disaggregation is reflected in all relevant SDG reporting platforms – at the local, national, regional and international levels – and that any policy-relevant conclusions drawn from disaggregated data are included in voluntary national reviews (VNRs). To have the highest possible impact, disaggregated data often needs specific communications and dissemination strategies. As this data should reach migration policymakers across line ministries, tailored approaches may be needed to convey messages on different indicators and promote their use in policymaking.

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10 One useful tool is A Human Rights-Based Approach to Data (OHCHR, 2018), which includes guidance on partnering NSOs with human rights institutions.
Conclusion

Measuring the linkages between migration and development is challenging. Disaggregation would contribute a practical solution to at least one important component of this, which is to measure sustainable development outcomes on migrants themselves. However, disaggregating data by migratory status can be more difficult than by other dimensions. As efforts continue to develop relevant guidance for practitioners, many questions remain open for discussion – for example, whether and how to adopt harmonized questions to selected variables, such as reason for and duration of migration, and how to best use administrative records towards disaggregated SDG data.

There is a need for all those working in disaggregation efforts to partner together. This should include working closely with countries, involving NSOs and line ministries, to discuss experiences, good practices and lessons learned, as well as to continue defining and addressing country needs, priorities and challenges. In particular, examples of innovative countries tackling specific challenges, such as improving disaggregation without significant additional resources, will be useful to ensure practical progress can be made in the near future. In 2020, through broad-based consultation, IOM will develop practical guidance on disaggregation of SDG indicators by migratory status and, in this way, hopes to make progress in addressing some of the above challenges.

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There is an advertisement for HSBC which says: “If you were born in one place, grew up in another, but now live somewhere completely different, where are you from?” It continues: “Tricky one. Perhaps, a better question is not where are you from, but where do you feel at home?”

In the immigration debate, making newcomers feel at home is one of the essential elements of success. Unhappy immigrants are unlikely to thrive and contribute to their new home either economically or culturally. However, this is not the only important factor. The other essential element for an effective immigration policy is the need for labour. Countries that do not need migrants for economic purposes or that do not accept their differences when the latter try to settle in are heading for political or cultural clashes.

On the question of need, there is little doubt that many of the wealthier countries in Western Europe either need additional labour now or will do so in the relatively near future. The reasons are simple: a low birth rate and a declining population.

Evidence of a declining population is clear. The European Parliament’s demographic outlook report (EPRS, 2019) shows a dramatically ageing European Union, whose working population (aged 15 to 64) shrank for the first time in 2010 and is expected to decline every year until 2060. In contrast, the proportion of people aged 80 or over is expected to more than double by 2050, reaching 11.4 per cent.

Without migration, critical sectors such as health care, elderly care, construction and agriculture will be chronically understaffed. People who do these jobs should always be made to feel welcome because without them, essential services would come to a standstill. Furthermore, productive young workers pay tax to finance education and pensions. In this context, Germany’s admittance of a million mostly young migrants during the last four years looks logical: they had joined a German population of 80 million at a time when unemployment in the country was statistically zero. Understanding these fundamental demographic issues and the fact that essential services will face difficulties without immigration should make Europeans conclude that they must positively welcome immigrants, not just tolerate them.

Fortunately, surveys show that Europeans do feel relatively positive about immigrants: 57 per cent of Europeans “feel comfortable” with immigrants, and 40 per cent have personal ties with them (European Commission, 2017). However, there are substantial variations in immigrant acceptability among the Member States of the European Union. Where there is hostility, it is because immigrants are seen as a “threat” – for example, to jobs or the local ways of doing things. People naturally sympathize with the persecuted or victims of war or famine. However, many hesitate when asked whether they would welcome this same group into their homes or as neighbours. When these casualties arrive in large numbers and depend initially on taxpayers to fund them, the level of support drops right away. It plummets even more when the perception – as opposed to the reality – is that the migrants are taking jobs that can be done by locals. This is understandable in certain circumstances. Complications escalate though when these perceptions and misperceptions are exploited by some politicians, even when untrue.

On the other hand, there are also government leaders who make huge efforts to pursue policies that do welcome migrants. These include the provision of language courses (most of the time compulsory), welcome committees, mentoring of young people and sponsorship. Libraries have been filled with public pronouncements and academic analyses on the ingredients for good immigrant integration. The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy (CEU, 2004) and the Global Compact for Migration (IOM, 2018) speak of a “two-way process of mutual accommodation”, mutual respect among different cultures, learning the host country’s language and other sensible ideas.

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1 Richard Lewis is a Senior Research Fellow in Migration and Diversity at the Institute for European Studies of Vrije Universiteit in Brussels and former Principal Administrator at the European Commission.
Migrants cannot be bullied into adopting a different way of life, religion or food. The progression of cultural adaptation is and must be gradual. Nevertheless, surveys in Australia – a country built on immigration – show that adapting to the way of life embraced by the majority population is the best way to feel part of the host society. Research worldwide clearly shows that immigrants who adapt to their respective host societies have a greater chance of achieving life satisfaction and a sense of belonging than those who do not (Berry and Hou, 2016). It is logical, therefore, to point migrants in this direction. Perhaps such adaptation is mostly possible in subsequent post-entry generations. Although, there has to be a process of change on both sides: acceptance by immigrants of local culture in the broadest sense and tolerance by the host society of migrants’ peculiarities.

This is not a plea for immigrants to abandon their “comfort zones”, where they fit in easily, especially in the first years after their arrival in a new country. A comfort zone can be acquired rapidly and may consist of living in close proximity to others of the same origin, shopping in outlets that stock familiar food, attending a familiar religious service and, above all, possibilities to speak their native language. In this environment, the newcomer can feel “at home” and take time to acquaint themselves to the new situation. The British philosopher Isaiah Berlin, whose family members were immigrants, wrote in Two Concepts of Liberty: “[My own people] understand me, as I understand them; and this understanding creates within me the sense of being somebody in the world.” One cannot expect a person to jump from one place to another and assume that they will feel a sense of belonging immediately. The comfort zone can be a useful intermediate step into a new world. Retaining a sense of being somebody in the world is, as Berlin (1969) suggests, important for the newcomer’s well-being.

The question is not whether Europe or other industrialized parts of the world should embrace immigration. The case for immigration has already been amply made by demography and sympathy for the persecuted. Europeans are aware of the sympathy aspect, but for their own benefit, they also need to understand deeply the demographic time bomb that is their current reality.

For immigration in Europe to succeed for everyone, immigrants once admitted should be treated fairly and offered broadly the same amenities as citizens. This needs to be done, not according to a fixed formula, but with a high degree of courtesy and respect on both sides.

To make immigration a success takes time and effort, and “belonging” is an essential ingredient for this to materialize. The feeling of belonging is not a sudden awakening but a gradual absorption into a new life. The personal histories of migrant families show that over time and generations, the importance of the culture of origin to individuals and families diminishes, while the practices and values of the host society become dominant. Therefore, when migrants first arrive, the host population needs to be tolerant of differences and appreciate the contributions that immigrants make to the welfare of their country.

Where you belong is where you are accepted as a full-fledged, productive member of society and where you feel comfortable and at home. Both immigrants and hosts have their roles to play in making this happen. ■

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Publications

Manual for Tuberculosis Management within IOM Migration Health Assessment Programmes
2020/168 pages
English

The management of tuberculosis (TB) by IOM aims to adequately treat and cure the infected patient, as well as minimize the risk of transmission to other persons before, during and after migration. Quality TB management requires the consistent and diligent application of a standardized, evidence-based approach along recognized guidelines. This manual aims to support a consistent and high-quality process of TB management for IOM health assessment activities worldwide.

Internal Displacement in the Context of the Slow-Onset Adverse Effects of Climate Change
2020/76 pages
English

This document is submitted by IOM, pursuant to the call for inputs by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons on “Internal displacement in the context of the slow-onset adverse effects of climate change”. Through this submission, IOM intends to support the development of the upcoming report on the issue of internal displacement linked to slow-onset natural hazards in the context of the adverse effects of climate change, to be presented to the United Nations General Assembly in October 2020. This submission is based on the work of IOM in its support to States in protecting the human rights of displaced persons, migrants and other populations affected by slow-onset events and processes, presenting the Organization’s experiences, perspectives and activities.
At its very core, IOM is grounded in the movement of people. Through 69 years of field experience, the Organization has identified best practices from millions of migrant movements around the globe, informing the development of its many protocols. Every single day, IOM teams are moving people, whether for humanitarian evacuation, resettlement or another pathway to admission. Movement staff tailor movement assistance to meet the needs of individual and relevant stakeholders in departure countries and receiving communities.

Resettlement is a protection tool to meet the specific needs of refugees and a durable solution and demonstration of international solidarity and responsibility-sharing. It allows people to begin life anew, those who would otherwise have neither home nor country to call their own. Annually, IOM supports some 30 States to carry out resettlement, relocation and humanitarian admission schemes for refugees and other vulnerable persons. In 2019, around 107,000 persons travelled under IOM's auspices through these programmes, with significant operations out of Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine and the United Republic of Tanzania. Of the above-mentioned figure, 30,264 persons in need of international protection were resettled in 18 different European countries, representing 30 per cent of the global resettlement and humanitarian admission caseload assisted by IOM. Given the high volume of needs and lack of available places for resettlement, IOM continues to engage with actors on increasing accessibility to safe and legal pathways.
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• Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant public administrations, or civil society, in other countries.

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