

# Migration Trends

in Selected Applicant Countries

## Volume III – Poland

### Dilemmas of a Sending and Receiving Country



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European Commission Project:

***“Sharing Experience: Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries and Lessons Learned from the ‘New Countries of Immigration’ in the EU and Austria”***

**VOLUME III – Poland**

**Dilemmas of a Sending and Receiving Country**

by  
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This country report on Migration Trends in Poland forms part of a publication series of six volumes, which have evolved under the roof of the European Commission funded project “*Sharing Experience: Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries and Lessons Learned from the ‘New Countries of Immigration’ in the EU and Austria*” managed by the International Organization for Migration Mission with Regional Functions for Central Europe in Vienna, Austria.

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IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental body, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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## PREFACE

### Migration to the EU

Migration to the European Union continues to be a disputed issue throughout Europe. Starting in the 1960s it began with the recruitment of migrant workers by some Western European countries and through family reunification in the 1970s, the process then continued with most Western European countries successively becoming countries of immigration. This has not necessarily been an intended process, but has become a fact in the better-off countries of the EU.

New EU members in the north and in the south have seen their immigration figures rise after accession, partly as a result of related increased economic growth. Countries like Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy or Greece – all situated on the EU periphery, where emigration had previously prevailed – had to adapt quickly to the new situation in the course of the 1990s. In terms of policy, the process suffered from a lack of experience, so the management of the flows was often not ideal and local societies were taken by surprise to a certain degree.

The surge in immigration has mainly been fed by people seeking protection from the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and by the fall of the iron curtain, which has allowed citizens of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to move. They made use of this possibility in direction of the prospering EU. Policy developments, notably linked to freedom of movement and to irregular migration, have carefully been described and analysed in two previous publications jointly produced by IOM and ICMPD: *“Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. 1999 Review”* and *“New Challenges for Migration Policy in Central and Eastern Europe”*.

With the accession of 10 new member states to the EU in May 2004 (and two more in 2007), these countries are likely to follow the path of the previous EU accession countries and, in turn, become countries of immigration. With increased global mobility and a growing number of severe conflicts and wars, people seeking shelter from Africa and Asia have become a growing source of migrants in recent years. Their paths of migration are directed to the EU and often lead through the accession countries. In this process, in spite of fortified border protection and the “safe third countries” rule, which has become a standard in the states of the EU, accession countries are increasingly becoming target countries of migration. For their societies, this means a rapid change from countries almost without migration via strong emigration to more immigration in the future. This scenario requires preparation and careful planning. On the other hand and on the background of demographic trends, this may be a rather desirable change. According to projections of the EC, the population of all accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe has a tendency to decrease, a fact likely to pose significant problems to economy and society in the future. Compared to Western European countries, where the established migration chains will soften the population losses for a longer period, the future eastern border countries of the EU will increasingly face this problem no later than 2010.

In relation to this, one very important characteristic of globalisation, that is especially relevant when talking about migration, is that causes and effects can happen in completely different parts of the world. This simple fact is even more significant if one comes to think that the interdependency of migration to social economic or political

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factors is extremely high. The globalisation of economy and politics, the continuous merging of cultural factors and the shortening of distances by the availability of quick and cheap transportation, makes regular migration always hard to isolate as a regional phenomenon or to control by national means. We have come to understand that Migration has its own internal dynamics. These particular dynamics – sensitive of course to external factors – can be maybe best compared with what liberals would describe as a marketplace. A place, where reality is the clash product of a demand and an offer, and where intervention can only be done with observance to these mechanisms. Arbitrary intervention can and does usually lead to unwanted results.

Before we attempt to develop this concept, let us enumerate briefly three more assumptions that are relevant for these internal dynamics, when discussing the marketplace approach: 1. First of all, the quantitative (as opposed to qualitative) degree of migratory movements always depends on the extent to which restrictive actions have hindered the migration process previously. Recent history of the continent has illustrated significantly enough this statement and comparing 1980 and 1990 statistics gives you a clear picture. 2. Very much related to the above assumption, one could safely talk about fluctuating cycles in migration, with ascending lines, peaks and regressions. In Europe, most of the Candidate Countries have passed their peaks in producing migration in the mid-90s. 3. Migration, especially the one motivated economically, is more sensitive to pull than to push factors. This assumption is very much relevant in Europe today, and it radically contradicts whoever states that the European Union has little to offer to migrants. The fact is that there are jobs available in the Union today, particularly in certain areas of the labour market. Migrants will satisfy this demand within or outside a regulated framework. Further it might very well be that legislators and policy maker who want to intervene in a certain manner on this marketplace would only be able to succeed by working precisely at these pull-factors. The way some countries do it – maybe the most relevant are the US and Canada – proving that they have understood this reality by attracting qualified migrants from all over the world, becoming preferred destinations even for people who are not that dependent on push factors in their own countries. And the moment is not far when competition between European and non-European destinations for qualified migrants may have a much more decisive impact on trends than the aforementioned demographic changes. Having taken into account these assumptions and coming back to the migration marketplace, maybe the first corollary of this analogy is the fact that as long as migration happens – with no regard to the policy of the state – it is proof enough that migrants are actually needed. As long as the movements are driven by labour related issues, the interior dynamics of migration, as said earlier, will always take precedence, no matter if the destination state will restrict it or not. The difference is only in the degree of legality within which the economic activities of the migrants (usually labour) will happen. In Europe this is both true in the member states of the EU and will be progressively more and more true in the Candidate Countries as they approach accession.

As we shift towards the particular European dimension of the marketplace analogy, one would say that state intervention has to be always in agreement with the intrinsic state of the determinant factors at the moment of intervention, and should ideally be justified by an unusual imbalance of the migratory “market”. That means that when a state designs its policy on migration or other way to control migratory movements such

intervention has to be in line with current migration realities and deal with them from within. But let us develop this. It is far from our intention to say that because of such a marketplace approach the best way to go around migration is an absolute *laissez-faire*, and it is also far from our intention to say that the Candidate Countries or the European Union should open their borders to whatever waves of migrants might want to enter. Like on every marketplace in our complex times, intervention might not only be legitimate and necessary but it usually is to the overall benefit. The only care to be taken when designing state intervention is that it should be in tune with the dynamics of the phenomenon, observing migration also in the context of supply and demand. And in this sense, keeping always with the market concept, let us not un-wantingly increase illegal employment nor unnecessarily expand the market share for traffickers and smugglers. Because to forget that most markets, have a black-market, may hinder the overall result that we were aiming for in the first place. The new European common policy proposal on immigration seems to have incorporated such interventions particularly by refining its employment strategy, but also by reviewing the impact of an ageing population on security and pensions and by making training more responsive to the market needs. A communication on illegal immigration has also been released, and the Candidate Countries will have to align themselves to this common policy probably before accession.

However if one looks at the entire accession negotiations in the field of Migration, the two most striking common features in all these countries seem to be: 1. Sometimes technical negotiations for accession were underestimated in favour of the political negotiations and 2. Migration realities were too rarely regarded in perspective. First, on the technical question. Beyond the status of a formal condition for enlargement (as defined in 1993 at the European Council in Copenhagen), technical criteria are of the utmost importance for the union, but especially for the country in question. No doubt that political negotiations are important and more than that, commitment to democratic values backed up by political commitment to the enlargement process are crucial factors. But it would be a mistake to underestimate the role of technical capacity. On the long term, political-only driven efforts will prove to be counterproductive, while technical efforts, resulting in a better infrastructure tailored to cope with European challenges will prove its benefits in facing very close future situations. Higher flexibility in implementing European legislation, higher efficiency in providing security to individuals, higher response of the administrative structures to fast changes, managing migration and other challenges and not least a better understanding – at all government levels – of the way the different states in the European Union work for a common interest are just some few arguments for the technical side of negotiations for enlargement. But in the end we face political and technical interdependency anyway: Accession may be a priority political objective, but migration management should not be too far behind, not least because it is the one topic in today's Europe that the electorate does not seem to be ignoring. In what regards the second common feature, the lack of perspective in approaching migration, the most common illustration of it is a state that would not diligently try to cope with the *Acquis* in the area of migration for the apparent (and obvious) reason that there were not too many migration challenges in that particular state. In a time magnified frame, that statement is true. Most of the candidate countries are not (yet) particular destinations for migrants (especially economic migrants), and when such phenomenon occurs it is typically insignificant and anyway just a "pit-stop", a transit period in the migrant's route towards the final destination (with the exception of the Czech Republic, where the percentage of

foreigners has already reached 2%). But upon accession this state of fact will change radically: as part of the Union the candidate countries will find themselves becoming very attractive for migrants over night, and not by accident: the membership in the Union's political processes will make these countries safer, the flow of capital and the development of the economic markets will increase the demand for labour and finally, the social welfare system will probably become more friendly.

All these changes will drive migration flows towards these countries, and this is the perspective that legislators and administrations have to keep in mind when designing their migration policy and when aligning themselves to the Migration Acquis. Moreover, adopting the Acquis alone, by a simple legislative process will never be enough, without the building of administrative capacity to enforce the EU framework legislation and to react in symphony to the challenges of the Union the process will be far from effective. What we all have to understand is that membership in the Union brings along a lot of advantages, in terms of strengthening the economy, consolidating democratic processes and providing for safety and security. But these advantages come along with huge responsibilities, because the way one single state deals with certain challenges – such as migration – is not only relevant for that state alone but for the whole union. And if the capacity of that state to face such challenges is lacking then there are high chances that completed enlargement may turn into weighty political embarrassment when the same state finds itself in the impossibility to strive for the values of the Union in undeniably visible situations.

Migration in the Candidate Countries is on its way to change in quantitative and qualitative presence, and these changes – in the good practice of globalisation trends – are both causes and effects of so many and complex other processes, of which the enlargement of the European Union is certainly the most revolutionary. In this context migration policies have to be carefully designed to lead eventually to migrants' economic and cultural integration in an extended area of freedom security and justice. An area which must consistently strive to balance rights and responsibilities of migrants. A balance that can only function when legal transposition is matched with both administrative and enforcement capacity. It is therefore high time to prepare the process, which must go beyond legislation and technical co-operation. Alongside emigration and established temporary migration to the west, the societies in the accession states have to be prepared for a new challenge to their cohesion: foreigners in their cities, often right in their neighbourhood, maybe competing for their jobs. Let us avoid emergency management and rather, in a timely fashion, strive for long term orderly migration supported by functional integration measures in tune with the host societies.

### **Research Methodology**

What began as a classical multiple country case study, later developed in a comparative study with the aim of creating a certain typology distinguishing between those countries where there is immigration and those countries where there is emigration. What also emerged was the need to distinguish between countries where permanent emigration is prevailed upon by circulatory emigration. Additionally a great deal of attention needed to be paid to the phenomena of transit immigration, temporary immigration and permanent settlement immigration. Some countries used to regard their emigrants to the EU only as a source of remittances. In the 90s this pattern changed and now the same emigrants are looked at as the ones who can potentially build transnational

connectivity. The question of whether this trend is also spilling over to the accession countries was a further element which needed to be assessed. What also needed appropriate attention is the issue of nationality and naturalization. Where usually nationality has been closely related to ethnic background, the new realities may create revised views and policies on this matter. With more and more people wanting to be naturalized, it is clear that the relevant laws and policies, when less than adequate, will bear the strain. This point has also been analyzed.

In fact this booklet is part of a product of comprehensive research and analysis of migration trends in each of six participating EU accession countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. The research project has been supported by the European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, under the European Social Fund budget line *“Analysis of and research on the social situation, demography and the family”* and was managed by IOM Vienna.

Under the title **“Migration Trends in Selected EU Applicant Countries”**, the following volumes are available:

**Volume I – Bulgaria.** The Social Impact of Seasonal Migration.

**Volume II – The Czech Republic.** The Times They Are A-Changin.

**Volume III – Poland.** Dilemmas of a Sending and Receiving Country.

**Volume IV – Romania.** More ‘Out’ than ‘In’ at the Crossroads between Europe and the Balkans.

**Volume V – Slovakia.** An Acceleration of Challenges for Society.

**Volume VI – Slovenia.** The perspective of a Country on the ‘Schengen Periphery’.

Within the project, applied research enhancing the EU knowledge basis on migration in candidate countries to the Union has been sought. Although building on the acquired knowledge, it is no continuation of the previous IOM / ICMPD research, but is inscribed in a different logic. The particular interest here was to find out more about the effects of migration on the countries’ societies. For this purpose, a mixed methodology was conceived, taking into account the different levels of migration research in the participating countries. It has been applied and can be found in each of the six country reports as well as in the overview.

The research was developed with an attempt to align the research process as far as possible. This field of research being new for the participating countries, two major disadvantages had to be faced: little research and a low number of researchers to draw upon as well as scarce data availability. However statistics and literature was found to be better in those countries which have already experienced in-migration to a certain degree (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, to a lesser degree also Slovakia), whereas Bulgaria and Romania were still greatly lacking both research and statistical apprehension of the phenomenon.

As a consequence, the methodology has been elaborated in three steps, which accompanied the entire research process: Literature analysis, interviews and recommendations. In fact data has systematically been completed by interviews with officials, experts, and migrants themselves or their associations, depending on the gaps



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in literature and statistics. Collaboration of the researchers with the respective IOM country missions has facilitated this process. For each of the countries, the interviews form the added value of the reports. Hitherto undocumented aspects of migration phenomena in the accession countries become perceivable for the first time, and besides, analysed in a systematic manner.

The research is made pertinent by analysis weighing the information against credibility and by the elaboration of conclusions to each chapter of the research. Recommendations to different stakeholders are formulated at the end of the text for optimal usability.

Through its form and result, the project *“Sharing Experience: Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries and Lessons Learned from the ‘New Countries of Immigration’ in the EU and Austria”* hopes to contribute to EU migration research and policy at the time of the expansion in May 2004 and beyond.

The reader may expect comprehensive information on the situation of migrants both, in and out of the countries, and the countries’ migration management approaches, with the main purpose to illustrate the impact of migration trends on the local society and the social situation in the country.

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## Executive summary

Emigration, both politically and economically determined, has always been a phenomenon firmly present in the history as well as in the consciousness of the Poles. Throughout Polish history migration flows were initiated either by political factors (dissidents fleeing political repressions at the hands of the occupants or the communist regime) or economic ones (peasants of the overpopulated countryside leaving 'in search of bread'). The result of more than 100 years of intensive emigration was the development of a Polish diaspora spread throughout the world (Walaszek 2001); the building-up of migration networks facilitating foreign migration and the generation from international migration of an easily available means of accumulating capital and resolving short-term economic difficulties.

Notwithstanding the scale and significance assumed by migration, accessible statistical data do not allow for an accurate estimation of the flows to and from Poland. Measurement of foreign migration is based first and foremost on registration and deregistration, rather than on people's real movements. Data from various sources are not compatible, and frequently even conflict with one another (Sakson 2002). This in part due to methodological limitations (with information on migration being collected *ex ante*, which is to say that a person who intends to emigrate declares both that intention and the planned length of stay), but also to some extent reflects economic considerations (other forms of measurement like the British International Passenger Survey are very costly), as well as civilisational changes shaping new forms of international mobility (i.e. circular or irregular migration), that fall outside the definitions and methods of measurement employed hitherto.

The transformation of 1989 that incited deep socio-economic changes in Poland, has also influenced migration trends. Firstly, the number of migrants leaving Poland for permanent residence has declined considerably, in favour of temporary or seasonal migration. Besides 'traditional' destination countries like the US, Canada, Germany, the UK and France, an increasing importance has been acquired by 'new' directions of temporary migration like Italy, Spain and Greece. Secondly, Poland has experienced a sizeable inflow of migrants of different types (regular and irregular migrants, migrant workers, asylum seekers, etc.) and directions (both Eastern and Western countries). From a typically sending country, Poland is currently evolving into a sending-receiving one, with all the challenges and difficulties that such a process involves.

The newly-observed migration trends have recently experienced a certain deceleration (probably as in connection with the economic slowdown and rapid growth in the unemployment rate in Poland). The influx of people into Poland had been slowing steadily since 1999, and this is true of both the numbers of foreigners whose presence is noted in the General Residence Register and have been issued with visas, and the passenger traffic.

The most important groups of immigrants residing in Poland continue to be the citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation (mainly irregular and circulation migrants employed in the secondary sector of the labour market), migrants from the Asian countries (mainly Vietnam and China) involved in gastronomy and the sale of cheap, low-quality textiles, and highly-skilled professionals (managers, consultants and language teachers) from Western countries, among whom many are return migrants

with dual citizenship or the children of emigrants. Among political migrants there is at present a prevalence of asylum seekers from Chechnya. The decline in the influx of immigrants is associated with an increase in emigration. It is true to say that this is not as great as in the 1980s, but it does exceed the rate of inflow several-fold.

Migration plays an important role at both the micro level (of the individual or household) and the macro level (e.g. of local communities and regions). The most important economic effects of the present migration include: an easing of the impact of high unemployment (especially in the case of those whose long-term unemployed status resulted in their losing the right to unemployment benefit), as well as remittances transferred to the country (estimated at c. \$900 million annually from legal employment alone). The supply of cheap labour due to economic migrants from the former USSR raises the competitiveness of certain sectors of the economy (construction, agriculture), as well as making it possible for a greater number of households to purchase services (domestic work, care of children and elderly persons), that would not be accessible to the average family were it not for the participation of the migrant labour force.

Migration also goes hand in hand with serious socio-cultural consequences. Trips for work combine with the influx of highly-skilled professionals to accelerate the diffusion of technologies, more effective means of organising work and new models of consumption and the organisation of time (Romaniszyn 1999). Economic migration raises the standard of living and prestige of households involved in it, though it at the same time encourages stratification and relative deprivation among household members that do not have access to income from abroad. They thus become a push factor generating a further stream of migrants. The most serious social costs linked to migration processes include: the exclusion of certain migrants from the primary sector of the labour market in the country of origin and their shift into the secondary sector and shadow economy in the country of residence (which not only reduces the amounts of tax coming into the Treasury, but also deprives people of the right to health and social services); a significant decline in population in certain regions (especially on the part of the professionally active population), disturbances in the sphere of the family influencing the durability of marriages and the socialisation of children (such as long-term separation of spouses or the redefinition of the traditional division of labour in a family; and lastly the social marginalisation of circulation migrants in both sending and receiving communities.

The challenge associated with the influx of immigrants has been accompanied by a need to develop adequate legislative solutions. Until the mid 1990s, we had to „make do” with the Old Aliens Act of 1963 (which is to say enacted in the days of the People’s Republic of Poland. At that time foreigners visiting – let alone settling down in – Poland were a rarity). The first Aliens Act to be adjusted to the new scale of migration phenomena was passed in 1997, but by 2001 this was already in need of root and branch amendment, such that two separate Acts were ultimately passed to take its place in 2003 (the Act on Aliens and the Act on the Protection of Aliens). The new Aliens Act provides the legal structures underpinning the launch of the first regularization action in Poland (an amnesty for irregular migrants staying illegally on Polish territory), as well as imposing restrictive regulations on undocumented migrants who crossed the Polish border illegally - something that should reduce the possibilities for misusing the refugee status procedure on the part of migrants trafficked through Polish territory.

Notwithstanding the marked prevalence of temporary migration over that involving settlement, as well as an unfavourable demographic structure resembling that in other

EU member states, the actions seeking to integrate migrants into the receiving society are restricted to refugees, and (on slightly different conditions) repatriates only. This is mainly a reflection of the budgetary constraints, though it also results from a lack of clearly defined priorities in the long-term policy on migration. The integration programmes addressed to refugees have limited scope of impact, because only a part of the refugees that have been granted the status in Poland decide to settle down here, while others join their compatriots in Western countries. An important circumstance favouring the integration of migrants and refugees is the friendly or at least neutral attitude of Polish society to immigrants and – in comparison with other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries – a vanishingly small incidence of acts of violence against those differing in terms of race or ethnicity.



## 1. Historical Context

Emigration, both politically and economically determined, has always been a phenomenon firmly present in the history as well as in the consciousness of Poles. Through Polish history, migrants have belonged to two main categories: political dissidents fleeing political repressions on the part of occupants or the communist regime, and economic migrants leaving 'in search for bread'. The second half of the 18th century and the whole of the 19th were dominated by the emigration of political refugees (leaders and soldiers of defeated uprisings), while mass economically-driven outflow started at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (Morawska 1989). In the years 1871-1913, almost 3.5 million people emigrated from Polish territories, among which almost 2.25 million chose overseas countries (mainly the US). This figure is equivalent to 10% of the total population of Poland before the Great War. In the interwar period another 2.1 million people left Poland, heading mainly for France, Belgium, Germany and both Americas (Frejka / Okólski / Sword 1998). The temporary migration to Germany for seasonal employment in agriculture that was so common before World War II ceased under the communist regime, but was quickly restored after the transformation of 1989 and attendant liberalisation of the passport regime (*interview No. 3 with Research Fellow, Institute of Labour and Social Policy at Ministry of Economy, Labour and Social Affairs*; cf. Korczyńska 1997).

World War II, and the establishment of a 'post-Yalta' order that led to the division of Europe into two opposing camps (with Poland left under Soviet rule) had serious consequences for the migratory flows to and from Poland. The re-demarcation of the borders combined with significant population loss to provoke mass displacement of the Polish population and forced expulsions of non-Poles. The repatriation from the USSR was conducted in two flows: in the years 1944-1949 almost 1.5 million people returned from the USSR, and in the period 1955-59 a further 249,000 (Hut 2002). Those Poles that during World War II were deported to Asian republics of the USSR or for some reasons have not returned yet have been able (or their offspring have been able) to repatriate themselves since 1996.

The return migration from Western Europe did not have a mass character. About 200,000 individuals had come back to Poland up to the first half of the 1950s. A large group of Poles stayed abroad for political reasons (fearing repressions on their return to Poland<sup>1</sup>), or else because their regions of origin had been incorporated into the USSR, leaving them with no place to go back to. The Poles and Polish citizens of other nationality, who stayed abroad after WWII, settled in the US, Australia, Israel, Canada, France, East Africa, Brazil and Argentina (Korcelli 1994). They maintained relations with families in Poland, though. As the migratory network pioneers, they would often facilitate the emigration of family members from the Polish People's Republic.

At the same time as repatriation was ongoing, the authorities were organising the resettlement of the non-Poles from Polish territory. The attendant transfers of population concerned over 4 million individuals (Latuch 1961), most of them of German origin, who left Poland. From 1946 to 1950, 2.3 million Germans were resettled. Due to a loophole in the resolution of the Polish Communist Party (which determined who was entitled to

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<sup>1</sup> Those fears were well grounded, since the pre-war political and military activists returning to Poland would be accused of spying and sentenced to death

resettlement), many ethnic Poles managed to flow into West Germany under the umbrella of ethnic migrations (Iglicka 1997). Although the Polish Red Cross has estimated that after 1951 there were only 160,000 ethnic Germans in Poland, from January 1956 to February 1959 almost 253,000 people claimed German origins and left the country (Łepiński 1987). By 1975, the number of DPs had reached well over the predicted 160,000 - by 285,000 people. The record number of repatriates was noted in 1989, when almost 250,000 people emigrated from Poland to West Germany (Golinowska / Marek 1994). Democratic transformation has not ceased the continuous outflow to Germany, although its intensity has decreased – almost 134,000 Aussiedler from Poland were admitted in 1990, followed by another 70,000 in the years 1991-1998 (Kamusella 2003, Schmit 2003).

The levels of emigration to West Germany and other Western European countries would have been lower, had not it been for the very restrictive migration policy implemented by the Polish People's Republic. As in the other communist countries, the Polish authorities controlled the right to leave the country<sup>2</sup>. The difficulties encountered while applying for the permit to leave, as well as possible repressions on return in the case of a "lawless stay" (i.e. a stay prolonged beyond the date of return ordered by an internal security officer), all transformed the possibility of leaving the borders of communist rule behind into a symbolic "get-away from the cage". Thus the main aim was to settle down abroad and possibly to bring in other family members.

It must be noted, however, that the actual level of long-term and settlement migrations has been higher than the values presented in Table 1 indicate. Only individuals who officially deregistered themselves from the General Residential Register, due to permanent leave abroad, have been included in the statistics of the Central Statistical Office. The majority of emigrants left the country (or were staying abroad) without having informed the appropriate authorities. Their names have been included in the General Residential Register and they are recognised as persons living in Poland, even if they might have resided for many years abroad. This is particularly true as regards many of the so-called late German repatriates, i.e. "Spätaussiedler", but also the economic migrants of the 1980s and 1990s.

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<sup>2</sup> Until the late 1980s the keeping of passports at home was not allowed. In a case in which the passport was needed, the passport office would give it out. Of course, the clerk could equally well refuse to give out the passport, without even having to provide an explanation for this decision

**Table 1: International migration. Poland: 1945–2002 (in thousand)**

Year	Emigrants	Immigrants	Year	Emigrants	Immigrants
1945	1 506.0	2 283.0	1974	11.8	1.4
1946	1 836.0	1 181.0	1975	9.6	1.8
1947	542.7	228.7	1976	26.7	1.8
1948	42.7	62.9	1977	28.9	1.6
1949	61.4	19.1	1978	29.5	1.5
1950	60.9	8.1	1979	34.2	1.7
1951	7.8	3.4	1980	22.7	1.5
1952	1.6	3.7	1981	23.8	1.4
1953	2.8	2.0	1982	32.1	0.9
1954	3.8	2.8	1983	26.2	1.2
1955	1.9	4.7	1984	17.4	1.6
1956	21.8	27.6	1985	20.5	1.6
1957	133.4	91.8	1986	29.0	1.9
1958	139.3	92.8	1987	36.4	1.8
1959	37.0	43.2	1988	36.3	2.1
1960	28.0	5.7	1989	26.6	2.2
1961	26.5	3.6	1990	18.4	2.6
1962	20.2	3.3	1991	21.0	5.0
1963	20.0	2.5	1992	18.1	6.5
1964	24.2	2.3	1993	21.3	5.9
1965	28.6	2.2	1994	25.9	6.9
1966	28.8	2.2	1995	26.3	8.1
1967	19.9	2.1	1996	21.3	8.2
1968	19.4	2.2	1997	20.2	8.4
1969	22.1	2.0	1998	22.2	8.9
1970	14.1	1.9	1999	21.5	7.5
1971	30.2	1.7	2000	26.9	7.3
1972	19.1	1.8	2001	23.4	6.6
1973	13.0	1.4	2002	24.5	6.6

Source: Central Statistical Office

Apart from the political and ethnic migrations, the majority of temporary and settlement migrations were purely economically driven. The economy of socialist countries was best summed up in the words of Janos Kornai as the “economy of shortage”. The permanent shortages and low quality of basic goods were structurally inculcated in the socialist economy. The speedy industrialisation of the country and the economic competition with the West was accomplished at the cost of low levels of domestic consumption. The lacking domestic market competition resulted in the poorer quality of goods, especially striking when Poland was compared with its Western counterparts. The Poles understood pretty quickly that foreign business trips (including also member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid) provided a good opportunity to obtain goods hardly available in Poland and available without any restrictions elsewhere. The “private” import, performed on the occasion of the short-term foreign migrations, enriched the domestic market, thus spurring people on further entrepreneurial trips in search of profitable bargains and market niches. Thanks to limits put on international travel, and sanctions imposed against speculators, commercial trips were usually taken under the cover of organised tourist trips (Stola 2001). These quasi-tourist journeys

(very often of a circulatory character) for small-trade become an almost mass phenomenon in the 1980s. In some cases, the gained skills, contacts and accumulated financial means led to the opening of own businesses (Koryś / Źuchaj 1998).

The next push factor, which encouraged short-term and durable migrations, abroad was the buying power of the Western currencies. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a whole family could live for a month on 25 USD (Golinowska / Marek 1994). Even small remittances sent by the family members working abroad would influence the financial status of a household remarkably. They gained even more in importance when cars, apartments and luxury goods became officially available in exchange for foreign currency (Stola 2001). The feeling of insecurity caused by ever deeper economic and political crisis, awoken aspirations as regards consumption and the presence of well developed migratory networks led in the 1980s to the “migratory psychosis”, i.e. the belief that the only accessible and acceptable life option was emigration to the West (Golinowska / Marek 1994).

## 2. Overall Migration Indicators

### 2.1. Available data sources

For several reasons, the accessible statistical data do not allow for an accurate estimation of the flows to and from Poland. Firstly, “Polish statistics are able to capture only two remote ends of the interval covering the ‘truth’ about international mobility of people” (Okólski / Kepińska 2001, p. 6) describing the migratory behaviours in an either too general or too selective way (respectively as cross border movement or as migration for permanent settlement). Secondly, the registration of migration flows is not adapted to the logic of migrations or to the dominant migratory strategies. For example (as was mentioned in Chapter 1), the only individuals registered officially as emigrants from Poland are those who definitely move their entire household from Poland to another country, and who thus justify the application for removal from the General Residential Register by reference to the fact of their going abroad. However, the decision to move to another country is usually taken after a former residential stay abroad, sometimes of a rather prolonged nature, but the statistics register only the final stage. They do not recognise the cases in which the decision to burn the bridges is not taken at all. This is also the case with various forms of circulatory migration (especially of petty traders, seasonal workers, etc); the actual period of stay of these individuals in Poland (or out of Poland) is usually longer than a few months in a year, but since their status is irregular, they do not figure in any of the statistics. Apart from that, as Barbara Sakson accurately noticed (Sakson 2002), statistics based on a declared intention regarding definitive departure are grossly misleading, since the actual duration of international migration cannot be predicted *ex-ante*. Thirdly, the data concerning theoretically the same migrant group tend to differ depending on the source.

At the moment, the basic sources and types of data concerning migrations from and to Poland are (compare Table 2):

1. Statistics of the Border Guard, registering the intensity of mobility via the border crossings, differentiating between outgoing Poles and visiting (transferring) foreigners.
2. Statistics of the Central Statistical Office, including
  - a) the population registered for temporary and permanent stay.
  - b) the results of the Labour Force Survey, registering temporary (short- and long-term) stays abroad of household members.
  - c) census data, of which the newest results are from 2002 (when for the first time questions about foreign migrations of Polish citizens were asked, and permanent and temporary legal immigrant households included).
3. Statistics of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners, which represent the issued number of fixed-time and permanent residence permits, residence visas with a right to work, student visas and refugee statuses.
4. Polish citizenship granted by the President of Republic of Poland – a statistic of citizenship illustrating the “last step” of the settlement and integration processes with a host society. Correspondingly, this statistic also registers those Poles who wish to renounce their Polish citizenship in order to acquire another one.

The sources mentioned above do not account for the cases in which all members of the household stay abroad but the household has not been officially deregistered, nor do they include the cases of irregular migrants in all forms of the phenomenon: illegal crossing of the Polish border, overstaying a visa or engagement in activities other than those declared upon entry on to Polish territory, etc.

**Table 2: Main sources of data on migration available in Poland and their basic limitations**

	Outflow	Inflow
<b>Border Guard Statistics</b>	+	+
Limitations:	Statistics do not differentiate between migrants and tourists, nor do they register purpose of visit or declared length of stay	
<b>CSO: Evidence (Population registered)</b>	+	+
Limitations:	The obligation of registration (and de-registration) is not strictly discharged, thus statistics on outflow and inflow are underestimated	
<b>CSO: Labour Force Survey</b>	+	-
Limitations:	Every edition of the survey conducted quarterly consists of questions put to household members that are currently staying abroad. A quite reliable source of continuous monitoring of the stock of short-term and long-term emigrants	
<b>CSO: Census 2002</b>	+ <sup>3</sup>	+
Limitations:	Results might be underestimated, especially in cases in which the whole household has left Poland (outflow) or interviewed immigrants do not speak Polish or another international language (inflow); long time interval between censuses	
<b>Office for Repatriation and Foreigners Statistics</b>	-	+
Limitations:	Statistics register only visas or permits granted – they do not register the actual numbers of arrivals (some migrants may obtain visa or residence permit but never arrive in Poland)	
<b>Citizenship Statistics</b>	+	+
Limitations:	These statistics concern only the final stage in the transformation of a migrant's status	

<sup>3</sup> The Polish census' questionnaire includes questions on all (registered) household members regardless their actual presence at a given address, what allows to record those household's members that were abroad during the census time. Those cases when all members of family have left are not included in record

## 2. 2. Cross border movement

In the early period of transformation, cross border movements of persons to and from Poland were indicative, not only of travelling, but also of circular mobility itself, since a large part of the travellers combined tourism with other goals (such as petty trade or occasional employment) or were seasonal migrants who otherwise escaped registration (Okólski / Kępińska 2001). Of course, statistics for cross border movement do not reflect the actual number of persons passing the borders of Poland (Sakson 2002), but roughly illustrate the directions and dynamics to international mobility.

### 2.2.1. Passenger movement

The political and economic transformation in Poland incited many processes (e.g. liberalization of the economy and a period of quick economic growth in the first half of the 1990s, stabilisation of the Polish zloty and its partial exchangeability), which in their turn have favoured an increase in passenger movements across the Polish borders, and stimulated comings and goings of foreigners vis a vis Poland, as well as departures on the part of Poles. The shifts in the intensity of the cross border movements in Poland are as presented in Fig. 1 (see appendix).

Until the beginning of the 1990, the number of Polish citizens leaving the country was higher than the number of foreigners coming to Poland. This is especially visible in 1989, when a sudden increase in the number of departures from Poland might be related to the collapse of the system. During subsequent years the numbers of Polish citizens going abroad grew steadily (due to the facilitation of movements at borders with most Western European countries that had given up their visa regimes, plus partial exchangeability of the Polish zloty and long-term economic growth), reaching its peak of 56.6 million in 2000. Since 2000, both numbers of Polish citizens leaving for abroad and of foreigners entering Poland have been on the decrease.

The mass increase in the number of foreigners entering Poland to be observed in the first half of the 1990s was mainly due to a considerable inflow of the citizens of neighbouring countries (especially the ex-Russian Republics), who could enter Polish territory without a visa on the basis of agreements signed between the Polish People's Republic and the USSR. At the beginning, these visits were usually short-term, quasi-tourist trips (Stola 1997) that would combine petty trade with occasional short-term employment in Poland. As the years went by, petty-traders turned into seasonal workers (mainly illegal, although some of them have regularised their stays and settled in Poland), and spread over Europe.

In the years 1996-1999 the number of foreigners entering Poland was at a stable level of 87-89 million. However, apart from being citizens of the ex-USSR, the visitors also came from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but mainly from Germany. The majority of the visits were related to short-term shopping satisfying the needs of a household<sup>4</sup>, with the result that their number decreased following the appreciation of the Polish zloty and the equalization of prices between Poland and neighbouring countries. (see Table 3 and Fig. 2). The decreasing numbers of foreigners also resulted in a drop in their expenditures in Poland. 1997 was the last year in which an increase in expenditure by foreigners in

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<sup>4</sup> According to estimates of the Institute of Tourism (based on annually conducted surveys) only 25% of (1,500,000) foreigners arriving in Poland in 2001 spent at least one night there. This allows it to be assumed that a majority of foreign citizens were involved in one-day trips to Poland (Kępińska / Okólski 2002)

Poland was registered (of 19.3% when compared with 1996). In 1998, expenditure was 25 per cent lower than in 1997, while in 2001 they were 25% lower than in 2000 (Kępińska / Okólski 2002).

**Table 3: Foreigners entering Poland from Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Lithuania (in millions): 1995–2002**

Country:	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Germany	47.34	46.56	49.17	50.7	52.45	47.05	29.6	22.30
Czech Republic	19.33	23.49	20.85	21.37	18.24	16.81	13.44	12.07
Slovakia	3.75	4.49	3.84	4.09	3.51	3.13	2.02	1.79
Ukraine	4.39	4.83	4.94	4.39	4.84	5.74	5.94	5.41
Belarus	4.45	4.49	4.14	3.17	5.12	6.51	5.63	4.61
Russia	0.68	0.95	0.98	0.7	1.06	1.21	1.04	0.85
Lithuania	1.11	1.3	1.66	1.74	1.48	1.39	1.37	1.31

Source: Border Guard

As Fig. 2 shows, the dominant components to the inflow were foreigners over the southern and western borders, though these are the ones whose shares in the overall pattern tend to be declining systematically. The inflow of visitors from the East also dropped, as something, which might reflect the decreasing demand for irregular workers. Interestingly enough, the regulations of the new Aliens Act 1997 obliged the citizens of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus to prove and demonstrate possession of the financial means needed to enter, stay or even transit through the territory of Poland, while the more restrictive procedures of issuing and registering invitations resulted merely in a rather insignificant and shortlived limitation of the inflow. It required the Polish economy to collapse before the inflow of foreigners from the ex-USSR gained some autonomous regulation.

A noteworthy form of cross-border movement is a specific and partially institutionalized phenomenon practiced in the Polish borderlands and involving individuals called “ants” crossing the border several times a day to bring in the allowed number of cigarettes, liquor or fuel. The cargo is then sold to the wholesale and retail traders cooperating with them. The differences in the taxes make this semi-legal form of import a very profitable activity for the “ants”, the traders and the Polish customers. Despite the attempts to restrict this phenomenon, it is still an important source of income for many households, especially in the underdeveloped regions with high structural unemployment rates, like the voivodships of Warmia and Mazury and of Podlasie in North-eastern Poland.

### 2.2.2. Illegal Border Crossing

One of the conditions behind Poland’s membership in the Schengen group, as well as EU accession in general, has been the improvement of controls on the Polish borders, and most especially on the Eastern border, which will soon become the external frontier of the EU. The change in the structure of the Border Guard (replacing conscripts with professionals) has combined with the development of infrastructure (additional equipment, new border guard posts and border crossings, a Europol electronic connection system) - all made possible thanks to PHARE funds - to bring palpable effects. Between 1997 and 2002, the number of foreigners apprehended for illegal crossing of the border decreased by 40 % (from 5,312 to 3,086), while the main human



smuggling channel no longer leads through Poland, but through the Czech Republic and Slovakia (*interviews No. 8 and 9 with officers of the Border Guard*).

The nationality of the individuals arrested for illegal crossing of the border has been changing (see Table A1<sup>5</sup>). In the mid 1990s, they were mainly citizens of Romania, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Currently, individuals apprehended for illegal border crossing are mainly citizens of India, Iraq, Afghanistan, China and Vietnam, as well as the countries neighbouring with Poland, i.e. the Czech Republic, Ukraine and Russia. The fact that a growing share of persons are turning to organised forms of trafficking through Poland in the last group (with the exception of the citizens of the Czech Republic) is quite disturbing (the statistic for individuals “apprehended in organised groups” – see Table A3). The most migrants and organised groups are stopped on the Polish-German border (something that might be a consequence of the fact that some migrants could have entered Poland legally, and then tried to get to German territory illegally; see Table A2). An objective indicator of the increasing effectiveness of the Border Guard is the 60% decrease in the number of foreigners readmitted to Poland in the years 1997 – 2002 (from 4,797 to 1,856; see. Table A4).

### 2.3. The inflow

#### 2.3.1. Legal Migration: Permanent and temporary migration

The data relating to the numbers of immigrants staying in Poland differ depending on the source. According to the Census data (which measure the stock of migrants residing in the country at a given time), there were 34,100 immigrants in Poland, i.e. foreign residents staying temporarily in Poland for over 2 months - in 2002. Given the fact that the Polish population amounts to 38,630,000 people, the share of registered immigrants constitutes less than 0.08 per cent.

Some registered migrants hold dual citizenship, and among them almost one-fourth held Polish citizenship (7,700). Among the non-Polish citizens, 73.5% (17,700) were citizens of one of the European countries, of which 4,500 held EU citizenship. Over 22,700 (66% of) registered incomers are long-term immigrants; they have been staying in Poland for 12 months or longer (of which 4,500 have been living in Poland for over 5 years), and 11,400 (33%) are short-term migrants, staying in Poland for a period from 2 to 12 months.

The statistics other than from Census 2002 confirm a recent tendency towards a decrease in the inflow, and an increase in the outflow from Poland. According to the Central Statistical Office data, the number of immigrants settling in Poland annually, i.e. individuals granted the permanent residence permit and registered in the General Residential Register, reached a peak in 1998 (at 8,916), and has since decreased to 6,587 in 2002 (see Table 4).

**Table 4. Immigration for permanent residence in Poland: 1997–2001**

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
8 426	8 916	7 525	7 331	6 625	6 587

Source: *Demographic Yearbook of Poland, various years*

<sup>5</sup> Because of the significant volume of the statistical data, some detailed tables are placed at the end of the present report, in the Statistical Annex

**Table 5. Persons arriving from abroad registered for a temporary stay of over two months, 1997–2001 (as of December 31)**

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
17 976	27 542	39 303	43 623	43 501

Source: *Demographic Yearbook of Poland, various years*

Among migrants who meet all the requirements that entitle them to a permanent residence permit (compare section 5.2.2), there is a prevalence of immigrants from European countries (especially Germany) and the US (see Table A5). Immigrants from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus do not account for more than 15 % of the overall number of immigrants settling in Poland, though the statistics for foreigners registered for a temporary stay of over two months reveal that citizens of Ukraine constituted as many as 47% of all registered foreigners in 2001 (see Table A6). Such a discrepancy could support the thesis stating that - for the immigrants coming from the ex-USSR - Poland is not an attractive country for settlement migration, but is definitely an interesting destination for short-term economic migrations (compare Okólski 1998). Apart from the citizens of the ex-USSR countries, the largest groups residing temporarily in Poland comprise citizens of Germany, France, the US and Canada.

The statistic of numbers of visas issued in the years 1998–2002 also attests to a sharp decrease in the inflow of foreigners. In the period, the number of residence visas and visas with permissions to work decreased by almost 80 % (see Table 6).

**Table 6. Different types of visas issued in the years 1998–2002**

TYPE OF VISA	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TOTAL 1998-2002
<b>Visas with permission to work</b>	10 709	2 015	1 064	1 444	2 465	17 697
<b>Residence visas</b>	33 180	17 960	12 381	9 788	6 719	80 028
<b>Transit visas</b>	1	3	1	0	0	5
<b>Total number of visas issued</b>	43 890	19 978	13 446	11 232	9 184	97 730

Source: *POLAND 1998 - 2002, Office for Repatriation and Aliens*

Although the number of foreigners coming to Poland is plummeting, the number of granted permanent residence permits oscillates at around 700 per year, while the number of fixed-time residence permits rose significantly in 2001. This means that, despite the limitation of the inflow, the number of migrants regulating their status is rising gradually. Among the foreigners applying for permanent residence permits, the Ukrainians, Russians and Vietnamese are the dominant groups (see Table A7). When it comes to the foreigners applying for fixed-time residence permits, the above groups are joined by Belarussian, German, British, French and US citizens (see Table A8).

<sup>6</sup> In 2001, 11% of the settling immigrant group was made up of Russians, Belarussians and Ukrainians, cf. less than 7% in 2000 and 1999

<sup>7</sup> Among the individuals who arrived from abroad and have registered for a temporary stay exceeding two months are citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, who could benefit from no-visa mobility until October 1, 2003 - it is for this reason that the number of registered temporary-stay migrants exceeds the number of visas and fixed-time residence permits

**Table 7. Permanent residence permits 1998–2001\*)**

1998	1998		1999		2000		2001	
	Appli- cations	Granted	Appli- cations	Granted	Appli- cations	Granted	Appli- cations	Granted
1 338 **)	851	275	723	544	1 576	851	742	674

\*) The number of persons granted the permit in a given year may exceed the number of applicants in that year because the former also pertain to applications submitted in preceding years

\*\*) Permits to settle granted to those who applied for “permanent residence” (in accordance with the “old” Aliens Act) before 1 January 1998

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table 8. Fixed-time residence permits 1998–2001\*)**

1998		1999		2000		2001	
Appli- cations	Granted	Appli- cations	Granted	Appli- cations	Granted	Appli- cations	Granted
9 448	4 893	16 712	16 810	17 167	15 034	23 445	20 522

\*) The number of persons granted the permit in a given year may exceed the number of applicants in that year because the former also pertain to applications submitted in preceding years

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

### 2.3.2. Illegal (irregular) migration

The category of irregular migrants includes all migrants who cross borders without proper authority or violate conditions for entering another country, i.e. by overstaying their visas or undertaking employment without required permission (Jordan / Duvell, 2002, p. 15). The number of illegal migrants is *ex definitione* impossible to measure, because the migrants falling in this category put a lot of effort into not being registered in any official records. Consequently, all the data concerning illegal migrants is of an estimatory nature - probably mis-estimated.

When it comes to the migrants who have been smuggled or trafficked through the territory of Poland, the 1998 volume was of an estimated 30,000 plus per year (Okólski 2000). Since then, a change in transit routes has probably resulted in a decline in this number. Unfortunately, the share of migrants who are stopped while travelling in organised groups is rising steadily, so confirming presuppositions to the effect that trafficking in human beings to Western Europe is becoming another branch of “business” controlled by organised crime and co-ordinated at the international level (*interviews No. 8 and 9*).

The group of irregular migrants involved in illegal employment consists generally of citizens of neighbouring ex-soviet countries (Ukraine and Belarus). According to the estimates from Marek Okólski, the number of clandestine migrant workers in 1998 oscillated around “one million individuals, and this activity is the basic employment for ca. 100,000 of them.” (Okólski 1998). However, this guess also seems too high nowadays. According to interviewed experts, the number of illegal migrant workers does not currently exceed 300,000 (*interview No. 7 with the high official of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners*).

It is difficult to provide any numerical data for the last category of illegal migrants, i.e. the foreigners who have overstayed their visas or been allowed a period of visa-free stay. This group consists mainly of migrants (predominantly from Armenia and other ex-Soviet Asian republics) who have come to Poland using the visa-free mobility scheme and who have stayed here since they are afraid they might experience problems with re-entry. We should hope that the results of the first Polish regulatory action, (started on September 1, 2003 and to be finished on December 31, 2003) addressed to this very group, will provide us with more relevant information concerning this category.

## 2.4. The outflow

As has already been mentioned in Chapter 1, the mass migrations of an economic or political nature are a permanent phenomenon in the Polish historical and social tradition. One can even venture to advance a thesis to the effect that emigration has become one of the more significant strategies of adaptation to the encountered difficulties on the micro-level (economic emigration of household members) and on the macro level (international agreements on the employment of Polish seasonal workers aimed at reducing structural unemployment pressure).

For many years (because of a very good exchange rate), emigration had been a very easy way in which to accumulate significant financial means and the related social promotion. Broad migratory networks functioning in the host countries have constituted an additional factor encouraging migration. Another important change, which occurred in the last decade, is the comeback of the short-term and seasonal economic migrations (dominant in the 2nd half of the 19th century), as well as a decrease in settlement migrations (albeit with a relative drop in the number of permanent emigrants at the beginning of the 1990s have been followed by the onset of growth once again).

In the case of emigration, it is difficult to draw a distinction between legal and illegal migration, from the point of view of the sending country. This is especially the case since 1989, at which time every citizen was re-granted the right to leave Poland at any moment and for whatever period<sup>8</sup>.

### 2.4.1. Permanent Migration

The volume of emigration for permanent stay dropped at the beginning of 1990, probably on account of a rise in optimism and high expectations related to the beginning of socio-economic transformation (migrants might have postponed the decision to withdraw their entry from the Register). Since then, however, this number has been growing steadily, to reach 24,532 in 2002 (Table 9).

**Table 9. Emigrants by major destinations. Poland: 1997–2002**

1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
20 222	22 177	21 535	26 999	23 368	24 532

Source: *Demographic Yearbook of Poland, various years*

<sup>8</sup> Apart from the situation in which the right to mobility is limited by a lawful court decision related to ongoing proceedings

Europe is one of the main destinations of settlement migration (attracting over 80% of all migrations), and almost 90% of emigrants choosing European countries settle in Germany (see Table A 10). Apart from Germany, very popular countries are the UK and France. In the last five years the incidence of settlement migration to The Netherlands and Italy has nearly doubled, whereas the number of people emigrating to Sweden has dropped (probably because of the crisis in the Swedish welfare state). Apart from Europe, the main destinations are the US (10% of all migrations) and Canada (5%).

#### 2.4.2. Temporary Migrations

Liberalisation of the passport regulations facilitates short stays abroad. However, the increase in the number of temporary emigrants was not as great as had been feared by Western European countries. According to the data from the 1988 Census, almost 508,000 Poles were then living abroad (since they did not cancel their entries in the General Residential Register, they are treated as temporary migrants); in 1995 the figure was of more than 900,000 (Micro-census data); while by 2002 it had dropped to 786,100, of which 626,200 Poles (79.7%) had stayed abroad for 12 months or more. The number of Poles residing abroad could be slightly higher (if all household members stay abroad without engaging in official deregistration), but does not exceed an additional 402,000 people (that was the exact number of the “lacking” respondents in the 2002 Census, as compared with the current estimates available at the end of 2001).

Apart from Censuses, there are two sources for data concerning temporary stays abroad. The first (see Table 10) registers the reported temporary stays abroad in the General Residential Register. According to this source, the number of individuals staying abroad has been growing steadily in the 1990s, reaching 15,000. The second source (see Table 11) estimates the number of people residing temporarily abroad, by using the data of the Labour Force Survey – a survey conducted quarterly on a representative sample of (over 14,000) households. In accordance with the LFS results, the number of Poles staying abroad in the 1990s was fluctuating at between 130,000 and 200,000 per year, while the share of short-term migrations (of up to 12 months) has been increasing. The number of temporary migrants recorded in the General Residential Register is only around one-tenth as great as that in the LFS. Moreover, apart from the divergence in the scales of the observed phenomenon, visible fluctuations in outflow registered in the survey do not reflect the image of the stable trend resulting from the General Residential Register data.

**Table 10. Population temporarily absent for 2 months and more due to residence abroad (in thousand\*)**

Year	Total	Males	Females	Urban areas	Rural areas
1995	10.3	6.4	3.9	8	2.3
1997	13.5	8.2	5.3	10.8	2.7
1998	14.2	8.8	5.4	11.6	2.6
1999	14.4	8.8	5.6	11.7	2.7
2000	15.3	9.5	5.8	12.3	3.0
2001	15.4	9.9	5.5	12.2	3.2

\*) As at 31 December

Source: Demographic Yearbook, various years

Both sets of statistics are gathered by the same institution (the CSO), so any difference is of a methodological character and has been caused by the diverse methods of data collection (registration of reported leavings vs. household surveys). For many reasons, people do not report short-term migrations in the General Residential Register (i.e. to benefit from different forms of social security in the country of origin – Kupiszewski 2002); however, they indicate the number of absent household members if asked in the survey. It thus seems that the broader use of the survey techniques could allow for better estimates of the scale and dynamics of the migratory flows, as well as for control of the results derived from other sources.

The territorial distribution of temporary emigration is similar to that obtained for settlement emigration. The biggest flow comes from ex-German territories (especially Silesia, Pomerania and the historical Eastern Prussia) and from the economically retarded agricultural regions of Eastern Poland. However, analysis of the number of emigrants per 1,000 inhabitants in each voivodship assigned top place to that of Opole (Opolskie), for each 1,000 of whose inhabitants almost 99 stay abroad (cf. Map 1 and 2). The next places are taken by the voivodships of Podlasie (Podlaskie), (ca. 46) and Podkarpackie (ca. 37). The lowest indicator was observed for the voivodships of Łódź and Wielkopolska (ca. 7 emigrants for 1,000 inhabitants).

**Table 11. Polish citizens residing abroad for longer than two months, who at the time of each Labour Force Survey (LFS) were members of households in Poland (by gender and duration of stay abroad; in thousands)**

Year *)	All migrants			Duration of stay abroad (in months)	
	Total	Males	Females	2-12	12+
1994	196	117	79	83	113
1995	183	110	73	89	94
1996	162	92	70	72	90
1997	144	83	61	62	82
1998	133	76	57	60	73
1999 **)					
2000	132	75	57	69	63
2001	168	97	71	99	68
2002 ***)	177	102	75	98	79

\*) Numbers denote annual averages based on four quarterly surveys

\*\*) LFS was temporarily discontinued after February 1999

\*\*\*) Average based on 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter surveys

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

The main destinations of temporary migrations, as with settlement migrations, are: Germany (294,300), the US (158,000) and Italy (39,000); in further positions one can find Canada, the UK and France. Beside “traditional” countries for temporary migrations (usually of an economic character) like Germany, the US or Canada, the new directions of outflow are provided by Mediterranean countries like Italy and Spain (see Fig. 3).

## 2.5 . Migration Balance

The general balance for permanent emigration is unfavourable for Poland. Each year more people leave the country than decide to settle here (see Table 12). Formally, within the past six years, almost 140,000 people have left Poland, while only 45,000 came in to settle. This proportion is unlikely to change immediately after EU accession, but – by drawing an analogy with Spain and Portugal – economic development stimulated by a joining of EU markets is expected to result in a growing inflow of migrants in the future.

**Table 12: Balance of Migration to and from Poland 1997–2002**

Year	Emigration	Immigration	Balance
1997	20 222	8 426	-11 796
1998	22 177	8 916	-13 261
1999	21 536	7 525	-14 011
2000	26 999	7 331	-19 668
2001	23 368	6 625	-16 743
2002	24 532	6 587	-17 945
<b>TOTAL 1997-2002</b>	<b>138 834</b>	<b>45 410</b>	<b>-93 424</b>

Source: Central Statistical Office

Within the past five years, the sex ratio for migrants has been surprisingly equal, amounting for both emigrants and immigrants to around 0.5 (with a slight surplus of males - see Table 13).

**Table 13: Migrants by gender (in actual numbers)**

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
<b>Emigrants</b>					
males	10 179	11 607	11 035	13 740	12 251
females	10 043	10 570	10 501	13 259	11 117
<b>Immigrants</b>					
males	4 279	4 400	3 853	3 893	3 505
females	4 147	4 516	3 672	3 438	3 120

Source: Recent Trends in International Migration, Poland, various years

The age structure among emigrants is also stable, not having experienced more major changes over the last seven years (see Table 14). Among men departing from Poland with an intention to settle abroad permanently, over 30% each year are under 20 years old, while about 50% are 20-49 and less than 20% over 50. In the case of the women leaving Poland, the age structure is very uniform – the group of emigrants is dominated by women of the greatest productive age (60% in the 20-49 year group). The last 7 years have seen a slight decline in the numbers of emigrating women under 20 (from 23% in 1995 to 17% in 2001), while there has been an increase in the share of those aged 50+ (from 17% in 1995 to 20% in 2001).

The breakdown by age of immigrants settling in Poland is characterised by a greater dynamic to the change. Over the last seven years there has been a clear increase in the share of migrants in the youngest age category (under 20) – of 13 percentage points in

the case of men (from 12.9% in 1995 to 26% in 2001), and of 14 in the case of women (from 14.5% to 28.4% over the same interval). There is also an increase, if slower, in the share of migrants aged 50 and over (in the years 1997-2001 from 20.4% to 24.2% in the case of men and from 23.7% to 28% in the case of women). The growing share of the youngest and oldest age categories is associated with a clear decline in the numbers of immigrants representative of the middle age interval. The numbers of male immigrants aged 20 to 49 have declined by 17 percentage points (from 66.8% in 1995 to 49.8% in 2001), while the figure for females of 18.3 (from 61.9% in 1995 to 43.6% in 2001). Such a distinct change in age structure may imply that a period of preliminary exploration (as usual pioneered by migrants of productive age) crowned by the settlement of a certain group, is giving way to a stage involving the reuniting of families.

**Table 14: Migrants by age structure (%)**

<b>Males</b>							
<b>Emigrants</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
-20	32.0	33.4	33.4	34.7	33.9	30.8	34.2
20-49	51.6	52.8	53.8	53.8	51.6	51.1	49.7
50+	16.4	13.8	12.5	12.5	14.6	19.2	16.1
<b>Immigrants</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
<20	12.9	15.6	17.5	20.9	29.0	25.2	26.0
20-49	66.8	63.9	62.2	57.3	50.6	52.3	49.8
50+	20.4	20.5	20.3	21.8	20.4	22.5	24.2
<b>Females</b>							
<b>Emigrants</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
<20	22.9	21.4	21.2	19.7	18.9	17.8	16.9
20-49	59.9	60.0	61.6	62.6	61.4	60.7	62.8
50+	17.2	18.6	17.2	17.7	19.7	21.5	20.3
<b>Immigrants</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
<20	14.5	16.2	19.0	21.3	29.4	27.6	28.4
20-49	61.9	60.3	57.4	54.7	44.0	44.7	43.6
50+	23.7	23.4	23.6	24.0	26.6	27.7	28.0

Source: *Kępińska / Okólski 2002*

What is also very interesting is the structure to the set of migrants from the point of view of educational attainment (see Table 15). Since 1997, some 24% of immigrants settling in Poland have been individuals with post-secondary educational attainment. In contrast, among the emigrants leaving Poland with the intention of remaining abroad permanently, less than 1.5% have been this well educated. Although the net gain of educated people was maintained after 1994 (Iglićka 2003), such that the phenomenon of *brain drain* can be said to have given way to *brain gain* (or reverse *brain drain*), the true scale of the phenomenon may be more minor. It needs to be recalled that it is easier for those with proven higher education to fulfill requirements for the granting of a fixed-time residence permit (i.e. to prove that they 'run a business activity (...) profitable for the national economy', compare section 5.2.1.). In turn, the major possibilities opening up



before highly-qualified specialists in post-1989 Poland ensured that educated emigrants might prefer temporary to permanent migration, and are not therefore taken account of in the statistics.

**Table 15. Migrants by educational attainment (for migrants aged 15 years or over)**

Migrant category	Category of educational attainment			
	Post-secondary	Secondary	Vocational	Elementary and unknown
	<b>1997</b>			
Emigrants	295	2 047	2 206	13 206
Immigrants	1 987	2 897	1 145	2 397
Balance	1 692	850	-1 061	-10 809
	<b>1998</b>			
Emigrants	286	1 934	2 332	15 224
Immigrants	1 885	3 017	1 176	1285
Balance	1 599	1 083	-1 156	-13 939
	<b>1999</b>			
Emigrants	415	1 699	2 026	15 095
Immigrants	1 604	1 798	977	1 230
Balance	1 189	99	-1 049	-13 865
	<b>2000</b>			
Emigrants	322	2 186	2 532	19 459
Immigrants	1 388	2 178	1 051	1 066
Balance	1 066	-8	-1 481	-18 393
	<b>2001</b>			
Emigrants	277	1 739	1 815	17 451
Immigrants	1 260	1 831	937	1 061
Balance	983	92	-878	-16 390

Source: *Recent Trends in International Migration, Poland; various years*

The statistic of Polish citizenship over the last thirteen years also confirms the relative unattractiveness of Poland as a country of immigration (Table 16). Polish citizenship attracted the most “attention” during Lech Wałęsa’s term of office as President, i.e. in the years 1990 to 1995 (Polish citizenship is granted by the discretionary decision of the President of the Republic). The ‘demand’ for Polish citizenship registered in the first half of the 1990s might be ‘spurious’, however, since the statistic may have included not only foreigners who wished to change their citizenship, but also cases of the restoration of citizenship for those who were deprived of it for political reasons in the 1980s, and for Polish nationals repatriated from Asian republics of the former USSR in the 1990s. Overall, during the 12.5 years, Polish citizenship was granted to 10,109 individuals; while in the period of 7.5 years, 6,741 Poles renounced it (in favour of a foreign citizenship of the countries which do not allow dual citizenship). Unfortunately, the difficulties with the acquisition of detailed data (e.g. presenting annual numbers of applications, previous citizenship or the most common reasons for refusal) make it impossible to analyse this very interesting source.

**Table 16. Polish citizenship granted and renounced (1990–2003)**

Term in office	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005
<b>The type of decision</b>	Lech Wałęsa's term in office	Aleksander Kwaśniewski's 1 <sup>st</sup> term in office	Aleksander Kwaśniewski's 2 <sup>nd</sup> term in office (as on June 9, 2003)
Granting of Polish citizenship	5 051	4 078	980
Refusal to grant Polish citizenship	975	1 878	160
Promise to grant Polish citizenship	468	931	575
Consent to renounce Polish citizenship	26*)	3 350	3 391
Refusal to give consent to renounce Polish citizenship	0	40	12

\*) During Lech Wałęsa's term of office there were no regulations on the renouncement procedure

Source: Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland

When analysing the territorial population inflows and outflows (Map 2), a positive balance of net permanent migration is observable only in Mazowsze (Mazowieckie) voivodship, within which the Warsaw agglomeration is situated. This fact confirms once again the strong relationship between international migration and an economic factor. Mazowsze is the region of the most intensive economic growth in Poland, where the majority of investments are concentrated, and where the largest number of businesses is located. The regions of the largest negative balance are Silesia (Dolnośląskie, Opolskie and Śląskie voivodships) and Pomerania (Pomorskie voivodship).

### Recommendations:

The documented knowledge about the inflows of foreigners, as well as the outflows of Polish citizens, is drastically incomplete, with the available data being not only unhelpful, but even erroneous (Kupiszewski 2002, Sakson 2002, Okólski 1997). An improvement in the quantity and quality of collected data (and especially a perfection of measurement methodology and triangulation<sup>9</sup> of results) is desperately needed. Reliable migration data will facilitate an effective migration policy.

Due to the high level of international mobility of Polish citizens and their reluctance to register short- and medium-term migrations, an extension of the role of surveys in measurement of flows and the volume of migration, as postulated by Okólski (Okólski 1997), is very much advisable.

<sup>9</sup> In social sciences, triangulation describes the methodological postulate that a given hypothesis should be verified by reference to data collected using different research techniques (Frankfort-Nachmias / Nachmias 2001, Konecki 2000)

The solution - easier and less expensive than adaptation of the British International Passenger Survey - could be to allow scientists greater access to the administrative migrant data (e.g. the data on migrants collected in the permanent and fixed-time residence permits data bases, at tax offices or in the new Central Register of Foreigners). Because of the restrictions of the Personal Data Protection Act, this data is rarely, if ever, made available.

### **3. Factors contributing to migration movements**

#### **3.1. Outflow: Economic migrations**

Since the political reasons that pushed members of the political opposition to leave the country have disappeared, current emigration from Poland is mainly of an economic character. There are several distinguishable types of such migration, like migration of the unskilled labour force to the secondary labour market; migration of the unskilled labour force on the basis of bilateral contracts and agreements, and migration of skilled workers and highly-qualified professionals. In each of these cases, both the motivations underlying the decision to migrate and the dominant migrant strategies are influenced by slightly different factors.

##### **3.1.1. Migration of the unskilled labour force to the secondary labour market**

The majority of the people emigrating with the purpose of semi-legal or illegal work have little chance of finding an attractive job in Poland or else are faced with a situation in which their income covers only the essential living minimum (this is especially true for the migrants from peripheral and rural areas). Therefore, a quite frequent strategy for dealing with economic shortages is a “nomination” of an economic migrant within the household (Romaniszyn 1999, Kaczmarczyk 2001b). Remittances provided by the family member improve the budget of the household and facilitate social promotion of other family members. The relatively low income generated by working in the secondary market of other European countries, and the strong emotional ties with the family (which often creates the main incentives for international migration) combine to generate a barrier that discourages these migrants from permanent settlement in the countries they work in. The simple fact is that the remittances involved significantly improve the living standards in the country of origin, but still represent too low a wage earned in the secondary labour market to allow a satisfying standard of living to be maintained were all family members to be brought to the country of residence.

Thus the best strategy for this group of migrants is to minimize expenses in the host country (to spending on living conditions, nutrition and health) and simultaneously to maximize the efforts leading to economic gain (emigrants very often work in several places and for up to 12 to 16 hours per day (Kaczmarczyk 2001a, Marek 2003a). The earned money is spent in the country of origin, as a compensation for the period of sacrifices and family partition. Migrants stay semi-legally in the host countries (only employment without a work permit is illegal), under the cover of a tourist visit, but they are obliged to leave the country of residence within a given period (i.e. six months under U.K. regulations, 90 days where other EU countries are concerned). This limitation forces them to circulate between countries of origin and residence (as overstaying is punished by temporary prohibition of entry to a given country). Since unskilled migrants are often unemployed in Poland, their savings brought from abroad are soon used up and they have to go back to work. Having the perspective of a job abroad they do not look for employment (also because the wages available in Poland are only one-half or one-third of those offered for the comparable jobs abroad, Jończy 2000), so the situation creates a vicious circle. Moreover, migrants from this group are not interested in the legalization of either their stay or official employment, since as taxpayers they would cease to be competitive on the labour market.

### 3.1.2. Migration of the unskilled labour force on the basis of bilateral contracts and agreements.

The basic limitation on the legal employment contracts based on bilateral agreements with EU countries is the clause saying that the maximum period of employment will not exceed 90 days within 12 months. For example, the average income earned during work under a seasonal contract in Germany amounts to about 5-6 thousand PLN, i.e. €1,200-1,500 (Domaradzka 2003), of which approximately two-thirds is saved and transferred to Poland (Domaradzka 1996, quoted by Marek 2000a). Thus, the individuals using this possibility (ca. 300–350,000 annually) are not able to accumulate enough money to secure all the needs of the entire household within the next 9-10 months. Migrants taking legal seasonal contracts are usually employed<sup>10</sup>, or they use some other sources of income in Poland (*interviews No. 3 and 4 with experts at the Office for European Integration and the Institute of Labour and Social Policy*), treating the jobs abroad as a source of additional profits. The primary aims of the international agreements on temporary employment signed by Poland, i.e. to “export the unemployed” and hence to reduce the unemployment, have not been achieved in this case, also due to the fact that foreign employers avoid anonymous workers recruited through Labour Offices, but prefer to employ recommended or already ‘tried’ and reliable workers, with whom they sustain long-lasting cooperation. The positive aspect of the legal seasonal migrations is the fact that the earned money is more often invested (e.g. in education of children) than consumed, also on status-building durables and the improvement of living standards (as is the case with the households of unemployed individuals living off illegal jobs abroad – Giza 1996b).

Although the Polish government has signed bilateral agreements on seasonal employment with sixteen European countries (Rajkiewicz 2003), only two countries - Germany and France - have implemented the agreements and recruited sizable numbers of Polish seasonal workers. Most of the legal seasonal workers are employed in Germany, usually in exhausting and unattractive occupations of the secondary sector of the labour market in such fields as agriculture, viticulture, forestry, exhibitions, and the hotel and catering industry (see Table 17). Their working time often exceeds 45 hours per week, while wages are lower than those paid to German workers (Marek 2000a).

**Table 17. Contracts for seasonal work in Germany by industry of employment in Germany. Poland: 1997–2002**

Year	Total	Agriculture and Viticulture	Exhibitions	Hotels	Other
1997	198 424	178 705	5 378	4 363	9 985
1998	201 681	189 101	4 408	2 632	5 540
1999	218 403	207 073	5 069	3 397	2 864
2000	238 160	226 172	5 578	5 208	1 202
2001	261 133	247 102	6 302	5 791	1 938
2002	282 826	268 407	6 325	6 374	1 720

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

<sup>10</sup> According to the results of a survey carried out on seasonal workers in Germany, two-thirds were ‘economically active’ before departure (Marek 2000a, p. 30)

### 3.1.3. Migration of skilled workers and highly-qualified professionals

In the case of the skilled and highly-qualified individuals, the decisive factor prompting them to emigrate might be, on the one hand, the conviction that the level of salaries in Poland is too low, and on the other the pure pursuit of career development abroad. Although the group of highly qualified professionals and academics working in the financial institutions of the City, Wall Street or American universities is not large, its existence proves that Polish migrants are also capable of finding employment in the primary sector.

Another factor, which has recently acquired importance, is the high level of unemployment among adolescents entering the labour market. Graduates of universities and private schools experience serious difficulties in getting a satisfying job (at least a financially satisfying one). Their frustration is fostered by a consciousness of the rapid upward mobility that was easily accessible to their predecessors – a few years ago a university diploma and competence in foreign languages allowed for the launch of a brilliant career in the rapidly growing private sector. Present graduates have been painfully experiencing the consequences of economic recession and saturation of labour market with specialists in some disciplines (i.e. management, law, PR, etc.). This situation creates an in-group drive to work abroad, transforming it into a kind of a “fashion” (i.e. for working in ‘cool’ places like London’s pubs, which are in fact in the secondary labour sector). As graduates planning temporary migration have confessed: *“It doesn’t make any sense to get further frustrated. I prefer to go to work on a construction site in Germany than to sit here and wait if something changes. At least there I can afford housing, food and going out” (...)* *“if I should wait for my chance for several years selling roasted chickens, isn’t it better to do it in Australia?”* (Prodeus / Bielińska 2003). Temporary migration is supposed to provide a chance to get to know the world, to learn the language and to earn money, but in practice the process limits possibilities for finding a satisfying job in Poland, on account of the temporary voluntary exclusion from the labour market.

### 3.1.4. Outflow: push and pull factors

The crucial push factor that contributes to a permanent substantial outflow for short and long-term migration stems from the current shape of the Polish economy. The most visible aspects are the high unemployment rate and limited supply of attractive job offers, especially in peripheral and underdeveloped regions and relatively low income in comparison with EU member states.

However, as Krystyna Iglicka has noticed (Iglicka 1995), it is not the push and pull factors that simply make people migrate, but rather perceptions, i.e. the significance that potential migrants attribute to given factors. Thus, the subjective equivalents of ‘objective’ factors can be described as follows:

- a fear of lacking the financial means to sustain the achieved economic status or simply live in Poland;
- a feeling of relative deprivation, intensified as a result of the transformation;
- a feeling of hopelessness and a lack of faith in any change in the status quo at the individual level (“I don’t know what to do to live better here”), as well as the systemic level (“nothing’s going to change here”);

- a belief that career paths are blocked and there are no perspectives for professional development;
- a social memory of migrations being routes to success, which is being strengthened by the large Polish Diaspora.

The main pull factors regarding Poles emigrating to the EU and the US are as follows:

- An 'inherent' and 'inexhaustible' demand for a cheap and flexible migrant labour force in the capitalist economy (Piore 1979), resulting in an unproblematic and successful job search and accompanied by the relatively ease of entry into some countries, especially of the EU zone (Jordan / Duvell 2002). This is very frequent. In the case of illegal work, the costs of disclosure and deportation are low in relation to the total profits generated by the individuals working illegally.
- Broad social networks built by the new economic migrants (who have emigrated in the previous 30-40 years), staying abroad temporarily or permanently. Individuals searching for an illegal job on the secondary labour market usually turn to them for help and accommodation (Kaczmarczyk 2001a, Giza 1997a).
- Geographical and/or cultural proximity, whereby the main flows of Polish economic migrants are directed to "familiarized" places in which networks have been operating, mainly selected EU member states (Germany, France and the UK), the US and Canada.
- The demand for special services and wage differences. This is particularly true in the case of highly-qualified professionals, especially doctors, finance specialists and engineers, as well as individuals having skills that are in demand (as truck drivers in Spain or nurses in Norway).
- Any particular resources at migrant's disposal (like dual citizenship or language skills) that increase the chances for achieving goals and reduce the potential costs involved in migration to another country. In Poland, for example, the region of the most major emigration to Germany is Opolskie (Opole) voivodship, in which some 54.5 % of inhabitants hold dual (Polish and German) citizenship (Census 2002).

### **3.2. Inflow: distinctive types of migrant and key pull factors**

The simplest criterion upon which to classify the groups of migrants present in Poland is that of geographical and cultural conditioning. On the basis of it is possible to identify the following groups of migrants:

#### **3.2.1. Immigrants from countries of the former USSR** (above all Ukraine, but also Belarus and the Russian Federation)

This is without doubt the largest group of migrants present in Poland – estimated to include several hundred thousand people. On account of the small geographical distance, the ease of entry and the relatively low travel costs, most of the people involved employ a circulatory model of migration linked with the taking up of short-term "black economy" employment in the secondary sector of the labour market (and hence analogously with the strategy applied by Poland's circulatory economic migrants within the EU, cf. section 3.1.1.). Migrants within this category first and foremost find employment in agriculture and construction (men) or as domestic helps, housekeepers, and carers for children and elderly persons (women). Besides the geographical proximity and sustained demand for a migrant labour force, some further factors favouring migrations to Poland are: cultural proximity, and especially the similarity of

languages, attitudes towards work and mentality (especially in the borderlands, within the reach of Polish mass media and where the trans-border family ties are still present – Koryś 2002); a well-developed migratory network which provides a feeling of security<sup>11</sup>; the relative ease of personal contacts with Poles (a specialized group of Poles providing services to the citizens of the ex-USSR, e.g. inexpensive housing, has emerged); the limited risk of deportation from Poland (there is basically no control over the legality of employment); and the insignificant impact of possible administrative consequences plus the neutral and tolerant attitude of Polish society.

### **3.2.2. Immigrants from Asian countries** (above all Vietnam)

At the peak phase of its development, the size of the Vietnamese diaspora was estimated at 100,000 people. However, for a certain time now there has been a contraction of it, as detectable in the decline from year to year in the number of work permits and fixed time residence permits issued. The present number of Vietnamese people present in Poland is around 30,000, among whom a certain proportion are doubtless present and at work here illegally, taking advantage of the migrants' network. The marked development of the Vietnamese diaspora (concentrating in Warsaw and the vicinity above all) was possible thanks to the large group of migratory chain pioneers, who used to study in Poland before 1989, as well as a correct identification of the economic niches (cheap fast foods, inexpensive textiles of low quality) which attracted high demand a few years ago (if now decreasing). The diaspora transformed itself into a large and united community providing jobs without requiring language skills and facilitating information flows (there are now four newspapers in Vietnamese published in Poland). Among its achievements were the facilitation of the consent of the Vietnamese government concerning foreign migrations, as well as the formal and informal forms of support offered by the Vietnamese Embassy to Vietnamese citizens.

The Confucianism-specific entrepreneurial structure based on small, most often family-based, firms (cf. Fukuyama 1995) was very effective at the outset of the Polish economic transformation, since family-oriented firms are more flexible and better at picking up signals emanating from the market. However, we have now reached a period in which the Vietnamese firms are beginning to be forced out of the market by Polish and Western clothing companies, plus the expansion of the hypermarkets that can offer prices competitive with those of the Vietnamese traders. The trend in question can be clearly seen in the statistics on issued work permits (Table A10). In 1998, 65% of those going to Vietnamese citizens (and 54% of those going to the Chinese) were permits issued to a firm's owner. By 2001, the share of owners among all work permits had declined to 31% in the case of the Vietnamese and 26% for the Chinese. A further factor reducing the profitability of doing business in Poland was the closure of legal loopholes and greater effectiveness on the part of the customs and tax services (Szymkowski 2003, Chełmiński 2003), which limits the profits to be gained from operations in the shadow economy.

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<sup>11</sup> "Because they are nearby here. If something happens, Svetlana or one of our friends can come to pick me up and I can get out of here – from Germany it is impossible" (*interview No. 29 with an irregular migrant from Belarus*)



### 3.2.3. Immigrants from the highly-developed countries: the EU, USA and Canada (highly-skilled professionals)

The coming of expatriates to Poland was a natural consequence of the re-inclusion of the Polish economy within the world economy. Many specialists and qualified managers came to Poland to work in the Polish branches of their companies. Acquaintanceship with the country or region can of course facilitate such a delegation, as can Polish origins. There have thus emerged a group of re-emigrants or descendants of emigrants coming back to Poland for the sake of the companies they represent (Iglicka 2002).

**Table 18. Work Permits issued to Foreigners**

Year	Work Permits	Occupation							
		manager	owner	expert consultant	Non-manual worker	teacher*)	skilled worker	unskilled worker	Other
2001	17 038	2 121 12%	2 243 13%	5 863 34%	1 704 10%		1 983 12%	2 517 15%	607 4%
2000	17 802	3 557 20%	4 302 24%	4 305 24%	2 117 12%		2 375 13%	661 4%	485 3%
1999	17 116	4 184 24%	4 154 24%	2 510 15%		1 890 11%	1 479 9%	385 2%	2 514 15%
1998	16928	3 496 21%	4 633 27%	2 368 14%		1 637 10%	1 758 10%	461 3%	2 575 15%
1997	15307	3 761 25%	3 340 22%	1 926 13%		1 790 12%	1 586 10%	829 5%	2 075 14%

\*) As of 2000, there was a change in the classification of professions, with the category „teacher” being included within the “non-manual worker” category

Source: Recent Trends in Migration to Poland, various years, own calculations

Immigrants within this category are as a rule employed in the primary labour sectors, in the role of managers, experts and consultants, as well as teachers of foreign languages (especially from the UK; cf. Fig. 4). Some of these found their own firms, something that is favoured by the relatively more limited competitiveness of the Polish market, as well as the presence of unoccupied economic niches. Their stays and labour are usually legal, though there are cases in which the utilisation of non-regulated stay status allows for the avoidance of high taxation or remuneration.

Analysis of the statistics on permits issued indicate that – in the primary labour sector – jobs as experts, consultants and teachers have also been taken up by immigrants from Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation, which is to say those countries associated first and foremost with work in the secondary sector (cf. Table A10). What is also interesting is the sketching out of a new trend for unskilled workers from such countries as Germany, France and the UK to appear on the Polish market. This may, however, result from the ever-changing principles under which work permits are issued and classified.

### 3.2.4. Other categories of migrants: refugees and repatriants

Besides the groups mentioned up to now (whose presence in Poland is first and foremost linked with economic factors), mention should be made of two further categories of immigrants whose departures were provoked mainly by political factors.

The first of these categories embraces refugees, be these "recognised", in that the criteria set out in the Geneva Convention are met, or otherwise, in that the privileged accorded refugees are denied them, but they have nevertheless migrated on account of armed conflict. (Both sub-groups are discussed in detail in other parts of the report.)

A second, rather Poland-specific group of political migrants is that made up of the so-called repatriants. These are, *de facto*, the offspring of Polish citizens deported during the Second World War to Kazakhstan and other Central Asian Republics, who for political reasons were not encompassed by previous waves of repatriation. On account of the costs attendant in repatriation, the phenomenon has so far been modest in scale – between 1997 and 2001, it took in more than 2,300 people who were in receipt of repatriation visas, as well as a further 3,000 family members entitled to resettlement along with the repatriant (Table 19).

The repatriants are probably the most privileged group of migrants in Poland, and this is doubtless a pull factor alongside sentimental considerations. In order that their adaptation to Polish society might be facilitated, the people involved are assured of a flat, work and monetary benefits. Unfortunately, some of the repatriants in any case find it difficult to manage in market-economy conditions (as a result, *inter alia*, of culture shock, language problems and difficulties with finding suitable work), coming to feel alienated and frustrated in their new homeland (Hut 2002).

**Table 19. Repatriation to Poland, 1997–2001**

Category	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Applications concerning repatriation	671	898	1 014	1 026	1 083
Applications for a repatriation visa	-	808	937	929	956
Applications from members of families having nationality other than Polish for a temporary residence permit	-	90	77	97	127
Repatriation visas issued	316	281	278	662	804
Persons who arrived within repatriation	267	399	362	944	1 000

Source: *Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2002*

### 3.3. Other factors contributing to migration movements:

#### 3.3.1. The education system

Although the number of foreign students in Poland is not high, it is increasing steadily year on year (see Table A11). The two dominant groups of foreigners who choose Polish universities are the students from the neighbouring countries (primarily from the former Soviet Republics like Ukraine, Belarus and Russia) and the children of Polish emigrants.

The students from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia find the educational offer of Polish private and state universities attractive for many reasons. Firstly, it provides a diversified range of requirements. Secondly, they do not encounter serious language problems and can easily learn the Polish language. Thirdly, there are many scholarship programmes addressed to the citizens of the CIS and to the Polish minorities in the East (e.g. ethnic Polish students from Lithuania). Finally, it is an easy way to legalise their stay<sup>12</sup> (entering a university programme entitles one to a one-year student visa, renewed annually until the end of the studies).

The second group are citizens of Western countries, whose families are of Polish origin. They come mainly from Germany, the US and Canada. They study in medical schools and in all other schools, which are usually very expensive in the West. Polish universities offer a quality education for a lower price.

### 3.3.2. Mixed (bi-national) Marriages

Mixed marriages (bi-national) can be a reason or a result of international migrations. Unfortunately, the available data is incomplete, since only the marriages contracted in Poland are registered. However, even the analysis of the incomplete data illustrates some interesting trends.

During the last decade, the absolute number of mixed marriages decreased (from 4,200 per year in 1990 to 3,500 in 2001 – see table A12). However, this shift derives from general cultural changes: marrying later or not at all, with a growing number of cohabitating couples. The percentage of mixed marriages has been almost constant throughout the decade, oscillating around 1.5 to 1.9 %.

We can observe certain regularities when analysing the sex of the Polish spouse and the citizenship of the foreign spouse. Firstly, women marry foreigners more often, though the disproportions are gradually tending to disappear (in 1990, the model 'Foreign husband - Polish wife' accounted for almost 80% of all mixed marriages. 11 years later, in 2001, the proportion of these marriages had decreased to 60%). Secondly, the spouses' countries of origin tend to differ as well – women prefer partners from affluent Western countries (Germany, the UK, the US<sup>13</sup>, Italy, The Netherlands and France – see Table A13), while men more often marry the citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (Table A14).

This relatively stable asymmetry to marrying preferences is related to the fact that, for women, marriage is still one of the socially accepted forms of upward mobility. Therefore, Polish women will prefer marrying foreigners from the Western countries (and consequently, Ukrainian, Russian and Belarussian women will be prone to marry Polish men) than to engage in marriages with citizens of the poor ex-USSR countries.

Since marriage to a citizen of a given country is one of the factors facilitating the regularisation of status and obtainment of a residence permit, there is always a question as to whether a marriage was contracted in good faith (*bona fide*), or whether it was a

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<sup>12</sup> The Ministry of Education recommends that the universities require an advanced payment of the yearly fee, since there have been cases in which students from the CIS, having obtained the student visa (with the support of the enrollment documents), would quit their studies – *interview with the high official of the Bureau for Academic Recognition and International Exchange*

<sup>13</sup> In the case of the mixed marriages contracted with the citizens of the countries of traditional Polish emigration, like Germany or the US, we can consider some part of them to be de facto uni-national marriages

marriage of convenience. Unfortunately, the divorce statistics published by the General Statistical Office do not give separate data for the bi-national marriages. However, while merely analysing the marriage data, we can suppose that the sudden increase in the number of mixed marriages with the citizens of Vietnam and Armenia in the years 1997 - 1999 was related to changes in immigration law (especially the procedure for granting citizenship). The Armenians, as well as the Vietnamese (Halik / Nowicka 2002), belong to cultures stressing the values of continuity and tradition, and do not eagerly accept marrying an outsider (*interviews No. 24 and 28 with young Vietnamese women*). The number of the mixed marriages among the women and the men increased significantly between 1997 and 1998, only to decrease immediately in 1999. In the case of Vietnamese men, marrying a Polish woman was only one-fifth as popular in 1999 as in 1998; Vietnamese women only married Polish men one-thirteenth as often in 1999 as in 1998 (see Tables A13 and A14). A similar trend could be observed in the case of Armenian citizens, with only one exception – the record number of mixed marriages was registered in 1999.

### 3.3.3. The Asylum system and other forms of state protection

In accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951 ratified by Poland in 1992, the foreigners who have entered Polish territory can apply for refugee status. During the application procedure (i.e. from the moment of lodging of the application with the local Border Guard post or the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners to the moment of a refusal of refugee status is granted), the applicants have the right to stay in reception centres and are entitled to medical care, Polish language courses, and financial and material assistance. After having been granted refugee status, the individual can start on the integration programme (more in Chapter 5).

Poland is still not an attractive country for the refugees coming here to stay or to settle (partly because of the modest assistance available to refugees). For this reason, the number of granted refugee statuses is not large. Because of the legal protection (e.g. suspension of the deportation procedure) and the benefits (housing, board) to which the applicant is entitled during the procedure of application, asylum seeking is often treated in an instrumental way. It becomes a mode of avoiding the penal responsibility for unlawful entering of Polish territory (the majority of the migrants trafficked in or through Poland are instructed by the traffickers to apply for refugee status the moment the Border Guards apprehend them), or may also represent a possibility for regeneration of energy and obtaining medical assistance to cure the most painful and serious illnesses on this stage of a migration to the West (*interviews No. 7 and 8*). The statistics for the discontinuance of refugee status proceedings<sup>14</sup> provide clear proof that this mode of action is very common. The knowledge concerning the regulations of the refugee status procedures (and the benefits) is very precious; it is distributed within the migrant networks and the trafficking groups. Russian citizens of Chechen origin, who lodge their application in Poland, use the services of specialized middle-men of their own migrant group, who provide training on the rights of foreigners on the territory of Poland, the conditions and standards of the reception centres and the “proper” answers to be given during the investigation and hearings related to the application procedure. They also organise bus transport to Poland (*interview No. 7*).

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<sup>14</sup> The decision on discontinuance of refugee status proceedings is taken when a person leaves Poland before the final administrative decision

Out of the 4,174 refugee status applications issued in 2002, only 253 were judged well founded (cf. table A15). Individuals who have been refused refugee status by the President of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners can lodge an appeal to the Refugee Council. If the Refugee Council upholds the decision of the first instance, the individual in question should leave Poland within 14 days, and if after this deadline s/he is still on Polish territory (with neither a temporary nor permanent stay permit), s/he should be deported. However, at the same time, under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950, such persons cannot be expelled if upon return to their home country their life might be endangered. Because of the *non-refoulement* rule, many people who have been refused refugee status and have not left Poland stay on Polish territory without regular status, medical insurance, a work permit, social security benefits, etc (*this is mainly true of Chechens - interviews No. 30 and 31 with the migrants from Chechnya and Afghanistan*). Since they have to earn a living and provide for families, they become ideal addressees of organised groups running semi-legal activities. The introducing of the so-called 'tolerated stay' (see section 5.5.3.) - addressed particularly to this group of migrants - should help to regularise their stay and allow them to participate in the legal structures of society (i.e. the labour market) instead of the shadow economy.

### **3.3.4. Trafficking, smuggling and international crime**

As regards the scale of human trafficking and trade, the main obstacle their successful counteraction is the fact that, in Poland at least, the victims of these dealings usually decide to co-operate with the traffickers, rather than to testify against them. Except in the cases in which victims are deceived into travelling abroad<sup>15</sup>, or pass the Polish border unconscious (through alcohol or drugs), they are not kidnapped or imprisoned by force; they cross the border willingly, on the basis of legal documents, which makes counter-trafficking prevention more difficult (*interview No. 10 with counter-trafficking officer at Police Headquarters*). Moreover, their stay in the given country is also legal (e.g. in the cases of Polish citizens working in EU countries and foreigners working in Poland). The victims are generally unwilling to co-operate: they fear deportation and thus do not search for help in the host country, and far more than that they fear the brutal revenge of their persecutors (that might also be taken out on victims' families). For this reason, they either do not want to offer testimony leading to a conviction at all, or else withdraw in the course of judicial proceedings. In Poland, cases of trafficking arise most often among individuals recruited for the sex business (i.e. Ukrainian and Bulgarian women forced to prostitution), and most probably among the Vietnamese immigrants smuggled onto Polish territory and forced into slave work for their compatriots (Koryś 2002). Unfortunately, the language barrier and high level of auto-isolation of this group in Polish society make it difficult to counteract such cases and help their victims.

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<sup>15</sup> As the IOM Warsaw practice proves, victims of trafficking are not recruited by unknown and suspicious persons, but often by colleagues, 'fiancés' or would-be mothers-in-law



*“You’ll never know where you’ll really go..” – postcard distributed by “La Strada”*

A significant role in limiting the level of trafficking is played by educational and information campaigns mounted by the “La Strada” Foundation, and addressed to both Polish women looking for seasonal employment in Western Europe and immigrant women from the ex-USSR staying in or trafficked to Poland. Differentiated and non-standard forms of communication reaching potential victims have raised awareness as to the dangers related to the “very profitable work offers” awaiting abroad.

A further phenomenon accompanying the increased passenger traffic and influx of immigrants is the “internationalisation of organised crime”. Besides home-grown criminal groups, Poland has also attracted operators from the mafias of other countries, among which the Russian mafia is particularly active. The main spheres of activity of the international criminal groups, apart from trafficking and human smuggling, are the smuggling of narcotics and hazardous substances, car theft, prostitution, illegal trade and associated financial operations, the forging of documents and the arms trade on a scale not met with hitherto (Iglicka et al. 2003). The assuming of informal control over human trafficking (especially in connection with prostitution) by criminal groups from the former USSR has brought with it a brutalisation of the methods by which servility is enforced among women forced into prostitution, as well as exceptionally cruelty in repressing those who have escaped or tried to escape<sup>16</sup>. The particular criminal activeness of citizens of the former USSR (see Table A16) in comparison with other immigrant groups combines with severity of the crimes committed to lead to the development of a very negative image assigned to immigrants from the former USSR.

<sup>16</sup> Information from IOM Warsaw

The mass media's determination to emphasise all the cases in which foreigners commit crime has also played a role in this (cf. Mrozowski 1997). What tends to be overlooked in all of this is the fact that the victims of most of the extortions and robberies are their own countrymen and women – mostly hardworking irregular workers.

Also under-appreciated is the role of international crime syndicates in stimulating the illegal influx of immigrants from developing countries (Romaniszyn 1999). Traffickers and human smugglers are actively engaged in recruitment in countries of origin, usually misleading their "clients" as regards the living conditions and levels of income likely to be met with in Western countries. The opportunities offered for "working off" part of the costs associated with the transfer to the target country is a further factor encouraging international migrations, especially since only a very small proportion of victims are aware of the traps that lie hidden behind such proposals (Okólski 1999a).

### **Recommendations:**

Active steering of migration processes would seem to be a more effective method than the mere combating of vigorous processes by means of restrictions (Iglicka et al. 2003). In line with this, it would be desirable to regularise the employment of migrants, be these Polish emigrants abroad or immigrants into Poland. One such step would be (during the time in force of the transitional periods for Polish citizens' employment in EU countries after accession) an extension of the maximum period over which seasonal work could be taken from 90 to 120 days (Marek 2003a). At the same time, in line with the recommendations of EU experts, there should be a realignment of legal foundations (i.a. a laying down of the maximum length of the period of employment within 12 months), as well as a simplification of the bureaucratic procedures associated with the employment of seasonal workers in Poland. In the case of immigrants embarking upon economic activity in Poland, it would be necessary to consider sharpening up the criteria under which permits for this are issued, i.a. through a raising of the minimal amount of start-up capital, as well as a requirement that detailed budgets, bank statements, business plans describing the nature of the business activity and number of employees, etc. be presented. Such a toughening of the requirements associated with the onset of business activity would hinder the running of illegal financial and economic operations under the cover of firms operating legally.

The restriction of the flow of economic immigrants, as well as the introduction of obstacles to legal entry to the territory of a given country usually result in abuses of the asylum and refugee procedures (Jordan / Duvell 2002), as well as criminalisation of the migration processes (a greater demand for the services provided by the human smugglers and traffickers).

The fight against human trafficking and the accompanying social ills is very difficult. The actual arrest and punishment of offenders is rare, since the victims are reluctant to give testimony, fearing repressions from the criminal organisations. Extending the main witness programme (including the change of identity and residence and possible plastic surgery) to the individuals giving evidence in cases involving human trafficking could improve the effectiveness of the legal proceedings.

Secondly, it is recommended that an educational and information campaign be conducted, with a view to information on the potential dangers of the extraordinarily attractive job offers abroad being provided, together with suggested precautions to be taken before a person leaves. Mere warnings will not be enough if legal avenues of getting on to the job market (like seasonal jobs contracts, or licensed and controlled au-pair agencies), are closed off.



## 4. Impact of migration movements on society

It is difficult to indicate all the manifestations and forms of influence of the dominant migration trends on the functioning of a given society. This difficulty derives from at least three reasons:

- a) The complexity of life in society makes it difficult to separate the reasons from the results and to isolate influence and consequences of migratory processes from the set of conditions that released the migratory flows.
- b) The assessment of the influence of migrations can differ depending on the level of analysis (the results, which may seem positive on the micro-level, i.e. for individuals, can become negative on the macro-level, i.e. local communities or the whole of society).
- c) The majority of the migratory flows, which at present are taking place in Poland, are not registered in any way, and migrants operate in a shadow economy. Thus, the actual scale of the phenomenon is unknown, as are the dimensions of the loss caused by the exclusion of a significant part of GDP from the tax system.

Another factor that complicates the answer to any question on the impact of migration on Polish society is that of the “structural shift” of large migrant groups between the West and the East. This has resulted from a transformation from a typically sending into a sending-receiving country. Polish (regular and irregular) workers are employed mainly in the secondary labour markets of the EU member states (and the US); at the same time about 100–300,000 migrants from the ex-USSR are employed in Poland’s secondary labour market. The demand for (an inexpensive and illegal) migrant labour force in Poland is high, although the unemployment ratio has reached the level of 18%. The phenomenon of the double-step shift of significant work forces from the East to the West (from Poland to the EU; from the ex-USSR to Poland and other CEE countries) derives from differences in the average income and exchange rates in the country of origin and the host country. Besides, a secondary labour market, analogous with those existing in the developed countries, has emerged in Poland, too.

Following the Wallerstein terminology (Wallerstein 1979), we can say that Poland has been transformed into a “semi-periphery”, which has become attractive for “peripheral” populations as a host country, but it is still vulnerable to the “gravity” pressures of “the centre”. Besides, Poland is likely to play the role of a “transfer point” – after a few years spent in Poland some migrants decide to migrate further, to western countries.

### 4.1. Economic effects of migration

#### 4.1.1. Remittances

Remittances brought by migrant workers in legal and illegal situations are a very important factor mitigating the negative effects of the systemic transformation (i.e. structural unemployment) at the level of individual households. The scale of financial flows is significant – according to the estimations of Edward Marek the 1998 transfers of income earned from legal employment alone amounted to 900 million US dollars (Marek 2003, p.228).

Remittances play another important role in economies in which the capital market is not well developed. Money accumulated during temporary economic migrations substitutes for bank loans - allows for the purchase of real estate (an apartment) or for the start up of a business. Thus 'migration to buy a flat or build a house' is often the only available choice for individuals who have no chance of obtaining the needed credit in Poland (Hirszfeld 2001).

Remittances transferred to and consumed in Poland wind up economic development. The inflow of remittances sent by Polish emigrants is, however, reduced by the transfers of the immigrants working in Poland.

#### **4.1.2. Reduction of social tensions**

Migrations can mitigate the costs of transformation. Thanks to migrations, the "surplus of labour force" (e.g. employees of collapsing branches of industry) are "exported" to the markets of the better-developed countries, instead of being unproductive in the country of origin. However, empirical research shows that migrations and financial flows have a very limited influence on socio-economic change (Hirszfeld / Kaczmarczyk 1999). They rather tend to petrify the defined social structures than to promote modernization strategies (at least in the Polish case).

Thanks to the supply of a cheap migrant labour force, entrepreneurs gain mobile and disciplined workers, something that considerably increases their compositeness. Simultaneously, certain types of services (domestic services, baby-sitting, care of the sick and elderly) become accessible to a larger number of households, thereby increasing their standards of living. According to the Institute of Labour and Social Policy, about 100,000 households use the services of domestic workers, of which 20,000 employ them full-time (Rajkiewicz 2003).

#### **4.1.3. Know-how transfers**

International migrations can promote a raising of individual qualifications, and the transfer of know-how and new technologies; they can also facilitate identification of the existing economic niches in a given country. The highly skilled professionals and consultants that flooded in at the beginning of the 1990s facilitated the diffusion of cultural patterns (like new management techniques or the capitalist ethos of work (see Romaniszyn 1999) that was necessary for the introduction of the capitalist economy and democratic institutions.

The benefits of know-how transfers are reduced by a significant outflow of qualified workers and professionals whose education is financed by the Polish State, and whose skills are used for the benefit of the Western countries (Hryniewicz / Jałowicki / Mync 1997). This outflow is not balanced by the inflow of immigrants from the ex-USSR countries, since they are usually employed to perform jobs requiring unskilled workers.

### **4.2. Non-economic effects of migration**

#### **4.2.2. Influence on the demographic structure:**

Mass migrations cause demographic crises that lead to depopulation of whole localities and to the break-down of the public sphere. According to Census 2002, the difference between the number of individuals registered and actually residing in a given

voivodship (an administrative unit) amounts to over 153,000 in the case of Opolskie (Opole) voivodship and almost 113,000 in Śląskie (Silesia) voivodship<sup>17</sup>. Local authorities in Silesia can hardly afford to maintain the infrastructure of the public sphere (medical care, schools) due to the fact that a large number of primary income earners are employed in Germany (where they pay taxes), while their family members consume public goods and services in Poland (Kaczmarczyk 2003). A similar phenomenon currently applies in Ukraine, which also experiences massive outflows of economic background (Machcewicz 2003).

#### **4.2.3. Changes of family structure**

The long term absence of family members forces the redefinition of the role-division in the family. Because of the large demand for “feminine-type” jobs, it is women who usually migrate, something that contrasts with traditional family models. In consequence, the men stay at home bringing up children, with different results. These trends seriously influence the continuity of marriages and the harmony of marital coexistence, thereby giving rise to problems with children (Solga 2002, Latuch 2001, Romaniszyn 1999).

#### **4.2.4. Corrupting the institutions and reducing social capital**

The operations in the informal sphere (“on the side” of the formal institutions of the host country), so typical for economic migrations, can strengthen models of illicit behaviour, characterised by repeated contraventions of the rules, and deformation of the principles (Banfield 1958). The ultimate effect is to reduce any social capital resources (like mutual trust, see Fukuyama 1995) left in the CEE societies. This is especially visible in the phenomenon of tax evasion and corruption.

#### **4.2.5. Social marginalisation and circular economic migrants**

Circular forms of mobility (as well as migrant networks) slow down the process of integration with the receiving society, while long-lasting temporary migrations lead to the permanent social marginalisation of a migrant, both in the sending, and in the receiving countries (Osipowicz 2001). Circular economic migrants are often “trapped” by long-term effects of their migration – at the beginning they migrate with the intention of improving the economic situation and raising the living standards of the household – afterwards they have to migrate to earn the money necessary to keep up the already achieved standards (i.e. for the maintenance of a house, which is ‘too expensive’ in relation to the available income in the country of origin – *interview No. 3*).

#### **Recommendations:**

The high rate of unemployment and increase in economic aspirations contribute to a high volume of temporary economic migration (both from Poland and into the country). The pressure of socio-economic factors is so intense, that effective elimination of irregular migration is highly unrealistic (also in reflection of profits gained from the migrant labour force by the host society). Therefore, migration policy should focus

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<sup>17</sup> Internal migration also contributes to this unbalance

rather on actions aiming at regulating migrant flows (and reducing related expenses and risks), than at a general restriction of entrances.

In accordance with Polish law, legal employment of migrant domestic workers from the ex-USSR is practically impossible, despite the huge demand for this kind of services. Therefore, regulations opening the way to legal employment for this group of migrants is needed. Apart from re-negotiation and actual implementation of bilateral agreements on seasonal employment that were signed for Poland and Ukraine, other forms of legalisation of employment that are 'flexible' and addressed to self-employing migrants should be deliberated. This can take the form of payable temporary licenses for specific jobs, i.e. cleaning or the care of the elderly (the licence would function as a form of taxation). Another step would be to require that all the foreigners (or selected nationalities) had health insurance when on Polish territory. Such obligatory medical cover, bought in the country of origin or in Poland, would limit the amounts spent every year on the treatment of irregular foreign workers.

Of course, improving the efficiency of employment and residence controls is always a relevant postulate, since there will always be migrants who will increase the competitiveness of their services by reducing the costs relative to the legalisation on the territory of the host country.

## 5. Migration policy, legislation and procedures

The rapidly increasing passenger transit through Polish territory in the 1990s combined with the inflow of immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers to promote the introduction of new legal solutions. These were very much needed, since the former Aliens Act of 1963 had been devised in different circumstances: the numbers of foreigners coming to Poland were negligible, and the Communist Party treated them with deep distrust, controlling their entry, stay and departure (Łodziński 1998b). In 1997, the new Act on Aliens was adopted, but the dynamics of migration processes proved so intense, that the Act was amended as early as in 2001, while in June 2003 it gave way to two new laws: the Act on Aliens (AA) (regulating the general conditions of entry and stay of foreigners on Polish territory) and the Aliens Protection Act (APA), which is mainly concerned with refugees and asylum seekers.

Implementation of the new regulations entering into force on September 1, 2003 has brought important changes. The new Aliens Act provides the legal structures for the launch of the first regularization action in Poland – an amnesty for irregular migrants, staying illegally on Polish territory. The next change concerns the more restrictive laws on undocumented migrants who crossed the Polish border illegally or who stay on Polish territory beyond the validity of their visas or permits. These more restrictive regulations should make it impossible, or at least more difficult, for refugee status procedure to be misused in human trafficking through Polish territory. Before September 1, 2003, the individuals stopped while trafficking through Poland have frequently applied for refugee status. While their applications were processed, they were placed at open refugee centers, something which allowed them to continue their journey easily. In accordance with the new regulations, the applicants in question are placed in detention centers for the duration of the refugee status procedure.

The above regulations do not concern EU citizens, for whom conditions of entry and stay are as regulated in a separate law: the Act on Regulations of Entry and Stay of European Union Citizens and Their Family Members on the Territory of the Republic of Poland dated July 27, 2002. This Act incorporates the freedoms and privileges inherent in the Freedom of Movement principle enshrined in EU law.

### 5.1. Admission

The basic documents legalizing the entry of a foreigner on to Polish territory are a valid travel document and visa (if the citizens of the given country are required to have one – AA, Art. 13). Apart from these documents, a foreigner entering Polish territory should have sufficient financial means to meet the expenses of entry, stay and departure from Poland (or possess documents confirming the availability of such financial means, e.g. a work permit promise), as well as (in the case of foreigners coming from certain countries) a permit to leave for another country or to return to the country of origin (AA, art. 15). The financial means requirement does not relate to foreigners admitted on the basis of a so-called ‘invitation’ or entry/residence visa. The sponsor is in this case obliged to provide maintenance and medical care to a foreigner.

### 5.1.1. Visas

A visa is issued or denied by the Consul<sup>18</sup> (AA, art. 46), and renewed by the Governor of Province (voivoda) competent with respect to the place of an alien's residence (provided that the application has been lodged earlier, at the due time before the expiration date). The most important types of issued entry visas are (AA art. 26):

- the airport and transit visa (for transfer through Polish territory);
- the entry visa issued for the purpose of repatriation (or visa for the purpose of resettlement as a member of closest family of a repatriate), the fixed-time residence visa (issued with a fixed-time residence permit), the permanent residence visa (issued with a permanent residence permit) and visas designated for the staff of diplomatic missions;
- the short-time residence visa issued to individuals: paying a tourist visit; paying a personal visit; participating in sport events; engaging in short-term business activity; engaging in a short-term cultural activity or participating in scientific conferences; performing official tasks as representatives of a foreign state or international organisation; participating in the refugee status procedure; working; profiting from educational programmes, training, performing a didactic task (other than working); using the temporary protection programme.

The entry visas entitle a person to single, double or multiple entries on to Polish territory. The Visitor visa can be a short-term visa (up to 3 months) or long-term (up to 12 months). The new Act introduced an important limit – the short-term visa can be issued only once in 6 months. This restriction, together with the appointment of the consul as the main subject in charge of the issuing of the visa, will make the practices of legalization of stay by multiple travels to and from Poland more difficult (these methods were used by citizens of Ukraine and Belarus).

## 5.2. Residence

### 5.2.1. Fixed-time residence permit

Individuals who “run a business activity (...) profitable to the national economy”; or who have obtained a work permit; or who, being recognized established artists, intend to “continue their artistic activities on the territory of Poland”; or intend to start or to continue their studies in Poland; or are spouses of a Polish citizen, or have come to Poland on the grounds of family reunification, can obtain the fixed-time residence permit, provided that they have the financial means to cover their living expenses in Poland and will not thus become a burden to Polish Social Security. The fixed-time residence permit is issued for the period “indispensable for a foreigner to achieve his/her aim, but no longer than two years” (AA, Art. 56).

In the situation in which an application for the fixed-time residence permit is lodged by the foreign spouse of a Polish citizen (or the foreign spouse of a foreigner granted a residence permit, or refugee status, or has been staying in Poland on the grounds of the fixed-time residence permit for at least 3 years), the administrative officials processing

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<sup>18</sup> In well-grounded cases (e.g. to provide a foreigner with the necessary medical assistance) the visa can be issued by a Border Guard officer or the Governor of a Province (voivoda)

the case are obliged to decide if the “marriage has not been concluded with the ill purpose of avoiding the standard legal procedures of entry” (AA, Art. 55). The circumstances that might indicate that the marriage in question is in fact a marriage of convenience are: financial gratification in exchange for the consent to marry (unless such a gratification is not related to the custom practiced in the given country or by a social group); when the spouses do not perform the legal duties imposed by their marital status, if they do not live together, if they did not meet before the marriage ceremony, if they do not communicate in a language understood by both of them, if they claim different personal data, or if one of them (or both of them) had concluded marriages of convenience before.

### **5.2.2. The permanent residence permit**

If a foreigner has stayed constantly on the territory of Poland for at least 5 years on the grounds of visas, a fixed-time residence permit or refugee status (or at least 3 years on the grounds of a residence permit), and moreover s/he proves the “existence of the durable family bonds or economic ties with the Republic of Poland, and will prove that s/he has “accommodation and economic means”, s/he can apply for the permanent residence permit (AA, Art. 64).

### **5.3. Citizenship**

A foreigner can be granted Polish citizenship if s/he has been living in Poland for at least 5 years on the grounds of the permanent residence permit. In some cases this period can be shorter. The acquisition of Polish citizenship can depend on the proved loss or renunciation of foreign citizenship<sup>19</sup> (PCA, Art. 8.). The granting of Polish citizenship to parents has the immediate effect of the acquisition of Polish citizenship by their children. If Polish citizenship has been granted only to one parent, the other must give her/his consent for the child to acquire Polish citizenship.

In accordance with Art. 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997, “a Polish citizen cannot lose citizenship, unless s/he renounces it”. The institution granting Polish citizenship and issuing the consent to renounce it is the President of the Republic of Poland. The applications are lodged through the Governor of the Province (voivoda) (AC, Art. 16).

### **5.4. Expulsion**

A foreigner can be expelled from Polish territory if s/he: (AA, Art. 88):

- a) stays on that territory without the required visa, permanent or fixed-time residence permit;
- b) has been illegally employed or run a business activity violating the regulations;
- c) does not have the indispensable financial means to meet the expenses of living on Polish territory, and can not indicate credible sources of such means;
- d) has been included in the register of foreigners whose residence on the territory of Poland is undesirable;

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<sup>19</sup> Polish Citizenship Act of February 15, 1962 (PCA)

- e) would, on staying longer, threaten the defense or security of the nation or public order, or otherwise impair or imperil the Polish national interest;
- f) has crossed, or tried to cross, the border by way of a violation of the law;
- g) not freely left the territory of the Republic of Poland after s/he was refused issue of a fixed-time residence permit or made subject to the the withdrawal of such a permit;
- h) does not meet tax requirements or has just served the sentence for a premeditated offence.

These regulations do not concern foreigners having the settlement permit, which are not subject to expulsion, as well as those individuals who are entitled to the “tolerated stay” (AA, Art. 89).

The costs of the deportation are the responsibility of the foreigner, or, as a new solution introduced in 2003, the person who issued the invitation or the employer, if the reason for deportation is illegal employment (AA, Art. 96). The decision to expel a foreigner is taken by the Governor of Province (voivoda) with authority in the voivodship of the foreigner’s residence, or where the legal offence or other event providing the grounds for deportation has occurred (Art. 92). The decision on legal expulsion invalidates the visa, and cancels the fixed-time residence permit as well as the work permit (Art. 97).

The decision to expel can specify the date of departure from the territory of the Republic of Poland (not exceeding 14 days after issue), the route by which the border is to be reached and the border crossing point. A foreigner can be obliged to stay in a temporary place of residence up to the moment of his/her leaving the country, and to report to the authority indicated in the decision at specified intervals of time (AA, Art. 90). If a foreigner does not leave Poland in the required period, or if there are serious national security threats involved, a foreigner can be immediately escorted to the border of the country of deportation, or to its airport or seaport.

If there is a justifiable belief that a foreigner in question might elude the execution of the deportation, or if s/he has tried to cross or actually crossed the border in a manner violating regulations, then, by the court decision, s/he can be placed in a detention center or under arrest (only if it is feared that s/he will not comply with the regulations of the detention center).

The length of stay in a detention center or prison should not exceed 90 days, in exceptional cases it can be extended, though it cannot be longer than a year (AA, Art. 106.). A foreigner cannot be placed in prison or in a detention center, if this could put his/her life or health at risk (AA, Art. 103). During the stay in the detention center, a foreigner is guaranteed the right to contact - and the possibility of contacting - the Polish state institutions, the diplomatic representatives of his/her country of citizenship, as well as Polish and international NGOs providing assistance to foreigners. A foreigner can use available means of communication, and s/he can receive visitors (immediate family) (AA, Art. 117).

An asylum seeker can also be placed in the detention center, under the same conditions, provided that s/he crossed the border in violation of Polish laws or had not regulated his/her stay on Polish territory (APA, Art. 40).



## 5.5. Refugee status, asylum and other forms of protection

The adoption of the new solutions concerning assistance on humanitarian grounds was a direct consequence of several factors. First, the number of refugee status applications has been growing steadily; second, only a small part of these could be accepted under the provisions of the Geneva Convention; third, the rule of *non-refoulement* made it impossible to expel these individuals from Poland. Therefore, the Aliens Protection Act adopted in June 2003 has introduced the following forms of protection:

- 1) Geneva refugee status
- 2) Asylum
- 3) Tolerated stay
- 4) Temporary protection

### 5.5.1. Refugee status

Refugee status is granted by the President of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners. It is granted to “a foreigner, who meets the requirements of the Geneva Convention and New York Protocol” (APA, Art. 14.), as well as to his/her spouse and minor children (provided that they are included in the application), and to a foreigner’s child born on Polish territory. Bearing in mind cases of drastically prolonged processing of applications for refugee status (in extreme cases even 2 years), the new Act limits the maximum period for the procedure to 6 months from the day the application is lodged. During the procedure, foreigners lacking the means to finance their stay in Poland are eligible for assistance at the refugee centers, (or obtaining financial aid, if no other assistance is available), as well as for medical care.

A refugee granted refugee status has the same rights as an individual having the fixed-time residence permit (APA, Art. 71). S/he is granted the Geneva travel document and the residence permit (APA, Art. 74).<sup>20</sup> A refugee cannot be deprived of the status, unless the circumstances are those enumerated in Arts. 32 or 33 of the Geneva Convention.

The prerequisites for denying the status are as follows: there are no grounds justifying the fear of persecution, as defined in Art. 1 of the Geneva Convention; there has been premeditated misinformation or abuse of the refugee status procedure; the applicant has been charged with supplying untrue information or false evidence, and especially with falsification and counterfeiting of documents; the applicant has already received refugee status in another country that provides the de facto protection (APA, Art. 14 and 15). The appeals against the decisions of the President of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners are reconsidered by the Refugee Council.

### 5.5.2. Asylum

This form of protection applies when it is in Poland’s special interest to protect a given foreign applicant. The asylum automatically grants the permanent residence permit (APA, Art. 90). As in the case of refugee, an individual granted asylum cannot be obliged to leave Polish territory, nor be expelled without earlier withdrawal of the asylum.

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<sup>20</sup> Both documents are valid for two years and can be renewed for another two-year periods

### 5.5.3. Tolerated stay

The tolerated stay has been created especially for that relatively large group of migrants who have been denied refugee status having failed to meet the criteria of the Convention, “and their expulsion can be executed only to the country where their right to life, freedom and personal security could be endangered, where they might be subject to tortures or inhuman, humiliating treatment or punishment, where they might be forced to work or denied the right to proper judicial proceedings, or where they might be punished without the legal basis as defined in the Convention on the Protection of the Human Rights and the Fundamental Freedoms stipulated in Rome, on November 4, 1950” (APA, Art. 97). A foreigner granted the tolerated stay has the same rights as the foreigner having the fixed-time residence permit. Besides, as with Polish citizens and persons granted the permanent residence permit, a foreigner granted the tolerated stay is entitled to social benefits (APA, Art. 129) and legal employment in Poland (APA, Art. 132 and 133).

### 5.5.4. Temporary protection

Temporary protection is an immediate solution targeted at the foreigners “coming to Poland *en masse*,” who have left their country of origin or a particular geographical region because “of alien invasion, war, civil war, ethnic conflicts or serious violations of human rights” (APA, Art. 106). The temporary protection is binding until such time as foreigners can return to their former place of residence, but not longer than one year (in extraordinary cases – up to 24 months). The foreigner under temporary protection is granted the one-year residence permit, access to medical care; accommodation and boarding (APA, Art. 111) S/he can work without a work permit or run a business activity (APA, Art. 116). The minor child of the foreigner under temporary protection has the right to attend school under the conditions binding upon Polish citizens. The President of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners is obliged to take steps to complete a family reunification procedure in the case in which the spouse or minor child of the foreigner is outside the territory of Poland.

### 5.6. Vulnerable groups: unaccompanied minors, “foreigners, whose mental and physical state allows it to be suspected that they have experienced violence,” and disabled migrants

The refugee status procedures afford special privileges to unaccompanied minors, “foreigners, whose mental and physical state allow it to be suspected that they have experienced violence”, and the disabled. The individuals belonging to one of these groups are not placed in the detention center, even where they applied for refugee status without a documented permit to stay in Poland, or after having crossed the border illegally.

If there is a justifiable belief that the applicant is a victim of a crime or has been subject to violence, all proceedings related to the case should be conducted with care and with consideration for the applicant’s mental and physical shape (APA, Art. 54). Exceptionally, the testimony can be heard out of the office, in the applicant’s place of residence. The hearing is conducted in the presence of a psychologist, and a doctor or an interpreter, if need be. The hearing should take place in “conditions assuring freedom of speech, in a particularly tactful manner, adjusted to the foreigner’s mental and physical condition.”

The unaccompanied minors are assigned a curator at the first stage of the procedure. The curator is a legal guardian of the minor and represents him/her in the refugee status proceedings. Additionally, the minor is assigned a *de facto* guardian (a trained employee of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners), who, “having the minor’s well-being in mind”, takes care of his/her living conditions and access to schooling and medical care, assists in contacts with Polish and international NGOs while searching for the missing family members of the minor, co-organizes extra-curricular activities, etc. (APA, Art. 48). The testimony of a minor is given in the presence of the curator, *de facto* guardian, psychologist or social worker, as well as “an adult indicated by the minor”, in a manner “considering his/her age, level of maturity and mental development” (APA, Art. 49).

### **5.7. Assisted voluntary returns**

“Assistance in the voluntary return departure from the territory of Poland” is mentioned twice in the Act Giving Protection to Aliens on the Territory of the Republic of Poland (APA, Art. 57 and 68). The assisted voluntary return can be applied for by those foreigners who have stopped the refugee status procedure being run in their name. The assistance, given also to the spouses and minor children, covers the expenses of the cheapest travel to a chosen country which the foreigner has the right to enter, the expenses of the administrative costs of indispensable visas and permits, as well as the food expenses during travel. Despite enjoying such a legal basis, the AVR programme is used in only a very small percentage of cases, since the appropriate agreement between the Polish Government and IOM has not yet been concluded.

### **5.8. Polish migration policy – future developments**

The development of Polish migration policy is not an issue that would engage the attention of public opinion, so it is not an object of interest of the political parties either. Society is more concerned with minimization of the costs of economic transformation (e.g. the high unemployment rate and growing social stratification), with the result that problems related to migration have been left to state officials and experts. This public and political lack of interest is, paradoxically, a positive phenomenon (*interviews No. 7 and 19 with the high official of refugees' Council*), both from the point of view of migrants, and the long-term interests of the Republic of Poland. Introduction of the notion of immigration to the public discourse usually results in the radicalization of attitudes towards “others”, and to growing xenophobia.

Considering the relatively strong current position in Poland of nationalistic populist parties which could use immigration in the political game (with all the negative consequences), the status quo is rather beneficial for all the actors involved in the shaping of migration policy – the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners, the state administration, and NGOs assisting immigrants and representing their interests (the Helsinki Foundation, Polish Humanitarian Action).

Society’s interest in migration policy might soon increase, when the costs of its implementation actually show. The introduction of the Schengen visa for the citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, in force since October 1, 2003, will inevitably result in a limitation of the travel between these countries and Poland (both ways, since Russia and Belarus announced reciprocal arrangements). A decrease in the volume of passenger movement may have negative economic and social impacts on the border regions of Poland (Każmierkiewicz 2003, Kurczewska 2002). The petty trade in these

regions might not have been impressive in terms of individual purchases, but its scale and intensity generated impressive profits, which were very often the basic source of income for households. The introduction of relatively expensive visas (€ 50 for a multiple entry visa valid 6 months<sup>21</sup>), together with more restrictive control of the incoming flows, will not only limit the half-legal border-trade, but may lead to a dramatic economic slowdown in these under-industrialized and underdeveloped regions.

### **Recommendations:**

The new legal solutions included in the Aliens Act and Aliens Protection Act (e.g. the obligatory detention of individuals who have illegally crossed the Polish border, or the limitation of entries and of the duration of stay allowed on a visa) might bring important changes in the forms and intensity of the migration flows in Poland. However, only the actual implementation will allow for any evaluation of the quality and efficiency of the current law.

At present, the most important challenge is to guarantee that migrants staying in Poland are treated equally under the law and have equal access to legal sources and information. Most immigrants cannot afford professional legal advice, and the single-handed usage of the relatively easily accessible legal sources<sup>22</sup> is limited by language skills (the majority of sources are only available in Polish) or intellectual capabilities (some migrants might experience serious problems trying to understand specialized legal vocabulary). It is particularly important that a legal culture be propagated among the migrants, since a migrant that is aware of his/her rights (knowing where to obtain assistance of what kind) is less vulnerable to abuse and victimisation by the receiving society (e.g. corrupted officials) or other migrants and fellow countrymen profiting from his/her ignorance.

The range of legal assistance provided by the non-governmental organisations (like the Human Watch Helsinki Foundation and so-called "Law Clinics" in Warsaw and Kraków) is still insufficient. There is therefore much to recommend the launching of an information campaign, (i.e. the distribution of booklets<sup>23</sup> that would explain the law in a very simple and comprehensible way – not only the legalisation procedures, but also the laws regarding the work permit, business activity and fiscal issues), or the running of information points (e.g. walk-in information centres).

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<sup>21</sup> Citizens of Ukraine are not charged for Polish visas, at least for a time being

<sup>22</sup> All relevant legal acts are available at web pages of the Office for Foreigners and Repatriation ([www.uric.gov.pl](http://www.uric.gov.pl))

<sup>23</sup> Booklets should be published in several language versions

## 6. Integration Policies and Practices

The history of refugees in post-communist Poland started in 1990, in the port of Gdynia, which admitted a ship carrying immigrants from Somalia and Ethiopia (Wojciechowski 2003). They had been refused admission to Swedish territory, but were granted refugee status in Poland. Since then, almost 1,500 people have been recognised as refugees, and the forms of appropriate assistance have been elaborated. Currently, the monitoring of the refugee integration programme is within the competence of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy<sup>24</sup> and, although financed by the state budget, is run by the *Powiatowe Centra Pomocy Rodzinie* (Community Centre for Family Assistance, further referred to as PCPR, which is subordinated to local authorities) and Community Centres of Social Assistance in cooperation with NGOs. Since it is these local institutions which are responsible for realisation of the integration programme and since general data concerning all assistance provided has not been published, I will refer in the further parts of the text to the statistical data collected in Mazowsze (Mazowieckie) voivodship<sup>25</sup>.

Under the provisions of Polish law, the right to benefit from integration programmes is restricted to selected groups of migrants: refugees, asylum seekers and (on slightly different conditions) repatriates. Foreigners are entitled to social security services provided that they have been staying in Poland legally and have been granted permission to settle. To date, cases of demands for social security relief brought by the entitled foreigners have been rare in Mazowieckie voivodship.

### 6.1. The geographical and administrative concentration of migrants

Individuals granted refuge status have the right to choose their place of residence within the territory of Poland, though the majority settle in the Warsaw area (as regular and irregular immigrants do). This choice is the result of a (not entirely well grounded) belief that it is easier to find accommodation and a job in the capital. Moreover, Warsaw hosts all the important institutions and offices to be contacted at every stage of the procedure by which an application for refugee status is made (e.g. URiC – the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners), as well as the organisations assisting refugees (the UNHCR, Helsinki Foundation and Polish Humanitarian Organisation). Even the Central Refugee Reception Centre in Dębak, which hosts the majority of refugees and asylum seekers, is situated near Warsaw. It is very probable that the migrants do not know other cities and do not have a good orientation as to the structure (and location) of the institutions that could assist them outside Warsaw. Moreover, in the case of the refugees, who usually do not have any developed migratory networks in Poland, other immigrants residing in Warsaw can be perceived as a group of potential support and assistance (*interview no. 20 with the Founder of the Refugee Association in Poland*).

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<sup>24</sup> The conditions under which assistance is provided to refugees and the range of such assistance, are as regulated by the Decree of the Minister for Labour and Social Policy dated December 1, 2000: “*Regarding detailed conditions of the assistance provided to refugees, the amount of the benefits, forms and range of the assistance, the procedures concerning this cases and the conditions of acquiring and losing the right to the assistance*”

<sup>25</sup> Since most refugees and foreigners decide to settle in the Warsaw area, the statistics for Mazowsze are a reliable, and to some extent even representative, source of data concerning refugees settling in Poland

Consequently, the Warsaw PCPR serves 90% of all individual integration programmes. The concentration of the refugees in Warsaw brings certain inconveniences, above all for the refugees themselves. Firstly, the prices of real estate and the cost of living in Warsaw are definitely higher than in other regions of the country, but social security benefit rates payable to refugees are on the same level all over the country (being determined by Decree of the Minister of Labour and Social policy). Secondly, the fewer clients given PCPR serves, the more time can be spared for the individual cases by the social workers (responsible for the integration programme). Moreover, in smaller (and thus better integrated) local communities it is easier to “introduce” the refugee into the social network and evoke positive feelings towards him/her, winning acceptance of the community. The big, anonymous cities do not offer such opportunities. In the last local elections, immigrants from African countries and the USA were chosen to be local community representatives or officials of the local administration in several villages. This phenomenon confirms the positive experiences of the social workers and refutes the common opinion that the inhabitants of the countryside are hostile towards all “otherness”, be it racial, religious or cultural.

**Table 20. Refugees participating in the integration programme run in the Mazowsze voivodship in the years 2001–2002\*)**

No.	Country of origin	Integration programmes in 2001		Integration programmes in 2002	
		Total of integration programmes	Total of individuals participating in programmes	Total of integration programmes	Total of individuals participating in programmes
1.	Chechnya	18	70	57	184
2.	Somalia	9	15	2	2
3.	Cameroon	7	8	2	2
4.	Ethiopia	6	7	3	3
5.	Sudan	6	7	4	4
6.	Ex-Yugoslavia	3	9	3	9
7.	Belarus	3	5	3	9
8.	Pakistan	3	4	3	4
9.	Turkey	2	7	1	1
10.	Liberia	2	6	1	1
11.	Stateless person	2	2	1	1
12.	Afghanistan	2	2	0	0
13.	Sri Lanka	1	1	3	7
14.	Sierra Leone	1	1	1	1
15.	Congo	1	1	2	3
16.	Nigeria	1	1	0	0
17.	Rwanda	1	1	2	2
18.	Russia-Dagestan	0	0	1	4
19.	Algeria	0	0	1	1
20.	Angola	0	0	1	1
21.	Cuba	0	0	1	1
22.	Palestine	0	0	1	1
	<b>Total</b>	68	147	93	241

Source: Mazovian Pilot Programme

\*) Systematic and comparable data are available only from the year 2001, because before that year the integration programme was run by various subjects (e.g. NGOs)

Chechens are the most numerous group among the programme recipients. They usually come with families (187 individuals participated in 57 programmes). In the opinion of the employees of the PCPRs (*interview No. 12 with 3 social workers of Warsaw PCPR*), these are not the easiest refugee group to manage – many of them have been deeply traumatized, but as a group they are demanding and formulate a plethora of requests for the social workers and NGOs (Romaszewska-Guzy 2003). Moreover, the strong network of Chechen immigrants that is present in Poland and in the countries of Western Europe counteracts any possible integration with Polish society. Having the possibility of further migration to the West, the Chechens have weak motivation to settle down in Poland, to learn the language and look for a job. In fact, the majority of them leave Poland following the Western migration path (*interview No. 18 with a Member of Parliament supporting Chechnya's political refugees*).

According to the social workers, the refugees coming from remote destinations and travelling alone, are more prone to settle in Poland, to participate in an integration programme and to adapt to Polish reality. The lack of support from the network motivates them to more rapid and more effective integration, and to stricter co-operation with representatives of the host society.

## **6.2. Available reception assistance programmes for migrants**

The main objective of the integration programme activated in 2000 is to assist in the starting of an “independent and satisfying” life in Poland (Mazovian Pilot Programme 2003). The programme promotes independence from social security benefit in the shortest time possible, as well as seeking to prevent such negative phenomena among refugees as homelessness, drug and alcohol addiction, mental diseases and all the derivative problems. Of course, integration as the task of the social security institutions is understood here in very narrow terms, i.e. as the process by which a refugee is placed in a new reality. The assistance of the State is supposed to overcome difficult life events, which cannot be surmounted by the refugee and his/her family alone using available means, competences and entitlements. The social workers should offer assistance consisting of information (not only the legal regulations which a refugee is subject to, but also the knowledge about the host country), assistance in finding accommodation (inexpensive community flats, if possible) and a job (or new job training). In co-operation with specialists, they should also assist a refugee with medical and psychological care, facilitating inclusion in the local community and preventing social exclusion of the newcomer.

It is assumed that the integration has been achieved if the following conditions are met (Grzymała-Moszczyńska 2000, p. 24):

- the refugee has learnt the language of the host country to a degree allowing for everyday communication;
- the refugee has been employed in a position corresponding with his/her qualifications and skills gained before coming to the host country, or else has gained new skills or qualifications corresponding to the employment structure of the host country;
- the refugee is financially independent and is not forced to rely on either welfare or on social security benefits;
- the dwelling of the refugee is of the standard generally met with in the given locality (being neither overcrowded nor in a worse technical condition);

- the refugee does not enter into any conflict with binding law; s/he using the educational and training opportunities open to him/her and participating in political life (through voting in elections and membership of political organisations).

Unfortunately, the refugees that would meet all of the abovementioned conditions, having participated in the integration programme, are still very rare in Mazowsze (and most probably in the rest of the country, too).

### **6.3. Implementation of the integration programme**

Fewer people enter the integration programme than the numbers of refugee statuses granted each year would suggest. Some (probably quite large) groups of refugees head for Western Europe (where they are awaited by relatives and friends) just after having been granted the status and the Geneva Travel Document. Unfortunately, there is no data that would allow for any estimation of the percentage of the refugees continuing migration or settling in Poland. The lacking data are not the result of carelessness on the part of administration officials dealing with refugees, but rather result from their being treated as Polish citizens. In compliance with the law, the refugees have the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to personal data protection, etc. Since the refugees are placed in the official statistics as Polish citizens, it is impossible to separate them later from the given collective data and hence to follow their lots. Moreover, a part of the refugees initially staying in Poland leave the country after having attended a portion of the integration programme or else after completion.

A refugee should contact the PCPR responsible for integration programmes within 30 days of having been granted the status. In theory, every programme is run individually; it is constructed on the basis of a community investigation and the actual needs of the refugee. In practice, it is limited to financial benefit, payable in two stages. In the first stage of the integration programme (1-6 months) the total size of the benefit amounts to 1149 PLN<sup>27</sup> monthly for a single-person household, to 804 PLN for a person in a family of two, to 689 PLN per person in a family of three and to 574 PLN per person in a family of four or more. In the second stage (7-12 months) the monthly payments are reduced to: 1033 PLN for a single-person household, 723 PLN (for a household of two), 629 (household of three) and 517 (household of four and more)<sup>28</sup>. It should be mentioned that the guaranteed minimum wage for a person entering the job market in Poland is 535 PLN, implying that the payments made to refugees are almost double (per each household member). Every refugee participating in the programme signs up to a contract defining the conditions of co-operation and the mutual obligations of both sides (i.e. refugee and PCPR) for the duration of the programme.

#### **6.3.1. Employment**

Entering the integration programme, refugees are obliged to register with the Labour Offices in their places of residence. The registration in the Labour Office is rather a formality, necessary not so much as a way of seeking legal employment, but to provide the refugee and his/her family members with access to free health care (to which employees paying social security contributions and registered unemployed are

<sup>27</sup> As for December 31, 2003 an exchange rate amounts: 1 € = 4,7 PLN

<sup>28</sup> The amount of the benefits is defined Each year by the Minister of Economy, Labour and Social Policy



entitled). Rarely does a refugee find employment through the Labour Office offer. The majority of refugees are unemployed also after having completed the integration programme.

The main barrier to finding a job is weak (or zero) proficiency in the Polish language and a lack of the qualifications and skills that would make a refugee an attractive employee on the job market. In general, the refugees who obtained a good education prior to leaving their country of origin can find a job corresponding, at least in part, to their qualifications. However, as the representatives of the Refugee Association have pointed out, such job search is very time-consuming and requires substantial effort. A married refugee couple that are medical doctors managed to nostrificate the qualification certificates and now work in the health care institutions. Other refugees teach languages in language schools and at university departments. The refugees from Africa are seemingly readily employed as waiters and bartenders; their exotic look - by Polish standards - is apparently an advantage esteemed by the employer.

The unskilled or illiterate refugees find themselves in the most difficult situation, their access to many employment opportunities being so restricted. The ones of pre-retirement age or with a serious health condition face similar problems. In a case in which one or several of these factors appear, the chances for employment on the Polish labour market drop significantly, especially at present, when the unemployment rate in Poland has reached more than 18%. The integration programme completed, the refugees usually become the customary beneficiaries of social security benefits.

Since the social security benefit is very low, (ca. 50 € per month), the refugees and their families are in danger of permanent marginalisation – without jobs they cannot afford to buy or rent a flat, and they may also find it difficult to satisfy their basic needs. Without a job (being a very good sphere for the initiating of social contacts), existence below the poverty line only deepens the state of social isolation. Thus the refugees (and immigrants) remaining in this condition become the perfect addressees of the illegal activities and organised crime structures developed within the ethnic groups. It should be noted, however, that almost one fifth of the citizens of the Republic of Poland live in very similar conditions of structural unemployment, chronic poverty and the related lack of prospects, as well as with exclusion from consumption (Domański 2003).

### **6.3.2. Language courses**

Polish language courses form the next element in the integration programme. In the opinion of the employees of PCPR it is possible to learn the basis of the Polish language in 6 months, to be able to communicate and to get along in society. Unfortunately, the majority of refugees are not motivated to systematic language learning. Participants in language courses are not numerous and tend to drop out. Sometimes there are additional general problems (elderly people, or those with limited language predisposition tend to learn more slowly) and intercultural conditioning (the refugees from the Muslim countries limit their wives' access to Polish language courses or ban them altogether). It may happen that the basic barrier to Polish language learning is the above-mentioned illiteracy of the refugees – the standard methods of teaching are not adapted to illiterate individuals. Many refugees demand English language courses, instead of Polish language courses<sup>29</sup>, something that attests indirectly to the fact that Poland is not an attractive target for settlement migration of refugees.

<sup>29</sup> The refugees signalled their interest in English language courses to PCPR and UNHCR employees

### 6.3.3. Housing

Within 14 days of having the status granted, a refugee should leave the reception centre s/he stayed in during the procedure. At this time s/he should contact the PCPR (or the community centre for social assistance) and move to other accommodation. The PCPR, as well as the NGOs assisting in the programme (the Polish Humanitarian Organisation and Caritas Polska) have at their disposal some rotational flats, which they rent to the refugees for the duration of the programme. The number of flats is still smaller than the number of refugees entitled to assistance and moreover the flats are rotational, i.e. on completion of the programme, they should be released to accommodate the next family. In general, apart from employment, the acquisition of proprietary rights or short-term housing is the main problem determining the quality of life of refugees in Poland.

On the basis of an agreement signed with the President of the Capital City of Warsaw, several public flats are assigned to refugees every year. It does not satisfy all needs, but considering the high prices of real estate<sup>30</sup> and rent<sup>31</sup>, the free-of-charge public flats exert a positive influence on the economic condition of several families per year<sup>32</sup>.

### 6.3.4. Budget

A positive phenomenon worth mentioning is the fact that each year, despite the prolonged economic crisis in Poland, appropriate sums are issued from the State budget to cover the expenses of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners, reception centres, PCPRs and refugee integration programmes (Table 21).

**Table 21. Financial means for refugee integration assistance in the years 1999–2002 in Mazowsze voivodship**

Year	Number of refugees subject to integration assistance	Sum paid (in PLN)
1999	60	375 000
2000	80	509 900
2001	147	1 083 577
2002	241	1 000 995
2003	?	1 300 000 (planned)

Source: *Mazovian Pilot Programme*

Moreover, the refugees and their children are very often helped spontaneously by representatives of the host society, e.g. teachers giving free complementary courses to help foreigners catch up with the educational requirements (the discrepancies derive mainly from limited language skills) and to equalise educational chances. Also the children of the individuals who have not been granted refugee status, but whose presence in Poland is informally tolerated<sup>33</sup> (e.g. Chechens and Armenians), are admitted free of charge not only to state schools, but sometimes even to public schools (i.e. private establishments), at the elementary, middle and secondary levels.

<sup>30</sup> The acquisition of a small apartment in the Warsaw area means an expense of € 15,000–30,000

<sup>31</sup> Monthly rent for a one bedroom flat is around € 200-250

<sup>32</sup> The free public flat is a very important component of the resources, such that social workers try to assign them to families which succeed in the integration process. In the past there were cases of repatriates who would lease the flats obtained from the community and go back to Ukraine to live on the rent money (Hut 2002)

<sup>33</sup> e.g. by make it possible for them to stay in the Polish Humanitarian Organisation's refugee centres

#### 6.4. Education and other cultural programmes

After WWII, border shifts and accompanying resettlements left Poland as one of the most ethnically homogeneous states in Europe. During communist times, Poland was not an attractive country for settlement migration, especially where migrants had come from distant countries and continents. With the exception of a few students participating in scholarship programmes, people of different skin colour were difficult to meet. The situation changed after 1989, when the inflow of refugees and immigrants activated both positively and negatively the attitudes of Poles towards people of other races. Getting accustomed to the otherness and shaping attitudes towards refugees has become an objective of several educational programmes and regular events organised by different organisations.

One of the best known events of an educational character<sup>34</sup> is the Refugee Day organised every year in Warsaw. During this one day the refugees, NGOs and international organisations dealing with refugees meet inhabitants of Warsaw. The programme includes ethnic music shows, tastings of ethnic food (exotic to Poles), refugee art exhibitions, lectures and debates concerning the countries of origin of the refugees and also their problems.

Apart from Refugee Day, which has been organised for 9 years now, there is also Warsaw Multicultural Week, an initiative of the School for Social Psychology running for the third time in 2003. Its programme is composed mainly of lectures and discussions, and it is addressed primarily to university students. In the year 2002, the Catholic Church placed Refugee Day in its official calendar, thereby establishing a formal holiday on June 20. The engagement of the authority of the religious communities in Poland (the Roman Catholic Church, and the denominations of the incomers, i.e. the Orthodox Church and the Muslim Religious Association) in the assistance provided for refugees and immigrants is a very valuable initiative. The Catholic Church still has strong influence on the general attitudes of Polish society, especially those of the inhabitants of small villages and of poorly educated and elderly people, i.e. all those who in surveys declare negative opinions concerning refugees and immigrants. The educational activities conducted within the religious communities can shape positive attitudes more profoundly and more successfully (especially in this group, rather immune to media messages) than can spectacular actions organised in the big cities. However, the visible and measurable effects of the Catholic Church's activities are still awaited.

It seems that the attitudes of those who are not easily influenced by the religious authorities, are positively shaped by the mass media. The visibility of immigrants and refugees in the media grows each year. They become characters in popular soap operas, they participate in TV shows, some of them become Polish celebrities. They enjoy common interests and positive attitudes, give interviews to the tabloids, have no problem in receiving Polish citizenship. Despite this, there are still cases of verbal or physical harassments of immigrants (*interview No. 20*), especially the refugees from African countries and the immigrants from Vietnam (Koryś 2002)..

Therefore, the necessity of running educational and integration programmes in the schools at medium and secondary level is more and more accentuated, since the school

<sup>34</sup> According to the annual surveys, ca. 35-40% of respondents have heard of (or have seen the TV report of) the Refugee Day in the general national sample, what is quite a good result if we consider that the event takes place in Warsaw

is a crucial socializing institution, influencing the opinions and attitudes of students markedly. One such programme is the so-called “Refugee Suitcase”, prepared by the UNHCR and the Polish Humanitarian Organisation (*interview No. 14 with UNHCR Officer*). The programme is composed of four integral parts: in the first one the students watch a movie presenting life stories of individual refugees, the reasons forcing them to leave their country and their life in Poland; the second part is a workshop explaining who a refugee is and why s/he becomes one, and encouraging students to take some action for the benefit of refugees; the third part is an exhibition of 35 posters depicting the lives of refugees (each holds an information note); the final element of the programme is a role play game “Crossings”, during which the students can put themselves in the place of refugees and experience at least a part of the difficulties encountered by them.

Apart from the sets of “Refugee Suitcase”, the Polish Humanitarian Organisation website also offers the scenarios for lessons entitled “ABC of humanitarianism”, as run by the trainers of humanitarian education.

### **6.5. Access to health care and other social services**

As has already been mentioned, refugees and immigrants are entitled to medical care free of charge and social benefits if they stay in Poland legally and if they are legally employed (or run a registered business activity and pay contributions to the Social Security Office). The refugees are also entitled to free medical care during the process of job seeking performed through Local Labour Offices.

The actual access of refugees to medical care is in fact hard to estimate. Some limitations can obviously derive from weak language skills and difficulties in communicating with the doctor, as well as from the necessity to become familiar with the structure and functioning of the Polish health care system. Neither employees of the PCPR and Mazowsze Voivodship Office nor the refugees themselves have any account of any problems the refugees might have encountered when demanding medical assistance.

Moreover, even if it is not in compliance with the regulations, *ad hoc* medical care is provided even to irregular migrants, in some circumstances. This is mainly true of limb fractures, accidents during illegal work and birth giving. Last year the total costs of the medical services provided for irregular migrants were well over 16 million PLN (i.e. € 4 million). The Health Care Offices pass on the charge to the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners. Children frequenting elementary and secondary schools are vaccinated independently of their parents' status in Poland, be this regular or not.

Of course, the situation of people who entered Poland legally, like the majority of the migrants from the former USSR, and who have not prolonged their stay over the allowed limit, is far better than that of individuals who were trafficked in or overstayed their visas. They usually avoid using public medical care, fearing the discovery of their presence and the subsequent deportation to the country of origin; and they cannot often afford private medical service. Their situation is problematical, since, apart from the possible health and life danger of migrants themselves caused by developing diseases, they can also be carriers of very dangerous pathogens, e.g. tuberculosis.

Providing medical care for these migrants is not only very difficult because of possible related costs. The indirect consequence of such a step would be *de facto* recognition of the present *status quo*, i.e. approval of the uncontrolled inflow of migrants to Polish

territory. Moreover, the free medical care could encourage seriously ill individuals to come to Poland, in cases in which they could not find proper assistance in their countries of origin, for diverse reasons. A similar phenomenon has been observed in the Central Reception Centre in Dębak: the refugee status is applied for by people with a serious health condition (e.g. with developed tuberculosis). They are entitled to medical care while in the centre, and they readily exercise this right. After having completed a necessary treatment (often requiring special surgery, artificial limbs, etc.) the potential refugees withdraw their application and go back to their country of origin. Employees of the Office for Repatriation and Foreigners call this strategy “medical tourism” (*interview No. 7*).

### **6.6. The participation of migrants in social and political life**

In compliance with the law in force, only the citizens of the Republic of Poland have active and passive voting rights. These rights are extended to naturalised foreigners, i.e. individuals who have received Polish citizenship. There are however very few immigrants who apply for Polish citizenship, and thus the political significance of this group is rather non-existent – as long as they do not have the votes, which could influence the elections, their presence in Poland, as well as their problems, are beyond the sphere of political interest (with one exception)<sup>35</sup>. This situation is changing gradually, as more and more often MPs intervene in individual cases of immigrants in difficulties (*interview No. 7*).

Apart from election rights, the immigrants residing legally in Poland have the right to free association and to run public activities. Only a few immigrant groups use this right, however – above all those that were forced to flee to Poland because of political activities in the country of origin, e.g. the Chechen Government in Exile, which officially resided for several years in Poland, the Association of Belarusian Political Refugees and the Association of Cuban Political Refugees. However, in practice they are more engaged in the political activities back in the country of origin than in the representation of the interests of co-citizens in the host country, not to mention lobbying activities.

The only group that has actually a dynamic public activity in Poland is the Vietnamese diaspora. At the moment, there are three registered Vietnamese associations and at least four journals and weeklies published in Poland in Vietnamese. The first one, the “Society for Polish-Vietnamese Friendship”, was established back in 1987; it was mainly the association for Vietnamese students, who, upon graduation from universities in Poland, refused to go back to Vietnam (this would usually provoke severe repressions towards their families in Vietnam), and their Polish friends. The second association, “Solidarity and Friendship”, was registered in the 1990s by the leaders of the economic migration. It is of a lobbying character and – in co-operation with the Vietnamese embassy – is representative of the interests of entrepreneurs residing in Poland. The third association, the “Polish Section of the Far East” has been established recently with the second generation of Vietnamese immigrants, born and educated in Poland in mind (*interview No. 24*). It seems that its model of activity is the closest to the Western type of organisation. It can also have more influence since its members are well rooted in the

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<sup>35</sup> Politicians of the centre-right party *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice) have often intervened in cases of the Chechen political activists who were refused refugee status. They also helped them in finding jobs or collecting money for necessary medical operations for the individuals wounded during the struggles in Chechnya (*interview No. 18 with MP*)

life of society, thanks to their fluency in the Polish language.

The Association of Refugees in Poland was established last year. It is meant to represent the interests of the refugees, and to integrate them into a mutual support group, facilitating the flow of information and assisting with the securing of a job or housing (*interview No. 20*). So far, the actions and initiatives pursued by the members of the society have remained in the sphere of declarations. It seems that the main obstacle is multi-ethnicity of the organisation and weak Polish language skills (they usually need to communicate in Polish) as well as the demanding attitude of the leaders, who await institutional grants and financial assistance before starting up with any activities). Despite the significant support of the UNHCR (*interview No. 14*), the activity of the association has gained little visibility so far and is limited to refugees from African countries (the leaders and founders are also of African origin).

What is interesting, economic immigrants from the ex-USSR are not visible in the public sphere. It seems that during their stay in Poland they concentrate mainly on economic activity and the minimization of expenses (Koryś 2002, Stola 1997), and thus refrain from any form of activity until they are back in their home countries. Another important factor is the irregular status of the majority of them, and the consequent fact that activity in the public sphere would attract the kind of attention from the authorities that they would probably like to avoid. The only forms of public activity they participate in are Orthodox masses. Apart from the religious service, conducting a choir, organising meetings with interesting people, the Warsaw Orthodox priests gather information about the immigrants kept in Polish prisons and also co-operate with the Polish police in distributing short notes with the words "I really need help" in Polish and Ukrainian. These notes, if returned to the priests, are a signal to the Polish police that the person is subject to extortion or some other racket (Machcewicz 2003). Similar assistance and integration activities are also conducted by the Catholic Church among Armenians (*interview No. 27 with the leader of Armenian Religious Society in Poland*) and the Vietnamese (*interview No. 26 with a priest of the Vietnamese Catholic Society*).

### **6.7. Public perception/opinion of immigrants and refugees**

Even though the inflow of migrants into Poland is a relatively new phenomenon, it is already registered in the social consciousness (Łodziński 1998a, 1999). Due to the economic and social costs that Poles are aware of, migration is regarded as a social problem, and as a challenge to the labour market. Nevertheless Poles prove to have a positive attitude towards the migrants flooding into the country. Up to now, contacts between Poles and immigrants have been frictionless; no serious conflicts have taken place yet. This peaceful coexistence is explained both by the fact that relatively few foreigners have settled in Poland so far, and what is even more important, by the still persistent social memory of 1980s, during which hundreds of thousands of Poles found themselves in similar positions in Western Europe. Present attitudes towards foreigners and their settlement in Poland are determined above all by pragmatic motives and reciprocity rather than by ideological argumentation (like the "Poland for Poles" slogan).

The existing public opinion poll data and results of sociological research do not give a homogenous and consistent picture of Poles' attitudes towards immigrant foreigners. To a large extent, attitudes towards migrants are formed, not out of direct contacts with foreigners but out of stereotypes. The change that took place during the 1990s entailed a broader confrontation of common stereotypes with concrete experiences. Contacts

with immigrants have not removed the stereotypes, but filled them with 'specific' content, thus 'The Alien' has become psychologically 'accustomed to' and transformed into 'The Other' (Łodziński / Nowicka 2003).

Another important feature of the public perception of immigrants is the relatively limited significance of cultural (e.g. religious) or racial (anthropological) differences in Poles' relations with foreigners. According to a public opinion poll carried out in November 1998, the majority of Poles declared an open and positive attitude towards people of different races: 92% of the respondents would willingly allow their own children to play with a 'coloured' child, 89% would willingly invite such a person into their homes, 87% would be willing to consult a doctor of different race. Answers given to other questions of the 'social distance index' confirmed the general tendency: over 85% of respondents would not mind having that person as a neighbour or a friend. Three-quarters of Poles would accept that person as a relative and almost half of them (49.25%) would accept a spouse of a different race. Other sociological studies claim that today's Poles are gradually withdrawing from the national model of cultural community as a basis for national identification and adopting the model of civil community (Łodziński / Nowicka 2003).

Despite the economic costs involved in the protection of refugees and the rare, although persistent, acts of verbal and physical discrimination, the general atmosphere surrounding refugees in Poland is (in the opinion of UNHCR officers *interview No. 14* and sociologists – *No. 23*) rather friendly, both in society and in the local communities in which refugee reception centres are situated (*interviews No. 14 and 13 with official at of Mazovian Voivodship, and Visitation of refugee shelter run by Polish Humanitarian Organisation*).

According to a public opinion survey conducted for the UNHCR, 65% of respondents correctly define a refugee as a person who has left his/her country fleeing persecution. 54% of respondents believe that a refugee is a person escaping from war areas. Nevertheless, the concept of the refugee is still weakly anchored in social awareness, considering that 43% respondents identify refugees with economic migrants (see Table 22). Moreover, a belief in the economic roots of the refugee phenomenon is becoming more and more common (rising from 27% in 1999 to 43% in 2002).

**Table 22: Who is a refugee? Answers from respondents obtained in Poland in the years 1999–2002 (%)**

<b>Who, according to you, is a refugee?</b>	1999	2000	2001	2002
People who fled their country fearing persecutions	71	64	63	65
People fleeing war areas	60	60	55	54
People who left their country in search of better standards of living	27	34	39	43
Poles from the East, e.g. Kazakhstan	10	16	12	10
Members of an ethnic/national minority settled in Poland	6	5	4	3
Gypsies on the Polish streets	4	4	3	3
Others	0	2	1	1

*The answers do not sum up to 100% because it was possible to indicate more than one answer.*

*Source: Understanding of the refugee problem in Poland, OBOP, 2002*

People who define refugees correctly and differentiate them from among other migrant groups are usually more prone to accept the settlement of refugees in Poland for a longer period of time. They also believe that refugees should not be sent back to their countries of origin (see Table 23). Also in the whole examined group, the attitudes have lost their negative edge – in 1998 one in three respondents believed that refugees should be sent back to the countries of origin (36% in the whole group). In 2002 this belief is shared by only one in five (21%).

**Table 23: The beliefs of respondents concerning the treatment of the refugees in Poland in the years 1998–2002 (%)**

<b>How, in your opinion, should refugees be dealt with? Should they be:</b>										
	<b>1998</b>		<b>1999</b>		<b>2000</b>		<b>2001</b>		<b>2002</b>	
	total N=1001	Respondents associating properly the concept of refugee n=271	total N=1009	Respondents associating properly the concept of refugee n=607	total N=1085	Respondents associating properly the concept of refugee n=523	total N=1193	Respondents associating properly the concept of refugee n=594	total N=1013	Respondents associating properly the concept of refugee n=492
allowed to settle in Poland for a longer period of time	29	36	41	45	36	43	39	45	37	42
sent back to the country of origin	36	28	30	31	25	22	20	16	21	17
allowed to settle in Poland permanently	13	13	8	7	15	12	16	15	13	13
sent to some other country	9	9	11	9	8	8	8	6	13	14
left alone	2	2	2	1	4	4	5	6	3	2
difficult to say	11	12	8	7	12	11	12	12	13	12

Source: *Understanding of the refugee problem in Poland, OBOP 2002*

However, the opinions on the role of the Polish State in the case of refugee management are quite stable in comparison to the personal opinions presented in Table 24. What is important, there is no such option as “sending back or to another country” (accepted

<sup>36</sup> The factor that differentiates the answers so dramatically may be the fact that the first question concerns “all” the refugees, while the second one is related only to those who “would like to stay in Poland for a longer period or permanently”



in the previous question by more than 30% of respondents)<sup>36</sup>. The general attitude (of 59-64%) is that the State should guarantee refugees accommodation in the Refugee Centres until they reach the stage of independence. Only 11% of respondents agree on the need for assistance with finding a job, while even fewer (7-8%) are in favour of the special language courses organised for refugees. Providing refugees with council flats is an even less popular move (appreciated by only 2-4%). This is not surprising in the light of the fact that the strong demand for council flats is far from being relieved.

**Table 24: The beliefs of the respondents concerning the role of the State in the management of the refugees in Poland in the years 1998–2002 (%)**

What, in your opinion, should our State provide for refugees?	OCTOBER	OCTOBER	JULY	JULY
	1999	2000	2001	2002
They should be granted a place in Refugee Centres until they are independent	66	59	59	64
They should be assisted in finding a job	12	11	11	11
Special language courses should be organized for them	7	8	8	8
They should be granted Polish citizenship	6	8	8	7
Other	6	11	2	6
They should be granted a flat	2	3	2	4
They should be sent to other countries	-	-	4	-
Nothing should be done	-	-	3	-
I don't know	1	-	3	-

Source: *Understanding of the refugee problem in Poland, OBOP 2002*

Relatively friendly or neutral attitudes towards refugees are an important social capital for the future, when the number of refugees settling in Poland may be much higher. However, a closer analysis of the answers shows that the engagement in the question of refugees is rather superficial, and the readiness for charitable activities rather limited. The preferred model of coexistence, from the point of view of an average respondent, is thus a situation in which refugees would take care of themselves without tying up any means from the State budget: they should be placed in some separate spaces like Refugee Centres until they are able to live on their own.

### **Recommendations:**

Undoubtedly, all attempts to adjust the integration programme to the particular needs of a given refugee and his/her family are strongly required, and should improve the effectiveness of a migrant's adaptation. Nevertheless, a limitation of the integration programmes to refugees only, even if financially rational, seems a short-sighted policy. Under the Geneva Convention, when the reason for an exodus ceases to exist, the refugee should return to his/her country of origin. This temporal aspect to refugee status is one of the main obstacles to integration – people have little motivation to learn

the language, culture and legal regulations of the host country, and this causes even further marginalisation. It would therefore seem a reasonable strategy to make the payment of social benefits dependent on the refugees' progress in Polish (of course, taking into consideration the differences in individuals' language abilities).

Another pro-integration policy would consist of a new form of supervision – each refugee would be assigned an individual mentor (a trained socio- or psycho-therapist) whom the refugee could contact in cases in which s/he encounters any problems (in offices, looking for a job). The mentor would monitor the process of adaptation in the new conditions. Particular attention should be paid to the children of the refugees. Since they tend to learn languages faster and to integrate more easily than the adults do, they play an important role in the social integration of their parents.

An additional weakness of the integration policy in Poland, apart from its limitation to refugees, is its focus on assistance for people who cannot, for many reasons, function independently in the host society. Some forms of incentives or prizes, inbuilt into the system, for those immigrants who have integrated into Polish society, would have a motivational effect and would be equally effective in assisting the less entrepreneurial individuals.

## 7. Conclusion and recommendations

Poland would seem to resemble other Central European countries (like the Czech Republic) in that the changes ushered in by the fall of communism – such as a liberalisation and democratisation of public life, the introduction of free-market economic principles and transformation of the economy and the opening up of borders – have led to a sustained decline in emigration with a simultaneous rise in immigration. The economic slowdown and rapidly growing unemployment rate have recently disturbed this pattern – the inflow has decreased, while both temporary and permanent outflow have increased. The forthcoming EU accession, together with expected economic growth, a developing dynamic to the Russian economy, and last but not least globalisation, are all going to influence the present migratory behaviour of Poles and immigrants, and thus might require governmental and institutional reaction in the future.

### 7.1. Emigration

As has been noted, Poland was traditionally an emigration country. It seems that for decades, if not centuries, economic migration has been to some extent a method offering solutions to such problems as the overpopulation of rural areas, economic underdevelopment and under-urbanization, unemployment, a low living standard, etc. The temporary economic migration has contributed to a reduction in the social costs of structural reforms ongoing in Poland. Both irregular migration and seasonal employment based on bilateral agreements are cushioning the social tensions reflecting the negative consequences of social inequality, and are supporting the state budget by limiting the amount of social benefits paid to “redundant” people (the deskilled) who have not and will not benefit from the transformation.

Nevertheless, fears that Polish economic migrants would overrun EU countries immediately after accession seem groundless. The opposite scenario is even more probable: economic convergence following accession (price and income unification and the further appreciation of the zloty) may curb current forms of irregular migration on the part of Poles and trigger off return waves of disappointed people for whom the West will have lost its pulling power. It may contribute to further grow in unemployment and a growing demand for social benefits, as well as pensions that have not been previously worked for.

### 7.2. Immigration

In the long run, the inflow of migrants is likely to grow, as happened previously in Spain and Portugal following their EU accessions. However, in the meantime, an incorporation of Poland into ‘Fortress Europe’ will possibly reduce the volume of current migration, especially of Ukrainian, Belarussian and Russian Federation citizens. The limitation of the migrant flow from the East may impair the competitiveness of the economic sectors profiting from the migrant labour force (i.e. agriculture or construction) and negatively influence the economic situation of certain groups (and regions), depending on the (informal) income from these activities.

Setting up barriers to entry into Poland may redirect the main migration flow to Moscow. Apart from being a big, rich and developing metropolis, this is more attractive to migrants from the ex-republics for linguistic, cultural and mental reasons. It needs to be recalled that there is a cultural impact of international migrations manifesting itself in, for example, the transmission of life models and impacts on attitudes (Romaniszyn 1999). The maintenance of a pro-Western orientation among Ukrainian citizens (in fear of a Ukrainian decision to follow Belarus in coming back to Russia) is of great geopolitical significance, and so will always have priority status within Polish foreign policy (Konieczna 2001).

Paradoxically, the closing of the borders resulting from the implementation of visas may increase the expansion of immigration from Ukraine to the Western European markets. They find Poland attractive not because of a high income to be earned here, but because of the relatively low costs (cheap travel), accessibility (visa-free entrance, acceptance of vouchers) and psychological comfort (cultural proximity, linguistic and mental similarities, easy adaptation). The existing migration networks, and the economic and psychological costs of acquiring a Polish visa may redirect a part of the flow to the richer countries. Of course, for many migrants from the ex-USSR, Poland will remain the country of destination.

Economically active immigrants from South-Eastern Asia are likely to stop perceiving Poland as an attractive host country. Some symptoms indicate that this process has already started. It is a consequence of the high growth dynamics in the South-Eastern Asian economies and the limited demand in the sectors of the Polish economy they dominate (fast foods, low-quality clothing). In the next few years, the children of Vietnamese migrants, grown up and educated at Polish institutions of higher education, will enter the Polish labour market. Will they be employed in Polish companies and public institutions, or will they be forced to stay in the ethnic niches? This will be an important test of the tolerance and openness of Polish society.

### **7.3. Recommendations**

A squaring up to the challenges referred to will require an anticipatory and far-seeing policy, as well as actions to regularise migration processes, since the active steering thereof is more effective than a mere restrictive combating of what are vital processes (Iglicka *et al.* 2003). The following issues would seem to deserve much attention from policy-makers:

- a) the re-elaboration of the principles underpinning Polish migration policy; i.e. a shift from the present perception of inflow as a threat to a benefit-oriented attitude;
- b) the improvement of the quality and quantity of data on migration, i.e. extension of the role of surveys in measurement of the flows and volume of migration (of the BIPS type) and a granting of greater access to administrative data on migrants for scientific study;
- c) the introduction of effective institutional mechanisms of legalisation that would encourage the immigrants residing in Poland to regularise their stays and enter legal sectors of the market, i.e. a re-negotiation of the bilateral agreements between Poland and Ukraine regarding seasonal employment;

- d) the putting in place of suitable conditions for the development of wide-ranging cross-border relationships and contacts with Ukraine, Russia and Belarus;
- e) the development of effective integration programmes, addressed not only to refugees, but also to migrants settling in Poland, to counteract the isolation and marginalisation of the inflowing ethnic groups;
- f) preparation to absorb the temporary economic migrants currently residing abroad; the State should define the conditions for them to gain access to pension benefits and social benefits, from which immigrants should be excluded on account of their being employed in the secondary labour market.

## Statistical annex

**Table A1. Foreigners apprehended by the Border Guard for illegal border crossing by citizenship. Poland 1997–2002**

Citizenship	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1997-2002
<b>Total</b>	<b>5 312</b>	<b>3 748</b>	<b>2 974</b>	<b>3 787</b>	<b>3 653</b>	<b>3 086</b>	<b>22 560</b>
Afghanistan	611	477	434	292	408	383	2 605
Albania	6	41	2	5	1	5	60
Armenia	246	87	30	67	116	85	631
Azerbaijan	17	16	13	92	52	5	195
Bangladesh	133	104	31	3	9	0	280
Belarus	59	55	69	104	66	43	396
Bulgaria	129	86	103	51	47	10	426
China	25	3	16	27	13	149	233
Czech Republic	449	482	420	598	593	502	3 044
FYR Macedonia	26	29	7	7	2	18	89
Georgia	13	12	40	47	61	8	181
Germany	83	81	49	60	99	82	454
India	97	91	52	30	54	113	437
Iraq	145	111	35	38	208	87	624
Kazakhstan	6	3	13	17	14	11	64
Latvia	26	15	13	25	7	7	93
Lithuania	73	73	62	129	114	88	539
Moldova	115	86	121	237	180	68	807
Mongolia	11	46	10	12	17	0	96
Pakistan	206	122	30	18	27	15	418
Romania	1 002	287	309	281	278	22	2 179
Russia	125	82	113	345	219	366	1 250
Slovakia	110	78	98	65	68	87	506
Sri Lanka	747	483	53	16	0	34	1 333
Turkey	50	27	26	15	16	22	156
Ukraine	370	291	460	877	558	573	3 129
Vietnam	30	82	60	136	283	146	737
Yugoslavia	74	205	97	11	11	3	401
Stateless	13	22	23	29	25	11	123
Unknown	46	22	38	52	26	62	246
all other	269	149	147	101	81	81	828

Source: Border Guard, *Kępińska / Okólski 2002*

**Table A2. Foreigners apprehended for illegal border crossing in organised groups\*)  
Poland: 1998–2002**

Border with:	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998-2002
	Number of groups					
Total	387	194	252	283	233	1 349
Russia	-	1	-	-	1	2
Lithuania	10	2	2	2	1	17
Belarus	6	1	4	5	1	17
Ukraine	16	7	18	32	32	105
Slovakia	13	4	10	5	6	38
Czech Republic	15	23	6	14	11	69
Germany	317	149	211	224	178	1 079
Other **)	10	7	1	1	3	22

\*) By the Border Guard and neighbouring services

\*\*) Including airports, sea border and groups apprehended inside country

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table A3. Foreigners apprehended in organised groups by citizenship. Poland:  
1998–2002**

Citizenship	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1998-2002
Total	3 659	1 866	1 895	2 541	2 100	12 061
Afghanistan	861	834	538	801	514	3 548
Armenia	144	17	49	171	44	425
Azerbaijan	14	24	110	93	14	255
Bangladesh	235	57	2	8	-	302
Belarus	6	-	9	11	-	26
China	-	12	10	13	229	264
FYR Macedonia	37	8	3	19	11	78
Georgia	7	71	53	58	1	190
India	124	70	22	65	218	499
Iraq	168	41	59	259	139	666
Kazakhstan	-	-	17	5	5	27
Moldova	46	31	203	135	21	436
Pakistan	187	42	10	32	38	309
Romania	151	171	119	207	-	648
Russia	-	42	420	230	409	1 101
Sri Lanka	832	135	14	12	42	1 035
Turkey	29	-	10	3	24	66
Ukraine	28	49	66	47	123	313
Vietnam	51	29	131	344	250	805
Yugoslavia	577	143	3	-	-	723
all other	162	90	47	28	18	345

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table A4. Foreigners readmitted to Poland by citizenship. Poland: 1998–2002**

Citizenship	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	1997-2002
<b>Total</b>	<b>4 797</b>	<b>2 817</b>	<b>2 072</b>	<b>2 414</b>	<b>2 224</b>	<b>1 856</b>	<b>16 180</b>
Afghanistan	682	427	546	337	451	293	2 736
Armenia	613	144	23	49	150	39	1 018
Azerbaijan	82	21	62	138	87	10	400
Bangladesh	310	58	24	3	1	4	400
Belarus	80	53	51	63	63	14	324
China	16	7	4	20	15	53	115
Czech Republic	24	39	36	30	50	8	187
FYR Macedonia	57	69	17	7	29	2	181
Georgia	53	39	100	79	37	6	314
India	165	48	38	3	13	136	403
Iraq	246	117	29	33	133	75	633
Kazakhstan	3	4	9	31	14	9	70
Lithuania	28	49	7	3	10	4	101
Moldova	433	275	318	452	221	108	1 807
Pakistan	203	65	32	20	8	39	367
Romania	24	1	2	8	87	3	125
Russia	140	78	144	446	283	461	1 552
Sri Lanka	697	342	80	6	20	34	1 179
Turkey	21	32	21	15	11	27	127
Ukraine	508	268	310	476	270	220	2 052
Vietnam	8	42	29	88	194	231	592
Yugoslavia	102	462	112	11	0	0	687
All other	302	177	78	96	77	80	810

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002



**Table A5. Immigrants by country or continent of origin. Poland: 1997–2001**

<b>Origin of Immigrants</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
Total	8 426	8 916	7 525	7 331	6 625
<b>Europe, of which:</b>	5 334	5 593	4 923	4 821	4 561
Austria	193	229	195	202	157
Belarus	243	198	77	77	125
France	315	399	345	269	226
Germany	2 098	2 341	2 491	2 494	2 177
Greece	n.a.	n.a.	99	82	n.a.
Italy	212	198	226	254	251
Netherlands	96	102	n.a.	n.a.	86
Russia	304	304	143	129	125
Sweden	126	133	103	78	74
Ukraine	758	661	235	291	486
United Kingdom	233	245	274	256	246
<b>Africa</b>	204	165	149	120	99
<b>North and Central America, of which</b>	1 685	1 759	1 797	1 576	1 304
Canada	415	415	448	331	282
USA	1 197	1 274	1 333	1 185	1 008
<b>South America</b>	n.a.	n.a.	54	46	48
<b>Asia, of which:</b>	1 033	1 206	434	648	457
Kazakhstan	324	385	159	408	265
Vietnam	n.a.	n.a.	123	51	70
<b>Oceania, of which:</b>	165	187	167	162	111
Australia	n.a.	n.a.	158	154	102

Source: *Demographic Yearbook, various years*

**Table A6. Persons arrived from abroad registered for temporary stay above two months by previous country of residence in 1997–2001 (as of December 31)**

<b>Continents and countries</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
<b>Total</b>	17 976	27 542	39 303	43 623	43 501
<b>Europe</b>	11 095	19 461	31 704	36 529	36 430
Armenia	*)	*)	988	878	697
Belarus	731	1 384	1 746	2 157	2 214
Bulgaria	354	487	661	700	640
France	530	876	1 303	1 525	1 879
Germany	984	1 480	1 921	2 002	2 078
Russia	992	1 346	1 782	1 863	1 937
Ukraine	4 367	9 542	17 256	20 888	20 534
UK	654	830	1 109	1 083	970
Other	2 483	3 516	4 938	5 433	5 481
<b>Asia</b>	5 161	6 034	5 003	4 456	4 358
<b>Africa</b>	555	528	719	789	890
<b>America North and Central</b>	971	1 283	1 503	1 323	1 317
<b>South America</b>	99	131	154	261	364
Australia	80	90	145	148	116
Unknown	15	15	75	117	26

\*) Included in other

Source: Demographic Yearbook, various years

**Table A7. Permit to settle by citizenship (major citizenship). Poland 1998–2001\*)**

Citizenship	1998 **)	1998		1999		2000		2001	
		Applications	Granted	Applications	Granted	Applications	Granted	Applications	Granted
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 338</b>	<b>851</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>723</b>	<b>544 (a)</b>	<b>1 576</b>	<b>851 (b)</b>	<b>742</b>	<b>674 (c)</b>
Ukraine	330	146	50	128	90	327	159	159	157
Vietnam	139	82	23	78	52	167	83	116	85
Russia	102	93	26	99	87	177	104	58	66
Belarus	108	45	15	39	29	84	50	40	40
Armenia	67	38	7	44	25	169	74	54	39
Germany	58	20	7	18	13	31	13	17	20
China	8	14	9	39	20	40	27	29	18
United Kingdom	17	15	7	15	14	31	20	19	17
Mongolia	8	14	6	10	2	20	8	13	12
India	1	17	5	5	4	30	19	21	11
Bulgaria	25	13	5	10	13	26	10	12	10
Syria	17	23	13	7	7	25	18	4	9
USA	11	33	16	15	5	20	11	6	9
Georgia	2	18	8	4	7	11	7	12	8
Italy	15	7	1	10	11	18	7	6	8
Lithuania	37	9	2	6	7	19	11	5	8
Sweden	19	9	2	5	7	14	12	5	8
Yugoslavia	17	29	19	20	17	26	9	4	7
Japan	3	10	5	8	8	7	4	3	6
Yemen	1	5	2	4	2	8	3	2	6
Kazakhstan	143	6	-	9	8	9	2	9	6
Netherlands	5	3	1	6	0	12	7	2	6
Austria	10	9	2	7	10	6	3	5	5
Turkey	10	16	2	11	8	21	13	6	4
Algeria	12	20	4	6	8	13	5	4	2
France	17	7	3	10	10	14	9	3	2
Jordania	11	8	2	5	3	9	7	5	2
all others	145	142	33	105	77	242	156	123	103

\*) The number of persons granted the permit in a given year may exceed the number of applicants in that year because the former also pertain to applications submitted in preceding years

\*\*\*) Permits to settle granted to those who applied for “permanent residence” (in accordance with the “old” Aliens Act) before 1 January 1998

(a) Of which 45 persons who applied for permit to settle before 1 January 1998

(b) Of which 5 persons who applied for permit to settle before 1 January 1998

(c) Of which 12 persons who applied for permit to settle before 1 January 1998

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table A8. Fixed-time residence permits by citizenship (major citizenship).  
Poland: 1998–2001\*)**

Citizenship	1998		1999		2000		2001	
	Applications	Granted(a)	Applications	Granted(b)	Applications	Granted(c)	Applications	Granted(d)
<b>Total</b>	<b>9 448</b>	<b>4 893</b>	<b>16 712</b>	<b>16 810</b>	<b>17 167</b>	<b>15 034</b>	<b>23 445</b>	<b>20 522</b>
Ukraine	1 474	896	2 776	2 540	3 746	3 216	5 343	4 583
Russia	715	384	1,001	1 037	1 207	1 033	1 695	1 543
Belarus	431	232	696	709	783	699	1 513	1 242
Germany	302	179	799	756	752	692	1 196	1 046
Vietnam	1 525	733	1 339	1 434	1 364	1 146	1 138	1 018
France	105	41	626	545	895	873	1 099	991
United Kingdom	168	53	446	484	425	382	902	744
USA	320	166	700	741	560	506	874	736
Armenia	730	432	686	601	924	668	682	580
India	156	80	327	348	330	292	409	366
Kazakhstan	164	52	307	327	265	235	429	364
South Korea	358	171	491	591	369	320	304	341
China	292	127	370	394	374	366	381	335
Turkey	92	38	190	187	216	195	357	293
Italy	79	39	191	199	199	175	320	282
Sweden	53	32	171	158	203	193	328	279
Netherlands	58	36	204	196	215	185	306	275
Bulgaria	130	65	237	239	291	195	326	269
Japan	43	18	193	188	125	121	259	256
Lithuania	85	50	202	194	165	153	266	236
Yugoslavia	105	57	1 263	1 202	162	140	231	230
Mongolia	167	74	209	212	201	172	259	226
Denmark	23	12	107	84	128	131	243	217
Austria	24	16	109	101	180	167	208	190
Libya	192	47	285	378	178	158	163	184
Czech Rep.	48	30	90	91	132	116	170	163
Moldova	32	21	90	67	103	86	198	155
Romania	33	17	69	71	103	82	164	146
Belgium	20	13	100	83	78	82	156	140
Syria	75	33	136	146	126	105	125	123
Slovakia	58	46	98	88	98	93	159	121
All others	1 391	703	2 204	2 419	2 270	2 057	3 242	2 848

\*) The number of persons granted the permit in a given year may exceed the number of applicants in that year because the former also pertain to applications submitted in preceding years

(a) Of which 205 refugees

(b) Of which 57 refugees

(c) Of which 218 refugees

(d) Of which 303 refugees


Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table A9. Emigrants by major destinations. Poland: 1997–2001**

<b>Country of Destination</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
Total	20 222	22 177	21 535	26 999	23 368
<b>Europe, of which:</b>	16 315	18 446	17 698	22 865	19 469
Austria	631	761	581	532	640
Belgium	80	77	99	99	103
Denmark	86	89	99	90	100
France	245	266	263	309	261
Germany	14 202	16 128	15 346	20 472	16 900
Italy	155	211	223	273	307
Netherlands	139	166	218	239	265
Sweden	288	250	251	249	167
United Kingdom	121	166	170	189	208
<b>Africa</b>	35	61	53	38	48
<b>North and Central America, of which:</b>	3 568	3 306	3 484	3 798	3 539
Canada	1336	1076	1113	1206	1037
USA	2 229	2 217	2 358	2 572	2 485
<b>South America</b>	15	8	11	12	19
<b>Asia</b>	42	57	34	42	34
<b>Oceania, of which:</b>	240	297	252	193	250
Australia	n.a.	n.a.	239	179	244


Source: *Demographic Yearbook, various years*

**Map 1. Number of temporary emigrants for 1000 inhabitants in 2002**



Source: Cenzus 2002

**Map 2. Net migration balance. Poland 2001**



Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table A10. Work Permits issued to Foreigners (selected nationalities)**

Country	Total*) %		Occupation %											
			manager		owner		expert consultant		non-manual worker **)		skilled worker		unskilled worker	
2001														
Ukraine	2 811	16%	115	4%	405	14%	1 078	38%	544	19%	518	18%	151	5%
Belarus	745	4%	55	7%	67	9%	279	37%	136	18%	150	20%	58	8%
Russia	674	4%	56	8%	120	18%	268	40%	80	12%	88	13%	64	9%
Vietnam	933	5%	44	5%	286	31%	226	24%	13	1%	195	21%	169	18%
China	440	2%	36	8%	113	26%	127	29%	29	7%	85	19%	50	11%
Germany	1 402	8%	368	26%	177	13%	467	33%	107	8%	72	5%	211	15%
France	1 255	7%	192	15%	54	4%	500	40%	180	14%	17	1%	312	25%
UK	1 260	7%	109	9%	31	2%	561	45%	360	29%	15	1%	184	15%
2000														
Ukraine	2 927	16%	122	4%	624	21%	951	32%	531	18%	582	20%	117	4%
Belarus	796	4%	39	5%	98	12%	265	33%	177	22%	195	24%	22	3%
Russia	756	4%	83	11%	129	17%	270	36%	138	18%	117	15%	19	3%
Vietnam	1 230	7%	78	6%	647	53%	53	4%	34	3%	364	30%	54	4%
China	517	3%	35	7%	217	42%	61	12%	67	13%	108	21%	29	6%
Germany	1 336	8%	490	37%	289	22%	296	22%	180	13%	72	5%	9	1%
France	1 217	7%	519	43%	141	12%	272	22%	247	20%	30	2%	8	1%
UK	1 218	7%	289	24%	130	11%	498	41%	268	22%	24	2%	9	1%
1999														
Ukraine	2 532	15%	117	5%	410	16%	379	15%	953	38%	383	15%	289	11%
Belarus	660	4%	38	6%	99	15%	108	16%	283	43%	119	18%	13	2%
Russia	792	5%	110	14%	155	20%	173	22%	301	38%	41	5%	12	2%
Vietnam	1 467	9%	208	14%	820	56%	42	3%	57	4%	337	23%	3	0%
China	685	4%	80	12%	334	49%	57	8%	39	6%	151	22%	24	4%
Germany	1 264	7%	510	40%	277	22%	283	22%	166	13%	28	2%	0	0%
France	1 138	7%	585	51%	131	12%	192	17%	212	19%	17	1%	1	0%
UK	1 236	7%	325	26%	144	12%	88	7%	678	55%	1	0%	0	0%
1998														
Ukraine	2 311	14%	55	2%	213	9%	262	11%	894	39%	511	22%	376	16%
Belarus	688	4%	34	5%	97	14%	99	14%	248	36%	192	28%	18	3%
Russia	823	5%	92	11%	205	25%	169	21%	309	38%	37	4%	11	1%
Vietnam	1 779	11%	99	6%	1160	65%	96	5%	85	5%	331	19%	8	0%
China	736	4%	65	9%	399	54%	57	8%	53	7%	162	22%	0	0%
Germany	1 189	7%	445	37%	254	21%	253	21%	202	17%	35	3%	0	0%
France	937	6%	440	47%	116	12%	194	21%	174	19%	12	1%	1	0%
UK	1 135	7%	320	28%	150	13%	91	8%	572	50%	0	0%	0	0%

\*) Percents do not sum up to 100, since only selected nationalities are included

\*\*) Including teachers and others

Source: Recent Trends in Migration to Poland, various years; own calculations

**Table A11. Stock of foreign students (excluding trainees) by citizenships  
(major groups) 1997–2001**

Country of citizenship	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Total	5 443	5 541	6 025	6 563	7 380
Belarus	600	693	831	909	1 002
Bulgaria	n.a.	117	127	136	117
Canada	n.a.	97	98	101	116
China	25	32	37	34	39
Czech Republic	250	251	265	229	229
France	31	33	20	28	18
Germany	139	138	147	154	133
Kazakhstan	281	321	363	409	411
Lithuania	n.a.	321	515	634	753
Mongolia	n.a.	36	43	44	51
Norway	n.a.	n.a.	311	343	383
Russia	268	251	262	289	291
Slovakia	n.a.	n.a.	60	73	109
Sweden	70	69	83	92	97
Syria	105	87	75	59	61
Ukraine	855	868	1 073	1 272	1 693
United Kingdom	19	22	24	21	28
USA	189	232	270	339	439
Vietnam	85	187	168	156	133
All others	2 526	1 786	1 253	1 241	1 277

Source: *Kepińska / Okólski 2002*

**Table A12. Total marriages contracted according to the spouses' nationality.  
Poland: 1990–2001**

Year	Total marriages contracted	Both spouses national	Mixed marriages	
			foreign husband	foreign wife
1990	255 369	251 129	3 329	911
1991	233 206	229 277	3 124	911
1992	217 240	213 876	2 588	776
1993	207 674	204 597	2 323	754
1994	207 689	204 392	2 366	931
1995	207 081	203 775	2 353	953
1996	203 641	200 411	2 177	977
1997	204 850	201 441	2 206	1 166
1998	209 378	205 374	2 428	1 541
1999	219 398	215 718	2 318	1 321
2000	211 189	207 613	2 178	1 359
2001	195 162	191 627	2 115	1 380

Source: *Kepińska / Okólski 2002*



**Table A13. Mixed marriages; Polish wife, foreign husband – by nationality of husband.  
Poland: 1993–2001 (selected years)**

<b>Nationality of foreign husband</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
Germany	876	748	698	649	632	621	629	538
Ukraine	67	89	108	106	119	160	152	156
United Kingdom	74	100	92	98	124	122	136	150
USA	204	185	138	126	99	115	111	128
Italy	85	102	86	104	108	111	116	120
Netherlands	101	120	111	78	102	96	104	108
France	62	63	76	61	71	79	74	94
Vietnam	60	45	79	152	251	54	48	73
Canada	69	46	43	30	46	67	54	61
Armenia	17	44	64	75	140	126	79	45
Russia	48	51	38	38	46	42	33	41
Austria	41	23	37	30	32	42	38	35
Belgium	31	41	41	41	28	33	33	33
Sweden	72	48	46	37	26	40	38	31
Turkey	17	17	18	24	21	16	20	29
Norway	23	20	27	23	20	32	23	27
Bulgaria	19	20	21	29	30	23	20	22
Denmark	14	15	13	12	16	18	21	20
Belarus	16	18	21	26	35	23	21	19
Spain	9	11	10	9	13	21	17	18
Greece	49	39	22	31	24	30	24	17
Ireland	1	-	1	2	13	8	12	15
Switzerland	12	9	9	12	10	10	10	15
Australia	29	29	20	18	44	21	22	15
Lithuania	13	8	15	15	15	15	13	14
Czech Republic	13	17	11	13	17	24	10	13
Romania	10	11	14	17	18	21	17	13
Algeria	9	30	26	31	27	13	16	13
Yugoslavia	5	27	12	9	18	13	15	11
Georgia	4	2	6	3	10	6	5	10
Moldova	6	10	5	9	5	5	7	10
Nigeria	-	9	9	9	13	18	6	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 323</b>	<b>2 320</b>	<b>2 177</b>	<b>2 206</b>	<b>2 428</b>	<b>2 318</b>	<b>2 178</b>	<b>2 115</b>

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table A14. Mixed marriages; Polish husband, foreign wife – by nationality of wife.  
Poland: 1993–2001 (selected years)**

<b>Nationality of foreign wife</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2001</b>
Ukraine	189	331	340	456	537	640	675	728
Belarus	54	95	104	122	124	125	152	172
Russia	139	119	151	127	142	121	111	105
Germany	85	61	63	53	74	68	82	63
Vietnam	15	15	42	110	310	23	18	34
Lithuania	23	41	40	33	41	21	28	29
Armenia	7	27	28	42	53	71	39	20
USA	63	46	33	39	22	29	20	19
Bulgaria	4	7	7	8	10	22	16	16
Latvia	2	6	10	9	10	10	10	15
Canada	20	17	15	7	15	15	18	15
Kazakhstan	2	13	11	10	23	15	17	15
Moldova	6	10	5	9	10	14	12	11
Austria	5	8	9	3	6	12	4	9
Mongolia	1	3	2	6	6	10	11	8
United Kingdom	4	8	3	12	5	8	15	8
Czech Republic	16	8	10	13	14	15	10	7
Romania	4	7	7	8	10	5	9	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>920</b>	<b>977</b>	<b>1 166</b>	<b>1 541</b>	<b>1 321</b>	<b>1 359</b>	<b>1 380</b>

Source: Kępińska / Okólski 2002

**Table A15: Number of persons to whom decisions in cases for granting the refugee status in Poland were issued in the years 1998–2002 by citizenship (selected nationalities)**

	1998			1999			2000			2001			2002										
	positive	negative	discontinued / left unacknowledged	Total	positive	negative	discontinued / left unacknowledged	Total	positive	negative	discontinued / left unacknowledged	Total	positive	negative	discontinued / left unacknowledged	Total							
Afghanistan	10	64	260	334	2	11	240	253	–	8	391	399	13	117	300	430	1	722	6	729	2145		
Albania	–	2	8	10	–	–	3	3	–	–	–	0	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	0	14	
Algeria	–	28	16	44	–	17	6	23	–	8	9	17	–	7	9	16	1	24	1	24	1	26	126
Angola	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	1	–	–	1	1	2	–	–	3	5	
Armenia	–	572	98	670	–	1063	54	1117	–	735	68	803	–	884	75	959	2	542	9	553	4102		
Azerbaijan	–	16	5	21	–	17	6	23	–	25	26	51	–	76	61	137	–	87	9	96	328		
Bangladesh	–	67	69	136	–	22	11	33	–	6	7	13	–	9	10	19	–	12	–	12	213		
Belarus	5	9	9	23	4	17	4	25	2	17	18	37	26	69	16	111	9	67	5	81	277		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	–	1	1	2	–	–	1	1	–	–	7	7	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–	0	11	
Bulgaria	–	39	12	51	–	187	5	192	–	345	17	362	–	187	11	198	–	26	1	27	830		
Cameroon	–	2	3	5	2	4	–	6	3	2	4	9	2	1	4	7	1	5	–	6	33		
China	–	1	–	1	–	2	–	2	–	–	2	2	–	15	5	20	–	39	1	40	65		
Congo, The Democratic Republic of	2	6	1	9	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	1	5	–	6	1	4	–	5	20		
Congo, The Republic of the	–	–	1	1	–	1	–	1	–	1	1	2	2	2	–	4	3	5	1	9	17		
Cuba	–	–	–	0	–	–	–	0	–	–	2	2	–	–	1	1	1	2	4	7	10		
Egypt	–	2	–	2	–	3	1	4	–	1	1	2	–	5	–	5	–	2	1	3	16		
Ethiopia	3	1	6	10	–	3	2	5	6	1	2	9	1	3	–	4	2	1	–	3	31		
F.Y.R. of Macedonia	–	–	–	0	–	6	–	6	–	1	2	3	–	1	1	2	–	8	–	8	19		
Georgia	–	19	4	23	1	12	10	23	4	30	12	46	2	53	41	96	–	87	11	98	286		
Ghana	–	–	1	1	–	1	3	4	–	–	–	0	–	–	6	6	–	–	–	0	11		
Guinea	–	7	3	10	–	–	1	1	–	–	1	1	–	–	2	2	–	4	–	4	18		
India	–	46	76	122	–	14	10	24	–	9	17	26	–	25	8	33	–	186	–	186	391		
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	1	3	9	13	–	–	1	1	–	1	1	2	–	2	–	2	–	7	–	7	25		
Iraq	5	38	94	137	1	6	30	37	–	3	30	33	–	9	106	115	–	55	1	56	378		
Kazakhstan	–	4	4	8	–	4	2	6	–	8	8	16	1	19	11	31	–	14	1	15	76		

Kyrgyzstan	--	--	0	--	1	--	1	--	--	0	--	3	7	10	--	1	--	1	12
Latvia	--	2	1	3	--	2	--	2	--	1	10	11	--	2	1	3	--	4	23
Lebanon	--	2	7	9	--	2	--	2	--	1	5	6	1	--	7	8	--	4	1 5 30
Liberia	--	4	2	6	2	--	3	5	1	--	1	--	1	--	1	3	4	5	-- 5 21
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	--	1	4	5	--	--	0	--	1	--	1	--	2	1	3	--	2	1	3 12
Lithuania	--	1	--	1	--	1	2	3	--	1	66	67	--	5	7	12	--	2	1 3 86
Moldova	--	3	1	4	--	5	1	6	--	5	9	14	--	189	61	250	--	198	24 222 496
Mongolia	--	8	--	8	--	139	1	140	--	114	4	118	--	302	28	330	--	177	-- 177 773
Morocco	--	--	--	0	--	1	--	1	--	--	0	--	6	3	9	--	3	1	4 14
Nigeria	--	4	3	7	--	5	4	9	1	1	7	9	--	5	4	9	--	35	2 37 71
Pakistan	--	72	120	192	2	16	20	38	--	3	38	41	1	19	38	58	--	55	-- 55 384
Romania	--	16	--	16	--	193	3	196	--	935	9	944	--	256	25	281	--	48	1 49 1486
Russian Federation	1	40	17	58	3	27	13	43	26	66	222	314	206	216	806	1228	206	1892	386 2484 4127
Rwanda	4	--	--	4	--	--	--	0	--	--	--	--	--	0	2	1	--	1	-- 3 7
Senegal	--	--	--	0	--	1	--	1	--	--	--	--	0	--	1	5	6	--	6 1 7 14
Sierra Leone	--	4	4	8	--	3	--	3	1	1	1	3	1	--	1	2	2	1	-- 3 19
Slovak Republic	--	--	--	0	--	2	--	2	--	4	--	--	--	--	0	--	--	--	7 7 13
Somalia	8	9	35	52	7	5	3	15	5	--	6	11	9	--	16	25	3	3	-- 6 109
Sri Lanka	6	134	478	618	1	1	206	208	1	20	69	90	2	7	29	38	6	43	1 50 1004
Stateless	6	16	3	25	2	12	4	18	1	6	17	24	--	13	1	14	1	16	1 18 99
Sudan	2	2	1	5	6	2	1	9	2	2	--	4	4	4	2	10	2	11	-- 13 41
Syrian Arab Republic	--	--	1	1	--	7	1	8	--	2	7	9	1	8	4	13	--	12	1 13 44
Tajikistan	--	2	5	7	--	4	1	5	--	--	4	4	--	--	0	--	6	--	6 22
Turkey	--	9	6	15	--	8	5	13	--	1	11	12	2	2	8	12	1	9	-- 10 62
Ukraine	--	25	19	44	--	25	3	28	--	36	13	49	--	122	26	148	--	131	4 135 404
Unknown Citizenship	--	3	2	5	--	3	1	4	--	--	3	3	--	1	2	3	--	3	-- 3 18
Uzbekistan	--	3	--	3	--	4	1	5	--	1	--	1	--	8	7	15	--	13	2 15 39
Vietnam	--	3	4	7	--	9	--	9	--	101	9	110	--	187	27	214	--	105	3 108 448
West Bank and Gaza Strip	--	2	--	2	2	1	1	4	--	1	2	3	--	1	1	2	4	2	8 19
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of	2	5	309	316	2	29	118	149	--	17	76	93	4	7	30	41	--	1	-- 1 600
<b>Total:</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>1305</b>	<b>1707</b>	<b>3067</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>1907</b>	<b>786</b>	<b>2732</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>2525</b>	<b>1216</b>	<b>3794</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>2864</b>	<b>1828</b>	<b>4974</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>4714</b>	<b>493 5460 20027</b>

Source: POLAND 1998 - 2002, Office for Repatriation and Aliens

Table A16. Crimes committed by foreigners in Poland (selected nationalities)

Citizenship	Year	Total crimes committed by foreigners	Murder	Bodily harm	Brawling or battery	Rape	Theft of private property	Car theft	Burglary	Robbery and extortion	Fraud	Forgery	Against a functionary	Against state institutions	Dealing in stolen property	Bribery	Currency violations	Customs violations	Tax violations	Fraudulent seizure of public property	Road violations	Drugs	Illegal possession of weapons	Illegal crossing of borders	Other	Damaged parties between foreigners	
Germany	1999	212	-	4	5	-	12	5	5	1	6	17	5	2	5	2	-	-	-	-	93	4	2	-	49	2958	
	1998	395	1	4	13	3	4	-	6	3	3	1	10	9	13	8	1	1	1	1	199	1	3	2	108	3941	
	1997	489	1	7	9	2	21	4	10	5	-	12	12	3	14	-	1	4	1	5	275	1	6	1	99	4058	
	1996	487	2	4	8	2	14	10	10	4	2	1	12	12	25	4	1	3	-	4	267	2	1	1	108	4271	
	1995	535	5	7	4	3	24	10	10	7	-	-	5	13	24	1	-	6	1	8	292	1	1	-	118	5550	
Ukraine	1999	1661	7	5	23	2	67	20	57	115	11	62	5	-	25	9	-	6	2	1	52	13	3	7	1189	311	
	1998	1693	9	8	18	-	86	18	70	125	3	4	7	7	55	5	-	1	1	6	124	13	2	-	1151	453	
	1997	2152	5	11	16	7	108	44	71	143	2	3	13	13	79	6	-	3	-	9	141	2	7	1	1519	563	
	1996	2071	11	9	15	3	150	67	90	179	-	-	7	7	70	11	-	6	1	6	126	4	5	1	1371	651	
	1995	1832	13	10	23	4	167	55	116	196	-	3	6	6	83	1	-	3	-	10	122	6	5	3	1068	633	
Vietnam	1999	21	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	13	20
	1998	62	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	3	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	50	39
	1997	71	1	2	2	-	1	-	-	5	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	2	50	46
	1996	52	1	1	1	-	2	-	2	4	2	3	-	-	4	1	-	-	1	-	9	-	-	-	-	21	39
	1995	54	-	-	6	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	23	56

Source: General Headquarter of the Police

**Table A 17. List of interviewee interviewed for the study**

Category	Institution / Organisation	No. of the interview	Post / function of respondent	
a) Officials	1. Ministries	1	High official of the Department of Religion and Ethnic Minorities	
		2	High official of the Department of Religion and Ethnic Minorities	
		3	Research Fellow, Institute of Labour and Social Policy at Ministry of Economy, Labour and Social Affairs	
		4	Expert, Department for Economic and Social Analyses	
		5	Expert, Department of European Law	
		6	High Official	
	2. Migration Offices	Office for Repatriation and Aliens	7	High Official
	3. Border Police	The Border Guard Headquarter	8	Officer
			9	Officer
	4. Police	Police Headquarter	10	Expert, Counter-trafficking Unit
	Municipalities	Municipal Center for Social Aid, Wrocław	11	Official of Adaptation-Care Center
		Warsaw Centre for Family Assistance	12	social workers (3 persons)
		Voivodship Office of Mazovia Province in Warsaw	13	Expert, Department of Social Policy
	International Organization	UNHCR	14	Officer
		IOM Warsaw	15	HSP Coordinator
	Embassies	Embassy of Vietnam	16	Counsellor
		Embassy of Germany	17	Attachee
Other:	Polish Parliament	18	Member of Parliament (involved in support of political refugees from Chechnya)	
	Refugees' Council	19	High official of Refugees' Council	
NGO – refugees	Refugees' Association in Poland	20	Founder and Secretary of Association	
b) Experts	Researchers	21	Research fellow	
		22	Research fellow	
	Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University	23	Assistant professor	
Immigrants' Organization	Far East Section (Vietnamese Organisation)	24	Founder of Organisation	
Religious or Diaspora Assoc.	Muslim Religious Association	25	President of Muslim Religious Association	
	Vietnamese Catholic Community in Warsaw	26	Polish priest	
	Armenian Pastoral Care	27	Armenian priest	
c) Migrants themselves:	Vietnamese Girl	28	Student (legal migrant settled in Poland)	
	Byelorussia Woman	29	Illegal migrant (domestic worker)	
	Chechnya Men with family	30	Illegal migrant (refused the refugee status but Refugee Shelter)	
	Afghani Men with family	31	Illegal migrant (refused the refugee status but Refugee Shelter)	

Visitation of refugee shelter run by Polish Humanitarian Organisation by IOM officers

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
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
Appendix

**Fig. 1: Cross border movement in the years 1986–2002 (in millions)**




Sources: Iglicka 2000, Border Guard Statistics

**Fig. 2: Millions of foreigners arriving in Poland via the country's western, southern and eastern borders in the years 1995-2002**




Source: Border Guard

**Fig. 3. Main directions of temporary migration from Poland**



Source: Census 2002

**Fig 4. Work Permits issued to foreigners according to their occupation 2001 (selected nationalities)**



## Sharing Experience...

Accession to the EU is expected to bring about changes in migratory routes and destinations, as well as societal changes in the future EU member states. How do new migration trends affect the local societies of these countries? How is the integration of migrants possible in societies marked mostly by emigration throughout the 1990ies? Which approaches do governments envisage in the different countries? Are they becoming countries of immigration – what can be expected after May 2004?

This booklet is part of a product of comprehensive research and analysis of migration trends in each of six participating EU accession countries. The research project has been supported by the European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs, under the European Social Fund budget line “*Analysis of and research on the social situation, demography and the family*” and has been managed by IOM Vienna.

Under the title “Migration Trends in Selected Applicant Countries”, the following volumes are available:

**Volume I – Bulgaria:** The Social Impact of Seasonal Migration.

**Volume II – The Czech Republic:** The Times They Are A-Changin.

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**Volume V – Slovakia:** An Acceleration of Challenges for Society.

**Volume VI – Slovenia:** The perspective of a Country on the ‘Schengen Periphery’.

The reader may expect comprehensive information on the situation of migrants both, in and out of the countries, and the countries’ migration management approaches, with the main purpose to illustrate the impact of migration trends on the local society and the social situation in the country.