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Preparing TB test for candidates who wish to go to the United Kingdom and want to stay for more than six months with various categories of visa at a medical centre in Dhaka, Bangladesh.
© IOM 2007 (Photo: Bashir Ahmed Sujan)
Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Welcome to the tenth issue of Migration Policy Practice. This issue covers a range of policy areas including border control and identity management in the Schengen area, disaster preparedness, and migration and development. In addition, the lead article for MPP 10 presents new, global-scale data on internal migration from the Gallup World Poll 2011–2012.

The first article, by Neli Esipova, Julie Ray and Anita Pugliese (all from Gallup), shows that 8 per cent of adults have moved within their countries in the past five years. Gallup estimates that 381 million adults worldwide can be counted as internal migrants during this period. Cross-national comparisons of internal migration are relatively rare, because countries often use different definitions of internal migration, and data quality in developing countries tends to be poor.

In its 2009 Human Development Report, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that approximately 740 million people are internal migrants, but this figure is a stock estimate for all internal migrants, and not an indication of internal migration flows during a five-year period. (The 740 million figure is based on estimates derived from censuses from ten years ago, drawing on data from 24 countries representing 57 per cent of the world’s population). The Gallup findings are based on data collected from a larger number of countries (139), representing 97 per cent of the world’s adults. The Gallup findings indicate some important differences between countries with low and high internal mobility rates (e.g., China, with less than 5%, as opposed to the United States, with 24%).

The second article, by Peter Graham, looks at emerging methods of controlling people travelling into and out of the Schengen area, and at the ways in which technology can alter existing identity management solutions. The article further explains that a key aim of future border control policies should be to process travellers with the lightest and cheapest touch that is possible without compromising security. Carriers should also be more involved in border control processes.

The third article, by Howard Duncan, examines the situation of foreign nationals in large-scale disasters by looking at the case of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan. The article explains that there are many factors that determine the choice of foreign nationals to stay or leave, and that disaster planning needs to take into account the situation of large foreign national populations, not only with respect to their needs during emergencies, but also with regard to their ability to contribute to the response.

The fourth article, by Andrea Riester, looks into the challenges facing migration experts when discussing, with development experts, the importance of taking migration issues into account when planning development interventions. The article examines, in particular, some of the common perceptions of migration held by development stakeholders and suggests ways to address these perceptions and move forward in integrating migration into international cooperation.

The fifth article, by Davide Mosca, Barbara Rijks and Caroline Schultz, examines current gaps and good practices in ensuring social protection in health for migrant workers. The article argues, in particular, that as both migration and health are enablers of development, health should be discussed in important migration and development debates and discussions such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD).

The last article features a short interview with Khalid Malik, Director of the Human Development Report Office of the UNDP, on the Key findings of the Human Development Report 2013 in the field of migration.

We thank all the contributors to this issue of Migration Policy Practice and encourage readers to contact us with suggestions for future articles.

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1 Solon Ardittis is Managing Director of Eurasylum Ltd and Frank Laczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOM Headquarters in Geneva. They are co-editors of Migration Policy Practice.
Although international migrants represent about three per cent of the world’s population – or about 214 million people – the UN Secretary-General’s latest report on migration trends suggests that the total number of internal migrants is even larger. However, the dearth of reliable global data on internal migrants – and the lack of cross-national measures – makes the exact number difficult to determine.

Between 2011 and 2012, Gallup set out to do just that via its self-funded annual World Poll, uniformly asking 236,865 adults in 139 countries whether they had moved from another city or area within their respective countries in the past five years. With the 139 countries representing 97 per cent of the world’s adults, Gallup reliably estimated that eight per cent of adults have moved within their countries in the past five years. This translates to approximately 381 million adults aged 15 and older worldwide who have moved during the five-year period; of these, about 196 million are women and 185 million are men.

The total number of all internal migrants worldwide is higher because it includes those younger than 15, while the Gallup figure does not. However, while Gallup counts the number of children in respondents’ households, it currently does not ascertain their migrant status. This task is possible to accomplish, but it would require asking additional questions.

Studies such as the Gallup World Poll establish how widely internal mobility rates range worldwide – from more than 21 per cent in countries such as New Zealand and the United States, to less than five per cent in countries such as China and Venezuela. They also confirm commonly held beliefs, including that the United States is one of the most mobile countries in the world. About one in four US adults (24%) reported moving within the country in the past five years – a rate similar to those reported in other advanced economies such as New Zealand (26%), Finland (23%), and Norway (22%).

Figure 1: Percentage of internal migrants

Did you move from another city or area within this country in the past five years?

Percentage answering yes

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1 Neli Esipova is Director of Research for Global Migration and World Poll FSU Regional Director at Gallup; Julie Ray is a writer and analyst at Gallup; and Dr Anita Pugliese is Research and Quality Director at Gallup.
According to the Secretary-General’s report, internal migration is mostly driven by economic and political factors. Other dynamics influence internal migration, however. For example, every year, thousands are displaced within their own countries because of conflict or persecution. Environmental changes and natural disasters can also force people to move from their homes.

In the United States, census data on geographic mobility show that Americans are most likely to cite a job-related reason for moving.\(^2\) Similarly, Statistics New Zealand data from 2007 surveys show that economic reasons were the main motivators for New Zealanders to move from one residence to another, and employment reasons were the main motivators for moving from one region to another.\(^3\)

In the developing countries of Syria and Malawi, internal displacement is a plausible explanation for the high internal mobility rates (20% or more). The United Nations estimated in 2012 that the ongoing conflict in Syria has internally displaced more than 1 million residents. Internal migration research prior to the civil war in that country suggested internal migration were far lower than the current estimate of 23 per cent and more typical of developing countries.\(^4\) In Malawi, the high percentage could have some environmental roots; floods, for example, displaced thousands in 2012.

**The demographics of global internal migration**

If it is difficult to accurately determine the number of internal migrants worldwide, it is even harder to find out who these migrants are and how they fit into development models. Because Gallup annually asks the same questions the same way across all the countries, territories, and regions that it surveys, it is possible to compare data on these migrants across multiple nations and create a demographic profile – the first step in beginning to understand who these migrants are.

**The educated are more likely to have migrated internally in past five years.**

Migration is often associated with the search for better educational opportunities, and across most regions, adults with higher education are more likely to be internal migrants. Worldwide, those with at least a college education are more than twice as likely (13%) to have moved internally in the past five years as those with primary education or less (5%). In some regions, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), there is no evidence of an education bonus, but the education differences are more dramatic in other areas such as sub-Saharan Africa.

Without further research, we have no way of knowing how educated migrants are prior to their move, so it is entirely possible that higher education levels have made it possible for them to move, or if they attained their education once they arrived at their destination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Internal Migrants</th>
<th>Primary education or less</th>
<th>Secondary education</th>
<th>College education</th>
<th>15 to 29</th>
<th>30 to 49</th>
<th>50+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/ New Zealand</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Asia</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Asia</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on surveys in 159 countries between 2001 and 2012

\(^*\)Sample size too small to report.

**Young people are more likely to be internal migrants.**

Overall, young adults are the demographic most likely to be internal migrants. Worldwide, 10 per cent of adults between the ages of 15 and 29 report moving within their respective country in the past five years. By age 50, this likelihood becomes only half as high (5%). In a number of regions, such as Northern America, the likelihood to migrate internally starts declining after the age of 29, but in others, including their southern neighbors in Latin America, it doesn’t start to drop off until after 49.

**First-generation international migrants are more likely to be internal migrants.**

First-generation migrants – adults who were born in countries other than the ones they currently live in – are more likely to report migrating internally than the native-born (19% vs. 8%). In addition, among first-generation migrants, newcomers (those who have been in the country five or fewer years) are twice as likely as long-timers those (who have been in the country more than five years) to have moved within the country in the past five years. This relationship is important because it

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suggests that international migration directly influences internal migration.

**Internal migrant employment status varies by region.**

Although it is not possible to tell whether their current employment situation is better or worse than before they moved, overall, internal migrants are more likely to be employed full-time for an employer (48%) than those who have not moved (41%). In general, internal migrants are more likely to participate in the workforce (67%) than those who have not moved (63%). In addition, internal migrants are also more likely to be underemployed (22% vs. 17%) or unemployed (11% vs. 8%) than those who did not move in the past five years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status Among Internal Migrants</th>
<th>Internal migrants employed full time for an employer</th>
<th>Those who have not moved employed full time for an employer</th>
<th>Underemployed internal migrants</th>
<th>Those who have not moved underemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia/New Zealand</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed Asia</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe Other</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Asia</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employed full time for employer: Percentage of adults in the workforce who work 30+ or more hours per week. Unemployed: Percentage of adults in the workforce who are not working and actively looking for work and able to begin work. Underemployed: Percentage of adults in the workforce who are employed part-time but want to work full-time.

**GALLUP**

Just as the global economic picture looks different from region to region, so does the employment picture for internal migrants. In Northern America, for example, internal migrants are more likely to participate in the workforce, but those in the workforce are no more likely than their counterparts who have never moved to work full-time (at least 30 hours per week) an employer. Further, internal migrants are significantly more likely to be underemployed (those employed part-time but looking for full-time work) or unemployed.

Internal migrants are more likely to be in the workforce than those who did not move in the past five years, in all regions except Asia and CIS countries. In CIS and Middle East countries, the employment situation for internal migrants and those who have not moved almost perfectly mirror each other.

In some regions, internal migrants in the workforce appear to have some advantages over those who have not moved. In sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, Asia, and non-EU European countries, internal migrants in the workforce are more likely to be employed full-time for an employer. They are also roughly as likely as each other to be underemployed or unemployed.

Internal migrants in other regions have some disadvantages. In addition to Northern America, underemployment and unemployment among those in the workforce are higher for internal migrants in Latin America, the EU and Australia/New Zealand.

**Internal migrants more likely to send and receive financial help.**

Not only are many internal migrants gainfully employed and participating in the economy, they are more likely than their non-moving counterparts to provide financial help to others inside the country and abroad. At the same time, internal migrants are also more likely to receive financial help from within the country and abroad. But when we look at both sending and receiving financial help, internal migrants are more likely to send financial help than receive it; the difference is not that pronounced among those who have not moved.

**Remittances Among Internal Migrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Send financial help</th>
<th>Receive financial help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on surveys in 139 countries between 2011 and 2012

**GALLUP**

These results reinforce how internal migration can be as important as or even more important to poverty reduction strategies than international migration. There are more internal migrants than international migrants on the move worldwide, and they are more inclined to send help. However, while there are no available global estimates of the size of internal remittances, additional global Gallup research shows households worldwide are three times more likely to get financial help from individuals within the same country (9%) than from outside (3%).

This relationship, as well as others, illustrate why migration – within countries and across international borders – will continue to be an important item on the post-2015 development agenda. However, compared with available data on international migrants, the development of global estimates of internal migrants is still in its nascent stages. Further research and measurement is needed for policymakers to realize the potential implications of this most common type of migration – internal movement within countries.

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The EU border of the future

Peter Graham

Background

In today’s digital age, citizens seeking greater convenience and security in their travels and transactions are demanding more effective identity management solutions from their governments. At the same time, there is strong opposition, on grounds of privacy and civil liberties, to some proposed government initiatives, including in the border management area, and to perceived shortcomings of the existing MDGs.

I call these apparently conflicting reactions the “privacy paradox” — caused by the power of technology to empower on the one hand and raise concerns among some citizens that they could be controlled, on the other. It is time for governments to recognize this paradox and, like their counterparts in the private sector, begin to respond to public demand for identity management solutions that not only deliver improved services, but that also engender trust and confidence that personal data will be protected.

Many governments are at a critical stage in tackling identity management projects. In response to increasing international travel and the growing number of network-based transactions, new and improved approaches are in development, driven by digital-age technology. Yet many of these programmes, such as Real-ID in the United States and the National Identity Scheme in the United Kingdom, face strong public opposition because of their perceived potential to compromise personal privacy and civil liberties. Public sensitivity to privacy concerns continues to grow in the wake of news stories about governmental losses and unauthorized use of personal data. Further advances in technology — including the ability to combine and analyse more information from more sources — are likely to intensify public reactions to identity management programmes.

The right to be forgotten should be accompanied by the right to be remembered.

Entering the Schengen area

This article looks at future possibilities for controlling people travelling into and out of the Schengen area.

Traditionally, on crossing a border you presented your passport for inspection by an official who had never seen you before and who had no access to any other information about you. The official checked that the passport was not a fake, checked that the picture looked like you, and, if required of someone of your nationality, checked that you had a visa. Sometimes the official asked questions and you had to give consistent answers. For instance, if asked when you would return home you needed to give a date within the limit of your right to stay.

The traditional process was sometimes been enhanced with watch list checks and detailed inspections of passport stamps to discover the individual’s travel history. However, it remains the basis of most countries’ border controls, including for the Schengen Area.

Technology can radically alter this process. It can link all the occasions that you interact with border officials from a particular jurisdiction, and provide them with information about you. You are no longer inevitably a stranger. The information might, for instance, be that you often overstay, that you are wanted for murder or that border officials should check that you are fluent in the local language, as this is an as-yet untested condition of your visa. In addition, technology can enhance border officials’ ability to check that your passport is valid, has not been stolen and truly belongs to you.

The critical question is not what the technology can do but what we want it to do. Increasingly, the technology can do almost anything — sometimes invading people’s privacy, sometimes protecting it. Thus the issue of how technology should be used to enhance border control is political, not technical. The purpose of this article is to set out the art of the technically possible to inform the real decision: What do we want and why do we want it?

The future context

We can be reasonably certain that the rate at which people cross borders will at least double. The current long-term trend for air travel is 6 per cent, which would double volumes in 12 years. Volumes may go much higher, though growth must tail off at some point. Without change, the cost of border control will increase relentlessly.

Although the style of passports currently in use is presently seen as a rational solution to identifying oneself, it is not clear whether this will remain so in

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1 Peter Graham is Associate Partner and Global Leader for Border Security and Immigration at IBM Global Business Services, United Kingdom.
20 years’ time. Citizens increasingly expect to deal with organizations remotely, using devices such as smart phones. This works well for commerce, banking and social media, but governments are struggling to find solutions to how people can safely access and amend their personal data online when making use of government services remotely. To do so, citizens need a secure and safe mechanism to identify themselves online, when they are not present. The mechanism needs to be as good as or better than proffering a passport when they are present.

It is unclear how this issue will be solved: in the United Kingdom, the Government is exploring the idea of encouraging commercial providers of identity data to enable citizens to securely identify themselves to any service provider, including the Government; Belgium already has an eID Card. The European Union is funding relevant research such as the STORK Programme. Whatever solutions emerge, a secure and trusted mechanism for identifying oneself online, backed by a government framework, could change the logic of carrying a passport for travel.

Given emerging technologies, a passport might become a piece of code on a smart phone, signed electronically by an Identity Service Provider. You would then need only to ‘present’ your passport electronically – perhaps your airline will be able to do it for you.

Alternatively, one might carry something like a bank card with a PIN, perhaps embedded in your smart phone. The device allows border officials to see specific items of your personal data. You would authorize the border official – in the future probably just a machine – to access the relevant personal data about you from a source that he or she can trust. Your permission would ensure that the source reveals only those items of your personal data necessary for the transaction being carried out – in this case, crossing a border. For instance the data provider might just tell the border official, “Yes, this person is an EU Citizen.”

Passports picked up from the Letters of Introduction used in the 19th Century and earlier. They came into routine use about 100 years ago in the early twentieth century. They may be superseded in the near future, as governments find better ways to help citizens identify themselves. There may be a long period wherein multiple approaches to identity are in use around the world, as different countries adopt different technologies in different timescales.

**Crossing the border for EU citizens**

Most people crossing a border are law-abiding and honest. For the European Union, such migration is essential for it to remain economically competitive in the global economy. At the same time, it is also critical for States to know who is in their territory, not just for obvious security reasons, but also for central planning purposes. Large migratory flows lead to additional demands on public services such as education, health care and housing. Public authorities therefore need accurate information about current and likely future demands.

A key focus for border control should be processing international travellers with the lightest and cheapest touch is possible without compromising security. Border control is like looking for a needle in a haystack: it is very valuable to build mechanisms for moving the hay aside so that the needle is easier to find.

As border controls have increased the desire to facilitate immigration clearing, regular, low-risk foreign national travellers have increased in number across the world. Anecdotes suggest that Governments can do much better the uninformed, repeated interrogation of regular travellers. The big task of reducing travel hassle, however, comes from addressing all the inspections and processes involved in travel. Governments only control one part of the process. What motivation is there for a traveller to join a registered traveller programme if the only outcome for them is that they end up spending more time waiting for their luggage in the baggage hall? The evidence on the ground suggests that the travel industry is best placed to organize, pay for and benefit from a re-engineering of the travel process. If governments are prepared to do the checking (perhaps by issuing something like the biometric residence permit) then the fastest way to get registered travel programmes going is by engaging the private sector. This approach has the advantage that Governments won’t have to foot the bill.

Europe is also moving towards collecting travel industry data (PNR and API) from carriers. Checking and analysing such entry and exit data can be largely automated, and this represents the most likely route for making border control more effective and cost less. Centralized collection of travel data enables a range of options, and different checks might be made on EU citizens and third - country nationals. Getting accurate data about all border crossings will take a number of years, so it is sensible to think in terms of the continuous development of enhanced controls, measuring results and checking to see what works, rather than implementing a pre-defined solution not designed on the basis of any real-world experience.

The initial objective might be simply the generation of travel history for later use by visa-issuing agencies and checking names and passports against watch lists for law enforcement on the border. This fulfills the objectives of an entry-and-exit system (EES).

The longer-term objective would be to ensure that a decision about every individual is made in advance of their crossing the border. Normally, the decision would be to waive the person through. In a few cases it would involve some intervention. At the border most people would only need checking to confirm that they match their travel document.
As progress is made towards an automated process for checking people in advance, physical border controls only need to confirm that a person is who they claim to be and implement the decision made earlier when the traveller’s information was checked. We see three parallel approaches for developing appropriate physical controls.

The first is to support the travel and transport industry in their development of frequent traveller schemes. This requires a number of actions. The first essential action is to offer such schemes the opportunity to check people who wish to enroll. Given a well-developed mechanism for checking people in advance of their arrival, this check would simply be the normal check done when an individual travels. The second action is to consider how such schemes should be audited to ensure they are and remain appropriate. Third, there may need to be joint action between the government and the travel industry to create standards which allow separate schemes to inter-operate, so, for instance, someone enrolled in a scheme run by Heathrow Airport can take advantage of a scheme run by Schipol airport.

The advantage of this approach – as opposed to a Europe - wide Commission run scheme – is that industry bears all the costs, and competing schemes ensure innovation, interoperability and value for money, particularly when new technologies become available. In addition, the industry’s objective is to streamline the whole travel process, so they have more options for creating both financial benefit and greater convenience for the traveller.

The second approach to physical border checks is the use of automatic biometric gates using the EU passport as the token. Such gates can perform facial or fingerprint checks. There is a question mark over the business case for such gates, so in our view a programme to implement automatic gates should proceed cautiously and investigate how best to manage and supervise the gates and to identify where and why they add value.

Such gates would obviously be used by EU nationals using their standard EU passport. However, the chip on the biometric residence permit, now being issued by all Member States, is technically the same as the passport chip. This means that BRP-holders could use the same gates. Indeed, third-country nationals could be invited to buy a BRP to facilitate their travel around Europe, and this might be a useful interim solution to the need for a registered traveller programme.

The third approach to physical border checks of identity is to delegate them to carriers. As airlines have moved away from paper tickets, it has become very important to them to institute very tight controls on identity using people’s travel documents, normally a passport. Clearly such an approach would be risk-based and the carrier processes would need to be audited. For instance, regulators might agree that flights from the USA by approved airlines who agree to follow a set process could land at certain EU airports without full passport checks at the border. All the people on the flight would be checked through the central data collection process. In extremis, for instance, if it turned out that a violent criminal was on the plane and needed to be detained, the flight could be rerouted to an international gate and subject to a normal full passport check.

Delegating checks to carriers involves some, as yet, unexplored compromises. It will never be universal: it is easy to identify high-risk countries for which this approach would be unacceptable. It cannot happen until there is sufficient experience of the centralized checking process, and it would need to be piloted to identify how best to make it work, so it is not an immediate priority. However, we think that carriers would be very keen to work with governments on such schemes because of the advantage it provides to their customers.

Europe plans to check the fingerprints of all visa nationals on arrival and potentially on departure. Such checks could be incorporated into frequent traveller schemes and automatic gates, and could in principle be delegated to airline companies. Clearly, experience will identify when and where such checks are valuable and, therefore, where the risk of not doing them is acceptable.

The potential items on a route map to a future EU border system should all be incremental in nature. It is our strongly held view that the IT systems to support them would also best be developed incrementally. Large and complete requirements - driven government IT procurements aim to transfer risk: however, it is evident that in practice they do not. It is better, in our view to recognize that an incremental approach that anticipates a need for flexibility materially be adapted, to reduce both business and technical risk. This more flexible approach also gives greater opportunity for true interoperability, particularly where open standards are used. In truth, the exact specification of the ideal border control system cannot be known and in any event, ill-intentioned travellers will change their behaviour as control improves, so creating the need for unanticipated changes to the business process and the systems that support it.

In the long term we think the travel experience could be very different and border controls more efficient. The business traveller who flies most months of the year would be a member of their nearest airport’s frequent traveller scheme. They would pass through most airports almost without stopping until they reached the aircraft, facilitated by the airport staff and his airline. The foreign business traveller who comes to Europe regularly would have a biometric residence permit and, using it, would go through the same-light touch process as a European citizen. The family flying to Disneyland would get off the plane and go directly to collect their luggage as if they were on an internal flight, without ever needing to know that they had been checked. More time can then be found to identify those who may pose a threat.
Immigrant integration as a factor in disaster preparedness: the case of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake in Japan

Howard Duncan

The situation of foreign nationals in large-scale disasters receives comparatively little attention in the emergency response literature. Of note in the case of Japan’s 2011 earthquake and tsunami was the large number of foreigners who left Japan – a reported 470,000, including 70,000 students from China out of a total of 86,000 who had been studying in Japan (Times Higher Education Supplement, 9 June 2011). Many embassies urged their citizens in Japan to leave the country or to at least leave the areas near the earthquake/tsunami zone. Some embassies even urged their nationals to leave Tokyo despite its distance from the crisis area, and many multinational corporations urged their employees to do the same thing, primarily over the fears of radiation exposure from the stricken Fukushima nuclear facilities. Ethnic relations are not foremost in the minds of officials when managing an emergency. However, here I hope to convey that disaster planning should include ethnic relations as a major consideration.

Communicating with foreign residents during emergencies

In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 earthquake, social media became the dominant means of communication in Japan. Twitter, perhaps the most popular social media tool in Japan, rapidly saw ‘Tweet’ rates rise to 1,200 per minute, with some extraordinary spikes of 5,000 tweets per second seen. Twitter, Facebook, Skype and other internet-based social media communication tools proved enormously valuable to family members, friends, and colleagues in reassuring them of their safety, alerting them to dangers and of spreading information about events as they were happening. At the same time, many phone lines and cell phone facilities were either damaged and unusable or were overloaded by the demand to the point of being unusable. For a great many people in Japan at the time, internet-based social media were the only functioning tools that they had for receiving or conveying information. For governments and emergency response agencies at the national, prefecture and local levels, the new communications technologies are potential game changers in the management of disasters. To a certain extent, the Japanese Government recognized and exploited the potential of these instruments. They and other governments and disaster response agencies will need to build them into their future response plans as integral and essential components.

It should be noted, however, that although social media offer governments and disaster response agencies significant communication potential, they do so for everyone else at the same time. Being neutral tools of the internet, social media are unable to sift information from incomplete information, rational advice from panic reactions, and official positions from those lacking authority and credibility. Managing information flow, therefore, has become an exceptionally competitive enterprise with the proliferation of communications tools, and this poses challenges to governments that are trying to get their messages out clearly and with the credibility and legitimacy that comes with their position.

One key aspect of the challenge is communications speed. With tweets and, importantly, retweets proliferating as they did in Japan following the earthquake, it is imperative that governments communicate quickly and frequently to achieve their disaster management goals. Not only do quick and frequent communications enable governments to remain effective and competitive in the marketplace of information and ideas, they enable governments to maintain their positions as leaders in the management of crises; this is absolutely critical to an effective and orderly disaster response. In today’s environment, where information flows are so rapid and can be initiated by anyone, governments must ensure that they retain the confidence of their citizens and foreign residents alike. The public needs assurance and guidance during crises, and providing information is often the first step in providing the public what it needs. Nothing is more assuring to a public in the midst of a disaster than knowing that their government is capably responding to the situation and giving them the information that they need when they need it. As communications technologies evolve, so, too, do the expectations of the users. It is no longer acceptable to have to wait lengthily for information; the public, if made to wait for what it considers an inordinate length of time, will simply turn to another source to get the information and advice needs, and this means that the public is increasingly susceptible to misinformation, outright lies and bad advice.

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When what we have come to regard as traditional means of communication are not functioning, governments need to be ahead of the public and competing sources of information in using alternate communications technologies to get their messages out. As the Heritage Foundation report on the March 2011 earthquake argued:

Japan has an extensive warning system for disasters like earthquakes. The Government also employed a variety of mediums from traditional warning sirens to social media tools, such as Twitter.

These warning systems and alerts were not perfect. The government experienced difficulties in communicating in the aftermath of the crisis. As one observer noted, "the government has a tendency to want to have all the facts before making an announcement or a decision. Releasing information based on hunches or half-completed work can be seen as a failure to do a complete job. But in emergency cases, a timely decision based on some information, is better than a delayed decision with complete information." The Government's inability to provide satisfactory information regarding the conditions at the Fukushima nuclear plant exacerbated fear and uncertainty among Japanese citizens, and led to speculation and misinformation in news reports around the globe. Honesty and openness about the knowns and unknowns of the situation would have been desirable.

In general, it appears that when the government relied on established systems and scripted warnings, it proved fairly efficient. On the other hand, when faced with uncertain and unanticipated incidents, such as responding to the situation at Fukushima, the Government’s response was less effective.

This is particularly the case for foreign residents, especially for those who have been in the country for relatively short amounts of time and, therefore, may not have yet adopted the practice of relying upon their host government for information or who are unable to do so because they do not possess sufficient fluency in the local language. Instead, many sought information and guidance from their home countries and, therefore, were overly susceptible to advice from their respective embassies or families back home to leave the country, even if the dangers did not warrant such a response and even if these sources of information and advice were themselves not well-informed. In a disaster situation, the advice first received is often that which is taken, regardless of its merits.

Adam Acar and Yuya Muraki found that Twitter posts about disaster-struck areas and the areas that were indirectly affected were somewhat similar. Most of the tweets about disaster-hit areas were warnings, requests for help and reports about the environment. Official local authority Twitter accounts set up at the time of the earthquake were particularly useful, well-followed and retweeted extensively, especially when an imminent tsunami was predicted. The team adds (that some Twitter) updates desperately asking for help were ‘heart-breaking,’ while others highlighted specific happenings, such as the rise and fall of the sea, burning buildings and explosions. However, the biggest problem was the reliability of Twitter updates, particularly calls for help, that were misplaced or merely pranks.

Another problem they uncovered was the low signal-to-noise ratio for messages using hashtags. (Hashtags are keywords prefixed with the # symbol that would normally allow users to filter updates of interest.) Hashtag misuse led to difficulties in finding important messages in the areas that the earthquake hit directly. The researchers also found that although many users were concerned by the number of unfounded rumors, there were too few official updates from the Government and the mass media.

There are three major conclusions that can be drawn from the study, the team says, although whether or not these would improve the value of Twitter in times of disaster remains to be seen. First, all users should have more responsibility for their tweets. Secondly, everyone should realize that Twitter is a public communication tool. Thirdly, information sources should be made clearer in updates. They add that appropriate use of hashtags and a method for regulating inappropriate or false retweets might be implemented. Further research is now needed to assess whether or not announcing official hashtags during disasters would solve any of the problems seen during recent tragic events in Japan. (Science Daily, 2011)

Foreign residents who do not read, understand, or speak the local language can be at a severe disadvantage during a disaster situation, and it can be readily predicted that they will become heavy consumers of information and advice from sources that use their native language. This must be taken into account in disaster planning at all levels of jurisdiction. For example, rather than task governments with translating information and advice into foreign languages, disaster plans could task NGOs, supported by government funding, with translating and communicating this information to the minority communities. In such a scenario, NGOs would assume a lead communications role, not as freelancers, but explicitly on behalf of the government or other recognized authorities. NGOs would be acting as formal partners with the government to effect disaster response. Foreign nationals can themselves be part of the official disaster response, particularly those with the facility in both the local and homeland languages.

Ha notes that her [Eclipse Rising] and other organizations have worked to provide information to Japan’s foreign community. “While the majority of the Japanese national and municipal governments,
as well as the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) that owns the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, tend to have the most updated information only in Japanese and English, many NGOs are providing information in languages such as Korean, Chinese, Tagalog, Portuguese, Vietnamese and Spanish,” she said.

On the ground, meanwhile, foreign residents continue to provide emergency aid, despite Western media reports that they have all fled. Writing for an online forum for Japan scholars soon after the disaster, John Morris noted the presence of Pakistanis serving Pakistani food at a relief centre, Filipina and Chinese women “working overtime to help people within their communities,” and a group of 30 men from a local mosque serving “hot food” to those displaced by the disaster.

Quoting a local news report on their activities, Morris said these men and women stayed behind “because it is their town, and they want to participate in their community.” (Schurmann, 2011)

To stay or to leave

Foreign nationals have two fundamental options during disaster situations: to stay or leave. Most choose the ‘realistic’ option to leave and return home. Many factors determine the choice; what is important to note here, however, is that the host society has considerable influence on these choices. Given this starting point, it is a quick step to recognize that disaster planning needs to take into account the presence of large foreign-national populations. However, the attention must not only be on the massiveness of their needs during emergencies, but also on their ability to contribute to the response.

Note in the quote above that some of those who remained to help did so because they regarded their community as ‘their town’ and stated a desire to participate in it. In other words, these particular foreign nationals had a sufficiently strong ‘sense of belonging’, in their new communities or, to put it another way, the immigrants had become integrated into their host community. These characteristics of a community are important aspects of resilience. A town whose residents have a stake in its future is more resilient than towns where the residents do not. Choosing to stay rather than return to their home countries is a strong indication that those foreign residents felt that they had a stake in the community, that their remaining and assisting in the response to the earthquake was motivated by their having a strong interest in the outcome.

Developing what the Heritage Foundation referred to as a ‘culture of preparedness’ requires cultivating this sense of belonging – a stake in the community among its residents, whether native- or foreign-born. This is a foundation for all else in successful disaster planning. If residents do not care about their communities, they will not care to participate in their protection from disasters or assist when a disaster occurs. Resilient communities are socially cohesive communities, and this means that in those with high degrees of ethnic, racial or religious diversity, minority affairs must be made an integral part of disaster planning. Managing ethnic and other forms of diversity is an important aspect of building community resilience and developing a culture of preparedness. In this regard, Japan has made progress, but as its diversity widens and as immigration continues, even without increasing, this will remain a significant challenge. The point is that efforts to secure the integration of immigrants in Japan will contribute significantly to its already sophisticated disaster preparedness.

Commentators have noted the differences in the level of attacks on foreigners in the contexts of the 1923 earthquake in Kanto, the 1995 earthquake in Kobe, and the Tōhoku earthquake of March 2011. Clearly, the levels of acceptance of foreign nationals are increasing, but just as clearly, work remains to be done and opportunities stand to be exploited. Communities pursuing policies of multicultural coexistence ought, therefore, to continue to develop these policies and ensure their effective implementation; at the same time, they need to ensure that their disaster plans incorporate the basic ideas of multicultural coexistence. Central here is that foreign nationals are enabled to participate in the workings of their communities. Similarly, with the formal multicultural policies in Canada and Australia, there is an emphasis on active participation and contribution by foreign nationals and immigrants to their host societies. This ought to include participation in disaster planning, disaster simulations to test the plans and the actual implementation of these plans should the need arise.

The local in disaster planning and response

The communications challenges that large scale disasters pose for the general population and especially for foreign nationals, raise the following procedural questions: Who has the authority in disaster planning and in the implementation of these plans? Where should this authority rest within the national and local governments and actors? How should this authority be exercised for the most effective results? We noted the communications challenges that modern technologies pose for governments. Where social media is heavily used, as is the case in Japan, a government can lose its leadership role in communicating to others the nature and extent of the disaster, how it and other authorities are responding, and what the public should expect and do. Again, other organizations, both within and beyond a country’s borders, can readily influence people’s thinking about and reactions to a disaster. In the case of the Tōhoku earthquake, it appears that those using social media, such as Twitter, came to dominate the flow of ideas in the early hours and days.
following the disaster and, thereby, were able to spread considerable misinformation and bad advice, some of which caused foreign nationals to leave. Some argue that despite its own use of social media, the national Government of Japan was too slow in its decision-making about which pieces of information to release and when. Consequently, people made decisions on the basis of what they heard from other sources.

A major impact of the disaster was the flight of foreign students and staff and not just from the disaster-hit regions. Many who left Japan did so because of fears of radiation exposure from damaged nuclear power plants. ‘There was a true exodus of foreign scientists and students who left Japan in a panic, causing considerable irritation among Japanese colleagues,’ says Germany-based Okuda. ‘Many Japanese universities, particularly those remote from the disaster area, did not understand why foreigners left.’

Okuda says the German media coverage of the damaged nuclear power plants, especially the worst hit Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, verged on the hysterical. Of the foreign students and staff who fled Japan, he says the “Germans were the first to leave and the last to return.” He still has memories of returning to Germany just after the earthquake and, along with other passengers, being checked with a Geiger counter as he got off the plane.

Watanabe notes that half of the short-term international exchange students planning to spend one or two semesters at Nagoya University last year cancelled. (Stafford & Kuramochi, 2012)

Local authorities often have the advantage of being able to respond more quickly to local conditions than national authorities can. At the local level, information can flow very quickly, as decision-making is often simpler and less bureaucratic. The risk, of course, is that local authorities may not have comprehensive information to offer, and that they may give advice that is based upon a less-than-complete understanding of the conditions and the responses implemented by national bodies and, in some cases, foreign aid organizations. A contemporary challenge in disaster response, then, is simultaneously coordinating information flow, ensuring its quality, and doing so at a speed that exceeds or matches the flow of information from sources that have less credibility, less or no authority, or are from outside the country. Again, in today’s environment of extremely rapid information flows — and public expectations to match — a high demand for information would encourage a high supply and result in high levels of consumption, whether the information supplied is credible or not. Meeting this challenge requires exceptional coordination among national and local authorities, aid organizations and NGOs, the media and, where the interests of foreign nationals are a factor, foreign governments and foreign media. Disaster plans need to take this seriously because the technological basis of this challenge must be expected to continue to develop as rapidly in the future as it has in the recent past. Governments and their disaster response agencies will therefore need to keep up with technological advances.

Although disaster planning needs to be coordinated and led at a national level, a great deal of its implementation will be local. Here are to be found advantages for enhancing community resilience and for empowering communities, including those with large populations of foreign nationals. Lessons can be taken from the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, which was quickly following by Hurricane Thomas and a serious epidemic of cholera. Some of the communications challenges were exacerbated by the low levels of literacy in the population, poverty and an already weak infrastructure, including the electrical grid. Aid agencies, including the International Organization for Migration, in designing their relief programmes attempted to address development and community capacity-building goals at the same time. Communication between the national government and local actors (both local government and NGOs) and the media were frequently two-way. In the camps established to house those who became homeless after the earthquake, NGOs were assisted to create communications vehicles for the local population, thereby empowering the local actors and producing communications products that were effective for specific local conditions. Camp newspapers were set up that, owing to the low literacy rates, conveyed information graphically and not only linguistically. Camps set up radio stations, staffed by locals, to convey information in Creole on matters having to do with the earthquake, the hurricane and preventing the spread of cholera. Buses and taxis were equipped with taped public service messages for passengers to hear; cell phone service providers cooperated with authorities to spread messages via SMS or similar services to the general public, most of whom owned cell phones; and dance and theater groups conveyed public service messages through their performances, using popular cultural means of expression rather than formal Government messages. Each of these local actions were intended to effect disaster response while simultaneously empowering the local communities, increasing their levels of resilience, and elevating the extent to which these communities had a culture of preparedness.*

* The information in this paragraph was derived from a 3 January 2013 interview with Luca Dall’Oglio of IOM.

The message that can be generalized is that national authorities can empower local actors to take charge of many aspects of disaster response in the interests of efficiency and, ultimately, effectiveness. Doing so enhances local communities’ capacity to manage disasters and, in general their affairs, more effectively. It is also the most effective way to engage foreign residents in disaster responses.
From liability to asset

Given the problems that communicating with foreign nationals can pose during a disaster, one can easily imagine how their presence could be regarded as little more than a hindrance to the emergency response, that is, that their presence is purely a liability. Mainstream relief agencies can be made to take into account their special needs, for example, extra time and money can be spent in translating information for their consumption. However, despite such efforts, many of these foreign nationals will simply leave the country, and, as such, some members of the public will channel their fear in the face of a disaster into anti-foreigner acts, as happened in March 2011, albeit to a limited extent. All of this suggests that foreigners are simply an additional problem to deal with in a crisis. However, it need not be this way. The real challenge is not dealing with the liabilities that foreigners present but, rather, securing roles for them as assets in the response. We have seen in some of the quotes above that they contributed usefully to the response to the Tōhoku earthquake. The question is how to make these contributions more systemic.

Foreign nationals and their organizations are able to contribute usefully in a great many ways, including the following:

- Translating and disseminating information about the disaster, the dangers it presents, how the government and other agencies are responding, how residents, including foreign residents, should respond and how they should seek help, and how they can be part of the response itself;
- Offering their special skills to the disaster response, be they in medicine, communications, planning and operations management, engineering, technology, transportation, search and rescue and a great many other areas;
- Offering their time and energy to organizations in need of volunteers, whether these organizations serve communities of foreign residents or the general public.

Little or none of the above will materialize, however, unless foreign residents and their organizations are empowered to do so. Foreign residents and their organizations, therefore, will need to be explicitly offered roles in the disaster response and, thereby, offered a stake in the outcomes. They need to be offered something useful to do and not be treated as liabilities in the crisis situation. Doing this effectively, however, will not be possible if one waits for the crisis to happen; the contribution of foreign residents to a disaster response must be built into the emergency planning in the first place. Importantly, immigrant NGOs and other stakeholders must participate in the establishment of the disaster plans themselves. They are in a strong position to identify possible roles for foreign residents in the response effort, encourage the members of their communities to become part of the response teams, and communicate with their co-nationals about how they can make a significant contribution. Further, they are in a good position to act as brokers between the Government and other mainstream agencies and the foreign resident populations, and they can act in ways to increase levels of trust between the immigrant communities and the general public and its institutions.

Foreign residents can themselves become part of the relief effort so long as they are made aware of how they can contribute and that they are welcome to do so. In the face of disaster, all share the common purpose of ensuring survival, rescue, and relief, regardless of nationality or culture. Many foreign residents possess special skills that can be used in the relief work, but harnessing these skills requires a concerted and coordinated planning and communications effort. Just as disasters display the resilience and cohesion of a society, they also display the degree to which foreigners are integrated and can share a sense of common purpose with larger society.

I will close by referring to important pre-conditions of success in making foreign residents an asset rather than a liability during a disaster response. These pre-conditions are those concerning the establishment of social cohesion in a diverse society, such that foreign residents come to feel that they belong in their adopted communities and its institutions, that they have a stake in these communities, and that they are welcome to contribute to their well-being, including in the face of a disaster. Ultimately, foreign residents will best be able to serve as assets in societies where their integration into the mainstream and its institutions is taken seriously. For foreign residents in Japan to serve as assets in situations of disaster requires that they feel that they belong there when life is normal and that their presence is accepted by the Japanese mainstream. There are many ways to manage the integration of minorities, immigrants and foreign residents. Japan has been exploring the concept of multicultural coexistence (tabunka kyosei), which has been implemented in a variety of ways by many institutions at the local level and which has received some support from national Governmental institutions, although falling short of becoming official national policy. One key aspect of multicultural coexistence has been to make possible and encourage the participation of foreign residents in civic affairs. The steps required to realize these ambitions are many and most will be effected by local government agencies, businesses, NGOs and so on. However, a task for the national Government, whether it does or does not want to establish tabunka kyosei as official policy, is to encourage this basic form of integration and to establish policies and introduce programmes that remove barriers to such civic participation. Leadership at the national level will encourage local governments...
to introduce concrete measures to implement *tabunka kyosei* and will set expectations of the general public on how to regard the presence of foreign nationals in their communities. Incorporating foreign nationals and their organizations into disaster planning and relief operations is one highly significant example of how to implement the concept of multicultural coexistence for the benefit of all. The ultimate result will be a society that, despite its growing diversity, will be more cohesive and, more resilient and therefore, even better equipped to manage major disasters.
How is migration perceived in development cooperation today?

The following sentiments are quite frequently encountered when discussing migration issues with development stakeholders and even form the background on which these discussions usually take place:

“Migration is rather bad for developing countries.”

In the early times of development cooperation (then referred to as ‘development aid’), in the beginning of the 1960s, the debate on development was dominated by two main ideological orientations: the modernization theory versus the dependency theory. The former perceived migration as a quasi-natural mechanism to obtain the necessary labour force in areas of high industrial production; therefore, migration was seen as something positive which allowed for better allocation of human resources. On the contrary, dependency theory saw migration as a result of an unequal distribution of wealth and power and, as such, as something negative. Without wanting to oversimplify, I believe it is fair to say that a majority of people who worked in development aid at that time had a penchant towards the dependency theory and, in particular, its political project of fighting for a better world. Many texts from the 1960s and 1970s deal with the negative consequences of migration on developing societies, such as brain drain, rural exodus and the negative effects on families separated by migration. Although these texts were written more than 40 years ago, there still exists a general feeling in development cooperation that this is the more ‘realistic’ view of migration than a benefit-oriented approach, which stresses the personal empowerment of migrants, skills transfers, and the contribution of the diaspora and remittances. This is not surprising since the negative consequences of migration are often more visible in practice. Research on transnationalism and diaspora, in particular, however, has contributed to balancing this view in recent years.

“Migration is an issue for home affairs.”

Migration for decades has been discussed in OECD countries, mainly under the heading of ‘immigration and integration.’ Therefore, there is a widespread feeling that migration is only an issue to be dealt with by ministries of the interior. This view has faded a little due to demographic change, which turned deficit-centered integration debates into debates on how to attract the desired work force. However, since these new debates generally focus on national labour markets, the prevailing impression is that migration is mainly an issue for home affairs and does not concern development politics. Only since the beginning of the 21st century, when global interdependence due to transnational threats like climate change or terrorism became more apparent, has this perception started to change as well. However, global interdependence generally does not ‘sell’ easily in national politics, as can also be observed with the debate on climate change. Still, this does not mean we should refrain from working on improving global cooperation.

“Migrants cannot be our target group because they are not the poorest part of the population.”

Development cooperation is about poverty reduction. Migration research has shown that income levels correlate with distances covered by migrants in their

Introduction

The debate on ‘migration and development’ has intensified in the past few years, most audibly during the Global Forum on Migration and Development, which has taken place every year since 2007. Its title suggests a close linkage between the two topics. However, migration experts seem to have a hard time convincing development experts of the importance of taking migration issues into account when planning development interventions. This article looks into the underlying communication hurdles and makes suggestions on how to overcome them. In order to do so, we will first look at some common perceptions of migration by development stakeholders and then suggest ways to address these perceptions and to move forward in integrating migration into international cooperation.
search for work and better livelihoods. Still, many migrants remain poor and vulnerable. Especially when looking at regional migration within the Global South, migrants are not wealthier than the sedentary part of the population but differ in terms of risk averseness, that is, they take the risk of going away. This behaviour may be rewarded by better income opportunities, but it also comes at the cost of being separated from one’s family and friends and at the risk of incurring debts to pay for recruitment and travel expenses, and of precarious employment, poor working conditions, discrimination and exploitation.

A number of studies have also shown that remittances can increase local inequalities, with families who are already better off becoming even wealthier due to the migration of some of their members. However, migration programmes like Tres por Uno aim at improving infrastructure for all inhabitants in areas of strong emigration, not just the families of migrants. Migration programmes do not necessarily have to target only migrants in order to foster development and should always make sure not to increase local inequalities.

“Development should help people to stay where they are.”

There is a widespread perception that development renders migration unnecessary: if people have everything they need at home, why should they bother to go elsewhere? In an ideal world, everyone would stay in their home countries. In many documents of the European Commission, development is explicitly mentioned as a means to reduce irregular migration. What is often missing in these documents is the acknowledgement of the so-called ‘migration hub,’ that is, if national income increases, so does migration – because more people gain access to funds necessary for international migration. It is thus fair to say that development in the short- and medium-term fosters migration rather than reduces it. Only when reaching the point where migration does not offer greater gains than staying at home does the migration curve slope downward again. Countries like Thailand have now reached this point, but many others have not.

“No yet another cross-cutting issue!”

Undoubtedly, migration influences many sectors of development, such as health, education, governance, economic development and others, so the idea to mainstream migration as a cross-cutting issue in development cooperation comes naturally – in the same way as gender, conflict or environmental sustainability. The process of devising and installing mechanisms to deal with these three cross-cutting issues over the last couple of years has strained development institutions quite a bit and rendered planning processes even more complex. Many development stakeholders, therefore, shrink back from the idea of having yet another cross-cutting issue to deal with.

Migration is not equally important in every country; therefore, the issue does not need to be dealt with as universally as gender, for example. There are many countries, however, where migration is highly important, which is why development stakeholders in these countries should definitely take migration into account.

How to address migration in development cooperation

Given the four reservations of development stakeholders in the quotes above, migration experts have to take a step back in calling for development projects and programmes on migration issues. Bringing migration into development cooperation cannot be commissioned. Rather, it is about understanding the logic and proceedings of development cooperation, working through established processes and feeding information and good arguments into them. The following approaches are suggestions on how to do that; they are by no means exclusive but can be combined with each other.

International cooperation as the right framework for migration and development

Development cooperation is best placed to deal with the global interdependencies created by migration. While home affairs experts are trained to deal with what is going on at the national level, development experts have suitable instruments and partnerships to deal with transnational issues and are thus better equipped to deal with all (potential) phases of the migration cycle: preparation, departure, arrival, integration, return, and reintegration. More than ever, migration calls for solutions which are beneficial to all parties involved – migrants, countries of origin, transit countries, and countries of destination. On the one hand, development cooperation can play the role of an ‘honest broker’ in this setting: it can mediate between countries of origin and countries of destination, or between governments and their diaspora, or between different national stakeholders in the area of migration policy. On the other hand, development cooperation can share its inter- and transnational experience and demonstrate to home affairs how to become more globally oriented. Ultimately, this could lead to more coherent policies and to truly international cooperation.

Country-specific approaches

Migration can take place for different reasons (e.g., war, unemployment, search for opportunities, etc.), take on different forms (e.g., temporary, permanent, circular, etc.) and form different patterns (e.g., highly skilled vs. low skilled, male vs. female, regionally focused vs. countrywide, etc.). Unsurprisingly, it also yields very different results for the countries of origin. Therefore, country-specific approaches are necessary to ensure that the respective context is duly being taken into
account and that suitable projects are being designed. One way to do this is by making migration a topic in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) or other national planning documents according to locally voiced needs. This approach also suits current processes of decentralization of bilateral and multilateral development cooperation, which leaves more room for decision-making at the country level. The process of bringing migration issues into development at the country level might be complicated, but it will certainly ensure that projects are locally adapted and increase ownership.

**Sector-specific approaches**

Many development stakeholders are technical experts on certain sectors of development. It is therefore important to link migration to each of these sectors and make clear how migration can contribute to the goals set in each. Here a (non-exhaustive) list of examples:

- **a.** Financial sector development aims at fostering financial inclusion. Remittances can be the perfect entry point for many families into the financial system if sent through formal channels.
- **b.** Care drain is a major issue for the health sector in many (if not most) countries of the world. Designing ways to strengthen educational facilities and to bond health personnel to the national health system is crucial.
- **c.** Migrants and returnees can be very creative and innovative actors for private sector development. The self-employment rate among migrants is higher than for the rest of the population, and they can rely on contacts, knowledge and (language) skills which might facilitate transnational business opportunities.
- **d.** Migration acts as an informal risk mitigation strategy and thus plays an important role in social protection. Finding ways to formalize this strategy into (micro-)insurance arrangements is an important way to facilitate the lives of migrants and their families.
- **e.** Migration can also contribute to rural and regional development. Diaspora communities might want to invest in social infrastructure in their regions of origin.
- **f.** Rights-based, gender-sensitive migration policy and the fight against trafficking are part of good governance.
- **g.** Demographic changes in OECD countries call for more immigration, which is why innovative systems of cooperation in education and vocational training between countries of origin and destination are starting to evolve.

**Migrant-specific approaches**

One of the reasons why migration projects should follow migrant-specific approaches is that migrants are often (mis-)presented as gender-neutral *hominis oeconomici*. However, migration and its effects are very much influenced by gender roles and gender-specific job opportunities. The success of projects and programmes could depend on the gender and skills composition of the migrant workforce. Another reason is that migrants are interesting new actors for development cooperation: they have a lot to offer in terms of country-specific knowledge, language skills, intercultural competencies, transnational experience and contacts in different countries. With their expertise and often existing wish to contribute to the development of their country of origin they could easily work with and for development agencies. Additionally, for some countries, the diaspora represents an important part of civil society and can play an important role in state transformation. Afghanistan and Myanmar come to mind, but also some African countries, for which this could be an alternative to cooperating with dysfunctional state institutions. And, sometimes, it can simply be useful to make migrants, returnees and their families target groups of certain development interventions – however, in this case, it is crucial not to favor migrants over the local population, as this might create conflict.

**Tools and results**

It is not enough to merely point out the linkages between migration and the different sectors of development, or the extent to which remittances make up the gross national product of individual countries. If development experts are expected to work on migration, they need practical tools to do so – and they need results to show that it is worth using them, i.e., these tools should have the capacity to contribute to their goals better than alternative tools which do not make use of migration or take it into account. Migration experts (or, rather, teams made up of migration and development experts) have to produce instruments which are much better adapted to the needs of development cooperation than what have been offered so far. This process of invention and creation has only just begun.

Additionally, since there are still only a few projects which really try to make use of migration for development, we still lack monitoring tools and evaluation results on what works and what does not. This problem is of course aggravated by the fact that migration statistics are very poor, which renders monitoring and evaluation quite challenging. Therefore, we cannot prove that money spent on migration projects is better invested than money spent on other issues. In fact, we cannot even tell how much money is currently spent on migration projects at all, since the OECD DAC (Development Assistance Committee) monitor does not yet feature
a CRS (creditor reporting system) purpose code for migration.

Practical tools on how to implement migration activities within the framework of development cooperation and evaluations of these activities are therefore the two most important issues that migration and development experts should work on in the coming years.

**Conclusion**

Migration and development are interlinked and influence each other. It thus seems self-evident to take migration into account when planning development interventions. However, since migration is not the only influence on the intricate process of development, and since the effects of migration are ambivalent, the task is not easily achieved. The approaches sketched above can help to integrate migration step by step into development. Some of these approaches are already under way within German development cooperation. The German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), for example, has developed a number of practical tools to make use of migration for private sector and financial systems development; an in-depth analysis on the role of migration in the development of Kosovo has been carried out; and migrants are being addressed as crucial actors and bridge builders in development. We hope to demonstrate how this can advance international cooperation for the benefit of all.
A role for health in the global migration and development debate? Looking ahead at the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (HLD) and other forums

Davide Mosca, Barbara Rijks and Caroline Schultz

To date the health of migrants has not received much attention in the migration and development debate, despite the adoption of the World Health Assembly Resolution on the Health of Migrants (2008)\(^1\) and the recognition of the development community that “health is central to sustainable development.”\(^2\) The 2010 Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in Puerta Vallarta, Mexico, recommended to “assess cost effective health care models for various types of migration scenarios.” Yet, so far there has been no comprehensive follow-up to the recommendation. Likely, this omission is due to the perception that health is something that should be discussed only by health specialists, even though many of the causes and solutions to improve migrants’ health are found in other sectors, such as labour, social protection, immigration and law enforcement, among others. In general, there is a lack of multisectoral participation in the global migration and development debate, in particular regarding the participation of national ministries of health.

This article examines gaps and good practices in ensuring social protection in health for migrant workers and argues that, as both migration and health are enablers for development, health should be discussed in global migration and development debates. The GFMD and the High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) are important venues to address the health of migrant workers, and this article provides views on how policies and multisectoral partnerships can promote healthier and safer labour migration for development.

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1. All three authors are officials in the Migration Health Division of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Geneva.
2. The Sixty-first World Health Assembly (2008) adopted Resolution WHA 61.17 on the Health of Migrants, which recommends the integration of health needs of migrants into the framework of the broader agenda on migration and development, and calls Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO) “to promote migrant-sensitive health policies” and “to promote interagency, interregional and international cooperation on migrants’ health, with an emphasis on developing partnerships with other organizations and considering the impact of other policies”.

The link between health, labour migration and development

Migrant labour is crucial to the economies of many countries worldwide, for instance, in the mining, construction, agriculture, health care and domestic work sectors. Going abroad for work is a livelihood strategy for an estimated 105 million persons (IOM, 2013). Health is the main asset of each of these migrants, and the prerequisite for them to be able to fulfill their development potential. Migrant workers contribute to their own social and economic development, as well as that of their countries of origin and destination. This occurs through various means, such as transferring remittances to relatives at home, investing in the economic development of their countries of origin and destination, facilitating trade and knowledge transfers between countries of destination and origin, and so forth.

Yet, migrants frequently work in so-called ‘3D jobs’ (i.e., dangerous, difficult and demeaning) in hazardous environments, which are often characterized by discrimination, lack of social protection and insecurity. In addition, they face multiple hardships and health risks (Schenker, 2010). For example, South Africa’s half-a-million mine workers, many of whom are migrants, have the highest TB incidence in the world, with many also positive for HIV or have silicosis (Stuckler et al., 2011). In addition, lower-skilled migrant workers, particularly, are often not covered by social protection measures such as sick leave, mandatory leave, unemployment and health insurance benefits (Asia Pacific Migration Network, (AP MagNet), 2013).

According to a recent ILO study (2013), there are more than 52 million domestic workers worldwide, most of them migrant women, who are employed in conditions that make them particularly susceptible to abuse and exploitation, which can result in long-term physical and psychological harm.
Jonathan Smith, writer and director of a documentary on the HIV and TB epidemics among South Africa’s mine workers, entitled They Go to Die:

“One miner went home for a few weeks and started coughing, and he came back and told the mine he was coughing and sick, and they said, ‘You got TB at home so we’re terminating your contract.’ And they sent him home. Other workers did get sick in the mine, including with multidrug-resistant TB; they tested and treated them – and then after six months when they didn’t get better, […] they were released from their contract. This practice is commonly referred to as “sending them home to die” by leading health officials.” (Mazotta, 2011)

Including health in the migration and development debate

Including migration-related health challenges in the migration and development debate is important because of the multiple health vulnerabilities experienced by migrant workers, which affect their human development prospects, as well as the socioeconomic development outcomes for their communities of origin and destination. While global debates increasingly focus on inclusive development, many migrants around the world primarily experience multifaceted exclusion, with not only their political rights often being limited, but also their labour and social rights.4

As highlighted in the Report of the Global Thematic Consultation on Health for the Post-2015 Development Agenda, “health is important as an end in itself and as an integral part of human well-being, which includes material, psychological, social, cultural, educational, work, environmental, political, and security dimensions” (WHO, UNICEF, Government of Sweden, Government of Botswana, 2013). As Carlson and Nordström (2012) point out, “we should also highlight the relation between health, human rights, and economic growth. Healthy workers are [...] good for both governments and business.”

The High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (HLD) to be held in October 2013 will discuss global migration and development issues in plenary debates and in four thematic round tables. The overarching theme of this year’s HLD is “identifying concrete measures to strengthen coherence and cooperation at all levels, with a view to enhancing the benefits of international migration for migrants and countries alike and its important links to development, while reducing its negative implications.” Addressing the health of migrants in a coherent manner is one of these concrete measures that are indispensable for ensuring that migrants and countries benefit from international migration.5

Health issues throughout the migration cycle

Thus, this is an opportune time for all governments and other participants and observers to recognize the need to include the health of migrants in the upcoming HLD, as well as in the annual GFMD, and discuss some of the most relevant migration-related health issues throughout the migration cycle. Below are some examples of the issues that can be discussed during the HLD, as well as a few good practice examples on how to address these health issues.

Pre-departure: Many states require migrant workers to undergo compulsory pre-departure and post-arrival medical examinations, often including testing for certain conditions such as HIV (ILO, 2009), TB (Welshman & Bhashford, 2006) and pregnancy (UNDP, 2008). Frequently paid out-of-pocket by prospective migrants, the medical examinations represent an additional financial burden for migrants, one that does not bring a health benefit, as any identified health needs remain untreated, and which can result in a halted or disrupted visa process. Some labour agents even force migrant women to take long-term contraception to ensure that they do not get pregnant while abroad, as reported by HRW (2007).

Transit: Migrants are frequently exploited while in transit, as security forces, smugglers and other criminal groups take advantage of their vulnerable situation (IOM, 2012a; MSF, 2013). Many migrants are exposed to institutional and criminal violence, including sexual violence, that influence their medical and psychological needs (MSF, 2013).

Destination: In most destination countries, migrants lack access to health services, especially if they are in an irregular situation. This may not only violate

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4 Importantly, health vulnerabilities of migrant workers do not only stem from health sector policies and practices. Restrictive migration policies tend to drive labour migration underground (Anderson, 2010), and a lack of labour protection mechanisms – or a lack of enforcement thereof – lead to precarious and dangerous working and housing conditions, especially for irregular and low-skilled regular migrants. While taking this broader picture into account, this article focuses especially on issues directly related to health.

5 Migrant health links with all four HLD round table themes: sustainable development, human rights, safe labour migration and inter-country partnerships. Similarly, the theme of the 2013–2014 GFMD chairmanship “Unlocking the potential of migration for inclusive development” opens the door for a more migrant-centred discussion where migrants’ health is recognized as a crucial element of inclusive human development that benefits migrants, their families, host and home communities.
international rights instruments, but also further aggravates social exclusion of migrants and, thus, endangers public health and security and hampers integration and social cohesion. Numerous countries deport migrants living with HIV (Pebody, 2010). According to HRW (2009b), 30 countries practice measures such as automatically detaining migrants and asylum-seekers with treatable infectious diseases, and even deporting them and imposing travel, work and residence limitations on them. Women, who comprise a significant percentage of migrant workers, often face great health vulnerabilities. According to HRW (2005, p. 92), “[i]n cases of pregnancy, women may resort to risky illegal abortion to avoid deportation.”

**Mark from the Philippines** realized that he could no longer obtain work visas from several destination countries because of his TB history, although he has already been cured:

> “I’ve lost something very important to me and I don’t have one good [or] sensible reason why. It’s hell to live with this, especially [in] these difficult times...This policy is inhuman, senseless, and even potentially dangerous [...]. TB is an ancient disease, but it’s exactly this kind of attitude by some policymakers that makes it still a problem to this day and age. On a broader outlook, how sure are these policymakers that not one, amongst the millions of migrant workers across the Middle East is hiding this disease because of fear of deportation? There is cure – medicines which are easily available and practically inexpensive – so why is there a need to push another human being into fear and despair?”


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7 According to HRW (2009b), 30 countries practice measures such as automatically detaining migrants and asylum-seekers with treatable infectious diseases, and even deporting them and imposing travel, work and residence limitations on them. Women, who comprise a significant percentage of migrant workers, often face great health vulnerabilities. According to HRW (2005, p. 92), “[i]n cases of pregnancy, women may resort to risky illegal abortion to avoid deportation.”

8 However, Jeffrey Cohen (2012) writes that “the fears that the economic crisis of 2008 would lead to a decline in remittances and the returns of migrants to their sending countries were largely unfounded.” (For the full text, visit http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/migration-and-remittances-during-the-global-economic-crisis-and-beyond-myths-and-realities.


10 These examples are taken from an IOM Migration Health Division Collection of Good Practices (forthcoming).

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**Return:** During the global financial and economic crisis (2008/2009) and in its aftermath, migrant workers very often were the first ones to lose their jobs and, thus, were no longer able to support their families (GMG and ILO, 2009). When migrant workers lose their jobs, they are frequently left “high and dry by their employers” (AP MagNet, 2013), which can have detrimental effects on their physical and mental health. Moreover, many migrant workers have to return home to seek health care because they do not have access to treatment in the country of destination. This means an additional financial and social burden for these migrants, their families and their communities of origin. Therefore, migration, if not managed well, can lead to significant public health challenges. Costs for the community left behind can thus outweigh financial remittances. According to the Stop TB Partnership, “the current cost of the TB epidemic in the South African mining sector is estimated at USD 886 million per year. However, implementing activities to tackle TB in mines would eliminate these costs and bring about increased productivity, resulting in a total financial benefit of USD 783 million per year.”

**Good practices to address health vulnerabilities of migrant workers**

Even though there are global commitments in place, such as the WHA Resolution on Health of Migrants and a quite comprehensive international legal framework (see Ruhs, 2013), they are often not fully ratified or implemented. Yet, we do see examples of good practices. Below are some examples that address the specific challenges identified in the WHA Resolution, which can feed into the migration and development debate.

1. **Promote monitoring of migrant health**

The project PROMINSTAT (Promoting Comparative Quantitative Research in the Field of Migration and Integration in Europe) compiled meta-information on statistical data sets on migration, integration, and discrimination in 29 European countries, to improve the quality of publicly available information on migration, integration and discrimination. It responded to the need for more reliable and more harmonized statistical data. Among the 12 thematic areas used to classify data were employment, housing, irregular migration, and health, as well as its social determinants.
2. **Promote conducive policy and legal frameworks on the health of migrants**

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Declaration on TB in the Mining Sector, adopted by the heads of State in August 2012, outlines priority areas for urgent action, and commits to zero new infections, zero stigma and discrimination, and zero deaths resulting from TB, HIV, silicosis and other occupational respiratory diseases. The mining sector in Southern Africa has the highest concentration of TB in the world, with more than 2,500 cases per 100,000 population, which is a rate 20 times higher than the global average. Many mine workers are temporary and circular migrant workers. SADC is currently working with partners to operationalize this Declaration and implement the identified priority actions.

3. **Promote migrant-inclusive health systems**

In Argentina, the advocacy efforts of trade unions led to the establishment of the National Registry of Rural Workers and Employers (RENATRE). Prior to this, agricultural workers had been excluded from unemployment insurance. The registration scheme covers all agricultural workers regardless of their migration status, and irrespective of whether they are employed on a permanent, temporary, or transitory basis. Employers contribute 1.5 per cent of the workers’ monthly salary to the RENATRE fund and are required to register their workers; which gives the workers access to social security benefits, including health insurance.

4. **Promote partnerships, networks and multi-country frameworks**

The Joint United Nations Initiative on Mobility and HIV/AIDS in South-East Asia (JUNIMA) is a partnership forum that works on universal access to HIV services to migrant and mobile populations. It was initially established as the UN Regional Task Force on Mobility and HIV Vulnerability Reduction in South-east Asia and Southern of China in 1997. This task force has since expanded to cover all the remaining South-east Asian countries. The partnership includes governments, UN and intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs and civil society. JUNIMA identifies priorities and gaps and facilitates programmatic, policy, and advocacy actions to reduce mobility-related HIV vulnerability and address issues of care and support throughout the migration cycle.

The way forward – making the migration and development debates healthier

These practices show some examples of social protection in health, that is, mechanisms that address migrant workers’ health vulnerabilities in their countries of origin, prior to departure, during transit, in the destination settings and after their return. Measures to empower and protect migrants are necessary to reduce the social and financial costs of migration (see for instance Akerman Börje, 2013).

The current concept paper of the GFMD, prepared by the Swedish Chair, rightly draws attention to the fact that “policies matter a great deal” (GFMD, 2013). Adequate policies ensure that migration can serve as an enabler for sustainable development for all, while mitigating the potentially negative impacts of migration on development. Measures such as opening more legal routes to labour migration and granting migrant workers and their families social protection, including in the area of health, greatly influence the extent to which migration can positively impact development. Where State structures are not strong enough to efficiently enforce labour rights, private sector initiative and public-private partnerships can be crucial temporary solutions. To achieve further progress towards better social protection of workers, including in health, civil society organizations, such as human rights observers, parliaments and trade unions need to continue their important work in holding governments accountable and promoting employers to establish and comply with codes of conduct. Ultimately, it is the State’s responsibility to regulate both employers and recruitment agencies.

In the endeavor to leverage the development potential of labour migrants, it might be fruitful to explore measures to:

a. Increase social protection in health measures for migrants and their families that reduce the social and financial costs to migrants such as access to health insurance and occupational health and safety measures;

b. Ensure that pre-departure recruitment procedures, including medical examinations, comply with international ethical practices, such as informed consent, confidentiality of medical results, reproductive health rights and access to counselling, treatment and support services;

c. Integrate health promotion into pre-departure orientation for migrant workers (including on sexual and reproductive health, hygiene, nutrition, occupational health and safety measures, and the details of the health system in the country of destination, among other issues);

d. Treat curable conditions of migrants before resorting to their expulsion, to reduce the burden of stigmatization, ostracism and broken hopes that deportation implies for migrants and their families.

If the migration and development debate were to become more multisectoral, with, for instance, health sector representatives participating in the upcoming HLD and GMFD, the achievement of global health and development goals could be accelerated.
The HLD and the GFMD represent opportunities for States to acknowledge the value of health of migrants for the realization of sustainable development goals, and to link relevant migration and health aspects with migration and development themes. The recognition of health as an enabler for development in these dialogues is a significant step in the right direction towards its inclusion in the post-2015 UN development agenda, and towards implementation of the WHA Resolution on the Health of Migrants.

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Key findings of the Human Development Report 2013 in the field of migration

An interview with Khalid Malik

The Human Development Report 2013, which is entitled ‘The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World’ stresses that areas of global international concern that merit urgent attention today include trade, migration, climate change and development. The Report suggests that each of these areas has been significantly altered by the rise of the South. In the case of migration, it indicates, for example, that nearly half of the remittances sent home to countries in the South now originates from migrant workers in other developing countries. Can you guide us through some of the most noteworthy findings of the Report in the field of migration policy?

Khalid Malik: The 2013 Report documents the changing patterns of migration globally from the traditional North-South axis alone to expanding immigration to developing countries from elsewhere in the South. For example:

1. In 2010, an estimated 3 per cent of the world’s people (215 million) were first-generation immigrants, and close to half lived in developing countries. Almost 80 per cent of South–South migration takes place between bordering countries. Migrant diasporas are a huge source of foreign exchange. In 2005, South–South remittances were estimated at 30 to 45 per cent of worldwide remittances from immigrants.

2. Many transnational opportunities in both trade and investment arise through personal connections, often between international migrants and their countries of origin. Diasporas are also a major source of information about market opportunities. For example, US multinational firms with a high proportion of employees from certain countries have been found to have less need to rely on joint-venture partners in those countries where their employees have cultural ties.

3. Development prospects are strongly influenced by demographic trends. Between 1970 and 2010, the dependency ratio (the ratio of children and elderly to the working-age population from age 15 to 64) declined sharply in most regions — most dramatically in East Asia and the Pacific, where it dropped by 39 per cent, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean and the Arab States, where it fell by 34 per cent. The Report notes, however, that these trends are not deterministic. They can be counterbalanced, at least indirectly, by education policies and sometimes by migration policies.

The report discusses the fact that, due to the continuing growth in annual international migration — from an estimated 70 million four decades ago to more than 200 million today, originating largely from the South — there is a growing need for rules to protect the rights of migrants and provide agreed international norms for the flow of migrants between source and host countries. According to the Report, “such rules would benefit all parties, in both economic and social terms, while the costs of inaction will continue to mount.” Can you outline some of the rules and norms that would be likely to benefit both migrants and host societies and economies?

Khalid Malik: While the governance of migration is not inevitably or exclusively a multilateral issue, international coordination mechanisms could provide a supporting framework for the emerging networks of regional and bilateral agreements. Regional and multilateral efforts could liberalize and simplify channels that allow people to seek work abroad, ensure basic rights for migrants, and reduce transaction costs associated with migration, enabling benefits from internal mobility, thereby improving outcomes for migrants and destination communities alike.

With the continuing growth in annual international migration — from an estimated 70 million four decades ago to more than 200 million today, originating largely from the South — there is a growing need for rules to protect the rights of migrants and provide agreed international norms for the flow of immigrants between source and host countries. Such rules would benefit all parties, in both economic and social terms, while the costs of inaction will continue to mount. The costs of inaction are not solely or even primarily financial: they include the profound human costs of forcibly prolonged family separation, all-too-common mistreatment in the workplace and the unnecessary and indefensible degradation of human dignity when foreign resident workers are not accorded basic legal rights.

1 Khalid Malik is Director of the Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York.
In terms of governance and regional/international cooperation, the Report stresses that, while many regional organizations have added migration to their agendas, regional consultations have remained informal and non-binding. Can you highlight the current state of development of, and any positive outcomes that might have already been generated by international consultations such as the Berne Initiative 2001–2005, the High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development hosted by the UN General Assembly and the Global Forum on Migration and Development?

Khalid Malik: The international processes mentioned, including the Global Forum and the UNGA High Level Dialogue, have not produced any binding commitments to date. Yet, one of the most salient contributions of these processes has been a reframing of migration in positive terms (as an opportunity for human development, as well as a potential asset for countries of origin and destination), and confidence-building among governments. Advances have been made in sharing best practices and collaboration on issues of mutual interest, such as in the GFMD Platform for Partnerships (http://gfmd.org/en/pfp).

That said, the implementation of outcomes and recommendations coming out of the GFMD remains at the discretion of national governments. The United Nations is convening its second High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development this year (4–5 October), but countries remain divided on many of the issues to be discussed. One prospect is that the Dialogue could place the topic on the broader post-2015 international development agenda, integrating migration more firmly into the multilateral system.