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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Continuing the Dialogue: Legal and Policy Perspectives

Edited by Joseph Chamie And Luca Dall’Oglio

Center for Migration Studies (CMS) and International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2008
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Preface

*International Migration and Development, Continuing the Dialogue: Legal and Policy Perspectives* is the outcome of a two-day conference held on January 17-18, 2008 to consider and discuss recent major intergovernmental events on migration and development. The conference provided a unique and timely opportunity for experts, researchers, policy makers and programme officials to critically review the outcomes, implications and achievements of these events. In addition, it provided a candid appraisal of where the debate on international migration and development is likely to be heading. The conference was organized jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Center for Migration Studies, with the support of a grant from Dearfield Associates. We would like to seize this opportunity to express our appreciation to the Dearfield Associates for their generosity; to Ilse Pinto-Dobernig for her constructive editing and to Frank Laczkó and the IOM Research and Publications Unit for the printing of this publication.

This publication includes the papers prepared for the conference by nineteen invited experts and the opening statements by the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General, the Director-General of the International Organization for Migration and the Executive Director of the Center for Migration Studies. For reference, the final programme of the conference is included in an appendix. We would like to acknowledge and express our appreciation to the United Nations for its cooperation and valuable participation in the conference.

The views and comments expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the International Organization for Migration, the Center for Migration Studies or Dearfield Associates. For further information about the conference or this publication, please contact Dr. Joseph Chamie, Center for Migration Studies, 27 Carmine Street, New York, NY 10014, or Mr. Luca Dall’Oglio, Office of the Permanent Observer for the International Organization for Migration to the United Nations, 122 East 42nd Street, Suite 1610, New York, NY 10168.
Overview

Joseph Chamie and Luca Dall’Oglio

INTRODUCTION

International migration has reached the top of the global political agenda. In addition to nations and regional groups, the larger international community is struggling with the question of how best to manage international migration, especially with regard to development and human rights. To date, however, there is little agreement on what should be done or, indeed, whether this is even an appropriate topic for discussion and recommendations at the multilateral level. For instance, migration has not been on the agenda of the United Nations as a global intergovernmental conference in the same way as conferences on the environment, urbanization and women’s issues, among others.

Given its controversial nature, especially among receiving countries, achieving a global consensus on how best to address the many complex facets of international migration and development remains a tortuous and uneasy course in the foreseeable future. Although the “high-level dialogue” on international migration and development, convened by the United Nations General Assembly on 14-15 September 2006, only produced a “chairman’s summary”, it confirmed the need for a new and bold initiative, albeit outside the traditional UN framework. And, while the Secretary-General’s Report for the high-level dialogue proposed the establishment of a consultative forum for Member States to discuss issues related to international migration and development, the forum itself remains a voluntary, informal and non-binding process, not designed to produce negotiated outcomes.

Yet, notwithstanding these challenges, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) – as it is formally known – has undoubtedly become the driver for international migration policy debates, capturing the attention of a broad range of state and non-state actors. The first Forum, convened by the Belgian government, met in Brussels from 9 to 11 July 2007. The governmental discussions on 10 and 11 July were preceded by a meeting of civil society representatives on 9 July. Over 800 delegates representing 156 States and more than 20 international organizations took part. The Brussels Forum marked the start of an innovative global process designed to enhance the positive impact of migration on development by adopting a more consistent policy approach, identifying new instruments and best practices, exchanging know-how and experience about innovative ideas and methods through interactive roundtables and, finally, establishing cooperative links between the various actors involved.

The primary focus of the Brussels Forum was to examine the ways in which the employment of migrants in rich countries and their remittances could contribute to development in
countries of origin. The first of three roundtables considered the maximization of opportunities and minimization of risks for human capital development and labour mobility. A second roundtable examined the means of increasing the volume and development impact of remittances, while the third addressed opportunities for greater coherence of migration and development policies, coupled with the promotion of partnerships.

The second Forum on Migration and Development is scheduled to be held in Manila in the Philippines, from 27 to 30 October 2008. The theme of the Manila Forum is “Protecting and Empowering Migrants for Development”. Building on the achievements of the Brussels Forum, the Manila Forum will consider key migration and development issues, with a special emphasis on the human face of migration. Also, the Manila Forum is expected to follow the same round-table format as Brussels, with particular emphasis on the rights of migrants. The discussions will examine the means available to increase safe and legal opportunities for the migration of workers as well as strategies to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking, while continuing to stress the importance of policy coherence concerning migration and development aspects. Three round-table discussions are proposed for the Manila Forum, namely: 1. Migration, Human Rights and Development; 2. Secure and Legal Migration, and 3. Policy and Institutional Coherence and Partnerships. The Manila Forum will also examine the need for more reliable migration and development research and data, and continue the debate on policy and institutional coherence in linking migration and development.

This volume includes the papers of nineteen invited experts who contributed to this conference by examining progress achieved by the recent major intergovernmental events on migration and development, in particular the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, the Brussels Forum and the forthcoming Manila Forum. In addition to reviewing and evaluating these various efforts, the papers provide suggestions on how to proceed forward.

SUMMARY

The conference began its first session with opening statements by the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ms. Asha-Rose Migiro; the Director-General of the International Organization, Mr. Brunson McKinley, and the Executive Director of the Center for Migration Studies, Mr. Joseph Fugolo.

Opening the conference, Deputy Secretary-General Migiro noted that only a short time ago the international community had great difficulty in discussing matters related to migration. Former divisions between North and South, and those countries frequently purported as “sending” or “receiving” had transmuted to more cooperative patterns relating migration to development. She believed that the shape of a consensus had become evident and stressed that migration had evolved into a truly global phenomenon requiring cooperation among nations to make it a safe, legal and orderly process able to protect the rights of all migrants. She added that to ignore that the relationship between migration and development had become a potential area of international cooperation would be grossly negligent indeed.
noting that this dialogue among nations was the beginning, not the end, of the teamwork which had begun with the GFMD. Paying tribute to the leading role played by the Belgian government, she stressed that the first GFMD has been so successful because it had focused on practical areas of cooperation to ensure benefits to migrants and sending and receiving countries, despite potentially divisive political issues.

Taking the floor, Brunson McKinley emphasized that, in order to build on the success of the HLD and the first GFMD, the current priority was to develop mechanisms to create synergies between migration policies and national development planning processes, and to ensure better utilization of the resources of the many stakeholders with interests in migration, including the development cooperation community. In addition to governments, many other actors were also engaged in identifying and ensuring more coherent, cooperative approaches to migration and development issues. Among these, the United Nations Global Migration Group (GMG) was in the process of expanding to 14 its interagency membership and could play a crucial role in enhancing policy coherence and optimizing programming complementarities to support the beneficial aspects of migration. Also, civil society actors and diaspora organizations, in particular, were important contributors in terms of both ideas and concrete development action. Lastly, Regional Consultative Processes, such as the forthcoming Ministerial Meeting in Abu Dhabi, marked an important development towards cooperation between countries of origin and destination, exploring for the first time partnership opportunities in the field of contractual labour mobility. He believed that these diverse developments could bring new ideas to the more formal UN intergovernmental processes and facilitate and support further follow-up activities, including national capacity building efforts regarding the development dimension of migration. In this connection, activities aimed at capacity building, training and research in order for governments to better govern the potential of migration, remained crucial factors.

In his opening remarks, Joseph Fugolo acknowledged the general awareness that international migration and development had become an increasingly critical issue in the world today. Even the non-practitioners were becoming increasingly aware of the fact that the international community, regional groups, individual nations, researchers and non-governmental organizations, to name but a few, were struggling with the question of how best to manage the many dimensions of international migration. Building upon the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Brussels Forum, he believed that this conference would make a valuable contribution to the dialogue, and that it was important to address the overarching question of where the international community should be heading with regard to international migration and development in the coming years.

**International Cooperation on Migration: From Cairo to the GFMD**

The paper presented by Roqelio Fernandez-Castilla stresses the vital importance of partnerships in addressing international migration. According to Castilla, the only way to approach the complex issue of international migration and to ensure that it benefits development, is to
engage in dialogue and to share respective experiences within a confidence building process that involves all the concerned parties. As virtually every country in the world is affected by international migration, he believes that responsibility to deal with the challenges of international migration should be shared. Moreover, migration should no longer be seen as the result of a failure of development, but rather as an integral aspect of the global development process. Accordingly, for migration to be managed effectively it is extremely important that governments ensure policy and institutional coherence and establish partnerships at the national, regional and international level among the diverse stakeholders in migration and development. While acknowledging governments as the main actors in international migration, other stakeholders, including local authorities, the private sector, civil society, NGOs and migrant associations should also be involved in the formulation and implementation of migration policy. As others had done, Castilla also stresses the need to share relevant experiences more readily among governments and the other stakeholders, and for policy makers to have access to the latest data and concise policy-oriented research. He believes that the time is ripe for developing a global consultative process that would allow governments to discuss the issues involved and forge constructive approaches towards realizing the potential benefits of migration for development. Indeed, Castilla views the Global Forum on Migration and Development as a venue to discuss international migration and development concerns in a comprehensive and systematic manner. Concluding his presentation, he noted that cooperation and partnerships within the United Nations have been strengthened through the Global Migration Group (GMG) - a group consisting of United Nations agencies involved in international migration, and the IOM. The GMG aims to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms dealing with migration and to encourage more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated policy approaches concerning international migration.

The paper presented by Victoria Garchitorena addressed the Second Global Forum on Migration and Development in Manila. In particular, it provides an update on the preparations undertaken by the Ayala Foundation to help convene the Civil Society Days which will immediately precede the Intergovernmental Forum. The Ayala Foundation is a corporate foundation established in the Philippines in 1961 with the aim to eradicate poverty in all its forms. Garchitorena believes that the non-state stakeholders, civil society, the private sector, labour recruiters, labour unions, church groups and academics, will complement the governmental deliberations. Acknowledging that governments have primary responsibility for international migration, she believes that non-state stakeholders can help craft the best solutions that will protect the rights of migrants and citizens at the same time as unlock the vast social and economic development potential. Building on the progress achieved at the Brussels Forum, the overall theme of the Manila Forum is “Protecting and Empowering Migrants for Development”. Discussions will be organized around three roundtables: 1. Migration, Development and Human Rights; 2. Secure Legal Migration to Achieve Stronger Development Impacts and 3. Policy and Institutional Coherence and Partnerships. According to Garchitorena, the Ayala Foundation is working closely with the Philippine Government to ensure that the Civil Society Forum will succeed in offering concrete recommendations on policies and programmes to the Intergovernmental Forum. The two-day Civil Society
Forum will be held in parallel to the intergovernmental discussions in order to facilitate contact and discussions between the participants of the two meetings. She believes that this arrangement will help to enhance the understanding of the various views and perspectives on international migration and development. She also referred to the decision to approach experts with a view to preparing background papers as inputs to Civil Society Days and to undertake online discussions for those unable to attend the conference. Closing, she acknowledged that, while much has been accomplished, there was still much to do to ensure the success of the Civil Society Forum.

In her paper, Milena Novy-Marx of the MacArthur Foundation discusses the Foundation’s Initiative on Global Migration and Human Mobility. Following a brief background on the foundation, Novy-Marx describes the Foundation’s work in the field of international migration and on the Global Forum in particular. In its endeavour to achieve the goal of making lasting improvements in the human condition, MacArthur provides funding through a small number of targeted programmes. Internationally, the Foundation is active on range of issues, including human rights and international justice, conservation and sustainable development, international peace and security, and population and reproductive health. In 2006, it launched its Initiative on Global Migration and Human Mobility to help countries and individuals to better realize the gains from globalization. MacArthur believes that the key value added is to help reframe migration as a global issue, to support evidence-based analysis and policy innovation, and help set the stage for improved international governance and policymaking over the next decade. Regarding governance issues, MacArthur is investing in research and policy efforts to achieve greater coherence of international norms concerning the movement of people. The foundation is looking at ways to improve global migration data, and selectively at national policy in the focus countries Mexico, Nigeria, India and Russia. Concerning development, the Foundation is seeking to help countries and individuals to better leverage the positive aspects of migration to improve their economic well-being. Its focus is on three main channels through which migration affects economic development – remittances, brain drain and diaspora communities. Besides supporting research and policy analysis in these three areas, they also fund particular projects to implement some of the research. In addition to describing their funding support to the second Global Forum in Manila, Novy-Marx also provides a brief overview of the Foundation’s support for other major projects relating to international migration. Concluding, Novy-Marx indicates that MacArthur hopes to expand grants in the field of international migration from USD 4 million in 2007, to USD 6 million in 2008, and up to USD 10 million per year by 2009 or 2010, or approximately USD 80 million over a ten-year period.

The Future of International Cooperation on Migration and Development

In examining the prospects and limits of international cooperation on migration and development, Gallya Lahav considers some policy and trends in the European Union. She believes that the EU case is paradigmatic of the various pressures that diverse, liberal states face with regard to migration management. On the one hand, there is the expanding competence of EU institutions in the policy areas of immigration, asylum, refugees, border
security and development; on the other, even as immigration-related issues have shifted from national to supranational policymaking arenas, powerful national voices continue to offer resistance. She believes that the most critical consequence with regard to international cooperation on migration relates not only to the fact it has expanded, but to the diversity of regulators and the widening gap between policy makers. The growth of stakeholders in an enlarged migration ‘playing field’ has generated political pressures that cut across various policy issues and priorities, which threaten to undermine coordination or cooperation. Accordingly, Lahav feels that there is a fundamental need to extend and integrate the communities and dialogues between the growing range of stakeholders – from public health officials to urban planners to economists and lawyers. In addition, she observes that because knowledge about the relationship between migration and development is fragmented among many specialized disciplines and policy makers, each with its own piece of the puzzle and particular conceptualization of the issues, public debate and policies often work at cross purposes or are counter-productive. Lahav concludes on a cautionary note advising us to hold off celebrating international cooperation and rather consider the limitations and complexities involved in migration management.

As reflected in its title, Mark Miller’s paper considers the past, present and future of international migration and development. He maintains that migration figures prominently in the history of humankind. For example, he notes that recent anthropological evidence concerning the late Iron Age in Europe suggests that distinctive societies were much more interconnected and fluid than once thought. With regard to the present, he asserts that the origins of the age of migration followed World War II and, more recently, five developments helped to trigger a second period of globalization. The first development was that most Western European countries had become at least de facto countries’ of immigration by the 1970s. The second concerns Latin America and dates from around 1970 when that continent became a net exporter of people, mainly to the United States, because of a growing socio-economic gap and, more recently, to southern Europe. Third, Africans and Asians began to migrate internationally in large numbers. Fourth, by the 1970s, countries of the Persian Gulf region had emerged as major importers of migrant workers. Finally, the situation in Eastern Europe changed also as more people began to migrate from this region as well. Miller concludes by spelling out why he believes that international migration will continue to occupy a central role in shaping tomorrow’s world, and in the forging and recasting of states and societies, as it has done throughout the past.

The paper by Irena Omelaniuk considers the next steps for the international community regarding international migration and development. In reviewing the Global Forum on International Migration and Development process, she finds that it demonstrates how development can be a useful framing device for dealing with migration in a more cooperative and consensual way. She believes that the Global Forum provides an opportunity for governments to find common ground and shared goals and to explore good practices to achieve these goals. To date, the Forum process has shown that the issues and challenges are very different from country to country, and that no one policy is likely to fit all cases. Also, the policy solutions to development challenges often lie outside the purview of migration
policy and are rather more related to economic and labour market planning. She also notes that there are more players besides governments and feels that the broader contextualization of migration and development policies is often better understood and monitored by non-government experts, particularly those involved in wider socio-economic research, rather than by government policy makers. Despite a lack of measurable evidence of the actual impacts or the effectiveness of many good practices and policy options, she concludes that there is general agreement that developing countries and development aid donors alike should factor migration into national and sectoral development strategies, and that migration policy should factor in development implications whenever possible. However, she also points out that to do this effectively, policy makers need to work more closely with each other and with other experts in order to: 1) ensure that the data and research are reliable; 2) strengthen diagnostic tools to assess country needs, 3) gather “good practice” policies to meet the diagnosed needs and 4) test and evaluate these policies, as the Mauritian Government and the European Commission aim to do with the concept of circular migration.

Legal and Policy Aspects

Antonio Golini focuses on facts and problems relating to migratory policies. Beginning with an interesting analogy to Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and the Tortoise, Golini considers whether there is a real chance for sending countries to reach a level of development equivalent to that of receiving countries so that the determinant migratory forces, i.e., push and pull factors, can be eliminated or significantly diminished. He begins by examining international migration as a structural component of population change. In his view, the demographic, economic, social, political and environmental context is feeding powerful and growing migration pressures. He notes that, in particular, demographic disequilibria between the countries in the North and South constitute the basis for continuing migratory pressures. In the coming decades, such pressures will cause international migration flows that will be even more unavoidable and unstoppable than today’s and become a structural and dynamic factor for many populations. Golini then describes what he views as the nine principal actors or protagonists in international migration, which together generate a complex migratory process that is very difficult to manage. After discussing the general aims of various migration policies, Golini concludes that we are facing a difficult puzzle the solution to which requires the matching of many dimensions and many diverse interests. Accordingly, he feels that in the present situation the only realistic option seems to be a gradual process that rests on five fundamental pillars: 1) awareness of migratory processes; 2) setting realistic aims; 3) a mix of long-term and temporary migration; 4) bilateral, multilateral and international agreements and 5) adequate statistical information systems on international migration. He also believes that for the medium to long term, improved migration management might be achieved by establishing four regional groupings or unions, which would be formed on the basis of geo-political and economic commonalities. Within these regional unions, namely Euro-Africa; the Americas, Indian sub-continent and the Far East and Pacific, individuals, capital and ideas would be able to circulate freely.
The paper by Rey Koslowski considers global mobility and the quest for an international migration regime. In addressing this question, he believes that it is useful to think in terms of a set of interacting global mobility regimes. Namely, an established international refugee regime; an emerging international travel regime and a potential but yet to be established international labour migration regime. Koslowski limits his paper’s scope to multilateral cooperation at the global level and does not include bilateral agreements and regional migration regimes. His analysis compares and contrasts the political dynamics of cooperation on international labour migration and global mobility, offers several reasons why an international migration regime has not yet been developed and discusses the diverse obstacles that may or do actually impede international cooperation on international travel. Based on the findings of his analysis, Koslowski believes that refocusing research on global mobility may be more useful to understand international cooperation than the current focus on the linking of migration to international development. According to Koslowski, the limits of unilateral government measures to halt illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking have led to significant international cooperation and furthered the development of an international travel regime. However, national economic and political interests still hamper international cooperation on labour migration and progress towards an international migration regime. Moreover, in his view and despite the increasing calls for international cooperation on migration, an international migration regime is unlikely to be established in the near future. The major migration destination states had little reason to join an international regime to facilitate labour migration or to undertake multilateral commitments to keep their labour markets open as migrant labour was readily available on a unilateral basis. Furthermore, Koslowski also notes the absence of any inherent reciprocity similar to that of international trade and, not surprisingly, the necessary leadership to promote an international migration regime was absent among the major migration destination states.

Nadia Yakoob addresses critical legal and policy issues concerning international labour migration. She begins by considering the reasons for labour migration and identifies some major reasons: 1. Migrants seek greater economic security, better opportunities and a promising future. 2. Many developing countries stand to gain certain benefits from emigration. 3. Employers were looking for competent, industrious and the most talented workers. 4. Many countries, particularly the more developed ones, needed and wanted foreign workers. Yakoob then turns to some of the policy responses to these dynamics and identifies some of the flaws in existing policies. While some countries preferred temporary admission with specific conditions for stay, others often offered paths to permanent residence for certain types of workers. Besides, countries were increasingly turning to policies for greater worksite enforcement and stricter scrutiny measures at the border. Yakoob notes that, despite government efforts to design satisfactory labour migration policies, immigration remains a contentious and politically charged issue in many countries. She stresses that migration touched the core of how a state defined itself. In her view, the major challenge was how to balance the interests of all parties involved and to optimize labour migration. For example, while states must protect their labour markets, they also needed to ensure that this did not impinge excessively on businesses and employers as these might otherwise decide to relocate. Also, she believed that it was necessary to consider the interests and objectives
of sending countries. While many had benefited from the receipt of remittances, such cash flows did not alter the structural causes of poverty, but only provide punctual relief to the families. Yakoob closes her paper with a discussion on how to balance the various interests of the relevant stakeholders in the migration debate in order to achieve fair, efficient and effective migration policy. She believes that, given the growing need to manage labour migration flows effectively, reactive policies that failed to balance the interests of all parties concerned would not provide effective solutions.

**Welfare, Rights and Integration of Migrants**

Nancy Foner focuses on the integration challenges facing the children of immigrants in the United States of America and in Europe. After briefly describing the demographic dimensions of immigration, Foner turns to some of major issues facing the second generation. With regard to the United States, she observes that despite worries and concerns, the general prognosis is quite good. She finds that the early fears of a widespread decline among the second generation have not been borne out and that, on the contrary, there was little evidence that a significant portion of the second generation in the U.S. was becoming part of a permanent urban underclass. However, Foner also reports important differences among the various immigrant communities. For example, while Asian and European second-generation migrants outperformed the children of native whites, black and many Latino second-generation migrants lagged behind. She also reports that the concern that the second generation would not learn English was unfounded; the large majority of the second generation had in fact made the transition to English. Nevertheless, children of immigrants faced a number of significant challenges, such as, for instance, the stigma of unauthorized immigrant parents, dropping out of high school and racial discrimination and prejudice. While studies on second-generation migrants in Europe were comparatively recent, the overall outlook was positive. In Germany, for example, many second-generation migrants reported good German language skills. In France, the educational level of second-generation migrants exceeded those of their immigrant parents and, in some cases, were comparable to those of native-born French. However, areas of concern included employment, job security and equality in various sectors of the society, especially with regard to religion. Foner concludes that comparisons between European and US experiences were useful as they contributed to clarifying the sources of the successes as well as difficulties of second-generation migrants.

The paper by Archbishop Celestino Migliore discusses the role of culture and religion in the effective integration of immigrants. Noting that about three per cent of today’s global population and about ten per cent of the population in industrialized countries were migrants, he believed that the question of the relationship between cultures and civilizations assumed particular relevance. In his view, this phenomenon has the potential – though not always realized – to promote an exciting and enriching exchange between cultures and civilizations. However, it also gave rise to difficult questions concerning integration, such as prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols, practicing religious rites and following cultural traditions considered as incompatible with human rights. Migliore also points to the recent increase in tension relating to integration, especially among children of immigrants. Unable
to see true integration or equal access to jobs and opportunities, he notes the unfortunate increasing incidence of hatred and violence erupting throughout Europe, Asia and Africa. While acknowledging the right of nations to safeguard their legitimate national interests, Migliore argues for lawful solutions to protect the rights of immigrants and provide for their basic needs. Recognizing the failure of migration policies based exclusively on self-defence against illegal immigration, he recommends exploring new ways to effectively integrate immigrants and minorities at the cultural and religious levels. In particular, he believes that the focus should be on the protection of human rights of refugees and migrants, in particular their rights to life and personal security, freedom of conscience and religion and non-discrimination at work and within civil society. In addition to assisting refugees and immigrants in need, especially children, he emphasizes the importance of also examining the root causes of international migration. He concludes by reminding governments that they had the responsibility to provide their citizens with decent conditions of life and access to work so that they were not obliged to consider emigration to seek a better future for themselves and their families.

The paper by Bernardo Sousa examines the migration experience of Portugal. Beginning with a brief note on Portugal’s history as a sending country, Sousa focuses his remarks on Portugal’s recent experience as a receiving country and its main policy initiatives to welcome and integrate immigrants. Although many of the immigrants to Portugal came from former Portuguese colonies, their origins were becoming more diverse. According to Sousa, this diversification had created new challenges and complexities for public policy in relation to border control, information and service provision to immigrants, combating discrimination and facilitating intercultural dialogue. Nevertheless, Portuguese society was able to welcome and integrate migrants comparatively well. Seven key principles guided the country’s immigration policy: equality of rights and obligations; hospitality; citizenship; participation; co-responsibility; interculturalism and consensus. In addition to the adoption of new legislation in 2006 enabling more immigrants and their children born in Portugal to obtain citizenship, Portugal had also adopted plans and programmes to facilitate the integration of immigrants. Despite Portugal’s considerable progress with international migration and the integration of immigrants, Sousa nevertheless believed that there was still a long way to go. In particular, Portugal still needed to make more progress towards dealing with all the barriers to the integration of immigrants. In addition, much could still be learned from the experience of other countries and that this would enable Portugal to consolidate its policies with those of other EU countries. Concerning the promotion of development through migration, Sousa believes international partnerships with European and other partners to be essential.

Migrants in Development: Labour Migration and Role of Diasporas

The paper by Belinda Damoah Comfort provides an excellent example of how diaspora communities could facilitate development in countries of origin. Damoah is the Queen Mother of the Suma Traditional Area and President of the Suma Agricultural Co-operative Society of Ghana and Italy. She is directing a development project from Italy in Ghana to
assist her people in Ghana to build a better future for themselves and their children. The main objective of the programme is to improve agriculture, taking into consideration the large labour force and availability of lands. The programme organizes farmers of cashew, mango and many other crops and livestock producers into cooperative associations. It also aims to introduce technology into farming practices, to provide machinery and farm tools, introduce efficient irrigation and provide adequate storage facilities to reduce waste during the harvest season. The project would create jobs, especially for the young and women, increase income for farmers and help to alleviate poverty. In addition, it would also help to stem migration to urban areas and abroad, which has left many of the elderly, women and children in alarming living conditions. In implementing the project, Damoah noted the numerous obstacles encountered in both Italy and Ghana, such as slow bureaucratic and administrative procedures, poor communication and lack of access to credit, all of which are insensitive to the requirements of the agricultural growing season. Damoah recommends the creation of an enabling environment to facilitate the investments of expatriates, including financial incentives and the elimination of double taxation for migrant investors as Ghana has done. Also, she would like to see improved access to credit, possibly by twinning banks in countries of destination and origin. Damoah strongly believes that the various diasporas could act as facilitators between Africa and host countries to advance development efforts in the sending nations.

The paper by Rodolfo de la Garza has two overall objectives: 1) to redefine the concept of national development and the role played by remittances in that process, and 2) to illustrate the extent to which theories explaining migration must take political factors into account. By so doing, he finds that the societal effects of migration transcend whatever the sum of the economic benefits that accrued to individuals from remittances. To understand how migration affected development, de la Garza argues that development was more than an increase in the sum of individual incomes, which is how it was traditionally defined. Instead, development was an indicator of macro-level societal well-being encompassing economic, social and political dimensions. From a cost-benefit perspective, de la Garza posits that claims regarding the positive impact of migration on development were either exaggerated or wrong. It is understandable that state leaders saw remittances as major sources of foreign exchange available for supporting national development. However, according to de la Garza, this could easily make governments avoid the difficult task of institution building and strengthening that is essential to development. He also asserts that sending states could play a greater role in managing emigration than they might wish to acknowledge. In order to do so, however, major changes in domestic policy would be required, including the development of new and more comprehensive social services, as well as the strengthening of democratic political institutions, including mechanisms for holding government accountable. While these types of changes could generate controversy, de la Garza believes that failing to enact them is likely to result in continued and perhaps increased high levels of politically motivated migration.

Andre Siregar’s paper examines regional consultative processes and provides an Indonesian perspective on the ministerial consultation on overseas employment and contractual labour
for Asian countries of origin, viz. the Colombo Process. Based on his experience as Third Secretary at the Indonesian Mission to the United Nations in New York, Siregar begins by spelling out the evolution of the issue of international migration and development since the 1994 Cairo Conference. He notes that governments all over the world were struggling to best address this issue. However, despite their willingness to address the issue and their economic strength, nations will not be able to resolve the issue unilaterally and that a more comprehensive approach was necessary. Similar to other regional consultative processes, the Colombo Process was designed as a forum where ministers of labour met annually to discuss labour migration, formulate relevant recommendations and action plans, review and monitor the implementation of the recommendations and identify further steps for action. Also, as in the case of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the Colombo Process provided a non-binding and informal environment for governments and organizations to engage in dialogue and cooperation on issues of common interest and concern regarding labour migration. Siregar believes that governments needed to be proactive and comprehensive in addressing international migration and development and that the United Nations should play a crucial role in addressing the issue, particularly in cooperation with other relevant organizations, and in providing recommendations through the reports of the Secretary-General. Siregar concludes by briefly expressing his views on three important questions relating to migration and development: 1) the future role of the Global Forum on Migration and Development; 2) expectations for future negotiations by the United Nations General Assembly and 3) the role of United Nations system, relevant international organizations and other stakeholders.

Research Priorities and Gaps

The paper by Susan Martin focuses on research priorities and gaps as an agenda for the Global Forum on Migration and Development. She begins by summarizing intergovernmental developments in the area of international migration and development since the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development. Despite some progress in understanding the linkages between migration and development, she finds that major gaps remained in the data and analysis needed to grasp fully the implications of these linkages for public policy. In particular, Martin elaborates four principal issues requiring more research: 1) remittance flows in communities experiencing conflict and political instability; 2) the role of diasporas in fragile and failing states; 3) the impact of diaspora contributions on peace-making and peace-building in fragile and failed states and 4) impact of large-scale migration on developing countries hosting refugees and migrants from fragile and failed states. Martin also cautions on the scale and viability of some recommended programmes, arguing that research was still needed to determine the extent to which the programmes and projects would retain their effectiveness if their size and scope were to be increased dramatically. Also, noting that the rights of migrant workers constituted a specific focus of attention at the Global Forum in Manila, she believed that more research should focus on national policies to promote the rights of migrants, particularly in a manner that also promoted development. In particular, such research should determine whether policies and programmes at the national level by both source and destination countries could be an effective means to protect the
rights of migrants. As many others, Martin recommends further research on women’s roles in migration and development as well as the general issue of governance of international migration at the global level. In her conclusion, Martin stresses the importance of developing research capacities, especially in developing nations. Migration studies, a comparatively new area of research, required an interdisciplinary approach including the political, economic, social, legal and human issues raised by the international movements of people. She feels that education and training of academics and research professionals should be a high priority for governments and academia given the growing importance of the subject.

The paper by Barry Mirkin is based the global monitoring of national population policies carried out by the United Nations Population Division. The author provides a brief overview of international migration policies by highlighting some of the recent major trends in international migration policies. For example, he notes that the countries of destination were becoming less restrictive; thus, if in 1996, 40 per cent of countries aimed to lower immigration, by 2007, that percentage had fallen to 19 per cent. However, countries had also become more selective in their migration policies, preferring to increase the level of skilled migration. Mirkin also reports that programmes to better integrate migrants, such as language and employment training, had become widespread in countries of destination. These programmes facilitated integration by improving the language skills and labour market prospects of migrants. At the same time, countries were increasingly clamping down on irregular migration through more stringent visa requirements, tighter border security, biometric passports and bilateral readmission and regularization programmes. The author concludes that international migration will remain at the forefront of national and international agendas for some time yet due to two major dynamics. On the one hand, low fertility, population ageing and labour shortages would persist in countries of destination; on the other, high population growth, unemployment, political, social and ethnic conflict and the importance of remittances were set to continue to exert immigration pressures in countries of origin.

In their paper, Koko Warner and Frank Laczko examine new directions for research on migration, environment and development. They wished to highlight the linkages between environmentally induced migration and development, and to discuss how environmental factors influenced the movement of people. They find that, unfortunately, these two important policy issues were generally discussed in separate policy forums. In addition, they note that the report of the Global Commission for Migration published in 2005 included virtually no discussion of environmentally induced migration. This neglect appeared surprising given the widespread acknowledgement that environmental migration was likely to increase in the future and to have the greatest impact on developing countries. Their substantive analysis begins with an overview of research on migration, environment and development. For illustrative purposes, they then turn to some of the results from a new study based on fieldwork conducted in 24 countries around the world. The authors also discuss some possible ways to develop a global research agenda on migration and the environment. They identify several key priorities for future research, including systematic stock-taking of existing research; a global research programme using a common design; information and
knowledge management, and capacity-building projects. To achieve these aims, Warner and Laczko endorse the formation of a Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance, which was recently recommended by an expert group meeting in Munich, Germany. The proposed alliance would bring the environmental dimension of international migration into the mainstream of sustainable development policy as well as the migration issue into the ongoing environmental and climate change discourse. It would include the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations, experts, non-governmental organizations, civil society representatives and governments. In addition to improving the knowledge base and advancing research, the alliance would provide a neutral forum for policy dialogue and promote practical solutions for addressing environmentally induced migration.
I am grateful for the invitation to speak at this important Conference and to join such an eminent group of speakers. Let me thank the organizers, in particular, Joseph Chamie, who so ably and memorably led the UN Population Division for many years, and Brunson McKinley.

The Secretary-General and I are both deeply encouraged by the positive and dynamic international discussion about migration and development that has evolved over recent years.

Only a short time ago, the international community had great difficulty discussing matters related to migration. Dividing lines were drawn between North and South, between what we called “sending” and “receiving” countries. Accusations and recriminations trumped reasoned dialogue.

But in the past few years, this has given way to a space for dispassionate discussion of how migration can contribute to development.

The UN High-Level Dialogue in 2006 was a watershed moment. At the time, I was serving as Foreign Minister of Tanzania, and I remember that the run-up to the event did not augur particularly well; there was a sense that the dialogue could degenerate into a political catfight.

And yet, thanks in large part to the very determined leadership of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Peter Sutherland, not only was the dialogue extraordinarily well attended, it took place in a collegial and constructive environment.

The shape of a consensus became evident. Migration, all agreed, has become a truly global phenomenon that required full cooperation to make it a safe, legal and orderly process that protected the rights of all migrants. It also became clear that it would be an act of profound irresponsibility to ignore the enormous interplay between migration and development.

From magnifying the impact of remittances to building a robust educational infrastructure in the developing world, the vast potential for international cooperation was fully evident at the Dialogue.
Perhaps even more surprising to many observers was that the Dialogue turned out to be the beginning of the international discourse on these issues, rather than the end. Under the leadership of the Secretary-General, Member States decided to create a Global Forum on Migration and Development.

Last July, less than a year after the High-Level Dialogue, 155 countries gathered in Brussels to launch the first Global Forum. The Forum, which was both hosted and ably coordinated by the Government of Belgium, offered further proof that there was a hunger for cooperation on these issues.

Over the course of three days, nearly 1,000 delegates explored how to reduce the costs and increase the micro impacts of remittances, how temporary and circular migration programmes could contribute to development, and how governments could ensure greater coherence in their migration and development policymaking.

This coming October, the second Global Forum will convene in Manila, under the dynamic aegis of the Government of the Philippines, while Greece will host the third Forum. The future of this important initiative seems assured.

As we continue to move the discourse on migration and development forward, let us remember why the High-Level Dialogue and the Global Forum proved successful, especially at a time when migration remains an explosive and often divisive political issue in many of our countries.

It was because of the focus on positive areas for cooperation on the countless ways countries can work better together to ensure that migration offered maximum benefits to migrants, to the families and communities they leave behind, and to their new communities.

Let us build such an ethic of cooperation around issues of mutual benefit. Then, as we build trust and achieve results, we can move on to address some of the more contentious issues we face.

Over the course of the two days of your remarkably ambitious agenda, you will help us maintain the momentum. You will explore the many and richly varied aspects of migration and development, and I look forward to hearing your conclusions. In that spirit, I wish you a most productive conference.
Brunson McKinley  
*Director General*  
*International Organization for Migration*

I am pleased to convene this event in cooperation with the Center for Migration Studies, and thank them for their kind generosity in the organization of this Conference. I am grateful for the participation of the Deputy Secretary-General who I know has more than a passing interest in the subject of international migration and development.

This event is timely given ongoing international debate on this topic – beginning with the 2006 UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD), which was a watershed event in building international consensus on the links between migration and development. The political will generated at the HLD resulted in the creation of a states-led initiative, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), the first meeting of which was hosted by Belgium last July. The success of Brussels will be followed by a second GFMD meeting, to be hosted by the Philippines this October, and the recently announced third GFMD to be hosted by Greece in 2009. IOM fully endorses the themes that the Government of the Philippines has selected to guide the Manila debate, and the emphasis placed on the welfare and well-being of migrants.

The priority now is to develop mechanisms to actually build synergies between migration policies and national development planning processes, and to ensure better utilization of the resources of the many stakeholders with interest in migration, including the development cooperation community.

After the HLD, IOM called for “stepped up measures to make migration work for development”, believing that among the many different innovative ways to do so, two were most prominent: first, mainstreaming migration into development planning agendas and, second, building capacities to deal more effectively with the global labour market.

This approach has found an important platform in the GFMD which identified several action outcomes for follow-up. Some of these relate to targeted needs for further research and analysis. Other action points relate to the development of practical, evidence-based migration initiatives that hold promise to enhance the beneficial links between migration and development. The GFMD and related activities such as the “marketplace”, have provided a new impetus for bilateral and multilateral cooperation, facilitating the continuing evolution of the migration and development discourse, and the practical development of new ideas and concepts.

To give a more concrete example of follow-up activities, IOM is developing jointly with the IBRD, UNDP and UNICEF a Migration and Development Handbook, the principal objective of which is to assist states, particularly developing ones, in their efforts to develop new policy approaches and solutions for the better management of migration for development.
In addition, IOM hopes to organize a two-day consultation among the secretariats and chairing governments of major Regional Consultative Processes on migration (RCPs). This initiative would serve as a follow-up to the first GFMD as a means to: 1) share best practices on migration and development, capacity building and policy coherence; 2) establish an informal network of migration and development focal points in RCPs and 3) facilitate a two-way information flow between RCPs and the GFMD. As parallel processes which are independent of but complementary to the GFMD, RCPs could provide a testing and dissemination ground for new ideas introduced in the GFMD. Overall, the proposed consultation is expected to further facilitate and deepen cross-fertilization among RCPs.

On the subject of RCPs and their focus on migration and development-related issues, I would like to draw your attention to next week’s Ministerial Meeting in Abu Dhabi, marking a historic development in cooperation between countries of origin and destination for contractual labour in Asia. For the first time, the eleven Asian labour origin countries of the Colombo Process—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam—are joining with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, plus Yemen, and a number of other destination countries in Asia to forge a partnership for development around the subject of contractual labour mobility in Asia. The meeting is evidence of the critical role that overseas workers and labour mobility play in the development of both countries of origin and destination in Asia and globally. It similarly provides testimony of the importance of respect for the rights and well-being of overseas workers and their families. Underlying all is the recognition that interstate dialogue and cooperation are essential to realizing both the development potential and welfare goals of all the states that will come together in Abu Dhabi.

In addition to states, many other actors are also actively working towards more coherent, cooperative approaches to migration and development issues. Among these is the Global Migration Group (GMG), which is in the process of expanding its inter-agency membership to 14 members. The GMG hopes to further improve the coordination of international migration activities within the United Nations system and with IOM in order to improve the overall effectiveness of our response to the opportunities and challenges posed by international migration.

Members of the GMG contributed in various ways to the first meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development. We provided technical support, seconded staff, collaborated in the organization of round-table sessions and assisted in preparing background papers. GMG members also responded to requests for technical assistance by states at the “marketplace”.

Currently, GMG members are implementing, within their respective mandates, some of the outcomes from the Brussels Forum. In addition, in order to assist governments in implementing those outcomes they consider beneficial, the GMG presented a proposal of an International Partnership on Migration and Development (IPMD) to the Forum’s Steering Group. This proposal responds to the need for an operational-level mechanism to facilitate the follow-up of action items and, more generally, to further contribute to policy coherence and capacity building. The heads of agencies of the GMG have endorsed this proposal, and it is contemplated that
several would be involved individually and working together, in partnership with interested stakeholders. The proposal will be adjusted following the reaction of the Steering Group to ensure that whatever is proposed meets the needs of governments and is coherent with the Forum process.

Let me take this opportunity to say that it would be helpful if UN member states continued to acknowledge the work of the GMG and encouraged its further strengthening. IOM remains convinced that this coordination mechanism among key intergovernmental bodies can play a crucial role in enhancing policy coherence and optimizing programming complementarities to support the beneficial aspects of migration.

There are, of course, other interesting opportunities for interagency work, such as the Spanish-supported Millennium Development Goals Achievement Fund (MDG-F), particularly its call for proposals on “youth, employment and migration”, which has offered an important chance for many agencies to work together on migration and development programming in a coherent and integrated inter-agency manner. It would be important to build on this level of field coordination even after this specific experience.

Another important political initiative discussed in Madrid was the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC), which highlights the relevance of “education, youth, migration and the media” as a key and interconnected means to facilitate integration, reduce tensions and promote tolerance and dialogue among cultures, communities and individuals. This echoes many of the issues that were singled out among the “cross-cutting” themes in Brussels.

Migration and development related initiatives are also being undertaken by important non-state actors. While the management of cross-border population flows falls within the sphere of state sovereignty, it is undeniable that many aspects of migration are also of concern to other stakeholders besides the state. For example, in both home and host countries, the business community plays a critical yet too little recognized role in the economics of labour migration, perhaps the critical role. In my view, the private sector is a key stakeholder in human mobility issues and concerning the relationship between migration and development.

To ensure that IOM hears the voice of the private sector, I established a Business Advisory Board (BAB) in 2005. The BAB is currently exploring an interesting new initiative, a Labour Migration Policy Index, which would aim to evaluate national labour migration programmes and assess the extent to which both the needs of business and migrant workers are being met. This initiative not only reflects the interest of the private section in labour mobility issues, but also its interest in the well-being of migrants. I look forward to seeing the BAB develop this initiative further over the course of 2008.

So, too, civil society actors with an interest and expertise in this field contribute crucially, both in terms of ideas and actions. From researchers and analysts, to advocacy groups to
diaspora associations, to service providers and more, civil society is a critical stakeholder on the ground and in stimulating our thinking.

Developments, such as the GFMD and others which I have mentioned here today, can bring fresh ideas to the more formal intergovernmental process, including the biennial deliberations of the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly. We certainly look forward to the debate this fall, and offer support to governments where needed.

Partly because of its timeliness, this Conference offers an opportunity to see how the debate on migration and development can be enriched. We have clearly seen through these various initiatives that the topic is of great significance for all countries, and this event can provide a thoughtful discussion on continuing this debate.

We hope that the deliberations over the next two days will explore substantive matters from further follow-up activities by the international community to national capacity-building efforts, bilateral arrangements and efforts of sub-regional and regional agreements and processes to become more proactively engaged in the development dimension of migration.

Capacity building, training, research and stocktaking at various levels to empower governments to best harness the development potential of migration remain key, and certainly many of you here today have much to contribute in these areas.

Finally, we wish to thank all of you for your interest and participation in this Conference, and we look forward to engaging with you both here and in the future.
Deputy Secretary-General Dr. Asha-Rose Migiro, Mr. Brunson McKinley, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

First, let me wish you a Happy New Year. I sincerely hope that 2008 will be a good year for everyone; especially for the many people living in difficult and troubling circumstances. We certainly wish them better lives in the New Year.

I would like to join Brunson McKinley in welcoming all of you to this Conference. We are very pleased and honoured to be working with Mr. McKinley and his colleagues at IOM, which, as you know, is the leading international organization addressing international migration matters.

At this point, I would to thank Dearfield Associates and, in particular, Ms. Marnie Dawson, for their important financial contribution to the convening of this Conference here over these two days. I would also like to express my appreciation and gratitude to the Permanent Missions of Belgium and the Philippines to the United Nations for their active involvement in international migration matters and for convening the first two intergovernmental forums.

Since the establishment of the Center for Migration Studies nearly a half century ago, my colleagues and I at the Center have been focusing on the many critical dimensions of international migration. Our mission has been primarily educational, providing an interdisciplinary approach and international perspective to migration research. In addition to books and our occasional paper series, we publish the International Migration Review, which, I am pleased to say, is entering its 42nd year of publication.

This Conference will also result in a joint CMS-IOM publication based on the written remarks of our expert speakers. We plan to make this publication available prior to the United Nations debate on international migration and development later this year.

All of us know quite well that international migration is an increasingly critical issue in the world today. The international community, regional groups, individual nations, researchers, non-governmental organizations as well as many other parties are struggling with the question of how best to manage the many dimensions of international migration.

As many of you are aware, several years ago the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested the preparation of an internal document to address this very question. Shortly thereafter, in December 2003 the Secretary-General encouraged the launching of the Global Commission on International Migration. In October 2005, the report of the Global Commission was presented to the Secretary-General at a ceremony held at the United Nations.
Our organization, in collaboration with Fordham University, organized a Forum at that time reviewing the findings and recommendations of the Commission’s report. The publication from that Forum was distributed to UN Member States and interested parties, and it is still available to those wishing to have a copy.

Subsequently, as is well known, the United Nations held its High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in September 2006, followed by the Brussels Forum held last May and, in October, the next Forum will be held in Manila. More will be said about these important developments later in this conference.

Today’s and tomorrow’s sessions will provide an opportunity for us to critically review the implications and achievements of these events. Our focus is on legal and policy perspectives and we wish this conference to be a dialogue. We have invited expert speakers who will help us undertake this critical review, in particular as regards the strengths and shortcomings of these events.

Also, we will be addressing the following important question: Where should we be heading in the coming years? In addition to the invited speakers, we are fortunate to have many knowledgeable participants among the audience who will certainly enrich the discussion.

Finally, I wish to thank all of you for attending this conference and wish you success in your work on the increasingly vital issue of international migration and development.

Thank you very much.
International Cooperation on Migration: 
From Cairo to the GFMD
Let me first join the colleagues who have preceded me in praising the International Organization on Migration and the Center for Migration Studies for organizing this important and timely conference. The issue of migration and development is central to international development and international relations today. At the launch of the Global Commission on International Migration in 2003, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated “win-win outcomes are possible, if we approach this issue rationally, creatively, compassionately and cooperatively”.

Indeed, the only way to approach the complex issue of international migration and to ensure that it benefits development is to engage in dialogue and to share experiences within a confidence building process involving all parties concerned.

Migration was one of the more important issues to emerge from the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in Cairo in 1994, and it was on the agenda of every major international conference since then. The ICPD clearly demonstrated that international migration and its consequences are of great concern to all countries, whether developed, developing or economies in transition. The ICPD Programme of Action stressed the need for a comprehensive approach to migration management and policy development by governments and other concerned actors, placing particular emphasis on international support to be provided to governments in terms of capacity building, training and mutual cooperation.

The ICPD Programme of Action encouraged more cooperation and dialogue between countries of origin and destination in order to maximize the benefits of migration for those concerned, and to increase the potential for positive consequences for the development of both sending and receiving countries. The ICPD urged governments to exchange information regarding their international migration policies and regulations governing the admission and stay of migrants in their territories.

In cooperation with international and non-governmental organizations, the ICPD also encouraged governments to support the compilation of data on international migrant stocks and flows, on the various factors causing migration, and the monitoring of international migration. It stressed the need to strengthen the role of international organizations with mandates in the area of migration to enable them to provide adequate technical support to developing countries, advise on the management of international migration flows and promote intergovernmental cooperation, i.a., through bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
Today, more than a decade after Cairo, the issue of international migration is even more complex. New patterns of migration have emerged as countries that had previously not known significant emigration now experience the departure of ever-increasing numbers of their nationals; and former countries of origin now find themselves cast in the role of destination countries for migrants from abroad. Current migration flows have placed the issue of migration high on the international agenda.

Virtually every country in the world is affected by international migration, either as sending, transit, or receiving country and, very often, by a combination or even all three of these. Addressing the challenges of international migration should, therefore, be a shared responsibility.

In addition, migration is increasingly perceived as a development tool. It is no longer seen as a failure of development, but rather as an integral aspect of the global development process. When properly managed, migration can benefit both developed and developing countries. It is therefore extremely important for governments to ensure policy and institutional coherence and establish partnerships at national, regional and international levels among diverse stakeholders in migration and development.

The Global Commission on International Migration and Development concluded that if the benefits of international migration are to be maximized and adverse consequences minimized, then migration policies should be based on shared objectives and a common vision. While there cannot be a single model for action by states and other stakeholders, migration policies at the national, regional and global levels should be guided by a set of principles for action that can serve as a guide to the formulation of comprehensive, coherent and effective migration policies, such as: migration by choice not of necessity; reinforcing the economic and development impact of migration; addressing irregular migration; strengthening social cohesion through integration; protecting the rights of migrants and enhancing governance through improved coherence, capacity and cooperation.

Coherence and consultation should begin first and foremost at the national level. Governments must address competing priorities and demands from different ministries within and different constituencies outside government. Important decisions in such areas as development, trade, aid and the labour market should be considered also in terms of their impact on international migration. There is, therefore, a need for wider consultation at the national level. While governments are the main actors in international migration, other stakeholders should also be involved in the formulation and implementation of migration policy. Such partners include local authorities, the private sector, civil society, NGOs and migrant associations. Each of these stakeholders contributes its own expertise and a different perspective to the issue. Grass-roots organizations bring a better understanding of local issues; they can help to ensure that migration policies are responsive to real needs and gender and culture sensitive. Partnerships must include actors from both the migration and development fields, and migration issues must be included in national development processes.
Interstate consultations, cooperation and partnerships are also essential to address the challenges posed by international migration. We need political commitment by countries of both origin and destination to achieve greater policy coherence and a common view of the potentially beneficial interrelationship between migration and development policies. Here again, partnerships must include actors from both sides of the migration and development equation.

There is a need for more active sharing among governments and other stakeholders of their respective experiences gained concerning international migration. The dissemination and sharing of data and research, including on the social impact of migration, the propensity to migrate and to return, is essential. Policy makers should have access to the latest data and policy-oriented research. This may be achieved through national focal points, or online databanks or newsletters. More and reliable information on social, economic and legal conditions should be available to migrants before they leave and also when they arrive in the country of destination. Formal and informal mechanisms should be put in place for government officials responsible for migration policies and development policies to communicate and consult with each other on ways to promote synergies between their respective policies and decisions. Such consultations should take place at all levels of government.

There are many examples of constructive informal consultative processes among governments at the regional level. Such activities have been pursued successfully for years.

The High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, held at the United Nations in September 2006, confirmed that the time was ripe for developing a global consultative process that would allow governments to discuss the issue and forge constructive approaches to realize the potential benefits of migration for development. A direct result of the High-Level Dialogue was the establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development as a venue for discussing issues related to international migration and development in a comprehensive and systematic way. The Global Forum, the first meeting of which was successfully held in Brussels in July 2007, was an informal, voluntary and government-led initiative taking place in a transparent and open manner, without the aim of producing negotiated outcomes or normative decisions.

The Global Forum process set a framework for addressing migration and development issues at the global level. It brought together government and international expertise and provided an opportunity through enhanced dialogue and partnerships for a deeper understanding of the opportunities and challenges of migration for development and of development for migration, and to identify practical and action-oriented approaches to address and put these in operation at national, regional and global levels. It also offered a platform for discussion and sharing of experiences and good practices. Recommendations included action to be taken at the national as well as bilateral and multilateral levels. Implementation of some of the recommendations will involve governments at different levels. Others will require coordination and partnership with international organizations or civil society.
The Global Forum was an example of partnership at its best. More than 800 delegates representing 156 UN Member States and more than 20 international organizations as well as observer states participated in the governmental meeting, and more than 200 representatives of NGOs, diaspora organizations, the private sector, universities and trade unions from around the world took part in the Civil Society Day. Moreover, the establishment of teams and consultations between governments, international organizations and civil society around themes of mutual interest resulted in partnerships that are likely to continue in the future. The creation of a ‘marketplace’ which allowed governments to advertise their needs in the area of migration and development and find partners able to assist them resulted in a large number of consultations and discussions of project ideas and concrete proposals for information, advice, training, equipment, capacity-building and other initiatives to enhance the mutual benefits of migration and development. The ‘marketplace’ consultations offered an excellent opportunity to forge long-lasting partnerships in this area.

Within the United Nations, partnership has been strengthened through the Global Migration Group, a group consisting of UN agencies involved in international migration and related issues and the IOM, established by the UN Secretary-General in 2006 to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international migration. The Global Migration Group contributed to the preparations for the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, and the first Global Forum on Migration and Development.

The process of dialogue and partnership continues. Preparations are under way for the second Global Forum in Manila in October of this year. The international community is once again collaborating not only in the event, but also in the process itself.

As current Chair of the Global Migration Group, the United Nations Population Fund looks forward to working with its GMG partners to coordinate the group’s contribution to the Global Forum and to help ensure its success.

Thank you very much.
The Work of the Ayala Foundation for the GFMD

Victoria Garchitorena

Let me first of all thank the International Organization on Migration and the Center for Migration Studies for inviting me to address this conference. I am honoured to be given this opportunity to update you on the preparations for the Second Global Forum on Migration and Development.

We at Ayala Foundation consider it a great honour to have been invited by the Philippines Government to help convene the Civil Society Days that will immediately precede the Intergovernmental Forum. It is our shared hope that the non-state stakeholders—civil society, the private sector, labour recruiters, labour unions, church groups and academics—can complement the governmental deliberations and bring our own perspectives as we discuss the many difficult and complex issues that surround the phenomenon of global mobility. It is a testimony to the spirit of openness and inclusion by the Forum that from the beginning it has sought to hear the voices of all stakeholders on migration and development in helping craft policy and design programmes.

Indeed, governments hold vast powers and immense resources and have as their primary concern the protection and welfare of their citizens, to enable them to seize opportunities and empower them to forge their own future. In coordination and collaboration with governments, however, the private sector, civil society, research and academic institutions and the migrants themselves can contribute their unique perspectives and their own human, financial, intellectual and social resources to the discussions on migration. We believe that by working together as partners rather than as adversaries all the sectors can craft the best solutions to protect the rights of migrants and citizens while at the same time unlocking the vast social and economic potential to be derived from the freedom of movement, of choice for both employers and employees, and the free but regulated flow of people, money and goods.

Before I update you on the plans for the second GFMD in Manila and the status of our preparations, please allow me provide a bit of information on Ayala Foundation, Inc. It is a corporate foundation and serves to articulate the corporate social responsibility of the Ayala Group of Companies. Ayala Corporation, the holding company, is a 173-year old institution that has evolved through the decades into one of the largest and most diversified conglomerates in the Philippines. It benchmarks itself against global companies, especially in terms of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.

Ayala Foundation was established in 1961 to “help eradicate poverty in all its forms”. Unlike corporate foundations in Europe and in the United States, it is an operating foundation,
pursuing its own programmes in education, culture and the arts, the environment, and entrepreneurship.

Ayala Foundation first got directly involved in the issue of migration when we set up an Ayala Foundation in the United States in 2000 to tap what is now known as “diaspora or migrant philanthropy” of Filipinos in America. In the seven years that we have operated in the U.S. we have met with hometown associations, professional and alumni organizations, civic and social groups and migrants themselves, and have developed a unique insight into their challenges, their successes, their motivations and their dreams.

Two years ago, the Chairman of Ayala Corporation, Mr. Jaime Zobel de Ayala, together with other business leaders, convened several roundtables on the issue of migration and development, in order to help jump-start the process of working in consultation with the government to craft a strategic national policy on migration and development.

For all these reasons, we are honoured to have been given this opportunity to serve as a partner of our national government in working with all of you and with all those who are working hard to reach an understanding of the issues and analysing the problems involved and looking for long-term sustainable and win-win solutions.

So, let me now give you an overview of the second GFMD agenda as crafted by the Philippine Government and as approved by the GFMD Steering Committee and the Friends of the Forum in December 2007 in Geneva.

The excellent discussions at the UN High-Level Dialogue in 2006 as well as the First GFMD in Brussels in 2007 set, among others, the following parameters for future deliberations:

- A growing commitment by various sectors to recognize and examine the intrinsic connections between global migration, human rights and development.
- If the right set of policies are a positive force for development, restrictive policies lead to irregular migration, exploitation, and abuse.
- The goal of discussions should be that people migrate out of choice, not necessity.
- Global migration issues need to be integrated into national development plans and poverty reduction strategies.
- Such development plans and strategies should then be accompanied by stronger bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation.
- Global migration is not a long-term development strategy.
- There is a need to pay special attention to vulnerable groups, such as women and children.
- Remittances are the most tangible benefits for sending countries and the families of migrants; while for host countries the filling of their labour needs is of critical advantage.
Building on these outcomes, the Manila Forum has chosen “Protecting and Empowering Migrants for Development” for its conference theme. The theme highlights the nexus, that is, the place where migration, human rights and development are shown to be inextricably linked and where the strengthening of one will also strengthen the others.

Three roundtables will be discussing separate topics under this overarching theme, the first of which puts this inter-relationship in the centre of the discussions:

**ROUNDTABLE 1: MIGRATION, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS**

There is growing evidence that the development benefits of international migration for the migrants and sending and receiving countries are contingent on the effective protection of the rights of migrants and their security. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that migrants are best able to contribute to the development in their home country and to make a positive contribution in their host country if they enjoy legal protection from abuse and exploitation, and are socially and economically empowered.

To further explore these ideas, two sessions will be held under this overarching topic:

*Protecting the rights of migrant workers—a shared responsibility.* This session will explore workable policies by both countries of origin and host countries to ensure the social, economic and legal protection of migrants. These include adequate information, training and counselling of migrants, decent and safe working conditions, appropriate standards of behaviour of recruiters and employers, gender-sensitive policies, social welfare and portable pension schemes, financial literacy training and access to legal and financial services.

In short, the session will address the questions:
- How can the protection of the rights of migrants enhance their contribution to development?
- What are the key elements of effective cooperation between countries concerning migrant protection?

*Empowering migrants and diaspora to contribute to development.* This session draws in part on the discussions of the Roundtable 2 in Brussels. It will showcase best practices adopted by host countries to improve the situation of migrants in their communities so that migrants can more fully contribute to development at home. This may include integration strategies, public-private partnerships on remittances, investments and business ventures, diaspora philanthropy and investments in their home countries, as well as portability of pensions, as the case may be.

The session will address the questions:
- What are the most effective policies and practices for empowering migrants and diaspora to contribute to development?
- How can the development impact of these policies and practices be best assessed, enhanced and shared across different countries and regions?
ROUNDTABLE 2: SECURE, LEGAL MIGRATION CAN ACHIEVE STRONGER DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS

Regulated migration programmes provide the best framework to ensure that migration can contribute to development in the sending countries and make a positive contribution to the receiving country, as well as for the migrants themselves. The more legal avenues are open to workers from low-income countries to access global labour markets, the lower the allure of and incentive for illicit forms of migrant labour recruitment, which, in turn, will reduce the incidence of abuse and exploitation of migrants.

Evidently, there is the concomitant need for effective control of irregular migration, particularly by smugglers and traffickers, aimed at safeguarding public security in host countries as well as protecting the security of the migrants. Responsibility in this regard must be shared by sending and receiving countries through agreements and mutual commitments, possibly bolstered by capacity-building strategies to help countries which may not have the capability to enforce such laws or regulations.

The topics for the sessions are:

*Fostering more opportunities for legal migration.* This roundtable will discuss best practices on migrant labour admissions programmes, particularly for temporary or circular migration. It will also address the need for better synergies between labour markets and migration planning and is intended to include the roles of the private sector and other non-state actors in achieving this balance. It will draw on the compendium of good practices on temporary labour migration prepared by the Spanish and Moroccan governments, and on the outcomes of the workshop on circular migration prepared by the Mauritian government and the EC.

The session will address the following questions:

- How can a temporary labour migration programme benefit development?
- How can developing countries strengthen their capacity to negotiate partnerships and be viable partners in the mutually beneficial labour and skills exchange?

*Managing irregular migration as a negative factor for development.* The other side of the coin are the possible the negative impacts irregular migration may have on development. The session will look at effective programmes to combat human smuggling and trafficking and pay special attention to forced migration and other vulnerable migrants. The benefits of cooperation between and among countries of origin, transit and destination will also be discussed as will the need for regional processes such as the “Bali Process” and the “5-plus-5” among Western Mediterranean countries.

The session will address:

- The cause-and-effect between irregular migration and low achievement of development goals.
- The capacity-building needs of developing countries to manage irregular migration.
ROUNDTABLE 3: POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE AND PARTNERSHIPS

Policy and institutional coherence and partnerships can optimize the beneficial impact of migration on development, and vice versa. They should be promoted on the national, regional and international fronts among the diverse stakeholders in migration and development. The Brussels GFMD brought to light the severe lack of data and research to inform and reinforce policy and institutional coherence on these issues. There is urgent need for measurable evidence of the interrelationships of these issues, starting with the identification of the gaps in information and knowledge to enable government and other policy makers to prioritize their research needs.

Regional consultative processes on migration are also increasingly effective frameworks to ensure appropriate coordination and coherence through informal dialogue, partnerships and capacity building.

**Strengthening data and research tools to foster policy and institutional coherence.** This session will provide an update on the efforts for improved data collection and to ensure the development impact of migration and to ensure better synergies in policymaking and cooperation on migration and development. The output of the working group and experts meeting organized by Finland will be presented to identify ways of strengthening research networks across countries and regions, and ensuring greater inclusion of migration in national development plans and strategies, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy papers.

The session will address the following questions:
- What are the critical gaps in data collection on the interrelationships between migration and development?
- How can research and analysis be most productively linked with policymaking?
- What are the key indicators of the development relevance of migration policies, and the impact of development policies on migration?

**Regional Consultative processes at the interface of migration and development.** Building on the Brussels Roundtable 3, this session will look at the experiences and advances made by RCPs in addressing the issues at the multilateral level. These are often able to achieve interstate and cross-cutting cooperation and mutual capacity building not yet possible at the global level.

The session will address the questions:
- How are RCPs effecting changes regarding migration and development policies at the national level, and within the agendas of larger regional economic processes?
- What are the good practices in integrating development considerations into RCP agendas?
- How can RCPs work more closely with the GFMD in mutually reinforcing ways?
A separate session on the future of the FGDM will be held at the level of heads of delegation to discuss the effectiveness of the GFMD as a global, government-led, consultative process that seeks to address the multi-dimensional aspects, opportunities and challenges related to migration and development, and to encourage practical and action-oriented policies and programmes. It will examine the concrete role of national focal points in promoting and disseminating GFMD outcomes, the effectiveness of the current support structure, and other relevant issues, such as funding policies and links with the United Nations, international organizations and civil society.

**CIVIL SOCIETY DAYS**

On the basis of the UN High-Level Dialogue and the outputs and feedback from the Brussels meeting, we have agreed with the Philippines Government on the following points that were presented to and approved by the Friends of the Forum:

1. Building on the excellent outputs of the First Global Forum on Migration and Development, we will work in close coordination with the Philippines Government to ensure that the Civil Society Forum will succeed in bringing about substantive discussions in order to offer concrete recommendations on policies as well as showcase concrete action plans based on the experience of non-state stakeholders to the intergovernmental Forum. We will work towards achieving convergence in our agenda, while at the same time providing space for divergent views and perspectives from other stakeholders. The challenge facing the participants of the Civil Society Days would be: What positive recommendations can we make not only for governments but for the other non-state actors to undertake on their own, in parallel and complementary to government policies and programmes?

2. In order to allow such substantive discussions, the Civil Society Forum will be held over two days, instead of just one. This is in response to the realization that the issues are so complex and that the varied perspectives of the different stakeholders need more time to delineate, discuss and digest. The first day will follow the structure adopted in Brussels, with parallel workshops that can delve into issues in greater depth. However, topics that are of great interest to civil society, such as the feminization of migration, human rights or the protection of vulnerable groups, may be given greater attention in workshops. The morning of the second day will be devoted to plenary sessions to focus on the results of the workshops as well as cross-cutting issues so that the various sectors can comment on them.

For both days, we hope to highlight the innovative approaches by civil society groups, migrants associations and the private sector to solve some of the seemingly insuperable problems attendant to migration. We will do this over breakfast, when we will organize topics to be discussed at each breakfast table and a group can present a project that seeks to address one specific issue. This might be a way to provide the government with insights on what is going on the ground and successes, small though they may be, that could possibly
help inform existing policies based on such small victories, so that perhaps government policies and incentives can be offered to upgrade or replicate such successful programmes.

3. During the afternoon of the second day, we will invite the Friends of the Forum to sit down with the Civil Society participants for an engaging discussion and deliberation on the outputs of the preceding day and a half. We received encouraging responses at the Friends of the Forum meeting in Geneva in December, and hope that this interaction can give government representatives more time to listen to the voices of the stakeholders outside government and perhaps bring the valuable insights, ideas and recommendations that their civil society counterparts may make to the intergovernmental forum in the succeeding two days.

• It is an opportunity for us to openly discuss with the other stakeholders our common desire to find overarching solutions that address the needs of everyone within the parameters of democratic engagement. We hope that the addition of one day to the Civil Society Forum will help to achieve greater success in finding the convergence we all seek.

• We further agreed that the Civil Society Days be held simultaneously with the intergovernmental forum itself precisely so that this kind of face-to-face engagement can be encouraged. We believe that the development of interpersonal relationships can improve our understanding of each others’ views and perspectives.

• In response to the finding that there is indeed a paucity of hard data and scientific research on the issues, challenges, opportunities, benefits and costs of migration and development and their inter-relationship, we have decided to ask experts in these issues to prepare papers that can provide more evidence-based inputs to the discussions at the Civil Society Days. To help us achieve this, we have harnessed the knowledge and wisdom of a core group of experts who agreed to coordinate the civil society sessions, help to identify and invite the experts, and review the papers to be submitted to the Forum. These papers will, of course, be made available to the government representatives as well for their consideration.

• We propose to undertake online discussions, as started by the KBF, to enable those who might not be able to participate personally in the Civil Society Forum to join the discussions online. We hope to have such an online discussion up and running by February or March 2008, so that they have at least six to seven months of active engagement. We will designate moderators for the various issues in order to encourage more active participation and engagement.

• We likewise intend to come up with an omnibus calendar in the GFMD website so that everyone interested in the issues will know what conferences and workshops are going on around the world in 2008. We hope that you will all send us information on such meetings being held in your countries as well.
STATE OF PREPARATIONS

What have we achieved thus far?

1. A Memorandum of Agreement has been signed between the Department of Foreign Affairs and Ayala Foundation as convener of the Civil society Days. We are working in close coordination on all aspects of the preparations for the forum. We will exert our utmost efforts to help the Philippines Government ensure the success of the Second GFMD in the Philippines. It is a matter of national pride.

2. We have been meeting, exchanging e-mails and holding conference calls with the King Baudouin Foundation, to fully appreciate the excellent work performed for the First GFMD in Brussels this year. They have turned over to us almost all of the materials from the Civil Society Day, and these will be an important foundation on which we will build the Second Civil Society meetings on Migration and Development.

3. We have started to meet with local and regional NGOs and NGO networks in the Philippines, as well as with representatives of the private sector, academic institutions and international organizations to generate their own inputs and ideas into the Civil Society Days. While we agree on the principle of convergence with the government, we likewise need to ensure that their voices are heard on the issues at stake.

4. We have set up the Philippine Organizing Committee, which will be led by Ambassador Narcisa Escaler, former Deputy Director of the IOM.

5. A subcommittee of the Philippine Organizing Committee has decided to take on the task of holding multisectoral and nationwide consultations in the Philippines in preparation for the GFMD. They hope this can be a first step towards the crafting of a long-term strategic national plan for migration management in our country.

6. We have prepared project proposals for possible funding and have started submitting them to international foundations.

What we still have to do:

Organize the International Advisory Committee, an international panel of ten to twelve persons representing various geographical regions and of stakeholders. The Advisory Committee will help Ayala Foundation in shaping the agenda of the Civil Society Forum in selecting the best speakers, and in developing the selection criteria for, as well as recommending, participants.

Work with the KBF for the turnover of the management of the GFMD Civil Society website and the archives of the First GFMD Civil Society Day.
In closing, may I assure you that Ayala Foundation will do its utmost to ensure the success of the Civil Society Forum of the Second Global Forum on Migration and Development. We have always worked closely with the Philippines Government in all our programmes and we have no doubt that we will have a strong partnership in helping all men and women of goodwill who desire to find a global paradigm that will maximize the benefits of migration, while minimizing the costs to both sending and receiving countries and perhaps most importantly, to the migrants and their families.

Thank you for your kind attention and we look forward to working closely with you in the coming months on this exciting adventure towards a world where every person is respected, cared for and empowered to shape his or her own destiny, wherever that might be.
Good morning. It is an honour to speak to you today about the MacArthur Foundation’s Initiative on Global Migration and Human Mobility. I would like to thank the conference organizers, Joe Chamie and the Center for Migration Studies, and IOM for inviting me to speak. As a part of this panel on external partnerships, I will discuss MacArthur’s work in the field of international migration and on the Global Forum, in particular. I will also provide some general remarks on non-governmental funding for the Forum, and will raise some issues for the future direction of the Forum as we see them.

To give you some context for considering our relatively new work on migration, I will provide a bit of background on the Foundation overall and where our Migration Initiative fits in.

This year, MacArthur celebrates its 30th anniversary. When Chicago insurance and real estate magnate John McArthur and his wife Catherine established the foundation in the late 1970s, they left very few instructions on how to best use their considerable fortune. MacArthur has thus adopted a rather broad mission statement - the goal of making lasting improvements to the human condition. We try to accomplish this lofty and far-reaching goal through a small number of targeted programmes, which I will describe soon.

We are fortunate that in recent years MacArthur’s endowment has reached over USD 6 billion dollars in assets, which allows us to disburse USD 225 million dollars in grants each year.

MacArthur is probably best known for its Fellows Program, or the genius grants that recognize outstanding contributions by individuals in various fields - but this is only a small part of our portfolio. We also have a substantial domestic programme that includes work on juvenile justice issues and the preservation of affordable housing, as well as on economic development in low-income communities in the U.S.

Internationally, we work on a range of topics, including:

- Human Rights and International Justice
- Conservation and Sustainable Development
- International Peace and Security
- Population and Reproductive Health
  and, most recently, in 2006, we began an
- Initiative on Global Migration and Human Mobility
CONTEXT AND NICHE

Migration is a complex global issue, and MacArthur is one of the few foundations focusing on migration as a global phenomenon. As you know, there are nearly 200 million migrants worldwide, or about three per cent of the world’s population. Though the magnitude relative to world population figures may be similar to other historic periods of migration in the late 1800s and early 1900s, migration today is more complex, with a growing number of countries experiencing significant migration flows, and issues such as feminization of labour, and transnational terrorism, further complicate the issue. This meeting attests to the growing appreciation of the need to better understand the global circulation of migrants and its effects on economic, political and socio-cultural processes around the world, as well as the growing momentum in the global policy arena to address policy incoherences on migration and development and, ultimately, to rectify the lack of an international mechanism to promote government cooperation in this field.

We established the Initiative on Global Migration and Human Mobility at MacArthur in January 2006 as a means to help countries and individuals to better seize the gains from globalization. We recognized migration as a potential niche where MacArthur could make a contribution, while other foundations concerned with globalization focused more on trade and international development per se.

We hope that MacArthur’s key value added is to help reframe migration as a global issue, to support evidence-based analysis and policy innovation, and help to set the stage for improved international governance and policymaking over the next decade. We are not directly involved in efforts to reform immigration policy in the U.S., to support small demonstration projects or to build a global civil society movement or human rights architecture for migrants, as important as these goals are. Rather, we see a timely opportunity to support experts now who are building the evidence base and will be prepared to take the lead once the policy debate worldwide broadens to encompass a global perspective on migration.

This global approach, and our emphasis on research and policy work, sets MacArthur apart from other U.S. funders in this field, most of which focus solely on the United States and many of which fund mostly advocacy or service provision. The Ford Foundation is perhaps the other foundation most engaged on migration as a global issue, but its focus is on advocacy and is folded into their work on human rights, global civil society and transnational economic justice. The Russell Sage Foundation is a leader in funding research on immigrant integration, with an almost exclusive U.S. focus. And the Atlantic Philanthropies, to name just one more example, looks at migration integration and comparative experiences in the United States and Europe, among other issues.

GOALS AND STRATEGY

The basic goals of the Migration Initiative are to better our understanding of migration as a global phenomenon, to help improve the governance of international migration and to help maximize its benefits for sending and receiving countries, and for migrants themselves.
Our strategy has two main threads—the governance of international migration, and the relationship between migration and economic development.

**BUDGET AND GRANTS**

During the first two years of the initiative, we made 31 grants totalling USD 10.5 million. This year, our annual budget will be increased to USD 6 million.

**GOVERNANCE – STRATEGY**

In the governance field, we are investing in research and policy efforts to achieve greater coherence concerning international norms regarding the movement of people. We are seeking to support improved governance at various levels, global, regional and bilateral. We are looking at how to improve global migration data and selectively at national policy in our focus countries of Mexico, Nigeria, India and Russia, where the Foundation has offices and well advanced programmes in other areas, such as human rights and maternal health.

**DEVELOPMENT – STRATEGY**

On the development side, we are seeking to help countries and individuals to better leverage the positive aspects of migration to improve their economic well being. We have chosen to focus on three main channels through which migration impacts economic development – remittances, brain drain and diasporas. We are supporting research and policy analysis in each of these three areas, while also funding targeted projects that implement some of the research.

**EXAMPLES OF FOCUS – COUNTRY ISSUES**

As we work on issues of governance and development, we hope to enrich our understanding of these issues and make targeted contributions on issues of migration governance and development by utilizing the Foundation’s experience and presence in several focus countries.

In Mexico, the initiative has made grants to the:

- “International Network for Migration and Development” (Red Internacional de Migracion y Desarrollo) an international network of scholars based in Zacatecas working on issues of migration and development.
- Survey of remittances in Oaxaca.
- A series of binational seminars on migration for U.S. and Mexican migration officials to foster renewed dialogue between the two countries, sponsored by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI).
- Support for Central American parliamentarians as they craft a regional framework for migration governance by the Mexican NGO Sin Fronteras.
In Nigeria:
• We are considering support for a research project by the Federal Ministry of Health to document and quantify the migration of health workers abroad and to craft better policies of retention.

In Russia:
• We have supported a reframing of migration policy by the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies.

In India:
• We are now considering supporting a case study on the Indian diaspora and its contributions to reforming government institutions by scholars at the World Bank Institute and other universities.

**GOVERNANCE – GLOBAL FORUM**

A major focus of our work on migration governance is support for the Global Forum on Migration and Development. MacArthur provided initial support for an early precursor of the first Forum, when it helped fund the Global Commission on International Migration.

We were honoured to be able to play a role supporting the first Global Forum, held in Brussels last July. The Foundation has a history of taking the long view, supporting international processes and institutions at early, critical stages. In the late 1990s, for example, MacArthur provided early support to promote ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which came into force in 2002, much sooner than anyone had expected, and the Foundation continues to support the Court and its work on its first three cases.

The Global Forum, more of a process than an institution, is also at an important development stage in its formation and one in which MacArthur felt an early commitment could potentially make a difference. MacArthur provided a pledge of support to Peter Sutherland, the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Migration, as he worked against the odds to build diplomatic momentum behind the Forum. MacArthur supported preparatory work for the first Forum through grants to Mr. Sutherland’s Office and to the Government of Belgium. Another grant, to the King Baudaouin Foundation, supported planning of the civil society day and travel for civil society participants to Brussels for the meeting. In all, MacArthur support for the first Forum totalled USD 441,000 or approximately 16 per cent of the total budget.

MacArthur is committed to continuing support for the Second Forum, which we feel will be important for consolidating the process itself and demonstrating to both governments and civil society that the meeting fosters productive dialogue and information sharing - and perhaps a few concrete outcomes as well, in the form of better policy coherence or specific demonstration projects. MacArthur’s Migration Initiative is in the process of considering grants to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, which will manage...
support for the Office of Peter Sutherland to assist with the planning of the Manila Forum, and to the Government of the Philippines. Both of these grants are well under consideration and are pending final approval by our Board of Directors in March.

And the Initiative has approved a grant to support the Ayala Foundation in its role as convener of this year’s civil society meeting, with some of these funds going towards an expert meeting, mentioned by Vicky Garchitorena yesterday, which will be held in February in Manila. This expert meeting will help identify existing research and data on the civil society meeting agenda and take the first steps towards crafting the background papers for Manila. If the first two of these grants are approved, we expect total support for the Manila Forum of at least USD 750,000, or approximately 20 per cent of the total estimated budget for both civil society and government portions.

GLOBAL FORUM - ISSUES TO CONSIDER

As we look ahead to this year’s civil society meeting it is worth noting several areas that could be expanded upon, many of which have been mentioned by previous speakers. For example, participation could be increased among private sector representatives, development oriented NGOs, migrant-led organizations and trade unions. Extending the meeting to two days should allow more time to develop the roundtable themes and to craft recommendations for the government meeting. Ideally, the time for reporting by the civil society delegates to the government representatives will be expanded in this year’s meeting, as it was cut short at last year’s event.

As we consider how to ensure the continuity and sustainability of future Forums in Greece and beyond, several issues come to mind. MacArthur is likely to continue to play a role in supporting these events and would consider helping to explore possibilities to strengthen the current organizational structure of the Forum. But it will be important in the third Forum to identify significant additional non-governmental funders. Expanding the pool of non-governmental resources, especially for the civil society portion of the meeting, is crucial for preserving its independence from governments, for demonstrating that the Forum is widely valued, and for stabilizing its financial future. However, as Ambassador Veestraeten discussed yesterday, an increase in government funding is also needed. Mr. Menez of Permanent Mission of the Philippines to the UN listed a number of projects that follow up on recommendations from the Brussels Forum. If these and other projects are to be implemented, additional funds will be required.

DEVELOPMENT - GRANTS

At the start of my presentation, I stated that our Initiative has two main components—governance and development. I would like to highlight an existing area of work in the development area, as it relates in particular to a theme from last year’s Forum which will be followed up on in Manila. Seeking to mitigate some of the costs of highly skilled migration for developing countries, we are funding research on the brain drain of highly skilled workers
who migrate from low-income to high-income countries, beginning with the healthcare sector. MacArthur is supporting the Washington-based Academy Health to collaborate with some of the world’s largest recruiting companies, U.S. hospitals, nursing associations and migrant representatives to craft voluntary standards for recruiting nurses to work in the United States. Such standards can help to protect migrant workers while also allowing countries of origin to benefit from their investment in their training, for example through temporary return programmes and exchanges. A draft of this voluntary code will be completed this spring.

We are also supporting the work of the Ethical Globalization Initiative, which serves as the Secretariat for the WHO’s Global Health Worker Advisory Council. This Council has been mandated by the World Health Assembly to craft a global code of conduct for health worker migration. The Global Health Worker Advisory Council will report on its progress with the code at the Manila Forum this October.

**SELECTED GRANTS**

To give you with a partial snapshot of the programme, and how the governance and development pieces fit together, this graph shows some of the leading institutions on migration policy and research that we support, many of which work both on governance and development issues. In the second column are selected project grants in governance, with the Forum related grants highlighted here, and the third column lists a sample of recent project grants in development that highlight our work on health worker migration.

Finally, I will conclude with a look at possible future directions for the Migration Initiative. We plan to continue to support key research and policy institutions around the world that work on migration and development.

In **Governance**, we hope to offer continued support for the Forum, as well as selected follow-up projects. In addition to the Forum, we would like to support regional migration governance as well as improvement in international data on migration stocks and flows.

- Global Forum
- Global Forum follow-up projects
- Regional migration governance
- Migration Data Initiative

In the **Development area**, we plan to support:

- implementation of the codes on health worker migration being drafted,
- applied research on remittances,
  and, in the area of diaspora,
- strengthening of the contributions of the African diaspora and its institutional links with governments on the continent.
CURRENT RECOMMENDATIONS

First is a grant of USD 900,000 over three years to the International Migration Institute of Oxford University which will launch a significant research effort on migration in Africa, focusing on four countries: Nigeria, Morocco, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In partnership with local researchers at institutions in each country, the Oxford team will help to reconceptualize the African migration experience with particular focus on circular migration. This research programme will also examine changing migration patterns over time and the impact of migration on peoples’ livelihoods in Africa. And, because nearly half of the programme funds will again be granted to African scholars, the grant will help to build migration research capacity on the continent.

The second recommendation is for support to the research unit of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A grant of USD 900,000 over three years will fund policy-relevant research on key issues of both governance and development, with a focus on West Africa. As part of this project, the OECD will review regional governance institutions involved in African migration, notably the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). It will also complete a detailed case study of migration in Nigeria, which is one of the continent’s most important migrant origin, transit and destination countries. The OECD will complement its analysis with a comparative case study of Central America, focusing in particular on Mexico.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This summer and fall, Milena and I will develop a more fulsome grant-making strategy and work plan for the Migration Initiative in the years ahead. We foresee the following priorities:

- Further strengthening key institutions engaged in migration research and policy work.
- Follow-up work on the Global Forum on Migration and Development.
- Enhanced engagement with regional migration governance institutions.
- Building a Migration Data Initiative aimed at improving the harmonization of national migration statistics, and assisting selected countries in improving their capacity to collect migration data.
- Follow-up work on health worker migration.
- More applied research on innovative financial mechanisms to increase the development impact of remittances.
- Work on the African diaspora and its contribution to home-country economic and political development.
TIMETABLE AND BUDGET

Before concluding, I would like to briefly review our timetable and budget. We plan to present the work plan for the Initiative’s second phase in December 2007. With Board approval, we hope to expand grant making from USD 4 million dollars in 2007 to USD 6 million in 2008 and up to USD 10 million per year by 2009 or 2010. Including the Initiative’s first two years, we envision at least a ten-year commitment to the field with a total investment of approximately USD 80 million.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to engage in this exciting new work. We look forward to your comments.
The Future of International Cooperation on Migration and Development
Approximately 200 million people around the world currently live outside their country of origin. Such unprecedented human mobility and resettlement have enormous political, social, environmental and economic effects on development, sustainability and stability. While these movements have important historical antecedents, their novelty lies in a new world era, composed of dramatic demographic transformation, growing regional economic disparities, security threats and globalization. Although migration is rooted in the history of man, the politics of migration is rather new (see Messina and Lahav, 2005) and merits critical attention for its volatility.

The emergence of migration as a political issue derives from the Treaty of Westphalia’s formalization of nation states and boundaries in 1648, when states gained sovereignty on all issues affecting their territory, including migration. The evolution of international migration as an issue for cooperation on the international agenda is relatively new on the political scene. Cooperation concerning the movement of peoples has been variously attempted throughout the post-WWII era as states sought to regulate the movement of foreign labour or peoples through multilateral or bilateral negotiations. However, only in the 1990s at the United Nations did this issue become firmly entrenched on the international political agenda, and gained marked salience at the global level in 1994, when it unexpectedly emerged as a controversial topic at the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo.

Notably, the salience of migration on the international agenda formally emerged on the forefront of international discussions in connection with development. Indeed, the UN meetings in Rio, Johannesburg and Cairo institutionalized migration within the socio-economic and demographic frameworks. These platforms exposed the nature of political contestation concerning migration and development. The issue became divided between south versus north; poor versus affluent; developing versus developed countries; countries experiencing population growth versus those with shrinking populations, with the former seeking to secure better terms for out-migration, and the latter to better control such inflows (UN Population Division, 1998).

Nonetheless, amidst much political wrangling, these substantial initiatives at the United Nations level paved the way for the establishment of institutions such as the GCIM, and the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (September 2006) and even a more permanent structure, the Global Forum of International Migration (see
Thouez and Rosengartner, 2007). To the degree that these initiatives reflect broad patterns of international cooperation, they underscore future prospects and challenges for policy makers in reconciling enormous political pressures. More particularly, how can states in an international system reconcile the needs to open borders for human mobility, demographic imbalances, sustainable development, global markets and rights-based norms with political, societal and security pressures to effectively protect and control their borders?

This paradox has been most evident at the EU level, where democratic member states are confronted with the need to balance national impulses of protectionism with communitarian demands for more cooperation. Clearly, as the EU case shows, substantial answers lay in international cooperation, a concept that has been increasingly evident in regional initiatives at the EU since the 1980s (see Geddes, 2000; Kosoloski, 1998; Lahav, 2004). But, what does this look like in practice? On what basis do states with different historical experiences and current approaches to migration find a common ground where their interests merge?

By way of assessing prospects and limits of international cooperation on migration and development, this essay briefly identifies some policy and attitudinal trends in the European Union, where some of the most formidable strides in regional cooperation on migration have taken place among a group of 27 member states, balancing their own opposing interests. The EU case is paradigmatic of the different pressures that diverse (liberal) states face with regard to migration management. On the one hand, the expanding competence of EU institutions in the policy areas of immigration, asylum, refugees, border security and development is inescapable. From the Dublin Convention on asylum to the Schengen security regime to the neighbourhood policy for development and security, EU policy initiatives are testimony to growing tendencies towards regional cooperation. Whatever the reluctance of national governments, it is evident that international and supranational institutions are becoming important venues for forging cooperation (see Geddes, Lahav, Ucarer, Guiraudon and Lahav). On the other hand, even as immigration-related issues have shifted from national to supranational policy-making arenas, powerful national voices continue to offer stiff resistance. Some national governments are reluctant to delegate policymaking authority in such sensitive areas of public policy.

These countervailing trends have become more notable since the end of the Cold War era, with its definitive turning point post-9/11. They compel us to consider how the emergence of a new security order has affected cooperation on international migration and development. To what degree does the new security agenda promote or undermine cooperation in this area? Furthermore, what are the implications for migration management?

A POLITICAL FRAMEWORK: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO SECURITY?

Although the institutionalization of migration at the global level was initially tied to issues of development, the political situation of migration changed dramatically by the end of the century, marking a definitive turning point in the post-Cold War era. Immigration became elevated to the status of a “meta-issue” (Faist: 2002 11), an overarching concern in which
the boundaries of immigration as a threat to “external” and “internal” security became increasingly blurred (Bigo 2001: 121-122; Geddes 2001: 29-30). As immigration-related issues became increasingly been linked to national security (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2005; Rudolph 2005) and physical threat, the issue’s salience on the international agenda has grown considerably.

The consolidation of migration on the international agenda coincided with a notable shift from a predominant policy focus on ‘development’ to one of ‘security’. This transmutation from socio-economic or development concerns to ‘new security’ issues (e.g. terrorism, ethnic conflict and migration) emerged on the global agenda at about the time of the end of the Cold War era and the fall of the Iron Curtain. The earth-shattering terrorist attacks of September 11, followed by the Madrid and London bombings, gave further impetus to the linkages between immigration, crime and security that had previously only been implicit in European societies (see Bigo 2002; Lahav, forthcoming). The central role of foreign networks and ethnic minorities in terrorist attacks has not only catapulted migration further on the international arena, but has notably politicized the migration issue in a new light.

While the events of 9/11 merely hastened policy initiatives discussed earlier, they more importantly crystallized a shift in how the immigration debate was framed throughout liberal democracies. Since then, the talk of ‘invasion, insecurity and foreign terrorists’ began to reflect European electorates identifying immigration as more than a serious problem, but as a threat (Marie 2004). The marked increase in bilateral and multilateral activity on international migration bears witness to the changing nature of migration cooperation, in the language of international relations, from ‘low politics’ (of technical/bureaucratic issues) to ‘high politics’ (of security and foreign policy) today.

The growing tendency to view international migration-related questions through a national security lens has had several perverse political effects. First, it has weakened the migration-development link, as physical security has influenced more protectionist regimes, while demographic and development agendas promote safety, sustainability and well-being, requiring more open agendas. Second, national security frameworks have not only found support from nationalist politics, but generated political debates about the broad and often contradictory ways ‘security’ has been defined (see Huysmans, 2001; Teitelbaum; Koslowski; Waever and Buzan; Huddy et al., 2006; Lahav and Messina, 2005; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2007). As the international community captured earlier in the 1990s, the term may be broadly attached to societal, personal, national or more basic human security, including economic, physical, health, environmental, cultural and political dimensions (see the 1994 Human Development Report of the UNDP). Despite global pressures for consensus and convergence, the breadth of meanings attached to security has eluded a coherent and comprehensive migration regime that intersects with development (see Lahav, forthcoming).

Finally, the growing tendency to view international migration-related questions through a national security rather than a development lens has had mixed blessings for international and regional cooperation. On the one hand, the increasing proclivity of national governments
in Europe to view immigration-related questions through the prism of physical safety has precipitated greater bilateral and multilateral cooperation to regulate the flow of persons, and especially asylum seekers and illegal migrants, across countries (Huysmans 2005; Levy 2005). In Europe, the inability of states to stem unilaterally the flow of “unwanted” immigration has facilitated the expansion of the policymaking competence of the supranational institutions, especially the European Commission (Uçarer 2001) and the European Parliament (Lahav 1997; 2004a) over Europe’s territorial borders.

Activities related to freedom, security and justice have been increasingly shared by national and EU jurisdictions. With the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, launched by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, these issues were carefully distributed across the First and Third Pillars of the EU. Thus, the relationship between national sovereignty and EU competence entered a new phase with sensitive questions such as asylum and policing, shifting from exclusively national competence to common legally binding EU law and policy.

At the same time, the ‘securitization of migration’ at the European level has provoked a backlash in nationalist politics and protectionist norms, that are a continual reminder of the importance of public opinion and consent, and the power of ideas and political discourse when it concerns issues related to immigration (Favell, 1998: 250).

By the turn of the millennium, extreme-right parties in Europe made considerable political inroads.

These trends in national resistance to immigration have been manifest in attitudes towards immigration cooperation more broadly. Diffuse public opinion, like elite attitudes also exhibit significant polarizations around, and resistance, albeit with significant national variations to a common European management regime (see Table 2).
The shifting political salience of migration on the security agenda has clearly reorganized migration policy frames and interests. Particularly, the salience of migration as a security issue on the international agenda coincides with notable institutional and normative developments in the policy environment of liberal democracies. The section below broadly outlines some empirical developments at the EU level, and the paradoxical effects on migration cooperation.

**POLICY AND NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENTS**

The prevalence of a security framework of EU cooperation is best captured in the soaring importance of ‘Justice, Home Affairs and Freedom’ area (see Walker 2004). The transfer of such issues, long entrenched in national political and juridical systems and intrinsically imbued with state sovereignty under a common EC/EU Treaty—have led some observers of European integration to refer to the JHA and Treaty as the most revolutionary changes since the launching of the Single Market (Monar, 2005; Walker, 2001, 2002). Since 1999,
the Justice and Home Affairs has been the fastest-growing policy area in the EU (see Walker, 2004). This remarkable expansion includes the adoption of well over 200 legislative measures, involving nearly 40 bodies; the proliferation of meetings from four times a year to every month. The Secretariat of the European Council itself reportedly dedicates roughly 40 per cent of its meetings and workload directly or indirectly to matters related to AFSJ (Monar, 2005). Justice, Freedom and Security policies have witnessed an almost threefold increase of spending from around 0.5 per cent in 2006 to around 1.3 per cent in 2013, as foreseen in the 2007-2013 Financial Framework for the EU, adopted in April 2005 by the College of Commissioners (European Commission, 2005; see also, Vandermoosten, 2006).\(^1\)

While these sweeping developments may seem exaggerated to some, there is no doubt that they are most dramatic in the sense that the JHA has moved the EU on a massive scale into areas which had for decades remained an exclusive preserve of national sovereignty. The Hague Programme adopted in November 2004 set a new five-year plan to strengthen freedom, security and justice further. It also committed the JHA Council to share more competence with other European institutions, such as the Commission (Ucarer, 2002), the Parliament and the ECJ. While previously only the JHA Council had power to decide, the bodies now responsible for these areas include the Commission, the JHA Council, including 27 ministers responsible for immigration from each member-state, and the European Parliament\(^2\).

At the institutional level, the europeanization and securitization of migration coincide with the expansion of the migration ‘playing field’ and regulatory practices. The proliferation and diversification of security instruments to control migration involve tighter border controls, increased visa requirements, readmission agreements, carrier sanctions, buffer zones, Eurodoc fingerprinting and Schengen Information System databases, safe third country and accelerated return procedures and coordination (see Lahav 2004). All of these initiatives fundamentally rely on EU cooperation, and the coordination with and incorporation of third states, non-state parties or private actors to provide services, resources, technology that were otherwise unavailable to government officials (Gilboy 1997, 1998; Lahav 1999, 2003).

The security framework has prompted a flurry of cooperative activity on police and security matters and a proliferation of new actors at the national, regional and transatlantic levels. This expansive migration playing-field includes a complex web of actors and institutions, such as the police, intelligence services, military professionals, private security agencies, airline and travel agents, diplomats, consular offices, bureaucrats and policy makers at the local and international level. Several regional, bilateral and multilateral arrangements between member states for information sharing and operational cooperation have also emerged (e.g. French-German border zone; Anglo-French police cooperation concerning the Channel Tunnel). In an attempt to control illegal migration across Europe’s southern borders following the 2002 Seville meeting, for example Operation Ulysses was deployed among five EU countries (Spain, Britain, France, Italy and Portugal) to coordinate police, customs and navy ships. This represented the first time that EU members formally coordinated their efforts in this way and, according to Spain’s interior minister, Angel Acebes, the operation...
was envisioned as a precursor to a common European border police force (*NY Times*, January 29, 2003).

From 2001 to 2004, cooperation between the United States and the European Union also grew, bringing together agencies and institutions in the United States and Europe that had never worked together before and, in some cases, had not even existed. For example, in September 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft became the first US Attorney General to meet formally with his EU counterparts, the ministers of Interior and Justice (the JHA Council). Another notable development was the establishment of the Policy Dialogue on Border and Transport Security in April 2004, bringing together relevant officials, especially from the US Department of Homeland Security, Department of State and the Justice Department, along with representatives from the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the EU presidency to discuss ways of improving security. In September 2004, the US Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, met with European Commissioner Antonio Vitorino and representatives of the EU presidency, and continued the dialogues. Clearly, an extension and reinforcement of professional policy and criminal justice networks across and beyond Europe have flourished under the Third Pillar.

Broadly speaking, the shift in focus from development to security is important from a political view, and exposes another set of paradoxical effects. Since development is subject to ideological debates and is rife with moral and socio-economic commitments, any issue linkage with migration is likely to generate political polarizations. In contrast, security, especially national security, tends to generate consensus, even if it sometimes promotes ethnocentrism, intolerance and a fortress mentality (see Lahav and Messina, 2005). Based on social behavioural research, it is not surprising that as immigration shifts from a development focus to a security concern, immigration issues would generate attitudinal consensus, particularly around protectionist values (Lahav and Courtemanche, 2007). As immigration salience becomes more attached to physical security, it may become less politicized or ideologically polarized, despite its salience (issue attachment). As aggregate behavioural research has suggested, national or physical security may displace traditional ideological alignments. From this perspective, policy norms and public attitudes are very revealing.

While the issue of public opinion in the EU is complex (see Lahav, 2004a for an overview), the recent scholarly attention to public opinion in the EU has provided compelling evidence that public opinion matters (Anderson, 1998; Dalton and Eichenberg, 1998; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren, 1994; Gabel, 1998; Niedermayer and Sinnott 1995), even on immigration (Citrin, Green and Muste, 1997; Fetzer, 2000; Lahav, 2004a/b; Citrin and Sides, 2004).

Clearly, domestic societal pressures such as public opinion and elite framing of migration are as critical to understanding cooperative initiatives in the EU as demographic data alone. As Figure 1, relating changes in migrant pressures to major cooperative initiatives in the EU, suggests, increasing migration flows and asylum applications did not precede policy cooperation, and therefore debunks some common claims that large flows engender policy
convergence (Ugur, 1994). While caution about causal interpretations is warranted given the complexity of variables (see Freeman and Kessler 2002), the figure below reveals that a number of important EU cooperative initiatives (i.e., SEA, Schengen Accords) preceded large inflows of the early 1990s.

Figure 1: Cooperative Initiatives and Immigrant Flows

These findings indicate that cooperation may reflect domestic societal pressures (i.e., the feeling that there are ‘too many’ foreigners) rather than the actual number of immigrants. In lieu of immigrant flows to explain cooperation, we need to consider public and elite reactions. The trends also suggest that the new modes of migration regulatory practices noted above, while representing a considerable retreat from liberal norms, may be far more representative and democratic in that they are sanctioned by more diffuse public opinion. Elite attitudes and public opinion converge far more than is traditionally assumed. (Lahav 2004a/b; Lahav and Messina 2006). Moreover, the growing tendency towards restrictive and protectionist migration policies across Europe stems less from demographic changes than from reactions of policy makers and masses to migration in the context of changing borders (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain, 1994: 7; Lahav 2004; 71).

Indeed, in the absence of a great influx of new migration, the surge to control migration seemed initially puzzling in a Europe built on the principle of free movement based on global mobility (Marie 2004: 11) and facing a demographic crisis (see Fargues 2005). Although the proportion between EU and non-EU (third world, non-white, non-Christian) foreigners has been skewed to the latter group, this ‘problem’ area has barely changed over the last 20 years (see Table 8.1). The data reveal relatively minor new migration flows, an indication of very low levels of mobility within the EU (very different from the U.S., where six per cent of the population is reported to move within the U.S. every year.) In fact, it is estimated that only two per cent of EU citizens live and work in another EU country, a cause of great concern to European policy makers. This limited mobility and failure to promote a real European labour market even prompted the European Commission to dedicate 2006 to the

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“Year of Workers’ Mobility” and to initiate the European Mobility bus tour. The policy goals of promoting the free movement of people conflict with the interests to limit the mobility of some foreigners and terrorists, drug smugglers and other criminal elements. Clearly, the framing of migration policy in a security context skews these priorities and reorganizes the migration-development connection.

Policy developments across the board confirm the psychological effects triggered by the link between migration and security. As public opinion in the EU corroborates, under conditions of threat, the movement of peoples takes second-order priority to border security. This is not surprising. Social psychologists and behavioural political scientists have provided ample evidence that threat increases group solidarity ethnocentrism and xenophobia (Levine and Campbell 1972; Seago 1947; Huddy 2001; Tajfel and Turner 1979; Brown 1995). It promotes intolerance and a willingness to forgo basic civil liberties, personal freedoms and minority rights, and leads to narrow mindedness (Rokeach 1960).

Empirically, recent public opinion polls have revealed that since September 11, the role of civil liberties and human rights have been seen as the price for shifting security concerns, a trade-off of certain democratic values, sanctioned by citizens or a willingness to compromise civil liberties and personal freedoms for a greater sense of security from immigration, terrorism and globalization (Lahav and Courtemanche, 2007; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2008; Huddy, Feldman, Lahav, and Taber 2003; Davis and Silver 2002; Gibson 1996, 1998; Sniderman et al. 1996). In the United States, since 9/11 Americans have reported support for racial and ethnic profiling of Arab Americans, greater FBI invasion of citizens’ privacy and a close monitoring of legal immigrants (Polling Report 2001). They are more likely to accept national identity cards and to be inconvenienced by surveillance schemes for more security. Findings on American public opinion in the period between September 2001 and February 3, 2002, six-month period that revealed some notable attitudinal trends in the direction of protectionism, when threat is looming and present.4

Finally, these changing normative frameworks compel us to consider not only the viability of international cooperation, but also the character of such a regime for migration. Indeed, there is a general belief that an international community or international regime may constrain state sovereignty. For migration, such cooperation may be seen to necessarily promote liberal or open doors, or oblige states to undertake moral and economic commitments. As documented elsewhere, however, the development of a common immigration regime is compatible with and may even bolster national and ideological interests (Lahav, 2004). Cooperation is not synonymous with national constraints, nor is it intrinsically a liberal phenomenon. Consider some of the most recent initiatives at migration and asylum management in Europe, such as the safe third-country principle, or the Dublin Convention to limit the scope of applications, which go beyond the Geneva Convention, its model.

In pressing neighbouring or transit countries like Ukraine or Libya which already faced challenges in this area, to take responsibility for migration, for example, the EU was seen to compromise certain democratic norms. The case of Ukraine captured the ways in which
many neighbouring countries are questioned in their ability to fulfil basic obligations, such as proper access to asylum, adequate conditions of detention and protection from return to torture or persecution. As long as neighbouring countries like Ukraine pursue close ties with the EU, the latter can put pressure on Ukraine to detain, host and accept the return of ever-greater numbers of migrants.

The EU also proposed to offer development aid and humanitarian assistance to increase the ability of such countries outside the EU to host refugees from the region through the European Commission’s Regional Protection Programme. Opponents criticized this initiative as merely another way to deny access to asylum in the EU. Another controversial proposal made by Germany and Italy during the October 2004 G5 meeting in Florence was to create centres in North Africa aimed at processing asylum seekers’ claims en route to the EU. Unsurprisingly, this proposal was vehemently rejected by human rights groups and governments in North Africa.

Although the most controversial dimension of the EU externalization agenda, processing asylum seekers outside the EU, has been shelved, the EU remains committed to “outsourcing” both control of migration and the determination of asylum. New components now include: the refusal of entry onto EU territory of asylum seekers who come from countries designated as ‘safe countries of origin’ or who transit through countries that are safe third-countries; the interdiction at sea of persons attempting to reach EU territory; the conclusion of readmission agreements with countries outside the EU; extended support to border enforcement and detention capacity in neighbouring transit countries.

While these shifts offer new possibilities for migration regulation, the incorporation of non-state actors through sanctions and the privatization of migration regulation through ‘contracting out’ of implementation functions have substantial implications for state control, sovereignty and democratic governance. These non-state actors may operate relatively unfettered and may even be enlisted by liberal states through outsourcing or sanctions (Lahav, 2000; 2005). In almost all cases, they are encouraged by states to promulgate extremely protectionist norms (Lahav, 1998; 2005; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; 2006). Enlisting non-state actors (e.g., airlines, travel companies, employers, universities, etc.), national policy makers may rely on racial profiling and other selective immigration practices to circumvent judicial and constitutional constraints, public scrutiny and debates, democratic accountability and transparency (see Lahav, 2005).

The logic often involves a political desire to control movement, and actors willing and able to play on the link between migration-crime-security (see Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). Since these actors have the economic, social, technological and/or political resources to facilitate or curtail immigration and return, they provide states with different sites and tools to control migration at the source. They also provide liberal states the political means to circumvent intense political debate and the most liberal rights constraints.
The proliferation and diversification of instruments used to control immigration throughout Europe and North America, too, accelerated in the aftermath of 9/11 and have reinforced images of police states (Pastore, 1991; Bunyan, 1991; Van Outeve, 1990; Etzioni, 2004). Such policies include tighter border controls, carrier sanctions, buffer zones, fingerprinting and biometric databases, accelerated return procedures and coordination, increased employer and airline sanctions, labour enforcement, work authorization and student verification procedures, detention and removal of criminal aliens, and computer registration systems. While many of these initiatives existed by the late 1980s, implementation soared after 9/11. Many of these policies were geared to more serious border control and implementation, but their reliance on instruments of surveillance (see Liberatore; Lyons) also suggests a critical retreat from certain liberal principles guiding immigration practices.

CONCLUSIONS

As the policy developments above indicate, the EU is paradigmatic of how a security framework can broadly deflect the development agenda, and reframe the migration equation – namely away from global inequalities, rights and liberties. The increasing momentum towards externalization by engaging countries of migrant origin and transit reflects an international policy frame that emphasizes the control and security aspects of migration over open borders for markets and liberal rights (Lavenex 2005, 1), demographic restructuring, and sustainable development. As the institutional analysis above suggests, these trends reflect that within a growing international migration agenda, the impulse to shift responsibility and incorporate new actors in border and migration control is oriented towards the compromise of liberal rights norms.

These trends remind us is that, contrary to conventional theories of globalization and international regimes, cooperation may bolster, not compromise state sovereignty.

Indeed, with specific exceptions (e.g., guest-work programmes, the U.S. Bracero programme), cooperation on migration has predominantly existed in the form of prevention. This is also true of refugee matters, which have been less about establishing a common European asylum system, and more about reducing migration pressures. To consider international and transnational organizations as an opportunity for, rather than a constraint to, the regulatory power of nation states, corroborates the rare, but practical view that states may deal more effectively by joining international or supranational institutions like the EU to coordinate best practices on migration.

The management of migration has now assumed new and more intensive modes of regulation and risk assessment. Notwithstanding structural and cultural variations, the widespread proliferation of actors (e.g., private, local and international) involved in restrictive policy implementation (see Lahav, 2005; 2006; 2007; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006) has developed almost uniformly in the countries of Europe and North America. As a result of these processes, the number of relevant actors or stakeholders in migration policy has increased significantly.
(see Guiraudon and Lahav, 2006). This expanded migration regulatory framework includes local, private and international actors, as well as redoubled government efforts (i.e., formation of DHS in the U.S., JHA in the EU). Clearly, the expansion of regulatory playing fields is substantial, as international migration now involves not only a community of states, but new actors and factors in migration regulation, which constitute “global governance” or “migration management”. Such regulatory modes go well beyond states and include civil society, private and non-state actors.

The most critical consequence with regard to international cooperation on migration relates not only to the fact it has grown, but to the diversity of regulators, and the widening gap between policy entrepreneurs. The growth of policy stakeholders in an enlarged migration playing field has generated political cross-pressures, which have threatened to undermine coordination or cooperation. The proliferation of policy actors and venues is not always coherent or coordinated, and the policy communities often remain isolated in their communications. There is a fundamental need to extend and integrate the communities and dialogues between the growing range of stakeholders—from public health officials to urban planners to economists and lawyers. Whether the effects of human mobility and resettlement are conceptualized as “development” or “security” issues, migration management clearly involves issues of public health, social welfare, environmental degradation and different vulnerabilities and needs to be conceptualized and framed as such. Policy and research programmes must address the links between information technology, public health, as well as environmental, political, economic, psychological and social factors in migration management.

While ‘migration management’ understands migration as a policy development that flows from a trade-off between different ‘risks’, a security-dominant approach tends to prejudice security technologies, bio-terrorism, data mining, optimization, data security and privacy, over issues of societal welfare and inequalities, including ethnic, religious and racial tolerance, diversity and sustainable development.6 Moreover, because knowledge about the relationship between migration and development is fragmented among many specialized disciplines and policy makers, each with their own piece of the puzzle and particular conceptualization of the issues, public debates and policies often work at cross-purposes or are counter-productive. Ultimately, these deficits remind us that, while there is a tendency to celebrate international cooperation, we must hold off celebrations and consider the limitations and complexities involved.
To paraphrase my senior honours thesis advisor at the University of Wisconsin, Kemal Karpat, rarely does migration not figure importantly in the history of humankind. Recent anthropological evidence concerning the late Iron Age in Europe suggests that distinctive societies were much more interconnected and fluid than once thought. The prosperity and goods of ancient Greece and Rome fostered trade and myriad other interactions just as the military might of Greece and Rome posed a perceived grave threat to tribes and peoples on the periphery forcing them to adapt, change and define their identities. The extensive Viking migrations of the eighth to eleventh centuries gave rise to plunder and violence. But those migrations also involved trade and commerce. Medieval migrations of Jews in Europe were often linked to rulers’ efforts to spur economic development and to generate greater tax revenues. Much the same could be said about Medieval German migrations eastwards.

However, during the age of Mercantilism in sixteenth to eighteenth century Europe, many rulers opposed emigration and proscribed it, even if not always successfully. Emigration was viewed as a socio-economic loss, especially of possible military recruits. Such was the status quo by the seventeenth century. By the nineteenth century, three factors began to facilitate extensive transatlantic migration. The French Revolution generated a new norm that emigration constituted a human right. Roughly concurrently, the British colonies, especially in North America, became a magnet for British and other European emigrants. British efforts to prevent emigration became a point of contention between the colonies and the crown. Heretofore prohibitively high transatlantic transportation costs began to decline, enabling more and more British subjects the possibility of exit.

The early decades of the new American Republic witnessed relatively little international migration. The American population nevertheless grew rapidly due to high birth rates. Settlers from the former colonies relentlessly pushed westward encroaching upon Indian lands. Despite Indian resistance, more and more land was conquered for settlement and many states actively encouraged Europeans to emigrate. Worsening political and socio-economic conditions in Ireland triggered mass emigration from there principally to the United States but to other areas of the New World as well, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

Hatton and Williamson have estimated that nearly sixty million Europeans emigrated to the New World, including points in Latin America like Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, between 1820 and 1939. The developmental outcomes for Europe and the New World reshaped the modern world. By the late nineteenth century, the once precarious American republic had emerged as an economic and military power. In Europe, mass emigration helped spur socio-economic development in Nordic states. Between 1860 and 1914, roughly one out of
every five Swedes emigrated, principally to the American Midwest. But Sweden had largely closed the socio-economic gap between the U.K. and Sweden in the meantime. The overall developmental effect in Europe varied. The Iberian countries were much less affected by mass emigration and their development lagged.

Transatlantic migration constituted the key dynamic in the first period of globalization. But the uneven distributional economic effects of international migration, among other factors, helped generate growing political opposition to immigration in the United States. The Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 dramatically curtailed international migration to the US in the interwar period. And other states of the New World largely emulated the closing of the ‘Golden Door’. France would become the leading land of immigration during the 1920s.

**THE PRESENT: ORIGINS OF THE AGE OF MIGRATION**

After the destruction wreaked by World War II in Europe emerged the beginnings of regional integration, a long-term process made possible by the U.S. security guarantee through NATO. In the United States, the Golden Door began to reopen, a process culminating in the 1965 Amendments to the INA. Hatton and Williamson identify five developments which helped trigger a second period of globalization, which brought about what Stephen Castles and I call ‘The Age of Migration’.

First, by the 1970s, most Western European countries had become at least *de facto* lands of immigration. Relatively few West Europeans continued to emigrate, although the 1965 Amendments in the U.S. were still largely intended for Europeans. Successive German governments would continue to declare that Germany was not an immigration country. It would take until the twenty-first century and a Red/Green coalition for the government to embrace reality. Lingering illusions from the guest-worker policy era largely explain the decades-long disconnect.

Bearing in mind the French tradition of admitting immigrants for demographic purposes, what was striking about mass migration to Western Europe between 1945 and 1975 was the unplanned outcome of mass settlement and family reunification. Max Frisch’s aphorism nicely sums up a very long and complicated history — “We asked for workers, but human beings came”.

A second key transformation occurred in Latin America. Circa in 1970, Latin America became a net exporter of people, mainly to the United States because of a growing socio-economic gap. Repressive governments also played a role. More recently, Latin Americans have begun to move in large numbers to southern Europe, a trend triggered in part by migration policy developments in countries like Portugal, Spain and Italy.

Third, Africans and Asians began to migrate internationally in large numbers. There was relatively little Asian and African migration during the earlier phase of globalization.
Most Africans faced severe poverty constraints which even today help us understand why most international migrants from Africa migrate chiefly to other African countries. But by the 1970s, black African migration was quite extensive in Western Europe, particularly in France.

Fourth, by the 1970s, the Persian Gulf states had emerged as major importers of migrant workers. Although Arab foreign workers initially predominated, recruitment of Asian workers steadily increased, in part due to political considerations.

Finally, the status quo in Eastern Europe began to change. German Ostpolitik began to open the door to emigration. A process that accelerated in the 1980s, as flows, in particular of Poles, to Germany grew. Poles benefited from protection against return to Poland. After 1990, East Europeans poured into Western Europe both legally and illegally. But the feared spectre of “new barbarian invasions” from the East did not come about, in large part due to pro-active steps by West European states and what became the European Union. Most recently, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU have added ten East European states. And there is growing evidence of states like Poland going through migration transition, despite the substantial emigration of Poles, especially to the U.K. and Ireland.

Preliminary assessment of those enlargements suggests significant positive developmental effects for both the EU-15 core states and the ten accession states. The major economic benefits accrued to migrants and their families. The enlargements also had substantial legalization effects for East Europeans illegally residing in the core-15 states or who were there on temporary legal residence permits. The enlargement served to close somewhat the socio-economic gap between the core and accessions states.

Stephen Castles and I will maintain in the forthcoming (we hope) fourth edition of *The Age of Migration* that the current era is defined by six general tendencies:

International migration is increasing in all world regions. While the percentage of international migrants in the world’s population remains roughly constant at between two and three percent, the world’s population continues to grow and will do so for several decades into the future, before peaking at about nine million. Most future growth will occur in Africa and Asia. Nevertheless, growth of international migration is not inexorable. Repatriations, for instance, have significantly reduced some refugee populations.

States and governments around the world face increasingly complex challenges in regulating international migration as they encounter, and sometimes precipitate, diverse inflows of migrants.

International migration-related issues are becoming increasingly salient in domestic politics, bilateral and regional relations and at the global level, as witnessed by the creation of the Global Commission on International Migration and the convening of the UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in 2006.
Women have become more salient participants in international migration. Many international flows are comprised mainly of women, such as domestic workers to the Middle East. And women are disproportionally victims of human trafficking.

More and more states have experienced migration transition, that is, traditional lands of emigration have become lands of immigration. Countries as diverse as Thailand, Turkey, Morocco, Greece, Italy, Spain, the Republic of South Korea and Mexico have experienced transition during the Age of Migration.

THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Often understanding the past serves as the best guide to understanding the future. International migration played a central role in the shaping of the modern, Westphalian world in which we still live. It is likely to continue to forge and reforge states and societies in the future.

International migration can foster development in both receiving and sending areas, as attested to by the US-Swedish migratory relationship before 1914. But high hopes were attached to the promise of international migration generating sustained socio-economic and political development in the Asian and African hinterlands of West Europe in the 1960s and 1970s, but those hopes largely proved misplaced.

Nevertheless, a new optimism has arisen over prospects for migration and development through well managed bilateral and regional policies. This optimism is linked to a more precise understanding of the vast volume of migrants’ remittances to homelands.

A number of scholars and policy makers have advocated temporary foreign worker admission policies in OECD democracies as part of a circular migration strategy to promote mutually beneficial development in sending and receiving states. A certain scepticism about such advocacy appears in order.

The historical track record of temporary foreign worker admission policies in democratic settings can be termed as checkered at best. Guest worker, seasonal worker and bracero-style policies had problems and unintended consequences for now quite well understood reasons. The Swiss reformed their seasonal worker policy in 1964 to allow those workers who had worked five consecutive seasons to adjust to resident status under diplomatic pressure from Italy. The volume of seasonal foreign worker-admissions also became controversial, leading to the divisive anti-Überfremdung campaigns of the 1970s that gave way to similarly unsuccessful referenda campaigns to abolish seasonal foreign worker policies as incompatible with human dignity in the 1990s. Swiss seasonal worker policy was not mismanaged. And as late as 1973 to 1975, many seasonal worker permits were not renewed due to the recession, thereby enabling Switzerland to shift some of the costs of the recession to Italy.
Similarly, German guest worker policies generally were well administered. But there was considerable political sympathy for legally admitted foreign workers by the 1970s. German courts blocked Conservative efforts to enforce rotation after 1973 as incompatible with the Federal Republic’s legal engagements and responsibilities. This constituted an enormous victory for German post-war democracy that is too little appreciated.

*Bracero*-policy history between Mexico and the U.S. does not appear to have yielded much evidence of fostering sustainable development in Mexico. U.S. recruitment of temporary Mexican foreign workers dates back to before World War I. Such recruitment helped set in motion large-scale unauthorized migration to the U.S. Significantly more unauthorized Mexican workers were returned to Mexico than were legally recruited during the 1942-1964 period. The U.S. unilaterally terminated the policy in a period of growing consciousness and concern about civil rights and the effects temporary foreign worker admissions had upon American farm workers.

The evolution of French seasonal foreign worker admissions after World War II somewhat resembled events in Switzerland. Admissions of seasonal workers, mainly for agricultural employment, crested at about 250,000 per year in 1968, but were steadily phased out afterwards. Significant numbers of seasonal workers became so-called *faux saisonniers* (or false seasonal workers) and overstayed their visas. Many applied for the recurring legalizations between 1972 and the 1980s. Seasonal foreign worker admissions continue today, but in very small numbers.

Since 1990, a new generation of temporary foreign worker admission policies have emerged in Europe, especially in southern Europe. The new policies are more narrow-gauged than policies during the guest worker era. The key issue is: will their outcomes resemble or not those of the guest worker era. Advocates of circular migration policies take an optimistic view.

Spain’s recent bilateral initiatives towards black African states in Western Africa perhaps best exemplify the optimistic perspective. In return for cooperation with Spain and the EU on the management of international migration, including prevention of illegal migration and human trafficking, as well as readmission of citizens illegally entering the European space, Spain will provide job training and then admit trained and prepared foreign workers for time-bound employment in sectors lacking adequate labour supply such as agriculture.

At first glance, such policies may appear constructive, even progressive. But almost by definition, the legal status of temporary foreign workers is contingent. Usually the foreign workers are tied, as it were, to a particular employer or industry. Of course, there is no incontrovertible way to measure the need for additional foreign workers in a given industry, but especially in agriculture. Perceptions of need represent outcomes of political and legal battles usually pitting employers against unions. Usually, employers have their way even with governments of the left, which is the case in Spain since 2004.
It is important to point out that there are viable policy alternatives to the circular migration model. Spain could also admit more persons from West Africa with permanent alien resident status. Those Africans admitted would be free to work throughout Spain. Nothing would constrain these workers to become EU citizens, but it would be a possibility. Such legally admitted permanent resident aliens would be free to travel back and forth to their homelands. But many certainly would opt for naturalization.

Herein lies the major advantage of increased admissions of permanent resident aliens. Spain and Spaniards would have to accept the likely reality of settlement giving Spanish society and government a strong incentive to foster immigrant integration. Historically, supposedly temporary foreign worker policies have resulted in significant settlement. But states and societies were unprepared for such unexpected outcomes leading to integration deficits and long-term integration issues.

Preliminary analysis of Spain’s temporary foreign worker admission, the so-called contingents, suggests that the historic pattern of unexpected policy outcomes will continue. Several contingents served as means to legalize aliens in irregular status rather than recruit foreign workers from abroad. Perceived unfairness in the administration of the contingents has roiled Spain’s relations with Morocco and several other homelands, whose governments feel that more of their citizens should be legally admitted under bilateral agreements. Spanish unions and employers often disagree on how large the authorized contingent should be reminding me of the annual “headaches” that Swiss cantonal and federal officials spoke of in the 1970s and 1980s.

Further enlargement or deepening of the EU and of other regional integration frameworks worldwide also merits consideration. Canada, the U.S. and Mexico could emulate the history of regional integration in Europe. The key problem lies in the dissimilarity between NAFTA and the EU. NAFTA does not have a political project, unlike the EC and now the EU. The Security and Prosperity Partnership agreement announced by the three NAFTA heads of state in 2005 may suggest a move in that direction.

However, within each region and globally I discern a need for greater cooperation between more and lesser developed states to promote greater socio-economic development. In my eyes, the history of European structural funds designed to promote a more even playing ground within the European space deserves careful scrutiny by the NAFTA partners.

Unfortunately, most OECD countries have ducked negotiations over international migration and development issues. The pattern was set at the 1986 OECD-sponsored conference on the future of international migration. The U.S. delegation, of which I was a member, was instructed to avoid anything resembling North-South dialogue at that conference. The Reagan Administration adamantly opposed a Willy Brandt-style North/South Dialogue.
The U.S. position appears to have evolved little ever since. It would take inspired American leadership for the decades-long migration and development stalemate to change. American leaders of either party simply continue to endorse the benefits of globalization and free trade as evidence mounts that it increases socio-economic disparities, both within and between states and societies. The circular migration advocacy risks generating false hopes that bilateral and regional cooperation on international migration will result.

One final point, I think that a new approach to migration and development would serve U.S. interests. The chief threats to U.S. security since the 1970s arose from failed states and the abysmal living conditions of average people in much of the world. After 9/11, I thought a window of opportunity had opened, but it has been largely squandered. Nevertheless, successful prosecution of the War on Terrorism requires progress on sustainable development in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere within what Barnet in the Pentagon’s New Map calls the Non-integrated gap area. The important question revolves around the credibility of options proposed to bring about development. The track records of structural funds in contexts of regional integration and of increased admissions of permanent resident aliens appear preferable to the circular migration model.
A Global Dialogue on Migration and Development

Irena Omelaniuk

INTRODUCTION

A question often asked in regard to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) is whether the world is moving towards a more global migration regime. The Global Forum, which offers the first, truly global dialogue on migration in the context of development, does not specifically address this question or aim at achieving such a regime. But the first Forum meeting in Brussels in 2007 brought to light some common elements and convergence of approach across countries, particularly at the migration-development interface.

These convergences are particularly apparent where countries are facilitating labour mobility on bilateral and regional levels in ways that could benefit governments, migrants, their families and local communities alike. Intergovernmental cooperation is also increasingly fostered through regional and cross-regional processes such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, which engages countries of origin and destination in Asia and the Middle East. The developmental impacts of such efforts have yet to be fully assessed, but they increasingly involve developing-developed country partnerships, or coalitions among developing countries aimed at achieving mutual benefits.

The GFMD process shows how development can be a useful framing device for dealing with migration in more cooperative and consensual ways. Seen through the lens of development, migration assumes a different importance, even authority, in the international policy discourses on economics, trade, labour markets and development. For example, the immense economic power of remittances has raised migration to the same (or even higher) level of importance as development aid, foreign direct investment and transnational business. As migration and development gain more prominence in international policy dialogues, governments are compelled to try more linked-up approaches to these two policy fields. Yet there is still little international guidance or doctrine on how and why to make these linkages.

In the relative absence of data on this issue, governments are thrown back on intuition and the authority of experience. The Global Forum provides an opportunity for governments to find common ground and shared goals, and explore good practices to achieve these goals. This presentation draws on a few select findings from the Global Forum to date that illustrate this, and points to four areas requiring urgent attention by the international community: data and research on migration and development; diagnostic tools; good practices; evaluations of policies.
WHAT DOES THE GFMD PROCESS TELL US?

No ‘one size fits all’ policy; the solutions often lie beyond migration and development policies.

The GFMD dialogue to date has shown that the issues and challenges are very different from country to country, hence no one policy is likely to fit all cases. Also, the policy solutions to development challenges often lie outside the migration purview and are, for example, more closely related to economic and labour market planning. The stage of development reached by the country can influence the migration strategy at either end of the migration spectrum in very different ways. Yet, the dynamics of the global labour market are also such that a dysfunctional system in one country can adversely affect the labour market in another.

In Brussels, the GFMD roundtable on skilled migration and brain drain identified 13 factors that drive emigration of doctors and nurses from developing countries, none of which directly relates to migration policies but rather to skills training, employment and wage policies. Malawi and Ghana demonstrated how strategic investment of their development budgets in skills training and deployment in the health sector has helped retain skilled persons and redress brain drain (see the final report of the Brussels GFMD, due May 2008). A 2005 study by IOM examines how the circumstances in some developing countries may predispose the government to adopt strategies that engage their diaspora, rather than retention strategies (Ammassari 2005).

Mauritius tabled a blueprint for circular migration agreements with labour-seeking countries that would form part of its longer-term trade liberalization and sectoral restructuring plans. It factors into the model some incentives for return and circularity based on pre-migration training for skills use and enhancement abroad, and strengthening of the lower-end business sector at home. While such a model may not necessarily fit the current needs of labour emigration countries in Asia, it may suit African and EU countries seeking to pilot the EC’s 2007 Communication on Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships.

The GFMD is bringing to light a number of important joint experiments, where developed countries strengthen the capacity of poorer countries to be able to provide more opportunities for their health professionals at home through training, salary and other incentives, while also equipping them to be able to cope better with the emigration of surplus labour. Labour and trainee exchange programmes between Africa and Europe, or the Caribbean and North America, offer employment and career outlets for workers from developing countries in exchange for filling some critical labour market gaps in the developed economies.

The Mauritian circular migration model rests on a shared commitment by the home country to manage migration as a support to its development efforts, and by the host country to allow more flexible visa, work permit and re-entry arrangements in exchange for a reliable temporary labour force.
More players than governments

But the broader contextualization of migration and development policies is often better understood and monitored by non-governmental experts, particularly those involved in wider socio-economic research, than by government policy makers. For example, it is more likely that agencies like Public Services International, the International Council of Nurses, trade unions, the Commonwealth Secretariat, ILO, IOM, World Bank, OECD observe the ways in which the distribution of resources is key to achieving better development effects through migration, and how best to match supply and demand at the international level for labour to fill the labour gaps in the developed world, and respond to the needs of developing economies.

The Philippines has learned over several decades of managing large-scale labour emigration that it is more cost-effective to allow the private sector to manage large parts of the labour emigration cycle. But the government regulates and monitors the activities and fee regimes of these agencies closely, using a carrot-and-stick approach: prescribed low fee levels, imposition of a “joint and solidarity liability” (JSL) on recruitment agencies and their foreign principals, and an internationally publicized awards system for good employers. Recruitment agencies play a role in protecting, informing and economically empowering overseas Filipino migrant workers and their families (e.g. “Asia Manpower” offers a Savings and Loans facility to its own constituencies).

In this context, the Bangladesh Government has opened a dynamic debate about the role that the private sector—employers, recruiters, banks, financial institutions etc.—can and do play in ensuring that workers from low-income countries are not exploited or impeded in their emigration aspirations through prohibitive opportunity costs. In collaboration with other like-minded governments, Bangladesh is taking the lead on two important bridging projects between the Brussels and Manila GFMD meetings to assess the feasibility of market-based approaches to lowering these and establishing some benchmarks for the ethical behaviour of recruitment agencies.

Some emerging good practices

One policy option identified by governments as a useful two-way lever for development, viz. productive in both origin and host countries, are temporary labour migration programmes (Ruhs 2005; Abella 2005). Where they are agreed and arranged bilaterally around the mutual needs of both countries, they can transcend the unilateral interests of many of the traditional labour immigration programmes of the past. While currently more easily accessed by high skilled migrants, a growing number of such programmes are now available for lower skilled migration.12

New forms of temporary labour migration programmes exist or are being planned today between European Union countries (e.g. Germany, Spain, France and Italy) and labour-
supply countries in central/eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America. Compared with the earlier large-scale, unilaterally planned “guest worker” schemes of Europe and the USA, these are more sector-oriented and jointly planned towards meeting the economic needs of both origin and destination country.

Of the many hundreds of bilateral labour agreements in existence around the world today, the GFMD has identified some small-scale illustrative programmes, such as the seasonal agricultural worker agreements between Canada and Mexico and the Caribbean, and the programmes between Spain and Morocco, Colombia, Ecuador and others. Spain, as a large labour recruiting country, links its immigration programmes to development in the country of origin, among others by building the capacities of migrant workers to contribute to home community development. Colombia, as a large labour exporter, links this emigration to fighting poverty. Also discussed were the seasonal agricultural worker movement between Guatemala and Canada, and the live-in caregiver flows between the Philippines and Canada. Both of these occur outside any formal bilateral agreement, and are closely and jointly managed by governments and employers or employer associations.

Drawn from such programmes are some common model elements of development-friendliness; e.g. non-discriminatory towards lower skilled workers from developing countries; visa flexibility to permit repeat migration and, in the case of the caregivers, the opportunity to apply for more permanent status; targeted selection from among the under-privileged (Mexico-Canada agreement); standard contracts with decent wages and social protection, preparation and protection of workers at every stage of their mobility; a high percentage of return; huge remittances to families back home. These practices are becoming more common across countries: e.g. the standard contracts used by the Philippines and Sri Lanka as a means to enforce ‘benchmark’ or minimum wages for their migrant workers are increasingly being pursued by other Asian countries of origin.

A common message of these “good practice” programmes is that where there is close government involvement in the selection, contractual arrangements and support of migrants and their families, the migration process is less costly, safer and more likely to yield higher economic and welfare benefits. But with a balanced approach to regulating recruiters and employers, this can also be achieved by public-private partnerships, as the Philippines ably demonstrate. The investment costs can be high for the developing country, but the returns can be higher in terms of decent wages, social security, earnings, remittances, welfare of the family, and sound relations between partner governments (Verduzco and Lozano 2004).

The Philippines’ “life cycle” approach to training, informing, documenting, protecting and supporting their overseas workers and families is reaping huge returns for the migrants, their families and the home economy (Yang and Martinez 2005). South Korea’s Employment Permit System uses a government-to-government approach to minimize exploitation of temporary migrant workers.
But the GFMD discussion was also realistic about the imperfections of such programmes. For example, they are too small to have a measurable impact on the economy; they often fail to upgrade skills and they perpetuate artificial dependencies on migration. The potential for replicating or adapting some of these models to other countries or scenarios is also limited, and governments still lacked the tools to diagnose their own situations and make the appropriate policy choices. There is still too little knowledge about the measurable impacts of such programmes on poverty reduction, health and education, among others, back home. At this stage, GFMD governments are pooling their knowledge and experiences of “best practice” policy elements that cause temporary bilateral labour arrangements to benefit development.16

Development impacts are still difficult to measure, but also go beyond economics…

Development economists see temporary or circular labour programmes as alleviating demographic and unemployment pressures in poorer economies and spreading the development gains more widely, particularly when lower skilled migrants from developing countries can access labour markets abroad (World Bank 2005). Their temporary nature makes them attractive and flexible labour market tools for the destination country, while assuring sufficient connection with the home country to encourage the return of migrant capital, skills and other resources supportive of development. Where some measure of temporariness is built into the programmes, they can allay traditional concerns of labour-receiving countries about irregular migration and its potential costs to social welfare systems.

But the actual developmental impacts on poorer families and home communities are still largely unknown in many parts of the world. This is in part due to the fact that analyses by the World Bank and others rely on remittance data that are not disaggregated by admissions programmes or between regular and irregular migration populations.

Large labour senders like the Philippines know that bilateral labour migration arrangements can deepen the trust between countries and increase the likelihood of more enduring migration arrangements between them. The Philippines’ excellent track record in preparing, training, supporting, protecting and returning its overseas workers is its biggest marketing tool. The Philippines “life cycle” approach to supporting overseas workers and their families is increasingly seen as a model worth emulating by other labour-sending countries.17 All this helps to give migration a good name and to boost strategic cooperation in other policy areas, too.

These are, of course, largely intuitive conclusion, which need to be tested. But there is already clear evidence that in some destination countries Filipino overseas workers enjoy a better standard of treatment and remuneration than other nationalities, largely due to the quality of their services and the commitment of their government to legislate and negotiate favourable agreements, including on portability of social security and gender-specific forms of protection.
More and more developing countries of emigration are looking for workable models such as the Philippines can offer, and the chance to test them with willing partners. The GFMD offers an effective multilateral space to discuss such options and their applicability to other countries.

GFMD as a new process is still feeling its way, but already has some useful pointers for and from policy makers. Governments across the developing-developed spectrum are working together, and with other international experts, to learn from the old, and try out the new for the common good.

The second Global Forum meeting in Manila in October 2008, will build on the discussions and outcomes of the Forum meeting in Brussels. Following the key priorities identified by GFMD member governments prior to the Brussels meeting, Manila will deepen the discussion on the developmental benefits of: a) better protected migration; b) better planned and managed forms of regular migration, and c) greater policy and institutional coherence and partnerships. The outcomes of a myriad of other regional and intergovernmental fora on the issue of migration and development will feed into the Manila meeting to ensure that it is truly a global process.

CONCLUSION

Despite a lack of measurable evidence of the actual impacts or effectiveness of many good practices and policy options to be discussed further at the Manila GFMD, there is general agreement that developing countries and development aid donors alike should factor migration into national and sectoral development strategies, and that migration policy should factor in development implications where possible. But, to do this effectively, policy makers need to work more closely with each other and with other experts on the subject to:

- get the data and research straight;
- strengthen diagnostic tools to assess country needs;
- gather “good practice” policies to meet the diagnosed needs;
- test and evaluate these policies (as for example the Mauritian Government and the European Commission aim to do with the Circular Migration concept).
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“Achilles is 100 metres away from a tortoise. He runs ten times faster than the tortoise. When he arrives at the point where the tortoise was at the beginning, the tortoise will be ten metres away from him. Then it will be one metre, ten centimetres ...farther. He will never meet up with the tortoise.”

Zeno of Elea

**INTRODUCTION: ZENO’S PARADOX IN A MIGRATORY PERSPECTIVE**

Zeno of Elea is responsible for a number of paradoxes which have puzzled, challenged, influenced, inspired, infuriated and amused philosophers, mathematicians, physicists for over two millennia. The most famous is one among the so-called “arguments against motion”, described by Aristotle in his *Physics*, and precisely the paradox of *Achilles and the Tortoise*, which deals with a provoking and not verisimilar assertion of an impossibility of motion and/or change.

When facing the current, actual and complex question of very substantial demographic and economic trends and related international migratory flows and, consequently, with responsive, indispensable migratory policies, some aspects have parallels with Zeno’s paradox. In fact, as we will subsequently argue in more detail, even if some less developed countries are increasingly improving their educational, social and economic conditions while also experience faster rates of economic growth than more developed countries, the difference between origin and destination countries, as far as income is concerned, for example, not only does not diminish, but actually widens. Therefore the dilemma for a Zeno expert of migration is the following: is there a real chance for the current migrant-sending countries to achieve an equivalent and multidimensional quality of life found in countries of destination, so that the collective emigration pressure can significantly diminish or disappear? In addition, in the pursuit of the **developed tortoise**, would specific migratory policies exercise a particular beneficial influence so as to demonstrate that change and progress are real?

Maybe the **migratory paradox** could offer some answers and strategies for political solutions by analysing, as in a complex “game of protagonists”, the contexts and actors of migratory flows, hoping that even maintaining a certain distance, all the world regions and countries would in the future share a perceived, decent life quality.

In other words, how much of the socio-economic distance between countries has to be reduced in order to totally or nearly eliminate the forces of migratory push and pull factors?
The parallelism of this philosophical paradox with the socio-economic distance between origin and destination countries can obviously be put in practice by attributing to the concept of “change” and “movement” a comparative and not absolute value. In fact, there is no doubt that many less developed countries are expected to significantly improve their life quality in the next few decades. At present, social and economic living conditions in destination countries are attractive to persons from origin countries when compared to their less satisfactory local conditions. However, when the living conditions in origin countries reach the current levels of receiving countries, the standards of living will have advanced in the more developed countries, thereby maintaining their attractive advantage for immigration.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AS A STRUCTURAL COMPONENT OF POPULATION DYNAMICS

Today and perhaps even more in the future, the demographic, economic, social, political and environmental context contributes to a huge and growing migration pressure. Therefore, international migration flows will become a structural and dynamic factor for populations in the coming decades and likely to become even more unavoidable and unstoppable.

In fact, the demographic disequilibria between the ‘northern’ and the ‘southern’ world regions may be forecast as a sure premise for future migratory pressure. Thus, between now and 2030, migratory flows, already described as unavoidable and inescapable, are expected to be the result of a decreasing working-age population (about 65 millions) in the ‘northern’ part of the world, and an enormous increase in the working-age population in the ‘southern’ part (about 1.037 million).18

Another relevant aspect of the projected population structure, which is already implicit when considering opposing growth patterns in northern and southern world regions, is the origin and consequence of some migratory flows that are related to population ageing. Due to reductions in fertility and increasing longevity, the northern regions of the world are expected to experience a decline of 65 million persons of working age during the next 25 years. In contrast, in the same period the population of working age in the southern regions is expected to gain 1,037 million. This yields a strong pull factor for immigration, as well as for unequal economic growth paths.

In this situation, it seems to be of absolute relevance to look more closely at the relation between the quantity and quality of job creation. In fact, as already noted, for a real satisfactory matching, those projections of working-age population growth in the South would imply a need of over than 700 million new jobs within 35 years, or roughly the creation of 20 million additional jobs each year. Moreover, in a globalized world context of labour rights, that is, that offer a minimum core of civil, social, political, economic rights, a new job cannot be considered as a socio-economic inclusion in the labour market if it is not also certifiable as decent, which, according to the International Labour Organization definition, excludes jobs with incomes of less than two dollars a day.
Illustrative projections of labour force are provided in the two figures below (figures 1 and 2). The working age population (15-59 years) is shown for seven countries from different geographic regions. Index numbers, defined as 100 for the year 1950 and the year 2005, show how the disequilibria in the respective working age populations become increasingly accentuated by mid-century, thereby acting as strong push and pull migratory factors.

**Figure 1 - Index numbers (1950=100 and 2005=100) of working-age population (15-59 years) in seven countries, 1950-2000 and prospects up to 2050 (medium variant)**

These observations are particularly evident in Figure 2. The disequilibria related to the working ages are projected to be even more intense than those observed during the second half of the 20th century. In particular, the biggest differences involve Africa and Europe, where the African population experiences vigorous growth, while the population in Europe shrinks rapidly (Coleman, 1992 and 1995).

In concluding these initial considerations on the demographic context, data are provided on the youngest share of the working-age population (Table 1). People in this age group (20-39 years) are perhaps the most likely to immigrate. From these figures it seems quite evident that large flows of migration from South to North are very likely to continue into the foreseeable future (Feld, 2000).

**Table 1 - Average population aged 20-39 in 2000/05 and 2020/25 in major areas of the world (absolute values in million)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro-regions</th>
<th>2000/05</th>
<th>2020/25</th>
<th>Absolute change</th>
<th>Per cent change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>World</strong></td>
<td>1.957</td>
<td>2.304</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDCs</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>-33</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
<td>1.614</td>
<td>1.993</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td>241</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>62.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
<td>210</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>-36</td>
<td>-17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per cent share of world total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>World</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDCs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Europe</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS IN A MIGRATORY PERSPECTIVE**

The above demographic projections are not only related, in a causative sense, with the quantitative and qualitative imbalances in the labour market, which are going to increase, but also with other expected developments in the South. These include: growth in per capita income; persisting labour movements out of agriculture, due to the modernization of this sector; increasing educational attainment, especially for women. These variables, together with differentials in wages and work conditions, play a determinant role in maintaining or very likely even increasing migratory flows.
The push action played by per capita income, as far as migratory behaviour is concerned, is not really so unilateral and explicitly defined. It is not the absolute growth of per capita income that alone counters migratory flows. In this regard, it is important to note how per capita income growth rates have been differentiated in recent years (Table 2, column 2). Chinese and Indian per capita income multipliers, for example, have been superior to those of the United States (Table 2, column 6).

Table 2 - Per capita Gross Domestic Product (2000 international dollars) in some countries, 1975-2003 and 1990-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Annual average absolute change (in $)</th>
<th>Per capita GDP multiplier</th>
<th>Per capita PPP GDP at the beginning of the period</th>
<th>Per capita PPP GDP at the end of the period</th>
<th>Gap from the United States at the beginning</th>
<th>Gap from the United States at the end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975-2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2,40</td>
<td>1 139</td>
<td>2 732</td>
<td>-18.776</td>
<td>-32.753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>7,94</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>4 726</td>
<td>-19.320</td>
<td>-30.758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>1,80</td>
<td>14 243</td>
<td>25 619</td>
<td>-5.672</td>
<td>-9.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>1,64</td>
<td>15 919</td>
<td>26 146</td>
<td>-3.996</td>
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Source: World Bank, 2004

The relevance of the income level and growth also represents evidence for an additional observation. Namely, very low per capita income prevents people from emigrating because minimum levels of education, skill and income are indispensable for international migration. The direct relationship between income level and growth on the one hand, and net migration on the other, may be verified at the macro level. The evidence in Figure 2 illustrates that when per capita income is extremely low, emigration is nearly absent. This is due to the lack of cultural, financial, professional resources, which limits the development of intellectual and material tools needed for immigration. In addition, very low per capita income is associated with high levels of illiteracy and large proportions of the workforce occupied in a decidedly outdated agriculture sector.
A second observation concerning the relation between per capita income growth and growing net emigration is that increasing income is also related to parallel social, economic and professional improvements. These improvements, in turn, act as push emigration factors, as shown in the left panel of Figure 2.

Finally, the third stage of a typical transition from a status of origin country to a destination country depends on generalized and systemic income growth. In other words, if economic conditions experience relative improvements, all aspects of the productive process become involved in an intensive modernization process. Moreover, if this economic evolution is coupled with a rapid demographic transition, the framework of an evolution is completed, thereby transforming an origin country into a destination country. The Italian case (right panel of Figure 2) is an example of this transformation.

Although interventions that favour economic growth and the modernization of the agricultural sector in the less developed countries are absolutely necessary for national development, in the short to medium term the consequence of these interventions are likely to be increased migratory pressure from these poor countries. Indeed, in less developed countries an obvious result of the modernization of the agricultural sector and increased education, especially for women, would be rapid growth of the non-agricultural workforce.

The difficulty arises is when a shift towards secondary or tertiary economic sectors does not correspond to sufficient job creation. In fact, with the modernization of the agricultural sector the numbers and the proportions of persons occupied in agriculture decrease rapidly. This in turn leads to huge additional labour supplies in the non-agricultural labour sectors. Also taking into demographic considerations, this generates extremely serious tensions in the non-agricultural labour market. This was the case in Italy in the 1950s and 1960s (Figure 3, left panel) and is currently being experienced in China, which, in 2000, still had half of its working-age population active in the agricultural sector (Figure 3, right panel).
The social context is also reflected both in modifying the amount of labour force, as increases in education (Figure 4) contribute to the growth of the female labour supply, and in shifting the quality of the supply. Therefore, as previously noted, even if higher educational levels represent a fundamental goal in the development of any country, such improvements will contribute to generating qualitative disequilibria in the labour market if they are not matched with equivalent and parallel labour demand.

Source: UNESCO, 2004
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: NINE PROTAGONISTS FOR THE MIGRATORY “GAME”

From a global perspective, the demographic, economic, social and educational factors noted above lead to increasing migratory flows. Also given the exponential growth in the persons and countries involved, the management of migration flows will be increasingly more difficult due to the significant social and political tensions which they frequently provoke.

If we look at the principal actors of international migration, nine protagonists with differing roles, strengths and contractual and operational capabilities can be identified. They can be seen as participants in the migration process, generating a real migratory game. The game is very difficult to manage because of its complexity. It is helpful to consider an analytical matrix that illustrates the intersecting contexts and active “players” involved.

First of all, there are some inherent differences or conflicts of interests among the actors. The single individual (1) claims the right to leave his/her own country, which may be required or simply a desire. The country of destination (2), in order to safeguard a peculiar and harmonious socio-economic development, in addition to safeguarding its own identity, claims the right to welcome a certain quota of migrants, possibly holders of particular characteristics.

This conflict is further complicated due to the increasing involvement of transit countries (3). They feel exploited as a “springboard” towards “eldorado” and do not see themselves in a position to deal with the growing numbers of irregular migrants. There are the human traffickers (4), who ignobly make a profit from migrants’ desperation and necessities.

In addition to these first four protagonists, the migratory game involves migrants’ origin country (5). It is interested in decreasing the local labour market pressure, in improving the economic conditions of a great number of families, and in gaining financial remittances. Migrants’ origin families (6) certainly constitute a push factor from a psychological, affective and, above all, financial point of view. Also, the well known “migration chain” (7) is an important actor, often representing an important pull factor. Employers in the destination country (8) determine the influx even of irregular migrants, to provide low-wage workers to the domestic labour market.

And finally, there are the other destination countries (9). Their migration policies influence flows towards a single country. For instance, in the European Union, the Schengen Treaty, enlarged to 25 countries to allow the free circulation of people among them, is bringing about the transformation from the one-dimensional and bilateral to multidimensional and multilateral migratory policy (Golini, 2006).

Moreover, the enormous improvements in the means of transport, e.g., frequency, speed and cost, facilitate the development of a single-country world. This also needs to be seen as an instrumental element, interacting intensively with all the nine protagonists in the migratory game.
From this focus on the numerous players and interactions, it is evident that it is practically impossible for any single destination country to control or efficiently manage international migrations. Even when the country of destination is the strongest player, it has many limitations on its actions. In contrast, other weaker players may be more agile in changing their strategies and actions.

**ORIGIN, DESTINATION AND TRANSIT COUNTRIES: GENERAL AIMS AND SIGNIFICANT MIGRATORY POLICIES**

1. After having focused on the contexts and players involved in the migratory field, the general aims of migratory policies of destination and origin countries should be considered.

As far as destination countries are concerned, four aims can be identified as public priorities: 1) to favour or to promote sustained economic development, first of all at domestic level and, when possible, also in origin and transit countries; 2) to promote a labour market match between demand and supply or at least to alleviate its qualitative and/or quantitative and/or spatial imbalances; 3) to favour the modernization, the development or the economic recovery of a specific sector of production/economy, and 4) to promote a demographic recovery or a slowing down of a negative demographic trend, above all in countries characterized by significant and prolonged low fertility rates.

As far as the origin countries of migration are concerned, five goals should be pursued: 1) to promote sustained economic development, reducing the huge quantitative supply on the labour market; 2) to acquire financial remittances and also, particularly in the long term, social remittances, consequently favouring the well-being of families involved in international migration; 3) to favour the modernization and the development of society and economy (even of a specific sector, for example agriculture); 4) to not waste excess human capital, and 5) to improve economic and socio-cultural relations with destination countries, also favouring export and direct foreign investments.

One way to better reconcile the political aims of both origin and destination countries could be to favour, in certain circumstances, temporary migrations. In fact, temporary migration might provide a good opportunity for origin countries, and this for a number of important reasons. First of all, temporary migration could continue to assure both financial and social remittances. Second, temporary migration does not deprive the origin country of both the migrants’ human capital and the physical capital invested in them. Moreover, temporary migration is also beneficial for destination countries, assuring them of more flexibility in the inflow of migrants and largely diminishing difficulties related to their integration. Obviously, the higher price of this kind of migration is paid by the migrant, who is separated from his/her family and may face professional and economic difficulties when returning. For the migrant social difficulties related to the future of his/her children have to be taken into account also. Accordingly, strong bilateral agreements between an origin and a destination
country regarding temporary migrations could reduce difficulties for the single person and his/her family. Moreover, these agreements could regulate modalities of departure, return and socio-economic assistance.

2. In order to achieve the general aims of an efficient management of the migratory process, as far as destination countries are concerned, it is necessary to address in an analytical framework 15 migratory policies to be implemented (Golini, 2005):

- entry flows
- accesses for family reunification and for people trained and/or selected in origin countries
- irregular or clandestine entries
- exit flows
- encouraged and/or forced returns
- clandestine repatriation
- mixed marriages
- citizenship concession to those born of foreign citizens
- citizenship concession for residence
- regular immigrant integration
- amnesties for irregular and/or clandestine immigrants
- irregular immigrants’ basic human rights (schooling, health, …)
- xenophobia/racism eradication
- own expatriates living abroad
- bilateral, multilateral, international agreements.

3. Also confirming the strategic and structural importance of all of the above 15 migratory policies, some aspects need closer examination. For example, attention is needed in relation to the presence of irregular and clandestine immigrants in the country of destination. In order to manage this delicate and important aspect, three practicable political options are available: (a) to ignore these immigrants, pretending not to know and not to see solutions that are practical and practiced widely until irregulars become “too many”; (b) to send them back, even forcibly, which is an unlikely or impossible solution, except for a “few” cases, because mass forced transfer is not ethically, politically, logistically and productively sustainable, and (c) to regularize or provide an amnesty to irregulars, which has many good reasons to be supported for both large numbers of irregulars and even for a single person. Perhaps a mix of solutions, with a preference for the last one, could be acceptable when matched with more strict and effective border controls. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that irregular and clandestine immigrants concern practically all countries of destination, be they countries with very severe controls at the frontiers or countries more lax in safeguarding the “check points” to their territories, as well as many transit countries. And this is the reason why a wide and shared political analysis and strategy on this matter is strongly recommended.
A related policy requiring close examination is the difficult question of irregular immigrant minors, with or without parents. Even though in many countries the laws provide for education and health assistance for irregular and clandestine minors living on their territory, two basic questions have not yet found positive and definitive solutions: (a) how long can these children be maintained in an irregular status?, and (b) how long can their parents be maintained in an irregular status?

SOME CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF POLITICAL EVOLUTION

In conclusion, international migration at the end of the 19th century and during the first decades of the 20th century has been a basic instrument to rebalance demographic and economic systems in the world, and also to populate the new world. In contrast, at the end of the 20th century, international migration no longer represents this same basic instrument. On the one hand, the labour supply of countries in the South is and will be overabundant. On the other hand, and not less important, there are no longer new entire worlds to be populated.

There is no doubt, in any case, that international migration represents and will continue to represent a major structural factor in the world well into the future. Its management, however, seems to be extraordinarily intricate and difficult. For example, there are questions concerning the safeguarding of the expectation and rights of migrants and their families. Also, there are the issues on the right of origin countries not to be depleted of their human resources, and the right of destination countries to safeguard their national identity, places, culture, etc.

Therefore, it seems clear that the world is facing an international migration puzzle of great difficulty. Solving this puzzle will require matching many different and diverse interests. As illustrated by goals of nine major actors in the migration game, these interests will operate along three fundamental dimensions: demographic, economic and psycho-social.

Accordingly, in the present situation the only available option seems to be a step by step policy. In the short to medium term, this policy rests on five fundamental pillars at the international, communitarian, national and local levels:

- awareness of migratory processes
- definition of realistic aims
- mixture of long-term migrations and temporary migrations
- bilateral, multilateral, international agreements
- appropriate statistical information systems.

Obviously, however, for the longer term, addressing international migration will need to rest on shared intergovernmental policies and agreements. One promising avenue to better manage
migratory phenomena might be the establishment of 4 to 5 international/supranational regional unions, perhaps as follows:

- the Euro-African area, unified with the Middle East;
- the Americas;
- the whole Indian sub-continent;
- East Asia, including the Pacific area.

These unions would be based on various coherent geo-political and economic aggregations. Their primary focus would be to resolve the migration puzzle. In particular, each regional union would guarantee within their borders the free circulation of persons, goods, capital and ideas.

Indeed, this process of international “migratory management aggregation” requires three essential attributes to ensure, among other things, geo-political influence, competitiveness and internal freedom of human mobility: (a) a sizeable population and economy; (b) a large regional area, and (c) full national sovereignty and significant (or even decisive) international influence and power. At present only four countries, China, India, the Russian Federation and the United States have these critical ingredients. However, they could represent a good model for other possible enlarged unions (Figure 5).

Figure 5 – Three characteristics to be owned to manage globalization and assure geo-political influence, competitiveness and internal free human mobility
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Global Mobility and the Quest for an International Migration Regime

Rey Koslowski

INTRODUCTION

Advances in transportation and communications technology increase the potential for international migration around the world. As international migration is less inhibited by physical or economic constraints and more a function of legal constraints imposed by states, it becomes an increasingly important political issue among states. As such, international migration is an issue area for possible international cooperation within and among international organizations or through the formation of less formal international regimes. “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983a: 2). The number of international regimes and the range of issues concerned have increased greatly over the past few decades, including international trade and finance (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984; Findlayson and Zacher 1988), international security (Jervis 1983; Van Ham 1993), human rights (Sikkink 1993), the environment (Young 1989; Haas 1989), transportation and communications (Cowhey 1990; Zacher 1996) and the internet (Franda 2001).

An international refugee regime based on the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, as well as the ongoing activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is well established. In contrast, there is no international migration regime. If one follows the UN definition of international migration as referring to those who have lived outside of their country of nationality or birth for more than one year, there is relatively little international cooperation on international migration at the global level.

The limitations of international cooperation on migration at the global level have been well surveyed in the project on the New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People (NIROMP) directed by Bimal Ghosh (2000) for the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Migration Working Group convened in 2002 by former Assistant Secretary-General, Michael Doyle, whose report (UN 2003) was then submitted to former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has long concluded conventions on the rights of migrant workers, but they are undersubscribed by UN member states, especially by destination states. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has expanded beyond its historic role of repatriating refugees and/or the securing of their and other emigrants’ admission in host countries in the post-war period, to a more general mission of migration management and increased its membership, while remaining outside the UN system, and has largely been limited to service provision by member states on a project basis. Under the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) some
100 member states have made commitments to temporary admission of foreign nationals who provide services, but these commitments mostly involve business visitor visas that are generally limited to 90 days, and intracompany transfers for periods of between two and five years that usually involve highly skilled managers, engineers and professionals. Given the UN one-year threshold for defining international migration, it can be argued that commitments made under GATS provide a set of norms that are liberalizing policies towards migration, but only for the highly skilled and only for “temporary” migration of up to five years.

In sum, these agreements do not involve significant commitments on the part of a majority of the world’s states to accept labour migration. They do not add up to a regime facilitating the international movement of labour similar to the international trade regime based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organization (WTO), to which cooperation on international migration has often been compared (see e.g. Ghosh 2000; Straubhaar 2000). International migration is not alone as an important issue area where there appears to be “demand” for a regime, but a regime has not formed. The international migration “non-regime” joins other international non-regimes in policy areas such as the proliferation of tactical nuclear weapons; information privacy; deforestation and coral reef management (Dimitrov, Sprinz, Digiusto, and Kelle 2007).

As policy makers have come to recognize that economic development in many source countries is facilitated by migrant remittances, and that destination countries increasingly look to immigrants to care for and financially support ageing populations, academics and policy analysts alike have increasingly discussed the possible development of a migration regime at the global level in both positive and negative terms (see e.g. Ghosh 2000; Straubhaar 2000; Appleyard 2001; Ogata and Cels 2003; Düvell 2005; Hatton 2007). Regardless of the arguments for and against the formation of an international migration regime, a migration regime has not formed at the global level for at least three reasons: 1) migration destination states have no reason to join an international regime to facilitate labour migration because they are able to acquire migrant labour on a unilateral basis; 2) there is no inherent reciprocity in terms of the value of labour market access that is similar to that of market access for goods in international trade agreements; 3) major migration destination states are not providing the leadership necessary for regime formation. Despite the increasing calls for international cooperation on migration, for the most part, these obstacles to increasing cooperation remain.

If we think about international migration as a subset of all movements of people across international borders, the possibilities for cooperation among states expand. In contrast to the UN definition of migration, “global mobility” refers to movements of people across international borders for any length of time or purpose. In addition to the world’s estimated 191 million migrants (UN 2006), there are billions of border crossings by tourists, students, business people and commuters who travel internationally for stays of less than a year. The UN World Tourism Organization estimates that the number of international tourist arrivals, which includes travel for leisure, business and to visit friends and relatives, increased from 846 million in 2006 to 898 million in 2007 (UNWTO 2008). If all of these individuals returned
home, their return trips home add another 898 million border crossings, totalling close to two billion border crossings. Given that contemporary migration often begins as tourism, study or temporary work abroad, global mobility is a more all-inclusive category for understanding the dynamics of international migration and the potential for its regulation by states. Expanding the issue area of consideration from international migration to global mobility also widens the scope of regime analysis to include international cooperation on international travel in general, and the activities of the international organizations concerned with it.

From a border security standpoint, the increasing number of travellers is a challenge to border control officials who attempt to identify dangerous individuals within the flows of legitimate travellers. This included the 19 hijackers who, on September 11, 2001, attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 17 of whom entered on tourist visas, one on a business visa and one on a student visa. The 9/11 hijackers were not immigrants to the U.S. Most of them were tourists. Contrary to the arguments of certain politicians and certain media outlets made after 9/11 that connected immigrants to terrorism (as well as the academic analysis of this linkage, see, e.g., Ceyhan and Tsoukala 2002; Tirman 2004), migration is not the “new security issue”; it is increasing global mobility, which is primarily tourism and business travel.

In response to the Sept. 11th attacks, the U.S. changed its visa policy and border control procedures in ways that have reverberated around the world. U.S. authorities are demanding passenger manifests and passenger name records of U.S.-bound travellers. They are also requiring all non-immigrant visa applicants to be interviewed at U.S. consulates and submit facial and fingerprint biometrics at that time and then again when entering. In some cases, these changes have prompted diplomatic conflicts and retaliatory measures. For example, in response to U.S. border authorities’ collection of biometrics, Brazil required U.S. nationals travelling to Brazil to submit fingerprints. In other cases, such changes in U.S. border control polices have elicited increased international cooperation as, for example, with the EU.

The U.S. and EU member states are increasingly viewing international cooperation, however difficult it may be, as the only option to increasing their own security. In the conclusion to its report, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) argued that, “[t]he U.S. government cannot meet its own obligations to the American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with other governments. We should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term through extensive international cooperation (9/11 Commission, 390).” In the aftermath of the July 2005 London bombing, the European Council emphasized that counter-terrorism was a “worldwide agenda” and that “The European Union will continue to work closely with the United States, other partners and key international bodies (European Council 2005: 9).” When, for example, U.S. authorities demanded passenger name record (PNR) data of U.-bound travellers from non-U.S. based airlines, European airlines became subject to conflicting EU data protection regulations and
the U.S. and the EU negotiated an agreement in order to permit the airlines to submit data to the U.S. authorities without violating EU law.

Likewise, an increasing number of UN member states are adopting visa and border control policies similar to that of the U.S., and they are joining international cooperative efforts on this front. The Protocol against Migrant Smuggling of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime calls on states to strengthen border controls and intensify cooperation among border control agencies, as well as ensure the integrity of their travel documents upon which other states depend to establish the identity (and therefore help gauge the risk) of an international traveller. ICAO member states have agreed to issue travel documents with biometrics on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips, and to procedures on electronic submission of advanced passenger information and the sharing of passenger name record data. A growing number of states are increasingly sharing data on lost and stolen passports through programmes sponsored by INTERPOL. The U.S. and the EU adoption of the Electronic Travel Authority (ETA) system, first developed by Australian authorities to collect passport data from inbound travellers who had not applied for a visa, may signal the next international trend in border security that will require additional international coordination and cooperation.

The political constraints and opportunities for international cooperation on global mobility are substantively different than those of international cooperation on migration. For example, major obstacles to international cooperation on labour migration may not necessarily apply to international cooperation on travel. Although migration destination states have no reason to join an international regime to facilitate labour migration, these very same states may be very interested in joining a global regime that facilitates the arrival of tourists and businesspeople while increasing the security of their entry. While there may be no inherent reciprocity with respect to labour migration, many policy makers and their constituencies view flows of international tourists and business people differently, thereby injecting a different set of considerations into international negotiations. Although major migration destination states are not providing the leadership necessary for the formation of an international regime to facilitate labour migration, some have clearly expressed the importance of international cooperation on international travel and have taken initiatives along the lines called for by the 9/11 Commission and the European Council.

Moreover, expanding the scope of international cooperation from international migration to global mobility may even provide opportunities for linking cooperation on international travel to cooperation on international labour migration. Essentially, the “international regime for orderly migration” proposed by Bimal Ghosh (2000) increased in value to many policy makers who, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, viewed the prospect of non-state actors acquiring and smuggling a nuclear or biological weapon of mass destruction into their country as one of greatest security threats they faced (see Allison 2004). Before September 11, the security threats posed by illegal migration and human smuggling were that of “disruptive movements of people” (Ghosh 2000: 221) that could provoke immediate border security problems because of the scale of such movements, or adverse domestic
political reactions to perceived governmental “loss of control” of borders. Now the security threats may come from small groups, or even individuals, within larger legal and illegal flows of people across international borders. By increasing the share of international migration that is orderly, properly documented, pre-screened and moves through ports of entry rather than around them, an international migration regime can help border authorities focus their limited resources on travellers and visitors that potentially pose the greatest security risks. Since the legislatures and the public of many major migration destination countries are very interested in maintaining global mobility in terms of business travel and tourism, while at the same time increasing security, cooperation on secure international travel may also serve as a stepping stone towards broader cooperation on international migration in general.

Perhaps the best way of approaching the issue under consideration is to think in terms of a set of interacting global mobility regimes. There is an established international refugee regime, an emerging international travel regime and a non-existent but potential international labour migration regime. Although the issue areas of these three regimes overlap somewhat and this overlap can lead to misunderstandings and policymaking at cross-purposes, potential issue linkages can also be leveraged for widening the scope of international cooperation in the quest of the illusive labour migration regime.

I will elaborate on these arguments in the following sections. First, I will compare and contrast the political dynamics of cooperation on international labour migration and global mobility by offering several reasons for why an international migration regime has not developed, and how similar obstacles may not exist for international cooperation on international travel. Second, I argue that limitations to unilateral measures of states to halt illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking have led to significant international cooperation that has furthered the development of an international travel regime. Third, I will describe post–September 11, 2001, border security initiatives of states and international cooperation on international travel security. Fourth, I examine the role of state leadership in regime formation and assess the prospects for leadership in the formation of global mobility regimes. Finally, I will explore the possibility of linking international cooperation on securing international travel to international cooperation on labour migration under the rubric of a General Agreement on Migration, Mobility and Security. The scope of analysis is limited to multilateral cooperation at the global level and does not include bilateral agreements and regional migration regimes that exist, for example, in Europe and that I have extensively analysed elsewhere (Koslowski 1998; 2000).

**COOPERATION ON MIGRATION VERSUS COOPERATION ON TRAVEL**

There has not been sufficient cooperation on international labour migration to produce and international migration regime primarily because of the structuring of economic and political interests. An international migration regime has not formed at the global level for at least three reasons: 1) migration destination states have no reason to join an international regime to facilitate labour migration; 2) there is no inherent reciprocity similar to that of international trade; 3) there is no leadership from major migration destination
states. These obstacles defy the best efforts of international organizations, international non-government organizations (INGOs) and migration origin states to promote cooperation and binding international commitments on labour migration. In contrast, the structure of economic and political interests in many states differs with respect to the international travel of tourists. Hence, obstacles to international cooperation on international migration may not be operative for cooperation on global mobility.

First, the fundamental obstacle to international cooperation on labour migration, as Ari Zolberg (1991; 1992) and James Hollifield (1992) have pointed out, is that migrant destination countries have little incentive to join such a regime because foreign labour, especially low-skilled labour, is in abundant supply. If labour shortages develop during periods of economic growth, states can get as much labour from abroad as they like with bilateral agreements or simply by opening labour markets to migrants while at the same time avoiding any commitments to keep labour markets open during economic downturns. A global migration regime that lifts state restrictions on international migration, much as the GATT reduced tariffs on international trade, may make sense in terms of increasing economic efficiency worldwide (Straubhaar 2000) and ensuring poorer migrant source countries access to richer migrant destination country markets for the sake of international development and reducing global inequalities (UNDP 1992). For individual migration destination states, however, the additional economic gains of joining such an international regime are primarily realized by the migrants themselves, and reduced labour costs due to migration are distributed across the economy as a whole. The broadly dispersed economic gains from reduced labour costs are concomitant with very concentrated wage competition experienced (or perceived) by certain native-born workers, who, in turn, are much more politically motivated against immigration than the broad population of consumers who enjoy lower prices for goods and services (Freeman 1995). Moreover, the broad economic gains from immigration may be negligible in comparison to the non-economic costs of large-scale immigration on a migration destination country’s security, society and culture. Such non-economic costs, whether real or just perceived, have domestic political consequences that make a policy of multilateral engagement on migration even more difficult for policy makers in destination countries to sell to a sceptical public than international free-trade agreements.

The second reason for the lack of global cooperation on labour migration is that bargaining between states on labour migration is not inherently conditioned by reciprocity (Hatton 2007). In order to shore up support in favour of international bargains to reduce tariffs, politicians in favour of free-trade agreements can argue that the gains in profits and growth of employment in export industries and agricultural sectors from opening up foreign markets make up for the loss in profits and jobs due to cheaper imports in other sectors of the economy. In contrast, workers in developed countries do not benefit much from gaining access to labour markets in migrant origin counties of the developing world. Politicians in developed countries who need the votes of workers threatened by the wage competition of migrants do not have a corresponding constituency akin to “exporters” and workers in export
industries. Hence, international negotiations over the liberalization of immigration policies are not about realizing competitive advantages as in trade, but rather primarily about the merits of advantages realized by migrant origin countries.

One potential point of reciprocity would be for migration destination states to agree to international commitments to legal labour migration in exchange for migrant origin states agreeing to stop their nationals from illegally migrating and working abroad. There are, however, often constitutional and human rights limitations to what many migrant origin states can do on this front, given that the freedom to leave one’s country has been considered a cornerstone of human rights, as prominently articulated by the U.S. government in the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act, which denied most favoured nation trading status to countries that denied their citizens the right to emigrate. Migrant origin states could (and many do) cooperate with migration destination countries by agreeing to readmit their nationals who are apprehended while living and working illegally in another state, as well as provide travel documents (if needed) to facilitate the deportation of their nationals by countries of destination. Depending on the regime type in the migrant origin state, this may be politically difficult, as illegal migrants working abroad may be sending home large amounts of remittances upon which the economy of the migrant origin state may depend. Even more poignantly, illegal migrants working abroad may be constituents and major political campaign contributors to politicians in the migrant origin state (see, e.g., Smith 2005) who are supposed to enact readmission agreements that facilitate deportation of their nationals.

Thirdly, there is little leadership among migration destination states to propel international cooperation on labour migration forward. As Charles Kindleberger (1973), Robert Gilpin (1981) and Robert Keohane (1984) have argued, the post-war international monetary regime required the “hegemonic stability” provided by the U.S. as a lender of last resort, and post-war expansions of free trade under the GATT depended upon a U.S. tolerance of “free-riding” by states in Europe and East Asia that took advantage of U.S. market openings to imports, but retained measures to protect their own markets.

While the U.S. has the largest migrant population in the world (see Table 1), the U.S. government has not demonstrated similar leadership with respect to fostering global cooperation in the area of labour migration, nor has the U.S. been among the states that have sponsored recent efforts such as the Berne Initiative and the Global Commission on International Migration.
Table 1 - The Ten Countries with the Highest Number of International Migrants (in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States of America 23.3</td>
<td>United States of America 38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Russian Federation 11.5</td>
<td>Russian Federation 12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India 7.4</td>
<td>Germany 10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ukraine 7.1</td>
<td>Ukraine 6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pakistan 6.6</td>
<td>France 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Germany 5.9</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia 6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>France 5.9</td>
<td>Canada 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia 4.7</td>
<td>India 5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Canada 4.3</td>
<td>United Kingdom 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Australia 4.0</td>
<td>Spain 4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.N. 2006

U.S.-based foundations, NGOs and American citizens working for international organizations may try to foster international cooperation on migration, but this is no equivalent to the U.S. government’s convocation of states at Bretton Woods and its follow-up actions to support the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the GATT.

Similarly, none of the top ten migration destination countries, which collectively host over half of the world’s 191 million migrants (see Table 1), has taken up the cause of international commitments to liberalizing immigration policies. In January 2008, however, labour ministers of Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam and Yemen met in Abu Dhabi to constitute the “Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia”. Inasmuch as Saudi Arabia, India and the Gulf States (collectively) are major migration destination countries, the “Abu Dhabi Dialogue” appears to be indicative of another potential source of leadership towards the formation of an international labour migration regime. The “Abu Dhabi Declaration of Asian Countries of Origin and Destination”, however, was carefully worded to refer to “expatriate and contract labour” and “contractual labour mobility” and not “migration” and there are no references to any multilateral commitments to keeping labour markets open to migrants or contract labourers.21

For all of these reasons, there appears to be relatively little interest among UN member states, especially migration destination states, to expand the global legal and normative framework for migration policies despite the increasing number of international conferences on the subject. This was reflected, for example, in the answers to a questionnaire by UN member states, in which only 47 favoured convening a global conference on the issue while 26 opposed and 111 did not reply (UN 2003).
Major migration destination states may not be very interested in making commitments to multilateral cooperation to facilitate labour migration, but these very same states may be inclined to join a global regime that facilitates the arrival of international travellers who do not come to work but rather to spend money on lodgings, meals and leisure activities. While there may be no inherent reciprocity between states that send and receive labour migration, international tourism has as a different array of political constituencies that produce different political dynamics with respect to international bargaining among states.

Over the past decade, international tourism has steadily grown in numbers of tourists as well as in terms of an industry in many countries of the world. Not only is international tourism becoming a major share of the economies of certain developing countries, but represents an increasingly important component of the post-industrial service economies of many developed countries, and especially of particular regions and cities in these countries. The governments of many UN member states, their regions and cities spend millions of dollars to actively promote their attractions for international tourists.

Arrivals of international tourists have increased from 535 million to 846 million, or 58 per cent, from 1995 to 2006 (see table 2). Of these, 51 per cent travelled for the purpose of leisure, recreation and holidays; 27 per cent for such purposes as visiting friends and relatives, religious reasons/pilgrimages, health treatment; 16 per cent for business, while the purpose of the remaining 6 per cent was not specified (UNWTO 2007). It is important to point out that many individuals travel internationally several times per year. Therefore, the 846 million international tourist arrivals does not equate to 846 million individuals who have travelled internationally in one year. Most of the world’s 6.3 billion people do not nor probably will ever leave the country of their birth.

### Table 2 - International Tourist Arrivals (in millions, ordered by 2006 ranking)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>535.0</td>
<td>682.0</td>
<td>702.0</td>
<td>691.0</td>
<td>761.0</td>
<td>803.0</td>
<td>846.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNWTO 2005; 2006; 2007
The 846 million international tourists generated USD 733 billion in revenue distributed across the world, with 75 states receiving at least one billion US dollars (UNWTO 2007). Nevertheless, USD 369 billion, more than half of the total, went to the top ten recipient countries (see Table 2), most of which are states with highly developed economies and, with the exception of China, all members of the OECD.

Table 3. International Tourism Receipts ($ billions, 2006 ranking)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>81.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* UNWTO 2006; UNWTO 2007.

Six of the top ten migration destination countries (the U.S., Russia, Germany, France, the U.K. and Spain) are also among the top ten destination countries of international tourists (compare tables 1 and 2). Although these major migration destination countries need not consider multilateral cooperation in order to obtain migrant workers because they are in abundant supply, the supply of international tourists cannot be similarly be taken for granted. Tourists can opt to travel to other countries or simply travel within their own. Moreover, the money international tourists spend can shift away from states that erect barriers to international travel toward those that do not.

For example, international tourism to the U.S. peaked in 2000 at 51.2 million international arrivals (USD 82.4 billion in receipts), then dropped to 41.2 million (USD 64.3 billion) in 2003. That was the year when the Department of Homeland Security was formed, that the Iraq War began, that many provisions of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, such as mandatory interviews for visa applications with submission of biometrics came into effect, and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) programme was deployed at all airports and seaports to collect facial and fingerprint biometrics from individuals travelling to the U.S. on a non-immigrant visa. It has taken six years until 2006 for the U.S. to regain the level of international tourist arrivals and exceed the receipts of 2000 (51.1 million and USD 85.7 billion, respectively). In the same six years, the world total of international arrivals increased 24 per cent; Spain overtook the U.S. second-place ranking as international tourist arrivals to Spain increased from 47.9 million to 58.5 million and arrivals to China increased from 31.2 million to 49.6 million, bringing China within striking distance of surpassing the U.S. third-place ranking.
This fact has not been lost on the U.S. tourist industry as evidenced by testimony on border security measures submitted by the Travel Industry Association (TIA) at a January 2004 Congressional hearing. “International business and leisure travel to the U.S. is a vital component of our national economy…. Overseas travel to the U.S. was down 31.8 percent in 2003 compared to 2000 levels. This decline has drastically reduced the flow of tax revenue to all levels of government and reduced our international balance of trade. Since 2000, the loss of international travel to the U.S. has cost our economy $15.3 billion in expenditures…. While some of the causes are beyond the reach of an individual country, actions by the U.S. government can either enhance or harm our nation’s ability to attract increased international travel to the U.S. and create more jobs and economic opportunities for states and cities across the country. For this reason, the US-VISIT programme must be implemented with traveler facilitation as one of its primary goals. Otherwise, international travelers might not wish to return to the U.S., or may be deterred from visiting in the first place (U.S. House 2004).”


The distribution and visibility of the economic benefits of international tourism are rather different than that of international labour migration. The economic benefits from international labour migration go to the migrants themselves, the businesses in migration destination states that profit from lower labour costs and their customers who enjoy lower costs for the goods and services produced. Receipts from international tourists benefit the accommodation, restaurant and entertainment businesses and can be directly tied to jobs in these industries. While a decline in labour migration may most visibility be reflected in declining remittances to home countries, a decline in a country’s international tourism is often reflected in rising unemployment rates and declining tax revenues in that country’s major tourist destinations. While politicians who advocate to maintain or increase labour migration may face significant opposition from those constituents who face wage competition from migrants, advocacy for increasing international tourism is not only uncontroversial, but it is a common mantra of economic development policies of many cities and regions in most countries of the world. While it may be very difficult for a politician in a major migration destination state to support international agreements that would commit a country to accept certain levels of labour migration regardless of economic conditions, advocacy for international cooperation that may facilitate international tourism would not be difficult. Indeed, depending on how much international tourism contributes to the economy of the politician’s constituency, taking a leadership role in furthering international cooperation to facilitate tourism would most likely be very popular among many businesses people as well as those who work in the hospitality industry.
A fundamental difference between international cooperation on migration and global mobility is that the world’s 200 million migrants are primarily from lower socio-economic classes who went abroad to take difficult, dirty, dangerous and undesirable jobs; international tourists and business travellers are primarily from middle and upper socio-economic classes. Those international tourists from lower socio-economic ranks are primarily migrants returning home to visit their family, or migrants’ relatives visiting them. While liberal immigration policies and international cooperation on facilitating labour migration primarily benefits migrant workers and their extended families back home who receive remittances, liberal visa and border security policies as well as international cooperation to facilitate international travel primarily benefit middle and upper class population segments who wish to take their holidays abroad as well as attend business meetings and conferences. While there are politicians in migration destination states who advocate liberal immigration policies to protect the human rights of migrant workers and for the sake of economic development through remittances, it is much easier for politicians to advocate liberal visa and border control policies that reduce the inconveniences of international travel for their own well-to-do constituents, while at the same time making international travel for migrants easier.

With respect to reciprocity, nationals of migration destination states might not be particularly interested in gaining access to the labour markets of migrant origin countries; however, those who have the financial resources, personal and business interests that would enable and motivate them to travel abroad are generally interested in access to the widest range of countries for leisure and business travel. Indeed, visa policy has historically been reciprocal in nature.

Reciprocity is also a key principle of visa waivers which enable visa-free travel. As the volume of international travel increased dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, several states dropped visa requirements for short-term visits on a reciprocal basis. The U.S. Visa Waiver Program (begun as a pilot programme with the U.K. and Japan in 1988 and made permanent in 2000) permits travel to the U.S. for purposes of business or pleasure for up to 90 days without a visa by nationals of 27 states that similarly permit visa-free travel by U.S. nationals. Nationals of EU member states do not need visas to travel to other EU states. All EU member states adhere to a common visa policy that includes a list of 36 countries whose nationals may travel to any EU member state without a visa for short stays, and 126 countries whose nationals must apply for and receive visas in order to travel. Seven of the top ten international tourist destinations (France, Spain, U.S., Italy, U.K., Germany and Austria) have reciprocal visa-free travel arrangements. When states require visas of other states’ nationals, those states will often reciprocate with matching visa application fees, as is case, for example, with Chinese application fees for travellers from the U.S.

International practices of visa reciprocity have over time developed into international norms codified under the GATS to help govern a major share of international travel, namely the 131 million international arrivals for the purpose of business in 2006 (UNWTO 2007). The GATS delineates the four possible forms of service delivery covered by the agreement, which includes the “presence of natural persons”, also referred to as “Mode 4”. WTO members’
commitments under Mode 4 are the temporary admission of foreign nationals who provide services, as outlined in the GATS “Annex on movement of natural persons supplying services under the Agreement” (WTO 1994). The scheduled horizontal mode 4 commitments made by some 100 member states are irrevocable and primarily deal with business visitor visas that are generally limited to 90-day stays (WTO 1998, 13).

At the same time that many OECD and other countries with relatively high per capita GDPs permit visa-free travel to nationals from similarly wealthy countries, these same countries have maintained visa requirements for the nationals of relatively poorer countries (Neumayer 2006). Commitments to offering business visas under the GATS are more universal, but are limited to travel by business persons who, in most countries, tend to be from higher socio-economic classes and, in any event, have to provide sufficient proof to consular officers that their proposed travel is truly for business purposes and that they have sufficient resources and reasons to return to their origin countries after the term of their visa expires.

One of the major challenges to states that liberalize their visa policies is the abuse of those visas by tourists and business travellers who do not abide by the terms of their visas (or visa-free travel), whether these individuals work after entering on tourist visas or stay without authorization beyond the terms of their visa. A significant share of international travel turns into international migration of the illegal sort if those who overstay their visa entitlements stay long enough. As the percentage of international travel that becomes illegal migration grows, political support for liberal visa and border controls wanes. As such political support wanes, the domestic political dynamics favourable to international cooperation on international travel shift and obstacles can quickly develop that are similar to those in the path of international cooperation on labour migration.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO COMBAT ILLEGAL MIGRATION, HUMAN SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING

Illegal migration can be the result of individuals entering states though authorized ports of entry by fraud or concealment within conveyances, crossing state borders without authorization between ports of entry or entering through ports of entry with appropriate authorization and/or a visa, but subsequently overstay the terms of entry. Human smuggling involves unauthorized border crossings facilitated through paid smugglers. International human trafficking occurs when an individual who has been smuggled across a border is then coerced, especially into forced labour or prostitution. As the declining travel costs reduced the geographical barriers to international travel, visa applications and border controls imposed by states became the primary barriers to entry. As increasing numbers of individuals attempted to enter destination countries without authorization in the 1980s and 1990s, these states tightened their visa and border control policies and increased the staffing, funding and legal authority of border guards. States can unilaterally address the problem of individuals overstaying their visas with stepped-up worksite and internal law enforcement measures. In contrast, reducing clandestine migration between ports of entry and smuggling through them is much more difficult without international cooperation.
Therefore, cooperation among states on illegal migration, smuggling and trafficking has developed to a considerable extent at the global level.

Contrary to popular perceptions, a relatively high percentage of illegal migrants in major destination countries entered legally but overstayed their visas. It has been estimated that between 40 and 50 per cent of the roughly 12 million illegal migrants in the U.S. overstayed their visas (Pew 2006) and that over half of the 8 million illegal migrants in the EU are also visa overstayers (European Commission 2008). States endeavour to reduce visa overstays by increasing thresholds and tests for successful visa applications, identifying those who have overstayed their visas, deporting them and barring them from receiving visas in the future, or at least for several years. Many states require international travellers to fill out arrival/departure cards that are collected by border control officers at the beginning and end of the visit. Data gathered from these cards can be used to determine whether an individual has overstayed the visa entitlement. Such data are useful to border control officers who enforce immigration laws by detaining and deporting illegal migrants. When tallied, such data can also be used to identify those origin states whose nationals have high overstay rates. Accurate calculations of overstay rates are useful to consular officers who use country of origin metrics in making their decisions to approve or deny individual visa applications as well as to policy makers determining which states should be on visa-free travel lists.

When computers are used to automate the processing of arrival/departure card data, the resulting automated entry-exit system can be a very powerful tool to identify visa overstayers, as Australian experience amply demonstrates. Australian border officials have been collecting entry and exit data since 1981. Not only does every incoming international traveller fill out an arrival/departure card and hand it over to border control officers upon entry and exit, Australian border control authorities now electronically record the entry of everyone entering Australia (whether a foreigner or Australian citizen), usually with an automated passport reader. Inspectors similarly capture passport data from everyone leaving and the system matches exit records with corresponding entry records. If the system determines that someone has overstayed his or her visa, he or she will be referred to secondary inspection for an interview. In secondary inspection, border control authorities can retrieve digital images of the handwritten arrival cards that were scanned shortly after arrival, and then compare the information and handwriting with the corresponding departure card submitted. If an individual has overstayed his or her visa and did so for more than 28 days, the person is informed that he or she will not be granted a temporary visa to travel to Australia for three years. This automated entry-exit system enables Australian border officials to easily determine the number of people who have overstayed their visas (47,500) as well as the countries they come from—the largest number being from the U.S. (4,940).

In 1996, the U.S. Congress mandated development of a similar automated entry-exit control system that would “collect a record of every alien departing the United States and match the records of departure with the record of the alien’s arrival in the United States” (U.S. House 1996: section 110.a.1). U.S. business groups, states and localities bordering Canada and Mexico argued against the new entry-exit data collection requirements, noting that
registering every person who crosses into the U.S. from Canada or Mexico, even using then existing smart-card technology, would still require enough processing time to back up traffic at the border for hours, especially at the U.S.-Canadian border crossing between Detroit, Michigan and Windsor, Ontario, impair the international movement of goods and people, thereby costing billions of dollars in lost trade and tourism receipts to the U.S. (U.S. Senate 1998). In response to this lobbying, Congress pushed back the impending deadline for implementation of the law in 1998 (Cohn 1999) and then in 2000 pushed back the deadline once again and limited data collection to that which was already being collected by existing law authorities and disallowed collection of any new entry-exit data (U.S. GPO 2000). The resulting entry-exit tracking system primarily covered passengers arriving by air and consisted of a paper arrival/departure form stamped at the port of entry, which was supposed to be collected by the airline upon departure, handed over to immigration authorities and entered into a database. Due to lost forms, incomplete or inaccurate data entry, exit over land borders and incomplete deployment of the system, missing exit data corrupted the database, leaving immigration inspectors with no effective way of knowing if individuals had overstayed their visas (Bromwich 1999).

In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the U.S. Congress mandated the development of an automated biometric entry-exit tracking system. The United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) programme collects digital photograph and fingerprint scan biometrics from individuals travelling to the U.S. on a non-immigrant visa or the arrival in the U.S. of nationals of countries in the Visa Waiver Program. Biometrics submitted with visa applications are matched against those of the individual presenting him or herself for admission into the U.S. at the port of entry. In the four years since the initial deployment of US-VISIT at the beginning of 2004 to March 2008, biometrics have been collected from 113 million individuals entering the U.S. and run against watch list databases (Chertoff 2008). Exit data beyond that received from airline and ship manifests are not yet collected; therefore, US-VISIT is not yet a fully functioning entry-exit system such as that used by Australian authorities. In November 2007, Japan deployed its biometric entry-exit system that requires all foreign nationals above 16 (with some exceptions) to submit facial and fingerprint biometrics upon entry (Immigration Bureau 2007). In February 2008, the European Commission announced its plans for an automated biometric entry-exit system, projected to be deployed by all Schengen member states by 2015 (European Commission 2008). Without exit data collection capabilities, which most major destination countries have yet to develop, it is difficult to identify visa overstayers or bar their future entry, let alone prosecute them for immigration law violations. Australia demonstrated some time ago that deployment of an effective automated entry-exit system is technological feasible; whether other states develop similar capabilities to reduce visa overstaying is largely a function of budgetary priorities and political will.

States endeavour to reduce clandestine entries between ports of entry as well as unauthorized entries by concealment in conveyances or through document fraud at ports of entry by increasing the number of border control officers, supplying them with better technology and changing laws and regulations to enable more aggressive pursuit of clandestine border
crossers, as well as to turn back those individuals suspected of identity and document fraud. The challenge faced by states on this front is much greater than that posed through overstaying of visa entitlements because unauthorized border crossers are able to purchase the assistance of professional smugglers and it is extremely difficult to combat human smuggling without international cooperation.

As migration destination countries tightened border controls during the 1990s, an increasing percentage of illegal migrants and asylum seekers paid human smugglers to assist them to circumvent border controls or pass through them using fraudulent travel documents. Moreover, many of those who thought they were simply being smuggled found themselves coerced into forced labour and prostitution. The increase in human smuggling and trafficking was a dark side of the rapid growth of international travel during the 1990s and it called into question the measures taken to facilitate international travel and promote development through international tourism, a small percentage of which became international travel undertaken in order to purchase relatively inexpensive sex with women and children who had been trafficked.

In response, policy makers from the major migration destination countries such as the U.S., Germany, Canada, Australia, the U.K., France, Italy and Austria became increasingly concerned with the trafficking in persons, particularly women and children into forced prostitution. Given that measures taken by states to tighten border controls did not necessarily stem the flows of illegal migrants due to increasingly sophisticated smuggling techniques, migration destination countries increasingly viewed the smuggling of migrants across their borders as a security issue of “uncontrollable” borders.

Although such migration destination states have demonstrated little interest in joining an international regime to facilitate labour migration, these very same states were very active in efforts to foster international cooperation on human smuggling and trafficking. While there may be no inherent reciprocity between states that send and receive labour migration, UN member states, whether primarily countries of origin, destination or transit could agree on the evils of trafficking in women and children across international borders. Moreover, most UN member states have also come to recognize that they could not collectively combat human trafficking in which individuals are coerced into forced prostitution and forced labour, if they did not also address human smuggling in which individuals simply pay smugglers to illegally cross international borders. States to which migrants were increasingly smuggled and trafficked also acknowledged that they could not combat human smuggling and trafficking on a unilateral or even bilateral basis due to the fact that human smuggling often involved several transit countries and smugglers and migrants from more than two countries and, therefore, many of these states have embraced international cooperation on the regional and/or global level.

The League of Nations and then United Nations have long served as fora for international cooperation against the trafficking of women and children—going back to international cooperation to combat “white slavery” at the beginning of the 20th century (see Sculley
During the 1990s, Austria took the lead in encouraging fellow UN member states to pass laws that specifically criminalized human smuggling and draft an international convention on the smuggling of illegal aliens (Schüssel 1997). In December 1998, the UN General Assembly initiated an Ad Hoc Committee and charged it to draw up a comprehensive international convention against transnational organized crime and, in November 2000, the “UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” as well as its “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children” and the “Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air” were adopted by the U.N. General Assembly. On receiving the requisite number of ratifications, the Convention came into effect on September 29, 2003, the anti-trafficking protocol on December 25, 2003 and the anti-smuggling protocol on January 28, 2004. As of April 2008, the anti-trafficking protocol counted 119 state parties and the anti-smuggling protocol 111 state parties to them.

The objectives of the anti-trafficking protocol are to prevent and combat trafficking in persons as well as protect and assist the victims of such trafficking. The objectives of the human smuggling protocol are twofold—establishing the smuggling of migrants as a criminal offense and facilitating cooperation in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of the crime of smuggling of migrants. In order to meet those objectives, the two protocols provide rules for interdicting and boarding of ships suspected of carrying illegal migrants, approves of the use of carrier sanctions, encourages information programmes directed at the clients of traffickers and smugglers, as well as information exchanges between states that enable more effective law enforcement. The protocol also calls on states to strengthen border controls and intensify cooperation among border control agencies by establishing and maintaining direct lines of communication, ensuring the integrity of the travel documents they issue and respond to requests to verify the validity of those documents.

The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) functions as the secretariat of the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, and the UNODC’s Global Programme Against Trafficking in Human Beings (GPAT) assists countries in their efforts to combat this crime. Additionally, UNODC launched the Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT) in March 2007, in order to raise awareness and increase the knowledge base about human trafficking, build commitment to partnerships with governments, the international community, NGOs, the private sector, civil society organizations and the media, and implement projects to fight human trafficking at the local, regional and international level.

The IOM has also emerged as a major actor with respect to international cooperation in the area of human smuggling and trafficking, despite the fact that it has a smaller membership than the UN and is much more specialized and limited as a forum for migration policymaking than regional organizations such as the EU. Indeed, IOM played a significant role preparing the way for negotiations that led to the anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling protocols. At a 1994 IOM-sponsored meeting in Geneva, which brought together representatives from source, transit and destination countries, participants asked the IOM to advance the policy discussions of migrant trafficking, organize regional meetings, collect and disseminate information, analyse the problem of trafficking in women for prostitution and contribute to
policy harmonization (IOM 1994). Since then, the IOM has been sponsoring regional processes dealing with irregular migration and migrant trafficking in Europe, the Americas, East and Southeast Asia. While the IOM has emerged as the leading international organization in the area of research and policy dialogues devoted to human smuggling in general, operational programmes have primarily focused on trafficking in women and children for forced prostitution, whether in terms of publicity campaigns to discourage women from turning to traffickers or return programmes, concerning which the IOM is very experienced.

Not only are there limitations on what states can do by themselves to identify and apprehend unauthorized border crossers, states also encounter new challenges when they successfully apprehend unauthorized border crossers and visa overstayers, especially in high numbers. That is, destination states may encounter difficulties returning such individuals without the cooperation of their origin countries, especially if they no longer have valid passports or other travel documents. In some cases, origin countries have opted not to acknowledge the nationality of failed asylum seekers and apprehended illegal migrants and have failed to supply travel documents necessary for the orderly return of these individuals. Many destination countries, therefore, have negotiated bilateral readmission agreements with origin countries to facilitate the voluntary return of those who were never authorized to enter, or had ‘lost’ their authorization to remain in the destination country.

Except for the commitments undertaken by states which signed and ratified the UN Refugee Convention not to return individuals with a well-founded fear of persecution, there are no international norms or multilateral agreements on readmission at the global level. Nevertheless, the international cooperation that has enabled the IOM to grow in terms of state membership, budget, staffing and activities has produced an international organization that facilitates readmission by helping states with its practical aspects. The IOM offers Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) services to states and individuals that provide “pre-departure, transportation and post-arrival assistance to unsuccessful asylum seekers, migrants in an irregular situation, migrants stranded in transit, stranded students and other persons in similar circumstances….The assistance typically provides information, referral, arrangement of travel to the home location and limited support towards reinsertion (IOM 2008).” On its website, IOM lists 128 Assisted Voluntary Return projects involving destination countries such as the U.S., Australia, Mexico, Switzerland, Norway and a majority of EU member states, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.

The prospect of terrorists being smuggled into target states was considered as a potential threat in some law enforcement circles, but it was not until after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington and the March 11, 2003 attacks in Madrid that human smuggling was viewed as a security threat in a qualitatively different way. For example, it became clear that terrorists could take clandestine routes that transnational criminal organizations use to smuggle illegal migrants into the U.S. The 9/11 Commission report details linkages between human smugglers and Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups in need of travel facilitation (9/11 Commission 2004a; 61). Investigations into the Madrid bombing produced reports
demonstrating that Ansar al-Islam, an al Qaeda-affiliated group linked to the attack, has been running a human smuggling and document fraud operation to fund terrorist actions as well as to smuggle its own members into countries like Spain and Iraq (Simpson, Crawford and Johnson 2004). As intelligence screening and visa security are tightened so as to stop terrorists from entering legally with valid visas, the threat of clandestine entry of terrorists using smuggling organizations will increase and so too will the security imperatives of international cooperation to combat human smuggling.27

By providing legal instruments for law enforcement cooperation on border controls, the U.N. Transnational Crime Convention’s Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air provides a set of norms and principles that are constitutive of an international regime. By convening regional meetings devoted to facilitating international cooperation to realize the objectives of the protocols against trafficking and smuggling, the IOM is playing a critical role in fostering regime formation, at least on the regional level. By assisting states with voluntary return, the IOM is also helping states in their border-control efforts directed at illegal migration and human smuggling. To the extent that these state efforts and corresponding international cooperation enable states to maintain “control over their borders” (or at least the perception of control by the public of destination countries) they foster political dynamics in favour of maintaining liberal visa polices and international cooperation to facilitate international travel. Hence, such international cooperation on border controls can be considered critical components of an emerging international travel regime.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO SECURE INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

Despite the fact that many states, including the U.S., built up their border control capabilities in the 1990s by hiring more officers and providing them with increasingly sophisticated technology, these proved insufficient to stop the Sept. 11 attacks, as Al-Qaeda systematically studied and trained to compromise existing border controls. Al-Qaeda operated a “pass-port office” at the Kandahar airport to alter travel documents and train operatives, including Mohamad Atta (9/11 Commission 2004: 169) and at least two, and perhaps as many as eleven, of the September 11 hijackers used fraudulently altered passports. Three of the hijackers had stayed in the U.S. after their visas expired and several purchased fraudulent identity documents on the black market that primarily services illegal migrants (9/11 Commission 2004a: 138-39). Contrary to much of the early discussions in the media that all of the hijackers entered legally and that border controls were irrelevant to their entry, the 9/11 Commission concluded that “15 of the 19 hijackers were potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities” (9/11 Commission 2004: 384).

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, many governments, led by the U.S., initiated measures to increase the security of international travel but, at the same time, they wished to avoid hindering legitimate travel. It is very difficult, however, to simultaneously facilitate international tourism and business travel and secure the movements of people across borders without multilateral cooperation, and many states have adopted policies towards securing
international travel with this in mind. Most notably, the European Commission and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security have been taking international cooperation into sensitive areas of state sovereignty dealing with border controls, government surveillance, data collection and exchange that, before September 11, 2001, would have been unthinkable. The emerging international travel regime is centred in the transatlantic area, developing rather quickly and leading to ever deeper and broader global international cooperation on travel document security, passenger data sharing and electronic travel authorization.

ICAO member states agreed in 1980 to standards for the issuance of machine-readable travel documents which most states began to issue in the 1980s and 1990s. Although the original objective was to enable border control authorities to cope with the increased number of passengers arriving at ports of entry at the same time due to increased capacities of much larger wide-bodied jets, such as the Boeing 747, machine-readable travel documents provided increased security because data in the machine-readable zone could be checked against the biographical data typed on the document itself, thereby making fraudulent alterations more difficult.

In reaction to the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Congress passed the October 2001 US PATRIOT Act, which, among other things, required states that participated in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program to issue machine-readable passports by 2003. Then, after the British national Richard Reid boarded a transatlantic flight in December 2001 with only his passport and tried to detonate a bomb concealed in his shoes, members of Congress called for the elimination of the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) that enabled nationals of 27 states (including 15 EU member states) to travel to the U.S. without a visa.

Instead of abolishing the Visa Waiver Program, the U.S. Congress required that all passports of Visa Waiver Program countries issued after October 26, 2004 contain biometrics. As one State Department official put it, the U.S. used the “leverage” of its Visa Waiver Program to push for a “common agenda on biometrics”. Many countries signalled that they could not meet this deadline, and former Secretaries Tom Ridge and Colin Powell asked Congress for a postponement to December 2006 (Powell and Ridge 2004). Congress responded with legislation, but only allowed a one-year extension to Oct. 26, 2005.

The U.S. Congress deferred to ICAO on setting the biometric standard and it was not until May 28, 2003, that ICAO announced an agreement—facial recognition plus optional fingerprints and/or retina scans stored on a contactless integrated circuit (IC) chip (ICAO 2003). The contactless IC chip is part of a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system in which data on a chip or tag are transmitted via radio waves to a reader. As opposed to machine-readable travel documents that contain data on magnetic strips, a passport with an RFID chip can be read by the reader at a distance, therefore allowing faster transfer of data from the passport. As envisioned, holders of new biometric passports issued by Visa Waiver countries will give their passports to inspectors who will simply bring the passport close to the reader. The reader will capture the personal data and the digitized biometric. This information can then be checked against terrorist and law enforcement watch lists. A year later, ICAO arrived at a
technical standard for the IC chips that ensured interoperability between chips and readers (ICAO 2004), leaving only five months for countries to purchase and install the necessary equipment for their e-passport programmes.

When it appeared that many Visa Waiver Program countries would not be able to meet the original deadline, the U.S. Congress granted an extension to Oct. 26, 2005, but it soon became clear that many countries could not meet that deadline either. Therefore, Congress relaxed the biometrics requirement so a digital photo embedded in the passport cover would count as the required biometric for another year. All Visa Waiver Program countries were able to meet this requirement, except Italy and France, which meant that those Italian and French citizens who received their passports after October 26, 2005, were required to have visas in order to travel to the U.S., that is, until the Italian and French e-passport programmes came online. The situation improved markedly within the next year, as 24 out of 27 Visa Waiver Program countries met the October 26, 2006, deadline for all new passports to have biometrics on RF-enabled IC chips—including all EU member states in the Visa Waiver Program.

Over forty states have communicated their intention to ICAO to upgrade to biometric e-passports by 2008, and approximately 15 million e-passports were issued worldwide in 2006 and it is expected that an additional 35 million to 40 million will be issued in 2007 (Card Technology 2007). Although U.S. homeland security policies have driven implementation of e-passport programmes in the EU and other countries in the Visa Waiver Program, the EU is now setting higher security standards for e-passports than those set by the U.S. EU members have collectively agreed to an EU requirement that new e-passports will eventually include fingerprints in addition to facial biometrics (European Commission 2004). This EU requirement is a step that has hardly even been broached by current DHS officials, let alone discussed in Congress. It is therefore unlikely that the U.S. e-passport would meet the agreed to EU standard in the near future, if at all.

Transatlantic cooperation emerged through U.S. security initiatives and negotiations with the EU that have set up a variety of arrangements and more formal agreements, most notably with agreements on the transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, which provide the data that many border security information systems need to function. The 2001 U.S. Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires that airlines with U.S.-bound international flights submit electronically a passenger manifest and mandates that “the carriers shall make passenger name record information available to the Customs Service upon request (U.S. GPO 2001: Section 115)” . PNR data are created each time a passenger books a flight and are stored in the airlines reservation systems. To comply with these regulations, U.S.-based airlines allowed access to their PNR databases to the U.S. Customs Service. Many opted to simply give database passwords to U.S. Customs, which allowed Customs to “pull” all PNR data rather than select and “push” a subset of that data which met specific Customs requests. The U.S. Customs Service also requested PNR data from European-based airlines, but several resisted, contending that it would be a violation of EU data protection rules. Essentially, European airlines were presented with the choice of either breaking U.S. laws, facing fines
and potentially losing landing rights, or violating EU and EU member state data protection laws and facing fines.

Discussions between the European Commission and the U.S. Customs Service yielded U.S. compliance extensions for these airlines until March 5, 2003, by which time the EU and the U.S. arrived at an interim arrangement (European Commission 2003; CBP 2003). After extensive negotiations, the European Commission and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) secured an agreement in 2004 in the form of a Commission “adequacy decision” (European Commission 2004a) that data were adequately protected and corresponding “undertakings” issued by CBP (2004), which promise that data would receive agreed to treatment (Bolkestein 2003). Key features of the agreement restrict data use to preventing and combating terrorism and serious transnational crimes (i.e. not domestic crime), limit retention of data for up to 3.5 years, and provide redress to passengers through a new DHS Privacy Office, with the possibility of EU data protection authorities representing EU citizens (Bolkestein 2003; DHS 2003).

Despite this arrangement, the European Parliament called upon the Commission to withdraw the draft decision, arguing that the Commission’s decision “presents the risk that millions of European passengers will be subject to comprehensive surveillance and monitoring by a third country (European Parliament 2004)”. When the Commission did not withdraw from the agreement, the European Parliament referred the issue to the European Court of Justice, which ruled in May 2006 against the Commission, annulling the legal basis of the agreement (but not ruling against the substance of the agreement itself) and stipulated that this annulment would come into effect in October 2006. Just in time, the EU and the U.S. arrived at another interim agreement that could remain in effect until July 2007. A new agreement was finally reached on June 27, 2007, in talks between European Union Justice and Security Commissioner, Franco Frattini, German Interior Minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, and U.S. Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff.

Transatlantic cooperation on PNR data collection and exchange as well as the setting of biometric standards requires acceptance of mutual constraints on the range of state action in the area of border control—one of the defining aspects of territorial sovereignty. Further cooperation, however, may be interrupted by differing legal regimes governing privacy and personal data protection. Given the increasing concerns by the European Parliament (and national parliaments) over the privacy of PNR data, there may be major limitations to further transatlantic PNR data transfer without global multilateral agreements. Partly motivated by the fact that Canada and Australia, in addition to the U.S., have also passed legislation requiring advanced submission of PNR data, the European Commission opted to take a global approach to the issue (European Commission 2003a). Ireland, on behalf of the EU, put forward a proposal for an international framework for the transfer of PNR data to the International Civil Aviation Organization (Ireland 2004). ICAO subsequently developed a set of guidelines for PNR data transfer that came into effect as a “recommended practice” on July 11, 2005 (ICAO 2005).
The next frontier of border controls may be electronic travel authorization systems, first pioneered by Australia in the mid-1990s. Australia maintains a de facto universal visa regime whereby those travellers for whom a visa is not required must apply for and receive an Electronic Travel Authority. To receive an Electronic Travel Authority, persons intending to travel to Australia electronically submit the biographical data on their passports either through travel agents or by themselves through a web portal. Automated watch list checks are executed and usually within minutes an Electronic Travel Authority is issued for travel to Australia or the applicant is referred to apply for a visa at an Australian consulate.

The U.S. Congress mandated the development of an Australian-style Electronic Travel Authorization system in 2007 as a condition to reforming the Visa Waiver Program and expanding the number of states in the programme. The U.S. Electronic Travel Authorization system has major implications for the development and use of border control information systems globally, as the European Commission has also announced plans that the EU will develop a similar system (European Commission 2008). The proposed U.S. Electronic Travel Authorization system not only requires transmission of biographical data of travellers (name, date of birth, passport number, etc.), but also an “exit system that records the departure on a flight leaving the United States of every alien participating in the visa waiver program” and that the system shall “match biometric information of the alien against relevant watch lists and immigration information, and compare such biometric information against manifest information collected by air carriers on passengers departing from the United States to confirm such individuals have departed the United States (U.S. Senate 2007: Section 501)”. If the U.S., the EU member states, Canada, Japan and other countries were to join Australia in using Electronic Travel Authorization systems, the resulting advanced passenger data exchange may yield a collective increase in the security of visa-free travel among these states. To achieve this collective increase in security, however, many other border security measures, such as implementing exit controls, may be necessary and be much more difficult to achieve without even more international cooperation.

The development of biometric entry-exit systems, electronic passports, passenger data sharing agreements and electronic travel authorization systems by an increasing number of states (although primarily only relatively wealthy OECD member states), offers a glimpse of how future secure international travel regimes may operate in practice. Each state would collect biometrics through the visa application process and then again for comparison at the port of entry. Nationals of those states issuing passports with biometrics meeting ICAO standards may be exempted from visa requirements but they would be required to submit their biographical data from their passports in advance of their travel or not be allowed to board. And when they did arrive in another state, their biographical data and biometrics would be captured and stored upon entry. Border control authorities would amass tremendous amounts of biographic and biometric data in digital format, which could then be mined to detect anomalies that could then be flagged for further investigation. Depending on the level of law enforcement cooperation among origin, transit and destination countries involved, these investigations of individual travellers may involve international law enforcement cooperation.
Such collaboration yields its own intelligence on terrorist travel and the sharing of border control best practices that, in turn, increase individual state border control capabilities.

**STATE LEADERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL REGIME FORMATION**

Multilateral cooperation on human smuggling and transatlantic cooperation on securing international travel do not in and of themselves add up to the formation of an international regime that regulates travel and migration at the global level. Such cooperation can only be considered as possible steps towards a set of global mobility regimes. Only if these regimes come into being in the future will historians be able to determine which of the various forms of cooperation discussed above in fact served as precursors to such global mobility regimes. Hence, the remaining discussion in the rest of this paper is highly speculative and is not intended to be prescriptive. I will describe various scenarios and possible strategies based on international regime formation in other issue areas and suggest ways in which they may be relevant in this case. Moreover, there may be other routes towards the realization of global mobility regimes that may prove to be more successful than the suggestions found in the following ruminations.

As discussed above, international trade and monetary regimes were put in motion with the hegemonic stability provided by the U.S. in the aftermath to WWII. Formation of an international travel regime will most likely also require similar hegemonic stability with a leader that will facilitate standardization of secure travel documents and biometrics, pay the initial development costs of new border control technologies, initiate deployments of new documents and systems, underwrite the institutionalization of international law enforcement cooperation and be willing to extend foreign assistance to states that may wish to participate in such regimes but do not have the requisite border control capabilities. At the same time, the hegemonic leader must maintain international mobility by keeping its own ports of entry open to legitimate travellers and migrants, and by spending additional resources to ensure that new security requirements and technologies do not significantly hamper legitimate travel flows.

Given all of the post-9/11 border security initiatives and transatlantic cooperation described above, it appears that the U.S. government is committed to international leadership on border security; however, it is not clear whether the U.S. is properly equipped to do so, or that the President and the U.S. Congress are politically willing to change that. The U.S. has assumed a leadership role in standardizing requirements for travel documents and biometrics in ICAO, but has been slow to implement systems that impose new biometric requirements on its own citizens, or even that of its neighbour, Canada. Although the U.S. Congress has passed legislation requiring an automated entry-exit system that collects facial and fingerprint biometrics of foreigners who travel to the U.S., it has not passed legislation requiring U.S. citizens who leave or enter the country to be enrolled in the system.
The Bush administration has been reluctant to request funding to fully implement border security measures at U.S. ports of entry (see Koslowski 2005), let alone underwrite a major expansion of international law enforcement institutions. For example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 authorizes increasing the number of full-time Border Patrol Agents by 2,000 per year for five years, and raising the number of full-time Immigration and Customs Enforcement Investigators by 800 per year for five years, but it does not authorize an increase in the number of CBP inspectors at the ports of entry.

The Department of Homeland Security is often depicted in the international media as an overly large organization with a greatly expanding budget. To put things in perspective, the border control divisions of EU member state interior ministries are collectively much larger than their U.S. equivalent, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Table 4 provides a rough comparison of U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border Protection staffing with that of just two of the 27 EU member states. CBP staffing is quite modest compared to border control agencies of other advanced industrialized countries with large-scale immigration flows, such as Germany, especially in relation to the length of their respective land borders and traveller flows through border crossing points.

The CBP has 44,058 employees, of whom 14,923 are border patrol agents working between ports of entry, and 15,850 are CBP officers at ports of entry. This is roughly comparable to the size of Germany’s Bundesgrenzschutz (Federal Border Police), now Bundespolizei (Federal Police), with 40,000 employees (30,000 of whom are officers). As German border controls with Poland and the Czech Republic were lifted on January 1, 2008, border controls are still enforced (at least nominally) at the 74 land border crossing points with Switzerland. Switzerland, however, joined the Schengen Convention in 2004 and these border crossing points were lightly staffed, if at all, even before then. More important for port of entry operations is the flow of travellers entering the country. While the U.S. has the greatest number of entries, Germany has about half the number, some 218 million, with roughly the same overall staffing capabilities. At 100 million, Poland has less than a quarter of the flow of the U.S., yet over 35 per cent of U.S. staffing capabilities. Meanwhile, due to their shorter land borders and the lifting of border controls among the countries parties to the Schengen agreement, there is less need for staffing between ports of entry in Poland and Germany. While CBP is responsible for inspecting the entry of many more travellers and for patrolling many more miles of border between ports of entry than that of Germany and Poland, the border control staffing capabilities of just these two countries, not to mention the entire European Union, significantly exceed that of the U.S.
Table 4 - Border Control Agency Staffing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area (in square miles)</td>
<td>3,794,083</td>
<td>137,846</td>
<td>120,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land borders (in miles)</td>
<td>7,521</td>
<td>2,263</td>
<td>1,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border crossing points</td>
<td>341&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>274&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>68&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entries (annual estimates)</td>
<td>440,000,000</td>
<td>218,000,000&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>100,000,000&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total staff (approx.)</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>16,000&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff per mile of land border</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff per border crossing point</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entries per staff member</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,450</td>
<td>6,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> There are 327 official ports of entry in the United States and 14 pre-clearance offices in Canada and the Caribbean. See CBP: [http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/](http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/contacts/ports/)

<sup>b</sup> This figure includes 135 airports, 65 seaports and 74 land border crossing points with Switzerland. See European Commission 2004b.

<sup>c</sup> This figure includes 20 airports, 19 seaports and 29 land border crossing points with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. See European Commission 2004b.

<sup>d</sup> This estimate is arrived at taking roughly one half of Germany’s total entries and exits: 436,580,484, as reported in Bundesgrenzschutz Jahresbericht 2002; p.28.

<sup>e</sup> Author’s interview with senior Polish Guard official, May 12, 2006.


If domestic politics and budgetary priorities constrain the U.S. government from providing the leadership necessary to form global mobility regimes, the EU could potentially fill the role, especially given its extensive experience in the institutionalization of international law enforcement, cooperation on border controls and building border security capacity in the new EU member states. While U.S. lawmakers are skittish of proposing the establishment of a national ID card, let alone one with embedded biometrics, many European societies are very accustomed to ID cards, some of which have included fingerprints for some time now. Moreover, EU member states agreed to include fingerprints in their e-passports whereas U.S. policy makers have not even broached this topic. Not only does the EU collectively have more border control staff than the U.S., as internal borders with new member states have been lifted, many border control officers, particularly German officers, will need new tasks. New European integrated border management arrangements may permit some to join in patrolling the EU’s new external borders, but some could be detailed to broader international cooperation efforts focusing on terrorist travel and document security. Moreover, the European Commission surpassed U.S. diplomacy on the Passenger Name Record issue when it opted for a global approach and led the international community by proposing a framework for cooperation in ICAO.

A third alternative would be transatlantic hegemonic leadership. That is, if the U.S., Canada and the EU could each agree to lead on issues where they are best able and the others follow that lead in turn, one could imagine a core group of states that push the agenda of international cooperation on global mobility as well as support it though exemplary implementations, financial contributions and political muscle. This scenario may offer the greatest possibility for regime formation, but it is also the most diplomatically complex and would require that
the domestic constituencies of a relatively large number of states do not resist either of the
two steps of such international cooperation. Moreover, such transatlantic agenda setting
offers little to those states outside the core group and could prompt significant diplomatic
resistance from the rest of the world should transatlantic hegemonic leadership actually take
shape. This brings us to the question of what stake, if any, migration origin countries may
have in a global effort to secure international travel and thereby further the establishment
of an international travel regime.

A GENERAL AGREEMENT ON MIGRATION, MOBILITY AND SECURITY (GAMMS)?

Given that international regime theory largely developed to help explain international
cooperation outside of formal international organizations, as was the case with the GATT,
analogies to the GATT for thinking about an international migration regime can be useful, as
several authors have demonstrated (Harris 1995; Ghosh 2000; Straubhaar 2000; Hatton 2007).
Most have envisioned rounds of negotiations towards an overarching agreement that links the
well established refugee regime and cooperation in trade in services, or even international
trade in general (Hollifield 2000: 101), to areas of international migration that have not been
the subject of international regulation. Given that migration destination countries have not
been particularly responsive to economic and human rights arguments for the initiation of
such rounds of negotiations, perhaps the security implications of accelerating international
mobility may provide increased impetus towards broader cooperation that links cooperation
on labour migration desired by source countries to cooperation on securing international
travel desired by destination countries.

Discussions of an international migration regime based on an agreement similar to the
GATT have focused on a principle of “regulated openness” as opposed to labour market
protectionism through the exclusion of migrants, as well as to the liberal doctrine of unfettered
free movement of labour across the borders of sovereign states (Ghosh 2000: 25). An all-
embracing global regime for the orderly movement of people would involve bargaining where
destination countries would permit legal migration of labour, while source countries would
agree to do what they could to suppress illegal migration and accept orderly repatriation
of their nationals who migrated illegally, despite the source countries’ best countervailing
efforts. From the destination countries’ perspective there is little incentive for international
commitments to keep labour markets open to immigrants. There is no compelling reason to
change the status quo when legal labour migration can be permitted (and illegal migration
tolerated) on a unilateral basis in periods of economic growth and shut down in times of
recession. From the source countries’ perspective this bargain is inherently problematic.
Not only do their economies increasingly depend upon remittances from legal and illegal
migrants alike, but there is relatively little that a state can do to prevent its nationals
from leaving without at the same time transgressing international human rights norms
and possibly also infringing on citizens’ constitutional rights. Starkly put, from a source
countries perspective, if destination state governments largely condone the employment of
illegal migrant workers and are having difficulties controlling their borders, that is not the
source countries’ problem.
In the wake of Sept 11, 2001, the stakes in establishing a regime for secure international travel are much higher for the U.S., EU member states and other migration destination countries than past incentives for the establishment of an international labour migration regime. For source countries, participation in and compliance with an international travel regime would involve the practical implementation of international norms on document security and biometrics, information exchange and international cooperation among border control authorities and law enforcement agencies that may be prohibitively expensive and administratively very difficult. As currently pursued by the U.S. and EU, the envisioned global border security cooperation makes heroic assumptions regarding the identity documentation of much of the world’s population. If identity and travel documentation systems of the U.S. and other advanced post-industrial states are so susceptible to fraud and counterfeit, what are we to expect of less developed countries? Kamal Sadiq’s work on “documentary citizenship” (Sadiq 2003; 2005) demonstrates that document fraud is not only widely used in illegal migration between countries in the developing world, but also enables illegal migrants to vote in the states in which they reside illegally. In many parts of the world, where the registration of births is far from systematic, national ID systems are weak or non-existent and bureaucracies corrupt, a person’s possession of a passport may be more indicative of illegal status than citizenship. Similarly, international information exchanges have been enabled by the internet; however, they rely on a state’s capacity to collect, store and retrieve required data. Finally, international cooperation on border control and law enforcement required for an international travel regime may involve source and transit countries’ acceptance of U.S. and/or EU border control officers at their airports and seaports and that may be considered by many domestic political actors as an intolerable infringement of state sovereignty. Hence, it may be politically difficult for many migrant source countries in the developing world to agree to a regime for secure international travel. Even if such agreement were to be reached, implementation may be just as, if not even more, difficult to achieve.

If U.S. and EU vital security interests are at stake in an international travel regime, and if cooperation on document security and law enforcement for securing international travel is linked to orderly international labour migration, perhaps a more all-encompassing General Agreement on Migration, Mobility and Security (GAMMS) could be negotiated. Incorporation of a labour migration regime into a package of global mobility regimes would require U.S. leadership in expanding legal immigration of migrant labour while at the same time enforcing employer sanctions to dry up demand for illegal migrant labour. It would require that those EU member states that have resisted opening their labour markets to immigrants do so and agree to an EU framework for labour migration. In return, source countries in the developing world would agree to rapid implementation of ICAO travel document standards, automated information exchanges and increasing international border control and law enforcement cooperation.

Trading labour market access against cooperation in combating terrorist travel may very well prove unworkable. Destination countries advocates for border security may argue that reducing terrorist mobility increases the security of all states and should not need to be tied to agreements on labour migration. In many developing countries, the threat of malnutrition
and disease overshadow concerns over border security, terrorist travel and the prospect of truck bombs detonated in front of hotels that cater to foreigners. Advocates in states of origin in favour of increasing opportunities for international labour migration may reject any linkage that “securitizes” migration and prefer to focus instead on convincing destination countries of the benefits of legal labour migration.

Nevertheless, there may be opportunities for international cooperation of a more narrow scope in certain areas where there is a convergence of interests between destination and origin states. One such point of convergence could be in the area of public administration reforms that reduce the cost and increase the security of passports, as well as the vital records used in the passport application process. While the above discussion explains why high quality passports issued through secure administrative processes are in the interest of destination states concerned over border security, if such passports can also be made affordable, they are also in the interest of origin states that hope to facilitate the travel and migration of their nationals. A World Bank study (McKenzie 2005) of passport fees in 127 countries found that high costs of acquiring a passport have become a barrier to migration from many states. Passports cost more than USD 100 in nine of the countries surveyed, with the highest fee of USD 333 charged for a Turkish passport. High passport fees relative to the income of the applicants are even greater barriers to emigration. In 23 countries, passports cost more than five per cent of annual per capita income, with the highest cost in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the USD150 passport fee represents 125 per cent of annual per capita income. Moreover, lengthy application and administrative processes often become opportunities for corruption as unscrupulous officials charge extra fees for “express” service. The spread of such corrupt practices also present opportunities for human smugglers to purchase genuine passports through fraudulent processes. If destination countries were to help finance administrative reforms to issue secure passports with shorter processing times and at lower costs to citizens, origin countries would be in a position to offer their citizens proper travel documents at affordable costs. Such international cooperation and development assistance would help all participating states combat human smuggling and document counterfeits.

Similar international cooperation could emerge from the convergence of interests to improve the administration of vital records, such as birth certificates, upon which passport application processes depend for applicant identification. Fraudulently acquired birth certificates or counterfeit birth certificates serve as “breeder documents” to obtain genuine documents such as passports and to commit identity fraud to obtain social benefits (see, e.g., HSS Inspector General 2000) and are increasingly considered a major security hazard among travel and migration destination states (Johnson 2005; Kefauver 2007). In many migration origin countries in the developing world the systems for the registration of births and issuance of birth certificates are very weak. They are so weak that worldwide an estimated 48 million children under the age of five were not registered at birth (UNICEF 2005) thereby challenging the right to an identity as provided for in article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 2002 General Assembly Resolution “A World Fit for Children”. Those not fully registered and without a birth certificate are “denied the right to a name
and nationality, a situation that may also impede access to other rights, including health care, education, or social assistance. Later in life, identity documents help protect children against early marriage, child labour, premature enlisting in the armed forces or, if accused of a crime, prosecution as an adult. Registration also enables the individual to access further identity documents, including a passport” (UNICEF 2005). Some countries, such as Mexico, have committed themselves to the systematic registration of children and have developed an online population register which enables anyone with internet access to check if he or she is properly registered.33 If destination countries were to help finance similar administrative reforms to enable origin countries to register all children and provide them with proper birth certificates and to strengthen vital records management systems and secure birth certificate issuance processes, it would help reduce travel document fraud based on breeder documents, while at the same time helping origin countries to secure their right to identity, nationality and corresponding social and educational benefits that all nationals of these states are entitled to.

If international cooperation to secure international travel does not embrace major origin countries in the developing world and remains limited to the transatlantic area, it will not be as effective as a package of global mobility regimes that secure international travel worldwide. Source countries in the developing world may resist the imposition of biometrics in their documents and foreign law enforcement officers at their airports; however, some states will cut bilateral deals to facilitate travel of their nationals as well as trade through their ports. With increasingly globalized economies, those states that resist cooperating with the U.S. and the EU on border security may suffer significant economic costs from decreasing mobility of their nationals and exports.

International cooperation on migration and mobility, whether on a global or regional basis, need not necessarily lead to liberal outcomes that make it easier for prospective migrants and asylum seekers to cross borders. A package of global mobility regimes would facilitate travel of tourists, businesspeople and migrants deemed legitimate and “wanted” by the states receiving them. At the same time, it would strengthen state capabilities to not only intercept suspected terrorists but also to limit the “unwanted” migration of illegal workers and asylum seekers.

Given the requirements for leadership necessary to establish such global mobility regimes and the domestic political barriers to governments seeking to assume that leadership, the steps towards establishing global mobility regimes may not go much further. If they do, however, source countries in the developing world will have choices forced upon them. There may be opportunities for collective actions that translate into additional broader cooperation on international labour migration in the form of a General Agreement on Migration, Mobility and Security. The prospects for such cooperation, however, may only be slightly better than the past efforts towards global cooperation on migration that have so far not produced very much.
CONCLUSION

As the migration and development agenda within the UN has moved forward there have been increasing discussions among academics and policy analysts alike over the possible development of a migration regime at the global level. Despite the increasing calls for international cooperation on migration an international migration regime is unlikely to form, largely because major migration destination states have no reason to make multilateral commitments to keeping their labour markets open when migrant labour is readily available on a unilateral basis; they see little value in reciprocity of labour market access and, not surprisingly, they are not providing the necessary leadership.

Global mobility is a more all-inclusive category for understanding the dynamics of international migration that also widens the scope of regime analysis to include international cooperation on international travel. Given that increasing international travel is a growing border security concern that engenders a different set of state interests, the political constraints and opportunities for international cooperation on travel are substantively different than international cooperation on migration.

Perhaps the best way to approach the longstanding quest for an international migration regime is to think in terms of global mobility and the development of a set of interacting global mobility regimes. An international refugee regime is already established, an international travel regime is emerging and an international labour migration regime does not exist, but has the potential that may be realized through linkages with the established and emerging regimes.

The above analysis suggests that refocusing research on global mobility may be more useful for understanding international cooperation than the current focus on the linkage of migration to international development. Sustained systematic and comprehensive analysis of the economic, political and security dimensions of global mobility could contribute to a better understanding of international cooperation on refugees, international travel and migration through the prism of global mobility regimes. Improved understanding of the dynamics of international cooperation may, in turn, facilitate better global governance of travel and migration.
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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT Continuing the Dialogue: Legal and Policy Perspectives

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As the attention on labour migration and its effect on development continue to gain momentum, an examination of the current legal and policy issues facing labour migration becomes necessary. Such an examination is critical if we are ultimately to optimize labour migration for positive and sustainable development. This article begins by asking why labour migration is occurring. It then examines the policy responses to these dynamics and identifies the flaws in current policy. The article closes with a discussion on how to balance the various interests of the relevant stakeholders in the migration debate in order to achieve fair, efficient and effective migration policy.

WHY IS LABOUR MIGRATION HAPPENING?

The International Organization for Migration estimated that there were approximately 191 million international migrants in 2006 worldwide. Migrants are normally defined as individuals who live for a certain period outside their country of birth. Although migrants currently comprise only three per cent of the world population, the actual number of international migrants has more than doubled in the last fifty years. In 1960, the number of international migrants stood at 76 million compared to 191 million by 2006. Migration will continue to accelerate as the dramatic transformations in telecommunications and low-cost travel reduce the size of our global village.

The pull and push factors underlying migration are best understood by looking at the interests and objectives of the relevant parties. First are the migrants who seek greater economic security, better opportunities and a promising future. Labour migrants (also referred to as economic migrants) generally differ from forced migrants or refugees who are fleeing physical insecurity often as a result of a socio-political breakdown or war. Labour migrants are moving across borders in search of better economic opportunities. The lure of such opportunities will only increase as the income gap between developed and developing countries grows wider and wider. The New Economics Foundation (NEF), an economic think-tank based in the United Kingdom, reports that the gross domestic product (GDP) per person in high-income countries is now 66 times that of low-income countries.

Second are the developing countries that enjoy certain benefits from the emigration of their own nationals. While the loss of highly skilled and educated nationals adversely impacts on sending states—acute shortages of doctors and nurses is widespread among many developing countries—the departure of young, able-bodied men and women also takes the pressure off high unemployment rates, while the remittances from expatriate workers provide poverty relief to their families.
Third are employers who seek competent, industrious, available and, in many sectors, the most talented workers. Our global economy is based on a capitalist system that requires infinite markets and/or low costs of production to increase profit margins. Lowering the cost of production calls for relatively inexpensive labour, which migrants often provide, while in high-skill sectors, foreign nationals do not necessarily represent less expensive labour, but rather invaluable intellectual capital coveted by employers, and where the workers’ nationality is not an issue. Certain industries, such as tourism, agriculture, janitorial services or construction, rely largely on migrant labour because of a lack of local workers to meet the demands of these industries.

Finally, many countries, particularly developed countries, need and want foreign national workers, and this for various reasons. For one, many are faced with shrinking populations and certain labour shortages. As the number of pensioners surpasses the number of young workers joining the local workforce, foreign labour will become necessary to maintain adequate growth of the local workforce as well as to care for the pensioners. The shortage of nurses and caretakers in geriatrics is widely documented. Second, while countries seek to support local employers and industries, they also need to strike a balance between protecting local labour and resources. Three, foreign nationals who visit for business, participate in cultural exchange programmes or enter the country under the provisions of international or regional trade agreements concerning such movements and provision of services, contribute to the growth and enrichment of a country. Business visitors may be potential investors, cultural exchange programmes promote diplomatic initiatives and international and regional trade agreements encourage economic growth.

**How do governments respond to labour migration?**

As countries seek to balance the needs of employers, local workers, demographic pressures, and the imperatives of national security and foreign policy, a variety of policy responses have been developed and implemented with the aim to manage migration. These responses can be grouped broadly into four categories: 1) temporary admissions with specific conditions for stay; 2) path to permanent residence for certain types of workers; 3) greater worksite enforcement along with criminalization of unauthorized stay and employment and 4) heightened scrutiny at the border and increased use of technology to identify fraudulent documents and unauthorized foreign nationals.

Governments have devised assorted temporary worker programmes that limit the length and set out the conditions of stay. Some countries also limit the number of temporary workers admitted in any one year, and determine the labour market segments authorized to hire foreign nationals. Certain temporary worker programmes are designed to comply with commitments undertaken under international and/or regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), that seek to facilitate the movement of professionals and intra-company transferees as part of a larger effort to facilitate the movement of goods and services. Most countries admit both high-skilled and low-skilled temporary workers.
Many temporary worker programmes, particularly those of shorter duration and for low or unskilled labour, do not allow dependants to either accompany or join the worker. Even so, temporary worker programmes often fail in their objective that workers would return home at the end of their contract or work authorization period. Temporary worker programmes are, therefore, sometimes euphemistically reframed as “circular migration”, emphasizing to foreign nationals the benefits of returning home and applying skills learned abroad for both personal gain and the betterment of the worker’s home country.

As the number of multinational companies grows and their businesses continue to become ever more globalized, the competition for talent is equally global in scope. Many countries offer access to permanent residence to attract desirable highly skilled workers and investors, and are aware of the need to attract talent and capital if they are to gain or maintain a competitive advantage, especially in highly specialized industries. In the United States, 40 per cent of doctorates in physical sciences now go to non-U.S. citizens and nearly half the scientific and medical staff at the National Institutes of Health are foreign nationals. Foreign nationals who are employed in certain capacities, such as researchers, professors or scientists or in particular occupations, such as information technology, may qualify for permanent residence after a shorter period of time. They may also be exempt from labour market tests to determine the availability of suitable local workers prior to being allowed to hire a foreign national. Finally, where countries have introduced a points system to determine eligibility for entry, employment and permanent residence, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, persons with high educational attainment and professional skills will be accorded a higher number of points.

Although, in principle, permanent residence is accessible to highly skilled workers, foreigners who have been in the country in an irregular situation for an extended period of time may benefit from regularization programmes that are periodically conducted in some countries to render the actual numbers of undocumented foreigners in the country more visible, and to bring them within the scope of the law. To benefit from such programmes, irregular migrants have to supply evidence of a minimum period of residence in the country, a clean criminal record and continuing employment, and, in some countries (i.e. the U.S.) may be required to pay a penalty.

At the same time, in order to protect the local labour force and prevent their displacement by cheaper and, frequently, unauthorized labour, worksite law enforcement such as audits, raids, stricter penalties for the hiring of foreign nationals and verification of employment authorization are becoming increasingly common. Such developments have been accompanied by a growing tendency to criminalize the unauthorized employment of foreign nationals and their irregular status. In many countries, both employers and the irregular foreigners may be subject to criminal procedures, ranging from hefty fines to imprisonment, as well as civil fines, deportation, temporary bans on hiring additional foreign workers and temporary bans on re-entry for the foreign national.
Finally, countries are tightening their procedures at borders to manage the flows and deter irregular migration. Irregular migration takes several forms. Foreign nationals may gain entry avoiding any inspection; to do so, they cross land and sea borders at places known to them not to be manned by border control personnel. They may also use fraudulent documents to enter, and they may enter lawfully but subsequently overstay their period of authorized stay and/or violate the terms of their stay (e.g., work though they entered on a visitor visa). Governments are responding by deploying more agents to protect borders, having recourse to biometric technologies in travel documents, and screening individuals and their documents, stricter screening at Consulates and, in some cases, simply building walls. A “fortress” approach to border protection is not uncommon.

**WHY ARE THESE POLICY RESPONSES FLAWED?**

Despite government efforts to design satisfactory migration policy, immigration remains a contentious and politically charged issue in many countries. In the U.S., for example, an oppressive political stalemate has settled over Congress and the possibility for comprehensive immigration reform appears remote. Rising anti-immigrant sentiment, nativist backlashes and xenophobia are increasing. The perception that migrants are taking away jobs from local workers, draining public resources, failing to properly integrate, abusing the system and violating the law by entering and/or staying unlawfully are regularly and widely disseminated in the sensationalist media. On the other hand, migrants are portrayed as victims, requiring public sympathy. Such images of foreign national distort the terms of the debate. Moreover, politicians in many democratic states often do not think beyond their election term and, as a result, hesitate before taking on an issue as prickly and emotional as immigration reform. Any thoughtful dialogue that could yield effective and humane migration policy is difficult to realize.

That said, a critical evaluation of current policy responses is necessary if we are to optimize migration for the benefit of all stakeholders and sustainable development. Migration is a complex and dynamic phenomenon with advantages and, if improperly managed, drawbacks. Migration policy should be sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to accommodate the diversity of migratory flows and types of migrants, the (often competing) objectives of the various parties, and the legitimacy of the migration regime itself.

Temporary worker programmes are routinely disparaged as not being temporary. Foreign workers establish ties in their host country: they marry local citizens, buy homes, have children and develop other links that inevitably anchor them to their host country. Their willingness to return to their home country diminishes with time and as their ties in the host community grow and strengthen. Temporary worker programmes, particularly in the low to unskilled sectors, that seek to confine workers by requiring employers to designate lodging and pay return transportation, as well as restricting the workers’ freedom of movement, have been compared to modern slavery. In many cases, employers have little incentive to ensure the departure of their temporary workers, and many employers prefer stability and continuity in their workforce, and the development of institutional memory. Training new
workers can be time-consuming and labour-intensive. Governments generally lack the will or the resources to enforce the departure of temporary workers. Enforcement happens in fits and starts. Finally, home countries prefer not to lose the stream of remittances their expatriates send home; the amount of remittances sent home is estimated at over USD 200 billion, exceeding the annual amounts received in foreign aid, and is the largest source of foreign exchange for dozens of countries. Of course, not all temporary workers stay and many do return home, and not all temporary worker programmes are inhumane or toothless. But, given the very real prospects of temporary stays becoming permanent, as well as the very real contributions made by these workers to the local economy, migration policy should contemplate the eventual settlement of such temporary workers, as appropriate, and foresee the necessary administrative procedures.

As the search for global talent intensifies, more countries are offering permanent residence to attract the most educated, skilled and talented workers. However, such policies are often slow to take effect and fail to adequately track changes in labour needs. Modern conditions and the evolution in both business transactions and the movement of people call for more rapid implementation of policies for these to be effective, as outdated regulations concerning occupations or industries that stand to benefit from appropriate and up-to-date procedures regarding the employment and residence of foreign workers can hamper the search for talent. Meanwhile, companies strategically identify countries with more favourable migration (and tax) policies and establish themselves there. Prohibitive migration policies for both temporary and permanent workers result in employers outsourcing operations to areas where workers are readily available.

Amnesties and regularization programmes have suffered most from skewed media representation and aggressive rhetoric. Condemned as condoning unlawful conduct, amnesties have acquired a negative connotation. Yet it has been an important tool for bringing greater transparency to employment practices and justice to unauthorized foreign workers. Public health issues, criminal activity, hate-crimes and exploitative labour practices go unreported when the individuals concerned fear deportation.

While the uptake in enforcement operations and greater vigilance at the border certainly have produced results; for instance, hundreds of unauthorized workers in the United States have been rounded up and more fraudulent documents have been detected at U.S. borders, raids can disrupt businesses and cause significant economic cost, create an atmosphere of fear and drive more migrants underground. Equating unauthorized entry or presence with criminal activity fosters hostility towards foreign nationals in general that could spill over to foreign nationals who are lawfully present or even permanent residents. Foreign nationals may experience excessive scrutiny at the border as unwelcoming; international companies that employ individuals all over the world and have robust global mobility programmes may choose to conduct seminars, trainings, conferences and meetings in countries with a less negative attitude at the border. Treating visitors as potential criminals or terrorists at the border could reflect negatively on the image of a country internationally.
HOW CAN WE BALANCE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES INVOLVED TO OPTIMIZE LABOUR MIGRATION?

Migration touches at the core of how a country defines itself. A basic tenet of political philosophy is that a community's power to grant or refuse consent to potential members is necessary for that community to protect its interests, maintain harmony and achieve a unifying sense of shared values. Boundaries are essential for the exercise of legitimate state power, the rule of law and a national/political identity.

The political philosopher Jürgen Habermas noted that the community's right to self-determination includes the right to affirm its identity vis-à-vis immigrants whose presence could modify the historically developed local political and cultural characteristics. The arrival and stay of foreign nationals alters the composition of the population and challenges a community's ability to maintain its political-cultural form of life intact. The arrival of foreign nationals implies the crossing or blurring of traditional boundaries defining distinctive cultures and identities. Members of a receiving community may see the settlement of foreign nationals a deviation from the natural mode of preservation of their identity. Controlling the numbers of foreign nationals temporarily or permanently present also aims to ensure that unfettered social and cultural change does not destabilize the social and political fabric and order of a society.

There are practical considerations for regulating the entry and stay of foreign nationals. The protection of local labour markets and of public health standards, preventing criminals from entering or staying and safeguarding national security all drive migration policy. While border protection, consular screening, workplace enforcement, labour market tests, annual entry quotas and limits on stay and temporary worker programmes are legitimate tools in the management of labour migration, they should be accompanied by appropriate means of protection of the rights and interests of foreign workers and their employers.

Foreign nationals provide sources of labour that are desirable, if not necessary. Driven by the search for greater economic security and a better future, they should not be criminalized as such. Granting them protection under domestic law, irrespective of their status, would also ensure that they are treated with basic fairness and encourage a certain level of integration. Protection from discrimination, the right to participate in unions and to equal wages would deter employers from paying foreign workers less than local workers. Foreign nationals should also be given greater access to administrative processes, such as concerning welfare benefits, or family reunification. In many countries, the administrative decisions concerning such applications are considered discretionary and not subject to review, while some jurisdictions may not even require a written decision and motivation. Another legitimate concern is access to basic social services and education for migrants and their families. Larger public health concerns should outweigh immigration enforcement objectives, and foreign children should be able to attend schools, as keeping these children off the streets is a greater policy imperative than immigration enforcement, particularly since most of these children did not choose to migrate. To render the conditions as inhospitable as possible in the receiving
state has not proven an effective deterrent to irregular migration. Rather, it may be the
cause of migrant communities to stick closer together, often creating ghettos, and impede
integration. They also cause migrants to avoid local authorities entirely thereby precluding
necessary attention from being directed at legitimate and pressing public concerns, as well as
criminal activities and exploitative labour practices. Finally, labour migrants should benefit
from the transportability of their social security contributions.

While countries will wish to protect their labour markets, such measures should not impinge
excessively on businesses and employers, as where undue constraints will cause employers
to relocate elsewhere, thus hampering economic growth. Employers need a transparent and
predictable system with reasonable processing times and procedures. To spend seven to
nine months to process a work permit is to ignore the pace at which business transactions
take place. Similarly, quotas, caps and periods of authorized stay should reflect business
realities. The U.S. Congress has limited the annual number of high-skilled worker visas to
65,000. For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, that limit was reached the day the government began
accepting petitions, viz. six months in advance of the starting date of employment. For an
economy the size of the United States, a 65,000 limit on high-skilled workers does not seem
to match the needs of employers. Finally, immigration processing should be handled by a
single, high-level agency. Decentralized processing among cities, regions or states can lead
to differing practices and less predictability. Procedures that require applications at, and
approval from various different agencies, such as the Department of Labour and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, also complicate and delay the process, particularly if regular inter-agency
discussion is absent.

Finally, a discussion on labour migration would be remiss without also considering the
interests and objectives of the countries of origin of labour migrants. While these countries
struggle with brain drain in high-skilled areas, notably medicine and science, at the
microlevel they have benefited from the remittances sent home by their workers abroad.
Some countries already largely rely on remittances for poverty alleviation. Money is usually
sent home to families for food, shelter and education. Remittances do not alter the structural
causes of poverty in these countries, even though they provide stop-gap relief to the families
at home. Understanding these dynamics, countries of origin should create opportunities
for their workers both abroad and at home. Preventing them from leaving undermines any
allegiance they may feel for their country of origin and denies them the opportunity to reach
their potential. Linkages with diaspora communities should be cultivated, while encouraging
expatriates to return would also encourage the transfer of knowledge and experience. Some
countries have introduced the possibility of holding dual nationality, thereby allowing
their expatriates to acquire the nationality of their host country while keeping their home
country citizenship, and providing that the host country also allows dual nationality. Dual
citizenship would ease travel between the country of origin and the host country, facilitating
the circulation of experience, knowledge and capital. Finally, certain countries, such as the
Philippines and Mexico, have opened consulates in countries hosting large numbers of their
expatriates, offering support and legal assistance to their nationals, and helping to maintain
the ties between their nationals and the home country.
CONCLUSION

Migration has been an enduring feature of human history. The particularities of today’s world with its widening income gap between developed and developing countries, the demographic pressures of the industrialized countries, the labour needs of employers, particularly international business activities that transcend state boundaries, and the reliance on remittances sent home by workers abroad all indicate that the pace of labour migration will continue to grow and, with it, the essential need for the effective management of such flows. Ad hoc and reactive policies that fail to balance the interests of all parties are not the solution.

Optimizing labour migration to foster sustainable development is a laudable goal. The link between labour migration and development, largely on account of remittances, has come under scrutiny by governments of origin and destination countries as well as the development community. For now, it is clear that the remittances sent home by migrant workers alleviate poverty among recipients. But remittances sent home do not facilitate structural changes in countries of origin to reduce poverty, such as better and more schools and hospitals and improved access thereto, access to reliable water supplies, improved transportation and roads, and greater economic opportunities. The responsibility for the economic development of the home country should not lie with its nationals who go abroad to find greater economic opportunity, but is incumbent on its elected leaders. The labour of migrants abroad cannot be relied on as the most important engine for economic development in the country of origin. However, looking at the positive effects of migration on the development of countries of origin does underpin the importance of creating efficient, effective and humane migration policies.
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Welfare, Rights and Integration of Migrants
Immigration continues to transform American and European societies. The numbers are remarkable. In 2006, 12.5 per cent of the U.S. population, or nearly 38 million people, were foreign-born—if second-generation migrants are included, we are talking of almost a quarter of the national total. The proportions in major European countries are also high; in 2005, the foreign-born population accounted for 12.3 per cent of Germany's population, 10.7 per cent in France, 9.1 per cent in Britain and 8.5 per cent in Spain. Although there are no reliable figures for the second generation, if available estimates were to be added to the mix, the percentages would be obviously much higher, in some cases, at least double (Muenz 2006).

Clearly, the numbers are critical. But it is much more than this. A pressing issue on both sides of the Atlantic is how immigrants and their children are to be integrated into the societies in which they live. This issue is even more pressing when it comes to the second generation. Not surprisingly, first-generation immigrants who were born, raised and educated elsewhere often remain immersed in the traditions of the “old country”, retain their original language and find it difficult to transfer employment skills from their home county to the new. The situation is different for children born into the new society. They are in their home society, and among the many questions to be considered is how they are faring in socio-economic terms and whether they identify themselves with and feel a part of the host society.

The focus in this paper is on some of the challenges of integration for the second generation in the United States and western Europe. I start out with the United States, where I have done most of my research and writing, and then move across the Atlantic. This is a broad-brush comparison which does not examine differences among European countries. Moreover, it is limited by the fact that we are just beginning to see studies exploring the trajectories and experiences of the second-generation migrants in Europe and the U.S., many of them currently in progress. The paper aims to give a sense concerning some of the different challenges facing the second generation in western Europe and the U.S. as they grow up and take their place in the societies in which they were born and raised.

**CHALLENGES IN THE UNITED STATES**

There is no question that the integration of second-generation immigrant youth in the United States is an enormous challenge, if only because the huge numbers. At the turn of the twenty-first century, there were some 27 million native-born persons of foreign parentage (about 15 million had two foreign-born parents, 12 million one foreign-born

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* Second-generation migrants here denotes children born in the host country to immigrant parents born abroad.
parent) (Rumbaut 2004). Although this second-generation group includes many older adults (mainly European and Canadian) whose parents came to the U.S. before 1965, the majority are children and young adults whose parents arrived after 1965, mostly from Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia.

Another statistic gives a sense of the numbers involved: one out of every five Americans aged eighteen or below is the child of immigrants. Given the continuing flow of immigration and the high fertility rates of foreign-born women, the proportion is likely to increase.

**THE GOOD NEWS**

The numbers alone are not the challenge; the important question is how the second generation will fare in the United States. Despite the worries and concerns, the overall prognosis is quite good, and early fears about widespread second-generation decline have, fortunately, proved wrong.

Such concerns arose in the early 1990s, when social scientists feared that many children of non-white immigrants, who faced racial discrimination, poor quality education and declining real wages, were in danger of “second-generation decline” or “downward assimilation” relative to their immigrant parents (Gans 1992; Portes and Zhou 1993).

It was believed that those socially closest to the lower class, particularly to native minorities, were at greatest risk, partly because they might adopt an oppositional culture and end up doing poorly in school and in lowly or no jobs at all.

In contrast, the expectation was that children of better-off immigrants with fewer ties to U.S. minorities and strong ethnic networks would do much better. Also, as argued by Alejandro Portes and his colleagues, retaining home-country cultural values and strong parental authority was an important advantage in protecting the second generation from negative “Americanizing” influences, not just the oppositional culture found among some native minorities, but also bad habits perpetuated in the American mainstream, including watching too much TV instead of doing homework and improving themselves through the pursuit of other activities.

More recent studies, however, do not support these predictions about second-generation decline or downward assimilation. At least so far there is little evidence that a significant portion of the second generation might be becoming part of a permanent urban underclass, as some early observers feared.

According to most indicators of social and economic achievement (educational and occupational attainment), the Asian and European second generation outperforms the children of native whites. Black and many Latino second-generation immigrants, though trailing native whites, are doing significantly better than members of native minority groups.
Mexican second-generation immigrants are of great concern owing to their numbers and the low educational and occupational status of so many of their parents. The Mexican second-generation cohort dwarfs all others in the United States. A little over a quarter of native-born Americans with at least one foreign-born parent are of Mexican origin, as are almost a third of those with two foreign-born parents (Rumbaut 2004). The Second-generation migrants of Mexican descent are generally doing better educationally than their parents, which might be expected in view of the limited schooling of their parents.

Thus, Mexican second generation cohorts are less likely than their parents to be found in typical immigrant jobs and more likely to attain professional and managerial positions. Although graduation rates from four-year colleges are much lower among the Mexican second generation than among native whites, a recent analysis shows that a similar proportion, i.e. about a third, have some college education, a figure that implies that a substantial fraction of the Mexican second generation is prepared for white-collar jobs (Perlmann 2005).

Another fact to note is that the second generation, taken as a whole, is characterized by relatively high labour force participation rates, not unlike the rest of the U.S. population. In 2005, two-thirds of 16-year old and above second generation immigrants of Mexican descent with two foreign-born parents, and nearly three-quarters with one foreign-born parent, were in the active labour force (Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

There was concern in the United States that the second generation would not learn English, threatening the very dominance of English in the United States. However, research shows that such concerns were unfounded, and that the large majority of the second generation has made the transition to English and that they are much more likely than their immigrant parents to speak English fluently. They are also less likely than their parents to have retained a strong accent. This is true even in parts of the United States where Spanish is widely spoken, including in the media. According to a recently released report from the Pew Hispanic Center, whereas only 23 per cent of Latino immigrants affirmed that they spoke English very well, that figure rose to 88 per cent for second-generation Latinos aged 18 and above (Hakimzadeh and Cohn 2007).

The degree of fluency in the parental language in addition to English varies. Not surprisingly, commonly spoken languages in the United States and those written in the Latin alphabet, such as Spanish, are more often maintained than those that are rarely spoken in the United States, or that are extremely different from English. Thus, according to the Pew Hispanic Center report (Hakimzadeh and Cohn 2007), half of the adult children of Latino immigrants speak some Spanish at home, and more than two-thirds reported that they could carry on a conversation in English or Spanish quiet well or very well. But there is little evidence that maintaining the parental language comes at the expense of English fluency, even among those groups in which second-generation bilingualism is common.

There is yet another challenge, and another fear that the second generation will remain marginalized and stigmatized on account of their ethnic origins and because so many are
viewed as “non-white”. These are serious worries, particularly for the children of black and darker-skinned immigrants in the United States.

Yet, when it comes to Asians and Hispanics, who represent the bulk of the U.S. second-generation immigrants, studies of intermarriage show a picture of increased blending and mixing. Already, significant numbers of the children of Asian and Hispanic immigrants have non-Hispanic white spouses or partners, and their children are being raised in mixed-origin homes. According to one prediction, almost the entire fourth and fifth generations of Hispanic and Asian immigrants will be of mixed origin and the descendants of non-Asians and non-Hispanics (Perlmann and Waters 2004).

**CAUSES FOR CONCERN**

All these are positive signs for integration. But there are other, less positive ones, also. Let me just mention a few.

We know that there are disadvantages associated with being the child of unauthorized immigrants, since unauthorized immigrants often work in the underground economy for low pay, without medical insurance or other benefits. Recent measures in local areas, and the general political climate in many regions, have further stigmatized and victimized unauthorized migrants. It seems likely that the U.S.-born children of unauthorized immigrants will have more difficulties in moving up the educational and occupational ladder than those whose parents have legal status, and will be more likely to end up in low-wage sectors of the economy. As more than half of unauthorized immigrants in the United States are Mexican migrants, this is a particular problem for that group.

In general, because so many Mexican immigrants rank low in terms of their economic situation and educational background, their children—just as the children of other labour migrants—will find it hard to accede to well paid and prestigious jobs later on. A recent study shows that Mexicans today are progressing more slowly than Italians in the past, and the prediction is that they may take four or five generations to reach parity with the native-white mainstream, rather than three or four generations as in the case of southern Europeans in the past (Perlmann 2005).

A particular problem among the Mexican second generation is the alarmingly high secondary school drop-out rate which exceed that of native blacks. However, it should also be noted that young second-generation male drop-outs are likely to be working, the majority of them full time (Perlmann 2005).

This leads to another concern, or challenge to integration, in the American context, namely racial discrimination and prejudice, which represent particular problems for second-generation youth of African ancestry and dark skin colour. The legacy of slavery, segregation and ghettoization continues to stigmatize and disadvantage people of African ancestry and may limit opportunities for their descendants. Among other things, it is more difficult for
second-generation African migrants and their immigrant parents to find housing outside of segregated neighbourhoods and to escape inadequate schools (Alba and Nee 2003: 247). In fact, the high rates of residential segregation between blacks and whites in American cities, and low rates of black-white intermarriages, lead some to predict that the United States may be moving from a white/non-white racial order to a black/non-black racial order, with people of visible African ancestry at or near the bottom, overtaken by Hispanics and Asian migrants (Foner 2005; Foner and Fredrickson 2004). A worrisome prospect indeed.

Other troubling trends arise in connection with racial typecasting. In a recent book, *Categorically Unequal*, Douglas Massey (2007) raises the spectre of what he calls “post-modern racialization”, the demonization of Latin American, especially Mexican, immigrants as a threat and undesirable, a trend, he predicts, that will intensify if the share of Latinos in the undocumented migrant population continues to rise. Whether, and if so, how this will affect the American-born children of Mexican immigrants is an open question.

**CHALLENGES IN WESTERN EUROPE**

So far, I have focused on the United States, but how does the United States compare to Europe in terms of the challenges of integrating immigrant and second-generation immigrant youth? We are just starting to see studies tracking the trajectories of the second generation in Europe; and there is considerable good news. In Germany, according to Diehl and Schnell’s (2006) analysis of longitudinal panel data from surveys of migrant communities, about 40 per cent of second-generation Turks and over 80 per cent of second-generation ex-Yugoslav nationals said they spoke German very well. There was a high degree of sociability with Germans and of intentions to stay in Germany; 80 per cent of second-generation Turks in 2001 wanted to stay in Germany. In France, an analysis of survey data shows that the educational level of the second-generation migrants exceed that of their immigrant parents. Some of the second-generation groups are not far behind the native-born French at the very highest educational levels (Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007). In Britain, ethnic minorities, many of whom are second-generation migrants, attend higher education institutions at higher rates than native whites (Modood, forthcoming).

**EMPLOYMENT, THE LABOUR MARKET AND THE WELFARE STATE**

Yet, there is also cause for concern. One is employment. In France, surveys document the labour-market disadvantages experienced by the second-generation migrants of Mahgrebin origin (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) whose unemployment rates are well above those of European groups (Silberman, Alba and Fournier 2007; Meurs, Pailhe and Simon 2007). When second-generation migrants of Mahgrebin origin are employed, it is mainly in positions below their actual level of educational attainment and professional training. They experience greater job insecurity and rely heavily on subsidized employment schemes. Indeed, it has been concluded that their unemployment rates are only partly explained by educational differences and that discrimination in employment appears to play a role (Silberman, Alba, and Fournier 2007; Meurs, Pailhe and Simon 2007). In this context, Meurs, Pailhe and Simon
note that the civil service might have served as a refuge as it accounts for a large proportion of employment opportunities in France and has been a component of anti-discrimination policies. In fact, however, this has not happened and access of young people of immigrant origin to the civil service, in particular by Mahgrebins, is “still characterized by inequality and low-level entry” (2007: 674). These labour-market inequalities and disadvantages have been a major factor in the riots in the Paris suburbs in 2005 and 2007.

It is not just in France that important second-generation migrant groups display high unemployment rates. This is also true of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, and Turks in Germany (e.g. Miller 2006). In contrast, the labour market participation rates of the second generation in the United States are similar to those of the rest of the population and, indeed, the rates for those with one foreign-born parent are even higher than for the general native-parentage population (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 247-8).

Why this is so is a complex question, and some have suggested that it is, paradoxically, linked to the fact that Western European countries have a longer and stronger record of social and labour protection with more generous welfare benefits, and more highly regulated economies than the United States. On the one hand, most would agree that it is better for a society as a whole to have a strong welfare state and to protect workers and their jobs. On the other, it has been argued that a high degree of social and labour protection in Europe is itself a cause of high unemployment and low rates of labour force participation among immigrant minorities.

The United States may not offer much in the way of government sponsored health insurance, or child care or housing, to name a few benefits that are widely available in Western Europe, but its flexible labour market offer more, albeit frequently also more precarious opportunities for immigrants and second-generation migrant youth, and more inducement to accept such jobs as there are, whatever the work or wages, simply because government benefits are so scarce.

**EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS**

Obviously, their access to education is critical for the second generation. According to Crul and Vermeulen’s (2006) comparative study of second-generation Turkish migrants in five European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands), the structure of the educational system makes a significance difference to outcomes. Youth of Turkish background in Germany and Austria experienced less unemployment because of the well established apprentice system linked to vocational training combined with formal professional education which is part of the normal curriculum and regular educational system, which offers young people with vocational diplomas entry to the job market, a step that is much harder to accomplish in countries without a formal vocational training and apprenticeship system. In Germany, between two-thirds and three-quarters of second-generation Turks begin their secondary school careers in vocational school. Other reports are less sanguine. Mark Miller (2006) cites recent research that reports that the apprenticeship
systems in Germany and Austria are experiencing difficulties, among other things, many of the firms that participated in and benefited from the apprenticeship programmes have relocated and, as a result, unemployment among Turkish-origin youths is rising. While the French educational system appears more effective in guiding Turkish youth people towards university than the German system, Turkish second-generation migrants in France also reveal extremely high drop-out rates (Crul and Vermeulen 2006).

How the different educational systems in Europe and the United States affect second-generation migrants needs to be examined. In general, the American educational system is less hierarchical and more diffuse than Western European systems with their various national sorting tests (generally speaking, in Germany and Austria pupils decide at a relatively early age of ten which of various different tracks, including vocational training, they are to pursue, though in Austria they still have the possibility of changing at a later stage; in the Netherlands at 12, in France at 15). In the U.S., there is a vast American community-college (two-year) system, designed mainly to train students for white-collar and technical jobs. Many four-year colleges are not particularly selective and emphasize vocational skills; the most popular bachelor’s degree is in business studies, with education in third place. Extremely important for second-generation migrants is that American post-secondary education also offers many “second chance” access points, including mature students, who may still be working or have already left the active work force. Data show that in the United States many second-generation youth (just over a third of the 25-39 year old second-generation migrants) are college graduates and may be presumed to be in decent jobs as a result (Rumbaut 2004).

THE COLOUR LINE

Another question concerns the impact of the colour line in the United States as compared to Western Europe. What are the wider implications that in the United States the ultimate problem group is a native-born group, African Americans (where racism is associated with colour), whereas in Western Europe, the ultimate problem group concerns Muslim immigrants and their children (where culture plays a more important role than skin colour in terms of discrimination and prejudice)?

A related question concerns how the presence of a large African American population in the United States (12% of the nation’s population) may be of assistance to immigrants and second-generation migrants of colour. Of particular relevance are the laws and programmes instituted in the wake of the civil rights revolution, originally justified as a response to the caste-like status of African Americans, and later extended to other groups, especially Latinos, and designed to promote greater representation of ethno-racial minorities.

To mention a few examples, there have been affirmative action and other programmes to improve access by minorities to higher education as well as bilingual or English as a second language programmes and, in the political sphere, legislation creating voting districts where minorities are at least competitive. Although the United States certainly has a long way to go, it has become widely accepted that blacks and Latinos should be represented or
improve their representation in important political bodies, in university faculties, and other institutions that have a bearing on society. In Western Europe, the introduction of positive discrimination has been resisted and nothing exists like the affirmative action and diversity programmes instituted in the United States.

It is worth noting that black immigrants in the United States, unlike their counterparts in Europe, have been able to benefit from the presence of a large African American population in other ways: the ability to unite with African Americans in a large “black” vote in cities like New York, and the presence of a large African American middle class and its “middle-class minority culture of mobility” (see Foner 2005).

A recent study of second-generation groups in New York City notes that those of West Indian origin, while they express a great deal of alienation from politics, are also among the most active participants in politics. This has to do, at least in part, with their access to African American political institutions and organizations (Kasinitz et al. 2006). In France and elsewhere in Europe, the second generation is confronted with white working-class communities and structures whereas, for black and Latino immigrants in the United States, their African American and native-born Latino “proximal hosts” may provide a warmer, although not necessarily unproblematic, and more helpful welcome.

**ISLAM**

Finally, a few words about another challenge to integration in Europe - Islam. Whereas in the United States religion has played an important role for the inclusion of the second generation and their parents, into American society and their sense of being American, this is different in Europe, where religion, specifically Islam, has had a rather more exclusive reaction. In popular as well as academic commentaries, the problems of integration for the second generation are often at least in part ascribed to Islam and its cultural practices.

As a result of post-war immigrant flows, Muslims have become the largest religious minority in western Europe, accounting for an estimated 12 to 14 million people who constitute a growing share of the population. Equally significant is that Islam is associated with large immigrant groups whose successful incorporation is viewed by native European as particularly problematic. They also count among the most problematic immigrant minorities in terms of poverty, unemployment and educational achievement. These are the Maghrebins from Algeria and Morocco in France, the Turks in Germany, the Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, and Bangladeshis and Pakistanis in Britain.

In contrast, in the United States most immigrants and their children, perhaps as many as 75 per cent, share a religious orientation, Christianity, with the majority of long established Americans. Mexicans, the most problematic group in terms of legal and socio-economic status, are virtually all Christian. Moreover, Muslim immigrants in the United States have done rather well in terms of educational and occupational achievement. To be sure, Muslims
in the United States have experienced antipathy and hostility, especially in the wake of September 11, but not on the same scale as in Europe.

For the second-generation Muslim migrants in Europe, a Muslim identity and a deliberate turn to Islam are perceived as a means to claim/maintain dignity in the face of exclusion. As an in-between group, neither accepted as French, Dutch, or German nor as Algerians, Moroccans, or Turks, many members of the second generation come to see themselves generally as Muslims and identify with “things Muslim” and for a sense of belonging.

The process of increased religious consciousness among members of the younger generation, which is often to a ‘globalized’ Islam rather than the “family Islam” of their parents, has been termed “re-Islamization”. While it is argued that an allegiance to Islam has had positive effects, such as helping young people stay away from crime and delinquency (e.g. Didier Lapeyronnie cited in Laurence and Vaisse, 2006: 93), there are also concerns about Islam’s role in the second generation’s “cultural isolationism” and, even more, the possibility that involvement in orthodox or fundamentalist Islam may instead lead to acts of violence and terrorism.

In this sense, Islam seems to have become an oppositional identity for some second-generation youth in European societies, a way of marking their rejection of the European mainstream, which they perceive as condemning them to positions of inferiority. Indeed, the aggrieved sense of exclusion felt by many Muslims who have grown up in Europe has created a pool of potential recruits for fundamentalist doctrines and radical Islamist groups. Some well known examples include Mohammed Bouyeri, the Netherlands-born son of Moroccan immigrants who shot and stabbed the film maker Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam several years ago, and several men of Pakistani origin born in Britain, who bombed the London subways in 2005.

As I have already indicated, one of the reasons that religion, including Islam, is not a “challenges of integration” in the United States is that the second generation generally shares a religious background with long-established Americans. As Richard Alba and I argue (Foner and Alba 2008), religion in the United States has managed to play a positive role in integration for other reasons, as well. Americans generally profess to more, and more variously pursued, religions and religious practices than is the case for western Europeans, and their state institutions and constitutional principles provide a foundation for greater acceptance and integration of non-Christian religions. To put it another way: in Europe, Muslim immigrants and their children confront majority populations that are mainly secular and therefore suspicious of claims based on religion and religious practice, and social institutions and national identities that remain anchored to an important extent in Christianity and do not make equal room for Islam.
CONCLUSION

What is clear from this paper is that, when it comes to integration, the second generation faces many different challenges in the United States and Western Europe owing to the nature of the immigrant flows and the respective social, economic and political contexts. As more empirical studies on the second generation are conducted in the United States and Western Europe, and the results more widely disseminated, we will have a better basis for evaluating the second generation’s trajectories and making trans-Atlantic comparisons. These studies will also allow analysis of national differences within Europe, to which I have alluded to here and that are obviously of critical importance. This paper demonstrates, however, that we have much to learn from a comparison of Europe and the United States which, among other things, may help to clarify the various experiences, and the sources of the success as well as difficulties, of the immigrant second generation as they come of age and carve a place for themselves in the societies where they were born and raised.
I was asked to speak today on the role that culture and religion play in effective integration. A century and a half ago, Karl Marx said that religion was the opium of the people, in the sense that it can easily be used to control the population, to dull their attention from the need to start a social revolution by promising a paradise in the next world. Today, on the contrary, religion is said to be the vitamin of the poor. It gives the poor a precise identity, a sense of belonging to those who otherwise can be left behind on the road to globalization. If religion is today the vitamin of the poor, it certainly constitutes a vitamin for poor migrants. So does culture.

The question of the relations between cultures and civilizations assumes a particular relevance when we think that about three per cent of today’s global population can be considered as migrants; the percentage in industrialized countries being closer to ten per cent. This phenomenon, therefore, has the potential, though not always seized, to promote an exciting and enriching exchange between cultures and civilizations. At the same time, it gives rise to incessantly new issues relevant to the process of integration: whether it concerns the prohibition to wear religious symbols or practicing religious rites and cultural traditions, and perceived as incompatible with human rights.

Two years ago in France, we witnessed an upsurge in tension among suburban youth, mostly the children of immigrants, unable to see any way toward true integration or equal access to jobs and social opportunities. Similar phenomena, accompanied by acts of hatred and violence, erupted here and there throughout Europe and Asia. The true difficulty seems to be not so much the problem of migrating to a particular country, but the subsequent lack of an equitable integration.

As Olivier Roy puts it in his recent book, *Secularism confronts Islam*, the two models in use to facilitate integration, namely, multiculturalism and the assimilationist model, are in crisis. Both models posit the existence of an intrinsic link between religion and culture. The author does not limit his discourse to the Muslim migrant communities; neither do we, for all practical purposes of this panel. Indeed, the real issue here seems to be the articulation of religious identity within the public sphere (x-xii).

The philosophy of the United Nations, where we are meeting today, is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this precise context we should further explore new ways for the effective integration of migrants and minorities on the cultural and religious level.

The failure of migration policies based exclusively on the protection against the illegal movements of peoples, should by now convince us that in order to face these root problems,
one has to focus on the protection of human rights of the refugees and migrants, men and women, with their right to life, personal security, freedom of conscience and of religion, non-discrimination, human and dignified conditions of work, and paying special attention to the most vulnerable and in particular the children.

This comes first before any political consideration and should be accompanied by a transparent legal framework as a guarantee for those who flee, and no less for the communities that welcome them. It must include dialogue with those who arrived and with their countries of origin, and no less with the civil society that welcomes them. It must also take into account the reasons for refugees who do not possess adequate documentation, and how to differentiate human trafficking and, at the same time, xenophobia and intolerance.

The most recent report on the elimination of all forms of religious intolerance, compiled by the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, deals with the particular vulnerable situation in which migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as religious minorities, find themselves in the exercise of their right to freedom of religion or belief.

International migration and refugee law clearly affords people on the move specific rights in their country of migration or refuge in the exercise of their freedom of religion or belief. Migrants and religious minorities do not expect special protection or status, as long as their right to religious freedom is fully guaranteed and they are not discriminated against on religious grounds. In fact, they should enjoy the same civil rights as the general population and members of the majority religion.

The safeguarding and promotion of religious liberty for all requires both state action and religious responsibility.

A state that guarantees a religious community respect for its identity and freedom to express it and live it out, is a state that cannot but respect and promote the political, social and individual rights of its citizens.

If migrants expect states and societies to respect them and acknowledge their religions to be truly instruments of peace, they themselves must respect religious freedom. They must show that they are committed to promote peace and shun violence, and they must demonstrate that religion is not and must not become a pretext for conflict.

Speaking of culture and religion as factors of effective integration, we cannot forget to mention the contribution of the cultural and religious leaders.

Some time ago, I was posted at the European Institutions in Strasbourg. One morning, while walking into the chamber of the Council of Europe to debate issues related to migration and, in particular, the Schengen agreement, I was assailed by one delegate yelling at me: “You! You people! You put us in an awkward position! It’s easy for you to play the prophets and
say nice things on migrants, but then it’s up to us legislators to find the way out to insoluble problems!” Incidentally, the day before the Pontifical Council for Migrants had published a document on migrant workers and the reunion of families. During the debate, that same person who yelled at me, made an intervention that focused on the recommendations put forward in the document and that had upset him. In the end he recognized that they shed light on inalienable tenets and attitudes. In a way, he was right. Max Weber used to say that societies are composed of kings and prophets. The kings are those who have to make decisions no matter how difficult they were, while the prophets are those who have to remind kings and people of those values without which human society would fall apart.

One of the questions that I am often asked is how do your religious convictions allow you to respect the law and, at the same time, carry out your activity towards these people who have no legal right to remain on a given national territory?

The first thing that any humanitarian worker can do, without fear of violating any regulation, is to listen to people in an irregular condition or in search of asylum, in order to know exactly what their situation is, and also provide them with their basic needs.

Obviously, this does not mean to contest or in any way deny the right of every civilized and ordered community to protect its own territory, to take proper measures to safeguard its legitimate national interests, to take measures against the circulation of criminals or subverters of public order, and of arms and drugs traffickers. Solidarity simply sees the need to care for human beings, especially young people, minors and children, who are incapable of defending themselves because they lack protection under the law. Often they do not know the language of the country in which they have been obliged to seek refuge from natural catastrophes, wars, violence, persecution, even genocide, or economic conditions that are such as to endanger their physical integrity or life itself.

Of course, it is necessary to help immigrants in an irregular situation and asylum seekers find the appropriate, lawful solution to their case and acquire a legal status. Some cases may need assistance so that they can turn to a third country for acceptance. Others would need support to be able to return safely to their home country. Whatever may be the best solution, solidarity compels us not to leave them alone to cope with the situation.

When looking at the social thought on migration of the Catholic Church, to which I belong, we cannot but realize that before speaking of the remedy, i.e., the full and compassionate respect of migrants’ basic rights, it points to the root causes and reminds governments of their responsibility to provide their own citizens with decent conditions of life and access to work, so that they are not obliged to emigrate.
Distinguished organizers and participants, I would like to thank you very much for this kind invitation, which I very much appreciate, and for this opportunity to share with you the Portuguese experience and to learn from your own experiences.

Let me start by sharing with you the characteristics of the migratory experience of Portugal and, following from this, the main policy initiatives that we have been undertaking in welcoming and integrating immigrants.

PORTUGAL AS A COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

The experience of migratory movements in Portugal is not a recent phenomenon. As you may well know, throughout its history Portugal has been a country of emigration. During the seventeenth century, Brazil was one of the main countries of destination, but in subsequent centuries, Portuguese emigrants left their home country for other destinations, scattering themselves all over the world. Currently it is estimated that around one-third of the population is living abroad.\(^{38}\)

PORTUGAL AS A DESTINATION COUNTRY

Large-scale immigration flows began much later. The end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974 and concomitant changes in political, economic and social structures, were responsible for the shift in Portuguese migration patterns.\(^{39}\) Emigration declined during that decade, and the independence of the former African colonies resulted in the arrival in Portugal of repatriates, asylum seekers and return migrants.

More recently, during the last decade, in the context of the construction boom linked to several major infrastructure projects and other openings in the labour market, immigration flows diversified to include Eastern European countries as countries of origin. The largest immigrant communities in Portugal today are from West Africa, South America and Eastern Europe.

PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF IMMIGRANTS IN PORTUGAL

Among the African community, immigrants from Cape Verde, Angola and Guinea-Bissau predominate, while the Brazilian and Ukrainian communities are the largest among the South American and Eastern European immigrants, respectively. Over one-third of all immigrants in Portugal are from Africa, and almost one-fifth are from the European Union.
Both Latin American and non-EU Eastern European immigrants each comprise just over one-sixth of immigrants in Portugal. There is also a smaller Asian community (5.5%), principally comprising Chinese, Indian and Pakistani immigrants.

The growth of immigration flows and the diversification of origins has brought new challenges and complexities for public policy, namely in relation to border control, information and service provision to immigrants, combating discrimination and facilitating intercultural dialogue.

Despite the rise in numbers of immigrants and the economic stagnation that Portugal has experienced since 2001, Portuguese society has been able to welcome and integrate migrants. Last year, the Euro barometer showed that Portugal was in second place (within the EU-25), just behind Sweden, in terms of positive attitudes towards immigration. The majority of people questioned believed that the contribution of immigrants to Portuguese society was positive. At the same time only three per cent of the Portuguese people questioned considered immigration to be “a problem”.

These results serve to substantiate the intuitive perception that significant levels of social harmony exist in Portugal in relation to the question of immigration, demonstrated by the absence of serious cases of xenophobia, racism or general hostility towards immigrants.

To a large extent, this is a feature of debate and legislative activity on migration and integration in Portugal. Several laws have been approved as a step forward in welcoming and integrating immigrants. The results of the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) of 2007 (undertaken by the Migration Policy Group and the British Council) highlight very well this positive Portuguese attitude towards immigration. Of the 28 countries included in the study, Portugal achieved second place (after Sweden) in terms of best practice for each policy indicator set at the highest European standard.

SEVEN KEY PRINCIPLES

Recognizing the importance of having a coherent integration policy for immigrants, Portugal created in 1996 a state service with the principal mission of promoting the integration of immigrants and encouraging intercultural dialogue in Portugal, the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (ACIME).

This state service, as a service for intervention on a cross-cutting basis, reports directly to the Prime Minister. Hence, in Portugal, there is a whole-of-government approach to immigrant integration, interlinking the different ministries concerned. Immigration is not merely seen as a matter for the labour market or a security concern.

On 1 June 2007, this state service became a Public Institute. In other words, the Portuguese State officially recognized the importance of this service to immigrants, reinforcing ACIME’s powers and areas of activity. Since then, a new institutional name has been adopted: the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue – ACIDI.
Within the context of the approach of a “State of Law with a Human Face”, ACIDI’s activities are guided by seven key principles:

- Equality of rights and duties; combating all forms of discrimination.
- Hospitality – combating specific vulnerabilities and disadvantages.
- Citizenship – promoting the political participation of immigrants and their access to Portuguese citizenship.
- The participation of immigrants, as part of the solution for better integration.
- Co-responsibility for the public good, working together with the host society.
- Interculturalism as an enriching way to enhance social cohesion, promoting diversity and intercultural dialogue in society.
- Consensus – promoting public discussion and providing accurate and unbiased information in order to reach consensus.

CREATING SOLUTIONS

Bearing this in mind, the Portuguese Government has implemented a range of initiatives in the field of welcoming and integrating migrants.

Legislative changes

In 2006, a new Citizenship Law was voted on in the National Parliament. This law was approved with great consensus in society, without a single vote against it from any of the parties represented in parliament. Adopting a humane and generous approach and shifting competences from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Justice, this law enables more people to acquire Portuguese nationality, particularly immigrant descendants born in Portugal. Without promoting illegal migration, it shows a great will by the government and the society to grant full rights to those immigrants who are already well integrated in society, as well as their descendants.

This year, after broad public consultation, the Immigration Law was also changed. Under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, the new legislation simplifies procedures and reduces bureaucratic requirements, seeks to promote legal migration, combats illegal migration and facilitates family reunification.

Plan for immigrant integration

However, for immigrants to be well integrated into society, it is necessary to do more than merely change the immigration law. The integration process of immigrants in society takes place in a variety of areas that reflect the everyday life of immigrants and of their families. This action plan is based on a holistic approach and on the participation of the different organizations that are responsible for the implementation of the corresponding policies.

Accordingly, the Council of Ministers established an ambitious initiative: The Action Plan for Immigrant Integration. Comprising 122 measures, it involves 13 ministries, with an implementation deadline of two years. It considers sector-based areas (e.g. employment,
health, housing, solidarity and social security, education), and cross-cutting themes (e.g. welcoming immigrants, descendants of immigrants, family reunification and racism and discrimination). This plan adopts for the first time a holistic approach to integration and serves as a reference point for both the state and for civil society. This substantial political investment, within the framework of political and social consensus, represents another structural step forward.

**Creation of two national immigrant support centres**

The Portuguese National Immigration Support Centres (Centros Nacionais de Apoio ao Imigrante - CNAI) were set up in 2004. Their establishment, in the cities of Lisbon and Porto, seeks to provide an integrated, efficient and humane response to the integration issues of immigrants who have chosen Portugal as their host country.

The two Portuguese National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAI) were recognized as an example of best practice in the EU Handbook on Integration for policy makers and practitioners.41 The integration and cooperation of different public services, previously with different locations and schedules, and new services that cater for the concrete needs of immigrants, became a fundamental facility for newcomers and permanent immigrants.

Within this innovative model, the participation of socio-cultural mediators is fundamental. Mediators guarantee not only a cultural and linguistic proximity to each immigrant who uses the services of these centres, but also a fundamental proximity between public administration and immigrant citizens. Furthermore, the participation of civil society institutions, as partners in the management of this project can bring important outcomes. This results in the development of immigrant integration policy becoming a shared responsibility.

The two centres bring together under the same roof a number of services related to immigration. Following the philosophy of working with partners to develop good integration policies and outcomes, in the context of shared responsibility, the centres involve:

**Ministerial Departments:**
- Ministry of Home Affairs (Foreigners and Border Services)
- Ministry of Employment and Social Security
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Justice
- Ministry of Education

**Specialized offices that provide specific support on:**
- legal advice
- family reunification
- housing
- social emergencies (e.g. homelessness, immigrants living in very poor conditions)
- labour market insertion (both for employees and self-employment)
- access to Portuguese nationality
• Portuguese language courses
• anti-discrimination
• integration for the Roma community
• technical support to Immigrant Associations

Therefore, the CNAIs have been designed and managed with a view to providing a high-quality service to immigrants, within a friendly environment and operating from an immigrant-centred approach.

This project proved to be innovative in terms of providing a joined-up response for the user, since it is based on a general shared data management system used in attending to the public (facilitating the digitization of data and documents, and communication between the different offices).

As a result, we believe that this project has built up a partner relationship between public administration and civil society (including Immigrant Associations) in Portugal. We further believe that this crucial partnership contributes to strengthening relationships of trust, feelings of co-responsibility and the participation of different partners.

NETWORK OF LOCAL CENTRES

This is also the case with the local networks that the High Commission has established with stakeholders such as municipalities, NGOs and immigrant associations. Closely linked to the two National Immigrant Support Centres, 69 Local Immigrant Support Centres and 23 Job Centres for immigrants have been set up. These two networks help immigrants settled all over Portugal to obtain information on their rights and duties, as well as looking for job offers if they find themselves unemployed.

These networks also provide integrated coordination between the national and the local level, and between a greater number of institutions involved in welcoming and integrating immigrants. This is even more relevant at the local level, where there are institutions that can intervene more swiftly as and when problems arise.

“PROGRAMA ESCOLHAS”

Social inclusion for descendants of migrants is also one of our main concerns. Accordingly, Programa Escolhas—the Choices Programme—was set up to improve the social inclusion of children and young people from the most socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds, mainly descendants of immigrants and ethnic minorities. This is a bottom-up approach that funds, supports and evaluates local projects in four areas of activity:

• Educational inclusion and non-formal education
• Professional training and employability
• Civic and community participation
• IT skills
The programme now supports 121 projects all over the country, involving approximately 40,000 individuals, 500 social workers and more than 750 institutions. The programme has a budget of over 20 million euros (20,741,368.10).

**TRAINING SESSIONS**

Another important field of the High Commission’s activity is to promote training for professionals and volunteers dealing with migrants. Accordingly, a trainers’ network of 23 trainers has been built up to carry out short training activities in any part of the country, based on the teachers’ in-service training model that has been adopted, covering several themes, such as:

- Services for welcoming and integrating immigrants
- Myths and facts on immigration
- Naturalization
- Intercultural education

**IMMIGRATION OBSERVATORY**

Another important initiative is the Immigration Observatory. For the past five years in Portugal, the Observatory has defined a strategy of partnership between academia and policy makers, under the slogan “learning more so as to act better”. We believe that the best policies for immigrant integration come from recommendations and benchmarking in academic research. Through the Immigration Observatory it is possible to obtain accurate information and research in the different fields of immigration, providing unbiased information about this complex phenomenon.

The High Commission disseminates this knowledge through the publication of research projects, promotion of seminars and the creation of a specific website for the Observatory.

**RAISING PUBLIC AWARENESS**

It must, however, be acknowledged that integration is a ‘dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents’. It is important to provide effective services to immigrants, but it is equally fundamental to undertake initiatives aimed at the welcoming society. This is achieved by providing training and accurate information on the migratory phenomenon, and raising public awareness of intercultural dialogue.

Unfortunately, people know little about the phenomenon of immigration. And what people do not know, they tend to be afraid of and to reject. One of our main concerns has been raising public awareness through campaigns in the media and television and radio programmes about immigrant success stories and good practices on migration.

In order to promote the right approach from the media, the High Commission organizes the “Journalism for Tolerance Award”, rewarding TV, radio or print articles that contribute to a more open society, promoting diversity and intercultural dialogue.
STILL A LONG WAY TO GO

Having said all of this, we believe that there is still a long way to go. Portugal is still far from having dealt with all the barriers to the integration of immigrants. We have much to learn from other countries’ experiences, which will enable us to consolidate our policies. Furthermore, in terms of the promotion of development through migration, international partnerships are essential. For this reason, the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue is currently engaged in a number of international projects with European and other partners.

The European Union funding programme for the Integration of Third-country Nationals (INTI) aims to promote dialogue with civil society, develop integration models and best practices, and to set up European networks. ACIDI is coordinating an international project on the One-Stop Shop model for immigrant integration and is working as a partner in three other INTI projects on Routes to Integration, Naturalization and Housing. Previously, ACIDI was a partner in two INTI projects on Indicators of Immigrant Integration and Success Through Migration.

ACIDI was involved in the establishment of the Ethnic Minority Entrepreneurs Network within the Enterprise and Industry Directorate General of the European Commission in 2003, and has been its Coordinator since late 2004. The Network aims to promote best practice in ethnic entrepreneurship and raise public awareness of this issue.

During Portugal’s six-month tenure as President of the European Union during the second half of 2007, ACIDI was centrally involved in activities relating to the theme of the European Year of Equal Opportunities for All, and the priority issue of Health and Immigration. The Commission is also a member of the working group to prepare for the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue this year.

ACIDI participated in the OECD working groups for the Gaining from Migration project, and invited the OECD to conduct an external review of integration in the labour market in Portugal. ACIDI also has bilateral relations with Cape Verde, Spain and Serbia - such structures are of central importance in promoting the development of countries of origin. Next week, we will open the first Country of Origin Migration Support Centre in Cape Verde, in partnership with an Immigrant Association. Equipped with information materials, this centre will be staffed by a mediator, providing reliable information on legislation for people who plan to travel and/or migrate to Portugal.

We believe this is an important step forward in taking a global approach to the migration phenomenon.

Thank you very much for your attention.
Migrants in Development:
Labour Migration and Role of Diasporas
I am Belinda Comfort Damoah, Queen Mother of Suma Traditional Area and President of Suma Agricultural Cooperative Society, Ghana and Italy. Honourable moderator, fellow speakers, it is a great honour to be here today and to have the opportunity to talk about my project to support the rural development in my traditional area. Also, I would like to express many thanks to the organizers of this conference.

The Suma agricultural programme has been prepared for the people of the Suma traditional area of the Jaman District in the Brong Ahafo Region Ghana. The project aims to organize farmers of cashew, shea butter, mango and many other crops as well as livestock producers into cooperative associations. In addition, other objectives of the programme are to introduce technological farming, provide machinery and farm tools, realize efficient irrigation systems in order to obtain year-round farm produce, process farm products, provide adequate storage facilities and reduce waste during the harvest seasons.

The main goal of the programme is to improve agriculture, taking into consideration the area’s large labour force and the availability of land, thus creating jobs for the youth and women, increasing the income level of farmers and alleviating poverty. For example, products such as cashew and shea butter are to be exported to India, Europe and United States for foreign exchange, with the rest of the products sold locally to the institutions in nearby cities. In addition to promoting agricultural activities, our programme includes a proposal to assist the association of women through the profits from the project to support the establishment of a school for about a hundred children who are now attending classes in the shade of trees. Achieving our overall goals would also help to solve the problem of migration to the urban areas and abroad, which has left many elderly people, women and children in alarming conditions.

The list of partners in our programme include: Belinda Comfort Damoah (promoter and co-financer); Suma Agricultural Cooperative Society (co-financer); International Organization for Migration (co-financer); Suma Rural Bank (co-financer), and Regione Lombardia (co-financer). As a diaspora and a beneficiary of IOM, Regione Lombardia and financing partners, I direct the project from Italy through the coordinator and staff in Ghana. It is not easy as a leader in a project or community, living abroad and managing activities in my country of origin and it needs devotion, but I am happy and satisfied to see my people, especially women, so enthusiastic to help build and achieve a better future for themselves and their children.
What is seen in the video presented to you today represents the efforts made to turn an idea into an effective project for national development. However, I must say that it has not been easy either for me or for IOM to reach this point. In my remarks, I would like to focus a bit on the critical issues that we encountered as well as some of recommendations that I have drawn from my experience. I think it is worth mentioning them in order to fine-tune for future interventions and learn from our initiative.

Our project, as all the other similar sponsored projects, entails partnership with Italian local authorities. Their engagement in diaspora projects surely represents an important sign of recognition of our role in host nations and countries of origin. Nevertheless, administrative internal procedures are extremely slow and follow a bureaucratic logic. While this is normal for a public administration, it does create several problems for an agricultural project. For example, our deadlines are not arbitrary or based on our choice, but are set by nature, the rainy and the dry seasons. Timing is therefore crucial when it comes to supporting agricultural projects in Africa. Also, other major problems include lack of access to credit for capital and poor information communication technology and an inadequate mail system in the rural areas.

Based on my experience, I would like to offer a number of recommendations. First, for governments in developing countries, I would recommend that they ease migration for development policies and initiatives and concrete projects. The creation of an enabling environment is important for every developing country seeking to facilitate the investments of expatriates. I am talking about financial incentives, the elimination of double taxation for migrant investors, as Ghana has done, facilitation of access to credit, and possible twinning with banks in countries of destination.

I wish to note that there are enormous investment opportunities in countries of origin. There is a need for collaboration between the African private sectors on the continent and the various diaspora, especially with respect to issues such as access to capital, microfinance and joint ventures. Moreover, the empowerment of women and youth should be essential elements in all economic planning and activity by governments, civil society and the private sector.

For donor countries and development agencies, I recommend that they facilitate and assist migrants to develop and promote development projects in their countries of origin. The main feature that migrants in Italy have appreciated in our project is the participatory process in building each activity. In my opinion, this is the path that every development agency should follow in planning migration and development initiatives, so that these projects are really designed by migrants and not for them.

Also, as the private sector drives much of the existing partnerships between the African continent and the diaspora, discussions should concentrate on how to leverage the interactions that already exist in the development of the continent. Particular focus should be directed to capital, micro-finance joint ventures and investment opportunities in Africa, and barriers
to trade. Moreover, the creation of skills and project databases is important to interface the developmental needs of African countries with the existing expertise available in the diaspora to assist with specific projects, such as our project in Italy is doing.

African diaspora associations also have an important role to play. They should actively take advantage of migration and development policies and projects. The Association of the African Diaspora should be the real engine for each migration and development initiative. Unfortunately, we often face problems related to the genuine representation of our leaders as well as internal divisions. It is crucial for our associations to overcome these problems and unite for common goals. In planning migration and development initiatives, we should better organize our associations in order to become real interlocutors for the institutions in the host and home countries. Also, the diaspora has an important role to play in assisting Africa to address the challenges of scarce skills, research and innovation. They can also help to strengthen the higher education sector and promote technology transfer to African nations. Moreover, the diaspora could act as facilitators between Africa and the host countries in advancing the empowerment of women and youth. In particular, the diaspora could assist African entrepreneurs, especially women, through easier and more affordable access to finance, appropriate technologies as well as the establishment of empowerment partnerships. As stated by the participants to the African Union Regional Consultative Meeting of the African Diaspora in Europe, there is the need for diaspora groups to establish organizational structures, such as a secretariat or committee to enhance synergies and cooperation among the different groups. Indeed, properly organizing the associations and ensuring widespread participation in migration and development initiatives are critical ingredients for moving forward.

Once again, thank you all for your attention.
The Costs and Benefits of Migration to Sending States: The More You Look, the Worse It Gets

Rodolfo de la Garza

This paper has two objectives. First, it argues for the redefinition of the concept of national development, and the role that remittances play in that process. The second goal is to illustrate the extent to which theories explaining migration must take governmental and political factors into account. Such an approach illustrates that the societal effects of migration transcend whatever the sum of the economic benefits that accrue to individuals from remittances may be.

The paper begins with a discussion of the effects of remittances on development. Its second section explicates traditionally ignored factors stimulating migration and, by so doing, adds to our recognition of the total societal costs generated by migration.

MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

To understand how migration affects development it must be recognized that development is more than an increase in the sum of personal incomes, which is how it has traditionally been defined; it is, instead, an indicator of macro-level societal well-being that incorporates economic, social and political dimensions. Nonetheless, economic change, including increased incomes, is at the core of the societal transformations that are collectively conceptualized as ‘development’. Therefore, this section emphasizes economic factors to gauge a key aspect of developmental gains.

MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Central to an understanding of the migration-development linkage is the clear definition of economic development. Traditionally, the measures used to determine development, e.g., increased income, poverty reduction and improvements in living standards, have been vague and can lead to mixed results. This is because they focus primarily on the effect that remittances have on income levels of recipients and total funds remitted to countries of origin. Both result in overstating the positive impact of migration because neither measures how the funds are spent, nor their impact on the economic structure of receiving states. Ellerman (2005, 624) therefore developed a more exacting conceptualization that defines economic development as occurring not when sending communities and households enjoy higher incomes because of remittances, but rather when communities are able to build enterprises that do not live off remittances directly or indirectly (via the multiplier effect), so that local jobs could be sustained without continuing migration and remittances.
Although development has been consistently measured in economic terms, explanations regarding the effect of migration on economic development have varied over time. In the 1950s and 60s, it was argued that poor countries would benefit from migration thanks to large-scale capital transfer (de Haas, 2007, p. 3). This view was superseded in the 1970s and 80s by theories that argued pessimistically that migration maintains or even exacerbates underdevelopment (Almeida, 1973; Lipton, 1980; Reichert, 1981; Rhoades, 1979; Rubenstein, 1992; Binford, 2003 in de Haas, 2007a, p. 4). The current dominant perspective, known as the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) includes a more nuanced insight into migration and development that links the costs and benefits of migration more explicitly, and argues that migration has the potential to affect development both positively and negatively. De Haas (2007a) analysed the post-2001 research boom and concluded that it has “mixed, but generally positive views” about the impact of migration on economic development. His evaluation, however, is arguably overly optimistic in that it does not incorporate long-term indirect costs of migration, such as those resulting from the state’s need to increase its policing expenditures to respond to the increased criminality that return migrants spur, or from the more immediate loss of millions of dollars migrants pay to finance their travel, including the hiring of coyotes to enter their country of choice undocumented. When such indirect and direct costs are combined, our judgment is that the evidence does not support the claim that migration has a net positive impact on development in general, and on economic development in particular.

**REMITTANCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

To the extent that migration fuels development it does so primarily through remittances. There is no other source of funds sufficiently large to have development potential. However, regardless of the total value in remittances that a country’s residents might receive, remittances alone cannot independently generate economic growth or nationwide sustainable development, nor independently trigger economic growth or solve structural problems such as an unstable political environment, bad economic policy, insecurity, or corruption (de Haas, 2007a, p.25). Rather than being a stand-alone process, economic development depends on policies and the environment in receiving communities and states as well as the policies and the economic situation of the countries hosting immigrants. If sending countries stabilize politically and economically and growth begins, remittance recipients may reinforce such positive trends through investing these funds in productive activities rather than in personal consumption.

Remittances may also support development by contributing to stabilizing the economy, as occurred during the financial crises in Mexico in 1995, and in Indonesia and Thailand in 1998. Their stability is also likely to diminish the probability of investors pulling their money out of particularly troubled states (World Bank, 2006, p. 5). Also, countries with bad credit ratings can use future hard currency receivables such as remittances to allow lenders to circumvent further deterioration of their credit ratings (Ketkar and Ratha, 2001 in Guarnizo, 2003, p. 687).
In addition, remittances seem to be a more stable and sustainable source of income than more volatile sources of foreign exchange, such as agricultural trade, e.g., coffee, vegetables and flowers. Remittances thus can contribute to job development and maintenance by offering some protection against destabilizing effects of poorly functioning markets, inept state policies, and lack of public social security (de Haas, 2007a).

Migrants, however, remit in order to provide financial assistance to the families they left behind and not to underwrite economic development. The evidence indicates this specific objective is realized. Remittances reduce the depth and severity of poverty by raising incomes among recipient household and in sending communities overall. The overall effects of these funds are not uniform, however, because migrants do not constitute a representative sample of the national population, and they are not geographically equally distributed across the home country. For example, it is neither the poorest nor the richest who migrate and remit. While this may be of little consequence to the affluent, it exacerbates the relative poverty of the poorest. Moneys sent by lower skilled migrants, however, has a bigger impact than migration by the more skilled worker because low-skilled individuals send funds to lower income households for which remittances are more significant. There is no doubt that this contributes significantly to raising household incomes among those poorer families that receive remittances. Nonetheless, overall, these funds do not stimulate job creation, which is by definition the basis of economic development.

Nonetheless, it must be recognized that remittances do reduce poverty. De Haas (2007, p. 25) shows that multiplier effects from remittance expenditure and investment have this result. Adams and Page (2005) examined the relationship between migration, remittances and the extent, depth and severity of poverty in 74 developing countries and concluded that remittances had a strong impact on reducing the extent and severity of poverty, controlling for income and inequality (as cited in Page and Plaza, 2006 p. 283). Spatafora’s (2005) analysis of 101 countries in the period 1970-2003 found a link between poverty reduction and remittances, regardless of whether poverty was measured using the poverty headcount or the poverty gap (in Page and Plaza, 2006 p. 284). Munzele (2005) used a cross-country data set with 71 developing countries to create a growth-poverty model and shows that official international remittances reduce poverty in the developing world. Nonetheless, Muzele notes that in South Asia, official remittances have no statistical impact on the level and depth of poverty. However, when he adds an estimated value for unofficial remittances to the official ones, he finds that the level of poverty is reduced (in Page and Plaza, 2006 p. 284). Using the most recent waves of the Ghana Living Standards Survey to look at the impact of remittances on the household using a random effects model, Quartey and Blanson (2004) found that the flow of remittances to Ghana increased in times of economic shocks, that the impact of those shocks in diminishing household welfare is reduced by remittances, and that the proportion of males receiving migrant remittances is greater than that of females (in Page and Plaza, 2006 p. 285). Adams (2004) found that remittances reduce the severity of poverty in Guatemala by changing their income status dramatically (in Page and Plaza, 2006 p. 285). Remittances also have been shown to reduce the share of poor people in the population by 11 per cent in Uganda, 6 per cent in Bangladesh.
and 5 per cent in Ghana. In Latin America, however, the poverty impact is very small (World Bank, 2006, p. 4).

The developmental impact of remittances, however, varies with their use made by the recipients. While the majority of remittances are used for food and basic consumption (de la Garza and Lowell, 2002), that is not always so, and spending patterns are also influenced by gender-specific differences. Evidence from Ghana indicates that households headed by females are more likely than male-headed households to spend their remittances on food, consumer and durable goods, housing, health and similar goods (Schiff et al., 2007, p.7). Similar patterns have been observed in Mexico (Schiff et al., 2007, pp. 4,7).

Most studies since the 1990s, when controlling for income and other relevant variables, suggest that households receiving remittances have a higher propensity to invest than those that do not (Massey et al., 1998; Adams, 1991; Taylor, 1999; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; de Haas, 2006, in de Haas, 2007a, p.14). Considerable evidence shows that remittances promote access to self-employment and increase investment in small businesses (Rapoport and Docquier, 2005, in de Haas, 2007a, p.14). Nonetheless, research has tended towards a negative evaluation of remittance-based consumption as not contributing to development. However, provided remittances enhance local consumption this can produce positive effects by supporting local production and thereby also job creation for non-migrants and increase income (there is empirical evidence of such multiplier effects: de Haas, 2007a, p.16). However, such positive effects notwithstanding, in the short term, personal consumption will predominate, with investment, which it is more difficult to realize through remittances, is more significant in the long run (Alper and Neyapti, 2006 in de Haas, 2007, p.14). It has also been held that large remittance inflows can lead to the so-called “Dutch Disease”, i.e. the important foreign currency inflows may cause the local currency to appreciate, penalizing export-oriented agricultural produce and manufacturing industries. Whether and the extent to which this may occur is largely unexplored in the literature (cf. Page and Plaza, 2006 pp. 281-282).

Taken together, these effects indicate that, while remittances can make a positive contribution to family income, there is no conclusive evidence that they enable communities to create business enterprises that would not continue to depend directly or indirectly (via the multiplier effect) on remittance flows to remain viable so that local jobs and community well-being in general could be sustained even in the absence of continued migration and remittances. In short, remittances increase the income of receiving families and their communities, but there is no evidence that they stimulate national economic development.

It should also be noted that just as migration generates economic benefits primarily through remittances, it also generates increased costs, the actual amounts of which are incalculable. For example, Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala, among others, are facing increased levels of transnational conflicts and drug-related violence involving return migrants (Cevallos 2004, del Barco 2008, Arana, 2005, International Herald Tribune, May 27, 2008). None of these states has been able to eliminate or control such developments, and in countries such
as Guatemala and El Salvador return migrants are so well armed and organized that they undermine state authority and threaten society at large. Estimating the cost to the state of responding to such threats is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is reasonable to suggest that it far exceeds the net positive impact of remittances on national development.

RETHINKING THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

The recognition that migration has become a major source of social, political and cultural tensions has increasingly led scholars to focus on explanations of why people migrate. Although recent forays into this maze, such as world systems theory and social network theories (Massey, et. al., 1999), as well as microeconomic theories that focus on individual choices by rational actors (Massey, 1993, 434; Goss and Lindquist, 1995) have advanced our understanding of the factors that influence migration processes, these explanations remain incomplete because they virtually ignore how the politics and policies of states of origin affect migration. To the extent that they deal with political factors, contemporary analyses tend to invoke one-dimensional caricatures of the state and present it either as puppet-like representatives of capitalist interests, or as a bureaucratic entity in charge of determining family reunification criteria (Massey, et. al. 1999). Thus, they ignore the role the state plays in promoting migration as well as the impact that political practices have on stimulating individual decisions to emigrate, i.e. in stimulating political migration. This is a most significant oversight because, theoretically, a state’s political institutions and processes are as capable of stimulating migration as are economic factors.

This is especially the case with undemocratic regimes which seldom change their policies to accommodate public concerns. Instead, they usually seek to stifle their critics. The most effective way to achieve this is to have their critics leave. The Castro regime, for example, controlled its most intense domestic opposition by encouraging them to flee to Miami, Puerto Rico and elsewhere. Similarly, the migration of economic elites obviated clashes between them and the Chinese government when Hong Kong reverted to China.

Mexico’s governing elites acted similarly to Cuba’s leaders (de la Garza and Szekely, 1997). For approximately seven decades they relied on legal and undocumented emigration to remove many of their opponents to the major cities of the American west. This migration served as safety valves to relieve public pressures regarding economic and political practices. Evidence of the kind of pressure migrants could have brought to bear on Mexico is evident in the immigrant marches they helped to organize in virtually every major U.S. city in 2006.

Eliminating its opposition via migration and internal repression has allowed the Mexican state to avoid changing policies and practices to improve the situation of the population at large. For example, when revenues from state oil and electricity companies are excluded, Mexico’s federal government collects taxes equal only to 10 to 12 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), which is only slightly higher than Haiti, a socio-economic basket case, and far below Brazil’s 36 per cent. This is compounded by a tax system riddled with loopholes, exemptions and widespread evasion. The failure to fairly tax its citizens helps explain why
Mexico devoted only 5.3 per cent of GDP to education in 2002, the last year in which the World Bank conducted a comparative analysis. Smaller and poorer countries such as Guatemala (9.01%), Cuba (9%), Barbados (7.61%), Honduras (7.22%), Bolivia (6.31%) and the Dominican Republic (5.82%) all spent more. Consequently, Mexico’s middle class has abandoned public schools partly because they fail to address issues such as merit evaluations and accountability of educational staff and local authorities, owing to external influences and pressures. Health Care has a similar record. Mexico earmarked only 6.10 per cent of its GDP for health care in 2002, less than El Salvador (8%), Nicaragua (7.9%), Haiti (7.6%) and Cuba (7.5%). The problem is not only the low expenditure on the well-being of Mexican citizens, but also the diversity of publicly subsidized providers.

Nor have impediments to internal competition been addressed and eliminated, though they raise costs, diminish efficiency and limit growth.

In the private sector, a small number of firms linked to officialdom, control telecommunications, television, food processing, radio, transportation, construction and cement. In 2004, the ship Mary Nour and her 41-member crew were stuck at Mexican ports for months, barred from unloading Russian cement by local producers who abhor competition. Cement giant Cemex, owned by the powerful Zambrano family, cited safety concerns and technicalities to keep them out of what some call an overpriced local market. Also, the World Bank Group found that it took 58 days to master the legal and bureaucratic hurdles to open a business in Mexico, compared with two days in Australia, three days in Canada, five days in the U.S., nine days in Jamaica, 27 days in Chile and 32 days in Argentina. Corruption further complicates private sector initiatives. Mexico’s highly respected Private Sector Center for Economic Studies estimates that 34 per cent of businesses made “extra-official” payments to legislators and bureaucrats totalling USD 11.2 billion in 2004. In a similar vein, Transparency International (TI) ranked Mexico as tied for 65th to 69th place among 158 countries surveyed for corruption and found greater corruption in Mexico than in Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Cuba or South Korea.

Many weaknesses and failures in the national context, that this is not the place to go into in detail, underpin our theory of political migration. Like microeconomic explanations of emigration, this theory42 explores the extent to which emigration reflects individual responses based on cost-benefit calculations individuals make to maximize the benefits of deciding whether or not to migrate (Massey, 1993: 434). It differs from microeconomic explanations of migration in that it focuses on the role that individuals assign to political factors in making their decisions. It builds on the work of de la Garza and Hazan (2002) in an ongoing effort to develop a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the significance of political migration.

The argument is divided into four sections. The first begins with a review of the theoretical foundation of the analysis and also includes conceptualizing and operationalizing political migration, the dependent variable, and of state policies and political processes, our independent variables. The next section consists of our analysis. In the final section, we evaluate the
results of the analysis from both a theoretical and political perspective. That is, we assess the extent to which migration theory is enhanced by incorporating a political dimension, and we suggest how states can use politics and policies to influence emigration.

**POLITICS AND EMIGRATION**

The paper draws heavily from Hirschman’s classic *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (1970). Unlike sociological and economic analyses of immigration, this approach recognizes the state as an entity involved explicitly in the migratory process via its policies, and implicitly through its relationships with public institutions. Hirschman’s theory may be understood as arguing that migration decisions reflect individual attitudes towards governments, which indicates that the decision to emigrate may be politically driven.

This analysis defines political migration as a voluntary decision rather than the forced response to state sponsored political, ideological or ethnic violence or threats (Goodwin-Gill 1990). It moreover acknowledges that not all citizens dissatisfied with government practices manifest their dissatisfaction by exiting the state. For most citizens, voice is the principal way “to register dissatisfaction with the way things are going” (Hirschman, 1970, p.76). “Voice” may take the form of mass protests, the emergence of dissident groups within governing coalitions, the creation of new political parties or letters to the press complaining of specific situations or the way services are provided. Voice, thus, is often direct and explicit and offers political leaders clear and sometimes immediate feedback regarding political practices and public policies.

Nonetheless, some citizens may express their discontent by voting with their feet, i.e. by exiting the state. This option, in contrast to the “voice” option, is usually a silent and anonymous form of expressing discontent with the state and its political or policy processes (Hirschman, 1974, p.16). For these reasons the existence of politically motivated migration as well as its intensity and scope are less likely to be recognized.

Political migrants, in sum, are migrants who are primarily motivated by political interests, i.e. they are citizens who are dissatisfied with public policies and political processes, but feel unable to influence them. Instead of voicing their discontent they opt to at least temporarily break their ties with the state and emigrate. They differ from political refugees who are defined by the 1951 United Nation Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as persons who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, are outside the country of their nationality, and are unable to or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. Rather, the focus here is to determine how many non-refugee migrants cite dissatisfaction with political practices and/or state policies as among the primary reasons for emigrating.

The theory presented here argues that, in addition to migrating for economic reasons or to join family members abroad, individuals may exit a state when it is not responsive to their
needs, or has failed to provide public services such as health, education and public safety, or when the political system lacks public accountability or is highly corrupted. This combines the arguments made by Hirschman (1970) and Barry (1974) regarding the source of citizen dissatisfaction. Hirschman (1970) predicts that individuals would be more likely to exit the state if the quality of the services supplied by the state is very low, while Barry (1974) suggests that it is not the quality but the types of goods and services provided by the state that are at issue. In our view, dissatisfaction may be the result of both the quality and the type of services available.

Our analysis examines the extent to which political factors influence migration decisions. To that end we measure the extent to which individuals report that dissatisfaction with economic issues, state social policies and state sponsored or sanctioned institutional practices influenced the decision to emigrate.

The data analysed are from a Tomás Rivera Policy Institute telephone survey designed to measure remitting behaviour among Mexicans and Salvadorans in pre-selected counties in California, Texas, Illinois and New Jersey during November and December of 2003. The survey included 400 respondents from Mexico and 400 from El Salvador. All respondents were at least 18 years old, were born in Mexico or in El Salvador, were at least 16 years or older when they first came to live permanently in the United States, and had personally or via a household member sent money to their countries of origin. The sample, thus, is not representative of Mexican or Salvadoran immigrants and our results therefore may not be used to generalize on these groups.

ANALYSIS

As indicated, our objective is to gain insight into the extent to which political rather than economic factors influence emigration decisions. To answer this question, we examine individual evaluations of the effect of economic factors, public policies and political practices on the decision to migrate. Our analysis, in effect, measures the extent to which émigrés perceive their state to have failed to provide its citizens with sufficient economic opportunities, social services and/or demonstrated political accountability to make them stay in their home countries.

Although both countries are characterized by poorly performing economies and high rates of poverty, El Salvador is much worse off than Mexico in this regard. This is evidenced in the ratings of the Human Development Index (HDI) developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which is “a composite index that measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP) US dollars” (UNDP, 2005, p.214). On average, from 1970 to 2003, Mexico’s HDI score was around 0.8 while El Salvador’s was approximately 0.6 (See Figure 1).
Our major concern, however, is the relative impact of political vs. economic factors on the decision to emigrate. To reiterate, what is distinctive about this theory is that, in addition to recognizing that non-political factors such as increased economic opportunities in host countries and social and migrant networks influence emigration decisions, it claims that political factors also play a significant role in these decisions. It says nothing, however, about their relative importance. Although we expect them to be highly salient, we do not expect them to be of greater salience than economic factors.

To measure the impact of these two types of factors, we asked respondents how much each type of factor influenced the decision to emigrate: a great deal, somewhat, not much or not at all (see Appendix 1 for the phrasing of these items) As we expected, when respondents were asked about how economic factors such as employment, the cost of living, the cost of doing business and taxes influenced their decision to migrate to the United States, 54 per cent of the sample reported that such factors greatly influenced their decision, 46 per cent said that social conditions such as educational opportunities, the availability of health care and public safety influenced their decision to come to the U.S. a great deal, and more than one-quarter said that lack of governmental accountability, the fairness of elections, and the integrity of government officials greatly influenced their decision to migrate to the U.S.

This pattern is modified when the salience of economic factors is compared with that of political factors when the latter are combined and evaluated as one factor. As Figure 2 illustrates, combining the assessment of the significance of social policy and the performance of political institutions indicates that approximately 73 per cent of respondents (Mexican and Salvadoran immigrants) state that political factors had a great deal of influence over the emigration decision compared to 54 per cent who referred to economic factors as having a great deal of influence over migration decisions (see Figure 4a).
To determine the validity of combining the responses in this way, the responses were analysed using a principal components analysis which explicates the key dimensions underlying these assessments. The results of this analysis reduce the multidimensionality incorporated into the data to three components. The first accounts for much of the variability in the data, and each succeeding component accounts for additional but smaller proportions. Figure 3 shows the result of this analysis for our sample populations. The principal component analysis suggests that there are two dimensions. The first component for both Mexicans and Salvadoreans is made up of social and economic factors. The second component consists of political factors. On average, these two principal components explain more than 80 per cent of the variance.
As predicted by our theory, this analysis clearly suggests that political considerations play an independent role in migration decisions. Not only do evaluations of political practices stand alone, but evaluations of state policies combine with more explicit economic considerations to create a second independent evaluative component. This latter result also leads us to suggest that economic considerations include a variety of factors not normally incorporated into economic explanations of migration. That is, in addition to the weight explicitly assigned to economic issues, politically based evaluations of economic policies, such as government-funded social services and education, are also influential. In sum, the results of the principal component analysis strongly confirm the centrality of political considerations in the migration decision.

Further evidence of the significance of political factors having an independent impact on migration decisions is suggested by the results of interviews with 56 Mexican immigrants in Austin, Texas, in 1998 and 1999, and with thirty-nine Mexicans interviewed in Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Mexico City in 1999. In 1998, Austin respondents were asked about the factors that influenced their decision to migrate. Twenty-five out of 38 respondents (66%) said that the main reason was economic, but seventeen (45%) indicated that political issues had been a primary concern prior to emigrating. Furthermore, 57 per cent reported that they would not have left Mexico if they had had an opportunity to influence the political system, compared to 24 per cent who said they would have left anyway.

Similar patterns characterized respondents interviewed in Austin in 1999. When asked about their primary concerns prior to emigrating, economic issues were the most frequently mentioned. But half of the respondents also identified political issues, and one-third mentioned social issues. Furthermore, 50 per cent reported they would not have left Mexico had the political situation been different. This group was most concerned with political corruption, lack of representation and the lack of accountability of governmental and political authorities.

Of the respondents interviewed in Mexico, almost 87 per cent cited economic problems as one of their primary concerns, two-thirds reported they were also very concerned about political problems and forty-one per cent mentioned social problems as a major source of concern. Overall, 20 per cent of these thirty-nine respondents indicated that they had considered emigrating, and two-thirds of these reported they would stay in Mexico if there were fewer political problems (de la Garza and Hazan 2000).

Finally, given that our results indicate that politics influence migration decisions, we would expect its effect to vary with differences in state capacity and characteristics. In other words, political migration should be higher in poorer states because such states would provide less and lower quality social services. Similarly, less democratic states should experience higher rates of political emigration because the citizenry has fewer expectations regarding its ability to influence state policy. Given our assessment that the Salvadoran state has been less successful than the Mexican state in economic and political areas, we expect Salvadorans to
be more likely than Mexicans to say that economic problems and political factors influenced their emigration decisions. As Figure 4 shows, these patterns are evident in our data.

As predicted, Salvadoran immigrants attribute more importance to home country economic, social and political factors as determining their decision to move to the U.S. than did Mexican immigrants. For example, almost 20 per cent more Salvadoran than Mexican immigrants reported that economic factors significantly influenced their decision to move to the U.S. Similarly, 18 per cent more Salvadorans than Mexicans cited the lack of social services as having greatly influenced their decision to come to the U.S. Although significantly lower percentages of both groups indicated that political factors greatly influenced their decision, Salvadorans were almost 33 per cent more likely than Mexicans to express this view.

Given their low incomes and the low level of social services available to them, the least educated and poorest respondents should be more concerned about economic factors than those who, because they are better educated and have higher incomes, have less need of such benefits. Also, those with the lowest levels of human capital should be less concerned about political processes since such individuals have historically had very little influence in their respective political systems. While the results of this analysis support the first two of these predictions, respondents with low human capital are also more concerned with political processes than are the better educated and more affluent. It is also noteworthy that, regardless of levels of education and household income, Mexican and Salvadoran immigrants articulate similar evaluations of how much emigration decisions are influenced by economic considerations and education levels. On the other hand, Mexican and Salvadoran evaluations of the salience of political considerations vary significantly by country as well as by demographic characteristics (See Figures 5-6).

**Figure 4. Reasons for Migrating to the United States, by Nationality**
Figures 5 and 6 indicate that, regardless of national origin, the individuals at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder measured in terms of years of education and income, were more likely to report being greatly influenced in their decision to come to the U.S. by the failure of the state in economic, social and political terms than those respondents with more years of education and higher incomes. This pattern suggests that those at the bottom of the SES ladder are those who, though they are the least politically influential, are the ones in greatest need of new politics that will begin to address their concerns and allow them to remain in their homelands.

Figure 5. Reasons for Migrating and National Origin by Educational Attainment
CONCLUSION

The results of our analysis clearly indicate the need to revise our thinking about the benefits and causes of migration. From a cost-benefit perspective, claims regarding the positive impact of migration on development are either exaggerated or wrong. While there is no doubt that the income of the remittance recipients increases, there is little support for the suggestion that remittances stimulate national development. On the contrary, the overall losses societies experience strongly suggest that migration is not only a drain on the economy, but generates
additional social long-term costs that can destabilize the society. Because of the huge sums that migrant sending countries receive in remittances, it is understandable that state leaders see these as among the major source of foreign capital available for supporting national development. This can easily result in avoiding the difficult task of institution building and strengthening that is essential to development. In other words, rather than generate development, migration probably exacerbates the economic, social and political problems that provoke migration in the first place. Unless state leaders confront this reality, they will never escape it.

Our results also indicate the utility of analysing emigration in terms of individual assessments of state policies and institutional political practices. That is, whether an individual evaluates state social services and political institutions as affecting the decision to emigrate as much as international labour market characteristics do. If individuals feel they can influence policy to be more attentive to public needs, they may be more willing to return or to remain at home. On the other hand, if they feel neglected by the state and ineffective in their ability to influence governmental behaviour, as did many of our respondents in Austin and Mexico, they have no reason not to emigrate.

To fully explain emigration, therefore, it is necessary to go beyond economics and social factors such as networks, and include citizen attitudes toward the state and its political institutions. Future research combining such variables would enable us to assess the significance of these distinct factors.

From a policy perspective, our results suggest that sending states might be able to play a greater role in managing emigration than they may want to acknowledge. To do so, however, is likely to require major changes in domestic policy, including the development of new and more comprehensive social services, as well as the strengthening of democratic political institutions including mechanisms for holding governments accountable. These types of changes could generate controversy, but failing to enact them is likely to result in continued and perhaps increased high levels of political migration.
APPENDIX 1

Overall, how much did [HC] economic factors such as employment, the cost of living, the cost of doing business and taxes influence your decision to come to the U.S.? Did it influence you a great deal, some, not much, or none?

- A great deal: 1
- Some: 2
- Not much: 3
- None: 4
- DK: 8
- RF: 9

Overall, how much did your concern about social conditions such as educational opportunities, the availability of health care and public safety in [HC] influence your decision to come to the U.S.? Did it influence you a great deal, some, not much, or none?

- A great deal: 1
- Some: 2
- Not much: 3
- None: 4
- DK: 8
- RF: 9

Overall, how much did [HC] political factors such as how accountable government was to people like you, how clean elections were, how honest government officials were, influence your decision to come to the U.S.? Did it influence you a great deal, some, not much, or none?

- A great deal: 1
- Some: 2
- Not much: 3
- None: 4
- DK: 8
- RF: 9

The Costs and Benefits of Migration to Sending States: The More You Look, The Worse It Gets
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Mobility and Development Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs): Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia - an Indonesian Perspective

Andre Siregar

INTRODUCTION

The issue of international migration and development has been discussed for many years in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), particularly in the Second Committee. UN member countries come together in the General Assembly to address this global issue and formulate normative principles in a resolution adopted by consensus. In the ten years since the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) met in Cairo, the position of member countries on the importance of further discussing the issue have converged and they agreed to hold the first UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD) in 2006 during the 61st session of the UNGA.

Since the HLD, member countries have not only conveyed their commitment to address international migration and development through a consensus resolution (A/RES/61/208), but have fostered greater dialogue, enhanced cooperation and collaboration through various intergovernmental cooperation forums at the regional and global level, strengthened coordination at the national level, and also encouraged closer cooperation with relevant international organizations and stakeholders.

Of the many types of intergovernmental cooperation, those that continue to be viewed positively are regional consultative processes (RCPs). Designed to be informal and practical, these forums have become the vanguard to address international migration in a positive and constructive manner. According to reports of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) RCPs have been established in almost all continents.

Based on UNGA Resolution 61/208, 2008 is expected to have the first substantive discussion on the follow-up to the HLD. This conference serves as a timely and pertinent kick-off event for government representatives and relevant stakeholders to review efforts in this area since 2006. It is important to take stock of what governments have accomplished since then, and to forecast areas for possible long-term cooperation.

Today I will focus my attention on one RCP, namely the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (Colombo Process). I do so in particular to share the perspectives of Indonesia which hosted the Colombo Process in September 2005, and to share my personal views on the issue based on my perspective as facilitator and negotiator on UN resolutions on migration.
BACKGROUND

Governments all over the world continue to struggle as they address the issue of international migration and development. Not one government, despite their willingness and efforts in this regard, or their economic strength, can hope to resolve the matter alone. The very sensitive nature of migration, not only as it touches on questions of sovereignty, but also institutional competence, have made stakeholders (NGOs, civil society, the business community and academia) call for a more comprehensive approach, involving aspects of economic and social development, legal protection and the promotion of human rights. Despite their limitations, governments have taken positive steps towards further intergovernmental cooperation, particularly in the regional area, through RPCs.

Although RPCs have existed since the late 1990s, only during the 59th Session of the UNGA was this reflected in the resolution on international migration and development. Later, the UNGA formulated even more specific language on RPCs as follows:

(...) Also welcomes the ongoing efforts of Governments in the area of regional and interregional cooperation and regional consultative processes, where they exist, on migration and encourages consideration of development dimensions in such processes, towards facilitating the dialogue and the exchange of information and experiences, fostering coordination at the regional and national levels, building common understanding, promoting cooperation, contributing to capacity-building and strengthening partnerships among countries of origin, transit and destination.

(0P5- A/RES/61/208)

Their role in addressing migration was clearly reflected in the UN Secretary-General’s report, as follows:

(...) In addition, regional consultative processes on international migration have been established in most parts of the world. The latter have proved useful in building trust and promoting cooperation among Governments (A/60/871, Para 33).

A consultative forum, led by and open to all the 191 States Members of the United Nations, would offer Governments a venue to discuss issues related to international migration and development in a systematic and comprehensive way (...) The forum would thus complement, and add value to, the activities of the regional consultative processes, especially since the latter do not usually address issues related to development, focusing instead on managing regional migration flow (Para 40).

Hence, given the importance of intergovernmental cooperation to address the issue of migration at the global level, the RCPs had played a constructive role in encouraging further UN dialogue on the matter.
INDONESIA’S PERSPECTIVE

As a country of origin, transit and destination, Indonesia is strongly impacted by migration. Out of a population of 220 million, Indonesian migrant workers (TKI) account for approximately 2.8 million (2005), travelling to 19 destination countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East, the U.S. and Europe. Most of them (75.38%) are employed in the informal sector and are estimated to generate remittances amounting to USD 2.93 billion (154% compared to 2004), representing 0.75 per cent of GDP, 50 per cent of FDI and 75 per cent of official capital inflows.

Indonesia is also a transit country for migrants from the Middle Eastern region (Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan) estimated at 4,400 (2003) travelling to countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand.

In an effort to address this global issue, the Indonesian government has been active in RCPs, such as the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (The Colombo Process) and the Asia Pacific Consultations for Refugees (APC).

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATION ON OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND CONTRACTUAL LABOUR FOR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN IN ASIA (THE COLOMBO PROCESS)

The Colombo Process was designed as a forum where ministers of labour could meet annually to discuss labour migration matters and formulate relevant recommendations and action plans and later review and monitor the implementation of the previous recommendations and determine further steps for action.

The Colombo Process offers member states and organizations a non-binding and informal venue to for discussions and cooperation on issues related to labour migration of mutual interest and concern.

The first meeting was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on April 1, 2003. It was attended by officials from Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam in partnership with IOM and ILO participation.

The second meeting of the Colombo Process was held in Manila, the Philippines, on September 23, 2004, where it continued to gain the support of relevant stakeholders and expanded its participation and coverage. In addition to the original participants from the first Colombo Process, it was attended by representatives of the Government of Afghanistan and inter-governmental organizations including ADB, DFID and other regional experts.

The third Colombo Process meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia, on September 20, 2005. After long discussions, this meeting not only included the original countries (Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam) but for the first time also invited the participation of major Asian receiving countries (Bahrain, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and in addition to various international and regional organizations (ASEAN, EC, GCC, ILO, UNIFEM and World Bank).

The aim of the Bali meeting was to provide a forum for Asian labour sending countries to:
- share experiences, lessons learned and best practices on overseas employment policies and practices;
- consult on issues faced by overseas workers, countries of origin and destination;
- Propose practical solutions for the well-being of vulnerable overseas workers;
- optimize development benefits;
- enhance dialogue with countries of destination;
- review and monitor the implementation of the recommendations and identify further steps for action.

In Bali, member countries of the Colombo Process highlighted a number of achievements since 2003, such as:
- identification at ministerial and senior official levels of policy challenges and needs, and exploration of the range of possible responses and exchange of experiences in development programme;
- establishing a common Overseas Workers Resource Centre;
- implementation of recommendations at the national level.

As discussed in Bali, a number of major clusters were identified: 1) Welfare of Overseas Workers and Support Services; 2) Optimizing the Benefits of Organized Overseas Employment and Cooperation on Managed Labour Mobility Between Countries of Origin and Destination, and 3) Follow-up Arrangements to the foregoing.

These clusters were discussed further as follows:

1. Welfare of Overseas Workers and Support Services -
   - Further implementation of the recommendations made at Manila on regulatory frameworks, establishment and operation of welfare funds.
   - Conducting information campaigns.
   - Development and introduction of a module for migrants on pre-departure orientation for relevant destination countries.
   - Working closely with countries of destination in establishing minimum wage levels and ensuring safe and decent conditions of work for contract workers.

2. Optimizing the Benefits of Organized Overseas Employment and Cooperation on Managed Labour Mobility Between Countries of Origin and Destination -
   - Enhancement of government and private sector capacity to place workers.
• Ensuring that potential workers are well informed concerning legal overseas work opportunities and procedures, and the risks of resorting to irregular movement.
• Capacity building for national authorities in countries of origin.
• Organizing annual consultations for senior officials among Asian countries of origin and main European destination countries on the development of managed labour movements and prevention of irregular movements.
• Further implementation of recommendations made at Manila on enhancing the development impact of remittances and on improving remittance services.

3. Follow-up Arrangements
• Establishment of an Overseas Workers’ Resource Centre.
• Roundtable meetings on: a) further cooperation between the GCC countries and Asian countries of origin; b) overseas labour in Southeast and East Asia.
• A senior officials meeting of Asian countries of origin with main destination countries for Asian workers in Europe.

The results of this meeting encouraged further discussion not only among the original member countries of the Colombo Process, but also with countries of destination.

After long discussions, the next meeting was to be held in a receiving country, which the Government of United Arab Emirates offered to host.

MINISTERIAL CONSULTATION ON OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND CONTRACTUAL LABOUR FOR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION IN ASIA (ABU DHABI DIALOGUE)

This historical meeting was held in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on 21st January 2008, with the participation of officials from countries of origin (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, The Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Viet Nam) and countries of destination (Bahrain, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE and Yemen)

The theme of the meeting was “Contractual Labour Mobility in Asia: Five Key Partnerships for Development Between Countries of Origin and Destination”, and it is expected to strengthen cooperation between countries of origin and destination and continue to provide a forum for the participating 11 Asian labour source countries to share their views and experiences in the field of labour mobility policies, review the implementation of recommendations of the Bali Consultations, and identify further steps for the effective management of labour mobility and temporary contractual labour for the benefit of all concerned.

The 11 Asian labour source countries that constitute the core of this ongoing dialogue were joined by Gulf Cooperation Council states as well as countries of destination in Asia, totalling 22 participating countries with observers from nine European and other countries, and 14 regional and international organizations.
The meeting was divided into three sessions:
1. Optimizing benefits of organized international mobility for contractual labour
2. Welfare and protection of contractual overseas workers and families
3. Building institutional capacity and interstate cooperation

Prior to the meeting, intensive negotiations took place between all participating countries on the areas for future partnership. The five key partnerships for development between countries of origin and destination were as follows:

1. Enhancing the knowledge of labour market trends, skills, profiles, contractual workers and remittance flows and policy and the interplay with regional development.
2. Building capacity to better match labour demand and supply.
3. Reducing the costs of contractual labour mobility, facilitating remittances and promoting investments in, and exchange with, countries of origin for development.
4. Promoting welfare and protection measures for contractual workers, supportive of their well-being and preventing their exploitation.
5. Developing a framework for the comprehensive approach to manage contractual labour mobility that incorporates and recognizes the inherent particularities and fosters international cooperation.

The meeting in Abu Dhabi, though a follow-up to the meeting in Bali, is not in fact the fourth Colombo Process meeting. Instead, it is an innovative event where relevant stakeholders from both receiving and sending countries meet to discuss migration issues in the context of development. This dialogue is a unique landmark where governments in Asia can address migration in the broad context of South-South migration. It is a positive step towards an approach where migration can be addressed comprehensively and supported by a strong political will by all governments.

CONCLUSION

Addressing international migration and development requires the continued pro-active involvement of governments. Given its multidimensional nature, governments are still seeking the most appropriate means to address immigration issues in a comprehensive manner. Small steps that foster greater intergovernmental cooperation are necessary to ensure a long-term sustainable outcome to protect not only the rights of migrants, but also to provide a realistic condition for both the sending and receiving countries. The Colombo Process provides an example of intergovernmental cooperation in the area of international migration and development. The Abu Dhabi dialogue demonstrates that the receiving countries too can play a concerted role in designing a long-term strategy to enhance the welfare of migrants and societies.

Although many outcomes of intergovernmental collaboration are political in nature, the relevant stakeholders should play an active role to enhance government efforts not only
in socializing the outcomes, but also serving as a secondary monitoring mechanism that balance the government reviews. The United Nations can play a crucial role in addressing the issue, particularly in cooperation with other relevant organizations, including IOM, and in providing practical migration recommendations through their biannual reports by the Secretary-General.

Finally, the momentum created by the preparation and follow-up to the HLD should be maintained so that the issue of international migration and development may be discussed in greater detail and benefit from relevant and practical solutions.
Research Priorities and Gaps
Research Priorities and Gaps: An Agenda for the Global Forum on Migration and Development

Susan F. Martin

The issue of migration and development is now firmly on the international agenda. Almost 15 years ago, in the first serious attempt to understand the interconnections between these two phenomena, the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) in Cairo produced a 20-year Plan of Action that included ways in which countries could accelerate development to make emigration unnecessary.

How to follow up on these recommendations remained a matter of great controversy, however. After the ICPD, states were divided regarding the benefits or value of convening a conference on international migration and development, and many were reluctant to support global discussions of migration. Despite countries’ continuing hesitations, global discussions of international migration issues ultimately got under way.

The Berne Initiative, launched by the Swiss government in 2001, aimed at identifying ways to better manage migration at the regional and global level. The Berne Initiative was followed by the Global Commission for International Migration (GCIM). Organized at the request of the UN Secretary-General and with the financial support of Switzerland and Sweden, it was mandated to “provide the framework of a coherent, comprehensive and global response to the issue of international migration” (GCIM, 2005). The Global Commission generated its own research and stimulated research activities by other actors. Its final report included recommendations on a wide range of issues, with the connections between migration and development playing an important role in the analysis.

The UN High-Level Dialogue (HLD) followed. It formally arose from General Assembly Resolution 58/208 of December 2003, where it was agreed to devote a high-level dialogue to international migration and development in 2006. In 2005, the Secretary-General reported on the organizational details of the HLD to the General Assembly, which then adopted Resolution 60/227 to convene the HLD on September 14-15, 2006, in New York. The resolution directed the HLD to explore the “overall theme of the multidimensional aspects of international migration and development in order to identify appropriate ways and means to maximize its development benefits and minimize its negative impacts” (UN, 2006B). The HLD also generated research, presented at a series of conferences, workshops and roundtables that engaged experts and policy makers.

The HLD perspectives subsequently informed the organization of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the state-owned consultative process established to further
discussions on the issues covered in the General Assembly. The first meeting of the Global Forum took place in Brussels in July 2007 and the second in Manila in October 2008. As with earlier efforts, the Global Forum generated its own research, generally focusing on best practices in government policy and programmes. Reported in background papers prepared for the forum roundtables, the information aimed to provide the appropriate context for the session discussions. In some cases, new surveys were launched, such as the Swedish government’s survey of governments to determine the level of coherence between migration and development policies, or the World Bank’s examination of the ways in which governments addressed migration issues in their poverty reduction strategy papers. Additional papers of this type will certainly be produced for the Manila Global Forum.

Research on migration and development was further boosted by the growing support from governments, major foundations and international organizations. For instance, the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) supported the research activities of the University of Sussex Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty. The MacArthur Foundation provided substantial funding to my own research centre, the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University, as well as the Migration Policy Institute, the Center for Global Development, and the Social Science Research Council, among other institutions, to carry out research on migration and development. The World Bank has supported new surveys and research on six sub-themes: determinants and impact of migration and remittances; brain drain; temporary movements of people; link between trade, migration and foreign direct investment; social protection issues; social capital, and governance. The World Bank has also developed new data sets available to researchers outside of the bank.

Despite all the progress in raising our understanding of the linkages between migration and development, major gaps remain in the data and analysis needed to grasp fully the implications of these linkages for public policy. This article focuses on five areas of research in which there has been substantial progress in collecting new information and analysing emerging trends, but where significant questions remain to be answered. The article ends with a sixth, related issue—how best to build the capacity of the research community to respond to the migration and development research gaps.

**IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON FRAGILE AND FAILED STATES AND THEIR NEIGHBOURS**

Much of the research conducted on migration and development has focused on stable countries that largely produce labour migrants moving from poorer to wealthier countries. The research on migration from Mexico, the Philippines, India and China certainly fits this pattern. As some of the largest countries of emigration and countries of remittance inflows, it is not surprising that these countries have received what might otherwise seem disproportionate attention from the research community.

Yet, important migration flows occur from less stable countries, with the bulk of such movements to neighbouring countries that are only marginally wealthier or politically more...
stable than the source country. While some of these movements are best categorized as refugee flows that are addressed through large-scale international interventions under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (e.g., Darfurians in Chad, Somalis in Kenya), others assume more complex forms. Iraqis in Jordan and Syria overwhelmingly fled to the urban areas of Amman and Damascus, respectively, living in apartments, purchasing food in local markets and working, often illegally, in the local labour market or finding support from savings or remittances sent by better-off family members. Only recently have they registered in any sizeable numbers with UNHCR for assistance. Instead, the impact of their presence in Jordan and Syria, as well as other Middle Eastern countries where they live, has largely been borne by the host country governments and general population. Others who have left fragile and failed states looking for both safety and possible work opportunities in other countries include Somalis, Haitians, Zimbabweans, Sri Lankans and Colombians.

Migrants driven by such mixed motives, leaving places of instability and migrating to places with better economic opportunities, have often been considered part of the migration-asylum nexus, but they are also part of the migration-development nexus in that they pose important challenges for their hosts, usually nearby developing countries, and present opportunities and problems for their countries of origin, which often rely on their remittances but may be penalized through the loss of their skills.

The Research Consortium on Remittances in Conflict and Crisis has made some progress in highlighting the issues raised by migration from fragile and failed states. As described on the Consortium’s website,* researchers from several centres and universities in Europe and North America came together in a workshop sponsored by the Georgetown University and the International Peace Academy of New York in November 2005. The meeting set out an agenda and modes of cooperation for research on this population. A second meeting was held at Georgetown University in May 2006 under a grant from the Canadian International Development Research Center, IDRC. This meeting included several participants from southern venues whose actual and potential research is fundamental for the field. The agenda was devoted to discussing methodologies of remittance research applicable to unstable environments and vulnerable diasporas. A brief paper was drawn up to delineate RCRCC’s Focus, Priorities, Actions and Research Agenda. The meeting followed a companion gathering on methodology held at George Washington University. The intention of the group of RCRCC researchers is to conduct research which, individually and collectively, would yield reliable information and a better understanding of the issues described above, with the ultimate aim of affecting policy in a constructive manner.

Four principal issues require a good deal more research than is currently available. First, more information and analysis are needed on remittance flows in these situations—how are remittances transferred, particularly into communities experiencing conflict and political instability? How are remittances used by individuals and households in the absence of functioning markets and other economic activities? To what extent are remittances

supporting food security in places in which agricultural production has ceased? To what extent are remittances supporting health care and education in areas where such public services are no longer available?

Second, research is needed to document more fully the role of diasporas in fragile and failing states. This role can be both negative and positive. On the negative side, diasporas may support armed conflict in a number of states by providing resources to one side or the other; on the positive side, they provide support for health and educational institutions that governments are unwilling or unable to fund. They can also provide support for good governance, the strengthening of democratic institutions and the respect for human rights, the rule of law and resumption or institution of market economies, particularly by offering expertise drawn from their own experience of living and working in more stable societies. The extent to which these various patterns emerge among the diasporas in fragile and failed states is not known; nor do we have sufficient understanding of the more specific ways that diasporas interact with communities and government institutions in these contexts.

Third, research is also needed on the impact of diaspora contributions on peace making and peace building in fragile and failed states. In the post-conflict phase, the role of diasporas in rehabilitation and reconstruction of countries destroyed by prolonged conflict and insecurity is another area where research is needed. Certainly, the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons in post-conflict situations has great implications for the development of these countries. Only now are there studies emerging which examined the longer-term process and impact of reintegration of refugees (for example, Hammond’s longitudinal study of refugees returning to a small village in Ethiopia). Studies that focus particularly on children and youth who grew up in refugee camps but have returned to their home countries which they may have never known, are needed to understand more fully the impact of the refugee experience on post-conflict development as well as the effectiveness of different policies and programmes for reintegration.

A final issue requiring attention on a migration-development research agenda is the impact of large-scale migration on developing countries that host refugees and migrants from fragile and failed states. As mentioned above, the great majority of Iraqis who have left their country are now living in neighbouring states, among the local population and with little international assistance. Spontaneous settlement of persons leaving conflict areas in neighbouring countries, outside of internationally managed camps, is widespread in many parts of the world. While there have been some, though still too few studies of the impact of camp populations on the development prospects of local hosts, there is much less research on the impact of spontaneously settled groups on their hosts.

SCALABILITY OF SMALL-SCALE PROGRAMMES AND PROJECTS

The Global Forum discussions in Brussels identified a number of promising programmes to enhance the development pay-off of migration for development for both source and destination countries. Many of these programmes were quite small, however, and targeted at specific
populations or geographic areas. At issue in terms of a research agenda is the scalability of such projects. Research is needed to determine the extent to which the programmes and projects would retain their effectiveness if the size and scope were to increase dramatically.

Of particular interest are the programmes that attempt to match workers in source countries with labour demands in destination countries. Many programmes aim at circular migration of foreign workers, with the objective of filling jobs with temporary workers who would return to their home countries after a specific period, possibly to remigrate at a future time. Programmes such as those established for the recruitment of agricultural workers from Mexico and Guatemala to Canada appear successful in maintaining a circular flow of migrants. Might it be possible for these to be expanded to meet larger labour demands (e.g., the United States) or to fill the needs of non-seasonal labour sectors? In other words, research is needed to determine whether the old adage “there is nothing as permanent as a temporary worker” will prove correct with shifts from small and seasonal labour to larger programmes that aim to meet labour demands in year-round industries.

Research is also needed to determine if legal foreign worker programmes, whether temporary or permanent, can function as effective substitutes for irregular migration. Research could also examine the relationship between the enforcement of barriers against illegal employment and the use of legal temporary workers. It is not clear that all employers would prefer temporary worker programmes that would require better working conditions than for unauthorized workers. If unauthorized labour were not available, employers might instead substitute capital expenditures and innovative business strategies, improved technology or transfer the production site rather than hire more costly legal temporary workers. Alternatively, they could continue to hire irregular migrants, increasing the underground economy. For example, the substantial growth in the number of U.S. legal temporary agricultural and seasonal employment programmes over the past decade has not offset the flow of irregular migrants in these sectors. One exception is the sugar cane industry that adopted technological innovations and has seen its legal and irregular workforce decline. Comparative research on the impacts on both sides of the equation may help determine if enhanced access to legal workers will stem the flow of irregular workers, and whether enhanced enforcement against irregular migration will provide opportunities for legal worker programmes or spur technological innovation.

GENDER, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

As of 2005, about 49 per cent of the world’s migrants were women, up from 46.8 per cent in 1960 (UN Population Division 2005). Significantly, the proportion of women migrants has grown to 51 per cent in more developed regions, with the highest proportions in Europe, Oceania and North America.

Incorporating a gendered perspective into migration and development research is essential to better understand both the causes and consequences of international migration. Gender inequality can be a powerful factor in precipitating migration, particularly when women
have economic, political and social expectations that cannot be met at home. To the extent that women are unable to exercise their rights at home, or fear for their safety and security, migration may be the only way to protect themselves and their families. Until women can secure credible protection of their human and civil rights, migration will not be a truly voluntary act on their part.

Home country development is unlikely to offset migration pressures for women (or men, for that matter) in the short to medium term and, in fact, may stimulate increased movement as more people gain the resources and knowledge needed to migrate. During the interim period, migrants can contribute to further economic development in their home countries through remittances as well as their skills, entrepreneurial activities, and support for democratization and human rights. Too little is known about the remitting behaviour of women migrants, but studies show that there may be significant gender differences. The evidence is contradictory, however. As one review of the literature concluded, “While research often finds that women are less likely and/or tend to remit less than men when they do remit, this is not a uniform finding. What is more, some of the available research finds that women remit more both overall and as a percentage of income than do men—and women tend to have stronger networks with their families that are associated with greater remitting behaviors” (Orozco et al., 2006). More research on the dynamics in remittance-receiving households is needed to determine the extent to which women left behind by migrating husbands use remittances similarly or differently than men left behind by migrating wives.

There is also a need for more gendered research on the contributions of diasporas to development. Migrants often form associations to raise and remit funds for infrastructure development, health and education programme, as well as income generation activities in their home communities. Migrant groups support health clinics, build schools, repair roads and invest in small business enterprises in their home communities. However, women are often precluded from the decision-making structures in these associations, thus limiting their ability to influence how the funds will be used. Given the research showing that women are more likely to support health and education, their active involvement in hometown associations might stimulate more investment in those areas that promote longer-term economic and social development. Research comparing experiences across diaspora groups could be useful in determining how best to facilitate the involvement of women’s leadership in the decision-making process.

The contributions of migrants go beyond the strictly financial. Return, for instance, can be a positive force for development. Migrant women returning temporarily or permanently bring needed skills to their home countries. Women’s skills may be needed for economic development, but they may also be required to help move the source country towards greater democratization and respect for human rights. Research is needed to identify programmes that facilitate the return of women migrants with specific skills needed in their home countries, and examine the contributions of these migrants to development. Similarly, research is needed to determine the extent to which the skills of women in the diaspora and
returning women can help move the source country towards greater democratization and respect for human rights and gender equality.

**RIGHTS OF MIGRANTS**

The rights of migrant workers are a specific focus of attention at the Global Forum in Manila. Much of the debate on migrants has occurred within a legal context, particularly aimed at promulgating ratification and adherence to international conventions designed to protect migrant workers. While such discussions continue to be valuable, increased research on the actual implementation of policies and programmes to empower migrant rights is also needed.

More research should focus on national policies to promote the rights of migrants, particularly in a manner that also promotes development. Research should determine if policies and programmes at the national level by both source and destination countries can be effective means to protect the rights of migrants. Theoretically, the better workers are informed prior to migrating, the better they are able to assert their rights. This is particularly so for contract labourers who may have little idea of the wages or working conditions to which they are entitled. Similarly, workers migrating to join family members need to know and understand their rights, both in relation to their spouses or children (particularly regarding domestic violence) and to their immigration status. Access to language training courses in destination countries is also believed to help migrant workers to learn and assert their rights when employers or family members violate them. Research to test these hypotheses will help identify effective practices.

A further research area concerns the role of recruitment agencies and employers. This is particularly the case when migrant workers are hired as domestic labour or other activities that keep them out of public view. Research could examine the effectiveness of source country policies and programmes protecting migrant rights. Within this context, research on the role of consulates in monitoring the security of migrant workers in potentially vulnerable positions would be an important area of investigation. Are they able to use their diplomatic positions to engage the host country in interceding in favour of their migrant workers? Do programmes that provide an opportunity for workers to report abuses increase the likelihood of action against recruiters and employers who violate labour standards? Similarly, research should focus on the regulatory frameworks of destination countries. Do requirements for labour contracts translate into enhanced protection of migrant worker rights? Are there effective programmes for destination countries to monitor workers who are engaged in private households? Do sanctions against abusive employers provide greater protection of rights?

Research could also focus on various means to empower the workers themselves. For example, when abuses occur, does providing legal representation for migrant workers help them fight against discrimination, sexual harassment, lost wages and other violations of their labour rights? To what extent do source or destination countries provide such representation? The
Philippines embassies, for example, will pay legal costs if a case alleging abuse goes to court. In Bahrain, a destination country, if a contract dispute involving a domestic worker cannot be resolved and goes to court, the court will appoint a lawyer for the migrant worker. Do such systems enhance protection?

Finally, research is needed on how to protect those migrating as workers or for the purpose of family reunification from physical and psychological abuse. Do programmes that provide shelter and social services to migrant workers and family members who have experienced abuse provide adequate protection? Do programmes that provide assistance to returnees help those who are trying to escape abusive conditions? Such research is particularly important in determining the best course of action in trafficking cases. If the trafficking survivor is likely to risk retaliation from the traffickers upon return, or face conditions that would render her vulnerable to repeat trafficking, it may be preferable to encourage integration in the destination country.

More broadly, research to improve policies aimed at the prevention of human trafficking and the protection of trafficking victims is an area that holds potential for increasing protection of migrant rights, while addressing basic problems arising from underdevelopment. Here, a gender perspective is essential since it is estimated that the majority of those trafficked internationally are women and girls. Identifying the deeply rooted social and economic factors that affect decisions to accept risky offers of work that end up in trafficking would be an important outcome of research in this area.

**GOVERNANCE**

The Global Forum marks an important transition in thinking about the governance of international migration from a purely unilateral to a multilateral framework for managing movements of people. Research continues to be needed into two principal areas of governance: 1) the legal and normative framework for managing migration and 2) the organizational mechanisms for managing flows of people across international boundaries.

Studies of existing international law provide useful contributions to the development of more effective normative and legal framework regarding: 1) the powers and obligations of individual states to manage the movements of people across their borders; 2) the rights and responsibilities of international migrants and 3) state cooperation in managing the international movement of people. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in international law, particularly related to migration for family and economic reasons. And, tension between facilitation of international migration and control of “undesirable” movements (particularly related to security concerns) continues to vex governments as they find it difficult to maintain an appropriate balance. Increased research aimed at identifying ways to balance these competing interests would help identify legal and normative frameworks that would enhance management of migration and cooperation among states.
Regarding organizational issues, successive activities have focused on the ways in which states could organize themselves to promote a more cooperative process for managing migration. The Global Commission on International Migration, following on the work of the Berne Initiative and The Hague Declaration, advanced a set of ideas about international governance, which require systematic analysis and discussion. The Global Forum is certainly one outcome of the debate launched by the Global Commission. So, too, is the Global Migration Group, which is an attempt to coordinate the work of international organizations.

Generally weak institutional arrangements make international cooperation in managing international migration all the more difficult to achieve and delay the development of effective legal and normative frameworks to address issues of broad concern. Moving from the current arrangements to a more robust international regime will be difficult, however. While there has been progress in setting out common understandings, there continue to be fundamental disagreements among states as to the causes and consequences of international migration, and the extent to which it is in the interest of states to liberalize or restrict migrant flows. This situation contrasts sharply with the general consensus that governs the movements of goods, capital and services—that it is in the ultimate interest of all states to remove barriers to their movements. Yet, there is growing consensus that a well regulated and more comprehensive framework for managing international migration would be in the best interest of both states and migrants. To move forward in this area will require considerable research on reform options that spell out the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches.

At the same time, a research agenda should acknowledge that responsibility for managing migration rests primarily with nation states. Regardless of what types of regional or global systems of governance are likely to be developed, the national level will continue to be the most important one in managing the movements of people. A core part of the research agenda should focus on the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of various organizational and legal frameworks that states adopt to manage migration and to address the interlinkages between migration and such other areas of policy interest as development and security.

**BUILDING RESEARCH CAPACITIES**

While much of this paper has focused on substantive areas of research, it would be remiss to conclude without discussing the research capacity to undertake the outlined research agenda. Migration studies is a relatively new area of research, which requires an interdisciplinary approach that brings in the political, economic, social, legal and human issues raised by international movements of people. The capacity to carry out the type of ground-breaking research needed to support the work of the Global Forum is sorely lacking in most countries. Gaps exist in terms of human capacity as well as data. Education and training of academics and research professionals should be a high priority for governments and academia given the growing importance of the topic. Improvements in data collection and development of innovative methodologies to analyse the phenomenon are essential to improving the research base needed by policy makers.
Particular attention should be given to developing research capacities in developing countries that are important sources of migration. While all data could be improved, emigration data are particularly weak, making it difficult for source countries to measure the extent of migration or the impact on development. Understanding the linkages between migration and development requires the capacity to study these impacts in the actual communities from which migrants come and to which they go, and to which remittances flow.

Fostering collaborations between researchers in source and destination countries would also greatly enhance the ability to answer many of the questions posed in this chapter. Matching emigration and immigration information would provide a more accurate picture of migration trends than is available from looking at the issue from only one side of the border. Certainly, remittances and diasporas are transnational issues that require transnational research. Governments have already recognized the benefits of such cooperative approaches. Research should not lag behind in approaching the study of international migration through cooperation between researchers in source and destination countries.
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Philip Martin, Susan Martin and Sarah Cross
International Migration Policies: An Overview

Barry Mirkin

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to provide a global perspective on international migration policies, by highlighting some of the recent major trends in international migration policies. The paper is intended to be illustrative rather than an exhaustive examination of these. The paper is based on World Population Policies 2007, prepared by the United Nations Population Division.*

The monitoring of population policies has a long history dating back to the World Population Plan of Action, adopted at the World Population Conference held in Bucharest in 1974. The Plan of Action was the first global intergovernmental instrument on population policy. This monitoring over the last three decades provides an invaluable resource for assessing changes in trends in international migration policies.

SUMMARY POINTS

1. In 2005, there were some 191 million migrants worldwide, representing three per cent of world population. Of these, 115 million lived in developed countries, and 75 million in developing countries.

2. It is estimated that migrants sent home USD 262 billion in remittances during the year. The volume of remittances has almost quadrupled since 1990.

3. Countries of destination are becoming less restrictive. In 2007, 19 per cent of countries wanted to lower immigration, down from 40 per cent in 1996. However, countries have also become more selective in their migration policies.

An increasing number of countries aim to increase the level of skilled migration. In 2007, 36 countries out of 144 countries reported promoting the admission of highly skilled workers. While more than 40 per cent of developed countries aimed to increase the number of admission of the highly skilled, only 17 per cent of developing countries pursued such a strategy. To attract skilled third-country nationals, the European Union proposed a “Blue Card” visa programme in 2007.

Temporary migration schemes have become increasingly popular. Two-thirds of countries now want to either maintain or raise the level of temporary migration by resurrecting the European guest-worker programmes of the 1960s and 1970s.

Programmes to better integrate migrants (language and employment training, information programmes) have become widespread in countries of destination. The number of countries reporting programmes to integrate non-citizens increased from 52 in 1996 to 79 in 2007. These programmes facilitate integration by improving language skills and labour market prospects of migrants. In the European Union, the unemployment rates among third-country nationals is double that of EU citizens.

Countries are increasingly clamping down on irregular migration through more stringent visa requirements, tighter border security, biometric passports, bilateral readmission programmes and regularization programmes. An estimated 5.5 million migrants have been regularized through some 35 programmes since the 1990s.

Despite the significant increase in the number of migrants, the share of developing countries aiming to lower emigration has remained at about one quarter since the 1980s. However, several countries, notably India, the Philippines and Thailand promote the emigration of their citizens through government agencies. This tends to contribute to lower unemployment and a higher level of remittances.

Many countries of origin have undertaken initiatives to facilitate remittance transfers and heighten their development impact. As banks, credit unions and microfinance institutions have joined money transfer companies in serving developing communities, transfer fees have started to fall. But there is still ample room to cut fees and to expand access to financial institutions for migrants and their families.

Many countries of origin are establishing linkage programmes with their citizens abroad. Collective remittances by migrant associations support small-scale development projects and are improving life in communities of origin.

An increasing number of countries of origin encourage the return migration of their citizens. Over half of them pursue such programmes of return migration as a means of coping with the loss of skilled workers.

Bilateral agreements to deal with temporary migration (almost 600) and for the readmission of irregular migrants (more than 300) are widespread. For example, Spain has signed agreements with Colombia, Morocco and Senegal, while Japan has signed agreements with the Philippines.

Among the regional agreements concerning international migration, that of the European Union is the most advanced. Under the European Union’s free movement policy, citizens of
the 27 member countries can move freely between member states. The European Union has also signed agreements with some African countries.

**CONCLUSIONS**

International migration will remain at the forefront of national and international agendas for some time. This is the result of two major factors: on the one hand, low fertility, population ageing and labour shortages in countries of destination and, on the other, high population growth, unemployment, political, social and ethnic conflict and the importance of remittances in countries of origin.

Making migration work, while respecting the rights and responsibilities of migrants, is a major challenge and opportunity for all communities, countries, regions and the broader international community.
Migration, Environment and Development: New Directions for Research

Koko Warner and Frank Laczko

INTRODUCTION

This article highlights the linkages between environmentally induced migration and development, and discusses how environmental factors may influence the movement of people. Climate change, migration and development are topics which are high on the policy agenda of many governments around the world. However, at present these two policy issues are by and large being discussed within separate policy forums. For example, at the UN General Assembly High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD), held in September 2006, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), held in July 2007, there was barely any discussion of the linkages between migration, environment and development. Similarly, the report of the Global Commission for Migration, published in 2005, includes virtually no discussion of environmentally induced migration.

This neglect is somewhat surprising, given that it is widely recognized that environmental migration is likely to increase in the future and to have the greatest impact on developing countries. As early as 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1990:20) warned that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration—with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and severe drought.

Parts of the earth are becoming less habitable due to factors such as climate change, deterioration of agricultural lands, desertification, salinization, water pollution, and natural and man-made disasters. All regions are likely to experience some adverse effects of climate change, but less developed regions are especially vulnerable because a large share of their economies depend on climate–sensitive sectors and their adaptive capacity is low due to low levels of human, financial and natural resources, as well as limited institutional and technological capability (IOM 2008a.).

Broadly speaking, two factors may cause a deterioration of the environment that impels people to leave: (1) a major natural disaster (such as an earthquake, flood, volcanic eruption or hurricane); (2) a gradual, incremental deterioration in the living and working conditions of a given area. Some environmental disruptions, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, occur with little or no warning and require that people move quickly to get out of harm’s way. Others develop more slowly and provide time for people to assess their options, leave in an orderly manner and even bring resources with them (IOM, 1992). Increased migration can contribute to further environmental problems, but it can also be a coping and survival
strategy for those who move. Indeed, migration—whether permanent or temporary, whether national, regional or international—has always been a possible coping strategy for people facing environmental impacts such as sudden disasters or cyclical climate conditions. Faced with an unprecedented scale of environmental change, migration may be an adjustment mechanism of first resort, or a survival mechanism of last resort.

Conversely, changes in migration patterns can have a negative impact on the environment. When large numbers of people move from one area to another, they can easily upset the delicate environmental balance of their new location (IOM, 1992).

The topic of environmental migration and its implications for development is not a new issue; for example, IOM organized conferences and prepared publications about this subject in the early 1990s (IOM, 1992). However, during 2007-2008 there has been renewed policy interest in the subject of environmental migration, with several policy forums focusing on this subject. In November 2007, for example, the member states of IOM, more than 120 countries, discussed a policy paper about environmental migration at the IOM Council.

One of the aims of the IOM paper was to raise awareness on the need for much better evidence if we are to develop a global strategy to plan for, adapt to, and mitigate the processes and effects of environmentally induced migration. The main objective of this article is to discuss what might be some of the priority areas for further research on the migration and environment nexus, focusing in particular on evidence needed to promote sustainable development. The paper is organized around three key sections.
First, we present an overview of research on migration, environment and development. Second, we outline some of the results from a new study based on fieldwork and case studies conducted in 24 countries around the world (the EACH-FOR project). Third, we will discuss some possible ways to develop a global research agenda on migration and the environment.

**RESEARCH ON MIGRATION, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT**

Recently, an expert group in Germany noted that:

“Environmentally induced migration” or “environmental migration” for short, has so far received little attention from a scientific perspective…. Patterns of cause and effect relating to environmental migration remain largely unexamined” (German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2007).

Although this statement is largely true, a significant number of studies and publications have focused on the subject of environmental migration. Much of this research, however, has been written by those working in the field of environment studies and many reports have focused more on the impact of migration on the environment, rather than the implications of environmental change on migration (Hugo, 1996, 2008). Moreover, there has been an overwhelming tendency to focus on the negative consequences of migration for the environment, with fewer studies exploring how migration can be a coping strategy and benefit development (Laczko, 2008).

There is little consensus among researchers about the relationship between environmental change and migration. As a recent paper by Fraser, et al. (2008), points out, the research literature on migration tends to fall into two broad categories: (1) work done by “minimalists”, who suggest the environment is only a contextual factor in migration decisions and, (2) “maximalists”, who claim that the environment directly causes people to be forced from their homes.

There are at least three areas of disagreement among researchers—definitions, data and drivers—that we might call the three “Ds”. These three “Ds” refer to three key questions. How do we describe people who move for environmental reasons? To what extent can environmental factors be isolated and shown to be a primary cause of migration?

**DEFINITIONS**

Definitions are crucial in guiding the policies of governments and international agencies in regard to population movements. The generation of statistics also depends on how we choose to define “environmental migration”. Without an accepted definition of who is an “environmental refugee” or “environmental migrant”, it is not possible to conclude whether this type of population movement is increasing.
The term “environmental refugee” was first popularized by Lester Brown of WorldWatch Institute in the 1970s. Two seminal reports, one issued in 1985 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the second in 1998 by WorldWatch, brought public attention to the issue of migration caused by environmental factors.

The UNEP report, prepared by Essam El-Hinnawi, described “environmental refugees” as: “(t)hose people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.”

The term “environmental refugees” has been used to describe the whole category of people who migrate because of serious environmental disruptions. This broad definition, while evoking an image that has brought public attention to the issue, is sufficiently precise for addressing the various types of movements that develop because of environmental degradation. Bilsborrow (2002) distinguishes between three categories of environmentally induced migration and argues that the category referring to “refugees” refers only to a small proportion of persons who move for environmental reasons:

1. “Environmental refugees/forced migrants”, who are compelled by environmental conditions to seek temporary asylum in another, usually neighbouring country.
2. “Displaced persons”, people forced to migrate within their country by environmental disasters or civil strife. Most often, major natural disasters lead to the internal displacement of persons.
3. “Other persons” who migrate from rural areas within their own country at least partly for reasons of environmental deterioration.

The latter group account for the largest number of “environmental migrants”, but have received little attention, partly because migration research has tended to focus on international rather than internal migration, and partly because this movement of people does not usually involve persons in desperate need of assistance as in the case of natural disasters.

Many other experts have strongly criticized the use of the term “environmental refugee”. For example, Castles, writing in a UNHCR publication in 2001, commented, “‘the term environmental refugee’ is simplistic, one-sided and misleading. It implies a mono-causality which very rarely exists in practice”, (Castles, 2002, p.8). The term “refugee” has a precise meaning in international law. A refugee is defined by the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and persons who flee owing to environmental degradation do not fall within the definition of the 1951 convention. It is also inaccurate given that the bulk of “environmental migration” tends to occur within countries rather than between countries (Hugo, 2008).

The use of the term “refugee” would imply that a similar response should be given to environmental refugees as to those who fled because of persecution and out of fear for their
lives and crossed international borders. Many have argued that this should not be the case and that it would be more constructive to talk of “environmental migrants” (Stranks, 1997).

IOM has developed a working definition of “environmental migrants” which describes them as follows:

“Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, because of sudden or progressive changes in the environment affecting adversely their livelihoods, move from their habitual homes to temporary or durable new homes, either within their country or abroad” (IOM, 2007).

This definition recognizes that changes may be progressive or sudden, that movement can be internal or international.

Despite the fact that there has been little agreement on the definition of an “environmental refugee”, there are numerous references in the research literature on migration and the environment to tens of millions of people being displaced due to environmental factors.

DATA

There are widely varying estimates of the likely number of people who may be affected by environmental migration. Jacobson (1988) suggested that “environmental refugees had become the single largest category of displaced persons in the world” and estimated that their numbers may have risen to 10 million in the late 1980s. More recent estimates suggested that their numbers may be even as high as 25 million (Myers, 1996). Furthermore, Myers (1996) forecast that rising sea levels alone would cause 200 million environmental refugees by 2050. Such projections, however, are based on little evidence, and no identification of any specific population groups that have been forced to relocate from areas that have already experienced a rise in sea levels (Black, 2001).

Similarly, advocates of the environmental refugee concept often fail to establish a direct link showing that desertification causes displacement. They tend to rely instead on correlations between areas vulnerable to, or suffering from, desertification and areas from which migrants originate (Vine, 2006). In some cases, those said to be victims of desertification may be the victims of expropriation through eviction and government land privatization.

Migration is one of many potential responses to environmental change, such as increased flooding, but such projections fail to take into account the possible role of adaptation. In a study of responses to floods in Bangladesh, Haque and Zaman (1993), point to a range of adaptive responses by local populations, that include forecasting, the use of early warning systems, flood insurance, relief and rehabilitation efforts.

Collecting accurate statistical data on “environmental migration” has thus far proven to be extremely difficult, few of the existing statistics have been empirically verified and, as such, any figures must be treated with a great deal of circumspection and caution.
However, data relating to the number of persons forcibly displaced by natural disasters/extreme environmental events are more reliable. The number of people affected by natural disasters has accelerated in each decade since the 1960s (IOM, 1992). While in the 1960s 28 million people were affected by such disasters, that number had risen to 64 million by the 1980s. Poor people in developing countries are the most severely affected by natural disasters (IOM, 1992). For example, almost half (43%) of all natural disasters occurred in Asia, yet accounted for almost 70 per cent of lives lost between 1990 and 1999 (IOM, 2007). What is not known is the extent to which such disasters cause people to migrate and whether such migration is temporary or permanent, internal or international (Hugo, 1996, 2008).

**DRIVERS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED MIGRATION**

Another area of disagreement concerns the relative importance of environmental factors compared to “intervening factors”, viz., the economic, political and social situation in a country. Although many experts accept that environmental degradation and natural disasters are important factors in the decision to migrate, their conceptualization as a primary cause of forced displacement has been questioned (Black, 2001). This does not mean that environmental factors are unimportant. Rather it means that environmental factors are closely linked to economic, social and political ones. Seen from this perspective, it is too simple to say country X is experiencing environmental problems and therefore will generated large numbers of environmental migrants.

The decision to migrate is seldom straightforward. While a specific event may precipitate the actual movement, a range of often complicated factors usually affects the final decision to uproot oneself (IOM, 1992). People will often remain where they are trying to cope with the impacts of an environmental disruption until they are unable to do so any longer. The political and economic situation of their countries is an additional factor that ultimately affects their decision and ability to remain in their own homes. Other factors are obstacles to movement, including the unwillingness of areas to which they could migrate to receive them.

All this suggests that “policy matters” and a strong, efficient state can deal with environmental challenges much better than a weak state (Castles, 2002). The key policy implication is that we not only need to understand environmental change itself, but also the ability of different communities to cope with it. For example, the poor are most affected by natural disasters for reasons having to do with poor housing quality, weak infrastructure, limited choice where to live, and limited or complete absence of disaster and prevention services. The impact of disasters and the displacement they provoke are heavily influenced by political and economic factors. Poverty shapes the vulnerability of people to disasters and thus to migration.

The consequences of environmental changes are also likely to depend on social, political and economic factors. In a relatively poor developing country, earthquakes have caused thousands of deaths and displaced many more amidst massive destruction. By contrast, in rich countries earthquakes of equal or greater magnitude have caused fewer deaths and displacement. The environmental phenomenon is the same, but its effects, including the extent of displacement, is often very different.
It is not natural disasters alone that generate risk, but rather the state of human development that shapes vulnerability to natural hazards and exacerbates their effects and consequences (IOM, 1992). The level of development is a critical factor and disasters have a disproportionate effect on developing countries for a variety of reasons, including the lack of resources to prevent the effects of natural disaster. When a disaster strikes, it will undermine the development of affected individuals and communities and, if it is large enough or recurrent, may even undermine the overall national economy and development. A natural disaster taking place in a developing country that lacks the economic resources to meet the needs of its citizens even at the best of times, will no doubt undermine the quality of life of affected individuals and communities.

PRELIMINARY FIELDWORK RESULTS

EACH-FOR was designed as an empirical research project to generate original global information about the links between environmental change and migration. Figure 4 shows the areas where EACH-FOR fieldwork is conducted. EACH-FOR covers the regions Europe and Russia, Newly Industrialized States (NIS) and Central Asia, Asia and the Pacific Region, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, from where 23 countries were selected for the case studies of the project.

Figure 1: EACH-FOR project case study research locations

The countries were selected for in-depth analysis based on four factors:

- the presence of documented environmental degradation;
- the sensitivity of social and political processes to these environmental changes;
- the dependence of people on the environment for their livelihood;
- documented migration dynamics.
The kinds of environmental degradation considered in the case studies include rapid-onset environmental stressors (such as extreme weather events like floods and cyclones) and slow-onset environmental stressors (such as water scarcity, desertification, soil degradation, deforestation). This paper reports on findings from Egypt, Mozambique and Viet Nam because of the special relevance to climate change and human security questions in these areas.

The EACH-FOR project conducted fieldwork (highlighted in the map) to address the following eight research questions:
1. To find out who has been migrating away from situations of environmental degradation/change.
2. To find out where migrants came from and where they were going.
3. To find out why people migrated.
4. To find out how environmental degradation interplays with other social, economic and political factors in the migration decisions.
5. Obstacles that prevent migration. To find out what might have prevented people from migrating in the first place (i.e. what assistance was needed, what was lacking?).
6. Coping capacity/adaptation. To find out why people who remained in areas of environmental degradation/change remained in their location while others migrated.
7. To find out how the migration process occurred (choice of destination, what networks were used to facilitate migration?)
8. To identify the perception of environmental degradation that triggers people to move.

NOTE: Originally the wording included “level of environmental damage”, which denotes thresholds or sensitivity and is different from perception, and therefore excluded in this paper.

In order to address such questions, researchers conducted interviews with NGO representatives, government officials, representatives of international organizations and academics active in the areas of migration, environment, disaster relief and agriculture. They also conducted a questionnaire and interviews with migrants to identify whether any environmental factors had triggered the migration decisions. A comparable questionnaire and interviews were also conducted with people living in areas with documented environmental problems to assess the degree to which these groups were affected by environmental problems and whether migration was an option in the future. Case study sites in Egypt, Mozambique and Viet Nam were chosen by pin-pointing locations experiencing environmental stress such as flooding or desertification and where people were most vulnerable to these.

EGYPT

Egypt is a country of vast arid areas and a narrow strip of very fertile land around the Nile and delta. Although the Nile is a generous water resource for the population, Egyptians are suffering from water shortages, partly because of the continuous population increase and density in such areas. Using the term ‘water shortage’ more broadly, it would also encompass the access to clean water suitable for drinking and irrigation; unfortunately, Egypt has been notorious for water pollution since the Nile and its canals have been receiving industrial,
agricultural and domestic waste for the past decades. Poor water management due to the disrepair and inefficiency of the traditional gravity irrigation system, inadequate maintenance of irrigation and drainage networks as well as depletion of groundwater, especially in the newly reclaimed desert areas, are all factors that magnify the problem. Increasing water salinity, a phenomenon that largely exists in the newly reclaimed desert lands that rely on groundwater, is another contributing factor.

In view of Egypt’s rapid population growth, environmental problems, such as water shortage and land degradation are important challenges. Fieldwork indicates that environmentally induced migration in Egypt is related primarily to water shortages and land degradation. Several other factors also affect environmentally induced migration in Egypt:

- The system and degree of landownership;
- the degree of poverty and whether individuals or families have the financial and social assets (incl. Networks) that would allow them to move elsewhere;
- whether a public land development programme is in place that affects environmental quality, migration, or both.

Environmentally induced migration occurs within Egypt, rather than across borders. Environmentally induced migration appears to be an alternative of last resort for poor Egyptians facing extreme environmental degradation. In contrast, rapid-onset events, such as earthquakes or floods have the potential to provoke large-scale movements of people in a short time period.

MOZAMBIQUE

Climate change is becoming increasingly problematic for the people of Mozambique, who were particularly affected by extreme floodings of the Limpopo River in the south of the country in 2000, and by the extreme floods of the Zambezi River in Mozambique’s central region in 2001, 2007 and again in 2008. In these years, rains caused flooding along the Zambezi River in central Mozambique and in 2007 tropical cyclone Favio increased the number of homeless people in Mozambique following the flooding of the Zambezi River.

A central question for Mozambique, but also relevant for other countries facing environmentally induced migration, is the degree to which environmental factors contribute to displacement or migration today, and in the future. As in Egypt and Viet Nam, environmental stressors (particularly flooding) contribute to migration and displacement in Mozambique. Regarding the flooding of the Zambezi River Valley, people were displaced during the flood emergency period. Following recurring floods, people are relocated on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. Along the Zambezi River Valley, temporary mass displacements taking on permanent characteristics can be observed. There is no evidence yet of large-scale international migration as a result of the Zambezi River flooding and, so far, flood affected groups are not prone to moving to urban agglomerations. Moreover, the government of Mozambique is trying to develop rural areas by providing the essential infrastructure and giving people incentives to produce more sturdy housing in the resettlement process.
Resettlement as an option to manage the threats from climate changes in Mozambique has the benefit of removing people away from the physical danger of extreme floods. However, resettlement can lead to other environmental, social and economic difficulties. Farmers are relocated from the fertile lands on riverbanks to higher areas, prone to droughts. If livelihoods are lost, relocated households remain dependent on governmental and international aid and remain very vulnerable to subsequent environmental events. As extreme weather events continue to affect Mozambique, the government will be increasingly faced with decisions on how to manage people at risk and on the move because of environmental factors.

VIET NAM

Field research conducted in Viet Nam examined the influence of environmental change, principally flooding, on migration in the Mekong Delta. Flooding in the Mekong Delta is a regular annual occurrence and an integral part of the livelihoods of the population living in the area. The regular flood area of the Viet Nam portion of the Mekong Delta affects 40 per cent (16,000 km²) of the land area in nine provinces, with approximately nine million people, or 53 per cent of the population of the Mekong Delta (Pham 2007 personal communication). The water depth during the flood season ranges between 0.5 – 4.0 metres and is known as the ‘nice’ flood, while water levels of approximately 4.5 metres or higher are considered to be ‘disaster’ floods.

The following linkages between flooding and migration were revealed by this research study:

- During the flooding season, people resort to seasonal labour migration and movements towards urban centres to bolster livelihoods.
- For those who directly depend on agriculture for their livelihood (usually rice farmers), successive flooding events causing the destruction of crops on more than one occasion can drive people to migrate elsewhere in search of alternative livelihoods.
- As an extreme coping mechanism, anecdotal indicators point to human trafficking into neighbouring areas as a strategy adopted by families who have suffered from water-related stressors.
- The government is currently undertaking the planned resettlement of people living in vulnerable zones along river banks as part of a flood management and environmental sanitation strategy.

Natural hazards, in combination with the stress exerted on the environment because of rapid socio-economic development in Viet Nam and upstream Southeast Asian countries, and the threats posed to Viet Nam by climate change, places the local environment and those who depend directly on it for their livelihoods in a precarious position. In the face of environmental stressors, people in the Mekong Delta will adapt in various ways. One type of coping mechanism may be migration, particularly given the rapid socio-economic changes taking place in Viet Nam which will create stronger pull factors towards urban environments. Even among people who are potentially or actually directly affected by climate change, e.g. people living in the Mekong Delta, there is very little awareness of the concept of climate
change and even the government in Viet Nam is only now beginning to grapple with this new information and the difficulties they face in dealing with the issue.

**COMPARATIVE FIELDWORK RESULTS**

A comparative analysis of the field experience points towards three main results:

1. Environmental factors currently contribute to migration in those cases observed, and interact with many other factors to influence migration. The principal effect of environmental change is on the local population’s livelihoods. The more direct the link between environmental degradation and livelihoods, the stronger the environmental push factor in migration choices.

2. Migration occurs when a certain ecological tipping point is reached; if environmental conditions worsen, interviewees remarked that they would migrate in the future. The ability to earn a livelihood in a given climate and environment is one of the determining factors that potential migrants are concerned about for the future. What is unknown is how mounting environmental pressures affect migration.

3. Government responses vary from incentives to mandated resettlement, with mixed results. In Egypt, constant internal migration results from environmental degradation and, ironically, the very programmes designed to reclaim desert lands at the edge of the delta. Relocation programmes also have their costs and benefits: the positive aspects of relocating people include moving them out of harm’s way. The undesirable aspects of resettlement include exposing displaced people to the loss of livelihoods, debt and social disarticulation without addressing the environmental stressor itself.

**TOWARDS A GLOBAL AGENDA FOR RESEARCH ON MIGRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT**

Beyond this preliminary fieldwork, much more information is needed about the multiple links between environmental change, migration and development. To help fill these gaps in dialogue and scholarly work, a group of experts convened in Munich in April 2008 to define a global agenda for research on migration and the environment.

**Munich Expert Meeting and Environment and Migration Alliance**

To address the need for more sound empirical research and identify priority areas of research relevant for policy makers in the field of migration and the environment, IOM together with UNU-EHS44, and UNEP organized a research workshop which brought together 35 international experts in the area of migration and environmental research. The meeting, which took place from 16 to 18 April 2008 in Munich, Germany, was hosted by the Munich Re Foundation (MRF) at the Munich Re headquarters and generously supported by the Rockefeller Foundation.

The main objectives of this workshop were to:

- develop a **research framework** - identify key questions, research themes and innovative research methods needed for more accurate data collection and cross-cutting approaches to migration and the environment;

- **compare perspectives** on migration, the environment, and social vulnerability across regions;
• identify priority areas of research for policy makers;
• create momentum among a core research network of experts through an expert taskforce to carry the research strategy forward.

MOVING THE RESEARCH AGENDA FORWARD

Experts at the Munich workshop identified key priority areas for research related to three thematic areas identified by IOM, UNU-EHS and UNEP:
• definitions and data;
• factors driving environmental migration;
• policy scenarios and migration consequences.

DEFINITIONS AND DATA

Participants agreed that more work was needed to conceptualize environmentally induced migration and to quantify migration responses to environmental change and degradation. Specific work in the following areas was recommended:

1. Definitions of environmentally induced migration: Experts discussed the advantages and disadvantages of different definitions appearing in the literature and policy discourse. Definitions are the starting point for both research, which must define a phenomenon before it can be studied and measured, and policy, which requires a definition in order to assign responsibilities and design action. Experts noted that it is easier to identify environmentally induced migrants following rapid-onset events such as tsunamis or major storms. Longer-term environmental degradation interacts with migration in more complex ways that make it difficult to clearly determine why people are moving and whether their move is environmentally induced.

2. Currently existing data and statistical sources; a point of departure: Resources such as national statistical institutes can provide relevant information at regular intervals, but these institutions require assistance in improving data collection, data quality and digitalization of data. Census data combined with GIS modelling can reveal relevant demographic structures and, over time, may begin to reveal general patterns of migration flows and directions.

3. Correlate migration flow data with environmental variation over time: It may be possible to use currently available data to identify the magnitude of migrant flows. Research might correlate estimated flows with environmental variation over time and across countries. Interdisciplinary studies could examine the same indicators and build consensus on models and methods (census data, early warning) and stimulate laws and policies which may impact both the environment and potential migration patterns, for instance by driving decisions at farm level that lead to improved land management processes.
4. A note of caution in measuring environmentally induced migration: Experts underscored that great care must be exercised in any attempt to measure such correlations and effects. For example, the complexity of meteorological conditions and socio-economic scenarios leave a large margin of error. The extent to which the environment is either the main push factor or one of many, needs to be taken account of when measuring environmentally induced migration. Current estimates of environmentally induced migration vary widely between 25 million and almost 700 million. For appropriate policy responses, uncertainty in modelling approaches must be carefully taken into account.

5. Environmental data dominates in scenario building: Scenarios in the current literature are largely based on environmental scenarios of the IPCC rather than an analysis of current and expected migration trends and migration policy developments. It is clear that a more balanced integration of data and knowledge used to inform policy approaches to manage environmentally induced migration is needed. Similarly, the experiences gained by using existing approaches and legal frameworks must be explored in greater depth through both a research agenda and a policy dialogue process.

FACTORS DRIVING ENVIRONMENTAL MIGRATION

Experts agreed that the mechanisms involved in migration and environmental degradation and change are complex and interlinked, and identified some of the most important among them that connect migration responses to environmental degradation and change.

1. Migration history and networks influence migration: Future research and policy approaches should recognize the significance of the history and context of environmental migration phenomena. It is critical to document and analyse the specific contexts of migration patterns. Migration patterns vary over time in response to environmental stressors. Many forms of migration, such as circular migration which may be a response to environmental pressures in the early stages, may transmute into outright flight as such pressures grow. Pre-existing migration patterns can influence responses to environmental stressors: the tendency to migrate in the face of environmental pressures and deterioration may further increase where temporary migration is already an established response.

2. Environmental change has a multiplier effect on other migration drivers: Increasingly erratic weather conditions, rising sea levels and other effects resulting from climate change further exacerbate migration pressures and environmental degradation. However, environmental degradation itself must combine with other factors to cause migration. The linkages between environmental change and migration are multidirectional, making it necessary to examine other factors such as poor governance, poverty, lack of social cohesion and conflict. Research into the impact of both migration and environmental policy on different groups of people, including who has adapted and who has been displaced, is needed. Poverty plays a significant role between environmental degradation and migration, where environmental impacts on livelihoods are a key factor affecting migration decisions.
Experts at the April Munich meeting also explored who is most likely to migrate from areas affected by environmental change.

1. **Mass migration as a homogenous group unlikely:** Different people in a community are affected in different ways: gender, age, socio-economic status all affect environmentally induced migration. This creates a highly differentiated group, each subcomponent having different policy implications. For example, in the face of slow-onset environmental change those who are able to move, viz. who have the necessary financial resources, social networks and access to alternative livelihoods, will tend to migrate independently. The vulnerable poor, with no personal capacity to move, the very young and the elderly may be left behind initially, and forced to resettle later. Gender and demographic structure also play a role in environmentally induced migration patterns. Property rights, resource distribution and family roles affect the migration patterns of men and women, respectively, particularly where environmental change becomes a strong push factor.

2. **Migration typologies differ, depending on the environmental stressor - research and policy must distinguish between the type of environmental stressor and the characteristics of human movement:** Slow and rapid-onset environmental situations will provoke different migration patterns, ranging from temporal or permanent displacement, to cyclical and permanent migration both internally and internationally.

**POLICY SCENARIOS AND MIGRATION CONSEQUENCES**

Experts discussed possible policy scenarios and migration consequences.

1. **Migration needs to be discussed within the context of adaptation strategies** to environmental and climate change. The development community often characterizes migration as a failure of adaptation, rather than as a conscious form of adaptation. Similarly, governments do not widely view migration as an adaptation alternative and very few national adaptation plans (NAPAs) mention migration or relocation options. Policy dialogue, especially at the national level, is needed to understand how climate change affects people’s livelihood potential. Migration is a livelihood issue which not only reflects where people are emigrating from, but also where they are immigrating to. To bring the discussions about environmentally induced migration closer to adaptation, policy makers need to understand the relevant thresholds and critical tipping points, to be able to see and reflect the implications for migration and relocation in their adaptation plans.

2. **Policy scenarios addressing environmentally related displacement and relocation** strongly affect existing social, economic and political structures. Rapid-onset events that lead to massive displacement or the impacts of resettlement on resident and migrating populations pose challenges for societal norms and standards, as well as property rights and political representation. The process of relocation has profound impacts on both displaced populations and receiving communities, but most policy focuses almost entirely
on the process of the move rather than the process of what happens to resettled people in the longer term. Displacement and resettlement can be traumatic for the communities concerned, affecting their group identity and culture, livelihoods and social capital. Resource depletion in destination areas might increase. Humanitarian aid patterns under current policy tend to go to people who have been displaced or relocated, rather than also to residents of receiving communities, thereby potentially aggravating scenarios for conflict. Looking at other forms of displacement and the policy responses thereto (i.e. in conflict situations) can help shape appropriate policies. In particular, research and policy dialogue should address displacement and resettlement with local governments, including local leaders and dignitaries and provincial governments.

3. Environmentally induced migration increases pressures in urban areas. Evidence about current environmentally induced migration suggests that movement from rural to urban areas can exert additional pressures on already fragile urban infrastructures and services. The public health, water and sanitation sectors are particularly affected. Policy makers need to be able to anticipate the magnitude of migrants expected to arrive in urban areas. In most developing countries the development transition has not yet been fully achieved and communities in urban areas remain vulnerable to sudden external shocks and population pressure on scarce resources and precarious livelihoods as a result of large-scale inflows of environmentally induced (and other) migrants. The policy challenge is to identify how environmental pressures translate into additional migrant flows to the cities.

CONCLUDING REMARKS – A CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENT AND MIGRATION ALLIANCE (CCEMA)

All participants at the Munich meeting agreed on the need for a global interdisciplinary research programme. Several key priorities for further work were identified, including:

1. The systematic stock-taking of existing research evidence in order to highlight the implications for policy and to develop new methods and approaches which could be applied in a second phase involving fieldwork.

2. Global research programme, based on new in-depth studies using a common research design focusing on those parts of the world expected to be worst affected by environmental degradation and extreme environmental events.

3. Information and knowledge management - networks, databases and websites to ensure that the results of research findings and key policy developments are shared in an effective manner among a range of stakeholders.

4. Capacity-building projects - examples mentioned included projects to enhance data collection through better use of existing data sources, or the creation of new datasets, research capacity building to ensure that countries likely to be most affected by
environmental migration would have an adequate research base, training workshops for policy makers to share policy lessons and best practices based on policy-oriented research.

To accomplish these aims, the experts recommended the formation of a Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance (CCEMA). The experts proposed the Alliance to bring the environmental dimension of migration into the mainstream of sustainable development policy, and to insert the migration issue into ongoing environmental change and climate change discourse. In the future, the Alliance can serve as a focal point and clearing house for the knowledge and experience gained on environmentally induced migration.

The Alliance will bring together UN and other intergovernmental organizations, experts, NGOs, civil society and government representatives to explore and better understand the root causes of environmentally induced migration, and identify solutions to the risks posed by climate change. The Alliance would provide a forum and venue for the exchange of new information relevant to policy and practice concerning environmentally induced migration.

The Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance aims to fulfil four objectives:

1. To provide a neutral forum for policy dialogue to deal with the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation on migration and population displacement, especially in developing countries. The Alliance will draw on the expertise of both public and private sectors to build strategic discussions and more informed policy dialogue.

2. To improve the knowledge base about environmentally induced migration, including databases and innovative research approaches.

3. To conduct and support pilot projects to address regional environmental changes and migration, in partnerships with and through existing organizations and programmes. To identify success stories and disseminate information on the environmental factors that affect migration, as well as migration factors that affect the environment. These activities will focus on developing countries, but will also assess solutions that have been applied in a variety of settings, such as displacement, refugee management, disaster management and environmental management.

4. To promote practical solutions to address environmentally induced migration through appropriate legislation, research, awareness raising, humanitarian assistance and the strengthening of relevant institutions. These solutions will be formed in cooperation with other organizations and initiatives and within existing frameworks such as the United Nations, as well as international financial institutions, international donors and the private sector.

The Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance will undertake policy-relevant research, capacity building, dissemination of findings and networking activities.
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ENDNOTES

1 Although some claim that it remains the smallest budget of all areas of financial perspectives, compared to those still dominating traditional Communities policies, under the headings of sustainable development, economic competitiveness and social cohesion for examples (Liberatore, p. 21), its relative change and substantive emphasis are considerable.

2 The Commission drafts and issues proposals and submits to the JHA Council and European Parliament, which together have decision-making power.

3 Available official data prior to the addition of the 10 new countries indicated that out of a population of roughly 330 million, approximately 19 million non-nationals lived legally in one of the 15 EU member-states (Council of Europe, 2004). Fewer than one-third (30% or 6 million) were citizens of other EU member-states, meaning that the majority of foreigners were third-country nationals (TCNs), mostly third world, non-white, non-Christian populations considered a ‘problem area’.

4 This is based on a six-month NSF-sponsored telephone survey (rolling cross-section); see Huddy, Feldman, Taber and Lahav, 2003. Among a random sample of 1,234 telephone interviews, the study of public opinion revealed that in the five months after September 11, there was some decrease in desire to curtail civil liberties for Arabs and Arab immigration etc; some decline in patriotic feelings; decline in personal threat; decreased sense of unity among Americans (see also Huddy, Khatib and Capelos 2002).

5 In the US, the Patriot Act of 2001 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 notably paved the way for electronic innovations, visa screening, racial and ethnic profiling, acceleration procedures and unprecedented security checks as well as the formation of a new Office of Homeland Security to coordinate activities with a reorganized INS. The formation of this new Office brought 22 federal agencies under one umbrella and has been considered the first significant addition to the US government since 1947, when Harry Truman merged the various branches of the US Armed Forces into the Department of Defense to better coordinate the nation’s defense against military threats (US Department of Homeland Security: www.dhs.gov).

6 Nowhere is this better exemplified than by the Department of Homeland Security’s newly adopted risk management approach in using new technologies to better identify and target flows of high-risk people and goods while at the same time facilitating low-risk flows.

7 The dialogue in January 2008 of the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia.

8 See background paper of RT 1.1, Brussels GFMD, prepared by Ronald Skeldon, Sussex University.

9 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 2007, “On Circular Migration and Mobility Partnerships between the European Union and Third Countries”, May.
Roundtable 1.1 at the Brussels GFMD demonstrated how The Netherlands and Zambia work together to supplement the income of doctors in rural areas and how the U.K. and Malawi have a six-year programme to reform the Malawi health sector also through the contributions of returned health professionals. See website gfmd-fmmd.

See background paper prepared by the Mauritian Government for RT1.4 at gfmd-fmmd.

See the background paper for RT 1.2 of the Brussels GFMD meeting (gfmd-fmmd) on new approaches by Canada, U.K., Australia and Italy.

See, e.g., the Worker Flow Management Program in Catalunia (RT 1.2 background paper: gfmd-fmmd).

Studies by the World Bank and others have shown that the impact of remittances from lower skilled workers abroad can directly help alleviate poverty and increase education, health and general welfare of poorer families. See, for example, Yang and Martinez (2005) on the Philippines; Adams (2004) on Guatemala; Verduzco and Lozano (2004) on Mexico-Canada and North-South Institute (2003) on Mexico-Canada.

See the background paper of RT 1.2, Brussels GFMD: gfmd-fmmd.

See outcomes of RT 1.2 in Summary Report of the Brussels GFMD.

The Welfare Fund for overseas workers is today operated by the Philippines, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Increasing numbers of sending and receiving countries are also adopting a standard contract for workers, particularly domestic workers (see UNIFEM’s work with Jordan).

The working-age population already includes two million persons a year moving within South to North migratory flows (United Nations, 2003).

On all these aspects one can see, i.a., Espenshade (1988), Andorka (1991), Steinmann (1991), Borjas et al. (1992), Gesano (1994).

International regimes were initially defined as “mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states” (Ruggie 1975: 570). Later, a “consensus definition” by a group of leading international relations scholars emerged, “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice” (Krasner 1983a: 2).


For official definitions of human trafficking and human smuggling, see Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, and the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, UN 2000.


For treaty texts, signatures and ratifications, see UN Signatories to the UN Convention against Transnational Crime and its Protocols, at: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_signatures.html
In addition to the quarterly bulletin, *Trafficking in Migrants*, see the book by Bimal Ghosh (1998).

For a review of international cooperation on human smuggling, see Koslowski 2001.

Marc Meznar of the US Mission to the EU, quoted in EurActiv.com 2006.

Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, United States (ICAO 2006).

The U.S. Customs Service was merged into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) formed in March 2003 and its former staff and resources are primarily in the Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement branches of the DHS.

Although roughly comparable, the *Bundesgrenzschutz* is not composed of the same array of functions as the CBP in that it also includes the Federal Railway Police (the U.S. counterpart would be Amtrak Police), but it does not include customs inspectors, which CBP does. See “*Bundespolizei: Aufgaben und Organisation*” at: http://www.bundespolizei.de/nn_719704/EN/__Home/Brochure/InfoformationBrochure_en_down,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/InfoformationBrochure_en_down.pdf

Following Leo Lucassen (2005: 18-19), I use integration in a very broad sense to refer to the way in which migrants and their children find their place in society. A useful analytical distinction adopted by Lucassen is between structural integration, which can be measured by social mobility, for example, educational achievement, and housing patterns and identificational integration, which is subjective and refers to the extent to which migrants and their children continue to regard themselves as different from the rest of society.

In one study using Current Population Survey data, second-generation Afro-Caribbeans and South Americans actually outperform native whites.) (Alba and Nee 2003; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters 2004; Portes and Rumbaut 2001.

In 2000, among men between the ages of 25 and 34, about a quarter of the Mexican second generation were high school drop-outs, compared to 15 per cent of native blacks and seven per cent of native whites.

In 2005, there were some 11-12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States, more than half of them Mexican.

These emigrants live in Europe (1,336,700), Africa (540,391), North America (1,015,300), South America (1,617,837), Central America (6,523), Asia (29,271) and Oceania (55,459). Cf. Arroteia (2001)

Esteves et al. (1991)


The relevant arguments were first presented in a paper by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jeronimo Cortina at an immigration seminar convened at Columbia University in 2006.

For a more comprehensive discussion of this process, see Philip Martin, Susan Martin and Sarah Cross, “High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development” in *International Migration* 45/1:7-25, 2007.

UNU-EHS is partner in the Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios (EACH-FOR), funded by the European Commission’s 6th Framework Program. The project is a systematic attempt to detect the degree to which and the pathways through which environmental stressors affect migration.