



INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT IV

IOM Iraq

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ACRONYMS

DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix

HLP Housing, Land and Property

IDP Internally Displaced Person

ILA Integrated Location Assessment

IOM International Organization for Migration

ISIL Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

KIs Key Informants

KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq

NFI Non-Food Item

RARTs Rapid Assessment and Response Teams

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY¹

Since reaching the official end of the crisis with ISIL in December 2017, the humanitarian context in Iraq entered a new stage: post-conflict status has allowed for the return of over 4.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their areas of origin. Refugees from abroad have also started returning from neighbouring Turkey and Syrian Arab Republic as well as from more distant countries, such as Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands.

However, since the second half of 2018 the pace of return – the percentage change in the number of returns – has greatly slowed, dropping from 133 per cent, recorded between May 2017 and May 2018, to 10 per cent observed between May 2018 and June 2019. In the three governorates of Anbar, Diyala and Erbil, returns increased by only five per cent or less between May 2018 and June 2019. At district level, the return process is nearly stalled in both Al-Ba'aj and Ramadi – respectively the fourth and fifth districts of origin for IDPs.²

There are also important variations in terms of rates of return – the ratio of returnees in a specific governorate/district to the sum of returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate/district. Around 90 per cent of IDPs originally from Anbar have come back to their location of origin versus 64 per cent and 75 per cent respectively of those originally from Ninewa and Salah al-Din. “Critical” districts – those with no returns – include Al-Musayab and Hilla in Babylon Governorate, Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Karkh and Mada'in in Baghdad Governorate, Baladrooz and Ba'quba in Diyala Governorate, and Al-Thetar in Salah al-Din Governorate.

As of June 2019, about 1.61 million people are still living in displacement. The long time spent away from home (70% fled before October 2016) coupled with unresolved inter-group dynamics and new sources of instability (such as concerns over the resurgence of ISIL) impacts their ability to return and in some cases triggers secondary displacement. At the end of 2018, at least 120,000 individuals were secondarily displaced either in new locations of displacement or following a failed attempt to return to their location of origin.³

Long-term intentions are largely consistent with May 2018 findings – suggesting an upward trend towards permanent relocation, which now stands at 25 per cent. Short-term intentions to remain in displacement have also risen from 68 per cent to 75 per cent – pointing in the direction of deferring returns.

When looking at obstacles to return, trends indicate that security and safety concerns have decreased in severity from

81 per cent in 2016 to 36 per cent in 2019, due to the general improvement in security conditions. Fear of changed ethno-religious composition at origin has also decreased to 9 per cent after peaking at 27 per cent in 2018. The obstacle “lack of means to return and restart” dropped from 32 per cent to 17 per cent, with a higher prevalence among IDPs in Sulaymaniyah (56%). This change is similar to the obstacle of blocked returns (from 26% to 5% in 2019), with a higher prevalence among IDPs settled in Salah al-Din (26%).

The three key push factors hindering returns appear to be the lack of job opportunities (73%), services (68%) and shelter (62%) at location of origin. Although housing destruction/damage improved slightly compared to last year (-9%), it is still the main obstacle to return for households settled in Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Qadisiya, Salah al-Din and Wasit.

Evidence of unstable/temporary returns – i.e. households who returned to the location of displacement after first returning to their locations of origin – was also recorded in six per cent of the locations of displacement. This instability seems primarily linked with negative push factors, such as lack of means to remain in displacement (18% of returnee locations across Iraq accounting for around 130,000 returnee households) as well as pressures to return from authorities, either in the location of displacement, origin or both (9% of locations in 2019).

It would also appear that the lack of means to remain in displacement (reported by 42% in 2016 and 47% in 2017) and the issue of ‘pushed’ returns (26% in 2017) triggered many returns at early stages. Incentives/support by government authorities/humanitarian actors (22%) and encouragement by community/religious leaders (28%), were also relatively strong pull factors in 2017. These returns may have been premature, as evidenced by the high number of returnees still living in high severity conditions as per Return Index data (472,350 individuals across 279 locations).⁴ In addition, these returns did not necessarily meet security conditions: only 67 per cent and 75 per cent of returnees in 2016 and 2017 respectively chose to return because they deemed the location of origin to be safe.

¹ All sections of the report – except the first one – are based on the ILA dataset which does not include the displaced population settled in camps. Data of the first section on population movements were extrapolated from the Round 110 (May 2019) and Round 109 (March 2019) Master Lists, which include both out of camp and camp IDPs.

² The main districts of origin are the districts where the majority of the IDP caseload come from. According to ML 109, the six main districts of origin are: Mosul (20% of current IDPs), Sinjar (18%), Telafar (8%), Al-Ba'aj (7%), Ramadi (4%) and Al-Hawiga (4%).

³ DTM Round 107, December 2018, IOM DTM Iraq.

⁴ See Return Index (RI) 3. The RI is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return. It is based on 16 indicators that represent a set of minimum or critical living conditions that are necessary to make a place conducive to returns. The RI score explains the likelihood of a population group returns and helps define living conditions in locations of return. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/iom_dtm_returnindex_round3_apr2019.pdf.

Access to employment/livelihoods continues to be the main need of returnees, mentioned in around 70 per cent of locations. Over 80 per cent of returnees live in locations where the availability of jobs is 'insufficient' and over half live in locations where most individuals "are not economically active". The lack of training or vocational centres and programmes to support business start-ups is an issue in around 15 per cent of returnee locations – and more so in Anbar (27% of locations).

Return dynamics can be further complicated by security issues, tensions between different population groups and unequal access to resources. While there has been a widespread improvement in security conditions since May 2018, in around 10 per cent of locations (mostly in the eight governorates of origin of IDPs) there is evidence of security incidents associated with the resurgence of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) asymmetric warfare. Specifically, 55 per cent of returnees live in locations where 'fear about the resurgence of ISIL' was reported.

In general, the relationship between different population groups (IDPs, returnees and stayers) appears to be positive and stable – overall, the presence of incidents involving physical violence, threats and mistrust in general was reported only occasionally in fewer than five per cent of locations across Iraq.⁵ The issue of biased access to resources has also largely improved: overall between 8 per cent and 14 per cent of returnees and between 25 per cent and 34 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favouritism regarding employment and political representation was reported (versus 45% of returnees and 50% of IDPs in 2018).

As for practices that could facilitate the reconciliation process, the situation regarding housing, land and property (HLP) issues appears to have improved. Ownership issues were only mentioned in around one per cent of returnee locations (vs. around 10% last year), mostly in Ninewa and Salah al-Din and a few in Diyala and Anbar. Nevertheless, nearly 70 per cent of returnees (and 51% of IDPs) live in districts where legal services are not available, over one third in districts where there are no courts, and 6 per cent of returnees (and 27% of IDPs) live in districts where there are no offices for the replacement of civil documentation.

Other key findings of the assessment include:

Movements:

- Compared to May 2018, the number of IDPs has dropped by roughly one fifth (-21%). Decreases were recorded across all 18 governorates, particularly in Ninewa (-23%, around 140,000 individuals), Salah al-Din (-43%, around 80,000 individuals) and Baghdad (-46%, around 50,000 individuals). Significant decreases were also observed in Najaf and Qadisiya (around -60% in both governorates), although the number of hosted IDPs is comparatively smaller.
- The displacement situation appears fluid (either dynamic or fairly dynamic)⁶ in most districts of Anbar, Baghdad, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit. The districts of Koisnjak and Soran in Erbil Governorate and Chamchamal and Darbandikhan in Sulaymaniyah Governorate also appear fluid, in contrast to the majority of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as IDPs are only very slowly moving out of all districts within the region.
- Numbers of IDPs are either static or very slowly decreasing in all districts of Diyala, Basrah and Thi-Qar governorates, whereas in Ninewa stationary or fairly stationary districts include Akre, Al-Hamdaniya, Al-Shikhan and Sinjar. Other noteworthy stationary districts include Kirkuk (in Kirkuk Governorate) and Al-Musayab (in Babylon Governorate).

Intentions:

- Individuals currently settled in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf and Wassit are the most willing to return in the long run (over 90% of individuals in all areas); while in the short term, the most significant inflows of IDPs are expected in Salah al-Din (67%, mostly to Baiji, Balad, Samarra and Tooz) and Diyala (74%, mostly targeting Al-Khalis, Al-Muqdadiya, Baladrooz and Khanaqin).
- Stable relocation appears to be the prevalent intention of IDPs settled in Babylon (97%), Kerbala (64%), Kirkuk (63%), and southern governorates like Basrah (70%), Muthanna (93%) and Thi-Qar (59%). Pull factors in the locations of displacement include security, which seems to be at the root of the decision to stay in southern governorates, whereas push factors – namely blocked

5 Although this finding is consistent with previous assessment, it is worth observing that social cohesion is very hard to measure and it is highly likely to be under-reported. See section on intergroup feelings, perception of security and civic life satisfaction.

6 The rate of change of the displaced population relates to the proportion of IDPs who have moved in or out the governorate/ district of displacement between May 2018 (ILA III) and June 2019 (ILA IV). A minus (-) sign in front of the percentage indicates a decrease of IDPs while a plus (+) sign indicates an inflow of IDPs. According to the rate of change, governorates/districts of displacement can be categorized into: stationary (rate of change < 10%), fairly stationary (rate of change between 10% and 20%), fairly dynamic (rate of change between 20% and 30%) and dynamic (rate of change > 30%). See *Reasons to remain, an in-depth analysis of the main districts of displacement and origin*, DTM IOM Iraq, April 2019.

returns, house destruction and lack of means – are primarily keeping IDPs in Babylon, Kerbala and Kirkuk. The presence of militias and/or a change in the ethno-religious composition at the location of origin is among the top three reasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing to resettle in Diyala, Salah al-Din and Sulaymaniyah.

Living Conditions:

- Access to employment/livelihood opportunities continues to be the main concern of IDPs: 70 per cent live in locations where access was reported among the top three needs. IDPs tend to be employed mostly in the informal sector (especially in Babylon, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala, Kirkuk and Missan). Compared to returnees, barriers to employment for IDPs are reported more frequently (25% vs. 14%), as well as dependence on savings (12% vs. 2%) and/or remittances from family/friends (17% vs. 2%).
- Around 30 per cent of IDPs (and around 20% of returnees) live in locations where access to food was mentioned as among top three needs – 99 per cent of IDPs in Sulaymaniyah, 53 per cent of IDPs in Baghdad, and 33 per cent of returnees in Anbar reported the issue. High prices are the main issue for both populations (66% and 46% respectively), which in turn influence their capacity to access food.
- Housing remains a pressing issue for the displaced population; 42 per cent of IDPs live in locations where housing was mentioned among the top three needs, with no change compared to May 2018. Only 8 per cent of households remain settled in critical shelter arrangements – it was 16 per cent in 2016 – while the share of the population settled in camps is comparatively increasing each year (from 12% in 2016 to 32% in 2019).
- The share of individuals able to return to their habitual residence has increased from 89 per cent in 2017 to 98 per cent in 2019. The exceptions to this trend are Anbar and Salah-al-Din, where about five per cent of households were not able to reclaim their residence and are mostly living in rented housing. It should also be noted that around three per cent of families are back in their original residence, however these residences may be in poor condition or damaged.
- The increase in the share of families able to regain their habitual residence is linked to reconstruction efforts. Currently extensive damage and destruction (over three fourths of houses are heavily damaged or destroyed)

was assessed in only around three per cent of locations countrywide – with peaks in Khanaqin (20%), Daquq (14%), Sinjar (13%), Tilkaif (16%) and Balad (27%). Reconstruction efforts are ongoing – only in 30 per cent of locations countrywide none or very few houses are being reconstructed/rehabilitated.

Ethno-religious Composition:

- In terms of ethno-religious composition, the most visible change since 2014 has been that of the religious composition of many Sunni majority areas, particularly in the three governorates of Baghdad, Basrah and Diyala, that have become Shia majority or mixed Shia-Sunni areas – mainly Arab in Baghdad and Basrah, and Kurdish in Diyala. Conversely, the presence of Arab Sunnis in the KRI has largely increased, due to the influx of IDPs.
- These changes can be linked with both the tendency of IDPs to ‘cluster’ in displacement and to their fear to return to places where their ethno-religious group is in the minority, particularly if a change in the population composition occurred as a result of conflict.
- At least three fourths of returnee locations fall in the category of ‘homogeneous’ locations, meaning where at least 60 per cent of the population belongs to one of the six main ethno-religious groups: Arab Sunnis, Turkmen (Shias), Yazidis, Kurds (Sunnis and Shias), Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais). The same figure was found for IDPs with regard to Arab Sunnis, Kurds (Shias and Sunnis), Yazidis, Arab Shias, and Turkmen Shias. As for Turkmen Sunnis and ‘other minorities’ homogeneous locations stand respectively at 21 per cent and 36 per cent.
- Main ethno-religious groups share common characteristics with regard to shelter, intentions, obstacles and reasons to return. For instance, while house damage/destruction, lack of jobs and basic services were the most reported obstacles to return for Arab Sunnis, all other ethno-religious groups were more likely to fear the lack of security/safety at origin. Lack of means to return and restart was mentioned in around one in four homogeneous locations of Arab Sunnis and Shias and around one in two homogeneous locations of Turkmen Shias and other minorities.; and fear of the ethno-religious change in 15–20 per cent of homogeneous locations of Kurdish, Arab Shias and other minorities. It is also worth noting that the issue of blocked returns was reported only in Arab Sunnis’ homogeneous locations (9%).

INTRODUCTION

The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) is IOM's information management system to track and monitor population displacement during crises. Composed of a variety of tools and processes, the DTM regularly and systematically captures and processes multi-layered data and disseminates a wide array of information products that facilitate a better understanding of the evolving needs of a displaced population, be that on site or en route. DTM data includes information relevant to all sectors of humanitarian assistance, such as demographic figures, shelter, water and sanitation, health, food and protection, making data useful for humanitarian actors at all levels.

In Iraq, DTM monitors population displacement since 2004. In 2014, following the worsening of the armed conflict and the increasing need for information on the displaced population, the programme was reinforced. Currently the DTM collects data on IDPs and returnees through a system of Rapid Assessment and Response Teams (RARTs) – composed of over 100 field staff present throughout the Iraqi territory – which in turn gather information through an extended network of over 9,500 Key Informants (KIs) as well as direct visits to identified locations hosting IDPs, returnees or both (see Methodology).

DTM figures, key findings and reports are published online and available on the portal of DTM Iraq at <http://iraqdtm.iom.int>. Bi-monthly reports are the core of DTM information, as they provide a countrywide monitoring of displacement and return movements. In-depth location assessments, on the other hand, provide a more exhaustive analysis of displacement and return trends and are conducted yearly.

The Integrated Location Assessment (ILA) belongs to this more comprehensive category, as it provides a simultaneous and rigorous profiling of both displacement and return movements in Iraq. Focusing on both populations at the same time allows to: capture overarching trends of population movements; evaluate the burden that forced displacement poses on some governorates; and outline social and living conditions, basic needs, intentions and vulnerabilities shared by IDPs and returnees.

The report starts with a brief description of the methodology and coverage of the assessment. Chapters are structured around five main topics: (i) population movements, including past trends, current rates of returns and description on future intentions; (ii) status of and accessibility to infrastructure and services; (iii) living conditions, particularly shelter/property issues, employment/livelihood and main basic and recovery needs; (iv) social cohesion and reconciliation, including feeling of safety and security and participation in civic life and (v) ethno-religious composition, and main vulnerabilities. Figures for the returnee and displaced population are provided at overall level and governorate level.

The form used for the assessment, as well as the dataset and additional district and location-level analysis, can be downloaded from [the Iraq DTM portal](#).⁷

The DTM considers as IDPs all Iraqis who were forced to flee from 1 January 2014 onwards and are still displaced within national borders at the moment of the assessment.

*Returnees are defined as IDPs who have now returned to the location (generally village or neighbourhood) where they used to live prior to being displaced, irrespective of whether they have returned to their former residence or to another shelter type.*⁸

METHODOLOGY AND COVERAGE

The ILA collects detailed information on IDP and returnee families living in locations identified through the DTM Master Lists. The reference unit of the assessment is the location, and information is collected at the aggregate level, that is, on the majority of IDPs and returnees living in a location, not on individual households.⁹

At the start of the cycle, the list of identified locations hosting at least five IDP and/or returnee households in the most up-to-date Master Lists is given to the field RART and is used

as a baseline. The data-collection cycle takes approximately three months and new locations identified during the implementation phase are not subject to the assessment.

⁷ IOM (2019), ILA IV. Available online at <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/downloads/dtm%20special%20reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV/Integrated%20Location%20Assessment%20IV%20Questionnaire.pdf>

⁸ The definition of returnees is not related to the criteria of returning in safety and dignity, nor with a defined strategy of durable solutions. Displaced families who have returned to their subdistrict of origin are counted as returnees even if they have not returned to their habitual address.


⁹ Family and household are terms used interchangeably throughout this report, and report to individuals related by birth, marriage or adoption living together. In Iraq, the average household size is 6.

Where access is possible, identified locations are visited and directly assessed by IOM’s RARTs through interviews with several key informants (including members of the IDP and returnee communities) and direct observation. At the end of the visits, RARTs fill one form with the summary of the information collected and the data is then uploaded to the server and stored as one assessment.

The ILA IV was conducted from May to June 2019 through a network of around 4,000 KI and covered 3,645 locations hosting at least five or more IDP and/or returnee households, reaching a total of 712,022 returnee households – and 5,641 individuals returned from abroad – and 171,699 IDP households (corresponding respectively to 4,272,132 returnees and 1,030,194 IDPs). Details about the population hosted in the assessed locations are provided in Figure 1. Findings reflect the locations where displaced and/or returned populations resided at the time of the assessment. Whenever applicable, data have been weighted according to the respective number of IDP or returnee households in the location, so that findings are projected at the level of households/individuals.

Overall, coverage stands at 99 per cent¹⁰ thanks to the progress in DTM’s field capacity as well as the improvement in security conditions.

Figure 1: Number of assessed locations per population group in location



Although some questions specifically target IDPs and other returnees, routinely collected core information includes:

- Geographic location
- Governorate of origin (IDPs) and of last displacement (returnees)
- Wave/period of displacement and return
- Ethno-religious affiliation
- Shelter type
- Reasons for displacement/return and future intentions on short and long term
- Common security incidents
- Specific protection and risk indicators

As in previous ILAs reports, IOM has included a specific section on security, safety and social cohesion – that is, intergroup feelings, social threats and civic life satisfaction, to assess the degree of satisfaction with how civic matters are handled. By incorporating this section, the ILA tool is able to monitor the current reintegration process, including ethno-religious and social tensions that may have arisen or remain active at the local level.¹¹

All sections of the report except for the first on population movements (which was extrapolated from the June 2019 baseline Master List Round 110 and includes the displaced population settled in camps) are based on the ILA dataset collected from May to June 2019. All comparisons with years 2016, 2017 and 2018 come from the datasets of previous ILAs conducted from July to October 2016, from March to May 2017 and from March to May 2018, respectively.


Shelter types were classified into three categories: private dwellings (habitual residence, hosted residence, rented housing and hotels/motels); critical shelter arrangements (informal settlements, religious buildings, schools, unfinished or abandoned buildings and other formal settlements/collective centres); and unknown shelters (when the shelter type cannot be identified or the locations could not be accessed). It is important to note that camps were not assessed, as the ILA methodology is designed for urban and rural areas only (location – fifth administrative level), whereas a different methodology is required for camps – that is, camp profiling and formal site assessment. Camps are usually included in the government’s records. Information on camps can be found in DTM bi-monthly Master List.

Data cleaning was performed in July and preliminary findings were validated with the RARTs. The ILA IV dataset and interactive dashboards were released on the DTM portal in August 2019 and are available at <http://iraqdtm.iom.int/ILA4.aspx>.

¹⁰ Overall 3,645 locations were directly visited by field teams, three locations were assessed by phone, 52 were excluded because identified as locations with zero IDP or returnee families and 64 were inaccessible locations.

¹¹ In order to gather a balanced assessment on social cohesion and reconciliation, the questionnaire has been administered to an informant of each population group present at the location (returnees and IDPs) and information obtained has been cross checked. Nevertheless it should be stressed how findings should be carefully handled since all limitations applying to the KIs tool (biases, underrepresentation of less visible groups, little basis for quantification and such) are even more relevant in this case due to the sensitive nature of the issue and the perspective of the informant.

Map 1: General map of Iraq



POPULATION MOVEMENTS¹²

The end of the crisis was officially declared in 2017. Since then, post-conflict status has allowed for the return of over 4,300,000 IDPs to their areas of origin.

Refugees from abroad have also started returning from neighbouring Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as from more distant countries such as Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands.¹³ Nevertheless, in the second half of 2018 the pace of return has greatly slowed, and around 1,610,000 people are still living in displacement. The prolonged period of displacement, coupled with issues such as unresolved inter-group dynamics and new concerns over the resurgence of ISIL, affects IDPs' ability to return and in some cases triggers secondary displacement. At the end of 2018, around 120,000 individuals were secondarily displaced either in new locations of displacement or following a failed attempt to return to their location of origin.¹⁴


Movement trends since 2014 (depicted below) demonstrate how the pace of displacement reflects the pattern of the Iraqi conflict. People fled their communities either because they were directly targeted (as were ethno-religious minorities from June to September 2014), frightened by the generalized violence, or could no longer make a living. Waves of returns primarily mirror campaigns to retake areas under ISIL control, and following these episodes, reflect expectations of restored stability, which peaked between June 2017 and June 2018.

¹² All figures for this section – except for those on Intentions, Reasons to stay and Obstacles to return – were extrapolated from Round 110 (May 2019) and Round 109 (March 2019) Master Lists and include the displaced population settled in camps. Conversely figures for Intentions, Reasons to stay and Obstacles to return are based on ILA IV dataset and only pertain to out of camp IDPs.

¹³ A dedicated section was added in the ILA III and ILA IV questionnaire with the objective to start monitoring returns from abroad. Overall, returns from people displaced internally greatly outnumber those from abroad. In 2018, around 74,000 individuals returning from abroad were observed – 77% of which had regained their location of origin and 89% who had left Iraq before 2014. In 2019, 5,641 returns from abroad were observed – all individuals had left Iraq due to the 2014 crisis, 92% had regained their location of origin, most came back from Turkey, Germany, Syrian Arab Republic, Netherlands and Belgium. According to UNHCR, there are around 270,000 registered Iraqi refugees in neighbouring countries namely Turkey (142,640), Lebanon (15,330), Syrian Arab Republic (35,220), Jordan (67,175), Egypt (6,920) and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (3,200): http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/go2019/pdf/Chapter_MENA.pdf

¹⁴ See Round 107 Master List, December 2018.

Figure 2: Displacement and return trends – April 2014–June 2019




PACE OF RETURN AND RATES OF RETURN

Compared to the previous reference period (May 2017–May 2018) when the political pressure for returns was substantial, the pace of returns – the percentage change in the number of returns – has greatly slowed, dropping from 133 per cent to 10 per cent. More specifically, the three governorates of Anbar, Diyala and Erbil recorded an increase in returns of only five per cent or less between May 2018 and June 2019.

Table 1: Return, yearly rate of change and rate of return


	Returnees May 2018	Returnees June 2019	% change May 2017–June 2019	% change May 2018–June 2019	% of returns as of June 2019	Rate of return June 2019
Anbar	1,264,890	1,305,456	63%	3%	30%	89%
Baghdad	77,046	88,170	188%	14%	2%	69%
Dahuk	780	780	> 200%	0%	0%	3%
Diyala	221,598	225,474	10%	2%	5%	73%
Erbil	39,006	41,070	14%	5%	1%	68%
Kirkuk	293,334	330,882	> 200%	13%	8%	76%
Ninewa	146,424	1,677,912	> 200%	15%	39%	64%
Salah al-Din	543,456	635,394	50%	17%	15%	75%
Total/Average	3,904,350	4,305,138	133%	10%	100%	73%

Map 2: Variation in rate of return between May 2018 and June 2019



The yearly trend of returns for the six main districts of origin Mosul, Telafar, Al-Ba’aj, Ramadi, and Al-Hawiga are detailed below. Mosul accounts for 20 per cent of all individuals still living in displacement, followed by Sinjar (18%), Telafar (8%), Al-Ba’aj (7%), Ramadi (4%) and Al-Hawiga (4%). In all districts there has been a significant decrease in the number of returns; however, while in Al-Hawiga, Mosul, Sinjar and Telafar returns are still progressing though at a slower pace, the return process is nearly stalled in Al-Ba’aj and Ramadi.

Figure 3: Return trends in six main districts of origin (2016–2019 / ILA I to ILA IV)




Important regional variations in terms of rates of return exist – the proportion of returnees originally from a governorate or district to the total number of returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate or district (see Map 2). Around 90 per cent of IDPs originally from Anbar have come back to their location of origin, versus 75 per cent and 64 per cent respectively of those originally from Salah al-Din and Ninewa.

Variations at the district level are even more significant. The districts of Mosul and Sinjar are top districts of origin for IDPs; however, 75 per cent of those IDPs originally from Mosul have returned to their location of origin compared to only 17 per cent of those from Sinjar. Other ‘critical’ districts include Al-Musayab and Hilla in Babylon, Adhamia,

Al-Resafa, Karkh and Mada’in in Baghdad, Baladrooz and Ba’quba in Diyala, and Al-Thetar in Salah al-Din. No returns were recorded so far in these districts, regardless of the number of individuals who fled them (which can vary from as few as 60 in Hilla to as many as 39,252 in Al-Musayab).

In addition to Sinjar, the process of returns is very slow in Al-Ba’aj (8% rate of return) and Hatra (30%) in Ninewa Governorate. Other districts experiencing lower rates of return include Al Ka’im (61%), Kifri (50%), Al-Fares (50%), Tooz (49%) and Balad (57%). The number of individuals who fled these areas is highly variable – around 50,000 individuals from Balad and Tooz are still displaced versus around 25,000 from Al-Ka’im and 1,200 from Kifri.

Map 3: Rate of return/Classification of districts based on the percentages of returns




This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

TIMING, DIRECTION AND REASONS TO RETURNS

Most returns took place in 2016–2017 (80% of total returns) and were intra-governorate (58%), meaning the location of last displacement was in the same governorate of that of origin. Baghdad and Erbil received around 90 per cent of returns from within the governorate; Diyala around 80 per

cent and Ninewa around 70 per cent. Ninewa is also the governorate most likely to have received recent returns (87% since 2017) due to displacement caused by the Mosul crisis, along with Kirkuk (83%).


Map 4: Periods of return



Security (92%), access to property (77%) and services/ livelihoods (45%) were the most important factors influencing decisions to return. Around one third of households (29%) were motivated by the emotional desire to return and 10

per cent by the desire to join family members who previously returned. IDPs are also more likely to return if they are pushed by lack of means (18%) or by inadequate or worsening conditions in their community of displacement (12%).

Figure 4: Reasons to return¹⁵




15 KIs were asked to select the main three reasons to return.

The importance of push factors is especially apparent when tracking reasons to return over the course of time. Apparently, the lack of means to remain in displacement triggered many returns earlier on in the conflict (42% and 47% in 2016 and 2017 respectively). These returns did not necessarily meet security standards: only 67 per cent and 75 per cent of returnees in 2016 and 2017 respectively chose to return because they deemed the location of origin to be safe. Incentives and/or support by government

authorities, as well as encouragement by the community and/or religious leaders were relatively strong pull factors in 2017 (22% and 28% respectively), when the evidence of 'pushed' returns was also seen in as many as 26 per cent of returnee locations (vs. 9% in 2019). These returns may have well been premature, as evidenced by the high number of returnees still living in severe conditions (472,350 individuals across 279 locations).¹⁶

Figure 5: Reasons to return, trend 2016–2019



¹⁶ See Return Index (RI) 3. The RI is a tool designed to measure the severity of conditions in locations of return. It is based on 16 indicators that represent a set of minimum or critical living conditions that are necessary to make a place conducive to returns. The RI score explains the likelihood of a population group returns and helps define living conditions in locations of return. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/iom_dtm_returnindex_round3_apr2019.pdf.

In addition to the improvement in the security situation and the availability of housing, which are common factors to all locations of return, around one third of returns to Diyala were motivated by a lack of means (31%) and/or encouragement by the community and/or religious leaders (33%). The availability of jobs and/or assistance have been

key elements in Baghdad (40% and 23% respectively), while in Ninewa the worsening of livelihood/services in displacement was mentioned more often than the average (21%). The emotional desire to return also motivated households in Salah al-Din (47%), Erbil (40%) and Kirkuk (38%).

DISPLACEMENT, DISTRIBUTION AND RATE OF CHANGE

As of June 2019, 1,607,148 internally displaced persons (267,858 households) remain dispersed across all 18 Iraqi governorates. Compared to May 2018, this number has dropped by roughly one fifth (-21%). Decreases were recorded across all governorates, particularly in Ninewa (-23%, around 140,000 individuals), Salah al-Din (-43%,

around 80,000 individuals) and Baghdad (-46%, around 50,000 individuals). Significant drops were also observed in Najaf and Qadisiya (around -60% in both governorates), although the number of hosted IDPs is comparatively smaller.

Table 2: IDPs, distribution and change (No. of individuals)

	No. of IDPs as of May 2018	No. of IDPs as of June 2019	% change since May 2018	% of IDPs June 2019
Anbar	81,192	49,086	-40%	3%
Babylon	25,794	17,454	-32%	1%
Baghdad	107,832	58,710	-46%	4%
Basrah	8,046	7,164	-11%	0%
Dahuk	350,232	326,106	-7%	20%
Diyala	64,674	55,722	-14%	3%
Erbil	222,738	209,784	-6%	13%
Kerbala	27,018	21,744	-20%	1%
Kirkuk	133,770	101,556	-24%	6%
Missan	3,006	2,388	-21%	0%
Muthanna	1,374	1,098	-20%	0%
Najaf	30,396	12,282	-60%	1%
Ninewa	620,628	478,638	-23%	30%
Qadisiya	12,882	5,592	-57%	0%
Salah al-Din	184,854	105,390	-43%	7%
Sulaymaniyah	154,020	142,422	-8%	9%
Thi-Qar	4,098	3,474	-15%	0%
Wassit	13,164	8,538	-35%	1%
Total/Average	2,045,718	1,607,148	-21%	100%

According to the yearly rate of change of the displaced population – the proportion of IDPs who have moved into (+) or out of (-) the governorate/district of displacement within the specified time frame – governorates/districts can be categorized into: stationary (rate of change < 10%),


fairly stationary (rate of change between 10% and 20%), fairly dynamic (rate of change between 20% and 30%) and dynamic (rate of change > 30%).

The situation appears fluid, i.e. either dynamic or fairly dynamic, in most districts of Anbar, Baghdad, Muthanna,

Najaf, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit. With the exception of Koissnjak and Soran in Erbil and Chamchamal and Darbandikhan in Sulaymaniyah, IDPs are only very slowly moving out of all districts of KRI. Displacement is also either stalled or only very slowly decreasing in all districts of Diyala, Basrah and Thi-Qar governorates, whereas in

Ninewa stationary or fairly stationary districts include Akre, Al-Hamdaniya, Al-Shikhan and Sinjar. Other noteworthy districts where IDPs are not or only very slowly moving out include Kirkuk (in Kirkuk Governorate) and Al-Musayab (in Babylon Governorate).

Map 5: Classification of districts based on the rate of change of displacement between May 2018 to June 2019



FUTURE INTENTIONS



In 553 locations hosting 25 per cent of current IDPs, most individuals are willing to go home in the short term (within less than six months), and in 1,659 locations hosting 74 per cent of current IDPs, most individuals are willing to go home in the long term (after six months or more). Long-term intentions are largely consistent with the findings of 2018, suggesting an upward trend towards permanent relocation, which now stands at 25 per cent. Short-term intentions to remain in displacement have also risen from 68 per cent to 75 per cent – pointing in the direction of deferring returns.

Individuals currently settled in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Najaf and Wassit are the most willing to return in the long run (over 90% of individuals in all areas); while the most significant inflows of IDPs in the short term are expected in Salah al-Din (67%, mostly to Baiji, Balad, Samarra and Tooz) and Diyala (74%, mostly to Al-Khalis, Al-Muqadadiya, Baladrooz and Khanaqin). IDPs settled in Missan, for the most part

hailing originally from Kadhimia in Baghdad Governorate and Al-Daur in Salah al-Din Governorate, also seem to be determined to go home in the short term (86%).

Stable relocation appears to be the prevalent intention of IDPs settled in Babylon (97%), Kerbala (64%), Kirkuk (63%), and southern governorates like Basrah (70%), Muthanna (93%) and Thi-Qar (59%). Pull factors – and first, security – seem to be at the root of the decision to stay in southern governorates, whereas push factors – that is, blocked returns, house destruction and lack of means – are primarily keeping IDPs in Babylon, Kerbala and Kirkuk. The presence of militias and/or a change in the ethno-religious composition at the location of origin are among the top three reasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing to resettle in Diyala, Salah al-Din and Sulaymaniyah.

Figure 6: Short- and long-term intentions of IDPs¹⁷



¹⁷ Data from IOM DTM Group Assessment Cycle I (September 2015) and ILA I, II, III, and IV utilized for short-term and long-term intentions analysis.


LENGTH AND GOVERNORATE OF DISPLACEMENT

Geographical proximity, together with length of displacement, are key factors in explaining intentions: the farther away people are from their communities and the longer displacement lasts, the less likely they are to return.


The long-term trend depicted in Figure 7 demonstrates how during the first six months of the crisis, most IDPs remained close to their location of origin (60% in June 2014). However, as violence continued to spread and conditions of living became harsher, IDPs were eventually pushed farther away – between June 2015 and June 2016, intra-governorate displacement reached the lowest point at around 37–38 per cent. The displacement triggered by the Mosul crisis caused a new increase in intra-governorate figures that peaked in June 2018 (48%). The figures of 2019 stand at 44 per cent, revealing a slight increase in extra-governorate displacement.

High shares of extra-governorate displacement – as in Anbar (77%) and Baghdad (99%) – are often associated with resettling in the KRI. Nearly 60 per cent of IDPs from Anbar and 90 per cent of those originally from Baghdad are currently living the governorates of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. Conversely, higher shares of intra-governorate displacement, and especially of intra-district displacement, as it is the case in Al-Musayab, Daquq, Falluja, Khanaqin, Kifri, Makmur, Tilkaif, Samara and Tooz, seem associated with the prevalence of community tensions in these areas which prevent returns. In Mosul, intra-district displacement (36%) is associated with movement east of the city to flee the significant devastation on the western side.¹⁸

Figure 7: Intra-governorate displacement, trend 2014–2019 and by governorate of origin



Map 6: Intra-district displacement




18 See IDPs Districts of Displacement Factsheets, IOM 2019. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/IDP_Districts_of_Displacement_Factsheets.pdf

As for the length of displacement – with the exception of Ninewa (32%) and Anbar (60%) – over 70 per cent of all IDPs hosted in other governorates have been displaced for nearly three years or more (prior to October 2016).

In Ninewa, most recent IDPs are settled in Al-Hamdaniya, Mosul and Tilkaif, while in Anbar they are settled in Falluja and Ramadi.

Map 7: Areas of protracted displacement (nearly three years or more)




OBSTACLES TO RETURN AND REASONS TO RESETTLE

In addition to duration of displacement and distance from location of origin, the obstacles that IDPs continue to face can explain both the difference between short- and long-term intentions (in the sense that households postpone their decision to return) and the increase in the share of

those willing to resettle. Three obstacles seem particularly important for households: the lack of job opportunities (73%), services (68%) and a residence to which to return at the location of origin (62%).


Figure 8: Obstacles to return



The long-term trend for a selected number of indicators is depicted in Figure 9. It can be observed that security/safety concerns are decreasing over time (from 81% in 2016 to 36% in 2019) due to the general improvement in security conditions. Households settled in KRI and Ninewa are those who mostly report pockets of instability at home. Fear of changed ethno-religious composition in areas of origin has also declined to 9 per cent, after peaking in 2018 at 27 per cent, and it is still currently reported in around 15 per cent of locations in Dahuk, Ninewa and Salah al-Din. The

idea that the lack of means to return and restart seems less of a barrier, having declined from 32 per cent to 17 per cent, with a higher prevalence among IDPs in Sulaymaniyah. This change is similar to the obstacle of blocked returns (from 26% to 5% in 2019), with a higher prevalence of this barrier reported among IDPs settled in Salah al-Din (26%). The housing damage indicator displays a slight improvement compared to last year (from 71% to 62%), although it is still the main obstacle to return for households settled in Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wasit.


Figure 9: Obstacles to return, trend 2016–2019, selected indicators only



Stable relocation appears to be the prevalent intention of IDPs settled in Babylon (97%), Kerbala (64%), Kirkuk (63%), and southern governorates like Basrah (70%), Muthanna (93%) and Thi-Qar (59%). Pull factors – first, security and then the presence of extended family and friends – seem to be at the root of the decision to stay in southern governorates, whereas push factors – that is, blocked

returns, house destruction and lack of means – are primarily keeping IDPs in Babylon, Kerbala and Kirkuk. Services and job opportunities are the most prevalent reasons to stay in the KRI, while the presence of militias and/or a change in the ethno-religious composition at the location of origin is among the top three reasons to stay for over half of IDPs willing to resettle in Diyala, Salah al-Din and Sulaymaniyah.

Figure 10: Reasons to remain



INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES AND LAND

This section analyses the access to and conditions of infrastructure and services, as well as agricultural land, in assessed locations across Iraq.¹⁹


To assess the state of infrastructure and services, a composite index was created taking into account access to 11 basic services: electricity, water, schools, health clinics and hospital, waste collection and latrines, market, office for the replacement of civil documentation and legal services for HLP issues. All indicators were weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location where the issue was reported. The assessed services/facilities, to be qualified as adequate, had to fulfil the following minimum standards:

- Electricity/water: at least 75 per cent of residents at the location were connected to the public electricity network/had tap water running.
- Primary and secondary school, health clinic, hospital, markets: functional and present within 5 km – hospital within 10 km.

- Legal services for HLP issues and offices for the replacement of civil documentation: functional and present within the district.

As shown in Figure 11, 87 per cent of IDPs and 79 per cent of returnees live in locations where the presence of most of the selected services or facilities is guaranteed, and around half have adequate access to all or nearly all (10–11 services or facilities). Inadequate access was assessed for around 15 per cent of returnees and 8 per cent of IDPs (only 6–7 services or facilities are guaranteed) and critical access for around five per cent of both IDPs and returnees (5 or fewer of the selected services or facilities). Critical districts include Karkh, Erbil, Al-Hindiya, Najaf, Tikrit and Tooz (for IDPs); Makmur, Al-Hawiga, Samarra, Al Shirqat, Telafar, Tilkaif and Mosul (for returnees); and Falluja, Abu Ghraib, Mahmoudiya and Sinjar for both populations.

Figure 11. Number of selected services or facilities per location (0 - none of the services or facilities are present to 11 - all services or facilities are present in location)



Legal assistance for the solution of HLP issues is the least accessible service in all assessed locations, and only 49 per cent of IDPs and 32 per cent of returnees live in locations where it is present within the district. Around 95 per cent of returnees and/or IDPs living in Babylon, Basrah, Diyala, Erbil, Kerbala, Missan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadissiya and south Salah al-Din cannot access them within the district. Health is the second critical service – in particular access to hospital – with as much as 18 per cent of IDPs and 36 per cent of returnees living in locations where there is no functional hospital within 10 km. Access to hospital is particularly low in Ninewa (29%)

and Kirkuk (39%). However, the presence of at least one health clinic within 5 km is more common – 93 per cent and 89 per cent for IDPs and returnees respectively and around 65 per cent in both Ninewa and Kirkuk.

Access to waste management is around 70 per cent overall; however, this figure is lower in Kirkuk (38%). Access to offices for the replacement of civil documentation currently stands at 81 per cent, Najaf being the only location with virtually no access (5%). Access to a functional market stands at 87 per cent (with lowest figures in Kirkuk at 60%).

¹⁹ Agricultural damage was assessed in rural locations only (1,723 locations).

Access to latrines is virtually universal (99%), as is access to primary school – functional schools are available within 5 km for both IDPs and returnees (97% and 99% respectively). Access to secondary school is slightly more challenging (93% both) – especially in Najaf (55%), Ninewa (66%) and Kirkuk (79%).

Around 70 per cent of households live in locations where most of the population (75% or more) have electricity (79% of IDPs and 70% of returnees); however, access drops significantly in the governorates of Qadissiya (31%), Kirkuk (23%) and Wassit (6%). In Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala,

Muthanna, Najaf and Salah al-Din, around 50–60 per cent of IDPs and returnees live in locations where 75 per cent of the population have access to electricity.

Overall, tap water is available to over three fourths of residents in locations where respectively 76 per cent of IDPs and 55 per cent of returnees live, ranging from of 11 per cent in Wassit to 100 per cent in Missan. Again, the provision of tap water is quite variable and nearly universal only in Babylon, Basrah, Dahuk, Missan, Sulaymaniyah and Thi-Qar.

Figure 12: Accessible and usable land (% of IDPs living at the location)





Figure 13: Accessible and usable land (% of returnee locations only)



As for agriculture, arable and grazing lands are safely accessible and usable in nearly all locations (91%). Only in Basrah, arable and grazing land in around 70 per cent of locations is currently not used, possibly due to lack of water – irrigation water supply is lacking in 77 per cent of locations. Lack of usage was also reported in between 10 and 15 per cent of locations in Anbar, Babylon, Erbil and Najaf, though in this case contamination and/or damage may be the reason for poor usage rather than lack of water. Land

is accessible but not usable due to lack of money and/or people in around six per cent of locations overall and was reported more often than average in returnee locations of the three governorates of Anbar (21%), Baghdad (15%) and Erbil (15%). Around ten per cent of returnee locations in Salah al-Din Governorate reported issue with accessibility due to either lack of irrigation/damage (4%) and/or lack of money/people (5%).

LIVING CONDITIONS


This section is dedicated to the living conditions of IDPs and returnees with regards to the fulfilment of basic needs including shelter, food and non-food items (NFIs), drinking water, education, health, livelihood/employment, replacement of civil documentation, access to solutions for displacement-related rights violations and reunification with family members separated during displacement.

After a brief introduction, where concerns for IDPs and returnees are compared at overall level, needs are reviewed one by one and compared with other relevant indicators. Figures are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location.

Basic needs continue to be regarded as more urgent than recovery needs by both IDPs and returnees. More specifically, access to employment/livelihood opportunities continues to

be the main need in locations where around 70 per cent of both IDPs and returnees reside. In addition, nearly half of IDPs live in locations where they have difficulties accessing adequate housing/shelter (42%) and NFIs (47%), and around 60 per cent of returnees live in locations where they need health services. Among recovery needs, access to a solution for displacement-related rights violations appears to be the most urgent for both populations (around 15%).

Figure 14: Basic and recovery needs for IDPs and returnees




EMPLOYMENT/LIVELIHOODS

A TOP NEED FOR 
70% IDPs
71% Returnees

Around 70 per cent of returnees and IDPs are currently living in locations where access to employment/livelihoods was cited among the top three concerns – with the only exceptions of Anbar, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala and Sulaymaniyah governorates for IDPs, and Anbar and Erbil for returnees. Over 80 per cent of both IDPs and returnees live in locations where the availability of jobs is ‘insufficient’ and around half in locations where most

individuals ‘are not economically active’. The issue of working minors often goes together with that of unemployment, especially in the case of IDPs; it was reported more often than usual in Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Wassit. It is also worth noting that around 15 per cent of returnees live in locations where the lack of training/vocational centres/programmes to support business start-up is an issue, with peaks of 27 per cent in Anbar.


Figure 15: Employment issues (% of IDPs and returnees)




Although returnees' 'inactivity' rates – that is, the percentage of population living in locations where most individuals are not economically active – seem higher than those of IDPs (57% versus 43%), and despite the fact that both populations need to rely on multiple income sources to guarantee their subsistence, when employed, returnees tend to be engaged in more stable and remunerating activities than IDPs. The returnees' most important income source is the public sector (91% versus 41% for IDPs), whereas IDPs tend to rely on the informal sector (78% versus 55% for returnees), which

only guarantees unstable and low-income jobs. In Babylon, Basrah, Diyala, Kerbala, Kirkuk and Missan, 90 per cent of households live in locations where inconsistent labour is one of the main income sources. Barriers to employment were more frequently reported in IDPs' locations (25% versus 14% for returnees), especially in Babylon, Dahuk, Thi-Qar and Salah-al-Din. IDPs are also more dependent on savings (12% versus 2%) and/or remittances from family/friends (17% versus 2%) than returnees.

Figure 16: Main sources of income (% of IDPs and returnees)




HEALTH

A TOP NEED FOR  Health is the second most reported need of returnees, mentioned in locations where around 60 per cent of returnees live (versus around 40% of IDPs). Indeed, returnees seem to experience more challenges in accessing facilities, especially hospitals (36% versus 18% for IDPs). However, if indicators on quality are compared, IDPs experience poorer services. Overall, high costs (60%) and poor quality (22%) were reported more

39% IDPs
61% Returnees

often for IDPs than returnees (12% and 13% respectively). In Qadissiya, Missan, Basrah, Baghdad and Sulaymaniyah, nearly all IDPs live in locations where the price of visits/medicines/treatment is “too expensive”; in Kerbala 21 per cent of IDPs live in locations that lack rehabilitation services (including psychosocial support). As for returnees, health was deemed “too expensive” in Kirkuk and Salah al-Din (around 30%), and of “poor quality” in Ninewa (25%).

Figure 17: Health issues (% of IDPs and returnees)




EDUCATION

A TOP NEED FOR 
9% IDPs
21% Returnees

Access to education also appears to be more of an issue for returnees: 21 per cent of returnees live in locations where it was mentioned among top three needs (versus 9% of IDPs), with a peak of 37 per cent among households who regained their location of origin in Kirkuk.


Map 8: Districts where IDPs and/or returnees report education access issues



The most reported issue appears to be the lack of schools (45%) and/or certified teachers (32%) – with peaks in Baghdad (65% and 72% respectively). Nonetheless, it is worth noting that attendance rates are higher for returnees, suggesting that IDPs may not be choosing education simply because employment, food and shelter were still unsatisfied and more pressing issues than education (response options could only include three). Nearly one third of IDPs live in locations where less than 75 per cent of children are

attending primary school (versus 11% of returnees) and nearly half in locations where less than 75 per cent of children are attending secondary school (versus 34%). Access in Najaf is particularly challenging: 52 per cent of IDPs live in locations where education was mentioned among top three needs, 73 per cent in locations lacking certified teachers and 3 per cent in locations where there are still language barriers (for example as is sometimes the case with Turkmen Shia populations).

Figure 18: Education issues (% of IDPs and returnees)




FOOD

A TOP NEED FOR 
32% IDPs | **21%** Returnees

Although the crisis officially ended in December 2017, around 30 per cent of IDPs and around 20 per cent of returnees still live in locations where access to food was mentioned among top three needs – with peaks of 99 per cent in Sulaymaniyah and 53 per cent in Baghdad (for IDPs) and 33 per cent in Anbar (for returnees). High prices are the main issue for both populations (66%

and 46% respectively), which in turn impact on their ability to access food. Around half of returnees live in locations where ‘some individuals are in need of food’ – with peaks in Salah al-Din (50%), Diyala (64%) and Anbar (77%) – and two per cent in locations where ‘a lot of individuals are in need of food’. The respective figures for IDPs are 30 per cent and 1 per cent.

Figure 19: Food issues (% of IDPs and returnees)




DRINKING WATER



Around 25 per cent of returnees versus around 10 per cent of IDPs live in locations where access to water was mentioned among top three needs.


Map 9: Districts with percentages of locations without adequate water supply



Over one third of returnees (35%) live in locations where less than 75 per cent of households have water (versus 24% of IDPs) and nearly half live in locations where there are water-source issues related to taste, colour and smell (versus 26% of IDPs). In Diyala, around 70 per cent of returnees live in locations where they have to occasionally rely on water trucking, and nearly all of returnees live in locations reporting

water-source issues. Around 40 per cent of returnees in Salah al-Din live in locations affected by inconsistent/sporadic supply. As for IDPs, water source-related issues were reported more often in Anbar, Baghdad, Diyala, Muthanna and Ninewa (figures between 51% and 72%), while low access was reported in Anbar, Kirkuk, Muthanna, Qadissiya, Salah al-Din and Wassit (figures between 50% and 88%).

Figure 20: Drinking water issues (% of IDPs and returnees)




SHELTER, RESIDENTIAL DAMAGE AND HOUSING, LAND AND PROPERTY ISSUES²⁰

Housing remains a pressing issue for IDPs – 42 per cent live in locations where it was mentioned among the top three needs, with no change compared to May 2018. Eight per cent of displaced households remain settled in critical shelter arrangements (16% in 2016) while the share of households living in camps is comparatively increasing each year (from 17% in 2016 to 32% in 2019). In Anbar, Ninewa and Dahuk, around one in two households is settled in camps. In Anbar, Kerbala, Qadissiya and Salah al-Din, around one in five households is living in critical shelters – in Anbar mostly in informal settlements, in Salah al-Din abandoned/unfinished buildings and in Kerbala and Qadissiya religious


buildings. Country-wide, one in ten households is hosted by other households, with higher prevalence in Anbar, Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, Missan, Muthanna, Qadissiya and Thi-Qar (figures between 17% and 39%). In fact, this may be a solution to deal with the most pressing shelter issue of IDPs: the high cost of housing (65% of IDPs live in locations where this is an issue). Rent assistance was deemed quite urgent in Anbar, Najaf, Salah al-Din and, particularly, Erbil (28%), while apparently both evictions and unequal access to shelter are no longer an issue in these locations.

²⁰ The section on shelter includes camp population and is based on information gathered from the IDPs and Returnee Master List 110. For trend, see ML May 2018, May 2017 and May 2016.

Figure 21: Shelter type, % of IDPs (2019 and trend)




Map 10: Proportion of IDP families living in critical shelters per district




The share of households able to return to their habitual residence also shows an upward trend since May 2017 (from 89% to 98% in 2019). Only in Anbar and Salah-al-Din around five per cent of households were not able to regain their residence and are mostly living in rented housing. It should also be noted that around three per cent

of households are back in their original residence, however these residences may be in poor condition or damaged.

Figure 22: Shelter type, % of returnees (2019 and trend)




Map 11: Proportion of returnees in habitual residences in good conditions per district



The increase in the share of households able to regain their habitual residence is linked to reconstruction efforts. Currently, extensive damage and destruction (over three fourths of houses are heavily damaged or destroyed) was assessed in only around three per cent of locations countrywide – with peaks in Khanaqin (20%), Daquq (14%), Sinjar (13%), Tilkaif (16%) and Balad (27%). Nevertheless,

reconstruction efforts are ongoing – only in 30 per cent of locations countrywide none or very few of the houses are being reconstructed/rehabilitated. Critical districts, where rehabilitation is only very slowly taking place, include Al-Rutba, Heet, Ra’ua and Dabes, Ana, Khanaqin, Al-Hawiga, Al-Hamdaniya, Hatra and Sinjar.

Map 12: Destroyed houses and the status of reconstruction per district of return



SECURITY, SAFETY AND SOCIAL COHESION

This section assesses the level of security, safety and social cohesion in IDP and returnee locations across Iraq. Particular attention was given to the factors that can ensure a smooth reintegration of returnees into society, both at collective and individual level – such as access to reconciliation programmes and restoration of property, as well as the relationship between different groups of the population, and confidence in security. All indicators are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living where the issue was reported.

SECURITY INCIDENTS


Personal safety continues to be the main concern in daily life, and the occurrence of petty crimes was assessed countrywide in around one fourth of locations (23%). In addition, in around 10 per cent of locations, mostly in the eight governorates of origin of IDPs, there was evidence of other security incidents that can be associated with the resurgence of ISIL asymmetric warfare.²¹ More specifically, suicide attacks were reported in a few locations: Al-Hawiga, Kirkuk, Mosul, Sinjar, Balad and Samarra; kidnappings in Falluja, Al-Musayab, Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Karkh, Mahmoudiya, Ba'quba, Kerbala, Mosul, Baiji, Balad and Samarra; fire attacks in Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Al-Khalis, Al-Muqdadia, Ba'quba,

Al-Hawiga, Kirkuk, Sinjar, Al-Shirqat, Baiji, Balad, Samarra, Tikrit and Tooz. Evidence of recruiting by militias and/or terrorist groups was also reported in nearly all districts of Salah al-Din Governorate and in Mosul, Sinjar, Al-Muqdadia, Ba'quba and Khanaqin. In seven per cent of locations in Salah al-Din Governorate, schools are reportedly used by armed groups.

Explosive devices and landmines are also a safety concern and incidents were reported in two per cent of locations, primarily in Falluja, Al-Muqdadia, Ba'quba, Makhmur, Al-Hawiga, Kirkuk, Mosul, Telafar, Balad, Samarra and Tooz.

²¹ Since the end of the war in December 2017, ISIL has moved back into the shadows and restarted asymmetric warfare across Iraq. Areas that should be monitored for signs of ISIL's rebirth include Anbar's porous borders with the Syrian Arab Republic, the hilly region between the governorates of Salah al Din, Diyala, Kirkuk and Ninewa and, in general, areas with a lack of a strong nation-State governance – such as 'disputed areas' and/or areas with a tribal or warlord type of governance. Security incidents have been reported, as well as recruiting into armed groups and kidnappings as evidence of 're-supply' activities. See UNAMI, security briefs.

Figure 23: Security incidents (% of locations, overall and by governorate of return)




INTERGROUP FEELINGS, PERCEPTION OF SECURITY AND CIVIC LIFE SATISFACTION

In line with previous assessments, the relationship between different population groups (IDPs, returnees and stayers) appears positive and stable and, overall, the presence of physical incidents, threats and, in general, mistrust was reported only occasionally in less than five per cent of locations across Iraq.²² Both IDPs and returnees feel welcome at the location where they are currently living, with only very few locations²³ reporting serious issues such as physical attacks (1% for IDPs and 2% for returnees).

Countrywide, improved safety and security was mentioned among the top three needs in only 2 per cent of returnee locations and 0.1 per cent of IDP locations – with peaks of around 10 per cent in returnee locations in the two governorates of Kirkuk and Salah al-Din. It is worth noting that, given that only three needs were selected, safety/security may have been underreported or not included simply because other basic needs were more pressing.

Figure 24: Intergroup feelings and need of improved security (% of population living at the location where the issue was reported)




22 Although this finding is consistent with previous assessment, it is worth observing that social cohesion is very hard to measure and it is highly likely to be under-reported. The reasons for these complex social cohesion-linked issues relate not only to the ISIL conflict, but deeper held grievances and root causes of conflict that have plagued Iraq prior to and after 2003. See *Reasons to remain, Categorizing Protracted displacement in Iraq*, IOM DTM Iraq, Returns Working Group Iraq and Social Inquiry, November 2011. Available online at http://iraqdtm.iom.int/LastDTMRound/IOM%20RWG%20SI%20Categorizing%20Protracted%20Displacement%20in%20Iraq_November%202011.pdf.

23 These include, for returnees, locations in the districts of Falluja, Mahmoudiya, Al-Muqaddiya, Sinjar, Telafar, Tikrit and Kirkuk. For IDPs, the occurrence of physical attacks was reported in locations within the districts of Falluja, Adhama, Al Resafa, Thawra2, Ba'quba, Shaqlawa, Soran, Ain Al-Tamur, Kerbala and Kut.

Despite an overall picture of smooth coexistence, households seem very concerned about the resurgence of ISIL and about 21 per cent of IDPs and 55 per cent of returnees live in locations where the issue was mentioned, with peaks in Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa and, particularly, Salah al-Din. Around one fourth of returnees in Anbar and Salah al-Din live in

locations where fear of revenge was also reported. Fear of ethno-religious tensions seems less common among both populations of IDPs and returnees (6% and 9% respectively); however, between one third and half of the displaced households settled in Salah al-Din, Thi-Qar and Wassit live in locations where the issue was mentioned.


Figure 25: Perceptions of security (% of returnees living in the location where the issue was reported)



Biased access to resources appears to be another issue that impacts the living conditions of those who are still displaced and may affect the quality of the reintegration process too. Overall, 14 per cent of returnees and 25 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favouritism regarding employment was reported; 8 per cent of returnees and 34 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favouritism regarding political representation was reported. Slightly higher percentages of IDPs also live in locations reporting favouritism in accessing

aid (9% versus 7% of returnees) and services (5% versus 2%), as well as equal participation in public affairs among the top three needs (1.0% versus 0.3%). Favouritism in political representation appears to be the most important issue among IDPs living in Anbar, Babylon, Dahuk, Najaf and Qadissiya (figures range between 58% in Najaf and 100% in Dahuk) and households returned to Anbar and Salah-al Din (around 15% in both governorates).

Figure 26: Discrimination issues (% of IDPs and returnees living in locations where the issue was reported)




DOCUMENTATION AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES

Practices to facilitate the reconciliation process such as programmes for the restoration of housing, land and property, offices for the replacement of civil documentation and reporting displacement-related violations are additional important factors that can influence the willingness of IDPs to return as well as the success of their reintegration process. Countrywide, around 15 per cent of both IDPs and returnees live in locations where access to solutions for displacement-related violations was mentioned among top three needs – with peaks of 38 per cent in Diyala (for returnees) and 30 per cent in Babylon (for IDPs). The need

for the replacement of personal documentation was also reported in around 10 per cent of IDP locations, primarily in Erbil and Kerbala (1% of returnee locations).

Overall, nearly 70 per cent of returnees and also 51 per cent of IDPs live in districts where legal services are not available; over one third cannot live in districts where courts are not present, and 27 per cent of IDPs and 6 per cent of returnees live in districts where offices for the replacement of civil documentation are not present.

Figure 27: Legal issues (% of IDPs and returnees living in the location where the issue was reported)




Compared to May 2018, the situation regarding HLP issues appears to have improved: ownership issues were mentioned in only about one per cent of locations, the majority of which are in Ninewa and Salah al-Din²⁴ (it was around 10% in 2018), with only a few additional locations in Diyala and Anbar. In most cases, returnees either never had the documents to prove ownership (68%) or their documents are not recognized by current authorities (6%). This is the case in Sinjar, Telafar, Tikrit and Tooz. In one location of Balad (Salah al-Din), the Government is restricting households from acquiring and renewing legal ownership.

Another reported vulnerability that might affect the possibility of smooth reintegration into society is the lack of civil documentation. This issue was not reported as

affecting “most individuals” in any location. However, in around 15 per cent of locations (588 locations for IDPs and 197 for returnees) there was evidence that a “few individuals lack civil documentation” and in around 10 per cent of locations, children born during displacement are missing birth certificates.²⁵

Higher figures were found in Kerbala and Kirkuk (among IDPs) and Anbar and Salah al-Din (among both IDPs and returnees). The lack of civil documentation primarily affects freedom of movement (reported at around 30%). Access to basic services appears to be more challenging for IDPs (24% versus 17% of returnees), whereas returnees missing documents are at a higher risk of arrest (17% versus 12% of IDPs).

Figure 28: Consequences of not having documents (% of locations where the issue was reported)



24 There is still evidence of occupied residences in a few locations of Ninewa (in the districts of Mosul, Sinjar and Telafar) and Salah al-Din (in the districts of Al-Shirqat, Balad, Samarra, Tikrit and Tooz).

25 According to the report, 'Barriers from Birth' by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) an estimated 45,000 children, most of whom were born in areas controlled by the Islamic State (IS) group, lack valid civil documentation since it is either lost/never obtained or their birth certificates were issued by IS and are not recognized by the government. Without valid documents, children are barred from attending school and denied access to health care. According to NRC, obtaining documentation for children from households accused of IS affiliation is “nearly impossible”. NRC receives an average of 170 requests for help each month involving cases of unregistered/undocumented children and their number is likely to increase with the expected return of more than 30,000 Iraqis from the Syrian Arab Republic. Available online at www.unhcr.org/refugeebrief/the-refugee-brief-1-may-2019/

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CHANGE AND COMPOSITION

This section covers issues related to the ethno-religious composition of returnees and IDPs and the change in the majoritarian ethno-religious groups.

A sub-analysis on main groups is presented – Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Turkmen Sunnis, Yazidis, Kurds (Shias and Sunnis), Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais) – to outline common characteristics

with regard to shelter, intentions, obstacles and reasons to return. Indicators are presented as percentage of locations where the issue was reported or are weighted with the number of IDPs and returnees living at the location.

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CHANGE AND COMPOSITION

One of the most visible change since 2014²⁶ has been the loss of many Sunni majority areas in the three governorates of Baghdad, Basrah and Diyala, that have become either Shia majority or mixed Shia-Sunni areas, mainly Arab in Baghdad and Basrah, and Kurds in Diyala. For instance, in the single district of Khanaqin, Arab Sunni majority locations decreased from 81 to 73 (and Kurd Sunnis from 20 to 17) since the start of the crisis. In Babylon Governorate too, Arab Sunni-Shia mixed towns like Jurf al-Sakhr and Musayab have become totally Shia by the end of 2014 and no returns have been recorded until June 2019.²⁷ Conversely, the presence of Arab Sunnis in the KRI has increased: in Sulaymaniyah Governorate, Arab Sunni majority locations went from 2 to 25 since 2014.

The extent of the ethno-religious change in mixed population areas, where diverse population groups were living before the 2014 crisis, is more difficult to assess due to the fact that the ILA collects information only on the two prevalent ethno-religious groups. Still, a decrease in the presence of Assyrian Christians in previously mixed areas of Ninewa Governorate was recorded, together with a decrease in the number of mixed Kurdish Sunni, Yazidi and Shabak Sunni and Shia locations in the districts of Mosul, Sinjar and Telafer. Few mixed Turkmen Sunni areas in Diyala no longer exist, while Turkmen (both Sunnis and Shias) seem to have reinforced their presence in the Kirkuk region.

The change in the ethno-religious composition can be linked with both the tendency of IDPs to ‘cluster’ in displacement

and their fear to return to places where their ethno-religious group is in the minority, particularly if a change in the population composition occurred as a result of conflict in their places of origin. These behaviours are clearly detectable if locations are analysed for ethno-religious homogeneity. At least three fourths of returnee locations fall in the category of ‘homogeneous’ locations, i.e. at least 60 per cent of the population belongs to one of the six main ethno-religious groups.²⁸ As for IDPs, the same figure was found with regard to Arab Sunnis, Kurds (Shias and Sunnis), Yazidis, Arab Shias, and Turkmen Shias. As for Turkmen Sunnis and ‘other minorities’ homogeneous locations stand respectively at 21 per cent and 36 per cent.

Geographical patterns emerge when observing the ethno-religious affiliation of current IDPs. Arab Sunnis can be found in north-central areas (64%) and KRI (36%); Arab Shias are in Kerbala (30%), Najaf (17%) and other mixed Shia-Sunni governorates (such as Baghdad and Salah al-Din) – just like Turkmen Shias (38% in Kerbala and 30% in Najaf). Nearly all Kurdish Sunnis are in the KRI (76%) or in Ninewa (21%), and nearly all Turkmen Sunnis are in Ninewa (63%) or Salah al-Din (20%). Most Yazidis are in Dahuk (59%) and the remaining share in Ninewa (36%) or other KRI governorates (5%); and the same goes for other minorities, such as Christians and Shabak Shias, with some also resettling in Wassit (23%) and Kerbala (9%). Nearly 90 per cent of Shabak Sunnis are currently living in Ninewa, together with 65 per cent of Kakais.

²⁶ It is not an easy task to find reliable data on the ethnic composition of Iraq since religion and ethnicity often coincide and religious rivalries have often taken a violent form, hence keeping information secret was necessary for security and survival. Information on prior and current ethno-religious composition obtained from ILA dataset has been complemented with information based on the shape file of Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) and ethno-religious maps by Michael Izady based on the adjusted population estimates at district level provided in 2014 by the Iraqi Government. See *Ethno-Religious groups and displacement in Iraq, 2nd Report, DTM IOM 2016; Integrated Location Assessment II and III, IOM DTM 2017 and 2018*; and http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Iraq_Ethnic_Shift_1947-2017_Jg.png.

²⁷ For further details, refer to RWG’s “Areas of no Return Insight Report #1: Babylon Focus on Jurf Al Sakhar”.


²⁸ Arab Sunnis, Turkmen, Yazidis, Kurdish, Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais).

ETHNO-RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND MAIN ISSUES²⁹

The sub-analysis conducted on main ethno-religious group of the IDP population shows that Arab Sunnis have been displaced throughout the whole crisis, and mostly between June 2014 and June 2016. Nearly all minorities fled during the summer of 2014 – Turkmen Shias between June and

July, Christians, Kakais and Shabaks (Shia and Sunni) between June and August and Yazidis in August. Movements of the Kurdish minority can be associated either with the summer 2014 waves or with movements in the disputed territories, following the Peshmerga handover in late 2017.

Figure 29: Period of displacement by main ethno-religious group




²⁹ The analysis was conducted on the displaced and returnee population for the following ethno-religious groups: Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Turkmen Sunnis, Yazidis, Arab Shias, Kurdish (Sunnis and Shia) and other minorities (including Christians, Kakais and Shabaks). Only prevalent locations, i.e. locations where at least 60% of the population belongs to a specific ethno-religious group were selected for the analysis. A strong homogeneity was detected for returnees, since between three fourths and nearly all locations host a prevalent ethno-religious group. As for IDPs, the same threshold applies to Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Kurdish, Yazidis and Arab Shias. Prevalent locations for 'other minorities' are around one third, thus findings should be handled with greater care, while Turkmen Sunnis were excluded from the analysis since only four prevalent locations were found.

Among households still in displacement, Arab Sunnis seem the most determined to return home in the short term (it is their main intention in as much as 30 per cent of locations), whereas in the long term their intent to regain the location of origin aligns more or less with that of other ethno-religious groups (ranging between 60% and 73% of locations). The only exception is represented by Arab Shias: in 42 per cent of prevalent locations they seem willing to

locally (and voluntarily) integrate, in 19 per cent they may be forced to do so. Voluntary integration is higher than the average also among Turkmen Shias (28%) and Kurds (32%); whereas in around 20 per cent of Arab Sunni locations involuntary resettlement may be the only option. Yazidis and other minorities are the only groups who may still be willing to leave the country (around 2% of locations).


Figure 30: Long-term intentions by main ethno-religious group



House damage/destruction, lack of jobs and basic services are the most reported obstacles to return for Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Arab Shias and other minorities – figures range between 29 per cent to 85 per cent. These three issues are common also among Kurds and Yazidis, together with the lack of security/safety at origin (66% and 77% respectively), a concern they share with other minorities (55%). Lack of means to return and restart was mentioned in around one in four prevalent locations of

Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias and Arab Shias; and fear as a result of the ethno-religious change at origin in 15–20 per cent of prevalent locations of Kurdish, Arab Shias and other minorities. It is worth noting that Arab Shias were the most likely to mention fear to lose humanitarian aid (16%), whereas the issue of blocked returns was reported only in around 10 per cent of Arab Sunnis’ prevalent locations – and 1 per cent of Yazidis’ prevalent locations.


Figure 31: Obstacles to return by main ethno-religious group (% of location)



In addition to the perceived safety of the current location, house damage/destruction and lack of jobs at origin, in many cases, reasons to relocate match the severity of obstacles reported by each respective ethno-religious group. Arab Sunnis willing to resettle again point out the issue of blocked return (22% of prevalent locations); while Turkmen Shias – and also other minorities – the lack of means to return and restart (around 50%). A key factor for Arab Shias appears

to be the presence of extended family/relatives and friends (51%), while Yazidis seem more willing to resettle in areas where they share the same religious, linguistic or ethnic composition (38%). In five per cent of prevalent locations where other minorities are currently living, a main reason to resettle is the fact that most family/relatives/friends have left the location of origin due to the crisis.


Figure 32: Reasons to relocate by main ethno-religious group (% of location)



Ethno-religious groups also tend to display specific characteristics with the regard to the shelter they are currently settled in. Most households across all groups, except Yazidis, tend to live in rented accommodations. Arab Shias are the most likely to be hosted (24%, which matches with their likelihood to report the presence of extended

family at the location of displacement); Turkmen Shias the most likely to own their property (10%) and Yazidis to be living in critical shelters (43%) or to be hosted (40%). Around 15 per cent of Turkmen Shias are also settled in critical shelters – mainly religious building – which can be explained by their presence in Najaf and Kerbala.


Figure 33: Shelter by main ethno-religious group (% of out of camp IDPs)



As for returnees, recent returnees are mainly Turkmen Shias (64% of Sunnis and 48% of Shias regained their location of origin in 2018-9). Conversely, all returns of Arab Shias and nearly all of Yazidis occurred in the early biennial 2015-6.

2017 was the main year of returns for all other groups and in particular for other minorities, such as Christians, Kakais and Shabaks (96%).


Figure 34: Year of return by main ethno-religious group



Nearly all returnee households, regardless of ethno-religious affiliation, have returned to their habitual residence (figures range between 93% and 100%). It is worth noting that Arab Sunnis, Yazidis and Turkmen Sunnis are the most likely to live in shelters in poor conditions (3–5%). In fact, the availability of housing at the location of origin – together with the safety of the location – is a main and common reason to return to all ethno-religious groups. As for specific reasons, the emotional desire to return together with a failed attempt to integrate in displacement were key in Yazidis

prevalent locations (93% and 56% of locations). Arab Shias were more likely to have benefitted of both encouragement from religious/community leaders (30%) and incentives by humanitarian actors (22%), while many returns of Turkmen Sunnis were pushed either by a worsening of their conditions at the location of displacement (52%) and/or the lack of means (20%). Lack of means as a main reason to return was also mentioned more often by Arab Sunnis and other minorities (around 25% both).

Figure 35: Reason to return by main ethno-religious group (% of location)



CONCLUSION

Two years after ISIL's military defeat, nearly four million and a half of those internally displaced since January 2014 have returned to their location of origin. Refugees from abroad have also started returning from neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey, as well as from more distant countries, such as Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. Still, within the time interval between ILA III (May 2018) and ILA IV (June 2019), the pace of return, defined as the percentage change in the number of returns, has greatly slowed, leaving 1.61 million people in displacement.³⁰

Around three fourths of the remaining IDPs are willing to return in the long term, and their intentions are largely consistent with May 2018 findings.³¹ However, it appears that more IDPs may be deferring their return – short-term intentions to stay have risen from 68 to 75 per cent – or considering permanent relocation as an alternative – the share of those willing to locally integrate has also slightly risen from 22 to 25 per cent.

Three obstacles continue to be particularly important for displaced households: the lack of job/livelihood opportunities (73%), services (68%) and a residence to return to (62%). Even if security/safety concerns have largely decreased over time (from 81% in 2016 to 36% in 2019), insecurity remains a strong barrier to return in some specific more volatile areas. In 9% of locations where the main intention is to return, IDPs fear ethno-religious change at the location of origin and in 5% of locations, IDPs are reportedly prevented from returning due to a lack documentation or discrimination .

The most 'critical' districts – those reporting no or few returns³² – include Al-Musayab and Hilla in Babylon Governorate, Adhamia, Al-Resafa, Karkh and Mada'in in Baghdad Governorate, Baladrooz and Ba'quba in Diyala Governorate, Al Ba'aj, Hatra and Sinjar in Ninewa Governorate and Al-Thetar and Tooz in Salah al-Din Governorate. According to the latest round of the Return Index, reconciliation is the indicator most correlated with lack of returns on the scale measuring social cohesion and safety perceptions (Scale 2).³³ The majority of locations where the need for reconciliation was reported are indeed

in the four above-mentioned governorates of Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. These findings are further corroborated when analysing locations for ethno-religious homogeneity. At least three fourths of returnee locations can be tagged as "homogeneous" – i.e. at least 60% of the population belongs to one of the six main ethno-religious groups, namely Arab Sunnis, Turkmen Shias, Yazidis, Kurds, Arab Shias and other minorities (including Christians, Shabaks and Kakais) – showing that the return of IDPs to formerly mixed areas is more difficult.

On the other hand, data indicate that overall conditions across Iraq are improving. Most indicators have risen since ILA III – and particularly services and infrastructure-related indicators. At country level, 87 per cent of IDPs and 79 per cent of returnees live in locations where the presence of most of the key services or facilities is guaranteed, and around half have adequate access to all or nearly all.³⁴ Critical access, where only five or less services or facilities are guaranteed, was observed in around five per cent of locations. Critical districts include Karkh, Erbil, Al-Hindiya, Najaf, Tikrit and Tooz (for IDPs); Makmur, Al-Hawiga, Samarra, Al Shirqat, Telafar, Tilkaif and Mosul (for returnees); and Falluja, Abu Ghraib, Mahmoudiya and Sinjar (for both).

The improvement in services and infrastructure is reflected in the assessment of main needs – these needs are generally less reported as compared to ILA III. Access to employment/livelihood opportunities, though less pressing (70% in ILA IV, 93% in ILA III), continues to be the main concern of IDPs because they tend to be employed mostly in the informal sector and, compared to returnees, are more likely to report barriers to employment (25% vs. 14%), as well as dependence on savings (12% vs. 2%) and/or remittances from family/friends (17% vs. 2%). Around 30 per cent of IDPs (and around 20% of returnees) live in locations where access to food was mentioned among top three needs – it was 51% (and 40% respectively) in May 2018. As for housing, 42 per cent of IDPs live in locations where it was mentioned among the top three needs. It is worth noting that the proportion of IDPs settled in critical shelters

30 The number of IDPs stands at 1,444,500 individuals as of October 2019, DTM IOM Master List 112. Between ILA II (May 2017) and ILA (III) May 2018 it peaked reaching 133 per cent, whereas between ILA III and ILA IV (June 2019) it barely reached 10 per cent - in the three governorates of Anbar, Diyala and Erbil, returns increased by only five per cent or less.

31 In 1,659 locations hosting 74% of current IDPs, most individuals are willing to return in the long term (after six months or more); it was 74% in ILA III (May 2018) as well.

32 Findings were rated according to rates of return – the proportion of returnees originally from a governorate or district to the total number of returnees and IDPs originally from the same governorate or district. 'Few', in this regard, means that less than 50% of the original IDPs have regained their location of origin.

33 See: *The Growing Role of Reconciliation in Return Movements: Snapshots from the Return Index, November 2019, IOM Iraq.*

34 To assess the state of infrastructure and services, a composite index was created taking into account access to eleven basic services: electricity, water, schools, health clinics and hospital, waste collection and latrines, market, office for the replacement of civil documentation and legal services for housing, land and property (HLP) issues. For further details, refer to the "Infrastructure, Services and Land" section of the report.

continues to drop (from 16% in 2016 to 8% in 2019) in comparison to that settled in camps (from 12% in 2016 to 32% in 2019). At the same time, the share of returnees regaining their habitual residence has increased from 89 per cent in 2017 to 98 per cent in 2019. The increase in the share of households able to regain their habitual residence is linked to reconstruction efforts. Extensive damage and destruction (over three fourths of houses are heavily damaged or destroyed) was assessed in only around three per cent of locations country-wide – with peaks in Khanaqin (20%), Daquq (14%), Sinjar (13%), Tilkaif (16%) and Balad (27%). Reconstruction efforts are ongoing – only in 30 per cent of locations country-wide none or very few of the houses are being reconstructed/rehabilitated.

Finally, when looking at social cohesion, the relationship between different population groups (IDPs, returnees and stayers) appears to be positive and stable – overall, the presence of physical incidents, threats and mistrust in general was reported only occasionally in fewer than five per cent of locations across Iraq.³⁵ The issue of biased access to resources has also largely improved: overall between 8 per cent and 14 per cent of returnees and between 25 per cent and 34 per cent of IDPs live in locations where favouritism regarding employment and political representation was reported (vs. 45% of returnees and 50% of IDPs in May 2018).

³⁵ Although this finding is consistent with previous surveys, it is worth observing that social cohesion is very hard to measure and it is highly likely to be under-reported. See section on intergroup feelings, perception of security and civic life satisfaction.

ANNEX

Table 1: IDPs and returnees by governorate and main indicators

GOVERNORATE	LOCATIONS WITH					IDPs				RETURNEES			
	IDPs	Returnees	Returnees from abroad	IDPs + Returnees	Total	Individuals	% change since May 2018	% of total	IDPs in camps	Individuals	% change since May 2018	% of total	Rate of return
Anbar	69	242	1	44	267	49,086	-40%	3%	57%	1,305,456	3%	30%	89%
Babylon	76	0	1	0	76	17,454	-32%	1%	0%				
Baghdad	401	110	60	9	502	58,710	-46%	4%	6%	88,170	14%	2%	69%
Basrah	91	0	45	0	91	7,164	-11%	0%	0%				
Dahuk	151	1	39	1	151	326,106	-7%	20%	47%	780	0%	0%	3%
Diyala	176	211		15	372	55,722	-14%	3%	13%	225,474	2%	5%	73%
Erbil	113	20		0	133	209,784	-6%	13%	9%	41,070	5%	1%	68%
Kerbala	119	0	11	0	119	21,744	-20%	1%	6%				
Kirkuk	71	198		41	228	101,556	-24%	6%	12%	330,882	13%	8%	76%
Missan	22	0	4	0	22	2,388	-21%	0%	4%				
Muthanna	14	0	1	0	14	1,098	-20%	0%	0%				
Najaf	55	0		0	55	12,282	-60%	1%	8%				
Ninewa	250	648	32	175	723	478,638	-23%	30%	55%	1,677,912	15%	39%	64%
Qadissiya	93	0	9	0	93	5,592	-57%	0%	0%				
Salah al-Din	152	194	1	88	258	105,390	-43%	7%	6%	635,394	17%	15%	75%
Sulaymaniyah	406	0	56	0	406	142,422	-8%	9%	12%				
Thi-Qar	41	0	41	0	41	3474	-15%	0%	0%				
Wassit	94	0		0	94	8,538	-35%	1%	0%				
Total	2,394	1,624	301	373	3,645	1,607,148	-21%	100%	32%	4,305,138	10%	100%	73%

Table 2: Intentions at short term and long term (% of IDPs)

GOVERNORATE	INTENTIONS AT SHORT TERM			INTENTIONS AT LONG TERM		
	Return	Stay	Move elsewhere/Undecided	Return	Locally integrate	Move elsewhere/Undecided
Anbar	43%	57%	0%	96%	4%	0%
Babylon	2%	98%	0%	3%	97%	0%
Baghdad	36%	64%	0%	96%	4%	0%
Basrah	0%	100%	0%	0%	70%	30%
Dahuk	0%	100%	0%	73%	25%	2%
Diyala	74%	26%	0%	93%	7%	0%
Erbil	39%	61%	0%	81%	19%	0%
Kerbala	5%	95%	0%	36%	64%	0%
Kirkuk	12%	88%	0%	37%	63%	0%
Missan	86%	14%	0%	86%	14%	0%
Muthanna	0%	100%	0%	0%	93%	7%
Najaf	46%	54%	0%	100%	0%	0%
Ninewa	24%	76%	0%	85%	14%	1%
Qadissiya	5%	95%	0%	78%	22%	0%
Salah al-Din	67%	33%	0%	80%	20%	0%
Sulaymaniyah	0%	100%	0%	66%	33%	1%
Thi-Qar	5%	94%	1%	40%	59%	1%
Wassit	0%	100%	0%	99%	1%	0%
Total	25%	75%	0%	74%	25%	1%

Table 3: Main obstacles to return (% of IDPs whose intention at long term is to return)

GOVERNORATE	MAIN OBSTACLES TO RETURN									
	No job opportunities at origin	Lack of basic services at origin	House damaged/destroyed	The area of origin is insecure/unsafe (conflict, armed groups, UXOs)	No financial means to return and restart	Living conditions are better in displacement	Fear as a result of the changed ER composition at origin	Children enrolled in school at displacement	Blocked returns	Trauma associated with returning to place of origin
Anbar	82%	62%	80%	16%	8%	8%	0%	23%	0%	10%
Babylon	70%	45%	90%	13%	10%	11%	0%	10%	0%	27%
Baghdad	81%	62%	88%	0%	15%	24%	1%	7%	9%	9%
Basrah										
Dahuk	64%	92%	52%	68%	0%	6%	12%	3%	0%	1%
Diyala	84%	41%	91%	8%	11%	7%	9%	39%	11%	0%
Erbil	89%	76%	14%	51%	2%	35%	5%	6%	0%	1%
Kerbala	86%	76%	67%	21%	21%	5%	7%	0%	0%	6%
Kirkuk	86%	72%	64%	21%	17%	5%	0%	1%	0%	18%
Missan	100%	89%	96%	0%	0%	16%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Muthanna										
Najaf	75%	42%	72%	20%	32%	9%	11%	10%	0%	6%
Ninewa	71%	71%	68%	36%	25%	4%	15%	1%	2%	4%
Qadisiya	27%	4%	94%	19%	39%	11%	21%	28%	0%	13%
Salah al-Din	51%	73%	85%	19%	17%	4%	11%	2%	26%	0%
Sulaymaniyah	67%	31%	67%	37%	56%	14%	3%	0%	6%	0%
Thi-Qar	52%	39%	49%	21%	0%	35%	55%	7%	0%	0%
Wassit	92%	60%	93%	43%	0%	2%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Total	73%	68%	62%	36%	17%	12%	9%	6%	5%	3%

Table 4: Main obstacles to return (% of IDPs whose intention at long term is to return)

GOVERNORATE	MAIN REASONS TO INTEGRATE LOCALLY										Same religious, linguistic or ethnic composition
	The location is safe	Lack of basic services at origin	The location is unsafe (militias, changed ER composition)	No financial means to return and restart	House in place of origin is damaged/destroyed	No job opportunities in return area	Availability of services	Presence of extended family/relatives/friends	Blocked returns	Availability of housing	
Anbar	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	33%	0%	0%	6%	67%
Babylon	2%	44%	7%	2%	27%	10%	30%	55%	93%	5%	6%
Baghdad	85%	6%	5%	24%	59%	10%	14%	13%	51%	23%	1%
Basrah	91%	0%	6%	71%	65%	3%	0%	44%	0%	9%	0%
Dahuk	83%	62%	17%	15%	18%	50%	24%	2%	0%	0%	3%
Diyala	96%	0%	75%	10%	5%	0%	3%	36%	23%	26%	14%
Erbil	73%	43%	12%	36%	0%	18%	62%	44%	0%	0%	0%
Kerbala	10%	17%	15%	59%	22%	16%	6%	17%	8%	5%	0%
Kirkuk	38%	71%	8%	65%	69%	19%	11%	0%	0%	11%	0%
Missan	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	19%	84%	0%	68%	0%
Muthanna	24%	0%	50%	22%	48%	42%	0%	13%	0%	0%	0%
Najaf	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%
Ninewa	62%	20%	19%	51%	70%	8%	5%	7%	1%	2%	4%
Qadissiya	100%	0%	0%	7%	29%	0%	0%	80%	62%	0%	9%
Salah al-Din	19%	26%	56%	42%	44%	10%	4%	15%	4%	45%	19%
Sulaymaniyah	46%	49%	100%	6%	8%	22%	2%	0%	14%	3%	0%
Thi-Qar	80%	0%	6%	8%	19%	0%	5%	80%	0%	12%	72%
Wassit	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	0%
Total	51%	46%	38%	35%	35%	21%	17%	14%	10%	8%	4%

Table 5: Main reasons to return and forced returns (% of returnees)

GOVERNORATE	MAIN OBSTACLES TO RETURN												Forced to return-locations (%)	
	The location is safe	Availability of housing	Availability of services (for example, education and health)	Emotional desire to return	No financial means to remain in displacement	Worsening of livelihood/services in displacement	To join family members already returned	Availability of jobs	Encouragement to return by community/religious leaders	Availability of assistance	Failed to integrate in HC	Worsening of security situation in displacement		Incentives/support to return by government authorities
Anbar	97%	82%	55%	23%	14%	8%	12%	4%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	24%
Baghdad	95%	58%	3%	17%	13%	5%	21%	40%	15%	23%	0%	0%	5%	0%
Dahuk	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Diyala	85%	94%	20%	22%	31%	7%	4%	0%	33%	3%	0%	0%	0%	8%
Erbil	100%	68%	0%	40%	0%	12%	29%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%
Kirkuk	90%	44%	40%	38%	16%	0%	13%	15%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Ninewa	91%	86%	38%	28%	20%	21%	4%	1%	4%	1%	4%	0%	0%	1%
Salah al-Din	88%	60%	21%	47%	22%	5%	17%	21%	7%	5%	0%	3%	0%	34%
Total	92%	77%	39%	29%	18%	12%	10%	6%	5%	2%	1%	1%	1%	9%

Table 6: Infrastructure and services index (% of locations, IDPs and returnees living at locations where infrastructure/services are present)

GOVERNORATE	0-5			6-7			8-9			10-11		
	Location (%)	IDPs (% of HHs)	Returns (% of HHs)	Location (%)	IDPs (% of HHs)	Returns (% of HHs)	Location (%)	IDPs (% of HHs)	Returns (% of HHs)	Location (%)	IDPs (% of HHs)	Returns (% of HHs)
Anbar	7%	9%	4%	25%	43%	14%	33%	16%	41%	35%	31%	41%
Babylon	1%	0%		8%	8%		55%	50%		36%	42%	
Baghdad	18%	18%	32%	21%	8%	24%	34%	37%	43%	27%	37%	1%
Basrah	1%	1%		15%	12%		60%	58%		23%	28%	
Dahuk	2%	0%	0%	9%	1%	0%	17%	8%	0%	72%	90%	100%
Diyala	7%	0%	4%	22%	6%	26%	52%	44%	56%	20%	49%	14%
Erbil	14%	5%	20%	10%	5%	25%	64%	82%	51%	12%	8%	4%
Kerbala	12%	27%		29%	36%		36%	24%		23%	13%	
Kirkuk	25%	3%	7%	31%	6%	24%	30%	73%	42%	15%	17%	26%
Missan	0%	0%		0%	0%		14%	6%		86%	94%	
Muthanna	14%	17%		36%	26%		36%	42%		14%	15%	
Najaf	36%	39%		45%	48%		15%	11%		4%	2%	
Ninewa	24%	2%	6%	19%	8%	10%	25%	19%	27%	32%	71%	57%
Qadisiya	15%	13%		32%	35%		45%	46%		8%	6%	
Salah al-Din	20%	11%	8%	17%	10%	17%	31%	39%	41%	32%	40%	34%
Sulaymaniyah	0%	0%		7%	3%		8%	4%		84%	94%	
Thi-Qar	12%	12%		20%	20%		20%	28%		49%	40%	
Wassit	12%	13%		13%	11%		68%	66%		7%	9%	
Total	14%	5%	6%	19%	8%	15%	33%	34%	36%	34%	53%	43%

Table 6a: Infrastructure and services index - detail on single indicators (% of IDPs and returnees living at the location)

	75-100% HHs have electricity	75-100% HHs have water	Access to waste collection	Access to latrines	Functional primary school within 5 km	Functional secondary school within 5 km
IDPs	79%	76%	89%	98%	97%	93%
Returnees	70%	65%	71%	100%	99%	93%

	Functional health clinic within 5 km	Functional hospital within 10 km	Functional market within 5 km	Office for replacement of civil documentation in the SD	Legal services for HLP in the SD
IDPs	93%	82%	96%	73%	49%
Returnees	89%	64%	93%	94%	32%

Table 7: Main needs and issues (% of IDPs and returnees living at the location)

	EMPLOYMENT						
	Insufficient jobs	Access to employment among top 3 needs	Children working	Most are not economically active	Unequal access to fair employment	Low paid/occasional/under-qualified/unequal jobs	Lack of training/vocational centers/programmes
Returnees	83%	71%	43%	57%	14%	2%	13%
IDPs	82%	70%	49%	43%	25%	10%	6%

	HEALTH						
	Access to health among top 3 needs	No hospital within 10 km	Quality (poor underqualified service/staff)	Price of health-care visit/treatment/medicines is too expensive	No health facility within 5 km	Quantity (facilities are few/small/overcrowded)	Lack of rehabilitation services
Returnees	61%	36%	13%	12%	11%	7%	1%
IDPs	39%	18%	22%	60%	7%	9%	1%

	EDUCATION						
	Quantity (insufficient/overcrowded classes/schools)	Less than 75% are attending secondary school	No certified teachers	Access to education among top 3 needs	Quality (infrastructure/staff is poor/inadequate)	Price (too expensive in terms of fees/materials)	Less than 75% are attending primary school
Returnees	45%	34%	32%	21%	20%	17%	11%
IDPs	42%	45%	18%	9%	18%	13%	28%

	FOOD						
	Some individuals are in need of food	Price (too expensive)	Access to food among top 3 needs	Quantity (insufficient, inconsistent or sporadic supply)	Quality (poor quality, not fresh or bad taste)	No market within 5 km	A lot of individuals are in need of food
Returnees	48%	46%	21%	16%	11%	7%	2%
IDPs	30%	66%	32%	8%	1%	4%	1%

		WATER						
	Have issues with water source (related to taste/appearance/smell)	Less than 75% of HHs have water	Quality (poor quality, not safe/contaminated)	Quantity (insufficient, inconsistent or sporadic supply)	Access to water among top 3 needs	Sometimes rely on water trucking	Price (too expensive)	
Returnees	47%	35%	31%	28%	26%	22%	8%	
IDPs	26%	24%	20%	16%	8%	16%	5%	
		RIGHTS AND DOCUMENTATION						
	No legal services office within the SD	Few individuals are in lack of civil documentation	Access to solutions for displacement-related rights violations (justice, reparations and compensation) among top 3 needs	Children are in lack of birth certificates	No office for replacement of civil documentation within the district	Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation among top 3 needs	Many/most individuals are in lack of civil documentation	
Returnees	68%	15%	15%	9%	6%	1%	0.3%	
IDPs	51%	15%	12%	8%	27%	8%	0.3%	
		SHELTER						
	No Problem	Quality (infrastructure is poor, not durable, not strong enough, sanitary facilities are not adequate)	Price (too expensive)	Quantity (there aren't enough houses so there is overcrowding)	Rent assistance (lack of or inadequate)	Rubble, improvised explosive devices (IED) and UXO removal	Eviction/unequal access	
Returnees	35%	23%	18%	13%	6%	5%		
IDPs	10%	14%	65%	4%	7%		0.1%	
		SECURITY						
	Presence of more than one security actor	Occurrence of security incidents other than petty crime	Concerned about resurgence of ISIL	Favouritism political representation	Favouritism employment	Favouritism aid	Concerned about ethno-religious tensions	
Returnees	77%	13%	55%	8%	14%	7%	9%	
IDPs	84%	8%	21%	34%	25%	9%	6%	

Table 8: Shelter type (% of IDPs)

GOVERNORATE	SHELTER TYPE							Total
	Rental (Habitable)	Camp	Host families	Critical shelters	Own Property	Rental (Uninhabitable)	Other	
Anbar	4%	57%	22%	17%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Babylon	89%	0%	6%	3%	3%	0%	0%	100%
Baghdad	55%	6%	32%	3%	1%	3%	0%	100%
Basrah	65%	0%	25%	8%	0%	0%	2%	100%
Dahuk	34%	47%	7%	12%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Diyala	66%	13%	17%	1%	0%	2%	0%	100%
Erbil	89%	9%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Kerbala	58%	6%	1%	19%	16%	0%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	75%	12%	3%	7%	1%	1%	0%	100%
Missan	49%	4%	39%	8%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Muthanna	69%	0%	27%	4%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Najaf	89%	8%	0%	3%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Ninewa	28%	55%	11%	4%	1%	1%	0%	100%
Qadissiya	55%	0%	23%	22%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Salah al-Din	55%	6%	9%	23%	0%	7%	0%	100%
Sulaymaniyah	85%	12%	0%	0%	2%	0%	0%	100%
Thi-Qar	72%	0%	27%	0%	1%	0%	1%	100%
Wassit	80%	0%	8%	10%	2%	0%	0%	100%
Total	92%	77%	39%	29%	18%	12%	10%	6%

Table 9: Shelter type (% of returnees)

GOVERNORATE	SHELTER TYPE					Total
	Rented Housing	Habitual Good Residence	Habitual Bad Residence	Host Families	Other	
Anbar	3%	96%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Baghdad	0%	93%	7%	0%	0%	100%
Dahuk	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Diyala	1%	89%	10%	0%	0%	100%
Erbil	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	0%	98%	2%	0%	0%	100%
Ninewa	0%	97%	3%	0%	0%	100%
Salah al-Din	4%	91%	4%	1%	1%	100%
Total	92%	77%	39%	29%	18%	12%

Table 10: Occurrence of security incidents (% of locations)

GOVERNORATE	SUICIDE ATTACKS	EXPLOSIVE DEVICES	LANDMINES	DIRECT FIRE ATTACKS	INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS	KNIFE ATTACKS	KIDNAPPINGS	ARBITRARY ARRESTS	RECRUITMENT BY MILITIAS	RECRUITMENT BY TERRORIST GROUPS	SCHOOLS USED BY AGS	CRIME
Anbar	0%	0%	3%	0%	0%	6%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	31%
Babylon	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	3%	0%	0%	1%	21%
Baghdad	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	10%	3%	0%	0%	1%	0%	40%
Basrah	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	20%
Dahuk	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	26%
Diyala	0%	4%	0%	4%	4%	1%	0%	1%	2%	0%	0%	12%
Erbil	0%	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Kerbala	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	16%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	36%
Kirkuk	2%	8%	1%	7%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	28%
Missan	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	91%
Muthanna	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	7%
Najaf	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	35%
Ninewa	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	4%
Qadissiya	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	12%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	16%
Salah al-Din	2%	2%	2%	3%	1%	0%	4%	14%	31%	2%	7%	24%
Sulaymaniyah	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	24%
Thi-Qar	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	12%	2%	0%	7%	0%	0%	32%
Wassit	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	84%
Total	14%	5%	6%	19%	8%	15%	33%	34%	36%	34%	53%	43%

Table 11: Length of displacement and protracted displacement (% of IDPs)

GOVERNORATE	PERIOD OF DISPLACEMENT											PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT (BEFORE OCTOBER 2016)
	January to May 2014	June to July 2014	August 2014	September 2014 to March 2015	April 2015 to March 2016	April to September 2016	October 2016 to June 2017	July 2017 to December 2018	January 2019 and later	Total		
Anbar	6%	0%	0%	8%	16%	30%	8%	32%	0%	100%	60%	
Babylon	1%	77%	18%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	
Baghdad	14%	19%	20%	20%	18%	4%	4%	0%	0%	100%	95%	
Basrah	8%	20%	21%	35%	8%	2%	5%	1%	0%	100%	94%	
Dahuk	0%	16%	79%	0%	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	100%	95%	
Diyala	1%	34%	14%	41%	2%	1%	1%	6%	0%	100%	93%	
Erbil	15%	34%	8%	3%	16%	4%	12%	8%	0%	100%	80%	
Kerbala	7%	92%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	
Kirkuk	1%	12%	10%	20%	16%	14%	17%	10%	0%	100%	72%	
Missan	4%	33%	34%	19%	2%	0%	6%	0%	0%	100%	94%	
Muthanna	3%	41%	30%	17%	5%	0%	4%	0%	0%	100%	96%	
Najaf	0%	65%	24%	10%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	
Ninewa	0%	5%	23%	1%	2%	1%	49%	18%	2%	100%	32%	
Qadissiya	0%	50%	49%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	
Salah al-Din	1%	14%	27%	18%	19%	7%	9%	4%	0%	100%	87%	
Sulaymaniyah	7%	19%	12%	25%	9%	8%	6%	13%	1%	100%	79%	
Thi-Qar	8%	39%	31%	16%	3%	0%	2%	0%	0%	100%	98%	
Wassit	6%	74%	14%	3%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	
Total	4%	18%	29%	8%	7%	4%	19%	11%	1%	100%	70%	

Table 12: Year of return (% of returnees)

GOVERNORATE	YEAR OF RETURN				
	2015	2016	2017	2018-19	Total
Anbar	2%	68%	23%	7%	100%
Baghdad	1%	52%	46%	1%	100%
Dahuk	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Diyala	55%	40%	3%	2%	100%
Erbil	34%	4%	61%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	1%	12%	76%	11%	100%
Ninewa	7%	9%	74%	9%	100%
Salah al-Din	33%	38%	18%	11%	100%
Total	12%	34%	46%	8%	100%

Table 13: Ethno-religious composition (% of IDPs)


GOVERNORATE	ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION						
	Arab Sunni Muslims	Kurd Muslims (Sunni and Shia)	Yazidis	Turkmen Muslims (Sunni and Shia)	Minorities (Christians, Kakais, Shabak Shia)	Arab Shia Muslims	Total
Anbar	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Babylon	92%	0%	0%	8%	0%	0%	100%
Baghdad	94%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	100%
Basrah	59%	0%	0%	1%	1%	39%	100%
Dahuk	9%	50%	35%	1%	4%	0%	100%
Diyala	93%	4%	0%	0%	0%	3%	100%
Erbil	90%	7%	1%	1%	1%	0%	100%
Kerbala	3%	0%	0%	68%	21%	9%	100%
Kirkuk	94%	1%	0%	4%	0%	1%	100%
Missan	24%	0%	0%	11%	10%	55%	100%
Muthanna	15%	0%	0%	22%	3%	59%	100%
Najaf	0%	0%	0%	97%	2%	1%	100%
Ninewa	50%	16%	18%	10%	7%	0%	100%
Qadissiya	0%	1%	0%	35%	0%	64%	100%
Salah al-Din	93%	1%	0%	7%	0%	0%	100%
Sulaymaniyah	81%	15%	3%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Thi-Qar	4%	0%	0%	9%	5%	82%	100%
Wassit	7%	0%	0%	34%	37%	21%	100%
Total	64%	15%	10%	7%	3%	1%	100%


Table 14: Ethno-religious composition (% of returnees)

GOVERNORATE	ETHNO-RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION						
	Arab Sunni Muslims	Kurd Muslims (Sunni and Shia)	Yazidis	Turkmen Muslims (Sunni and Shia)	Minorities (Christians, Kakais, Shabak Shia)	Arab Shia Muslims	Total
Anbar	98%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	100%
Baghdad	89%	0%	0%	0%	0%	11%	100%
Dahuk	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	100%
Diyala	90%	4%	0%	3%	0%	3%	100%
Erbil	50%	50%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%
Kirkuk	49%	49%	0%	1%	0%	0%	100%
Ninewa	64%	3%	5%	12%	16%	0%	100%
Salah al-Din	93%	4%	0%	1%	0%	1%	100%
Total	79%	6%	2%	5%	6%	1%	100%

INTEGRATED LOCATION ASSESSMENT IV

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