



# **Resolving Post-Disaster Displacement:**

**Insights from  
the Philippines after  
Typhoon Haiyan  
(Yolanda)**

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International Organization for Migration (IOM)

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## List of Acronyms

CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CHR	Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
CRRP	Comprehensive Relief and Recovery Plan
DENR	Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DILG	Department of Interior and Local Government
DOST	Department of Science and Technology
DPWH	Department of Public Works and Highways
DROMIC	Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center
DRRM	Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
HLP	Housing, land and property
HUDCC	Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally displaced person
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRR	Implementing Rules and Regulations
LGU	Local government unit
NBZ	No-build zone
NDRRMC	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council
NDRRMP	National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan
NEDA	National Economic Development Authority
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NHA	National Housing Authority
NOAH	Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
PSU	Primary sampling unit
RAY	Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda
SRP	Strategic Response Plan
SSU	Secondary sampling unit
UN	United Nations



# Executive Summary

In November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan – known locally as Yolanda – devastated the central Philippines. The strongest storm ever recorded at landfall, Typhoon Haiyan resulted in over 7,000 deaths and left more than 4 million people displaced. An estimated 1.1 million homes were damaged or destroyed, with Leyte and Samar in the Eastern Visayas region among the worst affected areas. One and a half years later, the reconstruction process is well under way. Hundreds of thousands of families have returned to and are working to rebuild their homes and re-establish their livelihoods. Nearly half of the residents of “bunkhouses” constructed to provide provisional accommodation for internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their communities or received support to move elsewhere. Plans have been laid to relocate families from areas that remain highly vulnerable to future disasters, and are gradually being implemented. Yet significant hurdles must be overcome to ensure that those who were uprooted are able to access truly durable solutions to their displacement – a particularly pronounced challenge in a country on the “front lines” of climate change.

Drawing on the rights-based approach laid out in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (IASC Framework) and reflected in many of the Philippines’ own domestic standards, this report analyses efforts to resolve the displacement crisis generated by Typhoon Haiyan. According to the IASC Framework, durable solutions (whether return, local integration, or sustainable settlement/relocation elsewhere) have been reached when IDPs “no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.” The Framework examines the *process* for achieving durable solutions, emphasizing that IDPs have the right to actively participate in planning and decision-making related to the resolution of displacement, and to make voluntary, informed choices on durable solutions. The Framework also lays out key *criteria* that help determine the extent to which durable solutions have been achieved. These criteria include the ability of IDPs to enjoy without discrimination: long-term safety and security; an adequate standard of living; access to employment and livelihoods; and access to effective mechanisms to restore their housing, land and property. Drawing on the results of a survey of over 4,500 Haiyan-affected households, focus groups with community members, site visits, and interviews with government officials, donors, and the staff of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations, the study examines the extent to which these criteria have been realized. It explores obstacles to the pursuit of durable solutions, and makes recommendations to help address these challenges. It also identifies insights from experiences in the Philippines that may help inform the achievement of durable solutions in other post-disaster contexts.

## Key Findings

In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, the vast majority of those who lost or were forced from their homes returned to where they lived before the disaster in relatively short order, even if their homes had been completely destroyed. In this sense, return was undeniably the main avenue taken in response to displacement, but the extent to which it represents a *durable* solution remains an open question. Indeed, the household survey conducted for this study found that one and a half years after the disaster, only 17.6 per cent of the population feels that life has returned to “normal.”

**Overarching challenges:** Perhaps inevitably in such a massive disaster, the disaster relief and recovery process became highly politicized, intertwining with electoral ambitions and rivalries. Many of the actors involved had dramatically differing approaches, expectations, capacities and agendas, generating significant tensions and coordination barriers. Almost unvaryingly, national and

local Filipino officials described the arrival of international organizations and NGOs as a “flood,” and pointed out that however well intentioned, most international staff lacked adequate knowledge of disaster response mechanisms, legal frameworks and governance systems in the Philippines. In addition, these international organizations and NGOs often approached government officials in a manner better suited to negotiating with recalcitrant authorities in a conflict zone than working with a government with extensive experience in natural disaster response and dedicated to assisting its citizens. For their part, international officials highlighted the impossibility of expecting poorly resourced and short-staffed local governments who are still reeling from the effects of the disaster on their own families to manage an extraordinarily complex logistical response – a view that sometimes carried over to the recovery phase as well. In this context, polarizing debates emerged on the relevance of international standards, particularly the Sphere Standards, and the best approaches to applying them. In some quarters, this translated into broader scepticism surrounding international standards – a scepticism that was not, for the most part, constructively addressed through donor and diplomatic advocacy. National staff working with international organizations and NGOs became key interlocutors with the government at different levels, helping to build mutual understanding and smoothening relations.

As the response evolved, tensions also arose surrounding the goals, timing and nature of the reconstruction and durable solutions process. For the most part, the IASC Framework was not well known, and different actors embraced divergent ideas of what was required to resolve the displacement situation, with only a minority understanding durable solutions as a protection concern. For some, durable solutions to displacement were simply equated with shelter. From this perspective, resolving displacement was simply seen as a matter of moving people out of tents and bunkhouses; once displaced people returned to their places of origin and began reconstructing their homes, their displacement and associated hardships were assumed to have ended. For others, durable solutions were also seen to require attention to a range of other losses associated with displacement, including livelihoods, but there were no clear answers on which challenges should be tackled first, or how to redress the inequalities that arise from investing in a holistic range of interventions in particular communities, leaving fewer resources for other areas.

***The durable solutions process:*** Humanitarian responses to disasters tend to focus on identifying individual needs and vulnerabilities. In contrast, many IDPs and other Haiyan survivors underscore the importance of community-based approaches that seek to preserve and recognize the value of the social networks through which families meet their needs and advance their goals for recovery and the resolution of displacement. Community solidarity and cohesion is a critical foundation for Filipinos’ renowned resilience in the face of Haiyan and many other disasters. This resilience coexists alongside deep and often unrecognized discontent rooted in broken and unfulfilled promises, and discomfort with the ways in which different criteria are used – sometimes inconsistently and inexplicably, from IDPs’ perspectives – to target assistance. Tellingly, only slightly more than half of the population in the surveyed area believe that government recovery and reconstruction plans reflect their needs and preferences. Less than half feel they had the chance to actively participate in the design and implementation of aid provided by international actors. Only 45.5 per cent think assistance has been fairly distributed. Yet many IDPs do not feel that they can voice their discontent, because of the perceived risk of being bumped down beneficiary lists.

***Long-term safety and security:*** Among both displaced and non-displaced typhoon survivors, disaster risk stands out as the predominant source of insecurity in the post-Haiyan environment, with 83.1 per cent of the population identifying natural disasters as their primary reason for current insecurity, followed by 5.3 per cent concerned with theft. Perceptions of disaster vulnerability exhibited a three-fold increase following the typhoon: only 27.1 per cent of the population considered natural disasters to be a primary source of insecurity before Typhoon Haiyan. Present feelings of insecurity are significantly associated with displacement, with 69.4 per cent of non-displaced and

only 57.8 per cent of IDPs indicating that they currently feel safe. Although households perceive disaster to be the foremost threat to their safety, the disaster risk reduction strategies prioritized by government bodies did not always resonate with the coping mechanisms employed by individuals and communities struggling to balance threats to their physical and socioeconomic security in the post-Haiyan context. Rather than relocation, many community members expressed interest in the development of more robust evacuation centres.

**Adequate standard of living:** IDPs and non-IDPs alike faced enormous economic losses as a result of Typhoon Haiyan, although IDPs were significantly less likely to believe that life had “gone back to normal.” Overall, 83 per cent recalled that before the typhoon, they were able to cover their basic needs, but only 32.1 per cent are currently able to do so. Furthermore, 60.9 per cent of families report they face difficulties accessing services. There was widespread perception that some basic goods and services were *available* in the community, but not *accessible* because of a lack of means, with an overwhelming proportion (93%) attributing their current inability to access basic services to a lack of money. For instance, 31 per cent of displaced and 44 per cent of non-displaced households stated that affordable housing was available, but the numbers drop to 20.1 per cent and 33.4 per cent respectively when asked if this housing is *accessible*. Despite the seriousness of these difficulties, it is clear that strong social capital may be *just as important as* material resources, especially in the face of recurring disasters and overstretched capacities of the government and international community. Especially in rural villages and other communities where residents had lived together for generations, people consistently gave examples of sharing food and supplies and watching out for the welfare of their community members.

**Access to employment and livelihoods:** A dramatic 73.9 per cent of households experienced a decline in their livelihood situation since the typhoon, with fisherfolk and coconut farmers particularly negatively affected. At the same time, “Yolanda prices” (the increased cost of living post-disaster) have exacerbated the economic pressures facing poor, displaced survivors who have generally been unable to access adequate support to enable the restoration of their livelihoods. 60.7 per cent of households lost productive assets; the inability to recover these assets was the most significant barrier to the restoration of livelihoods, faced by 34.7 per cent. For another 29.9 per cent, their main barrier was the lack of jobs or livelihoods in the area where they lived. Often with a view to re-establishing their livelihoods, some survivors have borrowed from relatives (9.2%), friends (9.3%) and financial institutions (15.5%). 25 per cent of the population indicated that they needed to borrow money, but were unsuccessful in obtaining a loan. IDPs in particular struggled to access credit: 27.4 per cent of the displaced, compared to 19.7 per cent of non-displaced households could not access credit.

**Restoration of housing, land and property:** Restoration of and access to housing, land and property is critical to durable solutions. Many respondents faced some form of tenure insecurity (51.9%), with 72 per cent of IDPs still trying to rebuild their houses. Despite the housing and tenure security challenges in the post-typhoon environment, 98.3 per cent of the reference population continue to live on the same plot of land as before, although often in a different house. In both urban and rural areas, community members identified a range of sources of tenure insecurity, often perceiving that urban developments or land sales linked to the reconstruction process would jeopardize their squatter or usufruct status.

**Relocation challenges:** Particularly complex challenges surround efforts to relocate populations (in many cases, informal settlers) away from coastal areas. The Government has identified over 205,000 households as being in need of relocation, because their former homes are in unsafe areas. However, the extent to which relocation – as it is currently envisioned and pursued – serves as a durable solution is also a matter of major debate. Importantly, relocation processes are –

in theory, if not yet in practice – to be reoriented around careful assessment of hazards, rather than undertaken on the basis of residency in the contested “no-build zone” (NBZ). While this is an important development, the process remains highly problematic as many families currently involved in the relocation process do not have adequate access to information about the process or opportunities to actively participate in decision-making. As in many past relocation attempts, access to livelihoods is a critical but unmet concern, with members of relocated families returning to their areas of origin to continue practicing their livelihoods, in the absence of viable opportunities to make a living in their new communities. Such situations illustrate the need to achieve a better balance between efforts to ensure public safety and the physical security of displaced families, and support for the achievement of their socioeconomic rights. In many cases, community members support the construction of robust evacuation centres as a preferable alternative to relocation.

The response to Typhoon Haiyan underscores the complexity of political dynamics in post-disaster environments, and yields valuable insights into several previously under-examined aspects of the durable solutions process in post-disaster contexts, including: (a) gender dimensions of durable solutions to displacement; (b) challenges surrounding the pursuit of durable solutions in rural environments; and (c) the role of local authorities in supporting solutions for IDPs.

**Gender dimensions of durable solutions:** In the post-Haiyan context, many displaced women have taken on significant leadership roles in their communities, and have become the main breadwinners for their families. While a potentially significant opportunity for empowerment, in many instances these new responsibilities have not led to the rethinking of traditional gender roles, but have simply translated into increased burdens for displaced women and their families. Moving forward, more detailed gender analyses are needed to inform durable solutions strategies.

**Durable solutions in rural environments:** Haiyan resulted in massive displacement in rural, urban and peri-urban contexts. All these contexts present unique challenges, but the needs of rural communities have arguably not received the attention they should. Strikingly, while the pursuit of durable solutions to massive displacement situations in post-disaster contexts is often characterized by rural–urban movements (part of broader urbanization processes unfolding worldwide), the post-Haiyan context has seen some counterflows from urban to rural and peri-urban settings as relocation unfolds. Initial evidence suggests that barring concerted support for livelihood opportunities in rural and peri-urban relocation sites, these movements will be unsustainable.

*“Barring concerted support for livelihood opportunities in rural and peri-urban relocation sites, these movements will be unsustainable.”*

**Local authorities and durable solutions:** Local authorities are pivotal in the resolution of displacement. Owing to the Philippines’ highly decentralized governance system, local authorities have played key roles in supporting solutions for IDPs, but these contributions have been constrained by lack of human and financial resources and training, including in relation to key disaster response and displacement-related standards; difficulties coordinating the massive influx of aid following the disaster; and tensions between different interests and visions for reconstruction.



## Recommendations

As the IASC Framework suggests, the resolution of displacement is, above all, a long-term undertaking, requiring consistent commitment and attention to the particular needs and concerns that continue to affect displaced households and other survivors one and a half years after Haiyan. While displaced populations continue to face a range of particularly pronounced challenges, including in terms of enjoyment of safety and security, and access to housing, land and property rights, displacement and its consequences can only be fully understood and addressed as part of the post-disaster political economy. Overall, the study confirms that while important progress has been made, achieving durable solutions to displacement remains an unresolved challenge, all the more pressing in light of the Philippines' continued exposure to serious disaster risk.

The findings backstop several recommendations advanced in previous studies. These include: (a) increasing transparency, community consultation and information dissemination for affected communities on relocation processes; (b) improving institutional coordination efforts among national and international agencies; and (c) strengthening capacity-building for LGUs in land-use planning, human rights protection, urban planning, disaster risk reduction and community consultations. In addition, the study raises the following suggestions for strengthening support for durable solutions to displacement for those uprooted by Typhoon Haiyan, bearing in mind the more general need to raise awareness of the IASC Framework and its implications for the resolution of post-disaster situations, in the Philippines and elsewhere.

1. *Recognize durable solutions as a multisectoral concern, including both humanitarian and development inputs, and extending beyond the housing sector.* Durable solutions are not simply a humanitarian concern but a major development challenge, requiring the long-term attention of local, national and international actors. Moving forward, concerted coordination is needed to ensure an appropriate balance between individual and community-level support.
2. *Redouble investment in the strengthening of evacuation centres, safer construction techniques and other disaster risk reduction programmes.* Alternatives to relocation should be considered and promoted to enable the government to meet its public safety responsibilities, pursuing relocations only when absolutely necessary, and in line with domestic and international standards. For example, significant investment in evacuation centres (including identification, construction, management and networking), combined with reconstruction assistance would strengthen IDPs' ability to choose durable solutions that best fit their needs.
3. *Establish an interactive, rights-based monitoring system for relocation plans, policies and projects, linking local and national levels.* A dedicated, rights-based relocation monitoring system should: (a) monitor the process and impact of relocations according to national and international laws and standards; (b) monitor the performance and quality of implementation of relocation sites; and (c) convene regular local and national workshops to identify problems and potential conflicts and share information between all stakeholders.
4. *Develop and implement enhanced, culturally sensitive livelihoods strategies for the affected areas, based on IDPs' active participation.* Livelihoods assistance should be expanded beyond short-lived cash grants, and linked to private sector business development plans and strategies.

5. *Address fairness concerns in the implementation of aid.* Concerted efforts are needed on the part of the government, international organizations and NGOs to address mounting concerns regarding fairness in the distribution of assistance, particularly as many families have been effectively discriminated against because of their previous residence in formerly termed “no-build zones.” Recognizing that many people in hazard-prone areas are not likely to receive timely relocation assistance, rebuilding assistance should be provided to allow them to live in safety and dignity – unless an alternative situation is identified that meets their needs and best interests, and is in line with the relevant standards. Revived efforts are needed to communicate openly with community members to identify and implement aid criteria, and adjust criteria as necessary in light of evolving needs.
6. *Strengthen community-based approaches to humanitarian aid and recovery.* In the delivery of aid, enhanced efforts are needed to empower communities and preserve the strong social capital that exists in the Philippines. Aid strategies should mainstream awareness-raising activities and community organizing so people are knowledgeable of their rights, and the mechanisms available to protect them.
7. *Ensure support for durable solutions and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) efforts at all levels integrate gender analyses and respond to the different needs and capacities of women and men, girls and boys.* Gender-sensitive capacity and needs assessments should address issues including emergency response; the management of evacuation centres, bunkhouses, and transitional and relocation sites; and the development of livelihood strategies.

# Introduction

In November 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan – known locally as Yolanda – devastated the central Philippines. The strongest storm ever recorded at landfall, and the deadliest in the history of the Philippines, Typhoon Haiyan resulted in over 7,000 deaths and left more than 4 million people displaced.<sup>1</sup> An estimated 1.1 million homes were damaged or destroyed, with Leyte and Samar in the Eastern Visayas region among the worst affected areas.

One and a half years later, the reconstruction process is well under way. While the process is expected to take 20 years, responding to USD 36 billion in damages, important gains have already been made.<sup>2</sup> Hundreds of thousands of families have returned to and are working to rebuild their homes and re-establish their livelihoods. None of the tent cities set up in the crisis stage remains open, and nearly half of the residents of “bunkhouses” constructed to provide provisional accommodation have returned to their communities or received support to move elsewhere. Plans have been laid to relocate families from areas that remain highly vulnerable to future disasters, and are gradually being implemented. Yet significant hurdles must be overcome to ensure that those who were uprooted are able to access truly durable solutions to their displacement – a particularly pronounced challenge in a country on the “front lines” of climate change.<sup>3</sup>

Drawing on the rights-based approach laid out in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (IASC Framework) and reflected in many of the Philippines’ own domestic standards, this report analyses efforts to resolve the displacement crisis generated by Typhoon Haiyan, recognizing that responses to this disaster must be understood within the broader, ongoing dynamics surrounding displacement and development in the Philippines. It explores obstacles to the pursuit of durable solutions for those displaced by Typhoon Haiyan, and makes recommendations to help address these challenges. It also identifies insights from experiences in the Philippines that may help inform the achievement of durable solutions in other post-disaster contexts, addressing issues such as gender dimensions of durable solutions, supporting durable solutions in rural contexts, and the role of local authorities in resolving displacement crises. This is the second study undertaken jointly by the Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), with the goal of advancing understanding of the pursuit of durable solutions to displacement in post-disaster contexts.<sup>4</sup>

1 See [www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29965570](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29965570). Among the 4.1 million IDPs were 2.1 million males and 2 million females. An estimated 1.7 million of those displaced were children; 8 per cent of IDPs in heavily hit areas were over the age of 60. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and IOM, *The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-based Overview* (IDMC and IOM, Geneva, 2014), p. 19.

2 See [www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/31/ipcc-climate-change-cities-manila](http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/31/ipcc-climate-change-cities-manila).

3 See [www.ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5\\_SPM\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf).

4 The first study examined durable solutions in a dramatically different context: the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince (see A. Sherwood et al., *Supporting Durable Solutions to Urban, Post-disaster Displacement: Challenge and Opportunities in Haiti* (Brookings Institution/IOM Washington, D.C., 2014). The first project focused on urban displacement dynamics in a deeply impoverished country with limited levels of government capacity and engagement. In contrast, the present study examines a middle-income country with highly nuanced legal frameworks and significant government capacity, responding to a super typhoon that devastated a massive swath of territory, covering both urban and rural communities. The studies were also undertaken at different points in the recovery process. While the first study was carried out four years after the earthquake, the present study was completed a year and a half after the disaster. Despite the marked contrasts between these cases, there are also some similarities in terms of, for example, extensive international engagement in the disaster response and the risk of protracted displacement for some elements of the population. The authors hope these independent but complementary studies may help increase understanding of the striking range of challenges associated with supporting durable solutions to post-disaster displacement.

As the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement indicate, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are individuals who:

... have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

In the Philippines, IDPs have been uprooted by a range of factors, including armed conflicts, development projects and natural disasters. While there are an estimated 127,000 people displaced by armed conflict in the Philippines, it is much more difficult to accurately estimate the number of people who were forced from their homes by past disasters, including Typhoon Haiyan, but have not yet been able to secure a “durable solution” to their displacement.<sup>5</sup> According to the IASC Framework, durable solutions have been reached when IDPs “no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement.”<sup>6</sup> The Framework identifies three main durable solutions for IDPs:

- Sustainable return and reintegration of IDPs in their places of origin;
- Sustainable local integration of IDPs in the areas where they found shelter; and
- Sustainable settlement and integration of IDPs elsewhere in the country (In the Philippines, this process is generally referred to as *relocation*).<sup>7</sup>

## Summary of Key Findings

In the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, the vast majority of those who lost or were forced from their homes returned to where they lived before the disaster in relatively short order, even if their homes had been completely destroyed. In this sense, return was undeniably the main avenue taken in response to displacement, but the extent to which it represents a *durable* solution remains an open question. Indeed, the household survey conducted for this study found that one and a half years after the disaster, only 17.6 per cent of the population feels that life has returned to “normal.” Many returnees indicate that they had no other choice but to go back to their former residences and attempt to rebuild, even though many remain deeply concerned about the risk of future disasters, with 83.1 per cent of the population identifying natural disasters as their foremost source of insecurity.<sup>8</sup> Often, their livelihoods were closely tied to residence in their former communities, and they lacked the financial and social capital needed to open up other options, with only 32.1 per cent of the population indicating that they are able to provide for their basic needs and 73.9 per cent of households experiencing a decline in their livelihood situation since the typhoon. Despite the centrality of livelihoods to durable solutions, especially in light of the economic pressures that “Yolanda prices” – the increased cost of living post-disaster – have created for poor, displaced survivors, international and national interventions in support of solutions have focused significantly on shelter.

5 See [www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/philippines/](http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/philippines/). For detailed discussion of the complex displacement situations in the Philippines associated with armed conflict, see for example R. Cagoco-Guiam, *Gender and Livelihoods among Internally Displaced Persons in Mindanao, Philippines* (Brookings, Washington, D.C., 2013); E. L. Hedman, *The Philippines: Conflict and Internal Displacement in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago* (WRITENET, London, 2009); N. Coletta, *The Search for Durable Solutions: Armed Conflict and Forced Displacement in Mindanao, Philippines* (World Bank, Washington, D.C., (2011).

6 IASC, pp. A-1.

7 Some actors use the terms “resettlement” and “relocation” interchangeably. We generally employ the term “relocation” to refer to “the physical movement of people instigated, supervised and carried out by State authorities (whether national or local).” The term “evacuation” is used to refer to short-term movements. See [www.unhcr.org/53c4d6f99.pdf](http://www.unhcr.org/53c4d6f99.pdf), p. 6 and 8.

8 For a broader discussion of risk of disaster-related displacement, see [www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/NRC-Displacement-Risk-Analysis-EFA-FINAL.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/NRC-Displacement-Risk-Analysis-EFA-FINAL.pdf).

In the aftermath of several disasters that unfolded prior to Typhoon Haiyan, the national and local governments in the Philippines have promoted the relocation of populations away from coastal areas (in many cases, informal settlers). However, the scale of Haiyan and the policy decisions that followed posed a far greater challenge for the country. One and a half years after Haiyan, the Government has identified some 205,128 households as being in need of relocation, because their former homes are in unsafe areas. However, the extent to which relocation – as it is currently envisioned and pursued – serves as a durable solution is also a matter of major debate.<sup>9</sup> Importantly, relocation processes are – in theory, if not yet in practice – to be reoriented around careful assessment of hazards, rather than undertaken on the basis of residency in the contested “no-build zone” (NBZ). While this is an important development, the process remains highly problematic as many families currently involved in the relocation process do not have adequate access to information about the process or opportunities to actively participate in decision-making. As in many past relocation attempts, access to livelihoods is a critical but unmet concern, with members of relocated families returning to their areas of origin to continue practicing their livelihoods, in the absence of viable opportunities to make a living in their new communities. Such situations illustrate the need to achieve a better balance between efforts to ensure public safety and the physical security of displaced families, and support for the achievement of their socioeconomic rights. In many cases, community members support the construction of robust evacuation centres as a preferable alternative to relocation.<sup>10</sup>

While humanitarian responses to disasters tend to focus on identifying individual needs and vulnerabilities, many IDPs and other Haiyan survivors underscore the importance of community-based approaches that seek to preserve and recognize the value of the social networks through which families meet their needs and advance their goals for recovery and the resolution of displacement. Community solidarity and cohesion is a critical foundation for Filipinos’ renowned resilience in the face of Haiyan and many other disasters. This resilience coexists alongside deep and often unrecognized discontent rooted in broken and unfulfilled promises, and discomfort with the ways in which different criteria are used – sometimes inconsistently and inexplicably, from IDPs’ perspectives – to target assistance.<sup>11</sup> Tellingly, only slightly more than half of the population in the surveyed area believe that government recovery and reconstruction plans reflect their needs and preferences; less than half felt they had the chance to actively participate in the design and implementation of aid provided by international actors. Only 45.5 per cent think assistance had been fairly distributed. Yet many IDPs felt that they could not voice their discontent, because of the perceived risk of being bumped down beneficiary lists.

The response to Typhoon Haiyan underscores the complexity of political dynamics in post-disaster environments, and yields valuable insights into several previously under-examined aspects of the durable solutions process in post-disaster contexts, including: (a) gender dimensions of durable solutions to displacement; (b) challenges surrounding the pursuit of durable solutions in rural environments; and (c) the role of local authorities in supporting solutions for IDPs.

- *Gender dimensions of durable solutions:* In the post-Haiyan context, many displaced women have taken on significant leadership roles in their communities, and have become the main breadwinners for their families. While a potentially significant opportunity for empowerment,

9 On the broad challenges associated with relocations, particularly in the context of climate change, see for example E. Ferris, *Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating Good Practices and Preparing for the Future* (Brookings, Georgetown, Washington, D.C./Geneva, 2014); E. Ferris, “Protection and planned relocations in the context of climate change” (UNHCR Division of International Protection, Geneva, 2012); K. Warner et al., “Changing climates, moving people: Framing migration, displacement and planned relocation,” Policy Brief No. 8 (United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security, Bonn, Germany, 2013).

10 As the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHR) has stressed, where relocations are involuntary and may amount to forced evictions, they should be handled through legal channels, rather than as a humanitarian undertaking. See CHR (2014) Human Rights Advisory – A2014-001: Human Rights Standards on Housing, Land and Property Rights of Populations Affected by Typhoon Yolanda, CHR, Manila.

11 On recipients’ discomfort with aid targeting strategies, see [www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/mar/27/impact-communities-distribution-aid-typhoon-haiyan-philippines](http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/mar/27/impact-communities-distribution-aid-typhoon-haiyan-philippines).

in many instances these new responsibilities have not led to the rethinking of traditional gender roles, but have simply translated into increased burdens for displaced women and their families. Moving forward, more detailed gender analyses are needed to inform durable solutions strategies.

- *Durable solutions in rural environments:* Haiyan resulted in massive displacement in rural, urban and peri-urban contexts. All these contexts present unique challenges, but the needs of rural communities have arguably not received the attention they should. Strikingly, while the pursuit of durable solutions to massive displacement situations in post-disaster contexts is often characterized by rural–urban movements (part of broader urbanization processes unfolding worldwide), the post-Haiyan context has seen some counterflows from urban to rural and peri-urban settings as relocation unfolds. Initial evidence suggests that barring concerted support for livelihood opportunities in rural and peri-urban relocation sites, these movements will be unsustainable.
- *Local authorities and durable solutions:* Local authorities are pivotal in the resolution of displacement. Owing to the Philippines’ highly decentralized governance system, local authorities have played key roles in supporting solutions for IDPs, but these contributions have been constrained by lack of human and financial resources and training, including in relation to key disaster response and displacement-related standards; difficulties coordinating the massive influx of aid following the disaster; and tensions between different interests and visions for reconstruction.

As the IASC Framework suggests, the resolution of displacement is, above all, a long-term undertaking, requiring consistent commitment and attention to the particular needs and concerns that continue to affect displaced households and other survivors one and a half years after Haiyan. While displaced populations continue to face a range of particularly pronounced challenges, including in terms of enjoyment of safety and security, and access to housing, land and property rights, displacement and its consequences can only be fully understood and addressed as part of the post-disaster political economy. Overall, the study confirms that while important progress has been made, achieving durable solutions to displacement remains an unresolved challenge, all the more pressing in light of the Philippines’ continued exposure to serious disaster risk.

*“New responsibilities have not led to the rethinking of traditional gender roles, but have simply translated into increased burdens for displaced women and their families.”*

## Methodology

Given its objectives of identifying specific challenges in achieving durable solutions for those uprooted by Typhoon Haiyan, drawing out insights from experiences in the Philippines, and offering recommendations to support the resolution of displacement that reflect the rights-based approach of the IASC Framework, the study employed a mixed-methods approach. This approach is best suited for exploring the complex relationship between pre-Haiyan socioeconomic conditions, the experience of displacement and the vulnerabilities associated with it, and the obstacles to recovery and development. The analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative data collected between December 2014 and March 2015, and is informed by previous studies on the response to Typhoon Haiyan. While the emergency response to Typhoon Haiyan has already been examined in some detail, this study and the methods underpinning it focus on the longer-term challenge of advancing durable solutions as a key component of the broader reconstruction process.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> For a synthesis of quantitative findings on different aspects of the emergency response to displacement following Typhoon Haiyan, see IDMC and IOM, *The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan: An Evidence-based Overview* (IDMC and IOM, Geneva, 2014).



The quantitative component of the study involved the development and administration of a questionnaire designed to explore socioeconomic conditions (before and after Typhoon Haiyan) and their relationship to experiences of displacement. The questionnaire also addressed involvement in the reconstruction process, including decision-making around durable solutions to displacement and other criteria identified in the IASC Framework. By collecting data from households that were and were not displaced by Typhoon Haiyan, the survey enabled examination of the associations between displacement and the conditions facing respondent households.<sup>13</sup> 75.1 per cent were displaced from their homes due to the typhoon, and 24.9 per cent were not displaced.<sup>14</sup> All tables and graphs presented in this report come from the quantitative survey.

The survey was designed to collect representative statistical data on the population affected by Typhoon Haiyan in Region VIII, the region most heavily affected by the disaster. A two-stage complex design was chosen, given the size, geographic distribution and possible heterogeneity of the reference population, and the variable effects of Typhoon Haiyan across the region.

To build the sampling frame, all municipalities in Region VIII (59 corresponding to 1,864 barangays with a population of 1,904,318 people and 405,174 families) located within 50 km of the Typhoon Haiyan storm track were included in the sampling frame (50 km above and 50 km below the storm track) (see Map 1).<sup>15</sup> Given the focus of the study on communities significantly affected by the typhoon, 11 municipalities with less than 25 per cent damage were removed from the sampling frame. Typhoon Hagupit (locally known as Ruby) hit the Philippines while the sampling strategy for this study was being prepared. While the areas most heavily affected by typhoons Haiyan and Hagupit were not the same, in order to ensure that the survey could effectively test the association between displacement due to Typhoon Haiyan and present conditions, without having to also account for another significant intervening event, five municipalities that experienced more than 1 per cent damage due to Typhoon Hagupit were removed from the sampling frame.

The final sampling frame is therefore made up of 43 municipalities or 1,511 barangays corresponding to a reference population of 343,389 households or 1,586,457 individuals.<sup>16</sup> Barangays are the primary sampling units (PSU) for the survey. Barangays or the PSUs were stratified according to: (a) location (coastal or inland); (b) three classes of poverty levels and (c) three levels of damage caused by Typhoon Haiyan. There were 18 strata created by combining these characteristics (2 strata did not have any PSUs in them, reducing the number of strata to 16).<sup>17</sup> Buildings are the secondary sampling units (SSU).

To sample barangays, random numbers were assigned to the barangays on this list, which were represented in the strata and nested within each municipality. The barangay with the lowest

13 For the purpose of the survey, a *household* is defined as a group of people, blood related or unrelated, who live together and share their resources.

14 In communicating survey results, terms such as *displaced households* are used to refer to the proportion of the population who indicated that they had to leave or lost their homes as a result of the typhoon, recognizing that some households in this group may no longer consider themselves to be displaced. The term is used in regards to these households' initial experience of displacement and not as a description of the current circumstances facing all households in this group.

15 The *barangay* is the smallest unit of governance in the Philippines. Data on the Typhoon Haiyan storm track was obtained from the Joint Typhoon Warning Center.

16 The reference population for the survey was determined on the basis of data obtained through the implementation of the 2010 National Census in Region VIII. The 2010 National Census population estimate for Region VIII was divided by the average family size for the region (4.62 individuals per family).

17 Barangays were classified as "coastal" if their boundaries touched the shore; otherwise, they were classified as "inland." Poverty rates were assessed on the basis of municipal-level data and reflect the percentage of people living in poverty according to government definitions. Poverty rates range from 9.8 per cent to 53.6 per cent in the selected municipalities, and three categories were created: (a) communities where 9.8–24.3 per cent of people are living in poverty; (b) communities where 24.4–38.9 per cent of people are living in poverty; and (c) communities where 39.0–53.6 per cent of people are living in poverty. Damage levels were assessed at the municipal level and represent the percentage of totally destroyed houses, based on information sent by barangay captains to municipal offices after Typhoon Haiyan. Municipalities were grouped in three classes of damage: 27–51.3 per cent damage, 51.3–75.7 per cent damage and 75.7–100 per cent damage. All categories were created using the variation range between the minimum and maximum value observed and divided by three.


randomly assigned number in each strata in each municipality was then selected (Given their larger populations, three barangays per strata were selected in each of three main population centres in the Typhoon Haiyan storm track in Region VIII: Ormoc, Tacloban and Guiuan). In each of the sampled barangays, 50 buildings were systematically sampled without repetition; all buildings had equal probability of being selected within each sampled barangay. All households residing in the sampled buildings were then interviewed.<sup>18</sup> Interviews were conducted with the head of the household or, in his or her absence, another adult member of the household. The questionnaire took an average of 40 minutes to complete; responses were recorded using tablets programmed with Open Data Kit.<sup>19</sup>

In sum, this approach ensured that the sample captured households from a variety of geographic and socioeconomic backgrounds. The theoretical or calculated sample size was 4,400 households in 88 barangays in 43 municipalities in Region VIII. The real sample size – that is, the total number of interviewed households – was 4,518. After weighting, this represents 336,851 households. Weights were applied to the sample to obtain estimates on the population of reference. Weights are calculated as the inverse of the probability of inclusion in the sample of families living in each stratum in each municipality. All figures presented in the text, tables and graphs of this report do not refer to the sample but to the reference population; that is, they do not indicate a percentage of the sample but of the reference population. Absolute numbers represent population estimates and percentages are weighted percentages. 95 per cent confidence intervals indicate the precision of the estimate. Chi-square tests are used to test the association between displacement and variables of interest. The analysis was performed in SAS using the SURVEYFREQ procedure, which allows for the definition of weights and strata and takes into consideration the stratified nature of the data and the disproportionate sampling design.

A range of qualitative methods were also applied to gain deeper insight into experiences of displacement and the struggle to recover following Typhoon Haiyan. The qualitative fieldwork was conducted in two stages, in late 2014 and March 2015, with initial findings from the first, exploratory round of fieldwork in 2014 informing the development of the survey and the continued qualitative fieldwork in 2015. The qualitative methods included: (a) 13 focus group discussions in Tacloban, Guiuan and surrounding rural areas; (b) site visits to heavily affected barangays and transitional sites; and (c) interviews with 34 key informants in Manila, Tacloban and Guiuan with national and local government officials (including elected leaders), local and foreign staff working with international organizations and NGOs, donors and disaster risk reduction specialists. Key informants and the communities that participated in focus group discussions were identified through purposive sampling, with a view to gaining a wide range of perspectives on the implications of the disaster and the challenges surrounding the sustainable resolution of displacement in the Philippines. Key informant interviews were conducted in English and lasted from 45 minutes to two hours. The focus groups were predominantly facilitated in Waray, lasted an average of one to one and a half hours, and involved approximately 170 adult participants in total. To analyse the ways in which gender shapes experiences of displacement and recovery, the composition of the focus groups varied, with some groups involving all woman, all men, or both women and men. The focus groups were conducted with individuals living in bunkhouses, transitional communities, permanent relocation sites, and in self-repaired or reconstructed homes in coastal urban barangays (in the “no-build zone”) and inland urban and rural communities. Qualitative data were coded; trends were identified and conclusions and recommendations were developed through integrated analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data.

18 Oversampling – in this case, interviewing all households within each selected building – was employed to compensate for the loss in precision due to the use of systematic rather than simple random sampling from a list of households, which was not possible due to resource constraints.

19 The questionnaire was administered in Waray, and refined following field testing. It was administered by trained IOM staff over a six-week period in February and March 2015 with a refusal rate of 0.6 per cent of households.



Map 1: Location of barangays for sampling



# Frameworks for Supporting Durable Solutions to Disaster-induced Displacement

The Philippines is, as one local disaster response expert expressed it, rich in laws. Alongside international normative standards on internal displacement, the Philippines has a wide range of important national and local institutions, laws and policies that underpin its responses to disaster-induced displacement.

## IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons

The IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons was developed under the leadership of Walter Kälin, the former Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights of IDPs. The Framework extends the discussion of the resolution of displacement included in the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which indicate that IDPs have a right to a durable solution.<sup>20</sup> The IASC Framework “describes the key human rights-based principles that should guide the search for durable solutions, and establishes criteria that determine to what extent a durable solution has been achieved.”<sup>21</sup> As both the Guiding Principles and the IASC Framework indicate, national authorities have primary responsibility for advancing IDPs’ right to a durable solution. Particularly in the Philippines, local authorities also play pivotal roles in resolving displacement. In addition, NGOs, international organizations and donors may make significant supporting contributions to the process, which is above all spearheaded by IDPs themselves. In the Philippines, as in many other countries around the world grappling with large displacement situations, IDPs do not typically wait to be “provided” a durable solution; instead, they actively seek out what opportunities they can to recover from their losses and improve their families’ well-being.

The resolution of displacement is, as the IASC Framework underlines, a long-term process that necessitates close cooperation between many different groups. It is not simply a humanitarian issue. Rather, the pursuit of durable solutions is first and foremost a development challenge with critical economic and human rights implications.<sup>22</sup>

The Framework examines the *process* for achieving durable solutions, stressing that IDPs have the right to actively participate in planning and decision-making related to the resolution of displacement, and to make voluntary, informed choices on durable solutions. In addition, the Framework lays out four key *criteria* that determine the extent to which durable solutions have been achieved. As the Framework states, IDPs who have obtained a durable solution should have no continuing assistance and protection needs associated with their displacement, and should in particular enjoy without discrimination:

20 W. Kälin, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations* (American Society of International Law/Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 125). While the IASC Framework is relevant in cases of disaster-induced and conflict-induced displacement, its primary focus on the dynamics associated with conflict situations has prompted some practitioners to observe that the Framework is particularly challenging to interpret and operationalize in post-disaster contexts. For a more detailed discussion of the application of the IASC Framework in post-disaster settings, see A. Sherwood et al. (2014).

21 IASC Framework, p. V.

22 For more detailed discussion of the development challenges associated with the pursuit of durable solutions, see for example, Sherwood et al. (2014), and Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Report to the General Assembly, A/68/225 presented at the 68th session, 31 July 2013, available from <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/413/77/PDF/N1341377.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 5 May 2015). See also the work of the Solutions Alliance, [www.endingdisplacement.org/](http://www.endingdisplacement.org/).

- Long-term safety, security and freedom of movement;
- An adequate standard of living, including at a minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, health care and basic education;
- Access to employment and livelihoods; and
- Access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property (HLP) or provide them with compensation.<sup>23</sup>

Depending on the circumstances, achieving durable solutions may also necessitate IDPs being able to equitably benefit from:

- Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation;
- Voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement;
- Participation in public affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population; and
- Effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violations.<sup>24</sup>

Achieving durable solutions does not mean that IDPs' rights and concerns should be unquestioningly prioritized over other populations that are also in need of support. As the Framework emphasizes, non-displaced community members "must not be neglected in comparison with the displaced."<sup>25</sup> Sustainably resolving displacement, as conceived in the IASC Framework, requires an integrated approach that considers the needs of whole communities, and is attuned to local economies.

The IASC Framework is not, for the most part, especially well known in the Philippines, particularly at the local level where the domestic frameworks discussed below constitute the primary reference points for responding to displacement caused by natural disasters. However, the IASC Framework's rights-based approach is related in its objectives and approach to important domestic standards, such as the Philippines' laws related to disasters and internal displacement, including a significant proposed bill on IDPs under debate in the Philippine Congress. The Framework can also be used in conjunction with domestic laws and policies to ensure that the particular needs and concerns often associated with displacement receive the attention they require, and are effectively integrated into broader recovery and reconstruction strategies.

## National and Local Frameworks

The Philippines has a well-developed and robust system of laws and regulations governing disaster risk reduction, disaster response, public housing and other issues with direct relevance to disaster-induced internal displacement and durable solutions. In addition to institutions with ongoing responsibility for disaster response and reconstruction, several Haiyan-specific institutional arrangements were enacted to deal with the unprecedented scale of the disaster. These laws, policies and institutional arrangements are significantly shaped by the Philippines' highly decentralized governance system, as per the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

<sup>23</sup> IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, A-4.

<sup>24</sup> IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, A-4.

<sup>25</sup> IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, A-3. This provision may not appear to be immediately relevant in the post-Haiyan context as the majority of households in heavily hit areas were displaced; however, the need to ensure equitable treatment of displaced and non-displaced community members is especially pertinent in areas outside the disaster zone to which IDPs moved, and in communities where progress towards durable solutions may be uneven.



Given the Philippines' vulnerability to major natural disasters, in 2007, the Philippine Government issued a circular that institutionalized the IASC cluster approach to humanitarian response within the government's emergency management mechanisms.<sup>26</sup> The circular established specific clusters, largely in line with clusters established at the global level by the IASC, and identified both government leads and international co-leads.<sup>27</sup> While there were some difficulties in the implementation of this system in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan, especially due to the size of the international response and the profound impact the typhoon had on the normal functioning of government at subnational levels in the worst affected areas, the Philippine Government nevertheless largely led relief efforts and continues to lead recovery and reconstruction programming. Government-led clusters were closed in July 2014, when the government declared the end of the relief phase.<sup>28</sup>

In 2010, the Philippines enacted the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act (DRRM Act), seeking to "develop, promote, and implement a comprehensive National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan (NDRRMP) that aims to strengthen the capacity of the national government and the local government units (LGUs), together with partner stakeholders, to build the disaster resilience of communities, and to institutionalize arrangements and measures for reducing disaster risks..."<sup>29</sup> Ambitious in its scope, the DRRM Act restructured risk reduction and emergency management bodies and functions at all levels and had a significant impact on relief, recovery and reconstruction efforts, including issues related to durable solutions, in the aftermath of Haiyan. At national level, the DRRM Act created the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), which is chaired by the Department of National Defense and vice-chaired by the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG, in charge of disaster preparedness), the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD, in charge of disaster response), the Department of Science and Technology (DOST, in charge of disaster prevention and mitigation) and the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA, in charge of disaster rehabilitation and recovery). Other government departments and agencies serve as members of NDRRMC. NDRRMC is in charge of the general oversight of the DRRM system in the Philippines, thereby playing an integral role in the response to Haiyan.

At subnational levels, the DRRM Act mandated the creation of thousands of DRRM Councils at regional, provincial, municipal and local levels to coordinate and implement DRRM activities at their respective jurisdictions. Critically, the Act establishes that LGUs "have the primary responsibility as first disaster responders."<sup>30</sup> LGUs were thus central to the implementation of policies and programmes having an impact on displacement and durable solutions following Haiyan. The DRRM Act also established a series of disaster risk reduction and management funds, accessible to the national and subnational governments. A minimum of 5 per cent of government revenue is set aside in the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund (LDRRMF) for disaster preparedness activities as well as a Quick Response Fund to permit rapid release of funds to LGUs for disaster response activities.

26 See [www.tinyurl.com/k2kqqzu](http://www.tinyurl.com/k2kqqzu). The IASC coordinates humanitarian assistance, and is comprised of the major international organizations and NGOs involved in emergency response and recovery processes.

27 The IASC cluster system includes the following clusters: (1) protection; (2) camp coordination and camp management; (3) health; (4) water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH); (5) emergency telecommunications; (6) food security; (7) logistics; (8) nutrition; (9) early recovery; (10) education; and (11) emergency shelter. The Philippine institutionalization of the cluster system also contains 11 clusters, although emergency telecommunications and education are not included; these are replaced by clusters focused on agriculture (a separate cluster from food security) and livelihoods.

28 Government-led clusters continue to operate in relation to other internal displacement situations in the Philippines, i.e. in Zamboanga.

29 Republic Act No. 10121, the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, sec. 2, available from [www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/45/Republic\\_Act\\_10121.pdf](http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/45/Republic_Act_10121.pdf) (accessed 6 May 2015).

30 DRRM Act, sec. 15.

As part of its mandate under the DRRM Act, and in light of the unprecedented scale of Haiyan, NEDA produced the Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda (RAY): Build Back Better framework to guide both national and international intervention in terms of relief, recovery and reconstruction. The document structures interventions in sectors, including shelter and resettlement, industry and services (including livelihoods) and social protection. Needs are categorized as *critical* (immediate action required in the six months following the disaster); *short-term* (2014); and *medium-term* (2015–2017). In total, the RAY framework estimated that USD 8.17 billion was needed to address all three phases.<sup>31</sup>

Considering the high levels of financial resources required for comprehensive recovery and rehabilitation, the President of the Philippines also established the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR) in early December 2013. OPARR was mandated, inter alia, to “[a]ct as over-all manager and coordinator of rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction efforts of government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities in the affected areas, to the extent allowed by law.”<sup>32</sup> OPARR subsequently spearheaded the development of the Comprehensive Relief and Recovery Plan (CRRP) and coordinated government, private sector, non-governmental and international assistance related to recovery from Typhoon Haiyan. However, responsibility for funding allocations and implementation of projects remained the domain of the specific departments and government agencies concerned.

Building on RAY, OPARR submitted the 8,000-page, 8-volume CRRP to the President for approval on 1 August 2014. The CRRP contains all recovery projects at LGU, provincial and national levels, a total of 18,400 projects with a combined budget of over USD 3.8 billion. The projects are classified into four “recovery clusters”: infrastructure, livelihood, resettlement and social services.<sup>33</sup> (These “recovery clusters” continue to operate, despite the government’s decision to close the humanitarian cluster system in July 2014.) Of particular relevance to durable solutions, within the CRRP, the resettlement cluster – coordinated by the government’s Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC) – aims to construct 205,128 permanent houses for “families living in hazard-prone and unsafe areas [that] will be relocated to safe areas for settlement,” representing a cornerstone of government recovery programming.<sup>34</sup>

These Haiyan-specific institutions and goals are related to the Philippines’ broader, elaborate system of public assistance in the housing sector. HUDCC “serves as the oversight, the over-all coordinator, initiator and facilitator of all government policies, plans and programs for the housing sector; sets the overall direction and targets for the sector; and determines strategies, formulates appropriate policies, monitors, and evaluates the programs, projects and performance of the implementing shelter agencies.”<sup>35</sup> Agencies attached to HUDCC have a variety of mandates, including land use regulation and planning, social housing finance, national mortgage assistance and low-income housing, which is the responsibility of the National Housing Authority (NHA). Critically, NHA has primary responsibility for resettlement and permanent house construction in post-disaster settings, and is a key player in the resettlement cluster under OPARR.<sup>36</sup>

31 Reconstruction Assistance on Yolanda: Build Back Better (RAY). 16 December 2013. Available from [www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/RAY-DOC-FINAL.pdf](http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/RAY-DOC-FINAL.pdf) (accessed 6 May 2015).

32 Memorandum Order No. 62, s. 2013. 6 December 2013. Sec. 1(a). Available from [www.gov.ph/2013/12/06/memorandum-order-no-62-s-2013/](http://www.gov.ph/2013/12/06/memorandum-order-no-62-s-2013/) (accessed 6 May 2015).

33 See E. Marcelo, “How government will spend P167.86B for Yolanda rehabilitation”, 8 November 2014, available from [www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/387222/news/nation/how-government-will-spend-p167-86b-for-yolanda-rehabilitation](http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/387222/news/nation/how-government-will-spend-p167-86b-for-yolanda-rehabilitation) (accessed 6 May 2015).

34 CRRP, sec. 7.3.2.

35 See [www.hudcc.gov.ph/content/hudcc-profile](http://www.hudcc.gov.ph/content/hudcc-profile) (accessed 6 May 2015).

36 Though NHA has a mandate for social housing, other government departments (such as DSWD) and LGUs are also regular actors in the sector, whether in the form of transitional shelters, “core shelters” or other activities.

In February 2013, the Congress of the Philippines approved the “Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Act of 2013,” which would have enshrined in law certain rights to IDPs, levied heavy fines for any arbitrary displacement and established a regime for financial assistance and compensation for the displaced. However, in May 2013, the President vetoed the law, objecting primarily to the compensation mechanism. As of this writing, a new version of the IDP law has passed the lower house of Congress and is currently in the upper house for debate. The draft law addresses displacement caused by a wide range of factors, and may, if passed, have significant bearing on ongoing efforts to advance durable solutions for those uprooted by Typhoon Haiyan. Additionally, the Urban Development and Housing Act is highly relevant in protecting IDPs in the Philippines, particularly in terms of equitable access to land and housing, and preventing and responding to evictions and arbitrary displacement.<sup>37</sup>

In sum, the Philippines has a robust set of general and Haiyan-specific frameworks that structure efforts to support durable solutions for IDPs in the aftermath of disasters. Local authorities have particularly critical roles in this system, which is characterized by complementary but complex interactions between different levels and branches of government.

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37 The development of the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons Act has been supported by the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of the Philippines, an independent commission created by the Philippine constitution to promote, advocate for and educate the population on human rights and investigate violations. The CHR has been involved in promoting a rights-based response to Typhoon Haiyan, including in terms of durable solutions.



# The Post-Haiyan Displacement Crisis: Background and Evolution of Responses

Before discussing national and international efforts to support durable solutions to displacement in Typhoon Haiyan's aftermath, this section first provides a brief overview of displacement patterns caused by the disaster. While the Philippines is categorized as a "lower middle income" country, displacement patterns and national and international responses alike were shaped by the majority of Haiyan victims, including IDPs, come from poor communities that have not, for the most part, enjoyed the fruits of the Philippines' economic growth. Indeed, an estimated 19.2 per cent of the population live in conditions of extreme poverty, on less than USD 1.25 a day.<sup>38</sup>

## Overview of Displacement Patterns

Internal displacement patterns immediately following the disaster were highly dynamic, with population estimates fluctuating dramatically. Typhoon Haiyan led to the displacement of approximately 4.3 million people in three main population centres in Region VIII (Tacloban, Ormoc and Guiuan) and hundreds of towns and villages, with the overwhelming number of IDPs staying with host families or returning promptly after the storm to their pre-typhoon land.<sup>39</sup> Smaller numbers sought refuge in spontaneous or organized IDP sites, or evacuated to Manila, Cebu or other regions outside the affected areas.<sup>40</sup>

In the days and weeks following the disaster, IDPs seeking refuge in organized or spontaneous sites were concentrated primarily in evacuation centres, which were generally located in public buildings, such as schools, churches, government buildings and multipurpose buildings. In many cases, IDPs simply stayed in the same buildings where they sheltered prior to the arrival of the typhoon. As of 13 November, five days after landfall, the Government estimated that 286,433 people (59,733 families) were sheltering in 993 evacuation centres.<sup>41</sup>

As the situation began to stabilize, IDPs were encouraged to depart from many of the evacuation centres, especially those located in schools, as the Department of Education planned to resume classes in early 2014. As of 2 December 2013, three weeks after the typhoon, an estimated 34,522 IDPs (7,281 households) were living in 225 displacement sites (primarily evacuation centres) in Region VIII.<sup>42</sup> Of the 225 sites, 132 (59%) were schools, sheltering 21,230 individuals, or 61 per cent of the IDP population living in displacement sites. As of 31 January 2014, only 18 evacuation centres

38 See [www.usaid.gov/frontiers/2014/publication/section-1-extreme-poverty-philippines](http://www.usaid.gov/frontiers/2014/publication/section-1-extreme-poverty-philippines).

39 Displacement figures vary widely depending on the source and date of the information. For example, DSWD's Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center (DROMIC) reported that, on 11 November 2013, 584,642 people were displaced. By 16 November, DROMIC figures had jumped to over 4 million. The latest DROMIC figures estimated a displaced population of 4.3 million, representing both the last DROMIC estimates of IDP numbers as well as the highest. For a more in-depth summary of displacement patterns, see, for example, [www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/The-Evolving-Picture-of-Displacement-in-the-Wake-of-Typhoon-Haiyan.pdf](http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/The-Evolving-Picture-of-Displacement-in-the-Wake-of-Typhoon-Haiyan.pdf).

40 It is difficult to estimate the number of people who left affected areas in the period immediately following the disaster. However, DSWD and the Department of Health reported that from 15 to 22 November 2013, approximately 17,000 people took military flights from affected areas to Cebu and Villamor Airbase in Manila, where reception centres were established to provide food, medical care and temporary shelter, among other services. Migration Outflow Desks were established by IOM at ports, airports and bus stations in affected areas to, inter alia, register people moving between regions and screen for potential human trafficking cases. Precise figures are difficult to discern, although the Protection Cluster estimated that approximately 5,000 people left affected regions each day in the immediate aftermath of the typhoon. See [www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/philippines/document/protection-cluster-assessment-report-sty-haiyan-yolanda-29-november](http://www.humanitarianresponse.info/operations/philippines/document/protection-cluster-assessment-report-sty-haiyan-yolanda-29-november).

41 [www.gov.ph/rescueph-a-detailed-list-of-government-rescue-and-relief-efforts-before-and-immediately-after-yolanda/](http://www.gov.ph/rescueph-a-detailed-list-of-government-rescue-and-relief-efforts-before-and-immediately-after-yolanda/).

42 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), Region VIII, Round I, December 2013, available from <http://cccmphilippines.iom.int/dtm-main> (accessed 6 May 2015).

remained open, housing 8,591 IDPs (1,994 households). However, during that same period, 14 tent camps (or “tent cities”) and 4 spontaneous sites opened, with 5,232 IDPs (1,258 households).<sup>43</sup>

Several weeks after the typhoon, the Government (led by the Department of Public Works and Highways or DPWH) began the construction of “bunkhouses” – blocks of dormitory-style housing – across the affected areas. At the outset, bunkhouses were the object of some controversy, especially in terms of compliance with Sphere Standards. In many areas, bunkhouses were improved to come closer to established standards, although this was not possible in all cases. Many interviewees suggested that tensions over the Sphere Standards in relation to the bunkhouses was reflective of ineffective or overly adversarial approaches to advocacy from the international community, rather than an approach focused on the contextualization and progressive realization of humanitarian and human rights standards. This adversarial approach fuelled scepticism on the part of some government officials on the relevance of international standards.

By late December 2013, the first bunkhouses were completed and many IDPs began to relocate to them. Most bunkhouses were fully occupied within the first several months of completion, with others being constructed and occupied over the course of 2014. The peak bunkhouse population was reached in October 2014, with a total population of 16,496 IDPs (3,676 households) living in these provisional shelters.<sup>44</sup> By April 2015, 13,333 IDPs (2,982 households) remained in bunkhouses; the overwhelming majority of these IDPs lived in low-lying coastal areas prior to Typhoon Haiyan and are currently awaiting the provision of alternative housing arrangements in transitional or permanent sites.<sup>45</sup>

The overwhelming majority of IDPs, however, lived in host family arrangements or in makeshift shelters on their pre-typhoon land, the land of family members or in other situations outside formal or informal displacement sites. For the most part, systematic data collection efforts on the conditions facing these populations ceased within a year of the disaster (and were limited from the outset in the case of IDPs living with host families). With these populations no longer being “counted” as IDPs, there has been a lack of detailed information on the extent to which they continue to face particular needs and vulnerabilities associated with their displacement – in other words, whether they have been able to access durable solutions.

## National and Local Responses Related to Durable Solutions

Several days before the arrival of Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippine Government fully mobilized to prepare for the storm’s landfall. On 7 November, the President conducted a nationwide live television broadcast and dispatched the secretaries of National Defense and Interior and Local Government to the city of Tacloban to coordinate preparations. Simultaneously, DSWD prepositioned relief supplies and food, and emergency funds were allocated and put on standby.

In the initial period following landfall, the Government undertook large-scale distributions of food and relief supplies, and focused resources on reopening ports and airports, clearing roads, re-establishing electricity and communications where possible, providing medical care for the injured and establishing coordination and distribution hubs in affected provinces. The Armed Forces of the Philippines were fully mobilized, working closely with foreign military contingents to deliver relief supplies by air, land and sea.

Relief distributions continued for several months following landfall, with DSWD leading relief operations for IDPs, including those in evacuation centres. By the end of November, however, the

<sup>43</sup> IOM DTM, January 2014, available from <http://cccmphilippines.iom.int/dtm-main>.

<sup>44</sup> DTM, October 2014, available from <http://cccmphilippines.iom.int/dtm-main>.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.



Government began planning recovery and reconstruction, including an early focus on “building back better” and encouraging disaster-resistant construction methods in affected areas. At a speech in December 2013, the President stated:

... we know that we cannot allow ourselves to be trapped in a vicious cycle of destruction and reconstruction. We know that it is more efficient to prioritize resilience now, rather than to keep rebuilding. This is why we are going to build back better. The task immediately before us lies in ensuring that the communities that rise again do so stronger, better, and more resilient than before.<sup>46</sup>

Crucial to the strategy of building back better was the construction of more resistant housing, but equally important was that reconstruction took place in areas that are less prone to storm surge. In late November, media statements were issued relating to a 40-metre exclusion zone in coastal areas, or a “no-build zone” (NBZ) to be implemented by LGUs. In reality, no new policy was created; rather, the President directed the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to enforce provisions of the 1976 Water Code that created public easements along coastlines and other water sources.<sup>47</sup> Over the subsequent weeks and months, the NBZ became the object of increasing controversy, due in part to inconsistencies within and between LGUs in its implementation and questions regarding its legal basis. There were also doubts about its effectiveness in achieving public safety goals, its disproportionate impact on poorer fishing communities, the massive number of people who would be affected should the policy be applied countrywide, and other issues. The Commission on Human Rights played an important role in promoting a rights-based approach to addressing these challenges through the release of an advisory on the housing, land and property rights of Haiyan-affected populations.<sup>48</sup>

Upon recognition of some of these problems, the government first modified the concept from “no-build” to “no-dwelling” within the same 40-metre easement.<sup>49</sup> Thereafter, the formulation was again changed to “safe” versus “unsafe zones,” to be determined based on hazard identification and mapping. This approach was formalized in a circular issued 5 November 2014 by the secretaries of DPWH, DENR, DOST and DILG which, inter alia, defined low, moderate and high hazard zones, and agreed on implementation modalities for hazard mapping. However, certain LGUs had implemented land use plans or re-zoned certain areas to correspond with the former 40-metre NBZ policy, or had committed to a broader policy of relocation away from coastal areas in general. In some areas, such as Tacloban City, current relocation activities closely follow plans that existed prior to the typhoon, but are now being implemented on public safety grounds.

In the context of widespread confusion on relocation and NBZs in the months following the disaster, many thousands of people were relocated to inland areas, in many cases to bunkhouses, where displaced populations would wait for the completion of transitional shelters or permanent housing in relocation sites. Approximately one year after the typhoon, the agencies working under the OPARR resettlement cluster as part of the CRRP had completed construction of 1,252 permanent houses, with 7,377 scheduled to be completed in early 2015. According to OPARR, 17.3 per cent of

46 [www.gov.ph/2013/12/18/speech-of-president-aquino-at-the-briefing-on-reconstruction-assistance-on-yolanda/](http://www.gov.ph/2013/12/18/speech-of-president-aquino-at-the-briefing-on-reconstruction-assistance-on-yolanda/).

47 The Water Code of the Philippines was enacted by the Presidential Decree in 1976 and established a series of public easements along coastlines, the width of which were determined by land use. In urban areas, the easement measured 3 m from the high water line, 20 m in agricultural areas and 40 m in forest areas. Importantly, the Water Code refers to “structures” in the public easements and does not make specific reference to dwellings or housing. Its stated purpose is to protect water sources and is thus not directly related to public safety. See Presidential Decree No. 1067 (1976), Water Code of the Philippines.

48 CHR (2014) Human Rights Advisory – A2014-001: Human Rights Standards on Housing, Land and Property Rights of Populations Affected by Typhoon Yolanda, CHR, Manila.

49 [www.gov.ph/2014/03/14/parr-no-build-zone-policy-not-recommended-in-yolanda-affected-areas](http://www.gov.ph/2014/03/14/parr-no-build-zone-policy-not-recommended-in-yolanda-affected-areas).

the over USD 1.7 billion allocated to the sector had been released as of February 2015.<sup>50</sup> All 205,128 new houses are officially still scheduled to be completed by the end of 2016.<sup>51</sup>

Although it is not explicitly framed in terms of durable solutions, the priorities of the social services cluster have direct bearing on the resolution of displacement generated by Haiyan; these include education, health, food security and environmental protection. The cluster also undertakes an important cash distribution programme for those with partially damaged or destroyed houses. This entitlement is limited to those in “safe zones”, with the expectation that those outside the safe zones would receive permanent housing in relocation sites activities instead. As of February 2015, approximately USD 70 million of the over USD 600 million allocated had been disbursed; this figure had risen somewhat by April 2015, but still less than 15 per cent of the allotted cash assistance had been disbursed.<sup>52</sup> Within the livelihoods cluster, whose work is also of immediate relevance to durable solutions, USD 700 million in projects have been planned, ranging from support to agriculture, fisheries and small and medium businesses, to “emergency employment,” skills training and a wide variety of other projects. As of February 2015, over USD 250 million had been disbursed to LGUs and implementing agencies.<sup>53</sup> The work of the infrastructure cluster includes critical construction projects, such as roads, ports, airports and public facilities, such as schools and markets. The cluster also supports projects related to livelihoods, such as farm-to-market roads and fisheries infrastructure. The cluster has been allocated nearly USD 800 million, of which over USD 500 million had been disbursed as of February 2015.<sup>54</sup>

Beyond public reconstruction efforts, the Philippines’ non-profit and private sectors have also played – and continue to play – important roles in relief, recovery and reconstruction. In total, the private sector contributed almost USD 300 million in assistance, ranging from the provision of over 1 million business loans, to the donation of 10,000 fishing boats and over 9,000 temporary houses, alongside a wide variety of other activities.<sup>55</sup> Private sector support included in-kind donations; cash donations to the government, international agencies and NGOs; and partnerships with local governments. Churches and a diverse range of community-based NGOs have also been critical, local drivers of the reconstruction process.

## International Responses

Given the sweeping destruction caused by Typhoon Haiyan and the international media attention it attracted, a massive international response – bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental – was initiated following the Government’s request for assistance. Within days of the disaster, numerous foreign military contingents were supporting humanitarian operations, providing equipment, logistics and relief supplies. For example, the United States Department of Defense deployed 13,400 military personnel, 66 aircraft and 12 naval vessels including an aircraft carrier battle group.<sup>56</sup> Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and 16 other countries deployed military ships, aircraft and personnel, providing the Philippine Government with significant quantities of relief supplies and logistical capacity to reach affected areas.<sup>57</sup> Dozens of countries also donated to relief efforts in the form of cash assistance and supplies. In addition, there was an outpouring of

50 See “Progress”, OPARR, available from [www.oparr.gov.ph/progress](http://www.oparr.gov.ph/progress) (accessed 6 May 2015).

51 See “Typhoon Yolanda: A year later”, OPARR, available from [www.gov.ph/crisis-response/updates-typhoon-yolanda](http://www.gov.ph/crisis-response/updates-typhoon-yolanda) (accessed 6 May 2015).

52 See “Social Services Cluster”, OPARR, available from [www.oparr.gov.ph/social-services/](http://www.oparr.gov.ph/social-services/) (accessed 6 May 2015).

53 See “Livelihood Cluster”, OPARR, available from [www.oparr.gov.ph/livelihood/](http://www.oparr.gov.ph/livelihood/) (accessed 6 May 2015).

54 See “Infrastructure Cluster”, OPARR, available from [www.oparr.gov.ph/infrastructure](http://www.oparr.gov.ph/infrastructure) (accessed 6 May 2015).

55 See Government of the Philippines, ReliefPH: Private sector participation and foreign assistance, available from [www.gov.ph/private-sector-participation-and-foreign-assistance/](http://www.gov.ph/private-sector-participation-and-foreign-assistance/) (accessed 6 May 2015). On the role of the private sector, see also [www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/the-private-sector-stepping-up](http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/the-private-sector-stepping-up).

56 See U.S. Embassy to the Philippines, Announcement of the disestablishment of the U.S. Military Operation Damayan, available from [www.manila.usembassy.gov/jtf-505-disestablished.html](http://www.manila.usembassy.gov/jtf-505-disestablished.html) (accessed 6 May 2015).

57 See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Infographic on foreign military assets deployed post-Haiyan, 30 December 2013, available from <http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-foreign-military-deployed-assets-30-december-2013> (accessed 6 May 2015).

international solidarity, with private citizens, celebrities and companies raising money to support relief operations. Numerous multinational corporations, many of which employ large numbers of Philippine nationals or diaspora members, made significant contributions to support relief efforts.

In terms of multilateral assistance, Typhoon Haiyan presented the IASC and the international humanitarian system in general with its first opportunity to activate the Level 3 emergency mechanism in a natural disaster, one of the reforms undertaken in the context of the Transformative Agenda.<sup>58</sup> Level 3 emergencies are considered “system-wide” emergencies that require mobilization of human resources and logistical, financial and coordination capacities beyond that which is normally deployed or otherwise made available in an emergency response and drawing on resources from a global level. In the Philippines, the activation of Level 3 had the effect of, inter alia, increasing funding allocations from centralized financing mechanisms such as the United Nations’ Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and led to the deployment of significant “surge capacity” from IASC member agencies to permit rapid scale-up of operations in response to extensive humanitarian needs. At times, this upsurge in deployment of personnel and resources created tensions between the international community and the government, including in relation to the overall coordination structure and the interaction between government clusters and international agencies, the application and appropriateness of international standards, the creation and development of strategies and frameworks to guide the response; and other issues.<sup>59</sup>

The Strategic Response Plan (SRP), the common fundraising mechanism of UN agencies and many international NGOs, initially requested USD 308 million, and later revised that figure to USD 776 million, to cover humanitarian and recovery needs for the period November 2013–November 2014. The SRP estimated a total affected population of 14 million people, and targeted 3 million among them for assistance.<sup>60</sup> Of the USD 776 million requested, a total of USD 468 million was raised and spent by international agencies and international NGOs, representing just over 60 per cent of requested funds.<sup>61</sup> Food security and agriculture (USD 182 million), emergency shelter (USD 173 million) and early recovery and livelihoods (USD 115 million) represented the three largest sectorial requests, and were 72.3 per cent, 46.7 per cent and 28.5 per cent funded, respectively.<sup>62</sup>

After the end of food distributions in the early part of the response, the shelter sector became by far the largest aspect of the international response, both in terms of funding and scale of activities, owing to the massive extent of housing losses. Interventions in the initial period after the typhoon focused on the provision of emergency shelter (tents, tarpaulins) and non-food items, such as mattresses, blankets and cooking kits. Quickly, however, the sector began planning for recovery shelter interventions. Shelter agencies provided a wide variety of assistance, such as shelter repair kits (including metal roofing sheets, lumber and related materials), transitional shelters, cash assistance and “core shelter” construction. There were also significant efforts made to improve construction methods, in line with the government’s focus on “build[ing] back better.” As of 6 October 2014, agencies reporting to the Shelter Cluster had completed 104,390 new housing units (temporary, core or permanent houses) and assisted 240,463 households with major or minor repairs, or self-recovery.<sup>63</sup>

58 For more information on the Transformative Agenda launched by the heads of major humanitarian agencies in 2011, see IASC Principals Transformative Agenda, IASC, available from [www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87](http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloader.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87) (accessed 6 May 2015).

59 For further reflections on the international humanitarian response, see T. Hanley et al., *IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response* (OCHA, New York, 2014).

60 [www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SRP\\_2013-2014\\_Philippines\\_Typhoon\\_Haiyan.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/SRP_2013-2014_Philippines_Typhoon_Haiyan.pdf).

61 See OCHA Financial Tracking Service, Table D: Requirements, funding and outstanding pledges per Cluster, Typhoon Haiyan Strategic Response Plan (November 2013–October 2014), available from [www.fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/OCHA\\_R32sum\\_A1043.XLS](http://www.fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/OCHA_R32sum_A1043.XLS) (accessed 6 May 2015).

62 Ibid.

63 See Shelter Cluster Philippines, Analysis of Shelter Recovery, available from [www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Final%20Analysis%20of%20Shelter%20Recovery.pdf](http://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Final%20Analysis%20of%20Shelter%20Recovery.pdf) (accessed 6 May 2015).

The NBZ had direct implications for interventions related to durable solutions, and international agencies and donors reacted to the NBZ in different ways. Certain agencies and donors were willing to engage in construction of transitional shelters or provide other “non-permanent” shelter assistance in coastal areas, as long as LGUs permitted such interventions, whereas many others did not. Numerous agencies engaged in advocacy on the issue of NBZs and relocation more broadly, urging government decision-makers at different levels to reconsider this approach. Others provided technical assistance in the completion of new hazard maps to better delineate safe and unsafe areas and in the creation or updating of land use plans.

International agencies and NGOs also participated to varying extents in relocation projects. In the north of Tacloban – the area designated by the city government for the relocation of many residents living near the coast – numerous transitional housing projects had been completed or were under construction by early 2015, while permanent housing projects are gradually getting off the ground. Various other transitional and permanent housing projects are ongoing or had been completed at the time of this writing in other areas of Leyte, as well as in Eastern Samar and other affected areas. Other projects are still in the planning stages and had not yet begun as of early 2015.

Aside from interventions in the shelter and housing sector, international agencies and NGOs invested significantly in short-term livelihood assistance – commonly in the form of cash assistance, skills training, fishing boat repair or replacement, and replanting of coconut trees and other agricultural interventions. Support was also provided for: (a) disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness programming; (b) water and sanitation services, including construction of new water systems at relocation or transitional sites; and (c) construction of new health facilities.

The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank were also heavily involved in relief and reconstruction, with many of their interventions having an impact on social protection, housing and durable solutions prospects. As of this writing, the World Bank had pledged over USD 1 billion in loans, grants and other assistance in the aftermath of Haiyan and the Asian Development Bank had also committed over USD 1 billion, in a mix of loans, grants, budget support and other assistance.<sup>64</sup>

In short, while many international actors – much like national and local actors – did not necessarily frame their interventions specifically in terms of supporting “durable solutions,” a wide range of activities were undertaken during and after the emergency response phase that had direct bearing on progress towards the resolution of the internal displacement crisis generated by Typhoon Haiyan. Yet major challenges remain. The following section explores the extent to which displacement-related assistance and protection needs persist in Haiyan-affected communities.

<sup>64</sup> See World Bank, “Kim announces new planned funding for Filipinos hit by Typhoon Haiyan” press release on 14 July 2014, available from [www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/14/kim-announces-new-planned-funding-for-filipinos-hit-by-typhoon-haiyan](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/07/14/kim-announces-new-planned-funding-for-filipinos-hit-by-typhoon-haiyan) (accessed 6 May 2015); Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan): Asian Development Bank Assistance (Asian Development Bank) available from [www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/154518/typhoon-yolanda-haiyan-adb-assistance.pdf](http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/154518/typhoon-yolanda-haiyan-adb-assistance.pdf) (accessed 6 May 2015).

# Supporting Durable Solutions to Displacement in Haiyan-affected Areas

Before analysing specific challenges pertaining to the realization of the criteria for durable solutions identified in the IASC Framework, this section considers some of the broad challenges that shaped efforts to resolve displacement following Typhoon Haiyan.

## Overarching Challenges

Resolving displacement is a long-term undertaking. In this sense, it is still too early to offer a definitive overview of the challenges to the durable solutions process. However, early efforts to support the resolution of the displacement and housing crisis generated by Typhoon Haiyan were certainly constrained by a range of significant, sometimes systemic challenges. Most obviously, Typhoon Haiyan resulted in massive levels of destruction, death and displacement over a vast geographic area. This presented major logistical difficulties for both the emergency response and longer-term durable solutions and reconstruction processes. Many of the affected communities were, even before Typhoon Haiyan, among the poorest in the country. Thousands of families lost both their homes and main breadwinners, compounding the psychological traumas and socioeconomic hardships the disaster entailed.

Perhaps inevitably in such a massive disaster prompting local, national and international responses, the disaster relief and recovery process became highly politicized, intertwining with electoral ambitions and rivalries. Many of the actors involved had dramatically differing approaches, expectations, capacities and agendas, generating significant tensions and coordination barriers. Almost unvaryingly, national and local Filipino officials described the arrival of international organizations and NGOs as a “flood,” and pointed out that however well intentioned, most international staff lacked adequate knowledge of disaster response mechanisms, legal frameworks and governance systems in the Philippines. In addition, these international organizations and NGOs often approached government officials in a manner better suited to negotiating with recalcitrant authorities in a conflict zone than working with a government with extensive experience in natural disaster response and dedicated to assisting its citizens. For their part, international officials highlighted the impossibility of expecting poorly resourced and short-staffed local governments who are still reeling from the effects of the disaster on their own families to manage an extraordinarily complex logistical response – a view that sometimes carried over to the recovery phase as well. In this context, polarizing debates emerged on the relevance of international standards, particularly the Sphere Standards, and the best approaches to applying them. In some quarters, this translated into broader scepticism surrounding international standards – a scepticism that was not, for the most part, constructively addressed through donor and diplomatic advocacy. National staff working with international organizations and NGOs became key interlocutors with the government at different levels, helping to build mutual understanding and smoothing relations.

As the response evolved, tensions also arose surrounding the goals, timing and nature of the reconstruction and durable solutions process. For the most part, the IASC Framework was not well known, and different actors embraced divergent ideas of what was required to resolve the displacement situation, with only a minority understanding durable solutions as a protection concern. For some, durable solutions to displacement were simply equated with shelter. From this perspective, resolving displacement was simply seen as a matter of moving people out of tents and bunkhouses; once displaced people returned to their places of origin and began reconstructing

their homes, their displacement and associated hardships were assumed to have ended. For others, durable solutions were also seen to require attention to a range of other losses associated with displacement, including livelihoods, but there were no clear answers on which challenges should be tackled first, or how to redress the inequalities that arise from investing in a holistic range of interventions in particular communities, leaving fewer resources for other areas. Throughout the response to date, timing has been a challenge, with pressure to take immediate action sometimes compromising careful, participatory, evidence-based decision-making processes (particularly regarding relocation), and facilitating the promulgation of problematic concepts such as the “no-build zone.” Systems to prevent corruption and ensure the responsible use of financial resources have also slowed some implementation processes, albeit with good reason.

*“For some, durable solutions to displacement were simply equated with shelter...For others, durable solutions were also seen to require attention to a range of other losses associated with displacement, including livelihoods.”*

Support for durable solutions has also been limited by the lack of reliable data on the evolving needs of the disaster-affected population, including IDPs. Data on displaced persons living with host families is particularly scarce, leading to potential neglect of this population’s needs. Although data on hazards and risk maps is now more widely available, including through initiatives such as Project NOAH, many local authorities struggle to effectively use this data in decision-making related to reconstruction and the resolution of displacement. This is particularly challenging because – as the arrival of Typhoon Hagupit (Ruby) in December 2014 made all too clear – efforts to resolve displacement caused by Typhoon Haiyan are unfolding against the backdrop of the Philippines’ continued exposure to natural disasters, including not only typhoons but also earthquakes, tsunamis, floods and landslides.

Almost without fail, international officials interviewed for this study remarked on the gratitude, joyfulness and resilience of the Filipino population, with some describing the Haiyan survivors as the happiest beneficiaries they have seen. While this positive outlook is undeniably a source of strength for individuals and communities, some international actors struggled to recognize and respond to the deep discontent that often exists alongside gratitude and optimism. This discontent is rooted in broken and unfulfilled promises, as well as broader discomfort with the ways in which different criteria are used – often inexplicably or inconsistently, from IDPs’ perspectives – to determine who is eligible for help. Although many focus group participants recognized that certain groups, such as widows and sole survivors, experienced particularly severe losses and should be entitled to increased support, most strongly felt that since everyone in their communities suffered because of the typhoon, everyone should be able to access assistance. This perspective is perhaps reflective of an especially strong sense of community solidarity and cohesion in Haiyan-affected areas, and underscores the value of community-based approaches to supporting durable solutions. However, it sits uneasily with predominant approaches that focus on identifying and responding to particular vulnerabilities at the individual or household level.

## The Durable Solutions Process

The IASC Framework indicates that a rights-based approach to the resolution of displacement should “ensure that IDPs are in a position to make both an informed and voluntary choice on what durable solution they would like to pursue.”<sup>65</sup> According to the conditions laid out in the Framework, IDPs have active roles to play in planning and managing durable solutions so that their rights and needs are appropriately considered within humanitarian, recovery and development strategies. A

<sup>65</sup> IASC Framework, p. 15.



rights-based approach to durable solutions also entails that IDPs have access to humanitarian and development actors and to mechanisms that effectively monitor their situation over time.

The Haiyan response was notable for initiating a range of programmes intended to directly engage and increase accountability towards affected populations, including IDPs. The household survey conducted for this study suggests that many of these initiatives were at best only modestly successful from the survivors' perspectives.<sup>66</sup> While well-intentioned, such initiatives struggle to counterbalance the socioeconomic inequalities and long-standing patterns of marginalization that exclude the majority of poor survivors from active participation in official decision-making processes on reconstruction and the resolution of displacement. For example, a majority of the population (70.3%) was aware of the government plans for recovery and reconstruction (Table 1).

**Table 1: Awareness of government reconstruction and recovery plans (Y/N)**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Yes	236,928	70.34
No	99,923	29.66
Total	336,851	100.00

However, only a little more than half (54.1%) believed that the plans represented their needs and preferences. A quarter of the population (25.5%) was sceptical that their preferences and needs were being met, and another 20.3 per cent were unsure (Table 2).

**Table 2: Perception that government plans reflect needs and preferences of the typhoon-affected population (Y/N)**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Yes	182,228	54.10
No	86,181	25.58
Don't know	68,442	20.32
Total	336,851	100.00

No significant association was found between being displaced and perceptions of the extent to which government reconstruction and recovery plans reflected individuals' needs and preferences. People were most likely to receive information about reconstruction and recovery plans from friends and family (35.7%), or through communication with local officials (35.1%) (Table 3).

**Table 3: Common mechanisms for receiving information on government plans/programmes**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Friends and family	120,328	35.72
Local officials	118,154	35.08
Community meetings	111,114	32.99
Radio/Media/Newspapers	47,521	14.11
Church meetings	2,092	0.62
Public info materials	2,297	0.68
We don't receive it	80,286	23.83

*Note:* This question allows multiple answers, so the total is not equal to the total population estimate.

<sup>66</sup> On efforts to strengthen communication with affected communities and increase accountability towards the recipients of humanitarian assistance, see for example [www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/coordination-around-communicating-with-disaster-affected-communities-insights-from-typhoon-haiyan](http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/coordination-around-communicating-with-disaster-affected-communities-insights-from-typhoon-haiyan), [www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/constructing-a-culture-of-accountability-lessons-from-the-philippines](http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/constructing-a-culture-of-accountability-lessons-from-the-philippines) and [www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/pamati-kita-lets-listen-together](http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-63/pamati-kita-lets-listen-together).

This reliance on informal information networks and interaction with local officials was substantiated by the study's qualitative findings. Focus group participants usually portrayed communication as a one-way street, with some community members indicating that they were unable to voice their concerns to key decision-makers, or were afraid that this would lead to them being punished for speaking out, for example by being bumped down or off of beneficiary lists. Affirming other qualitative findings, only 38.3 per cent of the population felt they had an opportunity to participate in the delivery of aid by government departments (Table 4).

**Table 4: Opportunity to participate in designing/implementing government aid interventions (Y/N)**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Yes	128,835	38.25
No	74,205	22.03
We did not receive help	133,811	39.72
Total	336,851	100.00

A slightly higher proportion (49.6%) felt they were active participants in the design and implementation of aid provided by international organizations (Table 5).

**Table 5: Opportunity to participate in designing/implementing shelter interventions led by NGOs or international organizations (Y/N)**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Yes	167,184	49.63
No	53,520	15.89
We did not receive help	116,147	34.48
Total	336,851	100.00

## Informed and Voluntary Choice

The principles of voluntariness and the right to freedom of movement, expressed in the Guiding Principles and IASC Framework, mean that IDPs have a right to choose a place of residence that is conducive to their needs. These principles furthermore prohibit forcible return or relocation in areas where IDPs' safety and security are at risk.<sup>67</sup> Despite the clear articulation of these principles in human rights standards, in situations of mass and complex population movements, it can be difficult to define and precisely distinguish between "forced" and "voluntary" movement. Furthermore, in many regulatory frameworks, governments stipulate and justify their right to restrict freedom of movement and voluntary choice of residence when exercise of these rights is seen to jeopardize the general welfare of the population, or impinge on the rights of other citizens.<sup>68</sup>

Among many residents of coastal communities and national and international stakeholders, there is a strong perception that, in practice, coastal residents in particular have not had the freedom to choose a place of residence that best fits their post-Haiyan needs. From this perspective, the ability of coastal residents to return and rebuild has been undercut by their ineligibility in many cases to receive shelter assistance as their former homes are located in what was originally referred to as the no-build zones. While many coastal residents are interested in relocation due to fears of future disasters, movements to new, relatively remote relocation sites are "coerced" on a certain level

<sup>67</sup> For a full discussion of movement-related rights and international law pertaining to situations of internal displacement, see J. Oloka-Onyango, "Movement-related rights in the context of internal displacement" In: *Incorporating the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into Domestic Law – Issues and Challenges*, W. Kälin (eds.) (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, Washington, D.C., 2010).

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p.28.

because there is a lack of other viable options. In most cases, relocation sites are far from the main centres of commercial and economic life, and many affected community members do not see how they could meet their basic needs while living in these sites, at least in the short term. Another questionable element of relocations was the expressed urgency of the process – people were pressed to make quick decisions without sufficient information on their future living arrangements. Opportunities to participate in “go-and-see” visits in advance of relocations were often limited; some focus group participants who were relocating imminently had never seen the settlements where they were to live. Some indicated that they felt time pressures to relocate because land leases on temporary sites and bunkhouses were close to expiring, or because if they did not accept the housing on offer, they might not be able to access other options in the future.<sup>69</sup>

One stakeholder identified the core of these dilemmas as a general disregard for voluntariness, dignity and choice, noting:

You need to ensure families have go and see visits to relocation sites. Because they need to understand what are the implications if they move, they need to know what is their right to choose. You have to educate LGUs that even though the IDPs asked for help, this doesn’t mean they waived their rights and can just be moved anywhere.<sup>70</sup>

In light of this, some stakeholders felt that more people could be empowered and supported to negotiate for land, or to do “on-site” upgrades to their existing plots alongside the construction of evacuation centres where they can shelter in case of future typhoons, and thus have an alternative to relocation to sites that are far from their livelihoods.

## The Right to Assistance in Support of Durable Solutions

The Guiding Principles and the IASC Framework clearly indicate that IDPs have a right to request and receive assistance, and unimpeded access to government and international humanitarian and development actors involved in the durable solutions process.<sup>71</sup> The quantitative and qualitative data produced different findings on satisfaction with assistance, with a high percentage (69.4%) reporting that their needs and preferences had been incorporated into aid packages (Table 6), although, as previously noted, only 54.1 per cent felt that their needs and preferences were reflected in government reconstruction plans.

**Table 6: Perceptions of whether aid packages reflect needs and preferences (Y/N)**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Yes	233,702	69.38
No	85,684	25.44
Do not know	17,465	5.18
Total	336,851	100.00

Despite the quantitative findings suggesting quite high levels of satisfaction with aid packages, there should be caution in interpreting this data. As discussed above, many people did not necessarily have an opportunity to participate in the process, with many focus group participants indicating they usually did not raise complaints out of fear of being dropped from beneficiary lists, losing

<sup>69</sup> In other contexts, such as in Indonesia after the Indian Ocean tsunami, risk mitigation options were presented that enabled fisher communities to return to “unsafe” areas following community-based risk mitigation training. Such options have been under-examined or neglected in Haiyan-affected communities.

<sup>70</sup> Interview, national staff member working with international agency, Manila, December 2014.

<sup>71</sup> See, for example, Guiding Principles 3 and 30, and IASC Framework, p. 22.

their “right” to relocate, or being rendered ineligible for future assistance. Participants in one focus group stated that they had attempted to visit the city government to air their grievances but were dismissed. Members of another focus group complained that assistance was not given to them directly; rather, their barangay officials distributed it based on their political interests. In various cases, there was “culture of silence” observed that significantly disempowered individuals in aid delivery and durable solutions processes. This was, however, not always the case; for example, some community members actively debated their ineligibility for shelter assistance with their mayor’s office.

As elaborated upon in other sections of this report, some coastal populations have been excluded from shelter assistance because of policies that prohibit rebuilding in these areas. Although the national government has since issued a multidepartment circular mandating the designation of safe areas for reconstruction on the basis of risk assessments and hazard mapping rather than the standardized application of “no-build” or “no-dwelling” zones, there has been no effort to identify those excluded previously and to provide them with assistance that they were initially denied. In principle, these households are to receive support through relocation; however, this will be a long-term process, and many would rather rebuild in their present locations than relocate. The uneven application of the “no-build” concept, coupled with its discriminatory and coercive effects on people residing on marginal land, underscores the need to remedy those who were previously excluded through the prompt provision of support for durable solutions.

The fieldwork results showed that, as in many crisis situations, aid actors involved in responding to Typhoon Haiyan were torn between the demands of *coverage* and *quality* in the distribution of limited resources. As one leading shelter actor underlined, aid organizations are repeatedly confronted with the same question: “Is the priority to reach more people or to build a certain [higher] level or standard of housing for a smaller group of people?”<sup>72</sup> Others elaborated on this tension in the context of bunkhouses, where adherence to Sphere Standards decreased the number of people provided temporary shelter, given limited resources. As in other post-disaster displacement contexts, stakeholders struggled to determine how best to advance durable solutions in the face of limited resources.

Finally, across the different social groups interviewed, affected community members commonly complained about the unfairness of aid criteria and questioned individualistic approaches to support for recovery and the resolution of displacement. Although displaced households were more likely to receive assistance than non-displaced households, nearly 40 per cent of the population in the surveyed area reported they did not receive assistance at all. In close-knit communities, people understandably believed that they had “all suffered” and should all be eligible for shelter, livelihood and other assistance. People raised all sorts of reasons why they thought aid delivery had been inappropriate or divisive: some pointed out the faults with “male-headed” assessments; others held doubts about the way aid organizations or the government constituted categories of vulnerability; and others simply felt “forgotten.” This discontent is reflected in household survey findings, with less than half (45.5%) of the reference population indicating that they believed assistance had been fairly distributed. As such, it is interesting to note that non-displaced households were twice as likely to think that assistance had been fairly distributed when it was given through the barangay, rather than by individual household. The qualitative data suggests that people were usually in the dark about why they did not fit into specific criteria and how to effectively bring this to the attention of those responsible for providing relief and recovery assistance.

72 Interview, Manila, December 2014.

## Law and Practice: Striving for Balanced Approaches to Durable Solutions

While a detailed legal and historical analysis of the Philippines' land, property and housing situation is beyond the scope of this study, these issues are intimately connected to developing a holistic approach to durable solutions that strikes an appropriate balance between disaster risk reduction plans and laws, protection of individual human rights, respect for customary norms and land use practices, and the achievement of social justice goals. Given that the poor and most vulnerable have faced the greatest exposure and worst effects of Typhoon Haiyan, durable solutions and reconstruction strategies should be part of a broader effort to progressively realize core economic, social and cultural rights.

There are many instances where certain interpretations of the DRRM Act<sup>73</sup> and Water Code<sup>74</sup> have conflicted with other laws and policies that aim to protect housing, land and property (HLP) rights, such as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (particularly its articles on forced evictions, housing rights and resettlement), sections 9 and 10 of the Philippine Constitution (on urban land reform and housing), and Section 108 of the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998. Furthermore, Section 4 of the Constitution mandates the state to undertake a holistic agrarian land reform programme, a major if still unrealized structural reform that could have significant impacts on recovery from Typhoon Haiyan, particularly in terms of meeting survivors' shelter and livelihood needs. In addition to various initiatives to facilitate the exchange of information and best practices between different jurisdictions in the Philippines, there have been some internationally-supported efforts to help local governments access consolidated information on housing and settlement best practices, and the relationship between the complex web of laws and policies related to these issues in the Philippines. For instance, the UN Shelter Cluster issued an advisory note early on to outline all national and international standards that should be adhered to in the provision of housing and settlement assistance, and to provide a basis upon which different stakeholders could determine whether or not they would participate in relocations.<sup>75</sup>

In the context of the reconstruction process and efforts to support the resolution of displacement generated by Typhoon Haiyan, the Philippines faces classic tensions between law and practice, as well as difficult questions on how to fairly interpret and apply the nation's own legal frameworks when it comes to conceptualizing and balancing public safety and protection of individual human rights. Without much transparency or space for public dialogue and debate, shelter aid, relocation plans and urban development plans have resulted from top-down processes that are usually disconnected from "pro-poor" legislation that the Philippines has developed to safeguard the rights of individuals and poor communities. For example, one official analysed the legal dilemmas surrounding the relationship between the Water Code and other standards in this way: "The Water Code was developed to protect waterways, not people. If the Water Code is applied, it provides a justification of why people cannot return. That justification is also legal, but the law needs to be relevant to the purpose of its use, and not making a situation of no return."<sup>76</sup> Civil society members have lamented that without their active inclusion, government officials are making rushed decisions without fully incorporating the expectations of people to make relocations sustainable.

In light of this challenge, stakeholders held different perspectives on methods for better advocacy to protect social and economic rights within the reconstruction and relocations processes. A number of

73 Republic Act No. 10121, the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010, available from [www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/45/Republic\\_Act\\_10121.pdf](http://www.ndrrmc.gov.ph/attachments/article/45/Republic_Act_10121.pdf) (accessed 7 May 2015).

74 See P.D. No. 1067 (1976), Water Code of the Philippines.

75 See Shelter Cluster Philippines, HLP Guidance Note on Relocation for Shelter Partners March 2014, available from [www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Relocation%20-%20HLP%20Guidance%20Note%20for%20Shelter%20Partners.pdf](http://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/Relocation%20-%20HLP%20Guidance%20Note%20for%20Shelter%20Partners.pdf) (accessed 7 May 2015).

76 Interview, Manila, December 2014.

interviewees felt that international organizations, because of their need to maintain good relations with government authorities, were not in the best position to conduct advocacy. Rather, several interviewees suggested that they should filter their positions through local actors who had long-standing relationships, knowledge of the context and legal framework, and experience in mediating between LGUs and local populations. Still, there were good examples where international institutions cultivated relationships with local authorities that allowed them to share best practices, engage in substantive discussions or conduct trainings, which led to increased awareness of potential social harms and human rights violations and more nuanced approaches to supporting the resolution of displacement caused by the typhoon. Reaching standards was thus conceived to be “part of a communicative process” whereby positive messaging could lead to certain compromises and negotiations on standards that “fit the reality of the context.”<sup>77</sup>

Given the dense legal framework and evolving rights-claiming opportunities in the Philippines, there are a number of ways that the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines (CHR) and local NGOs with detailed knowledge of legal, social and economic issues can be leveraged to help the displaced and disaster-affected populations understand, advocate, monitor and protect their own rights. Civil society actors felt that now, one and a half years after the typhoon, it was time for a “stocktaking meeting” on the relocations strategy, process and practices – and thus invite dialogue and opportunities to strengthen the rights-based approach.<sup>78</sup> Without greater efforts to include government monitoring bodies and local advocates, however, it was feared that most people will continue to lack the legal understanding or support to appropriately contest relocation processes or inadequate housing plans that may contravene their legal rights and best interests.<sup>79</sup>

## Promoting Long-term Safety and Security

Among both displaced and non-displaced typhoon survivors, disaster risk stood out as the predominant source of insecurity in the post-Haiyan environment, with 83.1 per cent of the population identifying natural disasters as their primary reason for current insecurity, followed by 5.3 per cent concerned with theft.

Perceptions of disaster vulnerability exhibited a three-fold increase following the typhoon: only 27.1 per cent of the population considered natural disasters to be a primary source of insecurity before the typhoon.

*“83.1 per cent identify natural disasters as their primary reason for current insecurity.”*


<sup>77</sup> Interview, Manila, December 2014.

<sup>78</sup> Interview, Tacloban, March 2015.

<sup>79</sup> Oxfam’s research found that 81 per cent of people they interviewed who were identified for relocation were not aware of their rights regarding permanent relocation. See Oxfam, *The Right Move? Ensuring durable relocation after typhoon Haiyan*, Oxfam briefing paper, 30 April 2014, available from [www.oxfam.qc.ca/sites/oxfam.qc.ca/files/The%20right%20move.pdf](http://www.oxfam.qc.ca/sites/oxfam.qc.ca/files/The%20right%20move.pdf) (accessed 7 May 2015).




**Graph 1: Main sources of insecurity in early 2015 compared to pre-Haiyan period**




Although households perceive disaster to be the foremost threat to their safety, the disaster risk reduction strategies prioritized by government bodies did not always resonate with the creative coping mechanisms employed by individuals and communities struggling to balance threats to their physical and socioeconomic security in the post-Haiyan context. This is especially worth noting as many focus group participants expressed that they were unable to channel their opinions into formal decision-making and policy development processes, especially regarding large-scale relocation plans. While the IASC Framework equates the achievement of durable solutions with protection from “threats which caused initial displacement or may cause renewed displacement,” this should also be interpreted according to principles of voluntary movement, free movement and participation, especially as communities have other ideas on how to mitigate risks and reduce the need for “arbitrary” displacement in the name of public safety.<sup>80</sup> In international and domestic law alike, there are provisions that both justify and defend people from relocations, and there is a need to strike the right “legal balance” to ensure that perceptions of safety are considered, but that responses to threats are formulated with the best interests of IDPs at heart.

Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of an extreme disaster, the data shows a negative change in perceptions of safety in the period before and after the typhoon: 79.9 per cent of displaced and 92.1 per cent of non-displaced households “felt safe” in their homes and communities prior to the typhoon.

<sup>80</sup> IASC Framework, p. 27.

**Graph 2: Perception of being safe in place of residence before Typhoon Haiyan (Y/N)**

When people were asked if they currently feel safe, these numbers dipped significantly, with 69.4 per cent of non-displaced and only 57.8 per cent of the displaced indicating that they currently feel safe, owing in large part to the continued risk of natural disasters.

**Graph 3: Perception of being safe in current place of residence (February 2015) (Y/N)**

The distinctions between these two groups may be a reflection of two different dynamics. First, some distinctions in house destruction may underpin differentiated feelings of insecurity. Non-displaced households were less likely to have lost their houses, land or property because of the typhoon (42.3% in comparison to 76.5%) and may therefore feel safer because of better access to shelter. Second, a higher number of displaced households (13%) than non-displaced households (3.3%) reported that they lived in coastal areas that were labelled no-build zones. These spatial factors and corresponding disaster vulnerability are likely to reinforce differentiated feelings of insecurity, especially after experiencing a “super” typhoon. Although the focus group facilitators did not pose direct questions about traumatic experiences during Typhoon Haiyan, people in nearly every coastal

focus group volunteered frightful accounts of their near-death experiences and loss of life among their loved ones. Many people explained they were unprepared for the typhoon, either feeling that they lacked information or misunderstood the meaning of “storm surge.” For example, one woman described how she believed she was safe within her two-story concrete house, but instead lost three children and barely survived herself as the entire house swept away beneath them. People on the coast had countless similar, deeply disturbing stories, and thus returning to coastal areas was often accompanied by a high degree of anxiety or concern (in fact, some people stayed away for several months after suffering trauma or post-traumatic stress disorder). Spatial differences – which are linked to poverty and risk of exposure to future disasters – may help explain why displaced people (29.8%) were more likely to list natural disasters as the primary source of their pre-Haiyan insecurity than non-displaced households (18.6%) (Table 7); after Typhoon Haiyan, these rates increased to 75.1 per cent among the non-displaced, and 85.9 per cent of displaced households (Table 8).

**Table 7: Main sources of insecurity before Typhoon Haiyan**

Displaced		Natural disasters	Theft	Eviction threat from private landowners
Yes	Population estimates	75,278	23,383	5,504
	Per cent	29.77	9.25	2.18
No	Population estimates	15,617	8,089	706
	Per cent	18.59	9.63	0.84

*Note:* The question allows multiple answers, ranked in order of priority.

**Table 8: Main sources of current insecurity (February 2015)**

Displaced		Natural disasters	Theft	Eviction threat from private landowners
Yes	Population estimates	217,139	11,664	2,229
	Per cent	85.88	4.61	0.88
No	Population estimates	63,047	6,280	141
	Per cent	75.05	7.48	0.17

*Note:* The question allows multiple answers, ranked in order of priority.

Furthermore, the study’s findings indicated that structural challenges in land availability (including cost) and broader socioeconomic dynamics have constrained people’s ability to react to perceived threats to safety and future displacement. Many lived in communities where they did not feel safe because of livelihoods concerns (13.9% before the typhoon and 19% after). But overwhelmingly, victims of the typhoon feel they have no other alternative to their former and current places of residence. Even if they did not feel safe in their places of residence, 71.4 per cent indicated that before Typhoon Haiyan, they had “no other place to live or land available.” Similarly, 68.8 per cent explain their “choice” of rebuilding/repairing their previous places of residence in terms of having nowhere else to go. On this question, there was very little distinction between displaced and non-displaced households (Tables 9 and 10).

**Table 9: Reasons for living in pre-Haiyan residence/location despite feelings of insecurity**

Displaced		No other place to live	Near place of work	Familiar with the area	Other	No response	Total
Yes	Population estimates	36,331	6,816	5,486	226	1,886	50,745
	Per cent	71.60	13.43	10.81	0.45	3.72	100
No	Population estimates	4,615	1,184	736	–	93	6,628
	Per cent	69.63	17.86	11.11	0.00	1.41	100

Note: Not applicable = 3,805. This question was only asked to those who answered they did not feel safe in their pre-typhoon residence.

**Table 10: Reasons for living in post-Haiyan residence/ location despite feelings of insecurity**

Displaced		No other place to live	Near place of work	Familiar with the area	Other	No response	Total
Yes	Population estimates	73,009	21,028	11,194	1,379	–	106,610
	Per cent	68.48	19.72	10.50	1.29	0.00	100
No	Population estimates	18,082	4,064	3,496	75	15	25,732
	Per cent	70.27	15.79	13.58	0.29	0.06	100

Note: Not applicable = 2,846. This question was only asked to those who answered they did not feel safe in their pre-typhoon residence.

In light of the socioeconomic dynamics that prompt people to return to and rebuild in hazardous areas, various international stakeholders, government officials and local participants underscored the critical role of hazard mapping and evacuation centres, especially in helping people balance their safety needs with their everyday economic demands. One of the key initiatives helping to inform this decision-making process is the national government-supported Project NOAH.<sup>81</sup> According to a number interviewees, Project NOAH has helpfully developed technology and hazard maps that can assist LGUs to determine comparatively safe and unsafe areas, increase the amount of land available for habitation, and help communities know their risks and make appropriate plans to mitigate them.

Even with these tools available, there is a critical need to strengthen evacuation infrastructure in the Haiyan-affected area (and more generally, across much of the Philippines), particularly as a significant percentage of evacuation centres were themselves destroyed or heavily damaged by the typhoon.<sup>82</sup> Most of those who evacuated in advance of Typhoon Haiyan did not shelter in an established evacuation centre. Instead, many sought shelter and support from host families outside their neighbourhoods (two thirds of those who fled to host families indicated that the homes in which they sought shelter were in different neighbourhoods). Some protection stakeholders indicated that the lack of evacuation centres not only increased the duration of displacement and pressure on families to make potentially dangerous trips, but also exposed people to other safety risks, such as human trafficking or simply the dangers that accompany being outside of one's known area, including those stemming from the inability to communicate in the same language. The

81 The Nationwide Operational Assessment of Hazards (NOAH) project develops systems, tools and other technologies to help the national and local governments prevent and mitigate disasters. One of its key outputs is hazard maps, which captured 98 per cent of the various hazards that the Philippines currently faces, and provides more precise information on disaster risks, thus enabling the authorities to more accurately determine the vulnerability of populations in areas facing a range of hazards. For more information, see [www.noah.dost.gov.ph/#controls](http://www.noah.dost.gov.ph/#controls).

82 See IOM, Damage Assessment of Designated Evacuation Centres in Typhoon-Affected Areas: Eastern Samar April 2014, available from [www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM-Assessment-ECs-ESamar\\_2014-Apr.pdf](http://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/IOM-Assessment-ECs-ESamar_2014-Apr.pdf).

establishment of more robust evacuation centre networks was suggested by stakeholders in Manila and in the affected areas as a key way for the government to uphold its responsibilities of ensuring the safety and protection of the population, while offering some breathing room for local governments to engage in long-term planning for sustainable relocations and the construction of safer and more durable housing. More robust evacuation centres would provide shelter to vulnerable populations during the passage of a typhoon and also serve as a collective centre in the period following a disaster in case of internal displacement. Some donors and international agencies had successfully partnered with provincial and local governments (outside the Haiyan-affected areas) to strengthen their homegrown initiatives on evacuation networks, preparedness plans and disaster information dissemination systems. Other disaster risk reduction initiatives suggested or undertaken by a variety of national and international actors included the construction of coastal dikes, large-scale mangrove and beach reforestation and afforestation. These experiences and ideas underscore that relocations are certainly not the only response to the threats that disasters pose to physical safety.

The study found several local communities that were sympathetic to government disaster risk reduction priorities, including relocations, but had other ideas on how to address preparedness and safety concerns. Some of these ideas would let them stay within their communities or avoid having to make difficult decisions between livelihoods and safer housing in hard-to-access relocation sites. In one focus group in Guiuan, in particular, the community expressed that they could not afford to relocate to areas away from the city market, nor did they desire to do so because of attachments to communities and homes; instead, their strong preference was for the establishment of a safe and reliable evacuation centre that they could use in case of a future disaster. Several communities revealed the “durable” social bonds that had aided their collective problem-solving and financial coping – a critical aspect of disaster resilience and braving the post-disaster economy.

To put these qualitative findings into larger context, the survey found that while family and friends represented important resources for responding to safety and security concerns, local government systems were also the front liners for dealing with these issues, with 74.3 per cent of the population reporting that they would refer their safety and security problems to their barangay captains (Table 11). Even when communities held concerns about the transparency of their local leaders, they often indicated they were now “more concerned with each other’s welfare” and “more capable to deal with another disaster,” especially when in terms of disaster preparedness and prevention of displacement.

**Table 11: Identification of actors to whom respondents would refer their safety or security concerns**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Barangay captain	250,165	74.27
Neighbours/Family	62,480	18.55
Government officials	13,037	3.87
No one	10,066	2.99
Religious organizations	527	0.16
NGO / International organizations	202	0.06
Others	374	0.11
Total	336,851	100.00

At the microlevel, behavioural changes were quite visible. For instance, one coastal community had dismantled all their makeshift houses during Typhoon Hagupit (Ruby) to ensure these materials could be of use afterwards. Another had collectively bought and collected transistor radios that

could be used across a wide network in preparation for evacuations to safer areas. Some had even prepared “grab bags” in their homes with staple foods and supplies for the next disaster.

Finally, theft was the second most frequent source of insecurity felt at present by the population in Haiyan-affected areas – albeit a distant second behind insecurities presented by natural disasters. There is a significant association between the feeling of insecurity due to theft and displacement status, with 7.5 per cent of the displaced and 4.6 per cent of the non-displaced identifying it as their main source of insecurity after the typhoon; this finding may be influenced by the looting that occurred when people left their homes (Tables 7 and 8). Reflecting on current problems with theft, some focus group participants attributed the increase in theft to an increase in desperation, particularly in poorer areas and occasionally in bunkhouses. However, these concerns should not be overstated, as people in bunkhouses simultaneously discussed their solidarity and community relations; in some instances, they said they feel safer in the bunkhouses or transitional sites than they did in their communities before the typhoon. Furthermore, both groups reported that overall, theft was less of a security problem in the post-typhoon context than it was before Typhoon Haiyan hit. Understandably, perceptions and priorities about insecurity shifted in light of the disaster.

## Enjoyment of an Adequate Standard of Living

The IASC Framework states that IDPs who have achieved a durable solution enjoy, without discrimination, an adequate standard of living, which includes shelter, health care, food, water, and other means of survival. This encompasses access to the following: essential food and potable water; basic shelter and housing; essential medical services; sanitation; and at least primary school education. Adequacy is defined in terms of goods and services being available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable. The IASC Framework further emphasizes the concepts of non-discrimination – services being “safe and easy to reach” as well as services meeting local standards in terms of both quantity and quality.<sup>83</sup>

Overall, one and a half years after Haiyan, only 17.6 per cent of the population believed that life had returned to “normal.” Data show a significant association between displacement status and the perception that life had not yet “gone back to normal.” Both groups discussed at length their harsh financial situation, which was first and foremost influenced by the challenging nature of the post-disaster economy, and the extent of their economic losses. 83 per cent recalled that before the typhoon, they were able to cover their basic needs. This figure plummeted when people assessed their current situation, with only 32.1 per cent now able to provide for their basic needs. Furthermore, 60.9 per cent of families report they face difficulties accessing services.

There were differences between the displaced and non-displaced population in responses on availability and accessibility of services. That said, these differences were also present and consistent with reflections from both groups about their living standards before the typhoon. In other words, percentage drops in each group with regard to their current levels of access to basic services were consistent with the differentiated access between the two groups prior to the typhoon, when those who were displaced by Typhoon Haiyan were already worse off. This finding suggests that for the survey population, the differences – or gaps – in availability and accessibility of basic services between the two groups were reproduced without much change in the

*“Only 32.1 per cent of households are able to provide for their basic needs. 60.9 per cent of families report difficulties accessing services.”*

<sup>83</sup> IASC Framework, p.32.

post-typhoon environment. As Tables 13 to 16 show, overall, the sectors that scored the lowest on availability and access across both groups were decent and affordable housing, land for agriculture and land for livelihood. These were the same three sectors that scored the lowest in the pre-typhoon environment.

These figures provide further evidence of some of the economic hardship that currently plagues post-disaster areas. An overwhelming proportion (93%) attributed their current inability to access basic services to a lack of money (Table 12).

**Table 12: Reasons for difficulty accessing basic services (Early 2015)**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Lack of money	191,462	93.36
Too far	7,543	3.68
Lost home/land due to typhoon	1,970	0.96
Old age or illness	1,288	0.63
Political affiliation	1,205	0.59
Others	770	0.38
Newcomers	539	0.26
Religious affiliation	124	0.06
Don't know	184	0.09
Total	205,085	100.00

*Note:* Not applicable = 1,848. The question was asked only to those who answered they have difficulties in accessing services.

This finding is further confirmed by the differences between *availability* and *accessibility* for a number of services (see Tables 13 to 16). There was widespread perception that some basic goods and services were available in the community, but not accessible because of a lack of means. For instance, 31 per cent of displaced and 44 per cent of non-displaced households stated that affordable housing was available, but the numbers drop to 20.1 per cent and 33.4 per cent respectively when asked if this housing is *accessible*. The sectors that did not change – and that were the most positively viewed during focus groups – were education and health; these were also sectors where individuals referenced ongoing assistance as the reason behind the availability. Even so, some families were already reporting that children had stopped going to school because of transportation costs, and that the lack of jobs had resulted in some young people having to leave school and move to Manila. In one resettlement village, the school was quite far away and required an average of PHP 100 per day, per family in transportation fees, which was becoming untenable for those without a stable source of livelihood. Sanitation remained an issue for many communities, but this problem was not necessarily much different than before the typhoon. People also described electricity and water services as starting up again six months after the typhoon hit.

Focus group participants indicated that they were taking a serious financial hit due to the rising cost of living, with commodities increasing to “Yolanda prices” that never returned to pre-typhoon levels. In most communities, the cost of a kilogram of rice had increased by at least PHP 10 (from around PHP 30–35 to PHP 40–48). Transportation costs also skyrocketed. People complained of steep prices for nearly every basic commodity. Coupled with the catastrophic impact of the typhoon on livelihoods, people felt poorer and threatened as food assistance and other humanitarian support for basic needs was coming to an end with the recovery phase. Even after “tightening their belts,” some felt they lacked the bare minimum to survive. As expressed by one participant, it is impossible to budget for PHP 100 a day when prices are always increasing, and even doubling in some instances.

The subject of price inflation invariably sparked animated and complex discussions among focus group participants. Particularly in Tacloban, people tended to blame local businesses for profiteering



**Table 13: Availability of key goods and services before Typhoon Haiyan****Affordable housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	159,593	93,251	252,844
	Per cent	63.12	36.88	100
No	Population estimates	61,493	22,361	83,854
	Per cent	73.33	26.67	100

**Adequate housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	179,152	73,692	252,844
	Per cent	70.85	29.15	100
No	Population estimates	67,795	16,081	83,876
	Per cent	80.83	19.17	100

**Land for housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	188,514	64,330	252,844
	Per cent	74.56	25.44	100
No	Population estimates	69,194	14,682	83,876
	Per cent	82.50	17.50	100

**Land for livelihood**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	220,644	32,200	252,844
	Per cent	87.27	12.74	100
No	Population estimates	76,363	7,513	83,876
	Per cent	91.04	8.96	100

**Education**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	245,370	7,474	252,844
	Per cent	97.04	2.96	100
No	Population estimates	82,659	1,195	83,854
	Per cent	98.58	1.42	100

**Health care**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	241,891	10,953	252,844
	Per cent	95.67	4.33	100
No	Population estimates	80,335	3,519	83,854
	Per cent	95.80	4.20	100

**Employment/Livelihoods**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	206,057	46,787	252,844
	Per cent	81.50	18.50	100
No	Population estimates	69,755	14,099	83,854
	Per cent	83.19	16.81	100

**Formal credit services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	230,295	22,549	252,844
	Per cent	91.08	8.92	100
No	Population estimates	77,258	6,596	83,854
	Per cent	92.13	7.87	100

**Transportation services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	242,467	10,377	252,844
	Per cent	95.90	4.10	100
No	Population estimates	82,821	1,033	83,854
	Per cent	98.77	1.23	100

**Water and sanitation**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	229,490	23,354	252,844
	Per cent	90.76	9.24	100
No	Population estimates	80,445	3,409	83,854
	Per cent	95.93	4.07	100

**Police services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	250,860	1,984	252,844
	Per cent	99.22	0.78	100
No	Population estimates	82,922	932	83,854
	Per cent	98.89	1.11	100

Note: Total population estimates vary due to non-responses to certain questions.

**Table 14: Availability of key goods and services after Typhoon Haiyan**

**Affordable housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	78,641	174,203	252,844
	Per cent	31.10	68.90	100
No	Population estimates	36,871	46,983	83,854
	Per cent	43.97	56.03	100

**Adequate housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	128,479	124,365	252,844
	Per cent	50.81	49.19	100
No	Population estimates	53,464	30,390	83,854
	Per cent	63.76	36.24	100

**Land for housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	174,138	78,706	252,844
	Per cent	68.87	31.13	100
No	Population estimates	63,610	20,244	83,854
	Per cent	75.86	24.14	100

**Land for livelihood**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	213,272	39,572	252,844
	Per cent	84.35	15.65	100
No	Population estimates	74,616	9,238	83,854
	Per cent	88.98	11.02	100

**Education**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	245,413	7,431	252,844
	Per cent	97.06	2.94	100
No	Population estimates	82,297	1,557	83,854
	Per cent	98.14	1.86	100

**Health care**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	241,197	11,647	252,844
	Per cent	95.39	4.61	100
No	Population estimates	80,070	3,784	83,854
	Per cent	95.49	4.51	100

**Employment/Livelihoods**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	198,397	54,447	252,844
	Per cent	78.47	21.53	100
No	Population estimates	67,267	16,587	83,854
	Per cent	80.22	19.78	100

**Formal credit services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	228,583	24,261	252,844
	Per cent	90.41	9.60	100
No	Population estimates	75,372	8,482	83,854
	Per cent	89.89	10.11	100

**Transportation services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	242,248	10,596	252,844
	Per cent	95.81	4.19	100
No	Population estimates	82,533	1,321	83,854
	Per cent	98.42	1.58	100

**Water and sanitation**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	225,876	26,968	252,844
	Per cent	89.33	10.67	100
No	Population estimates	78,890	4,964	83,854
	Per cent	94.08	5.92	100

**Police services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	250,906	1,938	252,844
	Per cent	99.23	0.77	100
No	Population estimates	82,942	912	83,854
	Per cent	98.91	1.09	100

Note: Total population estimates vary due to non-responses to certain questions.

**Table 15: Accessibility of key goods and services before Typhoon Haiyan****Affordable housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	141,753	111,091	252,844
	Per cent	56.06	43.94	100
No	Population estimates	55,188	28,666	83,854
	Per cent	65.82	34.19	100

**Adequate housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	159,297	93,547	252,844
	Per cent	63.00	37.00	100
No	Population estimates	61,843	22,011	83,854
	Per cent	73.75	26.25	100

**Land for housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	177,885	74,959	252,844
	Per cent	70.35	29.65	100
No	Population estimates	64,146	19,708	83,854
	Per cent	76.50	23.50	100

**Land for livelihood**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	206,121	46,723	252,844
	Per cent	81.52	18.48	100
No	Population estimates	70,994	12,860	83,854
	Per cent	84.66	15.34	100

**Education**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	238,574	14,270	252,844
	Per cent	94.36	5.64	100
No	Population estimates	80,467	3,387	83,854
	Per cent	95.96	4.04	100

**Health care**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	238,162	14,682	252,844
	Per cent	94.19	5.81	100
No	Population estimates	78,606	5,248	83,854
	Per cent	93.74	6.26	100

**Employment/Livelihoods**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	190,693	62,151	252,844
	Per cent	75.42	24.58	100
No	Population estimates	63,647	20,207	83,854
	Per cent	75.90	24.10	100

**Formal credit services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	171,563	81,281	252,844
	Per cent	67.85	32.15	100
No	Population estimates	59,003	24,851	83,854
	Per cent	70.36	29.64	100

**Transportation services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	238,197	14,647	252,844
	Per cent	94.21	5.79	100
No	Population estimates	80,136	3,718	83,854
	Per cent	95.57	4.43	100

**Water and sanitation**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	220,122	32,722	252,844
	Per cent	87.06	12.94	100
No	Population estimates	78,133	5,721	83,854
	Per cent	93.18	6.82	100

**Police services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	250,737	2,107	252,844
	Per cent	99.17	0.83	100
No	Population estimates	82,878	976	83,854
	Per cent	98.84	1.16	100

Note: Total population estimates vary due to non-responses to certain questions.

**Table 16: Accessibility of key goods and services after Typhoon Haiyan**

**Affordable housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	50,783	202,061	252,844
	Per cent	20.08	79.92	100
No	Population estimates	28,003	55,851	83,854
	Per cent	33.40	66.60	100

**Adequate housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	106,192	146,652	252,844
	Per cent	42.00	58.00	100
No	Population estimates	45,330	38,524	83,854
	Per cent	54.06	45.94	100

**Land for housing**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	166,094	86,750	252,844
	Per cent	65.69	34.31	100
No	Population estimates	57,744	26,110	83,854
	Per cent	68.86	31.14	100

**Land for livelihood**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	190,978	61,866	252,844
	Per cent	75.53	24.47	100
No	Population estimates	65,031	18,823	83,854
	Per cent	77.55	22.45	100

**Education**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	238,055	14,789	252,844
	Per cent	94.15	5.85	100
No	Population estimates	79,227	4,627	83,854
	Per cent	94.48	5.52	100

**Health care**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	237,361	15,483	252,844
	Per cent	93.88	6.12	100
No	Population estimates	78,147	5,707	83,854
	Per cent	93.19	6.81	100

**Employment/Livelihoods**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	175,235	77,609	252,844
	Per cent	69.31	30.69	100
No	Population estimates	58,799	25,055	83,854
	Per cent	70.12	29.88	100

**Formal credit services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	165,267	87,577	252,844
	Per cent	65.36	34.64	100
No	Population estimates	56,872	26,982	83,854
	Per cent	67.82	32.18	100

**Transportation services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	237,001	15,843	252,844
	Per cent	93.73	6.27	100
No	Population estimates	78,372	5,482	83,854
	Per cent	93.46	6.54	100

**Water and sanitation**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	213,465	39,379	252,844
	Per cent	84.43	15.57	100
No	Population estimates	75,540	8,314	83,854
	Per cent	90.09	9.91	100

**Police services**

Displaced		Yes	No	Total
Yes	Population estimates	250,384	2,460	252,844
	Per cent	99.03	0.97	100
No	Population estimates	82,980	874	83,854
	Per cent	98.96	1.04	100

Note: Total population estimates vary due to non-responses to certain questions.

from the disaster, sometimes even accusing them of price gouging by deliberately keeping supplies low. As one woman expressed it, the poor are becoming poorer and the rich are getting richer. Others implied that businesses with a monopoly over services were in a position to make consumers shoulder their rehabilitation costs. People wondered how electricity prices had increased threefold when they had lost their appliances and were therefore using very little power after the disaster. In a similar manner, another focus group participant quipped that with the water supply, “the price increases, the pressure decreases.” A local NGO suggested that price inflation problems could be addressed by local state of emergency laws that enable the government to put a price freeze on key materials. Other than this advice, price inflation was not usually brought up by the key stakeholders interviewed for the study, suggesting a disjuncture between the preoccupations of policymakers and humanitarian and development practitioners, and households struggling to stay afloat in the post-Haiyan economy.

A small percentage of the population (3.7%) considers basic services to be “too far” to access (see Table 12). In focus groups with bunkhouse and relocation site residents, people expressed significant concern with the availability and accessibility of basic services for those in comparatively remote relocation sites, particularly with the increased transportation costs. In one transitional shelter site, people had been promised and given free bus transportation into Tacloban, but this was discontinued after a short duration. People further lamented that while they had been living on the seaside and eating fish all their lives, the sea was now too far and too expensive to access, forcing them to face “another form of readjustment.”

Despite the seriousness of these financial difficulties, it is clear that strong social capital may be *just as important as* material resources, especially in the face of recurring disasters and overstretched capacities of the government and international community.<sup>84</sup> Especially in rural villages and other communities where residents had lived together for generations, people consistently gave examples of sharing food and supplies and watching out for the welfare of their community members. Some said they had pooled resources, or lent or received funds from friends to start businesses. Although these were noteworthy approaches to coping with the financial situation, only local NGOs were likely to stress the importance of community cohesion as a critical resource to protect and draw upon in the recovery process. Instead, national and international stakeholders more commonly discussed community cohesion as a local value that they attempted to respect, or as an unfortunate casualty of the mass relocation process.

## Access to Livelihoods and Employment

There are a number of clear reasons why Haiyan-affected people currently find it hard to make ends meet. According to International Labour Organization (ILO) figures, over 2.6 million affected individuals lacked stable employment prior to Haiyan, while the Philippines’ National Statistics Office reports that 40 per cent of the affected population lived under the poverty line.<sup>85</sup> An estimated 5.9 million individuals, or 42 per cent of those affected, directly lost income because of Typhoon Haiyan.<sup>86</sup> For instance, the destruction of 33 million coconut trees in the typhoon has endangered livelihoods for more than a million farming households.<sup>87</sup> The data collected for this study further substantiates the grim economic picture facing the displaced and other Haiyan-affected individuals, and deepens knowledge on the micro and macro level livelihood challenges affecting households and communities one and a half years after the disaster.

84 See D. Aldrich, *Building Resilience: Social Capital in Post-disaster Recovery* (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2012). Aldrich presents case studies from four post-disaster contexts, including the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, to demonstrate how robust social networks are usually better able to coordinate recovery and strengthen resilience to disaster shocks.


85 See Oxfam (2014).

86 ILO, “Rebuilding livelihoods after super typhoon Haiyan”, 5 February 2014, available from [www.ilo.org/manila/info/public/pr/WCMS\\_235029/lang-en/index.htm](http://www.ilo.org/manila/info/public/pr/WCMS_235029/lang-en/index.htm) (accessed 7 May 2015).

87 Oxfam, 2014.

Loss of livelihoods was a critical, priority concern facing both displaced and non-displaced survivors of Typhoon Haiyan. 73.9 per cent of households experienced a worsened livelihood situation after the typhoon (Graph 4).

**Graph 4: Perceived changes in standard of living in early 2015 compared to pre-Haiyan period**



A majority of people interviewed in bunkhouses, rural areas and affected communities had lost assets essential to their livelihoods, such as boats and other fishing equipment, tools for carpentry and masonry work, motorbikes, pedicabs and multicabs for providing transportation services, and a range of goods sold in markets and sari-sari stores.<sup>88</sup> According to the household survey, 60.7 per cent of households lost some form of productive assets. In terms of restoring livelihoods, loss of assets and inability to recover these were the main barriers faced by the population (34.7%). For another 29.9 per cent, there were not enough jobs or livelihoods in the area where they lived (Table 17).

**Table 17: Main challenges in providing for basic needs post-Haiyan**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Lost livelihood assets as a result of the typhoon and have been unable to recover it	79,304	34.70
Not enough livelihood opportunities	68,410	29.93
The cost of living/basic services has increased after the typhoon	65,280	28.56
Residence has changed and can no longer access former place of work or livelihood	6,435	2.82
No challenges	176	0.08
Others	8,940	3.91
Total	228,545	100.00

*Note:* Frequency missing = 1,421. The question was asked only to those who answered they have difficulties providing for their basic needs.

For women, in particular, some had lost the family's breadwinner, and others could not afford child care so that they could either look for or assume new work. Female bunkhouse residents often lamented that they were too far away from residential areas to be employed doing work they knew

<sup>88</sup> A pedicab is a three-wheeled, two-passenger vehicle made of a bicycle with an attached sidecar. A multicab is a passenger vehicle unique to the Philippines that seats as many as 18 passengers.

how to do such as housekeeping, or that they were restricted by bunkhouse “rules” that prohibit the selling of certain items or by rules requiring them to return to the bunkhouses by a certain hour. (See also section on “Gender dimensions of post-disaster durable solutions.”) While residence in the bunkhouses is meant to be temporary, it must be stressed that even temporary livelihood restrictions can have longer term, detrimental impacts on achieving durable solutions by entrenching displaced families’ socioeconomic marginalization.

As the household income in affected provinces was already below the national average, it is clear that vulnerable households have been immensely impacted by harsh post-disaster conditions, particularly since the agricultural, fisheries, industrial and service sectors have all suffered significant economic loss.<sup>89</sup> Putting these losses and general instability in sharp relief, the survey found that nearly one third of households (32.4%) currently receive their primary source of income from non-agricultural informal commerce or casual work, in comparison to smaller proportions of households who rely on agriculture (26.3%), and fishing (8.3%). Some accessed construction jobs in the context of the reconstruction effort, particularly in urban centres, but this work was not typically a long-term option. A modest 15.1 per cent of households reported they earned their income from a salaried position (Table 18). Focus group participants articulated the challenges of moving from their former livelihoods, such as fishing, into temporary work; others went beyond wanting to recover former livelihoods and aspire for stable (salaried) work that would relieve them of dependence on seasonal livelihoods.

*“73.9 per cent of households experienced a worsened livelihood situation after the typhoon. ... 60.7 per cent of households lost productive assets. Loss of assets and the inability to recover them were key barriers to restoring livelihoods.”*

**Table 18: Main current sources of income for households**

Source of income	Population estimates	Per cent
Agriculture/farming	88,748	26.35
Casual work	86,015	25.54
Business	33,036	9.81
Paid job – private	29,155	8.66
Fishing	28,048	8.33
Informal commerce	23,132	6.87
Paid job – public	21,796	6.47
Money from family and friends in the Philippines	17,173	5.10
No source of revenue	5,924	1.76
Money from family and friends abroad	2,098	0.62
Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4P – Philippines social safety net programme)	1,574	0.47
Cash for work (to support victims of natural disasters) / cash grants	1,273	0.38
Savings	333	0.10
Income from rent of house or land	278	0.08
Others	10	0.00

*Note:* The question allows multiple answers, ranked in order of priority.

In the typhoon-affected areas, livelihood recovery straddles a variety of household and market-based challenges that go far beyond the restoration of livelihood assets. As a number of stakeholders

<sup>89</sup> OPARR, Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Efforts, August 2014, available from <http://president.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Revised-DraftYolanda-Rehab-Briefer-as-of-1-Aug-2014-w-status-report.pdf> (accessed 8 May 2015).



working directly in the affected areas and displaced and affected communities saw it, there were also significant needs for skills training, job creation, access to land and credit and a general strengthening of the socioeconomic infrastructure to enable people to meet daily needs, rebuild homes and deal with significant price inflation as well. Overall, however, efforts to support the revival and creation of new livelihoods were hindered by a range of factors including lack of attention, funding and coordination, and disconnects between training, asset provision and market opportunities.

Strikingly, government and aid officials who were interviewed in Manila were more likely to emphasize housing rather than livelihoods, with housing discussed in terms of physical shelter, land tenure and land use, and the relocation of at-risk populations. Although focus group participants did not downplay housing concerns, they stressed their livelihood needs because of anxieties about dependence. As one participant lamented, “We have all become *palamunin*” – that is, they were forced to rely on other people’s support. These words capture an uncomfortable reality for a large number of typhoon survivors. According to the survey, only 32.1 per cent of households believe they can provide for their basic living needs at present, a dramatic decline from the 80.1 per cent of these same households who indicated they were able to cover all their daily expenses before the typhoon.

In focus group discussions, it became apparent that economic hardship and fears of a “shattered future” were having a severe negative impact on the survivors’ dignity and self-worth.<sup>90</sup> Time and again, people vocalized the myriad ways they felt disempowered by the loss of livelihoods and assets, and how they struggled physically or emotionally as a result of reduced self-sufficiency. As livelihoods and housing are intimately connected, access to livelihoods was not only perceived as a requirement for daily consumption, but even more so as a means to satisfy housing needs over the long-term. Many respondents faced some form of tenure insecurity (51.9%) and were still trying to rebuild houses (72% of people displaced and 28.9% of people not displaced); some were also unclear on the payments they would need to make for subsidized social housing (11%). These data, and related focus group findings, further underscore the relationship between lack of livelihoods and households’ broader ability to secure adequate housing in the long term.

Survivors’ predominant focus on livelihoods also rationalizes their different attitudes on disaster risk, safety and relocations. Certainly, the fisheries sector is not only economically motivated but is also a social and cultural practice, and many fisherfolk, despite their fear of future disasters, do not want to leave their livelihoods and fishing communities for a safer home in relocation areas.<sup>91</sup> Interlocking economic and sociocultural factors are also at the core of people rejecting relocation as a viable plan for their lives, and why some people who have already been relocated are already slowly leaving relocation areas to head back to the coast, even if they believed it was dangerous and a threat to their safety. As a local NGO described it:

The daily income from fishing is 150 pesos, if people are relocated to the north [of Tacloban] they will have to pay 50 pesos for transportation. This cost does not include what they have to pay in gasoline for their boats – sometimes as high as 45 pesos. So if they have a family of five, there is no way they can live on the earnings.

Particularly in relation to livelihood support, aid criteria and initiatives were often described as limited, unevenly distributed, overly restricted or unrelated to actual needs. Some participants

90 On the importance of livelihoods and assets in terms of self-worth, beyond daily survival, see for example A. Bebbington (1999) “Capitals and capabilities: A framework for analysing peasant viability, rural livelihoods and poverty”, *World Development* 27(2):2021–2044; and K. Jacobsen, “Livelihoods and forced migration,” In: Fiddian-Qasimiyeh et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, 99–111).

91 A year prior to the household survey, in February and March 2014, Oxfam conducted a household survey across three provinces (Cebu, Leyte and Eastern Samar) with 453 people and 14 focus groups. At that time, 49 per cent of those surveyed articulated that livelihood was the most important criterion for relocation site selection. See Oxfam (2014).

had benefited from cash for work, skills training or the provision of assets, but oftentimes this aid was temporary and not followed by tangible follow-up. Individuals and local authorities provided examples where training was provided, but without subsequent cash grants for investment and links to the market, these were considered virtually useless. A rural women's group, for example, had received training for a pastry-making business but was unable to sell the products to a community that could no longer afford non-essential items. In several instances, people indicated that aid for livelihoods had been neither inclusive nor participatory, and there were many cases where aid (cash grants or training) had been promised but never delivered. Other focus group participants articulated that when it came to livelihood support, they often lacked understanding of the criteria, or thought the criteria was unfair and misinformed by the real economic situation. A number of Filipino NGO leaders and staff suggested that an individual-based approach was harmful as it divided cohesive communities into "arbitrary" categories of vulnerability, which resonated more with the needs of aid organizations than the realities of the local context. While this view resonated in many focus groups, some participants suggested that practically speaking, individual livelihood support is preferable to community-based interventions, as it presents fewer coordination difficulties.

People have managed to survive using a range of coping strategies, sometimes forming rural cooperatives and leveraging community solidarity, particularly in groups that had lived together for generations. Some have borrowed from relatives (9.2%), friends (9.3%) and financial institutions (15.5%), often to attempt to restore their livelihoods. 25 per cent of the population indicated that they needed to borrow money, but were unsuccessful in obtaining a loan (Table 19).

**Table 19: Access to loans/credit post-Haiyan**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Never needed to borrow money	122,756	36.44
Unable to access loans/credit	85,858	25.49
Loans from banks or financial institutions	52,312	15.53
Loans from friends/acquaintances	31,181	9.26
Loans from relatives	30,999	9.20
Loans from shopkeepers/local businessmen	23,038	6.84

*Note:* This question allows multiple answers, so the total is not equal to the total population estimate.

Even so, many focus group participants were very hesitant to go into debt unless they were absolutely certain they had a viable livelihood plan. For them, informal lenders were exploitative, and the social pressure to pay back one's debt immediately was far too burdensome. Many perceived safer institutions, such as banks and financial institutions, as out of their reach, only lending to people with collateral assets (which most poor people lacked, especially after the typhoon. 27.4% of the displaced, compared to 19.7% of non-displaced households could not access credit).

The Philippines is one of the fastest growing economies in Asia, and there is an economic infrastructure that can be leveraged for livelihood assistance to the displaced and typhoon-affected.<sup>92</sup> Both international organizations and the government were largely positive about the role of the private sector in relief and recovery activities. That said, some stakeholders suggested the private sector tended to be more involved in housing and infrastructure projects, rather than taking a leading role in business development and reviving the local economy – activities that play to their strengths and are essential to durable solutions. As one government official phrased it, the economic situation might benefit from the private sector helping to "give solutions on what they know," in addition to their financial support for visible infrastructure projects.

92 OPARR, Yolanda Rehabilitation and Recovery Efforts August 2014, available from <http://president.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Revised-DraftYolanda-Rehab-Briefer-as-of-1-Aug-2014-w-status-report.pdf> (accessed 8 May 2015); see also [www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/02/05/philippine-economic-growth-looks-strong-2015.html](http://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/2015/02/05/philippine-economic-growth-looks-strong-2015.html).

## Restoration of Housing, Land and Property

Restoration of and access to housing, land and property is a critical foundation upon which IDPs and disaster-affected communities more broadly can rebuild their lives. In the Philippines, shelter assistance was a major, if not predominant, component of the international response.<sup>93</sup> However, the IASC Framework's emphasis on the rights of IDP property owners and restitution processes has somewhat eclipsed more specific rights-based guidance for IDPs with less secure forms of tenure, such as those who are landless, tenants or informal settlers.<sup>94</sup>

Existing conventions and instruments on housing rights and tenure security are becoming more relevant for protecting IDPs and disaster-affected communities, especially in achieving sustainable settlement, in light of increasingly rapid and unplanned urbanization and the growing severity and intensity of climate change-related natural disasters. However, these global norms are usually not well understood or implemented by international humanitarian actors and government authorities.<sup>95</sup> Nevertheless, some tools and guidelines, informed by field experiences, help in integrating global norms on the right to adequate housing and securing tenure into a durable solutions approach.<sup>96</sup> Both the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs and the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate housing have made recent statements supporting enhanced use of a right to housing framework to strengthen efforts to advance durable solutions to displacement.<sup>97</sup>

As observed in the Philippines, discontinuity between relief and recovery assistance in shelter, and the failure to recognize housing as a sector of interrelated elements, meanings and rights-based standards have translated into enduring obstacles to durable solutions.<sup>98</sup> As witnessed in other contexts, durable solutions and successful reconstruction require long-term housing approaches that go beyond the provision of immediate shelter. Indeed, they often require a deeper perspective on settlements that recognizes the connections between physical shelter and livelihoods, the provision of basic services and the reinforcement of social networks.<sup>99</sup>

*“Durable solutions and successful reconstruction require long-term housing approaches that go beyond the provision of emergency shelter.”*

### Durable Solutions and Housing, Land and Property: An Overview of Needs, Assistance and Protection Issues

The majority of study participants had their housing situation affected by Typhoon Haiyan. Within the total reference population, 68 per cent or an estimated 228,928 families lost their house or access to it because of the typhoon. Graph 5 shows that 76.5% of those who were displaced lost their house or land or access to it, compared to 42.3% of those who were not displaced. (The fact that significant housing losses were sustained by individuals who did not identify themselves as

93 Interestingly, however, the HLP (sub)cluster was not activated in the Haiyan response.

94 For discussion of these dynamics in the pursuit of durable solutions to displacement in Haiti, see Sherwood et al. (2014). See also the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, April 2010, p. 35.

95 See R. J. Barber, (2008) “Protecting the right to housing in the aftermath of natural disaster: Standards in international human rights law”, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 20(3):432–468.

96 See for example IDMC/Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), *Home Sweet Home: Housing Practices and Tools that Support Durable Solutions for Urban IDPs* (IDMC/NRC, Switzerland, 2015), available from [www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/20150325-global-home-sweet-home/20150325-global-home-sweet-home-en-full-report.pdf](http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2015/20150325-global-home-sweet-home/20150325-global-home-sweet-home-en-full-report.pdf) (accessed 8 May 2015). See also p.67 of the IOM-Brookings study on *Supporting Durable Solutions to Displacement in Haiti* where a number of criteria are proposed to augment the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions according to field research in Haiti.


97 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing realization of the right to adequate housing in post-disaster settings (A/66/270) and Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing on integrating the right to adequate housing, in post-disaster and post-conflict reconstruction processes (A/HRC/16/42), as well as the introductory statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs in IDMC/NRC (2015).

98 R. Zetter and C. Boano, “Planned evacuations and the right to shelter during displacement”, *Studies in Transnational Legal Policy* 41:165–206.

99 IDMC/NRC, 2015.

having been displaced points to the difficulties associated with conceptualizing displacement in some disaster situations.) However, the displaced and non-displaced indicated that they received similar levels of housing assistance.

**Graph 5: Loss of land or house as a result of Haiyan (Y/N)**



Despite the housing and tenure security challenges in the post-typhoon environment, 98.3 per cent of the reference population continue to live on the same plot of land as before, although often in a different house. Non-displaced households appear to have greater means or ability to repair their houses than displaced households.

There are significant differences in property ownership between the displaced and non-displaced groups, as well as differences in other forms of land tenure. As Tables 20 and 21 illustrate, however, typhoon-affected households did not generally perceive any significant changes to their land tenure status after the disaster.

This, however, is not necessarily indicative of the challenges faced regarding tenure security and rights to adequate housing that are related to but go far beyond the dynamics of typhoon displacement. In both urban and rural areas, participants offered different explanations of why their tenure security might be at risk, often perceiving that urban developments or land sales would jeopardize their squatter or usufruct status. Participants often believed their squatter situations were completely reliant on the (unknown) future plans of their landlords. For example, focus group participants who had been occupying the same land for 30 years received information that their landlord intends to sell the land soon or use it for agricultural or other projects, raising uncertainties for their ongoing efforts to recover from Typhoon Haiyan. In many such cases, informal residents had never been allowed to construct concrete houses as a condition of their occupancy, stipulated by the verbal agreement with their landlords. Thus, general challenges to tenure security and access to adequate housing shape the particular Haiyan-related obstacles people continue to face in realizing housing rights.

### **Housing Rights and Settlement Options**

During the fieldwork, interviewees and focus group participants characterized the lack of transparent information on relocations and arbitrary application of the NBZ as unfair and discriminatory towards the poor, and in some cases, violating socioeconomic rights (and thus contravening the IASC Framework). Some respondents suggested that particular laws and policies were being misused

to prevent people from returning, rather than ensuring that relocation and settlement processes reflected human rights commitments enshrined in Philippine law. Since the beginning of the Typhoon Haiyan response, a number of reports suggested that the “knee-jerk” NBZ policy, derived from a selective interpretation of the Water Code, has often led to breaches of key human rights standards pertaining to housing, forced evictions, relocations and arbitrary displacement.<sup>100</sup> In this way, the NBZ and related approaches also risk undercutting IDPs’ right to a durable solution.<sup>101</sup>

**Table 20: Land tenure status (before Typhoon Haiyan)**

Displaced		Owning land and house	Occupied land and house with consent	Occupied land and house without consent	Rented the land and owned the house	Occupied the land and owned the house	Others	No response	Total
Yes	Population estimates	47,366	29,568	11,314	13,473	144,961	6,090	72	252,844
	Per cent	18.73	11.69	4.47	5.33	57.33	2.42	0.03	100
No	Population estimates	33,110	7,492	1,001	4,095	36,598	1,556	156	84,007
	Per cent	39.41	8.92	1.19	4.87	43.57	1.85	0.19	100

*Note:* “Others” include renting the land and the house; owning the land and renting the house; renting the land and occupying the house; occupying the land and renting the house; and living in a shared house with relatives/friends.

**Table 21: Land tenure status (Early 2015)**

Displaced		Occupied the land and owned the house	Owning land and house	Occupied land and house with consent	Rented the land and owned the house	Occupied land and house without consent	Others	No response	Total
Yes	Population estimates	145,036	47,138	28,275	12,662	11,743	7,929	61	252,844
	Per cent	57.37	18.64	11.18	5.01	4.64	3.14	0.02	100
No	Population estimates	37,358	33,314	6,918	3,946	1,057	1,399	15	84,007
	Per cent	44.46	39.66	8.24	4.7	1.26	1.66	0.02	100

*Note:* “Others” include renting the land and the house; owning the land and renting the house; renting the land and occupying the house; occupying the land and renting the house; and living in a shared house with relatives/friends.

## Housing, Land and Property Issues Related to Return

Scores of typhoon survivors have either been prevented from returning, or coerced not to return through restrictions on shelter aid to people in NBZ areas. While some returnees’ makeshift houses in coastal areas were torn down, being physically prevented from returning to NBZs was uncommon, with only 0.5 per cent barred from returning because of residency in a NBZ, and 0.3 per cent due to relocation. Although these figures are negligible in percentage terms, they still represent 4,790 families from the so-called no-build zones, and 776 households involved in relocation. Notably, they do not capture the tens of thousands in the bunkhouses, transitional shelter sites and relocation areas, who may also feel they have been prevented from returning. This number also changes when

100 See Oxfam (2014) and A. Thomas, *Philippines: Post-Typhoon Resettlement Plan Carries Risks* (Refugees International, Washington, D.C., 2015), available from [www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/philippines-post-typhoon-resettlement-plan-carries-risks](http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/field-report/philippines-post-typhoon-resettlement-plan-carries-risks) (accessed 8 May 2015).

101 CHR (2014) Human Rights Advisory – A2014-001: Human Rights Standards on Housing, Land and Property Rights of Populations Affected by Typhoon Yolanda (CHR, Manila).

respondents were asked if they considered their housing permanent: 20 per cent of people do not consider their current living situation permanent because they live in an NBZ area.

While the survey did not directly ask people why they had not received aid for rebuilding houses, focus group data provide reason to assume that some of the 28.4 per cent of those who did not receive any housing assistance may have been disqualified because they returned to NBZs. For the most part, focus group participants indicated that they were living in bunkhouses either because the government was opposed to people living in tents, or they had no means (or access to assistance) to rebuild their houses. In triangulating the different data sources, it appears that while people have not been physically forced to relocate or prevented from returning, in some cases their movements have been coerced to some extent by withholding humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. There were also people who returned to NBZs and were able to access assistance, but were then subsequently informed by the government that they would have to dismantle their houses to make room for widened waterways according to the Water Code. These individuals expressed frustration that they were unlikely to be compensated for the rebuilding they had already done to their houses. Especially within cities, well-intentioned interventions in the name of public safety, disaster risk reduction and urban development put many returnees at risk in ways that will continue to unfold during the reconstruction process.

### **Housing, Land and Property Issues Related to Relocations**

After Typhoon Haiyan, the national government has estimated that 200,000 households need to be relocated away from coastal areas.<sup>102</sup> Seen by many as the “solution” attracting the lion’s share of the government’s attention, the relocation process has encountered several difficulties that often reflect previous relocation challenges experienced in the Philippines. Local government officials were forthcoming about past relocation projects that had failed because of a lack of follow-up support.<sup>103</sup> According to one stakeholder, there is a problematic tendency on the part of the government to equate durable solutions with access to a permanent house. Thus, once a shelter “solution” is achieved, people again become invisible to the system, although they continue to encounter assistance and protection needs related to their displacement and loss of housing. After all, as one interviewee quipped, “It is easier to solve a shelter situation than an income situation.” This reality was evident in focus group discussions with relocated community members, in which recently relocated family members indicated that concerns had already emerged about lack of livelihoods, the end of food assistance and the risks of family separation arising from husbands having to return to coastal areas for fishing, often for days or weeks at a time, owing to transportation costs prohibiting a daily commute.

Those most sceptical of the government’s relocation strategy questioned the transparency and legitimacy of the process, suggesting unfair application of standards for determining the necessity of relocation, with rich coastal residents being allowed to stay while the poor were required to move. Even so, many coastal residents interviewed were not opposed to the idea of relocation, especially if it would overcome their continued vulnerability to future storm surges. But their main concern, evident in other research on the topic, was the lack of information on housing arrangements and planning to fulfil livelihood needs.<sup>104</sup>

Under Philippine law, the local government holds primary responsibility for relocation planning and implementation. Relocations are heavily influenced by the local environment, from resources to leadership, and must be understood in this context. Generally speaking, however, there are overwhelming challenges in terms of capacity and resources. Especially in urban areas, both the

<sup>102</sup> A. Thomas, 2015.

<sup>103</sup> See also J.C. Gaillard, “From marginality to further marginalization: Experiences from the victims of the July 2000 Payatas trashslide in the Philippines”, *Journal of Disaster Risk Studies*, 2(3):197–215.

<sup>104</sup> See Oxfam (2014) and A. Thomas (2015).




high cost of land and the lack of available land were major obstacles in relocation planning and execution. Relocation sites in more developed cities like Tacloban, for example, were much farther away from the city centre than sites in smaller centres like Guiuan. Certainly, the entire relocation process is a massive undertaking that involves several government departments, financial resources and the private sector, and necessitates ongoing monitoring, evaluation and adaptation to ensure that the challenges that already appear to be undercutting the sustainability of certain relocations are promptly addressed.

## Access to Documentation

The use of documentation varies between local contexts. Efforts to address the loss of documentation in the typhoon should therefore consider what documentation has been lost and how these losses create specific obstacles to durable solutions.<sup>105</sup> Related to Principle 20 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the IASC Framework articulates that IDPs who have achieved a durable solution have access to personal and other documentation necessary to reclaim property and possessions, access public services and vote or pursue other activities linked to durable solutions.

The majority of the population (72.8%) did not lose civil or personal documentation during Typhoon Haiyan, although people who left their homes were more likely to lack documentation than those who did not (29.9% in comparison with 19.2%)

**Graph 6: Loss of documentation as a result of Haiyan**



Interviews with local authorities and stakeholders mentioned that replacing documentation is slow and often difficult, as it may require interaction with national departments in Manila. Approximately a third of those who lost documents successfully tried to replace the document, with non-displaced people (31%) slightly more successful than displaced people (26.5%). 42 per cent of each group had not yet tried to replace their lost documents, while 31.5 per cent of the displaced replied that they had tried but had been unsuccessful in replacing lost documents. 26.3 per cent of the non-displaced were unsuccessful in replacing lost documents. Focus group participants raised some of the potential problems associated with not having documentation, such as being unable to apply for jobs.

<sup>105</sup> In Haiti, for example, the government's post-disaster housing policy emphasized self-reconstruction; those who lacked national ID cards struggled to access credit, which exacerbated obstacles to self-reconstruction and the resolution of displacement. See Sherwood et al. (2014), p. 44.

Over half of the population (52.7%) stated that their present tenure arrangements are based on verbal agreements. Table 22 shows the figures for displaced and non-displaced.

**Table 22: Type of land tenure arrangement post-Haiyan**

Displaced		None, we never had it	None, we lost it during the typhoon	Title deed	Rental agreement	Barangay certificate	Verbal agreement
Yes	Population estimates	35,307	1,468.10	26,543	5,817.10	4,166	144,455
	Per cent	13.96	0.58	10.5	2.3	1.65	57.13
No	Population estimates	12,196	352	22,168	1,865	1,736	33,209
	Per cent	14.52	0.42	26.39	2.22	2.07	39.53

Continued

Displaced		Document provided by government right of occupancy	Sales contract	Tax declaration	Don't know/ Others	No response	Total
Yes	Population estimates	6,492.30	7,583.40	5,519	1,599.50	13,894	42,675
	Per cent	2.57	3	2.18	0.64	5.49	5,535.06
No	Population estimates	2,562	4,349	2,633	324	2,613	14,082
	Per cent	3.05	5.18	3.13	0.39	3.11	13,914

Most people returned to the land where they lived before Haiyan's landfall within one month of the typhoon (69.7%) (Table 23); they generally considered their housing arrangement to be permanent before the typhoon (87.1%) and afterwards (82.3%), and reported that their tenure arrangements had not changed as a result of Typhoon Haiyan. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that lack of documentation itself was not an obstacle to one's ability to return, although it had modest implications for the durability of the process in terms of, for example, access to livelihoods and services.

**Table 23: Time spent with host family post-Haiyan**

	Population estimates	Per cent
Zero	128,447	50.79
Less than one month	89,336	35.33
One to three months	18,188	7.19
Three to six months	6,070	2.40
More than six months	10,184	4.03
No response	670	0.27
Total	252,895	100.00

Note: Not applicable = 1,160. This question was only asked to those who were displaced.

For relocation processes, however, documentation was a more important issue. In Guiuan, providing the official documentation that confirms relocated families' home ownership arrangement was a way to build trust and acceptance of the process. However, the provision of this documentation required that people create and register with a new homeowner's association; this necessitated the submission and verification of a series of documents with national government departments based in Manila. While this process was proceeding, it was slow and complex, and required careful follow-up on the part of local authorities with national officials.

Affected community members and local stakeholders were not concerned that the loss of documentation would compromise individuals' right to vote, as the common practice is to point to their names on barangay voting lists and check themselves off, rather than to show documentation at polling stations.

## Other IASC Framework Criteria: Family Reunification, Participation in Public Affairs and Access to Remedies

In addition to the criteria discussed above, the IASC Framework identifies four supplementary criteria that may also, depending on the circumstances, affect the extent to which durable solutions to displacement are achieved. The following section considers the relevance of these criteria in the post-Haiyan context.

### Family Reunification

The IASC Framework stipulates that separated families should be assisted to reunite as soon as possible after displacement, and that those who desire to reunite should be able to seek a durable solution together. Especially in coastal areas, people had lost husbands, wives, children and other family members, which caused them considerable grief and trauma. They related harrowing stories of searching for their loved ones in the aftermath of the disaster, and struggling to deal with their family losses. Participants also raised the urgent need for psychosocial interventions for people who had suffered from traumatic losses. As this trauma remains so visible within displaced and affected communities, concerted efforts should be made to help families stay together and cope with the disaster's aftermath.

As fieldwork conducted for this study found, the most pressing challenge to family cohesion was the relocation process. For people who had been unable to return, or lived in bunkhouses, families were already splitting, often due to the need for husbands to stay near fishing areas. While there is no statistical information to capture these trends for a wider population beyond the focus groups, there is strong evidence to suggest that family separation is but one of the many "readjustments" people with highly restricted options are compelled to face in the aftermath of the typhoon.

### Participation in Public Affairs

The household survey did not identify substantial changes to voter registration or public life as a result of the typhoon. A high proportion of the reference population was still registered to vote (94.2%) and saw no obstacles to voting within their barangay (94.9%). Based on information from barangay officials, focus group participants, and local and national authorities, people who had relocated were still able to vote within their barangays of origin, although it was generally expected that they would eventually transfer their registration to the barangays into which they moved.

However, whether citizens hold public officials accountable through voting was another matter. Although local officials tended to stress that people could express their opinions on the reconstruction through voting processes, many affected community members felt that in public meetings, they did not have either the opportunity or the freedom to speak out and express their opinions. Not surprisingly, there was a common view that voting did not necessarily ensure politicians would deliver on their reconstruction promises. Still, slightly less than two thirds were satisfied with the efforts of their barangay officials after the typhoon, and approximately one third was unsatisfied. There was no difference between displaced and non-displaced households in this regard.

Again, data on public participation reinforced the value of social capital in typhoon-affected areas. The household survey showed high levels of trust among neighbours: 77.9 per cent of the reference population believed that trust levels stayed the same before and after the typhoon. (In contrast, a previous study on the pursuit of durable solutions to displacement after the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince found that 97% of the displaced and non-displaced believed that trust had declined in the years subsequent to the disaster.)<sup>106</sup>

Focus groups offered rich evidence on how people supported each other throughout the disaster, whether or not they had been displaced. (See “Access to an adequate standard of living” for examples.) 64.5 per cent of households reported that they had come together with their neighbours or community members more than once to deal with some of the problems caused by the typhoon. This included repairing and rebuilding infrastructure (45.5%), starting small-scale projects (17.2%), forming housing cooperatives or projects (6.3%), rebuilding or rehabilitating evacuation centres (4%), or conducting small tasks, such as clearing debris, canals or blocked roads. Most people were unlikely to believe they were discriminated against within their community because they had been displaced.<sup>107</sup> In those cases where discrimination was reported, this was typically connected to challenges encountered in trying to restore their land and rebuild housing.

### Access to Effective Remedies

According to the IASC Framework, “IDPs who have been victims of violations of international human rights or humanitarian law, including arbitrary displacement must have full and non-discriminatory access to effective remedies and access to justice, including, where appropriate, access to existing transitional justice mechanisms, reparations and information on the causes of violations.”<sup>108</sup> From this perspective of displacement-specific violations, some protection stakeholders had focused on cases of human trafficking and sexual abuse that had occurred as people were fleeing the disaster. Given the lack of evacuation centres and evidence that many people had to leave their areas to seek shelter, better disaster preparedness mechanisms could help minimize exposure to such types of abuse and violence, serving in effect as a form of redress. Some stakeholders mentioned that Typhoon Haiyan had destroyed law enforcement units’ case files and computers, underlining the need for data banking as a disaster preparedness measure. Nevertheless, the typhoon’s impact on the judicial system is an issue that touches society at large, and was viewed to have an equal effect on both displaced and non-displaced people.

In the Philippines, protection of the socioeconomic rights of the displaced is an essential component of durable solutions. As raised in other sections of this report, people are generally unaware of their land and housing rights under national and international law, and the legal and informal mechanisms to which they can appeal to protect them. Furthermore, the lack of resources for people to purchase even basic necessities, such as food and medicine, is indicative of their position of disempowerment and their lack of means to ensure their equality before the law and challenge processes that impinge on their economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, more legal aid and local NGO support for people disadvantaged by aid and reconstruction policies is strongly suggested.

<sup>106</sup> Sherwood et al. (2014), p. 47.

<sup>107</sup> This does not mean that IDPs are free from discrimination. Indeed, particularly for poor and uprooted families who grew up under the cacique/patronage system and are unfamiliar with their rights, certain patterns of discriminatory exclusion from decision-making may be “normalized.”

<sup>108</sup> IASC Framework, p. 42.

# Advancing Durable Solutions after Disasters: Reflections

As the analysis above demonstrates, while IDPs uprooted by Typhoon Haiyan do not generally encounter discrimination as a result of their displacement, many continue to face particular assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement. However, these assistance and protection needs are also encountered, in varying instances and degrees, by other households who were affected by Typhoon Haiyan even if they were not displaced. Thus, it is essential to take a holistic approach to the pursuit of durable solutions to the displacement crisis generated by Typhoon Haiyan, analysing and addressing the concerns facing the displaced within the broader context of the post-disaster political economy and governance systems.

This section deepens the analysis above by reflecting on the challenge of advancing durable solutions to displacement in the aftermath of disasters, particularly focusing on: (a) the gender dimensions of durable solutions for IDPs uprooted by the typhoon; (b) concerns associated with advancing durable solutions in rural communities; and (c) the role of local authorities in the resolution of displacement.

## Gender Dimensions of Post-disaster Durable Solutions

The IASC Framework stresses that IDPs should not be discriminated against on the basis of their gender, and emphasizes the importance of the full and equal participation of both women and men in processes surrounding the resolution of displacement, including information dissemination, planning and decision-making.<sup>109</sup> The Framework further underscores that needs assessments must be informed by gender analyses, and that the rights and assessed needs of women and men must be equitably incorporated into recovery and development plans.<sup>110</sup> Beyond this important general guidance, however, the Framework does not address in detail the gendered nature of many barriers to durable solutions, particularly in post-disaster contexts. Yet as Margareta Wahlström, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, has reflected, “Disaster risk reduction that delivers gender equality is a cost-effective, win-win option for reducing vulnerability and sustaining the livelihoods of whole communities.”<sup>111</sup> A growing number of studies and related literature on the impact of disasters on different communities point to the imperative of integrating gender dimensions and dynamics into disaster risk reduction and management and post-disaster response and rehabilitation programmes.<sup>112</sup> Devastating natural disasters put vulnerable communities at risk every year – but they affect men and women, boys and girls differently, with women and female children often bearing the brunt of disasters in particularly severe ways.<sup>113</sup> Strikingly, however, the gender dimensions of the pursuit of durable solutions to displacement have rarely been examined in detail, and are often left unaddressed in interventions intended to support the resolution of displacement.<sup>114</sup>

109 IASC Framework, p. A-4, 13, 17, 19–20.

110 IASC Framework, p. 20, 23.

111 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), *Making Disaster Risk Reduction Gender-Sensitive: Policy and Practical Guidelines* (UNISDR, UNDP and IUCN, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009). See also [www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications](http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications) and Margareta Wahlström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, video statement for the International Day for Disaster Reduction, 1:25, 10 October 2012, available from [www.unisdr.org/archive/29064](http://www.unisdr.org/archive/29064).

112 See several articles incorporated in the collection, such as UNISDR, UNDP and IUCN (2009). See also [www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications](http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications); M. Wahlström (2012); and C. R. Izquierdo, “Uncovering gender in policy responses to natural disasters: Disaster management in post-floods Mozambique – Part I”, Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 23 August 2013, available from [www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1332:uncovering-gender-in-policy-responses-to-natural-disasters-disaster-management-in-post-floods-mozambique-part-1&catid=91:rights-in-focus&Itemid=296](http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1332:uncovering-gender-in-policy-responses-to-natural-disasters-disaster-management-in-post-floods-mozambique-part-1&catid=91:rights-in-focus&Itemid=296) (accessed 11 May 2015).

113 *Ibid.* This is also the case in terms of how men and women experience displacement and other impacts of armed conflict in Mindanao. See R. Cagoco-Guiam (2013).

114 UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of IDPs, Report to the Human Rights Council on internally displaced women.

Gender roles are embedded in social structures and shape understandings of what being male and female means in different societies. Such roles are learned through socialization, first from parents, then from peers and the broader society. These constructs become deeply ingrained in the collective consciousness of community members. In a typical Philippine lowland rural community, these roles are considered de facto standards of behaviour: boys are oriented towards becoming future breadwinners for their families, while girls are trained to do housework and care for their families. Both boys and girls start their enculturation into these roles as early as from their toddler years.

Among Typhoon Haiyan survivors, these deeply embedded, learned gender roles are manifested in the survival strategies men and women employed during and after the storm, and the ways in which they speak of their traumatic experiences. When it was first implemented in late 2013, the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) found that women and children were disproportionately represented in the evacuation centres; many men stayed outside of the evacuation centres in order to salvage livelihoods, protect assets, and watch over other family members, dead and injured. In focus group discussions, women tended to highlight their experiences of having lost not only their houses but more importantly, their household appliances, such as pots and stoves. Male participants, on the other hand, tended to talk about the pain of losing their livelihoods, especially their tools for making a living, like fishing boats, pedicabs, tricycles and multicabs.

In a coastal barangay considered an NBZ in Tacloban City, a woman narrated that the day before Haiyan struck, the whole community was warned of an impending strong typhoon. But having lived in a typhoon-prone area all her life, she took it lightly – after all, she was used to experiencing typhoons. So she planned on preparing their food early in the morning so that when the typhoon arrived and the power went out, she would be ready with dishes for her family. But starting at 7 a.m. on 7 November 2013, the floodwaters rose quickly, washing out everything in their home and forcing her to swim with her family to safety. Officials had warned of a possible “storm surge,” but this was not well understood by everyone; the women participants said no one explained to them what a storm surge was. They said that had they been told a “tsunami” was coming, they would have evacuated earlier, saving many lives. The woman capped her story by saying that Yolanda “ate up” what she cooked, and also took away much of her household equipment.

In contrast, male participants in a rural barangay near Tacloban stressed the loss of their farm-based livelihoods as their most significant experience. While both men and women cited the loss of livelihoods, the expression of this type of loss was more intense among the men. Women participants frequently expressed how the super typhoon deprived them not only of valued possessions but also, and more importantly, their sense of completeness as persons. Some important part of “their being who they were before” was lost to the typhoon, according to one woman at a transitional site. This loss is associated with deep trauma, which eventually led to mental illness among some neighbours. She talked about her frequent hospital visits due to panic attacks brought on by changes in the weather or when it rained heavily. Whenever this happens, she becomes immobilized. One other participant indicated that after Haiyan, her husband has become mentally ill, yet there is a lack of support to address the mental health problems some survivors are now facing. She expressed her difficulty serving as the family’s main breadwinner, while at the same time performing her reproductive roles at home. Such experiences of disability and mental illness can significantly influence gender relations and efforts to resolve displacement and other challenges caused by the typhoon. With an immobilized husband, the wife is forced to straddle two distinct, practical gender roles – productive and reproductive. The wife, who is expected to do household chores (a reproductive role), must also be able to earn income for the family as the main breadwinner (productive role) in lieu of her husband. At first glance, the situation may seem to be an empowering opportunity for housewives, but this obscures the new reality that becoming



the main breadwinner does not necessarily transform social definitions of male and female roles; instead, it can simply exacerbate the psychological and physical strains many displaced women face.

### **Participation and Leadership Related to Durable Solutions: Differential Experiences**

The Philippines does not lack policies or laws safeguarding the special needs of women affected by disasters. Section 10 of Republic Act 9710, the Philippine Magna Carta for Women, provides that “women have the right to protection and security in times of crisis situations, especially in all phases of relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts.” The same legislation further provides that the government shall address the particular needs of women “from a gender perspective, to ensure their full protection from sexual exploitation and other sexual and gender-based violence committed against them.” However, there is a yawning gap between policy and practice in post-disaster areas in the provinces of Samar and Leyte, particularly among those affected by displacement.

Many women became widows after the typhoon and are now the main breadwinners for their families. Participants decried that despite this reality, some organizations that conducted surveys to inform the provision of housing assistance only asked the men in their communities about their needs. In one rural barangay in Leyte, women focus group discussion participants complained about this, but they did not get any answer from their barangay officials or town officers. This was a common experience for many survivors, especially women, who have unanswered questions on the criteria for selecting households that are prioritized for permanent housing.

Leadership roles formerly assigned to men seem to have changed after the disaster in many communities. In many relocation areas, whether transitional or permanent, the camp managers or building leaders are mostly women. As the women participants in a focus group discussion in bunkhouses in the Palo area expressed it, “We are the big mamas here.” However, their powerful positions obfuscate the fact that their reproductive roles are still unchanged after the disaster. In a permanent housing site in the northern part of Tacloban, women participants also affirmed that the block leaders of their housing units are women, but these roles just added to their regular reproductive roles at home. Thus, even if they are community leaders, they are still the typical housewives, taking on a multiple burden of household chores while performing political or community management roles.

### **Gender, Protection and Safety Concerns**

When asked about their safety and security in their new transitional residences, the predominantly women participants claimed that they felt safe there. However, some participants talked about cases of trafficking of young women in some barangays; reportedly, these cases have not been solved or even investigated. A professor at a state university also shared some of her findings from a rapid appraisal of Typhoon Haiyan victims, which suggested that instances of prostitution and sexual exploitation have been reported in the bunkhouse areas, but that nothing has been done about it.<sup>115</sup> Further, focus group participants were concerned with the placement of common bathrooms and toilets outside their shelters, as they lack adequate privacy while bathing. The male participants did not seem to be disturbed by this, but the women expressed, rather hesitatingly, how difficult it is to be doing their “private” things (using the toilet, taking a bath) in public. Women’s rights to privacy are often neglected in the provision of relief and rehabilitation after a natural disaster, and since the time frames for transferring from transitional to permanent housing are highly uncertain, such problems may persist in the medium to longer terms.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>115</sup> Personal communication, Tacloban, 15 March 2015. Her research is still ongoing up to this writing.

<sup>116</sup> M. Bokil, and N. Gorhe, *Gender Issues in Disaster Management* (Oxfam and Community Aid Abroad India, n.d.), available from [www.disasterwatch.net/resources%20links/milind.pdf](http://www.disasterwatch.net/resources%20links/milind.pdf) (accessed 11 May 2015).

## Gender, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions

Prevailing views of what men and women can and cannot do were expressed, albeit with disappointment, by women in a permanent housing site north of Tacloban. They appreciate their new, nicely painted, concrete houses, which include a toilet and bathroom. However, they complain that while their houses are better than what they had before Haiyan, their stomachs are empty because there are no livelihood opportunities in their new community, which is quite far from the rest of the city. On one hand, they like the new location because it is safe from storm surges, but they regret that their husbands have to go back to their former barangay (now labelled a “no-build zone”) to continue their livelihood as fisherfolk. The women leaders in the different blocks said they wanted to apply to work as members of the construction team (more houses are still being built), so they would have something to do and could earn some money. Yet they were told they cannot be accepted, especially if they have babies who are still being breastfed. The company said they are not suitable for construction work because they are women.

For many women survivors, childcare and other domestic chores have indeed limited their opportunities to get jobs, although re-establishing livelihoods is an essential element of durable solutions to displacement. In one community, a woman wanted to continue with the job she had before Haiyan, but couldn’t as she now has to care for relatives whose parents died during the storm. Their male counterparts, however, are not bound by these duties, so they can more freely pursue their search for new sources of income or livelihoods. But the men also get frustrated because the jobs they used to have are often no longer available. For instance, a multicab driver who lost his own unit in the typhoon now lacks his previous, stable job, and is only hired periodically to replace absent drivers.

Both men and women participants said that it is not good if the women have nothing to do “because they will just gossip, and become pregnant.” Gossiping is accepted in many rural Philippine communities and stereotypically attributed to housewives. While this was expressed in a joking manner, there is some evidence of women getting pregnant at an early age in communities harshly affected by Typhoon Haiyan. In one focus group discussion in a transitional site, there were 10 women participants, and the majority of them were very young mothers (19– 23 years old). They shared that they have nothing else to do, except to care for their children and clean their homes, while their husbands are working in their old residence sites as drivers, carpenters and similar occupations. They come home to the transitional site only on weekends because they cannot afford to pay daily fares of at least PHP 100 from the transitional site to the downtown areas in Tacloban.

## Recognizing Shortcomings and Looking Forward

The national and local policy environment is replete with guidelines and legislation that provide, as per Section 13 (B) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9710, for “gender responsive disaster management, including preparedness, mitigation, risk reduction and adaptation.” The same section also states that “In disasters, calamities and other crises, Local Government Units (LGUs) and agencies concerned in all phases of relief, recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts shall develop and implement a gender responsive and rights-based work and financial plan.” However, narratives of Haiyan survivors show that while there are significant differences in the vulnerabilities and concerns of men and women in the badly affected areas, this was rarely considered in designing post-disaster recovery programmes in Haiyan-affected areas, including those related to durable solutions to displacement. Survivors’ reflections suggest that governments, international organizations and NGOs alike struggled to effectively integrate and address gender dynamics in recovery programmes and initiatives. Indeed, fieldwork data show that survivors are

still suffering immensely and have not fully recovered. Women have had to find ways to make their meagre resources answer basic sustenance needs, pushing them to take out loans, even if loan sharks demand exorbitant interest rates. Men are frustrated that their previous livelihoods have not yet been restored fully, and must compete in tight labour markets in their old places of residence. In all the community discussions, both men and women expressed varying degrees of disappointment about government and NGO efforts to restore adequate services and livelihoods after Haiyan, attesting to the ongoing effects of displacement and loss that the disaster engendered.

## Supporting Durable Solutions in Post-disaster, Rural Communities

Durable solutions to displacement are inseparable from geographic, social, cultural, political and economic context. Just as displacement crises in urban contexts raise certain complex challenges, uprooted residents of rural communities also face particular difficulties.<sup>117</sup> The displacement crises generated by Haiyan spanned urban, peri-urban and rural contexts, although the challenges encountered by displaced rural survivors have arguably not received the attention and support that they should.

The IASC Framework points out that in many displacement scenarios, the pursuit of durable solutions involves the movement of people from the countryside to urban centres – movements situated within broader dynamics of urbanization.<sup>118</sup> While this dynamic is evident in Haiyan-affected areas, the relocation process has also resulted in a counterflow of people from urban environments to peri-urban and even comparatively rural areas, where transitional sites and permanent housing projects are being constructed. As focus group participants made clear, such movements raise a range of particular challenges, many closely linked to livelihoods. In considering these challenges, it is important to note that, as the IASC Framework stresses, governments have “a particular obligation to provide alternative livelihood opportunities for IDPs who are being forcibly relocated by authorities from high-risk areas.”<sup>119</sup>

One and a half years after Haiyan, displaced residents of rural and peri-urban communities are still experiencing difficulties in recovering their livelihoods, housing and their “lives.”<sup>120</sup> At first glance, IDPs who have moved to brightly coloured, concrete, neatly arranged permanent housing units with integrated toilets and bathrooms (a first for many) north of Tacloban may be considered “lucky.” Participants in the community discussion in this village said they are grateful to have finally been relocated to an area safe from flooding and typhoons. Before the super typhoon, many of them lived in makeshift houses along the coast, without modern toilets. Some of them jokingly confessed to having used the biggest “splash toilet” in the world – the sea. Despite the convenience of having their sanitation issues solved, the permanent shelter beneficiaries are still far from having a durable solution to their daily problem of sustaining their families. Their houses may be physically “durable,” but they worry about not being able to sustain themselves living in these houses. As the permanent shelter recipients lament, while their houses look beautiful, their stomachs are empty; they have no access to gainful and sustainable employment or livelihoods in the area, which has not yet been widely developed. Indeed, some of the men still go back to “temporary houses” in the NBZ where they used to live, to try to continue their fishing-based livelihoods – a challenge in light of their lost fishing boats and equipment.

117 On the pursuit of durable solutions in urban contexts, see Sherwood et al. (2014).

118 IASC Framework, p. 34.

119 IASC Framework, p. 34. See the section on “Process and participation” for discussion on the extent to which the relocation process may be considered forcible or voluntary.

120 As one focus group participant in a transitional site indicated: “*Kinuha ng Yolanda hindi lang mga bahay namin at mga kagamitang pang-hanapbuhay, pati na rin mga buhay namin.*” (“Yolanda did not only take away our houses and equipment for our livelihoods, but also our lives.”) This statement refers to the current situation of victims who are no longer as functional as they used to be because of trauma and mental illness.

Reflecting on the many displaced families that are “split” between urban and peri-urban or rural contexts, some of these fisherfolk received assistance from one urban barangay official to address the loss of their boats. This official facilitated the distribution of fishing boats to some constituents, although the majority of them have already been relocated to peri-urban areas. Unfortunately, as the barangay official herself acknowledged, the distribution of fishing boats was uneven – some residents got more than one boat (whether or not they were actually fisherfolk), others got only one, and some received nothing. She attributes this to inadequate coordination between donors and the barangay office. The distribution of former barangay residents across a wide range of new communities, many far from their original homes, can only exacerbate such challenges. Given the ways in which even families who have been relocated to peri-urban and even rural sites continue to maintain close links to the coastal, urban barangay (with many men staying in makeshift homes in the barangay while they fish), the barangay leader argued that building a permanent evacuation centre for the community is critical in attaining durable solutions. This idea certainly has merit, particularly as fishing will undoubtedly continue to be central to these livelihoods in these communities in the future; ultimately, however, diversified support for livelihoods within rural and peri-urban relocation communities will also be essential to their viability.

The importance of livelihoods support as a component of durable solutions was also echoed by survivors in more long-standing rural communities affected not by the storm surge but by Haiyan’s extremely strong winds, which destroyed sizeable proportions of the coconut trees on which their agrarian economy depends. Many of the trees were destroyed or could no longer bear fruit. After the super typhoon, participants said they have given up on coconut farming; if they replant, it would take years before they will have their first harvest. Instead, they are now focusing on their rice farms, but this activity carries risks as well, as the community has no access to irrigation, which means the entire crop is at risk during dry periods. They additionally have small vegetable gardens, but these have also struggled in light of a long dry season. Male community members suggested, “If they provide us an irrigation system, we will have a sustainable livelihood based on rice farming, and we can be self-sufficient.” Residents of other rural communities struggled to identify alternative livelihoods to coconut farming, jokingly asking, “Is there is a coconut tree that easily bears fruit?”

For women members of a quasi-cooperative in a rural barangay in Leyte, durable solutions are linked to the creation of an enabling environment for their individual, small-scale livelihood projects. In this community, the women are actively involved in the production of *kakanin* (a rice powder snack). Before Haiyan struck, the women had a brisk business selling their products in the barangay centre, because people had stable livelihoods that gave them modest surplus income and allowed some people to buy *kakanin* on a daily basis. After the super typhoon, however, their sales volume dropped considerably; many times, they have to eat the unsold *kakanin* before it spoils. The enabling environment the women referred to consists of a sustained agricultural support programme for their farmer husbands, and for them to have a permanent place where they can display and sell their food products with adequate support from their local government. They also complained that food assistance was cut off in September 2014, even though they had not yet recovered from their experiences of displacement or fully revived their business. This example points to the ways in which individual and community livelihood strategies are intertwined and in continued need of government and donor support.

## The Role of Local Authorities in Durable Solutions

Local authorities are pivotal to the resolution of displacement crises. The IASC Framework stresses the central role of local authorities in addressing a wide range of concerns pertaining to durable solutions. These include: working with the national government and humanitarian and development actors to coordinate assistance and establish rights-based processes and strategies for advancing

durable solutions;<sup>121</sup> ensuring that IDPs have the information needed to make informed and voluntary choices about durable solutions;<sup>122</sup> making the budget allocations necessary to enable durable solutions;<sup>123</sup> monitoring progress towards the resolution of displacement;<sup>124</sup> supporting the operation of credible complaint mechanisms;<sup>125</sup> facilitating the issuance of replacement documentation;<sup>126</sup> and protecting IDPs from threats to physical safety that may undermine durable solutions, including through the implementation of disaster risk reduction programmes.<sup>127</sup> Local authorities' significant role is partly attributable to their closeness to the displaced population; they are particularly well positioned to identify outstanding needs and hear from IDPs directly on the barriers that impede their access to durable solutions. The Framework effectively encourages local authorities to put a premium on their ability to hear directly from displaced constituents, urging local officials and their partners in the national government and international agencies to "base their durable solution programming on the actual preferences of IDPs and work towards providing them with a meaningful and realistic choice without coercion."<sup>128</sup>

Despite their central role, in many cases worldwide, local authorities lack the resources, training and capacity needed to effectively execute it. Further, there is a general lack of research and reflection on the local authorities' contributions to durable solutions and how these contributions can be strengthened.<sup>129</sup> Given the Philippines' highly decentralized governance structure, and the active role that LGUs play in preparing for and addressing the consequences of disasters, the Haiyan response is an important source of insight on the local authorities' role in advancing durable solutions.

As in many other countries, local authorities in the Philippines struggle with inadequate levels of financial and human resources, a shortcoming that was exacerbated by Haiyan's destruction of many LGUs' offices and equipment.<sup>130</sup> At the same time that local authorities were working to assist survivors in their communities, they themselves were struggling to deal with the devastating effects of the typhoon on their own homes and families. Most local officials working in Haiyan-affected areas did not have the opportunity to learn about and receive training on key international frameworks, including the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the IASC Framework. Some struggled to navigate the Philippines' own complex set of domestic laws and policies, which impose a wide range of significant demands on LGUs and other subnational levels of government. As one local government official expressed it, "Everything starts from the law... There are so many laws here, the problem is implementation."<sup>131</sup> For example, although the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Law was signed in 2010, many provinces still do not have local policies and plans to implement it. As long as local and national governments fail to plan for disaster risk reduction and management, as the law requires, they also plan to fail in upholding this key mandate for the welfare of people displaced by disasters such as Haiyan. When these policies are created and implemented, however, this localized approach has great potential to respond in a tailored way to particular community needs. As an elected local official reflected, "That's the beauty of the kind of government we have. It's a beautiful system, but people don't know it."<sup>132</sup>

121 IASC Framework, p. A3, 1.

122 IASC Framework, pp. 15, 17.

123 IASC Framework, pp. 20, 32.

124 IASC Framework, p. 23.

125 IASC Framework, p. 23.

126 IASC Framework, p. 39.

127 IASC Framework, pp. 27, 29, 31.

128 IASC Framework, p. 12.

129 On the role of local authorities in responding to conflict-induced displacement, see for example [www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/05/kenya-displacement-kamungi](http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/05/kenya-displacement-kamungi) and [www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/05/colombia-internal-displacement-municipal-bogota-cali-vidal](http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/05/colombia-internal-displacement-municipal-bogota-cali-vidal).

130 On the issue of under-staffing, one informant pointed to the lack of regular staff in the Tacloban DRRM Office, where the DRRM officer-designate has reportedly been serving on job order employment status, that is, they hold the position as temporary employment, which is contrary to what is provided for by law, under RA 9710 and the DRRM Act of 2010 or RA 10121.

131 Interview, Manila, December 2014.

132 Interview, Manila, December 2014.

In the context of this “beautiful system,” creative local leaders dedicated to upholding residents’ rights and well-being can have significant positive impacts, although they also have to contend with corruption and some officials’ self-serving approaches. While national and local authorities have primary responsibility for enabling durable solutions for IDPs, from the perspective of many focus group participants, this obligation was honoured more in the breach than in performance in the post-Haiyan context. Although IDPs rely on local officials, particularly barangay captains, to help them resolve challenges pertaining to their displacement, in every focus group participants expressed dissatisfaction with the ways in which governments – local and national – obstructed rather than enabled durable solutions. When asked how assistance should be delivered so it will lead to durable solutions, participants in many focus groups suggested that instead of government agencies, community organizations should be used. Reflecting deep frustration with corruption and the failure of some government officials to serve the public first and foremost, one Haiyan survivor referred to some officials as “land-based crocodiles” who have become rich at the expense of Haiyan’s victims.

The merits, limitations, technicalities and complexities of the Philippines’ local governance system were particularly unknown among the staff of international agencies, many of whom were used to working in more adversarial contexts where local authorities are not as actively engaged as they are in the Philippines. While some local officials indicated that – with an open and welcoming approach – they were able to reap great benefits for their communities from working with international actors, others found that the “flood” of internationals disrespected and sometimes compromised local systems.<sup>133</sup>

In some areas, tensions emerged between different branches of local government and, unsurprisingly, among elected officials. For example, an elected official in Tacloban expressed concerns on the continued adherence to the NBZ concept and the “knee-jerk,” rapid push for relocations, suggesting that “It is better not to rush these kind of programs if you want to build back better... For me, it’s a basic human right, they [IDPs from areas such as Barangay 88] should be given options. There are risks but they can choose to live there.”<sup>134</sup> In her assessment, the City Council was not adequately involved in the development of such plans, indicating that “We were not consulted...We have different views, maybe they were trying to avoid conflicts.”<sup>135</sup> As some local officials emphasized, resolving displacement, particularly through relocations, is dramatically shaped by political will, especially at the local level. Yet as some interviewees lamented, local officials’ engagement with durable solutions is often shaped by the election cycle, which can undercut the long-term thinking and sustained policy implementation necessary for sustainable solutions to displacement.<sup>136</sup>

<sup>133</sup> Interviews, Tacloban and Guiuan, March 2015.

<sup>134</sup> Interview, Manila, December 2014.

<sup>135</sup> Interview, Manila, December 2014.

<sup>136</sup> Interviews, Manila, December 2014 and Guiuan, March 2015. On the tension between short-term local governance strategies and long-term durable solutions, it is noteworthy that in some instances, important local initiatives related to durable solutions are taken through executive orders. For example, the town of Palo has attempted to address the need for the creation of more evacuation centres through an executive order that all new municipal buildings must have an upper floor that can be designated as an evacuation centre. While commendable, this initiative will not necessarily have long-lasting effect if it is not passed as a local ordinance, which has more “permanent” significance in Philippine national and local political entities. In contrast, executive orders can be more easily revoked by newly elected officials who may not necessarily agree with or prioritize even important initiatives such as this one.



## Conclusion and Recommendations

Efforts to respond to the massive displacement crisis caused by Typhoon Haiyan are a source of insight, at the same time as there is continued need to strengthen support for those who still struggle to overcome the consequences of displacement and other losses from the storm. In a range of ways, from access to housing, land and property rights to enjoyment of safety and security, those uprooted by Typhoon Haiyan continue to face significant obstacles that are not necessarily as pronounced for those who did not flee and lose their homes. Since the majority of the displaced returned to their former places of residence relatively promptly after the storm, it may be tempting to conclude that the displacement problem is over. Yet such a conclusion erroneously overlooks the persistent problems associated with displacement for those who remain in bunkhouses and transitional sites, and for those who are struggling to rebuild their homes and livelihoods or put down roots in relocation communities. While the continued and significant implications of displacement must be recognized, displacement cannot be understood or addressed in isolation. Rather, displacement is an element of Haiyan's broader local, regional and national repercussions; the vulnerabilities that underpin it, and that it in turn engenders, can only be tackled through holistic responses rooted in careful analysis of the post-disaster political economy.

Efforts to respond to the displacement crisis generated by Typhoon Haiyan underscore the central role of local governments, and the need to constructively engage local and national governments alike in open discussions on how to contextualize, harmonize and cooperatively achieve national and international standards. While international standards such as the Sphere Standards and the IASC Framework are certainly relevant in upholding the rights of IDPs in the Philippines, they need to be understood and advanced in the broader context of national frameworks and systems.

Moving forward, as many international humanitarian actors are concluding their work in the Philippines, it is essential not to lose sight of the outstanding obstacles to the resolution of displacement – obstacles that must be addressed through carefully crafted development support. At the same time, continued research and analysis is needed to understand the long-term consequences of the different approaches to supporting the resolution of displacement in Haiyan-affected areas, including through relocations. Various agencies, including Oxfam and Refugees International, have undertaken related studies in the typhoon-affected areas and formulated a number of recommendations, which are further affirmed by this research and have ongoing relevance for policymaking and implementation. These include: (a) increasing transparency, community consultation and information dissemination for affected communities on relocation processes; (b) improving institutional coordination efforts among national and international agencies; and (c) strengthening capacity-building for LGUs in land-use planning, human rights protection, urban planning, disaster risk reduction and community consultations.

*“As many international humanitarian actors are concluding their work in the Philippines, it is essential not to lose sight of the outstanding obstacles to the resolution of displacement.”*

Beyond backstopping these previous recommendations, this study raises the following suggestions for strengthening support for durable solutions to displacement for those uprooted by Typhoon Haiyan, bearing in mind the need to more concertedly integrate gender analyses into all interventions. These recommendations are prefaced by recognition of the more general need to raise awareness of the IASC Framework and its implications for the resolution of post-disaster situations, in the Philippines and elsewhere.

1. *Recognize durable solutions as a multisectoral concern, including both humanitarian and development inputs, and extending beyond the housing sector*

In the Haiyan response, as in many other post-disaster displacement contexts, the provision of permanent housing has often been equated with the achievement of durable solutions. However, the reality is more complex. Durable solutions are not simply a humanitarian concern but a major development challenge, requiring the concerted, long-term attention of local, national and international development actors. Supporting IDPs' own efforts to achieve durable solutions must address housing, but should also extend to livelihoods, education, health, and other concerns related to the heightened potential vulnerabilities associated with displacement, including access to basic services both at relocation sites and in cases of *in situ* reconstruction. Whether they are undertaken by national or local governments, international organizations or NGOs, efforts to enable durable solutions to displacement may take a variety of forms, from tailored, individual support to community-based interventions, but at all stages of response, concerted coordination is needed to ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained between individual and community-level support.

2. *Redouble investment in the strengthening of evacuation centres, safer construction techniques and other disaster risk reduction programmes*

Typhoon Haiyan has produced strong political will to urgently relocate populations from coastal areas that may be at risk of future typhoons. However, this has been described as a “knee-jerk” reaction that does not adequately recognize that relocation is a highly complex, lengthy process that can invite numerous, unintended but nevertheless negative economic and social consequences. A variety of alternative measures should be considered and promoted to enable the government to meet its responsibilities for public safety, pursuing relocations only when absolutely necessary, and in line with standards in the Philippine legal framework and relevant international human rights principles. For example, significant investment in evacuation centres (including identification, management, planning, construction and networking), combined with reconstruction assistance even in some coastal areas, would strengthen people's ability to choose durable solutions that best fit their needs (often a long-term process) by providing safe spaces that will serve as shelter for people during future disasters, and reducing the pressure on the government to relocate people within time frames that are unrealistic if relocation is to be sustainable. Working in tandem with improvements to evacuation centre infrastructure, other DRR programmes, including flood control infrastructure and environmental interventions that can minimize the impact of storm surge events (for example), will also help in reducing the risk of future displacement and supporting durable solutions for those already displaced while alleviating the need to undertake large-scale relocations.

3. *Establish an interactive, rights-based monitoring system for relocation plans, policies and projects, linking local and national levels*

Relocation processes must respect human rights principles enshrined in national and international legal frameworks, including the Philippine Constitution, and must be based on close consultation and participation of affected community members. A dedicated, rights-based monitoring system for the relocations process in typhoon-affected areas should be based on three objectives: (a) monitoring the process and impact of relocations according to national and international laws and standards; (b) monitoring the performance and quality of implementation of relocation sites; and (c) convening regular local and national workshops to identify problems and potential conflicts and share information between all stakeholders

involved in different aspects of the relocation process. At the moment, relocations are generally perceived as a bureaucratic exercise that provides few opportunities for input, information sharing and better decision-making according to the needs of communities and the expertise of local civil society. A strengthened monitoring process – potentially taking the form of a partnership between civil society and the CHR, operating at the local and national levels – can help communities access information and improve the overall transparency of the process. Efforts should also be made to monitor relocations over a longer period of time, ensuring that lessons from the post-Haiyan context are distilled and brought to bear on future relocations. Doing so will provide evidence and yield valuable lessons on the successes and shortcomings of relocation programmes over the long term, and may also serve to improve future disaster responses.

4. *Develop and implement enhanced, culturally sensitive livelihoods strategies for the affected areas, based on IDPs' active participation*

Thus far, there has been little progress in addressing the severe impacts of the post-Haiyan economic situation on survivors' lives, and expanding the provision of livelihoods assistance in meaningful ways beyond short-lived cash grants. Such assistance should be tackled from a cultural and gender-sensitive community perspective and engage local businesses according to the expertise, creative thinking, financial assistance and job creation they may be in a position to provide. Livelihood strategies should be linked to private sector business continuity plans and value chain developments. Creating livelihoods is an integral aspect of durable solutions, and restoring the dignity many people feel they have lost with the destruction of their homes and former ways of life. This is especially pertinent in cases where populations dependent on fishing are asked to move away from areas with easy access to the sea. Livelihoods strategies should be developed with the active involvement of IDPs, taking into account their own priorities and needs.

5. *Address fairness concerns in the implementation of aid*

Concerted efforts are needed on the part of the government, international organizations and NGOs to address mounting concerns regarding fairness in the distribution of assistance. Many families have been effectively discriminated against because of their previous residence in formerly termed "no-build zones." These zones are being reclassified according to disaster risk exposure, a process that should be concertedly supported throughout the Haiyan-affected areas. Recognizing that many people in hazard-prone areas are not likely to receive timely relocation assistance, rebuilding assistance should be provided to allow them to live in safety and dignity – unless an alternative situation is identified that meets their needs and best interests, and one that is in line with the standards laid out in the relevant legal frameworks. For international and civil society actors, this may require fresh efforts to identify communities that have been excluded from assistance packages, and to assist in advocacy and follow-up on their behalf with the responsible national and local mechanisms. Equally, redoubled efforts are needed to communicate openly with community members to identify and implement aid criteria, and adjust criteria as necessary in light of evolving needs.

6. *Strengthen community-based approaches to humanitarian aid and recovery*

In many cases, local populations were opposed to approaches to aid that did not capitalize on community cohesion or strengthen their self-sufficiency. In some transitional shelter sites, there were rules that were viewed as unfair, cumbersome, or even paternalistic, and had negative effects on feelings of dignity and self-worth. Furthermore, communities felt

that individualistic approaches to aid were at odds with the general view that everyone has suffered as a result of the typhoon and should have access to assistance. In the delivery of aid, more efforts should be made by national and local governments, international organizations and NGOs alike to find ways to preserve the strong social capital that exists in the Philippines, and empower communities in situations where people feel they have been reduced to an unwanted state of dependency because of lost homes and livelihoods. Related to this, aid strategies should mainstream awareness-raising activities and community organizing and advocacy strategies so people are knowledgeable of their rights, the mechanisms available to protect their rights, and the aid they are entitled to receive. More generally, international organizations and NGOs should carefully evaluate their Haiyan response efforts to help them better determine in future how to balance and integrate individual and community-based approaches.

7. *Ensure support for durable solutions and DRRM efforts at all levels integrate gender analyses and respond to the different needs and capacities of women and men, girls and boy*

Gender analysis should be incorporated into support for durable solutions and DRRM interventions from the national to barangay levels. The incorporation of gender analysis and the implementation of gender-sensitive strategies can strengthen resilience and adaptive mechanisms. Gender-sensitive capacity and needs assessments should address issues including emergency response; the management of evacuation centres, bunkhouses, and transitional and relocation sites; and the development of livelihood strategies.

8. *Continue and strengthen capacity-building initiatives involving LGUs and civil society groups on disaster preparedness, response and recovery*

The Philippines has rich legal and policy frameworks on a vast range of issues pertaining to citizens' rights and welfare. But as has been described in many parts of this report, there is a disconnection between policy and practice. Too often, rights-based frameworks remain unimplemented, particularly when constituents are not aware of these standards, and able to mobilize to demand that they are respected. Constituents at every level need to be vigilant in demanding mutual accountability, transparency and proactive management of disaster risks. This entails awareness-raising and capacity-building activities, particularly for LGUs and civil society groups who remain the "front line" of disaster prevention, response and recovery in the Philippines.



BROOKINGS



International Organization for Migration (IOM)