



# STUDY REPORT ON COMMUNITY INTEGRATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF BORDER SECURITY IN THE TILLABERI REGION





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Cover photo : (Photo 1) Local community playing the role of displaced people fleeing conflicts in a fictional neighbor country of Niger; (Photo 2) Women and vulnerable people waiting to go to the temporary site after the first registration.

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# INTRODUCTION

Located in the heart of the Sahel, the Niger covers 1,270,000 km<sup>2</sup>, three quarters of which are located in the Sahara Desert. The Niger shares borders with seven countries: Libya to the north-east, Chad to the east, Nigeria and Benin to the south, Burkina Faso and Mali to the west, and Algeria to the north-west. The Niger's 5,690 km of borders are porous and very poorly regulated and monitored, representing a major risk for the country's authorities in terms of providing security to the population.

Located in the western part of the Niger, the Tillabéri region lies between Mali to the north and Burkina Faso to the west. Various communities live in the region and rely mainly on agriculture and livestock. The proximity of the Tillabéri region to Mali makes it one of the regions of the Niger most exposed, on the one hand, to terrorist threats and, on the other, to bandits and community militias that operate in the region. Moreover, the persistent instability in northern Mali has caused many Malian refugees to flee conflict and seek refuge in the Niger. In addition to this border instability, there are various types of intercommunity traffic and conflicts currently unfolding in the region, fuelled mainly by tensions related to access to natural resources. All these issues make Tillabéri a particularly fragile region, with border insecurity disrupting the population.

The purpose of this study is to analyse local people's perceptions on two issues: border management in the Tillabéri region and the role of border authorities in response mechanisms to massive flows of displaced or migrating populations. This research also questions populations about their perception of the various security risks that threaten their environment – in particular, terrorism. One of the objectives of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Mission in the Niger is to contribute to the strengthening of the capacity of national and regional authorities, so that they can ensure full control of their borders. This will be achieved specifically by developing structured and resilient engagement of communities, to allow them to support the work of local and regional authorities.

The first phase of this project was implemented by IOM from September 2016 to March 2017 and focused on the Diffa and Zinder regions. Following a field survey on community perceptions and integration with border management, prevention (or vigilance) committees were established in 46 communities in the border areas mostly near Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, Chad. This report is part of a second phase conducted in 2018 in the Agadez and Tillabéri regions. The reports produced for each of the two regions were primarily aimed at guiding the process of structuring and strengthening the community prevention committees established in these regions. In May 2018, these committees were created in 48 villages in the districts (officially *départements* in Niger French) of Gotheye, Tera and Bankilare.

The main objective of these committees is to transmit information relating to safety, health and population movements to local and regional authorities. Thus, they are expected to report suspicious events or the presence of potentially dangerous individuals without undue delay. In the event of a crisis at the border, these committees should promptly notify the relevant authorities and services. They may also be called upon to assist rescue services in the identification, orientation and care of displaced and/or vulnerable persons. The results of this

study will guide the establishment and operations of these community prevention committees in the region. In addition, by highlighting the concerns of the population, by village, the report will therefore be a decision-making tool useful to the authorities.

Prevention committees are not requested to play a defence role or to encourage the use of violence, even if they are faced with illegal activities, as part of their operations. As a matter of fact, they are not intended to replace State authority but, rather, to facilitate the work of its services in the field of border management.

### **Geography of the Tillabéri region**

Located in the west of the Niger and bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, the Tillabéri region is characterized by its instability and high concentration of various threats. These threats emanate partly from international borders but are also fuelled by regional issues. The region covers an area of 97,251 km<sup>2</sup>, that is, about 7.7 per cent of the national territory. Its population was estimated on 17 December 2012 at 2,722,482 inhabitants, that is, 15.9 per cent of the Niger's population.

Like the rest of the country, this population is relatively young, with more than 6 out of 10 people under the age of 20.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, half of this population is under 14 years old and, thus, a significant share of the population could be considered potentially inactive.<sup>2</sup>

In terms of geography, the region can be divided into a northern and a southern part. The southern part is oriented towards land use and an agricultural economy. For the purposes of this survey, this part includes the districts of Tera and Torodi, which border Burkina Faso. The districts of Bankilare, Ayorou,<sup>3</sup> Ouallam and Banibangou are included in the northern part of the region, which shares a border with Mali. This northern part is a semi-arid and agro-pastoral area. This area is administratively delimited by the recent Pastoral Code implemented through Ordinance 2010–029, which supplants the delimitation established by Act 61–5 of 1961. It sets the northern limit of the crops and, thus, the beginning of the grazing areas.

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
<sup>1</sup> Niger, Institut National de la Statistique (INS, National Institute of Statistics), Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 2012: Monographie de la Région de Tillabéri" (General Census of the Population and Housing 2012: Monograph of the Tillabéri Region) (Niamey, INS, 2016). Available from (French only) [www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/RGPH2012/Monographie\\_Regionale\\_Tillaberi.pdf](http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/RGPH2012/Monographie_Regionale_Tillaberi.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Can also be spelled "Ayerou", "Ayérou" or "Ayourou".



## Map of pastoral areas in the Tillabéri region



Source: Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP, High Authority for Peacebuilding), the Niger. The map is based on the work of Amani Mohamed Mouhamadou and first appeared in the HACP report titled “Nord-Tillabéri : Analyse du conflit lié à l'accès aux ressources naturelles” (North Tillabéri: Analysis of a conflict related to the access to natural resources”. Available from [www.irenees.net/bdf\\_fiche-documentation-705\\_fr.html](http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-documentation-705_fr.html)

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

## A geographical organization that symbolizes the divide between pastoral and agricultural populations

The divide between agriculture and pastoralism goes beyond the simple framework of geographic and climatic structures. Relations between farmers and herders in the Tillabéri region are also representative of the economic diversity necessary for the well-being of not only the region, but the country as a whole. In addition to these two parts of the regional economy, there is also the growth of trade activities and local markets that promote exchanges between populations from both sides of the border. However, the dichotomy between agriculture and pastoralism remains particularly shaping of life in Tillabéri. Thus, these links are the core of the social structures of this region and shape the nature of the relationships between tribes and communities.

The difficult coexistence between nomadic and agricultural populations that prevail in some areas of the region results in many challenges that regional authorities face on a daily basis, particularly with regard to access to the territory's natural resources. The various water points spread in the northern part of Tillabéri constitute places of gathering and socialization, as well as of disputes, quarrels and sometimes even conflict. The same is true regarding access to land and respect for the Pastoral Code, which is often poorly enforced due to climatic hazards, new alliances or the results of intercommunity conflict. Introduced in 2010, the Pastoral Code mainly aims to strengthen the standards and regulations implemented to facilitate relations between nomadic and sedentary populations. Thus, its purpose is to both protect pastoralists in accessing land and preserve farmers' properties. This nomadic code recognizes, in particular, farmers' and herders' fundamental rights and prohibits the privatization of pastoral land whenever it

would prevent herders from accessing certain resources.<sup>4</sup> However, the lack of awareness of the rules and applications of the code, as well as unsustainable investment in administrative and legal structures that could ensure its effective enforcement, means that disputes and conflicts continue to spread in this part of the region.

Livestock farmers located in this semi-arid area are entirely at the mercy of climate hazards and regular weather disasters in the region. During the rainy season (June to September), grassy areas become abundant and water fills the ponds, allowing herds to graze and herders to move naturally and freely in the area. In contrast, the subsequent period of aridity constrains farmers in two respects. First, grazing areas are significantly reduced; as such, and secondly, farmers are forced to remain within 15–25 km of the nearest pastoral well to be able to provide water for the herds.<sup>5</sup> These seasonal changes are, thus, essential to understanding the economic, political and social dynamics of the region because they direct the mobility of populations, their relationship to space and to the border, and as well as their relationships with other communities.

Finally, and most importantly, an internal border marks the separation between the main communities in the region. The Hausa, the Peulh (also, “Fulani”) and, most importantly, the Djerma,<sup>6</sup> which constitutes the majority ethnic group in the region, are located in the south. In the north are the greatest number of pastoral communities, including nomadic communities such as the Tuaregs, the Dossaaks, and some communities of Peulh and Arabs. In recent years, population growth in the Niger,<sup>7</sup> combined with the effects of climate change, has resulted in a slow migration of agricultural populations to the north, increasingly reducing pastoral areas or pushing pastoralists towards Mali, which meanwhile became very unstable. These growing tensions in accessing natural resources lead to intercommunity conflicts that encourage the growth of terrorist and/or criminal groups operating in the region, whose ranks are regularly filled by some of its young people, who often are unemployed or marginalized. It is this intertwining of problems of multiple causes that local authorities and the peoples of Tillabéri must face.

## Border porosity that increases the risk of insecurity

In this context, there are also the territorial particularities of the region that prevent effective border control and, thus, limit the ability to ensure the security of its population, in particular, those that reside closest to the Malian border. According to a report by the Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP, High Authority for Peacebuilding),<sup>8</sup> the border shared by the Niger and Mali is a no-man’s-land that developed in the absence of a strong State presence. The distance between each outpost of the defence and security forces (DSFs) along the border is estimated at over 100 km.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), “Fiche technique de pays sur les questions relatives aux peuples autochtones, la république du Niger” (Country fact sheet on indigenous people’s issues), report (Niamey, IWGIA, 2013). Available from [www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/40224547/niger\\_ctn.pdf/d90e7e2d-cbb1-4191-ba7a-984a3a579fe9](http://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/40224547/niger_ctn.pdf/d90e7e2d-cbb1-4191-ba7a-984a3a579fe9)

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Sometimes spelled “Zarma.”


<sup>7</sup> With 7.6 children per woman, the Niger has the highest fertility rate in the world.

<sup>8</sup> S. Ibrahim, M. Mouhamadou, Z. Abdoulaye and D. Biri, “Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l’accès aux ressources naturelles” (North Tillabéri: Analysis of the conflict over the access to natural resources), report (Niamey, Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix/European Union and Modus Operandi, 2017). Available from (French only) [http://base.irenees.net/docs/publication\\_hacp\\_modop.pdf](http://base.irenees.net/docs/publication_hacp_modop.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

This instability has contributed to the recent increase in security incidents in the region, caused by bandits, community militias and terrorist groups. These incidents include, notably, territorial wars, targeted violence against civilians and terrorist attacks.

#### Evolution of insecurity in the Tillabéri region



Source : ACLED.

Of the 40 incidents recorded in the region since 2011, more than half occurred in the last two years,<sup>10</sup> with 33 of them causing losses, including the deaths of 225 people. Of these 33 fatal incidents, 26 occurred in 2017 and 2018 (data available for until June). The particularly deadly aspect of these acts was facilitated by easy access to light weapons in the region, which also increased the risk of acts of violence by some communities who felt they were being robbed by criminal gangs and other groups in their communities. To respond to this dual threat of banditry and terrorism, the State of the Niger launched Operation Zarmaganda a few years ago; it was replaced by Operation Dongo in June 2017. The main goal of Operation Dongo, based in Tilwa, in the district of Ouallam, is to contain the various threats emanating from the Malian border area.

### A highly prominent terrorist threat along the northern border of the region

The Tillabéri region is threatened along its borders by the growing number of terrorist groups. These groups are almost exclusively concentrated in northern and central Mali. This phenomenon is not new in the Sahel region, but it has become a major one, both in the reach and number of stakeholders involved and the extent of these groups' actions within the region. Now, more than ever, it draws the attention of the international community, which has increased the number of operations to try to put an end to this threat.

These terrorist groups have become more threatening since 2012, following the fighting between the Malian regular army and various groups, including the Tuareg independence fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and the Salafists of Ansar Dine, which are supported by other terrorist groups, including The Organization of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The work done by the Malian armed forces, supported by France's Operation

<sup>10</sup> The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Database. Available from [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com) (accessed in June 2018).

Serval, helped to contain this threat, though it did not eliminate it. Chadian forces are also present on the territory, as is the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission, whose mandate began in 2013 and which is still active in the area. Operation Serval has been reorganized as Operation Barkhane, which now extends over the western half of the Sahel–Sahara region and whose main mission is to fight jihadist armed groups. In addition, the main goal of the recent G5 Sahel Force, which brings together the armed forces of the region (the Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Burkina Faso), is to contain terrorist threats in West Africa.

These terrorist groups have gradually transformed and some have become allies, while others have disbanded. Today the main groups are still active, although they have suffered many losses in recent years. Thus, the north and centre of Mali serve as a base for groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen,<sup>11</sup> AQIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS).<sup>12</sup> In addition, there are non-State armed groups advocating the independence of northern Mali, namely, the Congress for Azawad Justice based in the Timbuktu region and the Movement of the Salvation of Azawad based in the Menaka region,<sup>13</sup> which is located less than 100 km from the border with the Tillabéri region. Neighbouring Burkina Faso is no exception to this terrorist phenomenon. The terrorist attacks in northern Burkina Faso claimed by Ansaroul Islam, a terrorist group based in the country, show that the threat of terrorism cannot be comprehended as a solely Malian phenomenon, but that it also spreads to other parts of the Sahel.<sup>14</sup> The terrorist phenomenon has also moved south and now affects eastern Burkina Faso, where law enforcement forces have suffered significant losses due to targeted attacks using improvised explosive devices.<sup>15</sup>

## Research methodology

### Objective and expected results

This study is part of the project “Engaging Communities in Border Management in the Niger”, designed and piloted by the IOM Mission in the Niger. Its main purpose is to understand the opinion of communities living in border areas regarding their integration with border management, their understanding of cross-border dynamics and their perception of terrorism in the region.

This study will lead national and international stakeholders to adapt their actions to better integrate communities and to work with them to better meet their needs. In conclusion, it will demonstrate the need to remove communities from the role of potential victims of insecurity, to make them key players in border management through the establishment of community prevention committees.

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<sup>11</sup> JNIM was created in March 2017, following the announcement of an alliance of three main terrorist groups from northern Mali: Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the branch of AQIM operating in the Sahara. See, for example: F. Offner, “Shifting relationships, growing threats: Who’s who of insurgent groups in the Sahel”, *The New Humanitarian* (formerly IRIN), 19 February 2018. Available from [www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/02/19/shifting-relationships-growing-threats-who-s-who-insurgent-groups-sahel](http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/02/19/shifting-relationships-growing-threats-who-s-who-insurgent-groups-sahel)

<sup>12</sup> The ISGS was created in 2015 by Adnan al-Sahrawi, former spokesman for the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (or, more commonly, MUJAO), who now seems to have disappeared, as his whereabouts remain unknown.

<sup>13</sup> F. Offner, “Shifting relationships, growing threats”.

<sup>14</sup> H. Nsaibia and C. Weiss, “Ansaroul Islam and the growing terrorist insurgency in Burkina Faso”, *CTC Sentinel*, 11(3):21–26. Available from <https://ctc.usma.edu/ansaroul-islam-growing-terrorist-insurgency-burkina-faso>

<sup>15</sup> *Jeune Afrique*, “Burkina : au moins sept membres des forces de l'ordre tués par l'explosion d'un engin artisanal” (Burkina: At least seven members of the police force killed in the explosion of an improvised explosive device), 28 August 2018. Available from [www.jeuneafrique.com/620820/politique/burkina-au-moins-sept-membres-des-forces-de-lordre-tues-par-lexplosion-dun-engin-artisanal](http://www.jeuneafrique.com/620820/politique/burkina-au-moins-sept-membres-des-forces-de-lordre-tues-par-lexplosion-dun-engin-artisanal)



## Research environment

A survey was conducted in 122 villages in the Tillabéri region. Selection of these villages was made by the mayors of nine municipalities (officially *communes* in Niger French) located along international borders: Ayorou, Banibangou, Bankilare, Ouallam, Tondikiwindi, Tera, Gorouol, Makalondi and Torodi. These villages were identified according to criteria pre-established by IOM:

- The village must have more than 100 inhabitants.
- It must have mobile phone network coverage.
- It must have already been affected by insecurity.
- The population does not or rarely provides information to the authorities.
- Participation in the study is voluntary and unpaid.

In terms of ethnic composition, the villages selected for this study were mainly Djerma villages. However, there were also villages with majority Tuareg and Peulh populations, and localities that hosted Gurma or Hausa communities. Therefore, the investigators ensured that the various ethnic communities of the Tillabéri region were adequately represented.

Twenty-five investigators were recruited locally based on their level of education and knowledge of the region, in particular, of its security context and the various local languages. They travelled throughout the country for a month of inquiry.<sup>16</sup> These investigators had been previously trained to fully carry out the mission.

A total of 7,275 people living in 122 villages were interviewed for this study.

A questionnaire stored on the Kobo smartphone application was available to each interviewer and mainly comprised multiple-choice questions. The questions were grouped into several chapters dealing with local communities' perceptions of border management, including its effectiveness, security risks, terrorism, and communication between authorities and communities on border security.

In addition, the questions were accompanied by guidelines for investigators to support them as they approached the various themes and questions with respondents. Guidance was also provided on the most sensitive issues. For instance, with questions on terrorism, it was specified that if the word "terrorism" did not seem to be appropriate in the local context; the investigator was encouraged to replace it with more indirect expressions such as the Djerma term *izéfotèye goyo*.<sup>17</sup>

## Methodological approach

### Sampling

The sample frame for the survey consisted of 122 villages, each with more than 100 inhabitants, located close to the border or affected by cross-border migration, trade and trafficking, among others. These localities were identified by the administrative authorities and elected local officials of the nine municipalities selected before the start of the survey.

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<sup>16</sup> Data gathering ran from 5 March to 1 April 2018.

<sup>17</sup> The term translates to "professional bandit."

### *Investigation technique*

Respondents were selected randomly, while ensuring even representation of age groups, social categories, nationalities and ethnicities found in the surveyed area.

Each interview was preceded by an oral consent procedure with the respondent. Field investigators had to read aloud a paragraph explaining the purpose of the survey, the voluntary nature of the interview and IOM's commitment not to disclose respondents' personal data.

### **Difficulties encountered during the investigation**

First, it is important to point out that some villages were very difficult to access. This inaccessibility is caused particularly by the remoteness of the villages in the region, as well as by the dangerousness of some areas. Some villages on the border with Mali had become inaccessible due to military operations by the G5 Sahel, as well as the state of emergency still in force in some areas.

Second, the sometimes very wide distance between houses within the same village made the task of the investigators more difficult. The 25 locally recruited investigators travelled mostly by public transport, which is often insufficient in some areas of the region. Travel from one village to another could sometimes be undertaken only once a week, usually on market days, slowing down the conduct of the survey.

In addition, poor coverage of mobile phone networks in some parts of the region, especially in border villages, sometimes hindered real-time sending of forms finalized by investigators.

Lastly, from a security point of view, it is noteworthy that although no untoward incidents were recorded, the risk still existed, particularly because of the absence of DSFs in most villages in the region.

### **Analytical methodology**

Most of the questions asked in the survey were closed-ended, multiple-choice questions. Analysis of the results reveal corresponding proportions of respondents who chose certain response options. These proportions are often expressed as absolute numbers and percentages, with the latter contextualized to the total number of respondents. In addition, the "Other(s)" option in each multiple-choice question allowed respondents to specify their choice if it was not among the listed options.

Furthermore, for some questions, the percentage corresponding to a response option refers to its frequency relative to all answers given, rather than to the proportion of respondents who chose it. This allowed the researchers to highlight the relative magnitudes of the responses, as well as the most common choices of the respondents. For these questions, the sum of the percentages representing the responses may be greater than 100 per cent, as respondents could give two or more answers.

With regard to the open-ended questions in the survey, data-processing revealed the most frequent and relevant answers given by the interviewees.

For the various variables measured by the survey, graphical representations in the form of pie charts or bar graphs are used to show the corresponding percentages of the responses. For multiple-choice questions, the graphical representation chosen is generally the bar graph. For closed-ended questions for which only one answer could be given, pie charts are preferred, in order to better take into account the mutually exclusive nature of the answers.

Lastly, the results of the survey are sometimes disaggregated according to the district or municipality of residence of the respondents surveyed, to highlight significant differences in the responses across geographical areas.






# 1. RESPONDENT PROFILE

This part of the report provides a profile of the sample interviewed, in terms of ethnic, demographic and economic characteristics.

**Figure 1: Distribution of respondents by gender**



With a surface area of 97,251 km<sup>2</sup> and 2,722,482 inhabitants divided proportionally between men (49.45%) and women (50.55%), the Tillabéri region is one of the most populated in the Niger.<sup>18</sup> The interviewers recruited for this study were instructed to interview a sample of the population as representative as possible, in order to draw conclusions from respondents who could give as close to actual community perceptions as possible. It is worth noting that this work was complicated by the social and cultural structures of these communities.


More than 9 out of 10 households in the Tillabéri region are listed by the Niger Institute of Statistics as being headed by men. The share of female-headed households is concentrated in urban areas (18%), which were less targeted by the interviewers,<sup>19</sup> who concentrated on the villages closest to the border. Following this logic, household heads were usually the ones designated to participate in the survey, which explains male predominance in the sample (76.7%) and the low proportion of female respondents (23.3%).

Consequently, several female interviewers were recruited to inquire about social and community effects that some women would have otherwise been unable to speak about. This helped ensure that the female share among the respondents was significant, allowing good sample representativeness.

<sup>18</sup> INS, Niger – Recensement Général de la Population et de L'Habitat 2012, 4ème Série (Niger – General Census of the Population and Housing 2012, Fourth Round) (Niamey, INS, 2012). Available from (French only) [www.stat-niger.org/nada/index.php/catalog/61](http://www.stat-niger.org/nada/index.php/catalog/61)

<sup>19</sup> INS, “Monographie de la région de Tillabéri” (Monograph of the Tillabéri region).


Figure 2: Distribution of respondents by age group



Like the rest of the country, Tillabéri's population is relatively young, with more than 6 out of 10 people under the age of 20.<sup>20</sup> Despite these demographics, the sample in this survey is composed mainly of adults ages 26 to 40 (45.4%) and 41 to 60 (35.3%); the 61–80 age group comes in last. The 18–25 age group (11.1%) is the second most underrepresented age group in our sample, although it is one of the largest in the region and in the rest of the country. This is due to household organization factors similar to those previously mentioned for the distribution of respondents by gender. As a matter of fact, heads of households are usually in charge of responding to surveys like this – and being household heads, they are less likely to be young people.

In the Tillabéri region, only 5 per cent of heads of households are under 25 years old; 34.25 per cent are between 26 and 40 years old; 42.12 per cent between 41 and 60 years old and 17.05 per cent<sup>21</sup> between 61 and 80 years old. This actual age distribution of heads of households within the region, combined with the investigators' efforts to ensure that the active and mobile population is represented in their sample, explains the age distribution of the respondents.

Figure 3: Distribution of respondents by nationality




<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

Less than 4 per cent of the sample in this study belongs to the category “migrants from the Niger’s direct borders”; 96.2 per cent of the respondents are of Niger nationality, while the rest of the sample are of Burkina Faso nationality (2.5%), Malian (1.1%) and, more marginally, Nigerian (0.1%) and Algerian (0.1%).

The ethnic distribution of the respondents has a very low share of migrants in the Tillabéri region compared to the country as a whole, and to other regions such as Agadez. Migrants in transit from Burkina Faso or Mali, travelling through the Tillabéri region, rarely settle there. Instead, they usually seek economic opportunities within the urban community of Niamey or in other countries in North Africa, or leave for Europe.

**Figure 4: Distribution of respondents by ethnicity**



From a community point of view, the Tillabéri region is similar to the rest of the country, that is, multi-ethnic, with numerous languages and cultures. The main ethnic groups in the region are the Djerma, the Peulh, the Tuaregs, the Hausa and, finally, the Gumas and the Arabs.

The Djerma, the majority ethnic group in the region, live mainly in the western and southern parts of the Tillabéri region, occupying its agricultural area along with the Hausa, as well as some Peulh groups. The pastoral northern part of the region is occupied mainly by Tuaregs and other Peulh groups.


In 2001, according to data provided by the National Institute of Statistics of the Niger,<sup>22</sup> the Tillabéri region hosted 1.1 million Djerma, that is, 63.6 per cent of the region’s total population. The rest was divided between the Peulh (12.6%), the Tuaregs (11.1%) and the Hausa (10.5%). Lastly, there were also smaller ethnic groups such as the Gumas (1.9%).

The study sample mirrors this ethnic distribution, with a predominance of Djerma, although this group does not represent a majority but only 43.6 per cent of the sample. Almost 2 out of 10 respondents (19.5%) are of Peulh origin, while 17.1 per cent are Tuaregs and

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. “Annuaire statistique des cinquante ans d’indépendance du Niger” (Niamey, INS, 2010). Available from [www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaire\\_Statistiques/Annuaire\\_ins\\_2010/50.pdf](http://www.stat-niger.org/statistique/file/Annuaire_Statistiques/Annuaire_ins_2010/50.pdf)


16.25 per cent are Gurmas – an almost even distribution among these three ethnic groups. To a lesser extent, we could find Hausa (2.7% of the sample), Mossi (0.6%) and other ethnic groups (0.1%). The Djerma can be found throughout the region, but mainly in the western part, unlike the Tuaregs, who are found mainly in the north. The Peulh are also spread over the territory of Tillabéri, while the Gurmas are located mainly in the west and south-west, along the border with Burkina Faso. Sampling focused on the border areas of the region, which might explain the overrepresentation of certain ethnic groups, such as the Peulh, the Tuaregs and especially the Gurmas. The ethnic distribution of the sample is nevertheless representative of the actual population of these border areas.

**Figure 5: Distribution of respondents by main economic activity**



The distribution of respondents by their main economic activity confirms that the regional economy is driven mostly by farmers and herders, who represent the largest part of the working population and who support these communities. Thus, as mentioned in the Introduction, the region's economy is based mainly on pastoral and agricultural activities, each with its geographic concentration, with the former in the north and the latter in the south. The presence of the Niger River, which courses through the region, and the abundance of rainfall during the rainy season make Tillabéri a naturally suitable area for agriculture. Therefore, it is not surprising that two thirds (64.5%) of the respondents are farmers. However, the country's inhabitants are rarely either solely herders or solely farmers and very often engage in both activities, depending on the season and climatic conditions.

## Map of pastoral areas in the Tillabéri region



Source: Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix (HACP, High Authority for Peacebuilding), the Niger. The map is based on the work of Amani Mohamed Mouhamadou and first appeared in the HACP report titled “Nord-Tillabéri : Analyse du conflit lié à l'accès aux ressources naturelles” (North Tillabéri: Analysis of a conflict related to the access to natural resources”. Available from [www.irenees.net/bdf\\_fiche-documentation-705\\_fr.html](http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-documentation-705_fr.html)

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

The second largest group is that of housewives, comprising 13.2 per cent or half of all the women in the sample and half of the women respondents. Trade is part of Tillabéri's economy and is increasingly developing in cross-border markets. The large market in the city of Ayorou is an example of this phenomenon, and is sustained by traders from the main countries of the region: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali and the Niger. Such merchants make up 7.5 per cent of the sample. Lastly, herders, who live mainly in the pastoral zone in the north of the region, make up 6.7 per cent of the sample.

There are nuances to the limited share (0.5%) of unemployed people. In a region like Tillabéri, which depends heavily on agriculture, majority of the population work according to the seasons. The share of unemployed people, especially during off-season periods, is therefore probably much higher, especially among young people who rely on seasonal employment.






## 2. LOCAL COMMUNITIES' PERCEPTIONS OF BORDER MANAGEMENT

This part of the study provides a better understanding and measurement of local communities' perceptions of border management. In particular, it analyses their knowledge of the very concept of borders, of their locality and of the authorities involved in their management and security. It also reveals how these inhabitants relate to their borders and the threats they perceive as arising from them. Lastly, it identifies solutions that should be considered by the authorities in order to improve border control and, thus, better ensure the safety of the population.

Figure 6: Respondents' perceptions of the border's function



Note: Multiple responses to this question were possible. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

In the Niger, some communities follow a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle and move geographically within the country according to the season and their needs. This is particularly the case with the Tuareg tribes,<sup>23</sup> which are the most nomadic, as well as some of the Peulh, who have likewise maintained a nomadic way of life, even though some have adopted more sedentary lifestyles.<sup>24</sup> For these communities, the border provides regular crossing points with various functions that are not clearly set. Furthermore, a community's relationship to the border and its function depends on the locality and the customs and education levels of these communities. Therefore, it was important to survey populations on their understanding of the role of borders, by including, for example, a multiple-choice question on how respondents perceive their usefulness.

<sup>23</sup> M. Saley, "Le cas du Niger : les touareg du passé au futur" (The case of the Niger: The Tuareg from the past to the future), *Civilisations (Revue internationale d'anthropologie et de sciences humaines)*, 43(2):65 – 82. Available from <https://journals.openedition.org/civilisations/1568#quotation>


<sup>24</sup> S. Ibrahim, M. Mouhamadou, Z. Abdoulaye and D. Biri, "Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l'accès aux ressources naturelles" (North Tillabéri: Analysis of the conflict over access to natural resources).

For nearly 9 out of 10 respondents (88.1%), a border is simply a demarcation between two States. Therefore, a considerable majority of the surveyed people understand the main function of a border as being confined to geographic and administrative dimensions – a line drawn on the ground that helps to delineate one State from another and defines the extent of their respective territories.

A far smaller number of people recognize that the border also has a role in securing the territory of the Niger and functions in controlling people's comings and goings. To be specific, 3 out of 10 respondents (32.6%) believe that the border has a role to play in "ensuring the safety of the population," and nearly a quarter of them believe that it allows the authorities to "monitor the entry and exit" of people.

These responses revealed that, to a large proportion of the surveyed respondents, the border is not a barrier against external risks or an effective tool for monitoring entry into the country. It essentially exists for its administrative functions. This affirms a daily reality in the region marked by repeated incursions by groups of bandits, traffickers and terrorists, and by the regular transit of migrants. As most are accustomed to these border problems, only a minority of respondents consider that the border also exist to ensure their security. This reflects the evidence gathered during this investigation, analysed later in this report, which shows that some parts of the region seem particularly exposed to threats along its borders.

**Figure 7: Respondents' knowledge of the border's location**




With regard to the purely geographical aspect of the border, two thirds (66%) of the respondents say they are familiar with its location, which means only a third (34%) of the sample do not know where it is. Therefore, while a very large majority of the people surveyed have precise knowledge of the location, the proportion of those who do not remains significant. All the villages surveyed are linked to municipalities in districts bordering neighbouring countries. They live very close to the border, which was a key selection criterion decided during the framing of the study. The considerable proportion of those who do not know where the border is located can be explained by two factors.

The first factor is the high sedentary nature of most of the region's population, which subsists mainly on agriculture and trades mostly with the rest of the region, especially with the nearby capital, Niamey.

The second factor is more cultural. The border, especially in the most desertified parts of the Niger, is rarely physically manifested or represented, whether by milestones, signs or border posts. In addition to this is the lack of human settlements, which could also indicate the location of the border. As for nomadic populations living in desert areas, with few inhabitants and authorities exercising very little control, the exact location of the border is not considered to be important information.

Figure 8: Respondents' knowledge of the border's location, by district of residence




The respondents' knowledge of the geographic location of the border varies depending on their district of residence. The lack of knowledge described above is particularly marked in Bankilare, where there are much fewer border control posts than, for instance, in the neighbouring district of Ayorou, which is located on the direct route to the city of Gao in Mali, and where the vast majority of the population interviewed seem to know the location of the border. The high level of knowledge of the location of the border among the people of Ayorou can also be explained by the presence of military posts, as well as of a border post built by IOM. Most of the villages surveyed essentially have regular commercial and cultural exchanges with Mali.

In Bankilare, a lack of knowledge of the geographical location of the border is mainly due to the fact that most of the villages surveyed are located in a new demarcation zone, which resulted in the Niger villages now being located in Burkina Faso and vice versa, although the demarcation has not yet been officialized.

More marginally, there is a high rate of respondents (between about 25% and 35%) from the districts of Ouallam, Tera and Torodi who do not know how to locate the border; however, the proportion of those who knew the location is still high. This high level of knowledge of the location of the border could be explained both by their residence in the border area and by their frequent crossing over to neighbouring Burkina Faso.

Figure 9: Respondents' history of crossing the border (past versus current)




In the Tillabéri region, and mainly in the cities surveyed, travels across the border are frequent. However, the actual percentages of respondents who regularly cross the border varied between the surveyed areas and communities. In the past, especially before the start of the Tuareg revolts in 2012 and the increase in terrorist groups in northern Mali, nearly 9 out of 10 respondents regularly crossed the border.

Since the deterioration of the security situation in northern Mali, and, more generally, along the borders between the Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, the number of respondents who cross the border has decreased considerably, although it remains significant. Thus, even though 26.3 per cent of the respondents do not cross the border at present – an increase of more than 15 percentage points compared to the past (11%) – three out of four respondents still do. This change is mainly due to worsening security in the area, which is linked to the increase in terrorist threats and bandit attacks, as well as the theft of livestock. It can also be explained by some areas of the region having been under a state of emergency since March 2017, significantly limiting the movement of communities.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>25</sup> L. Le Sam, "L'Etat d'urgence désormais dans trois régions du Niger" (State of emergency now in three regions of the Niger). *Agence Nigérienne de Presse*, 4 March 2017. Available from (French only) [www.anp.ne/?q=article/l-etat-d-urgence-desormais-dans-trois-regions-du-niger](http://www.anp.ne/?q=article/l-etat-d-urgence-desormais-dans-trois-regions-du-niger)



Figure 10: Respondents' history of crossing the border (past versus current), by district of residence




Among the districts included in this study, the aforementioned change in behaviour (i.e. fewer people crossing the border) is very clear among respondents from Ouallam. It is also worth noting that it is mainly the districts neighbouring Burkina Faso where little change is observed in the border-crossing behaviour of the people surveyed. For Ouallam District, and particularly the municipality of Tondikiwindi, the shift is from a large majority (72.5% of the sample crossed the border in the past) to a very small minority of people (5.4% of the sample still cross the border). This change in behaviour is also observed in Banibangou District, where only 46.6 per cent of respondents still cross the border, compared to 81.4 per cent in the past.

To understand the differences between the districts, it is essential to recall that among them, Ouallam and Banibangou have been the most affected by terrorist incursions in recent years. This phenomenon has intensified significantly since 2017, when the number of attacks against DSFs started to increase; these included the 22 February attack that killed 15 soldiers of the Niger army<sup>26</sup> and the 4 October 2017 attack in Tongo Tongo that killed four soldiers of the Niger and four members of the United States Special Forces.<sup>27</sup> The attacks, claimed by the ISGS, is of great concern to the local population, as it has made the territory extremely unstable and dangerous even for those who know the area well. Because of the deterioration of border security, the number of border crossings have dropped dramatically in the districts of Banibangou and, particularly, Ouallam.

<sup>26</sup> Jeune Afrique, "Niger : l'attaque terroriste du 22 février a fait 15 morts dans les rangs de l'armée, selon un bilan officiel" (Niger: The 22 February terrorist attack left 15 soldiers dead , according to an official count), 24 February 2017. Available from (French only) [www.jeuneafrique.com/406602/politique/niger-lattaque-terroriste-22-fevrier-a-15-morts-rangs-de-larmee-selon-bilan-officiel](http://www.jeuneafrique.com/406602/politique/niger-lattaque-terroriste-22-fevrier-a-15-morts-rangs-de-larmee-selon-bilan-officiel)

<sup>27</sup> N. Guibert, "Niger: les leçons de l'embuscade de Tongo Tongo" (Niger: Lessons from the Tongo Tongo ambush). Le Monde, 15 November 2017. Available from (French only) [www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/11/15/niger-les-lecons-de-l-embuscade-de-tongo-tongo\\_5215218\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/11/15/niger-les-lecons-de-l-embuscade-de-tongo-tongo_5215218_3212.html)


**Figure 11: Distribution of respondents by frequency of crossing the border**



For the three quarters of the respondents who cross the border regularly, these comings and goings are rather regular. Some 39 per cent of respondents say they cross the border weekly and up to 16.2 per cent cross the border two or three times a week; 6.6 per cent cross the border daily. Lastly, there is even 1.6 per cent of respondents who say they cross the border several times a day.

Nearly two thirds (63.4%) of those who cross the border do so regularly, from once a week to several times a day. Smaller proportions of respondents cross the border once a month (18.5%) or once a year (16.9%). Frequent travel between neighbouring countries reflects a convenient and essential connection with the border for the economic and social life of these communities. As a matter of fact, whether nomadic or settled, these people cross over to other territories to support their households, whether to access water points or grassland areas, or to conduct trade in neighbouring countries.

**Figure 12: Respondents' reasons for crossing the border (past and current)**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The specific reasons that drive the inhabitants of the region to cross the border are diverse but may be grouped into several distinct categories: family, economic, trade or more sporadic motives (e.g. those pertaining to studies, an apprenticeship, transhumance, health and gold-panning opportunities).

With regard to the reasons for crossing the border, prior to versus at the time of the survey, the respondents' responses show quite clearly that, while there has been a drop in the number of crossings (analysed earlier in this report), the reasons for crossing are not impacted. The reasons given for current border-crossings remain the same as for those before 2011. The main motivations are still economic, although the proportion of the respondents citing this reason has decreased significantly, from 54.7 per cent before 2011 to 44.7 per cent today, that is, a drop of ten percentage points.

The predominance of economic reasons can be explained logically by the main occupations of the region's inhabitants. As mentioned above, livestock and agriculture remain the main economic activities for the people of Tillabéri, as with the rest of the country. However, these two activities, and agriculture, in particular, cannot be carried out throughout the entire year and can easily be disrupted by climatic or security hazards. For these reasons, the local population of Tillabéri travel to neighbouring Burkina Faso, in order to find short-term jobs in transport or trade that last a few weeks or months. These regular travels are facilitated by the porosity of the border, as mentioned previously, and are concentrated towards Burkina Faso, at the expense of Mali, as a consequence of a security context with lower risk.


The second most frequently cited category of reasons for current border-crossings pertains to familial motives, by 40.4 per cent of respondents, compared to 47.2 per cent for past border-crossings. This is due to the territorial scattering of certain ethnic communities in the Tillabéri region, in particular, the Tuaregs and Peulh, who also inhabit northern Mali and eastern Burkina Faso. Thus, members of these groups, be they nomadic or more settled tribes, are used to travelling regularly between various members of their clans, who may be from any of these neighbouring countries or have migrated there. These trips are facilitated by the Protocol for the Free Movement of People and Goods of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger are members.

Lastly, trade is also cited as a reason for current border-crossings, by up to 18 per cent of respondents, compared to 23.1 per cent for past ones. This is twice as high as the share of respondents who report working mainly in the trade sector. In reality, this trade refers to informal cross-border trade, particularly in markets in Mali and Burkina Faso, and involves a large proportion of farmers selling their produce; fishermen, who also constitute a significant part of the active population of the Tillabéri region, also participate in this trade by selling their catch. The Ayorou market is particularly popular for various types of goods such as livestock, pasta and manufactured products from Algeria and Libya.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Danish Demining Group (DDG), "Dynamiques sécuritaires frontalières et transfrontalières à Ayorou" (Border and cross-border dynamics in Ayerou), report (DDG, Copenhagen, 2015). Available from [https://danishdemininggroup.dk/media/1851249/ddg\\_sahel\\_-\\_rapport\\_mission\\_exploratoire\\_ayorou.pdf](https://danishdemininggroup.dk/media/1851249/ddg_sahel_-_rapport_mission_exploratoire_ayorou.pdf)


**Figure 13: Respondents' awareness of the existence of border forces**



As mentioned earlier, the borders, crossed daily by inhabitants of the region, are porous and sometimes unguarded. Yet, it is the responsibility of the Niger's DSFs to ensure full control of these borders, in order to prevent external threats and to control entry into and exit from the Niger territory.

Nearly 7 in 10 of the survey respondents say they are aware of the existence of DSFs stationed along the border, a figure not too different from the proportion of respondents who currently cross the border and are therefore highly likely to encounter the border security system. However, these results also indicate that about one third of the respondents are not aware of the presence of these border forces. This figure is indicative not only of the rather sedentary nature of the Tillaberi region's population, which has already been pointed out, but also of the absence of DSFs in some border areas. While three quarters report regularly crossing the border currently, only 68 per cent of respondents say they are aware of the presence of these DSFs. The discrepancy between these two figures means that a considerable proportion of those who cross the border regularly never encounter DSFs, which tends to confirm the aforementioned porosity of the border. A similar share of respondents from Agadez report not knowing that there are DSFs operating within this region, but at a much lower border-crossing rate: only 31.3 per cent of respondents from Agadez currently cross the border there, compared to 73.7 per cent in Tillaberi.

**Figure 14: Respondents' awareness of the presence of border security forces, by district of residence**




The data also reveal that awareness of border DSFs is at a fairly similar level across the municipalities surveyed, with the exception of Ayorou. The respondents from villages in Ayorou seem to have clear knowledge of the presence of DSFs along the border, with 88.5 per cent reporting so.

This can be explained by the location of Ayorou, which is closer to the Malian border than the other municipalities. Furthermore, this municipality is located on the road leading to Gao, Mali, making it a crossing point for regular and orderly migration between the Niger and Mali, as well as various trade flows through the district.

In contrast, respondents from other municipalities lack knowledge about the border DSFs at higher rates, ranging from about 31 to 39 per cent. These higher rates may be explained by the remoteness of some of the villages from the border or the main roads of the region. As a result, the inhabitants of these districts, particularly, Makalondi (Torodi) and Petelkole (Bankilare), seem to be unaware of their presence, despite there being police stations at the nearby border.

**Figure 15: Composition of border security forces, according to respondents**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Among the respondents who say they are aware of the presence of security forces along the border, nearly 6 out of 10 (59.1% of respondents) identify them to be police officers and more than half say they are *gendarmes* (54%). These two forces represent everyday security deployed by the Government of the Niger to protect the inhabitants of villages and urban centres. The respondents also mention the military (39%), which is present along the border and deployed as part of counter-terrorism missions implemented in the region, such as the aforementioned Operation Dongo based in Ayorou. The National Guard (31.1%), customs officers (30%) and, to a fairly lesser extent, foresters and other DSFs in Burkina Faso (7.4%) are also mentioned.

Consequently, the locally deployed DSFs are the ones most commonly cited by respondents, albeit by only a small majority (59.1% and 54%, respectively, for police and *gendarmes*). This reveals that the border forces remain unknown or little known to a large part of the Tillabéri population. The respondents also have little awareness of the military's presence, although the Tillabéri area is one of the most affected by the terrorist threat in the Niger and soldiers are deployed throughout the region, particularly as part of the Government's collaboration with France's Opération Barkhane.






### 3. SECURITY RISKS ALONG THE BORDER

Majority of the respondents interviewed for this survey live quite close to the western border of the Niger. They are witnesses to the flows that take place there, that is, of the people who use the border, and are aware of the nature of these crossings. The purpose of this section is to illustrate communities' perceptions of the various threats experienced at these borders. It also analyses their views of the security situation in the area and the measures to be taken to improve the well-being of the population in the area.

**Figure 16: Nationalities of persons crossing the border, according to respondents**




*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

A large majority of respondents (84.1%) believe that the people who use the border in their region are Niger nationals from neighbouring villages or hamlets. Thus, the respondents not only portray a mobile population, as confirmed by the large proportion of them who continue to use this border; they also have a very localized perception of these movements. Therefore, unlike in other regions of the country, the inhabitants of Tillabéri have a tangible and daily connection to the border. As such, the border is not solely perceived as an intangible limit far from their communities, but rather as a place where they can easily and frequently pass through for their livelihood or family needs.

Furthermore, 7 out of 10 respondents (71.1%) identify Niger nationals from other areas, mainly Niamey or the neighbouring region of Tahoua, as the people using the border in their region. Burkina Faso nationals are also cited by a large majority of the interviewees (59.8%), which points to the existence of the many trade and migration flows between the Niger and Burkina Faso. Malians are less frequently mentioned (39.5%) due to a decrease in trade flows with the northern part of the country, as well as to the growing dangerousness in a large portion of the border between Mali and the Niger.

Lastly, a quarter of the respondents (25.6%) identify other West African nationals as those who cross the border. Among these nationals are working people who come for trade activities, as well as migrants passing through the region. Until the end of 2017, West African migrants generally passed through the Petelkole and Makalondi border crossing points to reach Agadez before continuing their journey. Therefore, it is logical for a significant proportion of respondents to include these migrants among the categories of people crossing the border.

Figure 17: Categories of persons crossing the border, according to respondents



Note: Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.


Respondents were also asked about the types of people who use the border. A very large majority of them (85.2%) believe that border flows comprise mainly traders in the region, who come together in Burkina Faso or Mali to buy or sell their goods. Half of the sample also mention families (50.1%), as well as migrants (52.2%). The latter are nationals of Burkina Faso, Mali and other West African countries transiting through the Tillabéri region as part of their migration routes. Lastly, refugees are mentioned by 16.7 per cent of respondents.

Since 2012, tens of thousands of Malian refugees have descended on the region, living mainly in the three camps in Mangaizé, Abala and Tabarey-barey. While some have left the camps since the first arrivals in 2012, others have continued to arrive, especially since the beginning of 2018. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), there were more than 16,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions in May 2018.<sup>29</sup>

Lastly, transhumance is mentioned by only 0.6 per cent of survey respondents. This may be explained by the security context in northern Mali, as mentioned earlier in this report, which makes it extremely difficult to travel across the various border crossing points in the northern part of the region.

<sup>29</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Bulletin Humanitaire Niger* (April–May) (Geneva, OCHA, 2018). Available from <https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/bulletin-humanitaire-niger-avril-mai-2018>

**Figure 18: Respondents' perception of border crossing points being used for criminal activities**




However, the border is not solely a place for the crossings and exchanges necessary for the daily life of the communities in Tillabéri. It is also a place conducive to various criminal activities, because of the weak government control in some parts of the country that allows various groups to break the law.

Majority of respondents mention a criminal dimension to the border. Almost 6 out of 10 (57.7% of the sample) believe that border crossing points are used for criminal activities, compared to 12.4 per cent who say it is not, and only 3 out of 10 who have no idea.

Accordingly, the inhabitants of the Tillabéri region regularly use the border, with a very large majority dominating movement in its vicinity, as they need it for their trading activities. However, they still perceive the border as dangerous and conducive to criminal activities.

**Figure 19: Security problems faced by border communities, according to respondents**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The various threats emanating from the border seem to affect the population to varying degrees. The most commonly cited security issue (67.8% of respondents) are the various attacks by armed bandits that occur regularly in the region. Another problem mentioned by the respondents (64.3%) is livestock theft, which greatly affects these populations, which consist of both full- and part-time herders. These two threats along the border are cited by the respondents as being especially important and surpass other threats by far.

The threat on livestock and herds in the various communities has long affected this region, which is an area convenient for transhumance, particularly in its northern part.<sup>30</sup> As a result, the local population has long adapted to the risks associated with livestock theft. However, a new aspect of this situation is that these thefts have seen a worrying upsurge since various insurrections in northern Mali started in 2012. Before the security situation in Mali deteriorated, pastoralists travelled freely along the border to bring their flocks to the various public wells throughout the region. Now, when herders venture into Mali, they take the direct risk of having their livestock stolen.<sup>31</sup> However, this threat is not limited to the Niger–Mali border and is prevalent throughout Tillabéri. Figure 20 shows how this threat is strongly felt throughout the region, not only in Bankilare and Banibangou, but also in Torodi (between 60 and 70% of respondents in each of these districts), even though it is the municipality furthest from the Niger–Mali border among the three. The quantities of stolen cattle and the evolution of these crimes over the years are very difficult to estimate and, as a result, it would be complicated to illustrate with statistics the connection between the evolution of these thefts and the increase in security threats in Mali. However, data showing the decline in the frequency of border-crossings, analysed earlier in this report, can be juxtaposed with the frequency of responses identifying cattle theft as the main criminal activity committed in border areas. Together, these data suggest that this is a real threat for the local populations of Tillabéri, one that disrupts people's daily lives in a lasting way, and, as such, is a primary source of concern among identified dangers from the border. Consequently, this reality must be taken into account by border security authorities in their liaisons and work with communities in the region, in order to best meet their expectations and concerns.

Furthermore, a surprisingly low 15.7 per cent of respondents mention incursions by terrorist groups, even though the region has been severely affected by the phenomenon, particularly since 2016. According to data provided by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED),<sup>32</sup> the Tillabéri region has suffered 10 attacks that can be attributed to the ISGS in 2017 and 2018 alone, including 7 in 2018. These various attacks are in addition to the violence already suffered by civilians, perpetrated by local armed groups, such as the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) or the Tuareg Imghad Tuareg Self-Defence Group and Allies (GATIA).<sup>33</sup> Thus, over the last two years, there have been no fewer than 43 attacks<sup>34</sup> perpetrated in the region, including 17 directly against civilians. As such, despite the fact that these acts of violence were committed in villages near the border, the terrorist threat does not seem to be as important to respondents as one might expect.

This reality can be understood, in particular, through the very nature of the violence. Analyses of these conflicts, presented earlier in this report, underline that the various groups active in the region (terrorists, independence fighters and bandits, etc.) rarely commit violence indiscriminately, but rather tend to exploit pre-existing local community tensions, sometimes

<sup>30</sup> VOA Africa, "Niger : attaques transfrontalières répétées contre des éleveurs" (Niger: Repeated cross-border attacks against farmers), 27 April 2011. Available from (French only) [www.voaafrique.com/a/niger-livestock-stealing-120761114/1379776.html](http://www.voaafrique.com/a/niger-livestock-stealing-120761114/1379776.html). This article, which dates from April 2011, thus preceding the conflict in northern Mali, reflects a situation quite similar to that observed in 2018.

<sup>31</sup> S. Ibrahim, M. Mouhamadou, Z. Abdoulaye and D. Biri, "Nord-Tillabéri : analyse du conflit lié à l'accès aux ressources naturelles" (North Tillabéri: Analysis of the conflict over the access to natural resources).

<sup>32</sup> The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Database. Available from [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com) (accessed in June 2018).

<sup>33</sup> Radio France Internationale (RFI), "Attaque contre des Peuls au Niger: «des victimes innocentes se font massacrer»" (Attack against Peuls in the Niger: "Innocent victims are massacred"), 20 May 2018. Available from [www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180520-attaque-peuls-niger-victimes-innocentes-aboubacar-diallo-eleveurs-mali](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180520-attaque-peuls-niger-victimes-innocentes-aboubacar-diallo-eleveurs-mali)

<sup>34</sup> The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Database. Available from [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com) (accessed in June 2018).

out of ideological convictions but often out of political calculation. The ISGS often targets the Daoussahak, while the MSA and GATIA attack mainly Peulh communities.<sup>35</sup> Tensions between the Daoussahak and the Peulh have existed for several decades, specifically, since the 1970s and the droughts that strongly characterized the Sahel at the time,<sup>36</sup> and have historically focused on control and access to grazing land. These tensions are now evolving towards issues related to the control of water points, which has become more difficult due to regional demographic growth and upheavals related to climate change. It must be understood that for the people of the region, these incursions by armed or terrorist groups are seen as more distant and less dangerous because they are part of intercommunity battles, resource controls or attacks on DSFs; as such, they feel less exposed to them. Therefore, unless they are directly affected by these problems, respondents do not consider this threat to be a major one in their daily lives.

The high prevalence of bandit attacks, as compared to terrorist attacks (67.8% versus 15.7%), in the perception of the communities can also be understood through two elements. The first is the very definition of the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist.” In Latin and Anglo-Saxon languages, the distinction between terrorists and bandits is perfectly clear, both in terms of the methods they use and in the objectives or ideologies underlying their actions. In contrast, some Tillabéri languages do not make a clear distinction between these two groups and modes of action, so that any person or group committing a criminal act against a community might be seen as “bandits,” regardless of whether the said act is a robbery (whether armed or unarmed), racketeering, a reprisal or even an attack targeted at a *gendarmérie* post. This linguistic blur is fuelled by the violence that bandit groups sometimes engage in, imitating terrorist groups in their methodology and, thus, in their impact on the local population, making it difficult for communities to make a clear distinction between these two security issues. This is further complicated by the fact that while bandit groups are very often independent and carry out actions for their own profit, some operate under the protection of terrorist groups in exchange for commissions. The threat of armed bandit groups operating along the Niger’s borders must also be seen as a problem that feeds off or at least benefits from the terrorist phenomenon in the region, with the abuses of some fuelling the chaos that others feed off on.

Other types of criminal activity in the region are significantly less commonly mentioned by respondents (21.1%). These pertain primarily to various trafficking activities involving, in particular, drugs and arms. Profits from trafficking are used to finance criminal groups operating in the Sahel, mainly between Mali and Libya. Arms trafficking increased sharply immediately after the fall of the Libyan regime and mainly involved small and light weapons in transit to Mali, through the Tillabéri region. However, Operation Serval and its successor, Operation Barkhane, combined with the reinforcement of troops of the Niger in the north of the country, have made trafficking more complicated, reducing its frequency in the region.<sup>37</sup> Lastly, smuggling is mentioned by 17 per cent of respondents and mainly involves food items and cigarettes.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> ACLED, “From the Mali–Niger borderlands to rural Gao – Tactical and geographical shifts of violence”, webpage. Available from [www.acleddata.com/2018/06/06/from-the-mali-niger-borderlands-to-rural-gao-tactical-and-geographical-shifts-of-violence](http://www.acleddata.com/2018/06/06/from-the-mali-niger-borderlands-to-rural-gao-tactical-and-geographical-shifts-of-violence)


<sup>36</sup> A. Sandor, “Insecurity, the breakdown of societal trust, and armed actor governance in central and northern Mali”, report (Montreal, University of Quebec in Montreal, 2017). Available from <https://dandurand.uqam.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Sandor-english-Report.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> S. de Tessières, “At the crossroads of the Sahelian conflicts: Insecurity, terrorism and arms trafficking in Niger”, report (Geneva, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2017). Available from [www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf](http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf)

<sup>38</sup> The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) estimated in 2009 that 80 per cent of the cigarette trade in West and North Africa is illegal. (UNODC, “Transnational trafficking and the rule of law in West Africa: a threat assessment”, report (Vienna, UNODC, 2009). Available from [www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a54bc3e0.pdf](http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4a54bc3e0.pdf))



**Figure 20: Security problems faced by border communities, according to respondents, by district of residence**




*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The municipality of Tera appears to be the most protected from the various threats that exist along the border, with 41.8 per cent of respondents considering that no illegal acts are committed there at all – a percentage higher than any of the affirmative responses. The western part of the region, which borders Burkina Faso, seems safer than the municipalities along the Niger–Mali border. This is reflected in the fact that the highest frequencies of responses pertaining to terrorist group incursions are from the districts of Ouallam and Banibangou (30.6% and 39.3%, respectively), which, as a matter of fact, have been more severely affected than the rest of the region. Nevertheless, the district of Tera has not been spared by the various attacks that the region has suffered over the past two years. On 25 May 2017, the Petelkole border police station was attacked and three members of the defence and security forces were killed. The gendarmerie checkpoint located 22 km north-west of the municipality of Tera was also recently attacked, killing two gendarmes.

The Niger’s border with Burkina Faso, however, is not entirely free of security problems or dangers that affect communities in the long term. This is the case as regards livestock theft and, more importantly, attacks by armed bandits, which are highly established in Torodi District. As a matter of fact, nearly 90 per cent of respondents living in this district – more than 20 percentage points higher than the regional average – identify this threat as a priority.

Lastly, the data reveal that while the level of terrorist threat is lower in this part of the region, other security risks, such as banditry, still pose a significant threat to the communities under study. These risks affect the well-being, disrupt the families and threaten the property of these populations which are already weakened by various climatic hazards. This banditry, which threatens not only the properties of communities but also their lives, and which is made easier by porous borders, thus greatly affects the respondents. Therefore, it is important to place these risks, that is, cattle theft and the threat of terrorism, at the forefront of the authorities’ concerns.


**Figure 21: Proportion of respondents from communities affected at least once by a border insecurity problem**



More than 4 out of 10 respondents report that they have already been affected by border insecurity issues – this represents a significant proportion of the population, especially since, even though the respondents live in districts along the border, their villages are not necessarily close to the border.

Thus, the various incidents along the border not only impact immediately adjacent areas, but can also directly affect a large part of even the most remote villages and hamlets in the region, indicating movement of these threats.

**Figure 22: Respondents' knowledge of existing border security measures**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.


While the threats appear clear to the local population, knowledge of measures taken to contain them is significantly less so. A very large majority of respondents (79.7%) seem to have no idea of the measures taken by the authorities to secure the Niger's borders. Almost two thirds of the people surveyed (63.5%) even say that no action is being taken by the authorities. This data highlights the extent to which communities seem to be unfamiliar with the authorities' activities, as well as the lack of a real relationship between the two parties. Most importantly, they reflect a significant lack of communication with communities, including through awareness campaigns. During the mission to set up the prevention committees, the border communities consistently raised this lack of communication from the authorities on border security. Patrols often pass through the area but very rarely communicate with village leaders (e.g. the village chief). As a result, majority of respondents seem to think that the region's borders are absolutely insecure because no measures are being taken to ensure their protection and that there is a form of anarchy along the borders of the region; this fosters feelings of insecurity, reinforced by the

perception of being left on their own to face the dangers that emanate from the border. It also reflects a need for the authorities to engage more with communities, raise awareness of the various risks that exist there, and to better communicate to them the actions being taken to secure border areas.

A third of the respondents state that intelligence and informant networks operate along borders to facilitate surveillance work. These networks sometimes rely on the leaders of the different villages in the region. Thus, it seems logical that a large proportion of respondents should have good knowledge of the authorities' working methods.


Lastly, and to a much lesser extent, respondents also mention searches (8%) and the implementation of so-called "prevention" (or "vigilance") committees (4.5%).

Figure 23: Respondents' opinions of existing border security measures



Despite the clear lack of awareness of the work of DSFs, as shown by the responses, the respondents seem generally satisfied with the measures taken by the authorities to secure the border. However, more than one in four respondents consider these measures to be insufficient, which shows that efforts still need to be carried out in order to best protect the communities of the region. In addition, although a large majority of respondents have a positive view of these measures (14.8% consider them "very sufficient" and 59.3%, "quite sufficient"), the large proportion of those who consider them only "sufficient" indicates that there is still significant work to be carried out for regional authorities to meet the expectations of the region's population.

Figure 24: Risks from poor border security management, according to respondents



When asked about the risks that result from poor border security management, a large majority of respondents (88.6%, or around 9 out of 10) cite banditry as the major one. The proportion of these respondents is much higher than those who say that the risk is a problem currently affecting communities. The fear of banditry far exceeds that of other threats, although they remain a concern of communities in the region. These armed attacks, whether by petty criminals or more organized groups, pose a major and tangible risk and threat to communities in the region.

Furthermore, while only 15.7 per cent of respondents consider incursions by terrorist groups in border areas to be a real problem for the populations living there,<sup>39</sup> more than half (50.4%) believe that poor border security management would lead to a clear increase in this risk.

In addition, almost one out of two respondents (46.3%) express concern about the risk of an increase in trafficking as a result of poor border security management. This figure is almost twice as high as the proportion of respondents who see trafficking as a current issue in border areas.

Moreover, the risk of epidemics is cited by almost a third of the respondents (29.4%). In recent times, these epidemics have mainly been cholera and meningitis.<sup>40</sup> Lastly, the risk of recruitment of young people by armed groups is cited by 30.4 per cent of respondents. This has been linked to the expansion of banditry and to terrorist incursions.

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<sup>39</sup> See Figure 19.

<sup>40</sup> OCHA, “Niger : Profil humanitaire de la région de Tillabéri – Juillet 2016” (Niger: Humanitarian profile of the Tillabéri region), fact sheet (Geneva, OCHA, 2016). Available from <https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-profil-humanitaire-de-la-r-gion-de-tillaberi-juillet-2016>



## 4. LOCAL COMMUNITIES' PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM

Terrorist groups operating in the Tillabéri area are almost exclusively concentrated in northern Mali. Although this phenomenon is not new in the Sahel region, it has become increasingly important, first because of the myriad of stakeholders involved and, second, because of their sheer number and the extent of their actions across the region. This situation has drawn the attention of the international community, which resulted in an increase in the number of operations to try to put an end to the threat of terrorism.

As mentioned previously, these terrorist groups began to emerge in 2012, following the fighting between the Malian regular army and various groups, including the Tuareg independence fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the Ansar Dine Salafists, supported by other terrorist groups, including AQIM. The efforts carried out by the Malian armed forces supported by France's Operation Serval enabled to contain this threat, but without eliminating it.

As outlined in the introduction, these terrorist groups subsequently transformed, with some allying themselves with other groups in the region and others disbanding. Today the main groups are still operating in the north of the Gao region, even after suffering many losses in recent years. As mentioned earlier in this report, Chadian forces are deployed in the territory to contain this threat, supported by the MINUSMA peacekeeping mission since 2013 and the forces of Operation Serval, now reorganized as Operation Barkhane. The latter covers the entire Sahel region, in order to fight against jihadist armed groups throughout the region. Today, the north and centre of Mali serve as a base for groups such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM),<sup>41</sup> AQIM and the SGS.<sup>42</sup> In addition, there are non-State armed groups advocating for the independence of northern Mali: the Congress for Azawad Justice based in the Timbuktu region and the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad based in the Menaka region,<sup>43</sup> located less than 100 km from the border with the Tillabéri region.

This part of the survey analyses local populations' views of terrorism in the region and their insights into the responses that communities and authorities must provide to combat it.


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<sup>41</sup> JNIM was created in March 2017, following the announcement of an alliance of several major terrorist groups from northern Mali: Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the branch of AQIM operating in the Sahara. See, for example: F. Offner, "Shifting relationships, growing threats: Who's who of insurgent groups in the Sahel", *The New Humanitarian* (formerly, IRIN News), 19 February 2018. Available from [www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/02/19/shifting-relationships-growing-threats-who-s-who-insurgent-groups-sahel](http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2018/02/19/shifting-relationships-growing-threats-who-s-who-insurgent-groups-sahel)

<sup>42</sup> ISGS was created in 2015 by Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, the former spokesman of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) who has now disappeared, with his whereabouts still unknown. (Counter Extremism Project, "Adnan al-Sahrawi", webpage. Available from [www.counterextremism.com/extremists/adnan-al-sahrawi](http://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/adnan-al-sahrawi))

<sup>43</sup> F. Offner, "Shifting relationships, growing threats: Who's who of insurgent groups in the Sahel".

Figure 25: Distribution of respondents by their definition of “terrorism”



The groups operating in the Tillabéri area employ various methodologies, depending on their objectives, size and desired impact. Therefore, the survey question on the definition of “terrorism” asks respondents what type of terrorist activities they know of in order to assess their experience with the phenomenon. Multiple answers are presented to the respondents, with the possibility to choose more than one to explain what, for them, defines terrorism.

Within the Niger–Burkina Faso–Mali area, the Niger remains relatively protected from the various attacks and other assaults of recent years. As a matter of fact, among the 270 attacks<sup>44</sup> perpetrated by non-State groups and that have resulted in at least one victim since 2016, more than 200 were in Mali, with at least 40 in Burkina Faso and about 30 in the Niger.<sup>45</sup>

In this context, more than a quarter of the people surveyed for this question define terrorism as acts such as attacks, assassinations, abductions and intimidation. This broad category includes the main methods, as enumerated, used by groups in the region. Attacks are now rarer because of the greater complexity of implementing them, but remain a threat in the area. They are especially dangerous because of the number of victims they can affect and the psychological impact they have. These attempts take place mainly in Mali and primarily target the armed forces, generally involving the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). According to *The Long War Journal* (a news website by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies), more than 250 attacks were committed by AQIM and its associated groups in the Sahel in 2016, including 93 committed with the use of IEDs.<sup>46</sup> Suicide attacks with bombs were much rarer, with six attacks in the same year.<sup>47</sup> Assassination remains among the most common methods used by these groups, whether against the DSFs or a target community, and whether they are committed as part of a battle for control of a territory. Abductions, particularly of Westerners, are also highly popular among West African terrorist groups, which finance themselves with ransom money received in exchange for their hostages.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>44</sup> These attacks include violence against civilians as well as other types of violence that do not include battles between armed stakeholders.

<sup>45</sup> The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Database. Available from [www.acleddata.com](http://www.acleddata.com) (accessed in June 2018).

<sup>46</sup> C. Weiss, “Al Qaeda linked to more than 250 West African attacks in 2016”, FDD’s Long War Journal, 7 January 2017. Available from [www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/01/over-250-al-qaeda-linked-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2016.php](http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/01/over-250-al-qaeda-linked-attacks-in-west-africa-in-2016.php)

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> D. Ghenem-Yazbeck (ed.), R. Barras Tejudo, G. Faleg and Y. Zoubir, “The Sahel: Europe’s African borders”, policy study (Barcelona, European Institute for the Mediterranean, 2018). Available from [www.euromesco.net/publication/the-sahel-europes-african-borders](http://www.euromesco.net/publication/the-sahel-europes-african-borders)




Additionally, nearly a quarter of respondents (24.3%) also mention acts of violent religious extremism (jihadist terrorism), which assume various forms of intimidation carried out by the aforementioned groups in order to obtain the support of a community or to force them to pay a “tax.” An example of a tax imposed on communities is zakat, an Islamic tax estimated at a fortieth of the herds and to which people must submit in exchange for the protection of and local administration by jihadist groups.<sup>49</sup>

Furthermore, 22.7 per cent of respondents mention attacks by armed bandits in the form of pillage, ambush and extortion. This is almost as much as the share of respondents who mention more traditional terrorist methods (namely, attacks, abductions and intimidation), at 26 per cent, although these acts are much more similar to those of smaller groups that make a living from banditry and are not be categorized with jihadist extremism. This shows once again that, for the inhabitants of the region, there is a fine line between terrorism and banditry, and that it is sometimes difficult for them to clearly distinguish these groups and their modes of action.

Finally, a significant proportion (13.5%) of respondents cite armed attacks on civilians and DSFs. This category can be subsumed in the first category analysed (i.e. attacks, assassinations, abductions and intimidation).

While the responses vary and sometimes refer to methodologies outside those used by terrorists, they remain, for the most part, very accurate about what terrorism is: a method, means of action or a form of war – and not an ideology or an identified group – characterized by various actions depending on the needs, the means employed and the desired effects of the perpetrators.

**Figure 26: Distribution of respondents by type of terrorist activity known to them**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The answers given to the previous question, which are based mainly on the respondents' experiences, show that they have a clear understanding of the methods used by terrorist groups operating in the region. Asked about the type of terrorist activities they know of, an overwhelming number of respondents (91.9%) say that these are primarily attacks targeting DSFs. Since 2016, at least a dozen attacks have been reported against DSFs, often by identified


<sup>49</sup> International crisis Group (ICG), “Frontière Niger-Mali : mettre l'outil militaire au service d'une approche politique” (Niger–Mali border: putting the military tool at the service of a political approach), report (Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2018). Available from (French only) [www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/mali/261-frontiere-niger-mali-mettre-loutil-militaire-au-service-dune-approche-politique](http://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/mali/261-frontiere-niger-mali-mettre-loutil-militaire-au-service-dune-approche-politique)

terrorist groups (mainly AQIM, but also and, especially, ISGS), and sometimes by other militias and armed groups. As the jihadist strategy in the region aims primarily to weaken State power, targeting the DSFs fulfils this objective in two ways. First, they eliminate the forces that guard the borders to enable them to gain control of new territory. Second, they instil fear and sow confusion among populations, so they start doubting the protection provided by the authorities.

For the same reason, terrorist groups also target communities in the region. The main aim is to invoke fear and anger among the inhabitants, while exploiting the ethnic conflicts that had already existed before the advent of jihadist terrorism. Thus, nearly two thirds (62.5%) of the respondents cite the killing of civilians as a type of terrorist activity they know. Attacks on civilians have increased, particularly with the emergence of community militias that target jihadists.<sup>50</sup>

Lastly, respondents also mention, to a lesser extent, intimidation and threats (28.6%) and abductions (24.2%), the aims of which have been analysed above.

**Figure 27: Distribution of respondents by type of terrorist activity known to them, by district of residence**




*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Asked about the types of terrorism they are aware of, respondents give fairly variable answers depending on their district of residence, thus reflecting their different experiences. For instance, intimidation and threats are cited in particular by respondents from the districts of Ayorou, Banibangou and Ouallam, which are close to the areas in which the perpetrators operate. In addition, attacks on DSFs affect the entire territory, unlike attacks on civilians, a category chosen mainly by respondents from municipalities close to Mali, with the exception of Torodi, where nearly three quarters (73.9%) of respondents selected this response option.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

**Figure 28: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why some join terrorist groups**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The phenomenon of radicalization – and, more specifically, of radicalization in West Africa – is a highly complex problem that has different dimensions. Radicalization pathways are different from one individual to another, even when these individuals come from the same village or hamlet and grew up in similar conditions. Most importantly, the bridge between radicalization and terrorist action is not necessarily automatic. Therefore, identifying the reasons that drive individuals towards terrorism, for which understanding is often limited or obstructed, becomes a tricky task.

Despite this, surveying local populations directly affected by this phenomenon remains necessary. This is because these populations evolve within the same environments as individuals who have turned to terrorism. As a matter of fact, they are in the best position to provide information regarding the issues existing in society at large or specific to certain communities. Because radicalization and enactments are rarely sudden or solitary acts, and as each village or community has its own particularities, it is essential to rely on local populations to understand and combat terrorism.

To explain what drives some inhabitants of the region towards terrorism, nearly half of respondents (47.8%) highlight the problem of lack of occupation and 40.9 per cent of them blame poverty issues. In 2017, the Niger ranked 187th out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index ranking released by the United Nations Development Programme. In addition, the World Bank points out that with a poverty rate of 44.1 per cent and an average per capita income of USD 420, the Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world. Even though poverty in the Niger is present in all regions and all age groups, young people with little education are most affected. Furthermore, in the Tillabéri region, employment is restricted mainly to agriculture and livestock farming, the latter being now threatened by two phenomena.

The first is the long-term phenomenon of the increasingly movement of the southern Tillabéri population into traditional pastoral lands in the north, threatening the employment of nomadic communities living there. As a matter of fact, in recent years, population growth in the Niger,<sup>51</sup> combined with climate change, has created a slow migration of agricultural populations to the north, increasingly reducing pastoral areas or pushing pastoralists towards Mali, which, in the meantime, has become very dangerous. This conflict over access to natural resources sometimes evolves into intercommunity conflicts that terrorist and bandit groups in the region feed off on, with unemployed or marginalized youth sometimes joining the ranks.


<sup>51</sup> With 7.6 children per woman, the Niger has the highest fertility rate in the world. See, for example: (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), *World Fertility Patterns 2015* (New York, UN DESA, 2018). Available from [www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/fertility/world-fertility-patterns-2015.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/fertility/world-fertility-patterns-2015.pdf)

The second is a short-term phenomenon, expressed as threats of banditry and livestock theft, which even more directly affect the daily lives of the inhabitants of this region, particularly young people. According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG),<sup>52</sup> the last few decades have seen an increase in the number of young people tempted by the “arms business.” This was particularly encouraged by the increase in Tuareg rebellions, and the circulation of arms following the fall of the Libyan regime in 2011. According to the ICG, for the youth of this region, “war activity is rewarding, a source of social and economic emancipation.”<sup>53</sup> For nearly half of the respondents, in addition to poverty, the lack of an occupation, whether professional, cultural or associative, is a structural and cyclical element that push some individuals towards terrorism. This finding is coherent with the extensive literature on the subject.<sup>54</sup>

Only a small share of respondents (14.4%) cite ethnic or family motivations to explain the growing attraction of young people to terrorism. According to the respondents, arms are used by very few people in the region use for “reprisals” against a particular ethnic group, or rarely by a community to establish dominance over another. This contradicts certain analyses that still seek to frame security problems in the region within the perspective of simple intercommunity struggle, regardless of the fact that there are other underlying and more complex mechanisms.

Opposition to the authorities, as well as the broader category of anger and frustration, are expressed more often in the responses, by 31.6 per cent and 29.3 per cent of respondents, respectively, as factors in radicalization. Such anger and opposition to the authorities can be understood in light of two main reasons: (a) the feeling of insecurity in some parts of the region<sup>55</sup> and (b) the feeling of neglect among some communities. The ICG report mentions, in particular, the case of the Peuhl community of the Toleebe ethnic group, who appear to be very poorly integrated into the State and who do not seem to have nomadic group chiefdoms, further accentuating their marginalization. Feelings of anger and frustration can also feed off on injustice felt on a daily basis: theft of livestock, attacks on villages and loss of territory as a result of conflict, to name a few.

**Figure 29: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why some join terrorist groups, by district of residence**



<sup>52</sup> International Crisis Group (ICG), “Frontière Niger-Mali : mettre l’outil militaire au service d’une approche politique” (Niger–Mali border: putting the military tool at the service of a political approach) (Brussels, ICG, 2018).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> I. Olawale, “Radicalisation and violent extremism in West Africa: implications for African and international security”, *Conflict, Security and Development*, 13(2):209–230.

<sup>55</sup> This is analysed further in this report.

There are some differences with regard to communities' perceptions of the reasons they perceive as leading to terrorism (i.e. their assessment of the phenomenon of radicalization), particularly between those in districts located near the Niger's border with Mali and those bordering Burkina Faso.


As a matter of fact, respondents from Banibangou are more concerned about problems of poverty and lack of employment, with response rates ranging between 70 to 75 per cent, than the rest of the region (between 40% to 45%). These figures support the aspects previously discussed, which linked the phenomenon of poverty and the lack of an occupation primarily to the pastoral areas of the region, which are more affected than areas relying on agriculture. This is an essential indicator for the authorities, particularly in terms of the response required to curb the terrorist phenomenon. However, it is noteworthy that, Ouallam residents choose the responses "poverty" and "lack of occupation" at much lower rates (11.9% and 32.5%, respectively), although the two districts are neighbours and both border Mali. Thus, the communities' perceptions of the structural factors that drive some individuals to join terrorist groups do not differ solely according to country or region. There are differences in perception even in very confined areas, that is, in villages that should share the same social, economic, cultural, historical and geographical characteristics. This reinforces the idea that while these structural factors are essential to understanding the radicalization processes, the pathways are very specific and can change from one individual to another, even within the same region. It also reveals that while some structural characteristics, such as poverty and unemployment, may be shared by two neighbouring districts, the causes depend mainly on the personal experiences of the respondents, for whom some phenomena, such as anger and frustration, appear much more significant than elsewhere.

Ideological support for terrorist movements is strongly identified with Bankilare (39.9%), but minimally with Ouallam (2.6%). The different figures across districts are a reminder, yet again, that the phenomenon of radicalization is complex and that, to a certain extent, all the elements of the response presented above are to be considered when explaining the attraction of some people to terrorism. However, these interpretive guidelines cannot be applied uniformly across an entire territory or even within the same region. Each area or community must be aware of its own challenges and the issues that affect it. Lastly, these elements must be fully taken into account by the authorities when drafting measures to be carried out in these communities to prevent violent extremism.

Ethnic motivations are totally absent from the causes identified by respondents from districts neighbouring Burkina Faso, as if they are only conceivable in the most nomadic areas of the region.


Two answers also emerge from data from the district of Ouallam. The first is that a very large part of the population seems lost or helpless when it comes to facing the terrorist phenomenon. While the municipality and district are among the most affected by terrorism in the Tillabéri region, more than 4 in 10 respondents (42.8%) say they do not know why some people join these terrorist groups. This response comes second to "opposition to the authorities" (50.9%). Thus, respondents from these villages appear unable to understand radicalization in their region, even while majority of them point out existing problems between communities and the authorities. The interviewees appear to be both angry at the authorities and disoriented with regard to the appeal of terrorism.

**Figure 30: Percentage of respondents who believe their community is exposed to terrorist threats**



Almost two out of three respondents believe they are currently exposed to terrorist threats, compared to a little over a third who say the opposite (36%). Thus, while a very large majority of respondents do not consider the risk of incursions by terrorist groups as a significant problem in border areas, except in the districts of Banibangou and Ouallam, a majority of them still claim they are exposed to the threat of terrorism.

**Figure 31: Percentage of respondents who believe their community is exposed to terrorist threats, by district of residence**



Given the issues discussed earlier in this report, the prioritization of threats by the respondents reveal that the latter are less concerned about the risks of incursions by terrorist groups than about other threats;<sup>56</sup> yet, it remains a serious issue. Respondents who feel most exposed to terrorism are those who have suffered the most in recent years. This is the case in the districts of Banibangou, where 52.6 per cent of respondents consider themselves to be exposed to terrorism, and, more importantly, Ouallam, where 98.1 per cent of the respondents believe their community is exposed to this risk. This figure is much higher than the regional average and represents almost all respondents in the area.

<sup>56</sup> See Part 3 of this report and, in particular, Figure 20.


The feeling of being exposed to terrorist threats also exists in less affected areas, for example, among respondents from Tera. This can be explained by a lack of security in the region, which can undermine communities' sense of security, as well as by the recent outbreak of terrorist attacks in north-eastern Burkina Faso. The latter were claimed by Ansaroul Islam, a terrorist group that increasingly threatens the Tillabéri region.<sup>57</sup>

**Table 1: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why their community is safe from terrorism**

Reasons why the community is safe from terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
Personal belief due to the community's socioeconomic/geographic situation	186	7.0
Security measures taken by the authorities (i.e. presence of DSFs)	835	31.6
Community mobilization/vigilance	146	5.5
Divine protection/Collective involvement	1,049	39.7
Peaceful area; never affected by the phenomenon	429	16.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,645</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Among the reasons identified by respondents who feel their communities are safe from terrorism, two responses stand out. The first, with 39.7 per cent, is based on notions of divine protection, which would allegedly shield the communities from terrorist groups. Analysing the data by district, it is mainly respondents from Ouallam (99.3%) and, to a lesser extent, Tera (47.8%) who give such a response. The second reason, given by 31.6 per cent of respondents, relates to the security measures undertaken by the authorities to protect the population. This answer is more common among respondents from Ayorou (44.4%), Banibangou (59.7%) and Bankilare (42.6%).

**Figure 32: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why their community is safe from terrorism, by district of residence**



Thus, the very small proportion of Ouallam residents who believe they are safe from terrorism justify this belief through their spiritual convictions and in no way attribute it to security measures taken by local authorities and implemented by DSFs. This, again, reflects a feeling of neglect among the respondents from this district, who believe that the authorities are not acting to ensure their safety and that they are particularly exposed to the various threats at the border.

<sup>57</sup> See in particular: H. Nsaibia and C. Weiss, "Ansaroul Islam and the growing terrorist insurgency in Burkina Faso".




**Table 2: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why their community is exposed to terrorism, by district of residence**

Reasons why the community is exposed to terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
Residual banditry or imminent terrorist threats/attacks, or a history thereof	1,252	27.0
Personal belief due to the prevailing situation	2,151	46.5
Low community engagement/involvement/mobilization	18	0.4
Lack of occupation, poverty and attraction to fundamentalism	60	1.3
Poor management of the security of the premises by the authorities	332	7.2
Porosity and insufficient border security	685	14.8
Very vulnerable area/Area not secured by authorities	132	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,630</b>	<b>100.0</b>


A majority of respondents (46.5%) who consider themselves to be exposed to terrorist threats justify this by citing actual events, mentioning the current situation in the region and the various attacks that communities continue to suffer regularly. To a lesser extent, respondents also mention banditry and terrorism (27%), showing that the preponderance of one amplifies the effects of the other. Lastly, they report a lack of security along borders, which they consider too porous (14.8%).

**Figure 33: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the source of terrorism**




Moreover, more than half of the respondents in the region are aware that the terrorist phenomenon is not exclusively of foreign origin, and that it must also be analysed in its Niger dimension, as shown in Figure 33. As a matter of fact, 51.1 per cent of respondents stated that terrorist threats come from both outside and within the Niger. Majority of respondents acknowledge that the issue goes beyond border limits, although nearly a third (32.1%) of them say that this threat comes only from outside of the Niger. Only 1.5 per cent believe that the source of terrorism is only within the Niger, while 15.4 per cent say they do not know where it originates from.

Figure 34: Distribution of respondents by their perception of the threat of terrorism



Within the Tillabéri region, only 19.4 per cent of respondents consider the threat of terrorism to be “in decline,” while more than a third (34.6%) believe it to be increasing and nearly half (46%) think it is stable. Thus, respondents in the region are very pessimistic overall with their outlook, which coincides with the feelings of being exposed to terrorism discussed earlier especially prominent in districts near Mali.

Figure 35: Distribution of respondents by their perception of the threat of terrorism, by district of residence



When the inhabitants of the various municipalities are asked about their perception of the terrorist threat, it appears that the most affected districts are not the most pessimistic. Almost 6 out of 10 respondents from Ayorou estimate that this threat is increasing, while respondents from Torodi share this feeling to the extent of 45.5 per cent. While these districts are regularly affected by problems of banditry, attacks committed and claimed by terrorist groups are much rarer. At any rate, Ayorou was severely affected by an attack claimed by the ISGS in October 2017, in which 13 members of DSFs lost their lives.<sup>58</sup> A *gendarme* (police officer) also lost his life in the vicinity of Kokolokou, a village in the district of Torodi.<sup>59</sup> In both Tera and Bankilare,


<sup>58</sup> RFI, “Niger : nouvelle attaque terroriste contre le camp de la gendarmerie d'Ayorou” (Niger: new terrorist attack on Ayérou gendarmerie), 21 October 2017. Available from (French only) [www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171021-niger-mali-attaque-islamistes-terrorisme-gendarmerie-ayorou-frontiere-tillabery-12-](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171021-niger-mali-attaque-islamistes-terrorisme-gendarmerie-ayorou-frontiere-tillabery-12-)

<sup>59</sup> “Un gendarme tué et un autre blessé dans une attaque terroriste dans l'ouest du Niger, selon des témoins” (One policeman killed and another injured in a terroriste attack in western Niger, according to witnesses), Niamey. com website News section. Available from (French only) <http://news.aniamey.com/h/83542.html>

this increase is explained by the presence of Peulh militia in the area. Two police officers and two gendarmes were recently killed at the Petelkolé Village Border Police Station and Foneko Village Gendarmerie Checkpoint.

Although these attacks are limited, they are quite recent and indicate that the threat is still present and is beginning to spread to parts of the region that have been spared so far. Respondents from Ouallam District, which is continuously affected by these acts of violence, are also pessimistic about the future of the terrorist threat. Six out of ten believe the threat will remain stable (59.6%), and up to 40.2 per cent believe it is increasing. The district of Banibangou appears to be the most optimistic, with only 7.5 per cent of inhabitants who believe the threat to be increasing and 68.4 per cent believing the threat would remain stable. This optimism can be explained by the amount of time since the last attacks perpetrated in this district, in 2016.

**Figure 36: Distribution of respondents by their recommended action for preventing terrorist threats**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.


In order to respond efficiently to the structural elements which, according to the respondents, could drive some people to join terrorist groups, various solutions have been proposed. Among these suggestions, three stand out: better involvement of community leaders, as affirmed by nearly 7 out of 10 respondents (67.2% of the sample), followed by economic activities for young people (65.6%) and awareness among young people (60.3%).

These three solutions directly address the issues identified and stressed by the respondents, namely poverty, lack of occupation and opposition to the authorities. These statements corroborate the conclusions of recent studies on the radicalization phenomenon in West Africa, which often treat the socioeconomic structures within which individuals evolve as frameworks for explaining the expansion of jihadism in the Sahel. By highlighting the involvement of community leaders, respondents wish that the authorities take the issue more seriously and act as closely as possible with the communities.

As a matter of fact, it was observed earlier in this report that among the reasons that drive young people towards terrorism, radicalization is a complex phenomenon which can only be understood through a thorough and individualized analyses of the various paths to it. Differences in perception between municipalities and districts, even those having very similar contexts, tend to demonstrate that in order to fully engage in the prevention of violent extremism, careful consideration should be given to each village. Prevention can only be achieved through the full commitment of government authorities responsible for the safety of communities and, of course, of community leaders. Government authorities can legitimately reach out to communities and ensure that they are better integrated into larger society. This is especially true for communities in the region that feel marginalized in the. By working as closely as possible with them towards better integration and intercommunity understanding, the authorities would, at the same time, benefit from increased trust from the population, which would help ease tensions. This would also allow better observation of the various conflicts arising in the villages – and the opportunity to contain them – before they can affect the rest of the region.

In addition, a more structured relationship between young people, religious leaders and the authorities, which could rely, for instance, on awareness campaigns or on the creation of community prevention committees, would also help to identify individuals inclined towards violent extremism. This would also help to better understand the aspirations of young people in terms of economic, cultural and associative activities, which are important pillars of community cohesion. Therefore, being aware of these reasons, respondents highlight the importance of raising awareness among young people, offering them better job opportunities and implementing community prevention committees (42.8%) in order to strengthen the authorities' involvement and to better prevent the growth and spread of terrorism.

**Figure 37: Distribution of respondents by type of support they believe communities can give authorities to effectively fight terrorism**




In the event of terrorist attacks, the persons interviewed also acknowledged the major role of the authorities in the management of this type of crisis. As a matter of fact, 96.9 per cent of respondents believe that the authorities should be immediately alerted, while only 10.6 per cent suggest that people should be able to defend themselves with weapons.



## 5. EFFICIENCY OF BORDER MANAGEMENT

The security of the Tillaberi region and the containment of the threats to which it is exposed rely largely on good border security management. This section analyses the respondents' views on what border security means in practice, on the sense of security or insecurity shared by communities, as well as on the role of local authorities and populations in border security management.

Figure 38: Distribution of respondents by their understanding of “ensuring border security”



The survey conducted as part of this report provides an understanding of the various perceptions respondents have of the role of the border. The question represented by Figure 38 is an open-ended question which lets respondents to propose their own definition of what it means to “ensure border security”. The objective of this question is to enable better understanding of the respondents' perceptions of security in the region.


Thus, the respondents' most frequent answer is controlling the movement of people and goods across the border (38.3% of the sample). This first definition invites us to consider the border as an open space conducive to transport and trade. This definition is reflective, on the one hand, of the highly mobile nature of the communities that operate in the region, particularly the communities in the north of the country, and, on the other hand, of the economic organization of the territory, which is increasingly oriented towards cross-border trade. In addition, the respect for the free movement of goods and persons in the Tillaberi region is reinforced by the principles of the ECOWAS Treaty, to which the Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso are signatories.

By contrast, almost one in five respondents (19.9%) prefer to see this border security through a more defensive lens, defining the concept of the border by the increased presence of DSFs. Moreover, 15.6 per cent of respondents believe that border security must be ensured through the protection and well-being of the country's communities. In addition, 5.8 per cent of respondents say that this is also intended to ensure the protection of people and property along the border. All these statements refer to a much more protective definition of border security, which aims, above all, to better protecting the populations living in the country.

Lastly, 13 per cent of respondents believe that to ensure border security is to materialize the geographical limits of countries to have better control of their respective territories. This definition, thus, refers to the administrative function of borders and their geographical representation.

Therefore, the idea of ensuring border security is perceived by the respondents through three main aspects. It seems to be a matter of being able to ensure the free movement of people, to protect the country’s communities and, finally, to mark the limits of a territory.


Figure 39: Respondents who have observed patrols along the border



Due to the various risks involved, good border management in the Tillabéri region must comprise an effective presence of the DSFs, not only at the border level but also in the various localities of the region.

A significant majority (58.3%) of respondents to this survey say they have observed the various patrols along the border, which seems to support this. However, the proportion of those saying otherwise remains high (41.7%), especially with regard to the neighbouring position of all the municipalities surveyed.

Figure 40: Respondents who have observed border patrols along the border, by district of residence






When looking at the response rates by district, it clearly appears that it is in the district of Ouallam where respondents most agree on the total absence of troops at the border with Mali (98.4% of the sample). Almost all the people interviewed in this district confirm that they do not observe troops at the borders. This figure confirms some aspects previously identified that highlighted the strong criticism of the inhabitants regarding the work of the authorities, as well as the general feeling of insecurity and vulnerability when facing threats. This feeling is also found in Bankilare, where 52.1 per cent of respondents do not observe any troops patrolling along the border, which remains a much smaller proportion than Ouallam's.

However, the opinions of the Ouallam respondents can be traced to two factors. The first is the residents' perception of their own security and the attacks they have suffered in the past. The people of Ouallam is under the impression that they are particularly affected and as a consequence, exposed to terrorism and banditry. Thus, only a small minority of these inhabitants still cross the border (as seen in Part 2 of this report, only 5% of respondents say they still cross the border). Thus, the answers given by the inhabitants of Ouallam can be analysed as impressions rather than concrete observations. In addition, Operation Dongo, which was mentioned earlier in this report, implemented by the Government of the Niger in June 2017 to fight terrorist groups in the region, is based in Tilwa, in the district of Ouallam, near the border. Troops are thus present at the border of the district. But the link between the DSFs, the authorities and the communities is damaged due to, on the one hand, the various security problems that have accumulated in the area and, on the other hand, the intercommunity conflicts that still exist there. Therefore, these stakeholders must work together to recreate this link that has been severely damaged in recent years. This includes the implementation of community prevention committees that would help all these stakeholders to work together for the good of the community.


Finally, the DSFs are much more visible in the districts of Ayorou and Banibangou, where 89.9 per cent and 84.4 per cent, respectively, of respondents observe these troops patrolling the border.

**Figure 41: Percentage of respondents who have observed patrols at the local level**




Nonetheless, the presence of troops locally, that is, at the village or hamlet level, is more widely observed. More than four out of five respondents (85.5%) state that they observe patrols in their locality – a figure that is more or less homogeneous throughout the country. Even among respondents from Ouallam, who do not seem to observe troops along the border, 86 per cent confirm that they are present in their villages.

**Figure 42: Percentage of repondents who have observed of patrols at the local level, by district of residence**



However, at the district level, Torodi is the only exception, with nearly 3 out of 10 respondents (29.4%) not observing patrols within their locality. This is especially true in the villages of Boandjola (81.6% say they do not observe any patrols in their locality), Pense (98.5%), Tchambouli (100%), Tabare (95.5%) and Djamdjergou (95.3%).

**Figure 43: Respondents' perception of security with versus without the patrols**




There is also a direct correlation between the perceived level of security and the number of patrols in the localities. Thus, when the respondents are asked about their perceptions regarding security or insecurity within their area, those who observe many patrols in their village say they feel safer than those who observe fewer patrols.

Almost a third (31.9%) of respondents who see these patrols in their village considered that the level of security in their locality is good, compared to only 20.6 per cent in areas where the DSFs seem to be less present. On the contrary, only 26.2 per cent of respondents who observe these patrols consider the level of security is insufficient, compared to almost 4 out of 10 respondents (37.9%) for those who do not observe them.

These answers indicate that the strengthening of patrols and the improvement of their visibility within the villages of the region are directly linked to a better perception of the level of security among the population. Thus, this is an important factor in strengthening a framework of understanding and trust between communities and border security authorities. This encourages the authorities to strengthen the visibility of their forces, especially where insecurity seems to be most prevalent among the population, particularly in the areas bordering Mali.

Figure 44: Local officials in charge of border security, according to respondents



Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Border protection is managed by various authorities, from the local to the national level, each assuming its responsibilities within the limits of its functions.

Among all authorities involved more or less directly in the protection of the communities in the region, the village chief is the most popular figure among the respondents. Thus, two thirds (66.6%) of the sample consider him to be the most well-known local border manager, far ahead of other categories of leaders. It is certainly the authority figure closest to the communities and therefore the most visible. The village chief is the one to whom communities turn in order to improve their daily lives and resolve any disputes that may arise. As such, he is one of the keystones of the region's social life, and although his effective authority over border security is almost non-existent, he remains a privileged point of access for villagers to contact other regional and national authorities. This explains why the survey respondents are so supportive of this authority figure, regardless of the actual allocation of roles and responsibilities in border management, as they are influenced by their daily relationships with this figure of authority.

The figures mentioned after the village chief are the DSFs represented by *gendarmes* (49.1% cited) and the army (41.6%). These soldiers are mainly present to carry out the various counter-terrorism operations that are taking place throughout the region, as the recent Operation Dongo, mentioned earlier in this report, which aims to combat terrorist groups in the region since June 2017. Furthermore, the mayor, symbol of the decentralized authority of the State, is also mentioned by 45.6 per cent of respondents.


To a lesser extent, respondents also mentioned the police officers (38.5% of the sample), the prefect (32.1%) and the group/canton leader (28.8%). The last authorities mentioned by the interviewees were customs officers (18.2%), the governor (16.8%) and the sultan (1.2%).

It is clear from these responses that the authorities' confidence and legitimacy agreement is based on the degree of proximity with the populations. Thus, the stakeholders that are the closest to the communities, those evolving within their daily lives, are the most recognized by the respondents, regardless of the effective distribution of roles and responsibilities within the Niger administration.

As a matter of fact, the prefects and governors, respectively, holders of police powers and regional representatives of the State, are the first to be responsible for managing and securing the border, far ahead of the village chiefs or the mayors whose roles are, above all, to manage the day-to-day affairs of the village and to embody a moral figure and authority.

Thus, the credit given to traditionally respected authorities such as village chiefs or mayors demonstrates the importance of promoting the implementation of community prevention committees built around these local figures, considered as more legitimate and respected by the region's inhabitants. Only these persons will be able to act with the necessary authority to carry out collaborative activities with the communities.


**Figure 45: Distribution of respondents by opinion of the border security management authorities and services**



While the distribution of border management roles and responsibilities among authorities is not clear to them, a majority of respondents express their satisfaction with the work that is being done by these leaders. More than half of them are at least “satisfied” with the work of these authorities, while 13.2 per cent are “fairly satisfied” (25.2%), which means that more than three quarters of respondents take a positive view of the work of the region's authorities.

However, the large proportion of those who consider this work only “somewhat satisfactory”, combined with the proportion of those who consider it not very satisfactory (19%) and even unsatisfactory (5.4%), raises questions on the fact that these communities need to have authorities more involved in the safety of the communities in the region.


**Figure 46: Distribution of respondents by opinion of the effectiveness of border security management authorities and services, by district of residence**



This dissatisfaction is particularly strong in three districts neighbouring Mali: Ayorou, Banibangou and Ouallam. Some 21.1 per cent of respondents interviewed in Ayorou are not very satisfied with the authorities, work on border security management and 7.6 per cent feel unsatisfied. In the district of Banibangou, more than 4 out of 10 respondents (40.8%) did not feel very satisfied and, lastly, 6.9 per cent were dissatisfied. In Ouallam District, 31.8 per cent of respondents were not very satisfied with the work of the border security authorities and 11.2 per cent said they were dissatisfied, which represents the highest rate of dissatisfaction expressed in the region studied in this report.

These figures confirm the trends observed in other parts of this survey and demonstrate that in some areas of the region, respondents feel extremely exposed to various threats along borders, particularly in Banibangou and Ouallam. However, in terms of the border with Mali, Bankilare District is an exception. The people surveyed in the area are much more optimistic than their neighbours, which can be explained with more limited exposure to the various acts of banditry and terrorism in the region in recent years.


**Figure 47: Distribution of respondents by the perceived ability of local authorities (mayor, prefect, village chief, DSFs) to ensure border security without the support of local communities**



A very small minority of respondents to this survey believe that local authorities are able to provide border security without the support of local communities, whether they are the village chiefs, the prefect or other known authorities. More than 9 out of 10 respondents think otherwise, a trend already noted in this reported, confirming the fact that the respondents do not believe that the local authorities are competent or involved enough to be able to protect the population of Tillabéri.

It also highlights the need for greater collaboration between communities and authorities that is not limited to a unilateral protective relationship but can be seen within a framework of exchange and mutual assistance which would improve the prevention of threats that exist in the region. The community prevention committees that are being implemented in the region are directly in line with this idea of better cooperation between the two stakeholders, and will help to make border management a more collaborative activity.

**Figure 48: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and authorities in charge of border security**




This collaborative structure of community prevention committees requires good understanding between communities and authorities, especially in the areas most affected by security incidents. It is thus important to understand the communities' feelings about their relations with the authorities, taking into account the various surveyed areas, in order to determine the priorities of the prevention committees, but more broadly to improve the understanding between these various stakeholders.

A large majority of respondents (65.6% of the sample) seem to have good relations with the authorities, and 17.3 per cent of them even say that these relations are very good. Only 4.9 per cent of respondents consider them to be poor, and 12.1 per cent of them consider them to be neutral.


These encouraging figures prove that, beyond the criticisms that some respondents may make of the insecurity they perceive in the region or of the work of the authorities, relations between these stakeholders remain overwhelmingly good. This is a positive sign for the effectiveness and work of the region's community prevention committees and for public policies aimed at improving cooperation between communities and authorities.

Figure 49: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and authorities in charge of border security, by district of residence



Encouraging to note is that no district seems to be particularly marked by poor relations between authorities and communities. The districts of Torodi and Banibangou have the most unfavourable opinions, which, however, remain very limited, as the proportion of those who consider relations to be poor is only 8.8 per cent of respondents in Torodi and 13.2 per cent in Banibangou.


Figure 50: Distribution of respondents by knowledge about the occurrence of disagreements between local communities and authorities in charge of border security



Relations between authorities and communities are mostly good and it also appears that these relations are rarely conflicting in the region. Only 17.2 per cent of respondents state that disputes arise between these two stakeholders. This share is thus limited, even though some districts have higher rates of disagreement, such as Banibangou (31.6%), Ouallam (24.2%) and Torodi (22%).




**Figure 51: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between the communities and authorities in charge of border security**



Among the minority of respondents who mention the existence of some disputes within their village, only a small minority (15.8%) consider that these disputes occur very often. On the contrary, a large proportion of them say that these disputes only rarely occur and 20.7 per cent believe that they “do not occur very often”. These answers are also encouraging and confirm the good understanding that prevails in the region, which is a positive factor for the success of the community prevention committees.


**Figure 52: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between the communities and border security authorities, by district of residence**



However, the results are not homogeneous throughout the country. In Tera District, there are only 5 per cent of respondents saying they are aware of disagreements between communities and authorities, but a large majority of them (51.1%) believe that these disputes occur very often.

These data confirm that some villages in the region are much more concerned by the challenges of achieving good understanding between authorities and communities than in the rest of the territory and that the analyses and actions carried out cannot be limited to the regional level. These disagreements deserve to be heard and evaluated in order to build greater collaboration between these two parties.

Figure 53: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the reasons that lead to disputes between the communities and border security authorities




The disputes between communities and authorities can be divided into three main categories: cases of “hassle” between authorities and the community members,<sup>60</sup> incidents related to border crossings and, finally, breaches of the law, punished by fines and arrests.

The last category is by far the most represented, with fines mentioned by more than half (54%) of the respondents to this survey, while arrests represent a much smaller part of these incidents (9%). Fines and arrests are among the most representative incidents of tension that can exist between communities and law enforcement agencies because they reflect direct violations of the law. The high occurrence of fines indicates a reluctance on the part of local populations to comply with certain laws or regulations or are sometimes due to a simple lack of knowledge of these texts. Consequently, it is necessary to raise awareness among the population of the legal frameworks that govern life in this region, but also to bring communities and DSFs together, in order to engage them in the resolution of the disputes that may remain within certain areas of the region.

Incidents at the border, included prohibiting and slowing down passage, are much rarer and account for only 19.2 per cent of these disagreements. Lastly, the various so-called “hassle” cases mentioned by respondents are only reported by a small share of the sample (16.8%).


<sup>60</sup> The term “hassle” (*tracasserie* in French) refers to an informal and unauthorized fine collected by the representative of the police outside any legal framework and for his or her personal benefit.

**Figure 54: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the organization by the authorities of meetings with communities to discuss border security**



The high levels of perceived insecurity observed in some areas of the region, as well as the respondents' lack of knowledge of security issues, such as the function/purpose of the border, that of the DSFs or the main responsibilities of the authorities, can be explained, in particular, by a lack of regular contact between communities, DSFs and border security authorities. More than 6 out of 10 respondents (61.1% of the sample) say that there are no meetings between communities and authorities to discuss border security issues.

**Figure 55: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the organization by the authorities of meetings with communities to discuss border security, by district of residence**




This perception is more heterogeneous among the respondents when interviewed by district, some confirming much more than others the existence of these meetings. Thus, more than 8 out of 10 (82.8%) respondents living in Banibangou say that these meetings do take place, while nearly two thirds (65.1%) of respondents from the neighbouring district of Ouallam say the opposite. Torodi District seems to be the least concerned by these meetings, with only 18.9 per cent of its respondents stating that they actually take place.

Thus, these figures underline the authorities' weak commitment to the communities of the region, with the exception of Banibangou. They also highlight the extent to which some areas of the region receive drastically less attention from the authorities than others. For the majority of these districts, between half and more than three quarters of respondents confirm the absence of organized meetings between communities and authorities. Yet, it is precisely these meetings

that are essential to improve relations between these two stakeholders. They are essential for informing the population on the actions that are implemented by the authorities to secure borders or even to enable residents to inform local authorities of the various dangers they face on a daily basis.

**Figure 56: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the type of meeting organized by the authorities**




*Note:* Multiple responses are possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Various types of meetings can be organized between communities and authorities, some dedicated to informing the population and others, more ambitious, aimed at training leaders for them to better understand their responsibilities. According to a very large majority of respondents (93.1%), awareness campaigns are the most organized meetings in the region. These campaigns can have different themes: the issue of refugees, the terrorist threat and the risks of banditry, natural and health risks.

More than half (54.4%) of respondents also mention the organization of meetings on capacity-building, and almost 4 in 10 (38.4%) say that training has also been organized. Finally, the implementation of prevention committees is mentioned by a quarter of respondents (25.2%).


**Figure 57: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the type of meeting organized by the authorities, by district of residence**



*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.


Awareness-raising is organized in a rather homogeneous way throughout the territory, unlike other types of meetings, which are implemented in a rather inconsistent manner. The capacity-building meetings were mainly organized in Banibangou (92.8%) and Tera (72%), while the training was mainly organized in the districts of Ouallam (74.3%), Bankilare (56%) and Banibangou (50.6%). Lastly, the implementation of community prevention committees took place in Torodi and Ouallam, but to a lesser extent (respectively 51% and 44.1% of respondents).

**Figure 58: Distribution of respondents by opinion of the authorities' involvement with their community on border security**



While meetings between communities and authorities remain mostly absent in the districts surveyed, respondents are generally satisfied with the involvement of the authorities with the population. Thus, more than half of the respondents (52.3% of the sample) consider this involvement satisfactory and 10.6 per cent of respondents even consider it very satisfactory, for a total of 62.9 per cent favourable opinions. Therefore, only a third of respondents (32.1%) consider this involvement to be poor and only 5 per cent of them consider it to be fairly poor.


**Figure 59: Distribution of respondents by opinion of the authorities' involvement with their community on border security, by district of residence**



When these results are analysed by district, the most positive feedback is received from Bankilare and Tera, where 21.6 per cent and 28 per cent of respondents, respectively, are greatly satisfied with the authorities' involvement. The other districts also express a good satisfaction, in general ranging from 50 to 70 per cent of respondents, with the exception of Torodi District, which is particularly critical of the authorities. As a matter of fact, 53 per cent of respondents in this district consider the authorities' involvement to be poor, and 10.1 per cent of these respondents consider it to be fairly poor. These figures are much higher than the regional average. Thus, the local authorities in charge of this district must take these responses into account in order to multiply and improve interactions with the inhabitants of the area.

It is Torodi District that respondents answer massively (81.1%) that these interactions never take place, highlighting the direct correlation between the involvement of the authorities and communities' satisfaction with their work. A greater interaction between authorities and communities is also one of the main challenges for the future prevention committees implemented in the region and in the rest of the country.

**Figure 60: Distribution of respondents by suggestion on factors to be improved for a good relationship between communities and authorities**



According to the respondents to this survey, various paths can be identified to bring these stakeholders towards a better understanding and greater efficiency. The answers given in Figure 60 were given as part of an open-ended question, in order to give respondents full freedom to identify solutions that would help build good relations between authorities and communities. Thus, three main types of responses were identified. The first, suggested by nearly 4 in 10 respondents (38.5%), is to promote the creation of consultation frameworks between authorities and communities. It is directly in line with the spirit of the community prevention committees, which aim specifically to serve as forums for exchanges between leaders and communities at the local level. These committees are a way for communities to better understand the security situation along the border, as well as to inform the authorities about the evolution of threats on the ground.

The second solution, identified by 3 out of 10 respondents (29.6%), would be to increase awareness and advocacy activities, which can be caravans, forums or conferences, for instance. This shows the attachment that communities in the region have for these meetings, although the latter are already held very often in the districts of the region.


The third proposal aims to strengthen the operational capacities of the implemented prevention committees. This solution, identified by 15.4 per cent of respondents, clearly supports the creation and strengthening of these committees. Operational support can be provided in the form of better access to communication tools.



## 6. COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNITIES ON BORDER SECURITY


Improving communication between authorities and communities is essential to ensure the effectiveness of community prevention committees. Some mechanisms have already been implemented and vary in their modalities and effectiveness depending on the municipality where they operate.

**Figure 61: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary between local communities and authorities in border security communication**



Only a very small minority (13.8%) of respondents to this survey have direct contact with border security authorities. The inhabitants (86.2%) mainly go through an intermediary person to contact these authorities. The nature or role of this intermediary person may vary according to the locality, and it can be a traditional chief, a community leader, a women's representative, youth representative or a representative of civil society.

**Figure 62: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary between local communities and authorities in border security communication**






Three quarters (75.3%) of the people surveyed liaised with the village chief to contact the authorities. Much less popular, but still the second most popular response in this survey, are the resource persons or delegates, mentioned by 1 in 10 respondents (10.9%). Lastly, to a lesser extent, there are the elected local officials (4.7%), the group leaders (3.7%), the community prevention committees (2.7%) and the religious leaders (2.1%).

This importance given by communities to the village chief and to the municipal authorities is valuable information to understand the dynamics of trust and decision-making that govern village life. Thus, the village chief, a genuine keystone of the Niger's social life, is the one to whom the local populations naturally turn to settle current affairs and address their various grievances. In Part 5 of this report, the latter was already identified as the best-known representative by the respondents among the various border security authorities, although his actual participation in this function is actually very limited. Thus, the trust placed in this central figure of the village not only reflects the hierarchical organization of the villages and hamlets of the Niger, but also the dependence of the populations on this authority, which is often their only point of contact with the rest of the region and the national authorities.


As a consequence, it seems perfectly logical to observe that three quarters of the respondents use this authority as an intermediary to contact the border security authorities. Respecting these dynamics within the community prevention committees is thus essential to ensure the smooth running of these structures.

**Figure 63: Proportion of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary for border security communication between local communities and authorities, by district of residence**



This organization of communication between communities and authorities does not vary much throughout the region. Only the districts of Ayorou and Tera (32.9% and 31.8%) seem to be the exception, as they appear to make extensive use of the resource persons to contact the authorities, even as village chiefs remain predominantly popular in these areas.

**Figure 64: Proportion of respondents by means of communication used by the local population to contact intermediaries**




*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Various means of communication exist within the region to be able to contact the authorities, but only the telephone is really preferred by the inhabitants. More than 8 out of 10 respondents (84.3%) use this method of communication frequently to connect with the identified intermediary person. This is significantly higher than face-to-face meetings, although they are mentioned by almost half (47.8%) of the respondents. Village assemblies are also mentioned by one in five respondents (20.7%).

However, the other available means of communication in some municipalities are rarely used by respondents from the region. For instance, radio is used by only 3 per cent of respondents and the Thuraya satellite network is used by only 0.2 per cent of respondents. This is due to the lack of access to the required equipment, but most importantly to the easy access people have to the telephone, which favours the use of this means of communication. While some areas of the region have very little or no mobile Internet coverage, the telephone network operates both in urban and many rural areas and thus allows a very large majority of residents to communicate easily with each other. The telephone also remains the easiest and cheapest mode of communication, contrary to radio or satellite networks, which require more resources and training to master their use. For this reason, the prevention committees implemented in the region have been equipped with fleet telephones.


**Figure 65: Proportion of respondents by means of communication used by the local population to contact intermediaries, by district of residence**



Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The vast majority of communities in the region prefer to use the telephone to contact their intermediaries, with the notable exception of Torodi District, where relatively fewer respondents prefer this method of communication. Around 63.4 per cent of respondents interviewed in this district prefer the telephone compared to 95.8 per cent in the neighbouring district of Tera. Thus, this remains the primary means of communication used by Torodi residents, but it is not much different from the second most used means in the region compared to other districts. As a matter of fact, it is just ahead of face-to-face meetings, which are mentioned by 61.4 per cent of respondents, 15 percentage points higher than the regional average for this type of communication. Incidentally, Torodi District is one of the few where relations between communities and DSFs are considered the worst, and interactions with border security authorities are the rarest. This supports what has been observed in other parts of the country, which shows a correlation between the lack of trust in the authorities and the need for communities to increase face-to-face meetings.

**Figure 66: Proportion of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measure to enable effective communication between communities and authorities for border security**



Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

In order to improve communications between communities and authorities regarding border security, several solutions were proposed to respondents to this survey. The purpose of this question was to ask the respondents about the border security warning systems to be implemented, to understand which communication channels would be the most appropriate for the community prevention committees.


A very large majority of respondents (84.6% of the sample) say they favour increasing telephone exchanges. This is in line with the practices already in place in the villages surveyed and also reflects a logic of efficiency, speed and cost. Telephones are certainly the most affordable communication tools on the market and do not require any training. Moreover, the various networks in the Niger also provide decent coverage in most areas of the region, although some have been neglected. Lastly, its cost of use and maintenance is much lower than that of radio or satellite networks. The telephone also allows direct contact with the relevant authorities without the need for prior meetings. This criterion is all the more important, as some villages and hamlets in the region are so isolated that they become very difficult to access. Others may be too dangerous to access easily. Thus, to have the possibility to keep this fast and efficient contact guaranteed by the telephone, often becomes a necessity and it seems logical to find this choice in the first place.

More than half (55.3%) of the respondents also wish to duplicate consultation frameworks between authorities and communities in more areas. These types of frameworks are in line with the same logic as the various community prevention committees implemented in the region in May 2018. Beyond their mission of prevention and informing the authorities, the committees also have the advantage of creating consultation frameworks where all types of community leaders (village chief, religious leader, women's leader, youth leader, etc.) can meet regularly to discuss the various issues affecting their localities.

Half of the respondents (51%) also propose to improve communication between authorities and communities through the establishment of local information committees. These committees would act as a link between authorities and communities, and would provide regular information to villagers on the various decisions taken in the region and the unrest that is affecting it. These information committees could also be directly related to the roles the community prevention committees already assume.

Lastly, a third of respondents (33.4%) would like regular visits by authorities to be organized in their villages. This is in line with the feeling previously mentioned that the interaction between communities and authorities is still too limited and echoes the fact that the inhabitants wish that these meetings go beyond simple awareness campaigns.

**Figure 67: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measure to enable effective communication between communities and authorities for border security, by district of residence**




Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

While the multiplication of telephone exchanges is favoured homogeneously by all respondents in the territory, other solutions, however, are unequally represented within the districts.

For example, the creation of consultation frameworks between authorities and communities is much more requested in the districts of Ouallam and Tera than in the rest of the region (81.7% and 91.3% against 55.3% in the rest of the region). In addition to this, the establishment of local information committees is much more wanted in Tera and Torodi than elsewhere (72.9% and 63.5%, respectively, against 51% on average for the rest of the region). Lastly, visits by authorities are more welcome in Ayorou and Tera than in the rest of the region (47.6% and 49.5% against 31% on average for the rest of the region).

**Figure 68: Proportion of respondents by opinion on the positive effects of good communication between communities and authorities**




Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The overall objective of improving communications between communities and authorities is to better address border security issues and to better involve all stakeholders in a joint effort to protect populations from the dangers that emanate from the border. This improvement would bring about various positive effects identified by respondents.

Three quarters of respondents (74.5% of the sample) consider that better communication between communities and authorities would facilitate an immediate response by the authorities in the event of a crisis or incident at the border. Furthermore, more than 7 out of 10 respondents say that this will help to understand security issues in a timely manner. Lastly, 63.9 per cent of them believe that this would reduce the impact of border insecurity on local populations.

The vast majority of respondents to this survey are therefore fully aware of the direct benefits of a better communication between communities and authorities.

**Figure 69: Proportion of respondents by opinion on the negative effects of poor communication between communities and authorities**



*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

In addition to these benefits, various dangers are also identified in the event of poor communication between communities and authorities.

First, more than 8 out of 10 respondents (82.2%) fear that this will lead to an increase in insecurity in the region, and more than 6 out of 10 (62.7%) are worried that it will lead to late action by the authorities in the event of a crisis or incident.

Second, nearly 6 out of 10 respondents (59.9%) fear that poor communication between stakeholders could have serious consequences for community safety. Last, nearly one in two respondents (48.4%) believe that this could lead to a loss of community confidence in the authorities.


The inhabitants of the region are thus fully aware of the benefits of good communication between authorities and communities and are cautious about a deterioration of communication. In particular, they are concerned about a potential increase in violence in the region in the event of agreement issues between communities and authorities.



## 7. RESPONSE TO A CASE OF EMERGENCY

Strengthening border management and improving communications between communities and authorities aim, in particular, at better preventing and more effectively responding to crises. This section illustrates the views of the populations surveyed about these emergencies, the capacities of communities to manage these crises and the role of the authorities in their prevention.

**Figure 70: Distribution of respondents by their perceived cause of massive population displacements along the border**



Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

The Tillabéri region has experienced various massive population displacements along its borders in recent years, caused by various humanitarian and security crises. When asked about this, respondents in the region identify three main causes that would explain these massive population displacements: armed conflicts, one-off terrorist attacks and natural disasters (mainly droughts and floods).

The threat of armed conflict is identified by nearly three quarters of respondents (73.6%) as a possible cause of massive population displacement in the region. The armed conflicts currently underway around the Tillabéri region are confined exclusively to northern Mali, mainly in the Menaka region, near the Niger border. This armed conflict has been ongoing since 2012 and has already caused the arrival of several massive waves of Malian refugees, particularly between 2013 and 2016.<sup>61</sup> The management of these refugees in the various camps in the region remains one of the major security issues for all regional authorities in charge of community security. Thus, it is logical for this cause to be identified by the respondents who have had to face these various crises in recent years.

The specific terrorist attacks are also identified by 65 per cent of respondents as a probable cause of population displacements. These terrorist attacks mainly target the DSFs posted on either side of the border, but can also affect the populations living in the area. In addition, some

<sup>61</sup> OCHA, "Niger : Profil humanitaire de la région de Tillabéri – Juillet 2016" (Niger: Humanitarian profile of the Tillabéri region).




attacks have directly targeted some communities in the region, causing internal displacements within the Tillabéri region. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), more than 8,000 IDPs were registered in the Tillabéri region between January and March 2018, caused in particular by repeated attacks by terrorist groups in the region.<sup>62</sup> The respondents echo this reality and the increase in travel that is affecting the entire region.

Natural disasters were mentioned by 62.9 per cent of respondents.<sup>63</sup> Every year, floods seriously affect populations, causing landslides and massive crop losses, which has important consequences for this region, which is massively oriented towards agriculture. The floods of 2017 killed 50 people and affected more than 100,000 people, many of them in the Tillabéri region.<sup>64</sup>

Lastly, one in five respondents mentioned the risk of epidemics. For instance, a cholera epidemic massively affected the region in 2012 and still remains one of the major epidemic risks for the regional population today.

**Figure 71: Proportion of respondents by opinion on the capacity of communities to manage the arrival and movement of a very large number of people**




A minority of respondents (18% of the sample) believe that communities in the Tillabéri region are capable of managing the arrival and movement of a very large number of people into their village or hamlet. On the contrary, more than 8 in 10 respondents (82%) say that these communities are not prepared at all for this type of crisis.

<sup>62</sup> *Niamey et les 2 Jours*, "Plus de 8000 déplacés internes enregistrés à Tillabéri (OCHA)" (More than 8,000 internally displaced persons registered at Tillabéri (OCHA)), 4 April 2018. Available from (French only) [www.niameyetles2jours.com/la-gestion-publique/securite/0404-2113-plus-de-8000-deplaces-interne-enregistres-a-tillaberi-ocha](http://www.niameyetles2jours.com/la-gestion-publique/securite/0404-2113-plus-de-8000-deplaces-interne-enregistres-a-tillaberi-ocha)

<sup>63</sup> World Health Organization, "Avec plus de 3500 cas, le choléra persiste à l'ouest du Niger" (With more than 3,500 cases, cholera persists in western Niger), CLUSTER Santé, August 2012. Available (French only) from [www.who.int/hac/crises/ner/niger\\_health\\_cluster\\_bulletin\\_august2012.pdf](http://www.who.int/hac/crises/ner/niger_health_cluster_bulletin_august2012.pdf); UNICEF, "Étude EHA dans les zones à haut risque choléra au Niger : Revue et formulation de propositions d'action pour prévenir le choléra dans les régions de Tillabéri, Tahoua and Maradi" (WASH study in areas of the Niger at a high risk for cholera: Review and formulation of proposed actions for the prevention of cholera in the regions of Tillabéri, Tahoua and Maradi), report, available from (French only) <http://plateformecholera.info/index.php/about-us/416-etude-eha-dans-les-zones-a-haut-risque-cholera-au-niger-revue-et-formulation-de-propositions-d-action-pour-prevenir-le-cholera-dans-les-regions-de-tillaberi-tahoua-and-maradi>

<sup>64</sup> *Voice of Africa*, "Au moins 50 morts, plus de 100.000 sinistrés après des inondations au Niger" (At least 50 deaths, more than 100,000 affected after flooding in the Niger), 14 September 2017. Available from [www.voaafrrique.com/a/ay-moins-50-morts-plus-de-100000-sinistres-apres-des-inondations-au-niger/4028953.html](http://www.voaafrrique.com/a/ay-moins-50-morts-plus-de-100000-sinistres-apres-des-inondations-au-niger/4028953.html); BBC, "Niger : 23 morts après des pluies torrentielles" (Niger: 23 deaths after torrential rains), 19 July 2017, available from (French only) [www.bbc.com/afrique/region-40662086](http://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-40662086)


**Figure 72: Proportion of respondents by reason why communities are ready/unready to manage an emergency**



Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Among the minority of respondents who state that communities are prepared to deal with this type of crisis, three main explanations are highlighted. For 65.5 per cent of them, this type of crisis has already been experienced in the past, and had resulted in a positive reaction from the population. Half of the respondents (50.1%) also believe that communities are well-prepared and organized to respond to this type of event. Last, nearly half of the respondents (44.9%) recall that local authorities have carried out various awareness campaigns in recent years to inform communities of this type of risk.

**Figure 73: Proportion of respondents by opinion on the roles that authorities must play in an emergency**



Note: Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.


Three quarters (76.3%) of respondents say that the authorities' first duty in emergencies is to know how to accommodate displaced populations. Since 2012, tens of thousands of Malian refugees have joined the region and live mainly in the three camps in Mangaize, Abala and Tabarey-barey. Moreover, while some have left the camps since the first arrivals in 2012, others have arrived, especially since the beginning of 2018.

These experiences have already enabled to test the authorities' responsiveness and also highlighted the risks of massive inflows of refugees that exist in the region. Therefore, it

seems consistent that more than half of the respondents (54.3%) stress the importance of immediate care for displaced persons by the authorities. The prompt response expected from the authorities is a key factor for the proper management of these displaced persons in the short and medium term.

Furthermore, the provision of emergency equipment (55.5%) is also identified by more than half of the respondents. This mainly concerns the creation of reception facilities that can accommodate displaced persons, as well as the provision of basic equipment. Further, nearly half of the respondents consider it necessary to secure the refugee reception area (49.2%) and to help the sick and wounded (42.6%). However, only 26.9 per cent of respondents believe that it is the authorities' responsibility to relocate displaced persons.

**Figure 74: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the role that authorities should play in an emergency**



*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Despite the expected role of the authorities in managing an emergency, the surveyed communities do not neglect the role they must also play in managing an emergency. A very large majority of respondents (83.3% of the sample) mention that the communities' role is to quickly inform local authorities of this massive inflow of displaced populations. This is in line with the project to establish community prevention committees, which aim to enable communities to inform the authorities quickly in the event of crises at the border.

In addition, almost three out of four respondents (73.4%) believe it is their responsibility to welcome the displaced population. The interviewees are, therefore, aware of the essential role the authorities have in the management of this type of crisis, but also consider that welcoming populations is a shared responsibility that communities do not want to neglect. These two main responses given by the respondents are articulated around the notion of community empowerment; according to respondents, communities must not remain indifferent and can also act in the event of a crisis.

However, it is important to stress that despite having this sense of responsibility, communities must respect the role and legitimacy of local authorities, who remain the only ones able to gather the necessary resources and equipment to manage this type of crisis. Communities must limit their role to an alert and assistance role. This direct and systemic cooperation between authorities and communities is at the heart of the strategy of the community prevention committees that are implemented in the region.


**Table 3: Distribution of respondents by opinion on measures that communities and authorities can collaborate on**

Measures that communities and authorities can collaborate on	Absolute	Percentage
Establish community alert and response units	1,114	15.3
Develop community prevention strategies (brainstorming)	123	1.7
Inform and train and support communities in case of emergency	1,754	24.1
Establish a framework for consultation/collaboration and joint action	4,027	55.4
No opinion	257	3.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

To understand what collaborative measures between communities and authorities would improve emergency response mechanisms for populations, respondents answered an open-ended question. This gave them the opportunity to freely express their proposals. As shown in Figure 75, the three main solutions that emerge are in line with the primary ambition of the community prevention committees, that is, to create consultation frameworks within which communities and authorities regularly exchange views on the problems and opportunities identified along the border.

Thus, the vast majority of respondents does suggest that a framework for consultation and joint action should be put in place. This measure, supported by 55.4 per cent of the sample, is already being implemented thanks to the creation of these community prevention committees. In addition, almost one in four respondents (24.1%) also suggests information, training and supporting communities for emergencies. This is can be achieved through two actions from the authorities: the multiplication of awareness campaigns and the creation of simulation exercises that can help communities better prepare for this type of events. Lastly, 15.3 per cent of respondents suggested creating community alert and response units. The implemented community prevention committees already provide for and encourage alert mechanisms; however, the response is entirely the responsibility of the authorities, who are the only legitimate stakeholders who can use force. These prevention committees are not expected to play a self-defence role or encourage the use of violence, even to deal with illegal activities. Their primary and sustainable roles are to assist the authorities by alerting and assisting communities that may be in danger.

**Figure 75: Distribution of respondents by opinion on what pre-emptive action would enable better emergency management**



*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.


Respondents were also asked about the measures to be taken before an emergency occurs, in order to better prepare themselves and limit its consequences. The measure most supported by respondents (85.7% of respondents) is community capacity-building in the transmission of information to the authorities. This idea is in line with the strategies already identified in this report,<sup>65</sup> which highlight an increased demand from the populations for the use of various communication technologies to better ensure border security.

Three quarters of respondents also express support for greater integration of communities into crisis prevention processes. Some 76.3 per cent of them say they want to allow, encourage and lead the local population to play a role in the community prevention. The populations are thus in agreement with the idea, mentioned above, of a shared responsibility to prevent and manage these crises.

## 7a: Management of past emergencies in the districts of Ayorou and Ouallam

In recent years, the districts of Ayorou and Ouallam have been affected by emergencies that have severely disrupted communities. As part of this survey, the populations of these two districts were questioned about the management of past emergencies in order to draw the lessons learned from these experiences, and thus better prepare all communities in the region for this type of crisis.

**Figure 76: Distribution of respondents by their reaction to massive population displacements**



*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.


The first two questions analysed in this section aim to ask the respondents about their own response when managing a massive population displacement, and to compare it with the response of their communities.

Nearly three out of four respondents (73.2% of the sample) say they remained on site while being vigilant. They did not react directly to this crisis and preferred to remain within their village or community, while preparing for possible complications. Almost a third (31.8%) of respondents sought to assist the authorities. This behaviour, a more active approach than the previous answer, suggests a certain trust in the authorities. It also reflects good reflexes from individuals who know where to turn when problems arise and prefer to rely on higher authorities rather than act themselves. However, this answer represents a minor part of the respondents, and stresses the urgent need to train communities in the region to integrate this type of reflex in case of new emergencies.

<sup>65</sup> See Part 6.

Furthermore, almost one out of five respondents (19%) admit to having panicked and immediately fled, and 7.6 per cent of them say they did nothing at all. The proportion of inactive people, whether vigilant or not, is much higher than the proportion of respondents who have taken the decision to alert the relevant authorities so that they can respond to this crisis as quickly as possible. This confirms the need to raise awareness among these populations on the adequate responses in the event of a crisis, as well as to improve communication channels between authorities and communities. It also highlights the need to train these individuals to respond effectively to this type of emergency through simulation exercises.

**Figure 77: Distribution of respondents by their community's response to massive population displacements**




*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Respondents report that, in general, the communities had a better reaction than the individuals, although proportions of respondents for each answer remain quite similar. Thus, 75.6 per cent of them (compared to 73.2% for the previous question) say that the communities in their village have remained at home while remaining vigilant. However, a larger proportion of respondents (by almost 10 percentage points) believe that communities have sought to help the authorities (40.6%) than respondents reporting the same about their individual behaviours (31.8%).

More than 4 out of 10 respondents say that the communities helped the authorities and have adopted an active behaviour in response to this type of crisis. This is encouraging not only in the perspective of future efforts to be carried out with these communities, but also more generally, for cooperation between communities and authorities. The proportion of respondents who say that communities fled is lower than those who say that they themselves fled (16.6% versus 19%), while the proportion of respondents who say their communities did not do anything at all is at a similar level as those who say that they themselves did not do anything at all (7.4% versus 7.6%).


**Figure 78: Distribution of respondents by the reaction of their community leaders at the time of the crisis (Tillabéri)**



*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

Respondents, however, are very divided about the reaction of community leaders to these crises. While 72.2 per cent of those surveyed say that community leaders stayed on site and remained vigilant, 69.7 per cent believe that their leaders had sought to help the authorities. A similar proportion of respondents (about 7 out of 10) have quite diverging impressions about the reaction of their community leaders, torn between an active and a more passive impression of their leaders.

**Figure 79: Distribution of respondents by the reaction of their community leaders at the time of the crisis**




*Note:* Multiple responses were possible for this question. Therefore, the total is not 100 per cent.

When considering the responses by district, it is clear that the district of Ouallam has a high propensity for inactive leaders. Nearly 9 in 10 respondents in this district say that community leaders have stayed on site, and 1 in 10 say they have done nothing at all. However, more than half of the respondents believe their leaders have sought to help the authorities. This is much less than in Ayorou, where 83.8 per cent of respondents have observed such behaviour, even though 62.5 per cent believe, however, that these leaders remained in place while being vigilant.

This data is interesting as it shows that a large proportion of respondents answered both questions with contradictory answers. This reveals that respondents, as they were not very close to community leaders at the time of these crises, do not seem able to say whether or not these leaders have actually tried to help the authorities. As a result, closer collaboration between community leaders and communities, together with more efficient communication between these stakeholders, will allow them to better understand each other's roles and responsibilities, and ensure that every member of society responds to these crises in an orderly manner.

**Figure 80: Distribution of respondents by the immediate measures taken by their community leaders**



In crises and emergencies, the first responses given by the authorities are essential because they determine the capacity of the State to contain a potentially dramatic situation. As part of the survey, an open-ended question asked respondents about the nature of the responses provided by border security authorities during times of crises. The objective is to give respondents complete freedom to share their own observations on the reactions of border security stakeholders.


Based on the responses received, it appears that the authorities first provided hosting and assistance to displaced persons (39.9% of the sample). This is the highest response rate obtained from the respondents, and it indicates that a large majority of the authorities adopted an attitude of helping these displaced populations. In addition, 16.1 per cent believe that the authorities have sought to relocate these displaced persons, and 4.9 per cent of respondents state that they provided assistance to the sick and wounded. These three responses, which represent the majority of the answers given by the respondents (60.9% of the sample), are all part of an approach of helping and protecting displaced persons.

Furthermore, almost two out of five respondents (18.8%) also say that these authorities have made efforts to secure the reception area in order to protect the displaced persons but especially the surrounding communities. According to 10.4 per cent of respondents, these authorities have also focused on strengthening control over the movement of people and goods. Further, 5.4 per cent of respondents recall that this has led to a strengthening of the state of emergency and border security. These responses are rather focused on an effort to secure the territory and protect communities. Lastly, 4.6 per cent of respondents maintain that no action has been undertaken.



Therefore, a majority of respondents maintain that the authorities have responded by trying to assist and help displaced populations.

**Figure 81: Distribution of respondents by information status of the local population prior to the emergency**



According to interviewees, few of them were informed of this massive influx of displaced populations. Only 28.4 per cent of respondents say they were informed, while 71.6 per cent claim instead that they did not receive any information. These data further underline the need for better training of authorities to improve the timeliness of response mechanisms in case of border emergencies. It also reiterates the need to better equip and train the communities and the authorities in effective communication.

## CONCLUSION

The Tillabéri region faces many threats from its borders that regularly disrupt local populations, while often playing on more deeply rooted internal crises. The goal to work on better border management in the Niger, and especially in the Tillabéri region, is to improve the communities' well-being, by addressing the various vulnerabilities that contribute to the emergence of these threats. These threats severely affect the daily lives of the inhabitants, by interfering with their way of life, their employment, and by contributing to the escalation of tensions between various villages and communities. As a result, improving border management is a priority for the authorities in securing the territory, protecting citizens and developing the region.

Better border management will require better synergy between the authorities and the communities, each of these stakeholders being expected to play its part and cooperate in risk management within the territory of Tillabéri. Thus, this study illustrated the visions and perceptions of communities not only on border management, but also on the work carried out by the authorities, on their exposure to security risks and on the relations between populations and DSFs. Each part of this report has contributed to a better understanding of central themes for border issues: perceptions of border management, security risks, terrorist threats, the effectiveness of authorities and DSFs, communication between stakeholders and emergency responses.

The various parts of this report revealed a strong heterogeneity between the districts and villages regarding these themes, whether in terms of the best means of communication, the prioritization of risks, or the trust placed in DSFs or local and regional authorities. As such, when some villages feel very little concerned by the terrorist threat, others see it as the main challenge that affects their daily lives. While some inhabitants have completely changed their border crossing frequencies following the start of the 2012 Malian crisis, others have maintained their habits, even within neighbouring districts. This heterogeneity questions and is a fair reminder that while public policies at the regional level are welcome and necessary, they cannot be applied uniformly throughout the territory and should be adapted to local circumstances and the needs of villages and their inhabitants.

The interviewees also showed a very broad range of knowledge about the location of the border, its main functions and the roles of regional and local authorities in managing border areas. The inhabitants of the region also continue to cross the border at higher frequencies than in the rest of the country, even though they have changed their habits since 2012.

The respondents have an acute knowledge of the problems of the region, the groups that frequent the border and also the threats that emanate from it. The cattle thefts and the bandit attacks are among the most frequently mentioned security problems by respondents who call on the authorities to curb these threats. These attacks targeting communities are mainly characterized by violence that is often lethal, facilitated by the circulation of weapons and the porosity of borders. Due to this increased violence, as well as the diversity of jihadist methods, banditry and terrorism are becoming indistinguishable, and these two types of violence merge into a single, significant threat that often exceeds the authorities and affects the villages in the region, particularly those that are the closest to the border. Terrorist threats seem to be much

more prevalent in the districts and especially in the district of Ouallam, where the inhabitants seem totally exposed and helpless when facing a threat that continues to affect them and which the authorities seem, in their opinion, incapable of containing. For them, putting an end to this threat can only be achieved through a triptych combines more involved community leaders, better economic prospects for youth and a greater effort to raise awareness in the communities.

The porosity of the borders is also pointed out, although unevenly, by the interviewees. While some respondents confirm the regular presence of DSFs, especially in the districts of Bankilare and Ouallam, many are more sceptical and rather have the perception of their absence. Patrols within respondents' villages are more regular, although they do not cover all villages consistently; thus, some respondents deplore the total absence of such patrols within their locality. It is, in fact, within these areas that insecurity is the most felt. However, the respondents are generally satisfied with the work carried out by the border authorities, even though they trust more easily the authorities closest to them, such as the village chief, unlike the governor or regional prefect.

Furthermore, the desire for better collaboration between communities and authorities was clearly expressed by respondents during this survey. They deplore the insufficient means deployed by the authorities to manage crises or daily problems at the border, and are open to the idea of actively participating in the community prevention committees. They also want more frequent interaction with their leaders and better communication between the stakeholders, reinforced by greater use of the telephone and by more frequent meetings that can encourage the participation of communities in the management of borders.

Today, this communication between communities and authorities is mainly done through an intermediary person who happens to be the village chief in the vast majority of cases. Telephone exchanges are much preferred, and were mentioned by respondents twice as much as face-to-face meetings and four times as much as village assemblies. Thus, the communities wish not only to increase the use of the telephone for future communications but also recommend increasing the frequency of face-to-face meetings, especially in areas where relations between communities and authorities appear to be the most deteriorated.

Lastly, the respondents to this survey are concerned about several main risks: a massive population displacement that could be caused by the worsening of the armed conflict in Mali, the occurrence of a major terrorist attack or the climate degradation (mainly floods and drought). In addition, while few respondents believe that communities are ready to face such crises, the vast majority is aware of the role they have to play in early-warning and assistance mechanisms for displaced populations.

## Recommendations

This report is part of the project “Engaging Communities in Border Management in the Niger”, designed and piloted by the IOM office in the Niger. The main objective of this research is to present and analyse the vision of communities living in the Niger's border areas on:

- (a) their participation in border management;
- (b) their understanding of migration dynamics;
- (c) their perception of terrorism in the region.

The results of this study will thus guide the development and work of community prevention committees in the project areas.

## General comments

The responses provided throughout the different parts of this survey demonstrated the communities' strong commitment to collaborative work, their willingness to help the authorities and, finally, their awareness of the role they can play in implementing better border management in the Tillabéri region. In this sense, the various responses support the philosophy and mandate of the community prevention committees implemented in the region. Their role is to transmit to local and regional authorities, information relating to security, health and humanitarian management of borders, and population movements. Thus, they are expected to report any suspicious events or the presence of potentially dangerous individuals as soon as possible. In the event of a crisis at the border, the committees will ensure early notification of the relevant authorities and services. They may also be called upon to assist rescue services in the identification, orientation and assistance of displaced and/or vulnerable persons.

The opportunities offered to respondents to choose or propose solutions to the various problems addressed reveal that communities are committed to participating directly in resolving problems at the border. They also want to increase interactions with the authorities and improve communication mechanisms.

Lastly, the interviewees also show they respect the legitimacy of the authorities, in particular DSFs, in dealing with threats and crises, but also that they did not neglect their own responsibility in transmitting information and being collectively vigilant in facing these risks. All these dimensions are directly at the heart of the project to implement community prevention committees and thus confirm the relevance of this initiative, as well as its acceptance by the population.

## Recommendation 1: Improve the presence of DSFs along borders and their relations with communities

- The first recommendation aims to improve the presence and visibility of DSFs in some parts of the region. Almost all respondents in the district of Ouallam state that they do not observe troops at the borders, which marks a clear discrepancy with the reality of some joint operations at the local level. This observation is in line with other survey data that highlights the strong criticism of the communities' inhabitants regarding the authorities' work and the general feeling of insecurity and exposure to threats that affect the communities. On the contrary, DSF patrols seem to be much more frequent in the villages of the region, with the exception of a few villages in Torodi District. During the mission to implement the prevention committees, the border communities also highlighted the lack of communication by DSFs on border security. Patrols often pass through the area but very rarely communicate with village leaders, whether the village chief or other leaders. The goal would be to increase contact between patrols, communities and local leaders so that exchanges on the work carried out at the borders can take place. This could result in an increase in awareness campaigns, stronger links between communities and authorities, a better understanding of the role of DSFs and of their activities, all of which are now requested by the inhabitants.

## **Recommendation 2: Contextualize the work of the community prevention committees**

- The action plans that will be implemented in the communities of the region will also have to be contextualized in order to be able to adapt to local realities, but above all so that the action carried out focuses primarily on the most pressing issues. This study reveals a strong heterogeneity between districts and villages on many subjects, from the best means of communication to the prioritization of risks and the trust placed in DSFs or local and regional authorities. Some districts regularly organize meetings between authorities and communities, while others do not hold this type of meeting at all. In addition, the local context may vary from one district to another: while the inhabitants of the Ayorou District are mainly concerned about livestock theft, those of Banibangou about banditry and those of Tera do not perceive any major threats from the border. These examples highlight the need to adapt the priority actions of the community prevention committees to issues at the village and district levels. Based on the conclusions of this report, as well as on meetings organized with the communities, the authorities will, therefore, have to build their own policy of good border management by responding to the most pressing challenges faced by the communities and by adapting to the needs of the municipality and surrounding villages.

## **Recommendation 3: Strengthen emergency response mechanisms**

- Community emergency response mechanisms enable communities to be trained and prepared for crises, including the sudden and massive arrival of displaced populations. The report highlighted the need to better prepare these communities and the local leaders for these various risks through more crisis simulation exercises, as well as by organizing training dedicated to communities, especially to those who will be in charge of the prevention committees. Previous crises in the districts of Ayorou and Ouallam have also highlighted the various responses to these crises, both by individuals and leaders, and showed that some were seeking to help the authorities while others preferred to remain on site. Based on these various reactions, a majority of respondents believe that communities are not ready to manage such crises. As a matter of fact, the need to organize capacity-building is further reinforced, as these activities are very poorly organized in the region. Thus, these sessions must be a priority in order to be able to train the committees on the relevant responses to adopt in the event of an incident or disturbance in the community, while at the same time the whole community in these exercises.

## **Recommendation 4: Improve communications between authorities and communities**

- Improving communication between authorities and communities is essential to ensure the effectiveness of community prevention committees. While mechanisms are already in place, they vary in their modalities and in effectiveness depending on the municipality. Most of the districts favour the use of the telephone and recommend an increase in its use in the future. This tool also remains the easiest and cheapest way to communicate, unlike radio or satellite networks, which require more resources and training. For this reason, the community prevention committees established in the region have been equipped with fleet telephones. The implementation of early-warning mechanisms between communities and authorities based on the use of these phones seems necessary in view of the difficulties encountered during past crises.
- Organize periodic meetings between all stakeholders: community forums, mobilization activities, sports meets between DSFs and communities and awareness campaigns.

### Recommendation 5: Address the roots of regional terrorism

- Terrorist groups that regularly attack the DSFs and the populations of Tillabéri are based mainly in northern Mali or western Burkina Faso. Respondents are aware that the people who join these groups are also from the communities in the region and that a regional response to this problem is needed. Three courses of action are recommended to address the root causes of this problem: better engagement of young people by community leaders; raising awareness of the risks and dangers of violent extremism; and offering more economic activities for young people. The challenge for the authorities lies in their ability to offer alternative solutions for unemployed populations suffering from local banditry while addressing the various community tensions that exist in the region, through inclusive dialogue and regular meetings between authorities and communities. The fight against terrorist groups remains entirely the responsibility of DSFs in the region. However, preventing this threat must also include in-depth efforts to strengthen community well-being and combat all forms of marginalization.



# ANNEX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE

## RESPONDENT'S CONSENT

**Consent** (Read to the potential participant.)

I am conducting a study and would like to invite you to participate. The research focuses on the involvement of local communities in border management in the Niger, particularly in the Agadez and Tillabéri regions.

Your participation is completely voluntary and we will not store your personal data that you choose to provide us. There will be no compensation or sanction for participating or not participating. You can, of course, withdraw your participation at any time before the start of the research phase. Your information and advice would be appreciated and will help guide policies, programmes and research on the involvement of local communities in border management. The interview lasts about an hour.

I have presented you with the information on the research. Do you agree to participate? (Check to confirm that you have obtained oral consent.)

☐ YES

## OBJECTIVES OF THE SURVEY

This study is part of the project "Engaging Communities in Border Management in the Niger". It was designed by IOM to understand the perspectives of communities living in border areas on their integration into border management, their understanding of migration dynamics and their perception of terrorism in the region. This study will therefore lead national and international actors to adapt their actions to better integrate communities, and to act alongside them to better meet their needs. Ultimately, this study will demonstrate the need to remove communities from the role of potential victims of insecurity in order to make them key players in border management, through prevention (or "vigilance") committees.

## A - GENERAL INFORMATION

A.1. Date:	
A.2. District:	
A.3. Municipality:	
A.4. Village/Hamlet:	

## B - PROFILE OF THE INTERVIEWEE

B.1. Gender:	<input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female
B.2.a. Nationality:	<input type="checkbox"/> Niger <input type="checkbox"/> Malian <input type="checkbox"/> Burkina Faso <input type="checkbox"/> Algerian <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____



B.2.b. Ethnicity:	<input type="checkbox"/> Tuareg <input type="checkbox"/> Arabic <input type="checkbox"/> Haoussa <input type="checkbox"/> Djerma <input type="checkbox"/> Sonrai <input type="checkbox"/> Gurma <input type="checkbox"/> Mossi <input type="checkbox"/> Peulh <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
B.3. Age group:	<input type="checkbox"/> 18–25 years old <input type="checkbox"/> 26–40 years old <input type="checkbox"/> 41–60 years old <input type="checkbox"/> 61–80 years old	
B.4. Professional activity:	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock breeding <input type="checkbox"/> Agriculture <input type="checkbox"/> Craftsmanship <input type="checkbox"/> Trade <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
<b>C - LOCAL COMMUNITIES' PERCEPTIONS OF BORDER MANAGEMENT</b>		
C.1. What do you think the purpose or function of a border is?	<input type="checkbox"/> Delimiting the separation between two States <input type="checkbox"/> Ensuring the safety of the population <input type="checkbox"/> Allowing authorities to monitor entry and exit <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	
C.2. Do you know exactly where the border is?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
C.3. Did you cross the border in the past?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
C.4. Do you cross the border currently?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
C.5. How often do you cross the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Several times a day <input type="checkbox"/> Every day <input type="checkbox"/> Often <input type="checkbox"/> Two to three times a week <input type="checkbox"/> Once a week <input type="checkbox"/> Once a month <input type="checkbox"/> Once a year <input type="checkbox"/> Never <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
C.6.a. Why did you cross the border in the past?	<input type="checkbox"/> Family reasons <input type="checkbox"/> Economic reasons <input type="checkbox"/> Trade reasons <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
C.6.b. Why do you cross the border currently?	<input type="checkbox"/> Family reasons <input type="checkbox"/> Economic reasons <input type="checkbox"/> Trade reasons <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
C.7. Are you aware of the defence and security forces at the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
C.8. If so, which of these do you know are part of the DSFs?	<input type="checkbox"/> Police officers <input type="checkbox"/> Gendarmes <input type="checkbox"/> National Guard <input type="checkbox"/> Customs officers <input type="checkbox"/> Military <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	

## D - SECURITY RISKS ALONG THE BORDER

D.1.a. What are the nationalities of the people who use border crossings?	<b>Nationalities</b> <input type="checkbox"/> Niger nationals from other regions <input type="checkbox"/> Niger nationals from the neighbouring village/hamlet <input type="checkbox"/> Malians <input type="checkbox"/> Algerians <input type="checkbox"/> Burkina Faso nationals <input type="checkbox"/> Migrants from other West African countries <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
D.1.b. What are the categories of people who use border crossings?	<input type="checkbox"/> Families <input type="checkbox"/> Refugees <input type="checkbox"/> Migrants <input type="checkbox"/> Merchants <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
D.2. Are border crossings used for criminal activities?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	
D.3. What types of security problems do local communities face at the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Cattle rustling/theft <input type="checkbox"/> Smuggling of goods (pasta, rice, etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Attacks by armed bandits <input type="checkbox"/> Incursions by armed groups/terrorists <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> None (no illegal acts)	
D.4. Has your village/hamlet ever been affected by a problem with border insecurity?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
D.5. Are you aware of the security measures taken to secure the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Border controls at border crossings <input type="checkbox"/> Patrols <input type="checkbox"/> Searches <input type="checkbox"/> Informants <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
D.6. How do you rate these security measures?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very sufficient <input type="checkbox"/> Quite sufficient <input type="checkbox"/> Insufficient	
D.7. What are the risks that can result from poor border security management?	<input type="checkbox"/> Epidemics <input type="checkbox"/> Terrorist incursions/Armed groups <input type="checkbox"/> Trafficking <input type="checkbox"/> Banditry <input type="checkbox"/> Recruitment of youth by armed groups <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	

## E - LOCAL COMMUNITIES' PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM

E.1.a. Have you ever heard of terrorism?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
E.1.b. How do you define "terrorism"?		
E.2. What terrorist activities do you know of?	<input type="checkbox"/> Attacks on DSFs <input type="checkbox"/> Assassinations of civilians <input type="checkbox"/> Abductions <input type="checkbox"/> Intimidation and threats <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	

E.3. What do you think drives people towards this phenomenon?	<input type="checkbox"/> Poverty <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of occupation <input type="checkbox"/> Adherence to ideology <input type="checkbox"/> Ethnic or family motivations <input type="checkbox"/> Opposition to the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Anger and frustration <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	
E.4.a. Do you think your community is safe from this phenomenon?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
E.4.b. Why do you say so?		
E.5. Do you think that terrorism is a phenomenon coming from inside or outside the Niger?	<input type="checkbox"/> From within Niger <input type="checkbox"/> From outside Niger <input type="checkbox"/> Both <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	
E.6. In your opinion, is the threat of terrorism in the region reducing, stable or increasing?	<input type="checkbox"/> In decline <input type="checkbox"/> Stable <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing	
E.7. What can be done to help local communities prevent this kind of threat?	<input type="checkbox"/> Raise awareness among young people <input type="checkbox"/> Offer economic activities for young people <input type="checkbox"/> Involve community leaders (village chiefs, imams, etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Implement community prevention committees <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
E.8. How can the local community support the authorities in the fight against terrorism and protect itself at the same time?	<input type="checkbox"/> Alert the authorities in case of problems <input type="checkbox"/> Raise awareness on the risks of violent radicalization of young people <input type="checkbox"/> Self-defence with weapons <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing	
<b>F - EFFECTIVENESS OF BORDER MANAGEMENT</b>		
F.1. What do you think it means to ensure border security?		
F.2. Are there patrols along the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
F.3. Are there patrols in your village?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
F.4. What is the level of security in the area in your opinion?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Insufficient <input type="checkbox"/> No security at all	
F.5. Who do you think is in charge of local border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Police officer <input type="checkbox"/> Gendarmes <input type="checkbox"/> Custom officer <input type="checkbox"/> Village chief <input type="checkbox"/> Group/Canton leader <input type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> The army <input type="checkbox"/> Prefect <input type="checkbox"/> Governor <input type="checkbox"/> Other	

F.6. How would you rate the work of these actors who manage border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Not very satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory	
F.7. Do you think that local authorities alone can fully ensure border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
F.8. How would you rate the relationship between the local community and border security actors/officers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very good <input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral <input type="checkbox"/> Bad <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	
F.9. Does the local community have disagreements with any of the border security officers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
F.10. If so, how often do these disputes occur?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very often <input type="checkbox"/> Not very often <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely	
F.11. What are the reasons for these disputes?	<input type="checkbox"/> Fines <input type="checkbox"/> Slowing down passage at the border <input type="checkbox"/> Prohibiting passage <input type="checkbox"/> Arrests <input type="checkbox"/> Hassle <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
F.12.a. Do authorities sometimes organize meetings with your community on border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
F.12.b. If so, which ones?	<input type="checkbox"/> Capacity-building <input type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Awareness-raising <input type="checkbox"/> Implementation of prevention committees <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
F.13. How would you rate the authorities' involvement with your community on border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Poor <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly poor	
F.14. What needs to be improved to build good relationships between border security officers and communities?		
<b>H - COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNITIES ON BORDER SECURITY</b>		
H.1.a. Is there an intermediary between local communities and authorities on border security communication?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
H.1.b. If so, who is it?		

H.2. If so, what means of communication do people use?	<input type="checkbox"/> Telephone <input type="checkbox"/> Thuraya (satellite network) <input type="checkbox"/> Radio <input type="checkbox"/> Face-to-face meeting <input type="checkbox"/> Village assembly <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
H.3. How should an alert mechanism be implemented during border security problems?	<input type="checkbox"/> Consultation framework between authorities and communities <input type="checkbox"/> Telephone exchanges <input type="checkbox"/> Local information committee <input type="checkbox"/> Regular visits by the authorities to the village <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
H.4. What means do you think should be used to ensure that information is shared?	<input type="checkbox"/> Telephone <input type="checkbox"/> Thuraya (satellite network) <input type="checkbox"/> SMS <input type="checkbox"/> Radio <input type="checkbox"/> Face-to-face meeting <input type="checkbox"/> Village assembly <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
H.5. What do you think are the benefits of good communication between the authorities and the local community on border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate action by the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Security problem understood in time <input type="checkbox"/> Reducing the impact of border insecurity on local populations <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
H.6. What do you think are the risks of poor communication between the two parties?	<input type="checkbox"/> Fast and wide spread of insecurity <input type="checkbox"/> Late action by the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Seriousness of the consequences for local communities <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of community confidence in the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
<b>I - RESPONSE TO AN EMERGENCY</b>		
I.1. What do you think can cause massive population displacements at the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Armed conflict <input type="checkbox"/> Spontaneous terrorist attacks <input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Epidemics <input type="checkbox"/> Natural disasters (floods, drought, etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
I.2. Do you think that communities are ready to face such a situation?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	
I.3. Why?	<input type="checkbox"/> Crisis situation already experienced; positive reaction of the population <input type="checkbox"/> Awareness-raising by local authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Community is well-prepared and organized for this purpose <input type="checkbox"/> Crisis situation already experienced, negative reaction of the population <input type="checkbox"/> Panic and escape as soon as a threat emerged <input type="checkbox"/> Population already terrified, misinformed and disorganized <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
I.4. What roles do you think the authorities should play in an emergency?	<input type="checkbox"/> Welcome the displaced population <input type="checkbox"/> Provide emergency equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Rescue the sick and wounded <input type="checkbox"/> Secure the reception area <input type="checkbox"/> Immediate care for displaced persons <input type="checkbox"/> Relocate displaced people	

I.5. What roles should the local community play in an emergency?	<input type="checkbox"/> Welcome the displaced population <input type="checkbox"/> Inform local authorities promptly <input type="checkbox"/> Coordinate with the local authorities to facilitate the care of displaced persons <input type="checkbox"/> Remain vigilant <input type="checkbox"/> Respect and follow the measures taken by the authorities present	
I.6. How can the local community and authorities effectively manage an emergency?		
I.7. How can the local community help prevent an emergency?	<input type="checkbox"/> Enable, promote and encourage the local population to play the role of a vigilance committee <input type="checkbox"/> Strengthen the capacity of the local community to transmit information to the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
<b>I - OUALLAM AND AYOROU ONLY – RESPONSE TO PAST EMERGENCIES</b>		
I.8. What did you do during the massive displacement of a third of the population following the Malian crisis?	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediately fled due to panic <input type="checkbox"/> Remained on site while being vigilant <input type="checkbox"/> Tried to help the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Did not do anything at all <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
I.9. What was the reaction of the local community to this same crisis?	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediately fled due to panic <input type="checkbox"/> Remained on site while being vigilant <input type="checkbox"/> Tried to help the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Did not do anything at all <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
I.10. What did the leaders of border communities do regarding the current crisis?	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediately fled following the panic <input type="checkbox"/> Remained at the location while being vigilant <input type="checkbox"/> Tried to help the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Did not do anything at all <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify) _____	
I.11. What measures have been taken in the immediate term by the actors in charge of border management?		
I.12. Was the population immediately informed of the situation?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	



## ANNEX 2: SURVEY RESULTS

### USE OF SURVEY DATA

#### 1. Respondent profile

Table A: Distribution of respondents by district and municipality of residence

District and municipality of residence	Absolute	Percentage
Ayorou	834	11.5
Ayorou	834	11.5
Banibangou	870	12.0
Banibangou	870	12.0
Bankilare	1,817	25.0
Bankilare	1,817	25.0
Ouallam	579	8.0
Tondikiwindi	579	8.0
Tera	907	12.5
Gorouol	585	8.0
Tera	322	4.4
Torodi	2,268	31.2
Makolondi	1,426	19.6
Torodi	842	11.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table B1: Distribution of respondents by gender

Gender	Absolute	Percentage
Women	1,698	23.3
Men	5,577	76.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table B2a: Distribution of respondents by nationality

Nationality	Absolute	Percentage
Niger	6,997	96.2
Burkina Faso	182	2.5
Malian	80	1.1
Algerian	7	0.1
Nigerian	6	0.1
Others	3	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>



Table B2b: Distribution of respondents by ethnicity

Ethnicity	Absolute	Percentage
Djerma/Sonrai	3,175	43.6
Peulh	1,422	19.5
Tuareg	1,244	17.1
Gurma	1,181	16.2
Haoussa	199	2.7
Mossi	44	0.6
Other ethnic groups	10	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table B3: Distribution of respondents by age group

Age group	Absolute	Percentage
18–25	840	11.5
26–40	3,306	45.4
41–60	2,569	35.3
61–80	560	7.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table B4: Distribution of respondents by main economic activity

Main economic activity/occupation	Absolute	Percentage
Agriculture	4,696	64.5
Housewife	961	13.2
Business/trade	547	7.5
Livestock farming/breeding	490	6.7
Craftsmanship	218	3.0
Task worker	167	2.3
Administration	104	1.4
Unemployed	40	0.5
Traditional/religious leader	32	0.4
Student/pupil	20	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 2. Local communities' perceptions of border management

Table C1: Respondents' perceptions of the border's function

Perception of the border's function	Absolute	Percentage
Delimit the boundaries between two States	6,410	88.1
Ensure the safety of the population	2,374	32.6
Allow authorities to monitor entry and exit	1,718	23.6
Does not know	267	3.7
Other purposes	8	0.1

Table C2: Respondents' knowledge of the border's location

Awareness of the border's location	Absolute	Percentage
Knows the location	2,492	34.3
Does not know the location	4,783	65.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table C2a: Respondents' knowledge of the border's location, by district of residence

District of residence	Knows the location		Does not know the location		Total (Absolute)
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage	
Ayorou	786	94.2	48	5.8	834
Banibangou	731	84.0	139	16.0	870
Bankilare	690	38.0	1,127	62.0	1,817
Ouallam	378	65.3	201	34.7	579
Tera	671	74.0	236	26.0	907
Torodi	1,527	67.3	741	32.7	2,268
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,783</b>	<b>65.7</b>	<b>2,492</b>	<b>34.3</b>	<b>7,389</b>

Table C3 and C4: Respondents' history of crossing the border

Past		Absolute	Percentage
Crossed the border		6,472	89.0
Did not cross the border		803	11.0
Current			
Crosses the border		5,360	73.7
Does not cross the border		1,915	26.3
<b>Total</b>		<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table C5: Distribution of respondents by frequency of crossing the border

Frequency of crossing the border	Absolute	Percentage
Other frequencies	35	1.2
Several times a day	46	1.6
Every day	193	6.6
Two to three times a week	472	16.2
Once a year	493	16.9
Once a month	540	18.5
Once a week	1,138	39.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,917</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table C6: Respondents' reasons for crossing the border (past and current)

Reason for crossing the border	Past		Current	
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage
Family	3,437	47.2	2,941	40.4
Economic	3,977	54.7	3,254	44.7
Business	1,679	23.1	1,311	18.0
Studies, apprenticeship, transhumance, health/sanitary and gold panning opportunities	271	3.7	359	4.9

Table C7: Respondents' awareness of the existence of border forces

Awareness	Absolute	Percentage
Knows	4,930	67.77
Does not know	2,345	32.23
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table C8: Composition of border security forces, according to respondents

Category of border security force	Absolute	Percentage
Burkina Faso foresters/DSFs	364	7.4
Customs officers	1,479	30.0
National Guard	1,535	31.1
Military	1,925	39.0
Gendarmes	2,662	54.0
Police officers	2,912	59.1

### 3. Security risks at the border

Table D1a: Nationalities of persons crossing the border, according to respondents

Nationality of persons crossing the border	Absolute	Percentage
Does not know	234	3.2
Algerians	325	4.5
Migrants from West Africa	1,865	25.6
Maliens	2,877	39.5
Burkina Faso nationals	4,349	59.8
Niger nationals from other regions	5,170	71.1
Niger nationals from neighbouring villages/hamlets	6,118	84.1

Table D1b: Categories of persons crossing the border, according to respondents

Category of persons crossing the border	Absolute	Percentage
Families	3,642	50.1
Refugees	1,216	16.7
Migrants	3,801	52.2
Merchants	6,200	85.2
Does not know	287	3.9
Gold panners	18	0.2
Transhumant herders	44	0.6

Table D2: Respondents' perception of border crossing points being used for criminal activities

Perception of border crossing points	Absolute	Percentage
Yes (They are used for criminal activities.)	4,199	57.7
No (They are not used for criminal activities.)	902	12.4
Does not know	2,174	29.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table D3: Security problems faced by border communities, according to respondents**

Security problem faced by border communities	Absolute	Percentage
Border location unknown or not enforced	9	0.1
Illegal control of the border/Unjustified fines	44	0.6
No problems encountered	1,097	15.1
Incursions by armed groups/terrorists	1,139	15.7
Smuggling (pasta, rice, etc.)	1,239	17.0
Trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.)	1,535	21.1
Cattle rustling (livestock theft)	4,676	64.3
Attacks by armed bandits	4,934	67.8

**Table D4: Proportion of respondents from communities affected at least once by a border insecurity problem**

Community's history of border insecurity problems	Absolute	Percentage
Never affected	3,056	42.0
Affected at least once	4,219	58.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table D5: Respondents' knowledge of existing border security measures**

Measure taken to secure borders	Absolute	Percentage
Does not know any	100	1.4
None are being taken	138	1.9
Establishment of a vigilance committee	328	4.5
Searches	579	8.0
Information/informants	2,525	34.7
None	4,620	63.5
Does not know	5,801	79.7

**Table D6: Respondents' opinions of existing border security measures**

Opinion of existing security measures	Absolute	Percentage
Very sufficient	1,079	14.8
Somewhat sufficient	4,313	59.3
Insufficient	1,883	25.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table D7: Risks from poor border security management, according to respondents**

Risk from poor border management	Absolute	Percentage
Lack of information, trust or confidence	21	0.3
Intercommunity conflict	33	0.5
Does not know	331	4.5
Epidemics	2,142	29.4
Recruitment of youth by armed groups	2,215	30.4
Trafficking	3,366	46.3
Terrorist incursions/Armed groups	3,667	50.4
Banditry	6,444	88.6

#### 4. Local communities' perception of terrorism

**Table E1a: Percentage of respondents who are aware of terrorism**

Awareness of terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
Yes (knows or has heard about terrorism)	7,025	96.6
No (does not know about terrorism)	250	3.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table E1a.1: Percentage of respondents who are aware of terrorism, by district of residence**

District of residence	Absolute	Percentage
Ayorou	808	96.9
Banibangou	847	97.4
Bankilare	1,672	92.0
Ouallam	578	99.8
Tera	887	97.8
Torodi	2,233	98.5

**Table E1b: Distribution of respondents by their definition of "terrorism"**

Respondent's definition of terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
Cannot define it exactly	175	2.4
Has never heard of terrorism	250	3.4
Opposition to authorities, rebellion or crime	550	7.6
Armed attacks on the populations/DSFs	985	13.5
Acts by armed bandits (looting, ambush, killing)	1,654	22.7
Acts of violent religious extremism (jihadist terror)	1,768	24.3
Attacks, assassinations, abductions or intimidation	1,893	26.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table E2: Distribution of respondents by type of terrorist activity known to them**

Terrorist activity known to respondent	Absolute	Percentage
Does not know any	324	4.5
Abductions	1,762	24.2
Intimidation and threats	2,080	28.6
Assassinations of civilians	4,550	62.5
Attacks on DSFs	6,689	91.9

**Table E2a: Distribution of respondents by type of terrorist activity known to them, by district of residence**

Terrorist activity known to respondent	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Attacks on DSFs	93.8	99.4	91.1	88.3	97.5	87.8
Assassinations of civilians	60.0	74.9	64.8	30.1	40.8	73.9
Abductions	35.1	9.3	20.6	15.2	34.8	26.9
Intimidation and threats	54.8	44.7	14.0	39.2	14.7	27.3
Does not know any	2.6	0.3	6.9	11.2	2.3	3.8

Table E3a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why some join terrorist groups

Reason	Absolute	Percentage
Others	253	3.5
Ethnic or family motivations	1,045	14.4
Does not know	1,056	14.5
Adherence to ideology	1,931	26.5
Anger and frustration	2,133	29.3
Opposition to the authorities	2,297	31.6
Poverty	2,979	40.9
Lack of occupation	3,475	47.8

Table E3b: Other reasons why some join terrorist groups, according to respondents

Reason	Absolute	Percentage
Drug addiction or alcoholism	133	1.83
Religious extremism	103	1.42
Proliferation of firearms	17	0.22
<b>Total</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table E3c: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why some people join terrorist groups, by age group

Reason	Age group				Total
	18–25	26–40	41–60	61–80	
Poverty	40.0	41.0	41.8	37.7	40.9
Lack of occupation	50.1	48.1	47.2	44.6	47.8
Adherence to ideology	17.5	26.4	30.2	24.1	26.5
Ethnic or family motivations	7.0	13.6	18.1	12.5	14.4
Opposition to the authorities	26.0	32.7	33.2	25.7	31.6
Anger and frustration	23.3	30.4	31.3	23.0	29.3
Does not know	17.6	13.7	13.4	20.0	14.5
Other reasons	2.9	3.7	3.5	3.2	3.5

Table E3c.1: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why some people join terrorist groups, by district of residence

Reason	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Poverty	53.5	70.8	39.0	11.9	23.2	41.0
Lack of occupation	61.3	74.3	36.4	32.5	41.5	48.1
Adherence to ideology	22.2	36.7	39.9	2.6	21.4	21.7
Ethnic or family motivations	24.0	25.5	26.3	0.5	2.4	5.3
Opposition to the authorities	28.2	41.5	28.9	50.9	28.6	27.4
Anger and frustration	36.9	41.4	37.8	0.7	21.5	25.5
Does not know	3.6	1.4	13.6	42.8	27.8	11.8
Other reasons	4.3	2.0	0.3	0.0	7.2	5.8

Table E4a: Percentage of respondents who believe their community is exposed to terrorist threats

Respondent's belief	Absolute	Percentage
Community is safe from terrorist threats	2,635	36.2
Community is exposed to terrorist threats	4,640	63.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table E4b: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why their community is safe from terrorism

Opinion on why the community is safe from terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
Personal belief due to the community's socioeconomic/geographic situation	186	7.0
Security measures taken by the authorities (i.e. presence of DSFs)	835	31.6
Community mobilization/vigilance	146	5.5
Divine protection/Collective involvement	1,049	39.7
Peaceful area never affected by the phenomenon	429	16.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,645</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table E4b.1: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why their community is safe from terrorism, by district of residence

Opinion on why the community is safe from terrorism	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Personal belief due to the community's socioeconomic/geographic situation	22.2	27.2	2.2	0.0	0.8	5.4
Security measures taken by the authorities (presence of DSFs)	44.4	59.7	42.6	0.4	35.7	18.7
Community mobilization/vigilance	16.7	0.4	3.5	0.4	3.0	21.4
Divine protection/Collective involvement	3.7	6.2	24.5	99.3	47.8	17.3
Peaceful area never affected by the phenomenon	13.0	6.5	27.2	0.0	12.7	37.2

Table E4c: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why their community is exposed to terrorism

Opinion why the community is exposed to terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
Residual banditry or imminent terrorist threats/attacks, or a history thereof	1,252	27.0
Personal belief due to the prevailing situation	2,151	46.5
Low community engagement/involvement/mobilization	18	0.4
Lack of occupation, poverty and attraction to fundamentalism	60	1.3
Poor management of the security of the premises by the authorities	332	7.2
Porosity and insufficient border security	685	14.8
Very vulnerable area/Area not secured by authorities	132	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,630</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table E4c.1: Distribution of respondents by opinion on why their community is exposed to terrorism, by district of residence**

Reason why the community is exposed to terrorism	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Residual banditry or imminent terrorist threats/attacks, or a history thereof	10.1	9.5	11.3	0.0	43.5	44.0
Personal belief due to the prevailing situation	28.2	63.4	74.6	54.5	42.4	32.7
Low community engagement/ involvement/mobilization	0.1	0.5	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.5
Lack of occupation, poverty and attraction to fundamentalism	0.7	7.6	0.9	0.0	0.5	0.5
Poor management of the security of the premises by the authorities	25.9	9.5	2.6	0.0	6.0	2.5
Porosity and insufficient border security	27.8	7.4	7.7	45.5	6.9	17.6
Very vulnerable area/Area not secured by authorities	7.2	2.1	2.5	0.0	0.5	2.2

**Table 5: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the source of terrorism**

Source	Absolute	Percentage
From within the Niger	109	1.5
From outside of the Niger	2,333	32.1
From both within and outside of the Niger	3,714	51.1
Does not know	1,119	15.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table E6: Distribution of respondents by perception of the threat of terrorism**

Perception of the threat of terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
Reducing	1,410	19.4
Stable	3,346	46.0
Increasing	2,519	34.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table E6a: Distribution of respondents by perception of the threat of terrorism, by district of residence**

Perception of the threat of terrorism	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Reducing	5.4	24.1	24.1	0.2	29.2	19.9
Stable	37.6	68.4	54.5	59.6	35.2	34.5
Increasing	57.0	7.5	21.5	40.2	35.6	45.5



**Table E7: Distribution of respondents by their recommended action to prevent terrorist threats**

Recommended community action	Absolute	Percentage
Does not know (no recommendation given)	42	0.6
Nothing (i.e. no action can prevent terrorist threats)	94	1.3
Support community prevention committees	120	1.6
Religious invocation	122	1.7
Implement a collaborative DSF–community framework	165	2.3
Establish community prevention committees where there are none	3,116	42.8
Raise awareness among young people	4,389	60.3
Offer economic activities for young people	4,774	65.6
Involve community leaders (village chiefs, imams, etc.)	4,888	67.2

**Table E7a: Distribution of respondents by their recommended action to prevent terrorist threats, by district of residence**

Recommended community action	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Oualla	Tera	Torodi
Raise awareness among young people	48.1	54.9	57.3	54.6	94.3	57.2
Offer economic activities for young people	62.9	90.8	64.5	66.5	68.7	56.4
Involve community leaders (village chiefs, imams, etc.)	63.2	57.5	61.0	92.7	75.7	67.4
Establish community prevention committees	27.2	61.0	24.9	20.6	54.1	57.1
Nothing (i.e. no action can prevent terrorist threats)	5.2	0.9	0.8	0.3	0.3	1.1
Other actions	2.9	2.1	4.3	0.5	9.6	10.5

**Table E8: Distribution of respondents by type of support they believe communities can provide authorities to fight terrorism**

Type of support against terrorism	Absolute	Percentage
None	88	1.2
Others	188	2.6
Defending itself with weapons	769	10.6
Alert the authorities in case of problems	7,053	96.9

**Table E8a: Distribution of respondents by type of support they believe communities can provide authorities to fight terrorism, by district of residence**

Type of support against terrorism	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Alert the authorities in case of problems	99.5	99.8	98.8	98.3	99.7	92.0
Self-defence with weapons	1.4	9.3	20.3	0.3	1.5	12.9
None	0.2	0.1	0.6	1.2	0.2	2.9
Others	0.8	0.7	0.4	0.5	2.5	6.2

## 5. Efficiency of border management

**Table F1: Distribution of respondents by their understanding of “ensuring border security”**

Understanding of “ensuring border security”	Absolute	Percentage
Ensure the presence of border DSFs	1,445	19.9
Ensure the security/protection of people and goods at the border	419	5.8
Control and ensure the free movement/migration of people and goods	2,788	38.3
Have a framework for consultation/sharing and community action on security	391	5.4
Materialize the geographic boundaries of countries and better control them	944	13.0
No opinion	156	2.1
Ensure the protection and well-being of the country's communities	1,132	15.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table F1a: Distribution of respondents by their understanding of “ensuring border security”, by district of residence**

Understanding of “ensuring border security”	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilaré	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Ensure the presence of border DSFs	42.9	0.8	3.0	0.5	29.1	33.5
Ensure the security/protection of people and goods at the border	0.4	2.2	14.4	0.7	3.0	4.6
Control and ensure the free movement/migration of people and goods	40.5	38.9	33.9	90.5	29.2	31.2
Have a framework for consultation/sharing and community action on security	1.3	2.6	7.6	1.2	9.2	5.7
Materialize the geographic boundaries of countries and better control them	7.9	10.2	17.5	2.1	10.4	16.1
No opinion	1.8	0.1	1.5	0.0	3.2	3.7
Ensure the protection and well-being of the country's communities	5.2	45.2	22.1	5.0	16.0	5.3

**Table F2: Respondents who have observed patrols along the border**

Patrols along the border	Absolute	Percentage
Yes (have observed them)	4,240	58.3
No (have not observed them)	3,035	41.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F2a: Respondents who have observed patrols along the border, by district of residence

District of residence	No		Yes		District total	
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage
Ayorou	84	10.1	750	89.9	834	100.0
Banibangou	136	15.6	734	84.4	870	100.0
Bankilare	947	52.1	870	47.9	1,817	100.0
Ouallam	570	98.4	9	1.6	579	100.0
Tera	332	36.6	575	63.4	907	100.0
Torodi	966	42.6	1,302	57.4	2,268	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,035</b>	<b>41.7</b>	<b>4,240</b>	<b>58.3</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F3: Respondents who have observed patrols at the local level

Patrols in the village	Absolute	Percentage
Yes	6,217	85.5
No	1,058	14.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F3a: Respondents who have observed patrols at the local level, by district of residence

District of residence	No patrols		With patrols		District total	
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage
Ayorou	38	4.6	796	95.4	834	100.0
Banibangou	61	7.0	809	93.0	870	100.0
Bankilare	110	6.1	1,707	93.9	1,817	100.0
Oualla	81	14.0	498	86.0	579	100.0
Tera	101	11.1	806	88.9	907	100.0
Torodi	667	29.4	1,601	70.6	2,268	100.0
<b>Group total</b>	<b>1,058</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>6,217</b>	<b>85.5</b>	<b>7275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F4: Respondents' perception of security with versus without the patrols

Perception of security	No patrols		With patrols	
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage
Good	218	20.6	1,981	31.9
Average	396	37.4	2,409	38.7
Insufficient	401	37.9	1,626	26.2
No security at all	43	4.1	201	3.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,058</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>6,217</b>	<b>85.5</b>

Table F5: Local officials in charge of border security, according to respondents

Local official	Absolute	Percentage
Sultan	88	1.2
Governor	1,222	16.8
Customs officer	1,324	18.2
Group/Canton leader	2,097	28.8
Prefect	2,333	32.1
Police officer	2,801	38.5
The army	3,027	41.6
Mayor	3,315	45.6
Gendarmes	3,573	49.1
Village chief	4,846	66.6

Table F6: Distribution of respondents by opinion of border security authorities and services

Opinion of border security authorities and services	Absolute	Percentage
Very satisfactory	961	13.2
Satisfactory	2,705	37.2
Somewhat satisfactory	1,831	25.2
Not very satisfactory	1,385	19.0
Unsatisfactory	393	5.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F7: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the capacity of local authorities to provide border security without the support of local communities

Perceived capacity of the local authorities working alone	Absolute	Percentage
No (They cannot do it by themselves.)	6,648	91.4
Yes (They can do it by themselves.)	627	8.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F8: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and authorities in charge of border security

Quality of relationship between the community and border security officers	Absolute	Percentage
Very good	1,262	17.3
Good	4,770	65.6
Neutral	880	12.1
Poor	356	4.9
Does not know	7	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F8a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and authorities in charge of border security, by district of residence

Quality of the relationship between the community and border security officers	Very good	Good	Neutral	Poor	Does not know
Ayorou	2.9	87.9	7.2	2.0	0.0
Banibangou	24.8	46.0	16.0	13.2	0.0
Bankilare	34.7	55.4	9.4	0.4	0.1
Ouallam	0.2	97.2	0.0	2.4	0.2
Tera	37.3	53.4	9.0	0.2	0.1
Torodi	2.3	69.8	18.9	8.8	0.2

Table F9: Distribution of respondents by knowledge about the occurrence of disagreement between local communities and authorities in charge of border security

Occurrence of a dispute with security officials	Absolute	Percentage
Yes	1,249	17.2
No	6,026	82.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F10: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between the community and border security authorities

Frequency of disputes between community and authorities	Absolute	Percentage
Very often	197	15.8
Not very often	258	20.7
Rarely	794	63.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1249</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F10a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between communities and border security authorities, by district of residence

Frequency of disputes between communities and authorities	Very often	Not very often	Rarely
Ayorou	19.2	1.9	78.8
Banibangou	18.9	36.4	44.7
Bankilare	10.5	9.6	79.9
Ouallam	5.0	32.9	62.1
Tera	51.1	8.9	40.0
Torodi	16.1	16.9	67.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.8</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>63.6</b>

**Table F11: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the reasons that lead to disputes between the communities and border security authorities**

Reasons for disputes with border security authorities	Absolute	Percentage
Fines	675	54.0
Slower crossing at the border	137	11.0
Prohibition from crossing	102	8.2
Arrests	112	9.0
Hassle	210	16.8
Lack of cooperation/collaboration	9	0.1
Does not know	4	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,249</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table F12a: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the organization by authorities of meetings with communities to discuss border security**

Knowledge of meetings on border security	Absolute	Percentage
No	4,444	61.1
Yes	2,831	38.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table F12a.1: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the organization of meetings by authorities with communities to discuss border security, by district of residence**

District of residence	No		Yes	
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage
Ayorou	369	44.2	465	55.8
Banibangou	150	17.2	720	82.8
Bankilare	1,226	67.5	591	32.5
Oualla	377	65.1	202	34.9
Tera	483	53.3	424	46.7
Torodi	1,839	81.1	429	18.9

**Table F12b: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the type of meeting organized by the authorities, by district of residence**

Type of meeting organized by the authorities	Absolute	Percentage
Capacity-building	1,539	54.4
Training	1,086	38.4
Awareness-raising	2,636	93.1
Implementation of prevention committees	713	25.2
Does not know	22	0.8

**Table F12b: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the organization of meetings by the authorities with communities to discuss border security, by district of residence**

Type of meeting organized by the authorities	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Capacity-building	25.6	92.8	34.9	28.2	75.0	39.9
Training	17.8	50.6	56.0	74.3	6.6	30.3
Awareness-raising	97.2	94.0	97.1	97.0	90.3	82.5
Establishment of community of prevention committees	21.1	26.7	3.7	44.1	21.9	51.0

**Table F13: Distribution of respondents by opinion of the authorities' involvement with their community on border security**

Opinion of the involvement of the authorities	Absolute	Percentage
Very satisfactory	770	10.6
Satisfactory	3,808	52.3
Poor	2,333	32.1
Fairly poor	364	5.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table F13a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the authorities' involvement with their community in border security, by district of residence**

Opinion of the authorities' involvement	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Very satisfactory	1.4	4.9	21.6	0.2	28.8	2.7
Satisfactory	68.9	53.2	60.4	52.0	65.6	34.2
Poor	23.1	36.4	16.3	47.2	5.6	53.0
Fairly poor	6.5	5.4	1.7	0.7	0.0	10.1

**Table F14: Distribution of respondents by suggestion on factors to be improved for good relations between communities and authorities**

Factor to be improved for good relations	Absolute	Percentage
Rehabilitation and vocational training activities for young people	138	1.9
Awareness-raising and advocacy activities (caravans/roadshows, forums, social inclusion programmes, etc.)	2,155	29.6
Framework for consultation/cohesion between authorities and communities	2,801	38.5
Control/monitoring and intervention capacities in the event of a request	484	6.7
Operational capacities of the community prevention committees	1,119	15.4
No opinion	177	2.4
Support and communication strategy for community participation	401	5.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table F14a: Distribution of respondents by suggestion on factors to be improved for good relations between communities and authorities, by district of residence

Factor to be improved for good relations	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Rehabilitation and vocational training activities for young people	2.2	3.9	3.2	1.0	0.8	0.7
Awareness-raising and advocacy activities (caravans/roadshows, forums, social inclusion programmes, etc.)	19.1	37.9	28.8	78.2	21.8	21.6
Framework for consultation/cohesion between authorities and communities	33.1	12.1	41.8	15.9	42.7	52.1
Control/monitoring and intervention capacities in the event of a request	31.3	1.4	4.6	0.0	11.0	1.2
Operational capacities of the community prevention committees	11.3	37.5	6.5	4.7	19.4	16.6
No opinion	2.2	0.2	2.4	0.0	1.8	4.3
Support and communication strategy for community participation	1.0	7.0	12.7	0.2	2.5	3.4

#### 6. Communication between authorities and communities on border security

Table H1a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary for border security communication between local communities and authorities

Existence of an intermediary person	Absolute	Percentage
Yes (There is an intermediary.)	6,271	86.2
No (There is no intermediary.)	1,004	13.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Table H1b: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the intermediaries for border security communication between local communities and authorities

Respondents' knowledge of who the intermediaries are	Absolute	Percentage
Community action staff	36	0.6
Group/tribal leaders	233	3.7
Village chiefs or their representatives	4,722	75.3
Vigilance/prevention committee	168	2.7
Elected local officials	294	4.7
Religious leaders (imams/marabouts)	133	2.1
Resource persons/delegates	685	10.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>6,271</b>	<b>100.0</b>



**Table H1b.1: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the intermediaries for border security communication between local communities and authorities, by district of residence**

Respondents' knowledge of who the intermediaries are	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Community action staff	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	2.0
Group/tribal leaders	0.0	0.0	14.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Village chiefs or their representatives	66.7	80.1	76.9	98.2	67.6	71.1
Vigilance/prevention committee	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.7
Elected local officials	0.4	3.7	5.5	0.7	0.5	9.3
Religious leaders (imams/ <i>marabouts</i> )	0.0	13.4	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.1
Resource persons/delegates	32.9	2.9	2.1	1.1	31.8	7.8

**Table H2: Distribution of respondents by means of communication used by the local population to contact the intermediaries**

Means of communication used	Absolute	Percentage
Mobile satellite service	14	0.2
Town crier/Local public broadcast	49	0.8
Radio	185	3.0
Village assembly	1,295	20.7
Face-to-face meeting	2,996	47.8
Telephone	5,288	84.3

**Table H2a: Distribution of respondents by means of communication used by the local population to contact intermediaries, by district of residence**

Means of communication used	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Telephone	99.1	96.5	83.3	98.4	95.8	63.4
Mobile satellite service	0.9	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2
Radio	0.6	2.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	9.1
Face-to-face meeting	8.5	53.6	42.4	34.3	66.6	0.1
Village assembly	13.4	25.1	7.8	32.3	23.7	28.5
Town crier/Local public broadcast	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.1	2.7

**Table H3: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measure to enable effective communication for border security between communities and authorities**

Alert mechanisms in case of problems	Absolute	Percentage
Does not know	26	0.4
Regular visits by the authorities to the village	2,433	33.4
Local information committees	3,707	51.0
Consultation framework between authorities and communities	4,021	55.3
Telephone exchanges	6,155	84.6

**Table H3a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measure to enable effective communication between communities and authorities for border security, by district of residence**

Alert mechanism in case of problem	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Consultation framework between authorities and communities	43.0	39.7	52.9	81.9	91.3	46.5
Telephone exchanges	81.7	95.9	82.9	94.0	92.5	77.2
Local information committee	31.9	46.3	34.3	53.9	72.9	63.5
Regular visits by the authorities to the village	47.6	28.3	28.2	40.6	49.5	26.2
Does not know	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.0

**Table H4: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most effective means of communication for border security**

Means of communication	Absolute	Percentage
Town crier/Local public broadcast	39	0.5
Does not know	18	0.2
SMS	170	2.3
Radio or television	744	10.2
Village assembly	2,788	38.3
Mobile satellite service	342	4.7
Face-to-face meeting	3,032	41.7
Telephone	6,549	90.0

**Table H4a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most effective means of communication for border security, by district of residence**

Means of communication	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Telephone	82.5	95.6	86.0	98.6	97.5	88.7
Mobile satellite service	4.3	29.8	0.5	0.2	0.1	1.6
SMS	0.6	6.9	0.3	0.0	0.0	4.4
Radio or television	14.4	4.0	5.0	0.2	2.1	21.1
Face-to-face meeting	18.9	36.3	40.2	38.9	66.4	44.1
Village assembly	50.7	28.2	29.8	58.0	53.6	33.3
Town crier/Local public broadcast	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
Does not know	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.7

**Table H5: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the positive effects of good communication between communities and authorities**

Perceived positive effect of good communication	Absolute	Percentage
Immediate reaction by the authorities	5,423	74.5
Security problem understood in time	5,247	72.1
Reduced impact of border insecurity on local populations	4,648	63.9
Information shared on time	17	0.2
Does not know	55	0.8

**Table H6: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the negative effects of poor communication between communities and authorities**

Perceived risk resulting from poor communication	Absolute	Percentage
Fast and widespread insecurity	5,980	82.2
Severity of the consequences for local communities	4,356	59.9
Late action by the authorities	4,559	62.7
Loss of community confidence in the authorities	3,524	48.4
Does not know	55	0.8

## 7. Response to an emergency

**Table I1: Distribution of respondents by their perceived cause of massive population movements along the border**

Perceived cause of massive population displacements	Absolute	Percentage
Armed conflict	5,356	73.6
Occasional terrorist attacks	4,730	65.0
Migration	1,529	21.0
Natural disasters (floods, drought, etc.)	4,574	62.9
Epidemics	1,414	19.4
Does not know	16	0.2

**Table I1a: Distribution of respondents by their perceived cause of massive population movements along the border, by district of residence**

Perceived cause of massive population displacements	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Armed conflict	95.2	89.1	68.7	55.8	91.5	61.1
Occasional terrorist attacks	67.6	60.6	57.6	76.3	51.5	74.2
Migration	26.9	39.7	32.9	8.3	0.3	13.7
Epidemics	31.3	15.1	15.8	7.1	18.1	23.4
Natural disasters (floods, drought, etc.)	54.7	92.3	45.8	58.2	57.8	71.5
Does not know	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.5

**Table I2: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the capacity of communities to manage the arrival and movement of a very large number of people**

Opinion on the capacity of communities	Absolute	Percentage
Yes (The community has the capacity.)	1,312	18.0
No (The community does not have the capacity.)	5,963	82.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table I2a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the capacity of communities to manage the arrival and movement of a very large number of people, by district of residence**

Opinion on the capacity of communities	Yes		No	
	Absolute	Percentage	Absolute	Percentage
Ayerou	79	9.5	755	90.5
Banibangou	642	73.8	228	26.2
Bankilare	145	8.0	1,672	92.0
Ouallam,	48	8.3	531	91.7
Tera	249	27.5	658	72.5
Torodi	149	6.6	2,119	93.4

**Table I3: Distribution of respondents by reason why their communities are ready/unready to manage an emergency**

Reason	Absolute	Percentage
Already terrified, misinformed and disorganized population	28	2.1
Well-prepared and organized community	657	50.1
Awareness-raising by local authorities	589	44.9
Crisis already experienced, with an overall negative reaction of the population	55	4.2
Crisis already experienced, with an overall positive reaction of the population	859	65.5
Panic and escape as soon as they feel threatened	45	3.4
Does not know	49	0.7

*Note:* This question was only asked to those who answered YES to the previous one (question I.3 in the questionnaire).

**Table I4: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the role that authorities should play in an emergency**

Role of authorities during an emergency	Absolute	Percentage
Relocate displaced people	1,957	26.9
Rescue the sick and wounded	3,100	42.6
Secure the reception area for the displaced	3,580	49.2
Immediate care for displaced persons	3,947	54.3
Provide emergency equipment	4,041	55.5
Welcome the displaced population	5,548	76.3

**Table I5: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the role that communities must play during an emergency**

Role of communities during an emergency	Absolute	Percentage
Inform local authorities promptly	6,058	83.3
Welcome the displaced population	5,339	73.4
Coordinate with the local authorities to facilitate the care of displaced persons	3,147	43.3
Respect and follow measures taken by the authorities present	1,918	26.4
Remain vigilant	2,940	40.4

**Table I6: Distribution of respondents by opinion on measures that communities and authorities must collaborate on**

Measures that communities and authorities must collaborate on	Absolute	Percentage
Establish community alert and response units	1,114	15.3
Develop community prevention strategies (brainstorming)	123	1.7
Inform and train and support communities on emergencies	1,754	24.1
Establish a framework for consultation/collaboration and joint action	4,027	55.4
No opinion	257	3.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,275</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table I7: Distribution of respondents by opinion on measures that communities and authorities must collaborate on, by district of residence**

Measures that communities and authorities must collaborate on	Ayorou	Banibangou	Bankilare	Ouallam	Tera	Torodi
Establish community alert and response units	12.2	46.6	11.3	30.9	9.8	5.9
Develop community prevention strategies (brainstorming)	0.5	1.6	4.4	0.0	1.1	0.7
Inform and train and support communities during an emergency	10.2	10.2	34.5	63.7	30.7	13.5
Establish a framework for consultation/collaboration and joint action	68.7	41.6	44.6	5.4	58.3	75.9
No opinion	8.4	0.0	5.2	0.0	0.1	4.1

**Table I8: Distribution of respondents by opinion on what pre-emptive action would enable better emergency management**

Pre-emptive action for better emergency management	Absolute	Percentage
Strengthen the capacity of the local community to transmit information to the authorities	6,237	85.7
Enable, promote and encourage the local population to play the role of a vigilance committee	5,552	76.3
Does not know	83	1.1

**Table I9: Distribution of respondents by their reaction to massive population displacement (Ayorou/Ouallam)**

Individual reaction to massive population displacement	Absolute	Percentage
Did not do anything at all	107	7.6
Immediately fled following the panic	268	19.0
Sought to help the authorities	449	31.8
Remained on site while being vigilant	1,035	73.2

**Table I10: Distribution of respondents by their community's response to massive population displacement (Ayorou/Ouallam)**

Community reaction to massive population displacement	Absolute	Percentage
Did not do anything at all	104	7.4
Immediately fled following the panic	235	16.6
Sought to help the authorities	574	40.6
Remained on site while being vigilant	1,068	75.6

**Table I11: Distribution of respondents by the reaction of their community leaders at the time of the crisis (Ayorou/Ouallam)**

Recommendations from community leaders at the time of the crisis	Absolute	Percentage
Immediately fled due to panic	42	3.0
Remained on site while being vigilant	86	6.1
Sought to help the authorities	985	69.7
Did not do anything at all	1,020	72.2

**Table I12: Distribution of respondents by the immediate disposition of their community leaders (Ayorou/Ouallam)**

Immediate action by the stakeholders	Absolute	Percentage
Welcome and assist displaced persons	564	39.9
No action taken	65	4.6
Declare state of emergency/Ensure border security	76	5.4
Relocate displaced persons	227	16.1
Strengthen the control of the movement of people/goods	147	10.4
Assist the sick and wounded	69	4.9
Secure the reception area for the displaced	265	18.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,413</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table I13: Distribution of respondents by information status of the local population prior to the emergency (Ayorou/Ouallam)**

Information status	Absolute	Percentage
Yes (Population was informed.)	401	28.4
No (Population was not informed.)	1,012	71.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,413</b>	<b>100.0</b>







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