THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA

Assessment of Border Crossing Points in the Volta and Western Regions and Training Capacity of Ghana Immigration Service
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The assessment team would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, the assistance and cooperation provided by the Government of Ghana and its officials in conducting this assessment. Without their patience and willingness to participate and contribute, this report would not have been possible.
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCP</td>
<td>Border Crossing Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMIS</td>
<td>Border Management Information System</td>
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<td>BNI</td>
<td>Bureau of National Investigation</td>
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<td>BPU</td>
<td>Border Patrol Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCE</td>
<td>District Chief Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIMMA</td>
<td>Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach</td>
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<td>GIS</td>
<td>Ghana Immigration Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Kotoka International Airport</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISATS</td>
<td>Immigration Service Academy and Training School</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Officer-in-charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISCES</td>
<td>Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public relations officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>TLO</td>
<td>Training liaison officer</td>
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A MAP OF GHANA
SHOWING IMMIGRATION BORDER CONTROLS

Source: Ghana Immigration Service (www.ghanaimmigration.org/).
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While the country enjoys relatively high economic growth, the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), in common with many government agencies, does not get the level of resources that it ideally requires to fully meet its objectives in all areas of border management, both in terms of staff and equipment. Common to all the border crossing points (BCPs) assessed were poorly maintained and inadequate infrastructure, unreliable communications, lack of serviceable transport, lack of basic amenities, such as electricity and water, as well as limited access to management information. This said, Immigration staff work to the best of their ability within the constraints of the financial resources allocated to them and take pride in serving their country. It was not uncommon to find instances of staff purchasing better quality equipment from their own pockets and using their own vehicles on duty. Throughout the assessment, members of GIS were professional, helpful and dedicated to meeting their responsibilities in a very challenging environment.

Training

Training was an area in which there were gaps. A common theme was the lack of training opportunities after the basic recruit course, with the only prescribed course being pre-promotion. Skills specific training was also cited and requests included human trafficking and smuggling, commodity smuggling, transnational crime, interpersonal communication skills and dealing with refugees. There is an ongoing curriculum review on basic training and that of management courses are planned for the future. The new course will eventually address the subjects identified above and more, but there is still much to be done before it is operational. Other issues include unstructured operational training, no regional training facilities and absence of central training records for individual officers.

Operations

Land borders are porous and cut across community catchment areas. Local residents often have family and business interests on both sides, and it is not practical to completely secure them. Traffic is primarily local border residents who are easily recognized by officers and pass freely through official and unapproved crossing points. Nationals from the Economic Community of West African States form the next largest travelling group, and although they are required to have identity documentation, many do not. BCPs operate a light touch control and concentrate on travellers who do not fit local profiles. Foreigners access the other minor entry/exit points but in much lower numbers than at the major BCPs of Aflao, Paga and Elubo. There is no formal Warning Index, although lists of names are sent periodically from GIS headquarters. The remit of GIS extends beyond migration control to responsibility for maintenance of security and a significant role in customs control of commodity smuggling, which forms the bulk of their work. It is apparent that there was a disparity in resources between them and customs, despite having assumed a significant role in customs enforcement. Irregular migration is not perceived to be a major problem.

Information technology and data management

There is a lack of computer technology in the regions assessed and all but the largest BCPs do not have computers. What is available at regional and sector commands and larger BCPs is used principally for word processing, as the GIS e-mail network is very limited, and as there is no money to pay for broadband, there is no access to the internet. The border management information system is the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System, which is only installed at the four largest major entry/exit points of Kotoka International Airport and the land BCPs of Aflao, Elubo and Paga. The national registration system for Ghanaian citizens is computerized, as is the passport office, but the visa system is not. None of the computer systems are linked. Reporting of statistics and border activity is in hard copy and intelligence assessments are rarely seen at land borders.
CHAPTER 1

ENVIRONMENT AND ASSESSMENT BACKGROUND

1.1. The Republic of Ghana – Geographic and economic background

The Republic of Ghana is situated in West Africa and shares land borders with Côte d’Ivoire in the west, Burkina Faso in the north and Togo in the east, spanning distances of 668 km, 549 km and 887 km respectively, with a coastline of 539 km opening on to the Gulf of Guinea and Atlantic Ocean in the south. The country has a total land mass of 238,535 km$^2$ and a population estimated at 26,327,649 (2015).\(^1\) The climate is tropical and can be divided into three zones: (a) warm and comparatively dry along the south-east coast; (b) hot and humid in the south-west; and (c) hot and dry in the north. Grasslands mixed with shrublands and forests dominate the country, with forests extending northward from the south-west coast and mostly low plains with dissected plateau in the south-central and eastern areas.

Ghana is divided into 10 administrative regions:

- Upper West
- Upper East
- Northern
- Brong-Ahafo
- Volta
- Eastern
- Ashanti
- Central
- Western
- Greater Accra

The two largest cities are Kumasi and Accra, with an estimated population of 2,599,000 and 2,277,000 respectively.\(^2\)

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\(^{2}\) Ibid.
Ghana has an abundance of natural resources, among them oil, gold, timber, industrial diamonds, bauxite, manganese, rubber, hydropower, silver, salt and limestone. Agriculture accounts for roughly one quarter of the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs more than half of the workforce, mainly small landholders. Gold and cocoa production and individual remittances are major sources of foreign exchange. Oil production at Ghana’s offshore Jubilee field began in mid-December 2010, and is producing close to target levels. Additional oil projects are being developed and expected to come on line in a few years. Estimated oil reserves have jumped to almost 700 million barrels, the fifth largest in Africa. The GDP grew by 7.9 per cent in 2013, which ranked thirteenth in comparison with the rest of the world and per capita GDP the same year was USD 3,500, up from USD 3,200 in 2011. It is also one of the world’s largest gold and cocoa producers.

1.2. Assessment objectives and rationale
This assessment has been conducted as part of the joint International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) project “Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach (GIMMA)”. It was made possible by generous funding from the European Union and the cooperation and partnership of the Government of Ghana. The overall objective of the proposed action is to contribute to the Government of Ghana’s efforts to manage migration effectively through the establishment of an integrated migration management approach.

The project includes a wide variety of activities to enhance the operational capacities of GIS, including:

- Developing a legal reference handbook;
- Capacity-building support to the Immigration Service Training School and select border posts;
- Rehabilitating and upgrading of Migration Information Bureau in Accra and Migration Consultation Centre in Sunyani;
- Conducting an information campaign on safe migration;
- Developing a national migration data management framework; and
- Updating the 2009 IOM Migration Profile for Ghana.

This assessment is conducted within component one of the project to enhance the operational and training capacities of GIS, which seeks to provide equipment to two border posts in Nyive/Akanu Sector of the Volta Region (Eastern border frontier) and three border posts in the Dadieso sector of the Western Region. Based on the identified needs, the project also plans to provide trainings to officers at these borders. In addition, the project will provide 70 computers to the information and communication technology laboratory of the Immigration Service Academy and Training School (ISATS) in the Central Region. Furthermore, it will support the finalization of GIS Training Curriculum and Syllabus, which have been drafted by previous European Union-funded project, pending final reviews, validations and sensitization to the regional commands. Specific objectives of the assessment are as follows:

- Identify the existing practices, needs and priorities of border posts;
- Identify training gaps for border patrol officers and recommend a training plan;
- Identify the infrastructure and logistical gaps and needs at five border posts and recommend items and types of trainings to be provided;
- Review the draft Training Curriculum and Syllabus and provide technical input to the finalization process in relation to Border Patrol Unit (BPU); and
- Identify areas and needs for future project development.

The data for the assessment was gathered principally from interviews and meetings with staff involved in the immigration structure at operational and policy level, observation at border crossing points (BCPs) and open source reporting.
The in-country review took place between 14 and 28 April 2015. The original assessment programme was to review the BCPs at Agotime Afegame and Hodzokope in the Volta Region and Dadieso, Yaakese and Sewum in the Western Region. However, while in the field, the assessment team took the opportunity to broaden the scope of activity to give a wider perspective of conditions, capacity and inhibitors relating to migration management in the regions visited. Assessments in varying degrees of detail were conducted in the Volta Region at the following:

- Volta Regional Command Headquarters;
- Agotime Afegame BCP;
- Nyive Sector Command and BCP;
- Atikpui unapproved BCP;
- Shia BCP;
- Hodzokope BCP;
- Kpoglo BCP; and
- Aflao Sector Command and BCP.

In the Western Region, the team visited the following:

- Dadieso Sector Command;
- Antokrom BCP;
- Kwabena Narty and Gyato Inland Checkpoints;
- Oscar and Kyenseekokoo Unapproved BCPs;
- Enchi District office;
- Sewum BCP;
- Yaakese BCP; and
- Elubo Sector Command.

Additionally, interviews were conducted at the Management Information System Unit at GIS headquarters in Accra and ISATS in Assin Fosu. Throughout the assessment period, the team were given free access to locations and staff. Officers at all levels spoke with refreshing candor and were straightforward in highlighting equipment, financial and human resource constraints. The only areas where it was deemed that security considerations precluded full transparency were statistical reporting on human trafficking, weapon smuggling and drug smuggling, although an undertaking was given to seek higher authority for release of the figures.

1.3. Immigration and control priorities

In 2005, the GIS was tasked with preparing and implementing a new border management policy with focus on border patrols and policing of the country’s borders, which had formerly been the responsibility of a disbanded Border Guard under the Ghana Army. This led to the formation of the BPU of GIS, which was officially inaugurated on 1 November 2006 and has primacy in patrolling and securing the country’s borders. The GIS annual report gives an overview of the responsibilities of the service as a whole:3 “the statutory functions of the Service include but are not limited to the following:

- Examination of travellers entering or leaving Ghana;
- Issuing of visas (entry visas, transit visas and re-entry visas);
- Processing and issuing of work and residence permits for regulated terms, as well as indefinite stay and right-of-abode permits;

• Investigation and monitoring of the activities of foreign nationals in Ghana;
• General investigations into breaches of Immigration laws and regulations, and prosecutions where appropriate;
• Enforcement of all existing immigration laws and regulations;
• Patrolling of the country’s frontiers to ensure border security and territorial integrity;
• Providing vital travel information to would-be emigrants, as well as promoting and educating the public on the legal ways of migrating;
• Processing of applications for Ghanaian passports, dual citizenship, naturalization and registration; and
• Collaborating with the [Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] UNHCR and Ghana Refugee Board to manage the movement and stay of refugees and asylum-seekers in Ghana and also combat human trafficking/smuggling."

The specific BPU mandate was stressed at a commanders’ conference on 12 and 13 June 2014 as:

“As per the cabinet decision, the GIS was mandated to perform the following general functions, which includes but not limited to the prevention, deterring and interception of:

• Illegal Migrants
• Drug Trafficking
• Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling
• Animal, Cash Crop and Fuel Smuggling

The Unit is further tasked to physically patrol all the borders of the country and report on all forms of suspected, subversive activities to the appropriate security agency (ies), it also coordinates with other security agencies to ensure border security and prevent territorial violation.

• The Unit is enjoined to be in the state of preparedness to act to contain external aggression prior to the deployment of troops from the Ghana Armed Forces.”

This policy statement makes it clear that the remit of GIS at borders extends beyond the generally accepted role of immigration authorities for the management of migration, into territory normally occupied by police, customs and the State Security apparatus. The resource and other implications of this were to become apparent as the border assessments progressed.

On the question of migration priorities, the relatively recent discovery of oil and the positive impact it had on the economy changed the dynamics of migration in Ghana, which had hitherto been perceived as far more of a source country for migrants than a destination. However, over recent years, strong economic growth has attracted increasing flows of internal and international migration, both regular and irregular, and the GIS 2013 annual report records the issue of over 53,000 residence and work permits. In terms of enforcement, it reports the repatriation/deportation of 1,065 persons of all nationalities, including citizens of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was a 338 per cent increase over the 2012 figure. Although the figures do not specify the nature of all immigration offences, 884 Chinese nationals were recorded as being deported for illegal mining. In the context of patrolling green borders, the annual report reveals that only 8.25 per cent of travellers arriving in Ghana pass through land BCPs, all but 0.24 per cent at the major ports of Aflao, Elubo and Paga; 91.75 per cent are reported as having arrived at Kotoka International Airport (KIA).
The report acknowledges the existence of people trafficking and smuggling by referring to two examples relating to a border interception of 9 Ivorian girls at KIA and 11 Nigerian girls at an inland checkpoint, although conversations with senior officers later indicated that the problem was greater than the paucity of open-source reporting suggests. While examples of trafficking/smuggling interceptions are difficult to find, it is generally acknowledged in the public domain that internal trafficking, particularly of child labour, is of considerably greater significance than that occurring across borders.

1.4. Immigration Service structure

The structure of the GIS is laid out in its annual report for 2013.\(^4\) For ease of reference, a synopsis follows. The Service is described as a paramilitary organization and comes under the remit of the Ministry of the Interior. It is governed by a supervisory body called the Immigration Board, membership of which, in 2013, was seven persons with a connection to the immigration structure, including the Director of GIS, Director of Passports, Director of the Migration Unit at the Ministry of the Interior, a businessman, a retired army officer and a university lecturer.

Although a member of the Immigration Service Board and at the same time, responsible for the general administration of GIS, the Director sits below it in supervisory terms, with a team of three deputy directors responsible for the departments of Operations, Legal and Finance and Administration, collectively known as the GIS Directorate. The Directorate and selected Senior Officers drawn from Headquarters, Greater Accra and Tema Regions and KIA form the GIS Management Team. Administratively, there are 11 Regional Commands, 14 Sector Commands and 42 District Offices. The current total establishment level of GIS is 4,341 officers and lower ranks, ranging from assistant immigration control officer through immigration control officer, assistant inspector, inspector, senior inspector, assistant superintendent, deputy superintendent, assistant comptroller, deputy comptroller, assistant director and deputy director, to Director of the Immigration Service. As with much else in GIS, the grading system was reported as being under review, with proposals to introduce non-commissioned officer ranks of sergeant and sergeant-major.

1.5. Recruitment

Staff are recruited at two levels, designated as recruits for the lower ranks and officer cadets for the higher ranks. Entry qualifications are senior high school certificate or equivalent for recruits and a minimum of a second class lower degree for cadets. Recruitment is through open competition by examination and age limits for entry is currently 20 to 24 for recruits and up 30 years (may be extended to 35) for officer cadets. Recruits have the potential to rise through six ranks from different levels of immigration control officer to inspector and cadets enter as assistant superintendents, with the potential to achieve the top rank of Director of the Immigration Service. Bridging from the recruit to officer stream is complicated and necessitates passing a degree before attempting to do so, but the system was said to be under review.

1.6. Assessment framework and methodology

This assessment has been guided by the framework developed by IOM, which normally considers and reports on migration and border management operations in the context of four broad groupings:

- Administration
- Policy and legislative framework
- Operations
- Information technology management

\(^4\) The 2014 Annual Report is not yet available.
However, for the purpose of this assessment, an abridged framework has been used to reflect the fact that it is focused on the operational practices, needs and priorities of five specific BCPs and the GIS’s ISATS. Other strands of activity under the project include preparation of a legal handbook, which will involve review of policy and legislation, and development of a national migration data management framework. As a result, legislation has not been focused on and assessment of information technology (IT) has been confined to identifying border management information systems (BMIS) and databases that are of relevance to, or can be accessed by, GIS.

The assessment therefore concentrates most effort on the operational aspects of land BCPs and ISATS to meet the primary objective of conducting a comprehensive review of operations, facilities, equipment and operational constraints; thus, the four usual groupings are reduced to three:

**Administration:**
- Agency structure and responsibilities
- Recruitment and training
- Performance standards

**Operations:**
- Alert lists
- Identity management
- Information collection and reporting
- Access to designated BCPs
- Facilities and equipment
- Operational constraints

**Information technology management:**
- Overview of IT environment
- Border, visa and passport systems
- Registration systems reviews
CHAPTER 2

THE IMMIGRATION SERVICE ACADEMY AND TRAINING SCHOOL

2.1. The Immigration Service Academy and Training School

Access
The ISATS is located in the town of Assin Foso, approximately 120 km west of Accra on metalled roads, in the Central Region. It has a well-posted sign and is easily accessed from a turning off of the main road. It is the only purpose-built GIS training facility in Ghana.

Facilities
The ISATS was developed on the 42-acre site of a former road construction camp as the base for the GIS, to meet the needs of its status as a paramilitary organization and particularly develop a facility for military training that was previously provided by the army. This was primarily because GIS were required to pay the military for training, and the view was taken that it could be delivered more economically in-house. The site is a mixture of mainly single-story prefabricated structures and concrete buildings for classrooms, conference rooms, offices, dining facilities, a clinic, physical training and residential accommodation, with an on-site sports field. It is set on a low hill and dominated by a three-story residential block, which was built by GIS and is by far the largest building on the site. All the buildings appear well maintained, and it was evident that the residential block is relatively new and in good condition. The facility has all the basic services with a backup electricity supply and the conference room is air-conditioned.

Administrative blocks of ISATS. © IOM 2015
Operation
The ISATS has a total of approximately 100 staff, which includes cleaners, caterers, administrators, a nurse, drill and physical training instructors, a band, officers and trainers. It is split into two parts: the academy for officer cadets and the training school for recruits to the lower ranks. The Commandant is in overall command and has one deputy, referred to as a course commander. The Commandant doubles as course commander with oversight responsibility of the training school, but the training school is headed by a Commanding Officer. The capacity of the facility is 300 males and 120 females and although the maximum number for induction training is 97, an operational limit of 40 to 45 had been set.

All trainees are given military training, such as physical fitness and drill and weapons handling, and follow an academic programme that includes the following:

- Immigration law;
- Border management;
- Forgery and fraudulent documentation;
- Human trafficking and smuggling;
- Transnational crime;
- Intelligence gathering;
- Discipline;
- Report writing;
- Information technology; and
- Language instruction in French.

The structure and content of courses is currently under review, but was initially six months, which was subsequently lowered to three months due to lack of finance. The intention is to extend this to four months on site, two months on operational attachment and two months back for recruits. To accommodate the additional management training required for officer cadets, it is proposed that their course will be six months on site, four months operational attachment and two months back at the academy. Additionally, a wide-ranging review of the GIS training curriculum and syllabus was underway, based on syllabus review under a previous European Union-funded project, to revise the basic training course content and decide the range of additional training that ISATS is planning on delivering in the future.

The academic course content is delivered by the commandant and two course commanders, supplemented by experienced officers brought in from elsewhere within the service on an ad hoc basis to cover specialized subjects. This arrangement is also part of the ongoing review, and it is proposed to form a permanent, larger training team at the academy and the possibility of establishing regional training centres is being explored. No training for trainers has been provided, and there are no training courses for recruits or cadets, due to a moratorium on recruitment for lack of funds, although work continues on the curriculum review and preparation of training material. However, GIS had requested the recruitment of 750 officers to meet operational needs over the next couple of years and is awaiting confirmation from the Ministry of Finance.
There is currently no continuous performance appraisal system for trainees during the course or, indeed, annual appraisal of established officers. It was reported, however, that the latter is on the point of being introduced. Postings after training appeared to be based on the staffing needs in different areas, but there did not seem to be any defined criteria to decide who would go where. Postings were for a minimum of four years before redeployment was considered.

Operational constraints

Regrettably, it is all too common for organizations to regard training budgets as a source of funds when reacting to unanticipated and what is perceived to be more urgent expenditure elsewhere. This is generally because the benefits of training are not immediately apparent and take time to measure and quantify, thus, suspension of training appears to have no operational impact in the short term.

However, the long-term effects of a poor or non-existent training programme has major implications for the effectiveness of any organization, and heavy reliance on operational training as an alternative to consistent, structured, classroom-based teaching runs a serious risk of perpetuating bad practice and inhibiting change and innovation. Training should be an essential investment and budget administrators must be persuaded to accept it as such. Immigration organizations are naturally heavily dependent on human resources because there is a limit to what technology can do. Clearly, GIS has recognized this and through the syllabus and curriculum review, signalled its willingness to develop a comprehensive, professional and properly structured training programme to meet the needs of the service over at least the next three years. However, it remains to be seen whether the financial and human resources will be made available.

The overriding constraint on the academy and training school is obviously the absence of funding, highlighted not least by the moratorium on recruitment for the past year. While the review of curriculum, syllabus and operational aspects is underway, it is difficult to say what may emerge to constrain future progress, but priorities need to be set, among them:

- Establishment of a fully trained corps of trainers based at the facility;
- Regional training centres with trained trainers to conduct at least locally relevant operational training;
- A system of training liaison officers (TLOs) at sector level;
- An ongoing performance appraisal system for trainees;
- A mentoring system for operational training;
- Preparation of training modules for each subject that include comprehensive briefing notes to build into an instruction manual;
- A feedback system for officers to notify needs and assess training effectiveness; and
- A central record of individual training for all officers.
The above constraints were, to a greater or lesser extent, identified during the curriculum and syllabus assessment and have been included in the GIS training policy statement, prepared as a result of the review. Although the policy statement gives a high-level view of what is required to implement the policy, operational detail was lacking and priorities and timescales had not been set, presumably because this was not included in the terms of reference for the previous European Union-sponsored Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum project. However, at the start of the in-country phase of this assessment, a workshop of senior GIS officers was underway to agree on the basic training curriculum. As a result of this workshop, it was agreed to hold a further two, the next to finalize the syllabus for career and professional development of senior officers, specialized courses and retirement training and the last to discuss development of curriculum and training manuals. Given that this discussion process is currently underway and unlikely to conclude in the immediate future, it may be helpful for the assessment team to contribute some suggestions to assist in the implementation phase, together with an outline action plan identifying priorities.

2.2. Training development and implementation

The curriculum – Entry-level basic training

The training policy document envisages an ambitious expansion of the training programme with a syllabus that includes courses in the following:

1. Immigration Laws and Practice
2. Travel Document Management
3. Security Management
4. Border Patrol
5. Information and Communication Technology
6. Introduction to Management for GIS officers
7. Management Skills for middle-level GIS officers
8. Senior Management Skills for GIS officers
9. Crisis Management (Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management)
10. Health and Safety Management
11. Personal Effectiveness and Self-management
12. The Legal Environment of GIS
13. Stakeholders of GIS

In addition, it is envisaged that reorientation courses, career development and specialist courses will be added to the programme.

The previous Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum project produced four training manuals, which between them comprehensively addressed the development of competencies in operational, managerial, personal and environmental awareness. Part one, covering technical and operational competence, is the basis of the entry-level basic training course and includes subjects one to five above. Part two is composed of managerial courses, the first of which is directed at cadet entrants, as they move straight into a management grade. As a basic entry-level course, the curriculum covers all that would be expected and more, designed along the lines of modules that, once properly developed, can be used in full or in part, depending on audience and time available.

While the subject matter is listed in the training manuals, with suggestions on presentation, the course material for each of the modules needs to be written and will require, in most cases, briefing notes that will double as handouts for trainees, together with preparation of PowerPoint presentations and training exercises. The success of modular training of this type depends on careful preparation of material that gives a full picture of the subject in briefing notes that will allow the module to be presented by any competent member of the training team and form part of a training manual for trainers.
To write all of this material, just for the basic training course, is a daunting task on its own, leaving aside all the other proposed courses that will require similar preparation.

Careful thought needs to be given on what subject matters to be included, which is presumably the purpose behind the Training Curriculum and Syllabus workshops devoted to the development and implementation of the new curriculum. However, on a cautionary note, there is a danger that having too many people involved in the development of courses can be counterproductive, as prolonged debate tends to impede decision-making. Bearing in mind the amount of work that needs to be done, it may be prudent to task the existing curriculum development team members, one of whom can be nominated as the project manager, with setting the course curriculum based on their professional experience, with a view to submitting it for endorsement by the management team. In acknowledging that the training manuals were designed to be all encompassing, a broad curriculum review in light of what the assessment team gained from visiting BCPs might perhaps be of assistance, particularly with regard to timings, set against the need to potentially train a large number of officers when the ban on recruitment is lifted. This may well require a reassessment of the proposal that basic training courses should be extended.

In reviewing the timings and subjects suggested by the author of the training manuals, the following comments may help:

**Immigration Law and Practice**

A total of six days is probably about right to cover the full scope of immigration legislation, although officers destined for land border posts are unlikely to require the fine legal detail included in, for example, residency regulations and United Nations conventions. Given the role assumed by the BPU in countering commodity smuggling, some of the immigration material could perhaps be replaced with more detail on customs regulations and related subjects.

**Human Trafficking/Smuggling, Travel Document/Fraud Management and Profiling**

A total of four days should be adequate, if fraud and forgery are kept at the basic level, but provision may need to be made for remedial training as some officers find these subjects difficult, particularly profiling and detecting forgeries. Forgery training is another subject, such as language training, benefits from being taught at basic, intermediate and advanced levels. It is not possible on a balanced basic training course to make everybody a forgery expert. The aim should be for officers to be proficient in recognizing safeguards and using forgery equipment available on immigration desks, such as ultraviolet light sources, oblique lighting and magnifiers.

Intermediate-level training can follow when officers have had experience in dealing with migration traffic for a year or two, during which they will have learned more about forgery and the reasons behind it in an operational context. Advanced level would be most applicable to those officers who demonstrate an aptitude for forgery detection and can be expected to be part of specialist teams, based centrally, regionally and at BCPs.

**National Security Structure and Security Management**

Grounding in information gathering and intelligence is essential for all new entrants, but only from the point of view of how the structure works and what it requires of them to support it. A new entrant course would not normally include instruction on how to conduct surveillance or handle covert informants. Both activities require experienced officers with specialist training to safeguard informants and avoid prejudicing operations through lax surveillance. The same applies to investigation; investigative officers are specially trained, and new officers should not be tempted to launch investigations, although they should know how they work.
Border Patrol Skills, Weapons and Map Reading

The 10-day allocation to patrol skills is clearly intended to be mostly conducted through practical exercises in the field and should be sufficient to provide a firm grounding in theory and practice that can be built upon during operational training when officers are posted to land BCPs. There may be scope to defer the 10 days of weapons training until GIS is formally given permission to bear arms, or until they start to be issued. In these days of GPS devices, five days on map reading seems a lot, especially given that the distances patrolled from BCPs are relatively short. Most of the patrol routes/zones are not excessively far apart. This situation is compounded by lack of urgent logistics for patrol activities.

Cross-border Crime

Given the BPU’s position at the front-line of immigration, smuggling, security and other cross-border criminal activity, one day seems a little rushed for what is a large subject, even when some of it has been previously covered in cross-related subjects. For example, given the security situation in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries, dealing with the threat of terrorism alone could easily take a full day.

Information and Communication Technology

At the same time as acknowledging the importance of the BMIS, it should be remembered that BMIS, in the form of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), is currently only operational at four locations in Ghana and designed to provide simplicity of operation. As system maintenance and security is a specialist function and officers will generally only be required to operate it, seven days appears to be a bit excessive. It may be worth considering deferring this training until and unless officers are posted to a PISCES-equipped BCP and then train them in situ.

Ten days has been suggested for computer training, specifically on the Microsoft Office Suite. Entry requirements for new recruits are at least a senior high school certificate, and given the prevalence of computers in everyday life, especially among young people, it is possible that some new entrants would be familiar with the operating system. Rather than subject an entire training course to 10 days of training that they do not necessarily require, it may be better to assess individual levels of knowledge and arrange study groups as required.

Finally, seven days have been allocated for training in radio communications. Radios are in short supply within GIS and not operational in any of the BCPs visited by the assessment team. However, there is no question that they are required in many locations, but simplicity of operation will be recommended as one of the criteria for procurement if it is decided to allocate funds for this purpose. It is therefore difficult to understand why officers would need such a long time to familiarize themselves with their use. The phonetic alphabet can be learned as homework and instruction would be best given during operational training at BCPs.

2.3. Training of trainers and the training team

There are currently three trainers at ISATS: the commandant and two course commanders. Having identified some of the challenges in preparing the curriculum and training modules for the entry-level basic training course, it is clear that this is inadequate. To run courses of the proposed length would more usually demand a team of six to seven trainers for the academic training phase, to accommodate for leave, days off, sickness, remedial training, development of training material, marking of exercises and all the other peripheral activities inherent to entry training.

Management should recruit trainers from within the organization by inviting applications from experienced officers who are prepared to move to ISATS on a posting of not less than three years. Trainer recruits should be volunteers who are enthusiastic about training. Training of trainers should be given at ISATS as soon as possible after recruitment. It thus follows that a training of trainers’ course needs to be developed in-house or bought in as a priority, preferably in advance of preparing training modules for the basic entry-level course, which will require the active participation of all trainers.
2.4. Management training
Once the trainers are trained and the basic entry course has been prepared, the logical progression would be preparing the Introduction to Management course as an extension of the basic entry course for officer cadets and including officers promoted into management ranks, namely assistant inspectors. This course should be the priority management course as it would be designed for officers who have little or no previous management experience. While management training is desirable at middle and senior levels, it does not have the same priority as entry level and management introduction courses and more of a consolidation exercise for officers used to managing than essential training. The specialist nature of higher level management training lends itself to outsourcing, rather than keeping senior management trainers on site.

2.5. Operational training
While the basic training course aims to equip new recruits with the theoretical knowledge to start work, it is essential that they are given structured support immediately afterwards. The GIS policy statement has identified the need for mentors, but any such system needs to be structured. This can be achieved through a network of operational trainers at the BCP to which they have been posted. Operational trainers should be experienced officers of the same rank as trainees who have received basic instruction on training techniques. Operational training should be for a minimum of four weeks, and trainees should be shadowed whenever operational by their personal trainer. It is good practice to assign two operational trainers for two weeks to each trainee to provide a balanced view of performance.

Operational trainers should ensure that trainees are given a full range of operational duties that covers all aspects of front-line work. A checklist can be used to record everything covered and comment on competence. At the end of the mentoring period, operational trainers should be required to confirm that trainees are competent to work solo. If there are any reservations on performance, the mentoring period should be extended. This system is only appropriate for new recruits and would not normally be used for officers above the rank of new recruits.

2.6. Consolidation (Advanced) training
There is currently no formal requirement or facility that routinely provides advanced training for immigration officers to consolidate basic training with operational experience, although the need for something similar, if not the same, has been identified in the training policy statement, where it is referred to as refresher training. Advanced courses would normally last for two to three weeks and should be more workshop-oriented than purely instructional, to allow participants to interact with their contemporaries and share their experience with trainers. Consolidation courses are best conducted within a year to 18 months of entry-level training and should take a selection of the subjects covered in basic training to a higher level. The following is not an exhaustive list but could include the following:

- **Profiling of problem travellers** – how to prepare profiles, what information contributes to them, how they can be used, profiles and trends that have emerged since basic training
- **Customer care** – problems encountered in dealing with the public, examples of circumstances leading to complaints or plaudits from personal experience, methods of communication and avoiding confrontation
- **Information and intelligence** – how information is processed to provide intelligence
- **Data gathering at borders** – what information is available to enhance intelligence and inform front-line officers, how and what to gather, and what to do with it
- **Investigation and case management** – how information from the front line can build into cases for investigation, how investigations are structured and conducted, and how information is stored securely
• **Advanced interview techniques** – reading lie signs, recognizing displacement activity, effectively using lines of enquiry

• **Trafficking** – interviewing minors and vulnerable people, getting information sympathetically from those who may be victims, and recognizing behaviour that may indicate trafficking

• **Refugees, asylum and international obligations** – recognizing, screening and processing refugees, complying with international standards of care, liaison with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on refugee matters and official stakeholders such as the Ghana Refugee Board

• **Intermediate-level forgery training**

• **Anti-terrorism** – higher level than basic, possibly conducted by the security services and relevant international agencies

• **Report and submission writing** – higher level than basic – more involved reports, activity reviews and analysis, specifically tasked submissions to policymakers

As participants on consolidation courses should be competent, established officers, there should be no need for testing or examination. The course need not be pass or fail; its purpose is to extend and embed knowledge gathered through operational work at the front line. The consolidation course would also be a good opportunity to obtain the perceptions of attendees on the effectiveness of their basic training, given that they will have had time to practice what they were taught.

### 2.7. Language training

Language training, particularly in French, has been included in the curriculum model, which is important, given that all neighbouring countries are French-speaking, but consideration may need to be given to what level is appropriate and where it would fit. The purpose of a basic immigration training course is to provide new officers with a broad perspective of immigration in the global and local context, together with the practical, technical, procedural and legal knowledge that will allow them to become operationally effective as quickly as possible. Every effort should be made to recruit people with language ability, and it is assumed that all new entrants will be fluent in English. Language training should be kept separate to basic training and conducted either before or after it as an intensive, freestanding course.

Consideration should also be given to providing different levels of language training – with all recruits receiving basic instruction, those at airports moving to an intermediate level and those who demonstrate the highest ability doing advanced courses – to develop a corps of officers with reasonable fluency that can be called upon to assist colleagues when necessary.

### 2.8. Regional training facilities

The GIS training policy statement requires commanders at all levels, from regional to sector command, to take responsibility for training issues, such as induction of recruits, identification of training needs, liaison with ISATS, mentoring and career development. The establishment of regional training centres is a natural progression in this process and will provide options for training that do not require officers to attend ISATS. This could be relevant to refresher/consolidation training, locally pertinent activities and training updates, particularly national and international legal issues. The “regional facility” title should not be taken to imply that every region should have one and they need not be staffed by full-time trainers, although their staff should include officers with training experience who are able to deliver it from modules sent from ISATS when required.

Logic would seem to suggest that the most obvious sites for regional training would be the major land BCPs of Elubo, Paga, Aflao and KIA. They have superior accommodation, uninterrupted power and a large pool of established officers able to participate in training. The volume of traffic is high and varied, particularly at the airport, which would provide new entrants with greater breadth of experience than the smaller BCPs.
For the same reasons, consideration could be given to using these BCPs for new entrants when they do their mid-course operational detachments.

### 2.9. Training liaison officers

While acknowledging the importance of the role of commanders at all levels in the training process, it is not realistic for them to carry the whole burden of training issues and the organization as a whole would benefit from the establishment of a network of TLOs to act as specifically designated points of contact with their regional training centre and from those in the centres to ISATS. TLOs need not be trainers, although a background in training would be useful, perhaps as an operational trainer. Failing this, basic instruction in BCP training issues and administration would be desirable and could be relatively easily provided. TLOs would be responsible for the following: (a) highlighting local training issues; (b) encouraging colleagues to take mandatory courses (monitored through a central training records database); (c) organizing local training on behalf of the ISATS; and (d) disseminating training materials and instructions. Although TLOs would be the focal point for training matters, it need not be a full-time role and designated officers could fit it around their normal duties, with time allocated by supervisors when needed.

### 2.10. Aids for learning and measuring effectiveness

The training manuals give suggestions on learning aids, but it is worthwhile briefly summing up common methods of measuring performance, progress and levels of knowledge:

- Case studies – with exercises
- Study tours – practical understanding of modern immigration controls
- Exercises in general – preparation of reports, official forms, submissions, files
- Role play – working on the control desk, interviewing – possibly with video facilities
- Marking of exercises
- Continual assessment – weekly tests
- Final examination – pass/fail
- Recruit profile by trainers – attitude, ability, potential, strengths and weaknesses

These are self-explanatory and of particular importance on entry-level basic training courses, when it is vital to monitor progress, address issues as they arise and continually assess the competence of recruits and officer cadets.

*Recommendations in relation to training are contained in the action plan attached at annex A. It is acknowledged that most recommendations have been identified in the GIS training policy document and the action plan is submitted as an aid to implementation.*
CHAPTER 3

OPERATIONS AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

3.1. Land borders – Overview

The Volta Region covers the south-eastern border of Ghana with Togo. It makes up approximately half of the total 887-km length of the eastern border and stretches from the Afiao sector command on the coast to Tinjasi BCP in the Nkwanta sector, where it joins the Northern Region. The terrain on the border at the BCPs visited by the assessment team is relatively flat, tall grass, shrubs and scattered trees. The road system is generally in good condition, and access to crossing points is reasonably straightforward. The Western Region borders Côte d’Ivoire in the south-west, stretching from the Gulf of Guinea northwards to Ahimakrom Checkpoint, where it joins the Brong-Ahafo Region. It presents a significantly more challenging environment than Volta in terms of terrain, climate and road infrastructure. The border area is predominantly rainforest, the climate is hot and humid, and the approach roads to BCPs are mainly un-metalled. Periodic heavy rainstorms add to transport difficulties and can render roads impassable.

Ghana, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire are members of the ECOWAS, which allows for economic cooperation, streamlined migration controls and relaxed labour regulations. As is common throughout Africa, land borders in Ghana dissect border communities, often of people from the same tribe. Local agricultural activity can straddle both sides of a border, and localized cross-border trading is an accepted fact of life. A pragmatic view is taken by GIS officers, and movement in the immediate vicinity of the border does not attract undue bureaucratic interference, at least as far as immigration procedures are concerned. While, in theory, all travellers are required to show evidence of identity and nationality, local people can be easily recognized by immigration staff and cross through BCPs without the need to produce passports or other identity documentation. Essentially, immigration officers are looking for anything out of the ordinary and will only intercept travellers who do not fit the profile of local traders or agriculturalists. Any non-local travellers without identity documents are questioned by officers to determine identity and nationality, and if found to be citizens of ECOWAS countries, allowed to proceed.

The GIS command structure runs from the headquarters in Accra to Regional, Sector and District command offices and thence to BCPs. Outside of the large BCPs, foreigners attempting to cross the border are rare, with the vast majority of travellers being local to either side or from other ECOWAS countries. BCPs are designated as official or known unofficial crossings, the essential difference being that passports and other travel documents will only be endorsed at official crossing points, so any foreigner requiring leave to enter the country are restricted to using these. The general practice is to use official BCPs as operating bases to patrol unofficial crossing points, although it was also common to find unofficial points also being used as patrol bases.
Despite the presence of customs officers at many BCPs and regional/sector commands, GIS has taken responsibility for border patrolling and thus added commodity smuggling prevention and security enforcement to their core role as the immigration control authority. As a result, in all but the large BCPs, migration issues have become subordinate to anti-smuggling and maintaining security. As the assessment progressed, it became more and more apparent that the title of immigration service had become something of a misnomer because of the other responsibilities that had apparently drifted into the original GIS remit.

Although the Volta Regional Command was not scheduled for formal assessment, a meeting with the regional commander and the second-in-command gave an excellent insight into how the region worked and the problems faced by officers, not just at BCPs but at all levels of the command structure, which made it the logical place to start the assessment process.

3.2. Volta Region

3.2.1. Field visit – Volta Regional Command, Ho

The city of Ho is located 160 km north-east of Accra in the Volta Region of GIS command. Approximately 50 km of dual carriageway out of Accra give way to a single-lane highway, which runs straight, virtually without deviating, to Ho. The road is metalled and well maintained. Settlements are widely interspersed, and the terrain is predominantly savannah-type flat grassland and bush, without much evidence of agricultural development.

The Volta Regional Command is comprised of 15 approved routes and approximately 24 known unofficial unapproved routes/crossing points, but the nature of the terrain, which is conducive to concealment, means that monitoring of these routes is imprecise and constantly changing. Much of the border area is dense, high grass and bush, which makes patrolling extremely difficult. It is reported that travelling the length of the border would take 10 hours.

There are a total of 658 officers within the regional command, distributed between the BCPs, with local staffing figures varying according to the size of the post, and 40 officers based in the regional command office. Officers are recruited nationally through a system of open competition, administered through the GIS training academy. There is no policy for local recruitment, and those posted in Volta Region come from all over Ghana. Most officers live in privately rented accommodation, with only the most senior being provided with GIS housing. Some rents are paid by the Service but not all, and officers posted to BCPs are expected to find accommodation in the vicinity. In remote BCPs, there are usually available living accommodations on site, although in most – if not all locations – it is debatable whether it can be described as adequate. The need to privately rent property raises issues in terms of community relations, as the border communities are long established and tend to resent what they see as impediments to their freedom to travel and trade. Thus, the national imperative to maintain control of security, migration and the transportation of goods means that potential for conflict between the authorities and local residents is never far away.

It is reported that GIS has been trying to court cordial relations with local communities, but acknowledges that it is not easy, and incidents of violence against officers are not uncommon. The situation is exacerbated by the prevalence of commodity smuggling by border residents from both sides, which is the main problem faced by the BPU. The most commonly smuggled items are drugs, pharmaceutical products, cars, motorbikes and petroleum products. In most BCPs, the vast majority of people crossing the border are either local residents or ECOWAS nationals, and while they regularly use unofficial routes, they are not perceived to be a migration problem. As a result, human smuggling is not seen as a consideration, although it is acknowledged that there had been reports of trafficking in persons from the major BCPs, both in and out of the country. This related mainly to minors and females trafficked from Nigeria and Benin, and although the purpose is not clearly defined, it is perceived that they are employed in markets in Ghana.
Operational constraints

1. Accommodation
In addition to the aforementioned problems related to the lack of secure staff accommodation, there is a profound lack of suitable office and control buildings at regional, sector and BCP levels. Much of the official accommodation is rented, leaving the Service at the mercy of private landlords and ever-increasing rental charges, coupled with poor maintenance. It is felt that there is a pressing need for purpose-built control facilities, to be owned by GIS, which would save money on rent in the long term, improve the effectiveness of the control by relocating these in places more convenient for the border and provide more reasonable conditions for officers.

2. Transport
There is a severe lack of serviceable vehicles, such as cars and motorcycles. There is only one car available at regional command, which means that officers have to be deployed for a week at a time to more remote BCPs, and rapid deployment or reinforcement is severely inhibited. Officers often use their own cars or motorcycles, but financial shortages mean that they could not always be reimbursed for the cost of fuel. Additionally, border patrols in many areas have to be conducted on foot where there are no motorcycles or four-wheel drive vehicles, thus restricting the scope of operation.

3. Communications
There is a radio system available at regional command, with a range limited to approximately a 10-minute drive from Ho. This is an insufficient coverage of virtually all the BCPs, even if they have radios of their own, which they do not. Communication is therefore predominantly by mobile phone, but coverage, particularly at remote BCPs, could be patchy and unreliable. This example is cited by officers having to go to a particular location in the surrounding area where a signal is available to make calls, and when they are not at the right spot, they could not receive them. Additionally, the use of mobile telephones for official communication raises issues in respect of security and confidentiality. It appeared that official phones are available in limited numbers to senior officers, which could be used to at least send and receive messages, which would then be followed up, in some locations, with landline calls.

There is one computer in the regional command, which used to provide a link with a computer at the headquarters in Accra, but there had been no broadband provision for over a year as there were no funds available to pay for it. The major BCPs are said to have computers, but also lack broadband connections. Any computers available are thus only used for word processing. Statistical returns are sent from BCPs via regional headquarters to the headquarters in Accra in hard copy. Incident reports, such as those in trafficking, are sent by the same method, although urgent events are first called in by telephone.

4. Training
It is felt that there is a need for more training beyond the baseline recruit entry course. Induction training is perceived as not meeting the specific requirements of BCPs, and while the regional commander tried to introduce a system of mentoring by experienced officers for newly posted staff, she was frustrated by the absence of mentor training and the lack of resources to allow potential mentors to participate, principally because they could not be spared from their own duties. Examples of possible additional training are quoted as anti-trafficking and intelligence. The lack of anti-human/commodity trafficking training resulted in the inability to properly detect and investigate possible incidents, coupled with a general lack of resources.
5. Protection

Not surprisingly, personal protection is of particular concern, especially as smugglers sometimes carry firearms. Approval had been given by the Cabinet for the issue for weapons, but still needed to be ratified by statute. How or when arms would be supplied is open to conjecture as plans did not appear to have been formulated. Aside from firearms, border patrol officers are provided with batons that deliver an electric shock sufficient to incapacitate a protagonist, but most of these are no longer working, and there is no money to repair or replace them.

3.2.2. Field assessment – Agotime Afegame Border Crossing Point

Access

Agotime Afegame BCP is under the Akanu Sector Command and situated to the south-east of Ho. A metalled road, interspersed with potholes, runs for approximately 40 km to an unmarked left-hand turn, on to a 10-km laterite road, leading directly to the border. The road is fringed by uncultivated tall grass, low trees and bush. The border post is located to the left-hand side of the road, 1 km from the border line, which is demarcated by a narrow river traversed by a road bridge, beyond which there is a further 5 km before the official Togo immigration control is reached. On the right-hand side of the road is a small border settlement of houses of various sizes and a few sparsely stocked small shops. There are no business infrastructure, such as restaurants and refreshment stalls, that often build around BCPs to accommodate cross-border trading, which indicates that it is not a well-used crossing point.

Facilities

The control post is an L-shaped single-story building with a pitched iron roof. The immigration office is situated in the part of the building at right angles to the road and contains an office for traveller examination furnished with a desk, two battered chairs and a bed. Open windows face the road. The building also houses two bedrooms, a rudimentary kitchen and a storeroom, the entrance to which is blocked by a broken-down motorcycle. The building appears to be generally in a poor state of repair, with a prominent hole in the ceiling of the control office. There is a wide parking area outside and the side of the building running adjacent to the road contains customs offices. The accommodation is rented from a private landlord. There is no generator on site and officers are reliant on power from the national grid. The area is subject to load shedding, which is generally 24 hours on and 12 hours off. There is no air conditioning, and cooling is provided by ceiling fans. There is no main water supply, and all drinking water have to be brought in. Communication is by cellular phone, when a signal could be found, and the radio system had long ceased to function. Broadband is not available, and the post has no computer equipment. GIS does not have any vehicles, and the motorbike parked outside the storeroom could not be repaired because spare parts are unavailable.
Operation
The BCP is open seven days a week from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. and is staffed by four officers and a shift leader of the rank of Assistant Immigration Control Officer Grade One. Officers are rotated to the post for a one-week tour of duty every two months and sleep on site.

Traffic is estimated at an average of 50 persons per day, virtually all of whom are local border residents. Vehicular traffic, apart from motorcycles, is sparse. Nationalities encountered are almost exclusively Togolese and Ghanaians, with occasional other ECOWAS citizens. As local people are frequent travellers, they are easily recognized by officers and allowed to proceed without having to produce evidence of identity. Immigration problems are said to be very rare and officers base the control on observation to identify anyone who does not fit the profile of border residents. If they encounter anything out of the ordinary, an interview is conducted to establish eligibility for entry and if refused, travellers are sent back without any official refusal notice. It is emphasized that this is a very rare occurrence. Other nationalities, that is, those with endorsable travel documents, are hardly ever encountered as most travel through the far more accessible BCP at Aflao. An immigration entry stamp is produced, which shows that it was last used on 26 December 2013. None of the officers could recall any incidence of possible trafficking and as the border traffic is essentially local, people smuggling is also unlikely.

Having acknowledged that immigration problems are not of real concern, it is reported that the focus of BPU activity is on smuggling, which is something of a pastime for local residents, as well as a source of income. The principal smuggled commodities are petroleum products, cloth and the occasional vehicle. When smugglers are intercepted, they are handed over to customs for processing, and in the absence of any accommodation at the BCP, sent to the local police station if detention is required. It is reported that, up until a year or so previously, there had been up to six customs officers rotated to the post who mounted patrols, but resource constraints resulted in the staff compliment being cut to one, who now deals only with revenue collection and is not involved in patrolling. GIS officers reported that, as a direct result of reduced patrol coverage, the number of travellers using the official crossing point had dropped significantly, thus making their own attempts to maintain control more difficult.
Officers mount regular foot patrols up to 3 to 4 km each side of the control office and tend to be stationed on known unofficial crossing routes for up to a day at a time. The review team were shown a couple of these routes, which are within a kilometre of the BCP and essentially dirt tracks through the undergrowth. It is reported that, technically, travellers crossing at unapproved points face a fine, but this is rarely imposed and once officers are satisfied that they are local people, they are permitted to proceed. The distance to the next border posts is estimated at 20 km to the north and 17 km to the south, which indicates difficulty in intercepting unofficial crossing without transport. Statistical reporting is in hard copy by monthly returns to the regional headquarter and the headquarter in Accra, as are incident reports, although the latter, if urgent, are also telephoned through to the regional headquarter.

3.2.3. Field assessment – Nyive Sector Command and Border Crossing Point

Access
Nyive BCP is situated approximately 40 km east of Ho and the command office for the Nyive sector. It is reached by a metalled road in a reasonable state of repair, although potholes are not infrequent. The sector office is located on the left-hand side of the road to Togo and faces a customs office on the opposite side. On the right is a small settlement of residential houses and some small businesses. The borderline is 300 m. further east and demarcated by a river straddled by a substantial road bridge. The main Togo immigration office is 5 km from the far side of the river, but a smaller control point is much closer in a small village that could be seen from the bridge.

Facilities
The sector command building houses the immigration control office and is a concrete-built, single-story construction with a corrugated iron-pitched roof. It later becomes clear from subsequent BCP visits that GIS border control buildings are constructed in a similar architectural style, with rooms leading off the veranda and entrance. The offices appear to be in a reasonable state of repair and the immigration control office is large enough to accommodate a long desk, four chairs, filing cabinets and a fridge. There is a water supply and power is from the national grid, subject to load shedding. The radios do not work and communication is by mobile phone. The command has one computer that is used mainly for word processing as there is no access to the internet. There is a motorbike for the post and a car for the sector.

Operation
The sector oversees four official crossing points:

- Nyive
- Shia
- Honuta
- Asikuma
And three major unofficial routes:

- Hodzokope
- Ashanti-kweita
- Atikpui

Additionally, there are many minor unofficial crossing points that are covered on an ad hoc basis. The staff establishment for the sector is 85 officers, which includes five of senior rank. Of these, 32 are based at the Nyive sector command, 18 are in the BPU and the rest are distributed around the BCPs. All officers, whether or not they are in the BPU, are expected to undertake patrol work. Patrols are deployed from the BCP, and officers rotate every two weeks.

Traffic is estimated at 200 travellers per day, documented and undocumented, principally local border residents, although Nigerians, Nigeriens and Liberians are occasionally encountered. Irregular immigration through the BCP is not perceived to be a problem, and the focus is on intercepting smugglers on the unofficial routes. Any smugglers detected are brought to the BCP office and processed, which involves taking personal details and recording the nature of incident, then reported to regional command and national headquarters in hard copy. Incident reports end up with the national intelligence facility in Accra, where they are collated. Smugglers carrying goods subject to duty are handed over to customs, and those with non-revenue goods are sent to the police. Relations with the local community can be fractious because their reliance on smuggling as a source of income and violent incidents, although not frequent, have been reported. Human trafficking has not been encountered, and there is a perception that the problem is mainly internal, with local children being taken to Accra.

Relations with Togo immigration officials are said to be good and contact and joint discussions take place frequently, although not on an official level. They do not mount joint patrols, but often see each other patrolling across the river. High-level discussions are underway to put joint patrols on an official footing, but no agreement has yet been reached.

**Atikpui unapproved border crossing point**

The next BCP scheduled for assessment is Shia, but on route, the assessment team stopped at Atikpui, approximately 12 km south of Nyive. This unofficial crossing point is accessed through the winding lanes of a small village and a wide path terminated at a shallow river, before continuing up a gentle gradient on the far side. As if to emphasize the casual regard that local residents have for the border, two males on a motorcycle appeared on the Togo side and proceeded across, undeterred by the presence of several GIS officers in uniform. They did, however, stop and were allowed to proceed after questioning.
3.2.4. Field visit – Shia Border Crossing Point

Access
Shia is 5 km north of Atikpui and reached by a metalled road. The BCP office is situated on the left side of the road and follows the standard GIS design. It is surrounded by a moderately sized settlement of houses and small businesses. The Togo control post is 1 km down the road.

Facilities
The control building is concrete built with a pitched corrugated iron roof and of a similar size to the building in Nyive. It is reasonably well maintained, although furniture and fittings are worn and in need of replacement. The main control office is relatively spacious and dissected by a long counter. Other facilities are the same as Nyive, with power from the national grid and water. There are no radios; again they are broken, and the computer is only used for word processing as there is no broadband connection.

Operation
The BCP has a staff compliment of 28 and a similar volume of traffic to Nyive, estimated at 200 per day. It is open from 6:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. Those crossing are principally border residents, although the monthly statistical return for March showed 37 departures and 27 arrivals had reported for immigration clearance which, although mainly ECOWAS citizens, included one American, two French and one Italian. It was reported that the post used to be busier, but local travellers had been deterred by strictly applied customs regulations and many now prefer to travel through Akanu where things are more relaxed. Commodity smuggling is the main focus of activity, with irregular migration barely featuring.

3.2.5. Field assessment – Hodzokope Unapproved Border Crossing Point

Access
After travelling for 8 km south on the main road, a left turn on to a laterite road leads to Hodzokope after a further 8 km. The road is extremely dusty and bordered by tall grass and trees. The border control post is situated at the edge of a small settlement. The border is 3 km down the road at the river, and the Togo control 3 km beyond it.

Facilities
Facilities are the most basic so far encountered. The control office is a wooden shack at the side of the road that is also used for sleeping. Although it is rigged for main power, there is no water, and communication is by mobile phone when a signal is available. There is no transport.

Operation
The BCP is staffed by three officers rotated out of Shia for a week at a time. Traffic is estimated at 50 to 60 persons a day, who are all locals. Relations with immigration officers in Togo are so relaxed that the team was able to travel to their border post, which is situated in a small village, and exchange greetings. The village is accessed across the river by a road bridge and down a badly rutted track that is unsuitable for vehicles, other than four-wheel drive, although a saloon car has been observed at the BCP previously. Patrols are conducted towards the Togo control.
3.2.6. Field assessment – Kpoglo Border Crossing Point

Access
Kpoglo is situated 60 km south-east of Ho in the Akanu sector and the last BCP before Aflao heading south. It is reached by a metalled road on a large site that includes substantial customs buildings and what appears to be a freight search shed. The Togo control point is 1 km down the road.

Facilities
The immigration office is a single-story building situated next to the border barrier with a pitched roof. It is in reasonably good condition and appears adequate for the 200 or so travellers that pass through each day. The control office is sufficient to accommodate four officers behind a counter. There are no cars or motorcycles. Power is from the national grid, and communication is by mobile phone.

Operation
The BCP is staffed by 30 officers, with 5 on duty at the control point and 15 out on patrol. Twenty officers are on duty at any one time. Traffic is mainly local residents, and officers find it simple to pick out those who are not. Non-locals are principally ECOWAS, but they also encounter small numbers of diplomats, European Union citizens and foreign NGO workers who used the BCP to avoid traffic congestion in the far busier post at Aflao. Vehicular traffic varies and occasionally includes transit buses from Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire. Irregular migration is not evident, and anti-human and commodity smuggling, as in the other posts, are the primary activities. It is explained that if the post has more resources and equipment, they would like to establish more patrol bases at unofficial crossing points, rather than operating entirely out of Kpoglo. Information and statistical reporting follow standard practice. Relations with Togo officials are described as good, and they unofficially give mutual assistance when required. Relations with customs are also good, and customs officers mount patrols from the post. Community relations, although cordial, suffer from the usual conflict over smuggling and local livelihoods.

3.2.7. Field assessment – Aflao Sector Command and Border Crossing Point

Access
Aflao is located approximately 12 km south of Kpoglo by a metalled road and a major crossing point. It is on the coast and surrounded by a large bustling town. It adjoins Lome, the capital of Togo, and is the only BCP assessed where there is no buffer zone; the border controls are situated within 120 m of each other. The control building is on the left side of a dual carriageway opposite the beach.
Facilities
The control building is a large, concrete-built structure with a tiled roof and a central entrance that leads directly into the control office. Other offices for the sector commander and senior officer on duty lead off of the main office, and there is a meeting room. A large carpark adjoins the building and to the rear is a substantial freight park for heavy vehicles. Despite the size of the post, familiar deficiencies are identified. A generator is available to provide backup power when load shedding occurs, and there is main water. However, communication is by cell phone as the radio system had broken down three years previously. The post has one car, which is described as being in poor condition, and although they have four motorcycles, none are operational. Officers are supplied with their own flashlights. There is one computer used for word processing, and although broadband and Wi-Fi are available in town, there is no money to pay for it. The post has four PISCES terminals, which has photographic and passport scanning capability but could not take fingerprints. Electric shock batons used to be available, but all are now broken and there is no INTERPOL terminal. It is reported that a surveillance camera system is in the process of being installed that would allow for coverage of strategic points on the border. The intention is to erect four units in different places, and although one is installed, it had broken down.

Operation
The staff compliment for Aflao is 236 officers who operated in 12 shifts for 24 hours, 7 days a week. Although 128 of them are in the Border Patrol Unit, all officers are expected to participate in patrolling. Traffic is predominantly local residents and ECOWAS citizens, and it is estimated that an average of 3,000 undocumented travellers pass through each day. Approximately 200 travellers with endorsable travel documents are processed through PISCES per day, although most are ECOWAS nationals and low numbers of foreign nationals. It is possible for some nationalities to obtain visas on arrival for a fee of USD 50 if their circumstances, such as emergency travel or being unable to obtain one abroad, are considered to justify it.
1. Traffic control
Traffic control, not surprisingly, is more organized than in smaller BCPs and vehicular traffic parks alongside the control building for clearance. Travellers with endorsable documents reported to the control office where they are processed through PISCES and then processed to a more senior officer to have their passports endorsed. There is a separate building for pedestrian arrivals and departures, and the arrival control office is shared with customs. Although a fence stretches 5 km inland from the beach, there were acknowledged to be 23 unofficial crossing points within the remit of Aflao, covered by 30 officers on patrol at any one time. The assessment team walked a 2-km stretch of the border, observed small groups of patrol officers manning unofficial crossing points, and crossed one to greet Togolese Immigration officers a short distance away on the other side.

2. Control issues
Irregular migration is not a concern, and in common with the other BCPs visited, commodity smuggling is the main preoccupation. However, there are reports of suspected trafficking and smuggling of persons, estimated at about four per year, mainly from Nigeria. The profile is said to be females aged 16 to 22 on route to Côte d’Ivoire, with the intention of travelling onwards to Europe. The traffickers are generally Nigerian nationals. Commodity smugglers are generally locals, and those detected are dealt with by customs. Relations with customs are described as good, and joint patrols are sometimes conducted. There is an established management committee for border agencies, comprised of immigration, customs, police, national security, narcotics and health. Relationships with the local population face the same challenges as elsewhere but more so, as 90 per cent of the officers stationed at the BCP live in privately rented accommodation.

3. Training
Training is again highlighted as being unstructured and inadequate after the basic recruit course, but the post has two officers with document fraud expertise who deliver training at least once a year. Other than this, officers are not often offered training, and the next training that most were sent on was a two-week preparation course prior to taking the promotion exam. The sector commander suggests that refresher military training would be useful and stresses the importance of language training and instruction in information gathering for intelligence. Personal files are kept on all officers, on which their training history is recorded, but there is no system for annual performance appraisal that would help to identify deficiencies and future training needs.

3.3. Western Region
3.3.1. Field assessment – Dadieso Sector Command
Access
The Dadieso sector command office is located in the town of Dadieso, which lies between the Elubo and Oseikojokrom sectors on the western border of Ghana with the Côte d’Ivoire. It is approximately 600 km north-west of Accra. The road out of Kumasi, roughly the halfway point, is mainly metalled with occasional laterite sections, until the approach to Dadieso, when it becomes laterite throughout the town and further westward. The sector command compound is situated to the left of the main road to Enchi on the edge of town.
Facilities
The sector office is set in a large, open compound between a relatively substantial customs office building and a long, single-story row of customs residential accommodation. It is a concrete-built, single-story construction with a pitched-iron roof, of four rooms in a row, fronted by an elevated veranda reached by steps. It is comprised of residential accommodation for the officer-in-charge and the deputy and an office situated on the far end. The building was acquired from customs and renovated by the officers themselves, and as a result, is in a reasonable state of repair. Aside from the rooms for the Officer-in-charge (OIC) and the deputy, there is no official accommodation for other officers, and they have to rent housing locally. Five years previously, work on an apartment block outside of town had been started, but it had come to a halt because GIS run out of funds due to budgetary constraint.

The sector office has main electricity, which was periodically interrupted for long periods without warning, and there is no generator or solar power. The sector has two cars, a four-wheel drive and a pickup truck that is described as being on its last legs. The 4x4 has high fuel consumption, which puts considerable strain on the monthly fuel budget of approximately USD 80, and there are no official motorbikes. Although official instructions are to service vehicles at main dealers, this would have entailed a trip to Kumasi, which is considered beyond the fuel budget, and they are therefore serviced locally. The radio system had long since ceased to function, and communication is by personal cell phones, which has limited coverage, especially at the border. There is one desktop computer in the office that is only used for word processing as, although there is Wi-Fi in the town, there is no money to connect to it. Self-defence electric shock batons had once been issued but are now all broken.

Operation
The Dadieso sector is responsible for three official duty posts:

- Antokrom
- Kwabena Narty inland checkpoint
- Gyato

And four unapproved ones:
- Oscar
- Obengkrom
- Lugu
- Kyensee Kokoo
- Africa

Additionally, the command also covers Enchi District.

1. Traffic
The sector has five commanders under the sector. It is staffed by a total of 157 officers, 43 of whom are based at the headquarters, although they rotate from there around the duty posts in the sector. Thirty officers are sent out for six or seven weeks at a time and spend a week in each post, before returning to the headquarters for what is effectively a rest week, although they are still expected to report to the office. Duty teams are between two and four officers, and a couple of customs officers conduct patrol activity in and around the town. Throughout the sector, traffic is broadly estimated at between 500 and 1,000 travellers per day, with lighter numbers during the week, building up to a peak at the weekend. It is also seasonal, corresponding with harvest periods, particularly the cocoa crops in mid-summer. The vast majority of travellers are local people and ECOWAS nationals, with very few foreigners.
Local people are all supposed to be identity checked, and generally, Ivorians have national identity cards and Ghanaians have voters’ registration cards. However, if they are not documented, they and other ECOWAS citizens would be briefly questioned and allowed to proceed if officers are satisfied as regards nationality. Irregular migration is not seen as a problem, although senior officers are of the opinion that trafficking in persons is an issue, both on the eastern border and to a lesser extent, in the Western Region. Trafficking is said to have increased in the east because the Nigerian anti-trafficking department has successfully disrupted it in Nigeria, forcing traffickers of Nigerian females to take routes across Benin and Togo to Ghana, then on to Côte d’Ivoire and beyond to North Africa and Europe. Officers are unable to give specific instances of trafficking activity detected as it is considered sensitive and higher authority is required to release statistics and information.

2. Control issues
Smuggling of commodities is considered to be an issue, as well as drugs, because there is intelligence to suggest that there is a heroin route from Côte d’Ivoire, through Ghana to Burkina Faso. Weapons are also reported to be smuggled into Ghana from Côte d’Ivoire, but again, both drugs and weapons information and statistics could not be released without higher authorization and do not usually feature in official statistics in the public domain. Commodity smuggling is mainly confined to petroleum products and cocoa beans, with variations in price and availability dictating the source and destination country. All smuggling is said to take place on unapproved routes. In terms of border security, problems had been encountered in the past with armed Ivorian rebels crossing into Ghana with weapons and causing conflict within the border communities. However, officers are confident that the issue has been mitigated by a robust response by the Ghanaian authorities.

3. Operating procedures
Although comprehensive standard operating instructions are issued by all government departments and an abridged version is prepared for the border patrol unit, no copies are available at the sector command office. When incidents and interceptions occur at BCPs and inland checkpoints, suspects are brought to the sector office for interview by a senior officer, usually the OIC. In the absence of official transport, local taxis or officers’ personal motorbikes are used. After the interview, a manuscript report, which is essentially a statement in front of a witness, is prepared and sent with the perpetrator to either the police or customs, depending on the nature of the alleged offence. Copies of the report are also sent to regional and national GIS headquarters, with the latter ending up with the GIS intelligence Unit. Reports are regularly received from the Intelligence Unit, mainly related to suspects to be put on alert at BCPs, as well as notification of incidents occurring within the region. The agencies present at smaller BCPs are immigration and customs and at large posts, there are narcotic officers of the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). There are generally no quarantine or health department representatives, and police are called to assist at BCPs as required. There are five customs officers stationed on the sector command compound and joint patrols occasionally takes place. Relations with the local community is reported as being good, but it is acknowledged that confrontations occur when smuggling interventions involving local people takes place, as they often do not appreciate the legal requirement for the Border Patrol Unit to enforce customs legislation.

4. Training
All officers had been through the GIS basic recruit training course, but subsequent training is said to be sporadic and unstructured. It is informally estimated that perhaps 2 per cent throughout the service has received refresher or specialist training. This, however, is being addressed through the ongoing fine-tuning of the national curriculum, which would establish training on promotion and provide specialist courses in such subjects as trafficking and intelligence in a more structured way.
Operational constraints
The Dadieso sector command is operating from substandard and cramped accommodation without reliable power. A broken radio network has not been repaired or replaced, and officers rely on personal mobile phones for communication in a region where, especially at BCPs, signals are patchy to non-existent. Even if there had been reliable communications, it is difficult to see how a response to incidents could be mounted in the absence of adequate transport. Vehicle maintenance is poor quality, resulting in unreliability, and the only motorbikes available belong to officers.

There is no internet, and reports have to be sent to regional and national headquarters in hard copy and vice versa. Officers have no weapons for self-defence, and broken electric shock batons have not been replaced. No official residential housing is available, and officers have to rent in the private sector. Although they had been granted a 20 per cent enhancement in their salary to cover rental costs in 2014 to 2015, this is a one-off arrangement, and there is no guarantee that it would continue. It is also reported that in most cases, the enhancement does not fully cover accommodation costs. In terms of office accommodation, the proliferation of customs buildings in contrast to the single small block used by GIS seemed strangely at odds, given that there are only five customs officers based there. When this point was raised by the assessment team, it was explained that the disparity is a historical issue that had arisen when responsibility for border security had passed from the disbanded Ghana Army Border Guards to customs, and that the Border Guard equipment and buildings are handed over to customs, but this is not so when the border patrol is handed over to GIS. GIS officers usually outnumber customs officers at BCPs and sector commands. Acquiring unused customs buildings, such as the current immigration office at Dadieso, appeared to have been achieved through local negations initiated by the sector commander, rather than by any official channel. The outward appearance of the site would suggest that there is potential for the transfer of more property, which could significantly alleviate the GIS residential accommodation crisis.

3.3.2. Field assessment – Dadieso-Antokrom Border Crossing Point

Access
Antokrom BCP is located approximately 12 km south of Dadieso sector command and reached by a laterite road, fringed mostly by thick, head-high undergrowth and low trees. Vehicular travel raises dense clouds of fine red dust, although traffic is very light considering that it is the approach to a BCP and there does not appear to be any border traffic heading west. The few pedestrians and motorcycles encountered lack the baggage and goods that might be expected to be carried by cross-border travellers and are therefore most probably local residents. At the rear and to the side of the BCP offices are a few houses occupied by border residents, mostly agriculturalists in cocoa growing.

Facilities
The immigration building is poorly constructed of planks of wood on a concrete base, with a corrugated iron pitched roof, which might be better described as a shack. It clearly has not been painted for some considerable time and shows outward signs of rot and decay. It is situated on the left-hand side of the road a few metres back from the border line, which is defined by a rope stretched across the road. In contrast, just past it, also on the left, stands a substantial concrete-built customs office, smartly painted in customs blue and in a reasonable state of repair. The immigration

Inside the Antokrom BCP office. © IOM 2015
office is at the front of the building and behind it are two bed/living rooms, furnished with makeshift beds covered by mosquito nets.

The post has no water supply or generator and although linked to main power, officers state that the unreliability of supplies had gone beyond load shedding and electricity goes off randomly for long periods. Communication is by officers’ personal mobile phones, but signals come and go. One officer stationed at the BCP said, only half in jest, that they had been known to lose colleagues in the bush. There are no official cars or motorcycles, and response to patrol emergencies are difficult in the extreme. Requests for equipment encompassed the following:

- Transport
- Radios
- Flashlights (although the use of flashlights on patrol is not encouraged by senior officers as it gives away the position of patrols)
- Night vision equipment
- Electric shock batons
- Pepper sprays
- Wet weather clothing
- Tents to use as shelters in the bush

Not surprisingly, it is pointed out that a new building is required and officers feel that a prefabricated portable construction would be preferable, as it would enable relocation should the need arise.
Operations
The GIS post is located approximately 2 km from the checkpoint on the Ivorian side. It is staffed with three officers – an immigration control officer and two assistant immigration control officers. They are stationed at the post for a week at a time and then rotate through the rest of the BCPs in the sector, until they arrive back at sector command for a week.

1. Traffic
Cross-border traffic is estimated at 30 to 40 travellers per day, mostly ECOWAS citizens from Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Nigeria and Togo, plus occasional Cameroonian. All travellers are officially required to show evidence of identity, generally in the form of national identity cards or voter registration cards and if they have passports, they would then be endorsed. Officers acknowledge that it is routine practice to question any travellers without identity documents and if satisfied that they are from ECOWAS, allow them to pass. The daily figures quoted do not include local residents, estimated at 20 to 30, who routinely cross and often have family and land straddling the border. They are considered to be easily recognizable and allowed to pass back and forth without hindrance. Most crossings involve petty traders going to local markets and further afield to Kumasi and Accra. Irregular migration is not seen as in any way significant, and there are few concerns about trafficking, although it was reported that two Nigerian woman who had been taken to Abidjan for prostitution had recently escaped from their Nigerian traffickers and been repatriated after being sent to headquarters after processing at sector command.

2. Control issues
Patrols are conducted during day and night, and officers generally patrol a radius of up to 5 km. They are primarily concerned with smuggling activity and regularly do joint patrols with the two customs officers on site. Smuggled commodities are quoted as cocoa, and to a much lesser extent, cannabis, and officers are aware of several unapproved crossing points in the vicinity. They reported that the immigration building used to be located up the road close to the official borderline in the days when it was manned by the Border Guards, but was moved back to the present location when GIS took over. This is because there were considered to be a lot of unapproved crossing points behind it when it was in the initial location, although whether this has helped increase security was up for debate, not least among officers themselves, as some of these routes, if not all, still enabled the control office to be bypassed, even by people who have legally left Côte d’Ivoire.

The team travelled to the forward border point where, just outside the border demarcation line of another rope across the road, there are a couple of small, open-fronted shops selling local produce and basic goods. Relations with the Ivorian authorities are good enough to enable the team to walk the 100 m to their control point and exchange greetings.

3. Training
As far as training is concerned, the only courses since basic training that any of the officers could recall is one in trafficking some time previously that selected officers attended.

3.3.3 Field visit – Kwabena Nartey and Gyato Inland Checkpoints
Kwabena Narty and Gyato Inland Checkpoints are not fully assessed as they are not scheduled for examination as part of the project, but they both form part of the border structure in the sector and from this point of view, there is merit in looking briefly at facilities and operation.

Kwabena Narty is situated about 20 km inland from the unofficial BCP at Lugu and 5 km from sector command. Situated on the left-hand side of the road heading west, the control building is in a small open compound shared with customs. The accommodation is a newly constructed wooden building of shiplap planks on a concrete base with a pitched-iron roof. It emerged that it had been built by GIS officers, who had clearly done a good job. Unusually, it eclipses the customs structure, which is smaller and appears badly maintained. The building has main power, and communication by mobile phone is not such a problem.
inland, as signals are better, but if officers there wish to contact BCPs, they have the same problems with reception as BCP officers trying to phone out.

The post has been set up solely with counter-smuggling in mind, and officers do not routinely check for irregular migrants. Traffic is relatively light while the team was on site, but vehicles are being stopped and drivers spoken too, although no searches are conducted. Traffic is almost exclusively Ghanaian and Ivorian citizens travelling to and from Kumasi, and it was reported that Nigerians trading in motorcycle spares and Togolese working in cocoa plantations in Côte d’Ivoire are occasionally encountered. Patrols are mounted from the checkpoint on the road to the border to identify unapproved crossing routes.

The team moved on to Gyato immediately afterwards. The checkpoint is located in a small town of single-story residential houses and open-fronted one-room shops. It is 4 km south of Kwabena Nartey on a tarmac stretch of the main road to the border, which is approximately 40 km further west. The control office is a two-room, single-story concrete building with a pitched-iron roof on the side of the road, with a veranda furnished with a desk and chairs. There is a similar building on the opposite side of the road occupied by customs, which conducts joint checks. The checkpoint barrier is a rope that stretches across the road. Facilities are the same as at Kwabena Nartey, and two officers are manning it. The team again watched drivers being stopped and briefly interviewed, with the emphasis again being on mini buses, which are clearly used to transport people and goods to and from the border.

3.3.4. Field visit – Oscar and Kyensee Kokoo Unapproved Border Crossing Points

Oscar and Kyensee Kokoo BCPs were not fully assessed, but time and distance allowed the team the opportunity to briefly visit them.

Oscar is of interest from the point of view that the accommodation for officers is the worst that the team had so far encountered. Residential accommodation is a shelter constructed from widely spaced wooden slats supporting a corrugated iron roof, which is partially open to the elements and afforded little privacy. It contains rudimentary sleeping platforms and very little else. It is located within a settlement of a few concrete farm buildings serving the surrounding cocoa plantation. The BCP is accessed by a dirt road and staffed by three officers on rotation from Dadieso, who spend a week there before moving on to their next duty post. The Ivorian BCP is 4 km further down the road, and normal practice is for two officers to patrol in the buffer zone while one remains at base. To add to the accommodation issue, the usual problems with communications, transport and power pertained. Traffic is invariably local farmers and residents from both sides of the border, with an average of 20 or 30 travelling each day. It is reported that cannabis is known to have been smuggled through the crossing point, but officers feel that this had now ceased.
Kyensee Kokoo is also accessed via an unmade road and located relatively close to Oscar, approximately 5 km away. Office and residential accommodation is a concrete three-room building with a pitched-iron roof and veranda. It is 7 km from the Ivorian control post, and three officers are stationed there for a week at a time. The patrol pattern is the common two-out, one-in system. Interestingly, the officers in situ had purchased their own two-way handheld radios.

3.3.5. Field visit – Yaakese Border Crossing Point

The Yaakese Border Crossing Point is based under the Enchi District Command, and the district has responsibility for two approved and two unapproved BCPs:

- Yaakese – approved
- Sewum – approved
- Boinso – unapproved
- Adonukrom – unapproved

**Access**  
The District command is located in the Enchi town municipal administration building, a large, imposing three-story concrete construction in which they have a small suite of offices. It is 52 km from Dadieso regional command and reached by an unmade main road and partly under construction. Despite being of hard-packed earth construction, it is relatively smooth, although dust clouds from traffic poses a hazard for drivers and pedestrians.

**Operation**  
All officers manning the four BCPs within the District command are based in Enchi. The staff compliment is 23, comprised of 2 senior officers of assistant superintendent rank and 21 other ranks. Officers are rotated in groups of four through the BCPs on a weekly basis and return to District command for one week in five. As they are expected to come into the office for only one day, this week was effectively their rest period.

**BCP access**  
The assessment team had been scheduled to visit Yaakese BCP on April 23, but overnight rain had made the road impassable, which gave an indication of what the access route is likely to be. In the event, it proved worse than anticipated. The crossing point is 35 km south of Dadieso, 32 km of which are on a passable laterite road. The last 3 or 4 km, accessed from a side turning by the Yaakese Customs compound, are by a narrow dirt track bordered by forest and what appeared to be virtually impenetrable undergrowth.
The track is liberally interspersed with deep ruts and large potholes, for the most part filled with water. Even without the water, the route is only safely accessible by four-wheel drive vehicles and motorcycles. The road eventually opens out to a large clearing in the forest where the control office and living accommodation is located, opposite a customs building.

Facilities
The immigration building was constructed with planks roughly attached to a wooden framework and had been built entirely by GIS officers. It is comprised of four rooms used as sleeping accommodation with a veranda across the front. Ramshackle is probably the most accurate way of describing it, and it is in desperate need of repair or more realistically, replacement. The rooms contain basic bed frames and hard mattresses, which the District Commander had paid for out of his own pocket. There are a few other shacks scattered around the clearing used by plantation workers and a one-room building used by travellers waiting to cross the border in daylight.

There is no electricity at the BCP other than a single solar-powered Arclight, and water for washing is obtained from a nearby stream. There are no radios, and communication is by mobile phone. Again, network access is poor and to get a signal, a phone is permanently suspended from the rafters of a grass-roofed open-sided shelter. The GIS detachment on site has no transport and is brought in by open-backed trucks normally used for transporting goods. Despite being what was effectively rainforest, officers had no wet weather clothing.

It is worthy of mention at this point that the commander had negotiated the use of one bedroom and a hall at the customs compound at the start of the border track, which he is slowly renovating at his own expense, for future use as the District Command. Although he had been promised a grant for the costs by headquarters in Accra three years previously, it had not so far been paid.

Operation
There are two border patrol unit officers on duty – as two others assigned to the BCP had already moved on to their next duty post – and one customs officer. Traffic is estimated at 15 travellers each way per day, most of which are local Ivorian traders on their way to nearby markets or Kumasi. It was reported that very occasionally, other ECOWAS nationals pass through. Any foreign travellers in the area use the major BCP at Elubo to the south. The Ivorian crossing post is located 2 to 3 km further down the road and although patrols are conducted along this route, they do not venture either side of the BCP due to the density of the undergrowth.
No migration or smuggling issues are identified and as with Sewum, the crossing point is seen as a security measure to deter cross-border crime and intrusion by insurgents, such as Ivorian rebels. Relations with their Ivorian counterparts are good, and the team was able to travel to the control point and exchange greetings with the officers at the Ivorian crossing point.

3.3.6. Field assessment – Sewum Border Crossing Point

Access
The Sewum Border Crossing Point is situated 25 km south of Enchi along an unmade dirt road through trees and high grass and brush. It passes through scattered small settlements, and traffic to and from the BCP is very light. By local standards, Sewum is a medium-sized settlement of houses and shops, and the rear control compound is on the edge of town. Metal barriers span the road that leads to a forward control point 4 km further on, where the immigration control office is situated at a river crossing that marks the border line. There is a substantial collection of customs offices and residential accommodation in the rear compound.

Facilities
The immigration control office and living accommodation is a single-story three-room wood construction of interlocking planks under a pitched corrugated iron roof. It is in poor condition with significant signs of rot and decay and situated on the right-hand side of the road, facing an elevated cabin for the customs control. Although the customs accommodation is never used by customs officers as they stay in the rear control building, it is not used by immigration officers because they do not have the authority to do so. Being optimistic, the GIS sleeping quarters could only be described as extremely basic and contain only rudimentary beds under mosquito nets. Cooking equipment is piled on a table on the veranda, along with water containers. There is no electricity,
and lighting is by solar lamps bought by the officers. There are no radios or mobile phone signal, and to get communications, officers have to return to the rear base. There are no official vehicles, and the GIS inspector in charge of the unit uses his own motorcycle for transport, but is not paid for his fuel. There are two or three other shacks around the control building occupied by cocoa plantation workers and a hut where travellers arriving at night wait to cross the border in the morning.

**Operation**

The Ivorian control point is located approximately 3 to 4 km from the west bank of the river. The current staff detachment is three officers, but at the time of the assessment, the commanding officer’s two subordinates had returned to District command in anticipation of their next deployment, where he would join them when relieved on Saturday. A footbridge is used to span the river, but this had collapsed in June 2014 and is awaiting repair. The only way to make the 10-m river crossing is by canoe, which is paddled by an enterprising border resident who charges one Ghanaian cedi for the service. At best, the canoe could only seat four or five people, which is not too much of a problem as traffic is estimated at only five or six travellers each per day, all of whom are local farmers and known to officers. When the footbridge is operational, traffic is marginally higher and travellers would be dropped by car at the crossing point and picked up on the other side. Due to the density of trees and vegetation on both sides of the crossing point, the riverbank is not patrolled and getting to any unapproved routes requires transport. The consensus of opinion among GIS officers present is that irregular migration and smuggling is not an issue. The Border Patrol Unit’s presence at the crossing is seen as a security measure necessary to deter unapproved crossing by criminals and Ivorian rebels. Relations with their Ivorian counterparts are described as good, and it was reported that visits across the river are made by both sides.

3.3.7. Field visit – Elubo Border Crossing Point

![Sewum Border Crossing. © IOM 2015](image-url)
Operation
Elubo is a major BCP about 60 km south of Yaakese and the second largest in Ghana. It was not scheduled for assessment, but was visited by the team as it is on the return route to Accra. It is accessed by a metalled road and is clearly a major post. The immigration control office is a large, concrete construction housing clearly defined arrivals and departure controls, equipped with two PISCES terminals in each control office and a desktop computer. Time did not allow for a detailed survey of processes, but travellers were channelled past a port health office, equipped with temperature-sensing detectors, then on to immigration and customs. The BCP is set on a large site and includes a heavy customs presence with freight clearance facilities, including a vehicle scanner.

Traffic
The staffing compliment is 150 officers of all ranks, and traffic is reported to be almost exclusively ECOWAS citizens, although foreigners occasionally pass through, particularly French nationals. Numbers are estimated at around 25,000 per year, not including local residents. Although a head count of locals was taken, figures were not immediately available as to volume of local traffic.

Facilities
Understandably, facilities are far superior to any other BCPs visited in the Western Region, and there are all main services and a generator to maintain uninterrupted electricity supplies, with air conditioning in use, although communications still rely on mobile telephones; radios are not being used on site, and there is no indication that they are available.
CHAPTER 4

INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY

4.1. Information technology and systems – Overview

Information technology is the remit of the GIS IT Unit, which is staffed by 10 officers, at GIS Headquarters in Accra. While the objectives of this assessment do not include a full review of information systems, an overview is included to give an indication of what is currently available, which has a bearing on what technology is in use or may be introduced in the future.

Border Management Information Systems

Of the 42 approved BCPs on the land borders of Ghana, four have computerized BMIS:

- KIA, Accra;
- Aflao land BCP on the border with Togo;
- Paga land BCP on the border with Burkina Faso; and
- Elubo land BCP on the border with Côte d’Ivoire.

These operate on the United States-manufactured PISCES system, which was first installed in 2002 and has been regularly updated to now run on the latest available software. Although there is also a PISCES terminal installed in the IT Unit at GIS Headquarters, the system servers are located at the airport and all information updates are carried out from there, as the office has uninterrupted power and is manned for 24 hours, 7 days a week. It is funded by the Government of the United States, and software updates remain the responsibility of contractors of the Government of the United States. The PISCES-integrated alert list is updated as required, and requests for the addition or deletion of names and information are sent to the airport, from whence they are migrated to headquarters and the BCPs. The transfer of information is not real time and can take up to 24 hours. All PISCES terminals have photographic and passport-scanning capability, and at the airport at least, are configured to take fingerprints. The system is not currently linked to any other internal databases and does not connect to the INTERPOL database, which is only available at the airport on an offline terminal. The reliability of PISCES was described as good, with no reported major incidents.
There is no nationwide GIS e-mail system, and aside from the PISCES-equipped BCPs, all other border management information is collected and distributed manually, in hard copy, although urgent alerts can be sent out in advance by telephone to targeted regional, sector and BCP offices. Non-urgent alert list updates can take up to a week to reach their destination. Traffic statistics are recorded manually at BCPs and submitted in the form of monthly returns to GIS headquarters, via regional command offices. Incident reports are sent by the same route as they occur, and if appropriate, notified in advance by telephone. A comment is made that, in the absence of electronic BMIS, the provision of laptop computers to BCPs would provide benefits for the collection of traffic statistics.

Recording of travellers’ biodata and movements, other than in the PISCES-equipped posts, is currently by completion of landing and embarkation cards that are sent to GIS headquarters. They are not transferred to an electronic database, although work is underway with IOM to assess how this might be done in the future. The cards are used primarily for statistical purposes, and individual passenger movements are not routinely cross-matched. Retrieval of landing cards for specific individuals of interest to the authorities who have not been identified through alerts at borders is acknowledged as being extremely difficult.

Registration systems
The National Identification Authority, which is under the Office of the President, is responsible for the registration of Ghanaian and foreign nationals. They are separate databases, maintained and operated by a commercial partner, and issue identity and registration cards.

Passports
The passport system is computerized and currently the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. However, GIS officers are posted to passport offices to provide immigration expertise and therefore have access to passport-related data.

Visas
Visas are also primarily the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. The visa system is not computerized, and all visa records are in hard copy. Visas issued abroad are completed by hand, and records are not easily, if at all, accessible to immigration officers at home. However, the recently introduced provision for designated nationals to obtain visas on arrival at Kotoka Airport is computerized and prints vignettes. However, it is operated by GIS, completely separate from the overseas visa system and not linked to any other databases or systems. To further complicate the issue, it is reported that work is underway to develop an online visa system, which will also be operated by GIS although where this would leave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the overseas system was not entirely clear.

4.2. Information systems – Evaluation

This is not intended to be an in-depth evaluation of information systems, but rather a brief analysis of deficiencies in respect of the Western and Volta regions. While the linking of the databases listed above and the expansion of the BMIS network should be and probably is, a priority for the IT Unit, as far as the BCPs assessed and visited are concerned, there is currently no viable means of introducing BMIS or, until broadband extends to the more remote border areas, internet and e-mail facilities. Even when the internet becomes available, it is unlikely that installation of PISCES or a comparable system, such as the IOM Migration Information and Data Analysis System will be justified in any but the larger crossing points that regularly see foreign traffic. If work on this is not already underway, a review of BCPs to determine which would realistically benefit from BMIS should be undertaken.
There does not appear to be any reason why a GIS e-mail system could not be extended and improved to link headquarters in Accra with regional, sector and district commands where personal computers, albeit in limited numbers, are already installed. The main barrier, assuming that there are no particular technical issues, would seem to be paying for the cost of broadband provision. This seems to be a very short-sighted use of funds when larger projects, such as a new online visa system, are being developed at, presumably, significant cost. Another example might be the ongoing installation of surveillance cameras on the border at Aflao, which must be costly and may require diverting resources from more basic but essential requirements. The advantages of an e-mail system in terms of communication, transmission of documents and reports, issuing instructions and e-learning, to highlight just a few, are considerable and central to any system of integrated border management. Without an e-mail system, it is perhaps pertinent to reflect on the need to create as large an IT training facility at ISATS as is proposed, and whether at least a proportion of these resources might be better diverted into providing and maintaining broadband connections around the country.
CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Findings
5.1.1. Volta Region

Agotime Border and Hodzokope Border Crossing Points

Access to Agotime Afegame is good, and the situation of the BCP close to a small settlement provides officers with contact with local residents, which lessens isolation. Set back 1 km from the border line, it could have been closer, but any advantage to be gained from relocation would depend on the corresponding Togo control also being a lot closer than the current 5 km, preferably within sight. Hodzokope, while not as accessible as Agotime due to the condition of the road, is still easy to access, although the 3 km to the border line and beyond to the Togo control, particularly on the Togo side, is only comfortably accessible to four-wheel drive vehicles. Because of the nature of the terrain and the susceptibility to flooding near the borderline, there is little prospect of situating the control nearer to Togo, and there is no advantage without the Togo control also being relocated.

The perception among officers at Agotime Afegame, and indeed the vast majority of other BCPs visited, that any problem from irregular migration is minimal, and this is supported by the national passenger traffic figures quoted in the GIS 2013 Annual Report, which indicated that 91.75 per cent of arriving passengers come through KIA and of the rest, only 0.24 per cent cross green borders outside of the three major BCPs of Aflao, Elubo and Paga. This, however, inevitably gives a distorted picture, as the number of border residents and undocumented ECOWAS citizens crossing are not recorded, for the understandable reason that they are not perceived to be a threat to migration control policy. The 50 or so travellers crossing daily are virtually all border residents and quickly recognized as such, demonstrated by the fact that the last time a passport required endorsement was over a year previously. Traffic figures and composition for Hodzokope are the same, although as an unofficial BCP, there is no capacity to deal with passports in need of endorsement.

The role of GIS as the primary agency has widened its scope of activity to the point where, in the absence of a significant need to provide migration control, it had assumed primacy in anti-commodity smuggling and maintenance of border security. As such, GIS must be seen more as a border agency than purely an immigration service, especially when it comes to funding. It therefore follows that, when reviewing the resources required at BCPs, account should be taken of the resource implications of performing duties that can be expected to, at least partially, performed by other agencies, principally customs.
Consideration should therefore be given to calculating what resource savings customs have made by reducing their presence at BCPs because of GIS operational involvement in anti-smuggling of commodities. This should involve staff, finance, accommodation and equipment, such as vehicles and IT. It may be that the most efficient way of freeing up resources would be to combine GIS and customs at borders into one entity, thus allowing for sharing of accommodation, staff and equipment. As well as better utilizing existing equipment, economies of scale should also be possible in future procurement. Precedents for this approach can be found in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States where, although the internal functions of customs and immigration remain separate and largely the same, the border functions of both organizations have been combined. While it has to be acknowledged that reorganization on this scale is not easy or straightforward and can be culturally unsettling, the scarcity of resources and funding in Ghana for border security suggests that it should at least be the subject of a feasibility study.

Leaving aside such far-reaching possibilities as a joint agency, the immediate needs of Agotime Afegame, although considerable, are relatively straightforward and have mostly been already requested by GIS:

1. **Communications**
   The absence of reliable communications is a major challenge confronting border management, not only for officers patrolling in the bush but also for communications between BCP offices, sector and regional commands. A high-powered, high frequency radio setup has the potential to provide secure, instant communication between officers, BCPs and at least the regional headquarters, if not Accra. Provision should include spare radios and batteries.

   In calculating requirements, working on the basis of four officers being stationed at each of the two BCPs, a rough guide to needs would be a minimum of a base station at the BCP office, together with a mast, eight radio handsets to provide spares when units are under repair, two batteries per handset, plus two more each to ensure officers can carry a spare and that there are always two in charge. This will need to be duplicated at regional, sector and national levels. Additionally, a substantial uninterrupted power supply (UPS) will be desirable to provide a constant source of electricity in the event of power cuts. The full technical requirement will need to be worked out by technical specialists to establish the most appropriate system for the conditions. Any supply contract should be subject to competitive tender and include planned maintenance of all equipment for at least three years.

2. **Power**
   The unreliability of power is evident at all levels and Agotime and Hodzokope are no exception. While a UPS can be used to keep low-level electricity requirements such as battery rechargers going, long power cuts and for lights, fans and air conditioning require a more robust solution. The alternatives are generators or solar energy or, possibly, both. Technical assessment and cost comparisons will be needed to decide the most appropriate and reliable system, bearing in mind that while a solar system may be more expensive to purchase, generators need fuel. Whichever system is chosen should include planned maintenance, through a servicing agreement, for three to five years.

3. **Transport**
   There is a clear need for motorcycles and cars at all levels. There is general agreement at BCPs, including Agotime, that motorcycles are the most practical mode of transport for patrolling and ideally, two or three per BCP where four officers are the normal compliment, with two for patrols and one at the BCP office to provide backup or as a spare to cover breakdowns and servicing. The practice of posting officers to BCPs for seven days at a time means that the motorcycles need to be permanently based there. Consideration should be given to buying good quality, sturdy trail bikes with ease and availability of servicing in mind, rather than the cheapest models available. Again, wherever possible, service agreements should be included in procurement contracts.
It is not necessary to base cars at Agotime and Hodzokope if motorcycles are provided, but they are needed at regional and sector commands, not least so that officers can be dropped at BCPs at the start and finish of their tour of duty and backup provided in the event of serious incidents. Funds are, of course, limited and cars are expensive, but any sector commands without a serviceable car should be provided with one, or preferably two. It would be sensible to keep two at regional level for deployment to any sectors with only one car to cover repairs and servicing. Procurement should take into account the conditions, and four-wheel drive is essential. Robust construction and simplicity of servicing is also essential, which suggests diesel power without any frills, such as turbo chargers. Service agreements with a reliable service provider should be included with purchasing contracts.

4. Accommodation
Accommodation at Agotime is not the worst encountered and is concrete built, but it is in dire need of maintenance and repair. Whether the landlord can be compelled to carry this out is open to conjecture, but something needs to be done urgently. Although, it is generally felt that renting buildings from private landlords is not desirable, it is not uncommon to do so in the public sector and provides the advantage that the lease can be terminated if and when the building is no longer needed. Office furniture, beds and kitchen equipment are also in need of provision or replacement. Four office chairs would be a reasonable request, together with a new desk.

Accommodation at Hodzokope is a rather different matter, as the location has a one-room wooden shack that also serves as the control office. It is totally unsuitable to accommodate three people for a week at a time, and if the intention is to continue to man the post on this basis, the request by GIS for prefabricated accommodation would quickly provide a solution to the problem, although it would be advisable to first determine the cost of using local builders and materials to erect a more permanent structure; even allowing for possible reuse of a prefabricated building elsewhere later on, it may prove cheaper. Three rooms comprising an office and two or three living/sleeping rooms should be the minimum and given the nature of the traffic, detention accommodation would probably not be justified. A furniture pack should also be put together, comprising four chairs, a desk, four beds (with mosquito nets and mattresses), cooking equipment and storage cupboards. Also required is basic provision for hygiene on site, such as a water tank, basins and a chemical water closet. Purchasing such a pack in bulk should provide economies of scale.

5. Other equipment
Other equipment identified by officers as required included, in no particular order of priority:

- Tents to provide shade when officers are stationed on unapproved routes;
- Camp beds for overnight patrols;
- Raincoats;
- Weapons, ideally firearms but at least electric shock batons as those previously provided no longer worked; and
- Night vision equipment.

All of which, with the exception of raincoats, mirror those requested by headquarters in Accra. The assessment serves to confirm that all this equipment is desirable, although the issue of firearms and shock batons is beyond the remit of this report. Working on staffing figures of four officers per post, two tents, four raincoats and four camp beds would be justified, together with four sets of night vision goggles, binoculars or a combination of both.
6. IT and office equipment

The requirement for IT and office equipment at Agotime and Hodzokope and other similar sized BCPs is open to debate. Activity reporting is currently done in hard copy and sent to sector/regional command when convenient, as are monthly statistical reports. In terms of statistical reporting, given that both posts rarely see endorsable passports and do not count local travellers, returns when required will be basic, and there is no real need to type them. As the internet is not available at either location and phone signals are unreliable, computers would seem to be something of an indulgence and in view of the adverse climatic conditions, could prove more of a liability than an asset. Without computers, there is no real purpose in having printers, scanners or photocopiers, at least until there is access to the internet. When internet access is provided, there is much more justification for IT equipment, although it should, of course, go hand in hand with improvements in accommodation and power to allow for cooling to protect equipment, unless it is designed for the purpose, such as for tropical climates allowing for high humidity. The eventual aim should be to provide all BCPs with IT and office equipment, irrespective of size, so that events and management information can be reported quickly and efficiently.

7. Water

There is no main water in both BCPs, and it appeared that water for washing is taken from local streams. Drinking water is supplied in packets or bottles. Although not present at Agotime, at some posts visited, large polytanks are in use, usually by customs. Consideration should be given to providing such facilities.

8. Training

The subject of training has been covered in detail in chapter two, and it is clear from the curriculum review and associated activity that there is a will to change how training is conducted. This section is located here not because it is low priority, but because of the depth of previous coverage. As well as an improved basic training course, there is a realization that specialist and topical training, such as human trafficking and smuggling, is required and it is being addressed through the curriculum review. When asked about what training is currently available, most officers interviewed said that they have had little or none after their basic training course and a consolidated list of what they suggested as desirable is given below:

- Human trafficking and smuggling
- Smuggling
- Transnational crime
- Prosecution
- Personal communication skills
- Dealing with refugees
- Refresher military training
- Language training
- Information gathering
- Interpersonal skills – such as dealing with the public
- Human rights/Dignity

All these subjects are relevant to the local situation on the Volta Regional borders and included on the new basic training course curriculum, but it should be remembered that for many officers, basic training was a while ago and at the time, may not have covered these subjects to an appropriate level. It is therefore suggested that all officers should be required to submit a written record of training received to assist ISATS in creating an up-to-date record of individual training to date and identify future needs.
9. Conditions of service and morale

When considering conditions of service and morale, the fact that GIS is a paramilitary organization, and as such, a disciplined force must be taken into account. When joining, officers are presumably made aware of the conditions of service, including the demands and challenges of working in adverse conditions on the green borders. In a civilian organization, there is an expectation that relatively stable, fixed hours and predetermined days off will be worked, but this is not always the case with military-type service. During the assessment, it proved difficult to make a judgement on the state of morale, although it was apparent that all officers were concerned about deficiencies in equipment and accommodation. However, this was tempered with a sense of duty and pride in serving their country. Overall, morale seemed reasonable, but there was no doubt that it would be a lot better if they believed that issues with equipment, transport and accommodation were being addressed and would improve.

The practice of rotating officers through four or five relatively remote BCPs for 24 hours, 7 days a week before returning them to sector command for what is regarded as a rest week, even though they are expected to periodically attend the office, is not ideal but is what the organization perceives to be necessary to meet objectives within existing resources. Should staffing levels improve, it would be prudent to review the shift patterns with, for example, the possibility of cutting deployment to five days a week with two days off. More frequent shift changes would also be facilitated by having additional transport available to move staff in and out of posts.

Rather surprisingly perhaps, there was no enhancement of salary or hardship allowance for working such hours in adverse conditions so, in effect, officers on the green border were paid the same as those at the airports and town offices who, it is assumed, work fewer hours in much more agreeable locations.

As with the Volta Region review, the scope of assessments was extended to visiting regional, sector and other BCPs to obtain a broader view of the situation on the Western border. Evaluation is confined to the designated BCPs, but it is accurate to say that conditions and challenges were common to all those visited, apart from the major crossing point of Elubo where facilities were immeasurably better than at small BCPs. While comparable in many ways to BCPs assessed in the Volta Region, in terms of access the situation was significantly worse, exacerbated by a more hostile climate and often impenetrable forest and undergrowth.

5.1.2. Western Region

Antokrom, Sewum and Yaakese Border Crossing Points

Antokrom and Sewum BCPs are relatively easily accessed by hard-packed dirt roads, although travelling is not pleasant due to the heavy clouds of dust raised by vehicles. In contrast, the approach to Yaakese is something of an endurance test for both vehicles and passengers. It is by far the worst approach road encountered during the assessments because of deep, water-filled ruts that combine to create a heavily undulating surface that slows progress and severely tests even four-wheeler drive vehicles.

In common with BCPs in the Volta Region, traffic is composed almost exclusively of local border residents involved in agriculture and petty trading, occasionally interspersed with nationals of other ECOWAS countries, as well as mainly small-scale traders. Volume of traffic is very light, ranging from 30 to 40 per day in Antokrom, 15 in Yaakese and 5 or 6 in Sewum. The situation of Antokrom is something of a paradox, given the preference stated by many officers on both eastern and western borders for wanting BCPs to be located, wherever possible, closer to their neighbouring counterparts. Although the control office had once been situated within 100 m of the Côte d’Ivoire BCP, it had been moved back 2 km to the main settlement housing the customs compound, even though there is a still a small settlement at the forward point. This is said to be because there are unapproved routes in between the forward and rear positions although, presumably, the same could be said of all the other BCPs visited that are separated from their counterparts by several kilometres. The logic of the argument is further tested by the fact that the Sewum control office is 4 km further west of the main border settlement where the customs office is situated, at a
river crossing point that marks the borderline. Given that the Sewum control office is surrounded by thick forest and vegetation that preclude patrolling to the north and south, it would seem more logical to move the Antokrom BCP forward and the Sewum control back.

The situation in the Western Region in regard to the threat posed by irregular migration is perceived as being less than in Volta, and commodity smuggling is also of little concern, to the point that both customs and GIS officers are of the opinion that it is verging on non-existent. As a result, the purpose of manning the crossing points is predominantly security, to deter cross-border crime and insurgency by Ivorian rebels, rather than intercepting smuggling. Officers of all ranks feel that their presence is essential as it stopped such activity from occurring.

As with the Volta Region, there is a significant disparity in the facilities available to GIS and customs, but to a greater extent. Customs accommodation, both office and residential, at virtually all the BCPs and regional/sector commands visited is more abundant and substantial in construction than that allocated to GIS. This is particularly apparent at Dadieso, where customs’ residential accommodation far exceeds the two or three rooms available to GIS. The most likely reason for this is customs status as a revenue-generating agency, which brings in income and thus considered more worthy of investment. Although customs equipment was not reviewed as it did not form part of the assessment, it is possible the same applies to transport, power provision and others. Certainly at Sewum, some of the customs buildings have polytanks for water.

As previously stated, the operational challenges present in the Volta Region are just as apparent in the Western Region and in some respects, more so. Much of the detail on requirements has been covered in the Volta Region evaluation in chapter three, section 3.9 and does not require repetition, so the following is a brief summary of the situation in the region.

1. Communications
   None of the BCPs and regional/sector offices had working radio equipment, and provision of a comprehensive network should be a priority. It is noteworthy that at one BCP, officers had purchased two-way radios from their own money, which, while commendable and a demonstration of their commitment to their work, emphasizes the inadequacies of equipment provision by the Organization. The use of mobile phones is subject to the same problems as in Volta, although it appears that network coverage is worse in the West.

2. Power
   None of the locations visited, aside from Elubo, has a reliable power supply and if anything, the situation is worse than in Volta, summarized by one officer’s comment that power cuts had gone beyond load shedding to random outages for long periods.

3. Transport
   The only official transport available in the regional sector is a serviceable four-wheel drive car and a pickup truck, which is in a poor state of repair, at the regional sector command in Dadieso. Officers who have their own vehicles use them without recompense for fuel or the wear and tear likely to be caused by the state of the roads. When officers are deployed to BCPs, particularly Sewum, local open-backed trucks designed for the carriage of freight are often hired. At least one further car/pickup truck is required at the regional sector command and another at the sector command, along with a couple of motorbikes. As in Volta, two motorbikes should be based at official BCPs and one at permanently manned unofficial crossing points. If officers use their own transport for official purposes, they should be paid a mileage rate calculated to cover the cost of fuel and depreciation of the vehicle.
4. Accommodation
Accommodation at Antokrom, Sewum and Yaakese is of wooden construction, ramshackle and progressively deteriorating. In all probability, it is beyond repair. As previously proposed, if the BCPs are to continue to be manned for 24 hours, 7 days a week, a costing exercise should be conducted to determine whether installing prefabricated three to four room constructions or using local labour and materials to build permanent structures is most economic. Before starting such an exercise, it would be prudent to open discussions with customs to determine what redundant accommodation they have available, bearing in mind that it is all paid for by the same taxpayers.

5. Other equipment
The equipment list suggested by officers in the Western Region mirrored those in the Volta Region, with the addition of flashlights and pepper sprays for self-defence. Particularly in Sewum, where the proximity of the BCP to the river encouraged disease-carrying insects, provision of insect repellents would contribute to reducing the health risks to officers.

6. IT and office equipment
The evaluation of IT and office equipment in the Volta Region applies equally to the Western Region. In the absence of internet accessibility, there appears to be no real advantage in providing computers and ancillary equipment as servicing and maintenance would be difficult in the hot, wet and humid conditions prevailing there. The IT and office equipment have been justified earlier as important tools for GIS operational activities. However, the request for air conditioners would solve the climatic effects on the above equipment.

7. Water
None of the assessed locations had main water supply, and requirements are the same as in Volta.

8. Training
As in Volta, a lack of training beyond the basic training course is highlighted, and the only subject suggested in addition to those already highlighted is child labour/protection, which is pertinent to the local situation where children are known to be employed in the cocoa plantations straddling the border.

9. Conditions of service and morale
Although the shift patterns are very similar, conditions of service on the Western border are worse than in Volta, from the point of view of climate and access to BCPs. Rain and punishing humidity are constant features in the rainforests, and getting to and from some BCPs is challenging. However, a similar sense of duty is apparent, and all the staff that the team met seemed cheerful and welcoming. Again, there is no doubt that addressing equipment and accommodation deficiencies would improve morale, as would a hardship allowance.

5.2. Joint considerations
5.2.1. Border crossing point assessment
Recommendations with regard to the BCPs designated for assessment have been detailed above together with – in terms of accommodation, transport and equipment – broad guidelines for the level of provision necessary. If the five BCPs are indicative of conditions and deficiencies at other minor crossing points, both official and unapproved, the scale of the task of bringing them all up to a reasonable standard will be daunting. GIS have provided a list of requirements in the areas reviewed, with which the assessment is broadly in agreement, although the level of provision will need to be explored in greater detail. Before procurement starts, however, there is a clear need for costing exercises to ensure that, through comparison, technical input and a competitive tendering process, the best and most appropriate equipment is purchased.
5.2.2. Maintaining security – Alternatives

It may also be appropriate to instigate an audit of all BCPs to ascertain what they lack so that a true picture of future requirements nationwide is obtained, in conjunction with a review of whether it is viable to continue permanently staffing them. To expand on this, GIS practice is to use BCPs, both official and unapproved, as forward bases for border patrols. However, the cost effectiveness of this policy is not entirely clear. Taking Sewum as an example, the terrain makes patrolling of the border either side of the post virtually impossible. It is therefore questionable whether keeping three officers permanently stationed at the crossing point, which sees five or six travellers in each direction a day, is the best use of resources as they are there for patrol activities.

5.2.3. Border communities

Policy also dictates that the primary function of GIS is largely as a deterrent to cross-border crime and threats to national security, but it is possible that this objective could be met through intelligence-based deployment. The best potential sources of border intelligence are border residents who should be encouraged to report suspicious and unusual activities in their area. This will require “hearts and minds” campaigns to make them aware that threats to national security and from crime are detrimental to them, as well as the rest of the population. It was apparent, however, that there is no signage or other information available at BCPs to alert travellers and residents to the dangers of irregular migration, terrorism or trafficking/smuggling or provide contact details for reporting of concerns.

The immediate problem is that, although GIS tries to foster good relations, enforcing customs regulations on local people who rely on cross-border trading for a living does little to endear them to residents. Generally speaking, traders will tolerate a level of customs duty that still allows them to make a reasonable profit and pay duty under these circumstances rather than risk fines and confiscation of goods. It is therefore important to find the right level of duty and avoid draconian application of regulations, which suggests that a combined effort by GIS and customs to make life easier for traders could pay dividends, and it should be remembered that it is a core objective of integrated border management to facilitate cross-border trade. The point was made at more than one BCP that when customs regulations are strictly enforced, people stop using the crossing point, which implies that there is flexibility in the system. If a pragmatic approach is taken, traders would be more inclined to become the eyes and ears of the border authorities and report suspicious activity, thus enabling resources to be deployed in response which, with the provision of extra transport and communications equipment, GIS would be in a position to do. Thus, the number of permanently manned crossing points could be reduced.

5.2.4. Random patrols

As an extension of the above point, even without the cooperation of local residents, it is relevant to consider whether, if more transport is available, random patrols would offer a more cost-effective alternative to permanent manning of BCPs. This could also be informed by GIS intelligence analysis to identify areas of threat and quickly place officers where the risk is greatest, which may not just be at the BCPs but also on the roads leading from them, where inland checks could quickly be established. People crossing borders illegally for whatever purpose generally resort to road travel once they have crossed and intelligence analysis based on information gathering at the local level should be able to assess likely routes.

5.2.5. Resource sharing

In most locations, customs and GIS are both present at, or near, BCPs. It is quite apparent that customs accommodation is generally superior and more abundant than that of GIS, often for fewer officers. Before new GIS buildings are contemplated, negotiations should be initiated with Ghana Revenue Authority (Customs Division) at a local level to ascertain what could be shared. At a higher level, the possibility of sharing procurement and developing joint responsibilities can be debated nationally. Ultimately, the benefits in combining customs and immigration into one border enforcement agency should at least be explored.
Resource sharing should also be considered in the context of cross-border cooperation. At both borders, relations with GIS counterparts are good and at several crossing points, the assessment team is able to travel, unannounced, to the corresponding BCPs and are welcomed without reservation. While informal contact and cooperation is always to be encouraged, if it was put on a formal level through diplomatic channels and perhaps in memorandum of agreements, there may be scope for coordinated cross-border patrolling and exchange of information to support targeted intervention.

5.3. Recommendations

5.3.1. Facilities and equipment

1.1. Before finalizing procurement requirements, open negotiations with Customs to determine availability of accommodation and equipment for sharing. Discuss practical issues in doing so, at least at the BCPs assessed.

1.2 Engage technical specialists to establish the most appropriate radio communications system for local conditions to link BCPs, regional and sector commands and Accra headquarters. Requirements should include handsets, base units, masts and batteries. Supply contracts should provide for planned maintenance.

1.3 Conduct a technical assessment with cost comparisons to decide the most appropriate and reliable system to provide backup power at BCPs – consider generators, solar panels or a combination of both. Include planned maintenance, through a servicing agreement, for three to five years.

1.4 Assess vehicle requirements at regional, sector and BCP levels. Source and cost vehicle provision after a technical assessment of performance requirements and invite suppliers to tender, with future maintenance included in contract prices.

1.5 Conduct a cost comparison exercise to replace existing accommodation at the assessed BCPs, with the possible exception of Agotime, which may be refurbishable. Consider the cost of providing prefabricated units against new construction using locally sourced labour and materials.

1.6 Obtain tenders for the supply of furnishing packs to include chairs, tables, desks, beds, mattresses and cooking and sanitary equipment. Accurately cost provision of fans and air-conditioning units.

1.7 Invite tenders for the supply of tents, camp beds, night vision goggles/binoculars, raincoats and self-defence equipment, such as shock batons and pepper sprays.

1.8 Supply insect repellent to officers in high-risk locations.

1.9 Obtain costs for the supply of water storage tanks and water purification equipment.

5.3.2. Operations

2.1 Consider the current location of BCP control accommodation, in terms of proximity to cross-border counterpart BCPs. Where possible, for example, Antokrom, move closer to the border line, but in Sewum, where patrolling is impractical, move back to the customs compound.

2.2 Before committing to redevelopment and re-equipping of the assessed BCPs, consider whether, in terms of traffic and perceived threat, they all need to be permanently staffed or if, with provision of additional transport, random patrols would be an option.

2.3 In negotiation with customs, assess the policy of enforcing customs regulations on border residents engaged in petty trading, in order to improve relations and encourage provision of information. Actively engage with community leaders and initiate an information campaign on cross-border threats and risks.
2.4 Review the GIS intelligence structure to ensure that information is properly gathered at borders to allow analysis and risk assessment that will aid resourcing to risk at strategic and tactical level.

2.5 Instigate a joint agency study at senior management level to consider the practicalities of merging GIS and customs at borders to form a combined border enforcement agency.

2.6 Consider the feasibility of joint patrols and structured information sharing with cross-border counterparts.

5.3.3. Conditions of service

3.1 Review the practice of deploying officers to remote BCPs for seven days in four- to five-week cycles with a view to giving at least two days off in every five.

3.2 Consider payment of a difficult post allowance for officers in remote, inhospitable locations.

3.3 Introduce mileage payments for officers who use their personal vehicles for official travel.

5.3.4. Information technology

4.1 Provide at least regional and sector commands with the funding to connect to and maintain broadband and create a GIS e-mail network to include all officers.

4.2 Map BCPs to identify those that would benefit from installation of BMIS to inform future planning.
## ANNEX A

**TRAINING ACTION POINTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

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<tr>
<td><strong>1. ADMINISTRATION</strong></td>
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| 1.1 Review training facilities and staffing at ISATS to ensure that use of accommodation and resources are maximized to provide the optimum level and mix of training courses. | Resources are finite in terms of accommodation, staff and equipment. It is necessary to ensure that all of these resources are employed to full capacity to provide the maximum amount of training according to priorities decided by senior managers. Additional resources will be required to fully meet commitments to the new basic training curriculum and proposed schedule of courses. | • Designate a project manager from the existing training team to lead the review, with assistants to lead an implementation team.  
• Survey existing accommodation. Identify areas underused and additional space with scope for expansion.  
• Review existing staffing levels against available facilities to assess potential for increasing training output.  
• Decide how many officers/recruits can be trained at entry level with varying levels of staffing and equipment. | High |
| 1.2 Informed by a facility and staffing review, expand the existing training team and address any equipment and accommodation issues. | The current team of three officers to run the academic element of the basic entry course is inadequate and will become even more so if more courses are needed to meet the recruitment requirements of 750 officers. | • Recruit trainers from within GIS to establish a full-time training team at ISATS.  
• Advertise internally for officers with an appropriate level of experience and interest in training.  
• If necessary, encourage the right applicants by offering incentives, such as relocation package and salary enhancement. | High |
| 1.3 Informed by the facility and staffing review, address accommodation issues. | GIS will need to ensure that what accommodation is available is sufficient to meet the proposed training commitment. | Review existing accommodation to assess capacity; consider the following:  
• Lecture room(s);  
• Administration office(s);  
• Breakout space/rooms for trainees to work in groups;  
• IT training room/area; and  
• Forgery equipment room. | High |
| 1.4 Informed by the facility and staffing review, address equipment issues. | The level of equipment necessary will be dictated by the number and nature of courses required, available finance and/or scope for donations. | Consider the following:  
• Furniture;  
• Whiteboards;  
• Flip charts;  
• Laptops for training staff;  
• PowerPoint projector(s);  
• Printers;  
• Photocopiers;  
• IT equipment for training purposes;  
• Access to forgery equipment; and  
• Stationery. | High |
| 1.5 Consider the resource, administrative and logistical issues involved in the establishment of regional training centres. | The wide dispersal of GIS staff around the country would probably make devolvement of at least some aspects of training viable and cost effective, especially if regional trainers are operational officers and train only when required. This will need to be a properly managed, separate project. | Consider the following:  
• Location (Elubo, Paga, Aflao and KIA);  
• Finance;  
• Trainers;  
• Accommodation;  
• Equipment;  
• Access; and  
• Courses appropriate for devolvement. | Medium |
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<td>1.6 Develop and install a central, computerized record of training for all officers.</td>
<td>A central record of training for all officers at ISATS will help to ensure that all required and especially mandatory training is delivered.</td>
<td>• GIS should liaise with Training Unit and Management Information Systems Unit to install a training records database.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. COMMUNICATION</td>
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| 2.1 In conjunction with the development of a nationwide internal e-mail system for all officers, get connections and access to e-mail set up at ISATS, if not already connected. | The lack of a GIS e-mail network is a severe inhibitor to operational effectiveness and particularly impacts on training. From the assessment, it was apparent that provision of internet connectivity is possible at least at ISATS, Accra headquarters, as well as in regional, sector and major BCPs. | • Engage with the technical department to set up internet connections.  
• Ring-fence finance to ensure that broadband provision is continuous.                                                                 | High     |
| 2.2 Set up a GIS training website.                                            | The absence of a GIS e-mail network should not preclude setting up a training website that officers can access and communicate with from personal accounts.                                                   | Engage a website designer. Consider publishing the following:  
• Details of ISATS facilities, objectives and the training team;  
• Standard training requirements for officers;  
• Curriculum;  
• Courses available;  
• Training activity underway and planned;  
• Avenues for feedback and communicating training needs;  
• Points of contact for officers within the training structure; and  
• Application process for courses.                                                                 | Medium   |
| 2.3 Set up a network of TLOs in all regional and sector offices, plus major BCPs, to be the points of contact with ISATS for local training and dissemination of materials and instructions. | Avenues through Regional and Sector Commands and major BCPs should be established to ensure a two-way flow of information relating to all aspects of training and encourage feedback from operational staff. It would be advisable to formalize the network with a contact directory and official endorsement of liaison officers. | • Invite Regional and Sector Commands and major BCPs to designate TLOs from operational staff.  
• Produce instructions for TLOs.  
• Provide basic training for TLOs.  
• Internally publish names and contact details of TLOs.                                                                 | Low      |
| 2.4 Designate points of contact within ISATS to liaise with outside agencies and organizations. | Once points of contact have been established within the immigration structure, the system can be extended to other agencies with overlapping interests.                                                                 | Establish points of contact with other agencies and organizations.                                                                                                                                   | Low      |
| 3. RECRUITMENT                                                                |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                       | Medium   |
| 3.1 Assess training capacity with a view to increasing the number of basic training courses to meet demand for staff when the moratorium on recruitment is lifted. | It may be assumed that the current moratorium on recruitment is creating pent-up demand, which will be released when it is lifted. Preparations should be made in anticipation of this. | • Review training resources to estimate current capacity to provide basic training.  
• Initiate dialogue between ISATS and Human Resource Directorates to agree recruitment levels in relation to what training can be provided.  
• Identify what and where resources can be obtained with a view to increasing training capacity if required.  
• Reconsider the proposal to extend the length of entry-level training courses in conjunction with projected demand.                                                                 | Medium   |
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. TRAINING CURRICULA and TRAINING PRIORITIES</strong></td>
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| **4.1 As part of the ongoing review, designate one of the existing training team members as project manager to prepare the entry-level training course curriculum from the material provided by the previous European Union project.** | The curricula workshops have an important role to play in course development, but decision-making would be aided by the preparation of a curriculum by a professional trainer. This would allow the workshops to review informed proposals rather than debate issues from scratch. | • Appoint a trainer as project manager of the entry-level course curriculum review.  
• Project manager to present a suggested curriculum, based on firsthand training experience, to the workshop for endorsement. | High |
| **4.2 In the context of expected demand for entry-level training, review and set priorities for other courses to offer.** | Training policy envisages an ambitious expansion of training on a variety of subjects at all levels. This will require time, resources and careful planning, the first stage of which should be deciding priority in order of importance. | • Decide course priorities for the new curricula – consider suggestions below as priority for development. | High |
| **4.3 Prepare a training of trainers course in anticipation of the recruitment of new trainers.** | In view of the fact that the training team will need to be substantially expanded, training of trainers assumes a priority equal with, if not above, that of preparation of entry-level basic training. | • Prepare training of trainers course or outsource a private organization or NGO to train new team members. | High |
| **4.4 Prepare entry-level basic training course.** | On balance, training of trainers should take precedence, but can run in conjunction with each other. | • Prepare basic entry-level course. | High |
| **4.5 Develop and introduce a system for operational training at BCPs for at least four weeks after recruits join their first posting, through a system of on-the-job mentoring by suitably trained colleagues.** | It is advisable to have a formal system for trainees to be allocated suitably qualified operational trainers to shadow and guide them during their first weeks at BCPs. This builds confidence and reduces the potential for errors. | • Identify experienced officers at BCPs to act as operational trainers; this could be done in conjunction with TLOs.  
• Provide instructions and training for operational trainers.  
• Devise a checklist to ensure that all aspects of operational work are covered during operational training. | High |
| **4.6 Prepare junior management training course for new promotees to management grades.** | The most important step in management training is when officers first enter the management grade, and this training therefore needs high priority. | • Prepare a foundation in management course.  
• Consider outsourcing to private contractor or NGO if resources or expertise is not immediately available. | Medium |
<p>| <strong>4.7 Develop and introduce a consolidation (advanced) course for immigration officers 18 to 24 months after basic training.</strong> | As part of ongoing training and development, it is advisable to have an advanced course for officers who have been operational for 18 to 24 months to consolidate knowledge from basic training with experience gained since. The course should be slanted towards a workshop-type format to allow officers to contribute their own experience. | • Develop a consolidation course. | Medium |</p>
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| 4.8 Develop and prepare management courses for middle and senior managers. | Middle and senior management courses are generally equal priority and should be directed to officers newly promoted to middle and senior ranks. They are more consolidation of management skills as the participants will have already have training and experience in management. | • Develop middle and senior management courses.  
• Consider outsourcing or buying in expertise to at least train trainers. | Low      |
| 4.9 Consider what skills-based training is required in conjunction with the views of staff via a staff survey and set priorities in accordance with budgets and facilities. | Skills-based training is, at this stage of curricula development, going to take priority below the preceding more essential training. However, thought should be given to prioritizing skills-based training for future development, in addition to the subjects already planned as part of the latest training policy. Staff should be consulted and asked to specify their own priorities. | • Designate a review team for skills-based training.  
• Consult staff, through a training needs survey, about their perceptions of what skills training they require.  
• Review resources and facilities to determine what can realistically be provided – when and where. | Low      |
| 4.10 Investigate the feasibility of buying in and/or outsourcing skills-based training. | Skills-based training tends to demand specialist input. Any skills or experience that does not already exist within GIS should be sought first within the country and then from outside. Officers from specialist units within GIS can be brought in as trainers; courses can be contracted out or trainers from outside can be contracted in. | • Conduct an audit of staff skills within GIS.  
• Look for officers with appropriate training skills within GIS and other ministries.  
• Identify and cost outside sources for skills training. | Medium   |

**5. TRAINING MATERIALS**

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| 5.1 Training team to review the content of all training material in conjunction with the new entry-level basic training curriculum. | All current training material should be reviewed with a view to creating consistent modules. New curriculum subjects will need to be developed from scratch. Modules should include comprehensive briefing notes to build into an instruction manual. | • Training team to update existing training materials and prepare new modules where required.  
• Circulate draft proposals to all Human Resource and curricula workshop participants.  
• Build feedback into final proposals.  
• Materials should be stored electronically in shared areas. | High     |
| 5.2 Trainers to rotate presentation of sessions to ensure that they are fully conversant with all course materials. | Ideally, trainers, although they may specialize in specific subjects, should be able to deliver any session on the curriculum. It is therefore good practice for sessions to be rotated among them. | • Training modules should be developed in a format that allows presentation by any trainer.  
• Trainers to be scheduled to cover all sessions over a series of courses. | Medium   |
| 5.3 Utilize supplementary source material, such as the IOM publication *Essentials of Migration Practice* (EMP), and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime training modules. | Essentials of Migration Practice contains a great deal of operational materials directly related to basic training of immigration officers. The IOM publication *Essentials of Migration Management* is slanted towards border management and as such, more relevant to management training than operational practice. | • Introduce the EMP Manual to the training material review process to supplement existing source materials.  
• Source additional materials from the UN and European Union. | High     |
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| 5.4 Produce weekly tests and final examinations to ensure consistent standards and satisfactory progress. | Tests and examinations should be an integral part of the basic entry-level course to ensure that trainees reach the required standard, identify where training methods may be deficient and highlight where remedial training is necessary. Appraisal of trainees during the course should be continuous. | • Review current tests and examinations.  
• Produce tests and examinations where none currently exist.  
• Introduce continuous assessment of trainees during courses. | High |
ANNEX B
LIST OF CONSULTATIONS

VOLTA REGION
Volta Regional Command
  COI Prudence Aku Sosuh – Regional Commander
  ACOI Amon Ashie – Nyive Sector Commander
  DSI Obo Cann – Regional Accounts Officer

Akanu Sector Command
  DSI Elijah Narh – Sector Commander
  DSI Fred Nunoo – Staff Officer

Agotime Afegame
  AICO II Bismark Gbediame
  AICO II Apiiga Emmanuel
  AICO II Dordor Richard
  AICO II Odoro Christopher
  AICO II Issaka Ayebo Simon
  AICO II Bright Afeli

Nyive Sector
  ACOI Amon Ashie – Sector Commander
  DSI Johannes Kpormegbe – Shia BCP OIC, Commander
  ASI Philip Essuman – Regional Public Relations Officer (PRO)/OIC, Asikuma Checkpoint
  Charles Algore – Chief Collector, Customs

Kpoglo
  DSI Eric Dogbe – OIC Kpoglo BCP
  Sr Insp. J.O. Afriyie
  AICO II C.A. Anania
  AICO II Harriet Osei Bonsu
  AICO II Faustina Afriyie
  Ebenezer Ahiotar – Chief Collector, Customs

Aflao Sector
  COI Julius Gborglah – OIC Aflao BCP
  DSI Dusour
  Sr Insp. Herman Kpoh – Patrol Team Leader

WESTERN REGION
Dadieso Regional Command
  ACOI Korletey Kwame Fosu – Sector Commander
  DSI Samuel Kwasi Nkrumah
  Suaman District Assembly – Dadieso District
  Honourable Joseph Betino – District Chief Executive (DCE)
  Mr Bofo Ahmed – District Coordinating Director
Antokrom
   AICO I Patrick Asante
   AICO I Romeo Abbey

Kwabena Nartey Inland Border Post
   AICO I Larbi George Mantey
   AICO I Sumaila Issaku

Gyato Inland Border Post
   ICO Edward Gyedu
   AICO I Abigail Akowuah

Oscar
   AICO I Albert Adjei Segla

Kyenseekokoo
   AICO II Seth Aseidu Addo
   AICO II Simon Degbey

Enchi District Assembly – AWoIN District
   Honourable Oscar Larbi – DCE
   Mr Augustine Baidoo – District PRO
   Mr Martin Asare – District BNI Officer
   Mr Emil Atsu – District Budget Analyst
   Mr Ibrahim Yakubu
   ASI Kojo Nketiah – Enchi District Commander
   ASI Desmond OIC Enchi District – 2IC for Yaakese

Sewum
   Insp. Erasmus Atse

Yaakese
   AICO II Daniel Owusu Ansah
   AICO II Prosper Ablordey

Boinso
   ICO Divine Oduma-Kumah

Immigration Service Academy and Training School, (ISATS), Assin Fosu
   COI Justice Amevor – Ag. Commander, Academy
   ACOI Felix Agyemang-Bosompem – Commanding Officer, Training School
   DSI Esther Efua Tecku
   DSI Kyei Asiedu
   ASI Ben Adaklu
   DSI Rita Afi Donkor
   DSI Believe Bubu Pomeyie
   DSI Nicholas Alassani
   DSI Regina Asiedu