STUDY ON BORDER COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF
BORDER SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT
IN THE
LIPTAKO-GOURMA
REGION

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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ACRONYMS

DSF   defence and security force

IDP   internally displaced person

IED   improvised explosive device

LPC   local prevention committee

NGO   non-governmental organization

PAAEPA   Support Programme for Access to Drinking Water and Sanitation

RGPH   General Census of Population and Housing
                 (French: Recensement général de la population et de l'habitation)

UNDP   United Nations Development Programme

VDC   village development committee

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The study on the Liptako-Gourma border communities' perception of border security and management in the region is an initiative of IOM with financial support from the United States Department of State. It was conducted in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger from March to May 2019, using a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches.

The field survey was conducted with communities in 20 border towns in the eastern, Sahel and northern regions of Burkina Faso; 2 towns in Mali and among DSF officers at 3 border posts in the Niger, and reached 4,930 people including 106 DSF officers.

I.   Border communities' perceptions

A region with a challenging security context

Since the 2011 crisis in Libya, the Sahelo–Sahelian area has been facing an upsurge in violence that has worsened year after year. Over the past five years, safety has deteriorated considerably in the border strip of the Liptako-Gourma States. A strong connection between armed groups and criminal groups has developed in this area, favouring coordinated incursions and attacks by the criminal networks of terrorist groups and other armed bandits and traffickers.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Mourabitoune, the Islamic State in the Great Sahara, and the Group to Support Islam and Muslims are the main terrorist groups operating in the Liptako-Gourma border area. In addition, they obtained the allegiance of some local groups such as Ansar Dine, Ansarou and Moujaho. Their strategy is to eliminate the presence of security forces and administrative and political authorities in the territories they want to control, thus instilling fear among the populations and leading them to believe that the State is unable to protect them. This terrorist groups' strategy is well understood by the respondents, with 81.46 per cent of them saying that terrorist attacks are mainly targeting the positions of the security forces.

Despite this apparent targeting of the DSFs, various statistics reveal that terrorist activities also strike local political stakeholders and religious and customary leaders through targeted assassinations, abductions and intimidation.

The literature on terrorism shows that political factors (e.g. corruption, impunity, incivility and the difficult civil–military relationship), combined with socioeconomic factors, such as rural poverty, high cost of living and unemployment, push young people towards terrorism. In this study, a large proportion of respondents mentioned poverty (54.74%) and lack of occupation (48.70%) as factors encouraging terrorism. Challenging authority (34.72%) and anger and frustration (26.72%) were also mentioned by the respondents as reasons leading to terrorism. According to 37.74 per cent of the respondents, adherence to the Islamist ideology is beginning to grow. This phenomenon could be explained by the communication strategy of these radical movements, which capitalize on citizens' anger and frustration. In their sermons, they expose the lack of presence of the States, raise the issues of hassle and administrative misconduct, and propose populist measures to the communities (e.g. authorization to exploit protected areas, hunting zones and gold sites).

The States' response with military operations dedicated to the fight against terrorism has enabled the DSFs to record some victories so that 13.21 per cent of the respondents believe that the terrorist threat is decreasing. However, a relative majority of the respondents (52.43%) believe that the terrorist threat is stable, while one third of them (34.36%) are less optimistic because they feel that the terrorist threat is increasing.

For border communities, the high media coverage of the terrorist attacks means the risk that their main security concern, such as instances of cattle theft (for 73.23% of them), will be overshadowed. Admittedly, this threat is not new in the Sahel, but its extent is recent and can be explained by the deterioration of security conditions. Attacks on and arson of town halls, gendarmerie brigades and police stations have forced mayors, prefects, and security forces to leave areas of high insecurity. The absence of administrative and military authorities in these areas has turned them into no man's land, which has encouraged raids and the resurgence of large-scale banditry, trafficking and smuggling.

In addition, economic activities, particularly agropastoral activities, are, according to the stakeholders met at the field level, suffering serious repercussions caused by insecurity in the studied areas. Producers in some areas of the Burkina Faso Sahel (Koutougou, Tin-Akof, etc.) and the Niger (Torodi, Gorouol) no longer have the courage to manage their land or lead their herds to some of the pastures, which has a negative impact on agropastoral production.

Porous borders

The border is perceived by a large majority of respondents in border communities as a demarcation, a barrier used to set the territorial limits of a State. Thus, 82.37 per cent of the respondents from Burkina Faso attribute an administrative and geographical function to the border. For the large majority (79.60%) of border communities met in Mali, the border is used to monitor the entries into and exits from a territory.

The porosity of the borders of the Liptako-Gourma States is quite visible, as not all borders are clearly defined or materialized. The existence of alternative routes, consisting of bypass roads around the border posts, is signposted along the entire border areas. Thus, these tracks can allow individuals at times to cross the border with goods and merchandise without being checked by the police, customs and other authorities. Wanted individuals, prohibited products, and various types of trafficking (e.g. trafficking in cigarettes, drugs, weapons and human beings), can thus move from one country to another without the risk of being arrested by the DSFs. People using the alternative routes sometimes benefit from the complicity of some members of the community who help them with transport, in particular motorcycle taxis.

Despite the difficult security context, the borders between the Liptako-Gourma States have remained open, allowing the free movement of people across the borders. The existence of the borders has not affected the ethnic and sociocultural uniqueness of the border communities because the reasons for crossing borders remain familial (weddings, baptisms, religious ceremonies, etc.), as attested by a large majority of respondents (90.58%). Commercial activities are the second reason why people cross borders (75.36%). However, the security crisis has had an effect on border crossings for economic activities. Crossings for economic reasons come last, mentioned only by 21.45 per cent of the respondents in Burkina Faso and 6.88 per cent of the respondents in Mali. The resurgence of community conflicts, livestock theft, and the desertion of fields in some border areas (e.g. Soum and Yatenga districts) for security reasons explain this situation.

Even if security is not fully ensured at the borders, a majority of respondents (59.73%) believe that the measures (e.g. reinforced searches and controls, curfews, state of emergency) taken to secure the border are sufficient. This perception seems rather to reflect a fear of new, more restrictive measures, extending the crossing time through multiple controls and restricting freedoms rather than real satisfaction.

Communities–defence and security forces: A collaboration to be improved

Forms of collaboration between local communities and the DSFs exist and have been developed over time. Thus, at the police and gendarmerie level, good relations are maintained with the customary and religious leaders and resource persons who sometimes receive protocol and courtesy gifts (e.g. sugar, mats, balloons) during traditional, cultural or religious events. The same applies to customs officers who have networks of informants with whom they maintain strong relationships. But it is particularly at the

level of the water and forest rangers that collaboration with the local community has heightened. This collaboration is shown by the organization of certain populations into groups for the protection of the environment and protected areas and for forest management. As a result, the populations feel strongly involved in the actions and participate actively in the protection of natural resources through eco-guard patrols and reforestation campaigns, among others.

The need for collaboration between the communities and the DSFs is necessary, particularly in the context of combating insecurity. However, this collaboration is still hampered by a lack of trust, fostered by:

- the communities' fear of the DSFs (inherently) and the possible reprisals they may suffer following terrorist incursions or attacks in their locality;

- the lack of promptness in the DSFs' interventions when ongoing attacks and suspicious events are reported by communities; the DSFs are seen as "doctors after death" by communities who say that "the DSFs are slow to respond to our cries for help";

- the lack of discretion of some DSF informants, as they often put themselves in danger by exposing their relationship with the DSFs.

State responses remaining ineffective

The response of the DSFs against terrorist acts has not yet succeeded in restoring security in Liptako-Gourma, but military action is not the only strategy to defeat terrorism: there is also the option of development. Unfortunately, at this level too, despite the efforts undertaken in the context of the devolution of public administration, the communities regret a lack of public services at the border towns. The prefecture and the primary services for the population (e.g. primary schools and health centres) are the main public services, which are often located in border towns, but they are understaffed, lack materials and equipment, and sometimes have to cover large areas. Beyond this shortfall, the context of insecurity has worsened the situation due to the closure of schools and sometimes health centres in most of the border towns. Consequently, thousands of children are deprived of the right to education and many citizens are deprived of the right to health without the State's response to this situation meeting the expectations of the communities.

In addition to terrorist attacks and sometimes because of them, community conflicts are erupting and can become violent (e.g. those in Yirgou, Arbinda, central Mali). These conflicts lead to many deaths and displacements of populations. In February 2019, official data indicated that there were 82,000 IDPs in Burkina Faso.

States and NGOs have created mechanisms for the prevention and management of conflicts and crises. Although structures and mechanisms do exist, they are not operational in the opinion of most stakeholders, who address the issue without enthusiasm and without any belief in the usefulness of the existing mechanisms in their current configuration.

The communities' proposals for strengthening the effectiveness of crisis prevention mechanisms are generally aimed at improving the functioning of existing frameworks with means such as the training of leaders, the organization of consultation meetings and simulation exercises similar to the one carried out in Tillabéri in 2018.

Therefore, it is necessary to get the resources to finance crisis prevention and management mechanisms and to encourage support partners to join their efforts with the State to optimize their operations.

It is noteworthy that local stakeholders want the State to invest more in crisis prevention rather than crisis management actions. This is why they propose tackling the causes of crises rather than preparing to manage the consequences, because as one local stakeholder stated: "the best way to manage crises is to act upstream".

Proposals from the communities

To prevent terrorist threats, improve relations between communities and the DSFs, and ensure prevention and better management of conflicts and crises, the respondents proposed the following actions:

- Training of community leaders, as the population listens to them, on the various roles they must play in the community, and take into account the proposals designed at the local level in the development of public policies;

- Greater involvement of mayors to take advantage of their proximity to the population: "Mayors know everyone in their localities, unlike administrators who are assigned to localities just for a time," said a member of the border communities;

- Protection of non-DSFs stakeholders involved in border management, which is urgent and necessary because of the multiple threats they face;

- Implementation of actions in favour of young people, who are the main target of terrorist recruitment; 76 per cent of the respondents proposed to carry out awareness-raising activities aimed at the young public and they suggested addressing unemployment among the young people by offering them the opportunity to get involved in economic activities;

- Strengthening of civil–military collaboration and the intensification of awareness-raising and capacity-building activities for non-DSF stakeholders through regular training sessions such as the IOM awareness-raising caravan in the districts of the Tillabéri region;

- Implementation of income-generating activities and the development of primary public services (e.g. schools, health centres) to boost social cohesion around the border;

- Implementation of a joint force composed of all DSF corps to support the police in the management of the post.

II.   Defence and security forces officers' perceptions

Security circumstances as a source of concerns

The DSF officers interviewed believe that the areas covered by the study are not safe from terrorism, as 92.4 per cent claim. Among the three affected districts, Ayorou appears to be the district where insecurity is at a higher level and where a psychosis prevails given its geographical position with Mali. The risks and threats include (a) the suspected presence in the district of terrorist groups (e.g. Moujaho, Ansar Dine), (b) the occurrence of rackets and *zakat*[1] ransoms recovered by the jihadists, (c) the laying of mines in the north-eastern part of Tillabéri (Inatès) and (d) the porous nature of the border with Mali and the lack of control over the Niger River.

In the survey areas, the different armed groups operating are terrorists (e.g. Ansar Dine, Moujaho) according to 83 per cent of the officers interviewed, armed bandits (49.06%) and traffickers of illicit products (4.7%).

Armed groups in the areas of investigation are responsible for attacks on DSFs, with the use of explosive devices and through abductions and killings.

The security measures (curfews, ban on motorcycles, state of emergency, etc.) introduced by the Niger in the Tillabéri region have helped reduce the psychosis created by the attacks attributed to the terrorist groups Ansar Dine and Moujaho, whose presence was reported in the districts of Ayorou, Inatès and Gorouol. The terrorist threat is gradually giving way to large-scale banditry (armed robberies, hold-ups, vehicle thefts, targeted assassinations, etc.). According to the officers interviewed, this banditry is the work of local youth who blame poverty and idleness for engaging

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[1]   "Zakat" refers to the obligatory charity that every Muslim pays according to the rules of solidarity within the Muslim community.

in criminal activities. Unreported for fear of reprisals, these young bandits represent the security issue most mentioned by the respondents (66.98%).

Smuggling (26.42%) and livestock theft (23.58%) are the other security problems mentioned by the stakeholders interviewed for this study.

For 76.42 per cent of the respondents, poverty pushes young people towards terrorism. Lack of occupation (i.e. idleness) was mentioned by 60.38 per cent of the officers as one of the reasons for young people's support for terrorism. Anger and frustration generated by feeling of injustice, unequal access to primary services and feeling of abandonment by the State among communities in border areas is the reason behind the adhesion of young people to terrorism for 37.74 per cent of the respondents.

To defeat terrorism, the respondents propose a participatory community approach. This approach would consist of raising youth awareness, involving community leaders and working with the DSFs (61.90%). It would also entail working to reduce the factors driving young people to join terrorism. To this end, 59.05 per cent of the respondents recommend providing economic activities to young people.

Insufficient secured border checkpoints

Border crossings are not secure according to the perception of 75 per cent of the DSFs interviewed for this study. The reasons given by respondents for this perception include the following:

- The presence of armed terrorist groups in neighbouring countries, which is illustrated by attacks on the DSFs, resulting in strong terrorist threats at border crossings;

- The poor geographical position (post located on hollow ground with numerous bypass roads), which has led some respondents to say that the post is designed to control passengers rather than to defend the territory;

- Insufficient strategic and operational preparation of officers to meet the new challenges of the terrorist groups' methods.

In addition, there is an insufficient number of officers, weapons and protective equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets, night-vision lamps, etc.).

Posts insufficiently prepared to control entries and exits

According to the DSF officers interviewed for this study, the number of people crossing the Ayorou, Makalondi and Petelkolé border crossings varies between 100 and 750 per day, depending on the day. However, 75 per cent of the respondents said that these positions are not sufficiently prepared to control entries and exits. Insufficient staff at the posts (44.30%), the lack of modern documents control equipment (43.04%) and the presence of bypass roads (8.86%) were mentioned as reasons why the posts are not sufficiently prepared to control entries and exits. Furthermore, the respondents pointed out that the Ayorou and Makalondi posts are far from the borders or not adjacent to the border posts of neighbouring countries.

The alternative routes consist of bypass roads around the border crossing, which can often allow people to cross the border with goods and merchandise without being checked by the police, customs and other authorities. Wanted individuals; prohibited products; and various trafficking activities (e.g. trafficking in: cigarettes, drugs, weapons and human beings) can move or be done from one country to another without the risk of being arrested by the DSFs. People using the alternative routes sometimes benefit from the complicity of some members of the community who help them with transport, in particular motorcycle taxis.

In the survey conducted among officers at the three border posts in the Tillabéri region, 94 per cent of the respondents confirmed the existence of bypass roads.

In order to carry out their tasks with professionalism and rigour, training is needed according to the officers interviewed. Seventy-three (73) per cent of them expressed the need for anti-document fraud training, as document fraud is a growing phenomenon.

Other training needs relate to community policing (16%), reception techniques (4%) and combating drug trafficking (3%).

Inter-defence and security forces collaboration to be improved

In the Niger, the DSFs involved in border security management comprise the police force, the gendarmerie, the national guards, civil protection officials, customs officers, and water and forest rangers. The officers of these various bodies have specific, and sometimes common skills, in particular the ability to ensure border security. However, the recruitment standards and the living and working conditions of some DSF bodies are better than the others. As a result, some feel frustration or develop a feeling of being superior to others.

Inter-DSF collaboration focuses on sharing information and conducting joint patrols that have improved the relationship between the DSFs and the population and enhanced the security of the area. However, this collaboration suffers from a lack of coordination, as revealed in the following statement by one stakeholder: "There are five DSF corps that intervene at the border, but each one of them only focuses on its own specific tasks. There is no action synergy...". Despite this situation, a large proportion of the officers interviewed (59%) stated that the quality of collaboration between the different DSF bodies is good.

Conflicts of jurisdiction, lack of communication and escorts' non-compliance with control procedures sometimes create disputes among the DSFs. However, the subject is a taboo and is rarely discussed with other stakeholders than the DSFs. Thus, when asked by the interviewers, a large proportion of officers (96%) stated that no disputes were observed between the various DSF bodies.

In order to improve collaboration between DSF bodies, the respondents suggested the following four courses of action:

- Create/Reinforce the cultural and sports meeting platforms between the various DSFs bodies;

- Organize, if not reinforce, the training courses shared by the various DSFs bodies;

- Promote/Develop the organization of mixed patrols;

- Reduce the superiority complex of one body over others by developing a culture of mutual respect and courtesy.

A need to diversify collaborations

Collaboration between the DSFs and technical services is informal and focuses on the escorts provided by the DSFs to other technical services when they have to travel to insecure areas for work.

The respondents suggested the organization of periodic meetings for exchanges between the DSFs and technical services, training workshop sessions, and strengthening dialogue and communication as means that could contribute to improving the relationship between the DSFs and technical services.

In addition, there is a collective awareness that collaboration between the local communities and the DSFs is essential to ensure security. This idea is widely accepted by the respondents, 97.17 per cent of whom are willing to collaborate with local communities. This collaboration mainly involves information-sharing, or more precisely, reporting of suspects who sometimes hide within the population. Overall, information-sharing is going very well, and the reliability of the information reported being reflected on the ground in major drug seizures, apprehensions of suspects and arrests.

It is increasingly clear that the military option alone cannot overcome insecurity and the threat of terrorism. This is well understood by a large proportion of respondents (99%) who said that the DSFs alone cannot ensure security in the current context.

Cross-border cooperation to be boosted

In the district of Ayorou, there is a highly operational formal framework for cooperation in the health sector, in particular during vaccination campaigns. Added to this is the cross-border framework set up by the Danish Demining Group, which is much more focused on bringing people together (e.g. through a project to set up a market garden) on both sides of the border (Ayorou–Ansongo) than on managing security around the border.

In Téra, cross-border cooperation exists in the pastoralism sector. Furthermore, the stakeholders present Téra as a leader in the field of cross-border cooperation with its participation in: (a) the creation of the C3 Sahel;[2] and (b) the implementation of cross-border projects such as the PAAEPA between the Dori and Téra districts, financed by the European Union, and the Programme for the Promotion of Community Security and Social Cohesion of the Liptako-Gourma Region, financed by UNDP.

These various existing frameworks and in particular cross-border cooperation in the pastoralism sector and the C3 Sahel could be used to identify and resolve security issues.

In Torodi, there is no formal cross-border cooperation in border management according to the majority of stakeholders.

The study reveals that, in the survey areas, the Niger DSF officers positioned at the Ayorou, Makalondi and Pételkolé border posts have met their counterparts in Burkina Faso but not those in Mali. In fact, 57 per cent of the respondents claim to know some of their counterparts in Burkina Faso, compared with only 1 per cent who know their fellow border officers in Mali. This can be explained by the fact that the Makaloni and Pételkolé posts tend to border Burkina Faso. At the border post level, the stakeholders maintain relations of information-sharing, verification and control even if these exchanges take place in an informal setting.

To promote exchanges with Burkina Faso and Mali, respondents from the Niger suggested the creation of joint brigades (30.48%) and organization of joint exercises (20.95%).

Results of the project

The project Engaging Communities in Border Management in [the] Niger was implemented by IOM in the Tillabéri region in 2018. The districts of Téra, Torodi and Ayorou were among the areas of intervention of the project.

IOM is well known in Téra District. Several stakeholders claim to have participated in the project's implementation activities, including the awareness caravan, the formation of local prevention committees, civil–military activities and the theoretical simulation exercise. All these activities appear to be innovations in the district, as they have never been carried out before.

In the districts of Torodi and Ayorou, the number of stakeholders aware of IOM activities is lower, as most activities (construction of buildings, electrification, IT equipment, etc.) are carried out at the police station level.

Those who mentioned IOM were referring to the awareness-raising caravan, which, in Ayorou, focused on violent extremism, DSF–population collaboration and compliance with state of emergency measures.

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[2]   C3 Sahel is a cooperation unit between the cross-border communities of the Sahel, which brings together the cross-border towns in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger.

At the level of border crossing officers, a large proportion of the respondents (72%) are aware of IOM border management activities.

According to 97 per cent of the respondents, the implementation of the border community engagement in border security and management project has helped strengthen citizens' participation in security. At the field level, this can be seen in the improved relations between the population and the DSFs. **According to some stakeholders, this is even a form of a trend reversal**, because before the implementation of these activities, collaboration between the two parties was poor. Moreover, in all three districts surveyed, this study finds that mayors are closer to the population, which means that they have more information than mayors elsewhere.

Respondents also attributed these outcomes to the project:

- Contribution to strengthening citizens' safety reflexes;
- Contribution to the improvement of DSF–local community relations.

This perception study, initiated by IOM with the border communities in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, is the reference study for the implementation of the project Engaging the Border Communities in the Liptako-Gourma Region in Border Security and Management.

At the end of the study, recommendations are addressed to the Liptako-Gourma States and to the authorities in charge of security. They focus on the following:

- Implementation of an integrated border management policy combining security and development, and helping transform "barriers" into "bridges";
- Reduction of socioeconomic factors conducive to the expansion of terrorism;
- Training of DSFs to work to "reach the hearts" of the communities;
- Implementation of information-sharing/awareness-raising activities to change the mentality on both sides (population and DSFs);
- Strengthening the knowledge of the DSFs about human rights;
- Implementation of actions that improve the relations between the DSFs and the communities;
- Facilitation of information-sharing and training for communities on the missions and functions of the DSFs and public administration services;
- Support for customary and religious leaders in mediation, dialogue promotion and peace-building activities;
- Identification of and support for local initiatives to promote peace and social cohesion.

INTRODUCTION

Located in the heart of the Sahelo–Saharan strip, the Liptako-Gourma region covers the territories of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger, and forms an economic area with great agropastoral and mining potential, a large youth population and many other advantages.

Livestock farming represents a key element of the area's rural economy, both in terms of economic weight (between 30% and 35% of GDP) and as a structuring factor in rural areas. However, it faces strong structural constraints, including (a) poor security of pastoral areas, (b) insufficient water points, (c) low availability of supplementary fodder, (d) difficulty in accessing financing, (e) low value of animal production (hides and skins, eggs, honey, etc.) in markets, and (f) poor access to veterinary and advisory support services.

Agriculture in the area suffers from low rainfall and soil degradation and faces difficulties in particular with regard to financing, market access and insufficient organization of the stakeholders involved in the agropastoral sector. All three countries covered in this study have a high climate vulnerability. Irregular and poorly distributed rains have significant impacts on people's livelihoods and food security.

The cross-border region is marked by a strong limitation of equitable access to primary services for the population. Access to water is particularly difficult for both people and livestock. There are not enough schools and the existing ones are not adapted to the needs of the local population. Furthermore, access to energy is very poor and transportation routes – such as tracks and roads – are severely degraded. The health sector as a whole suffers from a lack of infrastructure and insufficient supplies of staff and medicines. Borders are still porous.

In addition to this unfavourable situation, the security context is marked by extreme instability and an increase in violence over the last five years. In addition to the low presence and low quality of primary services, insecurity considerably complicates access to them for users. Public schools are particularly at risk because they are perceived by radical groups as the medium for Western education, which is perceived as harmful.

The Liptako-Gourma region accounts for most of the security incidents in the three countries (86% in Mali, 47% in Burkina Faso and 43% in the Niger), although the situation is different in the three countries, due to the specificities of their political and social contexts.

Since the January 2012 attacks on military camps in the north of the country by fighters of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and the Salafist movement Ansar Dine fighters, followed by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo's coup in March 2012, Mali has not been able to restore peace. Despite the peace agreements signed in Algiers in 2015, terrorist violence remains pervasive. The centre of the country is experiencing an escalation of intercommunal violence as illustrated by the clashes between the Dogon and the Fulani during the Ogossogou massacre in the Mopti region, which resulted in 157 civilian casualties in March 2019.

According to the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Security Council, the security situation in Mali in the second quarter of 2019 was marked by violence targeting the local population, the resurgence of acts of banditry, targeted assassinations, and attacks against the Malian DSFs and the United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali. In the north, attacks took place in all regions, including Gao (15), Timbuktu (11), Ménaka (4) and Kidal (4). However, in the central region, asymmetric attacks were concentrated mainly in the Mopti region (24). The Malian DSFs remained the main targets and victims of the attacks by terrorist groups. During these attacks, 67 soldiers were killed and 51 wounded.

Long spared by terrorism, Burkina Faso has been confronted since the uprising in 2014 with a resurgence of attacks in its territory, particularly at the borders with Mali and the Niger. According to the latest official assessment by the Ministry of National Defence and Veterans, from 4 April 2015 to 16 June 2019, Burkina Faso suffered 283 terrorist attacks that killed 524 people and injured 308 others. From January to June 2019, the country recorded 97 terrorist attacks, 26 of which targeted the DSFs and 71 others against civilians. These 97 assaults resulted in 234 deaths, 35 among the DSFs and 199 civilians. According to the same source, 17 attacks were carried out using IEDs. Out of 180 terrorist attacks against civilians, 43 were abduction operations in which 83 people were kidnapped.

In total, since the first terrorist attack on 4 April 2015, "more than 858 civilians" have died as a result of the deadly violence that has plagued Burkina Faso.[3] It was reported that "381 civilians were killed by terrorists, 213 by the *koglwéogo* (i.e. self-defence groups) and 262 civilians were arbitrarily executed by the DSFs".[4]

According to the United Nations, through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Burkina Faso is facing, for the first time in its history, ethnic massacres followed by massive displacements within the country's borders, including "more than 170,447 internally displaced persons" as of 11 May 2019, and "676,000 people threatened by food insecurity".[5]

In the Niger, the evolution of the security context can be observed around two areas: (a) the northern area (from the border with Mali to Gothèye), where the first attacks against the DSFs (i.e. police and customs) took place, and where community tensions have emerged between Songhaïs and Fulani communities; (b) the southern area (Torodi District), which is under the influence of armed groups established on the other side of the border in Burkina Faso.

In response to this situation, IOM, with the financial support of the US Department of State, implemented the project Engaging the Border Communities in the Liptako-Gourma Region in Border Security and Management. This project, which is consistent with the national policies of the Liptako-Gourma States, aims on the one hand to strengthen the capacities of governments and services in charge of security and border management, and, on the other hand, to establish the full commitment of affected communities to combat security threats.

In order to have a baseline of the perceptions of the border communities of Liptako-Gourma and the DSFs about the security situation and border management of the Sahelo–Sahelian area, IOM commissioned a perception study. This report outlines the results of the perception study. As with any perception study, the results are not necessarily intended to give an objective picture of reality. This study mainly consisted in collecting and analysing the people's views on the security problems they experience on a daily basis in border areas.

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[3] Boureima, Burkina : de 2015 à 2019, 283 attaques terroristes ont fait 524 morts (bilan officiel), Wakat Séra (17 June 2019).
[4] Ibid.
[5] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Situation report: Burkina Faso (May 2020).

I.   Methodological approach

1.1.   Objectives and expected results of the study

The implementation of the project Engaging the Border Communities in the Liptako-Gourma Region in Border Security and Management aims to establish effective partnerships and full commitment of border communities in the Liptako-Gourma region in order to effectively address insecurity. This implementation requires some prerequisites such as the knowledge of the initial situation. In order to bring communities to a behavioural change, identifying their initial state of mind beforehand is crucial. Subsequently, this study on community perceptions of border security and management was initiated.

The overall objective of this study is to identify the vision of communities living in border areas. In particular, there are three key reasons for carrying out this study:

- Firstly, to collect and analyse information to better understand the perception that border communities have of the security situation and border management in the Liptako-Gourma region;

- Secondly, to pursue an assessment of the community involvement level and collaboration with the authorities;

- Lastly, to suggest actions to encourage the emergence and adoption of attitudes and skills that promote behavioural change for responsible commitment and constructive community participation in security management and better collaboration with the DSFs.

1.2.   Study areas

Liptako-Gourma is located in the West African region. It is part of the continental platform located in south-western Niger and extends as far as Burkina Faso and Mali. Since independence, Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger have intended to implement a regional framework to promote solidarity and cooperation. This political ambition became a reality in December 1970 through a memorandum of understanding signed, creating the Liptako-Gourma Authority.

The target respondents and areas for the purposes of this study are:

- The localities in the eastern, northern and Sahel regions of Burkina Faso, on the one hand, and the towns of Mafouné and Mandiakuy in Tominian Cercle in the Ségou region, on the other hand, for the community survey;

- The officers working at the border posts located in the districts of Ayorou, Téra and Torodi in the Tillabéri region of the Niger for the DSF survey.

Map 1. Liptako-Gourma region and regional project areas

Source: IOM and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2019.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

The towns and villages covered by the study were first discussed at the study launch workshop held in Ouagadougou in November 2018. This proposal was again discussed and validated at the regional workshops held in Dori, Fada N'Gourma and Ouahigouya. Ultimately, it was decided that each interviewer would administer the questionnaire to 15 inhabitants in the 20 villages closest to the border and affected by insecurity.

In the Niger, a community survey was conducted earlier in the Tillabéri region in 2018. Thus, the questionnaire was used with the DSF staff at the Ayorou, Téra and Torodi border posts, in addition to the study previously conducted in Tillabéri.

1.3. Data collection methodology

The general approach used in this study was a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. This dual hybrid methodological approach allowed both to measure the perception that various communities in the border towns have of security issues and to understand the levers needed in order to involve communities' citizens in managing the security issue.

In Burkina Faso, qualitative data collection was conducted by the lead consultant in support of a team of nine provincial-level interviewers/supervisors. In both Mali and the Niger, a national consultant was appointed to conduct the qualitative survey. A set of investigative techniques with a holistic scope of the social context in which the perception study had been carried out was used. Interviews with specific resource persons at each territory level (such as customary and religious leaders, national administrative authorities, local mayors/local elected officials of municipalities in border areas, heads of the DSFs, heads of development associations/NGOs, leaders of farmers' organizations) were carried out. These interviews were supplemented by focus groups and allowed to capture the perceptions and representations of groups of stakeholders in order to highlight analyses and proposals for action on security issues, border management, collaboration between populations and DSFs, and cross-border cooperation, among others. For the collection of quantitative data, a questionnaire was administered among the communities in the villages along the Burkina Faso–Mali and Burkina Faso–Niger borders by 21 community investigators in Burkina Faso and 2 community investigators in Mali with knowledge of the local contexts and languages. These investigators were recruited with the support of the local executives of the covered municipalities. Two days were devoted to training investigators in interviewing methods for data collection, recording and transferring data to smartphones using the Kobo application. At the end of the training, each investigator was equipped with a smartphone. Supported by the IOM team, the supervisors recruited in each province carried out daily follow-ups of what the investigators had accomplished and monitoring of the data. In the Niger, the DSF survey was conducted by three investigators.

The study reached a total of 4,930 people as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Surveyed areas

Country	Region	Areas covered by the survey	Number of persons reached by the qualitative survey	Number of persons reached by the quantitative survey
Burkina Faso	Eastern, northern, Sahel	Komandjoari: Foutouri Tapoa: Botou Lorum: Banh, Sollé Yatenga: Kian, Titao, Oudalan: Déou, Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Tin Akof Seno: Falagountou, Seytenga, Soum: Baraboulé, Diguel, Koutougou, Nassoumbou Yagha: Mansila, Sebba, Tankougounadié, Titabé	150	4 255
Mali	Ségou	Tominian: Mafouné, Mandiakuy	74	313
Niger	Tillabéri	Ayorou, Téra, Torodi	32	106
		Total	256	4 674

The data collected by the investigators was directly transmitted to the database of the IOM Information Management Unit based in Dakar. This data was then entered in Excel (.xls) format and cleaned by matching the responses entered by the investigators. This initial work consisted mainly of proofreading spelling errors and differences. Following this cleaning work, a calculation of statistics was made using pivot tables. Each question was processed to get the percentage of respondents per answer and at times several questions were cross-tabulated to obtain more precise information. The result is a series of tables, each corresponding to a question on the survey form. From this, charts corresponding to selected tables were created and incorporated into this report using Microsoft Excel.[6]

As for the qualitative data, it was analysed through the prism of socio-anthropology.

The limits of this study are linked to the difficulties and constraints encountered in the conduct of the survey, mainly:

- The unavailability of some administrative and political authorities during the field investigation period;

- The lack of official correspondence from the hierarchy mentioned by some officers of the DSFs as a reason for not answering the questionnaires;

- The security risks faced by investigators in the Sahel, particularly since the publication of the list of terrorist suspects, some of whom had been contacted by the same investigators;

- The reluctance of the populations aggravated by the launch of the military operation, also known as Operation Otapuanu, in the east and central east regions of Burkina Faso, which further deepened their mistrust of local stakeholders;

- The increasing security threats, which made some locations inaccessible to investigators from a security perspective;

- Gender biases due to the numerical preponderance of men among the respondents, among other reasons.

Finally, the good collaboration among the stakeholders, the constant and effective communication, and the involvement of each of the stakeholders at both national and local levels during this study contributed to the success of the mission.

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[6] Not all charts have been inserted to avoid clutter within the report. However, a summary of all the data collected is provided in the annexes.

PART I:

COMMUNITIES' PERCEPTIONS

| CHAPTER 1 | PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS |

This chapter presents the demographic, ethnic and economic characteristics of the sample of communities living in the Burkina Faso–Niger and Burkina Faso–Mali border areas interviewed during the field survey.

1.1. Profile of respondents by gender

The community survey conducted in Burkina Faso reached 4,255 persons, of whom 3,267 were men (76.78%) and 988 were women (23.22%). This numerical preponderance of men does not comply with the instructions given to the investigators to interview a sample that is as representative as possible of the population of the towns covered by the field survey. As a matter of fact, this preponderance does not reflect the sociodemographic reality of these towns. With reference to the statistics of the 2006 General Census of Population and Housing (2006 Recensement général de la population et de l'habitation, RGPH), all the regions covered by the survey are predominantly populated by women – 50.92 per cent in the eastern region, 50.30 per cent in the north and 53.23 per cent in the Sahel. Due to cultural practices specific to some localities, it was often difficult for investigators to conduct individual interviews with women.

Figure 1. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by gender
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
In Mali, the community survey interviewed a total of 313 persons, of whom 251 were men (80.19%) and 62 were women (19.80%). As in Burkina Faso, the proportion of women reached during this survey is low given the numerical preponderance of women in the surveyed villages. This is due to cultural burdens.

1.2. Profile of respondents by age

In Burkina Faso, the study reached a high proportion of adults in the 26–40 age group (50.7%) and the 41–60 age group (32%), accounting for 82 per cent of the surveyed persons. The proportion of young people (18–25 years old) reached in this study is low and represents only 12 per cent of the total respondents. Thus, young people rank third in the numerical representation of the study sample, just ahead of seniors (4.23%). Yet, in Burkina Faso, the population is predominantly young (45.3% of the total population). The underrepresentation of young people can be explained by two hypotheses. The first relates to the period over which the survey was conducted, which is a period of exodus of young people to gold mining sites or urban centres. The second hypothesis is based on the status of young people where, according to habits and customs, they are not allowed to talk to a stranger when the elders are present.

Figure 2. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by age

In Mali, the study reached a total of 210 adults aged 40–69 years old, representing 67 per cent of the respondents. People aged 40–49 years old (26.51%), 50–59 years old (20.44%) and 60–69 years old (20.12%) are categorized as adults. During the survey, 75 young people aged 20–39 years old were reached, representing 23 per cent of the respondents. In 2018, the 20- to 34-year-old Malians were estimated by the National Institute of Statistics and Demography (Institut national de la statistique et de la démographie) at 4,098,550 out of the total population of 19,077,690. Therefore, the proportion of young people surveyed corresponds fairly closely to the national proportion, which is estimated at 21.48 per cent.

Figure 3. Distribution of respondents in Mali by age

1.3. Profile of respondents by nationality

The survey was conducted at the border area but mainly covered villages in the border towns of Burkina Faso. This explains why the analysis of the respondents' nationalities reveals that 97.84 per cent are from Burkina Faso, compared with 1.08 per cent of Malians and 0.96 per cent of nationals from the Niger. The survey villages are not necessarily host villages for migrants; hence, the low presence of Malians or nationals of the Niger in the sample.

The same situation was experienced in Mali, with a large majority of Malian respondents at 99.04 per cent compared with 0.32 per cent of Burkina Faso and the Niger respondents.

1.4. Profile of respondents by ethnic group

Data from the 2006 RGPH indicates that in the Sahel region, the Fulani people constitute the majority in the provinces of Seno (74%) and Yagha (68.5%). The Sonrais have a high numerical share in the Udalan (13.3%). In the northern region, the Mossis represent the majority (90.3%), but there are only two towns in the province of Lorum where the Mossis represent the majority (96%), and two towns in the province of Yatenga (89.9%). Gourmantchés represent the majority in the eastern region (66.1%), but the field survey was conducted in only two towns – Komandjoari with 48.1 per cent Gourmantché respondents and Tapoa with 82.9 per cent Gourmantchés.

It should be noted that the survey was carried out in 14 border towns in the Sahel region, 4 towns in the northern region and 2 in the eastern region. Regarding the sample, the distribution of respondents is as follows – 37.4 per cent Fulanis, 16.36 per cent Mossis and 14.99 per cent Gourmantchés, reflecting the ethnic configuration of the border towns surveyed in this study.

Figure 4. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by ethnicity

Ethnicity	Percentage
Djerma	0.85%
Gourmantché	14.99%
Haoussa	0.92%
Mossi	16.36%
Fulani	37.44%
Sonrai	12.81%
Touareg	1.62%
Bellah	2.96%
Dogon	3.06%
Foulce	4.39%
Koronfè	0.89%
Rimaïbé	1.10%
Tamacheque	1.81%

In Mali, the community survey was conducted in two towns predominantly populated of the Bwaba (95%) and the Dafing (4%).

1.5. Profile of respondents by economic activity

Burkina Faso is a country with an agropastoral vocation, where the agriculture and livestock sectors hold more than 80 per cent of rural households and account for 40 per cent of the country's GDP. Therefore, cross-border areas are agropastoral, just like the rest of the country, which is reflected in the composition of the surveyed population. In all the surveyed regions in Burkina Faso (eastern, northern and the Sahel), 64.04 per cent of the respondents practise agriculture as their main activity and 16.40 per cent are engaged in livestock farming as a secondary activity. However, in the Sahel region, livestock farming is the main activity of the populations. Commercial activities are practiced by 6.42 per cent of the respondents.

Figure 5. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by economic activity

Mali is also a country that mainly relies on agropastoral vocation, where the agriculture and livestock sectors account for more than 80 per cent of rural households and contribute up to 40 per cent to the country's GDP. Mali's agropastoral vocation is more notable in rural areas, which explains why 74.12 per cent of the respondents are active in agriculture. Livestock farming, although ranked second, is less popular in Mali than in Burkina Faso (7.67%). This low proportion of respondents in the livestock sector is mainly due to the fact that the survey areas in Mali (communes of Mafouné and Mandiakuy) are predominantly agricultural areas, inhabited mainly by the Bwaba who are rather inclined to farming.

Figure 6. Distribution of respondents in Mali by economic activity

CHAPTER 2   LOCAL COMMUNITIES' PERCEPTIONS OF BORDER MANAGEMENT

This chapter is a synthesis of respondents' perceptions of the general issue of border management. The purposes, geographical location of the border, reasons for crossing the border, and knowledge of the DSFs present at the border are the main topics discussed in this chapter.

2.1. Purposes of borders

In most cross-border areas, the populations on both sides of the border share a common ethnic and sociocultural background. The mapping of border crossings during the colonial period was not carried out due to the sociological, cultural and historical homogeneity. As a matter of fact, the borders of West African States are artificial lines that separate communities linked by history and culture.

In Burkina Faso, this perception of the border is strongly expressed by a large majority of the stakeholders interviewed (82.37%) who consider that the border aims to define the boundaries between States, that is, to set the territorial limits of a State. The border is thus perceived as a demarcation line, a barrier. The respondents highlighted this administrative and geographical dimension of the border.

Two secondary functions are assigned to the border. One is for ensuring the population's safety, as mentioned by a quarter of respondents (26.49%). For 23.01 per cent of the respondents, the border allows for monitoring of entries into and exits from a territory.

Figure 7. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the purposes of borders

In Mali, only 30 per cent of the stakeholders interviewed consider that the border determines the boundaries between States (i.e. to set the territorial limits of a State). For a large majority of the respondents (79.60%), the border allows the authorities to monitor the entries into and exits from a territory.

Figure 8. Malian respondents' opinions on the purposes of borders

2.2. Knowledge of the location of the border

The porosity of the borders of the Liptako-Gourma States is quite apparent, and not all borders are clearly defined or materialized. Moreover, the lack of control over border boundaries has led, on the one hand, Burkina Faso and Mali, and, on the other hand, Burkina Faso and the Niger, to notify the International Court of Justice in a joint letter of their willingness to settle the dispute between them regarding the delimitation of their borders.[7] This approach has led to compromises signed between Burkina Faso and Mali and between Burkina Faso and the Niger to agree on a precise delimitation of borders. Despite the absence of a border demarcation, in Burkina Faso, two thirds of the people surveyed (69.69%) claim to be familiar with the location of the border. This could be explained by the fact that the sample is composed of respondents living along the borders. Indeed, these persons had to travel regularly on both sides of the border and, as a result of the border controls, they came to have a clear idea of the location of the border.

One third of the respondents stated that they were not familiar with the location of the border. It should be noted that the absence of boundary markers does not facilitate the recognition of border boundaries, particularly for sedentary farmers.

The number of respondents with knowledge of the location of the border is higher in Mali, with 98 per cent of them claiming to know the location of the border with Burkina Faso. This knowledge of the location of the border can be explained by the respondents' proximity to the border they regularly cross.

2.3. Reasons for crossing the border

Five years ago, the main reasons for crossing the border were economic (53.99%) and familial (52.85%). The economic reasons were related to the practice of agropastoral activities, as most of the inhabitants from the border areas were engaged in agriculture and livestock farming. Since borders were only artificial barriers for local communities, family reasons (marriage, baptism, customary/religious ceremonies, etc.) were important for crossing the border. Currently, 27.28 per cent of the respondents say they cross the border for commercial reasons. These are the respondents who regularly cross borders for livestock and grain sales, and also those who go as far as Niamey to supply local markets with manufactured goods and other commodities. Family motivations still come in second place, with 23.79 per cent of the respondents mentioning these, even though the rate has dropped by almost 20 points. The percentage of respondents claiming to cross the border for economic reasons has decreased considerably in recent years, particularly in the border towns with Mali. The intercommunity conflicts (e.g. between the Fulani

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7   Burkina Faso–Mali joint letter notified to the ICJ on 14 October 1983 and Burkina Faso–Niger joint letter notified on 12 May 2010.

and the Dogon) led to a wave of return to the Yatenga province and the abandonment of crop fields by those living on the border between Soum (in Burkina Faso) and Mali. This could explain the decreasing trend of the economic reasons for crossing borders.

In Mali, the main reason for crossing the border is related to family obligations (weddings, baptism, etc.), according to 90.58 per cent of the respondents. Following family obligations, commercial activities motivate people to cross the border (75.36%) and economic activities come in last, mentioned by only 6.88 per cent of the respondents.

Figure 9. Malian respondents' reasons for crossing the border

2.4. Knowledge of the defence and security forces operating at the border

The DSFs operating at the borders are essentially composed of units from the police (national and border police), gendarmerie, customs officers, water and forest rangers, and military forces. Their missions are as follows:

- Ensure surveillance of the territory and protection of institutions, populations, and properties;
- Control the entries and exits at land borders;
- Check baggage, cargo, postal parcels, aircraft and vehicles;
- Ensure protection of public health through the control of medicine imports, the fight against illicit trafficking of narcotic products, and sanitary and phytosanitary controls;
- Ensure protection of the State's and territorial communities' forest, wildlife and fisheries heritage, among others.

The majority of Burkina Faso nationals interviewed in the course of this survey mentioned the military (31%), gendarmes (28%) and police officers (23%) as the main forces present at the border. However, prior to the terrorist attacks, the DSFs present at the border were mainly police officers, gendarmes and customs officers. The security situation has led the authorities to strengthen the military presence at the border. The perception that the military is most present at the border is probably linked to the deployment of military detachments at strategic points in the country.

Figure 10. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of different defence and security forces at the border

Compared with the respondents from Burkina Faso, respondents from Mali rarely mentioned the military (18%) among the DSFs present at the border. However, gendarmes (28%), police officers (27%) and customs officers (27%) form the trio of DSFs regularly mentioned for being present at the border.

Figure 11. Malian respondents' knowledge of different defence and security forces at the border

CHAPTER 3 BORDER SECURITY RISKS

Chapter 3 provides an in-depth understanding of the security issues encountered at the border and the measures taken to manage these problems. It also presents the nationalities and categories of persons crossing the border. In addition, this chapter includes respondents' comments on the risks of poor border security management and opinions on measures taken to secure the borders.

3.1. Knowledge of the nationalities of the people using the border crossings

In Burkina Faso, 76.15 per cent of the respondents said that people who cross the border are nationals of Burkina Faso. This can be explained by the fact that a large majority of respondents are Burkina Faso nationals (97.84%) and that among them 65.57 per cent claim to have recently crossed the border. This data confirms that Burkina Faso nationals from the border towns easily cross the border for commercial, family and economic reasons. They are followed by the Niger nationals (49.03%) and Malians (42.94%). From the respondents' answers, other West African nationals account for only 2.30 per cent. However, it should be noted that if towns with large border crossing points (e.g. Faramana, Kantchari) had been covered by the survey, the results would have been different.

Figure 12. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the nationalities of people crossing the border

Respondents from Mali believe that the people crossing the border are mainly Malians (96.66%) and Burkina Faso nationals (91.30%), motivated by social reasons. The other nationalities mentioned are Ghanaian, Togolese (6.35%) and of the Niger (3.07%).

Figure 13. Malian respondents' knowledge of the nationalities of people crossing the border

3.2. Knowledge of categories of people crossing the border

The data collected from the respondents in Burkina Faso once again confirms the preponderance of commercial motivations for crossing the border, with 73.53 per cent of the respondents saying that those who cross the border are traders. These would be mainly stakeholders from the eastern region who use the Botou crossing point and those from the Sahel region, mainly from the Yagha and Seno provinces, who cross the border through Seytenga to make purchases in the Niger and supply the local markets.

Many families live on both sides of the border. For these families, the border is just an artificial barrier that could prevent them from attending each other's family events. This is why, according to 54.92 per cent of the respondents, families constitute the second largest category of stakeholders using the border crossing.

The third category of stakeholders using the border crossing is pastoral herders according to 45.54 per cent of the respondents. This situation can be explained by the fact that livestock farming is one of the main activities of the populations living in the border towns of Liptako-Gourma. The livestock farming method is extensive, leading pastoral herders to move frequently in search of pastures and water points.

Figure 14. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the categories of people crossing the border

Based on the answers of the respondents in Mali, there are four main categories of people using the border crossings. These are the traders, who were mentioned by 97.32 per cent of the respondents, followed by the families (93.98%), confirming that crossing the border is mainly motivated by familial reasons. The particularity of these survey areas in Mali is that the border villages of the communes of Mafouné and Mandiakuy make up the border crossing point used by migrants (according to 28.76% of the respondents) who pass through the Libyan channel to reach Europe. The last category of people crossing the border, according to the Malian respondents, is composed of pastoralist herders (26.42%).

Figure 15. Malian respondents' knowledge of the categories of people crossing the border

3.3. Border crossings and criminal activities

Traders, families, pastoralists and others use the border crossing points to carry out their professional activities or to fulfil their family obligations. However, border crossing points are not used exclusively for lawful activities. According to 56 per cent of the respondents in Burkina Faso, the border crossing point is used for criminal activities, compared with only 11 per cent of the respondents who mentioned the opposite.

3.4. Security problems encountered at the border

For 73.23 per cent of the respondents, cattle theft is the main security threat at the borders. In the Liptako-Gourma border area, cattle theft is not a new problem. However, its scale has increased due to the presence of groups of armed individuals in the towns that hosted the investigators. Attacks on and arson of police stations and town halls in the Sahel have forced the DSFs, mayors and prefects to leave the areas due to high insecurity, which has encouraged raids. The magnitude of raids can be attributed to the deterioration of security conditions.

Apart from the town of Falagountou in Seno province, all the other towns have been victims of terrorist attacks one way or another. Each of the regions covered by the study has seen its share of attacks, such as attacks on the military detachment of Nassoumbou, the police stations of Baraboulé and Tongomayel, the police station of Intangom, the town hall and prefecture of Mansila, the border post of Petelkolé in the Sahel, and the military convoy (Foutouri) in the eastern region, and the killings in the towns of Kain in the northern region. Thus, it is not surprising that the second type of border security problems mentioned by respondents consists of attacks by armed bandits (61.02%) and incursions by armed groups and terrorists (59.32%).

According to the respondents, various trafficking activities (30.58%) and smuggling (29.79%) constitute the third type of security problems encountered at the border. Trafficking and smuggling include mainly drugs, cigarettes and food products, among others.

Figure 16. Security problems encountered by Burkina Faso cross-border communities

3.5. Knowledge of measures taken to secure the border

For any sovereign State, securing of borders is a major issue to ensure peace and order in cross-border communities and give the populations some sense of tranquility. Unfortunately, security conditions in border areas have deteriorated significantly in recent years. As the respondents pointed out, the populations using the border crossings do not do so exclusively for the benefit of the free and lawful movement of people and goods. Fifty-six per cent of the respondents stated that border crossings are used for criminal activities. This situation can be explained by the weaknesses of the security network combined with the poor control of territorial boundaries by the DSFs, and the existence of "no man's land" in some areas of the Sahel region and eastern Burkina Faso.

In order to contain this wave of criminal and terrorist activities and ensure peace and better living conditions for border populations, the State has taken a number of security measures. Analysis of the collected data reveals that respondents are highly aware of these measures. Accustomed to crossing the border, the respondents have a good knowledge of traditional security measures for border control (77%). The patrols that had been initiated as part of actions to tackle organized crime have been strengthened as part of the fight against terrorism. Of the respondents, 80 per cent reported being aware of this safety measure, and 54 per cent know about the searches that have recently been strengthened for better protection against terrorist attacks. However, the curfew, a new security measure in the fight against terrorism, is hardly known among the respondents (5.79%). Thus, it is logical that this measure introduced in the east and in the province of Yagha at the time of the launch of the Otakuamu military operation is not widely known by the public.

Figure 17. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of measures taken to secure the border

In Mali, the area covered by the survey is relatively unaffected by terrorist attacks. This is why the respondents' answers only refer to standard border security measures. For instance, border controls at border posts were mentioned by 100 per cent of the respondents and searches by only 9.84 per cent.

3.6. Assessment of the measures taken to secure the border

Despite the upsurge in attacks by armed groups and terrorists in Burkina Faso, a majority of the respondents (59.73%) believe that the measures taken to secure the border are sufficient. This satisfaction seems rather reveal the fear and frustration of this category of respondents. Some security measures increase travel time due to multiple controls. Furthermore, other security measures seem to reduce freedom (e.g. curfew, declaration of state of emergency). For fear of other more restrictive measures, some respondents prefer to report these measures as sufficient. However, 35.94 per cent of them found the measures insufficient and 4.33 per cent even find them highly insufficient.

Figure 18. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the measures taken to secure the border

Although the survey areas in Mali are less attacked than those in Burkina Faso, a large proportion of respondents in Mali (49%) feel that security measures are insufficient. As members of a population that regularly cross the border, they compare themselves with what they see elsewhere; hence, the conclusion that measures to secure the border are insufficient. The second hypothesis that may explain this is that there is a public perception that these measures are not dissuasive enough to prevent attacks by armed or terrorist groups.

3.7. Risks that might arise from poor border security management

In this study, 59.32 per cent of the respondents stated that terrorist incursions are currently a security problem in border areas. Mismanagement of border security will amplify this security problem. For 67.14 per cent of the respondents, terrorist incursions are the first risk that could result from poor border security management. The second risk, which is equally important, is the development of large-scale banditry (63.45%).

The other risks are illicit trafficking (29.40%), recruitment of young people by armed groups (28.37%) and epidemics (e.g. yellow fever, meningitis, cholera) (27.50%).

Figure 19. Burkina Faso respondents' perceptions of potential risks of poor border security management

Terrorist incursions	67.14%
Banditry	63.45%
Attacks by armed bandits	61.02%
Illicit trafficking	29.40%
Recruitment of youth by armed groups	28.37%
Epidemics	27.50%
Cross-border community conflicts	7.61%
Does not know	1.27%

The perceptions that respondents in the survey areas in Mali have of the risks associated with poor management of border security are quite different from perceptions of the respondents in Burkina Faso. In the Malian region, the risk that poor management of border security will lead to terrorist incursions is only marginally expressed by 35.46 per cent compared with 67.14 per cent of the respondents in Burkina Faso. The same applies to banditry (26.20%). However, according to 71.57 per cent of the respondents in the Malian area, poor management of border security can lead to community conflicts.

Figure 20. Malian respondents' perceptions of potential risks of poor border security management

Cross-border community conflict	71.57%
Terrorist/Armed group incursions	35.46%
Epidemics	28.75%
Banditry	26.20%
Illicit trafficking	25.56%
Recruitment of youth by armed groups	11.82%
Does not know	5.43%

CHAPTER 4   PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM

The perceptions described in this chapter relate to the terrorist activities and the reasons behind terrorism. The exposure of communities to terrorist attacks is analysed and actions are proposed to prevent terrorism.

4.1. Known terrorist activities

After a long period of peace and relative political stability, Burkina Faso has been facing increasingly frequent and deadly attacks since the end of 2014, particularly in the Sahel and the eastern region. In addition to the various abuses perpetrated by the koglwéogo against the civilian population, acts of violence have spread in Burkina Faso, which is now invaded by various terrorist groups, including mainly:

- Ansarou Islam in Soum;
- Islamic State in the Great Sahara in the eastern region and in Oudalan;
- Group to Support Islam and Muslims in the provinces in the northern region.

The modus operandi of these groups consists of attacks on the DSF positions (i.e. police stations, gendarmerie brigades, and customs and military detachment posts); arson attacks on administrative buildings (e.g. town halls, prefectures, schools); planting IEDs; and kidnapping/assassination of political, customary and religious notabilities or NGO members. The strategy of terrorist groups is to eliminate the presence of the DSFs and the administrative and political authorities in the territories they want to control, thus creating fear among the population and leading them to believe in the inability of the State to protect them. Targeting of the DSFs by terrorist groups is widely known by the respondents, of whom 81.46 per cent stated that it is mainly the positions of the DSFs that are targeted by terrorist attacks.

A large majority of respondents also mentioned assassinations (76.36%), kidnapping (65.88%) and arson attacks on offices (61.43%).

The use of IEDs (48.10%) and intimidation (29.56%) were the other terrorist activities mentioned marginally by the respondents.

Figure 21. Burkina Faso respondents' awareness of terrorist activities in their areas

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
4.2. Drivers of terrorism

Numerous studies explain the motivating factors behind the phenomenon of terrorism. For Loada and Romaniuk, political factors (corruption, impunity, incivility and the difficult civil–military relationship) together with socioeconomic factors marked in particular by rural poverty, a high cost of living and unemployment, drive local stakeholders towards terrorism.[8] For the International Crisis Group, the contestation of a fixed and unequal social order pushes young people in the Burkina Faso Sahel towards jihadism.[9] This contestation is supported by feelings of anger and frustration because "the contrast between the economic potential of the North and the lack of development fuels a sense of abandonment among the people".[10] Added to this is the vulnerability due to the proximity to the Malian border. In eastern Burkina Faso, which has just been affected by terrorist attacks, Promediation notes that the same factors have provided fertile ground for terrorism. The eastern region has significant agropastoral, forestry, wildlife and mining potential.[11] Despite this potential, the populations in the region are very poor and have difficulty accessing the primary services (education, health and drinking water). Even worse, they are faced with the proliferation of protected areas and private hunting zones, preventing them from farming, hunting and fishing freely.

In the course of this study, the respondents from the border towns gave their views on the reasons behind getting involved with terrorism. Unsurprisingly, a large proportion of the respondents mentioned poverty (54.74%) and lack of occupation (48.70%) as factors encouraging terrorism. Challenging authority (34.72%) and anger and frustration (26.72%) were also noted by respondents to be among the reasons behind terrorism.

In studies of terrorism in Burkina Faso, adherence to an ideology plays a marginal role in inciting terrorism. The results of this survey show that this adherence is growing (37.74%). The people's growing adherence to the jihadist ideology can be attributed to the communication strategy of these radical movements. They capitalize on the anger and frustration of citizens and the weak presence of the State, raise the issues of administrative hassles and abuses, and propose populist measures to the communities (e.g. authorization to exploit protected areas, hunting zones and gold sites).

Recent community conflicts could explain the growing ethnic or family motivations for supporting terrorism.

Figure 22. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on drivers of terrorism

8   A. Loada and P. Romaniuk, *Preventing Violent Extremism in Burkina Faso: Toward National Resilience Amid Regional Insecurity* (Global Center on Cooperative Security, June 2014).
9   International Crisis Group, The social roots of jihadist violence in Burkina Faso's north (Nord du Burkina Faso : ce que cache le jihad), Africa Report No. 254 (12 October 2017).
10   Promediation, Analysis note on east Burkina Faso situation, November 2018. (Promediation is a non-governmental organization present in Burkina Faso. This note was developed with funding from the Peace and Reconciliation section of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)
11   Ibid.

4.3. Communities' exposure to terrorism

From 2016 to 2018, mainly the towns in Burkina Faso Sahel were the most severely affected by terrorist attacks. The expansion of the phenomenon in the provinces in the northern region and then the opening of a front in the eastern region have gradually led the people of Burkina Faso to become aware of the extent of the phenomenon. The recurrence of attacks on the DSFs and targeted abductions and assassinations of customary and religious notabilities, local elected officials, and local agents has weakened the authority of the State, which has already little presence in the border areas. Unsurprisingly, a large majority of respondents (94.14%) believe that their communities are exposed to terrorism.

In the survey areas in Mali, 67 per cent of the respondents feel that the level of security is good, while for 13 per cent there is no security at all.

Figure 23. Malian respondents' assessment of the levels of security in their areas

- Good
- Insufficient
- Moderate
- No security at all

12.78%
8.63%
11.82%
66.77%

4.4. Terrorist threat situation

In border regions, a relative majority of respondents (52.43%) believe that the terrorist threat is stable. Meanwhile, the victories recorded by the DSFs may have generated optimism among respondents, as 13.21 per cent of them believe that the terrorist threat has become rare. However, more than one third of the respondents (34.36%) are less optimistic because they feel that the terrorist threat is increasing.

Figure 24. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the terrorist threat situations in border regions

- Increasing
- Decreasing
- Stable

34.36%
52.43%
13.21%

4.5. Actions to prevent terrorist threats

To prevent terrorist threats, the respondents proposed actions that can be grouped into three types:

- **Actions in favour of young people**: As young people are the main target of terrorist recruitment, 76 per cent of the respondents proposed to carry out awareness-raising activities for the young public. Other respondents (74.47%) said that the young people's lack of occupation should be tackled by offering them the opportunity to invest in economic activities.

- **Civil–military collaboration**: More than half of the respondents (57.05%) recommended strengthening the collaboration/cooperation between the population and the DSFs.

- **Involvement of community leaders**: This proposal is supported by 42.65 per cent of the respondents.

Figure 25. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on actions to prevent terrorist threats

4.6. Community actions to combat terrorism

The fight against terrorism requires a strong sense of responsibility and genuine community involvement. This is the opinion of 89.92 per cent of the respondents who suggested promptly alerting the authorities as soon as the population notices a problem, a behaviour or a suspicious object. Other respondents (68.36%) encourage the community to report members involved in terrorist groups. However, the idea of establishing LPCs is supported by less than half of the stakeholders surveyed (46.80%).

Figure 26. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on community actions to combat terrorism

CHAPTER 5   COMMUNICATION AND SECURITY

This chapter presents the respondents' perceptions of the links between communication and security. The interviews consisted in collecting the views of the border populations on the existence and type of intermediary stakeholders between the community and the authority, the mechanisms for communication with the authorities and the DSFs, and the mechanisms for sharing information.

5.1. Existence of intermediary stakeholders between authorities and local communities

For a good administration of the territory, the various systems that have succeeded one another in Burkina Faso have always relied on a stakeholder or group of stakeholders acting as an intermediary between the authorities and the communities. Before former President Captain Thomas Sankara came to power and established the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution, the village administrative managers were the intermediaries between the authorities and the communities. Since the implementation of the rule of law, the VDCs have acted as the intermediary stakeholders.

The existence of an intermediary stakeholder between authorities and communities was confirmed by 68 per cent of the respondents in Burkina Faso. The existence of an intermediary person is recognized in the areas of investigation. A large majority of interlocutors confirmed the existence of an intermediary between the authorities and the communities in the eastern region, particularly in the provinces of Tapoa (97.32%) and Komandjoari (95.35%), Lorum in the northern region (81.59%) and Soum in the Sahel region (75.31%). This confirmation is linked to the regular renewal of the VDC and often to the dynamism of the VDC chairperson. However, in some provinces, one in two persons denies the existence of an intermediary. These are respondents from Yatenga province (57.05%), Oudala (55.37%) and Yagha (53.22%).

Within the survey areas in Mali, only 14 people (4.47% of the respondents) stated that they were informed of the existence of an intermediary for communication on security between the local communities and the authorities.

5.2. Different intermediaries between authorities and communities

In situations where the existence of an intermediary between authorities and communities was confirmed, the investigators mentioned two categories of mediators:

- Intermediaries from the decentralization bodies, notably the chairperson of the VDC (81.36% of the respondents are aware) and the town councillor (of whom 78.41% of the respondents have knowledge);
- Customary chiefs (confirmed by 23.68% of the respondents) and religious leaders (of whom 7.30% of the respondents are aware).

Figure 27 shows the intermediaries that the respondents in Burkina Faso are aware of.

Figure 27. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of different intermediaries between authorities and communities for border security communication

In terms of intermediation in communication between local communities and authorities, Burkina Faso respondents' perception of the importance of the town councillor (78.41%) is more or less the same as the Malian respondents' perception (78.57%). The difference is most noticeable in the influence of the chairperson of the VDC. In Burkina Faso, 81.36 per cent of the respondents mentioned the chairperson of the VDC as an intermediary person. However, in the survey areas in Mali, only 14.29 per cent of the respondents mentioned the VDC chairperson.

Figure 28. Malian respondents' knowledge of different intermediaries between authorities and communities for border security communication

5.3. Means of communication with authorities and defence and security forces

Three quarters of the stakeholders interviewed during the survey (77.41%) mentioned the telephone as a means of communication with the authorities and the DSFs. However, 39.37 per cent mentioned in-person meetings. The poor mobile telephone coverage in these towns, communication disturbances, malfunctioning of the DSFs' (gendarmerie, police) toll-free numbers and poor access to the authorities' telephone numbers explain why many of the respondents prefer face-to-face meetings.

Many community radio stations broadcast from the provincial capitals (Djibo, Dori, Ouahigouya, Titao) and are a powerful means of communication. Unfortunately, these community radio stations do not reach all the communities living on the border area. This is why only 5 per cent of the respondents mentioned radio as a medium of communication between the communities and the authorities.

As in Burkina Faso, although to a greater extent, the telephone is perceived by the respondents (99.60%) in Mali as the primary medium of communication with the authorities and the DSFs.

5.4. Warning mechanisms for border security issues

A large majority of respondents mentioned the telephone as a primary tool for communicating with the authorities. This usage is further confirmed when a security problem occurs at the border. As a matter of fact, 59.41 per cent of the respondents suggested the telephone as a tool for alerting the authorities and the DSFs.

Following telephone communication as a warning mechanism when a border security problem arises is the consultation framework between the authorities and the DSFs, which is perceived by nearly half of the respondents (49.82%). This perception is a reminder that border management is carried out by various units of the DSFs (police, gendarmerie, customs, etc.) and that broad consultation between the authorities and the DSFs is essential when a border security problem arises.

The other warning mechanisms mentioned by respondents are the local committee (37.49%) and regular visits by the authorities (37.41%).

Figure 29. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on border security warning mechanisms that should be put in place

For a large majority of respondents in the survey areas in Mali (96.83%), the telephone is still the preferred warning channel in case of border security problems.

Figure 30. Malian respondents' opinions on border security warning mechanisms that should be put in place

5.5. Information-sharing mechanisms

The respondents' answers on information-sharing mechanisms further confirms the importance of the mobile phone in communication in border areas.

In Burkina Faso, 87.12 per cent of the respondents suggested the telephone as a tool for sharing information. Meetings were suggested by 42.77 per cent of the respondents, while 15.37 per cent said that they prefer the radio to share information.

As in Burkina Faso, respondents in Mali confirmed the telephone (100%) and meetings (17.46%) as the two main information-sharing means.

5.6. Benefits of good communication between authorities and local communities

Various studies predict that victory over terrorism will not be possible if not for the genuine collaboration between the DSFs/authorities and the local communities. This collaboration is achieved through good communication between the two parties. This is why many stakeholders, such as the Programme d'Urgence pour le Sahel (Sahel Emergency Program) and Voix de la Paix, integrate the communication component into the projects they implement for the benefit of border communities. The value of good communication in the midst of terror is well shared by respondents, with 49.5 per cent believing that good communication allows for understanding a security problem in time, which might lead to an immediate reaction from the authorities (67.07%) and thus help reduce insecurity.

Figure 31. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the benefits of good communication between authorities and local communities on border security

Respondents in the survey areas in Mali are less optimistic than those in Burkina Faso about the advantage of good communication between authorities and local communities. Only 16.67 per cent of Malian respondents believe that good communication could help reduce border insecurity, compared with 83.60 per cent of Burkina Faso respondents. However, the respondents (98.81%) in the Malian survey areas believe that good communication between the authorities and the communities could contribute to a good understanding of the security problem in time and encourage an immediate reaction from the DSFs (19.05%).

5.7. Risks of poor communication between authorities and local communities

Given the importance of communication in the border security management strategy, poor communication could have serious consequences. This is the opinion of 47.10 per cent of the respondents who believe that poor communication will result in a late reaction of the DSFs. For a large majority of respondents, poor communication could lead to a loss of confidence in the DSFs (64.18%), unleash serious consequences on local communities (68.77%) and grow insecurity at a high speed (70.34%).

Figure 32. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the risks of poor communication between authorities and local communities

For a large majority of respondents (78.57%) in the survey areas in Malia, poor communication between authorities and communities could also lead to a loss of confidence. Miscommunication could also have severe consequences for the local communities (35.32%).

Figure 33. Malian respondents' opinions on the risks of poor communication between authorities and local communities

CHAPTER 6   EMERGENCY RESPONSES

Respondents' perceptions of the hosting of displaced persons, the proposals for measures to be taken by the authorities to deal with an emergency situation and the proposals for community action to deal with a crisis situation are among the main aspects analysed in this chapter.

6.1. Hosting of displaced persons

Border towns are increasingly facing terrorist attacks that sometimes unleash community conflicts (e.g. Yirgou and Arbinda in Burkina Faso). In February 2019, official data reported 82,000 IDPs in Burkina Faso. Are border communities prepared to receive IDPs? Of the respondents who share the values of hospitality and solidarity, 76.29 per cent are not in favour of welcoming IDPs. These respondents feel that terrorism is not yet under control and that anyone may become an IDP in the future. However, 23.71 per cent of the respondents are in favour of welcoming the IDPs. Among these unsupportive stakeholders are those who are naturally distrustful, fearing that ill-intentioned individuals will hide with the IDPs and later return to attack the community. There is also a large proportion of these respondents who believe that the authorities and structures working in the humanitarian field (e.g. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Red Cross) are responsible for welcoming the IDPs.

6.2. Reasons for supporting the hosting of internally displaced persons

Interviews with respondents highlighted the reasons for hosting the IDPs. For a significant average of respondents (55.60%), the positive experience that can be gained from a crisis situation encourages them to welcome the IDPs. According to one respondent: "A crisis is experienced positively when it leads the stakeholders to think about all the positive potential that a crisis brings in the sense that it allows us to get out of the routine to look for solutions, to build progress". In addition, 36.37 per cent of the respondents are in favour because they have been informed by the local authorities and 34.49 per cent see that their communities are prepared and organized to welcome the IDPs.

Figure 34. Burkina Faso respondents' reasons for being in favour of welcoming the internally displaced persons

In the survey areas in Mali, the respondents (80%) think that it is the good preparation and organization of the communities that convince them to be in favour of hosting the IDPs, but they believe that the authorities' effort in raising awareness of the communities can also help to motivate local stakeholders to support welcoming the IDPs.

Figure 35. Malian respondents' reasons for being in favour of welcoming the internally displaced persons

6.3. Measures proposed to the authority to deal with emergency situations

Faced with a crisis situation, a large majority of respondents in Burkina Faso proposed to the authority to receive the IDPs (76.45%), provide them with the necessary equipment (61.95%) and ensure immediate care for them (60.99%). Another category of measures was proposed by a relative average proportion of respondents, which includes the provision of care for the sick and the wounded (54.57%) and securing the reception area (54.12%). In addition, 28.13 per cent of the respondents suggested to relocate the displaced persons.

Figure 36. Measures proposed by Burkina Faso respondents to the authority to deal with emergency situations

Almost in the same proportions, respondents in the survey areas in Mali proposed to the authorities to host the IDPs (72.52%), provide them with the necessary equipment available to them (68.69%) and ensure immediate support (68.05%). It will then be necessary to rescue the sick and the wounded (41.53%) and secure the hosting area (40.89%), according to the respondents.

Figure 37. Measures proposed by Malian respondents to the authority to deal with emergency situations

6.4. Proposals for action to communities to deal with emergency situations

When an emergency occurs at the border, the first stakeholders to be informed are members of the border community. Usually these community stakeholders initiate the first actions. What should these first actions be? In response to this question, 83.36 per cent of the respondents believe that it is imperative to inform the local authorities. A large majority (64.11%) suggested hosting displaced persons, while 52.95 per cent would remain vigilant. Nearly half of the respondents (41.83%) selected coordinating with the authorities and 41.8 per cent recommended respecting and following the measures established by the State.

Figure 38. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on actions proposed to communities to deal with emergency situations

In the survey areas in Mali, a large majority of respondents (70.93%) would welcome displaced populations, 20.77 per cent suggested coordinating with the local authority so that support can be provided to the IDPs and 9.27 per cent recommend informing the local authorities.

Figure 39. Malian respondents' opinions on proposed community actions to deal with emergency situations

CHAPTER 7 ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITY–GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

7.1. Relationship between the local community and public service agents

Despite the efforts undertaken in the context of the deconcentration of public administration, public services are lacking at the border town level. The prefecture and primary public services (e.g. primary school, health centre) are the main public services that are sometimes located in the border towns; however, these facilities are understaffed, underequipped and sometimes with a large coverage. The populations at the border are aware of these shortcomings and sometimes show admiration for the dedication of some public officials. This is why a large majority of respondents (68%) believe that there is a good relationship between the local community and public service agents. This perception is strongly supported by 16 per cent of the respondents who find the relationship is even very good.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that there are dissenting voices carried by 4 per cent of the respondents who feel that the community's relationship with public service agents is poor.

Figure 40. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community and public service agents

- Very good
- Good
- Bad
- Does not wish to answer
- Other

The quality of the relationship between members of the local community and public service agents is better perceived by respondents in the survey areas in Burkina Faso. Ninety-four per cent of the respondents believe that there is a good relationship between the local community and public service agents.

7.2. Relationship between the local community and town hall agents

The town hall or "common house" is a local service run by local stakeholders. Not surprisingly, the number of respondents who find the relationship between the local community and the mayor's office to be good is high. Sixty-eight per cent (68%) of the respondents have this positive assessment of the relationship. There are even 19 per cent of respondents who find the relationship very good. Nevertheless, the relationship between the local community and town hall agents is described as poor by 4 per cent of the respondents.

Figure 41. Malian respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community and town hall service agents

In the survey areas in Mali, 96 per cent of the respondents (excluding those who opted to not answer) believe that the relationship between the community and the town hall agents is good.

7.3. Frequency of exchanges

On the frequency of exchanges, 13.21 per cent of the respondents in Burkina Faso think that their exchanges with the mayor or town councilors are decreasing. This perception can be explained in towns where it is no longer possible to organize consultation frameworks because of the threat of terrorism and the prolonged absence of the mayor and councilors. On the other hand, in towns where consultations can be held, 34.36 per cent of the respondents believe that exchanges are increasing. This evolution of exchanges is possible in towns where security conditions allow it, where many initiatives to promote local development are being developed. In the other towns, 52.43 per cent of the respondents consider that exchanges are stable.

Figure 42. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the frequency of their exchanges with the mayor or town councillors

- Very often
- Often
- Rarely

Compared to the survey areas in Burkina Faso, there is less of a security threat in the towns of the Tominian Cercle. As a result, respondents say that there are frequent exchanges between the mayor, councillors and members of the community.

Figure 43. Malian respondents' assessment of the frequency of their exchanges with the mayor or town councillors

- Rarely
- Often
- Very often

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
Located in the extreme west of the country and watered by the Niger River, the Tillabéri region is bordered to the north by Mali, to the south by Benin, to the east by Tahoua and Dosso regions, and to the west by Burkina Faso. Covering an area of 97,251 sq km, Tillabéri comprises 13 districts and 45 towns.

The perception study was conducted at the border posts of Petelkoli (Téra District), Makolondi (Torodi District) and Ayorou (Ayorou District).

Map 2. Border posts in the Niger

LES 23 PPF ACTUELS		LES 15 FUTURS PPF	
1. Yassane	13. Farou	1. Bangare	11. Seguedine
2. Petel Koli	14. Firdji	2. Tamou	12. Manguaize
3. Makalondi	15. Bossossoua	3. Dole	13. Chnagoder
4. Gaya	16. Sassoumbroum	4. Boumba	14. Bazilbangou
5. Sabon Birni	17. Dan Barto	5. Goumki/Yelou	15. Inabangharit
6. Tombo	18. Tinkim	6. Gada	
7. Doumega	19. Adare	7. Guidas Kane	
8. Tafoukka	20. Birni Kazoe	8. Daichi	
9. Konni Illela	21. Nguigmi	9. Maine Soroa	
10. Guidan-Takouassara	22. Dirkou	10. Bosse	
11. Bangui	23. Assamaka		
12. Souloulou			

Source: Niger Directorate for Territorial Surveillance, 2019.

Notes: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

This map is only available in French.

CHAPTER 1   PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

This chapter presents the characteristics of the DSFs sample living in the border areas interviewed during the field survey.

1.1. Profile of respondents by gender

Figure 44. Distribution of respondents in the Niger by gender

The survey was conducted through a questionnaire administered to a sample of 106 DSF agents consisting of 8 female officers (7.55%) and 98 male officers (92.45%). Admittedly, the Niger has a predominantly female population, but the low representation of women in the sample can be explained by the fact that until the 2000s, these jobs were not easily accessible to women. Thus, in some DSF corps (e.g. National Gendarmerie, National Guard of Niger), recruitment of women has only been authorized in recent years. As a result, there are few women in various DSF corps, and even fewer at border posts because of their numbers since recruitment. In addition, female DSF officers at border posts are all between 20 and 39 years old.

1.2. Profile of respondents by occupation

The defence and security sector in the Niger is highly fragmented and includes many stakeholders (Office of the President of the Republic; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of National Defence; the Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Decentralization, and Customary and Religious Affairs (hereinafter the Ministry of the Interior), etc.).

For the purposes of this study, interviews at border crossings involved the following stakeholders:

- **National Police**: Reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, the National Police is responsible for security and law enforcement in urban centres, protection of government buildings and institutions, and security of government officials.

- **National Gendarmerie**: It depends on the Ministry of Defence. Its mission is to ensure territorial defence and policing while carrying out police activities.

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- **National Guard of Niger**: Reporting to the Ministry of the Interior, the National Guard of Niger is responsible for security in rural areas where there is no police presence and, above all, for the management and surveillance of prisons.

- **Niger Customs**: Under the Ministry of Finance, it is responsible for the implementation of the Government's policy on the protection of the national economic space and the collection of duties and taxes payable on the importation of goods, the application and monitoring of the customs aspects of Niger's bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners, and the research, detection and suppression of custom fraud.

In the study sample, National Police officers are the most numerous, representing 73 per cent of the total survey population. The second most represented force consists of water and forest rangers (9%), followed by customs officers (7%) and national guards (6%). As in all Liptako-Gourma States, the gendarmerie is the least staffed corps at the borders, accounting for only 5 per cent of the population surveyed.

Figure 45. Distribution of respondents in the Niger by occupation

1.3. Profile of respondents by number of years in post

Usually, DSF officers do not stay on duty at border crossings for long periods of time. Thus, in this sample, agents who have been at the border crossing for more than four years account for only 4 per cent of the sample, while those who have been there for less than one year account for 16 per cent. Officers who are posted for two to three years at border crossings represent the largest proportion of the sample.

Figure 46. Distribution of respondents in the Niger by number of years in post

CHAPTER 2	WORKING CONDITIONS AT THE POST

2.1. Entry and exit control

According to the DSF officers interviewed for this study, the number of people crossing the Ayorou, Makalondi and Petelkolé border crossings range from 100 to 750 per day, depending on the day. However, 75 per cent of the respondents said that these posts are not sufficiently prepared to control entries and exits. Insufficient staffing at posts (44.30%), the lack of modern documents control equipment (43.04%) and the presence of bypass roads (8.86%) are the reasons mentioned why posts are not sufficiently prepared to control entries and exits. Moreover, the stakeholders interviewed in this survey regret the situation of the posts (Ayorou, Makalondi) whose location is set back from the border or is not juxtaposed with the border posts of neighbouring countries.

Figure 47. The Niger respondents' opinions on the reasons for insufficient preparation of border posts to control entries and exits

2.2. Existence of alternative routes

The alternative routes consist of bypass roads around the border crossing. These tracks allow people to cross the border sometimes with goods and merchandise without being checked by the police, customs and other authorities. Wanted individuals, prohibited products, and various trafficking activities, such as trafficking in cigarettes, drugs, weapons and human beings, can thus move or be done from one country to another without the risk of being apprehended by the DSFs. People using the alternative routes sometimes benefit from the complicity of some members of the community who help them with transport, in particular motorcycle taxis.

Among the officers at the three border posts in the Tillabéri region, 94 per cent confirmed the existence of bypass roads.

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2.3. Officers' training needs

The officers interviewed for this study expressed that in order to carry out their tasks with professionalism and rigour, they would be needing training. For example, 73 per cent of them expressed the need for anti-document fraud training, as document fraud is a growing phenomenon.

Other training needs relate to community policing (16%), reception techniques (4%), citizenship verification (4%) and combating drug trafficking (3%).

Figure 48. The Niger respondents' training needs

2.4. Post security level

Border crossings are not secure according to the perception of 75 per cent of the DSFs interviewed during the survey. Many reasons were given by the respondents to justify this perception, including the following:

- The presence of armed terrorist groups in neighbouring countries, as evidenced by attacks on DSFs' positions, heightens terrorist threats at border crossings.

- The poor geographical position of the border post (i.e. located on hollow ground, surrounded by numerous bypass roads) has led some respondents to say that the post is designed to control passengers rather than to defend the territory.

- The strategic and operational readiness of officers is inadequate to meet the new challenges posed by the methods of terrorist groups.

Added to this is the inadequacy of staff, weapons and protective equipment (bulletproof vests, helmets, night-vision lamps, etc.).

CHAPTER 3   SECURITY THREATS AND RISKS

3.1. Incidents with foreign nationals

The border posts of Ayorou, Makalondi and Petelkolé are crossed daily by 100 to 700 people, some of whom are foreign nationals. Occasionally, incidents occur between these persons and the DSF officers. As Figure 49 shows, these incidents are frequent at the Ayorou and Torodi district posts. At the Téra post, these incidents are minor. The lack of travel documents, leading to refoulement, is the main cause of incidents that occur with foreign nationals. Frustrated after refoulement, some persons sometimes engage in verbal abuse, refusing to comply, leading to incidents. The findings of illicit products and smuggling by officers also creates incidents.

Figure 49. The Niger respondents' knowledge of incidents with foreign nationals at the border posts

3.2. Lack of identity papers

The lack of identity papers is the major offence of foreign nationals arriving at the post and is a major cause of incidents with border officials (40.57%). According to the officers interviewed in the field, 68.87 per cent of foreigner nationals arriving at the border are unable to present valid identity documents or visas.

3.3. Security problems encountered at the border

The security measures (curfews, ban on motorcycle circulation, state of emergency, etc.) introduced by the State of the Niger in the Tillabéri region have helped to reduce the psychosis created by the attacks attributed to the terrorist groups Ansar Dine and Moujaho, whose presence was reported in the districts of Ayorou, Inatès and Gorouol. For a majority of the stakeholders interviewed, Tillabéri regained relative stability during the first quarter of 2019. This is why the incursion of terrorist groups was mentioned by only 46.23 per cent of the respondents. The terrorist threat is gradually giving way to large-scale banditry (armed robberies, hold-ups, vehicle thefts, targeted assassinations, etc.). This banditry is, according to the officers encountered, the work of young people from localities in the district who blame poverty and idleness for engaging in criminal activities. Unreported for fear of reprisals, these young bandits represent the most mentioned security issue by respondents (66.98%).

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Smuggling (26.42%) and livestock theft (23.58%) are the other two security problems mentioned by the agents interviewed for this study.

Figure 50. Security problems encountered by the Niger respondents at the border

3.4. Assessment of security measures

In response to the security threat, various measures have been adopted, ranging from the provision of weapons of protective equipment (e.g. bulletproof vests, helmets) to joint patrols, curfews and state of emergency declarations, among others.

Despite these measures, the attacks, although relatively less significant, continue to cause psychosis among the population, leading a large majority of respondents to say that security measures are insufficient.

Figure 51. The Niger respondents' assessment of measures taken to secure the border

3.5. Risks related to mismanagement

For the DSF officers interviewed during the field survey, poor border security management poses the following main risks:

- Terrorist incursions (69.8%)

- Banditry (68.87%)

- Illicit trafficking (59.43%)

These perceptions are presented in Figure 52.

Figure 52. The Niger respondents' opinions on the risks of poor border security management

CHAPTER 4   PERCEPTIONS OF ATTACKS

4.1. Armed groups

In the surveyed area, the armed groups operating are terrorists (e.g. Ansar Dine, Moujaho) according to 83.02 per cent of the agents interviewed, armed bandits (49.06%) and traffickers of illicit products (4.72%).

Figure 53. The Niger respondents' knowledge of the different armed groups encountered in the survey areas

4.2. Terrorist activities

As shown in Figure 54, a large majority of the officers interviewed at the field level, accounting for 96.23 per cent, are aware of attacks on DSFs as one of the terrorist activities in the areas of investigation. Other terrorist activities mostly known to respondents include the use of explosive devices (53.77%), abductions (49.57%) and assassinations (40.57%).

Figure 54. The Niger respondents' awareness of terrorist activities in the survey areas

4.3. Reasons for supporting terrorism

Radicalization (15.09%) and adherence to an ideology (28.30%) are factors marginally alleged to lead stakeholders towards terrorism, according to the perceptions of the DSF officers. For the majority of them, it is rather socioeconomic factors that push people towards terrorism – 76.42 per cent of the officer respondents believe that poverty pushes young people towards terrorism. Lack of occupation (i.e. idleness) was mentioned by 60.38 per cent of the agents as a reason for young people's adherence to terrorism. The anger and frustration caused by feelings of injustice, unequal access to primary public services and abandonment of border areas would be, for 37.74 per cent of the respondents, a push factor for supporting terrorism among the young people.

Figure 55. The Niger respondents' opinions on drivers of terrorism

4.4. Safety from terrorism

Overall, 92.38 per cent of the respondents feel that the areas covered by the study are not immune to terrorism. Among the three districts covered, Ayorou appears, according to security officials, as the one where insecurity is much more real and where there is a real psychosis given its geographical proximity to Mali. The risks and threats refer to (a) the alleged presence of terrorist groups (Ansar Dine, Moujaho, etc.) in the district, (b) the existence of rackets and zakat ransoms recovered by the jihadists, (c) the laying of mines in the north-eastern part (Inatès), and (d) the porous border with Mali and the lack of control over the Niger River, among other bodies of water. All these threats have led 88.46 per cent of the respondents to say that the Ayorou area is not safe from terrorism.

Regarding the Téra area, 92.31 per cent of respondents believe that it is not safe either from terrorism. The rise in drug use in the towns of Méhanna, Kokorou and Téra; terrorist threats in Gorouol; and the escalation of banditry in the town of Diagourou support this perception.

Ninety-five per cent (95%) of the respondents say that the Torodi area is not safe from terrorism. This perception is justified by the expansion of armed banditry (e.g. bandits operating in military uniform, the existence of self-defence groups), abductions, executions, attacks on DSF posts and the circulation of firearms in the district.

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4.5. Hosting of persons displaced by terrorist threats

The problems of insecurity, which have become recurrent in the study areas as a result of various attacks by armed groups and terrorist threats, have led some populations to evacuate to the district capitals.

Figure 56 shows the number of displaced persons hosted in the district capitals in April 2019.

Figure 56. Number of displaced persons hosted in the Niger district capitals, April 2019

4.6. Terrorist threat situation

The security situation in the areas covered by the survey is stable according to 67 per cent of the respondents. The withdrawal of the state of emergency in Téra District, which has not experienced any attacks since those at the border post of Petelkolé (on 27 May 2017, resulting in three deaths including two police officers and a civilian), was mentioned, justifying this perception.

In the district of Ayorou, some stakeholders believe that terrorism still exists, while, for others, it is only residual banditry. In any case, there have not been any more attacks for at least two months.

Torodi District is still under a state of emergency, but the stakeholders perceive a relative lull, which is simply the result of the absence of offensives by jihadists and armed bandits.

Figure 57. The Niger respondents' perceptions of terrorist threat situations in their districts

4.7. Preventive means against terrorist threat

To prevent terrorism, the respondents propose a participatory community approach. According to 82.86 per cent of the respondents, this approach would consist of raising awareness among young people, involving community leaders (75.24%) and collaborating with the DSFs (61.90%).

It will also entail working to reduce the factors driving young people to join terrorism. To this end, 59.05 per cent of the respondents recommend providing economic activities to young people.

Figure 58. The Niger respondents' opinions on actions to prevent terrorist threats

4.8. Counterterrorism actions

The DSF officers interviewed during the survey recommend that local communities engage in two strong actions, among others, to fight terrorism:

- Alert the authorities in case of problems;
- Report any member of the community involved in terrorism.

In addition, 35.24 per cent of the respondents suggested that communities establish local prevention committees.

Figure 59. The Niger respondents' opinions on community actions to combat terrorism

CHAPTER 5	KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING SYSTEMS

5.1. Existence of local prevention committees

The establishment of LPCs aims to engage the communities in security management by ensuring protection for all and preventing violence and crime through concerted identification of local security problems, the search for solutions and their application.

The LPCs have two main roles: raise awareness among members of the community, on the one hand, to develop security reflexes and a cooperative relationship with the DSFs; and, on the other hand, to provide information, that is, to report any suspicious or unusual facts in a better time frame to the authorities in charge of security.

In the areas covered by the survey, the proportion of officers (41%) who claim to be aware of the existence of LPCs is low. This is due to the mobility of border officials and the fact that the LPCs have not been set up by IOM in all three districts. These same reasons explain the low proportion of respondents (40%) who are familiar with the LPC implementation process.

5.2. Results of establishing local prevention committees

The proportion of respondents with knowledge of the results of the creation of LPCs remains low. As a matter of fact, only 33.33 per cent of the respondents claim to be aware of the results of the formation of LPCs. This is mainly due to the fact that the information given by the LPCs always goes through the local authority, such as the mayor, the prefect or the DSF head, who will then take action. In addition, key informants are protected and their identities remain anonymous.

For these officers, the establishment of the LPCs has contributed to the creation of a favourable climate of cooperation between the communities and the DSFs and to raising awareness of the need for every citizen to be involved in ensuring security and to report any suspicious incidents, among other things.

Figure 60. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of the results of establishing local prevention committees

---

33.33%

66.67%

■ Yes
■ No

CHAPTER 6   INTER-FORCE COLLABORATION

6.1. Assessment of collaboration among defence and security forces

The DSFs involved in border security management comprise the police, the gendarmerie, the national guard, civil defence, customs, and the water and forest protection team. The officers of these various bodies have specific skills and have skills in common, in particular the ability to ensure border security. However, the recruitment standards and the living and working conditions of staff are not identical. As a result, some agents may feel frustrated or develop superiority complex.

Inter-DSF collaboration focuses on information-sharing and joint patrols that have improved the relationship between the DSFs and the population and have secured the districts. However, this collaboration suffers from a lack of coordination, as revealed in the following terms by one stakeholder: "There are five DSF corps that intervene at the border, but each one only focuses on its own specific tasks. There is no action synergy...." Despite this situation, a large proportion of the officers interviewed (59%) believe that the quality of collaboration between the various DSF bodies is good, as shown in Figure 61.

Figure 61. The Niger respondents' assessment of the relationship among border security officers

- ■ Very good
- ■ Good
- ■ Bad
- ■ Does not wish to answer

6.2. Existence of disputes between defence and security forces

Conflicts of jurisdiction, lack of communication and escorts' non-compliance with control procedures sometimes create disputes among DSFs. However, the subject is a taboo and is rarely discussed with stakeholders who are not DSFs. Thus, when asked by the interviewers, a large proportion of the officers (96%) stated that no disputes were noted among the various DSF bodies.

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Figure 62. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of disputes among border security bodies

6.3. Importance of collaboration

The various bodies of the DSFs can only ensure border security and defeat terrorism through strong cooperation among them. That is what 98 per cent of the respondents said. Topics of collaboration include force coordination, intelligence and information-sharing, among others.

6.4. Courses of action to improve collaboration between defence and security forces

To improve collaboration between bodies, the respondents proposed the following four courses of action:

- Create or reinforce the cultural and sports meeting platforms among various DSF bodies;

- Organize or reinforce training courses common to the various bodies of the DSFs;

- Promote or develop the organization of mixed patrols;

- Reduce the superiority complex from one body to another by developing a culture of mutual respect and courtesy.

CHAPTER 7   CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

7.1. Promotion of cross-border cooperation

In the district of Ayorou, there is a highly operational formal framework for cooperation in the health sector, especially during vaccination campaigns. Added to this is the cross-border framework set up by the Danish Demining Group, which is much more focused on bringing people together (e.g. through a project to set up a market garden) on both sides of the border (Ayorou–Ansongo) than on managing security around the border.

In Téra, cross-border cooperation exists in the pastoralism sector. Moreover, the stakeholders present Téra as a leader in the field of cross-border cooperation with its participation in: (a) the creation of the C3 Sahel;[12] and (b) the implementation of cross-border projects such as the PAAEPA between the districts of Dori and Téra, financed by the European Union, and the Programme for the Promotion of Community Security and Social Cohesion of the Liptako-Gourma Region, financed by UNDP.

These various existing frameworks and in particular cross-border cooperation in the pastoralism sector and the C3 Sahel could be used to identify and resolve security issues.

In Torodi, there is no formal cross-border cooperation in the framework of border management according to the majority of stakeholders.

7.2. Existence of relationships between the defence and security forces in the Niger and the defence and security forces in Burkina Faso and Mali

The study reveals that, in the survey areas, the Niger DSF officers positioned at the Ayorou, Makalondi and Pételkolé border posts have had an opportunity to meet their counterparts in Burkina Faso but not those in Mali. Of the respondents, 57 per cent claim to know some of their counterparts in Burkina Faso, compared with only 1 per cent who have met their fellow border officers in Mali. This situation can be explained by the fact that Makaloni and Pételkolé posts tend to border Burkina Faso. At the border post level, the stakeholders maintain relations for information-sharing, verification and control even if these exchanges take place in an informal setting.

Figure 63A. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of their counterparts in Burkina Faso

43%   57%   ■ Yes ■ No

Figure 63B. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of their counterparts in Mali

1%   99%   ■ Yes ■ No

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
[12] C3 Sahel is the cooperation unit of cross-border communities in the Sahel, which brings together the cross-border towns in Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger.

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The Niger officers' knowledge of their counterparts in Burkina Faso explains the high proportion of officers (53%) who claim to have exchanges with their fellow border officers in Burkina Faso. However, the proportion of officers (2%) maintaining exchanges with their Malian counterparts is low.

Figure 64A. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without an opportunity for exchange with their counterparts in Burkina Faso

Figure 64B. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without an opportunity for exchange with their counterparts in Mali

7.3. Development of exchanges between the defence and security forces in the Niger and the defence and security forces in Burkina Faso and Mali

To promote their exchanges with Burkina Faso and Mali border officers, respondents from the Niger suggested the use of television (63.81%), the creation of joint brigades (30.48%) and organization of joint exercises (20.95%).

Figure 65. The Niger respondents' suggestions to develop exchanges with their counterparts in Burkina Faso and Mali

CHAPTER 8 RELATIONSHIPS AMONG COMMUNITIES, AUTHORITIES, AND DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES

8.1. Quality of the relationship between the local communities and defence and security forces at the border

Collaboration between the DSFs and the population is collectively understood as a pressing necessity in all three districts in the survey region.

In the district of Téra, the local community and the DSFs have a good relationship. This collaboration mainly involves information-sharing, or more precisely, reporting of suspects who sometimes hide within the population. The DSFs expect that this collaboration will result in more reports of suspects from the population.

In Téra, several activities have been carried out by partners as part of the improvement of collaboration between the DSFs and the population. Among the partners working in this area are the High Authority for Peacebuilding, the NGO ACM-Niger, UNDP and IOM, which is presented as the most active partner in carrying out activities aimed at improving the relationship between the DSFs and the population.

Overall, information-sharing is going very well, and the reliability of the information reported is reflected on the ground in major drug seizures, apprehension of suspects and arrests.

Collaboration between the DSFs and the population exists in Torodi District, but it is tense and insufficient, as the population is as afraid of jihadists as it is of the DSFs. There is, however, an improvement that could be attributed to the training and awareness-raising activities that are carried out in the field by several technical partners.

Overall, 79.25 per cent of the respondents said that the relationship between the communities and the DSFs is good.

Figure 66. The Niger respondents' assessment of the quality of the relationship between the communities and the defence and security forces

Legend:
- Good
- Bad
- Does not wish to answer
- Very good

16.04%
0.94%
3.77%
79.25%

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STUDY ON BORDER COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF
BORDER SECURITY AND MANAGEMENT IN THE LIPTAKO-GOURMA REGION

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
8.2. Existence of disputes

The cohabitation between two social groups as distinct as the communities and the DSFs cannot take place without occasional disagreements. For example, in the survey areas, 32.08 per cent of the respondents said that there are disputes with members of the local communities.

These disputes occur frequently, according to 26.47 per cent of the officers.

Figure 67A. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of disputes with community members

32.08%
67.92%

■ Yes
■ No

Figure 67B. The Niger respondents' knowledge of the frequency of disputes with community members

5.88%
26.47%
67.65%

■ Rarely
■ Often
■ Very often

8.3. Reasons behind the disputes

The disputes that often arise between community members and the DSFs are driven by the reasons presented in Figure 68.

Figure 68. The Niger respondents' opinions on the reasons behind the disputes between the local communities and the border security officers

Reason	Percentage
Refusal to comply	55.88%
Non-payment of fines	47.06%
Fraudulent border crossings	41.18%
Lack of respect/trust	32.35%
Goods trafficking	20.59%
Violation of law due to ignorance	2.94%
Nothing	2.94%
Lack of evidence	2.94%

8.4. Capacity of defence and security forces to provide security

It is increasingly clear that the military option alone cannot overcome insecurity and the threat of terrorism. This is well understood by the large proportion of respondents (99%) who say that the DSFs alone cannot ensure security in the current context.

8.5. Purposes of meetings with local communities

The DSF officers interviewed at the field level confirmed that there were meetings between the DSFs and communities. The main purpose of these meetings is to raise awareness and inform community members. Figure 69 shows the purposes of meetings between the two parties.

Figure 69. The Niger respondents' knowledge of the purposes of meetings with local communities

8.6. Assessment of the officers' relationship with the communities

On a personal level, 6.60 per cent of the respondents feel that the relationship they have with the communities is unsatisfactory. However, 18.87 per cent find the relationship they have with community members very satisfactory, while 74.53 per cent find the relationship satisfactory.

Figure 70. The Niger respondents' assessment of the quality of the relationship between communities and border security officers

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
8.7. Collaboration between defence and security forces and stakeholders

Increasingly, there is a growing collective awareness that collaboration between the local communities and the DSFs is essential to ensure security. This idea is widely accepted by the respondents, 97.17 per cent of whom are willing to collaborate with local communities.

With regard to the decentralized technical services teams of the State, the distribution of respondents who collaborate with them is shown in Figure 71.

Figure 71. The Niger respondents' opinions on technical services with which collaboration is needed for border management

Collaboration between the DSFs and technical services teams is informal and focuses on the escorts that DSFs provide to some technical services personnel when they have to travel to unsecure areas for work.

The respondents suggested the organization of regular meetings for exchanges between the DSFs and technical services personnel, joint training workshop sessions, strengthening dialogue and communication as means that could contribute to improving the relationship between the DSFs and technical services teams.

CHAPTER 9 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES

9.1. Intermediation between communities and defence and security forces for border security communication

The involvement of non-DSF stakeholders in border management revolves around information-sharing and awareness-raising. For a better involvement of non-DSF stakeholders in border management, the stakeholders recommend the implementation of an operational communication mechanism between local communities and the DSFs. To this end, a majority of respondents (83.02) suggested that the role of intermediary between the communities and the DSFs in terms of communication on border security be devolved to customary leaders. Respondents believe that the legitimacy of customary chiefs gives them a capital of confidence that other stakeholders do not have.

For other respondents, the role of intermediary can be carried by the town councillor (24.53%) and religious leaders (14.15%).

Figure 72. The Niger respondents' knowledge of an intermediary between communities and defence and security forces for communication on border security

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
9.2. Mechanisms and means of communication between local communities and defence and security forces

To ensure effective communication between local communities and DSFs, a majority of respondents (92.45%) favoured the telephone as the most popular means of communication in Africa. Following telephone, organization of meetings between the two groups of stakeholders was suggested.

Figure 73. The Niger respondents' knowledge of means of communication between communities and defence and security forces

9.3. Warning mechanisms

The telephone remains the most popular means and is considered by 93.40 per cent of the respondents to be the most appropriate mechanism for alerting about border security issues. In addition, some respondents (38.68%) recommend the use of a consultation framework between the authorities/DSFs and communities, while others (31.13%) recommend the formation of a local safety committee and 16.98 per cent propose regular visits.

Figure 74. The Niger respondents' opinions on border security warning mechanisms that should be put in place

9.4. Means and mechanisms for sharing of information

To ensure information-sharing, the telephone is recommended by the majority of respondents (96.23%), followed by organization of meetings (24.53%).

Figure 75. The Niger respondents' opinions on means or equipment to use to ensure information-sharing

9.5. Benefits of good communication between communities and defence and security forces

According to 79.25 per cent of the respondents, good communication between local communities and DSFs helps to prevent attacks. It also enables an immediate reaction from the DSFs (66.04%) and reduces cross-border insecurity (60.38%).

9.6. Risks of poor communication between communities and defence and security forces

According to the respondents, poor communication between local communities and the DSFs can lead to the following main risks:

- Widespread insecurity (86.79%)

- Late reaction of the DSFs (62.26%)

- Loss of confidence in the DSFs (60.38%)

CHAPTER 10   ASSESSMENT OF RESULTS

The project Engaging Communities in Border Management in [the] Niger was implemented by IOM in the Tillabéri region in 2018. The districts of Téra, Torodi and Ayorou were among the areas of intervention of the project.

10.1. Knowledge of the activities of IOM

IOM is well known in Téra District. Several stakeholders claim to have participated in the project's implementation activities, including the awareness caravan, the formation of local prevention committees, civil–military activities and the theoretical simulation exercise. All these activities appear to be innovations in the district, as they have never been carried out before.

In the districts of Torodi and Ayorou, the number of stakeholders with knowledge of IOM activities is lower because most of the activities (building construction, electrification, computer equipment, etc.) are carried out at the police station level.

Those who mentioned IOM were referring to the awareness-raising caravan, which, in Ayorou, focused on violent extremism, DSF–population collaboration and compliance with state of emergency measures.

At the level of border crossing officers, a large proportion of respondents (72%) are aware of IOM border management activities.

10.2. Establishment of local prevention committees

In Téra, each of the towns has an LPC that functions normally and provides reliable information. This allows the members of these LPCs to benefit from the authorities' respect, attested in these terms by a stakeholder who said: "the authorities regularly congratulate the members of the LPCs".

In Ayorou District, the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace has established a peace committee whose members have been provided with a telephone fleet, and the Ministry of the Interior, with support from UNDP, has implemented vigilance and security communal coordination composed of 21 village committees.

The establishment of LPCs was evaluated as good by 49 per cent of the respondents and very good by 17 per cent. However, we note that 34 per cent of the respondents did not want to answer this question.

Figure 76. The Niger respondents' assessment of the establishment of local prevention committees

10.3. Citizen participation

The implementation of the project Engaging Communities in Border Management in [the] Niger has contributed to strengthening citizens' participation in security, according to 97 per cent of the respondents. At the field level, this can be seen in the improved relations between the population and the DSFs. According to some stakeholders, this is even a form of trend reversal because before the implementation of these activities, collaboration between the two parties was poor. Moreover, in all three districts in the Niger covered by this study, it was found that mayors are closer to the population, which means that they have more information than the mayors elsewhere.

10.4. Other project results

Respondents attribute these other results to the project:

- Contribution to strengthening citizens' safety reflexes, according to 96 per cent of the respondents;
- Contribution to the improvement of DSF–local community relations, according to 99 per cent of the respondents.

CONCLUSION

The perception study, initiated by IOM, was carried out among communities in some 20 border communities in Burkina Faso and Mali and among the DSFs operating at border posts in three districts in the Niger from March to May 2019.

A large proportion of respondents (82.37%) perceive the border as a barrier, a demarcation used to define the territorial boundaries between two States. Despite the absence of the border demarcation, 69.69 per cent of the respondents claim to be familiar with the locations of the borders.

The deteriorating security situation in the border areas has had a negative impact on border crossings, especially economic crossings.

As an area that promotes the regular movement of goods and people, the border, according to a fair average of respondents, is also a crossing point for criminal activities.

Theft of livestock, attacks by armed bandits and terrorist incursions are the main threats faced by border communities, although they consider that border security management measures are satisfactory.

Attacks on the DSFs, abductions and targeted assassinations are the main terrorist activities known to the border communities, who believe that the factors inciting terrorism are poverty, lack of occupation among young people, adherence to the jihadist ideology and opposition to authorities.

Despite a relative lull, border communities feel very vulnerable to terrorist attacks. The commitment of communities to secure borders could be reflected in their efforts to immediately notify authorities of any suspicious situation and report suspicious terrorist members in the neighbourhood.

Securing of border areas will only be possible through a synergy of action between the DSFs and the authorities with the full collaboration of local communities. This should involve leading efforts to build strong relationships between local communities and authorities/DSFs, based on trust.

In this perspective, it will be necessary to multiply information-sharing/awareness-raising actions and also consultation frameworks in order to reflect collectively on the situation and to mobilize energies for peaceful border areas and development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This perception study initiated by IOM among the border communities of Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger is the reference study for the implementation of the project Engaging the Border Communities in the Liptako-Gourma Region in Border Security and Management.

The following proposals and recommendations are provided to improve community engagement in border security and management.

Recommendations to Liptako-Gourma States

Border management

The Liptako-Gourma States should work towards an integrated border management policy that combines security and development and helps to transform "barriers" into "bridges".

Insecurity

It is recommended that the Liptako-Gourma States:

- Contribute to reducing the socioeconomic factors conducive to the expansion of terrorism through:
  - the presence of the State in border areas (construction of primary socioeconomic infrastructure, etc.);
  - actions to address poverty and the unequal wealth distribution and to promote youth employment;
  - actions to address abuses, exactions and poorly managed conflicts.
- Promote Liptako-Gourma inter-State security cooperation by organizing joint security operations along the borders.

Specific recommendations to authorities in charge of security

The engagement of communities in border security and management will only produce the desired effects if trust between the DSFs and communities is restored. For this purpose, it is recommended to:

- Train the DSFs to work to "win over the hearts" of the communities;
- Conduct information-sharing/awareness-raising actions for a change of mentality on both sides (population and DSFs);
- Strengthen the knowledge of the DSFs of human rights;
- Support the DSFs in providing quality and equitable professional services to citizens;
- Implement actions that improve the relationship between the DSFs and the community: citizens must feel that the DSFs are there for them.

ANNEX 1   QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BORDER AREA COMMUNITIES

Surname and first name of the investigator:

GPS coordinates:

Interviewer invite:

If you agree, I would like to ask for about 30 minutes of your time to answer some questions about your experience as a citizen living in a border area _____. Your answers will give us a better idea of your perception of border management _____. Your answers are important and will help us to better understand your concerns and to formulate proposals for more efficient border management.

There are no right or wrong answers. If you feel uncomfortable answering any of these questions, please let me know so we can stop. Your answers will be confidential. If I have your permission, may we continue?

A. Basic data

A.1.	Date	
A.2.	Region	
A.3.	Province	
A.4.	Town	
A.5.	Village	

B. Profile of the interviewee

Questions		Answers	Instructions
B.1.	Gender	□ Male □ Female	Only 1 choice possible
B.2.	Nationality	□ Burkina Faso national □ Malian □ Niger national □ Other (please specify) _____	Only 1 choice possible
B.3.	Ethnicity	□ Fulani □ Sonrai □ Tuareg □ Mossi □ Gourmantché □ Hausa □ Djerma □ Dafing □ Bwaba □ Other (please specify) _____	Only 1 choice possible
B.4.	Age		Open question
B.5.	Main professional activity	□ Agriculture □ Livestock farming □ Craftmanship □ Trade □ Other (please specify) _____	Only 1 choice possible

C. Community perceptions of border management

C.1.	Do you know what a border is (yes/no)?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to D.**
C.2.	Do you know exactly where the border is located?	□ Yes □ No	1 choice possible
C.2.a.	Where is the border located in respect to your village? (Indicate distance if known.)		
C.3.	What do you think the purpose of the border is?	□ Demarcate the boundary between two States □ Ensure the safety of the population □ Enable the authorities to monitor entries and exits □ Other: _____ □ Does not know	Several choices available
C.4.	Are you used to crossing the border? Since when? (year)	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If yes, go to C.5.** **If no, go to C.7.**
C.5.	If so, how often?	□ Several times a day □ Every day □ Often □ 2 to 3 times a week □ Once a week □ Once a month □ Once a year □ Never □ Other	Only 1 choice possible
C.6.	Why were you crossing the border before?	□ Family reason (wedding, baptism, others) □ Economic reason (pasture crops, mining sites, etc.) □ Commercial reason (sales of livestock, items, cereals, etc.) □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
C.7.	Are you crossing the border at the moment?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If yes, continue to C.8.** **If no, continue to D.**
C.8.	How often do you currently cross the border?	□ Several times a day □ Every day □ Often □ 2 to 3 times a week □ Once a week □ Once a month □ Once a year □ Never □ Other	Only 1 choice possible
C.9.	Why are you crossing the border these days?	□ Family reason (marriage, baptism, others) □ Economic reason □ Commercial reason □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
C.10.	What are the nationalities of the people crossing the border?	□ Burkina Faso national □ Niger national □ Malian □ Other (please specify) _____ □ Does not know	Several choices available
C.10.a.	If Burkina Faso national	□ Aboriginal peoples □ Other localities (to be specified): _____	Only 1 choice possible

C.11.	What are the categories of people using the border crossings?	□ Families (wedding, baptism, others) □ Pastors □ Refugees □ Migrants □ Traders □ DSFs □ Other (specify)	Several choices available

D. Security threats/risks at the border

D.1.	You or your village/hamlet have had incidents with people from other countries (Mali, the Niger, etc.).	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to D.2 then D.4.**
D.2.	Are border crossings used for criminal activities (trafficking in arms, human beings, drugs, other products)?	□ Yes □ No □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible
D.3.	What types of cross-border security problems does your village/hamlet face?	□ Livestock theft □ Smuggling (pasta, rice, etc.) □ Trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.) □ Attacks by armed bandits □ Incursions by armed groups/terrorists □ Others _____ □ None	Several choices available
D.4.	Do you know what security measures are taken at the border?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to D.5.**
D.4.a.	If yes, which ones?	□ Border control at border crossings □ Patrols □ Searches □ Other (specify) _____	Several choices available
D.5.	What is your assessment of these security measures?	□ Very sufficient □ Sufficient □ Insufficient	Only 1 choice possible
D.6.	What are the risks that can arise from poor border security management?	□ Epidemics □ Terrorist incursions/armed groups □ Illicit trafficking □ Banditry □ Recruitment of young people by armed groups □ Cross-border community conflicts □ Other (please specify) _____ □ Does not know	Several choices available

E. People's perception of attacks by armed groups

E.1.	Have you ever heard of armed groups?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to F.**
E.2.	What types of armed groups are involved?	□ Terrorists □ Armed bandits □ Traffickers □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available **If "terrorists" is unchecked, go to F.**
E.3.	What kinds of terrorist activities are you aware of?	□ Attacks on DSFs □ Use of explosive devices □ Home/Office arson □ Assassinations □ Abductions □ Harassment □ Does not know	Several choices available

E.4.	What do you think can push people towards this phenomenon?	□ Poverty □ Lack of occupation □ Adherence to ideology □ Ethnic or family motivations □ Opposition to the authorities □ Anger and frustration □ Radicalization □ Other (please specify) _____ □ Does not know	Several choices available
E.5.	Do you think your community is safe from this phenomenon?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
E.5.a.	Why?		Open question
E.6.	Does your community welcome people displaced by security threats?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
E.6.a.	If yes, how many are there?		Open question
E.6.b.	Are you aware of one or more villages that has or have moved?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
E.6.c.	If yes, name it.		Open question
E.7.	Have members of your community relocated as a result of security threats?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
E.7.a.	Has your entire village moved because of security threats?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
E.8.	In your opinion, is the terrorist threat in the region decreasing, stable or increasing?	□ Decreasing □ Stable □ Increasing	Only 1 choice possible
E.9.	What can be done so that local communities can prevent this kind of threat?	□ Raising youth awareness □ Offering economic activities to young people □ Involve community leaders (village chiefs, religious leaders, etc.) in decisions □ Collaborate/cooperate with DSFs and authorities □ Nothing □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
E.10.	How can the local community support the authorities in the fight against terrorism and protect itself at the same time?	□ Denounce community members involved in terrorism □ Alert the authorities when there is a problem or suspicious case □ Set up local prevention committees □ Self-defence with weapons □ Nothing □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available

F. Border management efficiency

F.1.	What is the level of security in the area in your opinion?	□ Good □ Moderate □ Insufficient □ No security at all	Only 1 choice possible
F.2.	Do you know the defence and security forces present at the border?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to F.4.**

F.3.	If yes, which stakeholders do you know?	□ Police officers □ Gendarmes □ Prison guards □ Water and forest rangers □ Customs □ Military □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
F.4.	Are there patrol crossings along the border?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
F.5.	Are there any patrol crossings in your village?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
F.5.a.	How often do these patrols take place?		Open question
F.6.	Who do you think are the local officials responsible for border security management?	□ Police officers □ Gendarmes □ Customs □ Military □ Water and forest rangers □ Village chief □ Customary/Religious leader □ Inhabitants of the villages □ Mayor □ The army □ Prefect □ Governor	Several choices available
F.7.	What is your assessment of the work of these stakeholders who manage border security?	□ Very satisfactory □ Satisfactory □ Unsatisfactory	Only 1 choice possible

G. Local community and authority/DSF relations

G.1.	What is your assessment of the relationship between the local community and the border security officers?	□ Very good □ Good □ Bad □ Other □ Does not wish to answer	Only 1 choice possible
G.2.	Does the local community ever have disputes with border security officials?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to G.6.**
G.3.	If yes, how often do these disputes occur?	□ Very often □ Often □ Rarely	Only 1 choice possible
G.4.	What are the reasons for these disputes?	□ Fines □ Seizure of goods/objects □ Slowing of the passage □ Prohibition of passage □ Arrest □ Corruption □ Harassment □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
G.5.	What needs to be done to improve/establish good relations between DSFs and communities?		Open question
G.6.	Can local authorities fully ensure border security without the involvement of local communities?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible

G.7.	Do the authorities ever organize meetings with your community on border security?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to G.8.**
G.7.a.	If yes, which ones?	□ Capacity-building □ Training □ Awareness-raising/Information-sharing □ Establishment of local prevention committees □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
G.8.	What is your assessment of the relationship between the administrative/political authorities and your community?	□ Very satisfactory □ Satisfactory □ Unsatisfactory	Only 1 choice possible
G.9.	What needs to be done to improve/establish good relations between administrative/political authorities and your community?		Open question
G.10.	Do you think you should be involved in border management?	□ Yes □ No	1 choice possible **If yes, go to G.11.** **If no, go to G.12.**
G.11.	If yes, how?		Open question
G.12.	If not, why not?		Open question
G.13.	Are you willing to collaborate/cooperate with the DSFs/authorities?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible

H. Communication between authorities and communities on border security

H.1.	Is there an intermediary person between local communities and the authorities for communication on border security?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to H.2.**
H.1.a.	If so, who is it?	□ Customary leader □ Religious leader □ VDC chairperson □ Town councillor □ Other (specify)	**Several choices available**
H.2.	What means/mechanisms does the population use to communicate with the authorities/DSFs?	□ Telephone □ Radio □ TV □ Meetings □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
H.3.	What warning mechanisms should be put in place in the event of problems regarding border security?	□ Framework for consultation between authorities/DSFs and communities □ Exchange of telephone contacts □ Local committee (prevention, information, etc.) □ Regular visits of the authorities/DSFs to the village □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available

H.4.	What means do you think are used to ensure information sharing?	□ Telephone □ Radio □ TV □ Meetings □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
H.5.	What do you think are the benefits of good communication between the authorities and the local community on border security?	□ Immediate reaction of the authorities/DSFs □ Security problem understood in time □ Reducing cross-border insecurity □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
H.6.	In your opinion, what are the risks of poor communication between communities, authorities/DSFs?	□ Rapidly spreading insecurity □ Late reaction of the authorities/DSFs □ Severity of consequences for local communities □ Loss of community confidence in the authorities/DSFs □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
H.7.	In your opinion, what limits collaboration/cooperation (information-sharing) between the community and the authorities/DSFs?		Open question
H.8.	What alternatives do you propose?		Open question

I. Conflict prevention/management

I.1.	What are the potential sources of conflict in your area?	□ Land □ Agriculture/Livestock □ Succession at the level of customary chieftaincy □ Succession at the mosque □ Migrants/Aboriginals □ Designation of the mayor □ Abduction of young girls □ Other (please specify)_____	Several choices available
I.2.	Are there conflict prevention mechanisms in your area?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to I.6.**
I.3.	If so, what is the nature of these mechanisms?	□ Customary □ Religious □ Administrative □ Association □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
I.3.a.	Specify the conflict prevention mechanism(s) in your area.		Open question
I.4.	What is your assessment of the effectiveness of these mechanisms?	□ Very satisfactory □ Satisfactory □ Unsatisfactory	Only 1 choice possible
I.5.	What needs to be done to improve the effectiveness of these mechanisms?		Open question
I.6.	Are there conflict management mechanisms in your area?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to J.**
I.7.	What is the nature of these mechanisms?	□ Customary □ Religious □ Administrative □ Judiciary □ Association □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available

I.7.a.	Specify the conflict management mechanism(s) in your area.		Open question
I.8.	What is your assessment of the effectiveness of these mechanisms?	□ Very satisfactory □ Satisfactory □ Unsatisfactory	Only 1 choice possible
I.8.a.	What needs to be done to improve the effectiveness of these mechanisms?		Open question

J. Emergency response

J.1.	What do you think can cause massive population displacements at the border?	□ Armed conflict □ Community conflicts □ Terrorist attacks □ Epidemic □ Natural disasters (floods, drought, etc.) □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.2.	Do you think your community is prepared to receive a large influx of displaced persons?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
J.3.	Why?	□ Crisis situation already experienced, positive reaction of the population □ Awareness-raising from local authorities □ Community well prepared and organized for this purpose □ Crisis situation already experienced, negative reaction of the population □ Panic and flee as soon as a threat approaches □ Population already terrified, uninformed and disorganized □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.4.	What kind of action do you think the authorities should take in response to an emergency situation?	□ Welcoming the displaced population □ Provision of emergency equipment □ Helping the sick and wounded □ Securing the reception area □ Immediate care of displaced persons □ Relocating the displaced □ Refoulement of displaced persons □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.5.	What actions could the local community take in response to an emergency situation?	□ Welcoming the displaced population □ Inform local authorities quickly □ Coordinate with the local authority to facilitate the care of displaced persons □ Remaining vigilant □ Respect and follow the provisions taken by the authority on site □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available

K. Population–public administration confidence

K.1.	What is your assessment of the relationship between the local community and public services representatives (prefecture, agriculture, animal husbandry, justice, etc.)?	□ Very good □ Good □ Bad □ Other □ Does not wish to answer	Only 1 choice possible
K.2.	What is your assessment of the relationship between the local community and the town hall services officers?	□ Very good □ Good □ Bad □ Other □ Does not wish to answer	Only 1 choice possible
K.3.	Do you have opportunities to discuss your concerns with the mayor or town councillors?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to K.6.**
K.4.	If yes, how often do these exchanges take place?	□ Very often □ Often □ Rarely	Only 1 choice possible
K.5.	Do you have confidence in the administration (judicial, other public services)?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
K.6.	Do you trust the local administration (town hall)?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible

ANNEX 2 INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR RESOURCE PERSONS

Date of interview: _____

Region of: _____

Province of: _____

Post: _____

Gender: _____

Age: _____

Contact details: _____

A. Basic data

Stakeholders	Questions

Regional authorities	1. General description of the region
	2. Overall assessment of the security situation in the region
	3. Specific assessment of the security situation in the border areas
	4. Analysis of potential sources of insecurity in the region and in the border area
	5. Analysis of existing/incurred risks/threats
	6. Assessment of DSFs/population collaboration
	  a. How can this collaboration be improved?
	7. Assessment of the citizen participation of border communities in their security, in the security of borders and border areas
	  a. How can this citizen participation be strengthened?
	8. Description and analysis of conflict prevention/management mechanisms; achievements/insufficiencies, areas for improvement
	9. Description of local crisis management mechanisms and procedures; achievements/insufficiencies, areas for improvement
	10. How can communities be informed/aware of the management of crisis situations, their participation in security and confidence-building, dialogue and transmission of information to the authorities and DSFs? With what tools? What equipment?
	11. Recommendations:
	  a. To improve the engagement of community citizens in border security and management
	  b. To improve DSF–population collaboration
	  c. To improve emergency management capacities

DSFs: Army, gendarmerie, police, customs, water and forest rangers, etc.	1. Introductory presentation
	2. General information on security issues: definition, types/sources, global statistical data
	3. Characteristics of insecurity in the region: types and sources of insecurity/conflict, main risks and threats, indication, extent, statistical data, etc.
	4. National border security strategy: overall approach, actions, stakeholders/roles, resources, results, challenges/constraints/
	5. Cross-border cooperation in securing borders
	  a. Type of cooperation (formal/informal)
	  b. Actions/Activities
	  c. Stakeholders/Means
	  d. Results
	  e. Inadequacies/Constraints/Difficulties
	  f. Proposals/Recommendations
	6. Inter-force collaboration on border security
	  a. Type of collaboration (formal/informal)
	  b. Actions/Activities
	  c. Stakeholders/Means
	  d. Results
	  e. Inadequacies/Constraints/Difficulties
	  f. Proposals/Recommendations

Stakeholders	Questions

	7. DSFs/customary and religious leaders collaboration on border security
	    a. Type of collaboration (formal/informal)
	    b. Actions/Activities
	    c. Stakeholders/Means
	    d. Results
	    e. Inadequacies/constraints/difficulties
	    f. Proposals/Recommendations
	8. DSFs/local border security initiatives collaboration
	    a. Type of collaboration (formal/informal)
	    b. Actions/Activities
	    c. Stakeholders/Means
	    d. Results
	    e. Inadequacies/Constraints/Difficulties
	    f. Proposals/Recommendations including to improve their understanding with the community
	9. DSFs/population collaboration on border security
	    a. Type of collaboration (formal/informal)
	    b. Actions/Activities
	    c. Stakeholders/Means
	    d. Results
	    e. Inadequacies/Constraints/Difficulties
	    f. Proposals/Recommendations
	10. Citizen participation in ensuring citizens' safety and in securing borders
	    a. Relevance of involving populations
	    b. Strategy for involving the population
	    c. Population initiatives
	    d. Achievements/Successes, inadequacies/obstacles to citizen participation
	    e. Proposals/Recommendations for strengthening citizen participation
	11. Mechanisms/Procedures for conflict and crisis prevention in border areas
	    a. Description of mechanisms/procedures
	    b. Stakeholders and roles in prevention
	    c. Achievements/Success of the mechanisms
	    d. Inadequacies/Constraints/Difficulties
	    e. Suggestions for improvement/Recommendations
	12. Mechanisms/Procedures for conflict and crisis management in border areas
	    a. Description of mechanisms/procedures
	    b. Stakeholders and roles
	    c. Achievements/Success of mechanisms/procedures
	    d. Inadequacies/Constraints/Difficulties
	    e. Suggestions for improvement/Recommendations
	
	– General recommendations
	– Specific recommendations:
	    ○ Citizen participation in security
	    ○ DSFs/population collaboration
	    ○ For a change in the behaviour of stakeholders at the grassroots level

Civil society/Opinion leaders	1. Introductory presentation
	2. Analysis of the security situation and border security
	3. Analysis of the state of border cooperation
	4. Citizen participation in securing them: SWOT analysis – recommendations
	5. Citizen participation in border security: SWOT analysis – recommendations
	6. Population/DSFs collaboration: SWOT analysis – recommendations
	7. Support strategies for cross-border cooperation and border security
	8. Actions in crisis and conflict prevention at the borders
	9. Actions in crisis and conflict management at the borders
	10. Proposals for actions, tools, equipment, etc. to:
	    a. Better inform [the communities]/Raise awareness of communities about the management of crisis situations
	    b. Have a better DSFs/population collaboration
	    c. Strengthen trust, dialogue and the transmission of information to the authorities and DSFs
	    d. Strengthen citizen participation in ensuring citizens' safety and in securing borders

ANNEX 3   QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY FORCES IN BORDER AREAS

Surname and first name of the investigator:

GPS coordinates:

> **Interviewer invite**:
>
> If you agree, I would like to ask for about 30 minutes of your time to answer some questions about your experience as a DSF officer working in a border area. Please note that your answers will give us a better idea of your perception of border management. Your answers are important and will help us to better understand your concerns and to formulate proposals for more efficient border management.
>
> There are no right or wrong answers. If you feel uncomfortable answering any of these questions, please let me know so we can stop. Your answers will be confidential. If I have your permission, may we continue?

A. Basic data

A.1.	Date	
A.2.	Region	
A.3.	District	
A.4.	Town	
A.5.	Post	

B. Profile of the interviewee

	Questions	Answers	Instructions
B.1.	Gender	□ Male □ Female	Only 1 choice possible
B.2.	Occupation	□ Police officer □ Gendarme □ Customs officer □ Water and forest ranger □ National guard □ FAN	Only 1 choice possible
B.3.	Age		Open question
B.4.	How long have you been assigned to this border crossing?		

C. Working conditions at the border crossing

C.1.	On average, how many people do you think cross your border post per day?		Open question
C.2.	Is the station adequately prepared to process and control this flow of entries and exits? If yes, explain. If no, explain.	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
C.3.	Do you think there are alternative routes bypassing the post for illegal entry and exit?	□ Yes □ No □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible

C.4.	**Do you have all the necessary knowledge/skills on migration-related topics (travel documents, document fraud, visa requirements, refoulement procedures, biometrics, etc.)**	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
C.5.	**Do you consider it necessary to receive specific technical training on the subject?**	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
C.6.	**If yes, which ones?**		Open question
C.7.	**Do you feel safe in your workplace?** **If yes, explain.** **If no, explain.**	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible

D. Security threats/risks at the border

D.1.	**Have you or your workplace had incidents with people crossing the border with non-Niger nationalities (Mali, Burkina Faso, etc.)?** **If yes, what kind of incident?**	□ Yes □ No □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible
D.2.	**Do many people fail to provide identity papers or visas when required?**	□ Yes □ No □ Does not know	
D.3.	**Are border crossings used for criminal activities (trafficking in arms, human beings, drugs, other products)?**	□ Yes □ No □ Not much, rarely □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible
D.4.	**Are the bypass roads in the area of the post being used for criminal activity?**	□ Yes □ No □ Not much □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible
D.5.	**What types of cross-border security issues do your post and its area face?**	□ Livestock theft □ Smuggling (pasta, rice, etc.) □ Trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.) □ Attacks by armed bandits □ Incursions by armed groups/terrorists □ Other (please specify) _____ □ None	Several choices available
D.6.	**Do you know what security measures are taken at the border?**	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
D.6.a.	**If yes, which ones?**	□ Other (please specify) _____	Open question
D.6.b.	**What is your assessment of these security measures?**	□ Very sufficient □ Sufficient □ Insufficient	Only 1 choice possible
D.7.	**What are the risks that can arise from poor border security management?**	□ Epidemics □ Terrorist incursions/Armed groups □ Illicit trafficking □ Banditry □ Recruitment of young people by armed groups □ Cross-border community conflicts □ Underdevelopment of the country □ Other (please specify) _____ □ Does not know	Several choices available

E. DSFs' perceptions of attacks by armed groups

E.1.	Have you ever heard of armed groups?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to G.**
E.2.	What types of armed groups are involved?	□ Terrorists □ Armed bandits □ Traffickers □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
E.3.	What kinds of terrorist activities are you aware of?	□ Attacks on DSFs □ Use of explosive devices □ Home/Office arson □ Assassinations □ Abductions □ Harassment □ Does not know □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
E.4.	What do you think can push people towards this phenomenon?	□ Poverty □ Lack of occupation □ Adherence to ideology □ Ethnic or family motivations □ Opposition to the authorities □ Anger and frustration □ Radicalization □ Other (please specify) _____ □ Does not know	Several choices available
E.5.	Do you think that your post and its immediate area are safe from this phenomenon?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
E.5.a.	Why?		Open question
E.6.	Does your area of intervention or work receive people displaced as a result of threats?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
E.6.a.	If yes, how many are there?		Open question
E.6.b.	If yes, what were the nature of the threats?		
E.6.c.	Does the terrorist threat exist in the reception area?	□ Yes □ No	
E.7.	What is your assessment of the terrorist threat in your area?	□ Decreasing □ Stable □ Increasing	Only 1 choice possible
E.8.	What can be done so that local communities can prevent this kind of threat?	□ Raise youth awareness □ Offer economic activities to young people □ Involve community leaders (village chiefs, religious leaders, etc.) in decisions □ Collaborate/Cooperate with DSFs and authorities □ Nothing □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices possible
E.9.	How can the local community support the authorities in the fight against terrorism and protect itself at the same time?	□ Report community members involved in terrorism □ Alert the authorities when there is a problem or suspicious case □ Set up local prevention committees □ Self-defence with weapons □ Nothing	Several choices possible

F. Knowledge of existing systems in the region

F.1.	Have you ever heard of local prevention committees (LPCs)?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
F.2.	Do you have any knowledge of the LPC implementation process?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
F.3.	If yes, are you aware of the missions and roles assigned to the LPCs?	☐ Yes ☐ No	
F.3.a.	If yes, do you have a good level of collaboration with them?	☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ Average ☐ Does not know	
F.4.	Do you have any knowledge of the results of establishing the LPCs in the Niger?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
F.5.	If yes, name it.		Open question

G. Inter-DSFs cooperation in border management

G.1.	What is your assessment of the collaboration between the various DSF bodies in your area?	☐ Very good ☐ Good ☐ Bad ☐ Other (please specify) _____ ☐ Does not wish to answer	Only 1 choice possible
G.2.	Are there any disputes between the various DSF bodies in your area?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
G.2.a.	If yes, how often do these disputes occur?	☐ Very often ☐ Often ☐ Rarely	Only 1 choice possible
G.2.b.	What are these disputes about?		Open question
G.3.	Do you consider the collaboration between the DSF bodies to be important?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
G.4.	Are there any topics on which you think it is important for the DSF bodies to work together?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
G.5.	If so, which ones?		Open question
G.6.	What needs to be done to improve/establish good collaboration between the various DSF bodies in your locality?		Open question

H. Cross-border cooperation (Burkina Faso–Niger/Mali–Niger)

H.1.	Have you met your colleagues from Burkina Faso?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
H.2.	Have you met your colleagues from Mali?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
H.3.	Do you have the opportunity to exchange with your colleagues in Burkina Faso?	☐ Yes ☐ No	Only 1 choice possible
H.3.a.	If yes, how often do these exchanges take place?	☐ Very often ☐ Often ☐ Rarely	Only 1 choice possible

H.3.b. What are the topics of these exchanges?		Open question
H.4. Do you have the opportunity to exchange with your colleagues in Mali?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
H.4.a. If yes, how often do these exchanges take place?	□ Very often □ Often □ Rarely	Only 1 choice possible
H.4.b. What are the topics of these exchanges?		Open question
H.5. If not, are there any topics on which you think it is important for the DSFs from Burkina Faso and Mali to exchange with you and vice versa?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
H.6. If so, which ones?		Open question
H.7. How can you develop these exchanges with your colleagues in Burkina Faso and Mali?	□ Telephone □ Radio (walkie-talkie) □ Joint brigade □ Joint exercises □ Other (please specify) _____	Open question

I. Local community–authority–DSF relations

I.1. What is your assessment of the relationship between the local community and the border security officers?	□ Very good □ Good □ Bad □ Other (please specify) _____ □ Does not wish to answer	Only 1 choice possible
I.2. Do you ever have a dispute with members of the local community?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to I.5.**
I.3. If yes, how often do these disputes occur?	□ Very often □ Often □ Rarely	Only 1 choice possible
I.4. What are the reasons for these disputes?	□ Refusal to comply □ Lack of respect/trust □ Non-payment of fines □ Merchandise fraud/Trafficking in Objects □ Fraudulent border crossings □ Collaboration with the bandits □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
I.5. What needs to be done to improve/establish good relations between DSFs and communities?		Open question
I.6. Can DSFs provide full border security on their own?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
I.7. Do you ever organize meetings with members of the community?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to I.8.**
I.7.a. If so, on what subjects?	□ Capacity-building □ Training □ Awareness-raising/Information-sharing □ Establishment of local prevention committees □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available

I.8.	What is your assessment of the relationship between you and members of the community?	□ Very satisfactory □ Satisfactory □ Unsatisfactory	Only 1 choice possible
I.9.	What needs to be done to improve/establish good relations between you and the community?		Open question
I.10.	Do you think the young people of the village should be involved in border management?	□ Yes □ No	1 choice possible **If yes, go to I.11.** **If no, go to I.12.**
I.11.	If yes, how?		Open question
I.12.	If not, why not?		Open question
I.13.	Are you willing to collaborate/cooperate with communities?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
1.14.	In your opinion, what are the technical services with which collaboration is needed in border management?	□ Health □ Registry office □ Humanitarian action □ Environment □ Education/Culture □ Other (please specify) _____	
I.15.	Are you aware of any collaboration with technical services at the operational level in your area?	□ Yes □ No □ Somewhat aware □ No answer	
I.16.	On which priority aspects do you think it is important to collaborate?		Open question
I.17.	How can this collaboration be strengthened?		Open question

J. Communication between DSFs and communities on border security

J.1.	Is there an intermediary person between local communities and DSFs for communication on border security?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible **If no, go to J.2.**
J.1.a.	If so, who is it?	□ Customary leader □ Religious leader □ Town councillor □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.2.	What means/mechanisms does the population use to communicate with DSFs?	□ Telephone □ Radio □ TV □ Meetings □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.3.	What warning mechanisms should be put in place in the event of problems regarding border security?	□ Framework for consultation between authorities/DSFs and communities □ Exchange of telephone contacts □ Local committee (prevention, information, etc.) □ Regular DSF visits to the village □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.4.	What means/equipment do you think should be used to ensure information-sharing?	□ Telephone □ Radio □ TV □ Meetings □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available

J.5.	What do you think are the benefits of good communication between the DSFs and the local community on border security?	□ Immediate reaction of DSFs □ Security problem understood in time □ Reducing cross-border insecurity □ Prevention of attacks □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.6.	What do you think are the risks of poor communication between communities and DSFs?	□ Rapidly spreading insecurity □ Late reaction of DSFs □ Severity of consequences for local communities □ Loss of community confidence in DSFs □ Endangering informants □ Other (please specify) _____	Several choices available
J.7.	What do you think limits collaboration/cooperation (information-sharing) between the community and DSFs?		Open question
J.8.	What alternatives do you propose?		Open question

K. Assessment of the results of the project

K.1.	Are you familiar with the IOM border management activities?	□ Yes □ No	Only 1 choice possible
K.2.	What is your assessment of the establishment of the LPCs?	□ Very good □ Good □ Bad □ Other □ Does not wish to answer	Only 1 choice possible
K.3.	Has this project contributed to strengthening citizen participation in security?	□ Yes □ No □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible
K.4.	Did this project contribute to strengthening citizens' safety reflexes?	□ Yes □ No □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible
K.5.	Did this project contribute to improving the relationship between DSFs and the community?	□ Yes □ No □ Does not know	Only 1 choice possible
K.6.	What is your assessment of the contribution of this project to improving security and strengthening collaboration between DSFs and the community?	□ Very good □ Good □ Bad □ Other □ Does not wish to answer	Only 1 choice possible
K.7.	What is your assessment of the contribution of this project to improving collaboration between DSF bodies?		Open question
K.8.	What is your assessment of the contribution of this project to improving collaboration between DSFs and technical services?		Open question
K.9.	What are your recommendations to the project?		Open question

ANNEX 4 · INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR REGIONAL/ DISTRICT AUTHORITIES IN THE NIGER

> **Interviewer invite**:
>
> We have been commissioned by IOM to conduct a study on community perceptions of border management. In your capacity as _____, I would like to ask for your availability to discuss issues related to the subject of the study. We have asked you to join us as a result of your responsibilities and your experience. The information you are willing to share with us is important because it will help us to better understand the concerns about border management and insecurity. Furthermore, it will enable us to formulate proposals for more effective security and border management.
>
> The interview is strictly confidential. If I have your permission, may we begin the interview?

Description of study objectives

- **Objective 1**: To assess the perception that communities on the three borders have of security and border management, including their apprehension of threats and tensions, their capacity for resilience in the face of insecurity, and their involvement in security and cooperation between them, the authorities and the security forces both internally and with those of neighbouring countries;

- **Objective 2**: To assess the implementation of the project Engaging Communities in Border Management in [the] Niger in the Tillabéri region in order to identify lessons learned and good practices.

> Date of interview: _____
> Region of: _____
> Province of: _____
> Post: _____
> Gender: _____
> Age: _____

I. General information on security issues

1.1. How [do you] define insecurity? What are the sources of insecurity in your region/district?
1.2. What is the extent of insecurity in your region/district? What type of violence/conflict do you encounter in your region/district?
1.3. What is your assessment of the evolution of the phenomenon of insecurity in your region/district?
1.4. What are the causes/consequences of this violence?
1.5. What proposals do you have for the prevention of such violence?

II. Border security issues

2.1. What are the characteristics of insecurity at the border: what types and sources of insecurity/conflict are encountered in the region/district? What are the main risks and threats that can be encountered there? How does this insecurity manifest itself? What is the extent of insecurity in your region/district?
2.2. What is your assessment of the efficiency of border management?
2.3. What is your assessment of the security measures taken at the border?
2.4. What proposals for improvement/recommendation do you have that could contribute to better border security?

III. Cross-border cooperation in securing borders

Collaboration between authorities on both sides of the border

3.1. What type of cross-border cooperation (formal/informal) exists between your region/district and those of neighbouring countries?
3.2. What actions/activities are carried out in the framework of the promotion of cross-border cooperation?
3.3. Who are the stakeholders and the means mobilized to promote this cooperation?
3.4. What results can be attributed to cross-border cooperation?

3.5. What are the inadequacies/constraints/difficulties encountered in cross-border cooperation?

3.6. What proposals/recommendations can you make to strengthen cross-border cooperation on border security?

IV. Collaboration between the various DSF bodies in the field of border security

4.1. What are the various DSF bodies positioned to ensure border security?

4.2. Is there any form of collaboration (formal/informal) between these various bodies of DSFs?

4.3. What is your assessment of this form of collaboration?

4.4. What are the achievements and results of the forms of collaboration between the various DSF bodies in charge of border security?

4.5. What are the inadequacies/constraints/difficulties encountered in the collaboration between the various DSF bodies?

4.6. How can these difficulties be overcome? What can be done to strengthen collaboration between DSFs?

V. Collaboration between DSFs and the community in securing borders

5.1. Is there any form of collaboration (formal/informal) between DSFs and the community?

5.2. What is your assessment of this form of collaboration?

5.3. What are the achievements and results of the forms of collaboration between the DSFs and the community?

5.4. What are the inadequacies/constraints/difficulties encountered in the collaboration between the DSFs and the community?

5.5. How can these difficulties be overcome? What can be done to strengthen collaboration between DSFs and the community?

VI. Collaboration between DSFs and border management technical services

6.1. Is there any form of collaboration (formal/informal) between DSFs and technical services?

6.2. What is your assessment of this form of collaboration?

6.3. What are the achievements and results of the forms of collaboration between DSFs and the various technical services involved?

6.4. What are the inadequacies/constraints/difficulties encountered in the collaboration between DSFs and technical services?

6.5. How can these difficulties be overcome? What can be done to strengthen collaboration between DSFs and technical services?

VII. Crisis/Conflict prevention/management mechanisms

7.1. Are there crisis or conflict prevention/management mechanisms in your region/district?

7.2. What is your assessment of these mechanisms?

7.3. What are the achievements and results of these mechanisms?

7.4. What are the constraints/insufficiencies of these mechanisms?

7.5. Is your region/district prepared for crisis management? if not, how [do you think your region/district should] prepare for it?

VIII. Appreciation of your involvement in border management

8.1. How is the region/prefecture involved in border management?

8.2. What are the achievements? Successes?

8.3. What are the constraints/difficulties encountered?

8.4. How can community involvement in border security be improved?

IX. Assessment of community involvement in border management

9.1. How is the community involved in border management?

9.2. What are the achievements? Successes?

9.3. What constraints/difficulties were encountered?

9.4. How can community involvement in border security be improved?

X. Assessment of the implementation of the project in the region/district

10.1. Do you have knowledge of the project?

10.2. What is your assessment of the involvement of communities in border management?

10.3. Did the project promote closer links between DSFs/communities? What are your comments about this?

10.4. What is your assessment of the establishment of local prevention committees?
       (What works well? Less well? Inadequacies? Constraints/difficulties, etc.)

10.5. What is your assessment of the national/regional/district capacities in humanitarian border management? In crisis management?

10.6. Are there other achievements of the project? What are these?

10.7. What lessons have been learned from the implementation of the project?

10.8. What are the good practices of the project that ought to be shared?

ANNEX 5   SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE SURVEYS CONDUCTED IN BURKINA FASO

I.   Profile of respondents

Table 1. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by gender

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Women	988	23.22
Men	3 267	76.78

Table 2. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by age

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Under 18	20	0.47
18–25	514	12.08
26–40	2 158	50.72
41–60	1 376	32.34
61–80	180	4.23
80+	7	0.16

Table 3. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by nationality

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Burkina Faso national	4 163	97.84
Malian	46	1.08
Niger national	41	0.96
Other	5	0.12

Table 4. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by ethnicity

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	25	0.59
Djerma	36	0.85
Gourmantché	638	14.99
Hausa	39	0.92
Mossi	696	16.36
Fulani	1 593	37.44
Sonrai	545	12.81
Tuareg	69	1.62
Bellah	126	2.96
Dogon	130	3.06
Foulce	187	4.39
Koronfè	38	0.89
Rimaïbé	47	1.10
Tamacheque	77	1.81

Table 5. Distribution of respondents in Burkina Faso by economic activity

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Agriculture	2 725	64.04
Craftmanship	29	0.68
Trade	273	6.42
Livestock farming	698	16.40
Housewife	314	7.38
Student	63	1.48
Gold panner	53	1.25
Other	100	2.35

II.   Perception regarding the border

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the purposes of borders

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Demarcate the boundary between two States	3 505	82.37
Ensure the safety of the population	1 127	26.49
Enable the authorities to monitor entries and exits	979	23.01
Does not know	94	2.21
Other	37	0.87

Table 2. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the geographical location of the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Don't know the location	1 121	30.31
Familiar with the location	2 577	69.69

Table 3. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents per border crossing at different times

	Crossed in the past (%)	Crossed recently (%)
Yes	31.67	65.82
No	68.33	34.18

Table 4. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents per border crossing at different times by area of residence

	Crossed in the past (%)	Crossed recently (%)
Komondjari	57.36	88.76
Loroum	32.71	61.72
Oudalan	18.54	52.40
Seno	51.80	82.66
Soum	2.96	55.83
Tapoa	89.32	97.57
Yagha	58.00	78.38
Yatenga	3.96	31.65

Table 5. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents by frequency of crossing the border in the past

	Number of respondents	Percentage
2 to 3 times a week	40	3.42
Other	9	0.77
Every day	52	4.44
Never	1	0.09
Several times a day	3	0.26
Often	704	60.12
Once a year	41	3.50
Once a month	83	7.09
Once a week	238	20.32

Table 6. Burkina Faso respondents' reasons for crossing the border by period

	Before (%)	Now (%)
Family	52.88	23.79
Economic	53.99	21.45
Commercial	47.08	27.28
Other	1.40	0.53

Table 7. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without knowledge of defence and security forces present at the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	2 773	65.17
No	1 482	34.83

Table 8. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of different defence and security officers at the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	7	0.11
Gendarmes	26	0.43
Customs officers	538	8.80
Forest rangers	559	9.14
Police officers	1 390	22.72
Gendarmes	1 678	27.43
Military	1 919	31.37

III. Security risks

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the nationalities of people crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	13	0.35
West African national	85	2.30
Does not know	310	8.38
Malian	1 588	42.94
Niger national	1 813	49.03
Burkina Faso national	2 816	76.15

Table 2. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the categories of people crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Families	2 031	54.92
Pastoralists	1 684	45.54
Refugees	788	21.31
Migrants	1 064	28.77
Traders	2 719	73.53
DSFs	438	11.84
Gold panners	115	3.11
Does not know	51	1.38
Other	18	0.49

Table 3. Burkina Faso respondents' opinion on whether criminals use border crossings for unlawful activities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	253	33.20
No	83	10.89
Yes	426	55.91

Table 4. Security problems encountered by Burkina Faso cross-border communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	19	2.49
None	119	15.62
Smuggling	227	29.79
Trafficking	233	30.58
Incursion of armed groups/terrorists	452	59.32
Attack of armed bandits	465	61.02
Livestock theft	558	73.23

Table 5. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of measures taken to secure the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	14	0.58
Curfew	139	5.79
Search	1 307	54.44
Border control of posts and borders	1 851	77.09
Patrol	1 923	80.09

Table 6. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of measures taken to secure the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Insufficient	863	35.94
Sufficient	1 434	59.73
Very sufficient	104	4.33

Table 7. Burkina Faso respondents' perceptions of potential risks of poor border security management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	54	1.27
Conflicts	324	7.61
Epidemics	1 170	27.50
Recruitment of young people by armed groups	1 207	28.37
Illicit trafficking	1 251	29.40
Banditry	2 700	63.45
Terrorist incursions	2 857	67.14

IV. Community perceptions of attacks by armed groups

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' awareness of terrorist activities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	16	0.95
Intimidation	499	29.56
Use of explosive devices	812	48.10
Home and office arsons	1 037	61.43
Abductions	1 112	65.88
Assassinations	1 289	76.36
Attacks on DSFs	1 375	81.46

Table 2. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on drivers of terrorism

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Poverty	924	54.74
Lack of occupation	822	48.70
Adherence to ideology	637	37.74
Ethnic or family motivations	476	28.20
Opposition to the authorities	586	34.72
Anger and frustration	451	26.72
Radicalization	288	17.06
Does not know	298	17.65
Other	102	6.04

Table 3. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the safety of their communities from terrorism

	Number of respondents	Percentage
No	1 589	94.14
Yes	99	5.86

Note: "No" means the community is exposed to terrorism, while "Yes" means the community is safe.

Table 4. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the terrorist threat situations in border regions

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Increase	580	34.36
Decreasing	223	13.21
Stable	885	52.43

Table 5. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on actions to prevent terrorist threat

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Nothing	62	3.67
Other	84	4.98
Involve community leaders	720	42.65
Collaborate/Cooperate with DSFs	963	57.05
Offer economic activities to young people	1 257	74.47
Raise youth awareness	1 283	76.01

Table 6. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on community actions to combat terrorism

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	60	3.55
Nothing	67	3.97
Self-defence with weapons	194	11.49
Set up local prevention committees	790	46.80
Denounce community members involved in terrorism	1 154	68.36
Alert the authorities when there is a problem or suspicious case	1 501	88.92

V. Communication on border security

Table 1. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of an intermediary between authorities and local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	2 876	67.59
No	1 379	32.41

Table 2. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of different intermediaries between authorities and communities for border security communication

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	181	6.29
Religious leader	210	7.30
Customary leader	681	23.68
Town councillor	2 255	78.41
VDC chairperson	2 340	81.36

Table 3. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the population's means of communication with authorities and defence and security forces

	Number of respondents	Percentage
TV	6	0.14
Radio	236	5.55
None	470	11.05
Meetings	1 675	39.37
Telephone	3 294	77.41

Table 4. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on border security warning mechanisms that should be put in place

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	50	1.18
None	145	3.41
Does not know	285	6.70
Regular visits by the authorities	1 592	37.41
Local committee	1 595	37.49
Framework for consultation between authorities/DSFs and communities	2 120	49.82
Telephone exchanges	2 528	59.41

Table 5. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on means to use to ensure information-sharing

	Number of respondents	Percentage
TV	26	0.61
Other	54	1.27
Does not know	102	2.40
None	132	3.10
Radio	654	15.37
Meetings	1 820	42.77
Telephone	3 707	87.12

Table 6. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the benefits of good communication between authorities and local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Immediate reaction from the authorities	2 854	67.07
Security problem understood in time	2 104	49.45
Reduced border insecurity	3 557	83.60
Peace	124	2.91

Table 7. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the risks of poor communication between authorities and local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Insecurity spread at high speed	2 993	70.34
Late reaction of the DSFs	2 004	47.10
Severity of consequences for local communities	2 926	68.77
Loss of confidence in DSFs	2 731	64.18
Victims	100	2.35
Other	75	1.76

VI. Emergency response

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the possible causes of mass displacement

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	91	2.14
Epidemics	748	17.58
Natural disasters	1 588	37.32
Community conflicts	2 506	58.90
Armed conflicts	2 695	63.34
Terrorist attacks/Epidemics	3 158	74.22

Table 2. Burkina Faso respondents' reception of displaced persons

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Favourable	1 009	23.71
Not favourable	3 246	76.29

Table 3. Burkina Faso respondents' reasons for being in favour of welcoming the internally displaced persons

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Positive crisis situation experienced	561	55.60
Awareness of local authorities	367	36.37
Community prepared and organized	348	34.49

Table 4. Measures proposed by Burkina Faso respondents to the authority to deal with emergency situations

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	78	1.83
Refoulement of displaced persons	245	5.76
Relocating the displaced persons	1 197	28.13
Securing the reception area	2 303	54.12
Helping the sick and wounded	2 322	54.57
Immediate care	2 595	60.99
Provision of equipment	2 636	61.95
Receiving displaced populations	3 253	76.45

Table 5. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on proposed community actions to deal with emergency situations

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	49	1.15
Respect and follow the provisions	1 748	41.08
Coordinate with the authorities	1 780	41.83
Remain vigilant	2 253	52.95
To receive displaced persons	2 728	64.11
Inform local authorities	3 547	83.36

VII. Community confidence in local government

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community and public service agents

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	43	1.01
Good	2 875	67.57
Bad	182	4.28
Does not wish to answer	465	10.93
Very good	690	16.22

Table 2. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community and town hall service agents

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	14	0.33
Good	2 910	68.39
Bad	165	3.88
Does not wish to answer	378	8.88
Very good	788	18.52

Table 3. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without opportunities to discuss public administration concerns with the mayor or town councillors

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	2 488	58.47
No	1 767	41.53

Table 4. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the frequency of their exchanges with the mayor or town councillors

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Very often	580	34.36
Rarely	223	13.21
Often	885	52.43

Table 5. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without confidence in the administration (judiciary, other public services)

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	3 676	86.39
No	579	13.61

Table 6. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents who trust versus who do not trust the local administration (town hall)

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	3 882	91.23
No	373	8.77

VIII. Effectiveness of border management

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the level of security in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	615	14.45
Insufficient	1 486	34.92
Moderate	1 686	39.62
No security at all	468	11.00

Table 2. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of patrol crossings along the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	2 399	56.38
No	1 856	43.62

Table 3. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of patrol crossings in their villages

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	3 321	78.05
No	934	21.95

Table 4. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the frequency of patrols along the borders and in villages

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Often	1 852	55.78
Every day	690	20.78
2 to 3 times a week	238	7.17
Once a week	214	6.45
Once a month	130	3.92
Once a year	120	3.61
Several times a day	76	2.29

Table 5. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on who should be responsible for local border security management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	7	0.08
Prison guards	31	0.34
Forest guards	839	9.16
Customs	986	10.77
Gendarmes	2 288	24.98
Police officers	2 325	25.39
Military	2 682	29.29

Table 6. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the work of border security management officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Unsatisfactory	1 509	35.46
Satisfactory	2 636	61.95
Very satisfactory	110	2.59

IX. Relations between local communities, authorities and security forces

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community and border security officers

	Number of respondents	Percentage
No relations	60	1.41
Good	2 611	61.36
Bad	501	11.77
Does not wish to answer	621	14.59
Very good	386	9.07
Does not know	76	1.79

Table 2. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of disputes between the local community and border security officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	1 119	26.30
No	3 136	73.70

Table 3. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the frequency of disputes between the local community and border security officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Rarely	449	40.13
Often	482	43.07
Very often	188	16.80

Table 4. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the reasons behind the disputes between the local community and border security officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Fine	514	45.93
Seizure of goods	460	41.11
Slowing of the passage	579	51.74
Prohibition of passage	567	50.67
Arrest	633	56.57
Corruption	350	31.28
Hassle	349	31.19
Other	33	2.95

Table 5. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on whether local authorities can fully ensure border security without the involvement of local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	514	12.08
No	3 741	87.92

Table 6. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on whether authorities organize meetings with local communities on border security

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	1 062	24.96
No	3 193	75.04

Table 7. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the purposes of meetings with local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Capacity-building	138	12.99
Training	225	21.19
Information-sharing	1 004	94.54
Establishment of local prevention committees	64	6.03
Other	19	1.79

Table 8. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the relationship between administrative/political authorities and the local community

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Unsatisfactory	864	20.31
Satisfactory	2 956	69.47
Very satisfactory	435	10.22

Table 9. Burkina Faso respondents' opinion on the need for their involvement in border management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	3 112	73.14
No	1 143	26.86

Table 10. Burkina Faso respondents' willingness to collaborate or cooperate with defence and security forces and authorities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	3 631	85.33
No	624	14.67

X.   Conflict prevention and management

Table 1. Burkina Faso respondents' opinions on the potential sources of conflict in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Nothing	120	2.82
Does not know	140	3.29
Abduction of underage girls	269	6.32
Succession at the mosque	292	6.86
Politics	325	7.64
Succession at the level of customary chieftaincy	330	7.76
Indigenous migrants	432	10.15
Designation of the mayor	1 020	23.97
Land	2 057	48.34
Agriculture/Livestock	3 400	79.91

Table 2. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of conflict prevention mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	782	18.38
No	3 473	81.62

Table 3. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the nature of existing conflict prevention mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	30	3.84
Association	74	9.46
Religious	219	28.01
Administrative	445	56.91
Customary	640	81.84

Table 4. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the effectiveness of existing conflict prevention mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Unsatisfactory	159	20.33
Satisfactory	566	72.38
Very satisfactory	57	7.29

Table 5. Distribution of Burkina Faso respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of conflict management mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	1 576	37.04
No	2 679	62.96

Table 6. Burkina Faso respondents' knowledge of the nature of existing conflict management mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Other	23	1.46
Association	48	3.05
Religious groups	119	7.55
Community social groups	316	20.05
Committees	456	28.93
Judiciary	543	34.45
Customary	933	59.20
Administrative	1 121	71.13

Table 7. Burkina Faso respondents' assessment of the effectiveness of existing conflict management mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Unsatisfactory	244	15.48
Satisfactory	1 109	70.37
Very satisfactory	223	14.15

ANNEX 6 SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE SURVEYS CONDUCTED IN MALI

I. Profile of respondents

Table 1. Distribution of respondents in Mali by gender

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Women	62	19.81
Men	251	80.19

Table 2. Distribution of respondents in Mali by nationality

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Burkina Faso national	1	0.32
Malian	310	99.04
Niger national	1	0.32

Table 3. Distribution of respondents in Mali by ethnicity

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Bwaba	298	95.21
Dafing	13	4.15
Fulani	2	0.64

Table 4. Distribution of respondents in Mali by economic activity

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Electrician	2	0.64
Retired	3	0.96
Craftmanship	5	1.60
Other professions	7	2.24
Trade	22	7.03
Livestock farming	24	7.67
Housewife	36	11.50
Agriculture	232	74.12

Table 5. Distribution of respondents in Mali by age

	Women	Men
Under 20	0	2
20–29	10	5
30–39	14	45
40–49	11	72
50–59	12	52
60–69	8	55
70 and older	7	20

II. Working conditions at the border crossing

Table 1. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of a border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	299	95.53
No	14	4.47

Table 2. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the geographical location of the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	293	97.99
No	6	2.01

Table 3. Malian respondents' knowledge of the distance between the border and the village

	Number of respondents	Percentage
0–3 km	80	27.30
4–6 km	76	25.94
7–10 km	30	10.24
Over 10 km	105	35.84

Table 4. Malian respondents' opinions on the purposes of borders

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Demarcate the boundary between two States	90	30.10
Ensure the safety of the population	49	16.39
Enable the authorities to monitor entries and exits	238	79.60
Does not know	5	1.67

Table 5. Distribution of Malian respondents who are used versus not used to crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	276	92.31
No	23	7.69

Table 6. Distribution of Malian respondents by frequency of crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
2 to 3 times a week	3	1.10
Every day	2	0.73
Often	260	95.24
Once a year	2	0.73
Once a month	3	1.10
Once a week	3	1.10

Table 7. Malian respondents' reasons for crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Family (marriage, baptism, etc.)	250	90.58
Economic reason (pasture crops, mining sites, etc.)	19	6.88
Commercial reason (sales of livestock, items, cereals, etc.)	208	75.36
Health	8	2.90

Table 8. Distribution of Malian respondents who currently use versus do not use the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	257	85.95
No	42	14.05

Table 9. Distribution of Malian respondents by frequency of current border use

	Number of respondents	Percentage
2 to 3 times a week	2	0.78
Every day	5	1.95
Often	241	93.77
Once a year	1	0.39
Once a month	3	1.17
Once a week	4	1.56

Table 10. Malian respondents' reasons for currently crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Family (marriage, baptism, etc.)	240	93.39
Economic reason (pasture crops, mining sites, etc.)	11	4.28
Commercial reason (sales of livestock, items, cereals, etc.)	205	79.77
Health	8	3.11

Table 11. Malian respondents' knowledge of the nationalities of people crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Burkina Faso national	273	91.30
Malian	289	96.66
Niger national	9	3.01
Togolese	19	6.35
Ghanaian	19	6.35

Table 12. Malian respondents' knowledge of the categories of people crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Families	281	93.98
Pastoral livestock breeder	79	26.42
Refugees	73	24.41
Migrants	86	28.76
Traders	291	97.32
DSFs	9	3.01

III. Security threats/risks at the border

Table 1. Distribution of Malian respondents or their villages that have had versus
have not had incidents with foreign nationals

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	1	0.32
No	312	99.68

Table 2. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of border security measures taken

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	61	19.49
No	252	80.51

Table 3. Malian respondents' knowledge of measures taken to secure the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Border controls at border crossings	61	100.00
Searches	6	9.84

Table 4. Malian respondents' assessment of measures taken to secure the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Sufficient	31	50.82
Insufficient	30	49.18

Table 5. Malian respondents' perceptions of potential risks of poor border security management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Epidemics	90	28.75
Terrorist incursion/Armed groups	111	35.46
Illicit trafficking	80	25.56
Banditry	82	26.20
Recruitment of young people by armed groups	37	11.82
Cross-border community conflict	224	71.57
Does not know	17	5.43

IV. Defence and security forces' perceptions of attacks by armed groups

Table 1. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of armed groups

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	104	33.23
No	209	66.77

Table 2. Malian respondents' knowledge of the different armed groups involved in attacks

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Terrorists	80	76.92
Armed bandits	91	87.50
Traffickers	79	75.96

Table 3. Distribution of responses according to other proposals

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Terrorists	79	75.96
Armed bandits	92	88.46
Traffickers	79	75.96

V. Knowledge of existing systems in the region

Table 1. Malian respondents' assessment of the levels of security in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	209	66.77
Insufficient	37	11.82
Moderate	27	8.63
No security at all	40	12.78

Table 2. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the defence and security forces present at the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	70	22.36
No	243	77.64

Table 3. Malian respondents' knowledge of the different security forces present at the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Police officers	55	78.57
Gendarmes	57	81.43
Customs	56	80.00
Military	36	51.43

Table 4. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of patrol crossings along the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	5	1.60
No	308	98.40

Table 5. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of patrol crossings in their villages

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	3	0.96
No	310	99.04

Table 6. Malian respondents' opinions on who should be responsible for local border security management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Police officers	26	8.31
Gendarmes	63	20.13
Prison guards	2	0.64
Water and forest rangers	4	1.28
Customs	237	75.72
Military	91	29.07

Table 7. Malian respondents' assessment of the work of border security management officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Satisfactory	226	72.20
Unsatisfactory	87	27.80

VI. Cooperation between security forces in border management

Table 1. Malian respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community and border security officers

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	223	71.25
Bad	17	5.43
Does not wish to answer	18	5.75

Table 2. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of disputes between the local community and border security officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	28	8.95
No	285	91.05

Table 3. Malian respondents' knowledge of the frequency of disputes between the local community and border security officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Often	15	53.57
Rarely	13	46.43

Table 4. Malian respondents' opinions on the reasons behind the disputes between the local community and border security officials

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Fine	24	85.71
Seizure of goods/objects	25	89.29
Slowing of the passage	15	53.57
Prohibition of passage	10	35.71
Arrest	1	3.57
Corruption	3	10.71
Hassle	1	3.57
Other	1	3.57

Table 5. Malian respondents' opinions on what needs to be done to improve/establish good relations between defence and security forces and communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Exchange of advice and ideas	105	49.53
Justice awareness	85	40.09
Union of border forces	7	3.30

Table 6. Malian respondents' opinions on whether local authorities can fully ensure border security without the involvement of local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	26	8.31
No	287	91.69

Table 7. Malian respondents' opinion on whether authorities organize meetings with local communities on border security

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	6	1.92
No	307	98.08

Table 8. Malian respondents' assessment of the relationship between administrative/political authorities and the local community

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Satisfactory	240	76.68
Unsatisfactory	73	23.32

Table 9. Malian respondents' opinions on what needs to be done to establish/improve relations between administrative/political authorities and communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Exchange of advice and ideas	200	88.50
Justice awareness	7	3.10
Sharing information	19	8.41

Table 10. Malian respondents' opinions on the need for their involvement in border management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	280	89.46
No	33	10.54

Table 11. Malian respondents' opinions on how to be involved in border management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Exchange of advice and ideas	97	42.92
Justice awareness	3	1.33
Sharing information	112	49.56
Training	14	6.19

Table 12. Malian respondents' reasons for not getting involved in border management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Not trained	2	7.41
Too old	8	29.63
Too busy	17	62.96

Table 13. Malian respondents' willingness to collaborate or cooperate with defence and security forces and authorities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	82	26.20
No	231	73.80

VII. Cross-border cooperation (Burkina Faso–Niger/Mali–Niger)

Table 1. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of intermediaries between local communities and authorities for border security communication

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	14	4.47
No	299	95.53

Table 2. Malian respondents' knowledge of different intermediaries between authorities and communities for border security communication

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Customary leader	9	64.29
Religious leader	6	42.86
VDC chairperson	2	14.29
Town councillor	11	78.57
NGO	1	7.14

Table 3. Malian respondents' opinions on the population's means of communication with authorities and defence and security forces

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Telephone	252	99.60
Radio	22	8.70
TV	15	5.93
Meetings	24	9.49

Table 4. Malian respondents' opinions on border security warning mechanisms that should be put in place

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Framework for consultation between authorities/DSFs and communities	46	18.25
Exchange of telephone contacts	244	96.83
Local committee (prevention, information, etc.)	23	9.13
Regular visits of the authorities/DSFs to the village	33	13.10

Table 5. Malian respondents' opinions on means to use to ensure information-sharing

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Telephone	252	100.00
Radio	45	17.86
TV	42	16.67
Meetings	44	17.46

Table 6. Malian respondents' opinions on the benefits of good communication between authorities and local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Immediate reaction of the authorities/DSFs	48	19.05
Security problem understood in time	249	98.81
Reducing cross-border insecurity	42	16.67

Table 7. Malian respondents' opinions on the risks of poor communication between authorities and local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Insecurity spread at high speed	47	18.65
Late reaction of the authorities/DSFs	46	18.25
Severity of consequences for local communities	89	35.32
Loss of community confidence in the authorities/DSFs	198	78.57

Table 8. Malian respondents' opinions on what limits collaboration or cooperation between defence and security forces and local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Ethnic diversity	109	43.25
Lack of information-sharing	98	38.89
Misunderstanding	44	17.46

Table 9. Malian respondents' proposed alternatives to the limited collaboration between communities and defence and security forces

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Fighting	93	37.65
Sharing information	120	48.58
Social cohesion	24	9.72

VIII. Relationships between local communities and authorities/security forces

Table 1. Malian respondents' opinions on the potential sources of conflict in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Land	44	17.60
Agriculture/Livestock	210	84.00
Succession at the level of customary chieftaincy	45	18.00
Designation of the mayor	14	5.60
Abduction of underage girls	40	16.00

Table 2. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of conflict prevention mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	86	27.48
No	227	72.52

Table 3. Malian respondents' knowledge of the nature of existing conflict prevention mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Customary	26	30.23
Religious	29	33.72
Administrative	29	33.72
Association	11	12.79

Table 4. Specific conflict prevention mechanisms in Mali survey areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Village councils	8	26.67
Dialogue	22	73.33

Table 5. Malian respondents' assessment of the effectiveness of existing conflict prevention mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Unsatisfactory	8	9.30
Satisfactory	74	86.05
Very satisfactory	4	4.65

Table 6. Malian respondents' opinions on how to improve the effectiveness of the existing conflict prevention mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Trust/Respect	6	20.00
Communication/Dialogue	24	80.00

Table 7. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of conflict management mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	81	25.88
No	232	74.12

Table 8. Malian respondents' knowledge of the nature of existing conflict management mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Committees	2	6.45
Religious groups	27	87.10
Community/Social groups	11	35.48
Association	2	6.45
Customary	26	83.87
Religious leaders	30	96.77
Administrative	30	96.77
Judiciary	23	74.19

Table 9. Specific conflict management mechanisms in Mali survey areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Dialogue	8	30.77
Village councils	18	69.23

Table 10. Malian respondents' assessment of the effectiveness of existing conflict management mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Unsatisfactory	5	6.17
Satisfactory	74	91.36
Very satisfactory	2	2.47

Table 11. Malian respondents' opinions on how to improve the effectiveness of the existing conflict management mechanisms in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Dialogue	16	69.57
Respect/Union	7	30.43

IX. Communication between security forces and communities on border security

Table 1. Malian respondents' opinion on the possible causes of mass displacement

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Armed conflict	236	75.40
Community conflict	225	71.88
Terrorist attack	28	8.95
Epidemics	29	9.27
Natural disaster (flood, drought, etc.)	25	7.99

Table 2. Malian respondents' opinions on their communities' readiness to receive a large influx of displaced persons

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	25	7.99
No	288	92.01

Table 3. Malian respondents' reasons for being in favour of welcoming the internally displaced persons

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Crisis situation already experienced; positive reaction of the population	2	8.00
Awareness-raising from local authorities	16	64.00
Community well prepared and organized for this purpose	20	80.00

Table 4. Measures proposed by Malian respondents to the authority to deal with emergency situations

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Welcoming the displaced population	227	72.52
Provision of emergency equipment	215	68.69
Rescuing the sick and wounded	130	41.53
Securing the reception area	128	40.89
Immediate care of displaced persons	213	68.05
Relocating displaced persons	19	6.07
Refoulement of displaced persons	1	0.32

Table 5. Malian respondents' opinions on proposed community actions to deal with emergency situations

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Welcoming the displaced population	222	70.93
Inform local authorities quickly	29	9.27
Coordinate with the local authority to facilitate the care of displaced persons	65	20.77
Remaining vigilant	18	5.75
Respect and follow the provisions taken by the authority on site	15	4.79

X. Assessment of the results of the project

**Table 1. Malian respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community
and public service agents**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	215	93.48
Bad	1	0.43
No answer	13	5.65
Very good	1	0.43

**Table 2. Malian respondents' assessment of the relationship between the local community
and town hall service agents**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	220	96.07
Bad	1	0.44
No answer	6	2.62
Very good	2	0.87

**Table 3. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without opportunities to discuss
public administration concerns with the mayor or town councillors**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	229	73.16
No	84	26.84

Table 4. Malian respondents' assessment of the frequency of their exchanges with the mayor or town councillors

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Rarely	6	2.62
Often	218	95.20
Very often	5	2.18

**Table 5. Distribution of Malian respondents with versus without confidence in the administration
(judiciary, other public services)**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	231	73.80
No	82	26.20

Table 6. Distribution of Malian respondents who trust versus who do not trust the local administration (town hall)

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	229	73.16
No	84	26.84

ANNEX 7   SUMMARY STATISTICS OF THE SURVEYS CONDUCTED IN THE NIGER

I.   Profile of respondents

Table 1. Distribution of respondents in the Niger by gender

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Women	8	7.55
Men	98	92.45

Table 2. Distribution of respondents in the Niger by age

	Women	Men
20–29	4	16
30–39	4	58
40–49	0	15
50–59	0	9

Table 3. Distribution of respondents in the Niger by occupation

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Customs officer	8	7.55
Water and forest ranger	10	9.43
National guard	6	5.66
Gendarme	5	4.72
Police officer	77	72.64

Table 4. Distribution of respondents in the by number of years in post

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Less than 1 year	17	16.04
Between 1 and 2 years	29	27.36
Between 2 and 3 years	44	41.51
Between 3 and 4 years	11	10.38
More than 4 years	4	3.77

II.   Working conditions at the border crossing

Table 1. The Niger respondents' opinions on the security of the posting

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	27	25.47
No	79	74.53

Table 2. The Niger respondents' knowledge of alternative routes for illegal entry or exit

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	2	1.89
No	4	3.77
Yes	100	94.34

Table 3. The Niger respondents' opinions on the need for training

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	96	90.57
No	10	9.43

Table 4. Distribution of the Niger respondents who feel safe versus who do not feel safe in the workplace

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	14	13.21
No	92	86.79

Table 5. The Niger respondents' opinions on the reasons for the preparedness of border posts to control entries and exits

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Staff sufficiency	20	74.07
IOM IT equipment	7	25.93

Table 6. The Niger respondents' opinions on the reasons for insufficient preparation of border posts to control entries and exits

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	3	3.80
Presence of bypass roads	7	8.86
Insufficient equipment	34	43.04
Staff shortages	35	44.30

Table 7. The Niger respondents' training needs

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Anti-document fraud	70	72.92
Community policing	15	15.63
Reception techniques	4	4.17
Citizenship verification	4	4.17
Combating drug trafficking	3	3.13

Table 8. The Niger respondents' reasons for feeling secure in the workplace

	Number of respondents	Percentage
No attack	5	35.71
Presence of DSFs	2	14.29
Self-securing	6	42.86
State of emergency	1	7.14

Table 9. The Niger respondents' reasons for feeling not secure in the workplace

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Lack of staff and equipment	20	21.74
Area of insecurity	72	78.26

III.   Security threats/risks at the border

Table 1. The Niger respondents' knowledge of incidents with foreign nationals

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	1	0.94
No	61	57.55
Yes	44	41.51

Table 2. Incidents encountered by respondents in the Niger with foreign nationals

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Lack of identity papers	43	40.57
Smuggling	1	0.94

Table 3. The Niger respondents' knowledge about many people failing to provide identity documents or visas when required

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	10	9.43
No	23	21.70
Yes	73	68.87

Table 4. The Niger respondents' opinions on whether border crossings are used for criminal activities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	14	13.21
No	4	3.77
Yes	84	79.25
Not much, rarely	4	3.77

Table 5. The Niger respondents' opinions on whether bypass roads are used for criminal activities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not know	22	20.75
No	7	6.60
Yes	74	69.81
Not much	3	2.83

Table 6. Security problems encountered by the Niger respondents at the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Livestock theft	25	23.58
Smuggling	28	26.42
Trafficking	52	49.06
Attack of armed bandits	71	66.98
Incursion of armed groups	49	46.23
None	2	1.89
Other	2	1.89

Table 7. The Niger respondents' awareness of measures taken to secure the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	83	78.30
No	23	21.70

Table 8. The Niger respondents' assessment of measures taken to secure the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Insufficient	71	85.54
Sufficient	11	13.25
Very sufficient	1	1.20

Table 9. The Niger respondents' perceptions of the potential risks of poor border security management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Epidemics	36	33.96
Terrorist incursions	74	69.81
Illicit trafficking	63	59.43
Banditry	73	68.87
Recruitment of young people by armed groups	43	40.57
Cross-border community conflict	20	18.87
Underdevelopment of the country	31	29.25
Other	2	1.89

Table 10. The Niger respondents' knowledge of incidents involving people crossing the border

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Identity papers issue	31	70.45
Unfamiliarity with procedures	4	9.09
Smuggling	3	6.82
Refusal to comply	6	13.64

IV.   Security forces' perceptions of attacks by armed groups

Table 1. The Niger respondents' knowledge of the different armed groups encountered in the survey area

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Terrorists	88	83.02
Armed bandits	52	49.06
Traffickers	5	4.72

Table 2. The Niger respondents' awareness of terrorist activities in the survey area

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Home/Office arson	22	20.75
Intimidation	24	22.64
Assassinations	43	40.57
Abduction	52	49.06
Use of explosive device	57	53.77
Attack on DSFs	102	96.23

Table 3. The Niger respondents' opinions on drivers of terrorism

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Ignorance	2	1.89
Does not know	4	3.77
Opposition to the authorities	10	9.43
Ethnic family motivations	12	11.32
Radicalization	16	15.09
Adherence to an ideology	30	28.30
Anger and frustration	40	37.74
Lack of occupation	64	60.38
Poverty	81	76.42

Table 4. Distribution of the Niger respondents who are willing versus not willing to host displaced persons

	Number of respondents	Percentage
No	61	58.10
Yes	44	41.90

Table 5. Number of displaced persons hosted in the Niger district capitals, April 2019

	Number of displaced persons hosted
Ayorou	45 760
Téra	17
Torodi	2 422

Table 6. The Niger respondents' perceptions of terrorist threat situations in their districts

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Increasing	32	30.48
Decreasing	3	2.86
Stable	70	66.67

Table 7. The Niger respondents' opinions on actions to prevent terrorist threats

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Involve women in economic activities	1	0.95
Offer economic activities to young people	62	59.05
Collaborate/cooperate with DSFs	65	61.90
Involving community leaders	79	75.24
Raise youth awareness	87	82.86

Table 8. The Niger respondents' opinions on community actions to combat terrorism

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Report any suspicious cases to DSFs	1	0.95
Set up local prevention committees	37	35.24
Denounce community members involved in terrorism	63	60.00
Alert the authorities when there is a problem or suspicious case	105	100.00

V. Knowledge of existing mechanisms in the region

Table 1. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of the local prevention committees

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	43	40.95
No	62	59.05

Table 2. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of the approach implemented by the local prevention committees

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	42	40.00
No	63	60.00

Table 3. Distribution of the Niger respondents with knowledge of the missions and roles of the local prevention committees

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	42	100.00

Table 4. Distribution of the Niger respondents by opinion on the good level of communication with LPCs

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	42	100.00

**Table 5. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of the results
of establishing local prevention committees**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	35	33.33
No	70	66.67

Table 6. The Niger respondents' opinions on the positive results of establishing local prevention committees

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Information-sharing	26	74.29
Awareness	4	11.43
Strengthening security	5	14.29

VI.   Cooperation between security forces in border management

Table 1. The Niger respondents' assessment of the relationship among border security officers

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	62	58.49
Bad	17	16.04
Does not wish to answer	10	9.43
Very good	17	16.04

**Table 2. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of disputes
among border security bodies**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	4	3.77
No	102	96.23

**Table 3. Distribution of the Niger respondents by opinion on the importance of collaboration
between the defence and security forces bodies**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes (important)	104	98.11
No (not important)	2	1.89

VII.   Cross-border cooperation (Burkina Faso–Niger/Mali–Niger)

**Table 1. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of their counterparts
in Burkina Faso**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	60	56.60
No	46	43.40

Table 2. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of their counterparts in Mali

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	1	0.94
No	105	99.06

**Table 3. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without an opportunity
for exchange with their counterparts in Burkina Faso**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	56	52.83
No	50	47.17

**Table 4. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without an opportunity
for exchange with their counterparts in Mali**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	2	1.89
No	104	98.11

Table 5. Distribution of respondents by opinion on the existence of subjects requiring subregional collaboration

Opinion	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	89	85.58
No	15	14.42

**Table 6. The Niger respondents' suggestions to develop exchanges with their counterparts
in Burkina Faso and Mali**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Radio	4	3.81
Exchange meeting	10	9.52
Joint exercise	22	20.95
Joint brigade	32	30.48
Television	67	63.81

VIII. Relationships between local communities/authorities/security forces

**Table 1. The Niger respondents' assessment of the quality of the relationship between the communities
and the border security forces**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	84	79.25
Bad	4	3.77
Does not wish to answer	1	0.94
Very good	17	16.04

**Table 2. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of disputes
with community members**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	34	32.08
No	72	67.92

Table 3. The Niger respondents' knowledge of the frequency of disputes with community members

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Rarely	23	67.65
Often	9	26.47
Very often	2	5.88

**Table 4. The Niger respondents' opinions on the reasons behind the disputes
between the local communities and the border security officers**

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Lack of evidence	1	2.94
Nothing	1	2.94
Violation of the law due to ignorance	1	2.94
Trafficking in goods	7	20.59
Lack of respect/trust	11	32.35
Fraudulent border crossings	14	41.18
Non-payment of fines	16	47.06
Refusal to comply	19	55.88

Table 5. The Niger respondents' opinions on whether local authorities can fully ensure border security without the involvement of local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	1	0.94
No	105	99.06

Table 6. The Niger respondents' opinions on whether authorities organize meetings with local communities on border security

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	4	3.77
No	102	96.23

Table 7. The Niger respondents' knowledge of the purposes of meetings with local communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Football games, etc.	1	0.94
Establishment of local prevention committees	8	7.55
Training	21	19.81
Capacity-building	22	20.75
Awareness-raising/Information-sharing	101	95.28

Table 8. The Niger respondents' assessment of the quality of the relationship between communities and defence and security officers

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Unsatisfactory	7	6.60
Satisfactory	79	74.53
Very satisfactory	20	18.87

Table 9. The Niger respondents' opinions on involving young people in border management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	92	86.79
No	14	13.21

Table 10. The Niger respondents' willingness to collaborate with communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	103	97.17
No	3	2.83

Table 11. The Niger respondents' opinions on technical services with which collaboration is needed for border management

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Health	91	85.85
Civil registry	46	43.40
Humanitarian action	46	43.40
Environment	43	40.57
Education/Culture	46	43.40
All services	5	4.72
Does not wish to answer	1	0.94

Table 12. The Niger respondents' awareness of collaboration with technical services
at the operational level in their areas

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Average	2	1.89
Does not know	11	10.38
No	31	29.25
Yes	62	58.49

IX. Communication between security forces and communities on border security

Table 1. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of the existence of an intermediary
between communities and defence and security forces for communication on border security

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	99	93.40
No	7	6.60

Table 2. The Niger respondents' knowledge of an intermediary between communities
and defence and security forces for communication on border security

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Customary leader	88	83.02
Religious leader	15	14.15
Town councillor	26	24.53
Neighbourhood leader	1	0.94
Village delegate	2	1.89
Koglwéogo	1	0.94
Broker	1	0.94
Forwarding agent	1	0.94
Road users	1	0.94

Table 3. The Niger respondents' knowledge of means of communication between communities
and defence and security forces

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not wish to answer	2	1.89
Word of mouth	8	7.55
Meetings	30	28.30
Telephone	98	92.45

Table 4. The Niger respondents' opinions on border security warning mechanisms that should be put in place

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Framework for consultation between authorities/DSFs and communities	41	38.68
Exchange of telephone contacts	99	93.40
Local committee	33	31.13
Regular visits by authorities/DSFs	18	16.98

Table 5. The Niger respondents' opinions on means or equipment to use to ensure information-sharing

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Does not wish to answer	1	0.94
Radio	5	4.72
Word of mouth	8	7.55
Meetings	26	24.53
Telephone	102	96.23

Table 6. The Niger respondents' opinions on the benefits of good communication between defence and security forces and communities on border security

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Immediate reaction of DSFs	70	66.04
Security problem understood in time	53	50.00
Reducing cross-border insecurity	64	60.38
Prevention of attacks	84	79.25

Table 7. The Niger respondents' opinions on the risks of poor communication between communities and defence and security forces

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Vulnerability of DSFs and communities	1	0.94
Does not wish to answer	1	0.94
Severity of consequences for local communities	47	44.34
Loss of confidence in DSFs	64	60.38
Late reaction of DSFs	66	62.26
Widespread insecurity	92	86.79

X.   Assessment of the results of the project

Table 1. Distribution of the Niger respondents with versus without knowledge of IOM border management activities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	76	71.70
No	30	28.30

Table 2. The Niger respondents' assessment of the establishment of local prevention committees

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Good	37	48.68
Does not wish to answer	26	34.21
Very good	13	17.11

Table 3. The Niger respondents' opinions on whether border community engagement in border security and management project has contributed to citizens' participation in security

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	74	97.37
No	2	2.63

Table 4. The Niger respondents' opinions on whether border community engagement in border security and management project contributed to strengthening citizens' safety reflexes

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	73	96.05
No	3	3.95

Table 5. The Niger respondents' opinions on whether border community engagement in border security and management project contributed to improving relations between defence and security forces and communities

	Number of respondents	Percentage
Yes	75	98.68
No	1	1.32