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Demographic and household
composition of refugee
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Ukraine populations:
Findings from an online survey

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Introduction

Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine has produced one of the largest human displacement crises in the world today (UNHCR, 2022). As of 8 July 2022, 5.5 million people had left the country (IOM, 2022a), more people than the entire population of Norway. Even more people – 6.3 million – have been displaced within the country (a status described as being an internally displaced person or IDP). These massive population movements have resulted in a humanitarian crisis that has placed an enormous strain on public services both within Ukraine and in receiving countries.

In order to create policies that can mitigate some of the effects of the migration crisis, it is vital to understand the characteristics and household composition of those displaced. Here we use a rapid online health needs survey disseminated via Facebook advertising and snowball methods. Between April and July 2022, 10,180 respondents completed the survey. While the survey is not representative of the Ukrainian population, it still provides important information for understanding those who have fled. Central to our analysis is a comparison between refugees and IDPs still in Ukraine. Those who have left the country may be more selective as they have different characteristics and experiences from those who remained within the country. Note, however, that these groups have been in constant flux with many migrants moving again or having returned home (IOM, 2022b). In addition, the nature of the war has changed over time and become concentrated in the east of the country. Most of our estimates do not capture change over time, but instead show averages across the period from April to July. Thus, the characteristics of migrants may have changed as more homes have been destroyed and territory occupied.

Here we focus on the demographic characteristics of those who have left and those with whom they have fled. We explore what we call “resettlement groups” – people who fled together – and whether they include children or adults who require specific care. Often the assumption is that Ukrainian displaced persons flee only with nuclear family members: for example, mothers with children. However, our data show that the displaced often travel in larger groups composed of original household family members plus other relatives, neighbours, friends, or even those they have met along the way. Below, we explore the composition of resettlement groups to better understand who has caring responsibilities as against other adults who could provide support. This paper also answers questions about types of accommodation, satisfaction with living conditions, the welcome they have received from the local population and welfare payments.

Finally, we investigate the family members that refugees have left behind, and beliefs about returning to Ukraine. These analyses provide insights to help policymakers inside and outside of Ukraine with priorities around housing and socioeconomic support.

Background

The Russian war of aggression broke out in Ukraine on 24 February 2022; however, even before the 2022 invasion, Ukraine suffered from a crisis of internal displacement. Nearly 1.8 million people had been internally displaced due to the war in the eastern Donbas region, which erupted between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian government forces in 2014 (Mykhnenko et al., 2022). By 2015, Ukraine had experienced Europe's largest displacement since World War II and was among the ten countries with the largest IDP populations in the world (UNHCR, 2015).

Most Ukrainian IDPs from that time settled relatively close to the separatist territories in the eastern part of the country (Mykhnenko et al., 2022). Those forcibly displaced moved into private rentals or with extended family, rather than into large collective settlements. Ukrainian Government benefits for IDPs, especially related to housing, were relatively meagre and humanitarian assistance

from non-governmental organizations waned over time (IDMC, 2020). IDPs consistently named housing, employment and income as their key problems (IOM, 2018). Surveys of IDP mental health reported high levels of anxiety, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (Roberts et al., 2019). Four years after fleeing their homes, IDPs reported worse subjective well-being than those who did not move, even after controlling for a range of economic, social and housing factors known to influence well-being (Perelli-Harris et al., 2022).

With the Russian Federation's invasion in February 2022, the majority of IDPs from the separatist conflict were forced to flee for the second time in their lives. Initially, the Russian Federation attacked from the north from around Kyiv to Kharkiv, and from the south through Kherson and Mariupol. Many of these regions had been IDP resettlement areas. After April 2022, the Russian Federation withdrew from the northern areas around Kyiv and focused attention on the Donbas (the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). Over the coming months, the Russian Federation obliterated settlements around Kharkiv and in the eastern regions, ironically those areas with the greatest concentration of Russian speakers. Thus, at the beginning of the war, those who fled were more likely to come from Ukrainian-speaking regions and may have had greater means or networks to be able to flee the threat of violence. As found in other refugee studies (Aksoy and Poutvaara, 2021; Welker, 2022), refugees are more selective, with the more educated travelling to countries further away from the armed conflict (Kohlenberger et al., 2022). Later in the war, as the Russian army occupied territory or destroyed housing and infrastructure in the eastern part of the country, a greater proportion of the population had to flee. Although many people from these regions fled abroad, we expect that far more settled within the country, as a larger proportion of this displaced population did not have the means or desire to leave the country.

Data

The data for this paper come from the survey “Health needs survey for Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees”.¹ The survey went live in early April 2022. No payment or incentives were offered for completion of the survey. The survey was disseminated on social media, predominantly via a Facebook “business page” that advertised the survey. Around 97 per cent of respondents indicated Facebook as the source of the survey. The advert targeted Ukrainian speakers over the age of 18 who normally lived in Ukraine and who, due to recent events, were now currently either abroad or in Ukraine, but not in the locality where they used to reside. We did not specify that only people who left home after the start of the war of Russian aggression could answer the survey, and although unlikely, people displaced after the war in 2014 may also have responded. The survey targeted all European countries apart from the Russian Federation. Besides direct advertising, the survey was disseminated via snowball methods; for example, the Facebook post was shared by over 1,400 people by 15 July 2022.

For the purposes of the analysis below, we dropped respondents who did not indicate age or stated they were under 18 years old; those who reported moving to the south or east of Ukraine after the Russian Federation's invasion (that is, to the core conflict areas); those who were located in the Russian Federation; those who had unclear answers on IDP status or resettlement group; and those who were missing other key variables such as housing type or satisfaction with living situation. The total sample was 8,802 (IDPs = 3,523; refugees = 5,279).

Because respondents were not selected based on a sampling framework, the survey is not representative of the Ukrainian population, and we urge caution with generalizing the results. Facebook use in Ukraine is biased towards middle-aged women who are better educated and live in western or central oblasts (Leasure et al., 2022). Because the survey was advertised as a health

¹ Available [online](#).

survey, those with health problems may have been more likely to respond. Respondents also had to have access to an electronic device and the Internet and be stable enough to complete the survey.

Approximately 60 per cent ($n = 5,279$) of our respondents were refugees and 40 per cent ($n = 3,523$) were IDPs. Far more respondents were female (89%, $n = 7,814$) than were male (11%, $n = 988$). Note that the Facebook algorithm typically targets people who are more likely to click on the advert link (that is, women). However, once we identified the imbalance in response numbers between women and men, approximately 3 weeks after the survey launch, we created a separate Facebook advertisement that targeted men only, in order to gather more male responses.

In the next section, we present basic figures and refer to results from logistic regression models (available on request). In the text, we refer to percentages, which may or may not represent statistically significant differences. For the logistic regression models, we have collapsed categories to create a binary dependent variable in order to ease interpretation. We only discuss results from these models if they are statistically significant below the .05 level.

Results

Characteristics of internally displaced persons and refugees

In our sample, refugees and IDPs do not differ much by age or education. The average age of refugees was 33 and IDPs 34, and men were older than women. The majority of respondents, whether refugees or IDPs and independent of gender, have a bachelor's degree or a higher educational qualification (see Appendix Table 1). These findings suggest that education was not the basis on which refugees were more selective than IDPs; however, again, note that all participants responded through Facebook advertising, which may bias the sample towards the more educated.

A larger proportion of IDPs (61.8%) were married, as compared to refugees (55.5%). Likewise, a greater share of IDPs were in cohabiting unions before the war, as compared to refugees (10.0% as against 8.0%). In addition, a larger proportion of refugees were divorced (16.8%), separated (2.9%) and never married (11.8%). This may indicate that unattached people were more willing to leave Ukraine. On the other hand, 59.2 per cent of currently partnered (married or living together) refugees did not travel with their partner, possibly to keep their children safe.

Since martial law was declared in Ukraine on 24 February, most men have been required to remain within the country. Exemptions included men over 60, fathers with three or more children, and those with a medical condition (although some Ukrainian men fled directly before the announcement of martial law or through other means; see Chevtayeva, 2022). We investigated whether male refugees were more likely to fall into one of these categories. First, male IDPs tended to be slightly younger than refugees on average, with nearly one third between the ages of 35 and 44. Of male refugees, 27.5 per cent were also between 35 and 44 years, but nearly 30 per cent were aged over 60, suggesting they may have left with a military exemption.


Logistic regression estimates indicate few differences in reporting chronic conditions by displacement status, potentially because those with the worst health were not in a condition to emigrate. Men who reported having caring responsibilities for three or more children were more likely to be refugees than IDPs (16.1% as against 3.5%), and they might have fled to protect

their children. However, the majority of male IDPs (58.3%) and refugees (52.1%) did not flee with children, and 40.9 per cent fled with other adults only. Note that the survey only asked whether respondents have caring responsibilities for children under 18, and many of the older men may have left older children behind in Ukraine.

Current location by origin

Refugees who answered our survey predominantly lived, prior to the invasion, in Central Ukraine, including Kyiv (59.7%), as shown in Figure 1. Another 34.1 per cent came from the south and east, areas most impacted by the war, while only 6.1 per cent came from the west. IDPs, however, were mainly from the east (50.4%) and south (23.0%). Additional analyses indicated that the majority of IDPs from the east and south relocated to an area nearby (13.9%), or to the centre (37.0%), and around 22.9 per cent moved to the west of the country. Thus, people from the central regions of Ukraine who may have had greater resources or fled earlier in the conflict were more likely to leave the country, while those from areas experiencing heavy conflict and Russian occupation (ACLED, n.d.) were more likely to stay closer to home.

Figure 1. Region of origin by displacement status




Source: All figures constructed by the authors from survey data.

Household composition

Our definition of resettlement group includes the respondent and the people with whom they travelled and live with now. In the survey, we asked people how many family members and co-travellers (попутниками in Ukrainian) they currently live with. Figure 2 shows the answer to the survey question plus the respondent. IDP resettlement groups tend to be larger – 4.2 people compared to 3.5 for refugee groups.

Figure 2. Average resettlement group size




Note: The average number of people in the resettlement groups includes the respondent.

The majority of respondents have resettled with others. Only 8.1 per cent of refugees and 4.9 per cent of IDPs resettled alone. While only 6.1 per cent of IDPs were alone with children, nearly 20 per cent of refugees were lone mothers or lone fathers. These larger support networks need to be acknowledged when providing accommodation for both IDPs and refugees. There is a need to recognize the importance of providing sufficiently large long-term housing, given the size of these groups.

Resettlement groups

Figure 3 presents a composite of several questions from the survey that ask about the number of people in the resettlement group, the number of children under age 18, and the number of vulnerable adults for whom the respondent has caring responsibilities. These categories represent configurations important for providing different levels of support. However, we were unable to determine the relationship of these other adults to the respondent (for example, husband, parents, siblings, or friends). One category – “with other adults (and possibly children)” – remained ambiguous due to question wording.

Figure 3. Resettlement groups by displacement status (per cent within displacement status)




The majority of persons who were displaced by the conflict, whether in Ukraine or abroad, left with other adults. Of IDPs, 33.6 per cent left only with other adults, and 36.2 per cent left with other adults and children. However, only 22.7 per cent of refugees left only with other adults whereas 36.9 per cent left with other adults and children. Nearly 20 per cent of refugees left only with their children, while more IDPs left with their children plus vulnerable adults. This configuration is probably because displaced persons were more likely to leave the country for the sake of their children, but may have been unable to leave if they were caring for vulnerable adults.

Housing type

Figure 4 shows that very few respondents lived in special housing or hotels. The majority lived with friends, family, or strangers (55.9% of refugees; 54.7% of IDPs). Nearly 37 per cent of single refugees and 42 per cent of respondents with children were living with strangers, which includes the categories “somebody with whom I was put in touch”, and “local people who have offered me accommodation”. Around 31 per cent of IDPs were renting, while 21 per cent of refugees were renting.

Logistic regression analyses indicate that IDPs were more likely to be renting than refugees. Those who left their partner behind were less likely to be renting, especially if they were refugees, while married couples were much more likely to rent than the never married. Russian speakers and those from the east of Ukraine were also more likely to be renting, especially if they were displaced within Ukraine, possibly because they had fewer family and friend networks in western Ukraine. Rental status did not differ by education, gender, age, health status, having witnessed a blast explosion, or resettlement group (except for those living with vulnerable adults, who were more likely to rent).

Figure 4. Housing type by displacement status (per cent within displacement status group)




Satisfaction with current living conditions

Figure 5 shows the distribution of respondents who agreed with the statement that they are satisfied with their current living conditions. The majority of refugees were either satisfied (31.1%) or somewhat satisfied (36.7%). A far larger proportion of IDPs indicated that they were very or somewhat dissatisfied (42.8%).

Logistic regression models, with the dependent variable dichotomized into disagree (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree) and agree (neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree and strongly agree), confirmed that IDPs were less satisfied overall with living conditions. Those living with vulnerable adults were least satisfied with their living conditions, including those with other adults but no children. Those with higher education, better self-reported health, living with strangers, and who did not witness a blast explosion were more satisfied with their living conditions. Those from the east and south were much more dissatisfied, and IDPs who were renting were the most dissatisfied.

The analyses indicate that those who were able to leave the country were more satisfied with their living conditions than those who remained behind, regardless of type of resettlement group or accommodation. The results may reflect the continued lack of safety and instability in Ukraine, or the effects of overcrowding, poor amenities and low quality of housing. IDP renters may be unhappy with having to pay for housing, especially if expensive, as they may have left homes that they own and that may have been destroyed. In addition, their savings may be dwindling, and they may be unable to find employment. Thus, IDPs' rental situation appears to be inadequate and potentially unsustainable. While we note that, among refugees, those who moved to countries with less generous welfare systems (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy, Spain and Türkiye) tend to be less satisfied with their living condition, differences with refugees in other countries are not statistically significant, and this does not depend on the type of resettlement group.

Figure 5. Satisfaction with current living condition



Welcome from community of destination

In general, the majority of both IDPs (85.1%) and refugees (94.9%) felt welcomed or somewhat welcomed by their new communities. However, many of the same factors associated with dissatisfaction with living situation were also associated with feeling unwelcome. IDPs were much more likely to feel unwelcome than refugees, unless the IDPs were living in special refugee accommodation. Compared to those living with friends and family, refugees living with strangers or renting were more likely to feel welcome. Those with poor self-reported health also reported they were less likely to feel welcome, which may reflect their difficulties with accessing health care (Head et al., 2022).

Welfare payments


As seen in figure 6, the percentage of respondents receiving any kind of welfare payments differed greatly across other countries and compared to Ukraine. Only 39.1 per cent of IDPs in Ukraine said they had received payments, and were less likely to have received payments than refugees. Czechia and Germany were swift to deliver payments (with nearly 80% of refugees receiving some type of support), while southern European countries and Turkey had provided very few. Note that the survey question could refer to a rapid one-off payment or regular welfare benefits, which may be in process. Nonetheless, this analysis indicates discrepancies across countries in providing benefits. Countries that have been slow to set up benefit systems need to be encouraged to provide support.

Refugees who were alone with children or vulnerable adults were more likely to have received payments than single people, but this was not the case for IDPs. Those living with strangers or in housing for refugees were also more likely to receive payments, which may explain the dissatisfaction with living conditions for those renting. Those from the east or south of the country were also more likely to have received payments, possibly because their regions were more directly impacted by the war. On the other hand, Russian speakers were less likely to have

received payments, even if they had migrated outside of Ukraine. Finally, access to payments did not differ by education, but those reporting poor health were least likely to have received payments, especially if they were still in Ukraine.

These associations may indicate selection processes. For example, Ukrainian speakers were more likely to be from Kyiv and the western parts of Ukraine and may have had greater means to travel than those from Russian-speaking areas, who were more directly forced to leave due to violence. The Ukrainian speakers may also have had greater human capital, foreign language skills and networks to be able to negotiate welfare systems. Likewise, those with poor health may not have had the energy or social connections to apply for welfare payments.


Figure 6. Percentage receiving some welfare payment, by country



Family members left behind

The vast majority of displaced persons reported leaving behind at least one relative in their origin area (90%). Figure 7 indicates that those left behind were often elderly, either parents or older relatives. Note that about one fifth of refugees and one third of IDPs left behind at least one child. However, it may be difficult to know exactly what “left behind” means, because some children may have left their homes to help the war effort. One quarter of IDPs and 14.3 per cent of refugees reported leaving behind sons, specifically, who may be at even higher risk of harm than other children.

Figure 7. Relatives left behind, by displacement status



Approximately 76 per cent of partnered female refugees with one or two children left behind their husbands or partners, indicating that many mothers have effectively become lone parents. Female refugees with 1 and 2 children were more likely to have left behind their partners than female refugees with 3 or more children, both because larger families are less common in Ukraine, and because fathers with 3 or more children have been allowed to leave the country with their wives. Newly lone mothers not only have the burden of caring and providing for their children by themselves, but they will probably also be worried about their husbands left in Ukraine, some of whom will be on the front line or protecting critical infrastructure.

Beliefs about returning to Ukraine

Respondents were asked whether they believed that they would later return home to Ukraine. Nearly all respondents (more than 91%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. However, because the question wording makes less sense for IDPs who are still in Ukraine, we focus our analyses on refugees. Almost 88 per cent of refugees believed that they would return home; however, logistic regression analyses indicated some differences. Unsurprisingly, those who left behind partners were more likely to believe they would return home. Those living alone with children, those living with other adults and vulnerable adults, and adult-only households were more likely than single people to believe they would return home. Likewise, older people were more likely to believe they would return home eventually.

Men were much less likely to believe they would return home. Russian speakers were also less likely to say they would return home, probably because their origin areas in the south or east are still experiencing conflict, and their homes may have been destroyed. Refugees living in Romania reported that they were more likely to return home than those living in Poland, but refugees in Germany and in the Netherlands were more likely to stay put. This may reflect the level of welfare payment, which is also associated with refugees being less likely to believe that they would return home. However, staying close to the border (for example, in Romania) may also indicate a stronger belief that they will be able to return home when it is safe.

Conclusions and policy recommendations

Although other surveys capture the conditions of refugees or those left in Ukraine, to our knowledge this is the only study to compare those who were displaced inside Ukraine with those who left the country. The results indicate stark differences between IDPs and refugees, with respect to region of origin, satisfaction with living conditions, and size and composition of resettlement group.

Refugees were more likely to report they were satisfied with their living situation and feel welcomed by the community of destination, even if they were living with strangers. Refugees in many countries were more likely to have received welfare payments than IDPs. Although refugees are a heterogeneous group, they were more likely to be from Central Ukraine, and large cities such as Kyiv and Kharkiv. Our survey did not ask about financial situation or prior employment, but we suspect that refugees may have had greater resources and social capital, which allowed them to leave the country.

Nonetheless, refugees were also more likely to be single mothers with children, who will need special support with language and education. Also note that this survey took place relatively early in the conflict, and as receiving countries start to experience donor fatigue, especially with increasing costs of living and gas, the original welcome and support for refugees may start to wane.

The situation of IDPs is even more difficult, with greater proportions of respondents reporting dissatisfaction with their living conditions. A larger proportion were renting, which may be unsatisfactory due to overcrowding, low quality housing and high prices. Also, IDPs were more likely to come from the east and south, where the war has been most devastating. IDPs may have been much more reluctant to leave home until the threat of violence was more acute, and they may feel greater resentment at having to leave homes that they had owned and that may now be destroyed.

It is important to note that although our survey has revealed important insights into the difficulties displaced persons face, it still may not capture the most vulnerable fleeing conflict. The survey is not representative of the Ukrainian population, and may not have been seen by Russian speakers from the east who do not use Facebook, but have been most affected by the war. In addition, the most traumatized may not have had the mental capacity to take an online survey, or have been in a safe space to do so. Thus, the survey likely underestimates key issues such as dissatisfaction with housing and perhaps overestimates the welcome from the community of destination.

We note the following observations and policy recommendations:

1. Most Ukrainians in our survey believed they would go home, and a significant proportion may have already done so, since the IOM estimates that around 6 million Ukrainians had returned to their place of habitual residence by late September 2022 (IOM, 2022b). However, at the time of writing in November 2022, renewed Russian aggression is making a return home extremely dangerous, and indeed more people may flee the deteriorating conditions, especially with winter approaching (United Nations News, 2022). In addition, 10 per cent of Ukrainians reported their homes had been destroyed (IOM, 2022a), and this percentage will be even higher among IDPs. Thus, whether Ukrainians can return home is contingent on the continuing conflict and situation in Ukraine. Also, it will take time before the country is safe and can rebuild. Thus, policies need to shift from short-term emergency responses to long-term strategies, including housing for displaced persons.
2. Most displaced persons have fled with other adults, and often children or vulnerable older people. Resettlement efforts need to concentrate on finding solutions to keep these groups together, as they are an important source of emotional support. For example, governments could provide funding to rent larger housing units, as has been arranged by some local authorities in the United Kingdom.
3. The demographic and family characteristics of refugees highlight the importance of continuing to provide social and financial support. Indeed, around 20 per cent of refugees among our respondents are single mothers with children. Among the partnered mothers with one or two children, nearly 70 per cent have had to leave their spouses behind. These newly lone mothers have to care and provide for their children, with the additional burden of worrying about husbands left behind, potentially in the military or in dangerous situations.
4. The most discontent displaced persons are IDPs from the east, older, without family or friendship networks and who have had to rent. These people seem to be much less satisfied with their living situation and less likely to feel welcomed. The IDP resettlement groups also tend to be larger and contain dependent adults.

In conclusion, although receiving countries must focus on providing support for refugees in their own countries, they also need to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to help Ukraine rehome IDPs. Prior studies on internal displacement in Ukraine before the current conflict found that lack of housing was the largest problem facing IDPs, even up to four years after displacement (Zaviska et al., 2021). An inadequate rental market in Ukraine is shaping up to be one of the greatest areas of concern. In addition, policymakers need to recognize that this crisis will continue beyond the end of the war, and will affect IDP and refugee mental health for years to come, especially for those who directly fled the threat of violence (Perelli-Harris et al., 2022). Thus, although stopping the war must be the top priority right now, European governments must also commit to supporting refugees and IDPs in the long term, in order to protect the most vulnerable from the consequences of this cruel war.

Appendix Table 1.

Descriptive statistics of the analytical sample, by sex

PANEL A: Refugees	Women			Men		
	N	Mean or %	s,d,	N	Mean or %	s,d,
Age	4 868	32.3	10.9	411	37.5	14.3
Education						
Elementary	39	0.8		7	1.7	
Basic secondary	220	4.5		22	5.4	
Special secondary (technical)	607	12.5		57	13.9	
Incomplete higher	285	5.9		33	8	
Higher (BA/BSc+)	3 717	76.4		292	71.1	
Language						
Ukrainian	3 473	71.3		270	65.7	
Russian	1 331	27.3		130	31.6	
Other	64	1.3		11	2.7	
Marital status						
Never married	562	11.5		60	14.6	
Married or cohabiting	3 049	62.6		303	73.7	
Separated/divorced/widowed	1 257	25.8		48	11.7	
Number of children respondent has caring responsibilities for						
0	1 530	31.4		214	52.1	
1–2	2 978	61.3		131	31.9	
3+	360	7.3		66	16	
Respondent location						
Poland	1,669	34.3		114	27.7	
Romania	93	1.9		13	3.2	
Republic of Moldova	40	0.8		2	0.5	
Hungary	53	1.1		1	0.2	
Slovakia	159	3.3		13	3.2	
Czechia	364	7.5		21	5.1	
Germany	844	17.3		87	21.2	
Bulgaria	119	2.4		8	2.0	
Italy	145	3.0		11	2.7	
Lithuania	100	2.1		5	1.2	
Estonia	35	0.7		2	0.5	
Türkiye	35	0.7		10	2.4	
France	127	2.6		12	2.9	
United Kingdom	116	2.4		16	3.9	
Spain	119	2.4		7	1.7	
Netherlands	86	1.8		14	3.4	
Austria	85	1.8		3	0.7	
Switzerland	64	1.3		9	2.2	
Belgium	62	1.3		6	1.5	
Denmark	59	1.2		6	1.5	
Sweden	63	1.3		7	1.7	
Other	431	8.9		44	10.7	

PANEL B: Internally displaced persons (IDPs)	Women			Men		
	N	Mean or %	s,d	N	Mean or %	s,d
Age	2 945	33.8	11	578	35.1	12.2
Education						
Elementary	47	1.6		15	2.6	
Basic secondary	232	7.9		45	7.8	
Special secondary (technical)	514	17.5		117	20.2	
Incomplete higher	162	5.5		45	7.8	
Higher (BA/BSc+)	1 990	67.6		356	61.6	
Language						
Ukrainian	2 066	70.2		347	60	
Russian	848	28.8		213	36.9	
Other	31	1		18	3.1	
Marital status						
Never married	187	6.4		98	17	
Married or cohabiting	2 112	71.7		417	72.1	
Separated/divorced/widowed	646	21.9		63	10.9	
Number of children respondent has caring responsibilities for						
0	1 155	39.2		337	58.3	
1–2	1 613	54.8		221	38.2	
3+	176	6		20	3.5	
Respondent location						
Cherkasy	131	4.0		29	4.3	
Chernihiv	38	1.2		9	1.3	
Chernivtsi	144	4.4		15	2.2	
Crimea	1	0.0		–	0.0	
Dnipro	303	9.2		63	9.3	
Donetsk	4	0.1		3	0.4	
Ivano-Frankivsk	191	5.8		38	5.6	
Kharkiv	121	3.7		25	3.7	
Kherson	16	0.5		7	1.0	
Khmelnyskyi	164	5.0		27	4.0	
Kyiv	318	9.6		91	13.4	
Kropyvnytskyi	90	2.7		22	3.2	
Luhansk	1	0.0		–	0.0	
Mykolaiv	47	1.4		8	1.2	
Odessa	121	3.7		32	4.7	
Poltava	180	5.4		33	4.9	
Rivne	76	2.3		13	1.9	
Sumy	21	0.6		1	0.2	
Ternopil	137	4.1		34	5.0	
Vynnytsia	193	5.8		35	5.1	
Volhynia	86	2.6		11	1.6	
Zakarpattia	255	7.7		48	7.1	
Zaporizhzhia	121	3.7		32	4.7	
Zhytomyr	61	1.9		9	1.3	
Other	476	14.4		95	14.0	
Unknown	10	0.3		1	0.2	

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