


A REGION ON THE MOVE 2021: EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA



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IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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Regional Office for East and Horn of Africa
Sri Aurobindo Avenue, off Mzima Spring Road, Lavington
P.O. Box 55040-00200
Nairobi
Kenya
Tel.: +254 20 422 1000
Email: rdhronairobi@iom.int
Website: <https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/regional-data-hub>

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A REGION ON THE MOVE 2021: EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA



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MiRAC
MIGRATION RESOURCE
ALLOCATION COMMITTEE



FOREWORD

The East and Horn of Africa is a highly dynamic region. In recent years, political instability, climate shocks and economic disparities have been pushing millions of people into displacement or into leaving their countries of origin in search of brighter futures. These trends have continued into 2022, while long-awaited elections took place in Somalia and Kenya, the Northern Ethiopia conflict displaced millions of people, and fragile peace processes are underway in many countries. The dramatic impact of the drought, compounded by other climate shocks, has led to high levels of acute food insecurity and rising food prices that are affecting millions of people in the Horn of Africa, while flooding is impacting South Sudan and the water levels are rising around Lake Tanganyika. Moreover, the socioeconomic recovery of the East and Horn of Africa following the COVID-19 pandemic has been further stalled by these dynamics and a global focus shifting towards the Ukraine crisis response.

A Region on the Move 2021 report aims to capture these trends, provide evidence-based analysis that improves our understanding of mobility in the region and promote the systematic use of data to guide advocacy and policy-level discussion. IOM has made tremendous progress in strengthening the migration data sector by adopting the 2020–2025 Global Migration Data Strategy in line with the United Nations data strategy, to better support Member States and the international community to achieve their commitments. IOM established the Global Data Institute in 2022 to bring together its unique data capacity and enhance the availability and use of data to achieve stronger governance outcomes and positive impacts for migrants and societies. The Regional Data Hub for the East and Horn of Africa plays a critical role in consolidating systematic data collection and analysis, supporting Member States' migration data priorities and informing evidence-based programming.

Similarly, the IOM Regional Strategy for the East and Horn of Africa 2020–2024 aims to enhance our strategic and policy engagement with Member States, the African Union and the regional economic communities. Migration data are a key tool and enabler in this process. In 2021, in close collaboration with IOM, the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established regional technical working groups composed of representatives of National Statistical Offices and of the Ministries of Labour, Immigration and Foreign Affairs, among others. These bodies facilitate the collection, standardization and comparability of migration data among Member States by defining regional harmonization tools and processes. IOM also supports similar data governance bodies already existing or being established at the national level.

As we progress towards reinforcing the evidence base for good migration governance at all levels and within the broader United Nations system, we must acknowledge that significant data gaps still persist, such as in documenting the link between human mobility and climate change and in informing the humanitarian-development-peace nexus programming across the transition and recovery portfolio. Meanwhile, national-level data capacities are yet to be reinforced to meet minimum harmonization and disaggregation standards. We hope that the combined effect of a better understanding of the magnitude of the challenges we are facing and the renewed commitment to collaborate in collecting accurate and disaggregated data will soon lead to more advanced and evidence-based migration policies, better protection of migrants' rights and improved assistance to those in need.



Mohammed Abdiker

Regional Director

IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa

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ABOUT THE REGIONAL DATA HUB

Established in early 2018 at the IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, the Regional Data Hub (RDH) aims to support evidence-based, strategic and policy-level discussion on migration through a combination of initiatives. The RDH aims to enhance the availability of migration-related data in the region and promote its dissemination to achieve stronger governance outcomes and positive impacts for migrants and societies as a whole. In particular, the RDH intends to facilitate technical coordination, harmonize the different IOM data collection activities and foster a multi-layered analysis of mixed migration movements, trends and characteristics across the region. Through a combination of IOM data collection methodologies, research initiatives and continuous engagements with National Statistical Offices (NSOs), key line Ministries and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the RDH aims to fill the existing gaps in strengthening the regional evidence base on migration. This contribution will, in turn, help improve policymaking, programming and coordination between all the stakeholders involved. The RDH strategy is structured along three pillars, in line with the IOM Migration Data Strategy. For more information on the RDH strategy and publications, see <https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/regional-data-hub>.



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
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

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DATA AT A GLANCE

10 COUNTRIES IN THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA REGION




INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS





MAIN MIGRATION CORRIDORS

(674,000 TOTAL MOVEMENTS TRACKED IN THE REGION)



DISPLACED PERSONS



INTRODUCTION

Data and evidence are at the centre of the current migration discourse. In his report on progress towards the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in December 2021, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres acknowledged that significant data gaps persist, such as in the area of irregular migration, and that many Member States' data capacity needs still require to be reinforced to meet minimum harmonization and disaggregation standards.¹ The first International Migration Review Forum, which was held between 17 and 20 May 2022, further discussed how to strengthen collection and use of accurate and disaggregated data for implementing the commitments of the Global Compact through evidence-based policies and actions.

A *Region on the Move* report series for the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA), which has been the regional flagship publication since 2017, aims to contribute to filling this gap, that is, to improve the migration evidence base for good migration governance in support of sustainable development and effective humanitarian action.² Over the years, the report series has illustrated the main humanitarian situations, with a focus on internal displacement and mixed migration flows along the major migration corridors of this region. Building on the leading IOM *World Migration Report* series, the structure of the 2021 edition was revamped to explore mobility dynamics affecting the EHoA region across its broader spectrum: from providing a regional overview of data and trends on international migrants to discussing specific groups of migrants, namely migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and irregular migrants along the main migratory corridors. *A Region on the Move 2021*, the ninth report in the series, builds on more than 20 data sources — official and operational — that examine different aspects of the multifaceted migration landscape.

The EHoA currently hosts around a quarter of all international migrants living in Africa and the estimated

number of immigrants residing in the region has nearly doubled in the last 20 years. Migration to, from and within the region has always been characterized by variety. While labour migration, through both regular and irregular channels, has continued to drive regional mobility dynamics, forced migration trends have become more prevalent. Even though the year 2018 ended on a hopeful note considering political transformations and renewed regional understanding, with Ethiopia embarking on a critical democratic transition that included the declaration of peace with Eritrea after 20 years of war and with South Sudan signing a revitalized peace agreement between warring parties, events in the following years have significantly affected the prospect of peace and socioeconomic development in the region.³

Prolonged and repeated humanitarian crises have uprooted millions of individuals to search for safety within and across borders. Overall, the EHoA was home to 13.2 million forced migrants in 2021, including 9.6 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 3.6 million refugees and asylum seekers.⁴ The eruption of the Northern Ethiopia conflict in late 2020 added to the political stalemate due to postponed elections in Somalia, renewed conflicts across South Sudan and the civil war which broke out in neighbouring the Sudan at the end of 2021, have all contributed to a worsening humanitarian situation and a fragile regional stability. While parts of the region were affected by devastating floods, a severe drought was declared across the region in 2021 and several countries have been experiencing one of the most severe climate-induced emergencies in decades. Between 12 million and 14 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, due to drought in the first quarter of 2022.⁵

More than two years into the pandemic, the unprecedented impact that COVID-19 had on mobility and migration across the EHoA continued to be felt, alongside its broader socioeconomic consequences, which further exacerbated

1 United Nations, General Assembly, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration – Report of the Secretary-General (A/76/642 of 27 December 2021).

2 IOM defines the EHoA as the region covering the 10 countries of Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. See <https://publications.iom.int/books/iom-migration-data-strategy-brief-informing-policy-and-action-migration-mobility-and> for an overview of the IOM Migration Data Strategy.

3 Mieke, 2021.

4 IDMC, 2022 (accessed 31 May 2022); IOM, 2021a; IOM, 2021b; IOM, 2022a; UNHCR, 2021 (accessed 15 March 2022). IDP data for Somalia were the latest available figure endorsed by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the government as of March 2021.

5 FSNWG, 2022.

the already stressed migrant protection systems. Reaching nearly 1.1 million confirmed cases and 19,500 deaths by the end of 2021, the region still had some travel restrictions in place, while thousands of migrants remained stranded along the journey and emergency mobility trends to cope with this health crisis continued to be observed.⁶ However, notwithstanding the COVID-19-related mobility restrictions, the will to migrate has not ceased. Ethiopian, but also Somali and Eritrean nationals, have continued to move extraregionally towards the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, South Africa and Europe through Libya. These irregular journeys remain fraught with peril as migrants use multiple smuggler networks, cross dangerous seas, pass through war-torn countries and continuously face the risk of detention and deportation along the way or at destination. Such mixed migration trends increased significantly in 2021 and were even approaching pre-pandemic levels, hinting that the desire to improve their life and overcome economic constraints at home were powerful push factors, while their reliance on established transnational migration networks facilitated their mobility.

This report strives to provide an advanced understanding of the main migrant groups and the environment in which mobility takes place; therefore, Chapter 1 opens with an overview of regional data and trends on international migrants and continues with a discussion of specific migrant groups that include refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and migrant workers. This chapter also discusses trends on international remittances as well as the impact of COVID-19 on human mobility, societies and economies in the region. Given the predominant humanitarian nature of the EHoA migratory landscape, Chapter 2 delves deeper into the subject of internal displacement which is largely driven by conflict, violence and climate shocks. Finally, Chapter 3 examines mixed movement trends along the main migration corridors in this region, which are generally irregular, with particular attention paid to migrants' varying needs, profiles, challenges and vulnerabilities.



Women who are internally displaced in Marka Town, Lower Shabelle Region, Somalia listen during a community discussion with various United Nations organizations. © IOM 2021 / Rikka Tupaz

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* All hyperlinks were working at the time of writing this report.

TIMELINE OF MAIN EVENTS IN THE EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA (JANUARY – DECEMBER 2021)

Note: Although Democratic Republic of the Congo, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Yemen are not part of the IOM definition of the East and Horn of Africa region, events in these countries affect countries in the region.



JANUARY

African Union: Trading under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) begins on 1 January 2021.

Ethiopia / the Sudan: The Tigray crisis pushes over 56,000 refugees to flee across the border to the Sudan, including some 800 people just in the first few days of January. Tunaydbah, a second camp site hosting Ethiopian refugees fleeing the Tigray crisis, opens in the Sudan as the Um Rakuba refugee camp approaches its full capacity.

Uganda: General elections are held on 14 January 2021, re-electing President Yoweri Museveni who has ruled the country since 1986.




MARCH

Djibouti: At least 20 migrants drown off the coast of Obock on 3 March 2021 after being thrown overboard by smugglers on their way to Yemen. An additional 44 people drown on 12 April 2021 as their boat capsizes while they attempt to return from Yemen to Djibouti.

United Republic of Tanzania: The United Republic of Tanzania swears in President Samia Suluhu Hassan, its first female head of State, after President John Magufuli's sudden death on 17 March 2021.

East and Horn of Africa: COVID-19 vaccination campaigns begin, with almost all countries in the region receiving their first batches of vaccine doses in March.



APRIL

Ethiopia: Authorities in Ethiopia declare a state of emergency in southern Amhara over intensified communal violence that started in mid-April.

Djibouti: President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh, who has served as President of Djibouti since 1999, is re-elected for another five-year term on 9 April 2021.

Somalia: Fighting intensifies in Mogadishu in late April due to the simmering political crisis over delayed presidential elections.

Somalia: A drought is officially declared by the Government of Somalia and the humanitarian community following the concerning deterioration of dry conditions across Somalia.

Burundi: On 20 April, the Government of Burundi, through the Meteorological Director General, officially declares a flood disaster due to the overflow of Lake Tanganyika, asking populations in affected areas in the provinces of Rumonge, Makamba, Bujumbura Capital and Bujumbura Rural to evacuate.

Somalia: The Government of Somalia signs a Treaty and a Memorandum of Understanding with the African Risk Capacity in order to better prepare, plan and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters.

Kenya: A road map for closing both the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps by 30 June 2022 is under discussion between the Government of Kenya and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). An estimated 434,000 refugees are currently living in these two camps.



MAY

South Sudan: The dissolution of parliament, as stipulated in the peace deal, is announced by President Salva Kiir on 8 May 2021. Members of Parliament will be nominated by different political parties.

Rwanda / Democratic Republic of the Congo: In the evening of 22 May 2021, the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo, one of the world's most active and dangerous volcanoes, forces thousands of people to flee the city of Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards the nearby Rwandan border.



JUNE

Ethiopia: After having been delayed twice, Ethiopia's national and regional elections take place on 21 June 2021. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is sworn in for another five-year term.

Ethiopia: On 28 June 2021, the Tigray Defense Forces take control of the regional capital, Mekelle, and the Ethiopian National Defense Force withdraws from most of the regional state, announcing a unilateral ceasefire.

Yemen: A boat capsizes off the coast of Yemen near Ras Al Ara on 13 June, leaving some 200 migrants from the Horn of Africa missing, while dozens of migrants are found dead.




JULY

African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights passes a resolution on missing migrants and refugees in Africa and the impact on their families.

Ethiopia / Saudi Arabia: Following the announcement by the Government of Ethiopia of the large-scale return of Ethiopian migrants, in collaboration with Saudi Arabia, around 42,000 people are returned from Saudi Arabia to Addis Ababa in the span of two weeks, marking a record in returnees registered by IOM since 2017.

Somalia: Somalia postpones parliamentary elections once again, delaying the presidential vote until 2022.

Ethiopia: The Northern Ethiopia conflict expands from the Tigray region to the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions.



AUGUST

South Sudan: After months of delay, South Sudan swears in a new national parliament on 2 August 2021, taking small steps toward the creation of an inclusive national assembly stipulated in the peace deal.



SEPTEMBER

Kenya: Kenya declares an emergency over drought in parts of the country on 8 September 2021.



OCTOBER

African Union / Somalia: The African Union declares it will expand the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to strengthen military operations against Al-Shabaab amid political tensions and a resurgence of activity by the extremist group. The African Union also proposes a joint mission with the United Nations.

United Nations Security Council / African Union: The United Nations Security Council adopts a presidential statement calling for greater strategic collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union, notably in peace and conflict resolution in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; elections and political transition in Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan; human rights and rule of law.

Somalia: Fighting erupts in Guri Ceel in Galmudug between Somali Government forces and the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama'a paramilitary group, former allies in the fight against Al-Shabaab. The clashes displace over 100,000 people, including over 1,000 unaccompanied children.

Uganda: Two deadly explosions take place several days apart, one in the capital of Kampala, and the other at its outskirts. In early November 2021, three more suicide bombers detonate explosions in Kampala minutes apart, killing at least three and injuring dozens.

The Sudan: The Sudanese military deposes Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and dissolves the Sovereign Council that had been established following nationwide protests in the 2019 revolution, effecting a military coup d'état.




NOVEMBER

Ethiopia: On 2 November 2021, Ethiopia declares a six-month nationwide state of emergency due to the escalation of the Northern Ethiopia crisis, which continues to spill over to other regions in Ethiopia as well as into neighbouring countries.

Uganda / Democratic Republic of the Congo: Around 11,000 people flee to Uganda, comprising mostly of women and children, as fighting escalates in North Kivu province in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo between government forces and armed militia groups.


Djibouti / Ethiopia / Yemen: IOM suspends its assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programme due to ongoing insecurity in Tigray, as Ethiopia is unable to receive migrants following the declaration of the state of emergency. IOM in Djibouti collaborates with UNHCR and the Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés (ONARS) to refer migrants seeking asylum. Similarly, Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) services in Yemen are also suspended.



DECEMBER

South Sudan: South Sudan is inundated with its worst floods in 60 years, affecting 835,000 people from May to December 2021.

East and Horn of Africa: December 2021 closes with a third consecutive poor rainfall season thereby triggering a severe drought alert across Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia which contributes to acute food insecurity. Parts of Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania also face worsening drought conditions.



CHAPTER 1

MIGRATION OVERVIEW: EAST AND HORN OF AFRICA



Through a cash-based transfer activity, 200 families in Baidoa, Somalia receive technical support to construct transitional shelters and better protect themselves from the elements. The community takes the lead in the shelter design and construction, building shelters that meet their needs and preferences. © IOM 2021

1.1 INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS

In recent years, the migratory landscape of the East and Horn of Africa (EHOA) region — which includes Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania — has become more humanitarian in nature.¹ Regional mobility has increasingly been characterized by forced migration due to widespread conflict and violence, political persecution, human rights violations, climatic events and harsh environmental conditions. As a result, the region hosts a very large population of internally displaced persons (IDPs);² refugees³ and asylum seekers⁴ make up around 60 per cent of the international migrant population in this region.⁵

Labour migration — both regular and irregular — also constitutes an important feature of the EHOA migration

landscape. This type of migration is prompted by multiple socioeconomic factors, such as wide income inequalities, poverty and unemployment as well as the presence and attractiveness of economic hubs that create employment opportunities and fuel rural–urban mobility. These intertwined push-and-pull factors drive both intraregional and extraregional movements in the EHOA.

In general, across Africa, most migration takes place *within* the continent; this is particularly true for sub-Saharan Africa.⁶ Importantly, migration in Africa is largely regular and comparatively little migration from the continent is via irregular channels towards Europe or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Middle Eastern countries.⁷

1 See Chapter 2 for more details.

2 An internally displaced person (IDP) is a person (or group of persons) who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave his or her home or place of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. See https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf.

3 A refugee is a person who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. See https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf.


4 An asylum seeker is an individual who is seeking international protection. In countries with individualized procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognized as a refugee, but every recognized refugee is initially an asylum seeker. See https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf.

5 See Figure 1. International migrants refer to the foreign-born population present in a country (or to foreign citizens in cases data on the place of birth were not available and data on the country of citizenship were used instead). Several countries host large refugee populations that are not always covered by population censuses, and in these cases, the international migrant stock includes the number of refugees and asylum seekers present in a country as reported by international agencies. For more information, see www.un.org/development/desa/pd/sites/www.un.org/development/desa/pd/files/undesa_pd_2020_international_migrant_stock_documentation.pdf.

6 de Haas et al., 2020.

7 Ibid. See Chapter 3 for more details on irregular trends.

Figure 1. Latest estimates on international migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons in the East and Horn of Africa



Source: IDMC, 2022 (accessed 31 May 2022); IOM, 2021a; IOM, 2021b; IOM, 2022a; DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021); UNHCR, 2021 (accessed 15 March 2022).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. The latest available estimates were as of mid-2020 for international migrants (DESA), as of mid-2021 for refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR) and as of December 2021 for IDPs (IDMC and IOM). IDP data for Somalia were the latest available figure endorsed by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the government as of March 2021.


The estimated number of international migrants (or immigrants) in the EHoA stood at 6.2 million as of mid-2020, which represented an 80 per cent increase from mid-2000 (3.5 million) and a 16 per cent increase from mid-2015 (5.4 million).⁸ Almost a quarter (24%) of all the international migrants living in Africa (25.4 million) were in the EHoA region.

The proportion of EHoA international migrants as a share of the regional population remained relatively stable over the past decade. This proportion was 1.9 per cent at mid-2020 (with a regional population of 331 million), which is similar to the corresponding proportion across Africa (1.9%) but much lower than the corresponding proportion globally (3.6%). While Africa's international

migrant stock increased significantly between mid-2000 and mid-2020, this increase was neither as pronounced as the one observed in Asia and Europe nor as notable as the demographic growth of the total African population.⁹

Most international migrants in the region resided in Uganda (1.7 million), followed by Ethiopia (1.1 million) and Kenya (1.1 million). Over 67 per cent of immigrants (4.1 million) originated from countries within the EHoA, mainly from South Sudan (1.6 million) and Somalia (974,000), while 33 per cent (2.1 million) came from outside the region, largely from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1 million) and the Sudan (702,000).

Figure 2. Estimated immigrant population in the East and Horn of Africa by country of origin and share of the regional population, 2000–2020



Source: DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021).

Note: DESA estimates are provided for the midpoint (1 July) of each year.

8 Figures for this section are taken from DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021). The latest available data were from mid-2020 at the time of writing this report.


9 IOM, 2021c; African Union Commission and IOM, 2020.

Of the 6.2 million immigrants in the region, the share of females (50.4%) was slightly higher than the share of males (49.6%) which is different from the shares as of mid-2010 (49.7% females versus 50.3% males) and as of mid-2015 (49.8% females versus 50.2% males). Globally, male immigrants have always outnumbered female immigrants, and as of mid-2020, the shares were 52.1 per cent for males and 47.9 per cent for females.¹⁰ The EHoA is also an exception compared to other regions in Africa that, by contrast, usually host more male migrants.¹¹ This fact can be largely attributed to the prevailing forced migration dynamics in this region (and across Africa) whereby females account for the largest share of refugees and asylum seekers while labour migration remains dominated by males.¹² Moreover, more than half (56%) of the immigrants in the region were aged

between 20 and 64 years, while 41 per cent were younger than 20 years and 3 per cent were older than 65 years.

Meanwhile, the number of estimated emigrants from the region reached 9.1 million at mid-2020, which is more than double the number recorded 10 years earlier at mid-2010 (4.4 million) and a 28 per cent increase from mid-2015 (7.1 million). Of those, 46 per cent lived in the region (4.1 million) while 54 per cent lived outside the region (4.9 million), mostly in other regions in Africa (42%), in Europe (24%), in Northern America (18%) and in Western Asia, which includes the GCC and Middle Eastern countries (13%).¹³ In all, an estimated 68 per cent of emigrants from the EHoA region (or 6.2 million) lived in another African country.

Figure 3. Estimated emigrant population from the East and Horn of Africa by country of destination and share of the regional population, 2000–2020



Source: DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021).

Note: DESA estimates are provided for the midpoint (1 July) of each year. It is important to highlight that many emigrants, especially the ones who emigrated before the last census, are not included in the population data and subsequent DESA estimates of the countries of origin.

10 IOM, 2021c.

11 In 2020, the male-female ratio for West and Central Africa was 52.9 to 47.1 per cent and for Southern Africa was 53.8 to 46.2 per cent.

12 DESA, 2021b. See also the below section on migrant workers for more details.

13 See <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/> for the breakdown of the geographic regions used by DESA.


As of midyear 2020, more than half (51%) of the EHoA emigrant population came from South Sudan (2.6 million) and Somalia (2 million) as they both were the origin countries of the largest refugee populations in the region. A significant share of South Sudanese emigrants moved within the region (60%), followed by Northern Africa (34%), while Somali emigrants had a larger presence outside the region (52%), particularly in Europe (19%), Western Asia (15%), other regions in Africa (10%) and Northern America (7%).

According to the World Bank's income level classification, the emigrant population from the EHoA region had a large presence in low-income countries (53%) in 2020, followed by high-income countries (28%), lower-middle-income countries (16%) and upper-middle-income countries (3%).¹⁴ Low-income countries included the top three

destination countries of emigrants from the region, namely Uganda (1.2 million), the Sudan (1.2 million) and Ethiopia (1 million), while high-income countries covered destinations such as the United States of America (714,000), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (452,000), Canada (171,000) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (164,000).

The presence of emigrants from the EHoA in low-income countries has by far seen the most rapid rise from mid-2000 (1.9 million), while their presence in high-income countries has followed a gradual increase over the past 10 years, even surpassing lower-middle-income countries after mid-2005. In addition, the emigrant presence in middle-income countries has remained relatively stable and at a less significant level than in the low- and high-income countries.

Figure 4. Emigrants from the East and Horn of Africa by income level of the country of destination, 2000–2020



Source: DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021).


Note: DESA estimates are provided for the midpoint (1 July) of each year.

¹⁴ See <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> for more details on the income level classification used by the World Bank.

Considering the humanitarian nature of the region's international migrant stock, it is unsurprising that the largest migration corridors reflect the main refugee movements. Most international migratory movements were from South Sudan to Uganda (1.2 million) as these mainly represented the displaced South Sudanese population who sought refuge in Uganda. Similarly, movements from South Sudan to the Sudan (868,000) as well as to Ethiopia (410,000),

which almost entirely emanated from the same refugee crisis, represented two other important corridors in the region. In addition, given the scale and the protraction of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, movements from Somalia to Kenya (425,000) and to Ethiopia (411,000) were also among the largest corridors, combining both forced movements and other types of migration.

Figure 5. Top 20 international migration country-to-country corridors in the East and Horn of Africa, 2020



Source: DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021).

Note: DESA estimates are provided for the midpoint (1 July) of each year. International migration country-to-country corridors display the number of international migrants (or immigrants) from the first-mentioned country (i.e. the country of origin) who are living in the second-mentioned country (i.e. the country of destination).

Overall, mobility in the EHoA is not only extraregional but also intraregional, and the latter is a key feature of the regional migration landscape. In the EHoA, the number of international migrants in the region who are from within the region was over 4.1 million at mid-2020. After reaching its lowest point in mid-2005 (2.1 million), this number rapidly increased until mid-2020.¹⁵ However, the estimates of the volume of intraregional mobility are different depending on the shares being looked at. While 67 per cent of all immigrants in the EHoA region were from other countries within the region, 46 per cent of all emigrants from the EHoA lived in the region as of mid-2020.

These two percentages vary considerably between regions in Africa. For instance, in West and Central Africa in 2020, 83 per cent of all immigrants in the region were from the region while 65 per cent of all emigrants from the region lived in another country in the region.¹⁶ These higher rates of intraregional and extraregional migration can be explained by the effective regional integration model in place among West and Central African countries, while similar frameworks are being strengthened across the EHoA.¹⁷ Still, as indicated above, in terms of extraregional migration, an estimated 68 per cent of emigrants from the EHoA region (or 6.2 million) lived in another African country.

Figure 6. Intraregional and extraregional migration in the East and Horn of Africa, 2000–2020



Source: DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021).

Note: DESA estimates are provided for the midpoint (1 July) of each year.

15 See Figure 6.

16 IOM, 2022b.

17 Strain, 2020.

COVID-19 impact on mobility


Human mobility and migration took a major hit in 2020 when the outbreak of COVID-19 was declared a pandemic.¹⁸ As the world began to impose numerous health and travel restrictions, mobility slowed down and even came to a temporary halt as many migrants became stranded, unable to move forward with their journey or to return home. Over time, COVID-19-related international travel measures enforced in the region shifted as various waves of the pandemic broke out.¹⁹

After peaking in April 2020 (around 80%), mobility restrictions sharply declined until October 2020 (just under 10%) and remained relatively at the same level until the end of 2021. This decline was prompted by the progressive lifting of movement restrictions in the second half of 2020 given that the health effects of the pandemic, not only in this region but across all sub-Saharan Africa, were not as severe as in other areas of the globe. International travel measures in the world

remained unchanged from April 2020 (around 75%) and only began to drop from July 2020 but to a much lesser extent than in the EHoA (50% in October 2020).²⁰

Health measures, on the other hand, were on an upward trend for most of 2020 and remained at a high level through 2021 (over 90%). As international travel measures became more focused on public health, health-related measures in the region surpassed mobility restrictions from July 2020, compared to from October 2020 at the global level.²¹ Generally, a common shift was observed globally in early 2021, whereby health measures moved away from being plain restrictive measures to actual enablers of mobility, considering the growing importance of pre-travel testing and vaccination certificates to allow travel. However, given the huge differences in vaccine coverage and test availability between high-income and low-income countries, health measures in the region could have not played a big role in this shift.

Figure 7. COVID-19-related international travel measures imposed in the East and Horn of Africa, March 2020–December 2021



Source: IOM COVID-19 Global Mobility Restrictions database (last updated April 2022).

Note: Health measures refer to medical measures (such as quarantine, self-isolation, pre-travel testing, health screening, health declaration forms) and location surveillance. Mobility restrictions include passenger restrictions based on nationality, immigration status or arrival from a specific geographic location as well as border closures, changes in visa policy, new requirements on travel documentation and other specific requirements for entry.

18 The various COVID-19-related measures put in place surely had implications for migration, however, it has not been possible to fully assess the impact of COVID-19 on the international migrant population given that the latest available estimates from DESA were as of mid-2020, relatively at the beginning of the pandemic. Meanwhile, data from national statistical offices were also not recent enough to assess the full impact.

19 See Figure 7. COVID-19-related international travel measures refer to the air travel restrictions put in place that limited the entry of passengers, which were categorized as either health-related or mobility-related.


20 IOM, 2021c.

21 Ibid.

As part of the COVID-19 government responses, internal restrictions such as lockdowns, curfews and bans on public transportation were also enforced in the region but their stringency varied between countries. By late March 2020, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda had adopted the strictest measures in the region

and scored higher than the global average stringency index (76), with Djibouti and Uganda scoring the highest (94 each). By the end of 2021, Uganda had the most stringent measures (73), followed by Eritrea and South Sudan (56 each), all of which scored higher than the global average (45).

Figure 8. COVID-19 government response stringency index in the East and Horn of Africa with relative changes and global and regional averages, 31 March 2020–31 December 2021




Source: Blavatnik School of Government and University of Oxford, 2021 (accessed 22 March 2022).

Note: The stringency index is a composite measure based on nine response indicators including school closures, workplace closures, and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest).

Overall, the United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya recorded the biggest relative changes in stringency index between late March 2020 and late December 2021, marking an 82 per cent and a 63 per cent decline, respectively. Burundi was the only country in the region that adopted more stringent measures at the end of December 2021 compared to the end of March 2020, thereby marking a 20 per cent increase.

respectively. Burundi was the only country in the region that adopted more stringent measures at the end of December 2021 compared to the end of March 2020, thereby marking a 20 per cent increase.

Figure 9. COVID-19 government response stringency index in the East and Horn of Africa, 31 March 2020–31 December 2021



Source: Blavatnik School of Government and University of Oxford, 2021 (accessed 22 March 2022).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. The stringency index is a composite measure based on nine response indicators including school closures workplace closures and travel bans, rescaled to a value from 0 to 100 (100 = strictest).




Portrait of a young migrant woman sitting under a tree in Fantahero, Djibouti. © IOM 2020 / Alexander Bee

1.2 REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

Some of the world’s largest refugee camps are located in the EHoA, namely in Ethiopia (Aw-barre and Sheder), Kenya (Dadaab and Kakuma), Uganda (Bidi Bidi) and the United Republic of Tanzania (Nyarugusu, Nduta and Mtendeli).²² However, unlike any other region in the

world, a number of countries in the EHoA are major refugee-hosting countries, while simultaneously being major origin countries of refugees and asylum seekers.²³ This unique fact highlights how refugee flows are primarily contained within the region.

Figure 10. Countries in the East and Horn of Africa by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2021



Source: UNHCR, 2021 (accessed 15 March 2022).

Note: Data for 2021 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report. “Hosted” refers to refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country, while “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers from that country who are outside of their origin country.

22 UNHCR, n.d.


23 See Figure 10.

Overall, the region hosted 3.6 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2021 (70% were from countries within the region), which is around two and a half times the number recorded in 2011 (1.4 million).²⁴ Meanwhile, refugees and asylum seekers from the EHoA accounted for 4.7 million in 2021 (54% residing in countries within the region), which represents nearly three times the number recorded in 2011 (1.7 million).

Uganda has been the top refugee-hosting country in the region since 2016, following the surge in new refugee

arrivals from South Sudan after large-scale violence erupted in the country in July 2016. In 2021, Uganda (1.5 million) was the third largest host country of refugees and asylum seekers in the world after Türkiye (4 million) and the United States of America (1.6 million), while Ethiopia (785,000) was the tenth largest country globally. Kenya (521,000), South Sudan (325,000) and the United Republic of Tanzania (230,000) were among the top five refugee host countries in the region, after Uganda and Ethiopia.

Figure 11. Refugees and asylum seekers in the East and Horn of Africa by top five host countries, 2011–2021



Source: UNHCR, 2021 (accessed 15 March 2022).

Note: Data for 2021 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report.

24 Figures for this section are taken from UNHCR, 2021 (accessed 15 March 2022). Data for 2021 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report. All other annual data from UNHCR are as of the end of the respective year.


Conflict in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan has triggered significant outflows of refugees and asylum seekers, which are among the largest across the African continent, with these three countries representing 40 per cent of the whole refugee population from Africa in 2021. Globally, South Sudan (2.3 million) was the third largest country of origin of refugees and asylum seekers as of mid-2021 after the Syrian Arab Republic (6.9 million) and Afghanistan (2.8 million), while Somalia (844,000) ranked eighth.

Refugees and asylum seekers from South Sudan were mainly living in Uganda (923,000), representing nearly two thirds (62%) of the total refugee population hosted in Uganda, but also in the Sudan (772,000) and Ethiopia (374,000), contributing to almost half (48%) of Ethiopia's refugee population. Refugees and asylum seekers from Somalia were

primarily hosted in Kenya (278,000) and Ethiopia (212,000). While the South Sudanese and Somali refugee population mainly resided in the region, refugees and asylum seekers from Ethiopia were mostly living outside the region, namely in the Sudan (68,000) and South Africa (64,000).

While Ethiopia hosted over a quarter (26%) of the total Eritrean refugee population in 2021 and was the biggest host country in Africa, nearly 39 per cent of Eritrean refugees were hosted in European countries.²⁵ Moreover, nearly half of the Burundian refugees and asylum seekers abroad were hosted by the United Republic of Tanzania (160,000), followed by Uganda (51,000) and Rwanda (48,000), while the refugee population from Rwanda was mostly living in neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo (213,000) and Uganda (18,000).

Figure 12. Refugees and asylum seekers in the East and Horn of Africa by top five origin countries, 2011–2021



Source: UNHCR, 2021 (accessed 15 March 2022).

Note: Data for 2021 were available up until midyear at the time of writing this report.

Many people from neighbouring countries have also found refuge in countries within the region. Almost three quarters of all the refugees and asylum seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (723,000) were living in the EHoA, predominantly in Uganda (433,000), while

one third of those from the Sudan were residing in South Sudan (297,000), representing 91 per cent of the overall refugee population hosted by South Sudan. In addition, Somalia hosted refugees and asylum seekers from Yemen (7,000) and the Syrian Arab Republic (800).

²⁵ Europe includes all 27 Member States of the European Union (EU), in addition to the four countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

1.3 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS


Large-scale and protracted displacement, both cross-border and internal, has been a characteristic feature of the EHoA region in the last years, with crises such as in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan driving up both the number of IDPs and humanitarian needs. Each year, renewed and lingering conflicts as well as seasonal flooding and recurrent drought trigger new displacements across the region, and in many instances, the same individuals can be displaced more than once.²⁶

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), nearly 7.4 million new internal displacements were recorded in the EHoA between January and December 2021, which is the highest number ever recorded in the region.²⁷ Of these, 83 per cent (6.1 million) were attributed to conflict and violence and 17 per cent (1.2 million)

were caused by disasters. These figures are in striking difference from 2020, during which a total of 4.9 million new displacements were recorded in the region, thereby representing a 51 per cent annual increase in 2021. More specifically, the new displacements in 2020 were primarily triggered by disasters (2.6 million or 54%) compared to conflict and violence (2.3 million or 46%).

In the last 10 years, new displacements in the EHoA were most associated with conflict and violence, except for 2012, 2019 and 2020, during which new displacements triggered by disasters outnumbered the ones caused by conflict and violence. Overall, the total new displacements recorded in 2021 were more than 12 times higher than the ones recorded in 2011 (599,000).

Figure 13. New displacements in the East and Horn of Africa due to conflict, violence and disasters, 2011–2021



Source: IDMC, 2022 (accessed 31 May 2022).


26 New displacements refer to the number of internal displacement movements that occurred in a particular period, not the total accumulated number of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. See [Chapter 2](#) for a more detailed regional overview of internal displacement that includes the latest estimates of the IDP population (or IDP stock) compared to “new displacements” in a given period which are presented in this section. See www.internal-displacement.org/monitoring-tools for the methodology used by IDMC to calculate “new displacements”.

27 Figures for this section are taken from IDMC, 2022 (accessed 31 May 2022). IDMC reports separately on figures for the Abyei Area, which are not included in the EHoA aggregate.

New internal displacements in this region have mostly happened in three countries, primarily in Ethiopia (5.4 million in 2021) but also in South Sudan (935,000) and Somalia (820,000). The drastic increase in new displacements observed in 2021 was largely attributed to the escalation of the Northern Ethiopia conflict, with Ethiopia recording over 5.1 million new internal displacements due to conflict in 2021.²⁸ Similarly, the second peak in new conflict displacements that was observed in 2018 was mainly caused by ethnic and border-based disputes in Ethiopia (2.9 million); this figure was the highest number of new conflict displacements recorded in the world during that year.²⁹ In addition, parts of Ethiopia continued to be affected by flooding and drought conditions, triggering 240,000 new disaster displacements in 2021.

The main drivers of internal displacement were political tensions, terrorist attacks as well as prolonged droughts and floods in Somalia, and national and localized conflict as well as heavy floods in South Sudan. Most importantly, the causes of new displacements in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan often overlap whereby the same areas can experience both conflict-induced and climate-induced displacement movements. Other countries in the region that also experienced new displacements in 2021 were Burundi (87,000), Uganda (48,000), the United Republic of Tanzania (47,000), Kenya (41,000) and Rwanda (15,000).

Figure 14. Top three countries in the East and Horn of Africa with most new displacements, 2020–2021



Source: IDMC, 2022 (accessed 31 May 2022).


28 See Box 2 for more details.

29 IDMC, 2019.

1.4 MIGRANT WORKERS

Labour migration is a mobility phenomenon motivated by the search for employment and better wages. Migrant workers have become an integral part of the social, economic and cultural development of both their countries of destination and of origin. While they enrich the cultural diversity of the destination country as well as fill gaps in its labour market and stimulate its economic growth, migrant workers also bring back key contributions to their origin country in terms of remittances, skills and knowledge.

Figure 15. Latest available estimates on the total population, international migrants and migrant workers in the East and Horn of Africa



Source: STATAFRIC migration database (last updated 25 February 2022); DESA, 2021a (accessed 18 November 2021).

Note: The latest available estimates were from 2019 for migrant workers (STATAFRIC) and from mid-2020 for the total population and international migrants (DESA). The working-age international migrant population refers to the number of migrants aged 15 years and older.

At the continental level, the latest available figures were as of 2019, and estimated the presence of 13.7 million international migrant workers³⁰ in Africa, which corresponded to 8.1 per cent of the global population of migrant workers (169 million), with the remainder coming from Europe and Central Asia (38%), the Americas (26%), the Arab States (14%) and Asia and the Pacific (14%).³¹ Male migrant workers were predominant in Africa with 8.8 million males (64%) compared to 4.9 million females (36%), which is higher than the male-female ratio at the global level (59% males versus 41% females).³²

Within Africa, international migrant workers were most commonly found in sub-Saharan Africa (12.6 million) followed by Northern Africa (1.2 million), representing 7.4 per cent and 0.7 per cent of the global population of migrant workers in 2019, respectively.³³ In particular, the share of migrant workers for sub-Saharan Africa rose from 5.3 per cent in 2013 most likely due to growing intraregional movements in the last years, which include flows of refugees.³⁴ Moreover, with a labour force estimated at 415.4 million workers in 2019 (53% males and 47% females), sub-Saharan Africa's migrant workers contributed to 3 per cent and this proportion also increased over the years, from 2.9 per cent in 2017 and 2.2 per cent in 2013.³⁵

30 International migrant workers refer to the working-age migrants (aged 15 years and older) who were either employed or unemployed in their country of destination (or of usual residence) in a given period.

31 ILO, 2021. According to ILO, Arab States include the GCC countries as well as Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

Figure 16. Total workers and international migrant workers in Africa by sex and subregion, 2019

	TOTAL WORKERS (millions)			MIGRANT WORKERS (millions)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Northern Africa	56.3	18.1	74.3	0.8	0.3	1.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	220.3	195.1	415.4	8.0	4.5	12.6
Total	276.6	213.2	489.8	8.8	4.9	13.7


Source: ILO, 2021.

Note: Slight differences in the totals are due to rounding up.

In this region and across the African continent in general, country-level labour migration statistics are often unavailable due to lack of reliable, accurate and up-to-date data. The latest available estimates by country for the EHoA were compiled by the African Union Institute for Statistics (STATAFRIC) as of 2019. During that year, the region hosted approximately 3.6 million migrant workers, of whom 54 per cent were male (1.9 million) and 46 per cent were female (1.7 million).³⁶ This distribution is

more balanced than the global one (59% males versus 41% females).³⁷ Between 2010 and 2019, the migrant labour force in the EHoA followed a gradual increase and the number of migrant workers recorded in 2019 was nearly twice as high as the one estimated in 2010 (1.9 million).³⁸ The share of females in the labour force showed a similar trend as the share almost doubled between 2010 and 2019 (up 93%) and this increase was slightly higher than that of the share of males (up 91%).³⁹

Figure 17. Migrant workers in the East and Horn of Africa by sex, 2010–2019



Source: STATAFRIC migration database (last updated 25 February 2022).

36 STATAFRIC migration database (last updated 25 February 2022).


37 Such significant differences in the male-female distribution at all three levels — global (59%–41%), continental (64%–36%) and regional (54%–46%) — require further research.

38 STATAFRIC migration database (last updated 25 February 2022).

39 Ibid.

Most of the EHoA migrant labour force in 2019 was located in Uganda which hosted 27 per cent of the 3.6 million migrant workers, followed by Ethiopia (21%), Kenya (14%), South Sudan (13%), Rwanda (9%) and the United Republic of Tanzania (8%).⁴⁰ Around 38 per cent of all migrant workers in the EHoA were aged between 15 and 35 years old (1.3 million), and among these, males outnumbered females (on average 53% versus 47%, respectively) with the exception of Burundi which saw a majority of female 15–35-year-olds (62%) compared to males (38%).⁴¹

Figure 18. Migrant workers in the East and Horn of Africa as a share of the regional labour force, by country and age group, 2019



Source: STATAFRIC migration database (last updated 25 February 2022).

Labour migration corridors in the EHoA are largely unexplored as they mostly occur through informal networks, and therefore outside of regulated channels. One such example is the labour migration route that stretches from Ethiopia through Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania towards South Africa, which is a destination of choice in Africa that offers many economic opportunities and fosters strong diaspora networks.⁴² While this corridor is male-dominated, the number of female migrant workers to South Africa has increased in the last years due to growing marriage and employment opportunities.⁴³ In all, the presence of international migrant workers in South Africa has created more jobs for the native-born population, raised the country's income per capita and even decreased unemployment rates.⁴⁴

Besides South Africa, the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and Middle Eastern countries are considered key destinations for migrant workers from the EHoA. Labour migration to the GCC and Middle East is predominantly low-skilled as migrant workers are primarily employed in the construction sector and the domestic work industry.⁴⁵ Since most of this migration is not regulated, migrant workers are highly vulnerable to exploitative practices and to protect them, some EHoA countries, such as Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, signed bilateral labour agreements, including with Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 IOM, 2022c.

43 Ibid. In addition, as females along this corridor travel in a different manner than males (by air instead of the overland route and by spending more time in transit countries), anecdotal information suggests that females have been less represented than males. See [Chapter 3](#) for more details.

44 ILO and OECD, 2018.

45 ILO, n.d.

Though the migration of Kenyan workers is mostly of high-skilled and educated migrants through regular channels, they often experience deskilling in the GCC countries as they take jobs below their qualifications and end up losing their previously acquired expertise.⁴⁶ Within the region, Kenyan migrant workers are mostly employed in the aid and finance sectors in Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan but also in Nigeria and South Africa, among others.⁴⁷ Being attractive locations for business and investment, Nairobi in Kenya and Kigali in Rwanda are two major hubs for migrant workers in the region as they generate significant bilateral labour flows and pull workers from other EHoA countries.⁴⁸

While skilled migrants from India and China come to Uganda to work in the manufacturing and infrastructure development sectors, Ugandan migrant workers often seek jobs in the hotel industry in Kenya, South Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania but most of them work in the informal sector.⁴⁹ Furthermore, labour migration from Ethiopia is largely informal due to limited options for regulated economic migration, with large flows towards the GCC and Middle Eastern countries as well as towards South Africa.⁵⁰ Moreover, migrant workers from Djibouti do not move as much as those from other EHoA countries, not only because of the small size of the country, but also due to language barriers whereby labour markets in neighbouring countries and regions favour English over French.⁵¹

46 ILO, 2020a.

47 IOM, 2022d.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 ILO, 2020b. See [Chapter 3](#) for more details.

51 ILO, 2020c.



“I want to go to South Africa. I do not know if I can change my life here because the region is so poor. I have seen people that go abroad really improve their lives. I have been told that I might die if I try to go there because the journey is very dangerous, but I want to try my luck because I can also die here.” © IOM 2021 / Yonas Tadesse



Mental health and psychosocial support for conflict-displaced communities in Konso, Ethiopia include arts and crafts activities for children.
© IOM 2022 / Hiyas Bagabaldo

1.5 INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES

International remittance flows to the EHoA have followed a gradual increase since 2011, growing from a regional total of USD 3 billion in 2011 to USD 8.9 billion in 2021.⁵² However, these figures are only indicative as data on remittances across sub-Saharan Africa remain sparse and of uneven quality, especially in the EHoA where only data for Kenya and Somalia are available.⁵³ In addition, remittance flows through informal channels are often not captured in these estimations, which means that the actual amount of remittance flows is most likely larger.

With the pandemic, most countries reported declines in inward remittances between 2019 and 2020, while Kenya and Somalia instead observed an increase in remittance flows (9% and 10%, respectively).⁵⁴ As a result, the growth experienced by some countries supported the resilience of remittance flows across the region despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as the EHoA registered an overall 5.2 per cent growth from 2019 to 2020. This growth is in line with the trend across sub-Saharan Africa,

which reported a 2.3 per cent increase in 2020, excluding Nigeria, while the overall flows to low- and middle-income countries dropped by 1.7 per cent.⁵⁵

Estimates as of November 2021 showed that the resilience of flows was expected to be carried out in 2021 as the region was projected to register an overall 8.2 per cent increase from 2020, with Kenya recording the biggest growth (19%) and totalling USD 3.7 billion. Kenya was among the top three countries receiving the most international remittances across sub-Saharan Africa, after Nigeria (USD 17.6 billion) and Ghana (USD 4.5 billion).⁵⁶

Similarly, international remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries were also estimated to increase by 7.3 per cent in 2021, with a 6.2 per cent growth in sub-Saharan Africa.⁵⁷ The resilience of remittance flows observed globally in 2020, despite predictions to the contrary considering the heavy impact of the pandemic on the economy and other sectors, was the main reason behind the robust growth of flows in 2021.⁵⁸

52 Figures for this section are taken from KNOMAD, 2021 (accessed 31 March 2022) and World Bank, 2021 (accessed 14 February 2022). Data for 2021 were forecasted estimates published in November 2021 at the time of writing this report. No data were available for Eritrea. For Somalia, no data on inward remittances were available prior to 2018.

53 Ratha et al., 2021a.

54 Data for South Sudan were not included in the 2020 analysis done by KNOMAD and the World Bank due to data validity concerns (see Ratha et al., 2021a). In 2021, both Somalia and South Sudan were excluded from the analysis for the same reason (see Ratha et al., 2021b).

55 Ratha et al., 2021a; Ratha et al., 2021b.

56 Ratha et al., 2021b.


57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

Migrants' remittances to their country of origin have developed into a vital lifeline of support for millions of households, not only in this region but across the African continent as well.⁵⁹ In many instances, these funds have become essential to meet some of the most basic needs, such as food and education. As such, international remittances have largely supported the

economy of several African countries by constituting a significant share of the gross domestic product. This is particularly the case for remittances received by South Sudan and Somalia, which in 2021, contributed to an estimated 38 per cent and 32 per cent of the country's gross domestic product, respectively.

Figure 19. Countries in the East and Horn of Africa receiving international remittances by total in USD million and as a share of gross domestic product, 2020–2021



Source: KNOMAD, 2021 (accessed 31 March 2022); World Bank, 2021 (accessed 14 February 2022).

Note: Data for 2021 were available up until November 2021 at the time of writing this report. For Somalia and South Sudan, data on remittances as a share of the gross domestic product in 2020 were preliminary figures provided by the respective central banks.

In 2021, the cost of sending USD 200 across international borders remained the highest to sub-Saharan Africa with an average cost of 8 per cent of the amount transferred, which is above the global average of 6.4 per cent and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) target of 3 per cent by 2030.⁶⁰ In the EHoA, the average transaction costs to send money from

the United Republic of Tanzania (19.7%), Kenya (9.5%) and Rwanda (8.5%) were higher than the sub-Saharan average.⁶¹ In particular, some intraregional remittance corridors were among the most expensive corridors across sub-Saharan Africa in 2021, namely from the United Republic of Tanzania to Uganda (23%), Kenya (19%) and Rwanda (17.9%).⁶²

59 It is important to note here that remittances are private funds and cannot replace official development assistance and other public spending.

60 Ibid.

61 World Bank, n.d (accessed 16 December 2021). The latest available data were as of 2020.

62 Ratha et al., 2021b.

Box 1. COVID-19 socioeconomic impact

The spread of COVID-19, which began as a global health emergency in 2020, quickly turned into an economic crisis that affected trade, employment and livelihood security in addition to taking a heavy toll on human lives. For many populations in the region, both resident and displaced, the pandemic has only exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities considering that the socioeconomic context of the EHoA was already weakened by conflict, political tensions, climate shocks and extreme poverty.

As the pandemic progressed, millions of people found themselves out of work and losing income across various sources, including remittances, which play a vital role for many communities in the EHoA and across the African continent. The inability to send and receive money brought by the COVID-19 pandemic accentuated the fragility of recipient families in the EHoA and of the many migrants abroad as they themselves faced increased hardship and were therefore not capable of supporting their family members back home in a continuous manner.

For those for whom economic mobility was a livelihood strategy, especially the poor and rural households, the ability to cope with COVID-19-related shocks through migration was severely impacted and their vulnerability to food and livelihoods insecurity was heightened. Many households became unable to purchase basic goods such as staple foods, soap and medicine; in some instances, families fell further into poverty because of higher food prices and disrupted economic activities. In 2021, South Sudan and Burundi recorded the highest poverty rates in the region at 85 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively, with both countries marking increases from the pre-COVID-19 rates recorded in 2019 (83% and 78%, respectively).^a

The COVID-19 pandemic also hindered access to health services, which was already limited due to poor and underfunded infrastructure and shortages of staff and medical supplies across the region, as well as shortages of COVID-19 vaccines; inequities in vaccine access further burdened such access. The added pressure exerted on health systems prompted the closure of health facilities, while the increased unavailability of beds and medicine combined with high treatment costs that many people struggled to afford, posed new challenges to accessing public health and health care.

Additionally, access to education has been severely disrupted by the pandemic. Over 32 million children across Eastern and Southern Africa were estimated to be out of school because of COVID-19-related school closures.^b In particular, the closing of schools pushed some children to favour labour over studies in order to support their families financially. This is especially true for children from poor households who, in many cases, decided to not follow the education path once schools reopened.^c Children but also women, persons with disabilities, indigenous populations, refugees and migrants were among the populations at disproportionate risk of socioeconomic marginalization because of the pandemic.^d

a Statista, 2022 (accessed 10 April 2022). The poverty rate refers to the share of the population living on less than USD 1.90 per day at 2011 international prices.

b UNICEF, 2021.

c Ibid.

d IFRC, UNOCHA and WHO, 2020.

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
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CHAPTER 2


**INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT:
A REGIONAL
OVERVIEW**

2.1 REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN OVERVIEW

The East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) is both home and neighbour to some of the world's complex humanitarian emergencies, namely in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan, and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique and Yemen, respectively. This situation explains why humanitarian needs as well as mixed and forced migration are so prevalent in this region with almost every country being affected by displacement either as the origin, transit point or host of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance in the region rose by 52 per cent between 2019 (22.1 million) and 2020 (33.6 million).¹ This number further increased by 21 per cent in 2021 (40.7 million) and is currently projected to reach 44.3 million people through 2022.² Ethiopia, with 24.2 million people in need in 2021, including 5.2 million needing assistance due to the Northern Ethiopia crisis, was among the top three countries in need of humanitarian assistance at the global level, alongside the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Yemen.³ In all, the EHoA contributed to around 17 per cent of the global population in need of assistance in 2021 (235 million).⁴

Figure 1. People in need of humanitarian assistance in the region, 2016–2022 (millions)



Source: UNOCHA, 2022a; UNOCHA, n.d.a; UNOCHA, n.d.c; UNOCHA, n.d.d.

Note: The 2020 figure for Ethiopia was not updated in the second source (UNOCHA, n.d.a) but the revised figure (19.2 million) can be found in the third source (UNOCHA, n.d.c). The 2021 figure for Ethiopia combines the number of people in need from the Humanitarian Response Plan (19 million) and from the Northern Ethiopia Response Plan (5.2 million).

1 UNOCHA, n.d.a. The overall number includes figures for Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan.

2 As of 1 March 2022.

3 UNOCHA, n.d.b.

4 Ibid.



A significant number of Eritrean refugees from the Berhale refugee camp flee to Afdera town as armed conflict and food shortages worsen in areas bordering the Tigray and Afar regions. © IOM 2022 / Hiyas Bagabaldo

Conflict, violence, droughts and floods are the key root causes fuelling displacement across the EHoA and over the years, many of the region's displacement situations have become increasingly protracted. In Ethiopia and Somalia, people have been displaced for years and some even for decades, while South Sudan has mostly known conflict and high levels of displacement despite being the world's youngest country.

By the end of 2021, the EHoA hosted an estimated 9.6 million IDPs, which is a 47 per cent increase from the end of 2020 (6.5 million).⁵ This upsurge in displacement was particularly driven by the Northern Ethiopia crisis as the number of IDPs across Ethiopia more than doubled between 2020 (2 million) and 2021 (4.2 million).⁶ As of December 2021, Ethiopia together with Somalia (3 million) and South Sudan (2 million) contributed to 96 per cent of the regional displaced population.

Figure 2. IDP stock in the region, December 2021

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF IDPs
Burundi	113,408
Ethiopia	4,239,636
Kenya	244,320
Rwanda	699
Somalia	2,967,500
South Sudan	2,017,236
Uganda	26,003
United Republic of Tanzania	938
Total	9,609,740

Source: Burundi (IOM, 2021b); Ethiopia (IOM, 2021c); Kenya (IDMC, 2022); Rwanda (IDMC, 2022); South Sudan (IOM, 2022a); Uganda (IDMC, 2022); United Republic of Tanzania (IDMC, 2022).

Note: IDP figures presented in the table were the latest available figures for the period considered as of December 2021. Data for Somalia were the latest available IDP figure endorsed by the Somalia National Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the government as of March 2021. Coordination with partners to triangulate existing sources and verify the total number of IDPs in Kenya was ongoing at the time of writing this report.

5 IOM, 2021a. See Figure 2 for figures per country and sources.


6 Ibid.

2.2 CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Political disagreements and postponed elections in Ethiopia and Somalia, episodes of subnational violence in South Sudan sporadically linked to the approaching 2023 elections, resource scarcity exacerbated by climatic events and the effects of COVID-19 were manifested in a significant increase in conflict and violence in the region

throughout 2021. The Northern Ethiopia conflict, which began in Tigray and progressively expanded to the Amhara and Afar regions, dominated regional and international headlines.⁷ While this conflict was by far the most extensive crisis of the year in terms of shaping political and migration dynamics, both domestic and regional, it was hardly the only one affecting the region.

Figure 3. Conflict events in the East and Horn of Africa, 2021



Source: ACLED database (accessed 15 March 2022).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. ACLED collects real-time data on the locations, dates, actors, fatalities and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world.

7 See Box 2 for more details.



A woman registers for the assisted voluntary return and reintegration programme at the IOM Migration Response Centre in Hargeisa.
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The conflict in Ethiopia's Benishangul Gumuz region, home to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam at the border with the Sudan, extended into January 2021 and displaced 76,000 persons towards Awi zone in Amhara due to intercommunal violence and attacks by unidentified armed groups.⁸ Ethnic and border disputes continued fuelling the Konso zone conflict in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' (SNNP) region. In early 2021, non-state armed group attacks against civilians left over 500 people dead and displaced nearly 180,000 across different woredas in Konso zone.⁹ In mid-April 2021, large-scale ethnic violence broke out in the Amhara region, in and around Ataye town in the North Shewa zone, displacing up to an estimated 310,000 IDPs.¹⁰ By the end of 2021, almost one third of the IDPs returned

to their area of origin, but the impact on livelihoods and damage to shelter remained a critical and largely unaddressed need.¹¹ In addition, 506,000 persons were displaced due to conflict in the Somali region as of September 2021 with a further 385,000 conflict IDPs in the Oromia region.¹²

In South Sudan, over 1.4 million people were still displaced due to conflict.¹³ In 2021 alone, over 223,000 people were newly displaced either due to conflict (68%), mainly in Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile, or due to intercommunal violence (32%), mostly in Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Western Bahr El Ghazal.¹⁴ In Tambura and other parts of the Western

8 IOM, 2022b. Unfortunately, most of the conflict-affected areas remained inaccessible to IOM for DTM assessments and comprehensive figures on the displacement impact of the crisis were not available.

9 USAID, 2021a.

10 IOM, 2022b.

11 Ibid.

12 IOM, 2021c. Conflict-displacement figures for the Oromia region should be higher, however, data collection was hampered due to conflict and insecurity in the West Wellega, East Wellega, Kelleme Wellega, West Hararge, East Hararge, West Guji and Guji zones.

13 IOM, 2022c.

14 Ibid.

Equatoria State, in particular, political violence rose dramatically from late June 2021, thereby contributing to the displacement of some 80,000 civilians and to severe human rights violations.¹⁵ Other hotspots included the Greater Tonj area in Warrap State, Jonglei State and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area as well as Central Equatoria State.

On the backdrop of a worsening economy, roaring inflation, severe floods and persisting conflict dynamics, the security situation in South Sudan in 2021 was exacerbated by youth protests across several counties, mainly in Aweil, Bentiu, Pibor and Yambio.¹⁶ Demands revolved around greater employment opportunities at international aid organizations for the local communities, which, in some instances, became so violent that they led to the suspension of life-saving operations, including to the displaced populations. The aid sector in South Sudan has become the main employment provider in a country where the private sector has collapsed and the government has been unable to guarantee wages.¹⁷

Meanwhile, in Somalia, the governance crisis sparked by the postponement of the parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in violent clashes in Mogadishu, which temporarily displaced nearly 207,000 persons between April and May 2021.¹⁸ The governance crisis and the transition of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which began handing over responsibilities to the Somali security forces as of April 2022, had provided an opportunity for further expansion of the influence of non-state actors, particularly in Banadir, Bay and Lower Shabelle. According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project, delayed presidential elections caused an increase in civil unrest and in political violence in 2021, while non-state armed groups were responsible for a 40 per cent increase in armed attacks.¹⁹

Over half a million people were displaced across Somalia as of October 2021, of whom 70 per cent were due to conflict.²⁰ This number included over 100,000 people who were displaced in Guri Ceel in Galmudug alone, following intensified fighting in the area.²¹ Data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Protection and Return Monitoring Network show that new displacements due to conflict were the highest at the end of April (250,000) and October 2021 (120,000), with the most affected regions being Banadir (185,000) and Galgaduud (137,000).²² Resilience in Somalia has been severely impacted by the protracted nature of the conflict, the effects of climatic events and the fact that an estimated 71 per cent of the population is living below the poverty line, particularly in rural areas and areas where access remains a challenge.²³

15 UNOCHA, 2021a.

16 The New Humanitarian, 2021.

17 Ibid.

18 UNOCHA, 2021b.

19 UNOCHA, 2021c.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 UNHCR, n.d (accessed 21 March 2022).

23 UNOCHA, 2021d.

Box 2. Northern Ethiopia crisis

No other conflict in the region in 2021 had such a devastating humanitarian impact and caught regional and international attention as the Northern Ethiopia crisis. The conflict erupted on 4 November 2020 in the Tigray region and by July 2021, the conflict had spilled over to the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions, including towards Afar's key rail and road artery connecting Ethiopia to Djibouti — critical to imports of oil and goods into the country.

As of August 2021, 2.1 million people were internally displaced due to the Northern Ethiopia crisis, including 1.8 million IDPs in the Tigray region, over 151,000 in the Amhara region and 149,000 in the Afar region.^a By early December 2021, armed conflict advanced deeper into the regions of Afar and Amhara, where key informants estimated that displacement reached 1.4 million IDPs in Amhara and 470,000 IDPs in Afar.^b However, by mid-December 2021, armed conflict subsided in both regions, prompting the mass return of IDPs. Moreover, over 50,000 Ethiopian refugees sought refuge in East Sudan, while Eritrean refugees in Tigray were also affected by the crisis.^c

Beyond displacement, 9.4 million were targeted for humanitarian assistance at the end of 2021 and 7.5 million were estimated to be facing severe or acute food insecurity due to this conflict alone.^d People in northern Ethiopia faced huge food consumption gaps as agricultural activities were severely impacted by the conflict and food prices increased, in some instances, by over 300 per cent above pre-crisis levels.^e

Insecurity and bureaucratic impediments restricted the provision of humanitarian assistance, and life-saving operations were severely impacted by cash and fuel shortages as well as by lack of telephone and internet connectivity in many areas. Active hostilities, including airstrikes, in the regions of Tigray (in the regional capital Mekelle and in Shire in the Northwestern zone), Amhara (North Wello, South Wello, Wag Hamra and parts of North Gondar zones) and Afar (Zone 2 and Zone 4) led to new displacements.^f

In addition, the use of schools as temporary shelters for IDPs hindered access to education. However, the efforts to reopen schools resulted in secondary displacements in North Shewa zone's Debre Birhan town in Amhara, which hosted around 145,000 IDPs as of late November 2021, but also pushed many IDPs to return to their area of origin in Amhara (North Shewa and South Wello zones) and Oromia or to relocate to alternative IDP sites within the North Shewa zone.^g

Many IDPs in the Tigray region expressed their intention to return to their areas of origin and return movements started to occur in the second half of 2021.^h Considering how this conflict destroyed shelters, crops and livelihoods, and therefore impacted the food security situation in a region that essentially relies on agriculture, the availability of food and livelihood options was the primary condition expressed by IDPs to ensure their return, alongside the evident need for safety and security and shelter.ⁱ

a IOM, 2021c.

b Due to the many operational challenges faced during the data collection period, such as conflict, movement restrictions and a lack of cash and fuel, the data were collected remotely (unlike previous rounds) and could therefore not be verified.

c UNHCR, 2022. As of March 2022, the number of Eritrean refugees in the Tigray region was under verification by the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) in Ethiopia.

d USAID, 2021b; USAID, 2022.

e FEWS NET, 2021b.

f USAID, 2021b.

g Ibid.

h IOM, 2021d. In the Tigray region, IOM DTM carried out household level intention surveys to map the demographics and needs of IDPs in seven urban areas with high displacement concentrations (Abi Adi, Adigrat, Adwa, Axum, Mekelle, Sheraro and Shire) and better understand their intention, the barriers preventing their preferred durable solution and the support needed to pursue that durable solution.

i Ibid.

2.3 HORN OF AFRICA DROUGHT

The Horn of Africa, comprising Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, is notorious for being exposed to erratic weather patterns that have triggered an alarming succession of droughts. The increased frequency and intensity of droughts stems directly from the effects of climate change, as climate volatility contributes to the occurrence of extreme weather events.²⁴ In particular, fluctuations in seasonal precipitation have led to extended periods without rainfall and have thus prolonged dry spells.

In 2021, emergencies over drought were declared in both Kenya and Somalia as the result of three consecutive poor rainfall seasons (October–December 2020, March–May 2021 and October–December 2021).²⁵ These are exceptional drought conditions across not only Kenya and Somalia but also Ethiopia, that have only happened once, in 1983–1984, and that share concerning similarities with the trends observed during the 2010–2011 famine and the 2016–2017 drought emergency.²⁶

The most affected areas of the Horn are the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya (eastern and northern parts) and of Somalia (central and southern parts) as well as eastern and southern Ethiopia. In these three countries, long lasting droughts have heightened the risk of being displaced as many people have been moving from rural to urban areas in search of water, food, pasture and humanitarian assistance.

In Somalia, over 3.2 million people across 90 per cent of the country were impacted by severe drought conditions at the end of 2021, including 169,000 displaced persons.²⁷ Dried-up boreholes and shallow wells were reported in Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland and South West, while in Jubaland, in particular, drought conditions deteriorated from severe to extreme in December 2021.²⁸

24 The Conversation, 2021.

25 Business Daily, 2021; UNOCHA, 2021e.

26 FEWS NET, 2021a; FSNWG, 2022.

27 UNOCHA, 2021f.

28 UNOCHA, 2021f; FAO, 2021.



A girl walks to a waterpoint to fill empty cannisters at the Kabasa IDP camp near Dolow, Somalia. © IOM 2020 / Tobin Jones

Projections on drought-induced displacement patterns produced by the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) estimated that, by June 2022, at least over 1 million individuals were likely to be displaced by drought across Somalia.²⁹

Meanwhile in Ethiopia, over 335,000 persons were displaced due to drought in 2021, mainly in the Somali (266,000) and Oromia (69,000) regions.³⁰ The Somali region is likely to experience further waves of displacement especially in Dawa zone, extending into Afder, Doolo, Erer, Jarar, Koraha, Liban, Nogob and Shabelle zones.³¹ In all, this drought affected 6.8 million people across the Oromia, SNNP, South West and Somali regions as well as impacted the livestock assets of 4 million people as of the end of 2021.³²

Because of the severity of drought, pastoral migration in the Horn, which was once voluntary, has progressively turned into forced displacement and over the past poor rainy seasons, increased migratory movements have been observed internally and across both the Ethiopia–Somalia and Kenya–Somalia borders.³³ While drought already stressed the availability of water resources, the rise in such drought-induced migration accentuated resource-based conflicts over the control of water and pasture, such as in Galmudug in Somalia and in several northern counties in Kenya.³⁴

Overall, between 12 million and 14 million people were estimated to be severely food insecure across Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia in the first quarter of 2022 due to destroyed crops, depleted pastures and lost livelihoods.³⁵ Rural agropastoral communities, in particular, suffered the most as they faced low agricultural production, high livestock mortality and high food prices, and in many instances, were pushed to adopt stressed, drought-coping strategies such as skipping or reducing meals. Moreover, the food security situation in the Horn has been exacerbated by the ongoing desert locust invasion which has been the worst outbreak in 25 years in Ethiopia and Somalia, and in 75 years in Kenya.³⁶

Persistent dry conditions leading to high levels of acute food insecurity have also been observed in the northern part of the United Republic of Tanzania, along the Kenyan border, with an estimated 437,000 people affected from November 2021 to April 2022.³⁷ Similarly, localized areas in Uganda were also impacted by drought, namely the Eastern (Amuria, Katakwi and Ngora districts in the Teso subregion) and Western (Kasese district) regions.³⁸

29 IOM, 2022d. The first scenario estimated 1,415,000 IDPs while the second scenario estimated 1,036,000 IDPs (projections as of December 2021).

30 IOM, 2022b.

31 Ibid.

32 UNOCHA, 2022b.

33 See [Box 3](#) for more details.

34 UNOCHA, 2021f; UNOCHA, 2022c.

35 FSNWG, 2022.

36 FEWS NET, 2021a.

37 IPC, 2022.

38 IOM, 2022e.

Box 3. Transhumance in the East and Horn of Africa

Pastoralism refers to the practice of livestock herding as the main social and economic activity of the communities that live in the arid and semi-arid lands of the EHoA region, mainly in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. In the Horn of Africa alone, arid and semi-arid lands cover over 60 per cent of the total surface area with an estimated pastoral population ranging between 12 million and 22 million people.^a The livelihood as well as the survival of pastoralist communities primarily depends on their capacity to move their livestock within countries and across borders in search of pasture and water.

While sedentary pastoralism is a more settled production system, such as ranching and agropastoralism, and nomadic pastoralism is a subsistence-oriented system through vast distances without a fixed or predetermined mobility pattern, transhumant pastoralism (or transhumance) revolves around the regular and seasonal migration of pastoralists.^b The practice of transhumance is typically combined with crop cultivation, as transhumant pastoralists often have a permanent settlement to which a group of herds and herders return after each seasonal mobility cycle.^c

Unlike cross-border transhumance in West Africa, whereby herders and livestock move across multiple non-contiguous borders in a single journey, transhumance movements in the EHoA are mostly clustered in eight transboundary areas.^d Pastoralists in these clusters, such as the Karamoja cluster that comprises of the border communities of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and Uganda, tend to stick to their cluster areas and rotate through them.^e

However, these strategic movements have been challenged by drought, floods and competition over scarce resources, especially along national and regional borders, thereby resulting in loss of livestock, land and livelihoods but also in population displacement. As transhumant pastoralists have limited options for and access to income diversification, their vulnerability to climate change and intercommunal conflict has increased over the past years.^f In South Sudan, where the livestock population is estimated at 36 million, years of flooding have had an impact on the migration routes taken by pastoralists and prompted encroaching on other lands, thereby fuelling tensions between different cattle keepers and also between cattle keepers and farmers over grazing land.^g As a result, pastoralists faced displacement, revenge attacks and cattle rustling, leading to a breakdown of social ties between communities and further perpetuating the risk of conflict. In other instances, such as in Uganda, resource overuse through over-grazing in areas where displaced pastoralists were forced to move, has contributed to an aggravation of the land degradation process.^h

In the region, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which covers seven countries in the EHoA (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda) plus the Sudan, adopted a protocol on transhumance in June 2021.ⁱ The protocol aims to allow free, safe and orderly cross-border mobility of transhumant livestock and herders as well as to commit its Member States to invest in pastoral regions and harmonize national laws in relation to pastoralism and transhumance.^j In the IGAD region, pastoralism is of utmost importance in the context of climate change, as pastoralists are uniquely positioned to adapt to climate hazards.^k In this regard, and especially in light of the current climate change predictions, the role of pastoralism in realizing food security, sustainable livelihoods and economic development will continue to be crucial throughout the 21st century.^l

a World Bank, 2014. These were the latest available estimates.

b IGAD, 2020.

c Ibid.

d Ibid.

e Ibid.

f Ibid.

g Ibid.

h Ibid.


i European Commission, 2021.

j IGAD, 2021.

k Rodgers, 2022.

l Ibid.

Figure 4. Climate events in the East and Horn of Africa by trimester, 2021



Source: UCL CRED EM-DAT (accessed 15 March 2022).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. EM-DAT contains essential core data on the occurrence and effects of over 22,000 mass disasters in the world from 1900 to the present day. The database is compiled from various sources, including United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes and press agencies.

2.4 SEASONAL FLOODS

While erratic rainfall patterns, caused by climate change, contributed to drought conditions in some countries, they also triggered flash and riverine floods across the whole region. The risk of flooding and related displacement remains high in several countries, as floods continue to occur every rainy season and as floodwaters from the previous months do not always recede before the arrival of the next rains, thereby prolonging displacement situations in the long term.

This year's floods in South Sudan have been described as the worst flooding in 60 years.³⁹ Between May and December 2021, over 835,000 people were affected by floods across the country.⁴⁰ The most impacted areas were located in the states of Jonglei (305,000), Unity (220,000), which also hosts Bentiu, the largest IDP camp in the country, and Upper Nile (141,000).⁴¹ Thousands of people became displaced and many were forced to move to higher grounds within their county while others were hosted in churches, schools and public spaces.⁴² Flooding in South Sudan is not only caused by seasonal rains, but is more linked to the lack of maintenance of water systems, especially in the White Nile basin, where prolonged waterlogging limits crop production and therefore increases the vulnerability of communities solely dependent on agriculture.

In Somalia, heavy rains in late April 2021 triggered flash floods in the northern parts of the country as well as riverine floods along the Juba and Shabelle rivers. An estimated 400,000 individuals were affected by flooding, including 101,300 displaced persons.⁴³ Among the most affected areas were Jowhar in Hirshabelle, where floods displaced 66,000 people in 27 villages, and Belet Weyne in Hiran with 22,000 IDPs.⁴⁴

Burundi declared an emergency over floods at the end of April 2021.⁴⁵ Heavy rainfall in April and May 2021 caused Lake Tanganyika to overflow and therefore, many communities living on the lakeshore (Bujumbura Mairie, Bujumbura Rural, Makamba and Rumonge provinces) were severely affected and displaced by floods. More than 52,000 individuals, including 22,600 IDPs, were affected by the rising lake waters as of June 2021.⁴⁶ During the second rainy season (September–November 2021), an estimated 7,400 persons (including 5,000 IDPs) were affected by heavy rains, strong winds and landslides, with an additional 31,000 affected persons (including 700 IDPs) in the last week of November 2021 alone.⁴⁷

In Uganda, mainly in the Eastern, Central and Western regions, floods but also landslides and hailstorms affected over 40,000 people from September to early October 2021, of whom 3,600 displaced persons who were temporarily sheltered in schools and community halls.⁴⁸ Moreover, in April 2021, nearly 27,000 persons were displaced due to floods in Kenya, mainly in the northern (Marsabit county), eastern (Garissa and Tana River counties) and western (Busia and Kisumu counties) parts of the country, while around 6,500 people were affected by floods and windstorms in Rwanda, mostly in the Northern (Bubera and Gicumbi districts) and Eastern (Kayonza district) provinces.⁴⁹ Ethiopia also experienced both seasonal and flash floods that displaced 99,000 persons in the Somali region in 2021, followed by SNNP (67,000) and Afar (64,000).⁵⁰

39 Al Jazeera, 2021.

40 UNOCHA, 2021g.

41 Ibid. The Bentiu IDP camp was home to around 113,000 individuals as of November 2021. See <https://displacement.iom.int/reports/south-sudan-population-count-bentiu-idp-camp-november-2021?close=true> for more details.

42 Ibid.

43 UNOCHA, 2021h.

44 Ibid.

45 IFRC, 2021c.

46 IOM, 2021e.

47 These figures are taken from DTM Burundi Emergency Tracking data. Weekly reports for the period considered can be found at <https://displacement.iom.int/regions/east-africa-and-horn-africa>.

48 ECHO, 2021.

49 IFRC, 2021a; IFRC, 2021b.

50 IOM, 2022b.

Box 4. Food security situation in South Sudan

After three consecutive years of unprecedented flooding and as crops were destroyed, water sources were inundated and livelihoods were lost, South Sudan faced high levels of food insecurity with 7.2 million (60% of the country's population) food insecure people as of late 2021.^a Of these, 2.5 million people were facing severe food insecurity, including some who were likely on the brink of starvation without food assistance, particularly in the Greater Pibor Administrative Area.^b

The stagnation of floodwaters in vast areas of the country has been detrimental to the planting and harvesting seasons, which worsened the vulnerability of communities to food insecurity and increased their reliance on humanitarian assistance. This happened in parallel to rising food prices, which increased by 15 per cent from September to August 2021, thereby further slowing down the recovery from flood devastation.^c

However, flooding is not the main driver of food insecurity in South Sudan. Recurrent localized violence, including in the flood-affected Warrap, Western Equatoria and Unity States, continues to fuel the hunger crisis, while hindering aid provision and driving humanitarian needs.^d In Unity State, in particular, conflict in the Leer and Mayendit Counties induced displacement and caused civilian deaths but also hampered assistance to flood-affected people.^e

Moreover, the risk of resource-based conflict over scarce natural resources (water, livestock and land) has become greater as climate shocks have become more intense and more frequent. The combined impact of climate shocks, conflicts, rising costs as well as the COVID-19 pandemic effects have led to the deterioration of the food security situation in the country, especially threatening the survival of communities in the most isolated areas of the Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Warrap States.^f

a WFP, 2021.

b Ibid.

c UNOCHA, 2021i.

d UNOCHA, 2021g.

e UNOCHA, 2021j.

f WFP, 2022.

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2021i *South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot (September 2021)*. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2021>.
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n.d.b Global Humanitarian Overview 2021. Available at <https://2021.gho.unocha.org/> (accessed 1 March 2022).
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- 2021b *Ethiopia – Northern Ethiopia Crisis Fact Sheet #3 Fiscal Year (FY) 2022*. Available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-northern-ethiopia-crisis-fact-sheet-3-fiscal-year-fy-2022>.
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
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CHAPTER 3

MIXED MIGRATION ALONG THE MAIN CORRIDORS


3.1 MIGRATION ROUTES OVERVIEW

Mobility in the East and Horn of Africa (EHOA) is characterized by mixed migration,¹ wherein different categories of migrants move within and out of the region. This region has three main interregional routes: the Eastern Route towards the Arabian Peninsula and in particular Saudi Arabia, the Southern Route towards the southern part of the continent and in particular South Africa, and the Northern Route towards North Africa and Europe. Important flows also take place within the region, which are classified as the Horn of Africa Route.

Migration in response to economic and environmental pressures at origin is a key component of the migratory landscape, as widespread poverty, rapidly increasing populations, environmental shocks and high levels of unemployment shape the social and economic landscape

that leads to international migration. Large income disparities between sending countries such as Ethiopia and Somalia and destination countries such as Saudi Arabia, South Africa and countries in Europe also fuel migration aspirations, as migrants are pulled towards migrating to certain destinations where they perceive they can find employment and benefit from relatively higher salaries compared to what they would earn at home.² Conflict and violence are also fuelling some of the decisions to migrate, mostly for movements within the region, together with seasonal and short-term mobility trends. The EHOA is therefore characterized by intertwined mobility patterns where countries are simultaneously origin, transit and destination countries for different categories of people on the move.

Figure 1. Movements tracked along the main migration routes in the East and Horn of Africa, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Movements were tracked in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen.


1 Mixed migration (or mixed movements) refers to a movement in which several people are travelling together, generally in an irregular manner, using the same routes and means of transport, but for different reasons. People travelling as part of mixed movements have varying needs and profiles and may include refugees, asylum seekers trafficked persons, unaccompanied/separated children, and migrants in an irregular situation.

2 IOM, 2021a.

Migration ambitions and destination choices are often fuelled by those who have migrated successfully in the past or are currently abroad. A recent Regional Data Hub (RDH) research report on network migration highlights how migration flows from Ethiopia to Saudi Arabia and South Africa become self-sustaining as information, capital and people move through well-established migration networks that link people transnationally.³ Communication with migrants abroad was not only found to spark migration aspirations at origin, but also to facilitate migration as prospective migrants’ friends and relatives abroad often support them in organizing and financing their journeys.

The COVID-19 pandemic continued to affect international migration along the four migratory routes in 2021. After migration drastically reduced for a few months following the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, the region witnessed a gradual increase in movements once restrictions started to ease in July 2020. While migration along all four routes continued to increase significantly in 2021, it also followed a constant pattern throughout the year. With an estimated 674,000 migrants tracked by the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) in 2021, movements were gradually approaching pre-pandemic levels (around 744,000 movements in 2019) and were over 40 per cent higher than the number of movements tracked in 2020 (around 482,000).

Figure 2. Total movements tracked along the four routes, 2019–2021




Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Although 2021 witnessed a significant resumption in movements compared to 2020, the Horn of Africa Route continued to be used on more frequently than the Eastern Route, which was traditionally the busiest route in the region until it was heavily impacted by COVID-19-related international travel limitations, particularly along the border

between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In 2020 and 2021, the Horn of Africa Route accounted for a higher proportion of movements than the Eastern Route, representing 50 per cent of overall movements in 2021 alone, while the Eastern (40%), Southern (9%) and Northern (1%) Routes accounted for the other half of movements combined.

3 IOM, 2022a.

Figure 3. Movements tracked by route, 2019–2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

As was the case in previous years, the origin and destination of overall movements remained largely unchanged, with most of the tracked movements originating in Ethiopia (64%), and to a lesser extent Somalia (20%), and headed towards Saudi Arabia (25%) and Yemen (15%) along the Eastern Route, as well as to Ethiopia (20%) and Somalia (19%) along the Horn of Africa Route. While the Horn of Africa Route mainly captures intraregional migration between Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia, over 20,000 return movements from Yemen to Ethiopia and Somalia were also observed, which may be linked to migrants being stranded along the Eastern Route due to movement restrictions and the ongoing conflict in Yemen.

Stranded migrant populations

The COVID-19 pandemic, as well as conflict dynamics in key transit countries such as Yemen, have heightened the vulnerabilities of migrant populations. Groups of stranded migrants have increasingly been reported across the region since the onset of the pandemic in 2020. These migrants were unable to proceed to their destination or return to their place of origin and often found themselves stranded in host communities that were themselves struggling with the public health emergency and ensuing economic and social pressures. In Yemen, the pandemic exacerbated existing pressures such as the decimation of services and coping strategies resulting from the ongoing conflict in the country. The fear of infection, which was particularly high in the early months of the pandemic, led to an increase in stigmatization and

discrimination towards migrants, thereby exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and further limiting access to coping strategies, such as short-term employment and support from the host community during the journey.

Migrants' access to basic services, including health care, was also severely impacted and the overall climate of fear led to instances of arrests, detention, forced relocations and deportations of stranded migrants. Expulsion and deportation of migrants without adequate quarantine and precautionary measures exposed migrants to an increased risk of COVID-19 infection. Moreover, stigma associated with fear of infection also complicated the reintegration process of migrants returning to their home countries. There have been numerous reports of returnees facing discrimination from their home communities upon return, due to the fear of their families and communities that they may transmit COVID-19.⁴

Although pockets of stranded migrants were particularly visible along the Eastern Route, they were also reported in other countries in the region. While the actual number of stranded migrants was likely to be higher, around 5,500 migrants were stranded in the Somaliland region around Borama, Burao and Hargeisa, and around Bossaso in the Puntland region of Somalia, added to over 600 migrants who were reported to be stranded in Djibouti, mostly in the Obock region, as of December 2021. A further 35,000 migrants were estimated to be stranded or trapped within Yemen's borders due to movement restrictions and an escalation of hostilities in the country, a figure that is expected to increase in 2022.⁵

4 IOM, 2022b.

5 IOM, 2022c.

Migrants became stranded in Yemen and the EHoA region for several reasons such as access to Saudi Arabia having become increasingly difficult for migrants, altered travel routes to circumvent active conflict in Yemen, tightened immigration controls and the economic impact COVID-19 had on host communities in transit countries such as Djibouti. Migrants often work while en-route to finance onward movement and the impact of the pandemic on local businesses and the lack of employment opportunities have made it harder for migrants to sustain themselves

during transit. Migrants in transit who planned to work en-route may therefore need longer periods than before the pandemic until they are able to secure employment and afford onward movement. The high numbers of stranded migrants were also linked to the intensified crisis in northern Ethiopia, which resulted in a suspension of assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) assistance, as well as migrants being unable to return to their place of origin in certain parts of the country.

Box 5. Missing Migrants Project

Every year, thousands of migrants die or go missing during their journeys abroad. IOM has tracked migrant deaths and disappearances since 2014 through its Missing Migrants Project, to better understand the challenges migrants face on their journeys, identify hotspots where many migrants go missing and better inform policy and humanitarian needs.^a In 2021, the Missing Migrants Project recorded a total of 109 migrant deaths and disappearances in the EHoA, marking a 95 per cent increase compared to 2020, when 59 migrants were recorded as dead or missing in the region. Most of the migrants who died or went missing in 2021 were Ethiopian nationals travelling along the Eastern Route. The majority of incidents occurred in Djibouti (93%), while 7 per cent were recorded in Somalia. At least 17 of the fatalities were children.^b

Most of the deaths occurred due to drowning (64) in two separate incidents that occurred off the coast of Djibouti in March and April 2021, involving migrants who were headed to Yemen. Tragic incidents of boats capsizing on the maritime route between the Horn of Africa and Yemen have become more frequent in the past two years, as smugglers have often been found to operate severely overcrowded, and in some cases unseaworthy, vessels. Another 38 migrants died in different locations along the route from Ethiopia to Obock in Djibouti for various reasons including harsh environmental conditions, exhaustion, illness, dehydration and starvation from inadequate access to food and water. Migrant deaths and disappearances recorded in Somalia were most commonly due to illness (3), violence (2) or vehicle accidents (1). These figures are not representative of the true number of migrant deaths and disappearances that occurred in the EHoA region in 2021, as sources reporting on missing migrants continue to be scarce and most deaths occur in remote areas where they are never recorded.

a See <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/> for more information on the IOM Missing Migrants Project.

b Sociodemographic data were not available for all incidents.



Ethiopian migrants journey through Djibouti. © IOM 2020 / Alexander Bee

3.2 EASTERN ROUTE

The Eastern Route running from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is one of the most significant migratory corridors in the region. The route is mostly used by Ethiopian labour migrants headed to the GCC countries in search of employment. Although Ethiopia and the GCC countries have been linked through historical trade routes for decades, the rise in irregular labour migration and strengthening of migration networks along this corridor began in the late 1990s, when large numbers of Ethiopian women began migrating to the GCC countries regularly to work as domestic workers. Since then, both regular and irregular labour migration along the Eastern Corridor has increased, making it one of the world's busiest maritime migration routes.

Irregular flows along this route are mainly composed of male Ethiopian migrants, while female migrants make up the vast majority of regular labour migration flows. This distribution is due to the nature of the work that migrants carry out at destination, with female migrants mostly employed as domestic workers and male migrants often working as daily labourers on construction sites and in agriculture. However, between one in four and one in

five migrants moving irregularly on this route is female, as not all Ethiopian females wishing to migrate to the GCC countries are able to do so through regular channels. The recruitment process associated with regular migration is oftentimes more expensive than irregular migration and bureaucratic hurdles associated with acquiring a passport, minimum education levels for recruitment and the cyclical nature of these programmes all constitute barriers to accessing legal migration channels.⁶

Migration along the Eastern Corridor is triggered by several push and pull factors including economic hardship, famine, lack of opportunity at origin, high levels of youth unemployment and climatic shocks such as drought and floods. Around 96 per cent of all movements tracked along this route were reportedly due to economic-related reasons. Recent research conducted by the RDH has shown that neither dangers along the route nor the increased risk associated with the COVID-19 pandemic have curbed the will of young Ethiopians to migrate to Saudi Arabia in the hope of a better future for themselves and their families.⁷


6 IOM, 2021a.

7 Ibid.

Before the onset of the pandemic, the Eastern Route had the largest number of migrants annually, with IOM tracking almost half a million movements along this route in 2019 alone. In the second quarter of 2020, the surge in COVID-19 cases in the region sparked movement restrictions across the EHoA, which led to a significant reduction in the number of people migrating along this corridor (around 157,000 annual movements). Following the easing of travel restrictions in countries along the route, movements picked up again towards the end of 2020 and continued to increase in 2021, with the IOM DTM tracking over 269,000 movements throughout the year, a 71 per cent increase compared to 2020.

Nonetheless, movements have still not resumed at pre-pandemic rates, with 43 per cent fewer migrants tracked along this corridor in 2021 compared to 2019. In 2021, most migrants originated from Ethiopia (84%) and Somalia (10%) and were headed to the Arabian Peninsula, as was the case in previous years. Saudi Arabia is the most reported country of intended destination (58%), followed by Yemen (35%). As a transit country for migrants headed to Saudi Arabia, most migrants who reach Yemen intend to travel onward to Saudi Arabia, although movement restrictions associated with the pandemic and active conflict in parts of the country have resulted in many migrants becoming stranded during transit and deciding to go back to the Horn.

Figure 4. Arrivals in Yemen from the Horn of Africa, returns from Yemen to Djibouti and Somalia and stranded migrants in Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen, 2021




Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).


Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Data on returns from Yemen and stranded migrants were provided through consultations with key informants.

Data on migrant arrivals in Yemen provide further insight into the profiles of migrants on the Eastern Corridor and the migratory routes they take to reach the Arabian Peninsula. In 2021, 27,693 migrants were tracked arriving on the coast of Yemen from the Horn of Africa, 88 per cent of whom were Ethiopian nationals and 12 per cent of whom were Somali nationals. In line with migratory trends along this corridor in recent years, fewer than one in five migrants arriving in Yemen were female (17%) and most migrants were male (83%), while 10 per cent of arrivals were children.


Figure 5. Arrivals in Yemen from the Horn of Africa by nationality, sex, age and vulnerability, 2021



NATIONALITY



SEX AND AGE



VULNERABILITY



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).




“It took me 15 days to arrive to Yemen. As I was crossing a road, I was hit by a car and the car sped off and I was left lying in the street. The Red Cross came and took me to a hospital where I spent one year. I never made it to Saudi Arabia because from there I was deported and brought back to Ethiopia.” © IOM 2021 / Yonas Tadesse

Migration along the Eastern Corridor occurs along two main routes, one via Djibouti and one via Somalia. The Obock area in Djibouti and Bossaso in the Puntland region of Somalia are the main embarkation hubs for migrants crossing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to Yemen on their way to Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries. In recent years, arrival data in Yemen indicated that the route via Bossaso was more frequently used than the route via Djibouti, with only around one third of Yemen arrivals in 2020 arriving from Djibouti, while 66 per cent of migrants arriving in Yemen had departed from Somalia.

Recent data showed a change in these dynamics, with 60 per cent of all arrivals in Yemen having departed from Djibouti in 2021. Departures from Somalia to Yemen were affected by extreme weather conditions in July and August of 2021. While departures from Djibouti resumed at higher rates in June 2021, departures from Somalia briefly picked up in June 2021 but declined again in July and August before rising in September 2021. Departures from both countries were significantly higher in most months of the second half of the year when compared to the same period in 2020.

Figure 6. Arrivals in Yemen from Djibouti and Somalia, 2019–2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Since the beginning of the pandemic, more bidirectional flows have been observed between the Arabian Peninsula and the EHoA, with many irregular migrants becoming stranded in Yemen on their way to Saudi Arabia. In its seventh year of conflict, Yemen continues to be one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Humanitarian conditions continued to deteriorate in 2021 and the effects of the conflict have been further compounded by COVID-19, putting a strain on vital infrastructure in the country. The protracted conflict exacerbated existing vulnerabilities of migrants transiting through Yemen,

severely harming the country’s economy, weakening the rule of law and leading to the breakdown of basic services and institutions.

As of 2021, over 20 million people in Yemen needed humanitarian assistance, 12 million of whom were in acute need and 16.2 million were facing acute hunger.⁸ Over 80 per cent of Yemeni nationals were estimated to be below the poverty line as the country’s economy has shrunk by over 50 per cent over the past six years of conflict, severely limiting employment opportunities.

Migrants travelling through Yemen from the EHoA to Saudi Arabia continued to be caught amid this conflict and were among the most marginalized and vulnerable people in need.⁹

The escalation of conflict in Yemen resulted in migrants using alternative routes into locations such as Marib, where many became stranded in informal sites from where they were unable to continue their journey to Saudi Arabia. IOM recorded an increased number of reports of migrants getting caught up and wounded in conflict in areas where public hospitals have little to no capacity to offer care to those who have been injured. Those able to reach the northern border with Saudi Arabia were at acute risk of direct targeting by border guards' excessive border management measures, resulting in scores of deaths and injuries among people on the move. Furthermore, migrants were forcibly transferred from the northern to the southern governorates of the country, across active frontlines, in an attempt to shift the burden of responsibility and avoid obligations under international law towards migrants. IOM estimated that around 42,000 migrants were transferred in this way by the end of December 2021.

The Northern Ethiopia conflict further affected migrants' ability to access humanitarian support such as life-saving Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) flights from Yemen which were suspended in late 2021 upon the declaration of a state of emergency in Ethiopia, despite thousands of stranded migrants approaching the IOM Migrant Response Points requesting return assistance to Ethiopia. Although VHR flights resumed in March 2021 after having been suspended due to COVID-19, they were suspended again in November 2021 due to the crisis in northern Ethiopia and the inability to return migrants to places of origin in conflict zones.¹⁰ In total, 2,028 migrants stranded in Yemen participated in the VHR programme in 2021, the majority of whom were Ethiopian nationals (91%) and male (92%).

Given the difficulties faced by migrants attempting to transit through Yemen, many migrants opted to spontaneously return to the EHoA. This trend was first observed because of the pandemic and related movement restrictions, but has more recently been driven by a combination of the difficulty of accessing Saudi Arabia, lack of economic opportunities in Yemen, where many host communities are under distress and have become less tolerant of the migrant population, and exploitation and abuse many migrants report facing there. These migrants are arguably among the most vulnerable groups observed moving along this route, as they have not succeeded in fulfilling their migration aspirations (that is usually finding a job abroad and sending remittances and savings home), have often become stranded in detention or suffered other significant abuses while in transit and may have had to pay ransoms as well as use smugglers on their journey back to the Horn. This situation is particularly challenging as most have depleted their resources and incurred further debts to manage their return journey, which will further complicate their process of reintegration once they return home. All 59 migrant deaths recorded by the IOM Missing Migrants Project in 2020 related to migrants returning to the Horn of Africa from Yemen under precarious conditions, although this is not the case for 2021.


9 Ibid.

10 IOM, 2022c.

In 2021, IOM tracked 13,125 migrants returning from Yemen to Djibouti (10,547) and Somalia (2,578) on their way back to their communities of origin, a 67 per cent increase compared to the number of spontaneous

returns recorded in 2020, when 6,094 migrants returned to Djibouti and 1,755 returned to Somalia. Most migrants (85%) returned to Djibouti and Somalia between July 2020 and July 2021.

Figure 7. Returns from Yemen to Djibouti and Somalia, May 2020–December 2021



Source: IOM, 2020 and 2021.

Note: Data on returns from Yemen were provided through consultations with key informants.

In addition to migrants returning from transit countries such as Yemen, to the EHoA, migrants who reached their destination may also be forced to return. Large return migration flows from Saudi Arabia began in 2016, when the Government of Saudi Arabia tightened its immigration policies. Deportations from the country began in 2017 and IOM electronically registered over 425,000 Ethiopians upon arrival in Addis Ababa between May 2017 and December 2021. In 2021, IOM registered around 79,500 migrants who were returned to Ethiopia by air from Saudi Arabia, more than twice the number of migrants registered in 2020 (36,600), when the pandemic resulted in returns being periodically suspended for several months starting in late March 2020 and resuming at a steady, albeit very low, rate as of September 2020.


In the first five months of 2021, figures remained low with an average of around 3,800 returnees per month, a bit over one third of the average of around 10,000 migrants registered in 2019 and the first three months of 2020, before COVID-19 hit the region. Mass deportations took place in July 2021, when nearly 32,000 migrants were returned to Ethiopia, constituting the largest number of returnees registered by IOM since the Organization began collecting this data in 2017. Returns from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia decreased again towards the end of 2021 until they were halted on 19 November 2021 due to the Northern Ethiopia conflict.¹¹

11 See Figure 8.

In 2021, 68 per cent of returnees were men and 21 per cent were women, while children accounted for 11 per cent of all returnees. The most reported intended regions of destination in Ethiopia were Tigray (34%), Amhara (32%) and Oromia (27%). The average time migrants reported spending in Saudi Arabia was quite long, with 58 per cent reporting that they had been in Saudi Arabia between seven months and two years, possibly due to the backlog

in deportations resulting from the months of suspended deportations due to the pandemic. As of December 2021, it was estimated that around 100,000 Ethiopians remained in detention in the country awaiting deportation. Transit centres were established in Addis Ababa to accommodate migrants who could not return home, as many returnees were from inaccessible, conflict-affected areas in the Tigray, Amhara and Afar regions.

Figure 8. Returns of Ethiopian nationals from Saudi Arabia, 2019–2021



Source: IOM Returns from Saudi Arabia database (last updated March 2022).

Return migration to Ethiopia

Each year, tens of thousands of migrants return to Ethiopia after having migrated to various destinations abroad, with both the Eastern and Southern Routes witnessing significant numbers of returning migrants. Reasons for return are manifold and not always voluntary, including making a personal choice to return home, reconsidering migration while in transit, or deportation following detention in transit or destination countries. Research findings detailed in a recent RDH report on return migration dynamics in five communities of high emigration in Ethiopia show that while returns from South Africa are often voluntary, most Ethiopians returning from Saudi Arabia do so involuntarily

because of large-scale deportations, with almost 80,000 Ethiopians repatriated from Saudi Arabia in 2021 alone.¹²

Migrants along both routes are also exposed to several challenges that may make them reconsider their migration during their journeys, meaning that they never reach their destination in the first place. Such challenges include exhaustion, dehydration, illness and injury, lack of access to basic services, extortion by brokers, physical and sexual violence as well as detention in transit countries, which is particularly common in countries along the Southern Route.

12 IOM, 2022b.


Migrants' experiences abroad, as well as the way in which migrants return to their homes, is highly meaningful in determining reintegration outcomes. Factors determining whether migrants have a dignified return experience include whether they were able to work at destination and send remittances and whether they have recovered the money spent on their migration abroad. Migrants who return home empty-handed may well return to families who are worse off than prior to their migration, due to costs sunk into the journey and debts that have not been repaid.

Research participants who had returned to Ethiopia before earning money abroad overwhelmingly reported experiencing discrimination, judgment, social isolation and stigma upon their return. Returnees may also face

rejection from family members, especially if the family was involved in financing the unsuccessful journey. Such migrants will also lack the funds to re-establish themselves economically following return.

In contrast, those who return after having successfully recovered the cost of their journey and earned money for themselves or to send to their families through remittances reported more welcoming reactions upon return. Migrants' return experiences and their households' rating of the outcome of their migration are therefore dependent on where migrants are returning from, with households with migrants returning from countries along the Eastern Route, where most returns are involuntary, rating migration outcomes significantly less favourably than households with returnees from South Africa.

Figure 9. Rating of migration outcomes as a share of households with returnees, 2021



Source: IOM, 2022b.

Note: This graph presents data collected in 2021 through 2,600 household surveys as part of an RDH research project in five communities of high emigration in Ethiopia.

Migrants' experiences abroad are equally relevant in influencing return and reintegration outcomes. Returnees have often faced a host of stressors during their journeys abroad and in destination countries. Migrants returning to Ethiopia after having been detained for months or even years in countries such as Saudi Arabia along the Eastern Route and the United Republic of Tanzania along the Southern Route may have endured abusive and inhuman and degrading conditions while in detention.

Migrants returning also reported having experienced challenging working and living conditions, such as rising

xenophobia and high incidents of crime targeting foreign-run businesses in South Africa, and exploitative and oftentimes abusive working conditions of migrant labourers in Saudi Arabia. Returnee research participants frequently reported abusive working conditions such as sleep deprivation, withholding of salaries, physical and sexual abuse and other forms of maltreatment.

Challenging experiences returnees have faced abroad are often associated with mental health conditions that may be prevalent among individuals who have suffered abuse. Female respondents, in particular, suggested that they had

struggled to socialize with family and community members following their return, due to perceived as well as actual mental health problems. They also often reported having experienced stigma from their communities and family members due to the common perception that most female migrants have been sexually abused. Despite the prevalence of mental health challenges among returnees in Ethiopia, the study found that support and understanding of mental health is not always available.

Research data also shed light on how COVID-19 has further complicated return environments. Key informants in three out of five communities reported that there had been COVID-19 cases among returnees to their areas and that returnees in general had been stigmatized as possible bearers of the disease, particularly at the beginning of the pandemic when fears of infection were heightened. Reports of community and family members refusing to interact with returning migrants, in some cases months after a negative COVID-19 certificate had been presented, were common.

Returnees also reported that the economic impact the pandemic has had on their home communities made their economic reintegration more challenging than it would have been before the pandemic. Returnees who had returned to Ethiopia with funds to start a business often reported having to postpone starting their own business, thereby often exhausting resources that were intended for the business on daily living expenses. Simultaneously, returnees reported that finding employment opportunities in their communities of origin had become even more limited, while living costs had increased.¹³

3.3 SOUTHERN ROUTE

Gauging the volume of migrants moving along the Southern Route each year is difficult, although their numbers are significant.¹⁴ Migration from the Horn of Africa to South Africa began in the 1990s, when the end of the apartheid regime resulted in an introduction of progressive asylum laws that permitted asylum seekers and migrants to study and work while their asylum claims were being reviewed. These laws led to the establishment of the first diaspora generation in South Africa as the country welcomed a significant number of Ethiopian asylum seekers. In the early 2000s, the appointment of an Ethiopian ambassador

from the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' (SNNP) region in South Africa triggered the second wave of Ethiopian migration along this corridor, as he arranged job opportunities for migrants from Hossana and Durame areas, which are the main areas of origin of Ethiopians along the Southern Route to this day.

In 2021, the Southern Route made up 9 per cent of all movements tracked by DTM in the EHoA (58,648 movements), although most movements (75%) were intraregional, headed towards Kenya, while 18 per cent were intended towards South Africa. Most migrants on the Southern Route were Ethiopians (70%) and Somalis (30%). As is the case along all three migratory corridors, these trends are fuelled by economic pressures at home and economic opportunity at destination, with 65 per cent of movements tracked along the Southern Route driven by economic reasons.

Most movements tracked by DTM towards South Africa were recorded at the Moyale flow monitoring point (10,243 movements), one in four of all migrants tracked at this point throughout the year. Moyale is a town along the Ethiopian–Kenyan border and a major transit and logistics hub for migrants headed south. Migrants heading to South Africa were predominantly from the SNNP (70%) and Oromia (23%) regions of Ethiopia and overwhelmingly male (91% men and 8% boys). The prevalence of males on the Southern Route was corroborated by registration data from the IOM Migration Response Centre in Moyale, where 98 per cent of the 1,400 migrants registered in 2021 were male and most (87%) were headed towards South Africa. These data also confirm that economic motivations (98%) are key to understanding migration along this route.

Research conducted along the Southern Route sheds further light on the profiles of migrants on the Southern Route. Of the 382 interviews conducted by IOM with migrants in the United Republic of Tanzania, most (86%) were younger than 25 years, male (99%) and single (86%).¹⁵ Migrants generally seem to come from large households in Ethiopia, with an average household size of seven individuals and 28 per cent reporting households with more than nine members. Almost two thirds of migrants reported that their household members were depending on them for household income.

13 IOM, 2022e.


14 In 2009, IOM estimated that as many as 20,000 migrants from the EHoA use this route per year. This estimate was revised in 2017 by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat to somewhere between 14,750 and 16,850 migrants per year.

15 IOM, 2022f.

Most surveyed migrants were from the SNNP region (99%), specifically from the Hadiya (68%) and Kembata (25%) zones and migrants overwhelmingly reported that they had migrated for economic reasons (99%). The need to support household members at origin (79%) and high salaries in South Africa (69%) were the most reported

economic drivers. Almost 70 per cent of migrants reported that their households had not been able to cover their basic needs in the year before they migrated and another 70 per cent reported that they had adopted coping strategies such as skipping meals or reducing portion sizes to compensate for insufficient household resources.

Figure 10. Migration drivers with breakdown of economic drivers



Source: IOM, 2022f.

Note: Multiple choices were allowed for migration drivers.

The research data also shed light on the Southern Corridor itself and the challenges migrants face while travelling on it. Most migrants interviewed in the United Republic of Tanzania reported that they had travelled with multiple brokers (76%), 96 per cent of whom reported that they had been unaware prior to departure that their journey would involve multiple brokers. Around 25 per cent of these interviewees reported having been asked to make payments to brokers during the journey that they had not anticipated prior to departure.

Almost all migrants reported having had insufficient amounts of food (98%), water (97%) and a severe lack of access to basic services (97%) during their journey. An overwhelming number of migrants also reported having experienced physical, sexual or psychological abuse, violence or torture (71%) during their journey and

around one in four migrants reported having experienced extortion or having had to pay bribes. Other challenges included sickness and injuries, vehicle accidents, unbearable conditions relating to modes of transport, such as overcrowding and asphyxiation, encountering wild animals while travelling on foot through off-road areas, witnessing the death of fellow migrants as well as abandonment by smugglers.

Compared to the Eastern Route, migration from Ethiopia to South Africa tends to be more permanent for migrants who manage to reach their destination. Research data show that migrants who reach South Africa usually find employment in diaspora-run businesses and are often sponsored by migrants who are already settled in South Africa, making it easier for them to integrate into the informal labour

market and establish themselves economically. Compared to migration to Saudi Arabia along the Eastern Route, where most research respondents had returned due to deportation (59%), most returnees from South Africa reported having made a voluntary and planned decision to return, with 21 per cent choosing to return due to health issues and 16 per cent returning as they had earned enough money (16%) to achieve their goals, which was only the case for 1 per cent of returnees from Saudi Arabia.¹⁶

However, these findings only hold true for migrants who reach their destination, with unsuccessful journeys or AVRR from transit countries even more common along the Southern Route (43%) than among migrants headed towards Saudi Arabia (28%). Detention of migrants in transit countries along the Southern Route is, unfortunately, common and many migrants often spend years in prison before they are repatriated to Ethiopia.

IOM monitors the situation of migrants in detention centres in the United Republic of Tanzania and conducts periodic verification missions with the Ethiopian embassy to assess the number of migrants detained in the country. The most recent assessment was carried out between August and September 2021 in prisons across three Tanzanian regions (Mbeya, Morogoro and Tanga) during which 786 Ethiopians were identified in detention, of whom 114 were children. IOM estimated that the number of Ethiopians in detention is higher than 2,200, as not all prisons holding Ethiopian migrants were assessed during the verification missions in 2021.

3.4 NORTHERN ROUTE

The Northern Route towards North Africa and Europe tends to be less travelled by migrants from the EHoA region, with only 1 per cent of movements tracked by DTM in 2021 along this route (6,222 movements), a figure similar to the number of movements tracked in 2020 (6,341), but a 60 per cent decrease compared to 2019 when COVID-19 was not yet impacting migration from the region.

Most movements tracked on this route originated in Ethiopia (97%), with the majority headed towards the Sudan (57%) or Europe (40%). Germany (8%), the United Kingdom (8%), the Netherlands (5%) and

Sweden (5%) were the most cited destination countries in Europe. Migration along the Northern Route was largely driven by economic motivations (59%), while 28 per cent of movements were due to seasonal migration. Although the DTM operational coverage along the Northern Route is limited and movements are likely underestimated, triangulation with other sources of data in transit countries outside the region such as Libya and countries of arrival in Europe suggest that the volume of migrants on this route is significantly smaller when compared to the Eastern or Southern Routes.

Libya is a key country of transit of migrants headed to Europe from the EHoA. Data on Libya's migrant population collected between October and November 2021 (591,415 migrants in total), indicated that just under 2 per cent of migrants in Libya were EHoA nationals (11,185). EHoA nationals in Libya were mostly from Somalia (51%), Eritrea (32%) and Ethiopia (17%). The proportion of EHoA nationals identified in Libya's migrant population has remained constant (around 2%) over the past years.


Insight into the profiles of EHoA migrants in Libya can be gleaned from DTM Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS) data collected from 177 migrants throughout 2021. Most EHoA respondents were aged between 20 and 29 years, with Ethiopians slightly more likely to be older than 30 years (53%) than Eritreans (37%) and Somalis (29%). Migrants were generally single (60%), and most had completed at least primary education (69%). Around 14 per cent reported never having attended school and 2 per cent held university degrees.

Eritreans had travelled to Libya via the Sudan (68%) or through Ethiopia and the Sudan (26%), while Ethiopians mainly travelled via the Sudan (88%) and Somalis commonly migrated via Ethiopia and the Sudan (56%) or through Yemen and the Sudan (22%) to Libya. Most respondents reported that their destination was in Europe (59%), 28 per cent did not have a fixed intention or plan and 9 per cent reported they planned on staying in Libya. However, most migrants reported having been in Libya for one to five years (51%) at the time of interview, while 6 per cent had resided in Libya for over five years.

It is not uncommon for migrants from the EHoA to spend a significant amount of time in Libya before crossing the Mediterranean to Europe, as they may become stranded due to depletion of the financial resources they started their migration with, or may have planned to work along the route to be able to afford the stretch of migration involving the crossing of the Mediterranean. Over half of the interviewed migrants reported that they were not working in Libya at the time of the interview but were looking for a job (56%). Spending prolonged periods in Libya could constitute potential protection concerns, which may be heightened during COVID-19, as 83 per cent of respondents mentioned having limited or no access to health services in the country.

The most common drivers of migration were war and conflict (21%), insufficient income at home (19%), the search for job opportunities abroad (15%), targeted violence or persecution (14%) and a lack of job opportunities at home (12%). Ethiopians were primarily migrating due to war and conflict (29%) and targeted violence or persecution (20%), potentially due to the ongoing crisis in northern Ethiopia. Somalis mainly cited war and conflict (24%) and a lack of job opportunities at home (24%) as the main factors triggering their migration, while Eritreans were mostly migrating due to insufficient income at home (37%) and targeted violence or persecution (21%).

Figure 11. Top six reasons for migration, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Note: Multiple choices allowed for migration drivers.

The presence and transit migration of EHoA migrants in and through Libya remains of concern as years of instability and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the country's economy continue to make migrants one of the most vulnerable and COVID-19-affected populations in the country. The majority of migrants interviewed by DTM in Libya in October and November 2021 reported that financial problems were among

the main challenges they were facing in Libya (61%) and the unemployment rate among migrants stayed higher than pre-pandemic levels, at 23 per cent of those interviewed (compared to 17% in February 2020).¹⁷ The 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview for Libya expresses concern over less than half of migrants (46%) having a predictable income source, while 69 per cent reported challenges in securing work.¹⁸ Moreover,

¹⁷ IOM, 2021b.

¹⁸ UNOCHA, 2021.

many migrants in Libya work in the informal economy, oftentimes in temporary jobs with little or no access to social protection systems.

A recent study by IOM and the World Food Programme (WFP) found that the economic consequences of the pandemic continue to adversely affect migrants, as one in five migrants interviewed can be considered as food insecure, while more than half were considered marginally food insecure.¹⁹ Comparisons with 2020 and 2019 highlighted that migrants from East Africa tend to have the highest proportions of poor and borderline food consumption levels compared to nationals of countries in other regions. This could be related to the lower levels of employment reported by migrants from the EHoA in Libya, as lack of a stable source of income directly affects food security.²⁰ Moreover, the cost of essential food and non-food items rose steadily in the second half of 2021, likely due to inflation as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and marking an almost 30 per cent increase compared to pre-pandemic levels.²¹

Looking north towards Europe, DTM data on arrivals by sea and land in the Mediterranean region can shed further light on EHoA nationals on the Northern Route. According to data collected from government authorities, 5,027 EHoA migrants (4% of all 114,275 arrivals by sea) were registered across European disembarkation and entry points in Greece, Italy, Spain and Malta in 2021.²² This marks a 67 per cent increase compared to the 3,018 migrants registered upon arrival in the same countries in 2020.

Italy recorded the largest number of EHoA arrivals by sea to Europe (3,832), followed by Greece (942), Malta (245) and Spain (8). Most arrivals were Eritreans (53%), followed by Somalis (35%), Ethiopians (9%) and South Sudanese (2%). This constituted a change in arrival trends compared to 2020, when most arrivals were Somalis (61%), followed by Eritreans (32%), Ethiopians (3%) and South Sudanese (3%). Most migrants recorded in Greece were Somalis (89%). The majority of registered

EHoA migrants in Italy were Eritreans (62%), Somalis (24%) and Ethiopians (11%). Malta mainly registered Eritreans (90%).

Additionally, 1,488 EHoA nationals were apprehended while transiting through the Western Balkan region in 2021, marking a 164 per cent increase compared to 2020, when 564 EHoA migrants were recorded along the Western Balkan route.²³ Movements of EHoA nationals tracked along this route in 2021 exceeded pre-pandemic levels by around 25 per cent (1,194 EHoA migrants registered in 2019), indicating that migration of EHoA nationals along this route resumed again in 2021, following a sharp decrease in movements due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The increase and return to pre-pandemic levels was observed for all nationalities along all routes. The majority of EHoA migrants on the Western Balkan route were from Somalia (59%) and Eritrea (38%). Most of these migrants were recorded in North Macedonia (785) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (343), followed by Croatia (119), Serbia (149), Romania (48) and Slovenia (39).

19 IOM and WFP, 2021.

20 Ibid.

21 REACH, 2022.

22 Information on nationality is based on the nationality declared by migrants as reported by the national authorities. For Spain, the nationality breakdown refers to all arrivals by sea, including those to the Canary Islands via the Western African Atlantic route and is available from Frontex. See <https://migration.iom.int/europe/arrivals> for updated figures on arrivals to Europe.

23 Figures are based on data collected in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Kosovo. References to Kosovo shall be understood to be in the context of United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

Figure 12. Countries of origin and countries of application for first-instance asylum applicants from the East and Horn of Africa, 2021




Source: EUROSTAT MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA database (accessed 13 April 2022).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Eurostat data on first-instance asylum applications in the 27 Member States of the European Union showed that Somalis (51%) lodged the largest number of applications of the almost 30,000 applications lodged by nationals of all EHoA countries in 2021, followed by nationals of Eritrea (32%) and Ethiopia (8%). These proportions were very similar to the breakdown of EHoA first-instance asylum applications lodged in 2020, when Somalis (48%), Eritreans (34%) and Ethiopians

(8%) accounted for the majority of the 21,065 EHoA applications lodged that year. The overall number of first-instance asylum applications by EHoA nationals, however, increased by 39 per cent compared to 2020, supporting the trend observed in DTM arrival data that more migrants and refugees are arriving in Europe by land and by sea. Around 59 per cent of applicants were male and 41 per cent were female.²⁴

Figure 13. First-instance asylum applications lodged by migrants from the East and Horn of Africa in Europe by nationality, 2019–2021



Source: EUROSTAT MIGR_ASYAPPCTZA database (accessed 13 April 2022).

Data on first-time asylum applicants who were unaccompanied children showed that 2,070 unaccompanied children from the EHoA lodged first-instance asylum applications in the European Union in 2021, marking a 165 per cent increase compared to 2020 (780 applications). Unaccompanied children applying for asylum in 2021 were most commonly Somali (75%) or Eritrean (21%) nationals and predominantly male (75%).²⁵

As was the case in 2020, Somalis mainly applied for asylum in Germany (24%), France (21%), Austria (10%), Greece (10%) and Italy (8%). While Eritreans mainly lodged their first-instance asylum applications in Germany (34%), followed by France (21%), Switzerland (18%) and Belgium (16%), Ethiopians mostly started their asylum procedures in France (37%), Germany (29%) and Sweden (10%).²⁶ It should be noted that there are also migrants who

24 Eurostat, 2022a.

25 Eurostat, 2022b.


26 Eurostat, 2022a.

arrive through regular means and apply for asylum in Europe, and that not all individuals arriving in Europe wish to apply for asylum. Of those arriving through irregular routes by land and by sea, some may try to reach European countries where there are already well-established networks of co-nationals and family members before lodging an application.

Eurostat also publishes data on first-instance asylum application decisions submitted by EHoA citizens. Of the 30,545 first-instance asylum decisions regarding applicants from the EHoA in the 27 European Union Member States in 2021, 65 per cent were positive, while 35 per cent of applicants were rejected. Over 84 per cent of first-instance decisions concerning Eritreans were

positive and 68 per cent received refugee status under the Geneva Convention.²⁷ Likewise, Burundians received positive decisions around two thirds of the time (66%) and almost all positive decisions regarding Burundians were Geneva Convention Status. Somalis received a positive decision in 59 per cent of first-instance decisions, although only 40 per cent of Somali applicants were recognized as refugees under the Geneva Convention. Nationals from other EHoA countries were less likely to receive a positive decision on their asylum application and were not recognized as Geneva Convention refugees. For example, around 63, 66, 70 and 72 per cent of Ethiopian, Djiboutian, Kenyan and Rwandese applications, respectively, were rejected in the first instance.²⁸

Figure 14. First-instance asylum decisions regarding migrants from the East and Horn of Africa in Europe by nationality, 2021



Source: EUROSTAT MIGR_ASYDCFSTA database (accessed 13 April 2022).

27 The kind of protection applicants are granted matters, as the rights, length of stay and benefits granted by one's status varies depending on the type of protection granted. Those who are granted subsidiary protection or humanitarian status are often accorded fewer rights in many countries compared to those who are granted full refugee protection under the Geneva Convention.

28 Eurostat, 2022c.




3.5 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

Trafficking in persons is a serious human rights violation that can occur at various stages of a migration journey and involve a range of victims and perpetrators. Violations can include sexual exploitation, forced labour, forced marriage, coercion into armed combat and organ removal.²⁹ IOM collects data on trafficking in persons (TiP) as part of the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) to strengthen the evidence base on trafficking in persons globally. This includes IOM's own database of trafficked individuals. Between 2011 and 2021, CTDC recorded nearly 3,000 cases of trafficking from the EHoA; these data provide information on identified survivors of trafficking who have been assisted by IOM and CTDC partners.³⁰

In the EHoA, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi were the countries where trafficked persons were most frequently identified. This was in line with the global trends reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in 2018 whereby most trafficked persons were detected in their subregion of origin rather than outside of their region.³¹ Kenya, in particular, was a key hub in the region as a source of origin (28%), transit point and destination for exploitation (35%).³² Citizens of Uganda (23%), Ethiopia (20%), Burundi (13%) and Eritrea (8%) formed the top five share of identified persons.³³

Figure 15. Countries of origin of trafficked persons in the East and Horn of Africa, 2011–2021



Source: CTDC, n.d.a (accessed 17 March 2022).

Note: For confidentiality reasons, victims' characteristics in countries with fewer than 10 victims were not reported. Data were insufficient for Djibouti and South Sudan.

29 ILO, 2017; IOM, 2022g.

30 Figures for this section are taken from CTDC, n.d.a (accessed 17 March 2022). The Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) is the world's largest data repository of human trafficking case data, publishing harmonized data from multiple counter-trafficking organizations around the world. These data on identified cases cannot be considered a random sample of the population of persons who are trafficked but larger country samples are often interpreted as fairly representative, given the pressing need for informed response amid limited alternative sources of data. Given this context, this section lays out current understandings of trafficking patterns in the region, which are critical to inform targeted responses and good migration governance in line with Target 8.7 of the Sustainable Development Goals, "eradicate forced labour, modern slavery and human trafficking" and Objective 10 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, "prevent and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration."

31 UNODC, 2018a; UNODC, 2020. The latest available data reported by UNODC were as of 2018.


32 NCRC, 2015; CTDC, n.d.a.

33 This is a description of the sample rather than the region, as the distribution likely reflects programming rather than prevalence.

Women and girls continued to be the most vulnerable groups at the global level (70% of victims).³⁴ Of all identified trafficked persons in the EHoA, 78 per cent were female and 22 per cent were male, with considerable variation by country of citizenship. For instance, while only half of the trafficked persons from Eritrea were female, those from the United Republic of Tanzania (95%), Burundi (91%), Kenya (89%), Uganda (87%) and Rwanda (85%) were predominantly female. Conversely, trafficked persons from Somalia were mostly male (65%).

A data story based on the CTDC data from 2002 to 2017 showed that over half of trafficked persons in Africa were children and that only one fifth of all identified victims at the global level were children.³⁵ From 2002 to 2017, 18 per cent of the identified trafficked persons in Kenya were children, compared to 72 per cent in Uganda and 60 per cent in Ethiopia, suggesting cross-country differences in children's vulnerability to TiP.

Figure 16. Identified trafficked persons in the East and Horn of Africa by citizenship and sex, 2011–2021



Source: CTDC, n.d.a (accessed 17 March 2022).


Note: For confidentiality reasons, victims' characteristics in countries with fewer than 10 victims were not reported. Data were insufficient for Djibouti and South Sudan.

34 CTDC, n.d.b.

35 CTDC, n.d.c; CTDC, n.d.d.

Human trafficking can involve many different types of exploitative activities. In sub-Saharan Africa, forced labour was most frequently reported in 2018.³⁶ However, the EHoA deviates from this pattern as data showed that 42 per cent of persons were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation, 39 per cent were trafficked for forced labour and 19 per cent were trafficked for other forms of exploitation, such as forced marriage or the removal of organs. The high rates of sexual and child exploitation emphasize the need for regional commitment to the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) Target 5.2, “eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls, including trafficking and sexual exploitation” and Target 16.2, “end exploitation, trafficking and violence against children.”

Figure 17. Type of exploitation in the top three countries in which trafficking in persons was identified in the East and Horn of Africa, 2011–2021



Source: CTDC, n.d.a (accessed 17 March 2022).

Note: For confidentiality reasons, victims' characteristics in countries with fewer than 10 victims were not reported.

Although countries globally are detecting more people who are trafficked and convicting more offenders, UNODC reported that the number of persons convicted per 100,000 people has remained low in sub-Saharan Africa (about 0.35) relative to other regions of the world (about 1.65 in Central America and the Caribbean) between 2014 and 2017.³⁷ However, this does not imply a lower incidence of trafficking in the region. A significant degree of complicity by authorities has been reported in EHoA countries, and sub-Saharan Africa is an important origin for many detected cases of trafficked persons globally.³⁸ Moreover, the GCC countries, which serve as destinations for migrants from the region who are migrating along the Eastern Corridor, report cases of trafficking of EHoA nationals.³⁹ These trends suggest that traffickers are operating with a high degree of impunity.⁴⁰

People who are forcibly displaced, transit irregularly, live in precarious conditions without access to basic services or opportunities for income, are separated from their family, and live in provisionary camps are commonly targeted by traffickers.⁴¹ Displaced persons who are forced to turn to smugglers may also fall victim to trafficking, and several such cases were identified by authorities in the EHoA in 2021.⁴² Others are trafficked to be exploited as combatants by armed groups and for forced marriage as incentives to male recruits.⁴³ The United States Department of State reported that in 2020, several trafficking survivors returned to Kenya from Somalia after fleeing a terrorist group.⁴⁴ Yemen, a key transit country for migrants travelling on the Eastern Route, has faced years of armed violence and some migrants caught in the crisis have been subjected to forced labour and killed by traffickers.⁴⁵

36 UNODC, 2018a; UNODC, 2020.

37 UNODC, 2018a.

38 UNODC, 2018a; UNODC, 2021; United States Department of State, 2021.

39 Ibid.

40 UNODC, 2018a; UNODC, 2018b; United States Department of State, 2021; ENACT, 2020.

41 UNODC, 2018a; UNODC, 2020; IOM, 2022h.

42 United States Department of State, 2021; MMC, 2021.

43 UNODC, 2018a.

44 United States Department of State, 2021.

45 IOM, 2020.

There is a critical need for stronger data in the EHoA to inform service delivery and counter-trafficking governance. An enduring challenge for counter-trafficking is ascertaining the number of persons subjected to this violation, given its covert nature. For this reason, existing numbers are largely underreported, while the technical capacity to collect quality data, consistent availability of data and harmonization for knowledge-sharing are lacking in many EHoA countries.⁴⁶ Survivors may also be reluctant to speak about their experiences for reasons including fear of intimidation by traffickers, stigmatization, fear of legal consequences such as deportation and detention, lack of trust in authorities and psychosocial trauma.⁴⁷ As such, ethical and operational challenges limit gathering a robust evidence base on TiP in the region. Additionally, some people may be more likely to be identified or to self-report than others. The identified cases cannot be considered as a random sample of the affected population of victims of trafficking; however, existing data can offer a preliminary understanding of key trends in the region.

Recently, some countries have taken positive steps to counter TiP. In late 2021, a mechanism was launched to measure state compliance with the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the TiP Protocol, as well as to assess cross-border coordination.⁴⁸ Stakeholders also met with the African Union Commission to validate a draft policy on prevention of TiP, drawing from the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Migration Policy Framework for Africa.⁴⁹

IOM, in collaboration with UNODC, has developed international classification standards and guidance for the collection and use of administrative data on trafficking in persons (ICS-TiP) for governments to improve their collection, management and reporting of TiP data. Government officials from nine countries in the region have participated in training on the ICS-TIP organized by IOM, UNODC and the African Union Commission in 2021. Additionally, IOM has developed Human Trafficking Case Data Standards to improve the collection and use of administrative data by frontline counter-trafficking agencies.

Those who are trafficked in this region are predominantly trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation — although activities vary by country — and displaced persons, irregular migrants, women and children of both sexes are especially vulnerable to being trafficked and exploited. Therefore, reinforcing regular and gender-responsive pathways to migration is essential to forestall irregular journeys that exacerbate vulnerability to trafficking. While governments and local agencies in the region have improved their ability to identify trafficked persons and prosecute perpetrators, the extent of this crime is not fully understood. This demands greater commitment to strengthen rights-based response and quality data collection to prevent and protect people who are trafficked, meet the goals of the 2030 SDGs and the Global Compact and reduce the number of those exploited.⁵⁰

46 United States Department of State, 2021.


47 UNODC, 2018b.

48 UNODC, 2021.

49 MMC, 2021.

50 UNODC, 2018b.

Figure 18. Tier ranking in counter-trafficking efforts in the East and Horn of Africa, 2021



Source: United States Department of State, 2021.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. In 2021, no country in the EHoA was listed as Tier I by the United States Department of State, meaning that governments were not in line with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 to prevent, protect and prosecute this violation, indicating the need for greater commitment to counter-trafficking in the region. Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania were listed as Tier II or Tier II Watch List countries, while Eritrea and South Sudan were placed in Tier III. Somalia was listed as a Special Case under the United States Department of State assessment and was not listed under any tier.



Woman in a shop in Ali Sabieh, Djibouti. © IOM 2021 / Alexander Bee


3.6 MIGRANT PROFILES

Nationalities

Ethiopians were the largest national group moving along the four corridors into and out of the region in 2021 (69%), corresponding to 95 per cent of the tracked flows along the Eastern Route and 94 per cent along the Northern Route. Both Somalis (49%) and Ethiopians (47%) moved along the Horn of Africa Corridor in similar numbers. In

2021, an estimated 463,700 Ethiopians were tracked on the move within the region, of whom 55 per cent were travelling along the Eastern Route and 35 per cent on the Horn of Africa Route. Most of the 194,300 Somalis, the second biggest nationality on the move (29%), were migrating along the Horn of Africa Route (85%).

Figure 19. Nationalities by route, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).


Note: Indicators on nationalities were compiled using a DTM Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR) sample of 674,243 tracked movements in 2021: Horn of Africa Route (340,340), Eastern Route (269,033), Southern Route (58,648) and Northern Route (6,222). Smaller values were not represented: Horn of Africa Route (0.3% Sudanese, 0.2% Yemenis).

Sex and age

Across all routes, most migrants were men (56%), followed by women (34%), boys (10%) and girls (8%). The male 18–29 years age group was predominant in the region, although differences exist between corridors. For example, on the Northern Route, over half of the population on the move (54%) were between 18 and 29 years old, while this share decreased to 47 per cent on the Eastern Corridor. The proportion of 18–29-year-olds

was lower on the Southern (36%) and Horn of Africa (24%) Routes. The latter had the most equilibrated proportion between males (45%) and females (31%), and the highest proportion (24%) of children younger than 18 years. These proportions were largely due to the characteristics of these intraregional mobility flows, which were driven by a large variety of factors, and migrants often moved with family members.⁵¹

Figure 20. Sex and age group by route, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Note: Indicators on sex and age were compiled using a DTM Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR) sample of 674,243 tracked movements in 2021: Horn of Africa Route (340,340), Eastern Route (269,033), Southern Route (58,648) and Northern Route (6,222).






51 See Figure 25.

Vulnerabilities

In 2021, over 58,500 vulnerabilities were identified in the region, representing a 4 per cent increase from 2020 (56,000). The progressive ease of COVID-19-related travel restrictions during 2021, especially in the second half of the year, increased the number of people willing to migrate, hence the increase in the number of vulnerabilities identified. The most common vulnerability identified was that of children younger than five years, who represented 3.5 per cent of the total population. The Horn of Africa Route had the highest number of children under five (6.4% of all migrants on this

route), followed by the Southern Route (2.3%). The second highest vulnerability reported was pregnant and lactating women, who represented 1.8 per cent of the total population moving through the region, with the Southern Route having the highest proportion (3.1%), followed by the Horn of Africa Route (2.8%). Moreover, 1.7 per cent of people on the move across the region were unaccompanied migrant children, with the Eastern Route having the highest proportion (2.9%) followed by the Horn of Africa Route (1.1%).

Figure 21. Vulnerabilities overall and by route, 2021

	VULNERABILITY	EASTERN ROUTE	HORN OF AFRICA ROUTE	NORTHERN ROUTE	SOUTHERN ROUTE	TOTAL
	Unaccompanied migrant children	2.9%	1.1%	0.2%	0.0%	1.7%
	Pregnant and/or lactating women	0.3%	2.8%	0.1%	3.1%	1.8%
	Elderly (60+)	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.2%	0.3%
	People living with disability	0.4%	0.7%	0.1%	0.4%	0.5%
	Children under the age of five	0.2%	6.4%	0.2%	2.3%	3.5%

Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).


Note: Indicators on vulnerabilities were compiled using a DTM Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR) sample of 674,243 tracked movements in 2021: Horn of Africa Route (340,340), Eastern Route (269,033), Southern Route (58,648) and Northern Route (6,222).

Education and employment

A shift was observed in migrants' education levels between 2020 and 2021. During 2020, almost half of the population interviewed across all routes (49%) indicated they did not have any formal education. This share declined significantly in 2021 with only a quarter of people interviewed (25%) reporting not having any formal education. In 2021, the Horn of Africa Route observed the highest proportion of migrants without

formal education (34%) but also recorded the lowest proportion of migrants who completed secondary education (8%). Very few migrants (1%) had completed tertiary education in 2021 (compared to 2% in 2020), with the Northern Route continuing to show the highest proportion (6%) across all corridors as well as the highest share of migrants having completed secondary education (27%).

Figure 22. Education level by route, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Note: Indicators on education were based on a DTM Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS) non-representative sample of 38,554 respondents interviewed in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia in 2021. Smaller values were not represented: Eastern Route (0.5% Tertiary, 0.4% Vocational training, 0.3% Religious schools), Horn of Africa Route (0.5% Short cycle tertiary), Northern Route (0.5% Religious schools, 0.2% None), Southern Route (0.1% Religious schools).



Roam's simple shop in Juba. In 2017, he left Egypt for South Sudan with the hope of starting a new life there after losing both parents. © IOM 2020 / Nabie Loyce

The proportion of migrants who were unemployed before migrating increased considerably between 2020 and 2021 (from 67% to 79%). Of the 21 per cent of those who were employed before starting their journey, almost

one third were working in the agriculture and forestry sector (29%), followed by people who were occupied in the wholesale and retail trade (14%) and activities of households for own use (11%).⁵²

Figure 23. Main employment sectors, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).


Note: Indicators on employment were based on a DTM Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS) non-representative sample of 38,554 respondents interviewed in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia in 2021.

52 "Activities of households for own use" includes the activities of households as employers of domestic personnel such as maids, cooks, waiters, valets, butlers, laundresses, gardeners, gatekeepers, stable-lads, chauffeurs, caretakers, governesses, babysitters, tutors, secretaries, etc. It allows the domestic personnel employed to state the activity of their employer in censuses or studies, even though the employer is an individual. The product produced by this activity is consumed by the employing household.

The fact that more than half of respondents (60%) were unemployed and looking for a job aligns with other data that consistently point to economic reasons as some of the main drivers of migration (62%) in the region. Less than a third of the population interviewed (18%) was either self-employed (12%) or employed (6%). The corridors with the highest proportion of unemployed migrants during 2021 were both the Eastern and Northern Routes (86%), followed by the Southern and Horn of Africa Routes (78% and 74%, respectively). Proportionally, on

all four corridors, the percentage of unemployed women was higher than the percentage of unemployed men, with the Horn of Africa having the largest difference (14%) between unemployed women (81%) and men (68%). In the Eastern Route, almost all women (93%) and more than three quarters (83%) of men were unemployed, resulting in a 10 per cent difference between both sexes. For both the Southern and Northern Routes, the difference between unemployed males and females was 4 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively.

Figure 24. Employment status by route, 2021




Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Note: Indicators on employment were based on a DTM Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS) non-representative sample of 38,554 respondents interviewed in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia in 2021. Smaller values were not represented: Eastern Route (0.1% No answer), Horn of Africa Route (0.1% No answer).

Difficulties faced

Most of the respondents (42%) indicated they faced some form of difficulty along the journey, with challenges related to food and water scarcity (70%), lack of shelter or place to sleep (48%) and financial challenges (47%) being the most commonly reported. The Eastern Route had the highest percentage of people facing any sort of difficulty (54%), with lack of food and water (33%) being the most common challenge, followed by the lack of shelter or safe place to sleep (23%). The Horn of Africa Route came second (37%), with a lack of food and water being the most reported difficulty (27%), followed by financial challenges (20%).

Figure 25. Difficulties faced during the journey, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).

Note: Indicators on difficulties faced are compiled using a DTM Flow Monitoring Survey (FMS) sample of 37,301 respondents. Respondents are free to not answer any question that they might find sensitive. Up to three responses were possible for this question. Only 15,483 respondents said they had been facing any difficulties.




A migrant pours water taken from a hole in the ground into a plastic cannister in Alat Ela, Djibouti. © IOM 2020 / Alexander Bee

Reasons for migration

The main driver of migration across all four corridors remained economic reasons (62%), with almost all migrants along the Eastern Route travelling for economic reasons (96%). Interestingly, more than a quarter of the population travelling along the Northern Route were moving due

to seasonal migration (28%). Generally, people on the Northern Route migrate because they are employed in the Sudan on a seasonal basis to work in agriculture and most are Ethiopian nationals.

Figure 26. Reasons for migration by route, 2021



Source: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix database (last updated March 2022).


Note: Indicators on reasons for migration were compiled using a DTM Flow Monitoring Registry (FMR) sample of 674,243 tracked movements in 2021: Horn of Africa Route (340,340), Eastern Route (269,033), Southern Route (58,648) and Northern Route (6,222). Smaller values were not represented: Eastern Route (0.4% Forced movement due to food insecurity, 0.2% Return to habitual residence, 0.1% Forced movement due to natural disasters, 0.1% Seasonal migration), Horn of Africa Route (0.5% Buy goods for personal consumption, 0.2% Education), Northern Route (0.4% Return to habitual residence, 0.3% Visit family), Southern Route (0.3% Forced movement due to natural disasters, 0.2% Forced movement due to food insecurity).

More than a quarter of migrants (28%) along the four corridors indicated they did not know how long they intended to stay in their destination country, including almost half of the people interviewed along the Eastern Route (49%). Over 27 per cent of people on the move indicated they were moving for a short period (from less than one day to up to three months), with the Horn of Africa Route having the highest proportion (33%) of such short stays. Another 11 per cent of all migrants interviewed mentioned that they planned to stay between three and 12 months in the host country, while

18 per cent indicated that they intended to be at their destination for more than one year. The Southern Route had the highest proportion of migrants hoping to stay more than one year at their destination (59%), followed by the Northern Route (38%). Both routes involve a long and arduous journey which can take months to complete. Finally, 8 per cent of respondents mentioned they were not planning to go back to their country of origin, with the Horn of Africa Route having the highest proportion (13%).

Box 6. Migration Response Centres

Eight Migration Response Centres were operated by national governments, IOM and other partners in 2021: Hargeisa and Bossaso since 2009, Obock since 2011, Semera and Metema since 2014, Dire Dawa and Togochale since 2019 and Moyale since March 2021. Most registered migrants were Ethiopian nationals (99.4%).



Source: IOM Migration Response Centre database (last updated March 2022).

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

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A photograph of a woman in a headscarf and patterned dress standing next to a camel in a desert landscape. The image is overlaid with a semi-transparent blue filter. The woman is looking directly at the camera with a serious expression. The camel is standing next to her, and its head is turned slightly to the left. The background shows a vast, arid desert with some low hills in the distance.

MIGRATION OUTLOOK

Halfway through 2022, the East and Horn of Africa (EHoA) migratory landscape continues to be highly fluid with little sign of stability in the short term. Apart from Burundi, which is now following a more stable track with strengthened capacity to cope with future shocks due to relatively better harvests,¹ the regional humanitarian situation is expected to further worsen. Conflict dynamics in northern Ethiopia are still unfolding, while political tensions around governance and elections in Somalia, added to the reconfiguration of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to hand over responsibility to the country's security forces, are likely to leave a security vacuum. In South Sudan, political violence is on the rise ahead of the 2023 general elections when at the same time, the 2018 peace deal has not halted subnational and intercommunal violence, which are expected to continue in several parts of the country, as demonstrated by the escalation of conflict in greater Jonglei in March 2022.² Such instability dynamics are deemed to create more displacement and distress migration as well as shrink the windows of opportunity for sustainable peace and socioeconomic development in the short and medium term.

At the same time, resource-based conflicts are also expected to increase largely due to the projected continuation of climate shocks, concerning food insecurity predictions, limited humanitarian access that hampers aid provision and competing humanitarian crises on the backdrop of deteriorating economies. There has been mounting evidence of the direct link between increased levels of displacement and forced migration due to extreme climatic events and variability (such as flooding and drought), and of the indirect link between migration and deteriorating climate-sensitive livelihoods.³ By 2050, climate change is projected to increase migration movements with 17–40 million people moving internally across sub-Saharan Africa.⁴ In Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia, the current state of the drought did not improve after a particularly dry

onset of the March–May 2022 rainy season. Between 6 to 6.5 million people in Ethiopia, 6 million in Somalia, including 81,000 at risk of famine, and 3.5 million in Kenya were estimated to need immediate food assistance as of April 2022.⁵ In addition, prolonged flooding and associated waterlogging, compounded with insecurity, pushed food insecurity in South Sudan to reach record levels at 7.7 million people likely to face extreme hunger (63% of the population) through 2022.⁶

While conflict and climate events are on the rise, the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic is predicted to end in 2022.⁷ Over two years after the onset of the pandemic, infections have been receding across the continent with no African country experiencing COVID-19 resurgence as of mid-April 2022.⁸ Although the health effects of the pandemic have been moderated with the introduction of COVID-19 vaccines, the risk of re-emerging COVID-19 outbreaks remains a possibility in the event that vaccine coverage and equity in vaccine access are not improved, especially for marginalized groups such as migrants, displaced persons, refugees and persons with low income or socioeconomic status.

On the other hand, the disruptive impact that COVID-19 had on mobility and the economy is expected to hinder the attempt to strengthen regional integration in the EHoA in the short run. In the context of regional integration, human mobility through the free movement of persons (which is intertwined with the movement of goods, services and capital) remains of significance for the EHoA region and the African continent to increase intraregional and intracontinental mobility and trade. While the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) was rolled out in early 2021, during the pandemic, the main Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in the region — the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) — have boosted their efforts to enhance integration through regional coordination frameworks to accelerate

1 UNOCHA, n.d.

2 United Nations Security Council, 2022.

3 IPCC, 2022.

4 Ibid.

5 IGAD, 2022.

6 IPC, 2022.

7 United Nations, 2021.

8 United Nations, 2022.

the harmonization of policies and practices. Among these efforts was the protocol to facilitate the free movements of persons and transhumance adopted by IGAD in June 2021, after several years of negotiation, which is now in the hand of Member States to finalize the national ratification processes and implement its road map.⁹ Another important development was the establishment of the EAC Regional Consultative Process on Migration (RCP) in February 2022 that aims to promote migration and development by creating intergovernmental networks to consult on migration governance. By closely working with the IGAD RCP, which was established in 2008, the EAC RCP will improve coordination and prioritization of regional migration issues as part of the integration agenda.

Furthermore, as labour migration is central to achieving regional integration, the third Regional Ministerial Forum on Migration (RMFM), which brought EAC and IGAD together in March–April 2022, will serve as a crucial step towards harmonizing labour migration policies in the EHoA.¹⁰ By working on enhancing migrants' working conditions and negotiating bilateral labour agreements to define minimum standards, such regional efforts have the potential to boost the economy and create labour opportunities, mainly for high-skilled workers who move through regular channels. However, they will probably have a positive effect on irregular migrants as well if greater opportunities are available and more legal migration pathways are established across the region and beyond.

In the current setting, irregular migration trends are likely to increase through 2022 to reach pre-pandemic levels. As irregular migration remains difficult to manage and is facilitated by a well-established migration industry,¹¹ migrants are expected to keep facing protection risks and human rights violations, such as challenges in accessing basic services, forced labour, discrimination, arbitrary arrest and detention, which pose significant threats to their health, safety as well as their capacity to establish a livelihood and remit back home. In particular, migrant children, who are often unaccompanied or in

unsupervised care arrangements, are a key concern when in such abusive systems as they often decide to migrate with little information and understanding of the risks that these journeys involve.

Finally, while international attention has been placed on the direct impact of the Ukraine conflict in Europe since February 2022, the economic consequences of this crisis on food security in the EHoA should not be underestimated. With several countries in the region and across Africa heavily relying on imports of cereals but also of fertilizers from both the Russian Federation and Ukraine, the unprecedented rise in food and fertilizer prices constitute a threat to agricultural production and food security. Food prices reached their highest point in 14 years in March 2022, while fertilizer prices increased by 21 per cent since the beginning of the conflict.¹² Similarly, the crisis also disrupted energy prices, causing oil prices to reach their highest level since 2008.¹³ Such strong pressure exerted on the region's economy, especially after countries took a major hit during the COVID-19 pandemic, further exacerbates a very fragile socioeconomic situation and challenges the potential for a smooth regional integration process.

9 European Commission, 2021.

10 IOM, 2022.

11 de Haas et al., 2020.

12 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2022.

13 Ibid.

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* All hyperlinks were working at the time of writing this report.



International Organization for Migration
Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa
Sri Aurobindo Avenue, off Mzima Spring Road, Lavington
P.O. Box 55040-00200
Nairobi, Kenya

 <https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/regional-data-hub>
 <https://twitter.com/RDHRONairobi>
 rdhronairobi@iom.int
 +254 20 422 1000