

Research Study on Assessing the Effectiveness of Migration Restrictions in Ulaanbaatar City and Migrants' Vulnerability



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ACRONYMS

ANOVA	analysis of variance
BSI	basic service index
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EWI	economic welfare index
FGD	focus group discussion
HEI	health and education index
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRIM	Independent Research Institute of Mongolia
KII	key informant interview
LFS	(Mongolia) Labour Force Survey
LSD	Fisher's least significance difference
MNT	Mongolian tugrik (currency)
MVI	multidimensional vulnerability index
NSO	National Statistics Office (of Mongolia)
SDG(s)	Sustainable Development Goal(s)
SOWSM	Social Well-being Survey of Mongolia
TVET	technical and vocational training
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mongolia, a landlocked East Asian country with a population of 3.2 million, has been experiencing a drastic increase in rural-to-urban migration flows, with the population of the capital city, Ulaanbaatar, peaking close to 1.5 million (almost half of the national population) by the end of 2019 (Ulaanbataar Statistics Department, 2011). During the past two decades, a combination of various push and pull factors, including urban–rural disparities in development – such as low resilience to natural disasters in the countryside and better educational and employment opportunities and infrastructure in the capital city – has led to rising migration flows from rural areas. While internal migration brought rapid urbanization and development to the capital, it has also created a number of challenges – from overpopulation and various types of pollution (e.g. air, soil, water and noise), to a lack of government capacity to provide adequate public infrastructure (IOM, 2020b).

The situation led the Municipality of Ulaanbaatar to temporarily halt migration to the city by introducing restrictions (or ban) in 2017. The mayor at the time stated the restrictions' objective being that of ensuring the rights of Ulaanbaatar citizens to live in a healthy and safe environment, free from risks brought about by pollution and the disruption of its ecological balance (Ulaanbaatar City Governor's Office, 2017a). The migration restriction policy was initially announced to be effective only for the duration of 2017 but was extended until January 2020, as the first year of the restrictions showed a reduction in registered migration inflows from the countryside (Government of Mongolia, 2017). The restrictions applied to everyone, except for people in need of long-term medical treatment, those who had purchased apartments in the city, and public servants appointed to work in Ulaanbaatar for more than six months and their accompanying family members.

There has been no in-depth assessment of the effectiveness of the migration restriction policy, which ended in early 2020. This project fills this gap, exploring four key research questions: (a) What was the actual volume of migration flow while the policy was in place? (b) Did the restrictions increase the vulnerability of internal migrants? (c) Have the restrictions contributed to the ultimate goal of bettering the living environment of Ulaanbaatar residents? (d) What kind of policy changes should be adopted? To answer these research questions, quantitative and qualitative methods were adopted. These included a large-scale survey, focus group discussions (FGDs) and a literature review of both international and domestic studies.

A total of 1,562 migrant and 943 non-migrant households (total: 2,505) in 6 districts and 40 *khoroos* of Ulaanbaatar were surveyed. Secondary data from the National Statistics Office (NSO) of Mongolia, such as Population and Housing Census 2020 and the Labour Force Survey of 2007–2019, were used to estimate trends in rural-to-urban migration flows. As for the qualitative research component, a total of 32 migrants and non-migrants were interviewed, along with 15 public service providers from health-care, police and local administrative entities. As a result of this mixed-methods research, the following findings emerged with regard to the four key questions:



(a) While the volume of registered migration flows declined during the migration restriction period, the number of unregistered migrants likely increased.

The research revealed that while the official number of registered migrants in Ulaanbaatar who came from the countryside dramatically decreased from 25,000 in 2017 to 6,800 in 2019, the number of unregistered migrants was not captured in official administrative records. Comparative analysis of the most recent census, administrative data and insights from the qualitative research indicates that the number of unregistered migrants may have increased during this period. A more definitive conclusion would require additional data sources that unmask the accurate number of unregistered migrants who are not accounted for in official records. In addition, it is possible that the downtrend in the number of registered migrants was due to contextual factors other than the migration restriction policy itself, such as improved development and lower occurrence of natural disasters and/or better disaster preparedness in rural areas during the period studied. Additionally, our data shows that 83 per cent of those who migrated during the ban responded that they would have migrated whether they knew about the policy or not, which suggests that it did not serve the purpose of discouraging the intentions of prospective migrants and did not have any effect on their actual behaviour.

(b) The migration restrictions have increased the vulnerability of internal migrants, especially unregistered migrants and certain other subgroups.

The vulnerability analysis found that internal migrants faced exposure to economic, social and health risks, causing a higher level of vulnerability compared to that experienced by non-migrants. Unregistered migrants who moved during the migration restriction period faced an additional layer of challenges due to the fact that they were unable to officially register in the Civil State Registration Database in Ulaanbaatar and receive public benefits such as education, health and other basic services. The specific challenges that unregistered migrants faced were related to receiving health care (29% of respondents), renting or buying accommodation (10%), finding a job (20%) and owning assets (25%). This report identifies several migrant subgroups that were found to be particularly vulnerable, such as households whose main income earner was female, older or less educated (high school or lower) and those with more members who were of retirement age or with children ages 14 and below. It was found that gender, in and of itself, was a key factor in experiences of vulnerability among migrants: female income earners reported significantly higher levels of vulnerability than their male counterparts.

(c) The migration restrictions have not contributed to the improvement of overall living conditions for Ulaanbaatar residents.

When survey respondents were asked whether the migration restrictions contributed to overall living conditions in Ulaanbaatar during the 2017–2020 period, majority (57%) answered that it did not bring any improvements – a statement supported by majority of FGD participants. To be specific, 83 per cent of survey respondents reported that traffic congestion did not improve; 79 per cent and 75 per cent said that soil pollution and water pollution, respectively, did not improve; 66 per cent commented that the employment rate did not improve; and 60 per cent said that safety and security did not improve. While air pollution and welfare assistance reportedly improved, targeted government interventions – which included a ban on the use of raw coal, provision of “healthier” fuels and an increase in cash allowances for children – overlapped with the implementation of the migration restriction policy and may have influenced its results. These findings show that, overall, the migration restrictions did not achieve its intended goal of improving the living conditions of Ulaanbaatar residents.

Additionally, FGDs with community members revealed that the migration restrictions contributed to a number of unintended consequences, such as greater vulnerability among the disadvantaged subgroups previously identified (e.g. households with elderly people and/or children) and unsafe living environments for migrants due to their inability to receive basic services, pushing them to resort to negative coping strategies such as illegally acquiring electricity and offering bribes to schools to admit their children. Social service providers, such as health-care staff, also reported additional workload that often went unacknowledged because they nonetheless had to serve unregistered migrants, which was officially prohibited. In addition, the FGDs unmasked Ulaanbaatar residents’ negative attitudes towards internal migrants and the corresponding stigma on unregistered migrants, which align with the findings of a 2017 World Bank study (“Urban poverty in Ulaanbaatar: understanding the dimensions and addressing the challenges”) and the international cases of internal migration presented later in this report.



(d) Short- and medium-term targeted interventions should be complemented with longer-term solutions to effectively manage internal migration.

Based on the research findings, the report suggests considering policy recommendations on sustainable ways of managing internal migration in the short, medium and long term. In the short term, Mongolia should identify and register unregistered migrants through community outreach and awareness-raising, while reducing related transaction costs (e.g. transportation, Internet access, fines and residency application fees). Additionally, it would be crucial to mitigate the negative effects of the ban on migrants, with special attention given to particularly vulnerable subgroups such as unregistered migrants and households whose main income earner is female, whose head is less educated (high school or lower), or which have more members who are of retirement age and/or children ages 14 and below. In the medium term, the Government should avoid extreme forms of migration restriction and adhere to conditions set in national and international human rights frameworks before legitimately restricting movement rights. The report also recommends devoting targeted resources by setting up a national agency within the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection that will develop migrant integration and reintegration programming and/or embed internal migration initiatives into the design of existing programmes. The report recommends rural development as a way to stabilize migration flows in the long run by leveraging the strategic disbursement of public and private investments, including through infrastructure improvement beyond the capital city, to ultimately develop the countryside. Additionally, the report recommends holistic, top-down and bottom-up emergency management as regards disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery strategies at local administrative levels. Mainstreaming migration-specific targets and actions into Mongolia's development plans and legal documents, such as Vision 2050 and the Development Policy and Planning Law (Mongolia Government House, 2020), along with the necessary accountability mechanisms, is also suggested. Additional research and key stakeholder consultations are encouraged to further complement the findings of this study.

This report is the first of its kind in Mongolia that assesses the effectiveness of the migration restrictions in the Municipality of Ulaanbaatar using comprehensive survey data disaggregated by key demographics. It should be noted that the survey project was completed under two unique circumstances – the COVID-19 pandemic and Mongolia's 2020 parliamentary elections. While these posed data collection limitations, they also provided an opportunity to analyse the situation from different perspectives by looking at the associated impacts of COVID-19 on migrants and non-migrants alike.

1. BACKGROUND



Migration is an indispensable component of development, as it brings various benefits to both the place of origin and the place of destination. Migrants act as net contributors to development through, among others, remittances, participation in trade and investment promotion, as well as in the labour force (specifically by filling gaps in the labour market), jobs creation, or generation of tax revenues, thus stimulating the economies in their places of destination (Goldin et al., 2011). In addition, where there is a lack of opportunities locally, migration has been acknowledged as an essential process for improving individual and societal well-being and expanding possibilities for one's further development (IOM, 2016).

Income disparities, poverty, environmental instability and lack of access to quality health, education and other basic services in the place of origin are considered to be common factors that push individuals to migrate, whereas better socioeconomic conditions and opportunities in the intended destination act as pull factors (Krishnakumar and Indumathi, 2014).

Migration can result in better employment opportunities for the individual and improved livelihoods for his or her family. However, poor working and living conditions, lack of access to basic services, discrimination and other human rights abuses at the destination can negate these improvements (Krishnakumar and Indumathi, 2014). Specifically in developing countries, not every aspect of migration is advantageous. Where people leave their country or community without the sufficient human capital needed to achieve long-term economic development, migration could impose considerable costs.

Nation-States shape their migration policies based on their economic and security concerns. Governments employ a wide variety of policy instruments to manage and control the inflow and outflow of migrants, many of which simply involve legal restrictions on migration. However, migration restriction policies are generally more able to affect only the direction of migration rather than the volume of migration flows, and migration may still continue even when restrictions are implemented (Czaika and de Haas, 2013).

This section summarizes the findings of the desk research (literature review) on rural-to-urban migration in Mongolia, the push and pull factors that influence such internal migration, and the measures taken by the Government to regulate its flow. It also summarizes the experiences and practices of other countries in implementing measures to restrict internal migration.



1.1. THE MONGOLIAN CONTEXT OF INTERNAL MIGRATION

Prior to the country's socioeconomic transition in 1990, the Mongolian Government fully controlled migration, and people did not have the right to freely migrate to and permanently reside in any of the *aimags*¹ or the capital city (Alгаа, 2007). During the socialist period, migration was centrally controlled and urbanization for the recruitment of factory workers was promoted. By 1990, approximately 55 to 60 per cent of all Mongolians were living in urban areas. Most of the remainder of the population lived in rural *soum*² centres, where living standards were reasonably high and comparable to those of today – with schools (including boarding schools), theatres, public transport, newspapers and electricity made readily available. This contributed to relatively high standards of living even in rural areas (Gilberg and Svantesson, 1999). In addition, land was collectively and freely used by everyone; however, it could not be privately owned by citizens until 1992.

After the democratic revolution, the Government permitted private ownership of land and property by its citizens, and democratic Mongolia's first Constitutional Law was introduced. This enabled Mongolians to own property and granted them freedom of mobility. Following the enactment of the Constitutional Law, the Land Law was passed in 1994 (and revised on 7 June 2002). Article 3.1.3 of the Land Law defines land ownership as “legitimate control of land with the right to dispose of that land”. The law enabled Mongolian citizens to own land within the territory of Mongolia. In the capital city, ownership is limited to 0.07 hectare of land, while residents of *aimags* may own up to 0.35 hectare and *soum* residents, up to 0.5 hectare (Integrated Legal Information System, 2021). Specifically, agricultural privatization heavily influenced urban–rural migration by enhancing households' ability and freedom to own livestock and take up animal husbandry. National statistics on internal migration shows that the number of migrants in the majority of rural areas, especially in the *aimags* of Khangai Region and Central Region, increased significantly right after the 1991–1992 socioeconomic transition, remaining high until 1999 (NSO, 2020a).

The migration of herders, along with their flocks, to more central provinces (e.g. the *aimags* of Central and Khangai) or closer to small urban centres, accompanied the tendency towards decentralization. Many herders thus gained access to markets and public services (Lkhagvadorj et al., 2013).

*Dzuds*³ have become more frequent and weather conditions have generally become harsher over the last few decades. From 2000 to 2002, and again in 2010, most of Mongolia was hit by severe *dzuds*. As Figure 1 shows, migration to the capital city started to increase in 1998 following consecutive *dzuds*.


¹ An *aimag* is a first-level administrative subdivision in Mongolia and is usually translated into “province”. An *aimag* is further divided into *soums*.

² A *soum* is a second-level administrative division (after the *aimag*, or “province”) and is roughly comparable to a county in the United States. There are a total of 331 *soums* in Mongolia.

³ A *dzud* is a period of summer drought followed by a severe winter.

Figure 1.

Internal migration outflows after the socioeconomic transition, by region




Source: NSO, 2020a.

Pastureland degradation and the frequent occurrence of *dzuds* (winter blizzards) and other harsh weather conditions have brought enormous economic and social challenges for herders. From 1999 to 2002, for example, nearly one third of all livestock perished in three consecutive *dzuds* (Lise et al., 2006), which have become an extreme push factor in the internal displacement or migration of rural people.

According to official statistics, more than 24,000 people migrated to Ulaanbaatar each year on average over the past 10 years. Following the 2010 *dzud*, the State Registration Office of Ulaanbaatar noted a 40-per-cent increase (representing 10,000 additional migrants) in annual migrant inflows from the countryside. (It should be noted that this statistic includes only officially registered, i.e. “regular” migrants).

Figure 2.

Administrative data on the number of migrants in Ulaanbaatar and number of livestock by thousand heads



Source: NSO, 2020a and 2020b.

Citizens migrating from rural *aimags* to the capital city, Ulaanbaatar, are required to update their residential status from “rural” to “urban” and register their city address with municipal authorities. There are currently no official records or data on internal migrants to Ulaanbaatar who are not registered officially.



The mining industry has accounted for a higher share of national GDP than agriculture since 2004. This development, however, has seemingly benefited urban residents much more than the rural population (Mayer, 2016). The desire of rural families for intergenerational mobility – in particular with regard to improving access to education and health services – is another main factor in migration to Ulaanbaatar, which has become a major migrant destination and a rapidly growing primate city (World Bank, 2017).

In the 2017 World Bank study, “Urban poverty in Ulaanbaatar: understanding the dimensions and addressing the challenges”, when asked about their reasons for moving to Ulaanbaatar, migrants stressed the need to safeguard the future of their children and, thus, the importance of good education. In addition, they reported that their children aspired to go to university and claimed that urban schools had higher-quality education. It was concluded that if generational expectations, coupled with a persistent lack of quality education in rural areas, were a key reason for migration, rural-to-urban migration would likely continue to increase.

Incorporation of rural-to-urban migration issues into legal frameworks and policies

As a former Soviet-allied country, Mongolia adopted the *propiska* system of residence permits, which were indicated in residents’ passports during the Soviet period. The aim of this system of authorization was to regulate internal migration and limit freedom of movement. A distinction between the countryside and the cities was created using socialist ideology (Hatcher and Thieme, 2015). Starting 1994, following the socioeconomic transition, the Mongolian Government incorporated internal migration issues in its legal and policy frameworks.

It is important to note that, theoretically, migration restrictions and similar actions are the result of a failure to implement policies to prevent, direct and regulate internal migration. In Mongolia’s case, such restrictive actions are a “last resort” to control migration. The fact that migration in Mongolia largely proceeds one way is a clear indication that there are not enough urban areas to attract migrants other than Ulaanbaatar, or that there is a lack of a policy to direct the flow of internal migration (Narantulga, 2019).

Table 1 provides a brief timeline of the actions taken by decision makers regarding rural-to-urban migration. There is very limited data and research on the implementation of the migration restrictions and their effectiveness in managing and controlling inflows to Ulaanbaatar from rural areas.

Table 1. Laws, orders and actions relating to rural-to-urban migration

Year	Laws, orders and actions	Details
1994	Law on the Legal Status of the Capital City, Article 8.2	The law states that “migration shall be regulated in accordance with the law in order to prevent overpopulation of the capital city and balance disruption of employment, public services, transportation and communication.”
1995	Start of collection of fees from migrants in Ulaanbaatar	Resolution No. 69 of the Citizens' Representative Khural (or Council) imposed the following fees: (a) Per adult migrant – MNT 26,000 (USD 9.20); (b) Per child migrant – MNT 13,000 (USD 4.60).
2001	Increase in the amount of fees from migrants in Ulaanbaatar	An amendment to Resolution No. 69 of the Citizens' Representative Khural raised the amount of service fees collected from migrants: (a) Per adult migrant – MNT 50,000 (USD 17.60); (b) Per child migrant – MNT 25,000 (USD 8.80).
2003	Termination of fee collection from migrants	The National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia issued a decree to the Court of Chingeltei District resulting in the dismissal of Resolution No. 69.
2013	Development of the Master Plan of Ulaanbaatar	A statement in the Master Plan describes the goal to “restrict the number of temporary or unregistered long-term residents in order to generate city revenue and increase access to services.”
2016	Government Policy on Population Development	An indicator in the policy notes that “by 2020, the share of the rural population in the total population will increase from 38 per cent to 50 per cent by 2025.”
January 2017	Migration restriction policy in effect	The Governor of Ulaanbaatar City announced “some measures to be taken to ensure the rights of citizens to live in a healthy and safe environment” and restricted migration from rural areas to Ulaanbaatar until January 2018.
December 2017	Extension of the migration restriction policy	Implementation of the migration restriction policy was extended until January 2020.



Due to the constant increase in the population of Ulaanbaatar, the capital city has been struggling to accommodate its new migrant residents, especially in terms of providing them with economic and basic social services. The Soviet-style planning legacy of the city and legally enforced land ownership regulations led to large urban blocks of low-rise buildings in the city centre. Registered Mongolians living in Ulaanbaatar are entitled to a free plot of land of up to 700 m² on the outskirts of the city and 400–550 m² in the city centre. The city has not properly planned for population development, with substantial gaps in the supply of affordable housing closer to the city centre, resulting in significant urban sprawl (World Bank, 2017).

With the objective of ensuring the basic rights of Ulaanbaatar residents, the Municipality of Ulaanbaatar, through the Governor of the Capital City, introduced a policy in 2017, through Order A/17, restricting migration from rural *aimags* to the capital city. The policy, titled “Some measures to be taken to ensure the rights of Ulaanbaatar citizens to live in a healthy and safe environment, and free from the risk of pollution and disruption in ecological balance”, was initially set to restrict migration for only one year.

The policy duration was extended for two additional years, until January 2020, as the first year of implementation seemed to show positive results in terms of reducing registered, regular migration from the countryside. During the first year of migration restrictions, as of November 2017, 9,567 people moved from the countryside to the capital city for permanent residence – 11,552 less than in the same period of the previous year. During this period, conversely, 10,161 people moved from the capital city to rural areas, and the number of permanent residents in the capital city decreased for the first time in recent years (Government of Mongolia, 2017).

The migration restriction policy essentially aimed to prioritize the rights of Ulaanbaatar residents and protect them from the challenges associated with overpopulation resulting from rural-to-urban migration. It allowed registered⁴ migrants to reside in Ulaanbaatar under the following three circumstances only:

- (a) The migrant needed long-term medical treatment in Ulaanbaatar;
- (b) The migrant had bought an apartment in Ulaanbaatar;
- (c) The migrant was a public servant appointed to work in Ulaanbaatar for more than six months (in which case he or she could be accompanied by family members).

Thus, one of only three conditions to obtain authorization to reside in Ulaanbaatar was to own real estate in the city, which was hardly feasible for new migrants just settling in. In addition, current literature shows that permanent residents in Ulaanbaatar are frequently stigmatized as migrants, as they are commonly seen as the cause of the high poverty levels in the city and blamed for the urban sprawl. In fact, however, urban migrants do not, as a whole, fall under the urban poor category in terms of income (World Bank, 2017).

⁴ That is, to be registered with the Government and receive a permanent residency permit.

The findings of the Labour Market Analysis Study conducted by IRIM in 2016 show a strong correlation between migration and education. People move to get an education, and those who are already skilled migrate to find decent careers. In developed countries, the migration rate of people with higher education is 6 per cent, while that of people having only secondary education is 3 per cent. In Mongolia, the overall migration rate is 18 per cent higher than in developed countries, and citizens with higher education have a migration rate twice that of citizens with only secondary education (IRIM, 2016a).

A study conducted by IOM in 2018 concluded that enterprises in Ulaanbaatar with good technology investment attract migrants with higher education or specific skills such as operating heavy machinery. Inevitably, the concentration of government and educational institutions and infrastructure in the capital city, and the lack of the same in the countryside, has led people to migrate to Ulaanbaatar in search of higher education. Out of the country's 113 institutions of higher education, 90 are located in Ulaanbaatar (IOM, 2018a). Thus, migrants should not be stigmatized or take full blame for the problems caused by the overpopulation of the city.

According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, all human beings are born free, equal in dignity and rights, and entitled to all rights that it sets out, without distinction of any kind – be it race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, or birth or other status (United Nations, 1948). Ulaanbaatar's migration restriction policy directly violated this international human rights framework by discriminating against a subset of its own population and creating two distinct classes in Mongolia: urban and rural citizens. In addition to international norms, the policy violated a provision in Article 16 ("Citizens' Rights") of the Constitution ensuring "the right to freedom of movement and residence within the country, to travel and reside abroad, and to return home to the country" (Government of Mongolia, 2020) and the right to access basic services (Mongolia Government House, 2017).

There were certain justifications that the Government may have considered in implementing the restrictions. For example, the Constitutional provision on the freedom of movement notes potential limitations, namely, that the right to travel and reside abroad may be limited exclusively by law for the purpose of "ensuring the security of the country and [its] population and protecting public order" (Government of Mongolia, 2020). However, there is no clear articulation as to how internal migration poses a threat to State security and public order to lead to such a drastic measure. According to Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (UNODC, 2018), certain conditions must be met for freedom of expression, movement, assembly and association to be legitimately limited. More specifically, all questions listed in Table 2 must be answered in the affirmative with full confidence for specific rights to be restricted. Unfortunately, the migration restriction policy did not fulfil all of these criteria; specifically, it failed to meet the principle of equality by discriminating against rural-to-urban migrants based on their residential status.



Table 2. The migration ban's fulfilment of ICCPR criteria

Year	Details
1. Is there a legal basis for the measure limiting the right?	There is no clear legal basis and articulation as to how internal migration poses a threat to State security and public order to lead to such a drastic measure. No baseline survey or any type of situational assessment was made to provide solid evidence to justify it.
2. Does the limitation of the right pursue a legitimate aim, such as respect for the rights or reputation of others, protection of national security, or maintenance of public order, health or morals?	
3. If so, is the limitation necessary to achieve the legitimate aim, and is the extent of the limitation proportionate in pursuit of the identified legitimate aim? (The existence and effectiveness of procedural safeguards will be a key aspect of the assessment of whether the limitation of the right is proportionate.)	Following the approval of the migration restriction measure, no procedural safeguards have been introduced and carried out. This validates that the limitations are disproportionate and their pursuit unjustified.
4. Does the restriction respect the principle of equality? Is it non-discriminatory? (Measures that limit rights in a discriminatory way will fail the test of proportionality. Therefore, the question of discrimination is generally considered as one aspect of the necessity and proportionality test.)	The measure fails to meet the principle of equality, as the migration ban is discriminatory towards rural-to-urban migrants. The measure restricts the Constitutional rights of rural citizens, as the measure restricts the right to freedom of movement and residence within the country.

1.2. INTERNATIONAL CASES AND PRACTICES IN MIGRATION RESTRICTION

This section provides a review of international cases where government authorities placed restrictions on internal migration. The research discovered that such migration restrictions are more commonly practiced in less democratic contexts, such as those of China, Nigeria and Myanmar. These cases are presented in order from most to least comparable and relevant to the Mongolian context.

1.2.1. China's *hukou* system

In 1958, the Government of China implemented a nationwide household registration system, known as *hukou*, that tracks key demographic information about its citizens, including urban/rural residential status, legal address, sector of activity, religion and physical description. In addition to keeping household records, the system has been primarily used by the Government to control population distribution and rural-to-urban migration (Juneja, 2017). Obtaining an urban *hukou* is extremely difficult, especially in large cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou (Fu, 2018), as prospective rural-to-urban migrants not only have to pay application fees but also meet certain criteria that are exclusivist in nature, such as having a high income, entrepreneurial talent, overseas education and relatives who already have an urban *hukou*. Without a proper *hukou*, rural-to-urban migrants are unable to gain employment and access education, food, health-care and other social services in a city (Chan and Buckingham, 2008). However, instead of limiting migration to cities,

the system has encouraged unregistered or undocumented migration, which makes citizens more vulnerable due to their inability to access key services (Girard, 2019).

The *hukou* system has been highly criticized both domestically and internationally as a tool that discriminates rural people by denying them the advantages and rights that urban residents are able to enjoy, ultimately creating social division in terms of culture and attitudes. In addition to the social inequality impact, research has found that there are also economic consequences, including limited labour resources, reduced consumption and a generally unstable economy in cities, as the policy restricts free movement of the workforce (Sheehan, 2017). It is estimated that there were approximately 261 million rural-to-urban migrant workers in 2015 without urban *hukou*, treated as second-class citizens, many of whom were denied rightful wages in the economy (ECOSOC, 2005). Having realized these negative impacts, the Chinese authorities relaxed the system by committing to the goal of granting urban *hukou* to 100 million rural-to-urban migrant workers between 2014 and 2020 and eliminating the restriction in towns and small cities with populations of 3 million people or less. China reported progress, with 8 million migrant workers having received urban *hukou* as of June 2020 (Fang, 2020).

The restrictions imposed through China's *hukou* system are comparable to those under Ulaanbaatar's migration restriction policy, as the reasons for the migration of rural Chinese to urban areas are also socioeconomic – that is, higher income and better employment prospects and access to better public services and urban amenities (Lu and Xia, 2016). China and Mongolia also have similar exclusivist criteria in place for people to obtain urban residency (i.e. property ownership, the need for long-term medical treatment and public service appointment) that have become major institutional barriers for rural migrants.

We can clearly see in the case of the *hukou* system that controlling population growth through discriminatory policies leads to more social and economic problems and vulnerabilities among internal migrants, in addition to encouraging illegal migration. Therefore, policymakers should consider shifting towards more pro-market policies and reducing migration costs embedded in institutional constraints, as recommended by the Asian Development Bank's migration experts (Lu and Xia, 2016).

1.2.2. Nigeria's open-grazing ban

In 2018, a land-use conflict between farmers and herders across Nigeria's Middle Belt displaced over 300,000 people and caused ethnic, regional and religious polarization (International Crisis Group, 2018). The main factors that sparked clashes between the two groups were: (a) climate-induced degradation of pasture and (b) a law that banned open grazing, thereby prohibiting traditional herders' practice of letting their livestock forage freely. Climate change events, such as drought and desertification, have displaced herders looking for alternative pastures and sources of water for their cattle. Additionally, the Government's discriminatory policy against open grazing, which favoured farmers, exacerbated the tension and led to violence instigated by frustrated herders. These herders' main livelihood was threatened by the Government's open-grazing ban, which is comparable to Ulaanbaatar's migration restriction policy, which prohibited formerly nomadic people who had lost their livestock to climate change events such as *dzuds*, drought and desertification (Kwong, 2019a), from entering the capital city, where they had hoped to find better employment and living conditions.



Similar to how the Nigerian Government's ban reinforced social division between herders and migrants (McDonnell, 2017), Ulaanbaatar's migration restrictions favoured urban residents and contributed to rural–urban polarization and associated negative attitudes towards rural-to-urban migrants, as supported by anecdotes from our focus group discussions (FGDs). The ban in Nigeria essentially gave herders a difficult choice between staying behind and facing economic hardship, along with risks of violence, and fleeing to face an uncertain future in a place where they were unwelcome. Ulaanbaatar's migration restrictions implied the same two choices for Mongolia's rural migrants. Nigeria's ban has been heavily criticized by international actors, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, and some states within the country already suspended its enforcement. Policy experts have recommended Nigeria to take non-discriminatory measures to help herders gradually become ranchers and conduct education programmes for herders to make the transition (Egunyomi, 2018). This case gives Mongolia the important lesson that exclusionary policies are not an answer to managing internal migration.

Myanmar's Rohingya case

The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority group concentrated in the state of Rakhine in the western part of Myanmar. Their case is an extreme example of exclusionary migration restrictions based on religion, ethnicity and place of birth, with the Government of Myanmar denying them citizenship rights and considering them to be illegal immigrants, restricting their movement across the country and limiting their access to critical services (BBC News, 2020). While not entirely parallel to Mongolia's case, one similarity observed is the blame culture that drives discriminatory practices in both countries. The Rohingya people have often been blamed for causing local unrest and disrupting state security and stability (Albert and Maizland, 2020) – a justification for the movement restrictions placed by the Government of Myanmar. Similarly, rural migrants in Mongolia have been blamed for contributing to harming the rights of the “capital city[’s] residents to live in a healthy and safe environment and be protected from environmental pollution and ecological imbalance”, as stated in an official announcement by the Municipality of Ulaanbaatar (Ulaanbaatar City Governor's Office, 2017b). This was why the migration restriction policy was taken as an effort to reduce pollution (especially air pollution) in the city. Over the years, international humanitarian organizations, human rights advocates and other countries have increased pressure on the Government of Myanmar to take measures to protect the Rohingya people. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, overhauling the culture of blame and institutionalized discrimination against the Rohingya is key to improving the situation – a principle that is applicable to Mongolia's case as well (Albert and Maizland, 2020).

The three international cases thus presented illustrate several key considerations for Mongolia:

- (a) Migration restrictions create both social and economic problems, including increased vulnerability, social division and risk of violence.
- (b) Such discriminatory policies are not a common practice in democratic, free-market countries (and Mongolia is both a democracy and a free market), and they are highly criticized on the world stage by human rights groups, multilateral organizations and governments.
- (c) Regardless of migration restrictions, irregular or unregistered migration flows continue, with migrants in this category facing increasing vulnerability.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY




2.1. RESEARCH GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The main goal of this study is to evaluate the effects of Ulaanbaatar City's migration restriction policy on internal migration trends (specifically, migration from rural areas to Ulaanbaatar) and migrants' vulnerabilities. In doing so, the research team defined the key research questions based on the so-called "Theory of Change", which regards the current migration picture as a result of the 2017–2020 migration restrictions.

Previous research (e.g. IOM, 2018b) on internal migration in Mongolia have revealed that economic factors are the main drivers of migration towards Ulaanbaatar. Such factors include availability of employment, better pay prospects and more favourable business conditions in the city. The upper-right part of Figure 3 shows that it is assumed that if the migration restriction policy is effective, rural residents would stay in their places of origin, resulting in a decrease in rural-to-urban migration (specifically, to Ulaanbaatar).

Figure 3.

Theory of Change, as applied to the migration restriction policy of 2017–2020



On the other hand, as the lower-right part of Figure 3 shows, the migration restriction policy is said to have failed to achieve its intended goal if rural households migrate in an irregular way, which exposes them to increased vulnerability, and if their migration affects the population of Ulaanbaatar and the well-being of Ulaanbaatar residents. The following four key questions were therefore defined to explore the impacts and effectiveness of the migration restriction policy:

- (a) What was the real flow of migration in Ulaanbaatar during the migration restriction period (2017–2020)?
- (b) Was there an increase in the vulnerability of internal migrants who migrated to Ulaanbaatar during the migration restriction period?
- (c) Has the migration restriction policy fulfilled its goal of contributing to the betterment of living conditions in Ulaanbaatar?
- (d) What kinds of policy changes and options should be adopted to effectively manage migration flows and reduce migrants' vulnerabilities in Ulaanbaatar?

Both quantitative and qualitative research was conducted under the main research goal:

- (a) **Quantitative research.** Migrant and non-migrant households were surveyed to assess the vulnerability(-ies) and well-being of migrants, as well as how the migration restriction policy affected these. In addition, secondary data analysis was conducted to estimate trends in rural-to-urban migration flows.
- (b) **Qualitative research.** Migrant and non-migrant household members from the target communities were interviewed (through FGDs) to learn about their lived experiences and gather in-depth information on the current state of migration to Ulaanbaatar. Key informant interviews with public service providers were conducted to aggregate perceptions and evidence on the effectiveness of the migration restrictions and to ask for their opinions on effective policy changes and options.

2.2. RESEARCH DESIGN AND TOOLS

This study utilized both quantitative and qualitative research methods, focusing on households (migrant versus non-migrant) in Ulaanbaatar City. Mixing qualitative and quantitative approaches allowed for a wide variety of perspectives and a more in-depth analysis of the challenges faced by Ulaanbaatar residents. Within the framework of the overall research, the following analyses were conducted:

- (a) Rural-to-urban migration flows during the migration restriction period were estimated through secondary data analysis using additional administrative and nationwide survey data.
- (b) The vulnerability of both migrant and non-migrant households residing in Ulaanbaatar City were measured. To do so, a desk review was first conducted to identify the main components and indicators of vulnerability. A household survey was then carried out to assess the effects of the migration restrictions on vulnerability based on these indicators. The indicators of internal migrants' vulnerability across different periods and those of migrant versus non-migrant households' vulnerability were compared.

- (c) An evaluation of the changes in the living environment in Ulaanbaatar City was conducted by assessing basic social service providers and through secondary data analysis.
- (d) Current circumstances, in addition to the legal and policy framework governing migration from rural areas to Ulaanbaatar City, were reviewed to provide a contextual overview.


More detailed information on the research framework can be found in Annex 1.

2.3. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH SCOPE AND COMPOSITION

2.3.1. Household survey sample size and composition

Household survey data collection took place in six central districts of Ulaanbaatar from 12 June to 2 August 2020. When selecting target areas for data collection, the research team considered several important factors, such as population density, total number of households and number of migrant and non-migrant households between 2014 and 2020, and geographic location and size. Subsequently, a total of 40 *khoroos*⁵ were selected (Figure 4). The sample size for each target *khoroos* was determined under a stratified random sampling design. Detailed information on the computation of the survey sample size and the sample size for each target *khoroos* is available in Annex 2.

Figure 4. Target districts and *khoroos* for data collection



Source: This infographic was produced by the IRIM research team.


As Figure 5 shows, a total of 2,505 households were surveyed for the quantitative research. Out of this number, 943 were non-migrant households.⁶ The research aimed to compare the vulnerability of migrant households with that of non-migrant households, as well as the livelihood problems faced by each of these two groups. Out of a total of 1,562 surveyed migrant households (defined as having migrated from rural areas to Ulaanbaatar City within the six years prior to data collection), 1,022 were registered (i.e. they were officially registered and held permanent residence permits), with the remaining 540 unregistered.

⁵ An administrative subdivision of Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia. The term is often translated as “subdistrict” or “microdistrict”.

⁶ Households that did not participate or get involved in rural-to-urban migration at anytime in the last six years (2014–2020) and had permanent residency permit in one of the target survey areas. Non-migrants were not necessarily people who never migrated, as this category also included “old migrants” – people who moved into Ulaanbaatar a considerable amount of time ago.



Figure 5. Composition of the research sample



Source: This infographic was produced by the IRIM research team.

To capture the effects of the migration restrictions on the lives of migrant households, two different groups of migrant households were surveyed. The first group comprised households that migrated to Ulaanbaatar City within the three years (2014–2016) prior to the migration restriction period. The second group was made up of households that migrated during the migration restriction period (2017–2020).

Both migrant and non-migrant households from the same neighbourhoods were interviewed to allow for an accurate comparison between the groups. In terms of locality (based on dwelling type), 56.4 per cent of the total 2,505 households were residing in apartments, with the remaining 44.6 per cent residing in *ger*⁷ district areas.

The following section summarizes the representativeness of the survey sample.

Table 3. Sample sizes by study group

Study group	Registration status	Total migrants to Ulaanbaatar	Sample size
Non-migrant households	Registered	n.a. ^a	943
Households that migrated to Ulaanbaatar before the ban (2014–2016)	Registered	29 862 ^b	486
	Unregistered	n.a. ^c	536
Households that migrated to Ulaanbaatar during the ban (2017–2020)	Registered	16 903 ^d	130
	Unregistered	n.a. ^c	407
Total		46 765	2 505

Notes: ^a Not applicable.

^b The number of internal migrants to Ulaanbaatar from 2007–2016 (according to the NSO statistical database).

^c Data not available.

^d The sum of the total number of internal migrants to Ulaanbaatar between 2017 and 2019 (according to the NSO statistical database).

⁷ A *ger* is a traditional Mongolian detached house or dwelling. A *ger* district is a form of residential district in Mongolian settlements. They usually consist of parcels with one or more *gers* surrounded by 2-metre high wooden fences. Most *ger* districts are not connected to centralized heating or water systems.

The quantitative survey sample size was calculated using the following formula:

$$n = \frac{z^2 \cdot p \cdot (1-p)}{c^2},$$

where:

- z = z value (e.g. 1.74 at a 95% confidence level);
- p = percentage picking a choice (.5 used for sample size needed);
- c = confidence interval, maximum margin of error (we chose narrower interval 1.9% to increase accuracy of our inferences);
- Sample size ~2,505, from which the sufficient sample sizes for the compared groups are 1,562 and 943.

2.3.2. Qualitative research composition

The primary aim of the qualitative research was to gather more in-depth and explanatory information, and ensure a diversity of opinions, perceptions and evidence on the effectiveness of the migration restriction policy. In this regard, we engaged a total of 15 community-level public service providers, including:

- (a) Policemen;
- (b) Family health centre doctors;
- (c) Social welfare social workers;
- (d) State registrars;
- (e) School managers of three *khoroos* in the districts of Sukhbaatar, Khan-Uul and Bayanzurkh.

In addition, a total of 32 people (16 migrants and 16 non-migrants) participated in two FGDs and shared their perceptions of the migration restrictions.

Figure 6. Composition of the qualitative research sample



Source: This infographic was produced by the IRIM research team.

In order to see whether there were differences in terms of locality and living environment, we interviewed public service providers working in the following:

- (a) A *khoroos* located in a central district with apartments only;
- (b) A *khoroos* located in the outskirts of Ulaanbaatar with *ger* districts only;
- (c) A *khoroos* with a mix of apartments and *ger* districts.



3. RESEARCH FINDINGS



3.1. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE MIGRATION RESTRICTIONS IN MANAGING RURAL-TO-URBAN MIGRATION

To answer the first research question – on the effectiveness of the migration restriction policy in controlling the flow of rural-to-urban migrants – the following two analyses were conducted:


- (a) Estimating the number both registered and unregistered migrants in Ulaanbaatar;
- (b) Assessing the actual effects of the policy by separating the impacts of other socioeconomic factors, such as economic growth and livestock loss.

3.1.1. Estimating the number of urban migrants

Direct and indirect approaches are commonly used in international practices for estimating the number of new urban migrants, both registered and unregistered. Direct approaches draw upon administrative data, including annual surveys and census data to directly “capture” the number of new migrants. On the other hand, indirect approaches rely on secondary data, such as registrar data from hospitals or police stations.

According to official statistics, the inflow of internal migrants to Ulaanbaatar dramatically decreased in 2017 and 2018, as Figure 7 shows, while the number remained almost unchanged in other regions. This suggests that the migration restrictions reduced the volume of registered urban migration flows at least in the short term. However, estimating the changes in all migration flows, including unregistered migration, would require other data sources, as administrative data covers only registered migration to Ulaanbaatar.

Figure 7. Number of migrants in Ulaanbaatar



Source: NSO, 2020a; researcher's own calculations based on Labour Force Survey data (NSO, 2020d).



To understand the trends in both the registered and unregistered migration flows, we used the annual Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 2007 to 2019, a nationally representative, large-scale survey conducted by the NSO from 2007 to 2019. It is assumed that the residents interviewed included new migrants, regardless of whether they were registered or not.

When we compare the administrative records of new registered migrants in Ulaanbaatar with the estimated number of all new migrants based on LFS data, a substantial gap can be observed. As Figure 7 shows, the estimated number of all new migrants (blue line) and even its confidence interval (green area) is much lower than the number of new registered migrants (red line). However, it should be the other way around. As Figure 7 shows, the official number of new registered migrants (red line) had been more than 25,000 until 2017, sharply declining to 6,800 until 2019 and then increasing to 12,300 in 2019. Although the estimated number of all new migrants in Ulaanbaatar, based on LFS data (blue line), declined in 2017 and 2018, increasing only in 2019, the rate of change is much slower than what administrative data shows. According to the survey microdata, the weighted share of Ulaanbaatar's total population of migrants who came from rural areas or other cities during the survey year declined from 0.65 per cent in 2016 to 0.49 per cent in 2017 and 0.46 per cent in 2018, and increased to 0.54 per cent in 2019.

This finding suggests that the official restrictions on new inflows to Ulaanbaatar might have led to reduced registered migration. However, the limitations of the administrative and survey data on new migrants must be considered.

First, the fact that the official number of new migrants in Ulaanbaatar substantially declined while the number estimated from LFS survey data only slightly declined may simply reflect a greater number of unregistered migrants who are not accounted for in official statistics.

Second, although the LFS is a nationally representative study, unregistered migrants might not have participated in the survey. A full count of the population of unregistered migrants is, by definition, difficult to track. As described in Kraler and Vogel (2008), unregistered migrants are “hidden populations” who are either difficult to observe or, once observed, are difficult to identify as belonging to that population. It is also not practically feasible to draw a representative sample from the total population, as the structure of the underlying total population is unknown. In fact, without intrusive methods (e.g. police investigation or inquiry), it may even be quite difficult to identify whether a particular person is indeed an irregular or unregistered migrant, even when observed and questioned. Like people involved in illicit activities, unregistered migrants have incentives to deliberately hide from public authorities.

Third, the survey-based estimation of the number of new migrants (those who migrated to Ulaanbaatar within the last 12 months) would not provide reliable statistics because the survey includes only a few of them. As expected, the coefficients of variation of the estimated number of new migrants based on LFS data are higher (11–18%). If we try to increase the weight of the new migrant households in the survey sample and re-weight the estimate by assuming that new migrants are undersampled in the survey, it gets even worse. This can lead to a higher variance of the survey estimate, which then becomes less accurate.

In the search for more reliable data to estimate the number of internal migrants, we utilized Population and Housing Census data published by the NSO (2020c). According to the census report, the number of internal migrants in Ulaanbaatar in 2019 who came from other regions was 55,296.⁸ However, as mentioned above, the NSO annual report on internal migration indicates only 12,300 new migrants (20% of the census estimate) registered in Ulaanbaatar. This means that the remaining 44,000 migrants (80% of the census estimate) can be considered unregistered, irregular new migrants. Unfortunately, these census and administrative data estimates could not be disaggregated by key demographic characteristics, such as age and sex, because a detailed report of the census data has not yet been published. FGD results also support the finding that people are still migrating to Ulaanbaatar from rural areas.



Perceptions of non-migrants on the effectiveness of the migration restriction policy

If the migration ban was effective, there would not be an increase in [the number of] people living in Ulaanbaatar. But lot of rental apartments and houses have been built over the past few years. It is almost impossible to find [an] apartment to rent in September (due to the start of academic year).

Non-migrant 1 (female)

I can feel that lot of people are still coming to the city. Especially in the ger district area, people are building fences and gers wherever they want to settle. It is getting extremely crowded where I live (ger district area).

Non-migrant 2 (male)

I think the number of migrants has decreased only in official registration systems and reports. People are still migrating to Ulaanbaatar even though there is a ban.

Non-migrant 3 (male)

To improve the estimation results, we attempted to utilize an indirect approach by using administrative data from police stations and hospitals. This kind of demographic method is based on the idea that over the course of one's life, each individual (whether he or she is a registered or unregistered resident) is exposed to certain "risks" of demographic events such as giving birth, death or hospitalization. Statistics on such events are well documented, and data on age, sex and group-specific birth rates, death rates, and hospitalization rates are widely available for comparison. Hence, a comparison of recorded demographic events in civil registries with those normally expected for a given age, sex and group cohort could theoretically be used in estimating the unregistered resident population.

Unfortunately, such data sources were not available at the city and district levels. We conducted interviews with basic service providers, such as family medical centres, police stations and schools, in various *khoroos* to get an estimate of the number of new migrants in their respective *khoroos* areas. Specifically, we asked for the number of registered and unregistered residents who received services from these service providers. There is no such disaggregated data at the *khoroos* level, but, according to

⁸ In the census, the NSO reported the number "last 1 year migration", which defines migrants as those who moved from other provinces within last 12 months. The census was held in January 2020, so this number represents the whole of 2019.




some interviewees, up to 30 per cent of total service recipients at their respective outskirts *khoroos* were unregistered migrants.

In brief, although the migration restrictions significantly reduced the trend of registered migration flows into Ulaanbaatar, according to the recent census report and qualitative information, it is likely that unregistered migration flows increased.

3.1.2. Impacts of other factors

As identified by Algaa (2018), the main drivers of internal migration in Mongolia are the prospects of financial security and socioeconomic progress, and access to information and social services. Similarly, IOM (2018a) finds that the main motivating factors for migrants to move are economic considerations, such as the desire to find a job and improve one's living conditions. This is also supported by this study's survey findings. Out of the 2,505 households interviewed, the largest proportion (40.8%) of migrant respondents migrated mostly for economic reasons such as better employment prospects or business opportunities. Other considerable factors for migration included better living conditions in Ulaanbaatar (22.3%) and education (18.2%).


Figure 8. Main reasons for migration



Source: Infographic produced by the IRIM research team.

Therefore, the downward trend of registered migration from rural areas to Ulaanbaatar could have also been affected by other factors, rather than solely by the migration restriction policy. One may notice in Figure 7 that the flow of registered migrants into Ulaanbaatar started to decrease even before the implementation of the restriction policy. The recent downward migrant trend may be partially related to the 2012–2017 economic slowdown. Data from the last 20 years gives a correlation coefficient of 0.28 between the number of new migrants in Ulaanbaatar and the rate of economic growth. This means that migration into Ulaanbaatar tends to decrease during an economic slowdown, such as the one during the period 2016–2017. However, economic growth increased from 2017–2018, while the flow of registered migrants remained at much lower levels than in previous years. This may suggest that the migration restriction policy reduced registered migrant flows, at least in the short term.

Figure 9. Number of rural-to-urban migrants in Ulaanbaatar



Source: NSO, 2020a and 2020c.

According to IOM (2018b), another major factor affecting rural-to-urban migration has been the declining socioeconomic opportunities in rural areas, amplified by drought and winter disasters. As Figure 6 shows, the number of new migrants in Ulaanbaatar spiked during the years of great livestock losses from 2000–2001 and in 2010. Additionally, there is a weak correlation coefficient (0.11) between the number of new migrants in Ulaanbaatar and livestock loss in the last 20 years, but positive and significantly different from zero. This means that fewer rural people may decide to migrate to Ulaanbaatar when there are no major natural disasters in rural areas. In fact, climate conditions were relatively good for the last 10 years. One reason for the recent downtrend before the migration restriction policy was implemented could therefore be the normal climatic conditions in rural areas in recent years.

Key findings from available data and associated analyses of migration flow trends during the implementation of the migration ban yielded the following insights:

- (a) The temporary migration restrictions significantly reduced the number of registered or registered new migrants in Ulaanbaatar between 2017 and 2020. However, unregistered migration may have increased because some pull factors, such as the city's economic growth, were prevalent in the country during that period.
- (b) The number of unregistered migrants is not captured through official administrative records, and it is likely to be higher based on the comparison of recent census, administrative and qualitative data.
- (c) Nationally representative survey data, such as those from the LFS, do not really provide reliable estimations of the number of migrants including those who are registered and those who are unregistered.
- (d) Registered migration might have declined due to other factors, such as economic growth slowdown and lower rates of livestock loss, even without the migration restriction policy in place.



3.2. THE EFFECTS OF THE MIGRATION RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNAL MIGRANTS' VULNERABILITY

In this section, we assess how the migration ban has affected the vulnerability of rural-to-urban migrants. First, based on the methodology for estimating household vulnerabilities, the multidimensional vulnerability index (MVI) was calculated for a total of 2,505 migrants and non-migrants using the household survey data. We then identify key factors influencing the MVI through multiple regression analyses and presented associated conclusions.

3.2.1. Definition of “vulnerability” of internal migrants

There are many different approaches to defining and conceptualizing vulnerability, which not only differ in the terminology used but also in the methods applied for its measurement. We have developed the vulnerability evaluation criteria based on studies similar to ours and previous research conducted by IOM.

The *IOM Handbook on Protection and Assistance for Migrants Vulnerable to Violence, Exploitation and Abuse* (2019) defines the concept of vulnerability as the increased susceptibility, relative to others, of some people to harm as a result of their exposure to some form of risk. The type of harm that migrants are more susceptible to is variable: it may be psychological, physical or environmental. Risk factors depend on the type of harm involved and may overlap. IOM uses the definition of “vulnerable migrant” set out in the United Nations’ “Principles and Guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations”: “Migrants in vulnerable situations” are thus persons who are unable to effectively enjoy their human rights, are at increased risk of violations and abuse and who, accordingly, are entitled to call on a duty bearer’s heightened duty of care.” (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019).

In the Mongolia Urban Vulnerability Assessment (IOM, 2018a) the following definition of vulnerability is presented by the Ger Community Mapping Centre: the situation in which individuals, social groups, property and systems become more vulnerable to the effects of disasters because of social, economic, environmental and physical factors and processes.

Loschmann and Siegel (2014) considered that the literature on vulnerability stems from the seminal work of authors like Sen (1981 and 1999), Chambers (1989) and Jodha (1988), each making a concerted effort to re-conceptualize the conventional notion of poverty as being more than lack of income. However, despite similarities between poverty and vulnerability, the two concepts are not synonymous. While poverty can be thought of as deprivation in terms of indicators like income, consumption, health, education and the like, vulnerability is better understood as the uncertainty caused by deprivation across these indicators. Thus, poverty is a static condition at a moment in time, while vulnerability is a dynamic condition related to insecurity about the future.

Loschmann and Siegel (2014) suggested that “it is both the lack of entitlements (internal) and the exposure to risk (external) which create vulnerability and ultimately influence well-being”. The internal aspect of vulnerability pertains to the idiosyncratic risks faced by particular groups of individuals or households due to weak risk management and low coping ability once faced with a shock. The external aspect, on the other hand, concerns the covariate risks, stress and shocks present in the surrounding environment that threaten the livelihood security of all members of a community or the whole society.

3.2.2. Vulnerability evaluation criteria

We determine the vulnerability of internal migrants to Ulaanbaatar based on the terminology and methodology used by Loschmann and Siegel (2014), who measured the vulnerability of migrants using a multidimensional approach in line with recent efforts of poverty measurement⁹ and four dimensions of functioning losses in human security, exchange freedom, social capital and access.

Ravallion (1998) defined the poverty line as the monetary cost to a given person, at a given place and time, of a reference level of welfare. If a person does not attain a minimum level of standard of living, he or she is considered poor. However, setting poverty lines is a very controversial issue because people disagree on what “subsistence minimum” is. The poverty line is crucial to monitoring poverty and policymaking decisions.

The NSO and the World Bank have collaborated on poverty assessments through the Household Income and Expenditure Survey and the Living Standard Measurement Survey since 2002. The poverty line is derived from the 2010 Household Socio-Economic Survey using the cost-of-basic-needs approach. It is set at the cost of acquiring a consumption bundle that includes food items that provide 2,100 calories per person per day, as well as non-food essential goods and services. The national poverty line was updated only for changes in price levels between surveys. The 2018 national poverty line is estimated at MNT 166,580 (USD 58.40) per person per month using the Bank of Mongolia exchange rate on 31 December 2020.

Based on the poverty measurements used by the NSO and the four dimensions of functioning losses used by Loschmann and Siegel (2014), we use the vulnerability evaluation criteria stated in the Research Methodology section. The target respondents’ vulnerability levels are evaluated using Table 4 and the “dual cut-off” method developed by Alkire and Foster (2011).

⁹ We will prefer measurements used in Human Development Indices and Indicators (United Nations Development Programme) and in poverty measurements of the NSO.



Table 4. Vulnerability evaluation criteria

Dimension	Variable/Indicator	Threshold of household deprivation
Dimension 1: Economic welfare	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Income/consumption per capita 2. Number of income sources 3. Asset ownership (index) 4. Land/livestock ownership 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Below the poverty line (MNT 166,580* (USD 58.40) per month) 2. Less than two sources 3. Less than the sample mean 4. No ownership of land/livestock
Dimension 2: Health and education	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Food security 2. Access to a health centre 3. Education level of household head/main income earner 4. Regular school attendance by school-age children (ages 6–14) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Problems securing food once every few months or more frequently 2. No access to a health clinic or hospital 3. Less than the secondary level 4. A school-age child not in school
Dimension 3: Social	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Participation in community organization 2. Availability of informal assistance (from the community), if needed 3. Trust in the community 4. Security in the community 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No participation in community organization 2. Unable to receive available informal assistance (from the community), if needed 3. No trust in the community 4. No security in the community
Dimension 4: Basic services	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Source of water 2. Type of sanitation 3. Source of fuel for heat(ing) 4. Access to electricity 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. River, lake, pond or stream as water source 2. No toilet; shared pit/latrine or pan/bucket as toilet 3. Wood, straw, shrubs/grass or animal dung as main fuel source 4. No access to electricity

Source: Adapted from Loschmann and Siegel (2014).

Note: * This amount was set as the 2018 threshold defined by the NSO.

3.2.3. Methods for evaluating the level of vulnerability of migrants

To evaluate the level of vulnerability of migrant respondents and measure multidimensional vulnerability, we identify cut-offs that determine the number of variables/indicators in which a household is considered vulnerable. We use the “dual cut-off” method developed by Alkire and Foster (2011).

When applying the dual cut-off approach to the research, rates of intra-dimensional vulnerability are calculated for two levels (“vulnerable” and “not vulnerable”) within each domain. All indicators for each index are binary in Equations 3–7 of Annex 4. Following Loschmann and Siegel, if the aggregated and weighted indicators in a dimension are greater than the cut-off, k , which equals 33 per cent, each indicator will take a value of 1. Each indicator within a dimension will be weighted equally and will be summed up to 1.

After identifying the multidimensional vulnerability index (MVI) for each household, we indicate the degree of vulnerability using the dual cut-off rates shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Criteria of vulnerability level

Level of vulnerability	Dual cut-off rate
Not vulnerable	$k \leq 33\%$
Vulnerable	$k > 33\%$

This means that a multidimensionally vulnerable household deprived in up to half of all indicators, relatively weighted, across dimensions is understood to be less severely vulnerable than those households that are deprived in more than a half of all indicators, relatively weighted, across dimensions.

3.2.4. Estimated multidimensional vulnerability index

We surveyed a total of 2,505 households, including 943 non-migrant and 1,562 migrant households, and calculated the MVI based on primary data according to the criteria in Table 2.

The difference between the gender of main income earners of migrant versus non-migrant households was 5.2 percentage points for both male and female genders (Figure 10). The age trends show that the main income earners of migrant households are rather young compared to those of non-migrant households: 60 per cent of migrant households, compared to 38 per cent of non-migrant households, had main income earners aged 18–35.

Figure 10. Gender and age of the main income earners of migrant and non-migrant households






Figure 11 illustrates the main challenges that the total 1,562 migrant households face after migrating from rural areas to Ulaanbaatar City. To capture the effect of the migration restrictions, a comparison is made between migration periods. For instance, people who migrated when the migration restriction policy was in force (2017–2020) face more challenges in renting or buying accommodation (26%) and receiving health services (12.5%) compared to those who migrated before the introduction of the policy (i.e. the 2014–2016 period).

Migrants who moved to Ulaanbaatar during the 2014–2016 period face more difficulties in finding a job (29.2%) compared to those who migrated during the 2017–2020 period. This might have had an effect on the drop in the employment rate in 2016 due to the economic downturn.

Figure 11. Main challenges faced by migrant households after migration, by migration period



The methods for creating the MVI are shown in Annex 4. The MVI must have a maximum value of 1 and a minimum value of 0, with the index defined as “vulnerable” if it is less than 0.67, according to the criteria of vulnerability level.

For the total of 2,505 households surveyed, the MVI was estimated at an average value of 0.671, which falls under the “not vulnerable” category. However, this value is very close to the vulnerability level threshold of 0.67. The histogram showing the MVI distribution for all households shows that 26.04 per cent of the 2,505 participants scored less than 0.67 and are thus considered vulnerable.

The MVI score of the migrant households is 0.67, while that of the non-migrant households is 0.68. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) finds that there is no statistically significant difference in MVI scores between the migrant and non-migrant households. In particular, in one-way ANOVA, $\chi^2(1) = 1.8214$ Prob > $\chi^2 = 0.177$ is obtained, and the null hypothesis (i.e. that the mean value of MVI is equal for migrant and non-migrant households), is accepted at a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$.

Figure 12. Histograms for the multidimensional vulnerability index (MVI)





Figure 12 shows the histograms of the MVI scores of migrant and non-migrant households, with 27.6 per cent of migrant households and 23.5 per cent of non-migrant households in the vulnerable category. **This means that migrant households are more likely to be vulnerable than non-migrant households.** Disaggregating by registration status, 27.8 per cent of officially registered, 26.9 per cent of temporarily registered, and 27.7 per cent of unregistered migrant households are identified as vulnerable. This shows that **there is almost no difference in vulnerability between officially registered and unregistered households.**

The respondents' scores in the MVI (by migrant type and overall sample), as well as in its four component indices, are shown in Figure 13. Mean scores for the social index (SI) and the economic wealth index (EWI) are relatively lower than those for the health and education index (HEI) and the basic services index (BSI).


Figure 13. MVI and component index scores (EWI, HEI SI and BSI) of migrant and non-migrant households



Each index is broken down into its component indicators (Figure 14), according to the methods described in the Annexes, to determine the strength of their effects on the index.

The EWI is the largest contributor to the MVI. The EWI scores for both migrant and non-migrant households are below 0.67 (i.e. vulnerable). In particular, monthly income per capita is in the extremely poor category for both migrant households and non-migrant households. Migrant households have a weaker index for the indicators *number of income sources* and *asset ownership* than non-migrant households, but a stronger index for *land/livestock ownership*.

Figure 14. Mean EWI indicator scores of migrant and non-migrant households




Monthly income per capita takes a value of 1 if it is higher than the poverty line (MNT 166,580 (USD 58.40) per month) and 0 if otherwise. Monthly income per capita is compared for migrant and non-migrant households. Approximately 96 per cent of all surveyed households had a monthly income per capita of below MNT 166,580 (USD 58.40). Income level shows the weakest results compared to other components, which implies that income is a strong factor contributing to the high vulnerability level reported for the EWI.

As Figure 15 shows, non-migrant households are more likely to be employed than migrant households, with the share of employed people in the non-migrant household group 2.9 per cent higher compared to the migrant household group.

Only 14.2 per cent of total non-migrant households and 17.3 per cent of total migrant households have unemployed adults. However, migrant households have a higher number of working household members than non-migrant households. Nearly half, or 47.5 per cent, of migrant households have more than two members earning income, whereas 40.2 per cent of non-migrant households have more than two income-earning members.

Figure 15. Number of income-earning members in migrant and non-migrant households




Descriptive statistics for migrant and non-migrant households show rather similar employment trends. The top three employing sectors for both migrant and non-migrant households are construction (16.8% of migrant and 14.6% of non-migrant households), followed by wholesale, retail trade and repair of motor vehicles (13.7% and 12.7%, respectively), and then by transportation and storage (7.8% for migrant and 9% for non-migrant households).

More than 50 per cent of the main income earners of both migrant and non-migrant households hold high school and technical and vocational training diplomas. In addition, the share of household main income earners holding a bachelor's degree or higher is considerably high among both migrant and non-migrant households. As for marital status, 79.7 per cent of the main income earners of non-migrant households have living partners, whether officially registered or not.




Figure 16. Education and marital status of the household main income earner



Source: Infographic produced by the IRIM research team.

Figure 17 shows the respondents' mean scores, by household type (migrant and non-migrant), for the four components indicators of the health and education index (HEI). Both migrant and non-migrant households rate relatively high in three of the four component indicators of the HEI. The remaining indicator, *education level of household head/main income earner*, is rated below 0.67 (i.e. the vulnerability threshold). In other words, the education level of the household head/main income earner is likely an important factor leading to household vulnerability in the health and education dimension.

Figure 17. Mean HEI indicator scores of migrant and non-migrant households



Scores for the component indicators of the social index (SI) are shown in Figure 18. With the exception of *security in the community*, both migrant and non-migrant households score below the vulnerability threshold level of 0.67 for these indicators. Migrant households have lower scores for *participation in community organization*, *trust in the community* and *security in the community* than non-migrant households. However, they score higher in *informal assistance available for the migrant households* than non-migrant households. Informal support comes in the many forms of helpfulness and assistance that people give each other freely in daily life, including food, finances, and psychological or emotional support from parents, siblings and other family members, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, neighbours, and other people in the community.

Figure 18. SI indicator scores of migrant and non-migrant households




Figure 19 summarizes the main challenges and difficulties faced by unregistered migrants upon their migration to Ulaanbaatar City. Due to their unregistered status, these households have to rent plots of land and houses in remote areas of the city where infrastructure, such as lighting and electricity, is not well developed. Our qualitative study documents the case of an unregistered migrant household living in the outskirts of the city and receiving electricity illegally from their neighbours. Other respondents find it difficult to get water from the water station, which is often located far from their homes.

Almost a third (29.3%) of the total 540 unregistered migrants report accessing basic infrastructure services, including electricity, water and heating, to be their biggest challenge. Finding adequate employment in the city is the next. Findings of the qualitative research validate this statement, as an official residency permit or authorization is needed to obtain a regular job and gain access to electricity,

Figure 19. Main challenges faced by unregistered migrants in Ulaanbaatar





Figure 20 shows scores for the BSI indicators, all of which are above the vulnerability criterion of 0.67. Although it is a challenge for unregistered migrants to get access to basic infrastructure services, in the end all of them receive these services, including water, sanitation and heating.

Figure 20. Mean BSI indicator scores of migrant and non-migrant households



3.2.5 Methods for assessing the effect of the migration restrictions on migrant vulnerability

This section provides the ANOVA and regression results based on multiple linear regression models to assess the effects of the migration restrictions on the vulnerability of internal migrants.

Based on the literature review on household vulnerability, we hypothesize that the vulnerability of internal migrants depends on geographic and socioeconomic factors. Socioeconomic indicators (Bhattacharjee and Behera, 2018) include the following: the household head's marital status of the household head; household head's gender, age and years of education; household size and number of children; dependency ratio (number of dependents (those aged 0–14 and over the age of 60) to household size, expressed as a percentage) (Baiyegunhi and Fraser, 2010); and income and occupation of the household head, among others. Geographic factors (Brooks et al., 2005) include distance to a paved road, livestock market and potable water source.

In this analysis, the dependent variable is the MVI and the explanatory variables comprise several geographic and socioeconomic variables, as shown in Equation 1:

$$MVI_j = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot x_1 + \beta_2 \cdot x_2 + \dots + \beta_i \cdot x_i + \gamma \cdot BAN + \delta \cdot \text{Migration Dummy} + \varepsilon \quad (1),$$

where:

MVI_j	= Multidimensional Vulnerability Index for household j
x_i	= geographic and socioeconomic variables
BAN	= dummy variable for the 2017–2020 restriction period
Migration Dummy	= dummy variable for migrant households
ε	= error term

In Equation 1, we include the BAN and Migration Dummy variables to assess the effects of the migration restrictions on the vulnerability of internal migrants. The BAN dummy takes a value of 1 if the year of migration is 2017–2020 and 0 if otherwise. The Migration Dummy takes a value of 1 if a household is a migrant and 0 if otherwise.

3.2.6. ANOVA and multiple regression analysis results

In this section, we interpret the results of the ANOVA and multiple regression of the household survey data. ANOVA will focus on determining whether the MVI score would differ depending on the migrant's registration status. The multiple regression analysis is aimed at determining whether the MVI score would differ depending on whether the migrant household moved to Ulaanbaatar when the migration restriction policy was in place.

We make the following hypothesis to analyse whether the MVI score of the migrants differed depending on the type of migration registration.

$$H_0 : \mu_{\text{Officially registered}} = \mu_{\text{Unregistered}} = \mu_{\text{Temporarily}}$$

$$H_a : \text{Not all population means are equal.}$$

The H_0 implies that the mean MVI scores of all three groups – those with official, registered permanent residency, registered temporary residency, and unregistered residency – are equal. ANOVA is a statistical test used to determine whether the observed differences between the three samples are large enough to reject the H_0 . If the H_0 is rejected, we cannot conclude that all population means are different. Rejecting the H_0 means that at least two population means have different values.

The results of the ANOVA are shown in Table 4. The p -value = 0.00087, which is less than the significance level ($\alpha = 0.05$). With the p -value $\leq \alpha$, the H_0 is rejected. Therefore, **it can be concluded that the MVI mean values of the three samples differ depending on registration status.**

Table 6.

ANOVA results to analyse whether MVI scores vary according to migrant type (based on registration status)

Summary

Groups	Count	Sum	Average	Variance
Migrant households with registered permanent residency	532	362.3125	0.681038534	0.012147731
Unregistered migrant households	540	354.6875	0.656828704	0.012196731
Migrant households with registered temporary residency	490	325.375	0.664030612	0.010487811

ANOVA

Source of variation	SS	df	MS	F	p-value	F crit
Between groups	0.164859316	2	0.082429658	7.079142751	0.00087	3.001496
Within groups	18.15302241	1 559	0.011644017			
Total	18.31788172	1 561				

Note: SS – sum of squares; df – degrees of freedom; MS – mean square; F – F-test statistic; F crit – F-test critical value



The next step is to find out which two groups have different mean values. Fisher's least significant difference (LSD) procedure can be used to determine where the differences occur. Fisher's LSD uses the t-test statistic, which can be computed for using the following formula.

$$t = \frac{\bar{x}_i - \bar{x}_j}{\sqrt{MSE \left(\frac{1}{n_i} + \frac{1}{n_j} \right)}}$$

where:

\bar{x}_i, \bar{x}_j = sample means of MVI for each group
 n_i, n_j = number of observation for each group
MSE (mean square due to error) = 0.011644017 (from Table 6)
Degree of freedom (df) = $n_T - k = 1,562 - 3 = 1,559$

The results of the analysis using Fisher's LSD procedure are shown in Table 7. The last column of the table contains a conclusion on whether to reject the H_0 hypothesis.

Table 7. Results of the analysis using Fisher's LSD procedure

Hypotheses	$\bar{x}_i - \bar{x}_j$	$\sqrt{MSE \left(\frac{1}{n_i} + \frac{1}{n_j} \right)}$	t-test statistic	Critical value of the t distribution with $df = 1\,559$	Decision /Result
$H_0 : \mu_{\text{Officially registered}} = \mu_{\text{Unregistered}}$ $H_a : \mu_{\text{Officially registered}} \neq \mu_{\text{Unregistered}}$	$0.681 - 0.657 = 0.024$	0.0066	3.641	1.961	Reject H_0
$H_0 : \mu_{\text{Officially registered}} = \mu_{\text{Temporarily}}$ $H_a : \mu_{\text{Officially registered}} \neq \mu_{\text{Temporarily}}$	$0.681 - 0.664 = 0.017$	0.0068	2.516	1.961	Reject H_0
$H_0 : \mu_{\text{Temporarily}} = \mu_{\text{Unregistered}}$ $H_a : \mu_{\text{Temporarily}} \neq \mu_{\text{Unregistered}}$	$0.664 - 0.657 = 0.007$	0.0067	1.040	1.961	Do not reject H_0

The H_0 that the mean MVI scores of migrant households with permanent residency and unregistered migrant households are equal is statistically rejected, with the latter found to be more vulnerable than the former. In addition, the H_0 that the mean MVI scores of migrant households with permanent residency and those with temporary residency are equal is statistically rejected, as ANOVA shows that the latter are more vulnerable than the former. However, the variance analysis could not reject the H_0 hypothesis that the mean value of MVI was equal for temporary resident households and unregistered households. This means that there is no statistically significant difference in the mean MVI scores of these two groups.

According to the results of the ANOVA, migrant households with officially registered permanent residency are less vulnerable than those with only temporary residency and unregistered migrant households. There is no statistically significant difference in vulnerability between registered and unregistered migrant households.

A multiple regression analysis is conducted to determine if the MVI score would differ depending on whether a migrant household moved to Ulaanbaatar in a year when the migration restriction policy was in place. These variables are tested for statistical significance at a 95 per cent confidence interval using the *t*-test and F-test, and the non-significant variables are excluded from the model. Four of the models identified in the evaluation are shown in Table 8. For each model, the error variance is not constant (i.e. heteroscedasticity occurred); all model ratings are evaluated as “robust” and standard errors are corrected. From the household survey questionnaires of the regression model, the variables that could affect the MVI are chosen; the MVI is tested to be statistically significant at a 95 per cent confidence interval using the *t* and F tests, and the insignificant variables are excluded from the model. A BAN dummy variable takes the value of “1” if the household migrated during the migration ban; in other cases, it is equal to “0”.

Table 8. Results of multiple regression analysis to determine of MVI for the migrant households

Dependent variable: MVI of migrant households				
Independent variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
BAN_Dummy	-0.024 ^a (0.006)	-0.022 ^a (0.005)	-0.015 ^a (0.005)	-0.013 ^b (0.005)
Main_Sex_Woman		-0.015 ^a (0.006)	-0.013 ^b (0.005)	-0.013 ^b (0.005)
Dependency_Ratio		-0.027 ^a (0.009)	-0.03 ^a (0.009)	-0.031 ^a (0.009)
Main_Edu_Low		-0.062 ^a (0.005)	-0.058 ^a (0.005)	-0.058 ^a (0.005)
Head_Married		0.032 ^a (0.006)	0.024 ^a (0.006)	0.025 ^a (0.006)
Head_Divorced		-0.024 ^c (0.014)	-0.029 ^b (0.013)	-0.027 ^b (0.013)
Income_Before_Migrating			0.0 ^a (0)	0.0 ^a (0)
Housing_House			0.038 ^a (.006)	0.038 ^a (0.007)
Housing_Public_Dormitory			-0.072 ^a (0.008)	-0.07 ^a (0.009)
District_Sukhbaatar				-0.014 ^a (0.005)
Mig_Reason_Living_Condition				-0.014 ^b (0.006)
Registration Type in Ulaanbaatar				-0.001 (0.003)
Intercept	0.682 ^a (0.004)	0.712 ^a (0.006)	0.704 ^a (0.007)	0.71 ^a (0.009)
Observations	1 562	1 562	1 562	1 562
R-squared	0.011	0.13	0.196	0.203

Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

^a $p < 0.01$, ^b $p < 0.05$, ^c $p < 0.1$



As a result of the estimation, we choose Model 4 and find that the model has high explanatory power in comparison to the other models. The BAN dummy variable and most other explanatory variables are statistically significant. $R^2 = 0.203$ means that these explanatory variables explain 20.3 per cent of the variance in the MVI scores of migrant households. Explaining the coefficients evaluated in Model 4, the estimated value of the BAN dummy is $z = -0.013$, which means that households migrating in a year when the migration restriction policy was in place would likely have a mean MVI score lower by 1.3 per cent compared to migrant households who migrated in other years. If the household's main income earner is a woman and poorly educated, the MVI score is likely to be lower. Regarding marital status, if the head of the household is married and the marriage is officially registered, the MVI score is likely to be higher; on the other hand, if the head of the household is divorced, the MVI score is likely to be lower.

Also, as the number of dependents increases by 10 per cent relative to the total household size, the household's vulnerability is more likely to increase by 3.1 per cent. The MVI score is likely to be better among households that were earning more before they migrated. The MVI score of a household living in a private house is estimated to be better, while the MVI score of a household living in a public dormitory is expected to be worse.

The regression analysis also finds that if a household is located in Sukhbaatar District, its MVI score is likely to be worse than those of households in other districts. This may be due to the fact that Sukhbaatar District is populated by more students and tenants. Another interesting finding is that households that moved to Ulaanbaatar to improve their living conditions are more likely to have lower MVI scores than other migrant households. Of the total 1,562 respondent migrant households in Ulaanbaatar, 212 moved in search of better living conditions; 28.8 per cent of them are vulnerable.

Migrants in Ulaanbaatar are divided into three categories: those with officially registered permanent residency, those with registered temporary residency, and those who are unregistered. Thus, in order to determine how the type of registration affects the MVI score of the migrant household, we include the variable *type of registration* as an independent variable in our regression analysis. However, this variable is found to be statistically insignificant.

3.3. THE EFFECTS OF THE MIGRATION RESTRICTIONS ON THE WELL-BEING OF ULAANBAATAR RESIDENTS

One of the research questions in this report is about whether Ulaanbaatar's temporary migration ban has served its intended goal of improving the overall living conditions of both migrant and non-migrant residents. The current study aims to detect whether there has been a significant change in the quality of the living environment due to the migration ban. The methodology is based on the combined assessment of the vulnerability index analysis and focus group discussion (FGD) insights around the four key dimensions: economic welfare, health and education, social situation, and basic services. The assessment suggests that the migration restrictions did not increase the overall well-being of Ulaanbaatar residents, whether migrants or non-migrants.

According to the quantitative survey data collected from non-migrant residents, the majority, or 57 per cent, of respondents report that the temporary ban did not bring any improvement to overall living conditions in Ulaanbaatar. This is further supported by FGD insights from the migrant and non-migrant representatives we engaged. When asked about how their living conditions changed during the years when the ban was in full effect, they explain that living conditions in and around both ger districts and apartment complexes remained difficult. However, they noted that air pollution decreased and social assistance improved during the ban implementation period of 2017–2020. It is difficult to conclude whether these improvements are fully associated with the migration restrictions because there were other initiatives that overlapped with the ban period, such as a ban of raw coal and the promotion of healthy fuel use (Kwong, 2019b). As for social protection, the Government instituted generous cash programmes, including an increase in child allowances from MNT 20,000 (USD 7) to MNT 100,000 (USD 35) (UNICEF, 2020), which could be linked to the upcoming 2020 parliamentary elections and the Government’s COVID-19 response.

The finding that the migration ban did not improve people’s well-being is also supported by the vulnerability index analysis. Both migrants and non-migrants are found to be vulnerable, with MVI scores of around 0.67–0.68 (on a scale of 0–1, where 1 indicates the lowest level of vulnerability), with the migrant group discovered to be more vulnerable. The high levels of vulnerability suggest that the well-being of both migrant and non-migrant populations are influenced negatively. If we separate migrants from the overall sample, they are found to be consistently more vulnerable compared to non-migrants across all four dimensions, especially economic welfare. During the migration ban, unregistered migrants are not able to receive key public services in the fields of education, health and protection (with the exceptions of emergency, domestic abuse, pregnancy and infant care), and infrastructure services (e.g. electricity).

3.3.1. Economic welfare

While both migrant and non-migrant populations are found to be extremely vulnerable on this dimension, migrants’ vulnerability is worse, at an EWI score of 0.34, compared to 0.38 of non-migrants – a statistically significant difference. While there may be other contextual factors contributing to this vulnerability, such as COVID-19 and the general economic situation, our index and FGD results suggest that the migration ban has negatively influenced the economic well-being of all Ulaanbaatar residents, but especially migrants. For example, we discover that the average salary of migrants is lower than the average salary of non-migrants by around MNT 200,000 (USD 70.20); approximately 28 per cent of the migrant respondents reported struggling to find employment, and 25 per cent having difficulty with asset ownership during the migration ban implementation period. The FGD insights help us unpack why this is the case:



I still have not officially registered in Ulaanbaatar. I moved from Darkhan Province two years ago to be with my children, who are registered. Whenever I attempt to get registered, the local authority (khoroo) would not accept me because of the migration ban. I have talked to the khoroo director many times about it. I could get a job – but for someone of my age, only jobs like janitors are available. However, some employers would not even consider me because I am not a registered Ulaanbaatar resident. Some places would put me on trial for a few days, and when they find out that I am not officially registered, they would decide not to hire me. Sometimes, I would not even get my salary for the trial days. Because I am not registered, I am now on my fourth job trial.

Migrant 1’s story about looking for employment





My husband currently has rural registration status but works in the city. We tried to get a bank loan to purchase a car, but the bank did not accept [our application] because he is not officially registered in Ulaanbaatar due to the migration ban. So we took out a private loan at a higher interest rate, and if something like a car crash happens, even insurance companies require official Ulaanbaatar registration.

Migrant 2's story about getting a loan and owning assets

3.3.2. Social situation

For the social dimension, we consider *participation in community organizations, informal assistance via the community, trust in the community and security in the community*. According to the vulnerability analysis of the social situation, both migrant and non-migrant groups are equally vulnerable, with SI scores of around 0.52–0.53 during the migration ban. Aligned with this finding is the fact that majority of the FGD participants allude to a strong tension between rural and urban residents, as these groups are considered to have different attitudes and cultures. Some even cite examples of discriminatory acts from urban residents towards rural people.



On my floor, there is one guy who lives alone. On his door, people would put up a piece of paper that warns him not to litter. But in reality, he does not litter. Another example is that on the third floor, another family has just moved in and people would put up the same piece of paper about garbage. It seems like people are assuming those newcomers are rural folk or from the ger districts, so they judge that they might litter.

Migrant 3's story about discriminatory attitudes towards rural people

The majority of the FGD participants also report a lack of knowledge about the existence of community meetings and local administrative teams (e.g. *khoro* staff) and their corresponding responsibilities and activities. Additionally, migrants participating in the FGDs report feeling unsafe, as the most common areas of the city that they move to are the ger districts, which are usually very remote and do not have any streetlights and proper infrastructure, posing safety and security concerns. Some respondents note how the migration ban has exacerbated the situation, as unregistered migrants are not able to get their electricity set up due to the requirement of having an official registration, so these migrants opt for illegal and unsafe ways to obtain electricity, such as by illegally connecting to their neighbours. Unsafe practices have, in the past, led to a number deaths in the ger districts, including that of a child (MMINFO, 2019).

The vulnerability index results, along with these FGD anecdotes, suggest that the social well-being of Ulaanbaatar residents has not improved as a result of the ban. Instead, it may have worsened the situation by creating less safe and more insecure living conditions, an urban–rural divide in culture and attitudes, and a lack of trust in community engagement. This finding is further supported by our survey data. The migrants who respond that they moved to Ulaanbaatar looking for better living conditions are found to have become more vulnerable overall, which illustrates how the ban did not deliver on its promise of increasing the well-being of Ulaanbaatar residents (both migrants and non-migrants).

3.3.3. Health and education

For this dimension, we consider food security, access to a health centre, the education level of the household head or main income earner, and regular school attendance of school-age children. The corresponding vulnerability index finds that migrant and non-migrant populations are equally invulnerable, with HEI scores of around 0.83–0.85, which are above the vulnerability threshold. These index results appear to show an “overall status” of being able to access health and education services; our FGD results help us unpack these scores to show what kind of measures people have to take to access these services. We determine that people are able to access health and education services through illegal ways, such as paying bribes, to get their kids accepted into schools. According to the FGD insights, people are commonly aware of such mechanisms and the associated standard bribe “rates” apply informally. These findings illustrate that index results should be accompanied by and enriched with qualitative research results.



In the form of donations, people give at least MNT 100,000 (USD 35) to enroll their kids in schools. Those that are in the downtown area are more expensive. This has almost become an unwritten law. Last year, people used to give MNT 250,000 (USD 88) to the downtown schools, but this year, the “rate” has increased.

Migrant 4’s story about school bribery

Health-service providers report that doctors provide first-aid support, but if the health issue requires more work (e.g. lab tests, specialty doctor visits and surgery), unregistered migrants are sent to district-level hospitals, where they may need to show their registration documents. At the *khoro* level, primary doctors see patients regardless of their registration status or type; however, they are not able to enter unregistered migrants’ information into the medical record system. This creates additional work for *khoro* frontline service providers, who do not get the proper credit and are unable to give accurate figures of their workload, making it difficult for them to make requests for or claim additional resources. They also report that explaining their difficult situation to unregistered migrants, the migrants sometimes get frustrated and make unsavory remarks. Frontline health workers receive a great deal of derogatory comments and experience disillusionment with their jobs. They estimate the percentage of people they see who are unregistered migrants at 30–50 per cent of the total number of their patients. These FGD insights illustrate how the migration ban has caused the unintended consequence of added workload for frontline health workers and increased tensions between citizens and public servants.



“Unregistered migrants refuse to tell us their identification numbers, get pretty angry, and insult us [by calling us] “lazy”, which leaves us no choice but to see them. As a result, our workload increased substantially and informally since the migration ban.”

Frontline health worker’s story about additional workload



3.3.4. Basic services

For this dimension, we consider the household's source of water, type of sanitation, source of fuel for heating and access to electricity. Our vulnerability analysis finds migrant and non-migrant populations to be equally invulnerable, with BSI scores of around 0.95–0.96. While this index shows positive results in terms of low levels of vulnerability, these need to be interpreted carefully. Similar to the HEI, the index results only show the final status that people are able to access these basic services, and do not account for the conditions or ways through which people access them. Disaggregating the raw data, almost 39 per cent of both migrant and non-migrant households source their water not from centralized systems, but instead from public and private wells and rainwater. Also, around 38 per cent of the households report having an open pit for sanitation, as there is no access to proper plumbing in most ger districts. Another 39 per cent of the households report lacking centralized heating systems, so they use stoves heated by burning coal or wood. All these statistics look worse if we separate migrant households from the sample. These conditions should not be considered as if people are not vulnerable and are able to access key services. The United Nations describes the human right to sanitation as everyone having “physical and affordable access to sanitation, in all spheres of life, that is safe, hygienic, secure, and socially and culturally acceptable, and that provides privacy and dignity.” Clearly, going to a pit toilet, travelling long distances to get drinking water from wells, and burning coal for heating should not be considered dignified ways of fulfilling these basic needs. Therefore, the index results should be interpreted and applied carefully based on human right norms – not local norms – when making policy decisions.

With a low indicator score, migrants and non-migrants are found to be invulnerable in terms of accessing electricity. However, this finding contradicts with FGD findings on how community members obtain electricity. They share that unregistered migrants cannot own land due to the migration ban; and because the land is not owned officially, migrants are unable to gain access to electricity. Hence, people take extremely unsafe measures to get electricity informally through their social capital (e.g. by tapping into their neighbours' electric line).



“When unregistered migrants come to the city, people always move to the most isolated parts of the city where there is no electricity. As for my family, we moved to the area called Moringiin Davaa, beyond Tuul River near the Ulaanbaatar airport. There is no infrastructure and it is completely dark in the evening.”

Migrant 5's story about basic services

With this integrated assessment of quantitative and qualitative research results, we conclude that the migration ban did not improve the overall well-being of Ulaanbaatar residents, as originally intended, across the four key dimensions of economic welfare, social conditions, health and education, and basic services. Counterproductively, the migration ban created more social and economic problems, particularly for unregistered migrant households, as outlined in this section.

3.4. EXPLORING THE IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON MIGRANT AND NON-MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS


The COVID-19 pandemic is affecting the social and economic circumstances of many countries. The Government of Mongolia declared State Disaster Preparedness Status following the first case of COVID-19 transmission in Ulaanbaatar on 13 February 2020. In light of this, all types of schools (including kindergarten) were closed, all types of public transportation (within Ulaanbaatar) and public events were restricted. Other measures taken included closure of bars, sport clubs, tourist camps, resorts and hotels, merchandise markets and wholesale shopping centres, and the prohibition of religious and cultural gatherings (Wilson, 2020).

In line with the measures taken by the Government, some organizations and private entities have begun to adjust work hours and salaries, and even laid off employees. This section of the report further explores the impact of the pandemic and restrictive measures taken by the Government on migrant and non-migrant households in Ulaanbaatar.

COVID-19 and employment

Majority (61%) of the 2,120 main income earners of surveyed households report that their working hours did not change due to COVID-19, while the remaining 39 per cent worked from home, took paid leave, and worked part-time.

Figure 21. Household income due to COVID-19 among all households



As for changes in salary, 46.4 per cent of the main income earners of total 2,120 households with employed members stated that their salaries have not changed; 2.7 per cent say it has increased; and 31 per cent say it has decreased (Figure 21).

Out of 780 non-migrant households, 50 per cent report no change in the salaries of main income earners; 46.3 per cent report a decrease; while 57.7 per cent of total 1,340 migrant households with employed members said that their salary has not changed, and 31 per cent say that their salary has decreased.

Also, there is no statistically significant difference in the answers about how salaries have changed due to COVID-19, depending on whether they are migrant households or not.


COVID-19 and household economic situation

In terms of decreased household income due to COVID-19, the percentage of non-migrant households were 17.1 percentage points higher than migrant households. Two thirds (66%) of the total 1,562 non-migrant households have full-time employment




and have stable incomes, and 18.4 per cent of them make money on their own (Figure 22). Due to COVID-19, full-time employers have reduced working hours, which resulted in a decrease in employees' incomes.

Figure 22. Household income change due to COVID-19 among migrant and non-migrant households



Due to decreased incomes, 11.2 per cent of non-migrant households (compared to 6.9% of migrant households) experience more frequent income insufficiencies to meet their basic needs. The discrepancy is due to the fact that migrant households are able to receive informal assistance from their relatives or friends in their places of origin, while non-migrant households do not. Majority (59.6%) of migrant households report having close relatives or friends who can provide monetary assistance when needed. This result is 13.1 percentage points higher compared to non-migrant households. Also, the percentage of non-migrant households with loans is higher than migrant households by almost 16 percentage points.

Figure 23. Frequency of household income insufficiency to meet basic needs due to COVID-19



Survey results show that 65 per cent of migrant households and 49.2 per cent of non-migrant households had outstanding loans. When asked whether someone could help them in case of sudden financial need, 59.5 per cent of migrant households and 46.4 per cent of non-migrant households answered in the affirmative.

To briefly conclude this section, the pandemic situation and the restrictive measures taken are impacting non-migrant households more, as they have more debt compared to migrant households and lack direct assistance from others.

4. CONCLUSION



Internal migration policies aligned with national and international frameworks of human rights on freedom of movement is a healthy and inclusive practice for sustainable urbanization and development. In exceptional cases of limiting certain rights, there needs to be a clear justification and the associated evidence to showcase why the right to move freely within one's homeland was restricted, such as national and population security as well as protection of the public order (Article 16(18) of Constitutional Law). However, a mass of evidence collected and analysed through this research suggests that the migration ban imposed by the Municipality of Ulaanbaatar was not consistent with the national and international legal frameworks or fulfilled the criteria to limit human rights. This research is the first comprehensive study that presents an empirical evaluation of the migration ban and provides an understanding of how it showed effect on migrant and non-migrant populations. The project utilized a diverse set of research tools, including a large-scale survey, focus group discussions (FGDs) and a literature review of international and domestic studies.

We conducted ANOVA and multiple regression analyses on the household data collected to determine whether MVI scores differed depending on the migrants' registration type and to identify the effect of the migration restrictions on migrants' vulnerability. As a result of the statistical analysis, it was found that unregistered migrant households and migrant households with temporary residency permits were more vulnerable compared to the officially registered migrant households. However, we should note that there was no statistically significant difference in the MVI. In addition, the MVI score was likely to be lower by 1.3 per cent when the household migrated in the year when the migration restriction policy was in place. This could be concluded as the migration restrictions affected negatively the migrants' vulnerability.

The research identified that the ban's intention to reduce migration flows was not achieved as the the actual volume of unregistered migrants might have increased even though the official statistics report fewer number of migrants since the ban did not allow them to register in the system. Unexpectedly, the research data showed that 83 percent of those who migrated during the ban reported that they would have migrated even if they knew about the migration restriction policy. This illustrates a significant lack of public awareness about the policy and the ban's ineffectiveness in influencing prospective migrants' behaviour (i.e. the decision to actually migrate).

The ban did not affect the overall number of migrants but because of its operational nature (i.e. impeding people to get residency registration), what happened was that, structurally, the migrant population moved towards having fewer migrants with registered residency and more without. It is also convenient from the official perspective: As long as official statistics are based on registered migrant numbers, inflows will show a sharp "decrease", thus the conclusion that the ban is an efficient policy – which, of course, is not reflective of the real situation.



The research discovered that unregistered migrants who moved during the period of restriction enforcement faced additional exposure to economic, social, and health risks, compared to non-migrants or permanent residents of Ulaanbaatar. Particularly, more vulnerable subgroups –households whose main income earner is female, older or less educated, and households with more members who are of retirement age and/or children ages 14 and below – faced critical challenges, such as inability to receive public services, find employment and own assets. The research also found that these consequences created by-product issues, from corruption in public service delivery to health hazards, and from illegal connections to electric lines to stigma and negatives attitudes of the non-migrant community. Surprisingly, FGDs revealed that the majority of non-migrant groups also believed that the migration ban did not improve their overall living conditions in Ulaanbaatar either, particularly with regard to crowdedness, water and soil pollution, traffic congestion, safety and security, and employment.

Given the size of knowledge gaps about the migration ban's effectiveness and best practices to manage internal migration flows in the local context, this research attempted to add value to the literature review and inform decision-making processes for relevant stakeholders. As this research gives evidence on the ineffectiveness of the migration ban and its associated, unintended consequences, we recommend a combination of short-term practical solutions and longer-term policy approaches in the next section. Such strategies should build on collected evidence, further assessments of the ban's indirect and direct effects, and key stakeholder discussions to create more inclusive migration policies and regulations moving forward.

5. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS



The findings of this research study has shed light on our understanding of specific challenges that migrants faced during the migration restriction period, particularly for those who are found to be more vulnerable, including unregistered migrants; households whose main income earner is female, older or less educated (high school or lower); and households with more members of retirement age and/or children ages 14 and below. The findings from the quantitative research are consistent with the results from the FGDs and the literature review and allow us to draw several direct policy recommendations. These are laid out in Table 6 and summarized below:

- (a) Identify and register unregistered migrants by raising public awareness, engaging community focal points and reducing transaction costs, including through making the registration procedure simpler and more accessible, including by digitalizing it and utilizing alternative data collection methods.
- (b) Reduce the vulnerability of those subgroups that are in a more difficult situation by creating targeted interventions and/or making referrals to existing services that are appropriate, particularly with regard to economic well-being.
- (c) Dedicate more targeted resources for managing and mainstreaming internal migration by establishing an agency/department/unit for migration management and migrant integration at the national level (most probably at the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection), but, more importantly, at the municipal and local levels, primarily in the Municipality of Ulaanbaatar.
- (d) Avoid extreme forms of migration restriction by considering international human rights conditions, applying less strict barriers to entry, and encouraging the voluntary return of migrants who are already settled in Ulaanbaatar.
- (e) Disseminate accurate, systemic information about decisions and policies on internal migration to ensure social awareness and buy-in regarding their value and expected outcomes.
- (f) Influence norms and attitudes towards internal migrants among the wider population about the many proven benefits that migrants can bring to the city through awareness-raising campaigns; Know Your Rights activities for migrants themselves, for their empowerment; and training for frontline workers on practices that are sensitive to migrant rights.
- (g) Reduce push factors by focusing on rural development and regional development as a precondition for stabilizing migration outflows from the countryside in the long run.
- (h) Mainstream internal migration into long-term development plans and policies.
- (i) Conduct additional research and key stakeholder consultations to complement the study.



Table 9. Specific policy recommendations for the short, medium, and long term

Time frame	General policy direction	Specific policy recommendations	Responsible agencies and partners
Short term: Mitigation efforts	Identify and register unregistered migrants.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Engage community focal points from local <i>khoroos</i> in the registration process to identify unregistered migrants that are hard to reach, which will improve community acceptance and trust and reduce costs of travelling to register. 2. Provide financial and technical support to <i>khoroos</i> to effectively identify unregistered migrants in their communities and officially register them. 3. Improve the national statistical system to track and incorporate the number of unregistered internal migrants into the official database by collaborating with local and international organizations, such as IOM, to use alternative data collection methods, including the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix. 4. Raise public awareness about the benefits of becoming registered to encourage registration and provide information on how to register. 5. Reduce associated transaction costs (e.g. application support, fines, transportation and Internet access) and simplify the registration process, for example, through digitized services; carrying out targeted programmes to register certain areas or populations; and eventually changing the concept of registration as simply a declaration of the place of residence. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipality of Ulaanbaatar • Local <i>khoroos</i> • International partners (e.g. IOM).
	Reduce the vulnerability of particular migrant subgroups, with a focus on economic well-being.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Create targeted economic interventions for subgroups, such as job search and matching programmes, vocational training for female household heads and subsidized loans for asset ownership (e.g. car and apartment). 2. Make referrals to existing social, health and educational services offered through MLSP and provide support when applying for benefits such as food vouchers, cash allowances, school grants and in-kind assistance. <p>The research identified the following migrant subgroups as extra-vulnerable: households whose main income earner is female, older or less educated (high school or lower), and households with more members of retirement age and/or children ages 14 and below).</p>	Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP)

Time frame	General policy direction	Specific policy recommendations	Responsible agencies and partners
Medium term: Integration and soft restrictions	Dedicate targeted human and financial resources for internal migration.	<p>Establish an agency/department/unit at the national level (MLSP), as well as the municipal and local levels (MUB), to lead policymaking on internal migration management and mainstreaming by setting up a targeted mandate, staffing structure and programmes that focus on the particular needs of migrants, such as integration and reintegration assistance.</p> <p>Integration programming</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Encourage integration by designing and implementing orientation programmes about city life, vocational training and awareness-raising campaigns to promote two-way integration, and temporary accommodation for extra-vulnerable migrants. 2. Integration programmes, such as business and employment support, must focus on better-off, middle-class migrants who could help drive the local economy. (Internal migrants in Ulaanbaatar scored higher in “availability of informal assistance” than non-migrant households. Informal support comes in many forms of help and assistance, including food, finances and psychological support, given freely in daily life by parents, siblings and other family members, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, neighbours, and other people in the community.) 3. Leveraging this research finding, invest in supporting local informal networks, such as neighbourhood associations or unions, to advance integration efforts, including awareness-raising and employment promotion activities. <p>Reintegration programming</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Offer resettlement benefit/motivation packages that incentivize and support migrants’ voluntarily return to their rural communities of origin, with access to job-matching, scholarships and social services. 2. Embed internal migration into the existing programming of six agencies under MLSP by expanding the eligibility of services and giving priority to migrant applicants to these programmes, which will help reach intersected segments of the population (e.g. migrant persons with disability, migrant youth and entrepreneurs who have migrated). 3. Mainstream internal migration considerations into different sectorial policies at the national and local levels, including in economic development, regional development, education, mining, environmental protection, health care and public infrastructure. 	MLSP



Time frame	General policy direction	Specific policy recommendations	Responsible agencies and partners
	Avoid extreme forms of migration restriction that are not sensitive to human rights, while encouraging the voluntary return of migrants settled in Ulaanbaatar.	<p>Prospective migrants</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Favor investments in integration and reintegration programmes instead of restrictive migration programmes that should be considered only as options of last resort. Support the most vulnerable while socially and economically empowering middle-class residents who could decide to remain in the countryside with additional support and contribute to local development. 2. Apply a human rights and vulnerability-sensitive lens through – for example, the conditions and criteria from Article 19 of the ICCPR, Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 16 in the Constitution of Mongolia, all of which guarantee the human right of exercising freedom of movement within the territory of one's homeland – before considering to implement any restrictive policies in the field of internal migration. 3. After certain decisions are made around internal migration policy, roll out systemic awareness campaigns to ensure accurate information among the wider population. A large majority (83%) of survey respondents who migrated during the ban stated that they would have migrated whether they knew about the policy or not, which suggests a lack of social awareness and buy-in. 	Municipality of Ulaanbaatar
		<p>Settled migrants</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Offer resettlement packages to those moving back (e.g. employment, social services and subsidized mortgage loans). 2. Apply a resettlement scheme for migrating unemployed people in the city to rural areas to fill vacancies, which was successfully implemented in Belarus in 2007 (Albert and Hårs, 2012). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipality of Ulaanbaatar • MLSP
	Address negative norms, stigma and attitudes towards internal migrants.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organize awareness-raising campaigns and community meetings among the wider population about the many proven benefits that migrants bring to the city (e.g. educated workforce, production income, business and skills) (World Bank, 2017; IRIM, 2016b). 2. Organize campaigns similar to Know Your Rights to educate internal migrants and empower them to become advocates. 3. Organize training for government employees, particularly frontline workers, on policies and practices in public service delivery that are sensitive to migrants' situation and their rights. 4. Organize awareness-raising activities for migrants and non-migrants about national legislation regarding freedom of movement. Majority (76%) of the unauthorized migrant respondents claimed that the restriction policy had not violated their rights. This suggests that citizens are not aware of their basic human right to freely move within the boundaries of their home country. There is a provision in the Constitution of Mongolia that grants "the right to freedom of movement and residence within the country, to travel and reside abroad, and to return home to the country," (Government of Mongolia, 2020) and the right to access basic services (Mongolia Government House, 2017). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil society • International partners • Municipality of Ulaanbaatar • MLSP • Ministry of Education • National Human Rights Commission

Time frame	General policy direction	Specific policy recommendations	Responsible agencies and partners
Long term: Prevention efforts	Reduce push factors by focusing on rural development.	1. Support the integration of internal migration dimension into the strategic visioning and planning for regional and rural development in Mongolia by integrating the data and knowledge of the concerns and lives of internal migrants into the evidence base and service delivery.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Development Agency Cabinet Secretariat
		2. Attract private sector investments in rural Mongolia by offering diverse and increased incentives, including to Mongolians abroad willing to return or invest via their family members (e.g. through tax breaks and credits, a simplified taxation system, subsidized business loans, cash grants, construction fee waivers, access to land ownership and other infrastructure-enabling support).	Ministry of Finance
		3. Advance administrative decentralization reform, especially its public finance dimension: Provide more flexible funding to local authorities while setting certain targets and putting in place accountability mechanisms that would give them the discretion to spend funding in ways that are most contextually appropriate, strategic and useful to the regions.	
		4. Improve infrastructure systems, such as roads, electricity, public transportation, affordable housing, and communication, which would help reduce transaction costs and promote connectivity across rural areas.	
		5. Invest in holistic, top-down and bottom-up emergency management with regard to the mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery strategy at local administrative levels to increase the resilience of nomadic herders in the countryside in case of natural disasters, such as drought and <i>dzud</i> . The work should also include “internal migration education” for as long as internal migration remains a top coping strategy in Mongolia. While such initiatives should include basic needs support via food and cash assistance, they also need to consider building the capacity of herders through vocational training, small business development and coping skills programmes.	Ministry of Construction and Urban Development National Emergency Management Agency of Mongolia



Time frame	General policy direction	Specific policy recommendations	Responsible agencies and partners
	Mainstream internal migration into long-term plans and legal documents.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Update policy documents to integrate internal migration and associated explicit mechanisms to assess progress towards targets: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> SDG 2030 commitments Vision 2050 (e.g. satellite city planning) State Policy on Population Development 2016–2025 Ulaanbaatar Master Plan 2020 Government Action Plan 2016–2020 Regional Development Vision Mainstream internal migration in development policy and planning documents still to be developed, such as the Targeted Programmes. Mainstream internal migration considerations into local development planning documents in Ulaanbaatar and at the <i>aimag</i> and <i>soum</i> levels. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Municipality of Ulaanbaatar Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of Mongolia
	Conduct further research and key stakeholder consultations.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct more comprehensive econometric assessments that isolate the effect(s) of the migration restriction policy from those of other factors such as economic downturns and natural disasters. Conduct in-depth analyses on the newly produced census 2020 data, disaggregating internal migrants and triangulating the data with other registration records and other administrative data to more accurately estimate the volume of migrant flows. Research on the current contingent of migrants who returned and resettled into the countryside from Ulaanbaatar: understand their drivers, motivation, key success factors, what the best policies for integration and reintegration would be, and what support programmes would be most helpful. Conduct an in-depth, cross-country literature review on effectively managing internal migration flows to understand what has worked and what has not, and apply best practices from comparable countries that have experienced similar challenges. Organize key stakeholder meetings to further discuss and refine policy recommendations, prioritizing them in order of feasibility and importance, and devise action plans. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Statistics Office Municipality of Ulaanbaatar Statistics Department
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Municipality of Ulaanbaatar MLSP National Development Agency International partners Think-tanks

GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

<i>aimag</i>	The first-level administrative subdivision of Mongolia. An <i>aimag</i> is further divided into <i>soums</i> .
<i>dzud</i>	A summer drought followed by a severe winter, generally causing serious loss of livestock.
<i>ger</i>	A traditional Mongolian dwelling.
internal migration	Movement of persons within a State (or country) involving the establishment of a new temporary or permanent residence. Internal migration movements may be temporary or permanent and include those who have been displaced from their habitual place of residence, as in the case of internally displaced persons, and those who decide to move to a new place of residence, as in the case of rural-to-urban migration. The term covers both nationals and non-nationals moving within a State, provided that they move away from their place of habitual residence. (IOM, 2020a)
irregular migration	Movement of persons that takes place outside of the laws, regulations and international agreements governing entry into or exit from a State of origin, transit or destination. Although a universally accepted definition of irregular migration does not exist, the term is generally attached to persons moving outside of regular migration channels. Moreover, categories of migrants who may not have any other choice but to use irregular migration channels may also include refugees, victims of trafficking and unaccompanied migrant children. The fact that they use irregular migration pathways does not imply that States are not, in some circumstances, obliged to provide them with some forms of protection under international law, including access to international protection in the case of asylum seekers fleeing persecution, conflict or generalized violence. (IOM, 2020a)
<i>khoroо</i>	An administrative subdivision of Ulaanbaatar, the capital of Mongolia. The term is often translated as “subdistrict” or “microdistrict”.



migrant	An umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for any of a variety of reasons. The term includes a number of well-defined legal categories of people, such as migrant workers; persons whose specific types of movements are legally defined, as in the case of smuggled migrants; and those whose status or means of movement are not specifically defined under international law, as with international students. (IOM, 2020a)
migrant in a vulnerable situation	A migrant who is at an increased risk of abuse and violations of his or her rights – and, thus, is unable to effectively enjoy them. Accordingly, such a migrant is entitled to call on a duty bearer’s heightened duty of care. (IOM, 2020a)
non-migrant household	A household that did not participate or get involved in rural-to-urban (also, “rural–urban”) migration in the six years prior to the survey, with its members having permanent resident permits in the survey’s target areas.
registered migrant	An individual that participated or was involved in rural-to-urban migration in the past six years and is officially registered as a permanent resident in any of the target survey areas.
registration	The process of enlisting in the Civil State Registration Database under one’s residential address, in accordance with the Mongolian Law on Civil Registration. (Mongolia Government House, 2018)
regular migration	Migration that occurs in compliance with the laws of the relevant countries of origin, transit and destination. (IOM, 2020a)
soum	The second-level administrative subdivision of Mongolia.
unregistered migrant	An individual that participated or was involved in rural-to-urban migration in the past six years and is not officially registered as a permanent resident in any of the target survey areas.
vulnerability	Vulnerability is any condition characterized by either a lack of entitlements (internal vulnerability) or exposure to risk (external vulnerability). Ultimately, conditions of vulnerability adversely affect well-being. (Loschmann and Siegel, 2014)

ANNEX 1. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Criteria	Sub-criteria	Methods	Tools
Estimation of the real migration flow into Ulaanbaatar	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Estimate the migration flow using available administrative data. 2. Estimate the migration flow using Labour Force Survey data. 3. Review relevant studies on irregular migrants in Ulaanbaatar. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary data analysis • Key informant interview (KII) data analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary data • KII guide
Measurement of vulnerability	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Identify dimensions of functioning losses that cause vulnerability. 2. Identify components of measurement of vulnerability. 3. Identify indicators that are used to measure each component of vulnerability within each dimension. 4. Identify thresholds that are used to define vulnerability. 5. Identify cut-offs that determine the number of indicators in which a household is vulnerable to be classified as experiencing multidimensional vulnerability. 6. Identify levels of vulnerability. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Survey • Creation of a composite index 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secondary data • Survey questionnaire and data
Assessment of the effects of the migration restrictions on vulnerability	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Detect whether there is a significant difference between the vulnerability indicators of internal migrants in the 2014–2017 group and those of the 2017–2020 group. 2. If some difference is detected, explore whether there are registration restriction effects on vulnerability. 3. Enrich the results of quantitative analysis with the findings from the qualitative analysis. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Analysis of variance (ANOVA) • Multiple regression analysis • Qualitative data analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey questionnaire and data • FGD guide and data • KII guide and data



Criteria	Sub-criteria	Methods	Tools
Assessment of the changes in the living environment in Ulaanbaatar	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Detect whether there has been a significant change in the quality of the living environment in Ulaanbaatar between 2016 and 2020, by the year, using secondary data. 2. Assess the perceptions held by basic social service providers, including school teachers, <i>khoro</i> and district-level hospital doctors, <i>khoro</i> administrators, <i>kheseg</i> leaders and the police. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Multiple regression analysis • Secondary data analysis • Qualitative data analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Survey questionnaire and data • KI guide and data • FGD guide and data • Happy City Index data • Social Well-being Survey of Mongolia (SOWSM)^a data
Policy analysis and review of the current internal migration situation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Review all current policy documents, law and regulations on internal and international migration by adopting equality- and human rights-based and gender-responsive approaches. Issues relating to ethnic and other minorities must be considered. 2. Detect what kinds of protection internal migrants need. 3. Identify short- and long-term interventions needed to empower migrants (e.g. self-reliance and prevention). 4. Identify changes needed in the governance structure in relation to internal migration issues. 5. Develop recommendations on improving: (a) data on and the registration of internal migrants, and (b) the level of intersectoral coordination and cooperation. Provide policy options and/or recommendations for effectively managing internal migration and reducing migrants' vulnerabilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Desk review • Qualitative data analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KI guide and data • FGD guide and data

Note: ^a The Social Well-being Survey of Mongolia can be accessed at irim.mn/uploads/files/13/Brand-Report-Eng.pdf.

ANNEX 2. SURVEY SAMPLE SIZE CALCULATION

The survey sample was calculated by the following formula:

$$n = \frac{z^2 p(1-p)}{c^2},$$

where:

- n = sample size
- z = confidence level (at a 95% confidence level, $z = 1.96$)
- p = probability of occurrence, C-error limit (confidence interval)

The sample error limit was chosen to be $\pm 3.7\%$, and confidence level to be 95 per cent. The sample size for each target location was determined by stratified random sampling. Please refer to Annex 3 for more detailed information on the quantitative research sample composition.



ANNEX 3. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH SAMPLE COMPOSITION, BY TARGET *KHOROOS*

	No. of total households	No. of non-migrant households	No. of migrant households
Total	2 505	943	1 562
Bayangol District	239	88	151
<i>Khoroo</i> 1	62	25	37
<i>Khoroo</i> 3	61	18	43
<i>Khoroo</i> 6	58	23	35
<i>Khoroo</i> 18	58	22	36
Bayanzurkh District	581	249	332
<i>Khoroo</i> 2	36	23	13
<i>Khoroo</i> 5	45	14	31
<i>Khoroo</i> 8	95	46	49
<i>Khoroo</i> 9	22	9	13
<i>Khoroo</i> 14	47	17	30
<i>Khoroo</i> 16	47	16	31
<i>Khoroo</i> 19	37	16	21
<i>Khoroo</i> 21	44	23	21
<i>Khoroo</i> 22	40	21	19
<i>Khoroo</i> 23	23	8	15
<i>Khoroo</i> 25	35	18	17
<i>Khoroo</i> 26	71	18	53
<i>Khoroo</i> 27	39	20	19
Songinokharikhan District	394	136	258
<i>Khoroo</i> 2	35	12	23
<i>Khoroo</i> 6	56	30	26
<i>Khoroo</i> 7	55	10	45
<i>Khoroo</i> 18	32	12	20
<i>Khoroo</i> 19	27	7	20
<i>Khoroo</i> 23	47	16	31
<i>Khoroo</i> 24	47	16	31
<i>Khoroo</i> 25	29	11	18
<i>Khoroo</i> 31	66	22	44

	No. of total households	No. of non-migrant households	No. of migrant households
Sukhbaatar District	832	293	539
<i>Khoroo 1</i>	89	34	55
<i>Khoroo 3</i>	64	21	43
<i>Khoroo 7</i>	63	28	35
<i>Khoroo 8</i>	75	25	50
<i>Khoroo 10</i>	84	26	58
<i>Khoroo 11</i>	221	75	146
<i>Khoroo 13</i>	66	21	45
<i>Khoroo 16</i>	75	33	42
<i>Khoroo 18</i>	95	30	65
Khan-Uul District	265	105	160
<i>Khoroo 3</i>	61	11	50
<i>Khoroo 5</i>	115	57	58
<i>Khoroo 16</i>	89	37	52
Chingeltei District	194	72	122
<i>Khoroo 9</i>	109	41	68
<i>Khoroo 12</i>	85	31	54



ANNEX 4. METHOD FOR CREATING THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL VULNERABILITY INDEX

We used a subjective weighting technique to allocate values to classes of dimension for each variable and formulates indices based on Equation 2 below.

$$CI = \frac{W_1 + W_2 + W_3 + \dots + W_n}{n} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n W_i}{n} \quad (2),$$

where:

CI = composite index
 $W_1, W_2, W_3, \dots, W_n$ = transformed values assigned to variables
 n = number of variables used in computing the index

Following this general principle, the economic welfare index, health and education index, social index, and basic service index were calculated. In addition, the multidimensional vulnerability index (MVI) for each household was calculated using Equation 7.

$$\text{Economic Welfare Vulnerability Index for Each Household } EWI = \sum_{i=1}^4 EW_i / n, (n=4) \quad (3)$$

$$\text{Health and Education Vulnerability Index for Each Household } HEI = \sum_{i=1}^4 HE_i / n, (n=4) \quad (4)$$

$$\text{Social Vulnerability Index for Each Household } SI = \sum_{i=1}^4 SI_i / n, (n=4) \quad (5)$$

$$\text{Basic Service Vulnerability Index for Each Household } BSI = \sum_{i=1}^4 BI_i / n, (n=4) \quad (6)$$

$$\text{Multidimensional Vulnerability Index } MVI = \frac{EWI + HEI + SI + BSI}{4} \quad (7)$$

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