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WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020
This volume is the result of a highly collaborative venture involving a multitude of partners and contributors under the direction of the editors. The World Migration Report 2020 project commenced in May 2018 and culminated in the launch of the report in November 2019 by the Director General at the 110th session of IOM Council.

The findings, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States.

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All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this report, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain. Unless otherwise stated, this report does not refer to data or events after June 2019.

The stories behind the photographs can be found on page v.
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Participatory video team recording their stories and messages of hope in Herat, Afghanistan. A group of 13 young Afghan women and men spent a week together in Herat to exchange experiences, direct and produce a film about migration. The initiative is part of IOM’s Global Migration Film Festival Participatory Video Project to engage migrants and host communities in participatory filmmaking that strengthens social cohesion. © IOM/Amanda NERO

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Many Venezuelans travelling through the continent do so by foot carrying their children and possessions. Caminantes, or walkers, trek along major highways and through difficult terrain. They must go through mountainous areas where temperatures drop below zero and through scorching hot areas where water is scarce. Many make this journey with just a light jacket, rubber flip flops and a small backpack with the most essential items they manage to carry. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED

Chapter 2
Aerial view of internally displaced persons in Wau protection of civilians site, South Sudan. © IOM/Rainer GONZALEZ PALAU

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The Kutupalong Refugee camp near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED

Chapter 4
Abdulai Adum, Mixammete Village, Central African Republic. © IOM/Amanda NERO

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IOM shelters in Bakassi internally displaced persons Camp, Nigeria. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED

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Robeiro, an ex-combatant from an illegal paramilitary group in Colombia, carries harvested chili peppers. Robeiro is one of 300 beneficiaries of an income generation project implemented by IOM Colombia. © IOM/Diego SAMORA

Chapter 6
Burmese migrant worker in Bangkok. © IOM/Benjamin SUOMELA

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IOM Thailand’s Migrant Health Assessment Centre on Silom Road in Bangkok provides health screenings for migrants who are about to migrate abroad. © IOM/Benjamin SUOMELA

Chapter 8
Children play at the playroom at the Processing Centre for Syrian families resettling to Canada. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED
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Bercy is the principal of an elementary school on Udot Island, Federated States of Micronesia. During the typhoon, one of their buildings was severely damaged. The new building is used as a library for students. © IOM/Muse MOHAMMED

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Mass Evacuations in Natural Disasters (MEND) - Quezon City, the Philippines. © IOM/Charissa SORIANO

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Chris’s mother is so happy to find her son after he was separated from his mother and little brother during their migration. © IOM

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Ameerah and Anajia spend time practising their drawing skills after class (the Philippines). © IOM/Julie BATULA
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Foreword

IOM’s responsibility to provide an objective and balanced account of migration globally has never been more important. Not only is the political salience of migration high, and frequently fevered, but the capacity for rapidly disseminating disinformation to influence the public discourse has expanded.

Twenty years ago, IOM published the first World Migration Report with the stated aim of providing an authoritative account of migration trends and issues worldwide. With the initial report published in 2000, the series has quickly become established as IOM’s flagship publication.

The early World Migration Reports were framed around specific themes. They provided deep dives into topics such as labour mobility, migrant well-being and communication on migration. But, with time, there was a sense that the broader landscape and complexity of migration issues was being neglected.

Times have changed, dramatically so. Migration is now a top-tier political issue interconnected to human rights, development, and geopolitics at national, regional and international levels. Accordingly, IOM has enhanced the flagship series to ensure that the World Migration Report is, in fact, a world migration report.

We have revamped the series to offer a more strategic contribution to the public debate. We have strengthened our collaborative partnerships with scholars and applied researchers in order to benefit from their diverse expertise and knowledge. We have made content and structural changes to increase the World Migration Report’s utility to the evidence base on migration globally, in line with IOM’s growing role in data collection and analysis.

The World Migration Report 2018 is the most downloaded of all IOM publications. It is clearly fulfilling the need to provide a balanced understanding of migration’s complexities, present the latest global data and information in an accessible way, and explore and explain complex and emerging migration issues.

As the United Nations’ migration agency, IOM has an obligation to demystify the complexity and diversity of human mobility. The report also acknowledges IOM’s continuing emphasis on fundamental rights and its mission to support those migrants who are most in need. This is particularly relevant in the areas in which IOM works to provide humanitarian assistance to people who have been displaced, including by weather events, conflict and persecution, or to those who have become stranded during crises.

Likewise, IOM remains committed to supporting Member States as they draw upon various forms of data, research and analysis during policy formulation and review processes. Indeed, this is reflected in IOM’s Constitution where the need for migration research is highlighted as an integral part of the Organization’s functions. The World Migration Report is a central component of this important function.

In this era of heightened interest and activity towards migration and migrants, we hope this 2020 edition of the World Migration Report becomes a key reference point for you. We hope it helps you to navigate this high-profile and dynamic topic during periods of uncertainty, and that it prompts reflection during quieter moments. But most importantly, we hope that you learn something new from the report that can inform your own work, be it in studies, research and analysis, policymaking, communication, or migration practice.

António Vitorino
Director General
REPORT OVERVIEW: PROVIDING PERSPECTIVE ON MIGRATION AND MOBILITY IN INCREASINGLY UNCERTAIN TIMES

Introduction

The long-term and growing body of evidence on migration and mobility shows that migration is in large part related to the broader global economic, social, political and technological transformations that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues. As the processes of globalization deepen, these transformations increasingly shape our lives – in our workplaces, in our homes, in our social and spiritual lives – as we go about our daily routines. Increasing numbers of people are able to access information, goods and services from around the world because of the ongoing expansion in distance-shrinking technologies.

There is also a sense that we are in the midst of a period of considerable uncertainty. Many commentators have called into question the solidity of aspects of the global political order forged in the immediate aftermath of the two world wars, including as they relate to alliances and common interests. Others are calling this time the “age of anger”, tracing back the current sense of geopolitical uncertainty and discontent to a dominant and relentless focus on “logic” and “liberal rationalism” at the expense of emotional responsiveness.

It is within this context that this world migration report focuses on developments in migration over the last two-year period, with an emphasis on providing analysis that takes into account historical and contemporary factors. Historical in recognition that migration and displacement occur within broader long-term social, security, political and economic contexts. Contemporary in recognition that we are in the midst of profound global transformations, and that the resultant changes to our daily lives are impacting the current environment in which migration occurs and is discussed.

What has happened in migration?

A lot has happened in migration in the last two years since the release of the World Migration Report 2018 in late 2017. The world has witnessed historic change at the global level with United Nations Member States coming together to finalize two global compacts on the international manifestations of migration and displacement: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and the Global Compact on Refugees. The finalization of the compacts is a result of decades-long efforts by States, international organizations, civil society organizations and other actors (such as private sector organizations) to improve

1 Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM and Binod Khadria, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
2 See, for example, Castles, 2010; Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, 2011; Koser, 2016; Triandafyllidou, 2018.
3 Ikenberry, 2018; Stone, 2016.
5 IOM, 2017.
how migration is governed at the international level. In the years leading up to States committing to develop
the compacts, numerous dialogues, workshops, consultations and side events at international, regional,
national as well as local levels have enabled different migration “realities” to be shared and the many areas
of common interest to be expanded through deeper understandings of the benefits of migration as well as the
challenges it may present. The compacts, therefore, build upon many years of engagement on the key issues
underpinning the two compacts.

The unfortunate reality is that there have been major migration and displacement events during the last
two years; events that have caused great hardship and trauma as well as loss of life. Foremost have been
the displacements of millions of people due to conflict (such as within and from the Syrian Arab Republic,
Yemen, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan), extreme
violence (such as inflicted upon Rohingya forced to seek safety in Bangladesh) or severe economic and
political instability (such as faced by millions of Venezuelans). There has also been growing recognition of the
impacts of environmental and climate change on human mobility (such as planned migration/relocation and
displacement), including as part of global efforts and international policy mechanisms to address the broader
impacts of climate change. Large-scale displacement triggered by climate and weather-related hazards
occurred in many parts of the world in 2018 and 2019, including in Mozambique, the Philippines, China, India
and the United States of America.

We have also seen the scale of international migration increase in line with recent trends. The number
of international migrants is estimated to be almost 272 million globally, with nearly two-thirds being labour
migrants. This figure remains a very small percentage of the world’s population (at 3.5%), meaning that the
vast majority of people globally (96.5%) are estimated to be residing in the country in which they were born.
However, the estimated number and proportion of international migrants already surpasses some projections
made for the year 2050, which were in the order of 2.6 per cent or 230 million. That said, it is widely
recognized that the scale and pace of international migration is notoriously difficult to predict with precision
because it is closely connected to acute events (such as severe instability, economic crisis or conflict) as
well as long-term trends (such as demographic change, economic development, communications technology
advances and transportation access). We also know from long-term data that international migration is not
uniform across the world but is shaped by economic, geographic, demographic and other factors resulting
in distinct migration patterns, such as migration “corridors” developed over many years (see chapter 3 of
this report for details). The largest corridors tend to be from developing countries to larger economies such
as those of the United States, France, the Russian Federation, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
This pattern is likely to remain the same for many years into the future, especially as populations in some
developing subregions and countries are projected to increase in coming decades, placing migration pressure
on future generations.

Highlights from Part I of the report on data and information on migration and migrants are outlined below.
Further information and discussion are provided in the report.

---

6 States’ commitment was articulated in the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNGA, 2016).
7 See chapter 9 of this report for detailed discussion.
8 See chapters 2 and 3 of this report for discussions on global and regional migration data and information.
9 UN DESA, 2019a; ILO, 2018.
10 See, for example, IOM 2003.
12 UN DESA 2019b.
Highlights from Part I: Data and information on migration and migrants

The number of international migrants globally in 2019: 272 million (3.5% of the world’s population)
- 52 per cent of international migrants were male; 48 per cent were female.
- 74 per cent of all international migrants were of working age (20–64 years).

India continued to be the largest country of origin of international migrants
- India had the largest number of migrants living abroad (17.5 million), followed by Mexico and China (11.8 million and 10.7 million respectively).
- The top destination country remained the United States (50.7 million international migrants).

The number of migrant workers declined slightly in high income countries while increasing elsewhere
- Between 2013 and 2017, high-income countries experienced a slight drop in migrant workers (from 112.3 million to 111.2 million). Upper middle-income countries observed the biggest increase (from 17.5 million to 30.5 million).
- Globally, male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by 28 million in 2017. There were 96 million male migrant workers (58%) and 68 million female migrant workers (42%).

International remittances increased to USD 689 billion in 2018
- The top 3 remittance recipients were India (USD 78.6 billion), China (USD 67.4 billion) and Mexico (USD 35.7 billion).
- The United States remained the top remittance-sending country (USD 68.0 billion) followed by the United Arab Emirates (USD 44.4 billion) and Saudi Arabia (USD 36.1 billion).

The global refugee population was 25.9 million in 2018
- 20.4 million refugees were under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 5.5 million were refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East.
- 52 per cent of the global refugee population was under 18 years of age.

The number of internally displaced persons due to violence and conflict reached 41.3 million
- This was the highest number on record since the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre began monitoring in 1998.
- The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced (6.1 million) followed by Colombia (5.8 million) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (3.1 million).

The number of stateless persons globally in 2018 was 3.9 million
- Bangladesh had the largest number of stateless persons (around 906,000). It was followed by Côte d’Ivoire (692,000) and Myanmar (620,000).

For further details, refer to chapter 2 of this report. Sources and dates of estimates above are outlined in the chapter.
Migration patterns vary from region to region

- While most international migrants born in Africa, Asia and Europe reside within their regions of birth, the majority of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean and Northern America reside outside their regions of birth. In Oceania, the number of intraregional migrants and those residing outside the region remained about the same in 2019.
- More than half of all international migrants (141 million) lived in Europe and Northern America.

Migration has been a key determinant of population change in several countries

- Intraregional migration has been an important contributor to population change in some African countries such as Equatorial Guinea.
- Labour migration has contributed to significant population changes especially in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States. With the exceptions of Oman and Saudi Arabia, migrants made up the majority of the populations in GCC countries.

Displacement remained a major feature in some regions

- The Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey were the origin and host of the largest number of refugees globally, 6.7 million and 3.7 million, respectively. Canada became the largest refugee resettlement country, resettling more refugees than the United States in 2018.
- The Philippines had the largest number of new disaster displacements in 2018 (3.8 million).
- Around 4 million Venezuelans had left their country by mid-2019. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was the largest source country of asylum seekers in 2018 (over 340,000).

For further details, refer to chapter 3 of this report. Sources and dates of estimates above are outlined in the chapter.

Migration research and analysis output remained high

- There was a continued increase in the number of migration-related academic publications, with the largest ever academic output produced during the last two years. There was significant output from international organizations on a wide range of migration issues.
- Academic output on migration is dominated with perspectives from destination countries, especially in relation to Europe. A geographic comparison of the primary affiliations of authors in selected journals shows that most are from institutions in developed countries.

For further details, refer to chapter 4 of this report. Sources and dates of estimates above are outlined in the chapter.

Is migration changing, or are the depictions of migration changing?

As can be seen from the discussion and key highlights above, there have been incremental changes in migration in recent years, such as in the overall scale of migration and displacement, although these changes could not be described as “seismic”. Rather, it would appear that there has been a deepening of existing patterns of migration as opportunities brought about by economic growth and reform, trade liberalization and long-term stability have been further realized. There is also a growing body of evidence indicating that while the general notion of international migration may seem simple and straightforward – as depicted in
news media, for example – its complexities are becoming more apparent. The issue of how we conceptualize migration and mobility has long been a focus of many scholars and policymakers. Recently, some are calling for a rethink, highlighting the growing anomalies resulting from a fairly fixed view of “migration” – see text box below on Professor Ronald Skeldon’s recent paper on the topic.

Rethinking international migration, internal migration, mobility and urbanization

That migration is the most problematic of the population variables is taken as given. Unlike the unique events of birth and death that define an individual’s lifetime, migration can be a multiple event. Its measurement depends entirely upon how it is defined in time and across space.

... Despite all the problems inherent in the collection of migration data, significant progress has been achieved over recent years. The compilation of a world origin-destination database, developed originally at the University of Sussex and now much extended and maintained by the United Nations Population Division and the World Bank, has provided the framework for a more precise measurement of global international population movement. These data showed that about 3 per cent of the world’s population lived in a State or territory not of their birth and that that proportion had not changed significantly since the 1990s ... As the systems of internal and international migration evolve and change, so too, does the nature of the linkages between them ... other forms of short-term mobility emerge from essentially urban cultures and economies.

... The idea that most people do not move or are fixed at a specific location might be appealing but it is wrong. Mobility is an inherent characteristic of all populations unless specific policies or other factors are in place that limit or control that mobility. Nevertheless, some peoples appear to move more than others and in different ways from others, which appears to be closely linked with the level of development in each country, which, in turn, is linked with the distribution of the population in each country. Despite all the difficulties with the measurement of internal migration as sketched above, considerable progress has been made towards the construction of analytical models that allow the comparison of patterns across space.

... Parsons et al., 2007; UN DESA, 2015.
Abridged excerpt of Skeldon, 2018.

We must recognize, however, that the increasing complexity of migration is, in part, also due to more information on migration and migrants being available than ever before. We know more about who migrates, why people migrate, where and how they migrate, although perhaps not to the extent we would prefer. But it is clearer that the bigger issue of “complexity” applies to very many changes occurring globally. Some of the specific ones, highlighted in the textbox below, have been intensively explored and analysed by experts in Part II of this report.

13 Czaika and de Haas, 2014; De Witte, 2018; Hall and Posel, 2019.
14 Faist and Glick-Schiller, 2009; Hochschild and Mollenkopf, 2008; King, 2012.
Highlights from Part II: Complex and emerging migration issues

- Migrants have made significant sociocultural, civic-political and economic contributions in origin and destination countries and communities, including by being important agents of change in a range of sectors (chapter 5).

- Immigrants tend to have higher entrepreneurial activity compared to natives. In countries such as the United States, migrants have disproportionally contributed to innovation (chapter 5).

- Migrants’ inclusion in the receiving society relates to diverse societal/policy areas that are closely interdependent. Inclusion outcomes in one policy area – such as language, education, labour market inclusion, family reunification, political participation and naturalization – will likely impact others (chapter 6).

- There is a dynamic and complex relationship between migration and health that extends well beyond crisis events. Migration can lead to greater exposure to health risks but it can also be linked to improved health, especially for those seeking safety from harm (chapter 7).

- While the majority of children who migrate do so through safe migration processes as part of family units, many other child migrants lack effective protection from harm and face human rights violations at all stages of their journeys (chapter 8).

- The most recent global estimate for the total number of child migrants is approximately 31 million. There are approximately 13 million child refugees, 936,000 asylum-seeking children, and 17 million children who have been forcibly displaced inside their own countries (chapter 8).

- There is increasing evidence that the magnitude and frequency of extreme weather events are rising, and this is expected to increasingly affect migration and other forms of movement. While human mobility resulting from environmental and climate change is often framed along protection and security lines, understanding mobility as adaptation allows for migrants’ agency to be part of the response equation (chapter 9).

- Migration status can significantly impact on migrants’ ability to deal with crisis. Flexible immigration and visa policies help make it possible for migrants to keep themselves safe as well as recover from the impact of a crisis. Return is one, but not necessarily the primary, response option (chapter 10).

- The last two years have seen substantial change in the global governance of migration, principally in the formation of the United Nations Network on Migration and the two global compacts on refugees and migration. Although they are not legally binding, the two global compacts represent a near-universal consensus on the issues requiring sustained international cooperation and commitment (chapter 11).
The unprecedented pace of change in the (geo)political, social, environmental and technological spheres has led some analysts and commentators to coin or use phrases such as the “age of accelerations”,15 the “fourth industrial revolution”,16 and the “age of change”.17 There is wide recognition of how quickly the world is changing, and of how the pace of change seems to be accelerating beyond all expectations and predictions. There is also a sense that change is resulting in unexpected (and unwanted) impacts:

We are living through an era of intense turbulence, disillusionment and bewilderment. Deepening geopolitical tensions are transforming international relations, and political tribalism is revealing deep fissures within countries. The spread of exponential technologies is upending long-held assumptions about security, politics, economics and so much more.18

Of particular note have been major shifts in the political realm, particularly in terms of civic engagement through emerging social media and other online platforms as well as the standards of political leadership. The “Arab Spring”, for example, heralded a significant development in how voices were heard and activists organized in political arenas.19 More recently, we have seen a groundswell in analysis and commentary on the changes that are occurring in democratic systems around the world, and the implications for governance, geopolitics and international cooperation. We are living in a period in which the core values underpinning global governance are being challenged. The values of equity, accountability, impartiality, fairness, justice and probity are being actively undermined as some political leaders disregard common interest in preference for personal interest – even if it corrodes laws, processes and institutions that have, overall, sought to advance whole nations and peoples, without excluding or expelling some because of their inherent characteristics or beliefs.20 Ongoing and systematic corrosion, as we have witnessed throughout history, can extend to attacks on human rights and ultimately on groups of people within societies.21

As part of current shifts, international migration has increasingly become weaponized. It is being used by some as a political tool, undermining democracy and inclusive civic engagement, by tapping into the understandable fear in communities that stems from the accelerated pace of change and rising uncertainty of our times.22 Some leaders seek to divide communities on the issue of migration, downplaying the significant benefits and enrichment migration brings and steadfastly ignoring our migration histories. And we are increasingly witnessing the harnessing of social media as a means of division and polarization, not just on migration, but at certain times we have seen the deployment of online “tribal tactics” by activists attempting to depict migration in a negative and misleading light.23 Underpinning these changing depictions of international migration is the uptake of technological innovation, particularly information and communications technology (ICT). However, we must also recall that the politicization of migration is not new, as the text box below highlights.

15 Friedman, 2016.
16 Schwab, 2016.
19 AlSayyad and Guvenc, 2015.
20 Fotaki, 2014.
22 Ritholtz, 2017.
23 McAuliffe, 2018.
The enduring issue of politics: Excerpt from the *World Migration Report 2003*

Migration is an eminently political topic. Over the past decade, the politicization of migration has been evidenced by a series of developments: the fear in Western countries of an influx of masses of migrants from countries of the former Soviet bloc and in European Union countries of an invasion by citizens from new member countries with each enlargement of the Union; the questioning of the role of migrants in the economic and social upheavals triggered by the financial crisis in South-East Asia; restrictive policies and anti-immigration backlash in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; renewed outbreaks of xenophobia in several African countries that blame domestic crises on migrants; and the exploitation of migration issues by some politicians to gain electoral mileage. All these examples illustrate the close links between economic, political and social issues on the one hand, and mobility on the other. More than ever therefore, migration is a ready target with psychological, economic, and public relations connotations.


**Technology as an enabler and a game-changer**

Migration is intertwined with technology and innovation and there exists a large body of analysis that has assessed how international migration acts to support (and sometimes limit) the transfer of technology and knowledge, often working in tandem with investment and trade flows along historical, geographic and geopolitical connections between countries and communities. Technology is increasingly critical throughout the migration process, especially newer forms of technology. In recent years, for example, we have witnessed the use of ICT by migrants to gather information and advice in real time during migration journeys; an issue that is raising interest and, at times, concern. The use of ICT, such as apps to share the latest information, including to support clandestine border crossings, together with the consolidation of social media platforms to connect geographically dispersed groups with common interests, has raised valid questions concerning the extent to which technology has been used to support irregular migration, as well as to enable migrants to avoid abusive and exploitative migrant smugglers and human traffickers. Due to the ever-increasing access to emerging technology at low cost, migrants have also developed applications to support better integration in receiving countries, while maintaining social links and financial support to their families and societies back home, including through the increasing prevalence of “mobile money” apps.

Other connections between migration and technology are also emerging in migration debates. As artificial intelligence is progressively taken up in key sectors, its consequences for migrant worker flows and domestic labour markets are areas of intense focus for policymakers and businesses in origin and receiving countries.

25 McAuliffe, 2016; Sanchez, 2018.
26 McAuliffe, 2018.
Recent discussions have also turned to blockchain technology and its consequences for migration, especially for remittances, but also for digital identities and global mobility. Social media technology is also increasingly impacting the politics of migration, with a surge of far-right activism on social media platforms seeking to influence political debates and ultimately political decisions.

It is within this current context of great change and increasing uncertainty that the World Migration Report 2020 seeks to draw upon the body of available data, research and analysis to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of some of the most important and pressing global migration issues of our time. By their very nature, the complex dynamics of migration can never be fully measured, understood and regulated. However, as this report shows, we do have a continuously growing and improving body of data and evidence that can help us make better sense of the basic features of migration and how they are changing – as well as understanding how the context in which migration is occurring is evolving. This is increasingly important as public debates, littered with misinformation and untruths, are increasingly able to utilize the ongoing expansion of open “new media” platforms to achieve distortion and misrepresentation of migration and migrants.

The World Migration Report series

The first World Migration Report was published 20 years ago, initially as a one-off report designed to increase the understanding of migration by policymakers and the general public. It was conceived at a time when the effects of globalization were being felt in many parts of the world and in a multitude of ways. Indeed, the first World Migration Report states that part of its genesis was due to the effects of globalization on migration patterns, and that the report therefore “looks at the increasingly global economy which has led to an unprecedented influx of newcomers in many countries…” The report highlighted the fact that, despite being an “age-old phenomenon”, migration was accelerating as part of broader globalization transformations of economic and trade processes, which were enabling greater movement of labour as well as goods and capital. Table 1 below provides a summary of key statistics reported in the World Migration Report 2000, as compared to this current edition. It shows that while some aspects have stayed fairly constant – the proportion of female international migrants as well as the overall proportion of the world’s population who were migrants – other aspects have changed dramatically. International remittances, for example, have grown from an estimated 126 billion in 2000 to 689 billion in 2020, underscoring the salience of international migration as a driver of development. This helps to partly explain the emergence of migration as a first-tier global issue that has seen United Nations Member States take a series of steps to strengthen global governance of migration, most notably since 2000 (see chapter 11 of this report for discussion). It is unsurprising then that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) itself has grown in size, with a significant increase in membership over the last two decades up from 76 to its current membership of 173 States. Also of note in table 1 is the rise in international migrants globally (up around 85%) as well as of refugees (up around 80%) and internally displaced (up around 97%); all the while remaining very small proportions of the world’s population.

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27 Latonero et al., 2019; Juskalian, 2018.
28 See chapter 5 of this report for discussion of how social media platforms are transforming public debates on migration.
Table 1. Key facts and figures from the World Migration Reports, 2000 and 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000 report</th>
<th>2020 report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated number of international migrants</td>
<td>150 million</td>
<td>272 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated proportion of world population who are migrants</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated proportion of female international migrants</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated proportion of international migrants who are children</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region with the highest proportion of international migrants</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>Oceania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country with the highest proportion of international migrants</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrant workers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>164 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global international remittances (USD)</td>
<td>126 billion</td>
<td>689 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of refugees</td>
<td>14 million</td>
<td>25.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of internally displaced persons</td>
<td>21 million</td>
<td>41.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of stateless persons</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of IOM Member States*</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of IOM field offices*</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>436*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: See IOM, 2000 and the present edition of the report for sources.
Notes: The dates of the data estimates in the table may be different to the report publishing date (refer to the reports for more detail on dates of estimates); refer to chapter 3 of this report for regional breakdowns; * indicates the data was not included in the report but is current for that year; † as at 28 October 2019.

The World Migration Report 2000’s contribution to migration policy as well as migration studies was timely, and its success heralded the World Migration Report series. Since 2000, ten World Migration Reports have been produced by IOM (see text box below) and it has become the organization’s flagship publication series. Its continued strong focus is on making a relevant, sound and evidence-based contribution that increases the understanding of migration by policymakers, practitioners, researchers and the general public.

In late 2016, IOM made the decision to refine the World Migration Report series in order to ensure it was able to maximize its contribution to fact-based knowledge on migration globally. Each edition of the series now has two parts comprising:

- Part I: Key information on migration and migrants (including migration-related statistics);
- Part II: Balanced, evidence-based analysis of complex and emerging migration issues.
The move away from single theme editions of the report series to this two-part structure was in recognition of the significant changes in migration research, analysis and publishing, as well as the different expectations and needs of readers. For those who want to find out about key migration facts and figures, Part I brings together the latest information and statistics so that readers are able to better understand migration trends, changing patterns and processes at the global and regional levels. But for those who may be working on (or studying) specific areas of migration policy or practice, deeper dives into the complexities are offered in Part II. Refinement of the series was also in recognition that, as the focus on, and complexity of, migration intensifies, reports limited to a single theme have the potential to understate or miss entirely the broader changes that are occurring in migration transformations globally.

A further consideration of the revised series was its intended “value-add”. As an intergovernmental organization, and a new United Nations related organization, it is critical that IOM ensures the World Migration Report serves the public in providing information and analysis that is relevant, accessible, sound, accurate and balanced. The need to avoid duplication or significant overlap is a genuine one, especially in light of newer contributions on migration governance (such as the Migration Governance Indicators). In this way, the World Migration Report series was re-framed to offer strategic analysis of complex and emerging issues facing migration policymakers, rather than describe or assess current policy and governance on migration. The series complements rather than duplicates other work.

Evidence indicates that the revised series has been successful in achieving its intended aims, with positive responses from readers, including Member States, migration academics and general readers. The significant, sustained increase in downloads during 2018 and (to date) 2019 of the World Migration Report 2018 over previous editions is another encouraging indicator.30

30 Figure 6 in chapter 4 of this report provides download statistics for the World Migration Reports 2018 and 2015.
World Migration Report 2020

This edition, heralding the twentieth anniversary of the World Migration Report series, builds on the previous report, the 2018 edition, by providing updated migration statistics at the global and regional levels as well as descriptive analysis of complex migration issues.

Part I, on “key data and information on migration and migrants”, includes separate chapters on global migration trends and patterns; regional dimensions and developments; and a discussion of recent contributions to migration research and analysis by academia and a wide range of different organizations, including IOM. These three chapters have been produced institutionally by IOM, drawing primarily on analyses by IOM experts, practitioners and officials around the world based on data from a wide range of relevant organizations. The seven chapters in Part II are authored by applied and academic researchers working on migration. They cover a range of “complex and emerging migration issues” including:

- migrants’ contributions to societies;
- migration, inclusion and social cohesion;
- migration and health;
- children and unsafe migration;
- migration and adaptation to environmental change;
- migrants caught in crises; and
- recent developments in global migration governance.

While the choice of these topics is necessarily selective and subjective, all the chapters in Part II of this report are directly relevant to some of the most prominent and important debates about migration in the world today. Many of these topics lie at the heart of the conundrums that face policymakers as they seek to formulate effective, proportionate and constructive responses to complex public policy issues related to migration. Accordingly, the chapters aim to inform current and future policy deliberations and discussions by providing a clear identification of the key issues, a critical overview of relevant research and analysis, and a discussion of the implications for future research and policymaking. The chapters are not meant to be prescriptive, in the sense of advocating particular policy “solutions” – especially as the immediate context is an important determinant of policy settings – but informative and helpful to what can be highly contested debates.

Part I

Chapter 2 provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons and stateless persons – as well as of remittances. In addition, the chapter refers to the existing body of IOM programmatic data, particularly on missing migrants, assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, resettlement, displacement tracking and human trafficking. While these data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant IOM programming and operations globally.
Following the global overview, chapter 3 provides a discussion of key regional dimensions of, and developments in, migration. The discussion focuses on six world regions as identified by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America, and Oceania. For each of these regions, the analysis includes: i) an overview and brief discussion of key population-related statistics; and ii) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses, including from international organizations, researchers and analysts. To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments” are presented at the subregional level.

There is a substantial amount of research and analysis on migration that is being undertaken and published by a range of actors such as academics, governments, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. Chapter 4 provides a selective overview of such contributions, updating the chapter on the topic as it first appeared in the *World Migration Report 2018*. The overview focuses on migration research outputs published by academia and intergovernmental organizations in 2017 and 2018, which saw a peak in output from intergovernmental organizations, some of which was produced to inform States and other actors during deliberations on the Global Compact for Migration (see chapter 11 of this report for discussion of the compact processes and outcome).

*Part II*

The lead chapter in Part II examines the historical and contemporary contributions of migrants to communities of destination as well as those back in their place of origin. With this perspective, it focuses on three central domains of migrants’ contributions: sociocultural, civic-political and economic. In the face of often negatively skewed discussions on migration and migrants, one can lose sight of the fact that migrants have made significant contributions in a multitude of ways. This “reality check” chapter 5 highlights an often overlooked but important topic, placing the analysis in the context of emerging impediments to the recognition of migrants’ contributions globally. The chapter concludes by outlining the implications for policy deliberations and for further research.

Chapter 6 critically reviews the issue of inclusion of migrants in host societies where they adapt to new cultures, customs, social values and language. The chapter provides an overview of the historical development of the policy approaches and terminology related to the topic. It discusses the roles of different stakeholders in optimizing the inclusion of migrants, as well as the importance of policy settings that are directly and indirectly related to inclusion. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the implication for policy responses.

Health and migration is often only thought about in crisis terms, but there is much more to the connections between the two. Chapter 7 provides an overview analysis of key issues related to health and migration, including in terms of benefits, vulnerabilities and resilience. The chapter then examines health systems’ responses and prevailing approaches, as well as gaps in the governance of migration and health. Lessons from good-practice guidelines and the global agendas in migration and health are provided.

Chapter 8 deals with child migration that does not conform to the traditional pattern of the migrant child accompanying or following the family in a safe environment, but rather migration that is unsafe, for example, occurring through irregular pathways without family. Following an expository approach, the chapter elaborates different types of child migration, their drivers, and issues related to the data on child migration. It discusses
key protection challenges affecting child migrants and addresses the current issues and the evolving policies to handle them. The chapter explores the main emerging challenges confronting child migrants and concludes by reflecting on policy and research priorities.

Providing an overview of human mobility and adaptation to cope with environmental and climate change, chapter 9 explores empirical research from around the world. Diverse examples of adaptive behaviour are presented from different ecological zones particularly at risk under climate change, namely, mountainous, dryland and coastal areas, as well as cities. The examples address a variety of strategies that promote one or several adaptive forms of migration. The chapter also provides a summary of the international policy frameworks on responses to the mobility aspects of environmental and climate change. The chapter concludes with focused recommendations for research, policy and practice.

Chapter 10 deals with crises that migrants are caught up in. Presenting examples of such crises like floods, hurricanes, conflicts, and political and economic crisis, it examines current emergency assistance and urgent protection responses. The chapter provides an overview of the local, national and international responses to such needs faced by different types of migrants and their effectiveness. By drawing on the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, it examines the varying contexts, responses, gaps, and lessons learned in crisis preparedness and post-crisis recovery. The chapter provides an overview of existing data on migrants facing risk and situations of vulnerability in various countries and assesses the gaps. It concludes with policy and practice implications of responses.

As the title spells out, chapter 11 provides an update on the migration governance chapter in the World Migration Report 2018, documenting key developments in global migration governance in the two years since the last report. The chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the development and adoption of the two global compacts, a brief analysis of their contents and the areas of convergence and divergence, an assessment of how they affect global migration governance framework, and the future implications as well as the challenges for implementation. The chapter discusses States’ commitments to implement and review follow-up and progress of the compacts, and summarizes changes in institutional architecture to support the Global Compact for Migration. The chapter also considers longer-term issues and implications for the future.

Overall, this world migration report has been produced to help deepen our collective understanding of the various manifestations and complexities of migration in the face of growing uncertainties. We hope that all readers are able to learn something new from this edition, as well as to draw on its contents as they undertake their work, study or other activities.
PART I
DATA AND INFORMATION ON MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS
Introduction

In most discussions on migration, the starting point is usually numbers. Understanding changes in scale, emerging trends and shifting demographics related to global social and economic transformations, such as migration, help us make sense of the changing world we live in and plan for the future. The current global estimate is that there were around 272 million international migrants in the world in 2019, which equates to 3.5 per cent of the global population. A first important point to note is that this is a very small minority of the world’s population, meaning that staying within one’s country of birth overwhelmingly remains the norm. The great majority of people do not migrate across borders; much larger numbers migrate within countries (an estimated 740 million internal migrants in 2009). That said, the increase in international migrants has been evident over time – both numerically and proportionally – and at a slightly faster rate than previously anticipated.

The overwhelming majority of people migrate internationally for reasons related to work, family and study – involving migration processes that largely occur without fundamentally challenging either migrants or the countries they enter. In contrast, other people leave their homes and countries for a range of compelling and sometimes tragic reasons, such as conflict, persecution and disaster. While those who have been displaced, such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), comprise a relatively small percentage of all migrants, they are often the most in need of assistance and support.

This chapter, with its focus on key global migration data and trends, seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers in making better sense of the bigger picture of migration, by providing an overview of information on migration and migrants. The chapter draws upon current statistical sources compiled by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The chapter provides an overview of global data and trends on international migrants (stocks) and international migration (flows). It also provides a discussion of particular migrant groups – namely, migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and missing migrants – as well as of stateless persons and remittances.

The chapter also refers to the growing body of programmatic IOM data, particularly on assisted voluntary returns and reintegration, resettlement, displacement tracking and victims of human trafficking. While these

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1 UN DESA, 2019a.
3 See, for example, IOM’s World Migration Report 2003 (IOM, 2003), which drew upon United Nations population data (UN DESA, 2002) and migration data (IOM, 2000).
4 In keeping within the scope of this report, statistics utilized in this chapter were current as at 30 June 2019, except for international migrant stock data which were incorporated into the chapter following the release of the 2019 revision by UN DESA on 17 September 2019.
data are generally not global or representative, they can provide insights into changes that have occurred in relevant programming and operations globally. As the United Nations migration agency, with activities relevant to all the themes discussed in this chapter, IOM data have the capacity to provide further insights on migration and its various dynamics, including the diverse needs of migrants.

This chapter highlights some of the challenges associated with data collection and definitions that make a comprehensive analysis of migration trends at the global level difficult. This also remains an issue for many States attempting to analyse migration trends within their own countries or regions, as reflected in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, with its emphasis on data collection for evidence-based policy (Objective 1 of the Global Compact – see discussion in chapter 11 of this report). Ongoing efforts to collect and improve migration statistics have led to an expansion in available data; however, the need for further technical capacity is an obstacle that is yet to be overcome as the international community works to develop a more comprehensive global picture of key aspects of migration. Similarly, defining migration and migrants is complex, as discussed in the text box below.

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Defining migration, migrant and other key terms

Outside of general definitions of migration and migrant, such as those found in dictionaries, there exist various specific definitions of key migration-related terms, including in legal, administrative, research and statistical spheres. There is no universally agreed definition of migration or migrant, however, several definitions are widely accepted and have been developed in different settings, such as those set out in UN DESA’s 1998 Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration.

Technical definitions, concepts and categories of migrants and migration are necessarily informed by geographic, legal, political, methodological, temporal and other factors. For example, there are numerous ways in which migration events can be defined, including in relation to place of birth, citizenship, place of residence and duration of stay. This is important when it comes to quantifying and analysing the effects of migration and migrants (however defined). We encourage readers to refer to primary sources cited in the chapter for information on specific definitions and categorizations underlying the data. Readers may also find the IOM Glossary on Migration (2019 edition) to be a useful reference.

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5 In general, explanatory notes, caveats, limitations and methodologies on specific sources of data can be extensive, and are therefore not included in this chapter. However, sources have been clearly identified so that readers can refer to them.
International migrants: numbers and trends

UN DESA produces estimates of the number of international migrants globally. The following discussion draws on its estimates, which are based on data provided by States.\(^6\)

The United Nations Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration defines an “international migrant” as any person who has changed his or her country of usual residence, distinguishing between “short-term migrants” (those who have changed their countries of usual residence for at least three months, but less than one year) and “long-term migrants” (those who have done so for at least one year). However, not all countries use this definition in practice.\(^7\) Some countries use different criteria to identify international migrants by, for example, applying different minimum durations of residence. Differences in concepts and definitions, as well as data collection methodologies between countries, hinder full comparability of national statistics on international migrants.

Overall, the estimated number of international migrants has increased over the past five decades. The total estimated 272 million people living in a country other than their countries of birth in 2019 was 119 million more than in 1990 (when it was 153 million), and over three times the estimated number in 1970 (84 million; see table 1). While the proportion of international migrants globally has also increased over this period, it is evident that the vast majority of people continue to live in the countries in which they were born.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of migrants</th>
<th>Migrants as a % of the world’s population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>84,460,125</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>90,368,010</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>101,983,149</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>113,206,691</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>153,011,473</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>161,316,895</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>173,588,441</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>191,615,574</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>220,781,909</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>248,861,296</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>271,642,105</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The number of entities (such as States, territories and administrative regions) for which data were made available in the 2019 UN DESA Revision of International Migrant Stock was 232. In 1970, the number of entities was 135.

In 2019, most international migrants (around 74%) were of working age (20 to 64 years of age), with a slight decrease in migrants younger than 20 years old from 2000 to 2019 (from 16.4% to 14%), and a constant share (around 12%) of international migrants 65 years of age and older since 2000.

\(^6\) Data are also provided to UN DESA by territories and administrative units. For a summary on UN DESA stock data sources, methodology and caveats, please see UN DESA, 2019b.

\(^7\) UN DESA, 1998.
Migration and migrants: A global overview

Snapshot of international migrants

The international migrant population globally has increased in size but remained relatively stable as a proportion of the world’s population.

- 2.8% in 1995
- 2.9% in 2000
- 3.2% in 2005
- 3.4% in 2010
- 3.4% in 2015
- 3.5% in 2019

- 174 Million in 1995
- 192 Million in 2000
- 221 Million in 2005
- 249 Million in 2010
- 258 Million in 2015
- 272 Million in 2019

52% of international migrants are male, 48% are female.

Most international migrants (74%) are of working age (20–64 years).

*Age groups above 75 years were omitted (male 4%, female 6%).
The proportion of international migrants varies significantly around the world.

Note: This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

272 million international migrants in 2019 out of a global population of 7.7 billion:
1 in every 30 people

Note: Infographics based on UN DESA, 2019a and UN DESA, 2019c.
In 2019, Europe and Asia each hosted around 82 million and 84 million international migrants, respectively – comprising 61 per cent of the total global international migrant stock combined (see figure 1). These regions were followed by North America, with almost 59 million international migrants in 2019 or 22 per cent of the global migrant stock, Africa at 10 per cent, Latin America and the Caribbean at 4 per cent, and Oceania at 3 per cent. When compared with the size of the population in each region, shares of international migrants in 2019 were highest in Oceania, North America and Europe, where international migrants represented, respectively, 21 per cent, 16 per cent and 11 per cent of the total population. In comparison, the share of international migrants is relatively small in Asia and Africa (1.8% and 2%, respectively) and Latin America and the Caribbean (1.8%). However, Asia experienced the most remarkable growth from 2000 to 2019, at 69 per cent (around 34 million people in absolute terms). Europe experienced the second largest growth during this period, with an increase of 25 million international migrants, followed by an increase of 18 million international migrants in North America and 11 million in Africa.

Figure 1. International migrants, by major region of residence, 2005 to 2019 (millions)


Note: Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3, appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

The increase in international migration in some regions over time has had an impact on population change. Figure 2 shows the proportional population change for each of the world’s six regions from 2009 to 2019. While Europe has traditionally been one of the major destination regions for international migrants, it has had the slowest rate of proportional population change over this period, at slightly over 1 per cent. However, the rate would arguably be much lower without international migrants who have mitigated decreasing populations

8 UN DESA, 2019a.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
in some European countries due, for example, to declining birth rates.\textsuperscript{11} By comparison, Africa underwent the most significant change, with its population growing by nearly 30 per cent over this period, due to high fertility rates and increasing lifespans.\textsuperscript{12} This growth has nevertheless been softened by emigration from Africa to other regions (namely Europe and Asia – see chapter 3 of this report for discussion).

![Figure 2. Proportional population change by region, 2009–2019](image)

Source: UN DESA, 2019c.

Note: Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3, appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

While population growth over the decade may be most pronounced for Africa, in 2019 more than half the world’s total population resided in just one region: Asia (4.6 billion people). From 2009 to 2019, the population in Asia grew by nearly 440 million (from 4.16 billion to 4.6 billion), compared with just under 300 million in Africa (from 1.01 billion to 1.31 billion).\textsuperscript{13} Five of the world’s top 10 most populous countries are in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh).\textsuperscript{14}

The United States of America has been the main country of destination for international migrants since 1970.\textsuperscript{15} Since then, the number of foreign-born people residing in the country has more than quadrupled – from less than 12 million in 1970, to close to 51 million in 2019. Germany, the second top destination for migrants, has also observed an increase over the years, from 8.9 million in 2000 to 13.1 million in 2019. A list of the top 20 destination countries of international migrants is provided in the left column of figure 3.

\textsuperscript{11} UN DESA, 2019c. See chapter 3 of this report (figure 14) showing countries with the largest proportional population change in Europe.

\textsuperscript{12} UN DESA, 2019c. See chapter 3 of this report (figure 2) showing countries with the largest proportional population change in Africa.

\textsuperscript{13} UN DESA, 2019c.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{15} UN DESA, 2008, 2019a.
The list of largest migrant origin countries and territories is shown on the right in figure 3. More than 40 per cent of all international migrants worldwide in 2019 (112 million) were born in Asia, primarily originating from India (the largest country of origin), China, and South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mexico was the second largest country of origin, and the Russian Federation was fourth. Several other European countries have sizable populations of emigrants, including Ukraine, Poland, the United Kingdom and Germany.

**Figure 3. Top 20 destinations (left) and origins (right) of international migrants in 2019 (millions)**

In regard to the distribution of international migrants by countries’ income group, nearly two thirds of international migrants resided in high-income countries in 2019 – around 176 million. This compares with 82 million foreign-born who resided in middle-income countries (about one third of the total migrant stock) and 13 million in low-income countries in the same year. Income levels of destination countries for migrant workers are further discussed in the section on migrant workers below.

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16 UN DESA, 2019a.
18 UN DESA, 2017a.
While international migrants may tend to gravitate toward high-income countries, their origins globally can be diverse. Some origin countries have high proportions of their nationals living abroad for economic, political, security, trade or cultural reasons that may be contemporary or historical in nature. For example, the Syrian Arab Republic has a higher rate of emigration than most other countries due to displacement caused by long-term conflict (see discussion below on refugees for more detail). Figure 4 highlights countries with high proportions of emigrants in 2019. Importantly, the emigration proportion of a country represents an accumulation of migration (and displacement) over time, sometimes many decades. Of note is the geographic diversity of the countries in figure 4 (countries from all regions except Northern America are included) as well as the high number of countries from Latin America and the Caribbean (10 of the 20 countries).

Figure 4. Top 20 countries of emigration in 2019 (proportion)

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Notes: The population size used to calculate the percentage of emigrants is based on the UN DESA resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born, and UN DESA international migrants originally from that country. Only countries with a combined population of more than 100,000 residents and emigrants were included in the analysis.
UN DESA estimates of foreign-born populations do not reflect immigration status or policy categories (such as students, highly skilled migrants, or refugees). Capturing such attributes is inherently difficult for several key reasons. First, a person’s immigration status can be fluid and change quickly, arising from circumstances and legal/policy settings. For example, many international migrants who may be described as “undocumented” or “irregular” enter countries on valid visas and then stay in contravention of one or more visa conditions. In fact, there are many paths to irregularity, such as crossing borders without authorization, unlawfully overstaying a visa period, working in contravention of visa conditions, being born into irregularity, or remaining after a negative decision on an asylum application has been made. 19

Second, countries have different immigration policy settings and different ways of collecting data on migrants, which makes it difficult to establish a harmonized approach to capturing irregular migrant stocks globally. The pace of change in the migration policy arena also poses an extra dimension of complexity, as people may slip into and out of “irregularity”. Notably, there have been very few global estimates of the number of irregular migrants because of this complexity. However, this has not prevented some organizations from coming up with inflated and incorrect global estimates—see text box below on “what not to do”.

What not to do: estimating the global population of irregular migrants

In an August 2019 report on irregular migration, the authors come up with a global estimate of the number of irregular migrants that is based on a lack of understanding of migration and displacement policy, practice and normative settings. a In arriving at an erroneous figure of 106.9 million people, the authors include groups of people who would not be considered irregular, such as internally displaced persons, stateless persons, and Venezuelan migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers. b

The important lessons in this example include:

- that categories of migrants (even while overlapping at times) and limitations on definitions must be well understood before analysis commences;
- ensuring qualified and experienced analysts with an understanding of the topic lead such work;
- seeking the advice and feedback of knowledgeable specialists in the field prior to publication (commonly referred to as “peer review”).

a CSIS, 2019:5–6.
b Many Venezuelans were authorized to cross international borders by receiving countries following the economic and political crisis causing displacement, and have been offered some form of status by the receiving country, even if temporary in nature.

Third, as noted in the text box earlier on the chapter on “defining migration, migrant and other key terms”, there necessarily exist different definitions, depending on the circumstances in which they are applied. In some legal/policy situations, as well as in general discussions, for example, a “migrant” can include a person who has never migrated. See the discussion of the common problem of conflating “migration” and “migrant” in the text box below.

19 Gordon et al., 2009.
Conflating “migration” and “migrant”

In a general sense, migration is the process of moving from one place to another. To migrate is to move, whether from a rural area to a city, from one district or province in a given country to another in that same country, or from one country to a new country. It involves action.

In contrast, a migrant is a person described as such for one or more reasons, depending on the context (see the text box on “Defining migration, migrant and other key terms” earlier on the chapter). While in many cases, “migrants” do undertake some form of migration, this is not always the case. In some situations, people who have never undertaken migration may be referred to as migrants – children of people born overseas, for example, are commonly called second or third-generation migrants.\textsuperscript{a} This may even extend to situations involving statelessness, whereby whole groups of people are not able to access citizenship despite being born and raised in a country.\textsuperscript{b} On the other hand, for example, returning citizens who have undertaken significant and/or long-term international migration are generally not classified as “migrants” upon or after their arrival to their country of birth, despite their migration journeys and experiences.\textsuperscript{c}

\textsuperscript{a} See, for example, Neto, 1995; Fertig and Schmidt, 2001.
\textsuperscript{b} Kyaw, 2017.
\textsuperscript{c} Skeldon, 2018.

International migration flows: definitions, numbers and gaps

While data on migrant stocks are widely available, data on global migration movements (flows) are much more limited. Available UN DESA estimates on global migrant stocks are extensive and global in scope; however, the database of migration flows only encompasses 45 countries.\textsuperscript{20} Capturing data on migration flows is extremely challenging for several reasons. First, while international migration flows are generally accepted as covering inflows and outflows into and from countries, there has been a greater focus on recording inflows. For example, while countries such as Australia and the United States count cross-border movements, many others only count entries and not departures.\textsuperscript{21} Additionally, migration flow data in some countries are derived from administrative events related to immigration status (for example, issuance/renewal/withdrawal of a residence permit) and are thus used as a proxy for migration flows. Furthermore, migratory movements are often hard to separate from non-migratory travel, such as tourism or business.\textsuperscript{22} Tracking migratory movements also requires considerable resources, infrastructure and IT/knowledge systems. This poses particular challenges for developing countries, where the ability to collect, administer, analyse and report data on mobility, migration and other areas is often limited. Finally, many countries’ physical geographies pose tremendous challenges for collecting data on migration flows. Entry and border management, for example, is particularly challenging in some regions, because of archipelagic and isolated borders, and it is further complicated by traditions of informal migration for work.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{20} Laczko, 2017.
\textsuperscript{21} Koser, 2010.
\textsuperscript{22} Skeldon, 2018.
\textsuperscript{23} Gallagher and McAuliffe, 2016.
IOM’s Global Migration Data Portal

The Global Migration Data Portal was launched in December 2017 as a one-stop access point for timely, comprehensive migration statistics and reliable information about migration data globally. The site is designed to pull together, in one place, key global data sources on migration from across different organizations, agencies and reports. The portal serves users in the field of migration by making international migration data more accessible and visible, and easier to understand.

The world map features more than 70 migration data indicators from more than 20 different international data sources, broken down by country, region, subregion and IOM region. Most data displayed are publicly available and provided by numerous international agencies. Migration data on the portal can be accessed for all United Nations countries and are complemented by contextual information, including demographic and employment data. Key additional resources, including written reports and alternative data sources, are made available for all countries, regions and subregions, where available. A regional section provides regional profile pages covering migration data and available sources within different United Nations regions.

In the thematic section, the portal offers reviews of available data in various fields of migration, provides explanations of concepts and definitions, and describes key strengths and weaknesses of the available data sources. The thematic pages review the data for around 30 topics of migration. The portal also features a collection of more than 100 handbooks and guidance reports on how to measure migration and collect data in various fields. Numerous blogs discussing recent data and innovations authored by leading experts in the field of migration, and video interviews with leading data experts from around the world, are also included on the portal.

The portal also includes migration governance country profiles and a dedicated section on data on migration governance. A specific section shows how data can support United Nations Member States in achieving the migration-relevant Sustainable Development Goals and in implementing the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

The portal is available in English, and translations of key sections are available in French, Spanish and German. For more information see: http://migrationdataportal.org.
Migration flows

There are currently two main international datasets on international migration flows, both of which are derived from national statistics: UN DESA’s International Migration Flows dataset and OECD’s International Migration Database. Since 2005, UN DESA has compiled data on the flows of international migrants to and from selected countries, based on nationally available statistics. At the time of writing (August 2019), there had been no update to the UN DESA flows dataset, with the most current being the 2015 version. The 2015 migration flows dataset comprises data from 45 countries (only 43 on emigration flows), up from 29 countries in 2008 and 15 countries in 2005.24

The OECD data on migration flows have been collected since 2000, which allows for limited trend analysis, as shown in figure 5 (though data are not standardized, as explained in the note under the figure).25 The estimates suggest that permanent migration inflows to OECD countries increased from 3.85 million in 2000 to 7.06 million in 2016, with a temporary lull occurring around the time of the global financial crisis (figure 5). Germany remained the main OECD destination country in 2016, with over 1.7 million new international migrants (more than double the levels registered in 2000, but with a decrease compared with more than 2 million in 2015) arriving that year, followed by the United States (nearly 1.2 million) and the United Kingdom (about 450,000 new migrants).26

Figure 5. Inflows of foreign nationals into OECD countries, permanent migration, 2000–2016 (millions)

Source: OECD, n.d.a.

Notes: Data are not standardized and therefore differ from statistics on permanent migration inflows into selected countries contained in OECD’s International Migration Outlook 2018 (OECD, 2018).

The 35 countries typically included in OECD statistics are the following: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. In some years, data for particular countries are not made available: data were made available for 31 countries in 2000 and 33 countries in 2016. Notably, data for Greece have not been reported since 2012 and data for Turkey have not been reported since 2010.

24 For UN DESA migrant flow data, as well as for the specific countries included, please see UN DESA, 2015.
25 This subsection is based on data from the OECD International Migration Database. For additional data on migrant flows and other migrant data in OECD countries, please see OECD, n.d.a.
26 These are the top OECD countries for permanent inflows of foreign nationals for which data were made available in 2017.
Migrant fatalities and IOM’s Missing Migrants Project

In the wake of the tragic events of October 2013, in which an estimated 368 migrants died in the sinking of two boats near the Italian island of Lampedusa, IOM began collecting and compiling information on migrants who perish or go missing on migratory routes worldwide, within its Missing Migrants Project (MMP). Information on migrant fatalities is collected daily and made available on the Missing Migrants Project’s online database, managed by IOM’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre. MMP also provides analysis of the data and issues related to deaths during migration, in briefings and its “Fatal Journeys” reports (volume 4 published in 2019). Data sources include official records of coast guards and medical examiners, media stories, reports from non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, and interviews with migrants. Data collection challenges are significant. For instance, the vast majority of recorded deaths are of people travelling via clandestine routes, which are often at sea or in remote areas (chosen with the aim of evading detection), meaning remains are not found. Few official sources collect and make data on migrant deaths publicly available. Relying on testimonies of fellow migrants and media sources can be problematic, due to inaccuracies and incomplete coverage.

In the five years (2014–2018) of systematically recording deaths during migration, MMP has documented over 30,900 women, men and children who lost their lives while trying to reach other countries. During that time, the Mediterranean Sea has seen the highest number of deaths, claiming the lives of at least 17,919 people, 64 per cent of whose bodies have not been recovered from the sea. In 2018, the Mediterranean continued to be the place with the highest known number of deaths during migration, but compared with the previous four years, there was a much higher proportion who died on the “Western Mediterranean route”. A total of 813 deaths were recorded on this sea crossing from the coast of Northern Africa to Spain in 2018, compared with 272 in 2017. Nearly 570 deaths during migration were recorded in North Africa in 2018, mostly due to the harsh natural environment, violence and abuse, dangerous transportation conditions, and sickness and starvation. Despite the ongoing war and humanitarian crisis in Yemen, in 2018 the migration route to the country from the Horn of Africa across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden continued to be in high use. In 2018, 156 people are known to have drowned in this crossing. In the context of the displacement of millions of people from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 42 people from the country lost their lives while trying to migrate elsewhere in the region in 2018. No deaths of Venezuelans were recorded by MMP in the previous year. Since 2014, 1,884 deaths have been recorded along the United States–Mexico border, including 434 in 2018.

To download the MMP data, see https://missingmigrants.iom.int/downloads. New data sources are constantly added and efforts are ongoing to improve data collection globally. For a discussion of the challenges of collecting data on migrant deaths, please see http://missingmigrants.iom.int/methodology.
Migrant workers

The latest available estimates indicate that there were roughly 164 million migrant workers around the world in 2017, accounting for nearly two thirds (64%) of the (then) 258 million global stock of international migrants. When compared with the global population of international migrants of working age – regarded as 15 years of age or older (234 million) – migrant workers account for 70 per cent. For a range of reasons, however, these global figures are likely to be underestimates. While earlier global estimates of migrant workers have been produced, ILO notes that these cannot be compared with 2017 figures, due to definitional differences and changes in methodology and data sources.

In 2017, 68 per cent of migrant workers were residing in high-income level countries – an estimated 111 million people. An additional 47 million migrant workers (29%) were living in middle-income countries, and 5.6 million (3.4%) were in low-income countries. While we are unable to compare the numbers of migrant workers over time, it is useful to examine changes in proportional distribution. In 2017, for example, there was a noticeable change in destination country category; that is, from 2013 to 2017, high-income countries experienced a 7 percentage point drop in migrant workers (from 75% to 68%), while upper-middle-income countries observed a 7 percentage point increase (from 12% to 19%) (see figure 6). This apparent shift may be influenced by economic growth in middle-income countries and/or changes to labour immigration regulations in high-income countries. The share of migrant workers in the total workforce across country income groups was quite small in low-income (1.9%), lower-income (1.4%) and upper-middle-income countries (2.2%), but much greater for high-income countries (18.5%).

Figure 6. Migrant workers by destination country income level, 2013 and 2017


27 The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from ILO, 2018. Please refer to this document for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, limitations and caveats associated with the numbers and trends presented. More generally, information on foreign-born employment in OECD countries is available at OECD, n.d.b.

28 See, for example, ILO, 2018.
Male migrant workers outnumbered female migrant workers by 28 million in 2017, with 96 million males (58%) and 68 million females (42%), in a context where males comprised a higher number of international migrants of working age (127 million or 54%, compared with 107 million or 46% females). This represents a slight shift since 2013, towards an even more gendered migrant worker population, when the share of male migrant workers constituted 56 per cent and females 44 per cent. See table 2 for further breakdowns by income level and sex.

Table 2. Migrant workers, by sex and income level of destination countries, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low-income</th>
<th>Lower-middle-income</th>
<th>Upper-middle-income</th>
<th>High-income</th>
<th>Global total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant workers (millions)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a proportion of all migrant workers (%)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on ILO, 2018.

Note: Totals may not add up due to the effects of rounding.

As evident from the data, the international migrant worker population is currently gendered as well as geographically concentrated. There is a much larger number of male than female migrant workers worldwide (see table 2), with a gender composition that sees much higher numbers of men in low-income and lower-middle income countries compared with women, and in contrast to the gender splits for high-income countries. In terms of geography, and as seen in figure 7 below, 99.6 million or almost 61 per cent of all migrant workers resided in three subregions: Northern America; the Arab States; and Northern, Southern and Western Europe. 29 Notably, there is a striking gender imbalance of migrant workers in two regions: Southern Asia (6 million males compared with 1.3 million females) and the Arab States (19.1 million males compared with 3.6 million females). The Arab States region is one of the top destinations for migrant workers, where they can dominate key sectors. For example, in the Gulf States, over 95 per cent of the labour force for construction and domestic work is comprised of migrant workers. 30 From 2013 to 2017, the number of migrant workers in the Arab States increased by over 5 per cent, following greater demand for male migrant workers, many of whom are involved in manual labour, mostly in the construction sector. 31

29 The ILO category of “Arab States” includes the following countries and territories: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and the Palestinian Territories.
30 ILO, n.d.
Figure 7. Geographic distribution of migrant workers by sex, 2017


Note: The figure reflects ILO geographic regions and subregions, and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM. Please see annex A of ILO, 2018 for more information on regional breakdowns. Please note that the rest of this chapter refers to the UN DESA geographical regions.

International remittances

Remittances are financial or in-kind transfers made by migrants directly to families or communities in their countries of origin. The World Bank compiles global data on international remittances, notwithstanding the myriad data gaps, definitional differences and methodological challenges in compiling accurate statistics. Its data, however, do not capture unrecorded flows through formal or informal channels, and the actual magnitude of global remittances are therefore likely to be larger than available estimates. Despite these limitations, available data reflect an overall increase in remittances in recent decades, from USD 126 billion in 2000, to USD 689 billion in 2018.

There was a 9 per cent increase in remittances in 2018, up from USD 633 billion in 2017. However, the two consecutive years prior to 2017 witnessed a decline; from 2014 to 2015, global (inward) flows of remittances

32 The content of much of this subsection, unless otherwise noted, is based on and drawn from the World Bank’s data in relation to migration and remittances (World Bank, n.d.b); and publications on the topic (World Bank, n.d.c.). In particular, the World Bank’s annual remittances datasets (World Bank, n.d.b), the Migration and Development Brief 31 (World Bank, 2019), Migration and Development Brief 30 (World Bank, 2018), the Migration and Development Brief 27 (World Bank, 2017a) and its 21 April Press Release (World Bank, 2017b) are key sources of information. Please refer to these sources as well as the World Bank’s Factbooks on Migration and Development, including its latest, published in 2016, for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented.

33 World Bank, 2016.
contracted by an estimated 1.2 per cent, from USD 603 billion in 2014 to USD 595 billion in 2015, and by another 1.1 per cent from 2015 to 2016 (from USD 595 billion to USD 589 billion). Consistent with this trend, remittances to low- and middle-income countries (which account for the majority of the global total) had declined for two consecutive years, from 2014 to 2016 – a trend that had not been seen for three decades, according to the World Bank, before returning back to the positive long-term trend from 2016 to 2018 (from USD 444 billion in 2016, to USD 483 billion in 2017, and USD 529 billion in 2018). Since the mid-1990s, remittances have greatly surpassed official development assistance levels, defined as government aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

In 2018, India, China, Mexico, the Philippines and Egypt were (in descending order) the top five remittance-recipient countries, although India and China were well above the rest, with total inward remittances exceeding USD 67 billion for each country (see table 3). When remittances are viewed as a percentage of gross domestic product, however, the top five remittance-receiving countries in 2018 were Tonga (at 35.2%), followed by Kyrgyzstan (33.6%), Tajikistan (31%), Haiti (30.7%) and Nepal (28%).

High-income countries are almost always the main source of remittances. For decades, the United States has consistently been the top remittance-sending country, with a total outflow of USD 67.96 billion in 2017, followed by the United Arab Emirates (USD 44.37 billion), Saudi Arabia (USD 36.12 billion) and Switzerland (USD 26.6 billion). The fifth-highest remittance-sending country in both 2016 and 2017 was Germany (with total outflows of USD 20.29 billion and 22.09 billion, respectively). In addition to its role as a top recipient, China (classified as an upper-middle-income country by the World Bank) has also been a significant, although declining, source of remittances, with USD 20.29 billion in 2016, down to USD 16.18 billion in 2017. Table 3 provides further details and trends.

Table 3. Top countries receiving/sending remittances (2005–2018) (current USD billions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top countries receiving remittances</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>23.63</td>
<td>53.48</td>
<td>68.91</td>
<td>78.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>22.74</td>
<td>52.46</td>
<td>63.94</td>
<td>67.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>22.13</td>
<td>22.08</td>
<td>29.80</td>
<td>35.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td>21.56</td>
<td>26.23</td>
<td>33.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>14.21</td>
<td>19.90</td>
<td>24.06</td>
<td>28.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>13.73</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>21.16</td>
<td>26.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>12.79</td>
<td>19.31</td>
<td>24.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>6.87</td>
<td>12.45</td>
<td>18.33</td>
<td>21.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6.66</td>
<td>10.85</td>
<td>15.81</td>
<td>17.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>10.35</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>15.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 See World Bank, 2019, for example.
35 See, for example, OECD, n.d.c, which also contains data on official development assistance. There is a growing body of work exploring the developmental, economic and social impacts of this trend.
36 Breakdowns for countries sending remittances in 2018 were unavailable at the time of writing.
## Top countries sending remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2017&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>47.25</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>50.78</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>17.76</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9.64</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>14.68</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9.48</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>12.89</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>12.03</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>11.86</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>10.65</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: All numbers are in current (nominal) USD billion.

<sup>a</sup> The latest available data at the time of writing was for 2017. Breakdowns for countries sending remittances in 2018 were unavailable.

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### IOM's assisted voluntary return and reintegration programmes

IOM has implemented assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes since 1979. IOM’s AVRR support to migrants comprises a range of activities, and typically includes: the provision of pre-departure counselling, the purchase of flight tickets, administrative and travel assistance and, where possible, the provision of reintegration assistance.

On average, from 2005 to 2014, IOM assisted 34,000 migrants per year through AVRR. In line with the rise in the volume of migration in recent years, the number of returns has increased. In 2018, AVRR support was provided to 63,316 migrants returning from 128 host or transit countries to 169 countries or territories of origin. However, this amounts to a 12 per cent decrease compared...
with 2017 (72,176). This decrease can be explained by a combination of structural and contextual factors, varying from country to country: lower numbers of migrant arrivals and asylum applications, and changes in national migration and asylum policies. Of the 63,316 AVRR beneficiaries in 2018, approximately 24 per cent were women and 22 per cent were children. Over 7 per cent of these returnees were victims of trafficking, unaccompanied migrant children, or migrants with health-related needs. Approximately 18,274 beneficiaries were provided with pre-departure reintegration counselling in host countries, and 41,461 beneficiaries were provided with reintegration counselling upon arrival in their countries or territories of origin.

**Top 10 host/transit countries and countries of origin of AVRR beneficiaries, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host or transit countries</th>
<th>Countries of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,942</td>
<td>5,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,977</td>
<td>5,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,968</td>
<td>4,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>4,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,392</td>
<td>2,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>2,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,149</td>
<td>2,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,508</td>
<td>1,952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>1,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>958</td>
<td>1,834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2018, the majority of AVRR beneficiaries (54%) returned from the European Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland, particularly from Germany, Greece, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands. Returns from the EEA and Switzerland decreased from 50,587 in 2017 to 33,971 in 2018. This trend confirms the increasing number of voluntary returns from transit countries. In 2018, returns from the Niger, Djibouti and Morocco to countries such as Guinea, Mali and Ethiopia amounted to more than 22 per cent of the global total. The main regions of origin for AVRR beneficiaries in 2018 were West and Central Africa (31% of total); South-East Europe, East Europe and Central Asia (28%); and Asia and the Pacific (14%). Together, the top 10 countries and territories of origin accounted for 51 per cent of the total number of AVRR beneficiaries.

For more information, see IOM, 2019a.
Refugees and asylum seekers

By the end of 2018, there was a total of 25.9 million refugees globally, with 20.4 million under UNHCR’s mandate and 5.5 million refugees registered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East. The total number of refugees is the highest on record, although the annual rate of growth has slowed since 2012.

There were also approximately 3.5 million people seeking international protection and awaiting determination of their refugee status, referred to as asylum seekers. In 2018, approximately 2.1 million asylum claims were lodged with States or UNHCR. Of the roughly 1.7 million first-instance applications for asylum lodged in 2018, the United States was the top recipient of asylum claims, with 254,300 new asylum applications, a 23 per cent decrease from 2017 (331,700), contrasting with the previous trend of increasing asylum applications in the United States from 2013 to 2016. Peru was the second largest recipient, with a sharp increase of asylum applications, from 37,800 new asylum claims in 2017 to 192,500 in 2018, mainly lodged by Venezuelans (190,500). Peru was followed by Germany, where the number of asylum applications continued to decrease (722,400 in 2016, down to 198,300 in 2017 and 161,900 in 2018).

UNHCR estimates that, at the end of 2018, those under 18 years of age constituted roughly 52 per cent of the global refugee population. From 2003 to 2018, according to available disaggregated data, the proportion of children among stocks of refugees was very high, fluctuating between 41 and 52 per cent. The proportion of females has remained relatively stable, at 47 to 49 per cent, over the same period. Consistent with broader global dynamics, refugees continued to be primarily based in urban settings, with about 61 per cent of refugees located in urban areas at the end of 2018.

Unaccompanied and separated children lodged an estimated 27,600 individual asylum applications in at least 60 countries in 2018, marking a continued declining trend since the exceptionally high number of applications in 2015 (98,400).

As in other years, unresolved or renewed conflict dynamics in key countries contributed significantly to current figures and trends. Of the refugees under UNHCR’s mandate at the end of 2018, the top 10 countries of origin – the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, Eritrea and Burundi – accounted for roughly 16.6 million, or 82 per cent of the total refugee population. Many of these countries have been among the top sources of refugees for at least seven years. The ongoing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic saw the number of refugees from that country reach approximately 6.7 million. The instability and violence that have made Afghanistan a major source of refugees for over 30 years have continued, with the country being the second largest origin country in the world, with 2.7 million refugees; this is a slight increase from 2017 figures (2.6 million), largely due to births during that year. South Sudan remained the third largest origin country of refugees since large-scale violence erupted in the middle of 2016, with 2.3 million at the end of 2018. Refugees from
the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia comprised over two thirds of the world refugee population. Figure 8 shows the trends in refugee numbers for the top five countries of origin from 2005 to 2018. The impact of the Syrian conflict is clearly illustrated in figure 8; in 2010, the Syrian Arab Republic was a source country for fewer than 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers, whereas it was the third largest host country in the world, with more than 1 million refugees mainly originating from Iraq.  

Figure 8. Number of refugees by top 5 countries of origin as of 2018 (millions)

Note: South Sudan became a country in 2011.

In 2018, for the fifth consecutive year, Turkey was the largest host country in the world, with 3.7 million refugees, mainly Syrians (over 3.6 million). Reflecting the significant share of Syrians in the global refugee population, two other bordering countries – Jordan and Lebanon – also featured among the top 10. Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran were also among the top 10 refugee-hosting countries, as the two principal hosts of refugees from Afghanistan, the second largest origin country. Uganda, Sudan, Germany, Bangladesh and Ethiopia comprised the rest. The vast majority of refugees were hosted in neighbouring countries. According to UNHCR, the least developed countries – such as Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen – hosted 33 per cent of the global total (6.7 million refugees). It is only when refugees are measured against national populations that high-income countries, such as Sweden (seventh) and Malta (ninth), rank among the top 10. Figure 9 shows trends in refugee numbers for the top five host countries from 2000 to 2018.
During 2018, over 590,000 refugees returned to their countries of origin – a decrease compared with the 667,400 returned refugees in 2017 – while the global refugee population has continued to increase. The majority of returns (210,900) were to the Syrian Arab Republic, primarily from Turkey.

While there are many challenges to measuring those benefiting from local integration, UNHCR estimates that, in 2018, 27 countries reported at least one naturalized refugee (compared with 28 countries in 2017), with a total of 62,600 naturalized refugees for the year (a decrease from the 73,400 newly naturalized refugees in 2017, but a significant increase compared with the 23,000 reported in 2016). Turkey, which naturalized an estimated 29,000 refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic in 2018 (compared with 50,000 in 2017), represents the greatest proportion, with Canada, the Netherlands, Guinea-Bissau and France contributing the bulk of the rest.

The traditional resettlement countries of Canada, the United States of America and Australia continued to conduct the majority of the world’s refugee resettlements. In 2018, approximately 92,400 refugees were admitted for resettlement globally, representing more than a 10 per cent decrease from 2017 (102,800). Syrian, Congolese and Eritrean refugees were the key beneficiaries. Figure 10 provides an overview of resettlement statistics for key countries from 2005 to 2018. With almost 23,000 resettled refugees in 2018, it was the first time since 1980 that the United States of America was not the top resettlement country. 41 The significant decline in the number of refugees resettled in the country was due to a substantial lowering of the refugee admission ceiling (the number of refugees admitted for resettlement each fiscal year) and enhanced security screening for refugees from “high-risk” countries, which has had the effect of decreasing the number of refugee admissions from these countries. 42 With a steady increase in the number of resettled refugees over the last decade, Canada became the top resettlement country in 2018, with slightly more than 28,000 resettled refugees.


Figure 9. Number of refugees by top 5 host countries as of 2018 (millions)

42 United States Department of Homeland Security, 2018; and Blizzard and Batalova, 2019.
IOM’s role in resettlement

IOM arranges safe and organized travel for refugees through resettlement programmes, as well as for other vulnerable persons of concern moving through other humanitarian pathways. Beyond traditional refugee resettlement and humanitarian admission programmes, more States are interested in or are currently carrying out other forms of admission, such as private sponsorships, academic scholarships and labour mobility schemes. IOM’s movement data for resettlement assistance refer to the overall number of refugees and other persons of concern travelling under IOM auspices from various countries of departure to destinations around the world during a given period.

During calendar years 2017 and 2018, IOM supported some 40 States in carrying out resettlement, humanitarian admission and relocation initiatives in over 138 countries of departure, with significant operations conducted in Lebanon, Turkey, Afghanistan, Jordan, Greece, Italy, Uganda, Kenya, Iraq, Ethiopia and Sudan.

In 2017, a total of 137,840 individuals travelled to 40 States under IOM auspices for resettlement assistance; the top nationalities were Syrians, Afghans, Eritreans, Iraqis and Congolese. In 2018, a total of 95,400 individuals travelled to 30 States under IOM auspices for resettlement assistance; the top 5 nationalities were the same as the previous year. From 2017 to 2018, the gender breakdown remained close, with 52 per cent males and 48 per cent females resettling to third countries.
Comparing years 2015–2016 with 2017–2018, there was a 49.6 per cent reduction of individuals resettled to North America, and a 46 per cent increase in resettlement and relocation to the European Economic Area (EEA). The top nationalities admitted to the EEA during 2017–2018 were Syrians, Eritreans, Iraqis, Congolese, Sudanese and Afghans.

Under cooperative agreements, IOM provides stakeholders with necessary information and shares data with key partners, such as UNHCR, resettlement countries and settlement agencies. IOM works in close collaboration with UNHCR on a regular basis, to verify and better align aggregate data related to resettlement, specifically around departures figures. For more information on IOM’s resettlement activities, see www.iom.int/resettlement-assistance.

Internally displaced persons

The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) compiles data on two types of internal displacement: new displacements during a given period, and the total stock of IDPs at a given point in time. This statistical information is categorized by two broad displacement causes: (a) disasters, and (b) conflict and violence. However, IDMC acknowledges the challenges associated with distinguishing between disasters and conflict as the immediate cause of displacement, and highlights the growing need to identify better ways to report on displacement in the context of multiple drivers.\(^{43}\)

With an estimated 41.3 million, the total global stock of people internally displaced by conflict and violence at the end of 2018 was the highest on record since IDMC began monitoring in 1998, and represents an increase from the 40 million reported in 2017. As with trends for refugees (discussed in the previous section), intractable and new conflicts have meant that the total number of persons internally displaced by conflict and violence has almost doubled since 2000, and has risen sharply since 2010.

Figure 11 shows the world’s top 20 countries with the largest number of IDPs displaced due to conflict and violence (stock) at the end of 2018. Most countries were either in the Middle East or sub-Saharan Africa. The Syrian Arab Republic had the highest number of people displaced due to conflict (6.1 million) by the end of 2018, followed by Colombia (5.8 million). The Democratic Republic of the Congo had the third largest number with 3.1 million, followed by Somalia (2.6 million) and Afghanistan (2.6 million). Over 30 million (nearly 75%) of the global total of 41.3 million people displaced live in just 10 countries.\(^{44}\) In terms of proportion of national population, the Syrian Arab Republic, whose conflict has dragged on for several years, had over 30 per cent of its population displaced due to conflict and violence. Somalia had the second highest proportion (18%), followed by the Central African Republic and Colombia (with both over 10%). It is important to note, however, that especially for protracted displacement cases, such as in Colombia, some

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\(^{43}\) IDMC highlights the challenges in collecting data on displacements due to development projects, criminal violence, or slow-onset disasters, as well as their efforts to overcome these difficulties. See IDMC, 2019.

\(^{44}\) The 10 countries include: the Syrian Arab Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Afghanistan, Yemen, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan and Iraq.
people who have returned to their places of origin and to their homes may still be counted as internally displaced. This is because, in some cases, a durable solution has not been achieved. Organizations such as IDMC follow the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s framework on “Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons”, which stipulates eight criteria that constitute a durable solution in determining when people should no longer be considered internally displaced.

Figure 11. Top 20 countries with the largest stock of internally displaced persons by conflict and violence at the end of 2018


Notes: IDP stock refers to the accumulated number of people displaced over time. The population size used to calculate the percentage of conflict stock displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates.

45 A durable solution is achieved “when IDPs no longer have specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their displacement”. See, for example, the Brookings Institution and University of Bern, 2010.

46 The criteria include: safety and security; adequate standard of living; access to livelihoods; restoration of housing, land and property; access to documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; and access to effective remedies and justice. See, for example, the Brookings Institution and University of Bern, 2010; IDMC, 2019.
In 2018, for the first time, IDMC also provided an estimate of the global stock figure of persons displaced by disasters. Slightly over 1.6 million persons were reported to be still living in displacement at the end of 2018 due to disasters that occurred in 2018. As noted by IDMC, this figure is a “highly conservative estimate”, as it does not capture those living in displacement because of disasters that took place before 2018.

New displacements in 2018

At the end of 2018, there were a total of 28 million new internal displacements across 148 countries and territories. Sixty-one per cent (17.2 million) of these new displacements were triggered by disasters, and 39 per cent (10.8 million) were caused by conflict and violence. As in previous years, weather-related disasters triggered the vast majority of all new displacements, with storms accounting for 9.3 million displacements and floods 5.4 million. The number of new displacements associated with conflict and violence almost doubled, from 6.9 million in 2016 to 11.8 million in 2017, and slightly decreased, to 10.8 million, in 2018.47

In 2018, Ethiopia topped the list with a significantly higher number of new displacements caused by conflict and violence (2.9 million in 2018, compared with 725,000 in 2017), considerably influencing global numbers as a result.48 Ethiopia was followed by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.8 million) and the Syrian Arab Republic (1.6 million).

Many more people are newly displaced by disasters in any given year, compared with those newly displaced by conflict and violence, and more countries are affected by disaster displacement. This is apparent when examining the number of countries and territories in which new displacements occurred in 2018: 144 for disasters, compared with 55 for conflict and violence. In 2018 (as in previous years), disasters triggered by climate and weather-related hazards, such as storms and floods, accounted for the bulk of the total (16.1 million, or almost 94%). Information on displacements caused by droughts was also available and obtained for the first time in 2017, with 1.3 million new displacements and, in 2018, 764,000, mostly in the Horn of Africa. Since 2008, the other cause of disasters, geophysical hazards, has triggered an average of 3.1 million displacements per year. While 2017 statistics for geophysical disasters were well below average, with 758,000 new displacements recorded, the number increased to 1.1 million in 2018. The Philippines and China (approximately 3.8 million each), as well as India and the United States (respectively around 2.7 and 1.2 million), had the highest absolute numbers of disaster displacements in 2018.

As shown in figure 12, in previous years, annual new disaster displacements outnumbered new displacements associated with conflict and violence. IDMC notes, however, that a significant portion of the global total of new displacements by disasters is usually associated with short-term evacuations in a relatively safe and orderly manner.

47 The content in this subsection is based on and drawn from IDMC, 2018 and IDMC, 2019. Please refer to these documents for explanatory notes, deeper analysis, caveats, limitations and methodologies associated with the numbers and trends presented. IDMC’s previous Global Estimates reports (available at www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/), as well as its Global Internal Displacement Database (IDMC, n.d.), are other key sources of information.

48 IDMC highlights possible reasons for these changes, including stabilization of front lines of conflicts, ceasefires, restrictions on freedom of movement, and changes in methodology for data collection.
Figure 12. New internal displacements by conflict and disasters, 2008–2018 (millions)


Notes: The term “new displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in a given year, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once, and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during a given year.

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix

IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) programme tracks displacement in countries affected by conflicts or natural disasters. It is designed to capture, process and disseminate information on the movements and evolving needs of displaced populations and migrants. Data are shared in the form of maps, infographics, reports, interactive web-based visualizations and raw or customized data exports. Based on a given situation, the DTM gathers information on populations, locations, conditions, needs and vulnerabilities, using one or more of the following methodological tools:

(a) Tracking mobility and multisectoral needs in specific locations to target assistance;
(b) Tracking movement (“flow”) trends and the overall situation at origin, transit and destination points;
(c) Registering individuals and households for beneficiary selection, vulnerability targeting and programming;
(d) Conducting surveys, to gather specific in-depth information from populations of interest.

In 2018, the DTM tracked over 40 million individuals (including internally displaced persons, returnees and migrants) in over 60 countries. IOM’s DTM data is one of the largest sources for global annual estimates on internal displacement compiled by IDMC. For more information on IOM’s DTM, see www.globaldtm.info.
Stateless persons

Stateless persons are, by definition, in a vulnerable situation, as they are not recognized as nationals by any State. They face obstacles in accessing basic services – such as education, employment or health care – and can suffer discrimination, abuse and marginalization. While stateless persons are not necessarily migrants, their situations involving vulnerability and lack of rights may lead them to migrate, internally or across borders, and often irregularly, given the significant obstacles they can face in accessing travel documents and regular migration pathways.

As part of its statelessness mandate, UNCHR reported 3.9 million stateless persons globally in 2018, the same global figure as in 2017. This figure is, however, a low estimate, and the number may have been as high as 10 million in 2017, according to UNHCR. Indeed, while identifying who is stateless is a necessary first step towards preventing and reducing statelessness worldwide, data collection remains a significant challenge.

For the first time, UNHCR included Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and IDPs in Rakhine State, Myanmar, in its 2017 and 2018 data of stateless persons, “in light of the size of this population and that they are in fact stateless as well as displaced”. Bangladesh and Myanmar were the countries with the first and third largest populations of stateless persons, respectively, in 2018 (around 906,000 stateless persons in Bangladesh and 620,000 in Myanmar). Figure 13 shows the other countries in the top 10 as of 2018. Côte d’Ivoire stood at the second position with 692,000 stateless persons, including mainly persons considered as “foreigners” after the country’s independence, as well as their descendants. Thailand had the fourth largest population of stateless persons in 2018, which consisted mostly of indigenous and ethnic communities. Latvia reported almost 225,000 stateless persons, with a significant number of ethnic Russians who have not been able to naturalize due to the country’s citizenship law after its independence from the Soviet Union, which only grants nationality by descent. It was followed by the Syrian Arab Republic (160,000), Kuwait (92,000), Uzbekistan (80,000), Estonia (78,000) and the Russian Federation (76,000). In terms of proportion of national populations, over 11 per cent of Latvia’s population was stateless, followed by Estonia, where stateless persons amounted to nearly 6 per cent.

50 McAuliffe, 2018.
51 The content of this subsection is based on and drawn from UNHCR, 2018 and UNHCR, 2019, unless otherwise indicated.
52 UNHCR, 2019:51.
53 UNHCR, 2018:53. In line with UNHCR statistical methodology, stateless refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs in other countries remain excluded from reported data on stateless persons. In Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017, however, UNHCR indicates that the statistical reporting for stateless populations is currently being reviewed (UNHCR, 2018). See also Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2018.
54 Adjami, 2016.
56 Venkov, 2018; Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2014.
Unfortunately, given current data gaps and methodological challenges, it is not feasible to provide trends over time either of statelessness, or of the impact of current efforts to eradicate it. While UNHCR’s *Global Action Plan to End Statelessness* by 2024 has led to tangible results since 2014, reducing statelessness is a slow process.\(^{57}\) UNHCR notes a reported 56,400 stateless persons in 24 countries who acquired nationality or whose nationality was confirmed in 2018, especially in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

\(^{57}\) UNHCR, 2014b; UNHCR ExCom, 2017.
The Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative

Since the mid-1990s, IOM has assisted over 100,000 victims of trafficking globally. Through these direct assistance activities, IOM has developed its central case management database, which contains information on over 55,000 individual cases since 2002. These data include information on victims of trafficking, including demographics, but also information on their trafficking experience. As a unique source of information on human trafficking, IOM has worked to bring these data to a public audience so that valuable insights can be developed and shared among counter-trafficking actors worldwide. A major part of this effort has been the launch of the Counter-Trafficking Data Collaborative (CTDC) in 2017, in partnership with Polaris and Liberty Shared.a

CTDC is the first global data hub on human trafficking, and combines the three largest case-level datasets, resulting in one centralized dataset with information on over 90,000 cases. For programme years 2016 and 2017, 40,190 new case registrations were included. Victims registered in that period were from 147 countries and were exploited in 107 countries. Most of them were women (54%), while 20% were girls, 22% were men and 5% were boys. Just over a quarter were children, with 16% of the victims from 15 to 17 years of age. Nearly 30% were trafficked into forced labour, while 47% were trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation. However, as shown in figures below, there are substantial regional differences.b

Gender by region of exploitation in CTDC data (2016–2017)

![Gender by region of exploitation in CTDC data (2016–2017)](image-url)
Conclusion

It is important to understand migration and displacement, and how they are changing globally, given their relevance to States, local communities and individuals. Human migration may be an age-old phenomenon that stretches back to the earliest periods of history, but its manifestations and impacts have changed over time as the world has become more globalized. Now, more than at any other time in history, we have more information on migration and displacement globally at our disposal. And yet, the very nature of migration in an interconnected world means that its dynamism can be difficult to capture in statistical terms. Migration involves “events” that can be fast-paced and complex. While it is certainly true that international migration patterns are related to social, economic and geopolitical processes that have evolved over generations, if not hundreds of years, recent advances in transnational connectivity are opening up more opportunities for greater diversity in migration processes.

It is increasingly relevant, therefore, to stay abreast of trends and evolving patterns in migration and displacement. In this chapter, we have provided a global overview of migration and migrants, based on the current data available. Notwithstanding data gaps and lags, several high-level conclusions can be drawn. At the global level, for example, we can see that, over time, migrants have taken up residence in some regions (such as Asia) at a much greater rate than others (such as Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean), and that this trend is likely to continue (see figure 1). Likewise, statistics show that migrant workers continue to gravitate toward regions with greater opportunities, as economies grow and labour markets evolve, and that some migrant worker populations are heavily gendered (see figure 7).
The global data also show that displacement caused by conflict, generalized violence and other factors remains at a record high. Intractable, unresolved and recurring conflicts and violence have led to an upsurge in the number of refugees around the world in recent years, with women and children comprising a substantial portion of the total. While a handful of countries continue to provide solutions for refugees, overall, these have been insufficient to address global needs, especially given the recent change in refugee resettlement patterns to the United States (see figure 10). In addition, there were estimated to be more people displaced internally at the end of 2018 than ever before. We also find that the estimated number of stateless persons globally is significant, at almost 4 million, notwithstanding that it has been cautioned that this is an underestimate. Aside from fundamental human rights issues, statelessness can place people at risk of (irregular) migration and displacement, so it is an important global issue worthy of further data collection, reporting and analysis.58

International cooperation on migration has been recognized by a significant majority of States – along with non-State actors in migration – as essential and central to achieving safe, orderly and regular migration for all. The Global Compact for Migration makes this clear, emphasizing a global commitment to improving international cooperation on migration, as well as the collection of migration data, so that we may better understand trends and evolving patterns and processes, to support the development of evidence-based responses.59 There are opportunities to be realized as well as challenges to be overcome, as we work collectively toward implementation of this commitment.

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58 Objective 4 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration recognizes the need to reduce statelessness and outlines measures to achieve this.

59 See chapter 11 of this report for discussion of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and its 23 objectives.
3 MIGRATION AND MIGRANTS: REGIONAL DIMENSIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

The previous chapter provides an overview of migration globally, with specific reference to international stocks and flows. Particular migrant groups – including migrant workers, refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs) – as well as remittances, were outlined. Chapter 3 focuses primarily at the regional level in order to provide a more detailed picture of migration, which sets out a different, but complementary, perspective of migrants and movements in different parts of the world.¹

Our starting point is geographic, rather than thematic, given that geography is one of the fundamentals underpinning migration today, just as it was in the past. Notwithstanding increasing globalization, geography is one of the most significant factors shaping patterns of migration and displacement. Many people who migrate across borders do so within their immediate regions, to countries that are close by, countries to which it may be easier to travel, that may be more familiar, and from which it may also be easier to return. For people who are displaced, finding safety quickly is paramount. People, therefore, tend to be displaced to safer locations nearby, whether that is within their own countries or across international borders.

This chapter seeks to assist migration policymakers, practitioners and researchers to make better sense of international migration globally by using a geographic perspective to present regional migration overviews. The analysis in this chapter focuses on six world regions as defined by the United Nations, and used by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and other organizations:

- Africa
- Asia
- Europe
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Northern America
- Oceania

For each of these regions, the analysis includes: (a) an overview and brief discussion of key migration statistics based on data compiled and reported by UN DESA, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC); and (b) succinct descriptions of “key features and developments” in migration in the region, based on a wide range of data, information and analyses from international organizations, researchers and analysts.

¹ All reasonable efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the data referred to in this chapter, including through data verification. We regret, however, any data errors that may remain. While the report generally does not refer to data or events after June 2019, international migrant stock statistics published by UN DESA on 17 September 2019 have been incorporated to the extent possible.
To account for the diversity of migration patterns, trends and issues within each of the six regions, the
descriptive narratives of “key features and recent developments” are presented at the subregional level.
For Asia, for example, this cascade approach allows for the presentation of insights from statistical data on
Asia as a whole, followed by summary information on subregions, including Eastern Asia, Southern Asia,
South-East Asia, the Middle East and Central Asia. A breakdown of the regions and subregions is provided
in appendix A. These subregional overviews provide information on migration patterns from, within and to
the subregions. Beyond this, attention has been paid to particular features that exist in a subregion, such
as labour migration and remittances, irregular migration, human trafficking, displacement (internal and
international) and integration. The subregional overviews are not intended to be exhaustive, but are designed
to be illustrative of key trends and recent changes in migration.

It is important to note that this chapter builds on chapter 3 of the World Migration Report 2018, Migration
and migrants: Regional dimensions and developments, by providing an update on statistics and current
issues. Importantly, it has been produced as a stand-alone chapter and does not require readers to refer back
to the previous report. Significant changes over the two years since the last report have been reflected in this
chapter, which incorporates data and information up until the end of June 2019. Recent shifts in migration
and displacement – such as the large-scale movement through South and Central America from the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela – are discussed, as is the mass displacement of Rohingya from Myanmar’s Rakhine State
in the second half of 2017. The chapter draws on the existing evidence base, and sources are provided in
footnotes and the references section. We encourage readers to refer to sources cited in this chapter to learn
more about topics of interest.

Africa

Migration in Africa involves large numbers of migrants moving both within and from the region. As shown
in figure 1, in 2019, over 21 million Africans were living in another African country, a significant increase
from 2015, when around 18.5 million Africans were estimated to be living within the region. The number
of Africans living in different regions also grew during the same period, from around 17 million in 2015 to
nearly 19 million in 2019.

Figure 1 shows that, since 2000, international migration within the African region has increased significantly.
And since 1990, the number of African migrants living outside of the region has more than doubled, with
the growth to Europe most pronounced. In 2019, most African-born migrants living outside the region were
residing in Europe (10.6 million), Asia (4.6 million) and Northern America (3.2 million).

One of the most striking aspects to note about international migrants in Africa, as shown in figure 1, is the
small number of migrants who were born outside of the region and have since moved there. From 2015 to
2019, the number of migrants born outside the region remained virtually unchanged (around 2 million), most
of whom were from Asia and Europe.

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2 Please note that subregions relate largely to migration dynamics and so may differ from those of UN DESA. Details are provided in
appendix A.

3 In order to ensure, to the extent possible, that this chapter provides a comprehensive “stand-alone” overview of regional migration
in 2017 and 2018, we have drawn upon relevant material included in the World Migration Report 2018 (chapter 3), especially that
which provides historical context to recent events and migration trends.

4 See appendix A for details on the composition of Africa.
Many African countries have experienced significant changes in the size of their populations in recent years, as shown in figure 2, which ranks the top 20 African countries with the largest proportional population change between 2009 and 2019. All top 20 countries were in sub-Saharan Africa and each underwent substantial population growth during this period. These 20 countries reflect the trend across the continent, with Africa currently the fastest-growing region in the world and expected to surpass 2 billion people by 2050. It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 occurred in countries with relatively smaller populations, as to be expected. Africa’s most populous countries – Nigeria, Ethiopia
and Egypt – are not among the top 20; however, all three countries also experienced increases in their populations.\(^6\) The population growth in Africa is in contrast to population change in Europe, for example, which has experienced slower population increases in some countries and even decline in others over the same period (see figure 14).

The significant increase in international migration \textit{within} Africa (see figure 1) has contributed to the recent population growth at the national level. While migration is not the only factor, with high fertility rates and increasing life expectancy also playing roles,\(^7\) increased intraregional migration within the continent has influenced population changes in some countries. For example, the share of international migrants as a proportion of national population in Equatorial Guinea has sharply increased in recent years. In 2005, international migrants accounted for less than 1 per cent of Equatorial Guinea’s population; by 2019, this figure had increased to nearly 17 per cent. South Africa is another example. In 2005, international migrants comprised 2.8 per cent of South Africa’s population; by 2019, this figure had risen to 7 per cent.

\textbf{Figure 2. Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Africa, 2009–2019}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure2.png}
\caption{Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Africa, 2009–2019}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: UN DESA, 2019c.}

\textit{Note:} It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

\(^{6}\) Ibid.

\(^{7}\) Ibid.
The African countries with the largest numbers of emigrants tend to be in the north of the region. These are shown on the left-hand side of figure 3, where countries are ranked by their overall numbers of migrants (the combination of immigrants in the country and emigrants from the country). In 2019, Egypt had the largest number of people living abroad, followed by Morocco, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and Algeria. In terms of the number of immigrants, South Africa remains the most significant destination country in Africa, with around 4 million international migrants residing in the country. Other countries with high immigrant populations as a proportion of their total populations but not among the top 20, included Gabon (19%), Equatorial Guinea (18%), Seychelles (13%) and Libya (12%).

Figure 3. Top 20 African migrant countries in 2019

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: “Immigrant” refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. “Emigrant” refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.
Significant migration corridors within and from Africa exist, many of which are related to geographic proximity and historical ties, as well as displacement factors. The size of a migration corridor from country A to country B is measured as the number of immigrants from country A who were residing in country B in 2019. Migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. Some of the largest migration corridors involving African countries, as shown in figure 4, are between North African countries such as Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France, Spain and Italy, in part reflecting post-colonial connections and proximity. Others, such as those between South Sudan and Uganda as well as Somalia and Ethiopia are the result of large-scale displacement due to conflict. Significant labour migration corridors to Gulf States also exist, as in the case of Egypt to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Importantly, just over half of the main migration corridors shown in figure 4 were within Africa, with the corridor from Burkina Faso to neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire constituting the second largest for Africa overall.

Figure 4. Top 20 migration corridors involving African countries, 2019

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.
Displacement within and from Africa is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 5. Most refugees and asylum seekers on the continent were hosted in neighbouring countries within the region. The top 10 countries in Africa, ranked by the combined total of refugees and asylum seekers both hosted by and originating from a given country, are shown in figure 5. Similar to 2017, South Sudan produced the highest number of refugees in Africa in 2018 (2.3 million), and ranked third in the world, with most hosted in neighbouring countries such as Uganda. After decades of conflict, Somalia produced the second highest number of refugees in the region and the fifth highest in the world, with the majority hosted in Kenya and Ethiopia. Other large refugee populations have originated from Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and Eritrea. Uganda remained the largest host country of refugees in the region, with around 1.2 million refugees living in the country; most were from South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Other large refugee hosting countries in 2018 were Sudan and Ethiopia.

Figure 5. Top 10 African countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018

Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.
The largest new internal displacements in Africa in 2018 took place in sub-Saharan Africa, with the majority displaced by conflict, not disasters. This is in contrast to Asia, which experienced a larger number of displacements caused by disasters (see figure 12). Conflict displacement within countries was most pronounced in Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which dwarfed the remainder of the region (figure 6). At the end of 2018, there were 2.9 million new conflict displacements in Ethiopia, the largest number globally, and much higher than the 2017 figure, which was just over 700,000. In addition to those displaced by conflict, there were more than 290,000 new displacements in Ethiopia as a result of disasters. In 2018, the Democratic Republic of the Congo had the second highest number of new conflict displacements both in Africa and globally, with the figure reaching 1.8 million. In the Central African Republic, while the scale of displacement was not as acute as in countries such as Ethiopia, it had the highest proportional rate of internal displacement (11%). Notably, several countries with large numbers of internal displacements – such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and Somalia – are also either hosting or producing significant numbers of refugees and asylum seekers (see figure 5). It is also important to mention that countries such as Mozambique, which recently experienced large-scale displacement due to cyclones Idai and Kenneth, are not included in figure 6. This is because the data used only capture the number of new internal displacements during 2018, not 2019. However, the discussion on displacement in Southern Africa due to weather-related events such as cyclone Idai can be found in “Key features and developments in Africa” below.

Figure 6. Top 20 African countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018


Notes: The term “new displacements” refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year. The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.
Key features and developments in Africa

Eastern and Southern Africa

Intractable conflicts, political and communal violence, and peacebuilding setbacks have resulted in the displacement of millions in Eastern Africa, with most countries in the subregion affected. At the end of 2018, for example, there were over 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees and close to 1.9 million IDPs.8 While the South Sudanese refugee population decreased slightly, from 2.4 million in 2017, it was still the largest in Africa in 2018.9 In the same year, Somalia was the origin of nearly 1 million refugees and had more than 2.6 million IDPs displaced by conflict and violence.10 Meanwhile, with 2.1 million IDPs, Ethiopia ranked among the top 10 countries with the largest number of people living in internal displacement as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2018.11 In Somalia, the protracted civil war has pushed people into other countries in the subregion, as well as eastward to countries such as Yemen; however, the unrelenting conflict in Yemen has created intolerable conditions, forcing migrants to return to Eastern Africa, while generating new asylum and refugee arrivals, including Yemenis.12 Thousands of Yemenis have fled to East African countries such as Djibouti, which, relative to its population size, ranked among the top 10 refugee hosting countries in the world in 2018.13 Other countries – including Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania – continued to host substantial numbers of refugees, predominantly from the subregion, as did South Sudan – notwithstanding the conflict that has prompted large-scale displacement from and within that country.14 The complex and multicausal factors triggering displacement and inhibiting solutions have meant that these host countries – some of the least developed in the world – continue to provide long-term refuge to a disproportionate share of the world’s displaced.15 In recognition of the challenges that many African countries face hosting large numbers of displaced people, and in an effort to highlight the link between displacement, peace, security and its development dimension, the African Union declared its theme for the year 2019 as “Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons: Towards Durable Solutions to Forced Displacement in Africa”.16 In 2019, the African Union not only aims to bring greater attention to the challenges of displacement in Africa, but also to foster innovative and robust initiatives to address the root causes and promote lasting solutions to forced displacement on the continent.17

Eastern and Southern Africa have long been major destinations for migrants from within Africa and other regions, while Eastern Africa is also increasingly a significant origin of migrant workers going to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States.18 Immigration from India has historically been significant in countries such as Uganda, Kenya and South Africa,19 while recent years have seen a sharp increase in the

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8 UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.
9 UNHCR, 2018a, 2019a.
10 UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.
11 IDMC, 2019.
12 UNHCR, 2019a; IOM, 2018a.
13 Ibid.
14 UNHCR, 2019a.
15 For internal displacement more generally, see also the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, particularly for Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, South Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
17 Ibid.
18 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional political organization comprised of six countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
19 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.
number of Chinese migrant workers moving to countries in the subregion. Given its advanced economy and relative political stability, South Africa has also experienced high volumes of immigration in recent years, attracting migrants, asylum seekers and refugees from within and outside Southern Africa. The number of international migrants in South Africa increased from around 2 million in 2010 to over 4 million in 2019. Meanwhile, Eastern Africa continues to experience considerable levels of outward labour mobility, driven by poverty, low wages and high unemployment. This is most evident in the large number of low- and semi-skilled East Africans who have in recent years moved to GCC States on temporary work contracts. The Gulf States’ proximity to Eastern Africa and their employment opportunities make them an attractive destination for many East Africans.

In Eastern and Southern Africa, intraregional migration is also driven by the growing demand for high- and low-skilled labour. As East African economies, such as Kenya and Rwanda, are becoming increasingly diversified, demand for workers in the services industry, for example, has drawn migrant workers from other East African countries, including Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. This is especially the case for Rwanda’s expanding technology sector, which continues to attract workers from within the subregion. The East African Common Market Protocol, which provides for the free movement of labour, has helped to facilitate labour migration within the subregion. Several countries have ratified the Protocol and some have already abolished work permits for East African citizens, making it easier for people to work across the subregion. Meanwhile, intraregional labour migration is well established in Southern Africa, where significant numbers of people have traditionally migrated from countries such as Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi and Zimbabwe, to work in South Africa and Botswana. While traditional sectors, such as mining, continue to attract migrant workers, other sectors – including finance and information technology – are increasingly drawing migrants to South Africa.

Migration in Eastern and Southern Africa continues to involve high numbers of irregular migrants, characterized by mixed migration flows and underpinned by multiple drivers, including socioeconomic factors, conflict and political instability. Migrant smuggling is particularly prominent in both subregions, with many people using the services of smugglers to reach their intended destinations. Many smuggling networks are based in the Horn of Africa, while countries that are members of the East African Community – such as Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania – are largely transit countries. The Middle East, Europe and Southern Africa are among the major destinations for migrants from Eastern Africa, who use several routes, including the Eastern routes to the Arab Peninsula and other countries in the Middle East, southern routes to Southern Africa, and northern routes to North Africa, Europe and North America. However, the Horn of Africa routes are also significant, with a large number of people moving to or within the Horn of Africa. Similar to Eastern Africa, irregular migration is widespread in Southern Africa, and involves intraregional

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20 Cook et al., 2016.
21 UN DESA, 2019a.
22 Manji, 2017.
23 Atong, Mayah and Odigie, 2018.
24 UNCTAD, 2018.
25 East African Community, n.d.
26 Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013.
27 UNCTAD, 2018.
29 IOM, 2019a.
migrants, such as those from Zimbabwe and Mozambique, moving to South Africa, as well as those from outside the subregion. Migrant smuggling networks have proliferated over the decades and have become more organized and professionalized, as it has become increasingly difficult to cross borders in Southern Africa. While a significant number of migrants smuggled into Southern Africa are from within the subregion, a large number also originate from outside Southern Africa, most notably from the Horn of Africa. Many migrants often face significant vulnerability, with many experiencing violence and extortion.

Environmental change and disasters in Eastern and Southern Africa are prevalent and increasing, and are influencing human movement and displacement. The subregion has faced increased variability in precipitation and higher occurrence of drought in recent decades. These slow-onset environmental changes have a major impact on food security, given that agriculture is a dominant economic sector in both Eastern and Southern Africa. Droughts have become a regular occurrence in countries such as Somalia, and are a major driver of displacement in the country. In 2018, there were a quarter of a million new displacements in Somalia due to drought. In 2017, drought-related displacements reached more than 850,000 in Somalia. Drought conditions have been responsible for increased malnutrition, food scarcity and increased competition for already limited resources, especially among farmers and pastoralists in the subregion; an estimated 1.2 million children in Somalia were acutely malnourished in 2017. Several countries in Southern Africa also experienced significant displacement due to sudden-onset hazards. From January to June 2018, Eastern Africa accounted for five of the most severe disaster events in the world. And in March 2019, Southern Africa experienced two subsequent cyclones, Idai and Kenneth, which brought torrential rains and winds, leaving a trail of destruction in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Malawi. Cyclone Idai, which made landfall in central Mozambique, is considered one of the worst natural disasters to hit Southern Africa in decades. By April, the cyclone had claimed almost 600 lives and displaced more than 130,000 people in Mozambique alone.

Xenophobic attacks on migrants and the emergence of new armed groups in Southern Africa have contributed to increased displacement in the subregion. Over the last 10 years, migrants in countries such as South Africa have increasingly been subjected to violence, resulting in the destruction of property, injuries and sometimes loss of life. Nationwide xenophobic attacks, such as those that took place in 2008, displaced thousands of migrants and resulted in more than 60 deaths. More recently, xenophobic attacks in 2018 led to several deaths, looting and destruction of property belonging to foreign nationals; the violence has extended into 2019 with more lives lost. Outbreaks of xenophobic violence are most common in South Africa’s townships and other economically poor neighbourhoods, where residents often blame foreign nationals for

30 Maher, 2018.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014a.
34 Tierney, Ummenhofer and deMenocal, 2015; USAID, n.d.
35 IDMC, 2019.
36 IDMC, 2018a.
37 UN Environment, 2018a.
38 IDMC, 2018b.
40 IOM, 2019b.
high rates of crime and job losses. In parts of the subregion, armed groups terrorizing communities continue to cause displacement. In northern Mozambique, for example, an armed group known as Al-Sunna wa Jama’a remains a potent threat and has driven hundreds of people from their homes.43

West and Central Africa

Intraregional migration, which is significant in West and Central Africa, is characterized by migration flows that are influenced by multiple drivers. While there are significant data deficits on movement, and accurate numbers can be difficult to ascertain, recent estimates indicate that the majority of international migrants in West and Central Africa move within the subregion.44 Intraregional migration dominates for several reasons, including visa-free movement among the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members, the relatively small sizes of many countries in the subregion and the strong networks among the many ethnic groups scattered across the subregion.45 Importantly, intraregional migration within ECOWAS is mostly due to labour mobility, with seasonal, temporary and permanent migrant workers moving largely from countries such as the Niger and Mali toward Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.46 A large number of migrant workers are in low-skilled sectors, including domestic work, informal trade and agriculture.47 In parts of West Africa, agricultural labourers often move during the harvest period (July to September), as well as through the off-season harvest that runs until March.48 Some of the migrant workers are children, as is the case with the movements between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso.49 Unlike West Africa, where environmental and economic factors are important drivers of intraregional migration, conflict and instability have played a larger role in displacement to neighbouring countries in Central Africa.50 However, labour migration is not absent in Central Africa, with Gabon, for example, home to a large number of migrant workers from within Central Africa who work in its oil and lumber industries.51

Irregular migration remains prevalent in West and Central Africa, although free movement agreements in the subregion have been designed to facilitate migration and reduce irregularity. The use of smugglers to cross borders even within free movement areas such as ECOWAS is not uncommon, particularly in circumstances where people do not possess identity documents.52 It is important to emphasize, however, that most West Africans who are smuggled overland begin their journeys as regular migrants under the free movement protocol and only violate immigration laws after exiting the ECOWAS area.53 Moreover, a number of borders in West Africa are extremely porous, enabling unauthorized movements between countries, with several ECOWAS borders cutting across politically unstable and sparsely populated areas, which are also characterized by security deficiencies.54 For many West and Central African migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe, the Niger is an important country of transit as well as a major smuggling

44 Adepoju, 2016.
45 Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.
46 Devillard, Bacchi and Noack, 2016.
47 UNCTAD, 2018.
48 ACAPS, 2018.
49 UNCTAD, 2018.
50 IOM, n.d.a.
51 Ibid.
52 Altai Consulting and IOM, 2015.
53 Carling, 2016.
54 Ibid.
The Niger’s weak border management capacity has been exacerbated by an increase in attacks by armed and extremist groups operating along the country’s borders. Most attacks, including from Boko Haram, have been concentrated in the Niger’s Diffa region, located in the south-east of the country, bordering Nigeria. The violence has had a devastating impact on health services and education, and has driven thousands of people from their homes.\footnote{IFRC, 2018.}

**Conflict and violence linked to political upheavals, communal and ethnic tensions and Boko Haram extremism, have meant that most countries in West and Central Africa are affected by internal or cross-border displacement, although the magnitude varies dramatically.** As with other subregions in Africa, countries in West and Central Africa have long histories of hosting and producing displaced populations, often simultaneously. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is one such example. At the end of 2018, it was home to more than half a million refugees, while at the same time it was the country of origin of over 700,000 refugees, with 300,000 of them residing in Uganda and significant numbers in other neighbouring countries, including Rwanda (77,000) and Burundi (71,000).\footnote{UNHCR, 2019a.} The protracted nature of conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involves dozens of armed groups, has had a devastating effect on the country, creating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. At the end of 2018, there were 3 million IDPs in the country, the third highest number of people displaced as a result of violence and conflict globally (see chapter 2, figure 11).\footnote{IDMC, 2019.} Meanwhile, with large swathes of the country controlled by armed groups, the civil war in the Central African Republic was reignited in 2016 after a period of relative calm; the conflict spilled over into 2017 and 2018, wreaking havoc and sending hundreds of thousands of people from their homes. Both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic ranked among the top 10 origin countries of refugees in the world in 2018, with the Central African Republic producing nearly 600,000 refugees and more than half a million conflict IDPs.\footnote{UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.} The Boko Haram insurgency, which began in 2009 in Nigeria’s northern State of Borno, combined with counter-insurgency operations and communal clashes over scarce resources, have also led to significant displacement in the Lake Chad region. With more than 2.2 million IDPs, Nigeria ranked among the top 10 countries with the highest number of people displaced due to conflict and violence by end of 2018 (see chapter 2, figure 11).\footnote{IDMC, 2019.} In the same year, there were more than 600,000 IDPs in Cameroon and over 156,000 in the Niger.\footnote{Ibid.} Some of the violence and displacement in West Africa is linked to conflict between pastoralists and farmers over land and resources, although these conflicts often have ethnic and religious dimensions too.\footnote{UNOWAS, 2018.}

**Environmental changes in West and Central Africa are impacting human livelihoods and mobility.** For example, although precipitation events in the Sahel\footnote{The Sahel region is a semi-arid tropical savanna ecoregion spanning many countries in West and Central Africa, including Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Sudan.} are slowly increasing, they are becoming increasingly unpredictable, leading to the frequent occurrence of droughts and floods.\footnote{Hummel, Doevenspeck and Samimi, 2012.} In the Niger, an estimated 40,000 disaster-related displacements were recorded at the end of 2018, while in Nigeria, there were around 600,000
displacements as a result of floods in the same year.\textsuperscript{65} At the same time, rapid population growth has led to the intensification of cropping, deforestation and overgrazing, contributing to land degradation.\textsuperscript{66} Despite an increase in the scale of agriculture in the subregion, food insecurity remains rampant.\textsuperscript{67} For example, at the end of 2018, more than 3 million people were affected by food insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin.\textsuperscript{68} Millions of people in West and Central Africa depend on Lake Chad; however, the lake’s volume has decreased by 90 per cent in area in the last 40 years, due to increased drought and human-related causes such as increased irrigation withdrawals.\textsuperscript{69} The lake’s shrinkage has not only affected the livelihoods of millions of people, but also impacted cattle transhumance, and is increasingly a source of tension and communal conflict;\textsuperscript{70} moreover, the deterioration of living conditions, which has made it difficult for people living along the lake to adapt to the harsher conditions, has created an ideal environment for armed groups to emerge.\textsuperscript{71} The complex and interconnected environmental changes – such as droughts and floods, overexploitation of resources and climate change – are contributing factors to rural–urban and cyclical mobility within countries and across borders in the subregion. Migration is one strategy used to increase livelihoods and reduce risks in the Western Sahel, particularly in light of uncertain agricultural returns.\textsuperscript{72} Research has also highlighted the interconnections between, on the one hand, impacts of climate change on natural-resource-dependent livelihoods and food insecurity and, on the other hand, tensions, conflicts and mobility.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{North Africa}

\textbf{Migration of North Africans to Europe and Gulf States continues to be a defining feature of the migration dynamics of the subregion, and one that has developed over several decades.} Migration of North Africans to countries outside of Africa has been, and continues to be, much higher than migration to other countries within the subregion and within Africa.\textsuperscript{74} Two distinct streams have characterized outflows from North Africa: migrants from the north-west (such as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) have historically moved to Europe, owing to their geographic proximity, previous labour recruitment agreements and post-colonial ties,\textsuperscript{75} while those from the north-east (such as Egypt and Sudan) have predominantly sought temporary work in GCC countries. Large income disparities between the origin and destination countries, and the high levels of unemployment in North Africa, remain significant drivers of migration. As of 2019, almost 12 million North Africans were living outside their countries of birth, with roughly half in Europe and 3.3 million living in Gulf States.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{In addition to being a major migrant transit area, North Africa also hosts notable populations of international migrants, including refugees.} Sudan had the largest number of international migrants in

\textsuperscript{65} IDMC, 2019.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} UNEP, 2011.
\textsuperscript{68} European Commission, 2018a.
\textsuperscript{69} Gao et al., 2011.
\textsuperscript{70} UN Environment, 2018b.
\textsuperscript{71} Rudincova, 2017.
\textsuperscript{72} Hummel and Liehr, 2015.
\textsuperscript{73} UNEP, 2011.
\textsuperscript{74} Flahaux and de Haas, 2016.
\textsuperscript{75} Natter, 2014.
\textsuperscript{76} UN DESA, 2019a.
the subregion, over 1.2 million in 2019.\textsuperscript{77} Sudan was followed by Libya, with over 800,000. The number of international migrants in Egypt increased from 300,000 in 2010 to more than 500,000 in 2019, with migrants primarily originating from the Syrian Arab Republic, Somalia, Sudan and the Palestinian Territories.\textsuperscript{78} While Morocco has traditionally been a country of emigration, it is increasingly becoming a destination country, including of migrants from other subregions in Africa, who stay for an indeterminate period while looking for a way to cross over to Europe.\textsuperscript{79} 

Conflict and violence within North Africa, and in surrounding subregions, have contributed to displacement. At the end of 2018, Sudan was the sixth largest country of origin of refugees globally, with around 700,000 refugees, the majority of whom were hosted by the neighbouring countries of Chad, South Sudan and Ethiopia.\textsuperscript{80} Sudan also had approximately 2.1 million IDPs due to conflict and violence.\textsuperscript{81} At the same time, Sudan is also a prominent host country of refugees, with over 1 million refugees (this number more than doubling since 2016), most of whom were from South Sudan, Eritrea and the Syrian Arab Republic.\textsuperscript{82} Algeria also hosted over 94,000 refugees by the end of 2018,\textsuperscript{83} while Egypt hosted over 240,000 refugees, primarily originating from the Syrian Arab Republic, the Palestinian Territories and other African countries and territories.\textsuperscript{84} A volatile security and political situation in Libya had contributed to a total population of 221,000 IDPs by the end of 2018 (a drop from over 300,000 in 2016), while also affecting the more than 56,000 refugees and asylum seekers residing in Libya.\textsuperscript{85} 

As a key hub of transit activity for migrants originating from many countries to the south, the North African subregion is confronted with protection challenges associated with irregular migration to Europe. In 2018, approximately 117,000 migrants arrived in Europe by sea.\textsuperscript{86} This is a significant drop compared with 2017 (around 172,000) and 2016, when the number rose to 364,000.\textsuperscript{87} There has also been a shift in the routes taken by most irregular maritime migrants; while the majority from Africa who entered Europe in 2016 and 2017 used the Central Mediterranean route (from Libya, mainly to Italy), most irregular maritime arrivals to Europe in 2018 took the Western Mediterranean route (from Morocco, mainly to Spain).\textsuperscript{88} There were close to 59,000 sea arrivals in Spain, as opposed to around 23,000 in Italy.\textsuperscript{89} The change in major routes, from the Central to the Western Mediterranean, is linked to several factors, including closer cooperation between the European Union (EU) and countries of origin and transit, counter smuggling efforts, as well as increased maritime security patrols off the Libyan coast.\textsuperscript{90} Migrants from sub-Saharan African countries comprised the majority of irregular maritime arrivals in Spain, followed by Moroccans.\textsuperscript{91} People who travelled the Central Mediterranean route to Italy were mostly Tunisian, followed by Eritreans, Iraqis,

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{79} Reifeld, 2015.  
\textsuperscript{80} UNHCR, 2019a.  
\textsuperscript{81} IDMC, 2019.  
\textsuperscript{82} UNHCR, n.d.  
\textsuperscript{83} UNHCR, 2019a.  
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{85} IDMC, 2019, UNHCR, 2019a.  
\textsuperscript{86} IOM, n.d.b. This includes arrivals to Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain.  
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{88} Frontex, 2019; MacGregor, 2019.  
\textsuperscript{89} IOM, n.d.b.  
\textsuperscript{90} UNHCR, 2019b; Frontex, 2019; MacGregor, 2019.  
\textsuperscript{91} UNHCR, 2019b.
Sudanese and Pakistanis.\textsuperscript{92} From January to November 2018, an estimated 15 per cent of all irregular maritime arrivals in Italy were unaccompanied children.\textsuperscript{93}

There are sizeable migrant smuggling routes to, within and from North Africa, with smuggling increasingly concentrated among a few organized criminal networks.\textsuperscript{94} With the help of smugglers, migrants from countries in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, often embark on highly dangerous journeys to North Africa, including through the Sahara Desert.\textsuperscript{95} One of the main smuggling passageways includes migrants moving from Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia, towards Egypt and Israel.\textsuperscript{96} But as socioeconomic conditions in Egypt have deteriorated in recent years, smugglers have turned increasingly to countries such as Libya, which prior to 2011 was a significant destination for migrant workers and, more recently, has become a major smuggling hub and the main departure point for migrants trying to get to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route.\textsuperscript{97} The subregion continues to struggle with serious human rights violations and protection challenges; many migrants in transit are exposed to sexual and gender-based violence, forced labour, arbitrary detention, extortion and exploitation, among other abuses. This is especially the case in Libya, where human smuggling often morphs into trafficking. In 2018, IOM assisted over 16,000 migrants to return home after they had been detained or stranded in Libya,\textsuperscript{98} some at the hands of smugglers and traffickers. The protracted civil conflict in Libya has created a climate of lawlessness, in addition to severely weakening its institutions and crippling its economy.\textsuperscript{99}

Asia\textsuperscript{100}

Asia – home to around 4.6 billion people – was the origin of over 40 per cent of the world’s international migrants in 2019 (111 million). More than half (66 million) were residing in other countries in Asia, a significant increase from 2015, when around 61 million were estimated to be living within the continent. As shown in the middle panel of figure 7, intraregional migration within Asia has increased significantly over time, rising from 35 million in 1990. Considerable growth has also occurred in Asian-born migrant populations in Northern America and Europe over the last two decades. In 2019, migration from Asia to Northern America reached 17 million, rising from a little over 16 million in 2015, whereas in Europe, migration from Asia stood at nearly 22 million in 2019. Migration from Asia to Northern America and Europe drove much of the increase in the number of Asian migrants outside the region, reaching a total of 44.6 million extra-regional migrants in 2019, an 11 per cent increase from 40 million in 2015.

The number of non-Asian-born migrants in Asia has remained at relatively low levels since 1990. Europeans comprise the largest group of migrants from outside Asia in the region. These numbers include migrants from the European part of the former Soviet Union now living in Central Asia. During the same period, the number of Africans – the other sizable group of migrants in Asia – has grown.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94} UNODC, 2018.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} İçduygu, 2018.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} IOM, 2018b.
\textsuperscript{99} UNSMIL and OHCHR, 2018.
\textsuperscript{100} See appendix A for details on the composition of Asia.
Several Asian countries have undergone substantial changes in the size of their populations in recent years. These changes are shown in figure 8, which ranks the top 20 Asian countries with the largest proportional population change from 2009 to 2019. Except the Syrian Arab Republic, all top 20 countries experienced increases in their populations during this period. GCC countries, which are all represented among the top 20 countries, underwent some of the most significant population changes over the last decade. International
migration has been a significant determinant of population change in Asia, and especially in GCC States, which continue to be important destinations for migrant workers from within Asia and from outside the region. As illustrated in figure 9, international migrants make up large proportions of national populations in GCC States, with migrants in the United Arab Emirates, for example, accounting for 88 per cent of the country’s population.  

The two Asian “population giants”, India and China, have the largest absolute numbers of migrants living abroad (figure 9). It is important to add that these large absolute numbers of emigrants constitute small shares of the total populations of India and China. Migrants from China made up the third largest population of foreign-born migrants in the world after India and Mexico. Nearly 3 million Chinese-born emigrants resided in the United States, which was also home to other large Asian migrant groups from India, the Philippines and Viet Nam. Other countries with large numbers of migrants residing abroad include Bangladesh and the Syrian Arab Republic.

In GCC countries, migrants make up high proportions of the total national populations (figure 9). For example, in 2019, migrants accounted for 88 per cent of the population in United Arab Emirates; 72 per cent in Kuwait;

Source: UN DESA, 2019c.

Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 were more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.
nearly 79 per cent in Qatar; and 45 per cent in Bahrain. Many migrants came from Africa, South Asia (for example, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal), and South-East Asia (for example, Indonesia and the Philippines).

It is also important to note that current data on foreign-born migrants also partly reflect significant historical events, such as the 1947 Partition, resulting in the mass displacement of people from and to India and Pakistan. This is evident in 2019 data, which show that over 5 million and 3 million foreign-born migrants, respectively, resided in the two countries.

**Figure 9. Top 20 Asian migrant countries in 2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrants (millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of population</th>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Bangladesh</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Syrian Arab Republic</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Iran (Islamic Republic of)</td>
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<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Kuwait</td>
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</table>

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: “Immigrant” refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. “Emigrant” refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.
Figure 10 shows the top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries, with a little over half of them – 13 of 20 – occurring within the region. These migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The largest corridor is from the Syrian Arab Republic to Turkey, where over 3.7 million Syrians were residing in 2019. This is a change from 2015 and 2017 when the largest corridor in Asia was India to the United Arab Emirates.

**Figure 10. Top 20 migration corridors from Asian countries, 2019**

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.
International displacement within and from Asia is a major feature of the region, as shown in figure 11. The Syrian Arab Republic and Afghanistan were the top origin countries of refugees in the world. The impact of the Syrian conflict on displacement can be clearly seen in figure 11, with refugees and asylum seekers from the Syrian Arab Republic dwarfing numbers from Afghanistan. In 2018, the vast majority of refugees from Asian countries lived in neighbouring countries. Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic, for example, were predominantly hosted in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while refugees from Afghanistan, whose size grew from 2.6 million in 2017 to 2.7 million in 2018 (mostly due to births during the year), were largely hosted in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Due to violence against and persecution of the Rohingya, Myanmar produced the third largest refugee population in the region and the fourth largest in the world in 2018, with most refugees hosted in Bangladesh. As shown in figure 11, it is also important to note that origin countries such as Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are also themselves hosting refugees.

Figure 11. Top 10 Asian countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018

Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.
The largest new internal displacements in Asia resulted from disasters (figure 12). The Philippines, which had 3.8 million new disaster displacements at end of 2018, recorded the largest number globally. The disasters that triggered displacement included volcanic eruptions, and flooding caused by monsoons and landslides. With around 3.7 million displacements, China recorded nearly as many new disaster displacements as the Philippines. China was followed by India (2.7 million) and Indonesia (853,000). Conflict also contributed to a large number of new internal displacements in Asia, with the Syrian Arab Republic recording the largest number (1.6 million), around 9 per cent of its population. Other countries where conflict led to significant internal displacement included Afghanistan (372,000), Yemen (252,000) and the Philippines (188,000).

**Figure 12. Top Asian countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018**

![Figure 12: Top Asian countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018](image)

*Source: IDMC, n.d.; UN DESA, 2017.*

*Notes:* New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative illustrative purposes only.
Key features and developments in Asia

**South-East Asia**

For many countries in South-East Asia, migration entails significant levels of both emigration and immigration, as well as transit migration. Considerable income disparity in the subregion is a major factor underpinning the strong trend of people to migrate from lower-income countries to higher-income countries within (and beyond) the subregion. There are a little more than 10 million international migrants within the subregion and just over 21.8 million total migrants from the subregion, 6.8 million of whom migrated to other countries within South-East Asia.103 The advanced economies of Malaysia and Singapore are notable destinations for migrants. The efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) toward greater regional integration have contributed to increased intraregional migration. There is also a strong geographic aspect to migration, with higher levels of migration occurring between countries sharing borders, particularly along Thailand’s border with neighbours Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar.104 Intraregional, long-term migration corridors are evident, which are mainly dominated by temporary labour migration, with smaller components of permanent (skilled and family) migration, student migration and forced migration.105

Labour migration, a prominent feature in South-East Asia and a key driver of economic growth and development, is also associated with inconsistent human rights practices. Labour migrants have long been integral to the economies of major destination countries within the subregion – such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand – where they help fill gaps in labour markets. This is especially the case for lower-skilled sectors such as fisheries, domestic work and construction.106 Meanwhile, the prospects for employment and higher wages often compel people from countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia to move to more prosperous economies within the subregion.107 Many migrants send significant shares of their earnings to their families back home, with the Philippines, for example, consistently ranking among the largest remittance-recipient countries in the world. In 2018, the Philippines, whose international remittance inflows amounted to USD 34 billion, was the fourth largest remittance recipient globally after India, China and Mexico.108 But even as labour migration has helped relieve labour shortages in destination countries, many labour migrants continue to face exploitative conditions. Workers employed in low-skilled, labour-intensive sectors, regardless of their legal status, are most affected, with wage-related abuse the most common.109 Many labour migrants are required to work extremely long hours for below minimum wages, a consequence of inadequate protection afforded to labour migrants during both recruitment and employment.110

103 UN DESA, 2019a.
105 Hugo, 2014.
107 Pholphirul, 2018.
110 Ibid.
Migration involves high proportions of irregular migration, mostly in relation to economic factors such as poverty and lack of employment. Irregular migration flows such as those from Cambodia and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to destinations including Thailand and Malaysia are often facilitated by smugglers. Smugglers also play a significant role in irregular migration out of the subregion, with Vietnamese migrants moving to Europe, for example, often using smugglers to reach their destinations. Mixed migration flows exist (involving movements of people with and without international protection needs), as do migration flows underpinned by mixed motivations. Many migrants face exploitation in South-East Asia, stemming from their irregular status. Migrant workers in particular industries also face forced labour, exploitation and serious abuse (for example, in the fishing, agriculture, construction and manufacturing industries).

In addition to smuggling, trafficking of persons continues to be a challenge in South-East Asia, with nearly half of all victims in Asia (46%) trafficked within the subregion. Large numbers of people are trafficked for both sexual exploitation and forced labour, with a larger share of females trafficked for sexual exploitation in 2016. Countries such as Malaysia and Thailand had more victims of forced labour than sexual exploitation in 2016.

There has been an increase in displacement in the subregion due to violence, systemic persecution and marginalization. The Rohingya refugee situation is the most acute, and remains one of the most complex refugee crises in the world. By end of 2018, there were over 900,000 Rohingya in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, and more than 1 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The Kutupalong-Balukhali site in Cox’s Bazar continues to be the biggest and most densely populated refugee settlement in the world; refugees from Myanmar accounted for the fourth largest refugee population in the world in 2018. Due to a surge in targeted killings and human rights abuses in August 2017, a significant number of Rohingya were displaced from Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the majority seeking protection in Bangladesh. While this was not the first time that Rohingya fled Myanmar as a result of violence, the August 2017 violence prompted one of the largest waves of displacement in decades. Meanwhile, within South-East Asia, Malaysia continued a long-term trend of hosting a large population of refugees and people in refugee-like situations (over 120,000 in 2018), mainly as a result of displacement caused by civil conflict in Myanmar over many years. Resettlement of refugees from the subregion is mainly undertaken by “traditional” resettlement countries (such as the United States, Canada and Australia), and there is little by way of “protection infrastructure” within the subregion. There are also large populations of IDPs and stateless populations in the subregion, with eight countries in the subregion hosting stateless populations (the largest of which is in Myanmar, which hosted more than 600,000 at end of 2018).

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111 UNODC, 2018.
112 Gois, 2015.
113 IOM, n.d.c.
114 UNODC, 2018.
115 Ibid.
116 IOM, 2018c.
117 UNHCR, 2019a.
118 Ibid.
119 McAuliffe, 2016. “Protection infrastructure” encompasses domestic law, national policies as well as administrative practices on protection; see Sitaropoulos, 2000.
120 Southwick, 2015; UNHCR, 2019a.
Southern Asia

Migration from Southern Asia to other subregions is a key feature, with many temporary migrant workers in the GCC countries originating from this subregion. The prospects of higher wages and accessible employment opportunities have resulted in a significant increase in the number of people leaving the subregion in recent years.\textsuperscript{121} For countries in the subregion with significant labour surpluses, migration has relieved labour pressures, while helping to reduce poverty through remittances. Accordingly, Southern Asia is among the largest recipients of remittances in the world. In 2018, remittance inflows to India amounted to USD 79 billion, the largest in the world; and in countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, remittances exceeded 5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the same year.\textsuperscript{122}

Migration within the subregion is a dominant feature in Southern Asia, driven by economic and labour market differentials.\textsuperscript{123} Intraregional movement, both regular and irregular, is related to strong common historical roots, geographic proximity, and cultural and kinship ties between countries.\textsuperscript{124} In 2019, just under 80 per cent of the 14 million international migrants in Southern Asia originated from other countries in the subregion.\textsuperscript{125} Major migration corridors include Bangladesh–India, Afghanistan–Pakistan, India–Pakistan and Nepal–India; however, it is important to note that these corridors are all quite distinct, reflecting a range of historical and contemporary economic, security and cultural factors. There are millions of Bangladeshi and Nepalese labour migrants currently working in India, for example, primarily in the informal sector as construction labourers and domestic workers, whereas the India–Pakistan corridor in part reflects the mass displacement following the 1947 Partition of India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{126} Further, many of the 3.9 million Afghan international migrants who reside in the subregion (primarily in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan) have been displaced across borders due to conflict and violence within Afghanistan that has waxed and waned since the 1970s.\textsuperscript{127} Internal migration within the countries of South Asia is extensive and larger in scale than international migration, related primarily to temporary and seasonal migration from rural to urban areas.\textsuperscript{128} From 2001 to 2011, Southern Asia’s urban population grew by 130 million people.\textsuperscript{129} However, while rural–urban migration has contributed to this growth, it has largely been driven by the reclassification of rural settlement and natural population increase.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{121} Doherty et al., 2014.
\textsuperscript{122} World Bank, 2019a.
\textsuperscript{123} Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} UN DESA, 2019a.
\textsuperscript{126} Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.
\textsuperscript{127} Schmeidl, 2016; UNHCR, 2016.
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Ellis and Roberts, 2016.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid.
Irregular migration both within and from the subregion is common in Southern Asia, and is often aided by loose smuggling networks. While the exact number of people undertaking irregular migration within the subregion is not known, there are estimated to be large irregular migrant populations within the subregion.\textsuperscript{131} India, for example, is home to significant populations of irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal and, to a lesser extent, Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{132} Regions including Europe, Northern America and Oceania are among the most preferred destinations of irregular migrants from Southern Asia.\textsuperscript{133} Socioeconomic and insecurity factors in countries of origin, in addition to better wages and employment opportunities in destination countries, are among the factors associated with irregular migration and migrant smuggling.\textsuperscript{134} Migrants from Southern Asia heading to Western Europe are primarily smuggled through Central Asia and the Russian Federation, as well as through the Middle East into the Western Balkans.\textsuperscript{135} Other irregular migrants are smuggled through to Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia for work.\textsuperscript{136} There have been many documented cases of migrants being exploited and abused by smugglers in Southern Asia.\textsuperscript{137} Trafficking of persons remains a serious concern in Southern Asia, although data and information for many countries in the subregion are scarce. A 2018 UNODC report estimates that nearly 60 per cent of victims of trafficking detected in the subregion in 2016 were female, based on information available for four countries, including Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{138} In Nepal, there were more child victims than adult victims.\textsuperscript{139}

Long-standing conflict, political instability, violence and repression have made Southern Asia a significant source of displacement; the subregion also hosts significant populations of displaced persons. In recent history, every country in the subregion (other than Maldives) has been an origin or a host of displaced populations. Most notably, at the end of 2018, there were 2.7 million Afghan refugees, the second largest refugee population in the world after the Syrian Arab Republic, and 2.6 million Afghan IDPs.\textsuperscript{140} The neighbouring countries of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted the most Afghan refugees and, accordingly, featured among the top host countries in the world.\textsuperscript{141} Pakistan, with its porous border and close ethnic, linguistic, religious and economic ties, has been the major host for decades, with around 1.4 million refugees at the end of 2018, almost exclusively Afghans;\textsuperscript{142} around 60,000 refugees were repatriated to Afghanistan in 2017, most of them from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{143} At the end of 2018, the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted close to 1 million refugees,\textsuperscript{144} making it the sixth largest refugee host country in the world, while both India and Bangladesh continued to host large IDP populations.\textsuperscript{145}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[131] Srivastava and Pandey, 2017.
\item[132] Jayasuriya and Sunam, 2016.
\item[133] McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016.
\item[134] Ibid.
\item[135] Sengupta, 2018.
\item[136] Gallagher and McAuliffe, 2016.
\item[137] UNODC, 2018.
\item[138] Ibid.
\item[139] Ibid.
\item[140] UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.
\item[141] UNHCR, 2019a.
\item[142] Ibid.
\item[143] IOM and UNHCR, 2018.
\item[144] UNHCR, 2019a.
\item[145] IDMC, 2019. For internal displacement more generally, see also the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, particularly for Afghanistan, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
\end{footnotes}
Southern Asian populations are particularly vulnerable to slow-onset and rapid-onset disasters related to natural hazards and climate change. Except for Afghanistan, where conflict and violence played a larger role in driving people from their homes, disasters were responsible for most displacements in Southern Asia in 2018. There were an estimated 3.3 million new displacements in Southern Asia due to sudden-onset hazards in 2018, with most of those affected in India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Relative to its population size, Southern Asia has the highest number of people at risk of displacement as a result of sudden-onset hazards, with Bangladesh, India and Pakistan having the highest disaster risk. India bore most of the brunt of the disasters in the subregion, with more than 2.7 million displacements as a result of tropical storms and floods. Afghanistan had the second highest number of disaster displacements in the subregion, with 371,000 new displacements, mostly due to drought conditions. Thousands of people were also displaced in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as a result of monsoons. The scale of disaster-related destruction and displacement in Southern Asia in recent years has in part been attributed to poor planning and lack of preparedness in the subregion. Migration and mobility are particularly important coping strategies in response to environmental change events in Southern Asia – including sea-level rise, coastal erosion, flooding and groundwater depletion – all of which pose considerable challenges in the subregion.

Eastern Asia

Eastern Asia is undergoing significant demographic change, with several countries experiencing low fertility rates and ageing populations, leading to revisions of immigration policies. Countries such as Japan are already experiencing negative population growth, while the Republic of Korea’s fertility rate is well below the replacement rate of 2.1 required to sustain a population. In 2019, Japan had the lowest potential support ratio in the world (the number of workers per retiree) and, along with China, was among the top 10 most populous countries with fertility rates that are below replacement. These demographic changes have far-reaching implications for public debt, the welfare state and labour markets. Japan, for example, is grappling with an acute labour shortage. These realities are prompting policymakers to reassess historically restrictive approaches toward immigration, which have been associated with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity in some countries, more limited experience in immigration policy compared with other regions and subregions, and the relative unpopularity of immigration in many countries.

146 IDMC, 2019.
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 IDMC, 2018a.
151 Climate and Development Knowledge Network, 2014b. See also Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.
152 UN DESA, 2019c.
153 Ibid.
154 Nye, 2019.
155 Staedicke, Batalova and Zong, 2016.
As key Eastern Asian countries experience declines in their populations, several countries have passed new immigration laws or implemented programmes meant to attract foreign workers. In December 2018, Japan’s Parliament approved a new immigration law easing restrictions on foreign workers in industries facing labour shortages, with the changes expected to bring in more than 300,000 workers. Recent changes to Japan’s immigration laws are also partly a response to the surge in demand for workers in areas such as construction, as the country prepares to host the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo. Meanwhile, through the Employment Permit System, which allows inflows of foreign workers from partner Asian countries that have signed memorandums of understanding, the Republic of Korea is expected to accept 56,000 foreign workers in 2019, in an effort to address labour shortages. China, primarily a country of origin of migrant workers, has also recently sought to attract workers in high-skilled and low-skilled sectors, both through changing its immigration policies and signing bilateral agreements. Attracting an increasing number of foreign workers is not only designed to address skills gaps, but is also part of the country’s efforts towards more economic openness and inclusiveness. In 2018, for example, China relaxed its visa requirements for professionals and high-skilled workers, in a bid to attract top foreign talent to join an economy that is gradually transitioning from manufacturing to services. In the same year, the country established, for the first time, the State Immigration Administration. The new immigration bureau is a response to both a growing number of international migrants in China and the need to streamline and better manage immigration. Additionally, China and the Philippines signed an agreement in 2018 that will allow 300,000 Filipino workers, including 100,000 English language teachers, to work in China.

Migration in Eastern Asia is increasingly characterized by significant outward and inward student mobility. The number of international students from Eastern Asia, particularly at the tertiary level, has increased rapidly in recent years, while the number of foreign students within the subregion also continues to grow. Driven by the prospect of better-quality education, a high number of international students from Eastern Asia study in destinations such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom. China continued to be a major source of international students globally in 2018, with over half a million of its students embarking on further studies abroad, an increase of more than 8 per cent from 2017. However, Eastern Asia is not only a major origin of international students, it is also gradually becoming an important destination for foreign students, many of them coming from within the subregion. The number of international students at higher education institutions in China was over 490,000 in 2018. Students from the Republic of Korea accounted for the largest number of international students in China in 2018. They were followed by students from Thailand, Pakistan and India.

156 McCurry, 2019; BBC, 2018.
158 The Employment Permit System partner countries as of 2019 include Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Timor-Leste, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.
159 Ju-Young, 2018.
160 Ning, 2018.
161 The State Council, the People’s Republic of China, 2018.
162 Jennings, 2018.
164 Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China, 2019b.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
Outward labour migration, particularly from China, has meant that the subregion is one of the largest recipients of international remittances in the world. In 2019, Chinese-born international migrants were the third largest foreign-born population in the world after Indians and Mexicans, with nearly 11 million Chinese migrants living outside of China. Global remittance flows in 2018 amounted to nearly USD 690 billion, with China receiving over USD 67 billion, the second largest share of international remittances worldwide after India.

While this chapter is focused primarily on international migration, it is important to note that, in this context, internal migration has been a significant feature in Eastern Asian countries, involving unprecedented movement of people from rural areas to urban centres. While the pace of urbanization has slowed and even decreased in parts of the continent such as Western Asia, Eastern Asia has undergone one of the fastest rates of urbanization over the last few decades. By 2015, the share of urban population in the subregion had risen to 60 per cent, more than tripling since 1950. This has most notably been the case in China, where the economic and social reforms of the 1980s initiated one of the largest human migrations in history. Among the reforms was the relaxation of the Hukou system, devised to record and control internal migration, which tied people’s access to services to their residential status. As a result, hundreds of millions of workers, driven by the prospect of employment and higher wages, left the countryside for the cities, where most economic activities were concentrated and in demand of both unskilled and skilled labour migrants. Most people have migrated from China’s western provinces to its eastern provinces. The socioeconomic dynamics between western and eastern China are important factors, with the west characterized by high population growth rates, a surplus of workers and lower incomes, while the east contends with a shortage of workers in metropolitan areas and records both higher incomes and higher education levels.

A recent new (atypical) feature in Eastern Asia’s migration dynamics was the arrival of hundreds of asylum seekers from countries ravaged by conflict and violence. In 2018, over 500 Yemeni asylum seekers arrived on the Republic of Korea’s Jeju Island, gaining entry through the Island’s visa-free policy designed to attract tourists. The arrival of Yemenis generated intense public debate and some anti-immigrant sentiment, in a country where asylum applications have historically been low. The Republic of Korea has not previously been much of a destination country for those seeking protection (except those from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). By the end of 2017, China and the Republic of Korea had around 600 and nearly 20,000 asylum seekers, respectively.

167 UN DESA, 2019a.
168 World Bank, 2019a.
169 UN DESA, 2018.
170 Ibid.
171 Hu, 2012; Qin et al., 2016.
172 Hugo, 2015.
174 People from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who move to the Republic of Korea seeking protection are not considered asylum seekers, but are recognized as citizens under the Republic of Korea’s Constitution.
175 UNHCR, 2019a.
Central Asia

Migratory movements in Central Asia occur in large part out of the subregion, and most noticeably northward to the Russian Federation. In 2019, for example, there were just under 5 million migrants born in Central Asia who were living in the Russian Federation. With significantly higher wages and better employment opportunities, the Russian Federation has long been a leading destination for labour migrants from Central Asia. For people in rural Kyrgyzstan, for example, labour migration has become a livelihood strategy, with many Kyrgyz migrant workers seeking employment in the Russian Federation, with provinces such as Siberia becoming increasingly popular. The Russian Federation is also attractive because of the large number of Kyrgyz who are already well-established in the country and provide assistance in terms of finding suitable accommodation and work for new arrivals. But not all migrants from Central Asia to the Russian Federation are low-skilled labour migrants; migrants from Kazakhstan, for example, are largely composed of students and highly skilled professionals. People from Central Asia also migrate to other parts of Europe and China, where work and family ties are relatively strong. An increasing number of Central Asians are also moving to destinations such as Turkey and the Republic of Korea to find work; movements to the Republic of Korea have been facilitated by bilateral labour agreements with countries such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Intraregional migration is a key feature in the subregion and is underpinned by geographic, cultural, economic, political and social links that are historical in nature. Central Asia is home to millions of international migrants, mainly from within the subregion, but also from further afield. Migrants primarily originate from countries of the former Soviet Union, many of which are current members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In 2019, Kazakhstan, for example, had a substantial foreign-born population (3.7 million), of whom 2.4 million were born in the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan is now predominantly a country of transit and of immigration, attracting skilled workers from various countries and, increasingly, becoming a destination for low-skilled migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In recent years, Central Asian countries have revised policies regulating intraregional migration, including through the conclusion of bilateral agreements on entry and readmission. For example, the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 has allowed people from its member States – including Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – to move freely to live, work and study in other member States of the Union. Further cooperation is currently occurring in the region on enhancing the management of mixed flows, including on aspects related to border management, migrants’ rights and protection, and irregular migration. There is a growing recognition of the importance of undertaking proactive migration policies and programmes in order to...
to protect the rights and dignity of migrants, as well as their families and communities. Both male and female migrant workers from Central Asia can be vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, particularly within informal employment, such as construction, agricultural and domestic work.\textsuperscript{188}

**International remittances play an important role in Central Asian economies, especially for the less developed countries in the subregion.** Two of the world’s top 10 remittance-receiving countries relative to GDP are in the subregion – Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.\textsuperscript{189} In Kyrgyzstan, remittances have been estimated to reduce the national poverty rate by 6–7 per cent.\textsuperscript{190} Remittance flows into Central Asian countries largely reflect migration patterns within and from the subregion, which are closely linked to work and income generation. Remittances from the Russian Federation, for example, have been substantial over time, aided by the relatively low transfer costs from the Russian Federation to the Central Asian countries. After a few years of consecutive decline, driven by economic slowdown and policy changes in the Russian Federation, remittances to Europe and Central Asia bounced back in 2017, growing by 21 per cent and reaching USD 48 billion in 2017.\textsuperscript{191} This figure further increased to USD 59 billion in 2018.\textsuperscript{192} Among the factors behind this growth was the continued recovery of economic activity in the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{193}

**Irregular migration is a feature in Central Asia, although exact numbers are difficult to ascertain.** Irregular migrants come from both within and outside the subregion, with those transiting through Central Asia often moving toward Western Europe. Most migrants’ first points of entry are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before being smuggled through Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation to Western Europe.\textsuperscript{194} Factors such as weak border management, combined with isolated borders, have contributed to irregular migration across the subregion.\textsuperscript{195} Migrant smuggling in Central Asia is a complex process, and involves both formal and informal arrangements at various border points within the subregion, as well as transborder activities that help facilitate the movement of people beyond Central Asia.\textsuperscript{196}

**Middle East**

**Gulf countries have some of the largest numbers of temporary labour migrants in the world.** Driven by oil wealth, GCC countries have undergone remarkable economic development over the last few decades, drawing both skilled and semi-skilled workers to various sectors, including construction and maintenance, retail and domestic service. In countries such as Qatar, the recent increased demand for workers in areas such as construction is partly driven by the country’s preparation for the 2022 World Cup.\textsuperscript{197} The increase in labour migration to GCC States has created tremendous demographic change. In 2019, migrants made up the majority of the population in half of the GCC countries – comprising 88 per cent of the population

\textsuperscript{188} IOM, 2016b.
\textsuperscript{189} World Bank, 2019a.
\textsuperscript{190} UNDP, n.d.
\textsuperscript{191} World Bank, 2018a, 2018b.
\textsuperscript{192} World Bank, 2019a.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{194} Sengupta, 2018.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{197} Buckley et al., 2016.
in the United Arab Emirates, around 79 per cent in Qatar and 72 per cent in Kuwait.\textsuperscript{198} Labour migrants in GCC countries primarily originate from Asia and Africa. Income differentials between origin and destination countries are a key driver of migration, with the Gulf countries providing higher wages and employment opportunities to labour migrants.\textsuperscript{199} Despite some progress, regulation and protection of migrants’ rights remain a challenge in the subregion. The \textit{Kafala} sponsorship system,\textsuperscript{200} which ties migrant workers to their employers and is practised across a number of GCC States, has come under scrutiny. Although several Gulf States have implemented reforms to the \textit{Kafala} system, the changes have been minimal and have had little positive effect on migrants.\textsuperscript{201} The sponsorship system remains widespread and continues to contribute to the vulnerability of labour migrants in the Gulf, including to conditions of forced labour and wage exploitation.\textsuperscript{202}

\textbf{Civil conflict, intensification of sectarian violence and the proliferation of terrorism (particularly by Daesh) have resulted in extensive levels of internal and international displacement in the subregion in recent years.} Two countries in the subregion – the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen – are facing “level 3” emergencies (the global humanitarian system’s classification for the most severe, large-scale humanitarian crises) and are key contributors to the world’s total displacement figures.\textsuperscript{203} The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, occurring now for over seven years, has displaced well over half of the country’s population, with over 6.6 million refugees and over 6.1 million IDPs, and had produced close to 140,000 asylum seekers by the end of 2018.\textsuperscript{204} Successive waves of displacement in Iraq – a feature since the beginning of the century – continued and intensified in 2016 and into 2017. This occurred in the context of efforts to retake territory and counter Daesh. While over 1.9 million Iraqis remained internally displaced by end of 2018, this was the first time in nearly over four years that this number fell to under 2 million.\textsuperscript{205} A growing number of Iraqis have also returned home, as Daesh has increasingly been pushed back and lost territory in both Iraq and in the Syrian Arab Republic; the militant group has lost more than 90 per cent of the territory it controlled in both countries.\textsuperscript{206} Yemen’s political and security situation continued to deteriorate, and the ensuing violence and volatility left the country with over 2.3 million IDPs at the end of 2018.\textsuperscript{207} By the end of 2018, more than 8 per cent of Yemen’s population had been internally displaced.

\textbf{The Middle East continues to host a significant share of the world’s refugees.} At the end of 2018, the Middle East subregion hosted the largest number of refugees globally, including the refugees registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).\textsuperscript{208} Neighbouring countries inevitably share a disproportionate burden when it comes to hosting people seeking refuge in other countries, and this dynamic is a key feature of contemporary displacement patterns in the subregion. As countries bordering the Syrian Arab Republic and the principal hosts of Syrian refugees, Turkey, Lebanon

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[198]{UN DESA, 2019a.}
\footnotetext[199]{Jacobsen and Valenta, 2016.}
\footnotetext[200]{“The \textit{Kafala} system restricts family reunification for unskilled migrants, ties them to a single employer, disallows them from marrying locals, and enforces other restrictions on rights and movements so that migrants stay as transient workers in the Gulf countries” (Rahman, 2013).}
\footnotetext[201]{Diop, Johnston and Le, 2018.}
\footnotetext[202]{Ibid.}
\footnotetext[203]{OCHA, n.d.}
\footnotetext[204]{UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.}
\footnotetext[205]{IDMC, 2019; IOM, 2018d.}
\footnotetext[206]{Seligman, 2018.}
\footnotetext[207]{IDMC, 2019.}
\footnotetext[208]{UNHCR, 2019b.}
\end{footnotes}
and Jordan were all among the top 10 host countries in the world in 2018 (Turkey is 1st, Lebanon 7th and Jordan 10th).\textsuperscript{209} The depth of their responsibility is particularly apparent when the number of refugees in each country is compared against the national population – in Lebanon, there were 156 refugees per 1,000 inhabitants; in Jordan, 72 per 1,000; and in Turkey, 45 per 1,000.\textsuperscript{210} Other countries in the subregion, including those affected by conflict, also host many refugees, including Yemen and Iraq, and even the Syrian Arab Republic.\textsuperscript{211} The almost 5.5 million refugees registered with UNWRA are also located in the subregion.\textsuperscript{212} 

**Irregular migration within and from the subregion continues to pose challenges for migrants and States.** Political instability and protracted conflicts in the Middle East are major drivers of irregular migration and migrant smuggling in the subregion.\textsuperscript{213} Most smuggled migrants in the subregion are people escaping conflict and violence. Migrant smuggling and irregular migration often go hand in hand with refugee and asylum movements.\textsuperscript{214} As conflicts have proliferated across the subregion, so has the number of smuggled migrants and countries affected by smuggling networks. Moreover, smuggling networks have become a lot more diversified and complex.\textsuperscript{215} The very large numbers of Syrian refugees hosted in neighbouring countries, together with the protracted conflict and the low probability of return to the Syrian Arab Republic, have seen refugees undertaking irregular migration onward to other countries, most notably those in Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route.

**Europe\textsuperscript{216}**

Over 82 million international migrants lived in Europe in 2019, an increase of nearly 10 per cent since 2015, when 75 million international migrants resided in the region. A little over half of these (42 million) were born in Europe but were living elsewhere in the region; while this number has only moderately increased since 2015, it was much lower in 1990, at around 28 million (figure 13). From 2015 to 2019, the population of non-European migrants in Europe increased from a little over 35 million to around 38 million.

In 1990, there were roughly equal amounts of Europeans living outside Europe as non-Europeans living in Europe. However, unlike the growth in migration to Europe, the number of Europeans living outside Europe mostly declined during the last 30 years, and only returned to 1990 levels over recent years. In 2019, European-born migrants living outside the continent were based primarily in Northern America (7.4 million). There was also some gradual growth of European migrants in Asia and Oceania from 2010 to 2019.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{210} UNHCR, 2019a.  
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{212} UNRWA, n.d.  
\textsuperscript{213} İçduygu, 2018.  
\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{216} See appendix A for details of the composition of Europe.
Several European countries have experienced large changes in the size of their populations over the last decade. Figure 14 ranks the top 20 European countries with the largest proportional population change from 2009 to 2019. While some countries, such as Luxembourg, Norway and Switzerland experienced population growth, others underwent substantial population decline over the last 10 years. Lithuania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Latvia experienced the steepest population declines (more than 10%). Low fertility rates are the most important driver of negative population change in parts of Europe. However, negative net migration,
where the number of emigrants exceeds the number of immigrants, has also contributed to population decline on the continent, especially in countries such as Lithuania and Latvia. A discussion on demographic changes in Europe, and their link to migration, can be read below under “Key features and developments in Europe”.

Figure 14. Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Europe, 2009–2019

Many countries in the east of Europe – such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland and Romania – have some of the largest emigrant populations within the region (figure 15). At over 10 million emigrants in 2019, the Russian Federation had the largest population of its citizens living abroad in Europe. After the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom had the third and fourth largest European emigrant population (4.4 million and 4.3 million respectively). Bosnia and Herzegovina had the highest share of emigrants in comparison with the resident population in 2019, many of whom left during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. Portugal and Bulgaria, two countries that have long histories of emigration, also had high shares of populations abroad.

With over 13 million migrants in 2019, Germany had the largest foreign-born population of any country in Europe; the number of immigrants in the country increased by nearly 3 million between 2015 and 2019. The largest groups came from Poland, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The populations of the United Kingdom and France each included over 9.5 million and around 8 million foreign-born people, respectively, in 2019. Migrants born in French-speaking North African countries made up
some of the largest foreign-born populations in France. In the United Kingdom, some of the largest migrant populations were from India, Poland and Pakistan. With foreign-born populations of around 6 million, Italy and Spain were the fifth and sixth most popular migrant destinations in Europe in 2019; both countries experienced slight increases in the number of foreign-born migrants since 2015. Many of the foreign-born populations in these countries came from elsewhere in Europe – such as Romania, Albania and the Germany – or from North African countries such as Morocco. The migration of people from countries of the former Soviet Union – such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – accounted for some of the largest European migrant corridors (see figure 16). As illustrated in figure 15, of the top 20 migration countries in the region, Switzerland had the highest share of migrants in its population (29.9%) followed by Sweden (20%), Austria (19.9%) and Belgium (17.2%).

![Figure 15. Top 20 European migrant countries in 2019](image)

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: “Immigrant” refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. “Emigrant” refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.
Figure 16 shows the top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, representing an accumulation of migratory movements over time, and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. One of the more striking features of the main migration corridors involving European countries is that most are intraregional corridors. The Russian Federation features heavily in the main corridors. Russian-born populations in former member States of the Soviet Union – such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – formed some of the largest European migrant corridors in 2019. However, it is important to note that these Russian-born populations only became international migrants after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; before that, they were internal migrants within the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was also the second largest destination of migrants in Europe after Germany.

**Figure 16. Top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, 2019**

![Graph showing top 20 migration corridors involving European countries, 2019.](image)

*Source: UN DESA, 2019a.*  

*Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.*
In 2018, Germany continued to host the largest population of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and the fifth largest in the world (figure 17). The largest number of refugees in Germany came from the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Afghanistan. France and Sweden were the second and third largest hosts of refugees in Europe, with over 368,000 and over 248,000, respectively. Ukraine and the Russian Federation produced the largest refugee population in Europe at the end of 2018, around 93,000 and 61,000 respectively.

**Figure 17. Top 10 European countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Hosted</th>
<th>Abroad</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** UNHCR, n.d.

**Note:** “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The top 10 countries are based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Most new internal displacements in 2018 in Europe were the result of disasters, not conflict (figure 18). Ukraine was the only country in Europe with new conflict-related internal displacements in 2018, with an estimated 12,000 new displacements due to conflict and violence during the year. The rest of the new internal
displacements were triggered by disasters, with Greece recording the largest number of disaster-induced displacements (9,200) followed by France (6,300). Both countries suffered from significant floods and storms. The Russian Federation, Spain and Italy recorded over 3,000 new disaster displacements in 2018.

Figure 18. Top 20 European countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018


Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative, illustrative purposes only.
Key features and developments in Europe

South-Eastern and Eastern Europe

For most South-Eastern and Eastern European countries, emigration rather than immigration has been the key feature over recent years and decades, with fairly low levels of immigration compared with other subregions of Europe. Due to this and other factors, several countries in Europe are projected to experience very significant population decline by 2050 (including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine).\(^\text{217}\) Emigration from Eastern European countries to Western Europe has been a growing trend, particularly since the expansion of the EU in both 2004 and 2007 to encompass more Eastern European member States, while extending the external borders of the EU outward towards non-member countries in the East.\(^\text{218}\) Emigration from Eastern and Southern Europe largely comprises labour migrants in high-skilled and low-skilled occupations. Recent years have, for example, seen a sharp increase in the number of medical professionals moving to Western Europe. Attracted by higher wages, a significant number of medical professionals from countries such as Romania, Poland and Slovakia have left their countries to work in Western Europe.\(^\text{219}\) It is estimated that, by 2015, Romania had lost half its doctors.\(^\text{220}\) The emigration of high-skilled professionals, in addition to a declining population, has created a severe shortage of workers in some sectors in several countries in Eastern Europe.

Despite the anticipated demographic decline across Europe, with Eastern Europe experiencing some of the most dramatic population changes, some countries are resistant to immigration as part of a broader response. As fertility rates in Europe fall, the number of elderly continues to rise. More people are living longer and life expectancy in Europe and Northern America reached 78.7 years in 2019 and is projected to increase to 83.2 years by 2050.\(^\text{221}\) Globally, an estimated 962 million people were over the age of 60 in 2017, with Europe having the largest percentage (25%).\(^\text{222}\) As the number of elderly expands, the social protection systems in Eastern European countries will come under significant strain, with public spending on health care and pensions expected to significantly increase.\(^\text{223}\) Meanwhile, a decline in the number of people of working age will have key implications for Europe’s labour force, with the average age of people participating in the labour force reaching 42.6 years by 2030.\(^\text{224}\) Even as Eastern Europe’s population grows older, many countries in the subregion are reluctant to embrace immigration as one part of the longer-term solution to impending demographic crises. Countries such as Hungary are already beginning to feel the negative effects of a declining labour force. In response to a shortage of workers and the impact this is having on the country’s economy, in 2018 the Government of Hungary passed a controversial law that generated mass protest action; the so-called “slave law” could require people to work up to 400 hours of mandatory overtime.\(^\text{225}\) In February 2019, Hungary also announced new loan and tax benefits aimed at boosting the country’s low birth rate, while

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217 UN DESA, 2015.
218 Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009.
220 Ibid.
221 UN DESA, 2019c.
222 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
225 Karasz and Kingsley, 2018; Peto, 2019.
it remains openly opposed to immigration. However, while attitudes and political discourse on immigration remain negative across Eastern Europe, countries such as Poland have increasingly been tapping into foreign labour, particularly Ukrainians, to address labour shortages. The number of Ukrainians in Poland has sharply increased since fighting began in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. In 2017, Poland issued more than 660,000 residence permits to foreigners, with the majority (more than 85%) going to Ukrainians.

The Russian Federation remains the major destination country in the subregion (and one of the most significant in the world). In 2019, the country hosted around 11.6 million international migrants. Most immigrants have come from neighbouring countries, most notably members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Immigrants from Ukraine comprised the largest number of foreign born populations in the Russian Federation (over 3 million), followed by Kazakhstan (around 2.5 million) and Uzbekistan (1.1 million). The Russian Federation’s large number of international migrants, many of whom are labour migrants, means that the country is also one of the biggest origins of remittances in the world. In 2018, remittances from the Russian Federation amounted to USD 21 billion, owing to the slow and but steady rebound of the country’s economy, which continues to attract labour migrants. In 2019, Ukraine also had a significant foreign-born population at around 5 million, with migrants originating in large part from the Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation and Uzbekistan.

The subregion has experienced increased displacement in recent years, largely as a result of the protracted conflict in Eastern Ukraine. The conflict, now in its fifth year, has resulted in significant internal displacement and generated an outflow of refugees and migrants to neighbouring States. By the end of 2018, Ukraine was the origin of nearly 93,000 refugees and around 800,000 IDPs. In 2018 alone, there were 12,000 new conflict/violence displacements in Ukraine (see figure 18). A significant number of refugees from Ukraine were living in the Russian Federation. Since the start of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, an estimated 400,000 people moved to the Russian Federation, with a large number having gained refugee status or temporary asylum.

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228 UN DESA, 2019a.
229 The Commonwealth of Independent States consists of nine member States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; as well as two associate States: Turkmenistan and Ukraine.
230 UN DESA, 2019a.
231 World Bank, 2019a; Hickey, 2019; World Bank 2018a.
232 UN DESA, 2019a.
233 UNHCR, 2019a; IDMC, 2019.
234 IDMC, 2019.
235 UNHCR, 2019c.
Northern, Western and Southern Europe

Intraregional migration within Europe is particularly dynamic, continuing to increase over time. As of 1 January 2017, there were 22 million persons living in one of the EU member States with the citizenship of another member State, up from 16 million a year prior. Such a high degree of intraregional migration is made possible by free movement arrangements, which enable citizens to cross borders without being subjected to border checks. The Schengen Area, which comprises 22 EU member States and 4 non-EU member countries, guarantees free internal movement to over 400 million citizens. In 2017 Romania, Poland, Italy, Portugal and Bulgaria had the highest numbers of their citizens living in other EU member States. However, free movement in Europe faces challenges. In 2015, the arrival of large numbers of migrants and refugees to Europe via the Mediterranean put pressure on the common European asylum system and affected the functioning of the Schengen rules. This led to a temporary suspension of the Dublin system and the introduction of border checks by several member States. There is also a degree of uncertainty, particularly for migrant workers, following the June 2016 EU membership referendum in the United Kingdom about future migration settings arising from “Brexit” negotiations. However, the bigger issue is the finalization of Brexit itself, and whether/how it will be implemented.

Immigration continues to be a contentious issue in Europe and remains on top of the political agenda across the region. While balanced debates on the issue are not absent, political rhetoric and public discourse on migration have at times been dominated by anti-immigrant sentiments. Over the course of 2017 and 2018, far-right wing groups across Europe promoted myths or “fake news” about migration. This was most evident in the coordinated online campaigns against the Global Compact for Migration by far-right activists, including through social media, online petitions and videos. The negative campaigns played a significant role in generating backlash against the Global Compact for Migration in several European countries, prompting some governments to withdraw from the migration pact. General attitudes toward immigration also remain polarized, while negative anti-immigration political rhetoric continues to take centre stage in several national elections across Europe. A 2018 European Commission survey found that four in ten Europeans view immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity. In a separate survey conducted in 10 EU countries by the Pew Research Centre, more than half said they want fewer immigrants in their countries.

Irregular migration continues to pose challenges to the region, and remained high on the European agenda in 2017 and 2018. By the end of 2018, the largest number of irregular maritime arrivals to Europe used the Western Mediterranean route, which leads to Spain. This marked a change from 2016 and 2017, when irregular maritime migrants arrived to Europe in the greatest numbers via the Central Mediterranean route from Libya (mainly to Italy) or from Turkey to Greece on the Eastern Mediterranean route. In 2018, over

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236 Eurostat, 2019.
237 European Commission, n.d.
238 Eurostat, 2019.
239 Ibid.
240 McAuliffe, 2018.
241 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 The 10 EU countries surveyed included Greece, Hungary, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Poland, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Spain.
246 Frontex, 2019; MacGregor, 2019.
117,000 and more than 26,000 migrants arrived in Europe by sea and land, respectively.\(^{247}\) There were around 59,000 sea arrivals in Spain and 23,370 in Italy in the same year.\(^{248}\) More than 2,000 migrants died in the Mediterranean in 2018, with the Central Mediterranean route by far the deadliest route for irregular migrants in 2018 (over 1,300 deaths).\(^{249}\) While the number of migrants who died at sea trying to reach Europe dropped in 2018 due to fewer overall crossings, the death ratio along the Central Mediterranean route increased from 2.6% in 2017 to 3.5% in 2018 and, by April 2019, it had reached 10 per cent.\(^{250}\) A large number of maritime arrivals in 2018 came from countries that continue to be affected by violence and conflict, including Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq, especially to Greece. North and sub-Saharan Africans also continued to make up a significant portion of migrant flows to Europe, especially to Italy and Spain.

**Human trafficking remains a major challenge in Europe, and the region has seen a rise in both trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation.** Trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation remains the predominant form of human trafficking in Europe (56%), followed by labour exploitation (26%) and other forms of exploitation, such as forced begging or organ removal (18%).\(^{251}\) Women and girls continue to be the most vulnerable group (68% of victims), often exploited in care and domestic work and forced prostitution.\(^{252}\) Two important trends reported by EU member States are the sharp increase in child trafficking (23% of all victims) and the growth of intra-EU trafficking (44% of victims are EU citizens).\(^{253}\) Profiles of traffickers and modus operandi have changed, with an observed increase in the number of women and younger perpetrators, and a growing role of Internet and social media for recruitment and distribution of exploitation material. Despite growing awareness and knowledge of trafficking practices, prosecution and conviction rates remain low. Irregular migrants are especially vulnerable, as traffickers often take advantage of their status to lock them into cycles of exploitation. In 2018, a case of migrant fishermen working on Irish registered trawlers was brought to the Republic of Ireland’s High Court; some of the migrants were believed to have been trafficked and worked under harsh conditions, including being racially abused, underpaid and overworked.\(^{254}\)

**Latin America and the Caribbean**\(^{255}\)

Migration to Northern America is a key feature in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. In 2019, over 26 million migrants had made the journey north and were residing in Northern America. As shown in figure 19, the Latin American and the Caribbean population living in Northern America has increased considerably over time, from an estimated 10 million in 1990 and 25.5 million in 2015 to 26.6 million in 2019. Another 5 million were in Europe in 2019; while this number has only slightly increased since 2015, the number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean living in Europe has more than quadrupled since 1990. Other regions, such as Asia and Oceania, were home to a very small number of migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean in 2019 (400,000 and 200,000 migrants, respectively).

\(^{247}\) IOM, n.d.b.  
\(^{248}\) Ibid.  
\(^{249}\) IOM, n.d.d.  
\(^{250}\) IOM, 2019c.  
\(^{251}\) European Commission, 2018c.  
\(^{252}\) Ibid.  
\(^{253}\) Ibid.  
\(^{254}\) O’Faolain, 2018.  
\(^{255}\) See appendix A for details of the composition of Latin America and the Caribbean.
The total number of migrants from other regions living in Latin America and the Caribbean has remained relatively stable, at around 3 million over the last 30 years. These were comprised mostly of Europeans (whose numbers have declined slightly over the period) and Northern Americans, whose numbers have increased. In 2019, the number of Europeans and Northern Americans living in Latin America and the Caribbean stood at 1.4 million and 1.2 million, respectively.

**Figure 19. Migrants to, within and from Latin America and the Caribbean, 1990–2019**

*Source: UN DESA, 2019a.*

*Note: “Migrants to Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. in Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Latin America and the Caribbean) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Latin America and the Caribbean region. “Migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean” refers to people born in Latin America and the Caribbean who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Northern America).*
Several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have undergone considerable population change over the last decade. Figure 20 shows the 20 countries in the region which have experienced the largest proportional population change from 2009 to 2019. All the top 20 countries experienced an increase in the size of their populations during this period, with the largest proportional population changes occurring in Central America. Belize had the greatest percentage change, with its population increasing by 24 per cent from 2009 to 2019. It was followed by Guatemala and Honduras, whose populations grew by nearly 23 and 20 per cent respectively.

**Figure 20. Top 20 countries with the largest proportional population change in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2009–2019**

Source: UN DESA, 2019c.

Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2009 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

Mexico was by far the largest emigration country in Latin America and the Caribbean (figure 21). Around 12 million Mexicans lived abroad in 2019. Mexico is also the second largest migrant origin country in the world after India. Most Mexican emigrants lived in the United States, which continues to be the largest country-to-country migration corridor in the entire world (figure 22). Many other Central American countries – such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – also have large migrant populations in the United States, as do South American countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru. Large populations of South American migrants resided elsewhere in the region. Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had the second and third highest number of emigrants in the region in 2019 (2.9 million and 2.5 million respectively). Around 1 million Venezuelans lived in Colombia, reflecting recent cross-border displacement from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
In 2019, Argentina was home to the largest foreign-born population in the region (with over 2 million migrants), mainly from neighbouring countries such as Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela had the next largest migrant population, followed Colombia and Mexico. In 2019, Mexico had over 760,000 migrants born in the United States. As illustrated in figure 21, of the top 20 migrant countries in the region, Costa Rica had the highest immigrant share of its total population (8%), due to long-standing migration from neighbouring Nicaragua. Other countries in the region outside of the top 20 had higher migrant populations as a proportion of the total population, such as Belize at 15 per cent.

### Figure 21. Top 20 Latin America and Caribbean migrant countries in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrants (millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia (Plurinational State of)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

**Note 1:** The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

**Note 2:** “Immigrant” refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. “Emigrant” refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

The most striking feature of the main migration corridors within and from the region (figure 22 is the dominance of the United States as the main country of destination. Most of the corridors in 2019 were to the United States, with the remainder all occurring within the Latin American and Caribbean region (for example,
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to Colombia). These migration corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements involving countries in Latin America and the Caribbean over time, and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

**Figure 22. Top 10 migration corridors involving Latin America and Caribbean countries, 2019**

![Diagram showing migration corridors](image)

**Source:** UN DESA, 2019a.

**Note:** Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2018, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was the largest source country of asylum claims in the world, with over 340,000 new asylum claims submitted by the end of the year. This is a sharp increase from 2017, when new asylum claims numbered just over 100,000. An estimated 3 million Venezuelans had left their country at the end of 2018 due to several factors, including violence, persecution and economic/political crisis. The vast majority of Venezuelans displaced abroad lived in Colombia (around 1 million). Colombia was the largest country of origin of refugees in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Most of the refugees from Colombia were hosted in the neighbouring countries of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador. El Salvador was the second largest country of origin of refugees and the second largest source of new asylum claims in the region, after the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. El Salvador was followed by Haiti, which was the third largest origin of refugees in Latin America and the Caribbean at the end of 2018.
Figure 23. Top 10 Latin America and Caribbean countries by total refugees and asylum seekers, 2018

Most new internal displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean were due to violence and conflict, not disasters. Figure 24 shows the top 20 countries in the region with the largest new internal displacements triggered by both conflict and violence and disasters. El Salvador and Colombia recorded the highest numbers of new internal displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2018, with most displacements driven by violence and conflict in both countries. There were 246,000 new conflict-related displacements in El Salvador (nearly 4% of the country’s population), while Colombia recorded 145,000. With 11,000 new displacements due to violence and conflict, Mexico recorded the third highest number in the region. The rest of the large internal displacements in the region were triggered by disasters, with Brazil recording the largest number (86,000), followed by Colombia (67,000) and Cuba (52,000). While the number of new internal conflict...
displacements in Latin America and the Caribbean are much lower compared with Africa, these are the only two regions where the number of new displacements due to violence and conflict is higher than those caused by disasters.

Figure 24. Top Latin America and Caribbean countries by new internal displacements (disaster and conflict), 2018


Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative, illustrative purposes only.
Key features and developments in Latin America and the Caribbean

South America

Political and economic turmoil in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has resulted in one of the most acute humanitarian crises in the world, displacing millions of people from the country. By the end of 2018, the number of displaced Venezuelans worldwide had surpassed 3 million; by mid-2019, this number had risen to 4 million. The large majority were hosted in neighbouring countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile and Brazil, although an increasing number of Venezuelans are also moving to countries in Central America and the Caribbean. Colombia and Peru hosted the largest number of Venezuelans at the end of 2018, over 1 million and 500,000 people, respectively. With the economy collapsing, a dire economic crisis has left millions of people unable to afford basic needs such as food, medicine and medical supplies. The poor state of the health-care system and increasing levels of malnutrition among children resulted in multiple deaths in 2018. The International Monetary Fund estimated that hyperinflation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela would reach over 1 million per cent in 2018, and would increase to 10 million per cent in 2019. In addition to the economic crisis, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is experiencing a deteriorating political situation, which involves targeting of political opponents and the arrest of thousands of protesters. The rise in violent crimes in the country also continues to force more people to seek protection in other countries. Asylum applications lodged by Venezuelans arriving in the United States, for example, reached nearly 28,000 by the end of June 2018.

Intraregional migration within South America is very significant, with the large majority of international migrants currently moving within the subregion. Most migrants in countries such as Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the two countries with the largest number of international migrants in South America in 2019, were from within the subregion. Argentina’s international migrants were mainly from Paraguay, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Chile, while those in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela were largely from Colombia. Most of the foreign-born population in Chile is also primarily comprised of migrants from South American countries such as Peru, Argentina and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. The Residence Agreements adopted by the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) – an economic and political body made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela – have played a significant role in enhancing intraregional labour migration, while at the same

256 IOM, 2018e.
257 UNHCR, 2019d.
258 UNHCR, 2019a.
259 Ibid.
260 OHCHR, 2018a.
261 Werner, 2018; Reuters, 2018.
263 UNHCR, 2019a.
264 UN DESA, 2019a.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
267 Chatzky, 2019.
time reducing irregular migration within the subregion. 268 These agreements allow nationals of MERCOSUR to reside and work in member States for a period of two years, provided they have no criminal record and can prove citizenship. 269 As a result, low- and semi-skilled migrants in sectors such as agriculture, fishing and domestic work, who comprise the majority of labour migrants in South America, 270 have been able to move and work more freely within the subregion.

**Millions of South Americans continue to reside outside of the subregion, while at the same time the number of migrants from outside the subregion is slowly growing.** Emigration from South America is mostly related to work, fuelled by economic crises and political instability in origin countries. 271 The United States is the largest destination country of South American migrants, with 3.4 million. 272 The countries with the highest numbers of emigrants residing outside of South America in 2019 were Colombia (around 1.57 million), followed by Brazil (1.5 million) and Ecuador (around 1 million). 273 At the same time, reduced opportunities in labour markets abroad, as well as improved economic conditions in the subregion, are contributing to the return of many South American migrants and a decrease in the rate of extraregional migration. 274 The number of migrants in South America from outside the subregion is also growing. For example, since 2010, more people have emigrated from the EU to Latin America and the Caribbean overall, than from Latin America and the Caribbean to the EU. 275 Many of these people are not return migrants, but rather EU nationals, primarily from Spain, Italy and Portugal. 276 Migrants from these three origin countries collectively represented a population of over 800,000 people in South America in 2019. 277 Increased numbers of Haitians, Cubans and Dominicans have also migrated to South America. 278

**Though localized to particular countries, conflict and violence contribute to human displacement and migration in the subregion.** In Colombia, over 5.7 million people remained internally displaced as of the end of 2018 – the second highest number of IDPs in the world. 279 In the same year, around 139,000 Colombians were living as refugees or in refugee-like situations abroad, a drop from more than 190,000 in 2017 and around 300,000 in 2016. 280 There were around 1 million Colombians in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador in 2019. However, as Colombia begins to transition out of five decades of violence with peace talks in late 2016 and 2017, deteriorating economic and social conditions in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are leading many Colombians to return home. 281

268 Acosta, 2016; Aimsiranun, 2018.
269 Ibid.
270 Aimsiranun, 2018.
272 UN DESA, 2019a.
273 Ibid.
274 IOM, n.d.e.
275 IOM, 2015.
276 Ibid.
277 UN DESA, 2019a.
278 IOM, 2017.
279 IDMCl, 2019.
280 UNHCR, 2018a, 2019a.
281 UNHCR, 2019a.
Central America and the Caribbean

Migration northward continues to be the predominant trend in Central America, Mexico and the Caribbean. Mexico remains a prominent origin country, with thousands emigrating mainly to the United States each year. It is also a significant transit country for migrants travelling northward to the southern United States border. However, within a context of improving economic conditions and rising educational levels in the country, as well as stricter immigration enforcement in the United States, Mexico is an increasingly significant destination country for international migrants, some of whom may have been unable to enter the United States as initially planned. The total number of foreign-born persons in Mexico increased from around 970,000 in 2010 to a little over 1 million in 2019 – a majority of whom were North Americans, but also an increasingly larger portion of whom were migrants from other Latin American and Caribbean countries. However, the United States is by far the most popular destination for Central American migrants, with more than 90 per cent of Central American migrants living in the United States in 2017. Violence and insecurity, poverty and family reunification remain important drivers of migration from Central America. The most prominent intraregional migrant corridors involve Nicaraguans, Panamanians and other Central Americans moving to Costa Rica for temporary or permanent labour, and Central Americans (primarily from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador) migrating to Belize because of instability and a lack of employment opportunities. In the Caribbean, the most prominent intraregional migrant corridors include Haitians migrating to the Dominican Republic. There is also an increasing number of migrants from other regions, including those from Africa, transiting through Central America toward the United States.

Irregular migrant flows in the subregion are dynamic, becoming increasingly complex as well as diverse. Mexicans represented the vast majority of irregular migrants apprehended while attempting to cross the United States–Mexico border for many years. However, in recent years, apprehensions of Central Americans originating from the “Northern Triangle” region of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador exceeded that of Mexicans at the United States–Mexico border. Fleeing violence, persecution and poverty, thousands of migrants from Central America trekked for thousands of miles toward the Mexico–United States border. The most recent so-called “migrant caravan” began in Honduras in October 2018. As Honduran migrants made their way toward the United States–Mexico border, thousands more migrants from countries such as El Salvador and Guatemala joined the group. By the end of 2018, the migrant caravan had grown to thousands of migrants, many of them children. Several factors drove people to the caravan, including escaping violence in countries such as Honduras, fleeing extreme poverty and seeking better economic opportunities. The migrant caravan resulted in fierce political debate in the United States and prompted the Government to deploy more than 7,000 active-duty military officers to the border with Mexico. By early 2019, a few thousand migrants who managed to reach the United States border had been apprehended. Some received Mexican humanitarian visas, while others were deported or chose to return to their countries of origin. Hundreds of migrants remain in Tijuana, Mexico. In February 2019, a caravan of Cubans and Haitians, including some Africans

283 UN DESA, 2019a.
284 Ibid.
287 Ibid.
289 Bialik, 2019.
291 Meissner, 2018.
and Asians, entered Panama from Colombia and later reached Mexico. In a shift from its more open policy announced at the start of 2019, Mexico began detaining migrants from Central America in April 2019.293

**Migrant smuggling is also a major feature of the subregion, as people attempt to bypass border controls in Central America and Mexico.** Along the United States–Mexico border, smuggling networks are a profitable industry overseen by international crime groups.294 Smuggled migrants are known frequently to fall victim to predatory practices ranging from demands for bribes to mass kidnapping and extortion.295 Migrants have also been subjected to execution, physical and sexual assault, torture and disappearance; this is especially the case in Mexico, where it has been reported that some smuggling networks are often managed by drug trafficking organizations.296 Migrant smuggling has also long enabled irregular migration in and through Central American countries such as Guatemala, especially with migrants moving to the United States. Both Guatemalan nationals and international migrants transiting through Guatemala have historically heavily relied on smuggling, locally known as Coyoterismo, to reach their final destinations.297 There is growing concern in Latin America that visa regimes are exploited to enable migrants to enter countries in the region before they are smuggled onward to other destinations.298 Moreover, a significant number of people have died while making irregular migration journeys across Central America.299

**Socioeconomic conditions and generalized community-level violence in a number of Central American countries contribute to migration, notably of high numbers of women and children.** There has been a significant increase in the number of asylum claims from Central America. Applications from Central America and Mexico comprised 54 per cent of all asylum claims in the United States in 2017.300 Migrants from El Salvador made up the majority of applicants (over 33,000), followed by those from Guatemala (around 33,000) and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (27,500).301 There has been an increase in the number of family units apprehended at United States–Mexico border; in 2018, around 163,000 family members were apprehended, accounting for 35 per cent of all border apprehensions and more than three times the number of family apprehensions in 2017.302 Unaccompanied children remain a significant part of irregular migration flows, with about 54,000 unaccompanied children apprehended at the border in 2018.303

**Climate change appears to be impacting on human mobility in Central America and the Caribbean, although isolating the environmental drivers of migration remains a complex task.** According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the rise in global temperature is associated with outmigration in communities dependent on agriculture.304 In 2018, drought conditions in Central America were responsible for an estimated 82 per cent loss of maize and bean crops in Honduras, putting nearly 3 million people at risk of food insecurity.305 In countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, a large share of the populations live in rural areas and heavily rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, making

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293 Cullell, 2019.
294 Sanchez, 2018.
295 Ibid.
296 Ibid.
297 Velasco, 2018; Sanchez, 2018.
298 Ibid.
299 IOM, n.d.d.
300 UNHCR, 2019a.
301 Ibid.
302 Bialik, 2019.
303 Ibid.
304 IPCC, 2018.
305 Palencia, 2014; FAO, 2018b.
them especially vulnerable to environmental changes such as droughts. The effects of climate change may have played a role in recent migration dynamics in Central America, with a significant number of people who were part of the caravan, for example, engaged in activities such as agriculture, forestry, cattle raising and fishing prior to embarking on the journey northward. Meanwhile, the Caribbean is located in an area highly prone to both seismic activity and climate-related disaster risks. Countries in the Caribbean are among the most vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. With a significant share of the Caribbean population living in areas exposed to sea-level rise, recent disasters have resulted in large-scale displacement and loss of life. Hurricane Irma, for example, which swept across parts of the Caribbean and Northern America, was the largest disaster event globally in 2017, displacing more than 2 million people in both regions. In addition to the loss of life, the hurricane left catastrophic damage to property and infrastructure in several Caribbean areas, including Puerto Rico, Cuba and the United States Virgin Islands. Many Caribbean islands are also heavily reliant on sectors such as agriculture and tourism, and disasters have taken a significant toll on their economies. As these disasters increase in frequency and intensity due to climate change, health risks and food insecurity are expected to worsen, in addition to increasing damage to biodiversity.

Emigration to the United States is a key feature in the Caribbean, with Caribbean-born immigrants among the largest groups in the country. Historical ties between the Caribbean and the United States, as well as geopolitics, have significantly influenced migration northward. In 2017, 10 per cent of all immigrants in the United States were from the Caribbean, making it the largest destination for Caribbean migrants outside the subregion. Other main destinations include Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom. Over 65 per cent of Caribbean immigrants in the United States in 2019 came from just five countries (Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic), with the majority of these coming from Cuba. The increase in the Cuban population in the United States post-mid-1960s was to a large extent driven by two laws that offered unique treatment to immigrants from Cuba: the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act and the 1994 and 1995 United States–Cuba Migration Accords, which made it possible for Cubans (who had arrived in the United States via land) to gain permanent residence after living in the country for one year. This came to be known as the “wet foot, dry foot” policy.

Northern America

Migration in Northern America is dominated by migration into the region. As shown in figure 25, over 58.6 million migrants were residing in Northern America from a variety of regions in 2019. This number has increased by around 3 million since 2015, when around 55.6 million migrants were living in the region. The largest group was from Latin America and the Caribbean (26.6 million), followed by Asia (17.4 million) and Europe (7 million). During the last 30 years, the number of migrants in Northern America has more than doubled in size, driven by emigration from Latin American and the Caribbean, and Asia, as well as by economic growth and political stability in Northern America.

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306 CEPAL, 2019.
307 IOM, 2018f.
308 IDMC, 2018a.
309 Ibid.
310 Otker-Robe, 2019.
311 Zong and Batalova, 2019.
312 UN DESA, 2019a.
313 CEPAL, United Nations and IOM, 2017; Zong and Batalova, 2019.
314 See appendix A for details on the composition of Northern America.
The number of Northern American migrants living within the region or elsewhere was very small compared with the foreign-born population in the region. In contrast to regions such as Asia and Africa where intraregional migration is dominant, more Northern American-born migrants lived outside the region (around 3 million) than had moved elsewhere within the region (1.4 million).

**Figure 25. Migrants to, within and from Northern America, 1990–2019**

![Graph showing migrants to, within, and from Northern America, 1990–2019](image)

*Source: UN DESA, 2019a.*

*Note:* “Migrants to Northern America” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Northern America) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Northern America” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Northern America) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Northern American region. “Migrants from Northern America” refers to people born in Northern America who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Africa).
Figure 26 shows the countries with the largest proportional population change in Northern America between 2009 to 2019. The population changes in both Canada and the United States were in terms of growth, with Canada experiencing the largest change in the size of its population over the last decade (11%). The United States’ population also expanded during the same period, increasing by around 7 per cent. In Canada, recent population changes have largely been driven by immigration, which remains the main driver of population growth in the country.

![Figure 26. Countries with the largest proportional population change in Northern America, 2009–2019](image)

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: It is important to note that the largest proportional population changes from 2007 to 2019 are more likely to occur in countries with relatively smaller populations.

In 2019, the United States had the largest foreign-born population in the world, while Canada had the eighth largest. Over 86 per cent of the foreign-born population in the region lived in the United States. As shown in figure 27, the share of Canada’s total population that was foreign-born (at over 21%) was considerably higher than in the United States in 2019 (15%). Canada also had a larger share of its citizens who had emigrated (as a percentage of its total home population) compared with the United States.

![Figure 27. Main migration countries in Northern America in 2019](image)

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: “Immigrant” refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. “Emigrant” refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.
Figure 28 shows the top 10 migration corridors involving Northern American countries, representing an accumulation of migratory movements over time and providing a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. The largest migrant corridors in Northern America all involve migrants either from Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean, to the United States. Mexican-born migrants form the biggest migrant group, with over 11 million living in the United States in 2019. The next largest migration corridors involve populous Asian countries, including China, India and the Philippines. Some of the other large migration corridors from Viet Nam, the Republic of Korea and Cuba to the United States grew rapidly after conflicts or political changes in origin countries many years ago.

Figure 28. Top 10 migration corridors involving Northern American countries, 2019

![Diagram of migration corridors]

**Source:** UN DESA, 2019a.

**Note:** Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

The United States hosted over 1 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2018. As apparent from figure 29, the majority, over 700,000, were asylum seekers. The United States also remained the largest recipient of new asylum claims in the world in 2018 (over 250,000), although this was a decrease from 2017, when asylum claims surpassed 300,000. Asylum seekers in the United States came from a vast range of countries; however, the largest populations were from El Salvador, Guatemala, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Honduras. Canada is also host to a large number of refugees and asylum seekers. In 2018, Canada hosted over 190,000 refugees and asylum seekers, an increase from 2017, when the country hosted about 150,000. Recent changes in refugee resettlement to the United States and Canada are discussed in the “Key features and developments in Northern America” section below.
All new internal displacements in Northern America were due to disasters (figure 30). The United States recorded the highest number, with more than 1.2 million people displaced as a result of two major hurricanes and wildfires. The scale of displacement in the rest of Northern America was much lower compared with the United States; Canada, for example, recorded 19,000 new displacements in 2018. The number of new internal displacements due to disasters in Northern America came second only to Asia, which experienced more disaster-driven displacement than conflict (see figure 12).
Key features and developments in Northern America

Migration trends in the United States are characterized by high levels of immigration, primarily from Latin America and Asia, although the demography of international migrants continues to evolve. The United States’ foreign-born population increased by 5 per cent from 2015 to 2019, reaching nearly 51 million people. As of 2019, Mexican-born migrants were still by far the largest foreign-born population living in the United States, at just over 12.4 million, accounting for around 22.7 per cent of the total number of immigrants in the United States. However, while Mexicans have historically comprised the largest inflows of migrants to the United States (at least since 1970), their numbers have dropped over the last few years. Recent arrivals have mainly come from Asia – particularly India, China and the Philippines – as well as from other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as the Dominican Republic, Cuba and El Salvador. In 2019, China was the origin of the second largest number of immigrants to the United States, and Asia is projected to become the largest origin region by 2055. The largest immigration pathway for Asians migrating to the United States is through family-sponsored visas, although many are also students; there were more than 360,000 Chinese international students in the United States in the academic year 2017/2018.

Migrant populations in Canada continue to increase, representing a growing percentage of the country’s total population. In 2000, foreign-born persons represented about 18 per cent of Canada’s total population, increasing to nearly 19 per cent in 2005, around 20 per cent in 2010 and over 21 per cent in 2019. However, while migrant populations in Canada have originated primarily from European countries in the past, the composition of the country’s foreign-born population has shifted to include large populations of migrants from Asian countries. For example, in 2000, the largest origin country of international migrants in Canada was the United Kingdom (608,000), followed by China (412,000), India (319,000) and Italy (315,000). By 2019, India and China had surpassed the United Kingdom as the two largest origin countries, with around 709,000 and nearly 700,000 migrants respectively. Other Asian countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran also featured in the top 10 largest populations within Canada’s total 7.9 million total foreign-born population in 2019. In 2017, Canada admitted over 286,000 new permanent residents, with India, the Philippines and China representing the top three countries of origin.

The estimated number of irregular migrants in the United States is thought to be lower than a decade ago, but remains much larger when compared with Canada. An estimated 10.5 million irregular migrants were living in the United States in 2017, accounting for 3.2 per cent of the total population. The number

315 UN DESA, 2019a.
316 Ibid.
317 Zong, Batalova and Burrows, 2019.
318 UN DESA, 2019a.
319 Radford, 2019; UN DESA, 2019a.
320 Malik, 2015.
322 UN DESA, 2019a.
323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 IRCC, 2018.
326 Krogstad, Passel and Cohn, 2019.
of irregular migrants has been decreasing, falling from a high of 12.2 million in 2007. For the first time, Mexicans comprised less than half (47%) of all undocumented migrants in the United States. The number of Central American irregular migrants – most from the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras – increased from 1.5 million in 2007 to 1.9 million in 2017. A significant number of adult irregular migrants in the United States are not new arrivals; more than 65 per cent of adults in 2017 had lived in the United States for more than 10 years. Irregular migrants may enter the country without authorization; however, a large number are visa overstayers who initially entered the United States regularly. In the fiscal year 2018, for example, there were more than 600,000 foreigners who overstayed their visas in the United States. Canada also has a significant number of irregular migrants, although estimates vary widely, and accurate numbers are difficult to establish. However, in the two years prior to June 2019, more than 45,000 migrants were reported to have crossed into Canada irregularly.

The United States and Canada have resettled significant numbers of refugees, representing the two largest resettlement countries in the world. In 2018, Canada resettled more refugees than the United States, the first time that the United States has not taken the lead globally. Out of the 92,400 refugees resettled around the world in 2018, Canada admitted around 28,000, while the United States took in a little less than 23,000. The number of refugees resettled in the United States has been declining over the last two years; in 2016, for example, the United States admitted nearly 100,000 refugees. This number dramatically dropped to 33,000 the following year. There has also been a significant increase in the number of United States citizens applying for asylum in Canada since 2016. In 2017 alone, more than 2,500 citizens of the United States applied for asylum in Canada, six times the number of applications in 2016 and the highest number on record since Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) began reporting on the number of asylum seekers more than two decades ago. The majority of asylum applications from United States’ citizens were made by children of parents without United States residency.

Immigration policies in the United States have hardened, slowing immigration inflows and humanitarian intakes. For example, in 2018, overall visa issuances for both immigrant and non-immigrants declined for a second year in a row. More than 10 million non-immigrant visas were issued in 2016; by the end of 2018, this number had fallen to a little over 9 million. The United States’ travel ban – which first came into effect in January 2017 and originally included citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen – has contributed to a reduction in the number of immigrants and visitors entering the United States. After it was challenged in court, the revised

327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
332 Connolly, 2019.
333 UNHCR, 2019a.
334 UNHCR, 2018a.
335 Ibid.
336 Patriquin, 2018.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 United States Department of State, n.d.
travel ban, which added more names to the list of banned countries, came into effect in September 2017. It included the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chad, Yemen, Somalia and Libya, although Chad was later removed from the list. The most controversial change began in June 2018, when the Government put into effect the so-called “zero-tolerance policy”, applying to migrants, including asylum-seeking families crossing the United States border without documentation. The policy was meant to serve as a punitive deterrent for irregular border crossing, and its implementation led to the separation of over 2,600 children from their parents, but the public outcry that ensued forced the Government to quickly reverse course. Tougher immigration policies have come on the back of widespread anti-immigrant rhetoric, which has sought to characterize migrants as both a danger and drain on United States society; conspiracy theories about immigration have also been widespread, creating an atmosphere of mistrust and fear. A 2018 poll found that more than half of United States citizens believed their Government to be withholding information on the real cost of immigration to society and taxpayers. Recent data also reveal that the number of hate crimes in the United States increased in 2017, with many victims targeted because of their race or ethnicity.

As immigration policies become more restrictive at the national level, “sanctuary cities” in the United States have stepped in, offering protection to undocumented migrants whose status puts them at risk of either being detained or deported. While the concept of sanctuary cities exists in other parts of the world, it is most commonly applied in the United States, where many local jurisdictions – such as cities, counties or States – are in open defiance of national immigration laws and have passed legislation aimed at protecting undocumented residents. In 2018, California – the most populous state in the United States, and with the largest number of undocumented migrants – signed into law statewide measures that limit local law enforcement cooperation with federal authorities on immigration enforcement. Sanctuary cities have generated backlash from federal authorities, including attempts to punish jurisdictions that do not comply with federal immigration ordinances.

Oceania

In 2019, around 7.7 million international migrants from outside Oceania were living in the region. As shown in figure 31 the foreign-born migrant population was primarily composed of people from Asia (49%) and Europe (38%). Throughout the last 30 years, the Asian migrant group has grown, while the number from Europe has remained steady.

341 OHCHR, 2018b.
342 Mittelstadt, 2018; Shapiro and Sharma, 2018.
344 Ibid.
345 FBI, 2018.
346 Duncan and Popp, 2017.
347 Bauder, 2016.
348 Raphelson, Hobson and Bentley, 2018.
349 Chishti and Bolter, 2019.
350 See appendix A for details on the composition of Oceania.
Out of all of the six world regions, Oceania had the lowest number of migrants outside its region in 2019, partly a reflection of the low total population size of the region, although there was an increase in their number during the previous 30-year period. Most of those born in Oceania living outside the region resided in Europe and Northern America.

**Figure 31. Migrants to, within and from Oceania, 1990–2019**

*Source: UN DESA, 2019a.*

*Note: “Migrants to Oceania” refers to migrants residing in the region (i.e. Oceania) who were born in one of the other regions (e.g. Europe or Asia). “Migrants within Oceania” refers to migrants born in the region (i.e. Oceania) and residing outside their country of birth, but still within the Oceania region. “Migrants from Oceania” refers to people born in Oceania who were residing outside the region (e.g. in Europe or Asia).*
Several countries in Oceania have experienced significant changes in the size of their populations over the last decade. The largest changes, as shown in figure 32, occurred in Vanuatu and Solomon Islands, whose populations increased by around 30 per cent between 2009 and 2019. The population change in the rest of the countries was also in terms of growth.

Figure 32. Countries with the largest proportional population change in Oceania, 2009–2019

The vast majority of international migrants in Oceania were living in either Australia or New Zealand (figure 33). Most countries in the region have skewed migration profiles, being either large net origin or net destination countries. For example, Tonga, Samoa and Fiji all have high counts of emigrants in comparison with their native population, and very low shares of foreign-born populations. Their emigrants were located primarily in New Zealand and, to a lesser extent, in Australia. Australia and New Zealand have high shares of foreign-born populations as a portion of their total population, comprising around 29 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively.
Figure 33. Oceania migrant countries in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Migrants (millions)</th>
<th>Percentage of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
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<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<td>Fiji</td>
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<td>Samoa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note 1: The population size used to calculate the percentage of immigrants and emigrants is based on the UN DESA total resident population of the country, which includes foreign-born populations.

Note 2: “Immigrant” refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the country. “Emigrant” refers to people born in the country who were residing outside their country of birth in 2019.

Figure 34 with the top 10 migration corridors involving Oceania countries shows an accumulation of migratory movements over time, and provides a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries. Eight out of the 10 top migration corridors in the region involve migrants to Australia, with the largest being of migrants from the United Kingdom. These
larger corridors also include migrants from a variety of countries from outside Oceania – including China, India, Viet Nam and the Philippines – many of which have experienced rapid population growth over recent decades. Migrants from Oceania were more likely to end up within the region than in other regions. For example, New Zealand had high shares of migrants abroad, with the vast majority residing in Australia.

Figure 34. Top 10 migration corridors involving Oceania countries, 2019

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

Note: Corridors represent an accumulation of migratory movements over time and provide a snapshot of how migration patterns have evolved into significant foreign-born populations in specific destination countries.

In 2018, Oceania hosted a little more than 126,000 refugees and asylum seekers. Australia was the largest host country in this region, followed by Papua New Guinea and New Zealand. Most of the refugees in these countries originated from Asia, such as Indonesians in Papua New Guinea or Afghans and Iranians in Australia. Globally, there were around 3,000 refugees and asylum seekers from countries in the Oceania region in 2018.
Figure 35. Numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in and from Oceania countries, 2018

![Bar chart showing numbers of refugees and asylum seekers in and from Oceania countries, 2018.](chart)

Source: UNHCR, n.d.

Note: “Hosted” refers to those refugees and asylum seekers from other countries who are residing in the receiving country (right-hand side of the figure); “abroad” refers to refugees and asylum seekers originating from that country who are outside of their origin country. The figure is based on 2018 data and are calculated by combining refugees and asylum seekers in and from countries.

Most new internal displacements in Oceania in 2018 resulted from disasters, not conflict (see figure 36). Papua New Guinea recorded the highest number of internal disaster displacements (61,000), which were largely triggered by an earthquake. Other large displacements associated with disasters were recorded in the Northern Mariana Islands (14,000), Vanuatu (13,000) and Australia (11,000). Volcanic activity led to most internal displacements in Vanuatu, while in Australia, bush fires were responsible for most of the displacements recorded in 2018. With 360 new conflict displacements, Papua New Guinea was the only country in Oceania that experienced displacements driven by violence and conflict.
Key features and developments in Oceania

Annual net migration to both New Zealand and Australia has declined. In the year that ended November 2018, New Zealand had a net migration of a little over 51,000, slightly down from around 52,000 in the year ending December 2017; estimates for Australia’s net overseas migration in the year ending June 2018 was 237,200 people, a 10 per cent drop from the year ending June 2017. The regions where migrants to Australia are born have changed in recent years; since 2014, the largest number of immigrants have largely come from Asia as opposed to traditional regions of origin, including Oceania and Europe. For example, the number of migrant arrivals from South and Central Asia have now surpassed those from North-West Europe and Oceania. In 2019, 30 per cent of Australia’s population was foreign born, in comparison with 21.3 per cent in Canada and 15.4 per cent in the United States. The United Kingdom has consistently been the main origin country of migrants in New Zealand for decades, with a notable increase in the number of Asian migrants, particularly from China and India, as well as a considerable population of people from the Pacific


Notes: New displacements refers to the number of displacement movements that occurred in 2018, not the total accumulated stock of IDPs resulting from displacement over time. New displacement figures include individuals who have been displaced more than once and do not correspond to the number of people displaced during the year.

The population size used to calculate the percentage of new disaster and conflict displacements is based on the total resident population of the country per 2017 UN DESA population estimates, and the percentage is for relative, illustrative purposes only.
Islands, including Fiji, Samoa and Tonga. In 2017, New Zealand’s foreign-born population constituted nearly 23 per cent of the country’s total population. In both Australia and New Zealand, there are a significant number of temporary workers. Over 209,000 people were granted work visas in New Zealand in 2016/2017, an increase of 9 per cent from 2015/2016. The largest origin country of temporary migrant workers in New Zealand was India in 2016/2017, followed by the United Kingdom, China and Germany. Both countries also attract a large number of international students. The number of international students has increased since 2012 in Australia, reaching a record high of nearly 700,000 in 2018, while there were over 91,000 student visa holders in New Zealand in the year 2016/2017, with most students primarily from China and India.

Both Australia and New Zealand participate in refugee resettlement. Australia’s refugee resettlement programme is the third largest in the world, with nearly 13,000 refugees resettled in the country in 2018. Under Australia’s Humanitarian Program, an additional 12,000 humanitarian places were made available in 2015 for people displaced by conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq. The number of places under Australia’s Humanitarian Program rose to 16,250 in 2017/2018 and was expected to further increase to 18,750 place from 2018 to 2019. Australia’s policy is to transfer those who arrive irregularly by boat as asylum seekers to offshore processing centres on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and in Nauru. In July 2013, Australia also announced that all persons arriving by boat and found to be in need of international protection would not be resettled to Australia. As part of a 2016 bilateral resettlement arrangement between the United States and Australia, the United States agreed to resettle up to 1,200 refugees from Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island. By early 2019, only around 500 refugees from these offshore processing centres had been resettled in the United States under the arrangement. At the same time, around 1,000 of those who were transferred to Manus Island and Nauru remain there, some of whom were experiencing severe physical and mental health needs. New Zealand is also a refugee resettlement country, resettling 1,000 refugees annually through its Refugee Quota Programme. This also includes 250 places specifically set for Syrian refugees in 2016/2017 and in 2017/2018. New Zealand has also established an additional quota of 300 places per year that allow extended family members of refugees in New Zealand to apply for Permanent Residence.

356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
362 UNHCR, 2019a.
363 Australian Department of Social Services, 2019.
364 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
367 Andrew and Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law, 2019.
368 Davidson, 2019.
369 UNHCR, 2019e.
370 New Zealand Immigration, n.d.
371 UNHCR, 2018b.
372 Ibid.
Economic challenges influence emigration from Pacific Island countries. Many Pacific Islands continue to experience persistent challenges related to poverty and inequality. The Islands’ economic growth has also been hampered by their remoteness or vast distances between them and larger markets, limited natural resources and narrowly-based economies.\(^{373}\) Additionally, the subregion is experiencing a significant “youth bulge”, with 70 per cent of the population in Solomon Islands, for example, under the age of 34.\(^ {374}\) This has resulted in a significant number of young people struggling with unemployment, leading to a high degree of labour emigration. Since 2007, seasonal labour migration schemes have helped to relieve labour shortages in the Pacific Islands, with the establishment of New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme and Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme in 2012, aimed at meeting labour needs, mainly in the horticulture and viticulture industries.\(^{375}\) Over 9,600 people from the Pacific Islands were granted visas under New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer scheme during the 2017/2018 season and more than 8,000 under Australia’s Seasonal Worker Programme during the same season.\(^ {376}\) In 2018, a new labour scheme, the Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS), was established to fill gaps in low- and semi-skilled jobs in both rural and regional Australia.\(^ {377}\) Importantly, while Australia and New Zealand remain the major destinations for labour migrants from Pacific Islands, labour emigration from these Islands has diversified, with Fijians and Tongans, for example, increasingly moving to countries such as Japan.\(^ {378}\)

Environmental change and degradation are also among the array of factors influencing many Pacific Islanders to migrate. The Pacific region is extremely vulnerable to natural hazards, some of which are linked to climate change. Vulnerability to climate change and associated migration, displacement and planned relocation varies among Pacific Island countries and territories. Half the population in Kiribati and Tuvalu lives in overcrowded urban areas on atolls of narrow strips of coral with limited access to water and land.\(^ {379}\) Incremental sea-level rise, saltwater intrusion and drought are important factors, among others, impacting people’s decisions to migrate in the region, both internally and internationally.\(^ {380}\) In this context, there is also growing discussion around the need for the planned relocation of groups and communities.\(^ {381}\) For example Kiribati, one of the States most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, promoted the “Migration with Dignity” policy as a long-term adaptation measure.\(^ {382}\) The policy aims to facilitate both permanent and temporary labour migration on a voluntary basis as a way of coping with the effects of climate change.\(^ {383}\) Meanwhile, the Government of Fiji has been relocating people from several coastal villages that have been identified as highly vulnerable to the impacts of environmental change and degradation.\(^ {384}\)

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373 World Bank, 2019b.
374 Vanderwey, 2019.
376 Ibid.
377 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019.
378 Ibid.
379 Curtain et al., 2016.
380 ESCAP, 2015.
381 See, for example, Georgetown University, n.d., for a range of resources on planned relocation.
382 Farbotko, 2018; Curtain and Dornan, 2019.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
Conclusion

This chapter has drawn on a wide range of statistics and information to provide regional overviews of international migration around the world, with emphasis on changes occurring in calendar years 2017 and 2018 (and drawing on material published up until the end June 2019). The chapter focused on six broad world regions (Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania), and provided discussion of key issues as well as recent developments at the subregional level.

Overall, and as is highlighted by the graphs presented at the regional level, there are clear geographic aspects to migration and displacement. A quick scan of figures in the chapter shows visually the significant differences in migration patterns between regions: migration in Africa has been predominantly intraregional (from one African country to another) with migration also occurring to other regions of the world (from African to non-African countries), whereas in Latin America and the Caribbean, migration is dominated by emigration to other world regions, especially Northern America, with intraregional migration playing a more limited role.

The addition of two regional graphs in this edition of the World Migration Report – one on population change over a decade and one on new internal displacements for 2018 – highlights and reinforces some interesting dynamics at the regional level. For example, we can see that, while the most significant proportional population change over the last decade has been mostly in terms of growth, parts of Europe have experienced significant population decline; this is exceptional globally, with no other region experiencing such results. The curious anomaly of population decline, long-term emigration trends, ageing populations and hostility toward immigration raises a number of strategic policy questions that some European countries will likely face for years to come. At the same time, demographic challenges are being addressed in other parts of the world, including in several North Asian countries, which are reassessing their approaches to immigration with a keen eye to labour markets, meeting key occupation and sectoral needs and preparing further for ageing populations. The addition of the new internal displacement graphs highlights the stark differences between conflict-related displacement and disaster displacement globally, with strong variations evident at the regional level.

At the subregional level, we can see that key features may remain largely the same from year to year, with only incremental change evident. It is, however, in the examination of recent developments that we can see substantial change occurring in some areas of the world. In part, this change is due to significant migration “events”, such as the large-scale outflow of people from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, or the mass displacement of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. We are also seeing change occurring on migration governance as subregions experience shifts in migration patterns and underlying population change. In North Asia, for example, China established its first immigration agency, bringing together functions from a number of agencies into one consolidated authority. Meanwhile, the Republic of Korea experienced large arrivals of asylum seekers from the Middle East not previously seen before, prompting intense public debate on related policy issues.

The regional differences and complexities, as well as recent developments, provide an important perspective to understanding migration. So often, we read and hear about migration from a national perspective, most commonly in recent times portrayed as a critical (negative) domestic political issue. But this dominant focus can mask the reality that migration patterns and processes are very closely linked to geography, and that key regional features developed over decades, if not centuries, continue to play a central role in how and where people migrate internationally. Greater recognition of regional and subregional migration patterns, variations and complexities can assist in formulating strategic and sustainable policy responses.
4 MIGRATION RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: GROWTH, REACH AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS

Introduction

In its simplest form, public policy has been defined as “anything a government chooses to do or not to do”.¹ Policymaking involves action through the setting of rules, laws, procedures, programmes, guidelines and other forms of regulation. But how do States decide on what should be regulated, and what should go into those regulations? Questions of policy settings transcend political systems, although policymaking processes vary across different types of systems.² The “raw ingredients” of policymaking include evidence (statistics and other data, research and evaluation) as well as funding, public sector capability and political dynamics.³ In migration policymaking, all ingredients are important; however, in recent years, we have seen the emphasis on political dynamics grow, sometimes regardless of, or in contrast to, the existing evidence base. It is clear, therefore, that the raw ingredients themselves are not enough to result in evidence-based policymaking, but that the following conditions are required:⁴

1. Evidence exists and is accessible to policymakers.
2. Policymakers are motivated to use evidence.
3. Policymakers have the capacity to use evidence.
4. Policymakers and policymaking bodies have relationships that facilitate the relevance and use of evidence.

This chapter on migration research and analysis is focused on point 1 above – for without statistics and other data and research on migration, any attempts at evidence-based decision-making are futile. The evidence for policymaking that originates from rigorous analysis and research on migration is the prime source and starting point for migration policymakers. It is also fundamental to migration practitioners, students, scholars and the public, as they examine aspects of migration and how they might be changing. A key challenge for many is how to determine the relevance and quality of an ever-growing body of migration research and analysis. It can often be overwhelming to identify what is important, and what should be afforded weight, when faced with virtual mountains of research output. This chapter is aimed in particular at those who would benefit from some broad guidance on this topic. It provides an overview of research and analysis on migration being undertaken and published by a range of actors – such as academics, governments, and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations – by building on the foundational chapter of the same name in the World Migration Report 2018.⁵ Understanding the variety, nature and characteristics of the different types

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¹ Dye, 1972.
⁴ Ibid.
⁵ This topic first appeared in the World Migration Report 2018 (IOM, 2017e), and will be repeated in future editions.
of research and analysis being produced on migration is important for those working on migration policies, studying migration, or wanting to develop an informed opinion on migration.

It is important to highlight at the outset that there are fundamental differences in the publishing processes for academic and non-academic material, and each has its strengths and weaknesses. The academic publishing system is largely focused on producing journal articles and books. This process typically involves multi-stage reviews and editorial comments involving authors, editors and reviewers. Most published academic research (“white” literature) is behind paywalls (that is, not freely accessible), and often managed by commercial publishers. In contrast, the production of research and analysis publications outside of academic publishing (“grey” literature) generally involves faster and simpler processes that are typically, although not always, characterized by more limited peer review. Contributions from grey literature (such as research reports, working papers and government/official documents) are usually freely available. A report such as this, designed to contribute to our collective understanding of migration and mobility in an increasingly interconnected world, would clearly be incomplete without describing the role of grey literature, which has been “recognized as a key source of evidence, argument, innovation, and understanding”.

The volume, diversity and growth of both white and grey literature preclude a systematic review of all the material produced and published on migration in 2017 and 2018. Instead, this chapter highlights examples of key contributions made during this period, published in English by a selection of academic journals and intergovernmental organizations. It provides an update to the chapter in World Migration Report 2018, including by focusing on different academic journals and intergovernmental organizations, and their key output in 2017 and 2018. The next section provides an overview of the different actors involved in migration research and analysis. The third section features recent, selected contributions from academia and intergovernmental organizations, and the reach and impact of some of the migration research materials published.

Main producers of migration research and analysis

Academia

Ideally, researchers create new knowledge that is supported by strong evidence and is useful for others. Research findings are produced for, and disseminated to, different target audiences. Traditional academic work can be highly technical and narrowly focused, although academic researchers are increasingly encouraged to disseminate their work beyond academic spheres. Researchers analysing policy-relevant issues are often keen to engage with policymakers to impart knowledge that can inform policy deliberations and help shape policymaking – this is especially the case with migration. Effective research contributions for policy audiences tend to take the form of short papers and blog articles, as well as policy workshops and interactive expert meetings.

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7 In order to ensure, to the extent possible, that this chapter provides a comprehensive “stand-alone” overview of migration research and analysis in 2017 and 2018, we have drawn upon key background and context material included in the World Migration Report 2018 (chapter 4).
8 McAuliffe, 2016.
In academia, the main focus is on publishing, with some forms (such as academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others. A key strength of academic publications is that they have usually been peer reviewed by experts in the field, which typically enhances their quality. The growing number of publishing outlets is, however, characterized by a wide range of peer review standards. Arguably, one of the weaknesses of academic research is that the pressure to publish has contributed to a large increase in academic output in recent years, not always of high-quality material. Appendix A provides a summary of academic publishing, including details of peer-review processes, citations and impact assessment.

Within the many thousands of journals currently being produced – covering all disciplines, topics and research fields – we identified over 130 migration-related journals publishing in English, French or Spanish, a list of which is published on the research page of the IOM website as a resource for students and others conducting migration research (www.iom.int/migration-research). Mainstream academic publishers tend to publish in English, which has the advantage of standardizing outputs but the downside of excluding those who are not able to submit manuscripts with an acceptable level of English.

Recent academic output on migration comprises mainly journal articles (see figure 1). The long-term trend shows a gradual increase in academic publishing on migration, which is likely to be related to both the general expansion of academic literature production, and the increased prominence of migration research.

![Figure 1. Number of academic publications on “immigration” OR “emigration”](image)

**Source:** Scopus, Available at [www.scopus.com](http://www.scopus.com) (accessed 18 June 2019).

**Note:** Querying the term “migration” alone returns figures that are more than 10 times higher. However, these include use of the term “migration” in disciplines that are irrelevant to the current research, such as computer science (data migration), biology (cell migration), zoology (bird or fish migration) and many others. Using the Scopus advanced search, we excluded subject areas such as chemistry, physics, astronomy, neuroscience and so forth.

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9 Ware and Mabe, 2015.
Governments

Historically, government administrative data on persons entering and/or leaving a country’s territory constitute the earliest sources of information on international migration.\(^\text{10}\) The earliest scholarly work on migration in the modern era, however, was on internal migration dynamics based on national census data collected by authorities in the United Kingdom.\(^\text{11}\) To this day, data enumerated by population censuses, population registers, representative surveys and other official statistical sources often constitute the basis for migration-related databases. The centrality of migration-related data within a government context is recognized, for example, by the IOM Development Fund, which supports (among other things) capacity-building of Member States on migration-related statistics.

Beyond statistical data collection, administration and reporting, some governments are also significant contributors of information on migration, particularly in the form of policy-related materials, such as evaluations, studies and discussion papers. They may also commission research with partners in academia, applied researchers, intergovernmental organizations and think tanks. The increasing relevance of migration has led to governments providing funding for empirical work directly (rather than indirectly through national research councils, funds or grant bodies), thereby opening up new research areas and broadening the scope of migration studies.\(^\text{12}\) This has led to some criticism of government-commissioned research being overly focused on policy issues and for, at times, suggesting “simplistic, short-term remedies to complex, long-term social issues”\(^\text{13}\) or of researchers being used to legitimize immigration policy.\(^\text{14}\) While this may be a valid concern, especially for commissioned research, governments continue to be significant funders (if not the most significant) of academic research in many countries, including of research on migration. There are, however, different ways research is funded and supported – some examples are provided in table 1.

There has been some evidence of researchers being pressured into “producing politically useful results” in policy-related research more generally.\(^\text{15}\) Understandably, issues addressed in government-commissioned dedicated migration research vary widely, and can depend on the countries’ role in the migration process.\(^\text{16}\) Equally, there is recognition that policy-irrelevant research is also crucial – particularly migration research that looks beyond the policy frames of reference to explore less visible aspects of migration.\(^\text{17}\) It is also important to note that research commissioned by governments can provide useful and rigorous examinations of migration – particularly in partnership with academic and other researchers, who can bring different perspectives, knowledge and analytical approaches to the examination of complex, multi-faceted migration issues, including by drawing upon administrative data that might not otherwise be accessible.

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10 Poulain, Perrin and Singleton, 2006.  
11 Ravenstein, 1885.  
12 Castles, 2010.  
13 Ibid.  
15 The LSE GV314 Group, 2014.  
16 Iredale et al., 2001.  
17 Bakewell, 2008.
## Table 1. Examples of government funding of migration research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
<td>Funded by multiple donors and focusing on producing social science research in Africa, including on the links between migration and urbanization (see <a href="http://www.codesria.org/spip.php?rubrique193">www.codesria.org/spip.php?rubrique193</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizon 2020 (European Union)</td>
<td>Largest research platform to date, focusing on the impact of migration and integration, as well as migration and development (see <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/what-horizon-2020">https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/what-horizon-2020</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India Centre for Migration</td>
<td>Funded by the Ministry of External Affairs and conducting research on international migration that informs policymaking, including on the international labour migration of Indians (see <a href="https://mea.gov.in/icm.htm">https://mea.gov.in/icm.htm</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Insight Program (Canada)</td>
<td>Federal research funding program supporting research that enhances understanding of people, societies and the world, including on migration (see <a href="http://www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/funding-financement/umbrella_programs-programme_cadre/insight-savoir-eng.aspx">www.sshrc-crsh.gc.ca/funding-financement/umbrella_programs-programme_cadre/insight-savoir-eng.aspx</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Network of International Studies</td>
<td>Funding for interdisciplinary academic research in Switzerland on topics transcending nation-State boundaries, including migration (see <a href="https://snis.ch/">https://snis.ch/</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Research and Innovation</td>
<td>Range of funding support for research and innovation, such as the Global Challenges Research Fund, a GBP 1.5 billion fund to promote research on the challenges faced by developing countries, including migration (see <a href="http://www.ukri.org/research/">www.ukri.org/research/</a>).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All hyperlinks were operating at the time of publication.
Think tanks and governments

The role of think tanks in informing migration policymaking is capturing increasing political and academic attention. As major contributors to grey literature, and in an era of increasing contestability of policy advice to governments, think tanks have emerged as important producers of migration-related information and analysis. The increasing prevalence of think tanks working on migration was quantified in World Migration Report 2018.

Think tanks are often associated with governments because, among other reasons, many aim to link scientific and policy communities by a range of activities, such as dialogues, workshops and closed meetings conducted under the Chatham House Rule. Think tanks may also undertake research and present it to governments in the form of analytical briefings (published and unpublished). Think tanks tend to act as brokers of policy knowledge, centres of research and incubators of new ideas, including by providing advisory services to governments and civil society, conducting training activities, publishing research reports, collaborating with the media, and undertaking advocacy work. Many think tanks produce high-quality work and thus play an important role in generating and disseminating new data and information about migration. Not all think tanks operate in the same way, however; some are independent and do not rely on government funding, while others may operate as part of broader State functions and authorities.

Although think tanks often portray themselves as experts providing evidence-based information and analysis, some are driven by political ideologies and agendas. Some of them work directly for, and develop close relationships with, governments or specific political parties, as advisors or helping drafting legislative reform agendas on immigration. Politicization of some think tanks can result in biased and ideologically-grounded information. There is a risk that some think tanks promote anti-immigration narratives and restrictive immigration policies to large audiences, especially when material produced is then relayed by news and other media.

Intergovernmental organizations

As publishers and institutional authors, intergovernmental organizations make specific contributions on migration. In some circumstances, such organizations may be the only source of information, and multiple references to publications by intergovernmental organizations are therefore often found in academic literature. A commercially published edited volume or article on an aspect of international migration or displacement, for example, can typically refer to material from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM, the
International Labour Organization (ILO), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and/or the World Bank, among others. Scholarly publications note that intergovernmental organizations are now among the main producers of information on migration, which reflects a broader growing interest in the issue of migration.\(^{18}\)

Although definitions of intergovernmental organizations may vary, Davies and Woodward define the term as “formal, continuous structures founded by an authoritative instrument of agreement between members (including two or more sovereign states) or an existing international organization through which members pursue their common interest”.\(^{19}\) Since the first half of the last century, the number, diversity and influence of intergovernmental organizations have grown,\(^{20}\) so much so that a systematic review of contributions on migration by such organizations is well beyond the scope of this chapter. The focus of this chapter is on global contributors within the United Nations system – UN DESA, UNHCR, IOM, ILO, OHCHR, UNICEF, UNODC, UNDP, UNESCO and the World Bank – which in no way diminishes the work of other organizations, including those operating at a regional or national level.\(^{21}\) As programmes or units within the principal organs of the United Nations or semi-autonomous, specialized or related agencies, the intergovernmental organizations discussed in this chapter all have global reach, access to the inputs and expertise of diverse stakeholders and, in some cases, global operations that enable them to shape discourse and practice on migration and mobility.

The mandates, missions or competencies of some of the organizations (such as IOM and UNHCR) are focused on specific forms of migration and displacement, while others have responsibilities relevant to particular aspects or groups of people: UN DESA for data; ILO for migrant workers; OHCHR for migrants’ rights; UNICEF for migrant children; UNODC for transnational criminal aspects (such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling); UNDP for migration and development; UNESCO for the educational, scientific and cultural aspects of migration; and the World Bank for economic implications of migration. Their various mandates enable such intergovernmental organizations to collect significant quantities of data and/or access data from States. Many of these organizations also convene and report on dialogues and conferences related to migration and mobility, in addition to generating and publishing background, technical, operational, state-of-the-art and agenda-setting research and analysis, including on global statistical data. As with other publishers, intergovernmental organizations are not immune to criticism related to quality, framing and agenda-setting. However, there is clearly also recognition of the responsibility of producing rigorous and robust data and research. Intergovernmental organizations, for example, routinely work in collaboration with leading migration-related data analysts and researchers as a means of drawing on critical skills and expertise.

Given the cross-cutting nature of migration, research on the topic is often undertaken jointly by intergovernmental organizations. Many publications were released under the aegis of the Global Migration Group (GMG) which, prior to its transition in late 2018 to the United Nations Network on Migration, consisted

\(^{18}\) See, for example, Mason, 1999; Pécoud, 2015.

\(^{19}\) Davies and Woodward, 2014.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.

\(^{21}\) Other organizations – such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – also publish material on aspects of migration, according to the thematic perspectives of their respective mandates. Future editions of the World Migration Report are expected to highlight some of the growing body of work by not-for-profit and for-profit international non-governmental organizations, which is beyond the scope of this chapter.
of 22 member agencies working on migration.\textsuperscript{22} The importance of collaborative research on migration was recently highlighted in the report of the United Nations Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) \textit{Strengthening Policy Research Uptake in the Context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development}, published in 2018.\textsuperscript{23} While the report is more broadly concerned with policy research within the United Nations system, it features a case study on migration that maps collaboration on migration research among 14 JIU participating organizations, as well as IOM (see the text box below).

### Collaborative research on migration in the United Nations system

**Excerpt of the JIU report \textit{Strengthening Policy Research Uptake in the Context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development}**

...the Inspector map[ped] the pattern of inter-agency collaborative research [on migration]. The mapping was based on the responses to a specific question about the organizations’ engagement in any form of cooperation with other United Nations entities prior to, during and after the research process. This mapping is not exhaustive, but it presents a sample of such interaction. The 15 available examples of inter-agency collaborative research are summarized in [the] table below, while [the] figure illustrates the relationships of the co-authors.

**Samples of inter-agency collaborations in research projects on migration:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Collaborating organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management of refugee data</td>
<td>DESA, UNHCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-custody of [Sustainable Development Goal] indicator 10.7.2 on countries with well managed migration policies</td>
<td>DESA, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2018 Report on “Migration and Structural Transformation”</td>
<td>UNCTAD, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of foreign direct investment by diaspora in Tunisia</td>
<td>UNDP, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Six-country study on access to economic opportunities for people affected by the Syrian crisis</td>
<td>UNDP, ILO, WFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on “Violence against women migrant workers”</td>
<td>UN-Women, ILO, IOM, UNHCR, OHCHR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study “At the Root of Exodus: Food Security, Conflict and International Migration”</td>
<td>WFP, IOM, FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint analysis of data for the “Migration Pulse” initiative</td>
<td>WFP, IOM, FAO, World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2017 publication “Migration, Free Movement and Regional Integration”</td>
<td>UNESCO, UNU-CRIS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{22} Discussion of GMG and the United Nations Network on Migration are included in chapter 11 of this report on global migration governance.

\textsuperscript{23} Dumitriu, 2018.
### Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects</th>
<th>Collaborating organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 2017 publication “Migration, Free Movement and Regional Integration”</td>
<td>UNESCO, UNU-CRIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 2019 Global Education Monitoring report on migration, displacement and education</td>
<td>UNESCO, IOM, UNHCR, UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Breaking the Impasse” study</td>
<td>OCHA, UNHCR, UNDP, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary discussion on taking forward projects on migration</td>
<td>UNRISD, IOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research initiative on migration governance and policy in the Global South</td>
<td>UNU-WIDER, FAO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research projects related to migration and displacement in the context of the climate change</td>
<td>UNU-EHS, IOM, UNHCR, UNDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective contributions to the research outcomes of the Global Management Group</td>
<td>DESA, UNDP, UNESCO, ESCAP, ESCWA, UNU, IOM (GMG)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As limited in size as is, the above sample of cases, corroborated with information extracted from interviews, allowed the Inspector to note:

(a) The collaborative research reflects by and large the necessity to add the interdisciplinary perspective to research activities;

(b) The collaboration scheme is more the result of separate initiatives and case-by-case needs than a systematic process of collaboration, characterized by joint agenda-setting, knowledge-sharing, co-design and co-production of research based on the specific mandates and expertise of interested organisations;
(c) While various undertakings do not necessarily converge into the same directions, there are three vectors indicating an emerging trend for a more systematic collaborative research:

- the presence of IOM, as a specialized partner, in most of the collaborations identified;
- the role of DESA and IOM as co-custodians of indicator 10.7.2 on migrations, which indicates an option towards a more systematic and demand-driven approach of policy research;
- the use of a group for collective reflection, action and enhanced coherence.

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IOM produces a large number of research and analysis publications on migration. Given the Organization’s focus on the provision of technical assistance and direct support to migrants and Member States, publications produced by IOM outside the realm of research and analysis typically include corporate reports (such as meeting/workshop reports and Migration Initiatives), training materials, handbooks and guides, and information materials for migrants (including graphic novels). It is worth acknowledging the mandate and context within which IOM operates, as well as its status as a United Nations-related organization. IOM’s role as a service delivery agency over almost 70 years has necessarily shaped how it articulates aspects of migration, including the links between its operations and migration practice, as well as migration policy and governance. Programmatic data, for example, have been a mainstay of IOM migration data – a reflection of IOM’s strong and enduring role in migration and displacement, including, for example, the support of internally displaced persons, the resettlement of refugees globally, health assessments, assistance to victims of human trafficking, and support to migrants returning home. Concomitantly, IOM has long recognized the need to support more nuanced understandings of migration, including through its focus on specific thematic areas, such as migration health and environmental migration.

Recent contributions: 2017 and 2018 in focus

Having described the main producers of migration research and analysis, we now turn to a discussion of examples of recent contributions by academia and intergovernmental organizations.

Academia

The large number of scholarly publications on migration precludes a review of all material published in 2017 and 2018. We instead examine a sample of contributions from the scholarly community, focusing on eight peer-reviewed migration-related journals. The previous edition of the World Migration Report featured different journals, as will future ones. For this chapter, we focused on the International Journal of Migration and Border Studies, International Migration, the International Migration Review, the Journal of Immigrant and Refugee

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24 IOM was established as an intergovernmental organization in 1951 and became a United Nations-related organization in September 2016.
Studies, the Journal on Migration and Human Security, Migration Studies, the Refugee Survey Quarterly, and the Revue européenne des migrations internationales. The examination comprised two components: analysis of all article titles published by these journals in 2017 and 2018 (totalling 493 articles); and editors’ overviews of their journals’ key contributions for this two-year period. This exercise allowed for deeper insights into journal contributions, highlighting their similarities as well as different interests and areas of focus, including thematically and geographically. Each editor’s overview is provided in full in appendix B. Excerpts of journal editors’ overviews are included in text boxes throughout the remainder of this chapter.

All journal editors emphasized the importance of rigorous and high-quality research on migration; however, relevance of scientific/academic writings for policymakers emerged as an important aspect for only some journals. Two editors emphasized the importance of contributions tackling policy-relevant issues in the field of migration (Gamlen and Chetail – see appendix B). This was noted as expanding the “growing community of migration experts” who are in turn “contributing to public life by informing and impacting the thoughts and decisions of politicians, policymakers and practitioners of migration policy at every level, from local NGOs, to municipal governments, to national governments and international organizations” (Gamlen – see appendix B). In addition, policymakers were specifically identified as falling within the target audience of two other journals (Duncan and Kerwin – see appendix B). The content of these journals is designed to appeal to a policy audience: one journal requires each contribution to start with an executive summary and set out a series of policy recommendations at the end (Kerwin – see appendix B), while the other journal introduced occasional interviews with senior policy officials (Duncan – see appendix B).

Migration Studies

Through scholarship that is policy-relevant but not policy-driven, Migration Studies is one of a range of academic journals contributing to building migration management capacity in communities and governments around the world. The past several years have seen a worldwide proliferation of graduate programmes and think tanks specializing in migration issues. At the same time, the rising political salience of migration has created a growing need for policymakers, journalists and NGO professionals in other areas to gain working familiarity with migration issues. In view of these trends, in the past two years, Migration Studies has run two series intended to contribute to the theory and practice of higher education on this topic.

Source: Alan Gamlen, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.

The analysis of the thematic focus of articles published in the selected journals in 2017 and 2018 in part relates to the specific, narrower focus of some of the journals. The Refugee Survey Quarterly, for example, is primarily on refugee research (Chetail – see appendix B), while the Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies covers labour migrants and asylum seekers/refugees (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B). The editors of the International Migration Review note that “beyond a general focus on international migrants, we find equal

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25 We have attempted to provide geographic diversity in the contributions obtained from the main migration journals. This exercise will be repeated in future editions of the World Migration Report, for which other journals will be invited to provide input. Ten journals were invited to contribute to this edition, and editors of nine journals replied positively, while only eight ended up providing input. Editors of Georgetown Immigration Law Journal accepted the invitation but did not end up contributing, and Migraciones internacionales did not reply to the initial invitation.
attention to native-born and second-generation groups, a critical mass of articles focus on immigrant youth, but far less work on refugees” (Windes et al. – see appendix B).

Nevertheless, the topics covered in the articles published in these eight journals in 2017 and 2018 are diverse and address complex migration issues. They also reflect new developments and trends in migration, acknowledging some delay effect due to the time frame required for peer review and publication (Duncan – see appendix B). For instance, among the 2017 and 2018 contributions, only three articles addressed the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees initiated in September 2016 by the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and adopted in December 2018. We expect that many more articles on the two compacts will be published in 2019 and 2020 (and beyond).

That said, two main themes reflecting complex migration issues emerge from editors’ contributions. The first topic is irregular migration, including in relation to border controls and enforcement. Editors of three journals identified this theme as particularly salient in the 2017 and 2018 contributions, covering issues ranging from human trafficking (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B), to border violence (Ma Ming and Petit – see appendix B), or detention and deportation (Kerwin – see appendix B). As “asylum and migration have become increasingly blurred in the past decades in both policy and practice”, this topic was also addressed in research on forced migration, most notably through the securitization of asylum and the detention of asylum seekers (Chetail – see appendix B).

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International Migration

The academic literature on migration responds in part to trends in migration phenomena and policy as well as to shifts in migration-related theory and previously published literature. Normally, there is a discernible time lag between the onset of a phenomenon and the appearance of scientific literature, this owing to the time required for research and then for publishing. The literature on the Syrian refugee crisis is now beginning to appear in significant amounts, and we can expect that the literature on the United Nations’ Global Compacts will start appearing in 2019. But looking back only slightly, to 2017–2018, we see discussions of earlier trends and phenomena [...].

Source: Howard Duncan, Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.

Revue européenne des migrations internationales

The issue of violence is a recurring theme in the latest dossiers. The importance of this issue reflects the tragic consequences of migration policies in particular contexts or crises, and the emergence of work around migrants’ journeys. [...] Considering language practices as an integral part of migration practices in the context of migration to Europe, the articles analyse how the actors put into words death and violence at borders. Death is considered in multiple dimensions: social death, physical death, disappearance, institutional and security arbitrariness, etc. These language practices are
understood at different sociological and political levels, whether it is their production from institutional spaces (international organisations, political spaces at European or state level) or their reception by migrants, during their life in Europe or afterwards when they arrive there, or when they return to their country after an expulsion. The language approach, corresponding both to a consideration of the discourses produced on migrants and of the narratives taken by migrants in plural discursive frameworks. This perspective makes it possible to think of the border object while offering a grid for interpreting socio-spatial inequalities in the era of globalization.

Source: Emmanuel Ma Mung and Véronique Petit, Chief Editors. The full submission is in appendix B.

The second topic of convergence across the selected articles is migrants’ inclusion, which was identified by editors of four journals as a prominent thematic focus in 2017 and 2018 (Gamlen, Triandafyllidou, Winders et al., and Ma Mung and Petit – see appendix B). The diversity of issues related to inclusion addressed in these four journals reflects the complexity of the topic. Contributions to the *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies* analysed integration processes, including the role of non-governmental and governmental organizations, integration barriers and the gender dimension of integration (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B). The issue of labour market incorporation was more particularly examined in *Migration Studies*, together with wider adaptation processes in terms of class, capital accumulation and happiness (Gamlen – see appendix B). The *International Migration Review* featured articles on assimilation, economic mobility and interpersonal contacts (Winders et al. – see appendix B), while contributions to the *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* approached inclusion through migrants’ perspectives.

**Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies**

The JIRS offers a unique virtual transnational space where different systems of reception and integration and different populations coming into the host countries under a variety of regimes (labour or family migrants, asylum seekers or resettled refugees) may face similar challenges (including that of mental and physical health), learning the ropes in their new environment, activating their social capital resources, and eventually carving a place for themselves in their destination country, are discussed. The double background of the JIRS from social work/community studies, and from sociology/ethnic studies pays well in bringing these different topics together.

Source: Anna Triandafyllidou, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the 493 articles published in 2017 and 2018 in the selected journals according to their geographic focus. The greater proportion of articles focused on Europe (233 or 47 %), followed by Northern America (153 or 31 %), Asia (150 or 30 %), Africa (107 or 22 %), Latin America and the Caribbean (89 or 18%) and Oceania (34 or 7 %).
One editor noted a shift of geographical focus from North America to Europe, Asia and the Pacific, as well as South-East Asia, with “a clear increase in recent years of articles focusing on the Middle East and particularly on Turkey, and the Syrian conflict” (Triandafyllidou – see appendix B). Broadening the geographical coverage of contributions to provide more articles on developing country issues was described as a new approach by one editor to better account for the fact that “the vast majority of refugees are hosted in the Global South” (Chetail – see appendix B). Editors of two other journals noted that increasing the geographic scope of articles was an objective for their journals (Kerwin and Winders et al. – see appendix B).

A close examination of IMR publications since 2016 (about 100 articles) identifies a number of trends. First, in terms of geography, around 80% of articles focus on North America or Western Europe, with a significantly smaller percentage focused on Asia (just over 10%) and an even smaller number on Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa. This uneven geographic coverage reflects one of the main shortcomings of migration studies – limited attention to migration dynamics beyond North America and Western Europe. It also highlights the challenges that scholars writing about the wider geography of international migration face in attempts to situate their work in relation to hegemonic perspectives about two global regions.

This discussion is based on articles officially published in an IMR volume. It does not consider articles published “early view” online but not yet assigned to a journal volume.

Source: Jamie Winders, Pieter Bevelander, Cynthia Feliciano, Filiz Garip and Matthew Hall, Associate Editors. The full submission is in appendix B.
However, so far, there remains a dominant “receiving country” perspective, especially in relation to Europe. This was already observed in chapter 4 of the World Migration Report 2018, where Europe was the only geographical term among the 10 terms most frequently used in the 538 articles under consideration. Referred to by Castles as the “receiving country bias”, the traditional focus of migration research and analysis on developed countries is explained: “Most migration research has taken the situation in northern destination countries as its starting point, neglecting the perspectives of origin and transit countries, and of migrants. This is not surprising, since research funding and capacities are concentrated in the North.”

The concentration of research funding in wealthy industrialized States not only affects the geographic focus of research, it also acts to build research skills and capacities within donor countries at the expense of developing country researchers. For example, while there were some 3,000 researchers for every 1 million people in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as of 2007, fewer than 50 researchers for every 1 million persons were accounted for in sub-Saharan Africa.

A geographic comparison of the primary affiliations of authors as reported in the articles they published in the selected journals in 2017 and 2018 confirms that a disproportionately high number of contributors are from institutions in developed countries (see figure 3). Of the 917 authors, 84 per cent were affiliated with institutions in developed countries. Almost 43 per cent were affiliated with institutions based in Europe, and 36 per cent in Northern America. Of the 6 per cent affiliated with institutions in Oceania, nearly 91 per cent of these institutions were based in Australia or New Zealand.

Refugee Survey Quarterly

One of the main challenges for the years to come will be to further diversify the geographical origin of contributors to the Refugee Survey Quarterly. While efforts have been made in this sense in the past years, submissions are still dominated by scholars from the Global North. This is not peculiar to the Refugee Survey Quarterly, but more broadly reflects the prevailing biases in academic research and publications. In this field like in many others, the production of knowledge remains largely structured by the Western-centric priorities of research funding that is financed by wealthy states and fuelled by the dominant discourse of the governing elites. This trend is further exacerbated by the enduring misperceptions spread by mass media, as illustrated by the rhetoric – if not the obsession – about the so-called refugee crisis in Europe. While it may have less implications in other fields, the geographical representation of researchers is particularly crucial in migration to account for the multifaceted dimensions and challenges of such a worldwide phenomenon that concerns every region of the world. There is more than ever a vital need for developing a more nuanced, representative and comprehensive understanding of migration through independent and evidence-based knowledge.

Source: Vincent Chetail, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.

26 IOM, 2017e.
27 Castles, 2010.
28 McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016.
29 Ibid., citing DFID, 2008.
While fewer than 12 per cent were affiliated with institutions in Asia, researchers from institutions in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean are particularly underrepresented (accounting for, respectively, approximately 3% and 2%). This may also be explained in part by language barriers, noting the dominance of English language academic journals over other languages. It is important to note, however, that figure 3 only accounts for authors’ affiliations as published in the articles under consideration. Many academics have multiple affiliations and some may choose to publish under a (more prestigious) affiliation that may not be the author’s main institution.

International Journal of Migration and Border Studies

The IJMBS contributed to the understanding of how the logics of borders are confronted by migrant realities and everyday experiences. Research has documented the increasingly protracted nature of migrants’ journeys. Being in transit has become the daily lived reality of many people on the move. Accordingly, special attention was paid by IJMBS to the concept of transit as a space constructed through mobility restrictions regimes and the above-mentioned systems of reciprocal conditionalities.

Source: Idil Atak, Editor-in-Chief. The full submission is in appendix B.
Plan S: The future of open access for scientific research?

Plan S is an open access initiative of Science Europe and the Open Access Envoy of the European Commission that was launched in September 2018 by a coalition of national research funding organizations, with the support of the European Commission and the European Research Council. Its objective is for all scientific publications funded by national and European research councils and funding bodies to be immediately available in open access after 1 January 2020. While authors will retain copyrights on their publications, funding institutions will cover open access publication fees applied by publishers, which will be standardized and capped.

The success of Plan S to establish universal open access will depend on the participation of funding institutions worldwide. As of April 2019, Plan S was supported by a coalition of 15 national research funding organizations and 4 philanthropic organizations within and outside Europe. Other funding institutions were awaiting a decision concerning the amount of capped fees for open access to be applied by publishers and/or investigating the impact that Plan S will have on research funding and scientific research before deciding whether or not to join. Some publishers have raised concerns about the implications of the initiative on academic freedom and the quality of scientific research, as the choice of publishers for researchers will be limited to those giving the option of open access publications.

The more funding institutions will decide to join “cOAlition S”, the more likely Plan S will be able to break the paywall business model of publishers and secure free access to scientific research worldwide. While this is particularly important for researchers in developing countries, whose institutions do not always have the financial resources to pay subscriptions to scientific journals, Plan S may well, however, create another geographic bias: open access publications will likely be outside the reach of researchers from the Global South, whose funding institutions will not be able to pay open access costs applied by publishers.

More information on Plan S can be found at www.coalition-s.org/.

a Rabesandratana, 2019.
b Kelly, 2019.

Beyond the selected journals, it is likely that this uneven distribution reflects the broader state of migration research. In 2015, professor Jørgen Carling compiled a list of “top” migration researchers who have published extensively in leading migration journals, concluding: “It’s striking that there’s not a single person on the list based in Africa or Latin America. And the six people based in Asia are all working in countries of immigration. This geographical bias continues to be a major challenge for migration research.”

As the interest in migration has increased, and the amount of migration research and analysis material has grown, it would be reasonable to expect that the reach (through expanding readerships, for example)
has also increased. One indicator – though extensively criticized – in academic publishing is a journal’s Impact Factor. However, Impact Factors were available for only three of the selected journals (International Migration, International Migration Review and Migration Studies). Taking into consideration these three journals, together with those examined in the World Migration Report 2018, there appears to have been an increase (see figure 4). The recent average Impact Factor increase suggests that the articles published in these journals are receiving more attention: citing a paper reasonably implies that it has been read, and that some of its content was helpful in adding to the evidence base and/or generating debates, building knowledge, or informing migration policy and practice.

Figure 4. Impact Factor of selected journals

![Impact Factor of selected journals](image)


Note: International Journal of Migration and Border Studies, Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, Journal on Migration and Human Security, Refugee Survey Quarterly and Revue européenne des migrations internationales were not indexed by InCites at the time of writing (June 2019), while Migration Studies started to be indexed in InCites in 2017. The Impact Factor is the ratio of citations to publications.

Publication metrics based on citation counts (including the Impact Factor) clearly have various limitations and downsides. First, citations tend to accumulate slowly, given academic publishing timelines and the time it takes to compile/release statistics. Second, citations are a matter almost solely within the academic context, which is one reason alternative measures (discussed below) have been developed. Third, citations do not measure quality of material, but are a way of quantifying impact (see the discussion on this point in

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32 The Impact Factor is a citations–publications ratio. For a given year, it takes into account citations and publications from the preceding two years. For more information, please see the example in appendix A.

33 For a recent overview of Impact Factor limitations, see Williams and Padula, 2015. For a broader account of Impact Factor misuse, see The PLoS Medicine Editors, 2006.
appendix A). While citation metrics have become a priority for academic publishers and scholars, they are likely to be less relevant to people outside academia.

New metrics are being developed for scholarly publications to assess their impact outside of academia. One such metric is the Altmetric Attention Score, indicating “how many people have been exposed to and engaged with a scholarly output”. For any research output, the Attention Score “provides an indicator of the amount of attention that it has received”, with some sources having more weight than others. For instance, coverage in the news has the highest weight of 8, since “it’s easy to imagine that the average newspaper story is more likely to bring attention to the research output than the average tweet”. Other high-weight sources include blogs (5), Wikipedia (3), policy documents (3) and Twitter (1). Altmetrics are relatively new, having commenced in 2012. They have been recognized as “tools that aim to measure the real-time reach and influence of an academic article”. Academics found “positive but relatively weak correlation with citations”, supporting the idea that “citation and altmetrics indicators track related but distinct impacts”. Mentions in blogs are particularly “able to identify highly cited publications” – an empirical finding that supports the important weight assigned to blogs within the altmetric algorithm, further highlighting the increasing importance of this form of dissemination of scientific material.

We have analysed views/downloads and the Altmetric Attention Score of 410 peer-reviewed articles published in 2017 and 2018 by six of the eight journals under consideration in this chapter (International Journal of Migration and Border Studies and Revue européenne des migrations internationales were not publishing these data at the time of writing). The Attention Score was chosen for two main reasons: (a) first, it was freely available on all the journal publishers’ websites; (b) second, the available evidence supports its use, especially for tracking recent research output. The analysis allowed us to unveil quantitative aspects of academic publications on migration, such as how many were mentioned, viewed and/or downloaded. Table 2 shows the top 10 articles with the highest Altmetric Attention Score for the selected journals in April 2019. The high scores obtained by these articles, however, does not reflect the Altmetric Score of the 410 sampled articles. Only 21 articles (5%) scored higher than 20 – roughly the equivalent of one mention in the news and one in a blog plus five tweets. The largest share of scholarly articles (172 or 42%) had a score from 2 to 20. However, 75 articles (18%) had a score of 2 or lower – meaning that they attracted, at most, the equivalent of a couple of tweets – and 142 articles (35%) scored zero, as they were not mentioned online by any source. This relates in part to the fact that they are recently published, and we would expect to see some articles attract more attention over time.

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36 Available at https://help.altmetric.com/support/solutions/articles/6000060969-how-is-the-altmetric-attention-score-calculated-.
37 Ibid.
39 Costas, Zahedi and Wouters, 2015; Thelwall et al., 2013.
40 Priem, Piwowar and Hemminger, 2012.
41 Costas, Zahedi and Wouters, 2015.
42 Just like classic citation metrics, altmetrics offer benefits and disadvantages. See Bornmann (2014) for a deeper discussion.
Table 2. Top 10 articles with the highest Altmetric Attention Score for selected journals, 2017 and 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 2,000 mile wall in search of purpose: Since 2007 visa overstays have outnumbered undocumented border crossers by a half million, by R. Warrant and D. Kerwin</td>
<td>Journal on Migration and Human Security</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpacking the presumed statelessness of Rohingyas, by N. Kyaw</td>
<td>Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between rootedness and rootlessness: How sedentarist and nomadic metaphysics simultaneously challenge and reinforce (dual) citizenship claims for Liberia, by R.N. Pailey</td>
<td>Migration Studies</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the legalization of undocumented immigrants in the US encourage unauthorized immigration from Mexico? An empirical analysis of the moral hazard of legalization, by T. Wong and H. Kosnac</td>
<td>International Migration</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The effect of visas on migration processes, by M. Czaika and H. de Haas</td>
<td>International Migration Review</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee resettlement as an alternative to asylum, by N. Hashimoto</td>
<td>Refugee Survey Quarterly</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeat migration in the age of “unauthorized permanent resident”: A quantitative assessment of migration intentions postdeportation, by D. Martinez, J. Slack and R. Martinez-Schuldt</td>
<td>International Migration Review</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctuary cities: Policies and practices in international perspective, by H. Bauder</td>
<td>International Migration</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The borders beyond the border: Australia’s extraterritorial migration controls, by A.L. Hirsch</td>
<td>Refugee Survey Quarterly</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forced displacement in Turkey: Pushing the limits of the ECHR system, by D. Dinsmore</td>
<td>International Migration</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: International Journal of Migration and Border Studies and Revue européenne des migrations internationales were not publishing these data at the time of writing (April 2019).

Concerning article views and downloads, not all journals provide such data on their websites. At the time of writing, one (Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies) was providing views only, one (Journal on Migration and Human Security) provided only downloads, and two (Migration Studies and Refugee Survey...
Quarterly) provided views and downloads. Four journals (International Journal of Migration and Border Studies, International Migration, International Migration Review, and Revue européenne des migrations internationales) were not showing any data on article views or downloads. To overcome this lack of standardization, we aggregated views and downloads. Figure 5 shows the distribution of views/downloads of 181 articles from the four available sources, grouped by hundreds. As for the articles of the seven journals examined in the World Migration Report 2018, the skewed shape of the distribution – similar to the Attention Score – highlights a relatively low level of reach. Only 24 articles (13%) were viewed/downloaded more than 1,000 times. The views/downloads data indicate that most academic writings have fairly limited readership.

Figure 5. Distribution of numbers of views and downloads of 181 articles from 2017 and 2018, selected journals

Source: Journal publishers’ websites, as of 26–28 February 2019.
Note: International Journal of Migration and Border Studies, International Migration, International Migration Review and Revue européenne des migrations internationales were not providing data on views or downloads at the time of writing (April 2019).

In summary, our quantitative analysis shows that migration as a topic is receiving increasing attention: the growing number of publications and citations are a sign of heightened interest, at least within the academic community. Measures of views/downloads and Altmetrics suggest that there is room for improving the reach and readership of scholarly production on migration. One of the main obstacles to this is the fact that academic publications tend to be behind paywalls, significantly limiting access to material beyond academia. Journal subscribers, for example, are often academic institutions, and the cost of downloading single articles

43 IOM, 2017e.
for non-subscribers can be prohibitive. Open access for academic publications enables free downloads, but usually requires publisher fees to be paid by the author or their institution. More open-access journals (such as *Comparative Migration Studies* and *Anti-Trafficking Review*) have, however, been publishing on migration.44

In addition, academic language and writing style tend to be more technical than in other areas of publishing, and the topics tend to be narrower. Dissemination of findings, however, through both traditional and newer forms of media, offer opportunities for academic research on migration to inform public and policy discourses. The potential reach of blogs on migration, for example, is discussed further below.

**Journal on Migration and Human Security**

*Without sacrificing academic and analytical rigor, JMHS papers take a human-centered approach to migration scholarship, focusing on (typically) at risk, vulnerable, and marginalized persons who are misunderstood and often scapegoated in migration policy debates. JMHS requires that each published paper begin with an executive summary and end with a series of policy recommendations. This increases the accessibility of JMHS papers to policymakers, policy influencers, and the general public. JMHS promises potential authors that their work will be rigorously reviewed, published in a timely fashion (if accepted), and distributed through research and university library databases, to JMHS’s extensive dissemination list, and to tailored lists of policymakers, the press and others with a special interest in the topic. JMHS also publicizes its papers via social media, both upon their release and subsequently in response to news hooks and relevant policy discussions.*

*Source: Donald Kerwin, Executive Editor. The full submission is in appendix B.*

**Intergovernmental organizations**

The contributions of key United Nations organizations working on migration reflect mandates as well as current trends and issues in migration. Table 3 provides examples of key material published in 2017 and 2018 by the United Nations organizations examined in this chapter. Given the high number and variety of publications issued during these two years, the table is limited to key material that has a global focus.

**Table 3. Examples of key global material published in 2017 and 2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN DESA</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Migration Report 2017</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>International Migration Policies Data Booklet, 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dataset on International Migrants Stock</td>
<td>Ongoing (2019)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dataset on International Migration Flows</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Statistics Database</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

44 Open access involves making published material available for free, not on a fee/subscription basis. See text box above on Plan S.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers – Results and Methodology</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Addressing Governance Challenges in a Changing Labour Migration Landscape</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ILOSTAT</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Principles and Guidelines, Supported by Practical Guidance, on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>A Child Is a Child: Protecting Children on the Move from Violence, Abuse and Exploitation</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beyond Borders: How to Make the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees Work for Uprooted Children</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education Uprooted: For Every Migrant, Refugee and Displaced Child, Education</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smuggling of Migrants Knowledge Portal</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Climate change, migration and displacement</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>Global Education Monitoring Report on Migration, Displacement and Education</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration and its Interdependencies with Water Scarcity, Gender and Youth Employment</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labor Markets</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook – Transit Migration</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook – Return Migration</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration and Remittances Data</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-agency collaboration</td>
<td>Handbook for Improving the Production and Use of Migration Data for Development</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migration, Remittances and Financial Inclusion: Challenges and Opportunities for Women's Economic Empowerment</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G20 International Migration and Displacement Trends Report 2018</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table does not include all material, such as working papers; only key material is included. IOM publications are discussed below.

**Sources:**
(a) Published by OHCHR and the Global Migration Group; (b) Published by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and UNDP; (c) GMG was an inter-agency group within the United Nations system that worked collaboratively on migration. Prior to its transition in late 2018 to the United Nations’ International Network on Migration, it had 22 member agencies, with a rotating annual chair. Discussion of GMG and the Network are included in chapter 11 of this report on global migration governance; (d) Produced by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD), World Bank; (e) Produced by the Economic Empowerment Section of UN-Women, New York, on behalf of GMG; (f) Led by OECD, jointly published with ILO, IOM and UNHCR.
UN DESA coordinates the assembly of data, including in relation to migration – a process that has highlighted limitations in the capabilities of national statistical offices.\textsuperscript{45} In 2017, its Population Division published the \textit{International Migration Report 2017}\textsuperscript{46} – a biennial publication that presents information on levels and trends in international migration for major areas, regions and countries of the world, and on the ratification status of migration-related legal instruments. The Population Division maintains the United Nations Global Migration Database – the most complete set of statistics on international migrants enumerated in countries or areas, and classified by age, sex and country or area of birth or citizenship – as well as a smaller data set with annual data on international migration flows for 45 countries.

As a United Nations agency with a mandate to pursue protection, assistance and solutions for refugees, UNHCR produces a wealth of publications and has a dedicated research repository – refworld. Released annually in June, \textit{Global Trends}\textsuperscript{47} is one of UNHCR’s flagship publications. It presents and analyses annual trends worldwide in relation to refugee and other populations of concern to UNHCR. UNHCR is also the key source of global statistics on refugees and other populations of concern, as reported in its online Population Statistics Database.

ILO is a standard-setting body responsible for coordinating the development and supervising the implementation of international labour standards. In the context of its efforts to improve the collection and production of labour migration statistics, \textit{ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers}\textsuperscript{48} provides estimates of the proportion of labour migrant workers among the total number of migrants worldwide. In 2017, it also published a report entitled \textit{Addressing Governance Challenges in a Changing Labour Migration Landscape}\textsuperscript{49} to inform the development of just and effective governance of labour migration. In addition to labour migration data, the ILOSTAT database contains diverse statistics related to the labour market which are also relevant to labour migration.

Part of the United Nations Secretariat, OHCHR is the principal United Nations office mandated to promote and protect the human rights of all persons, including migrants. In addition to supporting United Nations human rights mechanisms, such as treaty bodies and Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OHCHR produces a wealth of relevant materials. As co-chair of the former GMG Working Group on Migration, Human Rights and Gender, it led the development of the \textit{Principles and Guidelines, Supported by Practical Guidance, on the Human Rights Protection of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations}.\textsuperscript{50} These \textit{Principles and Guidelines} offer guidance to States on the operationalization of international human rights law to protect migrants who find themselves in vulnerable situations but do not fall into the legal category of “refugee”. They are explicitly referred to in the Global Compact for Migration to “[d]evelop national policies and programmes to improve national responses that address the needs of migrants in situations of vulnerability”.\textsuperscript{51}

Although UNICEF’s flagship publication – the \textit{State of the World’s Children}\textsuperscript{52} – does not necessarily single out migrant children, in 2017 UNICEF published \textit{A Child Is a Child: Protecting Children on the Move from Violence},

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{45}] Davies and Woodward, 2014.
\item[\textsuperscript{46}] UN DESA, 2017.
\item[\textsuperscript{47}] UNHCR, 2019.
\item[\textsuperscript{48}] ILO, 2018.
\item[\textsuperscript{49}] ILO, 2017.
\item[\textsuperscript{50}] OHCHR, 2018.
\item[\textsuperscript{51}] UNGA, 2018: para. 23(l).
\item[\textsuperscript{52}] UNICEF, 2017a.
\end{itemize}
Abuse and Exploitation.\textsuperscript{53} It examines the risks faced by migrant children because of the lack of safe and legal migration pathways, and sets out some policy recommendations to better protect them.

Within its mandate to assist States in addressing international crimes, UNODC undertakes efforts to combat transnational organized crime, including human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and produces a variety of reports on these themes. The fourth Global Report on Trafficking in Persons,\textsuperscript{54} published in 2018, provides an overview of patterns and flows of trafficking in persons, and is based primarily on trafficking cases detected from 2014 to 2016. In 2018, UNODC released its first Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants,\textsuperscript{55} which gives an account of the magnitude and functioning of migrants’ smuggling, the profiles of the people involved, and the risks faced by migrants. UNODC also maintains a Smuggling of Migrants Knowledge Portal on information to support the implementation of the 2000 United Nations Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime\textsuperscript{56} (such as case law, annotated bibliography and legislation).

As the United Nations global development agency, UNDP’s commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals translates into a broad range of programmes, including for building long-term development responses to migration and displacement. In 2017, UNDP issued a report, together with the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), entitled Climate Change, Migration and Displacement,\textsuperscript{57} which seeks to shed light on the complex connections between climate change and human mobility.

UNESCO’s mandate is focused on building peace by means of education, culture and science. The 2019 edition of its annual Global Education Monitoring Report series focuses on migration and displacement. It analyses the impact of human mobility on the education systems and the way these systems can help address the challenges posed by human mobility, offering examples of successful policies.

As a United Nations specialized agency and a major international financial institution, the World Bank publishes a variety of books, reports and working papers on the importance of migration for growth and economic prosperity, and monitors data on migration and remittances, such as remittances inflows and outflows. It issues regular Migration and Development Briefs on topical issues, the two most recent ones dealing with transit and return migration. The Policy Research Report entitled Moving for Prosperity: Global Migration and Labor Markets,\textsuperscript{59} released in 2018, analyses the apparent tension between academic findings on the social and economic benefits of migration, and the antimigration public discourse.

Key global material was also published in 2017 and 2018 as a result of inter-agency collaboration. Prior to its transition into the United Nations Network on Migration, GMG produced publications covering various topics relating to migration, often taking the form of handbooks and guidelines.\textsuperscript{60} In 2017, it published a handbook to support Member States in the production and use of data on migration for development purposes (produced by UN-Women). It also released a report examining the question of remittances and migrant

\textsuperscript{53} UNICEF, 2017b.
\textsuperscript{54} UNODC, 2018a.
\textsuperscript{55} UNODC, 2018b.
\textsuperscript{56} UNODC, 2000.
\textsuperscript{57} UNDP and ODI, 2017.
\textsuperscript{58} UNESCO, 2018.
\textsuperscript{59} World Bank, 2018.
\textsuperscript{60} GMG was an inter-agency group gathering 22 United Nations agencies working collaboratively on migration.
women’s financial inclusion (produced by KNOMAD, World Bank). Another key publication resulting from inter-agency collaboration is the *G20 International Migration and Displacement Trends Report 2018* produced by OECD, jointly with ILO, IOM and UNHCR. The report presents migration trends and policy challenges in G20 countries and Member States of the European Union.

**IOM**

IOM published a wide range of research and analysis materials in 2017 and 2018 – most notably in the form of stand-alone studies and reports, many of which stemmed directly from specific projects and often produced locally by IOM missions. For example, the report *Making Mobility Work for Adaptation to Environmental Changes: Results from the MECLEP Global Research* is the final publication of the European Union-funded Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project assessing the evidence base on migration and climate change in the six countries involved in the project: the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Kenya, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and Viet Nam.

The text box below lists key publications produced by IOM in 2017 and 2018. In 2017, IOM released its biennial flagship publication, the *World Migration Report 2018*. In 2018, the Organization also revitalized its *Migration Research Series*, which publishes policy-relevant research and analysis on diverse and complex migration issues. Calls for abstracts were circulated in 2018 on topics addressed in the *World Migration Report 2018* to further stimulate research and analysis, and three papers were published. Additionally, three Migration Profiles were issued in 2017 and five in 2018. They provide country-specific migration overviews (largely funded by IOM’s Development Fund) to support, among other things, capacity-building on migration data, and research and analysis in Member States. IOM’s support of migration journals – *International Migration* and *Migration Policy Practice* – was also an important contribution to migration research.

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**Key IOM research-related publications produced in 2017 and 2018**

*World Migration Report 2018*

*Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate: Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*

*Migration and the 2030 Agenda: A Guide for Practitioners*

*Fatal Journeys, Volume 3: Improving Data on Missing Migrants (Parts 1 and 2)*

*The Atlas of Environmental Migration*

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62 OECD comprises 36 members. Its mission is to promote policies enhancing the economic and social well-being of individuals worldwide. It conducts research on a variety of topics, including migration, with a scope that often goes beyond its member and partner countries.

63 G20 members are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union.

64 IOM, 2017c.

65 IOM, 2017e.
In 2017 and 2018, IOM also supported Member States during the consultation and negotiation process of the Global Compact for Migration with the creation of the Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate. A collection of short technical papers was published in 2017 in the form of a report (Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate: Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration)\(^6\) was one of the key outputs of the Syndicate’s work, as presented in the text box below.

IOM 2017 Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate in support of the Global Compact for Migration

The innovative research “Syndicate” initiative drew upon the research and knowledge of 36 of the world’s leading “migration policy scholars” hailing from all regions.

The 2017 Syndicate was established and convened to enable high-quality technical expertise and deep knowledge to be fed directly into the development of the Global Compact for Migration. Key outputs included:

- Syndicate members’ top three reads for policymakers on migration;
- Short technical papers on Global Compact for Migration-related themes with evidence, analysis and recommendations for policymakers;

\(^6\) IOM, 2017d.
• Blogs published by IOM’s partner, the World Economic Forum, on Global Compact for Migration-related topics;

• Syndicate members’ participation in Global Compact for Migration consultations as thematic experts and panel members;

• Several Syndicate United Nations panel discussions on Global Compact for Migration-related topics, including in the margins of the Global Compact for Migration negotiations.

Further information is available in IOM, 2017d.

In recent years, the IOM online bookstore has been upgraded and improved. Launched in 2009 as a means of facilitating greater access to IOM publications, the online bookstore is now able to track and support analysis of data on the number of downloads of IOM publications. These data provide insights into accessibility and reach of IOM publications, supplementing readers’ surveys of specific outputs. As of the end of 2018, the bookstore contained 1,794 electronic publications in 28 different languages, most of which could be accessed free of charge. While download data do not allow for an assessment of the quality of publications (such as can be done through reader surveys or peer review, for example), they do provide some insights into the individual publications that have high download rates, as well as the themes and geographic nature of the research-related publications that are produced and accessed globally. In 2018, the number of downloads from the IOM bookstore exceeded 2 million.

In 2018, the World Migration Report 2018 became the most downloaded IOM publication of all time, with over 400,000 downloads globally as at end of August 2019 (or around 620 downloads per day). The World Migration Report 2018 was the first edition after substantive changes were made to the World Migration Report series concerning content and quality assurances processes, including a move away from a single thematic report to a much broader coverage of key data and information on migration as well as complex and emerging issues. These changes have been successful in expanding the report’s readership and sustaining a high download rate compared with previous editions, such as the World Migration Report 2015, which was on the single theme of migrants and cities (see figure 6). In addition, the 2018 report has received more than 500 citations in academic literature.67

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67 At 14 October 2019 Google Scholar searches found 551 citations.
An examination of IOM research-related publications that were each downloaded more than 1,000 times shows that some themes were more prominent than others, with cross-cutting publications featuring heavily – including, for example, country migration profiles that traverse multiple thematic issues. Interest in migration law and governance increased in 2017 (see figure 7).

**Figure 6. Downloads of World Migration Report 2018 compared with 2015 edition**

Source: IOM.

Note: Downloads for each month following respective report launches; includes the English versions only.

**Figure 7. Proportion of IOM research-related downloads by theme**

Source: IOM.

Notes: “IM” means irregular migration. Only publications downloaded more than 1,000 times in a year included (downloads in 2015 have been prorated, as data for the entire year are not available). Downloads could be classified by more than one theme. n=5,547,808 downloads.
Overall, interest in research on specific regions was relatively stable from 2015 to 2018. Publications focusing on Africa featured more heavily than others for the past four years (see figure 8), followed by Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern America and Oceania.

Figure 8. Proportion of IOM research-related downloads by region

Source: IOM.

Notes: Only publications downloaded more than 1,000 times in a year have been included (downloads for 2015 have been prorated, as data for the entire year are not available). Downloads could be classified by more than one region. n=5,547,808 downloads.

"LAC" means Latin America and the Caribbean. Categorization based on UN DESA geographic regions (see chapter 3 appendix A for details), not implying official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

Blogs

As part of the broader tendency towards greater interest in migration and migration-related research, there has been a concomitant rise in the number of blogs that feature articles on migration. While the growth and utility of blogging was addressed in chapter 4 of the World Migration Report 2018, it is well beyond the scope of this chapter to examine in detail the changes in blog publishing specifically on migration; however, examples of widely read migration articles are provided below. They show that some blog articles can reach large audiences and, because of this, are likely to be influential in informing discussions on migration. It is also important to acknowledge that some argue that blogs tend to be written on “hot” or controversial migration topics, such as irregular or mass migration, refugees and asylum seekers, while less controversial topics are often neglected.
**Examples of migration-related articles published on blogs**

Canada wants to take in more than 1 million new immigrants in the next 3 years, by Kate Whiting, published by the World Economic Forum’s Agenda blog on 3 December 2018 – **102,224 views**.

Why accepting refugees is a win-win-win formula, by Dany Bahar, published by Brookings’s Up Front blog on 19 June 2018 – **24,094 views**.

Trump and AMLO are headed for a U.S.-Mexico blow-up, by Shannon O’Neil, republished by the Council on Foreign Relations’ blog on Latin America’s Moment (with permission from Bloomberg) on 30 July 2018 – **11,536 views**.

Beware the notion that better data lead to better outcomes for refugees and migrants, by Jeff Crisp, published by Chatham House’s Expert Comment blog on 9 March 2018 – **4,991 views**.

The journey across America: understanding a nation’s immigration experience, by Katy Long, published by the Overseas Development Institute, 2018 – **1,200 views**.

*Note: The number of reads or views and related analytics were provided by the relevant blog editor in April 2019.*

a IOM, 2017e.
b Aldred et al., 2008.
c Ozimek, 2012.

**Conclusions**

Building on the *World Migration Report 2018*, this chapter provides an overview of the key contributions of some of the main producers of migration research and analysis during the last two calendar years (2017 and 2018). We found that the long-term trend of increased output of migration research was further extended in 2017 and 2018, which saw the largest amount ever of academic output on migration published in 2017 and equalled in 2018 (see figure 1). Further, these two years saw tremendous activity by intergovernmental organizations, with a large number of global reports on aspects of migration having been published (see table 3 for examples).

The increase in material published is undoubtedly related to the salience of migration in policy, political as well as public spheres. We have witnessed the increasing use of migration – or more correctly at times, anti-immigration – as a political tool, despite the existing evidence base showing that there has not been substantive changes in migration (levels or processes) to warrant such significant shifts in the public debate (see chapter 5 of this report for discussion). It is understandable that researchers, working on academic or applied research, or in white or grey literature, have been inspired to seek and report the truth during a period in which we witnessed “fake news” and “disinformation” increasingly take hold in public debates on migration globally.
Consistent with the findings of \textit{World Migration Report 2018}, there is certainly a strong case to be made for playing to the strengths of the different types of research published on migration. Some of the highest quality blogs on migration, for example, are based on carefully elaborated and conducted studies, and insightful analysis drawing on years of research. They also are able to garner significant interest, with data clearly showing extended reach to wider audiences that lay beyond the scientific. The use of blog platforms by influential migration academics to communicate their empirical and theoretical research findings to policy and general audiences demonstrates the relevance of the form. We are also seeing recognition of this in the calculation of how research impact is measured. The growing use of altmetrics, for example, which measure a journal article’s reach in non-academic publishing, points to the increasing need to extend knowledge based on rigorous research and analysis into wider audiences. However, this should not be at the expense of the bedrock provided by scientific research, with its focus on meeting high quality standards.

In this chapter we examined research and analysis output from a geographic perspective for the first time. Previous IOM research projects conducted in partnership with academic and applied researchers around the world had brought disparities into sharp relief.\footnote{See, for example, IOM, 2017d, McAuliffe and Lazcko, 2016 and Triandafyllidou and McAuliffe, 2018.} Our examination of the selected journals and IOM publications for 2017 and 2018 showed that there are indeed significant differences in focus, volume and author affiliation when published material is analysed by geographic region. As we have commented elsewhere, this is undoubtedly related to research funding sources (direct and indirect), with most sources emanating from wealthier countries. More effort, on a sustained basis, is needed to better support research institutions and researchers in developing countries, including by confronting some of the structural impediments that exists to funding and capacity. Analysis of IOM’s own research publications confirmed anecdotal evidence that an important part of IOM’s role is its focus on research concerning parts of the developing world, especially in Africa. Even greater effort to support research in developing States, however, is warranted as the vast majority of countries around the world work toward the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration – endeavours that would greatly benefit from the input of academic and applied researchers.

Finally, we again encourage policymakers, practitioners, researchers and others to access and digest the great wealth of written material on migration with a critical eye. We also underscore the importance of activities and initiatives that bring together migration scholars, practitioners and policymakers, including through workshops, conferences, briefing sessions and related consultations. While it may be difficult at times to do so, bridging the gaps that exist between policy, practice and research when done thoughtfully can reap enormous dividends for all.
PART II

COMPLEX AND EMERGING MIGRATION ISSUES
Reflections on migrants’ contributions in an era of increasing disruption and disinformation

MARIE MCAULIFFE
ADRIAN KITIMBO
BINOD KHADRIA
Introduction

A glance through previous World Migration Reports, and other policy and scientific publications on international migration, shows that at least two observations have been prevalent over time: i) recognition that migration, particularly immigration, has emerged as a prominent international and national policy issue; and ii) that the public discourse on migration has increasingly become polarized with the space for balanced, rigorous, and evidence-based analyses having diminished over time. While the nature of the public discourse has changed over time, there is widespread recognition that the “toxicity” of the migration debate has further intensified over the last few years, with the politics of fear and division increasingly framing discussions. Disruption and disinformation are increasingly being deployed as part of tactical pursuits of power, with negative impacts on public, political and social media discourse, on societal values, and on public policy issues such as migration, displacement and migrants (including refugees).

In the face of often negatively skewed discussions on migration and migrants, one can lose sight of the fact that human endeavours to improve peace and prosperity in modern times that are underpinned by migration have been on the whole successful, and in specific key areas very successful (such as the eradication or control of specific, deadly diseases and the dramatic decline in infant mortality following the efforts of Nations under the 2000–2015 Millennium Development Goals). Migrants provide a source of dynamism globally, and are overrepresented in innovation and patents, arts and sciences awards, start-ups and successful companies. Such historical and contemporary contributions have become increasingly overlooked or ignored in recent discussions on international migration, with many contributions being “normalized” over time but nevertheless evident (at times conspicuously so).

It is also easy to lose sight of the fact that international migration remains a relatively uncommon phenomenon, with a mere 3.5 per cent of the world’s population being international migrants (see chapter 2 of this report for details). Notwithstanding this small proportion, the total number of international migrants has increased in recent decades to reach as high as 272 million, or close to the national population of Indonesia (269 million). What we currently know is that mobility, as opposed to migration, is becoming much more prevalent, making some argue that now is the time to rethink how weconceptualize and discuss these issues.

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1 Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM; Adrian Kitimbo, Research Officer, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM and Binod Khadria, Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
2 GCIM, 2005; Martin, Larkin and Nathanson, 2000; McAuliffe and Ruhs, 2017.
4 Morgan, 2018.
5 Mathers et al., 2018.
6 UN DESA, 2019.
7 Deutschmann and Recchi, 2019; Skeldon, 2018. See also the discussion on mobility in chapter 1.
In this context, revisiting the many ways in which migrants have contributed – at the transnational, national and local levels – is important in presenting a balanced discussion on migration. This is not to suggest that international migration and displacement do not pose challenges for communities in origin, transit and destination countries (as well as migrants) – many other chapters in this report are focused on such challenges. However, in writing this chapter, we acknowledge that the many ways in which migrants contribute to societies are currently being overlooked, downplayed or taken for granted, and it is the purpose of this chapter to bring these contributions of migrants to the forefront.

The next section describes key concepts related to contributions, providing an analytical framework for this chapter in the context of a rich body of academic and policy work on the topic. We then go on to describe and analyse migrants’ contributions globally, with reference to sociocultural, civic-political and economic aspects. The chapter then discusses emerging impediments to the recognition of migrants’ contributions globally, before outlining the implications for policy deliberations and for further research.

What are “contributions”?

To contribute means to give something – money, time, ideas, labour, material goods – in order to achieve something with other people. Outside of personal relationships, such as those with family and friends, and in the context of sociology and social change theory, “contributions” are part of broader interactions and engagement with individuals, groups and institutions in society. In other words, contributions occur as part of broader structural settings and social processes that support and shape societies. They can be broadly categorized as being in sociocultural, civic-political or economic domains (see text box for definitions).

As the salience of migration has risen in public policy and research spheres, there has been a new and greater focus on migrants per se – as distinct subpopulations within larger national populations, with reference to the structural settings they encounter, especially in the destination countries. The way in which people enter, stay and settle in a new country occupies the time of an increasing number of researchers, policymakers and those in the media: the first focusing on understanding the demographic, geographic, economic, legal/

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9 Dennison and Drazanova, 2018.
10 Chapter 4 quantifies the increase in research output; chapter 11 discusses global migration governance.
policy and other factors; the second on how best to meet policy objectives (however defined); and the third scrutinizing and commenting on both. Research continues to explore the dynamic relationships that exist between migrants (including potential migrants) and migration processes and related factors. We know from existing evidence and analysis, for example, that the contributions migrants are able to make in destination as well as origin settings do partly depend on legal–policy frameworks, such as those impacting the ability of both regular and irregular migrants to stay, participate in civic activities, work lawfully and send remittances, as well as to return home (see chapter 6 of this report). Contributions are also related to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, with those who choose to migrate having higher skills, education and opportunity, ultimately also reflecting a greater likelihood of contributing in origin and destination countries in a variety of ways.

Consistent with migration research more generally (see chapter 4 of this report), there is recognition that much of the analysis on migrants has been undertaken from a destination country perspective, with some arguing that the most significant immigration country in the world – the United States – has disproportionately influenced the study of migrants globally. With this in mind, this chapter attempts to reflect broader experiences of international migrants’ contributions by incorporating recent research and analysis focusing on destination and origin. In scoping and presenting the chapter in this way, we acknowledge that we are not seeking to summarize all existing literature, nor are we suggesting that the findings highlighted in the chapter are representative. What we do recognize, however, is the importance of encapsulating a reasonable geographic and thematic diversity of research and analysis on the topic in what, after all, would make a migration report truly a World Migration Report.

Importantly, this chapter does not assess the overall impacts of migration in these settings. Studies on the impacts of migration are numerous and well documented (see examples in the text box below); they provide important insights and analyses. This body of work is focused mainly on economic impacts rather than sociocultural or civic–political impacts, including because economic variables are to a greater extent standardized, thereby supporting comparative analysis. Some examples of recent publications on the economic impacts of migration, including some empirical estimates, are included in the text box below.

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11 See, for example, writings on cumulative causation (Massey, 1990), neoclassical economics (Todaro, 1989), world system theory (Wallerstein, 1974; Portes and Walton, 1981), new economics of labour migration (Stark and Bloom, 1985) and social network theory (Boyd, 1989).
14 Carling, 2015; Castles, 2010; McAuliffe and Laczko, 2016; Morawska, 2008.
15 Fitzgerald, 2014.
16 While this chapter focuses on international migration, we acknowledge that it may also be relevant to internal migration in some countries. See Weiner (1978) for examples of disruptions and disinformation leading to conflict and discrimination faced by intra-state migrants within India.
17 See also the World Migration Report 2005 (IOM, 2005).
Assessing the economic impacts of migration

Estimating overall economic impacts of migration is a topic of intense debate in political and policy circles. Some recent publications on the topic include:

- *Exceptional People: How Migration Shaped Our World and Will Define Our Future*, by Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, shows that there is broad consensus among economists that, for destination countries, immigration is a catalyst for economic growth at an aggregate level and produces net economic benefits. However, the authors also acknowledge that there are ongoing debates on how to measure these effects.a

- The McKinsey Global Institute's report, *People on the Move: Global Migration’s Impact and Opportunity*, echoes these findings, showing that migrants contributed over 9 per cent, or USD 6.7 trillion, to global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015.b

- *International Migration: Recent Trends, Economic Impacts, and Policy Implications*, by the International Monetary Fund, concludes that the economic impacts of migration vary across countries, and that, while migration brings challenges, it also confers benefits to origin and destination countries.c

- *Migration and the Economy: Economic Realities, Social Impacts and Political Choices*, by Goldin et al., affirms that immigration impacts positively on economic growth, and that this happens in a number of ways: many migrants are comparatively younger than local populations and thus have a significant positive impact on both GDP per capita and overall (aggregate) GDP; migration enhances output per worker by increasing human capital; and migration bolsters total factor productivity as well as innovation. The report finds that, had immigration to the United Kingdom and Germany ceased in 1990, both countries’ real GDP in 2014 would have been lower by GBP 175 billion and GBP 155 billion, respectively.d

- The impacts on labour markets, including on wages, vary widely, are often negligible and are largely driven by how complementary migrants’ skills are to those of local workers;e these may be reversible in the longer run, as economies adjust to immigration, as Ruhs argues in *The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration*.f

- *The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Granting Refugees Formal Labor Market Access*, by Clemens, Huang and Graham, suggests that most evidence shows that the average effect of refugee inflows is on labour markets for both developed and developing countries is small or null.g

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a Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, 2011.
b McKinsey Global Institute, 2016.
c IMF, 2015.
d Goldin et al., 2018.
e Ibid.
f Ruhs, 2013.
g Clemens, Huang and Graham, 2018.
The next section of this chapter discusses sociocultural contributions, and is followed by sections covering civic–political and then economic contributions. The chapter then examines recent evidence on how public migration debates are changing, including through the (mis)use of social media platforms for misinformation and disruption with transnational reach. The final concluding section summarizes the implications of current evidence for policy, practice and research.

Migrants’ sociocultural contributions

The sociocultural contributions of migrants are felt by many of us on a daily basis, even though we may not be conscious of it. Simple activities – such as shopping for groceries at our local market, eating out at a restaurant or ordering take-away food, visiting a place of worship, attending a musical performance or watching a sporting match – are likely to have been influenced or enriched (or, in some cases, made possible) by migrants who have brought with them customs and traditions.

Perhaps one of the most significant and highly visible contributions of migrants to the sociocultural dimensions of societies throughout the world has been the sharing of food and culinary traditions, resulting in the tremendous increase in food diversity in modern times. The highly social aspect of sharing food is a distinctly human trait of considerable cultural importance, and it has provided an opportunity for social bonding in private and public settings.18 The power of sharing and valuing such intimate and historical cultural conditions as the preparation of food allows for migrants’ contributions to be understood as more profound than the superficial so-called “sushiology” of migration.19 Food can lie at the heart of integration experiences, which are often depicted as two-way processes:

Immigrants travel with their culinary practices and habits, while acquiring new food customs that they adapt naturally to their new life and, occasionally, import to their countries of origin. This mixing takes place, therefore, in both directions, as a reflection of human beings’ need to share and dialogue, expressed through food.20

Food also acts as a catalyst for cultural fusion and new experience, as many of the world’s so-called “global cities” can show.21 Recent research shows that, globally, we are now more connected in culinary terms than ever before. A study of crop origins has found that the most important primary regions of diversity contributing to a country’s modern food system are more often located elsewhere around the planet.22 Immigration, mobility and trade links have helped facilitate the development of the modern food system. Cuisines such as “Indian curry” or the “chicken tikka masala” (which rose to the status of being called Britain’s national dish) have been a widely acknowledged aspect of the Indian–Pakistani–Bangladeshi diaspora’s contribution to bringing diverse people together both “on the table” and “inside the kitchen”.23

Food culture can also be enriched by migrants returning home. In Belize, for example, its diversity and emigration patterns have allowed for the development of a rich food culture that draws on a variety of

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19 Skerry, 2002.
21 Kershen, 2002.
22 Khoury et al., 2016.
cuisines and ingredients that are brought home to the country by migrant workers. There are many countries throughout the world that can claim their cuisines have been enriched by international migration and the transfer of related cultural practices, especially those situated along sea and land trade routes or part of long-term migration corridors, such as Malta and Singapore. Recent studies have found a strong relationship between diversity of modern cuisines and migration.

In recent years, the arenas of professional and representational sport at the international level have become important in anti-racism and counter-xenophobia campaigns. The highly competitive and elite nature of this sector, as well as its high profile, has meant that migrants are often centre-stage for predominantly positive reasons. In many ways, elite sports allow migrants to “transcend” discrimination and other negative issues because of the extraordinary talent they display and the admiration they may invoke. Programmes such as the European Sport Inclusion Network, the Social Inclusion and Volunteering in Sports Clubs in Europe, and “Welcome Football” (Australia) have sought to acknowledge and utilize migrant sports stars as positive role models, including to encourage integration through sports activities. And yet, research has pointed to issues of inequality in the international sphere of elite sports, whereby migrants from countries of considerable, long-standing talent at the representative level have not necessarily been able to support vibrant sporting systems. Or, put another way, “during the 2002 soccer World Cup, 21 out of 23 players on the team from Senegal... played in the French league... real Senegalese football is not therefore played within Senegal, but in the clubs of Europe”. At the local level in Australia, Sudanese migrants have established basketball teams at local sports clubs as a way of encouraging teenagers from the community – African-Australian and others – to leave street culture behind. Australia is a sporting country, and the discourse on sports and migration has been reasonably strong, with policy and programming including sporting activities as a means of integration. However, recent research has found that migrants’ cultural contributions can be both an asset to, and a source of exclusion from, sport participation. This depends, in part, on the majority-minority aspects of the sports activity and the extent to which the specific cultural capital of migrants can be flexibly incorporated into sporting systems. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, overall, migrants have made significant positive contributions in sports at local, national and global levels. See, for example, the text box below on the “Salah effect”.

25 Sajadmanesh et al., 2017.
28 Simiyu Njororai, 2010:449. This was also the case for the 2018 World Cup, in which the winning French team was almost entirely comprised players of African origin (McPartland, 2018).
29 Hinds, 2018.
30 Smith, Spaaij and McDonald, 2018.
31 Ibid.
The Salah effect

Besides his second-minute penalty for Liverpool FC against Tottenham Hotspur FC in Madrid on 1 June, Egyptian football striker Mo Salah may have also scored a goal against prejudice, according to a new study.

On the pitch, Salah often celebrates goals by dropping to his knees and touching his forehead to the grass in the sujood (an Islamic prayer position), while Liverpool fans have a chant that goes: “If he scores another few, then I'll be Muslim, too.” But the Salah effect is having an impact beyond the stadium walls, say researchers from Stanford University, who found a drop in hate crimes around Liverpool since Salah signed with the club in June 2017. Islamophobia – or anti-Muslim racism – has been on the rise in the UK since the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001, according to think-tank Runnymede Trust. There are generally spikes in anti-Muslim hate crimes between 24 to 72 hours after a terrorist attack by Islamic fundamentalists, such as the attack at Westminster in London in March 2017.

The report examined data from police departments around England, including Merseyside, the UK county in which Liverpool is located. It found hate crimes there were “significantly lower” – dropping by 18.9% since Salah joined the club – than would be otherwise expected.

“The observed decrease is larger in Merseyside than in all placebo counties, suggesting the result is not merely due to chance,” wrote the researchers. They noted that the trend has not coincided with a general decline in crime: “There is a larger relative decline in hate crimes than in any other crime category.” Not only that, but after studying 15 million tweets by UK football fans, the researchers found Liverpool supporters had halved the number of anti-Muslim tweets they were posting.

In the Stanford study, a survey of more than 8,000 Liverpool fans suggested the reason for the reduction in prejudice towards Muslims in Merseyside was because Salah was familiarizing his fans with Islam, through his observation of the faith, while his image as a bubbly father, friend and fantastic footballer was breaking down stereotypes of “threatening Muslims”. Through his now-famous goal celebration, his social media posts, his pitch-side interviews and seeing his wife Magi cheering him in a veil, Salah’s fans have been invited into his public and private lives. “These findings suggest that positive exposure to outgroup celebrities can reveal new and humanizing information about the group at large, reducing prejudiced attitudes and behaviours,” the researchers concluded. And they hope the Salah effect will offer up “new potential avenues for building social cohesion around the globe”.

Salah was named one of Time magazine’s 100 most influential people of 2019, described by HBO host John Oliver as “a humble, thoughtful, funny man who isn’t taking any of this too seriously”. Perhaps the last word should go to his Liverpool manager, Jurgen Klopp, who praised the athlete’s recognition in Time, noting, “Mo is a very smart person and his role is very influential. In the world at the moment, it is very important that you have people like Mo.”

Abridged excerpt of Whiting, 2019.
Just as extraordinary sporting talent has been found to enable individuals to transcend aspects of racism, migrants possessing exceptional artistic ability have been able to gain popularity and achieve success, thereby providing diverse role models for others in their communities. This is not to say that discrimination is overcome, but that social norms are able to be shaped over time in positive and constructive ways through admiration and respect (as highlighted in the text box above). In popular culture, difference is an asset, providing an “edge” in highly competitive talent and consumer-driven markets, making migrants from diverse backgrounds often overrepresented in entertainment sectors. In the creation of pop music, migrants can contribute fresh ideas:

Artistic production is an endeavour in which innovation is highly prized. This may give migrants and their ambivalently native born yet not-quite-native children some ironic advantages... Bringing different frames, tastes and repertoires from their cultures of origin may give migrants something new to add to the creative mix.

Cultural traditions can also be shared experiences as well as form the basis of resilience and strength in foreign (sometimes hostile) environments. A recent line of analysis has focused on “super-diversity” and the benefits as well as challenges highly diverse communities can present as a result of international migration, including in relation to cultural fusion and social cohesion, but also social tensions and xenophobia. The notion of “super-diversity” often relates to cities as the main site of increasingly diverse populations and, relatedly, of diversity of sociocultural settings and experiences.

Migrants have also made significant sociocultural contributions to countries of origin. It has long been observed that migrants bring with them new ideas, values and practices, sometimes referred to as “social remittances”. These types of remittances are transferred or exchanged in various ways, including “when migrants return to live in or visit their communities of origin, when non-migrants visit those in the receiving country, or through the exchange of letters, videos, cassettes, emails, blog posts and telephone calls”. Importantly, not all social remittances are positive. The ideas and practices that migrants bring with them can have both positive and negative effects. For example, migrants have helped to shape gender norms in countries of origin by supporting and arguing for greater gender equity after experiencing it in other countries. Returning migrants have been found to have contributed positively to the empowerment of women and girls in their home countries. One recent migration study found migrants in countries with gender parity are likely to promote gender equality in the social institutions in countries of origin, with women being greater agents of change than men. However, those who migrated to countries with lower ratings of gender equality tend to bring back more conservative gender norms. A similar trend has been observed in relation to fertility rates. A 2013 study examining the relationship between international migration and the fertility rates of countries of origin at the macroeconomic level found that migration to countries with lower

33 Kasinitz and Martinelli, 2019:858.
34 Vertovec, 2007; Van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014. Noting that the empirical basis of the term has been questioned by empirical findings showing that in some locations (such as the United States), migration has increased but there has been a narrowing of diversity of immigrants (Czaika and de Haas, 2014).
35 Nicholls and Uitermark, 2016.
37 Lamba-Nieves and Levitt, 2011.
38 Ibid.
40 Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015.
41 Ibid.
fertility rates is associated with a reduction in fertility rates at home, while migration to destinations with high fertility rates tends to result in the reverse.\textsuperscript{42}

Migrants’ contributions in civic–political terms

Migrants can be important contributors to civic–political life. In destination countries, for example, migrants can be involved in governance and politics at different levels (such as community/local areas, national levels), undertake volunteer work, and support fellow migrants (especially those who are newly arrived) as they integrate into new communities. Chapter 6 of this report discusses aspects of these issues from an integration and social cohesion perspective, including the extent to which migrants are able to wholly engage in political processes (such as democratic elections).

Perhaps more than sociocultural and economic contributions, the extent to which migrants are able to make civic–political contributions depends on policy settings of the country, including at the national, subnational and local levels; this topic is discussed in chapter 6 of this report and is not repeated here. However, the key factors influencing migrants’ contributions have been neatly summarized in a publication on migrants’ civic–political contributions (see table 1). This summary table shows the complexity of factors affecting the extent to which migrants are able to contribute in the civic–political sphere, which include structural settings but extend to other factors, including cultural and demographic aspects.

Table 1. Factors influencing immigrants’ civic–political contributions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global level</th>
<th>National level (origin and destination)</th>
<th>Local level (external and intragroup)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Transportation and communication technology</td>
<td>• Geographic proximity between origin and destination</td>
<td>• Structure and dynamics of the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International laws and treaties on human rights</td>
<td>• Structure and dynamics of the economy</td>
<td>• Civic culture/practice of inclusion–exclusion (multiculturalism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International power politics, pressures and conflicts involving immigrants’ home country/region</td>
<td>• State–national model of civic–political integration</td>
<td>• Extent of residential segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Civic culture/practice of inclusion–exclusion (multiculturalism)</td>
<td>• Intergroup relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State of Nation-building process</td>
<td>• Proportion of foreign-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Immigration/emigration policies and citizenship</td>
<td>• Immigrant/ethnic group size and residential concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State-to-State bilateral relationship</td>
<td>• Sojourn/diaspora mentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Patriarchal/egalitarian gender relations in private and public spheres</td>
<td>• Immigrant/ethnic group sense of civic entitlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Internal organization and leadership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Morawska, 2013, p. 142.
As can be seen from table 1, normative or policy settings at all three governance levels (global, national and local) are important in circumscribing migrants’ civic–political contributions. For example, the right to vote, hold public office, or join a political party or a trade union may be set by (or rely upon) regulations at different levels, determining the extent and nature of related engagement. In some places, for example, migrants are able (and expected) to contribute actively, including through voting in democratic elections (e.g. New Zealand), although this is still relatively uncommon for national elections. (See the text box on “Countries where migrants can vote in national elections” in chapter 6 of this report.) The ability to vote in democratic elections is often linked to naturalization, so that migrants who become citizens are able to vote as well as stand for public office. In the United States, for example, the November 2018 elections for the 116th Congress delivered the most racially and ethnically diverse Congress in the country’s history, and 13 per cent of its members are first- or second-generation migrants. In other locations, such as Gulf States, migrant workers make up very significant proportions of workforces and yet are banned from contributing to the protection of workers’ rights through collective/trade unionism, let alone able to naturalize (see chapter 6 of this report).

The role of diaspora has received significant attention in research and policy communities, and the extent to which diaspora groups are able to engage in the political processes of origin countries varies widely, and can be contested and sensitive. Recent Turkish elections (Parliamentary, and a referendum on the Constitution), for example, showed a high rate of participation by the Turkish diaspora and were also the subject of controversy, namely the extent of election campaigning by political parties targeting Turks living in Europe. There are also some specific limitations on diaspora engagement that are set at the international level, such as limits on the most extreme forms of political insurgency conducted by banned organizations operating transnationally. Experiences in destination countries can also shape the political ideals of migrants as they witness different systems in action and become integrated into host societies. Migrants can bring back political ideologies to origin countries when they return, temporarily or permanently. Research has found that returning Filipino migrants from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, for example, showed a higher commitment to democracy, while returnees from Saudi Arabia expressed more ambivalence towards it. Migrants, including refugees, can also be important agents of change in peacebuilding and reconstruction processes, bringing their experiences, skills and resources to the rebuilding of infrastructure, social cohesion and political processes in post-conflict settings, as shown in the text box below.

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43 Bialik, 2019; Geiger, Bialik and Gramlich, 2019.
44 ILO, 2019; Khadria, 2016.
45 Pan, 1999; Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006.
46 Adamson, 2018.
47 Clarke, 2017.
48 Rother, 2009.
49 Bradley, Milner and Peruniak, 2019; Jacobsen, Young and Osman, 2008; Milner, 2011.
Diaspora building peace

Diaspora involvement in the conflict ‘back home’ can be both positive and negative because of the diversity within the diaspora. Diaspora individuals and organisations often have conflicting roles: some contribute to the conflict and prolong the conflict through the provision of financial, material and political support that is used for military purposes and decreases the parties’ incentives to negotiate. Others contribute to peace and the resolution of conflict through the provision of financial, material and political support that can put pressure on parties to engage in negotiations to bring about a political solution.¹

Until recently, the dominant discourse on diaspora engagement in peacebuilding primarily focused on the negative aspects of diaspora engagement in conflict and post-conflict contexts, namely, the coercive power of diaspora groups. Diasporas were viewed as fuelling conflict and exacerbating tensions; however, diasporas often contribute positively towards peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected countries. The challenge is how to inspire diasporas to direct their energy to the promotion of a sustainable peace.

A Diaspora peacebuilder must be dexterous, informed, connected, passionate and courageous. No-one embodies this more than Stéphanie Mbanzendore, founder member of the organisation Burundian Women for Peace and Development (BWPD).² During the Diaspora Academy,³ Stéphanie emphasised the value of soft power when sharing her experience as a diaspora peacebuilder actively engaged in peace work in the Netherlands and Burundi. Soft power as a strategy requires careful and clear consideration of people, issues and processes. It also involves taking decisions that allow the peace potential of a situation to manifest gracefully through nuance engagement in navigating a challenging reality. Stéphanie demonstrates the skilful use of soft power in planning a trip home. In July 2004, she participated in a trip to Burundi aimed at introducing the Burundian diaspora to the new Burundian government, to build relations, and to assess the situation; this was her first visit home in nine years. There was a great deal of planning, strategising and preparation beforehand to make the trip a success.

After 2004, Stéphanie did lots of capacity-building⁴ trainings⁵ focused on building peace in Burundi, and a campaign to educate girls. A practical consideration (the high cost of hiring training venues) led to the idea of possibly building a training centre. In Stéphanie’s own words, “At first, I doubted it is possible, but when you don’t ask, you don’t get.” On her return to the Netherlands, Stéphanie approached the Dutch Government with the idea to build a centre, and received a positive response. She then asked counterparts in Burundi what their contribution would be to this project, and the local municipality gave the land for the building. The Multi-Purpose Centre of Kirundo was built; it has a large hall that seats 250, a library, training room, two offices, a computer room, and a large inside compound. The First Lady of Burundi officially opened the centre on 11 March 2011. The staff of the Centre has an orange uniform to acknowledge and thank the Netherlands for its contribution.
The economic contributions of migrants

In terms of economic contributions, there is a very substantial and growing body of evidence on the centrality of migrants’ remittances to support families and local communities in origin countries.\(^5\) International remittances – in contrast to overseas development assistance and, to a lesser extent, direct foreign investment – are localized contributions made through personal transactions, typically helping families to meet basic household needs (such as food and shelter) and alleviate poverty.\(^5\) The money that migrants send home can be important buffers against unexpected costs, supporting household financial stability and resilience.\(^5\) Money can also support access to health services and investment in education of immediate and extended family members, as well as provide the ability to invest in businesses, property and other assets.\(^5\) The introduction and expansion of “mobile money” apps over the last decade has allowed for migrants’ contributions in the form of remittances to better support their families and friends. An example from Kenya illustrates:

As of 2013, 93 per cent of the adult population in Kenya is registered for M-Pesa, and 60 per cent actively use the service. The impact of the M-Pesa is much broader as it has facilitated the creation of thousands of small businesses and gave nearly 20 million Kenyans access to financial services, particularly low-income Kenyans. The percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day using M-Pesa grew from less than 20 per cent in 2008 to 72 per cent in three years.\(^5\)

In addition to enhanced financial inclusion, “mobile money” also provides lower money transfer costs and reduces the risk of exploitative practices. There is, however, recognition that both access rates and usage differ socioeconomically and demographically within local communities. Recent research in Ghana, for example, has found that women display different financial behaviours and are more likely to save in household settings using mobile money, and yet have more limited access to information and communication technology (ICT).

\(^5\) IOM, 2016; Skeldon, 2018.
\(^5\) Beaton, Catão and Kocz, 2018.
\(^5\) UNDP, 2011.
\(^5\) Shrier, Canale and Pentland, 2016:10. M-Pesa, which stands for Mobile Money, is a platform that makes it possible for users to store and transfer money to other users using mobile phones. See Suri and Jack, 2016.
The researchers subsequently recommended that “efforts should be geared towards the provision of mobile phones (and other ICTs) to women to help them to be financially included to achieve development”.

A similar study in Uganda found that poor households would benefit from tailored programmes and additional assistance to support greater access to mobile money services. In some countries, various laws and regulations have limited ICTs for cross-border financial flows. While it is important to ensure digital security and prevent illicit financial transfers, overly cumbersome and rigid regulations have often driven up the cost of sending remittances, for example, and slowed the uptake of new technologies needed to enhance financial inclusion.

Legal status can have a profound effect on the ability to contribute economically to families and communities back home. Irregularity and precariousness are linked to more limited options to remit, and higher costs in doing so. Irregularity in destination also often translates into lower wages with greater risk of exploitation, higher relative living costs and reduced choice, which can in turn translate into a lower capacity to remit. In addition, studies have found that greater precariousness associated with working as an irregular migrant in informal settings results in workers ensuring they have enough money to deal with uncertainties, which again negatively affects their ability to remit. This is in the context of recognition that irregular migrants – even more so than other migrants – will be key contributors to societies of the type of labour least favoured by the native-born: the so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous, demanding) jobs. The “winners” in all this, some argue, are the receiving countries, who are able to benefit from a steady supply of workers in the informal economy and so keep wage costs down, while also not benefiting from income tax revenues. This is not uniform, however, and certain sectors in many economies (such as the agricultural, fishery and care sectors) rely more heavily on irregular migrant workers, resulting in labour market segmentation. Employers in these sectors may operate as “bad actors” by exploiting irregular migrant workers, who are more likely to accept lower pay and bad working conditions out of desperation. As one means of addressing these issues, some countries implement regularization programmes periodically so that those who are in irregular situations can gain lawful status and (re)enter the formal economy. However, more systematic responses focusing on decent work for native-born and migrants alike will ensure people performing low-/semi-skilled work are able to improve their ability to contribute.

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56 Murendo et al., 2018.
57 Cooper, Esser and Peter, 2018; IFAD and the World Bank Group, 2015.
63 Triandafyllidou, Bartolini and Guidi, 2019.
More than a worker…

While we often think of international migrants as primarily a source of labour, they are more than just workers, playing diverse economic roles in origin and destination countries, including:

- **As workers**, migrants are part of, but also have an impact on, the labour market; they also alter the country’s income distribution and influence domestic investment priorities.

- **As students**, migrants – or their children – contribute to increasing the stock of human capital and diffusing knowledge.

- **As entrepreneurs and investors**, they create job opportunities and promote innovation and technological change.

- **As consumers**, they contribute to increasing the demand for domestic – and foreign – goods and services, thus affecting the price and production levels, as well as the trade balance.

- **As savers**, they not only send remittances to their countries of origin but also contribute indirectly, through the bank system, to fostering investment in their host countries.

- **As taxpayers**, they contribute to the public budget and benefit from public services.

- **As family members**, they support others, including those who need care and support.

Source: OECD/ILO, 2018 (adapted).

Migrants have made and continue to make significant economic contributions, in both countries of origin and destination. Migrants’ monetary remittances to their countries of origin are among the most widely researched and scrutinized economic contributions. As the amount of money sent in the form of remittances has sharply increased over the years, so has the interest from policymakers and academics in understanding how remittances contribute, both positively and negatively, to recipient countries. In 2018, global remittances amounted to USD 689 billion, whereas flows to low- and middle-income countries alone rose to a record USD 529 billion, up from USD 483 billion in 2017.\(^\text{64}\) The significance of remittances to countries of origin cannot be overstated; remittances to low- and middle-income countries, except for China, exceeded foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 2018,\(^\text{65}\) a reflection of increased international migration, as well as new and relatively lower cost channels for international money transfers.\(^\text{66}\) More information on remittances is provided in chapters 2 (global overview) and 3 (regional developments) of this report.

While migrants’ other aggregate contributions to countries of origin are not as well documented as remittances, a growing body of evidence is providing a sharper focus on these benefits. One such contribution is financing

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\(^{64}\) World Bank Group, 2019.

\(^{65}\) Ibid.

\(^{66}\) Meyer and Shera, 2017.
through instruments such as diaspora bonds. For struggling and cash-strapped countries, diaspora bonds are a relatively inexpensive way to raise funds, including during periods of financial stress\(^\text{67}\) and after disasters; they have been a key alternative to borrowing funds from more expensive lenders such as other governments, financial institutions or capital markets. Borrowing at an attractive rate from their citizens abroad, governments have also been able to pursue large development projects. Meanwhile, diaspora bonds have provided citizens and former citizens abroad with the opportunity to be development actors back home – to tangibly contribute to their origin countries’ economies, particularly as disaster management initiatives after calamities such as earthquakes and floods have struck their “homelands”. In 2017, for example, Nigeria issued its first diaspora bond, raising USD 300 million to fund infrastructure projects.\(^\text{68}\) Armenia, a country with a large diaspora, also established government-issued diaspora bonds in 2018.\(^\text{69}\) But India and Israel are perhaps the most successful examples of countries that have reaped benefits from diaspora bonds, with both countries raising billions of dollars over the decades.\(^\text{70}\) India has also been offering differential and tax-free interest rates on fixed deposits in Indian banks made by non-resident Indians.\(^\text{71}\) Since 1951, Israel has raised more than USD 40 billion through this financing mechanism.\(^\text{72}\)

In addition to diaspora bonds, migrants have contributed to their home countries’ economies by directly investing in or starting new businesses. Several studies have demonstrated that returned migrants are more likely to start businesses than are people who never left their countries.\(^\text{73}\) Indeed, in some countries, diaspora-owned companies make up a significant share of FDI. In Georgia, for example, an estimated 17 per cent of private sector firms belong to the country’s diaspora.\(^\text{74}\) Diaspora entrepreneurship has not only helped to build physical capital in countries of origin, but also continues to enhance economic productivity as well as contribute to job creation. But the economic contributions migrants make to countries of origin extend beyond financing and entrepreneurship; by establishing migration networks across countries, migrants have reduced information barriers and have helped to boost trade and investment flows between countries of origin and destination.\(^\text{75}\) A recent study, exploring if the presence of migrants has an impact on FDI investment decisions, found that immigration does indeed reduce information asymmetries and positively affects outgoing FDI stocks from destination to countries of origin.\(^\text{76}\) The presence of a large number of migrants can also establish a market for products manufactured in their countries of origin and thus enhance trade flows between economies.\(^\text{77}\) Offshore business process outsourcing and back-office operations are significant ventures in India, started by returnees by raising venture capital at times of economic downturns in the developed countries, particularly the United States, that drove them back home in the first place.\(^\text{78}\) Among the most important contributions that migrants make to their countries of origin is their influence on human capital stocks. This is done either directly when they return with new knowledge and skills, or indirectly

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\(^\text{67}\) Ratha and Ketkar, 2011.
\(^\text{68}\) Brookings Institution, 2018.
\(^\text{69}\) Lieberman, 2018.
\(^\text{70}\) Strohecker, 2016.
\(^\text{71}\) A variety of bank accounts are offered by the Indian banking system. See Khadria, 2009, 2012.
\(^\text{72}\) Strohecker, 2016.
\(^\text{73}\) OECD, 2016; Demurger and Xu, 2011; Naudé, Siegel and Marchand, 2015.
\(^\text{74}\) OECD, 2016.
\(^\text{75}\) IMF, 2015.
\(^\text{76}\) Fensore, 2016.
\(^\text{77}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{78}\) Khadria, 2009.
by incentivizing citizens to acquire or enhance their human capital, bolstering a country’s overall skills.\textsuperscript{79} Innovative engagement of expatriate doctors and nurses in a perceived “United Nations Healthkeeping Force” (emulating the United Nations Peacekeeping Force) to provide free or low-cost medical care to unskilled and irregular immigrants among their own diaspora, as well as in low-Human Development Index third countries, has been suggested.\textsuperscript{80} However, a recurring concern among policymakers is that emigration, particularly of high-skilled migrants, can come at a cost. “Brain drain” and “brain waste”, or the loss/under-utilization of high-skilled human capital, are commonly raised and widely debated issues.\textsuperscript{81}

The economic contributions of migrants in destination countries have been examined in depth over time. A large body of evidence exists on how both low- and high-skilled migrants have rectified labour shortages, which may relate to particular occupation groups, sectors or specific professions.\textsuperscript{82} In countries with large shares of high-skilled natives, low-skilled migrant workers have complemented the skills of natives by occupying jobs in sectors where citizens are in short supply; in many cases, these are also sectors that native workers consider unattractive.\textsuperscript{83} This not only addresses labour gaps in industries such as construction and agriculture,\textsuperscript{84} but also allows native workers in high-skilled sectors to further specialize in their work. This complementarity of skills has been significant for native, high-skilled women. As migrants have filled jobs in childcare and housekeeping, female native workers have been able to increase their workplace participation and productivity. For example, a study conducted in Italy found that, when there was a large supply of immigrants who provided household services, native Italian women spent more time at work.\textsuperscript{85} A 2011 study in the United States drew the same conclusion, suggesting that by lowering the costs of household services, low-skilled immigration increases the labour supply and average hours of market work of high-skilled native women.\textsuperscript{86}

Some countries are almost entirely dependent on migrant workers, especially in industries such as construction, hospitality and retail. In the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, for example, international migrants make up significant proportions of their national populations (88% and 76%, respectively).\textsuperscript{87} And for countries undergoing population decline, migrants can be essential in offsetting some of the negative economic consequences associated with a shrinking population, which can stymie a country’s overall economic productivity and growth. As fertility rates tumble across regions such as Europe, migrants remain significant contributors to population growth and labour supply.\textsuperscript{88} In the European Union, natural population change (births and deaths) only contributed 20 per cent to population growth from 2012 to 2016, while net migration added 80 per cent to total population increase.\textsuperscript{89}

In terms of their broader economic contributions with large-scale and long-term externalities to societies, migrants have long been drivers of entrepreneurship and innovation. Migrants, unlike people who have never

\textsuperscript{79} McKinsey Global Institute, 2016.
\textsuperscript{80} Khadria, 2012.
\textsuperscript{81} “Brain drain” is defined as the migration of high-skilled people from poorer to wealthier countries, while “brain waste” refers to a downgrading of skills, where migrants end up working in occupations that require skill levels lower than those they had acquired in their countries of origin. See Docquier and Rapoport, 2011; Pires, 2015.
\textsuperscript{82} Khadria, 2012; Ruhs, 2013; Goldin et al., 2018; Goldin, Cameron and Balarajan, 2011; IMF, 2015.
\textsuperscript{83} Constant, 2014.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} Barone and Mocetti, 2010.
\textsuperscript{86} Cortés and Tessada, 2011.
\textsuperscript{87} UN DESA, 2019.
\textsuperscript{88} See the discussion on migration and population change in world regions in chapter 3 of this report.
\textsuperscript{89} Eurostat, 2019.
lived outside of their home countries, are much more willing to take business risks. This, as some researchers have observed, may be because migrants have already taken the risk of leaving their countries of origin to pursue opportunities in new places and are thus well-primed to be risk takers. By overcoming obstacles and the challenges that come with moving to a new country, they develop the so-called “growth mindset”, which allows them to be adaptable, more confident and to have a higher tolerance for uncertainty. Recent studies, however, have cautioned against seeing migrants as “super-entrepreneurs” compared with natives when aggregate data are patchy at best. Additionally, migrant entrepreneurs continue to face significant challenges, which can result in the collapse of their enterprises. The failure to access credit is among the most important constraints on migrant entrepreneurship, and while this is not unique to migrants, they have greater difficulty acquiring business loans than those who are native born. Factors such as lack of collateral, shorter credit histories, possible discrimination and credit institutions’ unfamiliarity with migrants all make them less likely to receive credit from lending institutions. Other obstacles – including limited rights to start a business, lack of local networks, unfamiliarity with the local business environment and language and cultural barriers – remain significant constraints on migrant entrepreneurship.

Perhaps more than in any other developed country, immigrants have significantly contributed to driving innovation and entrepreneurship in the United States. While immigrants represented only 13 per cent of the population in a country of more than 300 million people, they comprised nearly 30 per cent of all entrepreneurs. In addition to their disproportionate contribution toward entrepreneurship, recent research suggests that businesses founded by immigrants in the United States were not only more likely to survive, but also tended to outperform those started by native citizens when it came to employment growth over three- and six-year periods. However, the same study did find that, in terms of growth in wages, immigrant-founded companies did not perform any better than those started by natives and may in fact underperform their native peers. The success and contribution to innovation is most visible in the engineering and technology industries; in about one quarter of engineering and technology firms founded in the United States from 2006 to 2012, for example, at least one main founder was an immigrant. Silicon Valley is often cited as the hub of such successful migrant innovators and entrepreneurs. Yet this trend is not limited to the United States. Globally, migrants continue to help create jobs as well as contribute to destination countries’ economic growth through entrepreneurship. A 2012 survey of 69 economies by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor demonstrated that immigrants had higher entrepreneurial activity compared with natives. Moreover, while there is a dearth of research on the contributions of migrants to entrepreneurship in low-income countries, emerging studies, particularly those focused on refugees, show that where they are given the opportunity to work, refugees make positive contributions to destination economies. In Uganda, a country that hosts one

90 Goldin et al., 2018.
91 Kelly, 2018.
92 Naudé, Siegel and Marchand, 2017.
93 Desiderio, 2014.
94 Ibid.
95 UNCTAD, IOM and UNHCR, 2018.
96 Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2017.
97 Kerr and Kerr, 2016.
98 Ibid.
99 Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2014.
100 Lal, Reeves and Rai, 2006.
of the largest refugee populations in the world, refugees – those residing in both cities and in rural areas – are highly entrepreneurial and have created jobs not just for themselves but also for Ugandan nationals. Research conducted on refugee entrepreneurs in Kampala, showed that refugees employ 2.4 people on average in the city. A similar trend has been observed in South Africa, whose self-settlement approach to refugees allows them not only to move freely, but also to find work and to be self-employed. However, because many refugees struggle to find employment in the formal economy, many choose to start their own enterprises in the informal sector. A recent report on “refugee entrepreneurial economies in urban South Africa” found that refugee enterprises have contributed to the country’s economy by creating jobs; an estimated 52 per cent and 45 per cent of businesses in the provinces of Cape Town and Limpopo, respectively, employ people in their enterprises, with around 50 per cent of these businesses more likely to employ South Africans.

Migrants as innovators

The contributions that migrants make toward innovation, particularly in destination countries, have received much attention in recent years. There is little dispute and widespread consensus that migrants are significant drivers of innovation globally. A recent report identifies four ways through which migrants enhance innovation: (a) migrants’ higher concentration in economic sectors that tend to be more innovative; (b) through patents and as entrepreneurs; (c) their greater contribution to business start-ups compared with natives; and (d) by fostering investment, trade and technology linkages. The United States is the most salient example of migrants’ innovation. For example, migrants have long been linked to an increase in patents in the United States. In fact, given their concentration in fields such as science and engineering, migrants in the United States have been shown to patent twice as much as natives. A recent study, which sought to determine how high-skilled immigration affects “product reallocation” in the United States, found that “a 10 per cent increase in the share of H-1B workers is associated with a 2 per cent increase in product reallocation rates”. In other words, companies that hired more highly skilled, college-educated foreign workers created more new products. Product reallocation, which is another measure of innovation, is defined as the entry of new products into the market and exit of older products.

A separate 2018 study determined that, despite comprising a relatively small share of the country’s population, migrants have accounted for 30 per cent of aggregate innovation in the United States since 1976. The contribution of immigrants to United States innovation is evident in the number of Nobel Laureates and members of the National Academy of Sciences who are immigrants, which is triple that of natives. Although most studies on innovation have focused on the United States, a growing body of work is exploring how migrants have made contributions in this area in other countries. A study assessing migrants’ contribution to the increase in patents in the United Kingdom, France and Germany determined that, similar to the United States, there is a positive correlation between high-skilled migrants and innovation.

102 Betts et al., 2014.
103 Ibid.
104 Crush et al., 2017.
105 Ibid.
New impediments to the recognition of migrants’ contributions

In previous sections, we have seen that there have always existed obstacles, major and minor, to migrants being able to contribute in origin and destination settings, typically related to policy settings stemming from a range of legal contexts. Many obstacles, for example, are based on the application of laws regulating societies more broadly, such as those related to labour law, property law, criminal law, tax law and such. Likewise, we have seen that changes in structural/policy settings and new technology (such as mobile money) have been successfully adopted to facilitate migrants’ contributions in specific ways. The issue of maximizing or optimizing contributions and creating the right conditions for opportunities to be realized in the pursuit of peace and prosperity is, of course, not specific to migrants, but remains at the heart of policymaking in most countries throughout the world as it relates to all residents (citizen and non-citizens). However, the relationships between policymaking and politics have also evolved, bringing them much closer together over time for a range of reasons, including the 24/7 media cycle, the shift from “expertise and analysis” to “opinion”, the very significant changes in expediency and delivery at the expense of critical reflection and adjustment, among others.\textsuperscript{106}

Combined with seismic geopolitical events – such as the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks, the 2015/16 large-scale movements of people to and through Europe – more recent policy environments have had to increasingly accommodate a more brutal form of politics and respond to the pressing issue of migration. This is most apparent in Western democratic countries, but is by no means limited to them. In a 2014 big data study on media depictions of migration and migrants in 10 countries,\textsuperscript{107} one of the key findings was that politicians were by far the most dominant voices in the media in all countries. This was the case in Afghanistan, just as it was in Sri Lanka, Canada and the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{108} Immigration is increasingly being used as a political reference point, and as a way of defining values (and in democratic systems, as a means of appealing to the electorate). Some studies have found that “political conflict over immigration follows a political logic and must be attributed to parties and party competition rather than to ‘objective

\textsuperscript{106} Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker, 2005; Weinberger, 2011.
\textsuperscript{107} McAuliffe and Weeks, 2015. The 10 countries in scope were Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and Viet Nam.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
Reflections on migrants’ contributions in an era of increasing disruption and disinformation

Pressures”. The role of far-right parties in politicizing immigration for political expediency is a recurring theme in recent studies. In other words, in many countries “anti-immigration” rhetoric has become a central plank of political branding in the quest for market share, regardless of the significance (or otherwise) of the substantive issue itself. What was once “dog-whistling” on anti-immigration has become a central theme in political messaging. Politics itself is becoming a significant impediment to balanced policy on immigration and the contributions of migrants.

Politics and migration

Among the old stalwarts of the centre-left, there is a simple explanation for the decline of the parties they used to lead: immigration... Hardly a week passes without some candidate or columnist declaring that liberals will only regain power when they lock down the borders. The obsession with immigration is not an accident. It reflects a widely held belief that the decline of the grand parties of the centre-left across Europe... has been caused by the rise of the new parties of the populist radical right, who have “stolen” the old working-class vote with a nativist, even authoritarian, message.

But since the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, these worries have escalated into a panic, as the leaders of Europe’s social democratic parties scramble to show their concerns over immigration... [A] dramatic shift in the rhetoric of ostensibly centre-left parties is part of a larger panic over how to halt the spread of right-wing populism across the west in recent years.

...the recent growth of populist radical-right parties – unlike their initial expansion in the 1990s – has not been driven by winning over more of the working class. The real story is that responses to events such as 9/11 and the “refugee crisis” by mainstream commentators and politicians brought the arguments of the populist radical right more into the mainstream discussion – and their “solutions” consequently became acceptable to broader sections of the public. As a result, the most successful populist radical-right parties now are Volksparteien – “people’s parties”, rather than “workers’ parties” – and do not represent just the working class.

Academic research consistently shows that when mainstream parties move to the right in an attempt to co-opt the issues of the radical right, it does not hurt populist right parties – in fact, it often helps them. Moreover, other research shows that it does not stop the electoral bleeding of social democratic parties either. This makes perfect sense. By prioritising immigration as an issue – and reinforcing the negative depiction of migrants and migration – mainstream parties only help to boost the main issue and frame of the populist radical right. Moreover, populist radical right voters are not only nativist, they are also populist, which explains why the “immigration realism” of social democratic parties is ultimately not effective.

a Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018.
b Abou-Chadi, 2018.

110 Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018; Abou-Chadi, 2018; Mudde, 2019.
We must also recognize that the fundamental ways in which public debates occur has changed. By this we mean that the “who, what, where and how” of public discourse are manifestly different in a world that has recently experienced a rapid transformation in transnational connectivity. The ability to access information and opinion from different locations globally has massively expanded. We are also able to (self) publish our own views largely without restraint, a development made possible by relatively new social media platforms. By using these platforms, organized groups, regardless of their numeric size, are increasingly able to utilize open, real-time (un-curated) publishing to distort narratives in attempts to realize changes in political (and policy) decisions. Overall, the way we – as countries, as communities, and increasingly as transnational value-based groups – describe and discuss migration to ourselves and to others is being shaped by the massive changes in the media landscape. Recent research on these changes has been undertaken utilizing big data analysis on Twitter, for example, finding that some groups are engaging in “entanglement” of messaging in order to portray refugees and other migrants as negative, regardless of the facts (see text box below).

Transnational tribalism, immigration and social media platforms

A big data study of Twitter during the peak of the so-called refugee crisis (October 2015 to May 2016) analysed almost 7.5 million tweets collected through hashtags such as #refugee, #refugeecrisis and #flüchtlinge. The study examined the framing of refugees in the Twittersphere, and the extent to which the frames represented alternative voices. The analysis found that, overall, dominant frames revolved around security and safety on the one hand and humanitarianism on the other. The study also identified some explicitly racist hashtags linked to some of the security and safety frames. Linking any new issue to pre-existing hashtags—for example, #refugees and #tcot – points to an emerging dynamic in which new issues are subsumed and used for different political purposes. The researchers found that Twitter is no longer a social media platform that operates as a levelling field; rather, the long-standing presence of some has already conditioned the medium, “socializing” new tags in their own way and “broadcasting” to millions of followers. This points to the instrumentalization of Twitter, where it is used strategically to achieve certain political ends by specific interests, such as far-right activists. There was evidence of increasingly strident anti-immigration voices in Europe. Overall, the refugee debate on Twitter was caught between the security and racist frames on the one hand, and humanitarian responses on the other.

It is understandable that European activists were found to be present in the study, given the events that were taking place at the time in Europe. The relationship to these events and the rise of transnational tribalism through social media platforms as well as traditional media, spearheaded by political leaders, is a topic of intense interest to many political scientists. Migration features prominently in these analyses, which is often characterized as “battles”, “struggles” and “hostilities”. The main actors in the battle are based in Europe, the United States and Australia, and are able to connect via unprecedented transnational communication. Rather than predominantly economic issues, the battle is over societal attitudes between “nationalism and protectionism” and “integration and openness”. Immigration policy has regrettably become the centrepiece of this transnational struggle for political power.

111 McAuliffe, 2018; Siapera et al., 2018; Suiter and Culloty, 2019.
Concluding observations on the challenge ahead

In an ideal world, there would be no need for this chapter to be written. The topic itself would be so obvious and uncontroversial as to render it irrelevant. And yet, it is more important now than at any other time in modern, post-war history to reflect on migrants’ contributions to countries and communities around the world. Simply put, this is because it is becoming increasingly difficult to hear balanced perspectives in public debates on important policy issues, such as international migration.

Given this context, this chapter is not about quantitative cost–benefit analyses of migration. Instead, the chapter has looked at the often neglected but core determinant of the migrant(s) as contributors to communities of destination as well as those back in their places of origin.

With this perspective, we have focused on three central domains of what makes a good society: sociocultural, civic–political and economic contributions. Today in the twenty-first century, migrants may be better able to make contributions to these domains than they were in the last century (or prior) largely because of the phenomenal improvements in development that have taken place in most countries, as well as strong recognition of the need to ensure that global development and stability are underpinned by human rights. Yet, this chapter also drives home the point that the contributions of migrants to societies, polities and the economies globally have not only been largely overlooked, downplayed and taken for granted, but also hindered, through proliferation of disruption and disinformation against migrants. Recent research and analysis show that some forms of technology are impacting our media, social and political interactions, and are becoming more pressing for governance, both in relation to the regulation of newer forms of technology and how they are shaping democratic processes.

The question therefore remains as to what would be a balanced strategy to make the contributions optimally, if not maximally, visible, acknowledged and accepted on the global and national policy agendas.

While some activists and advocates argue for adopting political responses, and others engage in countering negative images only by putting forward positive “idealized” representations of migrants, others argue that we need to be cautious, as these approaches risk further polarization in public discussions that are increasingly influenced by inflammatory (and sometimes inaccurate) social media commentary. With this context in mind, the following implications for policy, practice and research are offered:

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112 See, for example, the United Nations Human Development Index results over time, which show significant improvements in the level of development in most countries globally.
113 Morgan, 2018.
114 See, for example, Crawley and McMahon, 2016.
Balanced public discussions require greater scrutiny of “fake” social media content, including by promoting a better understanding of the responsibilities that go hand-in-hand with free speech. This is currently a “hot” issue in many parts of the world, with stricter regulatory regimes being actively considered, or having been put in place.\(^{116}\)

There is clearly a place for greater emphasis on migrant-centric research and analyses, as well as research on the social media activists’ influence on bolstering unbalanced political discourse (and ultimately political decisions). Ideally, this research would examine the impacts of a wide range of distorted messaging, noting that existing studies outlined in this chapter indicate that the negative, anti-migrant interest groups appear to be increasingly using social media platforms to great effect, at times regardless of accuracy or truthful representations.

Both historically and contemporarily, there is strong evidence that migrants have made substantial contributions in a variety of settings and in a variety of important ways. However, it is also clear that there are structural limits that act to circumscribe migrants’ contributions in ways that are counterproductive for communities, States and migrants. The most obvious examples exist with respect to irregular or undocumented migrants who may be doing low-prestige, underpaid work that is, in many cases, nevertheless much needed. Structural reforms combined with migration policy initiatives (such as regularization and enhanced regular pathways) offer the opportunity to optimize migrants’ contributions and support sectors and communities.\(^{117}\)

There is room to build on innovations delivered by new technology – such as mobile money apps – to help facilitate migrants’ contributions in origin and destination settings. Migrant tech has the ability to support migrants all the way through the migration cycle, including as a means of supporting safe, regular and orderly migration. Further support of migrant tech start-ups is one practical approach, noting the work already underway in this area.\(^{118}\)

There is considerable room to improve recognition of the enormous value of sociocultural and civic-political contributions of migrants in societies and globally, including in political, media and research spheres. While this can be challenging, the tendency to focus on economic issues without fully acknowledging the importance of other aspects leads to a transactional view of societies and nation States. Expanding research, for example, on the influence migrants can have as positive leaders (for example, the “Salah effect”), as well as on the relationship between culinary knowledge transfer and health and well-being, would enable policymakers and general audiences to better appreciate the important contributions migrants have already made to modern life globally, as well as what further contributions they will offer.

\(^{116}\) BBC, 2019; Tusikov and Haggart, 2019.
\(^{117}\) Triandafyllidou, Bartolini and Guidi, 2019.
\(^{118}\) See, for example, “Start-ups Without Borders” available at https://startupswb.com/.
MIGRATION, INCLUSION AND SOCIAL COHESION: CHALLENGES, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Introduction

The relationship between migrants and the communities in which they reside forms an integral and important part of the migration cycle. This relationship takes the form of psychological and sociological processes of adaptation between migrants and receiving communities, which affect the degree of inclusion migrants will experience, including their sense of belonging. Settling in a new community – either temporarily or permanently – may require migrants to adapt to a new culture, customs, social values and language. The extent to which migrants will in turn be progressively included in their destination country also depends on the attitudes of receiving communities, including their openness to migration and migrants.

Migrants’ inclusion has always been an important part of the migration phenomenon; however, it is today a particularly complex issue. In an increasingly globalized world, the growth in the absolute number of migrants over the past 50 years and the diversification of migrants’ origins, socioeconomic backgrounds and reasons for migrating have led to more social, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in receiving societies. As a result, the impact of migration and diversity on social cohesion has become an important concern. This is illustrated by inclusion policies adopted by some States to frame the relationship between migrants and receiving communities and preserve social cohesion. These inclusion policies have taken multiple forms over time in different countries, reflecting societal values, including attitudes on immigration and diversity.

While the question of how to live together in increasingly diverse communities has become central, the challenges in addressing migrants’ inclusion have been compounded by the many opinions and voices on the topic. Alongside migrants and States, a wide array of actors – such as civil society organizations, communities and local authorities – now play increasingly important roles in migrants’ inclusion. In addition, virtually everyone today has the ability to express publicly their opinions on immigration and migrants’ inclusion. The politicization of migration for electioneering purposes has elevated the issues to become a matter of public concern. Due in part to negative portrayals made by political parties and reported by the media, migrants have in some countries been presented as a challenge to national identity, values, economic stability and security, as well as, more broadly, a threat to social cohesion. Despite migrants’ important social and

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1 Céline Bauloz, Senior Research Officer, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM; Zana Vathi, Reader in Social Sciences, Edge Hill University; and Diego Acosta, Professor in European and Migration Law, University of Bristol.
2 While this chapter focuses on destination countries, the process of migrants’ inclusion also occurs in transit countries, as well as in countries of origin for returning migrants. On migrants’ reintegration, see Newland, 2017.
3 Appave and David, 2017.
4 Demireva, 2017.
5 See, for instance, the survey on attitudes of Europeans towards migration and inclusion carried out in 2017 in the 28 member States of the European Union (European Commission, 2018).
6 Crawley, McMahon and Jones, 2016. On narratives of negativity in the media, see most notably Allen, Blinder and McNeil, 2017.
7 Appave and David, 2017; Papademetriou, 2012.
economic contributions (see chapter 5 of this report), anti-immigration sentiment has resulted in instances of intolerance, discrimination, racism, xenophobia and even acts of violent extremism towards migrants, especially in countries where nationalism, patriotism and populism have been on the rise.

Despite these challenges, States have recently reaffirmed the centrality of migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion by making them a stand-alone objective in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.8 The Global Compact on Refugees likewise promotes the inclusion of refugees in the receiving country through durable solutions, such as local integration.9

In order to better understand what migrants’ inclusion entails and the challenges and opportunities it may bring, the remainder of this chapter is organized into three main parts. The first part introduces the notions of inclusion and social cohesion, before turning, in the second part, to inclusion outcomes and obstacles. The third part then explores what “the situation on the ground” is, most notably through the role played by local actors and by migrants themselves. The conclusion discusses some implications for policy responses that may help further foster migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion.

Inclusion and social cohesion: Key concepts and definitions

Defining “migrants’ inclusion” and “social cohesion” is a difficult task, as there are no universally recognized definitions. The ambiguity of these notions is exacerbated by the frequent use of various closely related terms, and the difficulty in distinguishing them (see appendix A for an illustrative list and suggested definitions of these concepts).10

In broad terms, social cohesion can be defined through the notions of “solidarity”, “togetherness”, “tolerance” and “harmonious co-existence”.11 It is not necessarily related to migration and migrants, but is more generally about the bonds tying a community together through trust and common social norms. While these bonds can be undermined by disparities in wealth and income, poverty, or intercommunal, ethnic or racial tensions, the impact of migration, and especially of diversity, on social cohesion has been increasingly questioned.12 However, empirical evidence has so far not been conclusive. If some studies suggest a negative impact of diversity in countries such as the United States of America, research in the United Kingdom and, more generally, in Europe, finds that income inequality and deprivation have a greater impact on social cohesion than does diversity.13

While the impact of migration and diversity on social cohesion is not clear-cut, social cohesion and migrants’ inclusion are closely related. Social cohesion cannot be achieved if part of the population, including migrants, is excluded in a given neighbourhood, community, city and/or country.14 As a result, and despite the lack of a

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8 UNGA, 2018a: Annex, Objective 16.
9 UNGA, 2018b: paras. 97–99.
10 The choice of the terms “inclusion” and “social cohesion” in this chapter is in line with the terminology used in the Global Compact for Migration (UNGA, 2018a) and with the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (UNGA, 2015).
11 Demireva, 2017. See also Fonseca, Lukosch and Brazier, 2018; Forrest and Kearns, 2001.
12 Zetter et al., 2006.
14 See Jenson, 1998, where inclusion is listed among the different dimensions of social cohesion.
universal definition, inclusion can be summarized as consisting of social cohesion and migrants’ incorporation in the various societal areas, such as education, health, employment, housing, and civic and political involvement.15

Who is a migrant? An inclusion perspective

As noted in chapter 2 of this report, there are no universally agreed definitions of a migrant, but multiple understandings depending on the policy and analytical contexts. For instance, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) defines a migrant for statistical purposes as “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence”.a

When talking about inclusion, the understanding of who is a migrant is often broader and extends to migrants’ descendants born in the receiving country. Although they have not migrated themselves, migrants’ descendants may still be perceived as migrants by the receiving society and self-identify as such. This is especially the case of so-called “second-generation migrants”, who may embrace both the identities of their receiving country and of their parents’ country of origin.b These multiple identities are well illustrated in the testimony of Jenan, who was born in the United States to two migrant parents:

Being the daughter of two immigrants, I feel I have to work twice as hard as my friends whose families have been here for generations just so I can prove to my family it was worth it for them to come here and to make this journey and start their lives all over again. Being a child of immigrants, it means balancing two different cultures. Growing up I had a hard time accepting that I was part of these two different worlds that are so conflicting. c

Against this background, inclusion entails a process of mutual adaptation between migrants and receiving communities. The degree of migrants’ inclusion depends on the individual concerned and the context in which adaptation takes place. Factors affecting migrants’ process of inclusion include their demographic and personal characteristics (such as age, gender, level of education and language ability), social networks, and ability to exercise agency.16 Inclusion remains a highly personal and individualized experience, as it differs among migrants and family members, and can be different for various “groups” of migrants, such as refugees, high- or low-skilled migrant workers, victims of trafficking or migrants’ descendants.17 Likewise, the context influences one’s degree of inclusion, in terms of both geographical location and timing. Each country, society and community will necessarily approach inclusion differently, as it depends on their respective historical,

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15 Faist, 2018. For another definition, see Charsley and Spencer, 2019. This chapter focuses on the inclusion of migrants without prejudice to the fact that some nationals may face similar inclusion challenges.
16 Castles et al., 2002; Fokkema and de Haas, 2011; Charsley and Spencer, 2019.
17 On the difference between the inclusion of refugees and other migrants, for instance, see Castles et al., 2002. See also Bauböck and Tripkovic, 2017; and Vathi, 2015 concerning different migrant generations.
economic, sociocultural and political contexts. Their resulting attitudes towards migration and diversity can change over time, determining in turn the type of migration and inclusion policies States will adopt.\textsuperscript{18}

As a psychosociological process, inclusion is inherent to the migration experience.\textsuperscript{19} Although research focuses primarily on the “Global North”, inclusion transcends any North–South divide because it concerns all countries. The fact that some countries have not adopted inclusion policies, as seen mostly in the “Global South”, does not necessarily imply that migrants’ inclusion – or exclusion – does not occur in practice. It simply means that the State has not set a nationwide strategy for migrants’ inclusion. This may be because inclusion is not among the priorities of policymakers. For example, this is the case in West African countries, where other socioeconomic challenges are more pressing or resources are insufficient.\textsuperscript{20}

Nonetheless, as acknowledged in the Global Compact for Migration, inclusion policies can constitute important tools for countries to support migrants’ inclusion and foster social cohesion.\textsuperscript{21} By contrast, the absence of inclusion policies may be costly, not only for migrants who may face discrimination and be marginalized, but also more broadly for social cohesion, with a heightened risk of tensions, riots and civil unrest.\textsuperscript{22} As part of (im)migration or stand-alone policies, migrants’ inclusion can take different forms to frame how it should take place in a particular country according to its own values. The most prevalent national policy models of inclusion have been those of assimilation, multiculturalism and integration which, as summarized in table 1, can be differentiated according to the expected degrees of adaptation by migrants and of accommodation by the society.

\begin{itemize}
\item[18] Castles et al., 2002; see also Silver, 2015; Landau and Bakewell, 2018.
\item[19] See most notably Berry, 1997.
\item[21] UNGA, 2018a: para. 32(c).
\end{itemize}
Table 1. Summary of the main inclusion models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion model</th>
<th>Degree of adaptation by migrants</th>
<th>Degree of accommodation by society</th>
<th>Examples of policies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>White Australia policy, 1901–1966a Restricting “non-white” immigration and assimilating “white” immigrantsb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Canada, multiculturalism policy, 1971–presentc Recognizing that “multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society”d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>European Union Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, 2016e Considering integration as a “dynamic two-way process”f</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (a) National Museum Australia, n.d.; (b) Ibid.; Berndt, 1961; (c) Government of Canada, 2018; (d) Ibid., 1985; (e) European Commission, 2016; (f) Ibid.

Assimilation considers diversity as a risk for social cohesion and requires the highest degree of adaptation by migrants and a low degree of accommodation by the receiving society. It consists of a one-way policy where migrants must fully embrace the receiving society's national identity and values, to the detriment of their original ones.24 By contrast, multiculturalism values diversity and expects a low degree of adaptation by migrants – who can retain their cultural identities – and a high degree of accommodation by the receiving society.25

While assimilation has been referred to as a “melting pot”, multiculturalism has often been associated with a “salad bowl”: a melting pot contains ingredients that melt together and become indistinguishable, whereas a salad bowl is made of diverse ingredients which co-exist side by side harmoniously. While assimilation was already the rule in Latin American countries, such as Argentina, during the mass migration of Europeans in the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century,26 these two models were particularly prevalent in traditional immigration countries during the twentieth century. In broad terms, the focus was placed on assimilation from the 1920s to the 1960s, and shifted to multiculturalism in the 1970s due to the

23 This summary table notably builds on the work of Berry, 1997 and 2006.
24 IOM, 2019, in appendix A.
25 Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014.
26 See, for instance, Acosta, 2018; Bailey, 1979; Bjerg, 1988; and Sánchez Alonso, 2002.
inability of the assimilationist model to accommodate increasingly diverse societies. Although it is still followed by some States, including Canada, some have disavowed multiculturalism since the mid-1990s because it has been considered unable to counter migrants’ exclusion and perceived as a threat to national identity and values.

As a result, different models have been embraced to restore a balance between diversity and unity, claimed by some to have been lost because of multiculturalism. At the national level, the model predominantly relied on today is that of integration, which stands in between assimilation and multiculturalism. It expects medium degrees of adaptation by migrants and accommodation by the receiving society. Although no commonly agreed definition exists, it is generally accepted to be a two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live. At the local level, an interculturalist approach to inclusion has developed, which emphasizes the importance of contacts and bonds between individuals of different backgrounds, both migrants and nationals. It relies on the idea that diversity is an advantage and aims to create mutual understanding and a culture of diversity to combat discrimination and inequalities. This policy narrative finds its origins in Quebec in the 1980s in response to the Canadian multicultural policy, and has since been taken up in an increasing number of cities and neighbourhoods, in countries such as Spain or Italy.

Inclusion outcomes: Challenges and policy responses

Measuring the level of migrants’ inclusion in receiving societies (so-called “inclusion outcomes”) is complex given the various individual and contextual factors influencing inclusion (see text box below). It is nevertheless important to identify potential obstacles and design and/or re-evaluate policy responses to more effectively support migrants’ inclusion.

Measuring migrants’ level of inclusion through indicators

Indicators of integration have been developed to measure the degree of migrants’ inclusion in certain countries and rank these countries according to the effectiveness of their inclusion policies. These most notably include:

- The Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 (MIPEX 2015), co-financed by the European Fund for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals, European Union (EU), and led by the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs and the Migration Policy Group (2015); and

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27 Castles, 2004; Castles and Davidson, 2000.
31 Bivand Erdal and Oeppen, 2013; see also Favell, 2005.
32 IOM, 2019.
33 Zapata-Barrero, 2017.
34 Ibid. On interculturalism in Italian cities, see for instance Caponio and Donatiello, 2017.
• The immigrants’ indicators developed in 2012 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), with the latest edition Settling In 2018: Indicators of Immigrant Integration jointly produced with the EU.\(^a\)

Inclusion being highly contextual, these indicators reflect a particular understanding of what “successful integration” means.\(^c\) Both sets of indicators were devised in the context of traditional destination countries. Thus, they may not be applicable in other geographical locations, including in the increasing number of States worldwide that have also become countries of destination.

Comparisons between the countries covered through rankings or indexes also remain delicate, as the understanding of inclusion and the objectives of inclusion policies differ even among traditional destination countries. A multiculturalism inclusion policy will not have the same objectives as one that tends to be more assimilationist. It is thus difficult to compare how effective inclusion policies are between countries with different inclusion objectives.\(^d\)

Although not focused on inclusion, the Migration Governance Indicators also provide a useful tool for States to assess the comprehensiveness of their migration policies, including their inclusion policies. The Migration Governance Indicators are an IOM initiative, implemented with the support of the Economist Intelligence Unit, to support States in implementing the Migration Governance Framework, adopted by IOM Member States in 2015 (Council Resolution No. 1310 of 4 December 2015 on the Migration Governance Framework).\(^e\) With its 90 indicators, the Migration Governance Indicators help States identify potential gaps in their migration policies, future priorities, and good practices for well-managed migration policies, including with respect to migrants’ rights and their well-being, which are key dimensions for migrants’ inclusion.

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This section explores migrants’ inclusion outcomes and challenges in some key policy areas of inclusion, namely, language, education, labour market inclusion, family reunification, political participation and naturalization. The focus on these specific policy areas is without prejudice to the importance of others, such as health or housing. While health is subject to a specific chapter in this report (see chapter 7), housing is also an important aspect of migrant inclusion because its affordability and quality influence migrants’ well-being and social inclusion.\(^{35}\) If housing inclusion can be assessed on the basis of access to homeownership for some migrants,\(^{36}\) for others, such as refugees, mere access to decent housing is already an issue, as illustrated by the so-called migrant “crisis” in Europe in 2015–2016, which has been considered by some as a “housing crisis”.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{35}\) Phillips, 2006.

\(^{36}\) See, for instance, Darden, 2015.

\(^{37}\) Penny, 2016.
As detailed in appendix B, all the policy areas examined in this section reflect human rights to which all individuals are entitled, including migrants, with the principle of non-discrimination constituting a central pillar of migrants’ inclusion. However, migrants’ inclusion outcomes in these different policy areas remain dependent on their immigration status. While legal residence is a major first step towards inclusion, the type of permit dictates additional rights and entitlements, such as access to work and study. As it will appear, and similarly to human rights, all these policy areas are also interrelated, as each may impact on one another. Despite the emphasis sometimes placed on labour market inclusion, this reflects the need for holistic inclusion policies, covering all dimensions of migrants’ inclusion.

Language

Language is considered one of the most central aspects for migrants’ inclusion by both the receiving society and migrants themselves. In Europe, for instance, 95 per cent of Europeans are of the opinion that a certain command of the national language is important for migrants to integrate. While language can facilitate inclusion prior to departure, without or with insufficient knowledge of the language upon arrival, migrants often identify language barriers as one of the first challenges they face. For instance, after migrating from Cambodia to Thailand for a work opportunity, Sophal notes: “The first three months proved to be very difficult due to the language barrier. I couldn’t communicate with people and I was not familiar with the food.”

In addition to facilitating social interactions, language is important for helping migrants navigate a new environment, including access to health care, housing and other services. It also improves their access to education, increases their likelihood of being employed, and leads to better self-reported health outcomes.

With such a pivotal role for migrants’ inclusion, language often constitutes an important area of government policy. National or local authorities sometimes support language acquisition through language courses, which can be mandatory for migrants. These language courses are at times freely available to migrants together with civic/social orientation courses (for example, in Sweden and Canada). In addition, language proficiency can be a requirement for entry or stay depending on the residence permit sought (such as family reunification) and for naturalization. For instance, as reported by the MIPEX 2015, countries with language requirements for permanent residence increased from one EU country in 1990 to 18 in 2014.

While States’ support to language acquisition is key, language requirements – on which are conditioned entry, stay or naturalization in a country – may be counterproductive for migrants’ inclusion. In fact, countries with lower language requirements turn out to be the most favourable for migrants’ inclusion. Language tests can indeed deter migrants from applying for a particular status, rather than motivating them to master the language. These tests can also exacerbate vulnerability faced by some migrants who are unable to pass them.
due to different factors, such as age, literacy, as well as health, family or economic reasons. For instance, evidence supports that age is negatively correlated with one’s ability to learn a new language.\textsuperscript{45}

Research highlights a paradox in focusing on national language acquisition in societies that increasingly promote multilingualism.\textsuperscript{46} In certain cities of the United States, for instance, such as Miami, Spanish may be more important than English to work in some sectors.\textsuperscript{47} In some communities, research has found that moving away from language assimilation to a multilinguistic approach in schools supports migrant students’ educational outcomes and, ultimately, decreases the likelihood of discrimination and improves their sense of inclusion.\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{Education}

Along with work prospects, migration can be motivated by migrants’ willingness to access higher quality education in another country.\textsuperscript{49} Education has a positive influence on migrants’ employment and social participation in the receiving society, which tends to view migrants more positively when they have attained higher educational qualifications.\textsuperscript{50} For migrant children, access to primary education is a fundamental human right, regardless of their migration status (see appendix B). However, migrants’ educational outcomes are still lower than those of their native counterparts, especially for first-generation migrants. The educational performance of migrants depends on a range of factors, including their language skills, socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds, and age at migration.\textsuperscript{51}

While policy responses are important in improving migrants’ education levels, the MIPEX 2015 notes that “[e]ducation emerges as the greatest weakness in integration policies in most countries”.\textsuperscript{52} Beyond countries covered in MIPEX 2015, there more generally remain issues in migrants’ access to education. This is especially striking for refugee children. Four million refugee children were out of school in 2017 out of the 7.4 million of school age under UNHCR mandate – more than half of all refugee children worldwide.\textsuperscript{53} As for migrant children, their full inclusion in national education systems is important, including for those whose education tends to be left to the humanitarian sector in countries with high numbers of refugees. With 1 million refugee children of school age in 2018, Turkey has committed to include all Syrian refugee children previously attending temporary education centres into its national education system by 2020.\textsuperscript{54}

Challenges in accessing education also exist for other migrant children. Administrative formalities in some countries may pose obstacles for migrants to enrol their children at school, especially if they lack some documentation or are in an irregular situation. Schools’ obligations to report irregular migrant children to the authorities or provide government authorities with access to children’s data may further deter migrant

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{45} Isphording, 2015.
\bibitem{46} Ros i Sole, 2014; Krüger Dias and Plaza Pinto, 2017.
\bibitem{47} Lewis, 2013.
\bibitem{48} Somers, 2018; Panagiotopoulou and Rosen, 2018.
\bibitem{49} Hagelskamp, Suárez-Orozco and Hughes, 2010; Bakewell and Bonfiglio, 2013.
\bibitem{50} See UN CESCR, 1999; UNESCO, 2018.
\bibitem{51} Filsi, Meroni and Vera-Toscano, 2016; Corak, 2011; UNESCO, 2018.
\bibitem{52} Huddleston et al., 2015.
\bibitem{53} UNHCR, 2018.
\bibitem{54} UNESCO, 2018.
\end{thebibliography}
children from attending school due to fear of deportation.\textsuperscript{55} To ensure migrant children's enrolment and attendance, some countries have established firewalls between immigration authorities and schools.\textsuperscript{56} In Germany, for example, the obligation for schools to disclose pupils' data to the police was abolished in 2011.\textsuperscript{57} Simplified formalities for school enrolment, including for migrant children lacking certain identification documents, have also been put in place in some countries, such as Thailand.\textsuperscript{58}

Challenges for migrant children's education go beyond access to school. Other obstacles to improve their education outcomes include the lack of education tailored to their needs and, less commonly, their segregation from natives in classrooms.\textsuperscript{59} The composition of classrooms plays a role, as a high concentration of migrant children negatively influences their educational outcomes. Research also suggests that digital technologies could help reduce the gap in educational achievements between migrant and native children by supporting migrant children in doing their schoolwork at home, including through access to educational material in their native language.\textsuperscript{60}

More generally, migrant children may experience prejudice and discrimination at school. Schools can, however, serve as spaces for promoting tolerance and social cohesion. An increasing number of countries are integrating diversity into their curricula, but teachers still need support and training to teach effectively in diverse classrooms,\textsuperscript{61} including through induction or mentorship programmes.\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{Labour market inclusion}

With 164 million migrant workers worldwide in 2017, representing 59.2 per cent of all international migrants and 70.1 per cent of those of working age, labour market inclusion is a key policy area for States.\textsuperscript{63} Its importance is increasingly emphasized in terms of migrants' economic contributions to receiving and origin societies (see chapter 5 of this report). It has, for instance, been estimated that, while migrants contributed 9.4 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015, better inclusion, including in terms of employment, could add an additional USD 1 trillion per year to the global GDP.\textsuperscript{64} For migrants, just as it is for non-migrants, labour market inclusion brings greater economic security, and enhances their well-being and sense of belonging in receiving societies.\textsuperscript{65}

Labour market inclusion consists of different dimensions, ranging from access to employment and general or targeted support, to protection of migrant workers.\textsuperscript{66} Among these, access to employment is an important factor. Migrants' employment rates are commonly lower than those of non-migrants. In the European Union,
for instance, the unemployment rate of migrants was 13.3 per cent in 2017, compared with 6.9 per cent for the native-born. Nevertheless, substantial differences exist between countries and groups, as labour market inclusion depends on the socioeconomic situation and policies of each country, as well as on migrants’ demographic and individual characteristics (such as age, gender, language skills or qualifications) and the circumstances of their migration. Overall, for example, refugees and those who migrated for family reunification have a lower likelihood of finding a job than other migrants. To improve the employment rate of refugees, Switzerland launched a new Artificial Intelligence pilot programme in 2018. This programme relies on an algorithm that determines in which area of the country a particular asylum seeker should be placed to maximize his/her employment likelihood.

General and targeted support for migrants is important for improving migrants’ access to employment. In addition to language training, vocational training has been found to be effective in improving access, especially if it encompasses a practical on-the-job training component. Other tools considered effective include job search assistance programmes and wage subsidy programmes (that is, subsidized employment in the private sector).

The inability to have qualifications recognized or skills validated also remains an issue, as it restricts access to certain jobs and leads to overqualification in lower-skilled positions. Working below skill level may also increase the risk of distress for migrants and result in lower psychosocial well-being. This issue is not only linked to the absence of recognition programmes, but also to the lack of awareness and information about such programmes or to their cost and complexity. The establishment of a one-stop shop for recognition in some countries, such as in Denmark, can be valuable to simplify and centralize recognition programmes under one roof.

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The feminization of migration: Calling for a gender-sensitive approach to inclusion

The feminization of migration is reflected in the increasing number of female migrants and changing migration patterns. Female migrants are not only migrating as part of a household, but exercise increased agency in migrating on their own, as migrant workers, students or refugees, for instance.

This feminization of migration has, however, not been accompanied by more gender-targeted policies for migrant inclusion, which would reflect the particular obstacles faced by female migrants. These barriers are particularly apparent when it comes to labour market inclusion. In the European Union,

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67 Eurostat, 2018. In the United States of America, however, the unemployment rate of migrants (defined as foreign born) was lower (4.1%) than that of the native-born (4.4%) in 2017 (United States Department of Labor, 2018).
68 Lens, Marx and Vuji, 2018; Canganio, 2014.
69 Stanford University, 2018.
70 Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.
73 Espinoza-Castro et al., 2018.
74 IOM, 2013; Huddleston et al., 2015.
75 IOM, 2013.
for instance, 54 per cent of women born outside the EU were employed in 2017, compared with 73 per cent of men born outside the EU and 68 per cent of women born in the reporting country.\textsuperscript{c} Among employed women migrants, 40 per cent were overqualified for their positions,\textsuperscript{d} with a high number engaged in domestic work.\textsuperscript{e} Refugee women are even worse off in terms of labour market inclusion, given their more precarious status and situation.\textsuperscript{f}

Lower educational levels and the younger age of female migrants may in part account for the difference in employment rates between female migrants and their native-born counterparts.\textsuperscript{g} Compared with male migrants, female migrants may also have childcare responsibilities, which they may accommodate by not working or taking on part-time or even informal employment.\textsuperscript{h} This impacts not only their labour market inclusion, but also their potential to act as sponsors of relatives for family reunification, because they may not have the minimum salary required to do so.\textsuperscript{i} The influence of cultural norms may also play a role for female migrants coming from countries where female economic participation is low.\textsuperscript{j}

The adoption of policies addressing the particular structural obstacles and inequalities faced by female migrants can improve their inclusion, not only in the economic sphere but also in other policy areas.\textsuperscript{k} Such policies can also protect female migrants from experiencing vulnerable situations that may put them at heightened risk of violence, abuse and exploitation.\textsuperscript{l}

\textsuperscript{a} See chapter 2 of this report.
\textsuperscript{c} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{d} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{e} ILO, 2015; IOM, 2017a.
\textsuperscript{f} Liebig and Rose Tronstad, 2018.
\textsuperscript{g} Barslund and Laurentsyeva, 2018.
\textsuperscript{h} Kontos, 2011.
\textsuperscript{i} Huddleston and Pedersen, 2011. See the section below on family reunification.
\textsuperscript{j} Barslund and Laurentsyeva, 2018.
\textsuperscript{l} See Hennebry, 2017.

**Family reunification**

Family reunification is a central component of the right to family life. On this basis, nationals and migrants, including refugees, can act as “sponsors” of family members living abroad in order for them to be reunited. Although not all migrants want to be reunited with their families in the receiving country,\textsuperscript{76} for those who wish to do so, family reunification can play an important part in their inclusion. Family reunification is not only about improving family life, but also social inclusion (through engagement with schools or community-
based associations) and political participation. Evidence also indicates that family reunion enhances migrants’ labour market inclusion. According to a longitudinal survey of immigrants in Canada, family members play a particularly important role in supporting and facilitating migrants’ entry and inclusion into the labour market, especially during the first four years after arrival.

Family reunification has become an important component of many States’ policies, especially in Western countries. Family migration accounted for 38 per cent of all permanent migration in OECD countries in 2016, representing 1.8 million family migrants, of which 1.6 million were registered under family reunification and the remainder as accompanying migrant workers. Family reunification is often limited to certain types of family members and subject to specific conditions. It is usually restricted to the immediate family members (such as spouses, children below the age of 18 and dependent relatives), which may not reflect the social configurations of migrants’ families. The sponsor is often required to provide proof of sufficient financial means to support his/her family members. As this income requirement may raise difficulties for refugees, some countries have exempted them or lowered the minimum salary required.

While these conditions typically relate to migration management, other requirements for family reunification that are adopted for the declared purpose of ensuring migrants’ inclusion can be counterproductive. Pre-entry language tests that sponsored family members are sometimes required to pass to be able to reunite with migrants in the receiving country are a case in point. These tests can be prepared with prior language courses, but they are usually expensive, not easily accessible in rural areas of the country of origin and have a disproportionate negative impact on some family members, such as the elderly or refugees, who are less likely to succeed due to their vulnerable situations. Rather than improving the educational achievements and labour market inclusion of sponsored migrants, they may discourage migrants from applying for family reunification or delay family reunion. Delays can undermine the potential benefits for migrants’ inclusion, as family reunion will raise more difficulties for families when occurring after a long period of separation between sponsors and their relatives.

Political participation

Migrants’ participation in the political life of their receiving countries can take different forms, ranging from voting in local, national or regional elections and standing as candidates in local elections, to joining associations and political parties or being consulted through local, national or regional consultative bodies. Compared with other policy areas of inclusion, such as language or employment, less attention has been
devoted to political participation in policymaking and research. However, migrants’ political participation can help States maintain the legitimacy of their democratic systems, realize migrants’ inclusion and promote social cohesion. It gives migrants the opportunity to have a say on policies that concern them and can increase their feeling of belonging in the receiving society.

Migrants are not significantly less politically active than nationals. Their level of political participation depends on a range of factors, including contextual/structural and individual ones. The degree of political participation that migrants can exercise depends first on the receiving country. While most countries do not currently give migrants the right to vote (especially in Africa and Asia), some offer voting rights in national elections (see text box below), and an increasing number provide them with the right to vote in local elections (for example, in Europe, the Americas, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea). By contrast, the right to stand in elections is more limited, even for countries offering the right to vote. In addition to differing political opportunities across countries, migrants’ political participation is influenced by the culture of political participation in the receiving country and the level of participation and democratic tradition in migrants’ countries of origin.

Countries where migrants can vote in national elections

Offering voting rights to migrants in national elections is much more unusual than in local ones. Only five countries in the world enfranchise migrants in national elections, regardless of their nationality: Chile, Ecuador, Malawi, New Zealand and Uruguay. The length of residence required to participate in national elections varies from 1 year in New Zealand to 15 years in Uruguay. Beyond these five countries, many others entitle migrants only of certain nationalities to vote in national elections. This is the case in the United Kingdom (where Commonwealth as well as Irish citizens can vote), most Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean (for other Commonwealth citizens), Ireland (where United Kingdom nationals can vote), and reciprocally between Brazil and Portugal.

Individual factors that influence migrants’ political participation include migrants’ demographic and personal characteristics, especially as the level of participation increases with age and the level of education. The duration of residence and naturalization also positively impact on migrants’ political participation, and second-generation migrants are thus often more active than the first generation.

While it is difficult to measure the impact of policies on migrants’ political participation, MIPEX 2015 suggests that countries with inclusive naturalization policies tend to have stronger political participation policies.

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89 Huddleston and Dag Tjadén, 2012.
90 Huddleston, 2017; Thorkelson, 2015.
91 Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.
92 Huddleston et al., 2015.
93 Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.
94 Ibid.
95 Huddleston et al., 2015.
In general, however, there remains a clear discrepancy between the high diversity of receiving societies and migrants’ representation at different political levels.  

Beyond the State, political parties thus have a particular role to play in increasing migrants’ political representation and diversity.

**Naturalization**

Naturalization is the process and acquisition of nationality by a non-national. Migrants can become naturalized if they meet legal criteria and apply through appropriate channels. Although naturalization is often considered a milestone for migrants’ inclusion in the receiving country, it is not an end in itself because inclusion remains an ongoing process. That said, naturalization often provides migrants’ full access to entitlements in receiving countries (such as voting and candidacy rights). Evidence demonstrates that naturalization increases migrants’ labour market and social inclusion, their level of political participation, and their sense of belonging in the receiving country.

Given the importance of naturalization for migrants and their inclusion, it comes as no surprise that a large share of migrants are or want to become citizens of their receiving countries. However, not all migrants want to be naturalized, as it depends on a range of individual and contextual factors. Most notably, migrants from developing countries have a greater propensity to naturalize, because it ensures security to remain and eliminates the risk of being forced to return to their countries of origin, especially when these are characterized by a lower level of development, political instability or a non-democratic regime.

The most significant factor influencing migrants’ likelihood to naturalize remains the receiving country’s citizenship policies: the more inclusive such policies are, the higher the likelihood of naturalization will be. In contrast to migration/inclusion policies, all countries have adopted nationality laws regulating the acquisition of nationality by descent, birth and/or naturalization. As citizenship is closely linked to national identity, naturalization can be politically controversial in some countries. In countries that do not allow individuals to hold dual nationality, migrants may have to relinquish their nationality of the country of origin to obtain that of the receiving country, which may deter them from naturalizing. Naturalization can be even more politically delicate with large flows of migrants, including refugees, although the United Republic of Tanzania has succeeded in naturalizing more than 170,000 Burundian refugees since 2007.

While a few countries grant citizenship to migrants in exchange for financial investments (such as Antigua and Barbuda, and Malta), in most countries, naturalization is subject to specific conditions. These requirements

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97 Long et al., 2017; Bauböck et al., 2013.
100 Bauböck et al., 2013; Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012; Bakkaer Simonsen, 2017.
101 Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.
102 Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015; Logan, Oh and Darrah, 2012; Dronkers and Vink, 2012.
103 Huddleston et al., 2015; Bilgili, Huddleston and Joki, 2015.
104 Long et al., 2017.
105 Reichel, 2011. This also depends on whether dual nationality is allowed by the country of origin.
106 See Long et al., 2017; Kuch, 2018.
107 Long et al., 2017. For Malta, see the Citizenship by Investment Program: www.maltaimmigration.com/.
commonly include a minimum duration of legal residency, knowledge of national language(s) and, sometimes, culture, evidence of good character and the payment of fees for the naturalization process. The length of residence required differs from one State to another. While it is on average of 7 years in countries covered in MIPEX 2015, it goes as high as 35 years in the Central African Republic. In addition to the high fees sometimes required for naturalization, the most contentious requirement relates to mandatory language and civic tests that migrants must pass in some countries. These tests sometimes require knowledge about the receiving country that even some nationals may not possess.

Situation on the ground: The role of local actors and migrants

While States can foster migrants’ inclusion through national measures and policies, inclusion happens first and foremost “on the ground”. This section first presents the role of the local level, especially cities, where everyday practices may be disconnected from national inclusion policies. While the local level is key for realizing migrants’ inclusion, the section also highlights the role of migrants themselves, who are essential actors of their own inclusion.

The role of local actors

As inclusion primarily occurs at the local level, local actors can play an important role in supporting and fostering migrants’ inclusion. These local actors are of a different nature and can range from local communities, including local resident and diaspora communities, and local civil society organizations to local authorities. Community centres provide spaces for interactions between locals and migrants in a given neighbourhood, and give access to a wide range of services and activities within the community. The Neighbourhood Houses in Greater Vancouver, for instance, provide support for employment, day and after-school care, activities for seniors, parent groups or sociocultural events. In Europe, civil society organizations were important in assisting and sustaining longer-term initiatives for the inclusion of the increased number of migrants who arrived in 2015–2016 in countries such as Austria, Germany and Sweden. This is notably illustrated by the European Prize for Civil Society, which rewards initiatives taken by organizations, including local non-profit foundations and associations, in the field of identity and integration, and which in 2016 received a total of 284 applications from organizations in 26 EU member States.

Alongside the involvement of local communities and civil society organizations, the role of local governments, especially cities, in migrants’ inclusion has attracted increased attention due to migration patterns and processes of urbanization. Urban areas are the main destinations for migrants across the world, given the high return for migrants’ human capital.

108 Huddleston et al., 2015; Manby, 2016.
109 Long et al., 2017. As of 2015, half of the countries included in MIPEX 2015 required migrants to pass citizenship tests (Huddleston et al., 2015).
110 Banulescu-Bogdan, 2012; Bauböck et al., 2013; Long et al., 2017.
111 Schmidtke, 2018.
112 EESC, 2017.
113 Duncan and Popp, 2017.
Cities have an important role to play as spaces of inclusion, because they are the main sites of migration/inclusion policy implementation. They are the ones giving life to a greater or lesser extent to States’ international obligations and commitments, especially with regard to housing, health, employment and education. Some cities deliver services to all migrants, regardless of their migration status, ensuring access to housing, health, employment and education. For instance, some cities, such as New York, have ID cards granted to all residents (“nationals” and migrants alike, including irregular migrants), which facilitate access to numerous services and serve as means of identification.

Some cities also increasingly rely on innovative and pragmatic solutions to improve migrants’ inclusion. For instance, this is the case in European cities, such as in Austria or the Netherlands, which have taken initiatives driving policy changes at the national level. Some cities in Flanders, Belgium, have developed Centres for General Welfare to respond to the increasing number of migrants and care for their needs. These centres combine a variety of services centralized under the same roof, such as housing, health care and psychosocial support for migrants. A similar one-stop shop model has been applied in Lisbon, Portugal, to improve migrants’ access to public services that are key for their inclusion.

Cities may also positively impact on migrants’ inclusion through multicultural urban planning, when undertaken to strengthen the inclusion and resilience of diverse communities. However, urban planning for migrants’ inclusion may raise more difficulties in informal urban spaces that have developed with rapid urbanization, such as (peri-urban) slums. More generally, slums often escape the reach of national and local authorities, resulting, for instance, in lack of access to basic services for residents, including migrants. As illustrated in the text box below, in the specific context of Africa, these informal settlements have predominantly been formed in cities of the Global South, although peri-urban areas are developing in the Global North as well, such as in Lisbon, Athens and Rome.

Migration and inclusion in the context of urban transformation in Africa

Urbanization is a significant process in Africa. In 1995–2015, Africa had the highest rate of urban change of all continents, recorded at 3.44 per cent, with an urban growth 11 times quicker than in Europe. Across the continent, rural–urban migration rates are high, with increasing rates of international migration as well. For example, in 2013, 72.3 per cent of the resident population of the Dakar area was born outside the region. However, countries were relatively unprepared to plan for the impact of rural–urban migration. In 2016, 67.8 per cent of the entire urban population in Africa lived in informal urban settlements. Compared with State-led urban planning, local initiatives appear to have the highest impact on urban space. There is thus a growing recognition of the need for a more coherent urban governance and national development plans in African countries.

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114 Robinson, 2014; Crawford, 2016; OECD, 2018b.
115 Medina, 2015.
117 Ibid.
119 UN-Habitat, 2016a.
120 Duncan and Popp, 2017.
Research in West Africa shows that migrants are not disadvantaged compared with non-migrants, and that inclusion in urban areas concerns locals as much as migrants. Other research is pointing to gated communities as one of the key phenomena of urbanization in Africa. After first appearing in South Africa, these gated communities have rapidly spread across the continent. Current research is focusing on the influence of these communities on achieving inclusive and sustainable urban transitions. They also raise the question of their impact on overall community cohesion, including for migrants’ inclusion, as they reinforce segregation by increasing social differences between migrants and non-migrants.

Despite the role played by cities, their importance for migrants’ inclusion, including in policy development, has yet to be duly acknowledged at the national level. Some cities have developed their own policies and actions to foster inclusion, in recognition that inclusion needs to be supported at different governance levels within a country. From this perspective, the interculturalist approach taken by some cities has been depicted as “a policy rebellion of cities against the state domination of policy in recent decades”. Far from individual instances of rebellion carried out by a few cities, the idea of interculturalist cities has gained traction over the last decade. In 2008, for instance, the Council of Europe launched the Intercultural Cities programme for supporting cities in capitalizing in diversity. At the time of writing, the programme totalled 135 participating cities in country members of the Council of Europe, as well as in Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Morocco and the United States of America. Participating cities are indexed according to their intercultural policies, governance and practices. Research on the results of the Intercultural Cities Index suggests a positive correlation between the scores cities obtain and local well-being: the more intercultural policies are, the better the quality of life is. While some national governments consider municipalities as key actors in policymaking and governance of migrants’ inclusion, as is the case in Turkey, in other countries, the proactive role of cities has led to frictions between city and national levels. This has been the case, for instance, with sanctuary cities that have adopted their own policies and measures to protect migrants, including those in an irregular situation. These policies have at times been adopted in reaction to restrictive national migration and citizenship policies, and have established cities as spaces of inclusion.
While cities are active players in the global governance of migration, national governments are key in scaling up initiatives developed by cities and sharing good practices globally. The role of cities in organizing appropriate services to care for migrants' needs is increasingly recognized by States in global initiatives, such as in the New Urban Agenda following the Habitat III Conference in Ecuador in 2016. Through a whole-of-government approach, the importance of the local level is also explicitly acknowledged and mainstreamed throughout the Global Compact for Migration. Objectives 15 and 16 are of particular relevance, as they both emphasize the role of the local level (including local authorities) for providing migrants' access to basic services and empowering them and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion (see chapter 11 of this report).

Recognizing migrants' agency

Beyond the State and local levels, migrants play a crucial role, not just as passive subjects of inclusion policies, but also as active actors of their own inclusion. Migrants’ entrepreneurship is perhaps one of the most obvious illustrations of their agency for their economic inclusion. Beyond success stories such as that of Silicon Valley in California, where half of the high-tech companies were founded by migrants, there exist many examples of migrants’ entrepreneurship (see chapter 5 of this report). For instance, Syrian refugee-owned companies have developed in response to refugees’ lack of formal employment opportunities and the need to make a living.

Migrants are not only agents of their own inclusion but also actively support other migrants, while striving, more generally, for social cohesion. Among many other examples of migrants’ initiatives, a school established by Congolese refugees in a Ugandan refugee camp has been depicted as a success for migrant children’s inclusion. Since its creation in 2009, some 800 pupils have progressed to secondary school and 40 study in universities around the world. As the founders put it, “we realize that through education you can never be called a refugee forever”. Technology has also been used by migrants to support the inclusion of other migrants in receiving countries through YouTube videos to counter xenophobia and discrimination or with the development of smartphone applications, as illustrated in the text box below.

129 See also the Global Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development, Available at www.migration4development.org/en/events/global-mayoral-forum; and the Global Parliament of Majors Initiative, Available at https://globalparliamentofmayors.org/.
130 Duncan and Popp, 2017.
131 UNGA, 2018a.
132 Wadhwa et al., 2007. Among the 126 companies that reported for this study, 52.4 per cent indicated that they had been founded by migrants.
133 MEDAM, 2018. For more illustrations, see UNCTAD, IOM and UNHCR, 2018.
134 Onyulo, 2018.
135 IOM, 2018.
Migrants’ use of technology for inclusion

Today, tech innovations are used to foster migrants’ inclusion, as illustrated by the many smartphone applications developed to help migrants find their way in their country or connect with diaspora communities. The potential of these “apps” has not escaped migrants’ attention, as evidenced, for instance, by the video game Survival, available on Android and iOS.

Survival was developed by young migrants, refugees and Spanish people in the Gibraltar Strait, with the support of the Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations and Omnium Lab Studios.a Through this game, they share their experience of migration in the form of an “odyssey of social inclusion, going through all stages of the Migration trip”.b The objective of this game app is to “educate the player about the reality of thousands of people who are facing the tragedy of migration”, putting him/her “in the shoes of these people, to try to change the focus, the perspective with which this problem is analysed in our social contexts”.c

a Available at http://omniumlab.com/trabajos/detalle/survival.
c Ibid.

Migrants’ inclusion in communities and countries does not require relinquishing one’s identity or ties with communities and countries of origin. Migrants increasingly act as transnational actors,136 as explained by Daniel from Guatemala, who has been living for 30 years in Costa Rica:

My home could be a Guatemalan territorial space but with windows and doors open to Costa Rica. My home became a place where both visions and cultures can grow and live together.

That is the biggest challenge of living in another country: living a little here and a little there. You live the two visions of the world every day, one from the home country and the other one from the host country. Expressions, food, culture, world vision: the two countries intersect in everyday life.137

Migrants’ transnational lives can nonetheless be at odds with expectations of migrants as “settlers”, and can result in their allegiance to the receiving country being called into question.138 They may be perceived as a threat to social cohesion, with the risk of being discriminated against and excluded. However, migrants’ discrimination and exclusion can entail a high cost for both migrants and receiving societies. For instance, migrants’ exclusion can affect their own well-being, as illustrated by a study on the effects of discrimination.

137 Available at http://iamamigrant.org/stories/costa-rica/daniel-matul-0.
at work on the well-being of Russian and Estonian migrants in Finland. Perceived discrimination accordingly predicts negative outcomes in terms of general and mental health for both groups of migrants.\textsuperscript{139} Migrants’ exclusion can also negatively impact on their contributions to trade, skills and labour supply, cultural transfer and exchange, which all consist of major benefits for receiving societies (see chapter 5 of this report).

More generally, migrants’ exclusion constitutes a risk for social cohesion. On rare occasions, social exclusion can act as a driver of radicalization to violent extremism.\textsuperscript{140} Although the likelihood remains low as terrorist attacks have not been primarily perpetrated by migrants,\textsuperscript{141} such consequences and costs entailed by migrants’ social exclusion are arguably too high and have to be addressed. These constitute an additional factor to be taken into account to strengthen migrants’ inclusion, in order to reduce the risk of radicalization for the well-being of societies and communities.

The various costs of exclusion and migrants’ agency support the need to more fully involve migrants in the formulation of migration/inclusion policies. These policies could benefit from better understanding how migrants view their inclusion process, what their needs are and what potential policy responses could more effectively support their inclusion.\textsuperscript{142} More active involvement of migrants at the policy level would also be in line with the Global Compact for Migration, which emphasizes the need to empower migrants to achieve full inclusion and social cohesion.\textsuperscript{143}

Migrants’ views to inform inclusion policies: The potential of migrant surveys

While research increasingly incorporates migrants’ voices to better understand the impact of migration on their identities and sense of belonging, more insights would be needed on migrants’ views of their inclusion process, needs and aspirations to inform and evaluate the effects of inclusion policies on migrants’ lives.

Migrant surveys are useful tools to get a sense of migrants’ views on their inclusion, as illustrated by the multiple references to the \textit{Immigrant Citizens Survey} in this chapter. Piloted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, the survey was conducted with 7,473 migrants born outside the European Union and residing in 15 cities in seven EU member States. While the main findings of the survey are reproduced in appendix C, the survey concludes by pointing out that “surveyed immigrants today are generally as satisfied with their lives as most people in the country where they live”. This positive note should not, however, obscure the challenges to inclusion identified by migrants in the survey, and can hopefully motivate similar endeavours in the future, as attitudes towards migrants are likely to have considerably evolved since the survey was concluded in 2012.

See Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012. The main findings of the \textit{Immigrant Citizens Survey} are reproduced in appendix C.

\textsuperscript{139} Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liedkind and Perhoniemi, 2007.
\textsuperscript{140} Koser and Cunningham, 2017.
\textsuperscript{141} Duncan and Popp, 2017.
\textsuperscript{142} Mustafa, 2018.
\textsuperscript{143} UNGA, 2018a.
Conclusion

This chapter offers an overview of what migrants’ inclusion entails in policy and practice, the factors and obstacles thereto, and how it is approached by different stakeholders. However, it also illustrates the difficulty to address the question of migrants’ inclusion at the global level, as it intrinsically remains a national issue. This is reflected in the Global Compact for Migration, where the actions linked to Objective 16 on empowering migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion remain largely aspirational (see chapter 11 of this report).

While there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach to inclusion, due to its highly personal and contextual nature, three main policy implications can be drawn from this chapter to foster migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion:

- **The adoption of holistic inclusion policies has the potential to improve the effectiveness of policy responses in the field of inclusion.** As seen in this chapter, despite the emphasis sometimes placed on labour market inclusion, the different policy areas are closely interdependent, as inclusion outcomes in one specific policy area will likely impact on others. Conversely, the absence of holistic inclusion policies may be costly for both migrants and receiving societies. Single policy responses in one specific policy area will likely be ineffective in improving migrants’ overall inclusion if not complemented by measures in other areas and supported by a coherent policy strategy. The risk is not only for migrants to end up being excluded and marginalized, but to create social tensions undermining social cohesion in the receiving society.

- **More inclusive policy responses in a wide range of related policy areas leads to deeper and more sustainable inclusion outcomes.** While this may sound logical, it is particularly striking with regard to language requirements, political participation and naturalization. By contrast, more restrictive policies have the risk of being counterproductive, especially when used for migration management purposes. Conditions for family reunification that are meant to ensure that reunited family members will integrate in the receiving society, especially pre-entry language tests, can in practice limit the number of migrants benefiting from family reunification at the expense of supporting the inclusion of migrant sponsors and their relatives.

- **The important role already played by local actors and migrants calls for further strengthening their involvement in developing and (re-)evaluating national inclusion policies.** Increased involvement and empowerment of cities would help in mitigating tensions between local and national levels, because of discrepancies in how inclusion is approached. As the spaces where inclusion primarily occurs, cities and other local authorities are also the best placed to inform about the challenges of inclusion and good practices that can be implemented. As for migrants, their involvement in policymaking has so far not reflected how active they have been in practice for their own inclusion and that of other migrants. If their voices are increasingly heard today, their inclusion needs and aspirations are yet to be more thoroughly explored and taken into account to improve the effectiveness of inclusion policies.
Migration and health: Current issues, governance and knowledge gaps

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Introduction

There is a dynamic and complex relationship between migration and health. Migration can lead to greater exposure to health risks, such as those migrant workers working in conditions of precarious employment with limited access to affordable health care. Migration can also be linked to improved health – for instance, after moving from a context of persecution and fear of violence to a safe environment. In this chapter, we examine the four key aspects of migration and health: (a) the health of individual migrants (“migrant health”); (b) the ways in which migration can affect the health of populations (“public health”); (c) health-care systems responses; and (d) the global governance of migration and health.

The first aspect – migrant health – can be defined as the differences in health found between migrants and populations at both origin and destination, and across different migration settings, such as labour migration, international and internal displacement, or irregular migration. Whether individual migrants will experience improvements or declines in their health status will depend partly on their interactions with the multiple factors that determine their health before, during and after their migration journey. Such factors – known as the social determinants of health – include access to safe transit, quality housing and health care.

The second issue – public health – focuses on how migration can affect the health of populations, including the ways in which healthy migrants can promote social and economic development and progress towards the global target of universal health coverage (UHC), which aims to ensure access to affordable and quality health care for all. However, if poorly managed, migration can negatively affect populations’ health. For example, a migrant mother struggling to access documentation may be unable to access timely health care for her child – including vaccinations – for fear of arrest, detention or deportation. This could contribute to the spread of communicable diseases, such as measles, across and within borders, with negative health effects for the entire population.

The third issue concerns systems responses to migration and health. The development of migrant-sensitive health-care responses and the monitoring of migrant health, through a Migration and Health in All Policies (MHiAP) approach, can address the health needs of migrants. Poorly managed, inadequate or discriminatory immigration and health system responses can have multiple negative consequences for the health of migrants and the communities with which they interact.

The fourth issue is the global governance of migration and health. This involves a focus on the ways in which migration and health can be mainstreamed into global governance processes, including identifying key strategic opportunities to do so.

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The chapter examines these four key issues. It starts with a brief overview of definitions and determinants. It then provides an overview of the factors that determine the health vulnerabilities and resilience factors of diverse migrant groups. Systems responses, and an overview of current approaches to the governance of migration and health, are then outlined. Key evidence gaps are highlighted, and the chapter concludes by emphasizing the importance of investing in effective migration and health governance, and how current approaches could ideally be strengthened.

Migration and health: Key facts

- **Good health encompasses mental, social and physical well-being.** The field of migration and health encompasses health concerns arising from human mobility, such as the transmission of infectious diseases, and should engage with all aspects of well-being in the context of migration and with all who are affected, including families of migrants and the public health of communities with whom migrants interact during all phases of the migration journey.

- **People who move are often healthier than those who stay behind and may display what is known as the “Healthy Migrant Effect”**. This means that those who move tend to be healthier and live longer than people living in both the communities they leave and those to which they arrive. Health vulnerabilities and resilience factors are dynamic and change over time, and this elevated health status – if migration is not managed properly – can be eroded due to the poor living and working conditions experienced post-migration.

- **Migrants are not automatically vulnerable to poor health outcomes.** It is the conditions associated with different phases of the migration journey (pre-migration, transit, arrival and return) that may negatively or positively affect health.

- **Many migrants struggle to access health care.** Despite human rights norms on the right to health, and promotion of UHC for all, States are only obligated to provide a minimum basic package of emergency medical care to irregular migrants. Even regular migrants sometimes face legal barriers, racism and corruption, which inhibits health-care access. Plus, migrants often underutilize health-care services and delay seeking health care.

- **Healthy migration can benefit the health of communities.** For example, ensuring the good health of migrant workers can – through remittances sent home – enhance the socioeconomic status of family members, therefore promoting access to health care and education.

- **Health-care providers face challenges in managing care for migrants**, including: language and cultural barriers, resource constraints within health systems to deliver services, and the contradiction between professional norms/ethics and domestic laws that limit migrants’ right to health care.

- **Strategic leadership and investment in building alliances between migration management systems and the health sector is needed.** Multisectoral action is needed to support alliance-building between immigration and health actors across multiple governance groups: the State, civil society – including migrant groups – the private sector and academia.
• **Investment in the field of migration and health supports social and economic development.** Investment in monitoring and mitigating health risks is key to maintaining the health of migrants which, as a result, supports progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and global health targets.

• **Migration and health research capacity needs to be built globally, particularly within low- and middle-income countries.** Existing research output focuses disproportionately on a few categories of migrants and health concerns, and on migration to and from high-income countries.\(^j\)

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**Definitions and determinants**

The World Health Organization (WHO) defines good health as a “state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”.\(^3\) This recognition of mental and social well-being, in addition to physical well-being, is critical, and emphasizes the importance of viewing health holistically. The state of a person’s health is shaped not only by one’s access to health services, but by a multitude of factors, which are termed the “determinants of health”. Figure 1 shows how the determinants of health can be applied to migrants across the migration cycle. Individual determinants are factors such as age, sex and genetic predisposition to disease, and the epidemiological profile of a given context and the disease exposures associated with it. Structural determinants are usually politically mediated – such as legal frameworks and societal attitudes towards migrants – and can result in a range of inequalities in socioeconomic status. For migrants, structural determinants of health include the conditions associated with the different phases of their migration journey – pre-migration, movement, arrival and integration, and (for some) return.

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3 WHO, 1946.
Migration and health: Current issues, governance and knowledge gaps

Figure 1. The determinants of migrant health throughout the migration cycle

Pre-migration phase
- Pre-migratory factors beyond individual genetic and biological characteristics include epidemiological profiles at origin (e.g. endemicity, infectious and chronic disease patterns), environmental, political and personal exposures and events, such as trauma stemming from protracted conflicts, human rights violations and interpersonal violence.
- Health status is influenced by health sector at destination (health service equity, coverage, quality, access) and health protection/insurance schemes that are affordable, portable, etc.
- Linguistic, cultural and geographic proximity to destination.

Movement phase
- Duration, circumstances and condition of journey.
- Single or mass movement.
- Violence, exploitation and other abuses.
- Travel conditions and mode (especially for irregular migrants).

Return phase
- Duration of absence.
- Reintegration with family, household, community at origin. Family conflict and harmony pertain to multiple determinants (e.g. household factors such as level of debt, to others, such as reshaping of decision-making power in migrant household).
- While some migrant groups – such as migrant workers – may return to household settings that have benefited from remittance flows and increase financial and social capital that promote positive health trajectories, others – such as irregular migrants or those trafficked that return – may be more vulnerable, with the cumulative tolls their migration journeys have taken on their physical and psychological well-being.

Arrival and integration phase
- Domestic migration policies and legal frameworks often govern migrants’ access to health services (based on their legal status).
- Epidemiological profile, environmental, political exposures at destination.
- Health risk behaviours and vulnerabilities among migrants and their families may change over time.
- Language and cultural values.
- “Othering”, racism, social exclusion, discrimination, exploitation may inhibit health access.
- Linguistically and culturally sensitive service provision.
- Family/partner separation and stress.

Cross-cutting aspects
Gender, age, socioeconomic status, genetic factors

Well-being of migrants and their families

Source: Adapted from Gushulak, Weekers and MacPherson, 2009; IOM, 2008.
The various legal frameworks associated with different phases of the migration journey are important structural determinants of migrant health. This is because a migrant’s legal status in a country can determine, for example, the extent to which they can access safe working conditions as well as the quality and affordability of health care. As illustrated in figure 1, there are multiple determinants of health – both individual and structural – that can have both positive and negative effects on health. An irregular migrant, for example, is unlikely to find work in the formal sector, and has to rely on the precarious informal sector, where work can be both unsafe and – often – illegal. As a result, irregular migrants may experience greater vulnerabilities to poor health, including increased exposure to infectious diseases, violence and injury. They are likely to face many challenges in accessing quality health-care services, and have very limited (if any) access to social protection services.

Migrant health

The field of migration and health explores the patterns in health found between migrants and the host population, and across different migrant groups, including in contexts where the host population may be struggling to meet its own mental, social and physical well-being needs. Exploring these patterns is important for several reasons. Firstly, the development of public health strategies over many decades recognizes the need for inclusiveness – the need to incorporate whole societies when addressing communicable disease control, such as through immunization programmes. The exclusion of subpopulations – such as migrant groups – must be avoided. There is a significant burden of tuberculosis (TB), HIV, hepatitis B, hepatitis C and vaccine-preventable diseases in migrant populations. Addressing this important group in surveillance, screening and linkage to care is crucial to meet the public health targets of countries and regions. Secondly, some health-related interventions developed for specific subpopulations, such as migrant groups, can provide or lead to health benefits for the whole population. Thirdly, ensuring the best possible health of migrants before, during and following their migration journeys enables them to maximize their inclusion and contributions to their host society, facilitate their support to families of origin, and minimize potential health-related costs borne by both the destination country and migrants themselves. Even in acute displacement situations, such as large-scale refugee flows, immediate health issues (along with food and shelter) are of primary concern, and dedicated resources are needed to meet these critical needs for the good of individuals, local communities and the broader society.

Understanding health vulnerability and resilience is central to the field of migration and health. Migrants are not a homogenous group, nor are their needs, health vulnerabilities and resilience factors. Gender is a key dimension that particularly needs to be considered (see the text box below).

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4 Lee, Sim and Mackie, 2018; Thomas, 2016.
5 Thomas, 2016.
6 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2018.
7 Chung and Griffiths, 2018; Thomas, 2016; Wild and Dawson, 2018.
8 Lu and Zhang, 2016; Wickramage et al., 2018b.
9 Abbas et al., 2018; Griswold et al., 2018.
Gender dimensions in mortality and abuse in “low-skilled” labour migrants

Globally, there is a higher proportion of male (58.4%) than female (41.6%) international migrant workers. Males dominate manufacturing and construction jobs, while female migrant workers work mainly in service sector jobs (nearly 74%), such as domestic services – often in conditions of precarious employment. Systematic reviews indicate a range of health vulnerabilities of female domestic workers, including poor access to sexual and reproductive health services. Poor work and living conditions, particularly restrictions on mobility and non-payment of wages, further exacerbate difficulties encountered by female domestic workers.

There is also limited empirical research on female migrant worker abuse, despite the phenomenon being widely reported in the media. Studies have shown that female migrant worker abuse manifests in multiple ways, including physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, spiritual and verbal abuse, and in terms of financial exploitation.

Health vulnerability can be defined as the degree to which an individual is unable to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impacts of diseases or epidemics. While most often associated with low socioeconomic status, health vulnerability can also arise when people are isolated, insecure and defenceless in the face of risk, shock or stress, including during and following migration journeys. Health resilience, on the other hand, results from individuals having access to the resources needed to cope with a threat to health or to resist the impact of a health hazard. Such resources can be physical or material, but they can also be found in the skills or attributes of individuals and their social networks.

Some migrants are healthier than the communities they leave and the communities to which they arrive, displaying levels of resilience to the health challenges encountered. However, these health benefits can rapidly wear away, and migrants may struggle to access positive determinants of health, resulting in a range of health vulnerabilities that are more pronounced than those of the local population. For example, perinatal and postnatal health complications are often worse in migrant women. Not only are experiences with pregnancy-related health care more likely to be negative, there is an increased risk of mental health disorders, maternal mortality and premature births. A systematic review of perinatal health outcomes and care among asylum seekers and refugees reported that perinatal mental health disorders such as postnatal depression were more frequent in migrant women than in women from host countries. The study also reported a twofold relative risk of mortality of migrant women related to preeclampsia/eclampsia and thrombosis.

11 Spallek et al., 2016.
12 Heslehurst et al., 2018.
As outlined in table 1, those migrants with the greatest health vulnerabilities are those in situations that diminish their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the changes and challenges associated with the different phases of the migration process. Some migrants can be exposed to trauma, exploitation and abuse during perilous journeys. They may experience psychosocial stressors, nutritional deficiencies, dehydration, exposure to infectious diseases, a lack of health-care services or continuation of treatments, and face the unhealthy consequences of certain settings, such as immigration detention centres or informal and illegal work environments. The literature on these issues is predominantly from high-income destination countries, focusing on specific health issues, categories of migrants, and source countries. Some literature combines different migrant groups together into descriptive studies, and most do not have comparisons with the host populations. For these reasons, it can be difficult to generalize from the limited data, but many of these health issues are consistent across studies, as summarized in table 1.

Table 1. Summary of main health concerns of selected migrant groups in vulnerable situations

| Irregular migrants | • Limited/no access to health-care services  
|                   | • More limited ability to pay for preventative and primary health care  
|                   | • Limited/no access to safe and legal work  
|                   | • Fear of deportation has multiple effects on emotional well-being and mental health, and impacts willingness to seek health-care services\(^a\)  
| Migrants in detention | • Conditions of detention are often punitive, jail-like conditions with limited access to medical care  
|                     | • Indefinite nature of detention contributes to the extreme distress, and cognitive, physical and emotional deterioration  
|                     | • Dramatically increased rates of depression and suicidal thoughts  
|                     | • Child migrants may be held in detention alongside their parents or separated from their families, and experience a lack of education or play opportunities\(^b\)  
| Child migrants and unaccompanied minors | • Preventative health interventions such as immunizations may be interrupted  
|                                            | • Social isolation and separation from family members seriously limits ability to seek health care when needed  
|                                            | • Persistence of mental health disorders even after settling  
|                                            | • Age determination processes used as for immigration application resolution are controversial and fraught with imprecision and ethical challenges\(^c\)  
| Children “left behind” | • Potential benefit of remittances that can allow for money to purchase food and for educational benefit  
|                           | • Increased risk of anxiety, depression, suicidal ideas, substance abuse and growth disorders\(^d\)  

\(^a\) Sweileh et al., 2018.
| Adult caregivers “left behind” | • Elderly caregivers take on a disproportionate burden of care for the children left behind, with negative psychosocial and physical health consequences  
• Left-behind elderly caregivers experienced higher levels of depression, loneliness, cognitive impairment and anxiety, and had lower scores on psychological health compared with older parents with no migrant children |
| LGBTI migrants | • Migration can be undertaken to leave violence, discrimination or persecution  
• Trauma associated with need to continuously prove gender and sexual identity for asylum claims  
• High levels of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidality and substance abuse |
| Survivors of human trafficking | • High levels of physical and sexual violence, and workplace injury  
• High rates of depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, attempted suicide  
• Chronic threats, excessive work hours, poor living conditions and severe curtailment of freedoms |

Source: (a) Hacker et al., 2015; Martinez et al., 2015; Winters et al., 2018; (b) Filges et al., 2015; Robjant, Hassan and Katona, 2009; Sampson et al., 2015; (c) ISSOP, 2018; Jensen, Skårdalsmo and Fjermestad, 2014; (d) Fellmeth et al., 2018; (e) Graham, Jordan and Yeoh, 2015; Siriwardhana et al., 2015; Migration Policy Institute, 2015; Thapa et al., 2018; (f) White, Cooper and Lawrence, 2019; (g) Kiss et al., 2015.

Note: Migrant groups are not mutually exclusive (can be overlapping). What is meant by “irregular migrant” is discussed in chapter 2 of this report.

Public health

The second aspect related to migration and health is on how migration can affect the health of populations (public health). As outlined above, migrants can face challenges in addressing their mental, social and physical well-being needs. Migrants who have limited or no ability to access positive determinants of health (see figure 1) can experience poor health outcomes, with various consequences for public health. This situation could itself be the result of difficulties faced in accessing a secure income, perhaps associated with challenges involved in obtaining the necessary documentation to work legally. Should they be unable to access timely testing and treatment, chances for onward transmission of the disease to others within the community would increase, as would the likelihood of unnecessary costs being incurred by the host health-care system as a result. It is important to recognize that popular representations of migration and health tend to be exaggerated by the media, sometimes as part of anti-immigrant political agendas, in which migration is positioned as a threat to public health.

Regardless of the setting, if migrants access health care only when they are very sick, additional costs will burden the health-care system. In contrast, health-care services – both preventative and curative – that are easily accessible enable the health needs of migrants to be addressed before they become very sick, reducing overall costs to health-care systems. When considering infectious diseases, delays in seeking treatment or challenges encountered when attempting to continue treatment for chronic infectious diseases such as TB
and HIV can have negative effects for populations, as the potential for onward transmission of infection may increase. This is particularly true in the case of movement across international borders, where delays in seeking care are associated with multiple factors, including the fear of engaging with public services when one is without legal status, or the outright denial of access to care by health-care providers. The emergence of “sanctuary cities” in countries with restrictive immigration regimes has in part stemmed from a need to ensure that health-care services are available regardless of a person’s migration status. The “sanctuary cities” movement is based on human rights principles and health equity approaches that prioritize access to health care for undocumented migrants. For instance, no significant differences in reports of physician communication, or in measures of diabetes management between undocumented and documented immigrants, existed among Mexican immigrants receiving care in two immigration sanctuary areas in the United States where people seeking health services are not asked about immigration legal status, nor is immigration status reported to immigration officials. Undocumented immigrants achieved comparable clinical outcomes and reported similar experiences of health care as documented immigrants and United States-born Mexicans.

Some groups of migrants – including refugees, asylum seekers and irregular migrants – may be particularly vulnerable to infectious diseases and experience worse health outcomes than the host population, or come from locations where certain infectious diseases are of high prevalence; these groups can benefit from targeted screening and interventions. Their journeys from one place to another – including forced movements from conflict zones with severely compromised health-care services – may result in interruptions in vaccination schedules, with potentially negative public health implications for both individual migrants and communities affected by migration.

Migration, both within a country and across national borders, is a key consideration in the control of infectious diseases. One such example is the case of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014 (see text box below). Another example relates to interventions to address malaria. These require careful consideration of migration, which has been shown to affect diagnosis and negatively impact access to treatment and continuity of care. This may contribute to the spread of antimalarial drug resistance. Additionally, the reintroduction of malaria in countries reaching elimination through inbound migration presents further challenges to cross-border malaria control. Recognizing its importance in the control of infectious diseases, migration has been enshrined within the International Health Regulations and key disease control programmes in global health. For example, the WHO framework for the global post-2015 “End tuberculosis (TB) Strategy” has identified migration and cross-border issues as a priority action area for countries with a low incidence of TB.

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14 Aboii, 2016.
15 Iten et al., 2014.
16 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2018.
17 Hui et al., 2018.
18 Lynch and Roper, 2011.
19 Cotter et al., 2013; Jitthai, 2013; Pindolia et al., 2012.
20 Lönnroth et al., 2015; Wickramage et al., 2013; WHO, 2015.
21 Lönnroth et al., 2015.
Migration and disease control – The case of Ebola

Internal migration and cross-border mobility for purposes of formal/informal trade, cultural events, employment, education and health remain an essential part of life for many communities in West Africa, where the free movement of people, goods and services is considered key for regional integration, prosperity and development. The Kissi Triangle cross-border region at the intersection between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, critical for trade and commerce, became the epicentre for the spread of the Ebola virus in 2014. The Forécariah–Kambia axis between Guinea and Sierra Leone was another corridor of human mobility that sustained transmission of the virus. During the month of July 2015 alone, four of the seven transmission chains of positive Ebola virus disease (EVD) cases identified in Kambia (Sierra Leone) were linked with positive EVD cases in Forécariah (Guinea). Communities residing on both sides of the border share strong familial ties. Cross-border movement is a part of these communities’ daily lives and takes place mostly through unregulated border crossing points. Restrictions to human mobility were enforced by authorities in some settings to inhibit cross-border movements with the rationale of containment of the spread of EVD. The impact on trade and on the economy in the West African region was estimated at USD 1.6 billion (12% of the combined GDPs the three most affected countries). Health systems weakened through decades of conflict, and deficits of human resources for health and disease surveillance along mobility pathways, undermined effective disease control measures. The need to adopt evidence-informed methods to determine corridors of population movements and for understanding the primary drivers of human mobility is vital for targeted disease prevention, detection and response efforts, especially at border areas, while safeguarding countries’ trade and economic interests.

IOM, with the support of government authorities and local communities, started mapping cross-border and in-country population flows between Guinea and Mali as early as December 2014. This information was then mapped against epidemiological data, enabling further analysis of vulnerabilities of travellers along their mobility continuums. Similar initiatives were subsequently set up at the Forécariah–Kambia border between Guinea and Sierra Leone, as well as at the Liberia–Sierra Leone border. Mobility mapping has since been expanded to include several sea landing points along the shores of Freetown and Port Loko, as well as internal movement between Kambia and Port Loko Districts in Sierra Leone. In all these locations, health screening and installation of infection prevention control measures were established, boosting the surveillance and response capacity of these three worst-affected countries and their neighbours.

a IOM, 2016.
b World Bank Group, 2015.
Health systems responses

The third aspect of migration and health is how health-care systems respond to migration and health. The health-care system is itself a determinant of health and, depending on the policies and legal frameworks of individual States, migrants may not be granted adequate, equitable and affordable access to health services, and/or local health systems may not have sufficient capacity to manage migrant health needs. For example, in countries of protracted crisis, migrant children fleeing conflict settings and seeking asylum with their families are more likely to have not met their vaccination targets due to disruptions in health-care delivery in countries of origin. Where health services are available, certain migrant groups may find it difficult to express symptomology and understand treatment instructions due to language barriers. Different cultural constructs of illness causation, such as those concerning mental health, challenge effective clinical management. They may also have difficulty with navigating unfamiliar health and welfare systems – especially when coming from countries with severely disrupted health systems.

A systematic literature review of reported challenges in health-care delivery to migrants and refugees in high-income countries identified three main topics of challenges in health-care delivery: communication, continuity of care and confidence. Communication is critical for obvious diagnostic and treatment trajectories. The availability of trained interpreters from migrant communities was described as a key aspect in providing migrant-sensitive care. Training of such interpreters to ensure an ethical and professional approach to medical consultations was also highlighted. Continuity of care related to factors such as migrant understanding of the health-care system, integration and case management across different parts of the health-care system. Confidence was the third most common topic mentioned and related to trust in the health-care provider, ensuring cultural sensitivity in care provision and the ability to have agency. Studies indicated that, in cases where no trustful relationship was established, patients resorted to using traditional medicine and trusted “their own resources” from their community for treatment. Conversely, a systematic review that investigated the perceptions, attitudes and practices of health providers in the provision of health-care services for migrants found they were challenged not only by language and cultural barriers, but also by resource constraints within their workplaces, and incoherence between professional ethics and domestic laws that limited migrants’ right to health care. Health-care providers used innovative means to ensure care provision in managing such clinical cases with civil society groups.

A key component of improved systems responses is the development of “migrant-sensitive health systems and programmes which aim to incorporate the needs of migrants into all aspects of health services, financing, policy, planning, implementation, and evaluation”. As outlined in appendix A, this includes measures to: ensure culturally sensitive and linguistically diverse health service provision; enable access to primary health care; include non-citizen groups within national disaster preparedness and response plans; and establish reporting mechanisms within routine health information systems to ethically harness data to plan for migrant needs. Often, migrants/“non-citizens” are excluded within preparedness and response strategies at national levels.

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23 Brandenberger et al., 2019.
24 Suphanchaimat et al., 2015.
26 Mladovsky, 2013; Pottie et al., 2017; WHO, 2010b.
27 Guinto et al., 2015; Wickramage et al., 2018a.
Migration and health indicators and metrics

Accurate data on the health status, outcomes, and social determinants of migration health are an essential precondition for ensuring better monitoring and improving health and providing appropriate and accessible health service. The World Health Assembly (WHA) resolutions on migration health (61.17, 2008; 70.15, 2017) and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration\(^{28}\) call on governments to better harness migration health data in order to formulate evidence-informed policy and practice interventions. However, the 2nd Global Consultation on Migration Health (2017)\(^{29}\) and subsequent academic commissions\(^{30}\) have indicated migration health data availability, quality and linkage to be highly variable, especially in low-to-middle-income countries. Little progress has also been made by member States and international organizations on advancing initiatives to improve migration health data collection and analysis at national, regional and global levels.

Sources of health data at country level are derived from multiple sources. First are health data derived from institutional registries or census-based data sources. These include, for example, birth and death registries capturing vital statistics and disease-specific registries, such as those for cancer, tuberculosis and malaria. A second source is through health survey data that may be collected periodically – for instance, demographic and health surveys. Research data are another major source providing specific information about specific communities or disease gradients. The final category includes a diversity of sources, such as those data from migration health assessments, health information systems at refugee camp settings, and big data projects such as the Global Burden of Disease project.\(^{31}\)

A narrative review of migration health data collection practices in Europe revealed that most European Union countries do not collect data on migrant health in health-care utilization or disease registers, and those that do use different categorizations and definitions, so that data are not always comparable across countries.\(^{32}\) Health information systems, surveillance systems and disease registries do not systematically capture migration variables.\(^{33}\) Migration modules have been tethered in only a few countries undertaking demographic and health surveys, such as Colombia and Ecuador, which capture data by place of birth. An exceptional case is that of Sweden, which in its annual survey of living conditions includes disaggregated data based on migration or residence status. People are classified either as first- or second-generation migrant, or non-migrant.\(^{34}\)

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\(^{28}\) Objective 1 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration underlines the need to collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies; in addition, Objective 3 underscores the need to provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration. The Compact explains that investing in improved methods for migration data collection “fosters research” and “guides coherent and evidence-based policy-making and well-informed public discourse” — allowing for effective monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of commitments over time.

\(^{29}\) IOM, 2017c.

\(^{30}\) Abubakar et al., 2018.

\(^{31}\) Available at www.healthdata.org/gbd (accessed 24 July 2019).

\(^{32}\) Rechel, Mladovsky and Devillé, 2012.

\(^{33}\) Giorgi Rossi et al., 2017; Riccardo et al., 2015.

\(^{34}\) Mladovsky, 2013.
Principles of data protection and ethical considerations are paramount for the collection, analysis, dissemination and linkage of migration health data – not only due to historical framing on race, ethnicity and health and potential for stigmatization, exclusion or, in the case of undocumented migrants, deportation. Efforts to capture the extent of migrant integration within health systems, and therefore capture measures of health equity, are exemplified by the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) Health Strand project (see text box below). MIPEX Health Strand offers a survey instrument designed to investigate the degree to which policies affect migrant health and promote equity, allowing for comparison between different country contexts.

Migrant Integration Policy Index Health Strand

The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) Health Strand is a survey instrument designed to investigate the degree to which policies affect migrant health and promote equity. It captures four dimensions considered critical for ensuring health equity: (a) entitlements to health-care coverage based on domestic legal and policy frameworks; (b) accessibility to health services; (c) responsiveness, such as on issues of language and cultural sensitivity; and (d) measures to achieve change, such as data collection and research to better inform services. Intersectoral application of the “Health in All Policies” (HiAP) principle, as well as mainstreaming of migrant health policies, are also included. A scoping review of available evidence on the association between health outcomes and integration policies conducted in 2017 showed a majority of studies included MIPEX as a measure of national migrant integration policies. Data showed that health disparities between migrants and citizens, and between migrant groups, were generally reduced in countries with a strong integration policy.

In the context of health systems, a MHiap response – modelled on the WHO Health in All Policies (HiAP) approach and drawing on the MIPEX Health Strand – aims to engage all the crucial governance actors and sectors involved in the field of migration and health. An example of this in action is the development of the National Migration Health Policy and action framework in Sri Lanka (see text box below).

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36 Hiam, Steele and McKee, 2018.
37 IOM, 2017a.
38 Juárez et al., 2019; WHO, 2014.
Lessons from advancing a National Migration Health Policy and action framework in Sri Lanka

Migration continues to be a catalyst to Sri Lanka’s development within the South Asian region. Sri Lanka is both a labour-sending country (with over 2 million of its citizens working abroad), and a labour-receiving one – with a growing number of migrant workers from countries such as India and China arriving to work on large-scale infrastructure projects, such as new highways, seaports and airports. Such development is projected to further increase population mobility into and within the island. The end of a protracted civil war led to a return of Sri Lankan refugees from India and other countries, with many more internally displaced persons returning to their places of origin.

Addressing the health challenges of a dynamic range of population flows therefore becomes important. In recognizing the intersectoral nature of addressing migration and health, a participatory “whole-of-government” approach – which included civil society, the United Nations, academia and migrant advocates – was adopted by the Government of Sri Lanka to advance a National Migration Health Policy and Action Plan, which was launched in 2013. Sri Lanka is one of the few countries to have a dedicated migration health policy framework inclusive of all migrant typologies. The process was led by the Ministry of Health under auspices of an interministerial mechanism with technical partnership from IOM. A hallmark of Sri Lanka’s policy development was an emphasis on an evidence-informed approach to guiding interventions/policy formulary. A national Migration Health Research Commission was undertaken over a three-year period, engaging local and international researchers to identify gaps in knowledge, conduct empirical research and gather data on migration health across inbound, internal and outbound flows. A pragmatic, action-oriented approach was adopted. For example, a National Border Health Strategy was developed to enhance point-of-entry capacities to enable better preparedness and response for health security risks, and capacities to address enhanced psychosocial support for returning female migrant workers.

Key lessons for advancing the National Migration Health Policy include:

(a) Invest in an evidence-informed approach;
(b) Ensure intersectoral coordination;
(c) Engage diverse stakeholders from civil society, academia, industry and migrants themselves via participatory approaches;
(d) Harness the network to be responsive to emergent issues (focus not only on policy formulary);
(e) Embed an accountability framework;
(f) Ensure global health diplomacy and engagement in regional and global processors.

An expanded case study is in appendix B.

a Wickramage, De Silva and Peiris, 2017.
The migration of health professionals

Health worker migration in response to the global shortage of health professionals demands dedicated and effective management, including building the capacity of health systems in origin countries, promotion of good practices and prevention of negative effects of health worker migration. There is a global imbalance between the availability of health workers and the burden of disease. For instance, sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest density of doctors and nurses, and the highest disease burden.\(^{40}\) Well-managed migration of health workers can play a key role in development overall, as well as in building capacity of health systems, not only in receiving countries, but also in countries of origin.\(^{41}\) Global health tools such as the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel provide an evidence-based framework to promote good practices and prevent negative effects of health worker migration. As outlined in the WHO Global Code of Practice, there are strategies for both sending and destination countries to decrease reliance on foreign-trained health workers and mitigate the negative effects of health personnel migration on the health systems of developing countries. These may include, for instance: aligning government educational spending with employment opportunities; not hiring directly from countries with the lowest health-care worker-to-population ratios; and adopting innovative financing mechanisms, allowing local and private entities to provide complementary funding to government subsidies to health worker training.

The global governance of migration and health

Governance is central to the development and implementation of any response to migration and health.\(^{42}\) Migration governance rests primarily upon the fulcrum of national sovereignty,\(^{43}\) and ensuring that positive health outcomes require well-managed migration. However, there is often limited engagement from health authorities in high-level migration governance decisions beyond issues concerning global health security – including quarantine and border-health management – and migration is frequently forgotten in the development of health programmes.\(^{44}\) Many countries have explicitly stated before international human rights bodies that they cannot, or do not wish to, ensure health protection, including the provision of essential health services, to migrants, and especially to irregular migrants.\(^{45}\)

A range of governance agendas on the domains of migration and health have developed in recent years, providing important opportunities for garnering political support for intervention (see figure 2). These agendas bridge the fields of migration governance, development and global health governance, and include: the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; the Global Compact on Refugees; the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); UHC; World Health Assembly processes; disease prevention and control programmes (including for malaria, HIV and TB); and the Global Health Security Agenda.\(^{46}\) Effective governance requires strategic leadership and investment to build alliances between migration management systems and the health sector.

\(^{40}\) Crisp and Chen, 2014.
\(^{41}\) IOM, 2018.
\(^{42}\) By “governance”, we mean the ways in which an entity functions to develop and implement policy and practice, incorporating the State, civil society, the private sector and other key actors, such as international organizations.
\(^{43}\) Wickramage et al., 2018a.
\(^{44}\) Wickramage and Annunziata, 2018.
\(^{45}\) IOM, 2013.
The SDGs suggest multiple demands to bring the migration, development and health sectors together to develop and implement unified and coordinated responses. Target 3.8 of the SDGs calls for universal health coverage (UHC) – a key SDG target providing a strategic opportunity to improve responses to migration and health which will, by ensuring the good health of migrant workers and the associated flow of remittances, indirectly benefit social and economic development. Migrants unaccounted for in UHC programmes are often missed in discussions about UHC goals at the country level.

Figure 2. Global agendas for advancing migration and health goals

- **“Migration governance” agenda**: Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
- **“Development” agenda**: Global Compact on Refugees, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), World Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions relevant to migration health, Global Consultations on migration health, International Health Regulations (IHR)
- **“Global Health” agenda**: Universal Health Coverage (UHC) agenda, Disease prevention and control programmes (e.g. HIV, TB, Malaria), Global health security (GHS) agenda

Health enshrined within 14 objectives/sub-objective. Objective 15 encourages governments to “incorporate the health needs of migrants in national and local health-care policies and plans.”


1st (Spain, 2010), 2nd (Sri Lanka, 2017), Colombo Ministerial declaration

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49 Guinto et al., 2015.
The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration – discussed in chapter 11 of this report – features health as a cross-cutting priority with references to health and health-care access in several objectives. Key health-related objectives within the Global Compact for Migration with commitments and actions relevant to health are presented in appendix C. A number of experts have commented on weaknesses in the Global Compact in its realization of the right to health of migrants, including its absence on reproductive health and access to safe maternity care, which directly impacts newborn and child health.50 Despite these limitations, the Global Compact for Migration does provide the health community the opportunity to use it as a tool to advance migrant-sensitive health policies and services within discussions on migration governance, where health often remains left behind.51

Gaps in migration and health research

Globally, various research initiatives are underway to assist in developing improved understanding of – and responses to – migration and health, with a focus on the implementation of evidence-informed interventions to improve the health and well-being of both migrants and communities affected by migration.52 While this field of research is growing, efforts to improve understanding of migration and health, and examples of migration and health programming, remain limited.53 As outlined in the text box below, the existing literature on international migration and health is limited in scope. It focuses on (a) high-income receiving contexts of Europe and North America; (b) specific health conditions such as mental health, HIV and TB; and (c) specific migrant groups, including migrant workers, child migrants, unaccompanied minors and “left-behind” children, women, refugees and (female) survivors of human trafficking.54 This highlights the need to improve research capacity in low- and middle-income country contexts, where the majority of migration takes place globally, and to increase the scope of research beyond the current focus on mental health and psychosocial well-being. Contextually relevant research agendas need to be set at the national and regional levels, through consultation with migrant communities, policymakers, practitioners, civil society and researchers.

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50 Bozorgmehr and Biddle, 2018; Devakumar et al., 2018.
51 Wickramage and Annunziata, 2018.
52 Abubakar et al., 2018; Griswold et al., 2018; IOM, 2017c; Pottie et al., 2017; Wickramage et al., 2018b.
53 Ho et al., 2019; Sweileh et al., 2018.
54 Sweileh et al., 2018.
Global distribution of international migration and health research in peer-reviewed publications

By international migrant category:

- Refugees and asylum seekers (25.4%)
- Migrant workers (6.2%)
- Human trafficking and smuggling (3.2%)
- International students (2.1%)
- Patient mobility across international borders (0.1%)

By country income classification (based on World Bank Classification)

- Low-income countries (0.8%)
- Middle-income countries (9.6%)
- High-income countries (89.6%)

By thematic research areas:

- Mental health and psychosocial well-being literature (47.0%)
- Communicable diseases (13.7%)
- Non-communicable diseases (8.9%)

Source: Sweileh et al., 2018.

Note: A total of 21,547 documents were retrieved and reviewed. The variables are not necessarily exclusive, so percentages may not total 100 per cent.

Conclusion: Investing in migration and health to support social and economic development

Investment – by way of both financial and human resources, and political will – by States in the development of evidence-informed migration and health interventions will not only address the health needs of individual migrants, it will also improve public health and support efforts towards achieving UHC. This investment is particularly important for low- and middle-income country settings, where significant levels of migration take place.

Good health is a prerequisite for optimizing the benefits of migration (e.g. in the form of remittances); investment in migration and health therefore contributes to social and economic development in both migrant sending and receiving areas.55 Policymakers, civil society, the private sector and researchers all have

55 Abubakar et al., 2018; IOM, 2017c; Onarheim et al., 2018; Trummer et al., 2016; Tulloch, Machingura and Melamed, 2016; Vearey et al., 2019; Wickramage et al., 2018b.
important roles to play – globally, regionally and nationally – in understanding and responding to migration and health, and migrants themselves must be involved in the development and implementation of policies and programmes.\textsuperscript{56}

To achieve this, investment in research capacity is first needed to improve understanding of the four key aspects associated with the field of migration and health that were outlined in this chapter – migrant health, public health, health systems responses and global governance opportunities. Research is needed to generate evidence-informed and context-specific interventions to address migration and health, which will, in turn, support UHC. Through partnerships with international organizations and academics, a new generation of migration and health scholars can be supported to develop new research approaches and monitoring systems to improve migration and health responses globally.\textsuperscript{57} Additional research beyond the current focus on refugees and asylum seekers, and on mental health and psychosocial well-being, is needed to better inform improvements in health systems and services.

At the global level, improvements in understanding of the implications of human mobility in order to support and improve public health preparedness planning – including developing responses to infectious disease outbreaks or other health emergencies – are needed, requiring investment in building research capacity, particularly in low- and middle-income country contexts.\textsuperscript{58} Working within the framework of a national migration and health policy process, the private sector can also support the development of programmes to improve the health of, for instance, migrant workers. The role of the private sector has been overlooked in the governance of migration and health and, among many other innovative roles, this can include sponsorship for building research capacity and interventions designed to address the health needs of migrant workers. Such programming will benefit the health of both individual migrant workers and their families, both in the origin and destination countries.

Frameworks that can provide guidance and indicate strategic opportunities to support migration and health interventions include: the 2008 World Health Assembly (WHA) resolution “Health of migrants”; the 2017 WHA resolution “Promoting the health of refugees and migrants”; the declarations made at two Global Consultations on Migration and Health; the WHO (draft) Global Action Plan on the Health of Migrants; and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which features health as a cross-cutting priority.\textsuperscript{59} These can be used by academia, United Nations bodies, civil society and government actors to mobilize action, including within the private sector. Policymakers – with the support of researchers – need to identify how both the migration and health sectors can strengthen their engagement with migration and health through a MHiAP approach. As the integration and inclusion of migrants and migration are a vital component of global disease control programmes – such as those for TB and malaria – and global health security agendas, health should form a key pillar in the development of migration governance.

At regional levels, consultative processes to support the development of coordinated approaches to migration and health are needed. This could be achieved through integrating health into existing regional consultative processes on migration and development, and should include collaborations for disease surveillance and

\textsuperscript{56} IOM, 2017c; Wolffers, Verghis and Marin, 2003.
\textsuperscript{57} The Migration Health and Development Research Initiative (MHADRI) Available at https://mhadri.org/ (accessed 25 July 2019)) is a recently established global research network that seeks to address these issues and promote shared research activities and approaches in migration health.
\textsuperscript{58} IOM, 2017c; Wickramage et al., 2018b.
interventions to support continuity of care across national borders. To operationalize these suggestions, States should consider identifying a national focal point that can drive the development of a national migration and health policy, and lead engagements at regional and global levels. This would require an evidence-informed, intersectoral, participatory approach, the development and adoption of an accountability framework, and centring of global health diplomacy. By investing in evidence-informed interventions, States will be better equipped to develop responses to migration and health at the local, regional and global levels. This will have positive impacts on the health of individual migrants, support efforts to achieve UHC by 2030, and – ultimately – ensure that individuals, communities and States can access the social and economic development benefits associated with healthy migration.
Introduction

Child migration is a significant contemporary phenomenon. It is likely to increase in both scale and salience as the mobility of young people grows, a result of more affordable travel, climate change, growing technologymediated connectivity, increasing global inequality in the distribution of opportunity, security and access to employment, and the diffusion of a global cultural commons.

Like the migration patterns of other age groups, child migration spans a broad range of phenomena. To start with the term itself, a child is defined in international law as “every human being below the age of 18 years, unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”. Data on youth migration do not always use this cut-off point, however, so reference is often made to “youth migration”. The broad term “migration” can cover both international and domestic human mobility – movement that is of short duration or lifelong – and both one-way and circular journeys. It can span the range from unproblematic family relocation to traumatic forced displacement caused by the violence of war, attempts at ethnic cleansing or State disintegration. The migration of children includes both journeys where children accompany adult relatives and situations where children need to undertake journeys alone; it includes situations that result in enduring improvements to the quality of children’s lives, in terms of educational opportunity or familial security, and situations where exposure to exploitation or risk leads to enduring trauma.

Child migration is not a new phenomenon, but one that has a history dating back to ancient times. Children, both boys and girls, have always migrated with or following their families, to pursue opportunities or increase their safety away from home. Much of this migration is unproblematic. After a period of adjustment to a new context, and with the exception of situations where enduring racial or religious discrimination prevents this, most children, along with their families, integrate into their new societies. This chapter, however, focuses on child migration that does not conform to that pattern – migration that is unsafe, irregular, exploitative. And it focuses on international migration. This is not to suggest that other aspects related to child migration are not important. However, the urgent need to better understand unsafe international child migration, in its various dimensions, stems from the fact that this aspect of child migration requires greater engagement and support from governments and international actors, to ensure children the protection they are entitled to.

Accounts abound over the centuries of the unmet protection needs of both male and female children separated from their families by wars, famine and environmental disaster; of trafficked children transported from home by exploitative masters (slave owners, religious orders, warlords); of unaccompanied children received after forced exile by unfamiliar, even unrelated careers (foster families, refugee agencies, and educational or

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1 Jacqueline Bhabha, Professor of the practice of health and human rights, School of Public Health, Harvard University; Guy Abel, Professor in the School of Sociology and Political Science, Shanghai University.
correctional institutions). But, despite this long history, the challenge of protecting the safety and best interests of migrant children has been neglected.

One reason for recent increased attention to the phenomenon is its current magnitude. As figures 1 and 2 show, there were 37.9 million migrants under the age of 20 in 2019, 14 per cent of the world’s migrants. This reality has urgent implications for educational, child welfare and migration authorities.

Another factor galvanizing increased political will and public concern about child migration is the peculiarly newsworthy and compelling nature of child suffering. The tragic September 2015 drowning of Alan Kurdi and the international outrage provoked by the United States Government’s 2018 southern border family separation policy exemplify this. So does the growing acknowledgement of the life-changing impact of aspects of the migration process for very large numbers of child migrants. Policies that separate parents from their children at borders or through deportation proceedings, as well as protracted administrative procedures that prevent children from reunitifying with parents for years, can be devastating for the health and well-being of affected children. Dramatic impacts for children also flow from other migration-related contexts: the absence of life-saving rescue procedures to pre-empt child drowning or fatal dehydration during migration journeys; educational shortcomings in refugee camps; State inaction in the face of evidence of migrant child sexual exploitation; and unmet physical and mental health needs for displaced children.

This chapter examines unsafe international child migration, and the ongoing tension between migration governance and child protection imperatives. The chapter starts by detailing the different types of child migration globally, including their drivers, and issues related to the data on child migration. Next, it discusses key protection challenges affecting child migrants before going on to address current issues and evolving policies relating to them. The chapter then explores the main emerging challenges confronting child migrants. It concludes by reflecting on achievements and priorities still in need of attention.

Types of child migration

Definitional confusion has long bedevilled discussion of child migration. Like the deficiencies related to data that are discussed in what follows, not all aspects of this challenge are specific to children. Facile dichotomies of forced versus economic migration are widely deployed in the migration field, and complicate the imperative of foregrounding rights considerations for vulnerable populations who may be in urgent need of protection. The dearth of child migration research from a child- rather than State-centric perspective contributes to this.
Like adults, children’s migration is not usefully divided into “forced” or “voluntary”, but rather viewed as a combination of elements of compulsion and choice, which may change over time. Because of the large variety of relevant situations, child migrants are now commonly referred to as “children on the move”, a phrase that has the advantage of not precluding a transition from one migrant category to another, but the disadvantage of obscuring the challenges arising after settlement.

Children embark on a broad range of different types of migration. Some migration journeys are highly gendered, such as the long-standing exploitative transportation of Nigerian girls to Europe to work in the sex industry, or the self-initiated migration of North African adolescent boys in search of opportunity. Many other migrations, the majority, include both boys and girls, though sometimes in different ratios, depending on country of origin. Much child migration, particularly outside the context of conflict or disaster, is safe and undertaken as part of a family unit. However, there is an increasing tendency for children to be involved in migration that jeopardizes their safety and violates their rights. Examples of this type of migration include not only the obviously life-threatening forced migrations across treacherous routes – such as the Eastern and Central Mediterranean, where drownings are frequent – but also migrations where children are routinely exposed to physical and/or sexual violence. Unsafe migration also includes situations where children rely on exploitative intermediaries who take advantage of the need for migration assistance to extract labour or other types of services from children in their custody. The discussion focuses on these aspects of child migration.

Children may be internal or international migrants. Children whose migration is internal include internally displaced persons, seasonal migrants or rural-to-urban migrants. Internal migration may be cyclical, and it may be a prelude to international movement. All three categories comprise large groups of children, some of them in very precarious situations.

International child migration includes children who travel for family reasons, for safety or survival, at the behest of traffickers, for opportunity, and frequently for more than one of those reasons. This chapter focuses on unsafe child migration across borders. The following factors are particularly significant for understanding children’s distinctive needs, particularly in relation to safety:

(a) **Who is the child travelling with?** Is he or she accompanied by parents or caregivers (including customary caregivers), travelling unaccompanied (alone), or travelling separated (in the company of extended family members, strangers, traffickers or mere acquaintances)? A child might start the migration accompanied and then become separated from family, so that his or her needs change at different stages of the journey.

(b) **Whether or not the child’s migration is authorized** (by a visa or other legal provision). Children travelling without a regular migration status are at higher risk of exploitation, detention and other harms. Again, a child’s legal status can change from regular to irregular during migration, as when an asylum claim

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14 UNHCR was the first agency to specifically focus on the needs of this population, through its *Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum* (UNHCR, 1997). Others followed rapidly, including the European Union, with its “Resolution on Unaccompanied Minors who are Nationals of Third Countries”, and the national authorities, including Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. See Bhabha, Kanics and Senovilla (eds.), 2018.
15 Kara, 2009; Peyroux, 2018.
16 Bicocchi, 2011; Kanics, 2018; Rozzi, 2018.
is refused but the child remains in the destination State without legal authorization. The converse is also true, as when an undocumented child receives a legal status. An example is the procedure in the United States, whereby an unaccompanied migrant child who has been abused, abandoned or neglected is granted Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. 17

(c) **Whether the child is migrating to escape child-specific persecution**, such as recruitment as a child soldier or gang member, child abuse or child marriage. Timely access to legal representation and guardianship is a protection priority in this type of migration situation. 18

(d) **Whether the child is migrating following a family decision** or without family knowledge or support. Many migrants from countries where adult responsibilities vest at an early age exercise their own decision-making agency. Afghan males, Eritrean male and female teenagers, and Central American boys and girls are cases in point. Acting like adults, even though classified as “children” under international law, many seek out opportunities to support themselves or their families by migrating. 19 Children in West and Central Africa also move to pursue religious education, and are entrusted to a religious leader or figure who is meant to take care of their religious education and well-being, though often for lack of means end up being their exploiter. 20 There is no international uniformity about the age when a child’s decision has legal force. Domestic standards vary, depending on the activity in question. 21

Central American children fleeing gangs

Central American children have been fleeing extreme violence in their home countries for decades, but the rate of this forced migration has increased rapidly since 2014. Though the majority of these child asylum seekers, both unaccompanied and in families, seeks protection in the United States, asylum applications from the so-called Northern Triangle countries (El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala) have increased dramatically throughout Central America. 2 Unaccompanied child asylum seekers who make their claims in the United States have difficulty accessing a lawyer or guardian, despite the best efforts of a web of specialist organizations, including KIND, LIRS and the Young Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights’ Child Advocate Program. As a result, large numbers of children are held in detention, over 14,000 in November 2018, according to official government figures. 2

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17 Thronson, 2018.
18 IOM, 2017b; UNHCR, 2018.
19 Timera, 2018.
21 Wide disparities exist between decision-making domains (for example, voting, driving, criminal, contractual and health care) and jurisdictions. For interesting discussions about child agency in relation to asylum decisions, see the United States Appeals Court decision *Polovchak v. Meese* (1985); see also *Gonzalez Ex Rel. Gonzalez v. Reno*, United States Appeals Court (2000).
A self-initiated migration strategy can include entering into relationships with adults who facilitate cross-border movement in return for services rendered. Adolescents also adopt income-generating opportunities, including in deeply exploitative situations of labour and sex trafficking, to generate resources for migration. Because of the absence of legal migration routes, many adolescents eager to exercise their mobility have no safer alternatives. Europol reports that 28 per cent of identified victims of trafficking globally are children. States have obligations to address these hazardous situations, through robust search-and-rescue operations and livelihood opportunities that might forestall perilous journeys.

Afghan unaccompanied minor asylum seekers in Sweden

Afghanistan has been the site of violent conflict and ensuing population displacement for over 35 years. In 2015, Sweden received over 35,000 asylum claims lodged by unaccompanied minors; 66 per cent of these claims, totalling over 23,000, were from Afghans, the majority male and fleeing political violence at home. Relying on information gleaned in the course of their long international journeys (on average seven months long), many chose Sweden, with its educational opportunity and generous, rights-respecting approach to child migrants, as their destination of choice. As asylum seekers, in line with Sweden’s obligations under international law, they were initially permitted to remain within the country pending a decision on their case, and were thus lawfully present. For those whose asylum claims were successful, a grant of refugee status converted their temporary legal status into a permanent permission to remain, and related to that the opportunity to apply for family reunification for immediate relatives (or for less closely related family members in proven compassionate cases). For those whose asylum claims were unsuccessful, removal notices were issued, converting the young Afghans’ status from that of temporary lawful residents to overstayers, irregularly on the territory and thus liable to deportation. Some of these unsuccessful asylum claimants have been granted subsidiary humanitarian protection, a status that is temporary and carries with it limited family reunification options.

Four changes in Swedish migration procedure in 2016, at the height of political concern about the increasing numbers of arriving asylum seekers, accompanied this change of status, lowering the chances of a positive outcome to the asylum claims lodged. In early 2016, age assessments based on knee or teeth x-rays were introduced, leading to a rise in findings that young asylum claimants were in fact over 18 years of age. In June 2016, the practice of granting humanitarian leave to rejected unaccompanied Afghan asylum seekers was withdrawn, leading to the issuance of deportation orders; in the same year, Sweden, alongside other European Union member States, signed a readmission agreement with Afghanistan ensuring the safe reception of returnees; finally,

22 Vacchiano, 2018.
23 Europol, 2018; Digidiki and Bhabha, 2017.
24 Bhabha, 2014.
25 Europol, 2018. See also Sigona, Chase and Humphris, 2017b.
26 IOM, 2019. The Mexican delegate to the Day of General Discussion acknowledged such responsibilities when reporting on her country’s federal and local mechanisms designed to protect domestic children from perilous journeys and migrant children from dangers at the northern and southern Mexican borders. See United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2012.
policies to more rigorously enforce deportation orders were enacted, to ensure that those with rejected claims were removed from Swedish territory.\textsuperscript{e}

\begin{enumerate}
\item UNHCR, 2015.
\item Swedish Migration Agency, 2017. The authors are grateful to Jonathan Joseffson for his guidance on Swedish policy.
\item Ibid., 2019.
\item Dononi, Monsutti and Scalettaris, 2016.
\item European Commission, 2017a. There are currently no statistics on the ages of forced returnees.
\end{enumerate}

Data issues in measuring the scale of child migration

Two propositions about child migration are widely accepted: that the scale of child migration is increasing, and that the data on child migration are incomplete. Figures 1 and 2 give a snapshot of the migration of under-20-year-olds since 1990. In the absence of data limited to children, these data, which extend from 2 years to beyond 18, must be relied on. They draw on census data, one of the most reliable sources, and show a steady increase in absolute numbers, but a decline in the proportion of under-20s as a share of global migration.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Global migrants under 20 years of age}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source:} UN DESA, 2019a.
Concerns about the inadequacy of data – lack of sources and deficits in reliable, up-to-date and disaggregated data – are not peculiar to the child migration context; they exist for the migration field as a whole, and are referenced throughout this report. But the data deficiencies regarding child migrants are of particular concern, because they hamper timely and adequate protection and care for a group of migrants that may be especially vulnerable and dependent on government support. Remarkably, only 56 per cent of refugee-related data and 20 per cent of internally displaced person (IDP)-related data include age-disaggregated information; even migrant stock data include information about age in only 80 per cent of countries. The absence of age disaggregation is not the only concern. Others include broad gaps in data on gender, problems relating to the double-counting of children who move between and within countries, and deficient methods for ascertaining age.

The most recent global estimate for the total number of child migrants is approximately 31 million. This is a “stock” figure, one that represents the total number of people under 18 born in a country other than the one where they are living. Though it gives a snapshot of the magnitude of the issue, it is of limited accuracy and use, because it does not describe which country the migrant children have come from, what their legal status is, how long they have been where they are or what the children’s date of birth is.

27 UNICEF et al., 2018; UN DESA, 2019b.
28 IOM, 2016.
29 UNICEF, 2018b.
An additional complexity arises from the technical fact that a child, in international law, is defined as “any human being below the age of 18”, whereas census data are based on the age groups 0–4, 5–9, 10–14 and 15–19 years of age; the global figure just cited is based on a United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimation of the size of the last of these groups, which applies to people under 18. To this figure can be added others. UNICEF has calculated – using United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) data, combined with evidence from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and Eurostat – that approximately one in eight migrants is a child, the majority of them being regular migrants who travel with a regular status and the necessary protection. However, large numbers do not enjoy that safety. There are approximately 13 million child refugees, 936,000 asylum-seeking children, and 17 million children who have been forcibly displaced inside their own countries.

Figure 3. International migrants (millions) under 20 years of age, by region

Source: UN DESA, 2019a.

31 UNICEF, 2018b.
These regional stock data graphs complement the global picture presented earlier, in figures 1 and 2. They show that some regions (most dramatically, Asia) have experienced a sharp increase in the numbers of young migrants. They also highlight large differences between the regions in the proportions of children within their migrant stocks – nearly 30 per cent in Africa, compared with less than 10 per cent in Europe and North America.

In addition to these sources, there is also a proliferation in the availability of new data mining techniques that have the potential to generate better information in the future. They include geospatial mapping, satellite nightlights and analysis of changing smartphone location in real time. A word of caution is in order, however. The proliferation of and access to personal information, including biometric indicators, may generate risks rather than protections for child migrants. So more rather than less data should not be a goal in and of itself, unless privacy protections and other ethical concerns are carefully attended to. In particular, due diligence in the implementation of “firewalls” to prevent the use of personal data for punitive or immigration enforcement goals is an essential correlate of ethical and rights-based data collection.⁹²

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Data on vulnerable populations, such as displaced child migrants, are particularly useful when they are specific and have the potential to contribute to policy challenges. One example is the following details on the distribution of young Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, where over 50 per cent of the child population is still out of school. In this context, up-to-date age and gender details can appropriate expansion of school programmes and skill training.

Table 1. IOM/UNHCR/education sector – Rohingya child and youth population in Cox’s Bazar Refugee camps, Bangladesh, January 2019

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population in need</td>
<td>518,404</td>
<td>105,433</td>
<td>235,638</td>
<td>74,773</td>
<td>102,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently enrolled in school</td>
<td>222,916</td>
<td>84,619</td>
<td>133,638</td>
<td>4,048</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently outside school</td>
<td>192,084</td>
<td>20,814</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>70,725</td>
<td>101,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target goal for 2019 (% of the total population)</td>
<td>393,012 (75.8%)</td>
<td>105,433 (100%)</td>
<td>235,638 (100%)</td>
<td>44,864 (60%)</td>
<td>7,077 (6.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNHCR, 2019a.

Figure 5. Demographic breakdown of Myanmar refugees in Bangladesh

Source: UNHCR, 2019b.
Another example of specific age- and gender-disaggregated data that provide a useful basis for the development of protective child migrant policy concerns the extensive and rapid recent forced migration of Venezuelans into neighbouring Latin American countries. The contrast in age distribution between Rohingya and Venezuelan refugee populations in these figures is noteworthy. It illustrates significant differences in the age composition of the populations prior to their forced migration, with Rohingya estimated to have had one of the highest birth rates of all ethnic groups in Myanmar.\(^{33}\)

There are also likely to be differences related to the nature of the displacement events. For the Rohingya, lethal ethnic violence prompted entire communities to flee for survival in a short period. For the Venezuelans, economic crisis and ongoing instability initially compelled adults of working age to move in search of alternative sources of income to support families left behind. However, over time, this has become a more pervasive displacement situation as the crisis has deepened and whole families, including children, have moved.

**Figure 6. Demographic breakdown of Venezuelans in Colombia**

![Graph showing demographic breakdown of Venezuelans in Colombia](image)

*Source: Government of Colombia, 2018.*

*Note: The split in child migrant age groups is estimated using the overall gender split reported for the total child data.*

\(^{33}\) Bomquist and Cincotta, 2016.
Key child protection challenges affecting child migrants

Large-scale child migration inevitably places complex demands on States, obligated as they are to address needs and provide services as required by international and domestic legal standards. Following are some of the key current challenges concerning child migration.

Education

States are mandated to provide education to all children in their jurisdiction without discrimination.34 For any migrant child, few State services are more important. Not only does education generate portable individual skills and capital that impact central aspects of the life course, it also provides the context for social inclusion, peer group encounters and new cultural and language acquisition. Many examples exist of innovative educational provision directed at generating robust multicultural environments responsive to different pedagogic and emotional needs.35

This is a context where scarce resources and a perception that outsiders are being privileged can generate acute resentment towards newcomers, unless investment also targets domestic populations in need.36 Challenges also arise in identifying accurately the needs of migrant or refugee children, taking account of their prior educational experience and their linguistic competencies.37

Bangladesh: Rohingya children’s access to education

As of October 2018, over 900,000 Rohingya refugees from Myanmar were living in 30 temporary camps located in the Cox’s Bazar coastal region of south-eastern Bangladesh. According to UNICEF, approximately 620,000 were between 4 and 14 years of age. They are being provided with a range of humanitarian services, including education in 1,898 learning centres that cater to the needs of children their age. These centres provide access to non-formal educational activities for over 140,000 children. Impressive though this effort is, it still leaves almost 482,000 Rohingya children without any educational access. The situation of adolescents and youths is particularly challenging: 98 per cent of Rohingya aged 15 to 24 years have received no education at all; girls of all ages and disabled children are also disproportionately disadvantaged.9 Many of the children in the learning centres had been out of school for at least two years prior to their admission to the centres, as a result of events in Myanmar and the dislocations related to their exodus into Bangladesh.

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35 Ensor and Goździak, 2016.
36 Theirworld, 2017.
37 Dryden-Peterson, Dayya and Adelman, 2017.
Instruction is provided in classrooms where two female teachers, one from the host community and one Rohingya, cover a standardized curriculum delivered in English and Burmese. No instruction is permitted in Bangla, the national language of Bangladesh (a local dialect of which, Chittagonian, is the Rohingya language) because of the expectations that this population will not remain permanently. Instruction is divided into four levels, catering to children aged, respectively, 4–6 years (level 1); 7–8 years (level 2); 9–10 years (level 3); and 10–14 years (level 4). As of January 2019, curricular materials were only available for level 1 and 2 students.

Guardianship

Whereas some State services, such as education, are essential for all migrant children, others only apply to some. A case in point is the need for appointment of a guardian responsible for the child’s care where children are unaccompanied or separated, or otherwise at risk, a measure called for by both international and regional policies on child migration. Only a minority of States have incorporated this recommendation into their domestic legal obligations. Among them is Italy (see text box below).

Italy’s protection measures for unaccompanied minors

Italy promulgated a law in May 2017 on “Protection Measures for Unaccompanied Minors”, which obliges the police to immediately report the presence of an unaccompanied minor to the relevant judicial authority, who in turn has 48 hours in which to appoint a guardian. The law requires comprehensive protection to be speedily put in place for unaccompanied child minors. In practice, underfunding and other capacity deficits have resulted in frequent delays before a guardian is appointed (up to 11 months in some reported cases) and in the allocation of large numbers of unaccompanied children per guardian (often public officials), complicating or even eliminating the development of the close and parental relationship envisaged. A case in point was the reported allocation of 850 unaccompanied children to the same guardian, the Welfare Councillor of Palermo. To address these staffing challenges, the 2017 law also calls for the compilation of lists of “volunteer guardians”, selected and trained by the Regional Ombudsperson for Children, and then allocated as mentors for individual children. Ensuring quality control and consistency in such a setting is difficult. The challenge of securing individualized child protection arrangements for all migrant children who need them thus remains a work in progress.

a Law no. 47/17, often referred to as the “Zampa law” after the name of the MP who introduced the bill to Parliament.
Several acute child protection challenges have emerged where unaccompanied minors outside family care or any institutional framework providing shelter have set up home in informal unauthorized camps created by refugees and migrants, often as a prelude to further migration to join family members elsewhere.

Current issues and evolving policies

While the majority of children who migrate do so through safe migration processes as part of family units, many other child migrants do not. Some continue to lack effective protection from harm and face sustained human rights violations at all stages of their journeys, in the country of origin at departure, en route through transit regions and seas, on arrival at their temporary or permanent destination and, with growing frequency, in the country to which they are returned if their migration journey is curtailed.

Many agencies have called attention to this substantial protection deficit, highlighting urgent challenges. Of immediate concern as key priorities are the risk of exploitation and abuse, the negative impact of detention, the effect of family separation, the inadequate access to education and health care, the lack of attention to drivers of forced child migration and, finally, discrimination. To these urgent issues could be added others confronting millions of child migrants. One is the absence of adequate legal pathways for the exercise of child and youth mobility, a shortcoming of the contemporary migration framework that renders so much child migration unsafe. Another is the pervasive and underaddressed stigma surrounding undocumented child migrants, whatever their length of residence at destination. Yet another concern relates to the absence of safety and child protection guarantees in asylum seeker and refugee camps or shelters. Finally, there are serious deficits in access to guardianship and legal representation for unaccompanied and separated child migrants.

International initiatives to improve protection of child migrants

Alongside these continuing challenges, one finds a rich body of recent international work, setting out principles and implementing policies that improve the circumstances surrounding child migration. At the international level, there have been a number of developments regarding child migration. A landmark document is the international synthesis of rights relevant to child migrants set out in the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child 2005 General Comment No. 6 (2005): Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin. The General Comment was followed by a second important international effort regarding child migration, the 2012 Committee on the Rights of the Child Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion: The Rights of All Children in the Context of International Migration. A practical outcome of the Day of General Discussion was the creation of an Inter-Agency Group on Children on the Move focused on mainstreaming child protection concerns into the migration agenda. The group produced a widely endorsed set of recommended principles for child migrants targeting some of the key enduring protection challenges.

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38 For an example of the impact of these deficits in practice, see Human Rights Watch, 2018b.
41 Ibid., 2012.
42 OHCHR, 2016.
Most recently, other initiatives have built on the conclusions and principles of the initiatives just described, as well as the inter-agency position on migrant and refugee children for the two compacts and the work of the Inter-Agency Working Group to end Child Immigration Detention. 43 Two United Nations treaty bodies adopted additional General Comments on the topic of child migration in 2017 and consolidated their efforts into the first Joint General Comment on the subject in the same year, namely the Joint General Comment No. 3 (2017) of the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and No. 22 (2017) of the Committee on the Rights of the Child on the General Principles regarding the Human Rights of Children in the Context of International Migration. 44 The Joint General Comment also stresses the importance of according relevant State authorities – whether of origin, transit, destination or return – a leading role, "with clear decision-making power", on policies and practices pertinent to migration-affected children. 45 Central among such practices are the conduct of best interests assessments and determinations, individualized procedures that need to be conducted by trained and accountable personnel, where appropriate at different stages of the decision-making procedure. UNICEF consolidated much of this policy work by releasing a “six point plan to keep refugee and migrant children safe” in 2017. 46

Together these initiatives have created a useful action framework for States. By highlighting needs for specially targeted protection measures – including access to free legal representation, integrated services including in relation to education, and to protections from exploitation and trauma – these frameworks have given a welcome impetus to policy reform. They have stimulated measures that take note not just of the vulnerability and dependence, but also the resilience and agency of young migrants, including States’ duties to “prepare and accompany children through the journey to adulthood, rather than threatening them with abrupt change as soon as they reach the age of maturity”. 47

However, effective implementation of these recommendations has been mixed. All the documents just referenced stress the imperative to issue birth registration and concomitant proof of identity for all children in the territory, because these documents provide critical tools for reducing statelessness, exploitation and abuse of child migrants, and for increasing access to State facilities such as health care and education. 48 But many groups of migrant and refugee children continue to lack these documents. They include Syrians born in exile, and Rohingya in Myanmar and abroad. 49

Integration of migrant children outside of family care within the national childcare or child protection agency is still not the norm. Research has identified a policy and practice gap in the protection and support apparatus related to the transition to adulthood, with obvious implications for both mental health and well-being. 50 There are, however, some examples of good practice, such as Italy and Turkey. 51

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45 Ibid.
47 OHCHR, 2016.
49 Blitz, 2011.
50 Chase, 2017; Sigona, Chase and Humphris, 2017a.
51 Law 47/2017 (the so-called Zampa Law) heralded an innovative volunteer guardian programme, run by the Italian Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents, to train volunteer guardians as both legal and humanitarian mentors for up to two migrant and refugee children; AGIA, 2017.
European States have made considerable, if uneven, progress in instituting access to legal representation for unaccompanied and separated children, and in reducing the reliance on detention, but this is not the case in other jurisdictions, such as the United States.\(^{52}\)

Much of the agenda laid out by these normative frameworks remains to be implemented. Several recent mass forced exoduses of children have demonstrated the dearth of services available. Mental health needs among millions of displaced Syrian children are acute and mainly unattended to; educational needs among Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh are challenging and not fully met, particularly for the older cohorts of children.\(^{53}\) Another area where the gap between normative exhortation and implementation is evident is protection of migrant children following repatriation. Returned children rarely encounter reintegration assistance, or the rehabilitative services called for by standard-setting initiatives.\(^{54}\)

Regional initiatives to improve protection of child migrants

Several significant regional initiatives on child migration have been developed in recent years. Three are noteworthy – those in the European Union, in West Africa and in Latin America – and are discussed in turn below.

The European Union has witnessed large-scale flows of child migrants in recent years. In 2015, for example, 31 per cent of the refugees arriving in the European Union by sea were children, and in early 2016 the proportion of children among sea arrivals in Greece was up to approximately 40 per cent.\(^{55}\) European institutions have been at the forefront of some of the most impactful policy and practice advances in respect of migrant and refugee children.

The European Court of Human Rights has played an important if cautious role, providing a critical forum of last instance for particularly egregious State behaviour.\(^{56}\) It has prohibited the placement of asylum-seeking children (including where accompanied by their parents) in reception conditions likely to generate “a situation of stress and anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences”, an all-too common occurrence, particularly in Southern Europe;\(^{57}\) it has ruled against the detention of migrant children, even for short periods, where alternative and less restrictive strategies should have been considered, or where the detention conditions, when inflicted on children, whether in terms of length of time in custody or level of provision within the institution, amount to inhuman or degrading treatment;\(^{58}\) and it has, albeit in a limited fashion, prevented family expulsions with far-reaching consequences for the care or well-being of affected children.\(^{59}\)

European Union measures are also noteworthy. On 12 April 2017, the European Commission adopted a “Communication on the protection of children in migration”, articulating a comprehensive programme of protective action for child migrants at all stages of their migration.\(^{60}\)

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52 Crea, 2018; International Detention Coalition, 2018.
53 Save the Children, 2017; Ruhani, 2017.
56 Smyth, 2018; the following discussion on the court’s jurisprudence relies on this chapter.
60 European Commission, 2017b.
But adequate or integrated responses to this ambitious programme are still elusive. “Reconciling child protection and migration control goals, already difficult at national level, may become all the more difficult across borders. In practice transnational cooperation frequently focuses first and foremost on which State should have the child within its jurisdiction, rather than centring on a proper joint assessment of the best interests of the child”.  

Integration across all European Union member States in respect of child protection obligations has not been effective so far.  

West Africa is another region with a well-established system of cross-border free movement of persons, promoted in part by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional grouping of 15 West African States founded in 1975. The region has a long tradition of mobility, driven by a range of factors, including economic self-improvement, environmental hardship, conflict and escape from abuse of harmful traditional practices (including early marriage and witchcraft). Rates of child migration are high: a 2016 UNICEF report notes that 1 in 45 children in the world today are on the move, with Africa home to 1 in 5 of these child migrants. In this region, most migration is intraregional, and children travel as much as adults, many of them unaccompanied or separated, often considered de facto adults with attendant responsibilities. While some of this child movement is self-initiated and generative of opportunities and life enhancements, a significant portion is coerced or abusive, and places child migrants in situations of high risk and scarce protection.  

Child protection implementation for migrants has lagged far behind norm-setting standards. Domestic social and child protection structures are minimal, and transnational mechanisms are practically non-existent. By contrast with the European Union, ECOWAS has not promulgated any coordinated protective transnational measures for child migrants. Early protective efforts in the region, taking note of widespread child trafficking, resulted in misplaced efforts to stop child migration, described by experts as “an attempt to pour water uphill”, as most intercepted and returned children embarked on migration again within weeks.  

From 2005 onwards, ECOWAS has collaborated with partners in the region in forming the West African Network (WAN), specifically geared to generating protective interventions and effective referral mechanisms for the benefit of child migrants in the region, particularly those travelling unaccompanied. WAN reports delivering assistance to over 6,500 child migrants since its inception. WAN’s work has included early identification of vulnerable child migrants and provision of emergency support where needed, as well as the consistent use of best interests assessments, which consider alternatives to migration, family and community support measures to assist reintegration where appropriate.  

A third region where child migration has been the focus of multi-State attention is Latin America. Among various regional initiatives, the most notable is the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 2014 Advisory Opinion on the needs of children in international migration. The opinion draws attention to the urgent
and unmet need for international protection, and describes applicable procedures relevant to the treatment of both asylum-seeking and irregular child migrants, highlighting principles such as the non-detention of children based on an irregular migratory situation. Mexico has taken a lead in implementing protective services for unaccompanied child migrants, including those returned by the United States. Measures to decrease the reliance of detention are being considered (see the text box below on recent progress).

Two examples of recent progress in protecting child migrants

1. **Mexico**: Implementation of a 2014 law that includes child migrant protections, including the appointment of 300 dedicated child protection officers, who assisted 130,000 child migrants, 50 per cent of them unaccompanied, in 2017. It has developed a model of alternative, non-custodial care and a family foster care pilot for the placement of child victims of violence, and is in the process of designing a national action plan to increase alternatives to detention. Mexico is collaborating with Save the Children on a regional project to improve local conditions and educational access in the Northern Triangle countries.\(^a\) At the same time, externalization of United States migration control is generating hazardous situations at Mexico’s northern border for minors attempting to lodge asylum applications in the United States. A limited quota system for asylum applicants forces thousands, including unaccompanied minors, to spend months in dangerous limbo on the Mexican side of the border, out of the reach of effective child protection services.\(^b\)

2. **Turkey**: Since 2014, successful implementation of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, which permits access to protection, education and health care for children under international or temporary protection on equal grounds to Turkish children. This has resulted in improved access for migrant and refugee children to education and to needed health services and medicines.\(^c\) Despite these positive developments, however, Syrian refugee children continue to face challenges in securing the health and educational opportunities they need. The Temporary Education Centres established for Syrians, an important transitional step in securing schooling for Syrian children in Arabic, were not initially accredited and delayed adaptation to and inclusion in the host community. Recruitment of Syrian doctors and teachers has eased the language challenges facing the refugees, but some have no access to appropriate service providers or linguistic support. In addition, some of the Turkish teachers recruited to meet the increased school population were inexperienced and lacked the skills or support needed to manage complex classrooms with highly traumatized children.\(^d\)

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\(^a\) Information received by the Mexican Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, thanks to Mirela Shuterqui.

\(^b\) UNICEF, 2016a; Campoy, 2016.

\(^c\) Aida, 2018.

\(^d\) Aras and Yasun, 2016; Çelik and İçduygu, 2018; Uyan-Semerci and Erdoğan, 2018. The authors are grateful to Deniz Yılmaz for these references.
Emerging issues

At its important convening in September 2016, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) issued a landmark statement, the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, announcing the launch of two non-binding Global Compact processes, one for refugees and one on migration. It stated: “We will protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all refugee and migrant children, regardless of their status, and giving primary consideration at all times to the best interests of the child. This will apply particularly to unaccompanied children and those separated from their families”.

A central goal of the Global Compact for Migration is to advance the important Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on migration. This SDG, identified as SDG Target 10.7, calls on States to “facilitate orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies”.

The Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts, a multi-stakeholder effort to highlight child migrant issues, identified several priority areas for making SDG Target 10.7 a reality for children. Among them is the meticulous generation of accurate, targeted and disaggregated empirical data to anchor the process of evaluating compliance with the Global Compact for Migration’s child migrant protection goals.

An emerging child migration issue is the growing political heft of an organized movement of child migrants themselves. In the spring and summer of 2017, a group of young Afghan migrants led protests in Sweden’s capital Stockholm against the Government’s threat to deport them back to Afghanistan, culminating in a 1,000-person-strong demonstration in the city centre. The protests were successful, forcing the Government to withdraw deportation notices issued to some of the unaccompanied Afghan asylum seekers whose claims for protection had been denied. Another instance is the United States-based “Dreamers” organization, a group of young migrant activists who have embarked on “a gesture of civil disobedience that defied immigration enforcement policies and sought to re-shape legislation on citizenship”. A very large constituency of children and young people, many of them United States residents since infancy, this group has succeeded in bringing to public attention the compelling merits of their case for legalization. Deeply affected in all areas of their lives by their irregular migration status, the group has organized public events drawing attention to the pervasive consequences of being undocumented. Broader alliances demanding legalization for undocumented youths have also developed, including United We Dream, a national youth-led advocacy network that brings together over 50 affiliates. The future of the so-called “DACA-mented” youths – those who have benefited from former President Obama’s “Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA)” executive order deferring deportation and permitting employment for 800,000 eligible undocumented children and young people – remains deeply uncertain.

70 UNGA, 2016.
71 Ibid.
72 SDSN, 2019.
73 The Local, 2017.
74 Terrio, 2018.
75 Ibid.
Deportation and forced removal of unaccompanied child migrants and refugees is an issue of growing concern.76 This large-scale repatriation process, a consequence of vigorous regional border enforcement policies, particularly in Europe and North America, externalizes the protective responsibilities owed child migrants to jurisdictions poorly able to shoulder them. Human rights organizations have drawn attention to significant child protection concerns related to these policies, including the absence of any systematic scrutiny of the best interests of children or the likely risks back home.77 In 2017, UNICEF reported that 9 per cent of the estimated 400,000 migrants stranded in Libya were children, 14,000 of them unaccompanied.78 By May 2018, Amnesty International reported the existence of over 33 active detention centres in Libya with over 7,000 migrants (many of them children) detained in them. In the absence of relocation opportunities in Europe or elsewhere, the European Union, the African Union and United Nations agencies have directed their efforts to the repatriation of migrants wishing to exit from the detention facilities and return home. IOM has facilitated the return of over 23,000 migrants from Libya, including a small number of children. Efforts are being made to ensure that assessments of the best interests of repatriated children are conducted prior to return, and to address the lack of support to returnees or their families once they arrive in the country of return.79

A final emerging issue, and one that may dwarf the others, is the growing impact of climate-related mobility on the lives of children and their families (see chapter 9 of this report). In addition to the general issues, a few child-specific points arise. Children rarely make decisions about how or when to move in climate-related mobility contexts, nor are they generally involved in any way in the programming of such moves. This participation failure can exacerbate the feeling of disorientation and loss associated with forced uprooting from one’s home, one’s peer group and one’s anchoring sense of belonging.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter has been on the subset of international child migrations that generate protection concerns, migrations that require greater public engagement and support.

Increased attention to the scale and modalities of contemporary child migration has generated policy reforms, several of them detailed above, that are beginning to result in improved protections for child migrants and refugees. For example, many countries to which large numbers of unaccompanied children have migrated have instituted guardianship schemes and free legal representation services. And indeed, even where policy implementation is still incomplete or inconsistent, there is a growing consensus about minimum standards that should apply to child migrants. Thus, it is widely accepted that child migrants should not be subject to detention, that the agency, participation and resilience of child migrants should be attended to as much as their vulnerability and dependence, that migrant and refugee children should be mainstreamed into domestic educational and child protection services, and that unaccompanied and separated children should be the focus of dedicated measures. Both early childhood development and adolescent child welfare experts are gradually including the special considerations relevant to child and refugee migrants in their programing and training.80

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76 Chase and Sigona, 2017.
77 UNICEF, 2018b.
78 UNICEF, 2017b.
However, considerable implementation gaps remain, illustrated by recent incidents described above, such as family separation and child migrant detention in the United States, and the need to expand educational provision for Rohingya refugee children in Bangladesh. Very large numbers of forcibly displaced children, both inside the borders of their own countries and in camps adjacent to them, continue to lack access to basic services such as primary health care and education, and to experience repeated threats to their physical and mental well-being. Exploitation and exposure to violence en route remain common incidents of contemporary child migration. Overall, the imperative of attending to the needs and rights of child migrants, and of developing a child-centric approach to research and planning, is still imperfectly realized, and data that are necessary to demonstrate the urgency of this situation remain inadequate.

This chapter has pointed to several hopeful developments, including the more vigorous engagement of a range of actors in the improvement of child migrant protection, the production of useful guidelines for policy development, the growing intersectoral convergence of professionals working with child migrants, and the increasing activism and leadership developing within the child migrant community itself.

Finally, it bears repeating that serious protection challenges remain, challenges that are likely to persist unless concerted steps are taken to counter some worrying trends. Among them, most critical perhaps, is the persistent evidence of violence targeting migrant communities including young migrants, whether in the course of their journeys or on arrival in their new host countries. Children who have survived the challenges of life in refugee camps or perilous border crossings need inclusive measures, stability and opportunity if they are to overcome the searing legacy of the past. For those who enjoy the benefits of supportive familial or community settings, this may well ensue, provided their societies engage actively with the prevention of xenophobic aggression and the diffusion of hate – in the classroom, football field or housing complex. For those child migrants who have travelled alone, more may be necessary to ensure resilience, to ensure that their voices are heard, and to support their prospects of success. Child welfare and migration governance systems need to converge and build the capacity to collaborate with greater consistency, to facilitate the inclusion of migrant children into domestic child protection structures, to incentivize greater knowledge of and understanding towards children’s needs and rights in the migration system, and to thoroughly implement non-discrimination obligations in respect of all migrant children within the jurisdictions.
HUMAN MOBILITY AND ADAPTATION TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

Introduction

Millions of men, women and children around the world move in anticipation or as a response to environmental stress every year. Disruptions such as cyclones, floods and wildfires destroy homes and assets, and contribute to the displacement of people. Slow-onset processes – such as sea-level rise changes in rainfall patterns and droughts – contribute to pressures on livelihoods, and access to food and water, that can contribute to decisions to move away in search of more tenable living conditions. Advances in meteorological and other sciences which inform about the dynamics and pace of climate change indicate that disruptions ranging from extreme weather events to large scale changes in ecosystems are occurring at a pace and intensity unlike any other known period of time on Earth. Anthropogenic climate change is expected to increasingly affect migration and other forms of people moving to manage these changing risks.

This chapter provides an up-to-date overview of environmental change and the spectrum of human mobility. It first explores different perspectives on environmental change and migration, ranging from the view that human mobility including migration is a security issue, that it is an issue of protection, and that it is a matter of adaptation and managing risks associated with environmental change. The chapter then provides examples of environmental migration from empirical research around the world. It then summarizes recent developments in the international policy sphere on the topic. The conclusion draws out the implications for research, policy and practice.

Understanding the links between environmental change and migration

The mechanisms through which environmental impacts contribute to migration are complex. Over the last decade, it has become accepted that links between the environment and migration are rarely linear. Some literature frames the issue as a normal and neutral social process and other articles refer to the “migrancy problematic”. Economic, political, cultural and demographic factors interact with environmental drivers to shape intentions of people to move or stay in a given location. These interactions can contribute to building

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2 NASEM, 2016; IPCC, 2014.
3 Since the end of the twentieth century there have been estimates of the future numbers of people who will move due to climate change (Myers, 1993; Stern et al., 2006). While policy circles may embrace such estimates, academia has been critical of the assumptions necessary to produce models, in particular the lack of consideration given to non-migratory adaptation measures (Gemenne, 2013). Nonetheless, these approaches, and the numbers they generate continue to influence media and policy discourses (Rigaud et al., 2018).
4 Siddiqui et al., 2019.
5 Castles, 2010; Hall, 2015.
pressure – sometimes referred to as tipping points – after which remaining in situ becomes less attractive than leaving.\textsuperscript{6} Whether and when these intentions are manifested into actions is partially dependent on the material ability to move,\textsuperscript{7} with some immobile populations labelled as “trapped”.\textsuperscript{8} Immobility is not necessarily related to material conditions, and also relates to psychological and cultural limitations and preferences.\textsuperscript{9}

Numerous terms have been used to describe people who move as a result of environmental and climate change. This chapter uses terms such as “human mobility” in the context of climate change, which refers to a broad spectrum of people movement. It covers migration, displacement and planned relocation, as well as “environmental migrants”, including in relation to extreme events and other environmental stressors. Three main framings of environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change have emerged in academia, the media and in policy circles: (a) irregular migration related to environmental change and resource shortages as a border security issue, particularly for areas of destination; (b) protection of environmental migrants; and (c) environmental migration as a form of adaptation and climate risk management (see table 1), reflecting the political sensitivities of migration.

| Table 1. Three different ways of framing interactions between environmental change and migration |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|
| **Key concepts**                              | **Protection**                                | **Adaptation and climate risk management**    |
| Irregular migration                           | Human rights                                  | Adaptive capacity; Remittances; Averting, minimizing and addressing the adverse impacts of climate change. |
| Factor of instability in the face of resource shortages (climate as a threat multiplier) | Lacking agency                                | Agential.                                      |
| National borders should be controlled to reduce risks to society, resources, and culture in areas of destination | If people move they must be able to do so in dignified, safe conditions within protection frameworks | Human mobility can be one of a spectrum of responses to climate impacts and risks. |

\textsuperscript{6} McLeman, 2018.
\textsuperscript{7} Black et al., 2011.
\textsuperscript{8} Black and Collyer, 2014.
\textsuperscript{9} Ayeb-Karlsson, Smith and Kniveton, 2018; Oakes, 2019.
Policy arenas  
Platform on Disaster Displacement;  
Global Compact on Refugees.  
UNFCCC Cancun Agreement;  
UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement;  
Global Compact for Migration.

Examples in reports and literature  
IPCC AR5 chapter on human security and migration;  
UNSG Climate as a threat multiplier.  
Kelman et al., 2015;  
Nansen protection framework.  
McLeman and Smit, 2003;  
IPCC special report on land and climate change;  
IPCC AR6.

Notes: UNFCCC is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; IPCC is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; AR5 is the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report; AR6 is the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report; UNSG is the United Nations Secretary-General.

The first type of framing tends to emphasize environmental migrants as part of a wider “threat multiplier” landscape as either explicitly or implicitly a threat to security in areas of destination, and has been argued as being related to a focus on national borders and resource control. In policy, these ideas can translate into border security discussions and measures. The second framing tends to represent environmental migration as a phenomenon associated with vulnerable people moving in adverse circumstances and who need protection. Protection approaches share commonalities with approaches that highlight human rights related to rights to work, education, health care, food and water, and other rights that environmental shocks can disrupt. Protection approaches place the needs of the affected people who may be moving at the centre. The protection framing is evident in the work of the Platform on Disaster Displacement.

The securitization and protection framings have been critiqued as they have not sufficiently acknowledged the agency of the people affected by environmental change, emphasizing threats without fully acknowledging opportunities that may also play a role in environmental migration. The third type of framing views human mobility ranging from migration, displacement, and planned relocation as a set of possible adaptive responses to climate impacts and risks. In climate policy, human mobility appeared for the first time in the Cancun Adaptation Framework and currently features in a dedicated workstream on human mobility as well as the Task Force on Displacement. This framing recognizes the possibility of reducing exposure and vulnerability to physical disruptions associated with climate and other environmental stressors. It also emphasizes the pursuit of approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change. The following section briefly sets out the evolution of the framing of migration as a form of adaptation.

10 Baldwin, 2013; Bettini, 2013.  
12 PDD, 2016.  
13 Adger, Campos and Morteux, 2018.
Understanding migration as a possible response to climate impacts and risks

Though outcomes are context specific, some understanding has emerged over the last decade of the opportunities migration presents in the face of environmental disruptions.\(^{14}\) When voluntary migration is considered, people may be able to protect or use their assets and health, decide on who in the household moves and how, as well as when and where they will go. In this manner, migration is part of a suite of adaptation measures, which people use to deal with climatic and environmental change and reduce poverty and boost resilience.\(^{15}\) Where households are more resilient, younger, better-educated migrants improve the condition of the household through remittances used to pay for education, health care or livelihood diversification. Where households are in a more precarious position, migrants might be the household heads and outcomes can be described as surviving through securing food, or cash to acquire food.\(^{16}\) The distinction between voluntary and forced migration is somewhat arbitrary and has been described as more accurately resembling a continuum from entirely voluntary to entirely forced.\(^{17}\) In responding to environmental issues, even “voluntary” migration can involve some degree of pressure. Supportive policies and legal pathways therefore act as an enabling factor for migration in these situations, with the effect of facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration that is better able to be managed.

Once adaptation possibilities (both in situ and ex situ strategies) and community resilience have been exhausted, an entire community may have to relocate as a last resort.\(^{18}\) The resulting change in circumstances means that the consequences of the move could be considered adaptive under certain circumstances. In the case of planned relocation, outcomes may be adaptive if processes are participatory and include acceptance among both areas of origin and areas of destination from an early stage, and when suitable livelihood opportunities are available for people who may move.\(^{19}\)

Critiques and nuances

The questions of framing environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change as part of a threat multiplier (security) discourse, as a protection framework issue, and as an issue of risk management has a significant subjective element. Migration has been explained as a failure to adapt or a strategy of last resort.\(^{20}\) The “environmental refugee” literature that emerged further reinforced this framing which depicted the prospect of climate change causing large-scale movements to urban areas and from developing to developed countries.\(^{21}\) The term “adaptation” has been critiqued as some uses emphasize the role of individuals and households over responsibility to the political and economic structures that foster

\(^{14}\) Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.
\(^{15}\) ADB, 2012.
\(^{16}\) Warner and Affi, 2014.
\(^{17}\) Hugo, 1996.
\(^{18}\) ADB, 2012.
\(^{19}\) Brookings Institution and UNHCR, 2015.
\(^{20}\) Baro and Deubel, 2006; Adamo, 2008; Penning-Rosell, Sultana and Thompson, 2013.
\(^{21}\) El-Hinnawi, 1985; McLeman, 2016.
The concept of migration as adaptation has been challenged as ignoring political economic realities,\(^{23}\) and some literature claims that the migration as adaptation framing obscures the discourse about climate change and migration along ethnic and racial lines.\(^{24}\) The emphasis of positive outcomes in the migration as adaptation framing has been criticized by some scholars as not reflective of migrants’ realities.\(^{25}\) Further, planned relocation processes have proven to be complex, and can also affect the relationship between governments and subnational jurisdictions in urban and rural areas, so are sometimes not considered as adaptation to climate change.\(^{26}\)

Moving may reduce vulnerability in the short-term, but contribute to further problems in the medium-term, as populations may recreate exposed and vulnerable conditions in new sites.\(^{27}\) Migration for work may help migrant-sending households to manage environmental shocks and stressors in the short-term. However, it could expose migrant workers, and thereby migrant-sending households, to shocks and stressors in the medium- or long-term.\(^{28}\) Consideration of the “who” and “when” of adaptation reveals that adaptation is experienced subjectively; in the last decade there has been an increase in research which highlights the subjective nature of climate risk,\(^{29}\) and subjective barriers to both climate change adaptation and potentially adaptive migration.\(^{30}\)

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**Data and knowledge on environmental mobility**

Research on environmental mobility is still developing and while advances have been made in the two decades there are various data and knowledge gaps that persist.\(^{a}\) Increasingly reliable figures for the number of new internal displacements related to rapid onset environmental disruptions are produced each year. But there are difficulties in obtaining reliable numbers of migration when it is not forced; for example, it is difficult to compute reliable estimates for the numbers of people moving in anticipation of or response to slow-onset processes such as desertification or sea-level rise.\(^b\) There is also a need for the assessment of the economic and other costs associated with migration.\(^c\) Research on this theme continues to be about the Global South and by researchers from the Global North.\(^d\) There is scope for South–South and South–North capacity-building and improved integration of research and local knowledge.

\(^{a}\) Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017; PDD, 2016.
\(^{b}\) IDMC, 2019.
\(^{c}\) Ibid.
\(^{d}\) Piguet, Kaenzig and Guélat, 2018.

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\(^{22}\) Ribot, 2011.
\(^{23}\) Felli and Castree, 2012; Bettini, 2014.
\(^{24}\) Baldwin, 2017.
\(^{25}\) Ransan-Cooper et al., 2015.
\(^{26}\) Arnall, 2019.
\(^{27}\) Adger et al., 2015.
\(^{28}\) Banerjee, 2017.
\(^{29}\) Adger et al., 2013.
\(^{30}\) Grothmann and Patt, 2005; Adams, 2016; Oakes, 2019.
Evidence of migration and environmental change

The following section presents examples of migration and environmental change drawn from around the world. It builds on the three ecological zones identified in the Foresight Report (i.e. mountainous, dryland and coastal) which face disruption related to climate change. The examples address a variety of adaptive responses to these environmental disruptions, ranging from migration for work to diversify income to national policy to promote anticipatory forms of migration (table 2).

<table>
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<th>Geographical focus</th>
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<td>Circular migration</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mountains

A diverse range of human migration pathways in the context of environmental change have been documented in mountainous regions: displacement, labour migration, planned relocation and transhumance. Changes in climate adversely affect transhumant movements between summer and winter pastures of herders in high mountains. Herders in Afghanistan, Nepal and Pakistan perceive negative changes in vegetation composition as a result of erratic snowfall patterns and a decrease of rainfall. Livestock deaths due to heavy snowfall and water scarcity in traditional water sources along migration routes have been reported across

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31 Black et al., 2011.
32 IDMC, 2016; Brandt, Kaenzig and Lachmuth, 2016; Liu et al., 2018; Namgay et al., 2014.
33 Namgay et al., 2014.
34 Shaoliang, Ismail and Zhaoli, 2012; Joshi et al., 2013; Gentle and Thwaites, 2016.
the Hindu Kush Himalayan region. At the same time, an increase in temperature, with its effects on snow cover, have had some positive impacts such as an early start of seasonal migration from winter to summer pastures and lengthening of residence in summer pasture. Pastoral communities also face complications from other factors which interact with climate change, such as conflict with sedentary communities, institutional barriers, market forces and inadequate policy support. Different adaptation measures have been adopted by pastoral communities to manage environmental shocks and stressors. In the Himalayan region, herders have incorporated changes in their movement (such as shifting grazing areas, change in routes and reducing the length of stay at different locations on the route), and in a few cases have relocated families or entire villages. Herders have also adopted in situ measures such as stall-feeding animals, changing types of livestock, temporary ban on livestock sale, and digging ponds to store water.

Migration for work, particularly circular and seasonal migration, is a traditional strategy of mountain people to manage the risks posed by environmental hazards to farming and livestock rearing. Transitioning from farm-based income to labour migration and associated remittances was one of the ways in which communities in Naryn River Basin in Kyrgyzstan, particularly those located in the downstream region, responded to changes in water supply. Remittances finance relief during disasters and support recovery and reconstruction in their aftermath. Migrants and diaspora in the United States of America were actively involved in sending money to support their families and relief efforts after the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. The extent of remittances' positive or negative impacts on recipient households and origin communities varies from one context to another. For example, the effect of remittances on vulnerability to extreme weather events is non-linear. Remittance-recipient households in drought affected rural communities in South-west China have less adaptive capacity than non-recipient households. However, remittance-recipient households that received remittances over longer periods were found to have improved adaptive capacity. In Tajikistan, families have a high dependency on migrant remittances and also largely lack understanding of possible adaptation responses that lower their capacity to adapt to environmental and climate stressors.

In many mountain regions, migration for work is a gendered process. Women left behind bear the responsibility of taking care of children and the elderly, managing household assets and responding to new challenges. Factors such as social and cultural norms, access to information and institutional issues act as barriers to adaptation for women. In Nepal remittance-recipient households are more likely to invest a part of their savings in flood preparedness if women left behind have access to capacity-building interventions that aim to strengthen autonomous adaptation measures such as precautionary savings and flood preparedness.
Drylands

In drylands around the world, environmental change is increasingly contributing to human migration. In particular, changes in rainfall are contributing to pressures on livelihoods, including those supported by agriculture, pastoralism and fisheries. These factors have a potentially serious and difficult-to-predict impact on different ethnic groups. For example, insufficient information exists about indigenous communities in Australia, their responses and the way that local knowledge may contribute to different forms of adaptation, including migration. In Central America, a significant relationship has been found between changes in rainfall in dry Mexican states and human flows to the United States. Other authors have highlighted the relationships between food security, migration and violence in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.

There is evidence of diaspora investment into dryland areas. In the Senegal River Valley, migration is related to environmental change and water extraction. The new mosques and schools that have been built in the Podor Department in the Senegal River Valley are illustrations of diaspora funding to contribute to community resilience and development. A joint project of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification was successful in encouraging investment by diaspora communities in sending areas of Burkina Faso, the Niger and Senegal. This money was used for investments in sustainable land management and to formalize networks between communities in Milan, Italy, and areas of origin.

Movements from the Senegal River Basin to Port Louis, in part driven by drought and water extraction in the last quarter of the twentieth century may have seemed adaptive initially. But, after the end of a dry cycle, newly settled areas of the city, which were previously subject to flash floods, were once more inundated. One response to this risk has been the creation of an early warning mobile app through which users are informed of likely flood risks when mobile signals are attenuated due to atmospheric water. This shows the need to consider the combination of slow- and rapid-onset hazards. Migration from densely populated areas to more sparsely populated agricultural frontiers in Dagara, Ghana, contributed to reducing the pressure on the land in sending areas and resulted in increased remittances which facilitated the purchase of bullock and ploughs. On the other hand, it also facilitated the continuance of potentially unsustainable agricultural practices in sending areas. International movements related to environmental change may increase due to reduced costs and development of (regular and irregular) routes and of networks to support cross-border movements.

47 Rigaud et al., 2018.  
48 Carson et al., 2014.  
49 Nawrotzki, Riosmena and Hunter, 2013.  
50 IOM and WFP, 2016; IABD et al., 2017.  
51 Madgwick et al., 2017.  
52 Ibid.  
54 Diagne, 2007.  
55 Ouedraogo et al., 2018.  
56 Van der Geest, 2011.  
57 Donato and Massey, 2016.
Slow-onset processes

Dry regions are at risk of slow-onset processes, such as land degradation and desertification, changes in rainfall and drought. It may be possible to evacuate from a cyclone, return home and continue with a livelihood such as fishing. When a livelihood is dependent on rain-fed agriculture, in situ adaptation may be more problematic when precipitation or access to water slowly decreases over time. As such mobility related to slow onset processes can take on a more permanent profile with related impacts on livelihoods, health and human rights. The longer lead time relative to sudden-onset hazards can also provide scope for all forms of adaptation, in situ and through mobility. On the other hand, slow-onset processes may also erode people’s ability to move and this can make people more vulnerable with respect to the impacts of sudden-onset hazards.\(^a\)

\(^a\) Black et al., 2011.

Coastal areas and islands

Historically, migration has been a way of life in many islands around the world, and these processes are accelerating under the influence of a changing climate.\(^58\) Coastal and island communities face increasing exposure to the impacts of tropical storms and sea-level rise.\(^59\) In addition, many coastal regions and islands are adversely impacted by a shortage of freshwater sources, compounded by changes in rainfall patterns and salinization caused by flooding.\(^60\) The prospect of disappearing land, islands and freshwater poses serious challenges and a range of human mobility patterns are emerging in this context, including a range of solutions to protect the well-being of those moving.\(^61\)

In Pacific small island developing States (SIDS), research has shown that migration (related to anticipated climate impacts) results in remittances, more opportunities for younger people and is complementary to other adaptive measures.\(^62\) Because migration is not an option available to all, moving and flows of remittances can recreate or enhance vulnerabilities and inequalities, as was the case in Tonga.\(^63\) Coastal fishing communities can have their homes and livelihoods affected by climate change. Declining fish populations and biodiversity related to overfishing and increased sea temperatures have forced artisanal fishers in Senegal to fish further out in sea or seek work as fishing labourers. Some fishers could fund building homes away from the encroaching ocean with the money they had made from international migration.\(^64\)

Deltaic regions provide fertile land and access to water for irrigation, fisheries and trade. Climate change has put them at risk of sea-level rise and flooding as they are located at meeting points of rivers and coasts. This

\(^{58}\) Kirch, 2017.
\(^{59}\) IPCC, 2014.
\(^{60}\) Oakes, Milan and Campbell, 2016.
\(^{61}\) Van der Geest et al., 2019.
\(^{62}\) Shen and Gememen, 2011; Goldsmith, 2015; Ash and Campbell, 2016.
\(^{63}\) Le De, Gaillard and Friesen, 2013.
\(^{64}\) Zickgraf, 2018.
is contributing to flows of migration and, in Viet Nam, migration from the Mekong Delta was found to be related to higher incomes and employment.\textsuperscript{65} In Jamalpur, Bangladesh, dry spells and drought have impacted farming and people have responded by switching livelihoods and moving, often to the capital, Dhaka. Often it is the young who move and the remittances they send can contribute to the development of new livelihoods and enterprise facilitated through the purchase of a water pump.\textsuperscript{66}

Perceptions of adaptive mobility in the Marshall Islands

The Republic of the Marshall Islands is exposed to a variety of environmental risks as livelihoods and infrastructure are affected by sea-level rise, heat stress and drought. As the impacts of climate change increase, the Marshallese may have to decide whether to stay on their islands or to move. The United States is the most popular destination as the Marshallese can work and live there under the Compact of Free Association. A recent study suggests that environmental pressures are already contributing to the decision to move to the United States.\textsuperscript{67} For example, a respondent in a field interview stated:

“If more people leave there will be less people and more jobs open then my husband will be able to find a job.”

Another participant explained the tangible benefits of migration in the context of challenging environmental and economic conditions:

“By going abroad for a short time this can prevent the migrant or the person moving from losing his or her lands and houses”.

When asked about the potential threats to Marshallese culture for migrants in the United States, another participant responded:

“I disagree because I see Marshallese on Facebook singing Marshallese songs and dancing Marshallese dances.”

\textsuperscript{a} Van der Geest et al., 2019.

In Haiti, the “Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy” (MECLEP) project found that seasonal migration might have a beneficial impact on household vulnerability.\textsuperscript{67} Accordingly, the new migration policy of Haiti developed within the project recognizes the positive outcomes of migration and how it can lead to adaptation through the transfer of skills, money and knowledge. Migration has been integrated into urban development, adaptation and disaster risk reduction programmes. Questions related to migration and environmental change have now been added to the census.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{65} IOM, 2017.
\textsuperscript{66} Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2016.
\textsuperscript{67} IOM, 2017.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
Relocation of some coastal and island communities has begun. One study projects that over 400 towns, villages and cities in the United States, including a large number of coastal indigenous communities, will need to relocate by the end of the century as a result of environmental change.\textsuperscript{69} Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana will be the first community to receive federal funds and support for relocation. Residents have worked with local non-governmental organizations to plan a new sustainable community and settlement using modern technology and innovative use of wetlands and parklands to protect against flooding while maintaining fishing livelihoods. A significant challenge will be to incorporate the history, traditions and culture of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe.\textsuperscript{70} The full involvement of affected communities in decision-making on matters including access to resources, where the new settlement will be sited and when and how the project develops plays an important role in community relocation.\textsuperscript{71}

### Migration with dignity

Pacific small island developing States (SIDS) leaders have coined the term “migration with dignity” to envisage a situation in which people have control over whether, when, where and how they can move, or stay if that is their wish. The idea centres on boosting education standards so that migrants can compete in the international labour markets and on strengthening networks with the diaspora in the region to create new opportunities and support new arrivals.\textsuperscript{\textit{a}} It is hoped that such flows of people could reduce the strain on households and environmental resources, and provide financial and social remittances to enable other forms of adaptation.

In the absence of overarching global frameworks to promote and ensure adaptive forms of migration, innovative, more flexible arrangements will be necessary.\textsuperscript{\textit{b}} Regional frameworks can build on existing bilateral agreements. Such plans could be successful with the support of regional economic powers willing to open borders to migrants. For example, countries in South America have introduced a non-binding agreement on the protection of persons displaced by disasters across borders and migrants in countries affected by disasters.\textsuperscript{\textit{c}}

State-level planning for environmental migration is also emerging. Fiji’s Planned Relocation Guidelines state that relocation is a last resort, to be considered “after all other feasible adaptation options have been explored”.\textsuperscript{\textit{d}} Should it occur, it needs to ensure long-term economic sustainability, support and services, and the protection of the rights and well-being of vulnerable groups. The Guidelines describe the steps that should be taken, such as consultations with all affected stakeholders, including people moving, host communities and those choosing not to move.\textsuperscript{\textit{e}}

\textsuperscript{\textit{b}} Barnett and McMichael, 2018.
\textsuperscript{\textit{c}} CSM, IOM and PDD, 2018.
\textsuperscript{\textit{d}} Government of Fiji, 2018.
\textsuperscript{\textit{e}} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{69} Maldonado et al., 2013.
\textsuperscript{70} King, 2017.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
Urban areas

While it is important to consider areas of origin, it is also vital to analyse areas of destination when assessing the outcomes of environmental migration. For example, after three years of drought in Mexico, increased flows of people from rural to urban areas have been documented. Such movements can be adaptive or maladaptive. Cities are often situated in areas prone to hazards, such as on the low-lying coastal areas or in areas of geological hazards, such as landslides, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In cases where migrants settle in areas exposed to hazards, such as in slums on hillsides or in flood-prone regions, these populations may be more exposed and vulnerable to environmental and climatic disruptions in the future. It is possible that more environmental hotspots will emerge in the future with a population subject to a triple jeopardy of population growth, increased vulnerability and exposure to more severe and frequent and climate events.

Urban settings can magnify the differences in the experiences of women and men, highlighting the gendered aspects of migration and environmental disruption. Women are considered to be more vulnerable than men before, during and after moving, with implications for their safety and security, psychological needs and access to services and property rights. Migration in the wake of disasters can also increase risks of trafficking. However, migration, and even displacement, can also bring opportunities for women. In the Philippines, women took on roles as camp managers in the aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan. Women leaving environmentally marginal areas in Bangladesh have the potential to find employment in the Dhaka garment industry where they are perceived favourably by potential employers in comparison to men. Women must weigh benefits of being able to send remittances to sustain families against possible stigma of migration. These factors make women less likely to move in the context of environmental impacts.

Minority migrant groups in urban settings are most affected by risks to critical infrastructure. They are often portrayed as a vulnerable group in the face of a hazard (see chapter 10 of this report). However, recent research has shown that linguistic minority immigrants and refugees might be resilient because of the challenges they have experienced in the past. For example, urban residents who have left Pacific SIDS, where they experienced floods and cyclones, were better placed to cope with new urban risks in destination, such as the Wellington earthquake.

States are beginning to plan for resilient and transformative settlements. Kenya’s National Adaptation Plan explicitly mentions that climate change places a strain on urban infrastructure. The Plan states that droughts drive urbanization which places people – especially vulnerable groups such as children, persons with disabilities and the aged – in marginal lands prone to flooding. It therefore recognizes the need for climate-resilient urban development. In Bangladesh, State actors are planning to encourage people to move to climate-resilient and migrant-friendly urban centres. These urban areas need to be developed through a combination of bottom-up

72 Nawrotzki et al., 2017.
73 Hugo, 2011.
74 Sierra Club, 2018.
75 IOM, 2016.
76 Sherwood et al., 2015; Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2017.
77 Evertsen and Van der Geest, 2019.
78 Garschagen and Sandholz, 2018.
79 Uekusa and Matthewman, 2017.
80 Ibid.
participatory processes to address the local needs and contexts and top-down planning and support. This concept fits into Bangladesh’s Seventh Five Year Plan, which focuses on “transformative adaptation.”

Policy frameworks

As outlined in chapter 11 of this report, there have been substantial developments in global migration governance in recent years. However, an overarching framework has not yet fully emerged to provide policy guidance where human mobility and environmental stressors, including climate change, intersect. A number of different global governance mechanisms exist, having emerged in different contexts and with varying emphasis on the mobility aspects of climate change. The chapter briefly describes two key mechanisms that seek to address environmental change, migration and aspects of adaptation and climate risk management: the United Nations Framework Climate Change Convention’s climate negotiations and the recently adopted Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. Beyond the Global Compact for Migration, there are, however, much more international considerations of, and policy approaches to, this highly topical issue. A summary of international policy aspects beyond these two mechanisms is outlined in appendix A.

Global climate change negotiations and human mobility

Human mobility – migration, displacement and planned relocation – has been framed as an issue of climate risk management under the UNFCCC, particularly in the work conducted under the adaptation and loss and damage work streams. The framing of risk management has evolved between the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) in 2007 and the 24th Conference of the Parties (COP24) in 2018. Figure 1 highlights decision milestones and progress.

Figure 1. Emergence of human migration as a risk management topic in international climate policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bali Action Plan</th>
<th>Cancun Adaptation Framework</th>
<th>Warsaw International Mechanism and its Executive Committee established</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COP13 2007</td>
<td>COP16 2010</td>
<td>COP18 2012</td>
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<td>COP19 2013</td>
<td>COP21 2015</td>
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<td>COP23 2017</td>
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Consideration of means to address loss and damage

CAF para 14(f) introduces migration, displacement, and planned relocation for the first time in international climate policy

Recommends work to enhance understanding migration, displacement, and human mobility in the work on loss and damage

Paris Agreement creates Task Force on Displacement

Excom includes human mobility in five-year rolling work plan

Recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement


82 ICCCAD, 2018.
83 GED, 2015.
The first time that the issue was recognized in international climate policy was at COP16 (2010) when Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Cancun Adaptation Framework. It included paragraph 14(f), which laid out the range of movements people may take, what measures should be taken, and at what level these actions could be taken:

14. Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework … by undertaking, inter alia, the following: … (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international levels

In 2013, at COP19, Parties to the UNFCCC established the Warsaw International Mechanism to explore arrangements to manage residual risks, including those related to human mobility. Ongoing work under the UNFCCC process, including the Warsaw International Mechanism, aims to bolster the capacity of countries to make risk-informed decisions about pre-emptive activities, planning, and contingency arrangements that affect where and how people live.

At COP21, a turning point occurred when the Paris Agreement established a Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism, mandated to develop recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change. The Task Force is comprised of States, technical experts from different groups under the UNFCCC, United Nations organizations and representatives from civil society. The Task Force produced comprehensive recommendations that touched upon the whole human mobility spectrum, such as encouraging countries to integrate climate change and migration concerns when formulating national laws, policies and strategies, and supporting the facilitation of regular and safe migration pathways. In parallel, the Warsaw International Mechanism also endorsed a five-year work programme where one work stream relates to migration, displacement and human mobility.

COP24 adopted the Task Force on Displacement recommendations in 2018 and extended the Task Force mandate for another two years. The text box below summarizes the types of recommendations addressed to countries, United Nations agencies and stakeholders.

84 UNFCCC, 2010.
85 UNFCCC, 2013.
86 UNFCCC, 2015.
87 Ionesco and Traore Chazalnoel, 2018.
88 UNFCCC, 2017.
89 UNFCCC, 2018.
UNFCCC Task Force on Displacement

Recommendations were made by the Task Force to countries parties to the UNFCCC as well as United Nations and other stakeholders. They were ultimately adopted at COP24. The following are examples of recommendations made by the Task Force.

**Countries:**

- Laws, policies, strategies to avert, minimize and address displacement;
- Research, data collection, risk analysis including community participation;
- Strengthen preparedness (early warning, contingency planning, evacuation planning, resilience-building, innovative approaches like forecast-based finance);
- National planning processes;
- Find durable solutions;
- Facilitate safe, orderly, regular migration and mobility of people.

**United Nations agencies and stakeholders:**

- Provide support (finance, technology, capacity-building) including to affected communities;
- Enhance regional, subregional and transboundary cooperation;
- Develop and share good practice (understanding risk, accessing support, assistance and protection, international legal instruments and normative frameworks);
- Invite the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct a system-wide strategic review and facilitate integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement in the envisaged high-level panel on internally displaced persons.

*Note:* The full decision text is available at [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp24_auv_ec%20wim.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp24_auv_ec%20wim.pdf).

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

Ahead of deliberations on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the United Nations Agenda for Sustainable Development made mention of migration, although the connection between migration and the environment was not explicitly stated. That said, the Agenda for Sustainable Development and its related goals for 2030 have paved the way for linking migration and the environment in future frameworks. Of particular note is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, which is a legally non-binding agreement by States that is directly linked to target 10.7 of the Agenda for Sustainable Development:
10.7 Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.

The Global Compact for Migration sets out 23 objectives in a comprehensive approach to optimize the benefits of migration while addressing its risks and challenges, including those relating to climate stressors and disaster. The Global Compact states that migration is “a source of prosperity, innovation and sustainable development”.

Nonetheless, when environmental migration is mentioned, it is mainly presented in the context of vulnerability as opposed to beneficial outcomes. Four objectives of the Global Compact for Migration are especially relevant to climate and disaster risks. In particular, Objective 2 is about minimizing the adverse drivers that compel people to move and includes a standalone section dedicated to climate change and disasters. In that respect, the text recognizes that climate change adaptation and resilience measures in countries of origin need to be prioritized to minimize the adverse drivers of migration. However, the text also acknowledges that adaptation in situ or return of migrants might not be possible in some cases and mentions the need to consider planned relocation and visa options (Objective 5 on enhancing availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration). Objective 7 of the Global Compact for Migration aims to address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration. Finally, Objective 23 commits to international and regional cooperation in the context of disasters.

Overall, the Global Compact for Migration articulates a comprehensive set of potential responses to address the adverse drivers of migration and make migration a choice rather than a desperate necessity. However, due to the non-legally binding nature of the Compact, some States may decide to only take limited action to address environmental migration challenges.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of three prominent framings of environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change: securitization, protection, and adaptation and climate risk management. The chapter has also highlighted existing evidence of patterns of human movements – ranging from migration, displacement and planned relocation – in different settings, principally mountainous areas, drylands, coastal zones and urban areas. This evidence illustrates some of the trade-offs people make as they weigh the realities and potential risks of staying or moving away in the face of environmental and climate stress. It has also highlighted the relevance of context, as it relates to environmental settings but also how different communities are able to demonstrate resilience as well as adaptive capacities.

The chapter has also reviewed two key mechanisms in international policy where discussions about environmental migration and human mobility in the context of climate change are taking place (with additional material in the appendix). There has been growing recognition in recent years of the need to better integrate migration into global climate and environmental mechanisms, and for climate change mechanisms to incorporate human mobility aspects. Significant steps have been taken to ensure that the issue of human mobility in the context of environment and climate change receives greater consideration at the international level. And yet, its inherent sensitivities – as reflected, for example, in the different framings discussed above – means that there is still more work to be done in the development of cohesive

90 UNGA, 2018: annex, preamble para 8.
policy approaches. Nevertheless, the ultimate success of these frameworks and guidelines relies on the degree to which recommendations are implemented by States and other actors through migration, development, risk and environmental policies in addition to mainstreaming into other programming.

In conclusion, climate science suggests that the magnitude and frequency of extreme weather events are rising, exposing more people and their assets to adverse impacts. The places people currently live and work in are under increasing pressure from environmental and climate change. Migration, displacement and planned relocation are capturing increased attention from research, policy and practice as people attempt to move away from stress and risk, and towards safety or opportunity. In this context, measures are needed with the following characteristics:

- people are enabled to choose whether, when, and with whom to move (existing networks and dignified options appropriate to cultural contexts and preferences);
- people who move can access livelihood opportunities and remit resources that enhance adaptation; and
- people who move can do so in a dignified, safe and regular manner.

The literature and cases examined in this chapter indicate a need for research, policy and practice on which adaptive options can help people move towards well-being even in the face of growing environmental and climate risks.

The importance of environmental, climate change and disaster drivers will continue to be a key area for future research and policy developments in the international migration governance debate. The reality of how slow and sudden-onset hazards impact people’s livelihoods and influence their migration strategies, as much as the significance of the political questions around migration and climate change issues will continue to position environmental migration at the forefront of these debates.
MIGRANTS CAUGHT IN CRISSES: CONTEXTS, RESPONSES AND INNOVATION

Introduction

The situations of people who have moved from their countries of origin only to find themselves caught in a crisis that threatens their security and ability to thrive are of growing concern to the international community. While crises affect both nationals and non-nationals, the ability of migrants to cope with their impacts may be reduced, due to conditions of vulnerability associated with migrants’ legal, economic and social status, as well as practical challenges, such as linguistic differences, geographic displacement and even cultural context, which can limit access to timely and understandable information, services, resources and safety. While not all migrants are equally affected in times of crisis, they are often among the most vulnerable, at increased risk and in need of specific support.

Addressing the needs of migrants living in places affected by crisis has become a priority of policy forums at both global and regional levels. Recent initiatives and policy processes include regional dialogues on migration in Africa, the Americas, and Central and South-East Asia; the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030; the Paris Agreement; and the World Humanitarian Summit. The Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative and the development of the set of Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster provide concrete examples of efforts to improve current practice. The situation of migrants in crisis contexts is also acknowledged in the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, where it is highlighted as an essential element for the achievement of objective 2 on minimizing the drivers of forced migration, and objective 7 on reducing migrants’ vulnerability.

Despite the existence of relevant policies, questions remain on the effectiveness of current efforts to address migrants’ vulnerability and support their capacity before, during and after crises. This is due, in part, to the fact that, although there is growing recognition at regional and global levels of the need to respond to the particular situation of migrants in crisis contexts, the needs and safety of migrant populations may not be a priority for affected countries. Moreover, in some cases, migrant-specific crisis response measures have focused primarily on returning migrants to their countries of origin. While evacuations or returns may in some instances be the only life-saving option for migrants caught in crisis contexts, this focus can come at the expense of other effective support mechanisms that may better meet migrants’ immediate post-crisis recovery and longer-term interests and needs. Ensuring appropriate responses requires a clear understanding of migrants’ interests and priorities across different geographical and sociopolitical contexts.

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1 Nassim Majidi, Founder and Director of Samuel Hall; Heaven Crawley, Professor, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University and Lorenzo Guadagno, International Organization for Migration; and Camille Kasavan, Samuel Hall.
2 MICIC, 2016. For the purposes of this chapter, migrants include tourists, business travellers, foreign students, temporary workers and permanent residents, as well as asylum seekers and refugees.
3 MICIC, 2016.
4 Martin, 2016.
5 The focus on evacuation of migrants to their countries of origin as a response to crisis, in a global context of return as the “go-to” policy response (Shaw, 2018), reflects a limited interest in, and use of, alternative responses that are more cognizant of migrants’ capacities and aspirations.
Reflecting these concerns, this chapter focuses on the experiences of migrants in crisis contexts, and the local, national and international responses to address their conditions and needs. This is important for three main reasons: (a) to better understand the ways in which migrants are affected by situations of crisis that occur in the countries in which they live or through which they are travelling; (b) to reflect on the effectiveness of efforts that focus on the needs of migrants in crisis contexts; and (c) to identify the ways in which actions by a range of stakeholders involved in any crisis situation can ensure that the needs and interests of migrants are taken into account.

The chapter is organized into four sections: (a) the next section draws on the framework provided by the MICIC Initiative to examine the varying contexts, responses, gaps and lessons learned in crisis preparedness, emergency response and post-crisis recovery; (b) the section that follows provides an overview of existing data on migrants in countries at risk of or affected by crisis, and assesses data needs and gaps; (c) innovative responses for supporting migrants caught in crises are discussed in the section that follows; and (d) the final, concluding section reflects on policy and practice implications.

**Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or National Disaster**

The MICIC Initiative, a State-led process launched in 2014, was designed to engage a wide audience on the topic of protecting migrants in crisis contexts. Through a series of multi-stakeholder consultations, the Initiative developed a set of voluntary Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or National Disaster. Published in 2016, the Guidelines represent a non-binding collection of principles, recommendations and practices that can guide efforts by all stakeholders to reduce the vulnerability of migrants in times of crisis.

**Cycles and steps in crisis management, as defined in the MICIC framework**

- **Crisis preparedness**
  - 1. Track information on crises
  - 2. Collect and share information on migrants
  - 3. Empower migrants to help themselves
  - 4. Incorporate migrants in preparedness and emergency response systems

- **Emergency response**
  - 5. Involves migrants in contingency planning
  - 6. Establish migrant-sensitive communication mechanisms
  - 7. Build capacity for emergency response and recovery

- **Post-crisis action**
  - 8. Provide timely and accurate information on accessing assistance
  - 9. Facilitate migrants’ movement to safety
  - 10. Establish coordination agreements
  - 11. Provide assistance without discrimination
  - 12. Establish clear referral procedures
  - 13. Evacuate and rehouse migrants when needed

Support the recovery of host communities
Key contexts and crisis phases

Crises – defined as situations “in which there is a widespread threat to life, physical safety, health or basic subsistence which is beyond the coping capacity of individuals and the communities in which they reside” – are associated with a wide range of phenomena. They can be triggered by environmental hazards, conflicts and terrorism, as well as complex emergencies, failures of political and economic management, epidemics and pandemics, and global financial cycles.

In recent years, flooding in Bangladesh and Thailand, major hurricanes in North America, conflicts in Libya and Yemen, as well as political and economic crisis in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, have created the need for emergency assistance and urgent protection of migrants. Each of these places hosted migrants prior to and during the crisis, including permanent residents, temporary workers, business travellers, tourists and students, as well as asylum seekers and refugees.

The issue of migrant vulnerability in crisis contexts has been brought to the attention of the international community following large humanitarian emergencies. Lower-intensity (but often higher-frequency) events – such as urban fires and accidents, localized landslides and episodes of violence – can also disproportionately affect migrants, who may be living in areas more susceptible to these hazards. Experience from all crisis events shows that patterns of marginalization and exclusion increase migrants’ vulnerability to most hazards. Different crises, whether large- or small-scale, affect migrants in different ways (see appendix A), and will result in different operational interventions or actions.

Taking specific operational contexts into account: The example of health crises

Health crises have their own unique markers, which include clear protocols and preparedness procedures as defined by the World Health Organization (WHO). Migrants are rarely included in relevant planning mechanisms, with significant impacts on migrant and host communities alike. This has human rights as well as health implications, and means that health-care practitioners need to have an understanding of the social dimensions of human mobility. Shared learning between health-care and humanitarian practitioners, as well as migrant communities, is a priority.

Migrants may experience greater obstacles accessing protection and support, particularly where an individual has limited social networks. Depending on the circumstances, numerous other factors (such as gender, age, race and ethnicity, sexual orientation or disability status) compound vulnerability and the ability to cope in crisis contexts. At the same time, and as discussed in this chapter, migrant and local capacities before, during and after crises can inform and strengthen response beyond a vulnerabilities-centric approach, to one geared to understanding migrant capabilities. Recognizing the diversity of migrant profiles and supporting migrants to respond to crises are essential to reducing risks. Migrants may find themselves facing situations in which they are more vulnerable or more empowered. When the 2011 Brisbane floods occurred in Australia,
for instance, the role of culturally and linguistically diverse community leaders in immigrant and refugee communities was essential, as they acted as gatekeepers and communicated emergency responses to the disaster to their communities. While in Thailand, restrictions on mobility stemming from administrative barriers limited the mobility of many migrant workers affected by floods, who had to choose between staying in flooded, risky areas or face possible loss of legal status, arrest and deportation.

**Coordination, planning, and preparedness**

Effective coordination, planning and preparedness require clear identification of the roles of various stakeholders. This begins with the fundamental obligation of States under international human rights law to protect the life and dignity of everyone – both citizens and non-citizens – living within their borders.

Countries of origin most often respond to the needs of their nationals caught in crises abroad through consular assistance. The rights and responsibilities of consular services to exercise their consular prerogatives in times of crises are delineated in the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963). In practice, however, the ability of States to act effectively in these contexts depends on resources, capacity, political will, effective planning and preparation.

### The right to consular protection

The responsibility of consular services to assist their citizens abroad is a recognized norm, enshrined in the national laws of at least 45 countries. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations does not explicitly oblige States to provide support to nationals affected by crises abroad. However, article 5 of the Convention lists a number of functions States can exercise in another State’s territory, including (a) the protection of the interest of its nationals, and (e) the disaster assistance a State can provide to its nationals abroad. Article 36 also obligates host countries to allow consular officials to communicate with – and provide support and protection to – their nationals, to the extent allowed under the national laws of the host country.

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Beyond consulates, other institutions in migrants’ countries of origin can provide support in crisis contexts. For instance, the Government of the Philippines has integrated measures to protect its nationals abroad in its policies, institutional structures and mandates, which may directly and indirectly support migrants caught in crisis. Key to the country’s system is the Overseas Preparedness and Response Team, established in 2011 and comprising representatives of several ministries. The team’s objective is to develop preparedness strategies aimed at supporting Filipinos abroad, including destination-specific contingency plans in case of crisis, to be updated every six months. This is complemented by a variety of programmes and services that aim to support the ability of migrants to address challenges they may face.

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7 Shepherd and Van Vuuren, 2014.
8 Guadagno, 2015.
9 Battistella, 2012.
10 Government of the Philippines, 2011.
Philippine consular support for migrant workers caught in conflict

The preparedness arrangements of the Philippines’ consular authorities were tested during the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. Due to escalating violence, a rapid response team composed of staff from the Foreign Affairs, Labour and Interior ministries was deployed to assist the embassy in Damascus in repatriating 8,000 Filipino workers.¹ For example, Ruth Pana, 29, domestic worker for a Syrian family, fled her employer’s house because she was fearful of being caught in the crossfire between government troops and rebel forces in 2012. When her employer and his family moved to a rented house, she contacted the Philippine Embassy, which sent a car that took her into the care of Filipino personnel until she and the others were repatriated. Pana said her employer initially did not want her to leave, saying she was still under contract, but then relented.²

Where States cannot respond effectively, international organizations have sometimes stepped in to fill gaps and support the implementation of support mechanisms for migrants. This was seen most clearly in Libya during the conflict that broke out in 2011. Between 1.5 million and 3 million migrants, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa, were estimated to be living in the country at the time of the civil war,¹¹ and most were unable to access services provided by Libyan or home country authorities when the conflict escalated, as there were no contingency plans for migrants. Bordering countries promptly opened their borders to migrants escaping Libya, and non-governmental and international organizations also supported relief efforts, notably in the form of international evacuations to home or third countries.¹² Coordination of these operations was initially developed on an ad hoc basis. In March 2011, IOM and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) coordinated evacuation efforts and set up the Humanitarian Evacuation Cell. This Cell sought to support the management and use of assets and in-kind contributions received from 19 countries for the evacuation of migrants, totalling an estimated USD 23 million, and was supported by the European Union (EU) Monitoring and Information Centre, which assisted in transmitting requests for assets and in collecting offers from EU member States. The ad hoc nature of these operations highlighted the need for stronger preparedness mechanisms to manage large-scale international evacuations out of crisis areas.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) are also key service providers in crisis contexts, often acting as a bridge between migrant communities and State actors.¹³ During the 2006 war in Lebanon, for instance, CSOs supported migrant domestic workers, forming a consortium to work with the Lebanese Government to address the needs of this group. CSOs made the case for better cooperation and coordination with intergovernmental organizations and State actors, which were their main allies during the crisis.¹⁴ In the United States, civil society efforts such as the California Farm Worker CARE Coalition have also played a role in ensuring that migrant workers had access to information and support during the California wildfires (see box below).

¹ Mainwaring, 2012.
¹² Aghazarm, Quesada and Tishler, 2012; Zampagni et al., 2017.
¹³ MICIC, 2017.
California Farm Worker CARE Coalition: Civil society coordination

Following the 2007 California wildfires, the California Farm Worker CARE Coalition developed a structure to better coordinate and communicate with (and assist) migrants in emergencies. The structure leverages existing community networks, and peer educators known as promotoras, and includes local response organizations, other domestic NGOs and media (including Spanish language media). As part of this work, the Coalition has built the capacity of its members to prepare for and respond to emergencies, and has developed a formal emergency preparedness plan that is now integrated in official crisis management arrangements.\(^a\)

\(^a\) Martinez, Hoff and Núñez-Alvarez, 2009; Martinez, 2017.

Emergency responses and lessons learned

The effectiveness of responses is to a large extent dependent on the preparedness of key stakeholders, and their ability to include and coordinate plans with migrant communities. Regardless of the level of preparedness, many crises require flexibility, ad hoc arrangements and quick decision-making. The availability of and rapid access to crisis funding, information and flexible migration policies can significantly affect the effectiveness of response efforts targeting migrant populations.

Responses to the needs of migrants in the contexts of large humanitarian crises have mostly been financed through traditional funding streams. Evidence from past crises suggests that these can be narrowly or politically focused. In the 2011 Libyan context, for instance, there is evidence that funding was used primarily for evacuation and returns to home countries, rather than on supporting those migrants who wished to remain, or providing options to stay in safe third countries.\(^{15}\) Moreover, these traditional funding streams may be difficult to access, or slow to activate, significantly impacting on the lives and well-being of migrants. Again, there is evidence that administrative and bureaucratic obstacles delayed and limited the timeliness of support operations during the crisis in Libya. By November 2011, IOM had formally received USD 111 million from donors and USD 23 million in in-kind donations.\(^{16}\) At the height of evacuation operations, up to USD 4 million were required every day to charter planes to destinations as far away as Bangladesh or Viet Nam.\(^{17}\) Administrative issues delayed access to the funding and, in turn, evacuations.\(^{18}\) Following the experience of large-scale migrant evacuations in response to the Libya crisis, IOM set up a Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism, with Member States’ support, to cover the cost of international transport for migrants affected by crisis. The purpose of the fund is to jump-start the emergency response while waiting for donor funding to be received, in order to avoid the delays similar to those experienced during the evacuations from Libya.

There have been efforts by international organizations such as the World Bank and IOM to improve direct cash assistance. In 2011, the World Bank granted a loan of USD 72 million to the Government of Bangladesh

\(^{15}\) Perchinig, Rasche and Schaur, 2017.
\(^{16}\) Aghazarm, Quesada and Tishler, 2012.
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
\(^{18}\) Ibid.
to repatriate and provide transitional assistance to over 36,000 Bangladeshi migrant workers who escaped the crisis in Libya.\textsuperscript{19} The assistance was provided directly to returnees, through a one-time cash grant to cover immediate basic needs and partial expenses associated with the initial restoration of livelihoods.\textsuperscript{20}

At the national level, India has established Community Welfare Funds, which levy small fees from consular services to support Indian nationals caught in crisis or other emergency situations abroad.\textsuperscript{21} These funds allow consulates to have rapid access to resources in emergency cases, which in turn allows for the launch of rapid responses.\textsuperscript{22} This has been further strengthened through the institutionalization of State capacity to repatriate nationals in times of need. In addition to emergency response services such as repatriation, the funds can fund a range of support services aimed at addressing migrant vulnerability and capabilities, including providing boarding and lodging for migrants in need, emergency medical care and provision of legal assistance.\textsuperscript{23}

New avenues for cooperation could usefully be developed between the private sector and other non-traditional actors, including diaspora populations, providing material support, communications resources, translation or shelter to migrants in crisis contexts.\textsuperscript{24} The role of private sector actors in supporting migrant resilience and their capacity to face crisis effectively was highlighted during the MICIC Initiative’s consultations.\textsuperscript{25} In 2016, IOM moved forward with private sector partnerships, including partnerships with media or partners within the technology sector working on effective information sharing.\textsuperscript{26} Such partnerships may serve as models for better integration of community and private sector actors in backing or initiating activities that may directly or indirectly better support migrants’ capacity to handle a crisis. Research is needed to ensure that best practices are successfully identified and adapted to specific contexts. Diaspora populations may also have an important role to play in improving emergency response capacity and coordination, notably through their provision of more reactive funding streams.\textsuperscript{27}

Access to services, information and social networks is also critical in times of crisis, for ensuring migrant safety and decision-making. However, access to information for migrants can be challenging, and is often hampered by a failure to take account of migrants in emergency communication plans, as well as their limited language skills, local knowledge and lack of opportunity of access to local social networks.

This problem could be seen during the 2011 floods in Thailand. Emergency services in Thailand were informed by census data that was unable to adequately capture a large population of migrants with irregular status.\textsuperscript{28} In addition, limitations on migrant worker movement, as well as conflicting information from the Government concerning support to migrants, was a source of confusion and uncertainty for migrants and national aid workers.\textsuperscript{29} Migrants’ awareness, access to knowledge and preparedness for the floods thus depended on their level of integration in their host society, especially their ability to speak and understand Thai.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{19} Munier, 2017.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Khadria, 2009.
\textsuperscript{22} MICIC, 2016.
\textsuperscript{23} Government of India, 2012.
\textsuperscript{24} MICIC, 2015.
\textsuperscript{25} IOM, 2016.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Samuel Hall, 2018.
\textsuperscript{28} Bravi et al., 2017.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Perchinig, Rasche and Schaur, 2017.
The existence of migrant groups and community networks can mitigate the negative impacts of a crisis. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Japan during the 2011 earthquake. Prior to the earthquake, the Bayanihan Kesennuma Filipino Community collective was already an active group, bringing together Filipino women living in Kesennuma (mostly married to Japanese men), who provided guidance and support to newcomers. The strength of these existing networks meant that the group was able to ascertain the status and safety of families and individuals during the earthquake, provide information to the Embassy of the Philippines, and support response actions and aid distribution.31

In addition, there is clear evidence that migration status can also have a significant impact on the ability of migrants to deal with crisis, and that flexible immigration and visa policies enable migrants to both keep themselves safe in times of crisis and more easily recover from its impact. For example, the Government of Tunisia led the way in allowing the movement of migrants and other affected persons out of Libya in 2011. Thousands of migrants who were unable to return to their countries of origin were assisted by Tunisian institutions, civil society and the population, with the Tunisian Red Crescent playing a central role.32 Similarly, the Government of Djibouti has played a key role in facilitating the evacuation of migrants trapped in Yemen en route to Gulf States during the conflict.33 Moreover, flexibility of visa and work permit policies can ensure that migrants who have lost documents are able to renew them.

Post-crisis actions: Reintegration and reconstruction

Policy revisions and reflections after a crisis ensure that lessons are learned and can enhance response capacity and preparedness. The MICIC Initiative itself reflected a growing global concern to address the situation of migrants in times of crisis.

A critical gap in post-crisis action concerns the support that is provided to returnees and host communities. Although repatriation is common in many crisis scenarios, returns can challenge the absorption capacity and resilience of households, communities and societies in the country of origin. It is notable that no long-term positive examples of reintegration were identified during the review undertaken for this chapter. Indeed, most literature points out that migrants often receive little or no long-term assistance after being returned to their countries following a crisis.34 The majority of reintegration efforts – where they existed – were short-lived, with longer-term crisis responses hindered by lack of funding and the absence of future-oriented perspectives.35

The failure to institute effective reintegration structures raises important questions about the extent to which it is appropriate to focus on return when addressing the needs of migrants in countries facing crisis. Returns are often a highly visible sign of action, but they are also expensive and politically sensitive. Returns – if combined with a long-term reintegration strategy, and made to a location where conditions are safe and amenable to the pursuit of a dignified life – can be appropriate. However, returns may also render migrants considerably worse off. For instance, Cameroonians and Chadians who were working in the Central African

31 MICIC, 2017.
32 Zampagni et al., 2017.
33 Veerassamy, 2017.
34 Kleist, 2017; Hendow et al., 2018; Zampagni et al., 2017.
35 Ibid.
Republic in 2012 were mainly self-employed business people working in trade, and generally better off than the average local population. Most returned to their countries of origin because of the 2012 crisis, funded by donor States. However, the return and reintegration support that was available was often lacking. The returnees who had previously found success working in urban areas in the Central African Republic were frustrated to find themselves in rural surroundings upon return. When assistance to returnees dried up due to donor interests shifting to the insurgency in the Lake Chad region and resulting displacement, Chad was unable to continue to support returnees, and the reintegration support effectively ended.36

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**Thailand: Migrants’ involvement in emergency management as a driver of integration**

Although migrants caught by the floods in Thailand were a particularly vulnerable group, they also were active members of their communities, providing relief and clean up services where needed and supporting preparedness, response and recovery efforts. This, in turn, made them feel more integrated in their host community. As one male migrant commented: “Do you know, I even helped the soldiers and Thai citizens make dams against the flood? I lived like a Thai citizen and felt like I had a responsibility to support neighbours to prevent the flood.”

Local Thai CSOs reported the involvement of migrants in supporting the communities they lived in, including support for host community members: “In Samut Sakhon, some groups of migrant workers tried to form support networks and mobilized monks to collect alms as a fund for relief supplies. These were mostly Burmese, but they did it to support all flood victims, not just their compatriots.”

*Source:* The above is an abridged extract of the Thailand Case Study (Bravi et al., 2017).

At the same time, there are examples of migrants choosing to stay, sometimes successfully, in their host countries, despite the existence of crisis. In some cases, this resulted in a strengthened sense of community, due to the involvement of migrants in response and recovery efforts. In Lebanon, for example, those in the migrant community who remained found themselves turning to each other for support and information after the 2006 war.37 Once migrants started to work together with their embassies and with NGOs to support domestic workers affected by the conflict, they better understood the importance of coordination and community solidarity. Migrant workers reportedly went from feeling helpless and disconnected prior to and during the crisis, to being a largely connected and stronger force on the ground.38 After the crisis, migrant domestic workers maintained strong networks and established the Domestic Workers’ Union. In this particular case, the lack of international or government support for migrants was seen as the trigger for building more active grassroots support networks within migrant communities themselves, as they worked to create activist groups and build their own resilience and coping mechanisms.39

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36 Zampagni et al., 2017.
37 Mansour-Ille and Hendow, 2018.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
Learning from migrant and local capacities

There is much to learn from migrants at all stages of crisis management, from preparedness planning to post-crisis reflection. Afghan, Somali and Iraqi refugees were able to contribute and be an integral part of community rebuilding after the 2011 Canterbury earthquakes in New Zealand. Likewise for Filipino migrants in the wake of the 2011 Tohoku disaster, affected migrant women spoke about the empowerment and the increased social capital they gained in the aftermath of the disasters, as they participated in reconstruction efforts.

During the 2011 floods in Brisbane, Australia, migrant representatives acted as intermediaries between local authorities and their communities. They supported response efforts through translation and appropriate information dissemination, supporting relief agencies in identifying affected persons in need of support, and advocating with local authorities on behalf of their fellow nationals to ensure that official assistance received was adequate and culturally appropriate. Furthermore, following the 2015 Hurricane Stan, efforts by the Government of Mexico to have a line of direct communication with local stakeholders and representatives from migrant and host communities marked a clear shift in approach, leading to the Reducing the Vulnerability of Migrants in Emergencies project. The IOM-led project mainstreams migration in national disaster response policies and plans, while also creating a space for participation of migrants in policymaking.

These examples highlight the opportunities that exist to re-centre conversations at the local level and on migrant capabilities, and ways to actively include civil society in conversations related to crisis response. It remains the case, however, that more can be done to ensure that recommendations of the MICIC Guidelines are implemented beyond the national level at the subnational and local levels.

Using data to address challenges

Data on population mobility (such as those available in the UN DESA and World Tourism Organization (WTO) databases) highlight the fact that global mobility trends are wide ranging: when combined with data on hazard exposure or risk, these can support planning, preparedness and effective response measures. As can be seen in table 1, crises affect countries regardless of development levels, with both developed and developing countries exposed to significant risks of crises that can affect migrants. Correlating data on migrant stocks, hazard exposure and risk levels allow for the identification of countries where crisis may particularly affect migrant populations.

Table 1 correlates data on migrant stocks, hazard exposure and risk levels to show that crises may affect countries regardless of development levels, and that in both developed and developing countries, potential crises may affect large numbers of migrants. All countries can therefore benefit from more immediate and robust inclusion of migrants in emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction planning: the existing data can inform these decisions at the national or regional levels.

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40 MICIC, 2017.
41 Ibid.
43 MICIC, 2017.
44 MICIC, 2016.
45 MICIC, 2017.
46 Available at, respectively, UN DESA: www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/database/index.asp; and UNWTO: www2.unwto.org/content/data (both accessed 16 July 2019).
Table 1. International data on migrants and crises

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HDI rank, 2018</th>
<th>Exposure to natural hazards, 2018</th>
<th>Exposure to human hazards, 2018</th>
<th>Risk class, 2018</th>
<th>International migrants, 2019</th>
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<tr>
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<td>186</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
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<td>512,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>865,552</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A high value means:  
Low human development  
High exposure to natural hazards  
High exposure to man-made hazards  
High levels of risk  
High number of migrant residents  

A low value means:  
Very high human development  
Low exposure to natural hazards  
Low exposure to man-made hazards  
Low levels of risk  
Low number of migrant residents

Sources: UNDP, 2018; UN DESA, 2019; IASC, 2018.

Notes: This is a non-comprehensive list of countries included both in the Human Development Index (HDI) and Inform Risk Index. Inform’s “hazard exposure” indices express on a scale from 0 to 10 the likelihood that a given country is affected by either a natural hazard (such as an earthquake, flood, tsunami, cyclone or drought) or a human hazard (such as conflict or violence). The risk classification is based on consideration of each country’s hazard exposure, vulnerability (resulting from such factors as inequality, aid dependency and composition of the country’s population) and capacities (resulting from governance levels, quality of local infrastructure and access to health, among others). The following thresholds are defined to assign each country’s risk index (from 0 to 10) to a given risk class: 0–1.9 = very low; 2.0–3.4 = low; 3.5–4.9 = medium; 5.0–6.4 = high; 6.5–10 = very high.
Figures 1 and 2 provide examples of how information on key hazards can be superimposed onto data relating to migrant stocks and flows in Mexico and Libya, respectively. These kinds of mapping exercises allow the identification of high-risk areas within countries, which are also characterized by a significant presence of migrants (including those in transit). Since migrants’ presence is not always captured comprehensively and in a timely fashion by census and population statistics, this kind of local-level disaggregated migration data, where they exist, can be integrated into assessments for a more accurate picture of hazard exposure and risk.

Effective crisis management should build on precise, local-level information. Disaggregating migration and risk data at the subnational level is essential for informing emergency management in ways that better include migrants. Focusing on the more localized administrative level (such as within a district or municipality) can help improve the effectiveness of crisis management measures. This level of data correlation and analysis enables relevant institutions to: (a) tailor warnings and emergency communications to the specific and appropriate requirements of migrant populations; (b) stockpile or deliver food and non-food items that may be essential to specific migrant groups; and (c) deploy multilingual or culturally competent personnel in crisis
areas with high migrant presence. When informed by specific and localized data, responses can effectively address the specific needs of at-risk and affected migrant communities.

Figure 2. Migrant presence and transit through Libya, and occurrence of violence

This map is for illustration purposes only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Organization for Migration.

Sources: IOM, 2019 and ACLED, 2019.

There are, however, challenges to collecting robust, reliable and comparable data, and official migration statistics are likely to be conservative estimates that do not fully capture the extent of movements. Foreign embassies, missions and consulates rarely have comprehensive information about their nationals abroad. Data on asset, livelihood and other material and opportunity losses incurred in crises are often not categorized or disaggregated. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to quantify (a) the true loss suffered by migrants, (b) their vulnerability in comparison with other affected groups, and (c) any extraordinary losses unique to migrants.

Gathering data through key informants

Surveying key community informants is an effective way to gather information on numbers, demographic and socioeconomic profiles, and characteristics of migrants in a given area. It helps avoid challenges and sensitivities linked with the collection of individual data, and allows for the inclusion of particularly hard-to-reach groups, such as transit or irregular migrants. Networks of key informants provide the data for IOM’s assessments of presence and movements of migrants in Libya and refugees in Cox’s Bazar (Bangladesh) – which are then used to inform humanitarian interventions, preparedness planning and urban development. Similarly, the City of Bergen (Norway) collects information on its neighbourhoods and their population through a network of trained “street mediators”, and uses this to deliver local public services in a more inclusive manner.

In the absence of comprehensive and up-to-date datasets, it is important to utilize a variety of information sources and data collection mechanisms. Academic institutions, international organizations, civil society and private sector actors provide some of the most detailed and useful stand-alone data sets, but taken together, these may still be patchy or disconnected. Significant resources may be required to systematically gather, update and safely store relevant, appropriate and timely data.

It should also be noted that loss data do not always capture longer-term well-being impacts, particularly as they relate to a less effective, slower recovery – which may be particularly relevant for migrants, who are often excluded from longer-term financial, housing and livelihood assistance after crises. In addition, whenever migrants are affected in a crisis, loss estimates should also account for impacts suffered in distant locations. The impacts migrants suffer may be felt by: (a) their families and communities in countries of origin, in the form of psychological impacts, missing remittance transfers and inability to pay off debts; and (b) people in places migrants return to or move to as a consequence of a crisis, in the form of increased pressures on labour markets and availability of services, land and housing.

Information on migrants’ language proficiency, preferred communication channels, cultural sensitivities relevant to the provision of emergency services, levels of trust towards responders, and existing capacities at the community level would allow for stronger and more inclusive crisis planning and response. The limited degree to which these kinds of data currently exist and inform crisis management is one of the elements compounding migrants’ vulnerability in times of crisis.

Innovative responses and ways forward

One of the key components of innovation is finding ways to enable people to work together. Innovations can lead to partnerships that support the implementation of guidelines and principles outlined in international protection frameworks and non-binding agreements. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Oslo Manual 2018: Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation provides a framework for identifying the range of innovations that can be adapted to support migrants in crisis contexts (table 2).

Table 2. The OECD guidelines on innovation adapted for responses to migrants caught in crisis

| Product | Product innovation increases the type of and access to products and services for migrants caught in crisis, including products that may increase access to information and support networks. **Examples:**
|         | • Developing new – or improving accessibility to – existing tools that support migrant decision-making in crisis situations. This may include subscriber identification module (SIM) cards or virtual information delivery systems (such as apps or crowdsourced platforms, and translation platforms), or the creation of migrant support groups. |

| Process | Process innovation is needed for migrants to access two-way communication channels, in particular for migrant groups who are most marginalized from mainstream services and support, such as irregular migrants or domestic workers. **Examples:**
|         | • Developing new funding streams that can support individuals, households and communities.
|         | • Inclusion of migrants in crisis preparedness, emergency response and monitoring.
|         | • Ensuring flexibility of immigration and visa policies in emergencies. |

| Organizational | Organizational innovation refers to the way an organization evolves in its mandate, mission and methods. **Examples:**
|                | • Creation of new operational frameworks, such as IOM’s Migration Crisis Operational Framework and the Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism.
|                | • Increased involvement of and coordination with non-traditional actors (such as private actors and companies, diasporas, student networks, trade unions and faith-based organizations). |

| Outreach and visibility | Innovation in outreach refers to the way uptake of solutions by migrants and host communities are enhanced for greater inclusion and protection. **Examples:**
|                        | • Awareness-raising campaigns advocating for migrant inclusion and against xenophobia, including, for example, essay writing contests and dissemination on public platforms.
|                        | • Context-specific campaigns (for example, IOM’s “Aware Ramadan” campaign on internal displacement).
|                        | • Original and innovative uses of media and other platforms to communicate information both to and from migrants. |
This section focuses on innovative responses that aim to better connect migrants with information, services and social networks, as these have been shown to deliver better outcomes and can be delivered without requiring government support or elaborate systems of financial assistance. There are two interventions that provide a foundation for improved communication and mobilization: (a) improvements in knowledge and data on migrants living in the contexts of crisis, and (b) the use of technology in responding to crisis.

The establishment of regular data standards in tandem with expansion of data collection is necessary to ensure effective and long-term analysis of the impacts of policies and practices intended to address the needs of migrants in crisis contexts. Information is needed about the number of migrants present in a specific area – especially at the subnational level – in order to enhance preparedness and response. More rigorous analysis is also needed on the impacts of crises in migrant communities. Although some reports exist on these impacts, they remain the exception rather than the rule, and stand as good practices to be scaled and replicated. For example, in north-eastern Nigeria, questions on language and communication needs were included in IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix surveys as a way to fill the information gap that existed concerning the languages spoken and understood by those displaced by conflict.

Technology has the potential to assist migrants affected by crises. At a 2018 Techfugees Global Summit in Paris, 25 start-ups from across the world presented social enterprise initiatives for addressing the needs of migrants. The use of these technologies needs to be mainstreamed into global, regional, national and local crisis response policy and practice, with attention paid to sensitization programmes, culturally friendly trainings and workshops, to ensure uptake. Trust-building during the preparedness phase, through community-led efforts, can ensure that migrants have the impulse, during emergencies, to rely on technologies that they are familiar with.

Innovative initiatives that may be scaled to assist migrants in crisis and address current limitations include, but are not limited to, the following:

*Translation and digital information services*: Translators Without Borders has developed freely downloadable multilingual glossary apps accessible online and offline, and has worked with Refucomm to test the distribution of mother tongue information on legal and asylum procedures via micro-SD cards to recently arrived migrants in Greece. Other apps, such as IOM’s MigApp, help migrants make informed decisions throughout their migration process (for example, on health and travel requirements, visa application processes and remittances), and provide migrants a platform to share their experiences. Accessible digital translation and information initiatives can bridge the information gap migrants experience due to language barriers and lack of tailored communications.

*Enhancing accessible communication media*: Sri Lanka’s SIM card scheme for workers going abroad is one model for ensuring access to communication options for migrants. The existence of hotlines in countries of destination to recover and communicate information that can support migrants is another example. The Sendai International Relations Association set up one such multilingual information hotline in 2011.

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50 See, for example, the literature examining unmet needs of immigrant communities in the Metro New York area after Hurricane Sandy (Make the Road New York, 2012; New York Women’s Foundation, 2015).
51 Translators Without Borders, 2017b.
52 Ogie et al., 2018.
54 IOM, n.d.
55 UNISDR, 2015.
Crowdsourcing platforms to address discrimination against migrants: The African Centre for Migration and Society at Wits University in Johannesburg and the technology website iAfrikan launched a crowdsourcing platform called Xenowatch to monitor efforts related to violence against migrants. People can report xenophobic threats or violence to Xenowatch online, by SMS or email. Reports are verified, anonymized and documented on a map using the Ushahidi platform, and shared with the police and UNHCR. Crowdsourcing platform initiatives are a real-time resource for organizations to advocate for and enhance migrant rights, security, inclusion and community engagement.56

Looking ahead and policy implications

Migrants may face particular challenges in accessing documentation, information, resources and assistance in crisis situations, and may be exposed to additional precariousness and to discrimination.57 Responses have not systematically addressed this range of challenges before and during crises, and further information and data at the local levels are needed in order to support effective planning and preparedness. However, information without funding, political will and the participation of migrants would not suffice to support preparedness. In most of the examples reviewed, cooperation sprang up spontaneously or as a result of a top-down decision by governments or international organizations. The role and inclusion of grassroots organizations, employers, technology partners and the diaspora in situations of emergencies and post-crisis recovery merit greater attention than they have received to date. At the governance level, the implementation of the MICIC Initiative can inform and accompany the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.58 The inclusion of human rights frameworks, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Principles and Guidelines, supported by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations,59 can strengthen initiatives and facilitate discussions between State and non-State actors.

Our analysis in this chapter has a number of implications for future policy and practice in this area. These support the 15 guidelines of the MICIC Initiative, emphasizing that:

- Before, during and after crises, stronger preparedness and post-crisis actions are needed. Most large-scale interventions in assistance to migrants in crisis have taken place in an unplanned manner. Instead, more systematic efforts are required to build on and develop capacities of emergency management actors, foreign embassies, consulates and missions, as well as local institutions and migrants themselves. Involving non-traditional stakeholders and migrants in the response and coordination mechanisms is key to enhancing flexible, effective funding and response.

- Funding schemes need to be diversified and strengthened to support greater preparedness and coordination. Flexible and diverse funding can provide new avenues for support systems that can integrate migrants in a non-discriminatory manner. This includes the exploration of linkages with the private sector and diaspora networks, engaging with and sensitizing donors, while also scaling up initiatives for flexible donor and government financing of emergency funds for crises response.

56 Alfred, 2016.
57 Hendow et al., 2018; MICIC, 2015.
58 ICMPD, 2017.
59 OHCHR, 2018.
• Post-crisis reflections can be enhanced, with responses beyond return to be explored, including local integration and resettlement. Returns are not the only solution and should not necessarily be the preferred one, given that there is often a lack of support after return. Where migrants are returned, long-term efforts to measure reintegration and monitor protection outcomes are critical to ensuring that migrants do not return to situations of greater harm or find themselves back in crisis situations.

• Addressing gaps and shortages of data will enable more effective coordination, preparedness, communication and provision of assistance. While anecdotal evidence may be available, larger data gaps prevent effective coordinated responses, whether between governments of origin and destination, or other stakeholders. The lack of impact evaluation data impedes the ability to identify fully what makes a response effective, while the lack of local level, disaggregated data does not allow for an understanding of the loss experienced by migrants. Enhancing transnational learning can lead to the scaling up of successful practices.

• Developing a road map for innovations in response to migrants caught in situations of crisis, which takes into account the above recommendations, can support the elaboration of specific responses, stronger processes, organizational effectiveness and outreach that are more inclusive, both of migrants’ vulnerabilities and their capacities.

• Finally, and fundamentally, human rights considerations and the humanitarian imperative to save lives should inform the development of emergency preparedness frameworks, and operational protocols and practices, during disasters. Supporting humanitarian and human rights-based responses requires cooperation of State- and non-State actors, who may hold differing priorities and agendas. It is important to ensure that responses in crises situations are primarily and substantively human rights-based, rather than based on political considerations or populist expediency. In order to uphold international human rights obligations, it is crucial that respect for the human rights of all migrants, irrespective of status, should be on par with the maintenance of the rights of citizens. Greater flexibility on visa policies and removal of administrative and security restrictions are known to improve migrant protection and community resilience. These should be recognized as exceptional measures needed in times of crisis. Support for coordination, negotiation and diplomacy with relevant countries affected by crisis is necessary in order to ensure that rules are made flexible to empower migrants to have a broader range of options and make informed decisions.

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60 Ibid.
11
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION: AN UPDATE TO THE WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2018

Introduction

By their very nature, international migration and displacement are transnational issues concerning origin and destination States, as well as States through which migrants may travel (often referred to as “transit” States) or in which they are hosted following displacement across national borders. And yet, somewhat paradoxically, the majority of migration governance has historically remained with individual States, their policies and regulations on migration typically made at the national level.\(^2\)\(^3\) For the most part, migration governance has been closely associated with State sovereignty. States retain the power of deciding on the entry and stay of non-nationals because migration directly affects some of the defining elements of a State.\(^4\) Bilateral and multilateral arrangements are features of migration governance, and there are several global arrangements in the form of international treaties in which States have reached agreement on the application of human rights and the related responsibilities of States in specific areas. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) are two significant examples, notable for being widely ratified. Other migration conventions have not been so broadly accepted, such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which still has no traditional countries of destination among its States parties. Beyond this, there have been numerous multilateral and global initiatives, dialogues and processes on migration over several decades (see Appendix A for a tabular summary). The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global Compact for Migration) is another milestone, as the first internationally negotiated statement of objectives for migration governance striking a balance between migrants’ rights and the principle of States’ sovereignty over their territory. Although it is not legally binding, the Global Compact for Migration was adopted by consensus in December 2018 at a United Nations conference in which more than 150 United Nations Member States participated and, later that same month, in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), by a vote among the Member States of 152 to 5 (with 12 abstentions).

In the absence of a coherent international regime on migration, unexpected large-scale migration events of significance, as well as seismic geopolitical events,\(^5\) can have dramatic impacts on global migration governance, operating as “calls to action” within the international community. Such events have also brought into sharp

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1 Kathleen Newland, Senior Fellow and Co-Founder, Migration Policy Institute; Marie McAuliffe, Head, Migration Policy Research Division and Céline Bauloz, Senior Research Officer, Migration Policy Research Division, IOM.
2 Several political systems, such as federations, also have aspects of migration, particularly those related to integration, regulated at the subnational level (for example, the provincial level, such as in Australia, Canada, Switzerland and the United States). Increasingly, aspects of international migration are also managed at the city level (see, for example, Duncan and Popp, 2017; and the World Migration Report 2015 on migrants and cities).
3 McAuliffe and Goossens, 2018.
4 For example, a permanent population and a defined territory, as per article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.
5 By seismic, the authors mean large-scale transnational conflict, or profound events, such as the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001.
relief some of the gaps that exist within a fragmented global migration governance framework, and the need for more action to develop a much more coherent international approach to migration for the betterment of States, societies and migrants. In 2015 and 2016, for example, the mass movement of more than 1 million people to and through Europe (including Syrian and other refugees) provided some of the impetus for the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (New York Declaration), adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2016. The making of the New York Declaration signalled an important point in the history of global migration governance. All 193 United Nations Member States unanimously affirmed their support for upholding the rights of migrants and refugees, and committed to a process of intergovernmental negotiations in order to reach agreement on a Global Compact for Migration as well as on a Global Compact on Refugees. Importantly, the two compacts build upon years of structured dialogues, initiatives and cooperation between States, regionally and at the international level.

The World Migration Report 2018 included a chapter on global governance of migration, which provided the background and context to the adoption of the New York Declaration. It was the first chapter in Part II on complex and emerging migration issues, and was designed to provide a critical overview of existing global governance architecture and recent developments. The key elements of that chapter included:

- Discussion of the concept of “governance”;
- The benefits and barriers to global migration governance;
- Norms and institutions;

Chapter 5 of the World Migration Report 2018 also laid the foundation for the remaining chapters in Part II of the 2018 report by providing a context for governance at the global level, in part by highlighting the key thematic areas in migration that have been the subject of international cooperation in recent times. We encourage readers interested in foundational aspects and contemporary developments of global governance of migration to refer to this chapter in the World Migration Report 2018.

So much has happened in the sphere of global migration governance in the two years since the publication of the World Migration Report 2018 that the editors felt it important to have an update on the topic for readers of the World Migration Report 2020. This chapter provides a descriptive analysis that is specific to a point in time – the implementation and evolution of the system will continue well into the future. In picking up from where the World Migration Report 2018 left off, the next section walks through the development and adoption of the two global compacts. The third section offers a brief analysis of the complementarity, coherence and gaps between the two global compacts. The fourth section outlines an assessment of how the global compacts affect global migration governance architecture. The final section then looks to the future by outlining the implications of these recent developments as well as the challenges for implementation of the global compacts. The chapter builds on information from the policy sphere, academic commentaries and opinion pieces. At the time of writing, very little new academic research had been published on the

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6 UNGA, 2016.
7 UNGA, 2018a.
8 UNGA, 2018b.
10 This chapter refers to information and events up until the end of June 2019.
adoption and implementation of the two global compacts, which is a reflection on the time frames involved in academic peer-reviewed publications (see chapter 4 of this report). We expect new academic publications on the compacts will increase from the last quarter of 2019.

The development and adoption of the global compacts

The two global compacts sprang from a widespread sense of crisis, as the world faced large-scale movements involving people in several locations throughout the world. These events – most spectacularly in the Mediterranean, but also in the Gulf of Aden/Red Sea and the Bay of Bengal – led to the making of the New York Declaration. The Mediterranean crisis was notable not only for the huge numbers of people involved, but also for its visibility, unfolding as it did within sight of major Western news outlets. The movements brought home to the governments of wealthy European States (the intended destinations of migrants) that even these States, with all their legal and financial resources, could not cope with flows of this magnitude without cooperation among themselves and with countries of origin and transit.  

The United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants in September 2016, convened in the shadow of the crisis, produced a Declaration of commitment on the part of States, the most significant elements of which were pledges to negotiate the two global compacts. The initial conception was of a single compact that would cover both refugees and migrants. Several obstacles to this plan presented themselves, including a fear that, on the one hand, a dual-purpose compact would dilute the protection to which refugees are entitled under the Refugee Convention and, on the other hand, that equating refugees and migrants would entail stronger obligations toward migrants than States were willing to accept. Most destination countries, by and large, would have been content to have one global compact that dealt only with refugees, but other States, most notably countries of the Global South, insisted on a Global Compact for Migration as well. Both compacts were envisaged as being legally non-binding, unlike an international treaty that obligates all State parties to implement its provisions.  

In addition, conceptual discussions and debates on the various definitions of “refugees” and “migrants”, as they relate to the New York Declaration and during the development of the two compacts, were prominent. While the New York Declaration noted that “refugees and migrants have the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms”, a distinction between the two was upheld, as summarized in the Global Compact for Migration:

Migrants and refugees are distinct groups governed by separate legal frameworks. Only refugees are entitled to the specific international protection as defined by international refugee law.

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11 See, for instance, European Commission, 2015.
12 There is a question as to whether the Global Compact for Migration could be interpreted as “soft law” (Chetail, 2019; Allinson et al., 2019).
13 See, for instance, Klein Solomon and Sheldon, 2018.
14 UNGA, 2016: para. 6.
15 UNGA, 2018a: para. 4.
As a result, the two compacts embrace a residual understanding of “migrants”, as people living outside their countries of origin who are not refugees (figure 1): “a diverse, residual category of people who are united by the feature of not being refugees”. By contrast, the United Nations Population Division uses an inclusive definition whereby any person residing outside his or her country of origin is a migrant.

Figure 1. What does “migrant” mean?

Source: Carling, 2017 (adapted).

The processes leading to the two compacts were very different. The Global Compact on Refugees was drafted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the lead-up to the September 2016 United Nations Summit on Refugees and Migrants, and during UNHCR’s piloting of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). UNHCR organized a series of thematic discussions with States and other stakeholders, and then entered into consultations with States (see figure 2). It received in total more than 500 written contributions from United Nations Member States and other stakeholders throughout the process. UNHCR produced the final draft, which was adopted during the seventy-third session of the United Nations General Assembly in December 2018 after a vote in the Third Committee, with 176 in favour, 1 against (the United States of America) and three abstentions.

16 Carling, 2017.
17 UN DESA, 1998.
18 On the development of the New York Declaration and the CRRF, see Ferris, 2016.
20 Eritrea, Liberia and Libya.
21 Türk, 2018.
The Global Compact for Migration process, by contrast, was firmly in the hands of States, although with the close involvement and support of the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration. Two States, Mexico and Switzerland, were appointed as co-facilitators of the process, and they took responsibility for drafting the Compact. The first stage of development consisted of six months of consultations at the global, regional and country levels, followed by a stocktaking exercise.
The co-facilitators produced a first draft of the Compact, and chaired six rounds of informal consultations at the United Nations over the course of six months.\(^\text{22}\) The final version of the text was formally agreed at the end of the final round in July 2018, and was adopted at a special conference in Morocco in December 2018, five months after the conclusion of negotiations. The United Nations General Assembly in New York formally endorsed the outcomes of the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, with the results of the General Assembly vote as follows: 152 States in favour, 5 against and 12 abstentions. The United States withdrew from the process before intergovernmental negotiations commenced and voted against the Compact at the General Assembly (along with the Czechia, Hungary, Israel and Poland). The countries that abstained were Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, Singapore and Switzerland.\(^\text{23}\)

The rise of nationalism, far-right political parties and anti-migrant sentiment, especially in destination countries, contributed to several countries withdrawing support for the Compact, which at times involved rhetoric based on misrepresentation of the Compact and its effects.\(^\text{24}\) For example, the former Immigration Minister of Canada under the Conservative Harper Government, Chris Alexander, publicly denounced comments made by opposition leader Andrew Scheer on the impact of the Compact by stating: “Scheer’s statement is factually incorrect: this Compact is a political declaration, not a legally binding treaty: it has no impact on our sovereignty”.\(^\text{25}\)

The Global Compact for Migration has four major elements. The first consists of the early paragraphs that set out the Compact’s vision of better cooperation among States to improve the governance of international migration.\(^\text{26}\) They reiterate the principles on which the Compact is built, one of which is that it “reaffirms the sovereign right of States to determine their national migration policy and to govern migration within their jurisdiction, in conformity with international law”.\(^\text{27}\) The preamble to the Compact acknowledges the related human rights instruments, other agreements and the outcomes of prior United Nations meetings on migration.

The second element is the heart of the document, which consists of 23 objectives that offer a fairly comprehensive approach to international cooperation on migration (see box below). Each objective has several associated actions from which countries will draw in order to realize their commitment to the stated goal. This is central to the Compact, which re-affirms the sovereignty of States over their migration policies.\(^\text{28}\)

\(^{22}\) See UNGA, 2017a setting out the modalities for the intergovernmental negotiations of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.

\(^{23}\) A number of countries were not in the room for the vote (Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Benin, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Dominican Republic, Guinea, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, the Federated States of Micronesia, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Slovakia, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Vanuatu).

\(^{24}\) Kaufmann, 2017; Mudde, 2019; Zalan, 2018.

\(^{25}\) Zimonjic, 2018.

\(^{26}\) UNGA, 2018a: paras. 1–15.

\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Makooi, 2018.
Global Compact for Migration’s 23 objectives for safe, orderly and regular migration

1. Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies.
2. Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin.
3. Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration.
4. Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation.
5. Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration.
6. Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment, and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work.
7. Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration.
8. Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants.
9. Strengthen the transnational response to the smuggling of migrants.
10. Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration.
11. Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner.
12. Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral.
13. Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives.
14. Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle.
15. Provide access to basic services for migrants.
16. Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion.
17. Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration.
18. Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences.
19. Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries.
20. Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances, and foster financial inclusion of migrants.
21. Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration.
22. Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits.
23. Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration.

The Global Compact for Migration’s 23 objectives can be thought of as falling into three “baskets”: (1) specific and relatively straightforward measures; (2) specific but contested issues; and (3) very broad and aspirational goals.
Recent developments in the global governance of migration: An update to the World Migration Report 2018

### Table 1. Global Compact for Migration objectives by category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Specific and relatively straightforward measures</th>
<th>2. Specific but contested issues</th>
<th>3. Very broad and aspirational goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving migration data and research (Objective 1)</td>
<td>Opening wider legal pathways for migrants (Objective 5)</td>
<td>Reducing the negative drivers of migration (Objective 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing accurate and timely information at all stages of migration (Objective 3)</td>
<td>Managing borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner (Objective 11)</td>
<td>Addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration (Objective 7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensuring that migrants have proof of their legal identity (Objective 4)</td>
<td>Using detention only as a last resort, and seeking alternatives (Objective 13)</td>
<td>Empowering migrants and societies for full social inclusion and cohesion (Objective 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating fair and ethical recruitment and conditions for decent work (Objective 6)</td>
<td>Providing access to basic services for migrants (Objective 15)</td>
<td>Eliminating all forms of discrimination and promoting evidence-based public discourse (Objective 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saving lives and coordinating efforts on missing migrants (Objective 8)</td>
<td>Investing in skills development and mutual recognition (Objective 18)</td>
<td>Creating conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development (Objective 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening the transnational response to smuggling (Objective 9)</td>
<td>Facilitating return and reintegration (Objective 21)</td>
<td>Strengthening international cooperation and global partnerships (Objective 23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventing, combating and eradicating trafficking in persons (Objective 10)</td>
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<td>Strengthening migration procedures (Objective 12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhancing consular services for migrants (Objective 14)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facilitating remittance transfers (Objective 20)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits (Objective 22)</td>
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Some of the objectives are relatively straightforward with wide support, and are subject to immediate implementation – indeed, implementation has already begun on some, including on data collection and research, ethical recruitment and remittances, among others. Others – such as enhanced legal pathways for migration, better border management, and cooperation on return and reintegration – are specific but contested and will require further negotiation, commitment of resources and summoning of political will.
Others, such as those in the third category in table 1, are very long-term propositions, notwithstanding the high degree of agreement on the need for positive change on these issues. Their goals are quite far-reaching, so they will indeed take time to realize. For example, the protection of migrants in vulnerable situations (Objective 7) now extends beyond traditional vulnerability categories (for example, women and girls, children and trafficking victims) to more broadly cover vulnerabilities arising “from the circumstances in which they travel or the conditions they face in countries of origin, transit and destination.” The realization of some of these objectives is also closely interlinked with the implementation of other initiatives related to development, environment or, more generally, the protection of migrants caught in crises. For instance, Objectives 2 and 19 explicitly refer to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development.

The third element of the Global Compact for Migration deals with implementation. It is clear that States have the primary responsibility for implementing the 23 objectives of the Compact. To support their efforts, a “capacity-building mechanism” was envisaged, consisting of a knowledge platform, a connection hub and a start-up fund for projects. Importantly, in this section, States pledge to work on implementation with other stakeholders, including migrants, civil society, the private sector, trade unions, local authorities and others. The Compact also welcomes the Secretary-General’s decision to establish a United Nations Migration Network, coordinated by IOM, to foster effective, coordinated support to States from the many United Nations entities that work on migration issues. The Secretary-General is asked to draw on the Network to prepare a biennial report to the General Assembly on United Nations activities to support implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. The final paragraph on implementation recognizes that State-led processes, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development and the regional consultative processes on migration, have important roles to play in furthering international cooperation on migration.

Finally, the fourth element of the Global Compact for Migration relates to follow-up and review. Progress on implementation of the Compact’s objectives will be examined every four years in the General Assembly, starting in 2022, in an “International Migration Review Forum”, which will replace the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. Regional reviews are to take place every four years alternately with the Review Forum, starting in 2020. The Compact foresees contributions to these reviews from other State-led processes, such as those mentioned above, as well as IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration. It also encourages States to institute national-level reviews.

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29 Newland, 2018.
30 UNGA, 2018a: para. 23.
31 UNGA, 2018a.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 UNGA, 2019.
The Global Compact on Refugees

The New York Declaration explicitly recognized the pressing need for more cooperation in distributing the responsibility of hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, who are mainly situated in neighbouring countries (most of which are low- or middle-income countries). The Declaration states:

To address the needs of refugees and receiving States, we commit to a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world’s refugees, while taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources among States.35

Unlike the proposed Global Compact for Migration, involving intergovernmental negotiations to reach agreement on a Member State document, the New York Declaration envisaged the Global Compact on Refugees emerging from a process led by UNHCR. The emphasis would be on the further development and practical implementation of an existing response to refugee issues, the CRRF, with a particular focus on responding to large movements of refugees (including in protracted situations). The CRRF, therefore, as outlined in Annex 1 of the New York Declaration, is central to the Global Compact on Refugees. The key elements of the CRRF, developed by UNHCR in close coordination with stakeholders and implemented in multiple countries36 during the Global Compact on Refugees process (see table 2), included reception and admission, support for ongoing needs, support for host countries and communities, and durable solutions. The core CRRF objectives are to: (1) ease pressure on the host countries involved; (2) enhance refugee self-reliance; (3) expand access to third-country solutions; and (4) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.37 In addition to the CRRF, the Global Compact on Refugees includes a Programme of Action that builds on the CRRF and sets out measures for States and other relevant stakeholders designed to ensure better responses to refugee displacement (table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRRF pillars</th>
<th>Programme of Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reception and admission</td>
<td>Early warning, preparedness and contingency planning</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immediate reception arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safety and security</td>
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<td>Registration and documentation</td>
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<td>Addressing specific needs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identifying international protection needs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Thematic areas of focus in CRRF and Programme of Action

35 UNGA, 2016: para. 68.

36 The 16 roll-out countries included: Afghanistan, Belize, Chad, Costa Rica, Djibouti, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya, Mexico, Panama, Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia. The United Republic of Tanzania was initially a roll-out country but later withdrew.

Providing adequate funding for host countries and to resettle refugees are two concrete expressions of responsibility-sharing, but they have both proved challenging throughout the Global Compact on Refugees process and will likely continue to be so in the future. It has been difficult to secure funding to enable the full roll-out of the CRRF, with inadequate donor support hampering the implementation of the framework in several countries, including Uganda and Ethiopia. Likewise, the very small number – compared with the need for refugee resettlement places and other durable solutions for the displaced – will remain challenging for the CRRF/Global Compact on Refugees. While neither of these challenges is in any way new to the international refugee system, or to UNHCR as the mandated United Nations agency and its chief guardian, the Global Compact on Refugees process has served to highlight the enduring difficulties in these two matters, while attempting to garner more support from the international community to enable more practical results to be realized.

To address these two challenges and, more broadly, support Member States’ commitments, the Global Compact on Refugees sets up different follow-up, review and implementation mechanisms. A Global Refugee Forum is to be convened every four years, with the first one scheduled for December 2019. The objective of this Forum is, first, for United Nations Member States to make formal pledges and contributions in the form of financial, material or technical assistance or resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission, and then report on key achievements and good practices. This global arrangement for international cooperation

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38 Siegfried, 2017; see also Hansen, 2018.
39 Angenendt and Biehler, 2018.
is complemented by national arrangements that can be established by host countries to coordinate the measures taken by relevant stakeholders working toward achieving a comprehensive response.\textsuperscript{41} To avoid future “refugee crises”, a Support Platform can also be activated upon the request of the host country(ies) or country(ies) of origin in two cases:

- A large-scale and/or complex refugee situation where the response capacity of a host State is or is expected to be overwhelmed; or

- A protracted refugee situation where the host State(s) require(s) considerable additional support, and/or a major opportunity for a solution arises (for example, large-scale voluntary repatriation to the country of origin).\textsuperscript{42}

Led by a group of States, Support Platforms can initiate solidarity conferences for a particular situation in order for States and relevant stakeholders to contribute financially, materially and technically, or provide resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission.\textsuperscript{43}

The non-binding nature of the Global Compact on Refugees and the focus on implementation and action have resulted in some commentators pointing to worrying signs for the likelihood of sustainable change, given that States will be able to pick and choose the approaches that are more attractive to them at a time when the current geopolitical climate on refugees and displacement is unfavourable.\textsuperscript{44} Other concerns have related to the focus on the Refugee Convention as the core of the Global Compact on Refugees, or the relative neglect of related rights expressed in other key instruments, as well as aspects of displacement not covered by the existing refugee regime.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Complementarity, coherence and gaps between the two global compacts}

\textbf{Notwithstanding the high profile of the 2016 New York Declaration, and the related commitment of all States to finalize the two global compacts, the content of the compacts did not spring out of nowhere. There has been a much longer lead time in developing the ideas and approaches in the compacts than may first appear. As highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, the two compacts build upon years of structured dialogues, initiatives and cooperation between States, regionally and at the international level. The Global Compact for Migration in particular builds on recent global and regional migration initiatives and processes,\textsuperscript{46} including}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{41} UNGA, 2018b.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Angenendt and Biehler, 2018; Hathaway, 2018.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Aleinikoff and Martin, 2018; Chimni, 2018; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2018.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} For an historical overview of previous global migration initiatives and processes, see Newland, 2010; Martin and Weerasinghe, 2017; Betts and Kainz, 2017.
\end{itemize}
by addressing thematic areas where States’ interests have converged\textsuperscript{47} (see appendix B for more detail). As for the Global Compact on Refugees, it focuses on “translating [the] long-standing principle [of] international cooperation enshrined in the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention into concrete and practical action” for “predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing”.\textsuperscript{48} The Global Compact on Refugees reinforces and strengthens previous efforts, including, for instance, by answering the repeated calls for international cooperation made by the UNHCR Executive Committee,\textsuperscript{49} as well as by consolidating UNHCR-led initiatives for specific cases of ad hoc responsibility-sharing.\textsuperscript{50}

The two global compacts are not mutually exclusive, but have been designed to complement one another in recognition of the “many common challenges and […] similar vulnerabilities” of migrants and refugees.\textsuperscript{51} The two compacts are considered by UNHCR and IOM to be functionally coherent when it comes to the common challenges they seek to address.\textsuperscript{52} The Global Compact for Migration is broader in scope than the Global Compact on Refugees, “addressing migration in all its dimensions”. Thus, it complements the more limited focus of the Global Compact on Refugees on the specific challenges of large movements of refugees, including situations of protracted displacement.\textsuperscript{53} Offering a “360-degree vision of international migration”,\textsuperscript{54} the Global Compact for Migration addresses issues throughout the migration cycle, be it upon departure from the country of origin; during migrants’ journeys, including in transit countries; upon arrival and stay in the country of destination; or upon return to the country of origin. In their early drafts, neither global compact addressed displacement associated with the impact of climate change and environmental degradation. Some stakeholders hoped that protection of people displaced by these forces would be included in the Global Compact on Refugees, but States did not agree. The final text of the Global Compact for Migration did, however, include a subsection on “natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation” under Objective 2 (Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin).\textsuperscript{55}

The different scope and purposes of the two compacts avoided contradictions between them and achieved general coherence. But the two left another important area of potential overlap unresolved: mixed flows of refugees moving onward from countries of first asylum with other migrants in large-scale movements.\textsuperscript{56} The unplanned arrival of large numbers of people, including some who have solid claims for international refugee protection and some who do not, places huge demands on national asylum systems and humanitarian institutions. Even those who are not refugees may be in desperate need of assistance and protection, such as unaccompanied children, and the Global Compact for Migration addresses their needs in Objective 7 (Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration). But neither compact comes to grips with the phenomenon of “secondary movements” by refugees.

\textsuperscript{47} Neither the Compact on Refugees nor the Global Compact for Migration deals with internally displaced persons (IDPs) – of whom there are twice as many as there are refugees. Some participating Member States in the Second Thematic Consultation held at United Nations Headquarters in New York in May 2017, had argued for IDPs to be included in the Global Compact for Migration, but others were opposed to it. Acknowledging the international and internal migration linkage, the moderators, co-facilitators and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, however, clarified that IDPs were not within the mandate of the Global Compact for Migration (Khadria, 2017).

\textsuperscript{48} UNGA, 2018b: paras. 2 and 3. See the fourth preambular paragraph of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

\textsuperscript{49} Dowd and McAdam, 2017.

\textsuperscript{50} Such as the 1989 International Conference on Central American Refugees and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees. On these actions plans, see Betts, 2006; Newland, 2011.

\textsuperscript{51} UNGA, 2016: para. 4.

\textsuperscript{52} Türk, cited in Leone, 2018.

\textsuperscript{53} CRRF, annexed to UNGA, 2016; and UNGA, 2018b.

\textsuperscript{54} UNGA, 2018a: para. 11.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid: paras. 18(h)–(l).

\textsuperscript{56} See, for instance, Ndonga Githinji and Wood, 2018.
One of the key lessons from the 2015–2016 movements to and through Europe is the number of refugees who were able to travel on from the first country they reached after being displaced from their countries of origin, in search of greater safety or more promising prospects. In Europe in 2015–2016, the volume of secondary movements was partly due to geography (particularly the close proximity of Turkey and Greece) and crowded conditions in first countries of asylum, but also because of more fundamental changes in technology (including that used by smugglers), “mobile money” and information exchange. The story of Paolina Roccanello (see below) highlights just how much the world has changed since the end of the Second World War: while refugees had at that time a limited capacity to move by themselves beyond the confines of Europe, this is no longer the case.

Migration before appification

The world has changed fundamentally in the almost 70 years since the largest refugee crisis in Europe following the aftermath of World War II when the Refugee Convention was being developed. Back then, there was no Internet, there were no mobiles or fax machines, and postal services were slow and often disrupted. Telegram and telephone communication was limited and costly. Paolina Roccanello arrived in Melbourne in April 1947 from Italy with her mother on the SS Misr in the shadow of the war. They were lucky to be reunited with her father who had emigrated to Australia eight years before, expecting his family to follow soon after. For all their war-time separation they received only one of his letters, which had taken five years to reach them. Such were the times.

After World War II refugee movements beyond war-torn Europe were regulated by States (including under the United Nations). The UN coordinated repatriation, returns and resettlement of refugees to third countries. In today’s terms, movements were slow, highly regulated and very selective. Information for refugees was largely the monopoly of states and opportunities for migrating to other regions were limited to formal channels. Things are very different now.

Some refugees are now able to migrate on their own, exercising a degree of self-agency. Contrary to the “binary construct” between forced and voluntary migration, refugees often move for mixed motivations, meaning that:

They may have left their home countries because of conflict or persecution, but they have chosen a destination country because of the economic opportunities it affords. They may well fit the refugee definition and cannot be returned home.

57 McAuliffe, Goossens and Sengupta, 2017; Triandafyllidou, 2017.
58 On self-agency, or “free will”, see Akesson and Coupland, 2018; McAuliffe et al., 2017.
59 Ibid; see also de Haas, 2011; Faist, 2000; Massey et al., 1998.
60 Martin, 2014.
Many people (including refugees) are unable to move directly to their preferred destinations, for lack of visa access, for instance, and may first travel through one or more transit countries to reach their preferred destination, or end up in countries that are not their first choice of destination. While this complex reality of “mixed motive” migration is becoming more common and raises challenges to States in terms of secondary refugee movements, it is largely beyond the ambit of the two global compacts. As previously noted, and despite its broad scope, the Global Compact for Migration is limited to migrants in the “residual” sense – that is, migrants who are not refugees. The Compact refers to “mixed movements”, which do not explicitly acknowledge that many people have mixed motives for migration, but rather concern the mixed nature of movements involving migrants and refugees. Before the Global Compact for Migration’s text was finalized, it referred to the provision to migrants of “information on rights and obligations in migration laws and procedures, including on access to the right to seek asylum or other adequate forms of protection”, indicating that some migrants may have a claim to refugee status. That language was dropped from the final text, indicating the sensitivities and complexities of this issue. This grey area is one that has the potential to result in confusion or even gaps. That said, the frameworks of the compacts do not prevent cooperation between States on mixed motive migration, and specific parts of the Global Compact for Migration encourage cooperation that would assist in addressing this issue (for example, Objective 5: Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration). Similarly, the Global Compact on Refugees seeks pathways beyond conventional resettlement of refugees to move from host countries in order to pursue, for example, educational or career opportunities. In addition, there already are many measures in place to accommodate this increasingly important aspect of migration – one of the most pertinent being regional free movement agreements with eligibility based on nationality rather than policy category or reason for migrating.

How do the global compacts influence the global migration governance architecture?

Despite their common origin in the 2015 migration crises and the New York Declaration, the two global compacts occupy quite different positions in the architecture of global migration governance. The Global Compact on Refugees is grounded in established international law, specifically in the widely ratified Refugee Convention. Although migrants are entitled to the same protections that apply to others under international human rights law (as are refugees), there is no equivalent to the Refugee Convention for migrants. Consequently, and even though it is not legally binding, the Global Compact for Migration represents more of an innovation in global governance of migration than does the Global Compact on Refugees.

The Global Compact on Refugees is all about implementation: how to create mechanisms of burden- and responsibility-sharing that will strengthen the refugee regime by giving more support to host countries and fostering refugee self-sufficiency. While the Global Compact on Refugees does not aspire to change refugee law, it does represent a substantial change of emphasis for UNHCR. The refugee agency has traditionally seen its role primarily as the guardian of the Refugee Convention, overseeing States’ fulfilment of their obligations
to protect refugees and seeking durable solutions that allow refugees to stop being refugees. It has also assumed a major role in marshalling humanitarian assistance. The Global Compact on Refugees places much greater emphasis on support for host country governments and communities, recognizing the service they provide, not only to refugees, but to the international community as a whole – which should be the basis for much more robust solidarity expressed as burden – and responsibility-sharing.

The system the Global Compact on Refugees lays out for achieving greater solidarity with refugee hosts presents a further shift of the refugee regime by giving actors other than States a more central role. Non-governmental humanitarian organizations have long played a major part in protecting and assisting refugees, but the Compact envisages more active engagement with the private sector, subnational authorities and other stakeholders. The addition of a regular review event is an additional architectural element, which should make it harder for prolonged refugee situations, or those that do not make the headlines, to drop off the international agenda. The uneven distribution of resources among host countries has undermined the stability of the refugee regime. The inclusion of an academic network signals a positive move toward evidence-based responses to coincide with greater involvement of non-State actors in the implementation of the CRRF. However, some have raised concerns about the nature, scope and focus of the network, raising questions about how it would be managed and what value it would add.66

While acknowledging the importance of non-State actors through its whole-of-society approach, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration frames the construction of cooperation on migration among States, but the roof and walls and floors will have to be added by States in the course of implementation. Since there has never been such a construct, it is difficult to foresee how heavily States will invest in bringing the Global Compact’s objectives to life. With 23 objectives and 187 specific actions, implementing the Global Compact for Migration will not be easy. No country has the capacity to work on all the recommended actions, and almost all will find some actions they would prefer not to take. The strength of the Compact is that it has something for everyone; that inclusiveness is fundamental to the compromises the Compact struck in order to get near-universal agreement.

Institutional architecture

The global migration governance chapter of the World Migration Report 2018 provides an overview of the international institutional arrangements, with particular reference to three agencies involved in migration – IOM, UNHCR and the International Labour Organization (ILO) – as well as the United Nations’ Global Migration Group and the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration.67 The last two years have seen significant change in institutional settings within the United Nations system, most of which relates directly to supporting States’ implementation of the Global Compact for Migration. The mandate of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration came to an end at the end of 2018 and has not been renewed; IOM has entered the United Nations system, and the Global Migration Group has been succeeded by the United Nations Network on Migration. The reformation of the institutional architecture was instigated by the Secretary-General following the consultation and stocktaking phases of the Global Compact for Migration, and highlighted specifically in his report Making Migration Work for all, in which he stated:

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66 Crisp, 2018; Chimni, 2018.
I will initiate internal consultations on how best to configure the United Nations system, including IOM, to coordinate the actions of the Organization on migration. I am determined to ensure that the system is fully positioned to respond promptly and effectively in supporting implementation of the global compact, once it is adopted. In conducting these consultations within the system, I will place a premium on drawing on existing expertise, ensuring operational deliverables in response to the needs of the Member States and ensuring efficiency.68

One major outcome of the consultations within the United Nations system initiated by the Secretary-General was the recommendation to create a United Nations Network on Migration. It was accepted by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the United Nations Executive Committee in May 2018, and formally launched by the Secretary-General on 9 December 2018, the eve of the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.69 It has been presented as part of broader United Nations reforms. The Network is a successor to the Global Migration Group, and has the following features:

- A clear focus on ensuring effective and coherent system-wide support to the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration;
- Direct reporting to the Secretary-General on its activities, who will, in turn, report to the Member States as required;
- Core membership and an extended membership, with the former comprising those United Nations entities with clear mandate-driven relevance and capacity, and now referred to as the Executive Committee;
- Working groups based on the Global Compact for Migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and responsive to the needs of Member States;
- Periodic meetings of the Network's extended membership, together with other stakeholders, for information-sharing and agenda-setting;
- IOM as Network coordinator and Secretariat.70

The Network’s Executive Committee comprises IOM, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), ILO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNHCR and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), with the Director General of IOM as the Network Coordinator. The extended Network membership includes the Executive Committee entities plus an additional 30 United Nations entities.71 The Network, therefore, is larger than its predecessor, the Global Migration Group, which grew over time to include 22 entities. However, the establishment of an Executive Committee of eight, together with a single Coordinator and reporting arrangements that involve the Secretary-General, indicate that the emphasis on deliverable achievements and United Nations coherence have featured heavily in the thinking underpinning the Network’s construction.

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68 UNGA, 2017b: para. 74.
69 UNGA, 2018a.
At a time when nationalism is on the rise in key locations, and the support for multilateralism has been challenged, the pressure on the Network to succeed will be great. The focus on clearer management and coordination processes that underpin the Network is in contrast to those processes of the Global Migration Group, as articulated in their respective terms of reference. But coordination is not the main function of the Network; rather, it is to support Member States in implementing the Global Compact for Migration. On many of the issues for which that support will be needed, no single United Nations entity has the necessary expertise and capacity; these entities will need to join forces in implementing actions and projects, collaborating in Network working groups, to bring their combined capacities to bear. Some projects will be supported by the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, which was established on 8 May 2019 by the principals of the eight United Nations entities of the Network’s Executive Committee and launched on 16 July 2019. The Fund is embedded in the United Nations Migration Network to support Member States’ implementation of the Global Compact for Migration, primarily at the country level. Notwithstanding these fundamental changes to how the United Nations responds to and coordinates on Global Compact for Migration implementation, the core principles guiding the operation of the Network remain as they were for the Global Migration Group – specifically, the focus on migrants’ rights and well-being – but with the additional focus on implementation within communities of destination, origin and transit.

The current phase in the evolution of migration global governance: Implications for the future

The global compacts mark a new phase in international cooperation to manage and respond to the movement of people. Although they are not legally binding, they represent a near-universal consensus on the issues that require cooperation, and on actions to move toward achieving the objectives laid out in the compacts. The Global Compact on Refugees, if implemented consistently, will reinforce the willingness of States to host refugees, by breaking their sense of abandonment when their burdens are not shared with others. If the commitment of other States and a wider group of stakeholders is consolidated through Comprehensive Refugee Response Frameworks for all host countries, the fundamental condition for protection – access to territorial asylum in another country – will be immeasurably reinforced.

United Nations Member States crafted the Global Compact for Migration with an eye to the long term, but it already has one accomplishment to its credit: it has brought one of the last outstanding global issues into the United Nations in a formal, negotiated manner. For decades, the international system has had standards and institutions to facilitate cooperation and the maintenance of order on issues of finance and trade, arms control and refugees, and many other issues. More recently, it has developed a framework for dealing with climate change. But international migration remained a patchwork of unilateral, bilateral and regional policies, long considered too divisive for general debate within the United Nations as a stand-alone issue beyond its interrelationship with development. With the Global Compact for Migration, a framework of common expectations and obligations has at long last emerged.

73 See the terms of references: UNDP, Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, 2019.
The very first draft of the Global Compact for Migration identified a “coherent UN system” as necessary for effective implementation. As mentioned, the Compact welcomed the Secretary-General’s decision to replace the Global Migration Group of United Nations agencies, with a United Nations Migration Network with clearer and consistent leadership from IOM and a small group of United Nations entities that have movement of people as an important part of their mandate or capacities. The agreement that brought IOM into the United Nations system as a related organization in 2016 gives the United Nations system unprecedented capacity to help its members address migration issues. The United Nations has also strengthened its capacity by establishing the Network on Migration. With this structure in place as of December 2018, the United Nations system should be positioned to offer coherent and comprehensive support to States as they set about implementing their commitments to safe, orderly and regular migration.

While the Global Compact for Migration may not be legally binding on States, it can be construed as a “political commitment” creating an expectation of implementation. The Compact is the first agreement that has been negotiated intergovernmentally at the global level, and heralds a significant step forward in international cooperation. The negotiations followed a series of thematic consultations and a stocktaking exercise that in many ways were similar to previous international and regional dialogues, meetings and other events on international migration over recent years. The intergovernmental negotiations phase, however, represented the first time that States sat side-by-side to negotiate and agree upon a specific text on international migration. The significance of this cannot be overstated; it has taken place in an environment increasingly challenged by toxic political discourses that can at times result in misrepresentation of key facts on migration, confounding and confusing members of a public concerned about the impact of seemingly uncontrolled migration on their lives and the future of their communities.

One of the challenges will be how the United Nations and its Member States deal with the expected shifts in political support and changing commitments to implementation of the global compact. Unlike processes related to the adoption and implementation of treaties (as well as withdrawal), which are necessarily long and involved, support for the non-legally binding compacts is first and foremost political. It is likely that, as governments at the national level change over time, which they inevitably will do, there will be a “moving feast” of State support, particularly in relation to key destination countries. Implementing positive and constructive policies and practices on international migration as complexity increases and fragmentation becomes more deeply embedded will take leadership and unwavering commitment on the part of the vast majority of States, the United Nations system and the many other actors involved. The most likely forms of cooperation among States on the specific issues addressed in the two compacts were identified by the late Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for International Migration Peter Sutherland as being coalitions of States with strong, overlapping interests in a given issue. It is possible to imagine States with different starting points converging on actions to tackle a problem such as lack of legal identity of migrants, or obstacles to return, and readmission in safety and dignity. Such “mini-multilateralism” may emerge as a preferred mode of collaboration on an issue that has eluded effective cooperation among States for too long. This type of approach produced the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Guidelines. Commentators are urging all parties and onlookers to maintain reasonable expectations as Global Compact for Migration implementation will undoubtedly involve long-term, incremental advances. Nevertheless, “even small

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75 Chetail, 2019.
76 UNGA, 2017a.
77 See the chapter in this report on migrants in countries in crises for more detail.
78 Gallagher, 2018.
progress under the umbrella of this ‘new deal’ for migrants will help to move us forward – towards a world where the movement of people across international borders is safer, better regulated and widely embraced as mutually rewarding for everyone involved’.79
Appendices

Chapter 3

Appendix A. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs: Regions and Subregions

Please note that this table reflects the UN DESA geographic regions and subregions and does not imply official endorsement or acceptance by IOM.

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<td>Congo (the)</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>of Tanzania</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

a Eastern Africa has been combined with the Southern Africa subregion in the chapter, although the countries/territories/areas within remain the same.

b This subregion has been renamed “Central Africa” in the chapter and combined with Western Africa.

c This subregion renamed “North Africa”.

d This subregion has been combined with Eastern Africa.

e This subregion has been renamed “West Africa” and combined with Central Africa (UN DESA Middle Africa) in the chapter.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Asia</th>
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<th>Eastern Asia</th>
<th>South-Eastern Asia&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Southern Asia</th>
<th>Western Asia&lt;sup&gt;g&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>Bhutan</td>
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<td>Lao People’s Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
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<sup>f</sup> This subregion renamed “South-East Asia”.
<sup>g</sup> This subregion renamed “Middle East”.
### Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Northern Europe</th>
<th>Southern Europe</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
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<td>Channel Islands</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>France</td>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Faroe Islands</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Poland</td>
<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Liechtenstein</td>
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<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Romania</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
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<td>San Marino</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
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h Some countries in this subregion, particularly members of the European Union, may have been included both in the discussion of South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, as well as the subregional discussion on Northern, Western, and Southern Europe within the chapter.

i Northern, Western and Southern Europe are combined in the chapter, excluding the following countries in Southern Europe: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and North Macedonia, which have been included in South-East Europe in the chapter, under the subregion South-Eastern and Eastern Europe.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caribbean</th>
<th>Central America¹</th>
<th>South America</th>
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<td>Antigua and Barbuda</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Bolivia (Plurinational State of)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>Bahamas</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Falkland Islands (Malvinas)</td>
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<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>French Guiana</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>Curaçao</td>
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<td>Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)</td>
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<td>Saint Lucia</td>
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<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
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<td>Sint Maarten (Dutch part)</td>
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<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
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<td>Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
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<td>United States Virgin Islands</td>
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</table>

¹ The subregion “Central America” has been combined with Mexico and the Caribbean in this chapter.
### Northern America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/territory/area</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saint Pierre and Miquelon</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
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### Oceania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australia and New Zealand</th>
<th>Melanesia</th>
<th>Micronesia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Cook Islands</td>
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<td>French Polynesia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Wallis and Futuna Islands</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Legend:

- **Region**
- **Subregion**^1^  
- **Country/territory/area**^II^  

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^i Subregions utilized within the chapter may differ from those utilized by UN DESA’s Statistical Division either by name, or by countries/ territories/areas included within.

^ii “The names of countries or areas refer to their short form used in day-to-day operations of the United Nations and not necessarily to their official name as used in formal documents. These names are based on the United Nations Terminology Database (UNTERM), which can be found at: [https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/portal/welcome](https://unterm.un.org/UNTERM/portal/welcome) The designations employed and the presentation of material at this site do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations [or the International Organization for Migration (IOM)] concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.” For further information, see [https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/](https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/).

^iii The entities included in this table, from which the previous chapter draws upon, include countries, as well as territories, areas and special administrative regions. Please note that this table is not intended to be fully comprehensive.
Chapter 4

Appendix A. A brief overview of academic publishing

The scholarly dissemination system rotates around a well-established gravitational centre: publication, with some forms of publication (such as academic journals) having much greater credibility and weight than others (and within that, individual academic publishers have different standings). Publishing the results of research in academic journals is without any doubt the paramount objective of today’s scholars. Journals alone constitute about 40 per cent (books 16%) of the revenues of the broader scientific, technical and medical publisher’s market, the size of which has been estimated at USD 25.2 billion in 2013. Through academic publishing, scholars formally share their findings within the scientific community. This exchange enables other researchers to learn about the latest advancements, to design new studies for filling current knowledge gaps, to compare their findings with the ones of their peers and perhaps to avoid reinventing the wheel. Moreover, publication constitutes “…a permanent record of what has been discovered, when and by whom – like a court register for science”. The world’s first academic journal – Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society – appeared as early as of 1665, as an expression of the Royal Society’s policy of promoting the progress of science through open sharing of results and ideas supported by empirical evidence. Since then, the number of active scholarly peer-reviewed English language journals had reached 28,100 in 2014, and it has been calculated that the global scientific output doubles every nine years. Many scholars today are overwhelmed by the mass of academic literature, and it is becoming impossible to find the time to read every piece of literature, even on the narrowest topic.

Publications are the core of career advancement for academics, whereas researchers working in applied research settings are not necessarily working under the same degree of pressure to publish. Overall, the academic reward system is responsible for the very significant increase in the number of publications but, arguably, a quantitative increase does not automatically lead to an increase in the average “quality” of published academic research.

Measuring quality is a complex and debated issue. In terms of the major form of output (journal articles), we can say that an article’s quality is evaluated mainly qualitatively before publication, and mainly quantitatively after publication. The type of qualitative evaluation that occurs before publication in academic journals is called “peer-review”. The term “peer” refers to the fact that the people performing reviews of the submitted article are meant to be of equal (or greater) expertise on a topic. Peer review in academia is almost always unpaid. Peer review of journal articles “…has traditionally been seen as part of the professional obligations of the researcher”, and a large scale-survey amongst 40,000 research papers authors found that most of them considered peer review as “…essential to the communication of scholarly research”. Ninety-one per cent of the respondents stated that “…the review process improved the quality of the last paper they published”, and 86 per cent declared that “…they enjoy reviewing and will continue to review”. The most tangible incentive for

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1 Other means of scholarly communication include books, conference presentations, seminars, email lists and so forth.
2 Ware and Mabe, 2015.
3 Sense About Science, 2005.
4 Ware and Mabe, 2015.
5 Van Noorden, 2014.
6 Ware and Mabe, 2015.
7 Mulligan, Hall and Raphael, 2013.
reviewing is perhaps earning recognition: journals usually publish a yearly “reviewers thanksgiving” document in which they list the names of people who served as reviewers. Being on those lists can improve a researcher’s CV, especially if s/he plans to seek funding/job in that specific field. Reviewers thoroughly examine the methods, results and conclusions before submitting their recommendation (accept/revise/reject) to the journal’s editor. The review process iterates until the editor is satisfied with the manuscript, which can finally enter the production pipeline (copy-editing, typesetting, online publication and possibly printing). Overall, the peer-review process lasts from a few weeks to several months, with considerable variance among disciplines and journals. After publication, abstracts are free of charge, while access to the full text may require access through academic libraries (that typically pay subscriptions to the publishers), or require pay-per-view fees. The “open access” publishing model grants free full-text access to anyone, courtesy of the author’s institution having paid publication fees to the publisher.

The peer-review process examines a piece of writing before publication using mainly a qualitative approach, while a quantitative approach dominates the assessment of material after publication. Citation – the act of quoting – is the single unit at the base of bibliometrics (the statistical analysis of written publications). Crudely put, the more the citations, the higher the impact, the better the supposed quality of a paper/article/book. Basic citation metrics for any publication can be obtained using Google Scholar, the most used search engine by academics worldwide. For instance, a search for “migration” in Google Scholar returned 3.8 million results and the following first page:

**Figure 1. Example of Google Scholar search results**

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9 Search results may vary depending on user settings (e.g. whether logged in to Google or not) and geographic ISP location.
You can see at a glance (figure 1, bottom-left) that the book “The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world” has been cited by more than 8,000 other publications. By clicking on “Cited by 8219” you can see all the citing publications since the first edition (1993). If you click on the author’s name (S. Castles) you will see the author’s citation indices.

Building on raw citation counts, various so-called “impact metrics” can be calculated at the publication level, author level, journal level and so forth. For instance, a journal’s Impact Factor (the citations/publications ratio) is widely used as a proxy for the relative importance of a journal, while the h-index\(^{10}\) provides a measure of a single author’s impact (though it can be also calculated for a department, institution or country). The citations/publications ratio most commonly involves examination of a two-year publishing cycle over three years. For example, for Journal X’s 2015 impact factor, 122 citations of articles published in 2013 and 2014 are divided by the total number of articles published in 2013 and 2014 (166), so that the 2015 impact factor for Journal X is 0.735 (or 122 citations divided by 166 articles).

The debate on the usefulness of impact metrics is still open, the aim being finding the right balance between research funders’ needs of measuring the impact of their spending, and academics’ desires for fair evaluation systems of their work (and consequent funding). Recently, alternative impact metrics (altmetrics) have been developed, taking into account, for instance, number of mentions in news articles and blogs, Twitter, Facebook and so forth.

The pressure to achieve within an academic reward system that values publication in peer-reviewed journals is acknowledged as having some serious downsides,\(^{11}\) including in relation to quality. The “publish or perish” culture has been found to stifle research innovation,\(^{12}\) lower research publication standards,\(^{13}\) encourage peer-review fraud\(^{14}\) and negatively affect the ability of researchers to work on applied research tailored to policymakers.\(^{15}\) At the same time, academics are under pressure to undertake innovative research, publish in the top journals and present evidence to policy audiences and ultimately influence policy.\(^{16}\)

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\(^{10}\) The h-index is the number of publications that have at least \(h\) citations. For instance, Author X has written 4 publications: A (cited by 27 others), B (cited by 14 others), C (cited by 2 others), and D (not yet cited). Author X’s h-index is 2 at present. In the future, the h-index may be 3, if publication C will be cited at least 1 more time.

\(^{11}\) Smith, 2006.

\(^{12}\) Foster, Rzhetsky and Evans, 2015.

\(^{13}\) Colquhoun, 2011.

\(^{14}\) Prosser Scully, 2015

\(^{15}\) Cherney et al., 2012.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
Appendix B. Contributions from academic journals

*International Migration*

*Chief Editor: Howard Duncan*

2017 and 2018 were years during which the international community, with a degree of co-operation rarely seen in the field of migration, agreed to two sets of guiding policy principles, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees. Never before have we witnessed such a testament to the global importance of migration nor such a widespread ambition to better management of international migration of all kinds and its effects on the migrants, their societies of destination, and their homelands. These agreements were borne out of a sense of crisis with a particular focus on the Mediterranean region; we now wait to see if the hope they inspire will bear tangible fruit. The owner of *International Migration*, the International Organization for Migration, was heavily involved in the effort to achieve these agreements, especially the Global Compact for Migration. Since the previous World Migration Report, the IOM has become a member of the United Nations family of organizations and, with a membership now of more than 170 states it is a truly global institution. This journal, appropriately, can also claim a global status in that its authors are from around the world and with authors from no single country dominating its contents. *International Migration* is pleased by its global reach which has been achieved despite the challenges associated with publishing double-blind peer-reviewed material from less developed countries.

The journal continues to regard its audience as both the global academic and policy communities, and it will retain its requirement of policy-related content in the articles it publishes. In 2017, *International Migration* took a further step in this direction by introducing a series of occasional interviews with senior policy officials, notably national Ministers responsible for managing migration. Three such interviews have appeared over the course of 2017-2018 with contributions from migration Ministers from Canada, Germany, and Australia. In keeping with our global aspirations, Ministers responded not only to questions about their country’s domestic migration policies but about their approach to the discussions at the United Nations on the Global Compacts. Migration policy, like migration scholarship, can be fraught with controversy; these interviews did not shy away from contentious issues.

The previous two years have seen numerous special issues and special sections of regular issues, most of them proposed to us from members of the academic community. Topics and geographical coverage were widespread and included:

- Interculturalism in Times of Crisis (Bello and Bloom)
- Cultivating the Migration-Food Security Nexus (Crush and Caesar, eds.)
- Peace Processes and Durable Returns (Stefanovic and Loizides, eds.)
- Blessed Be the Ties: Health and Healthcare for Migrants and Migrant Families in the United States (Ervin, Hamilton and Lopez-Carr, eds.)
- Labour Migration in Europe: Changing Policies – Changing Organizations – Changing People (Laubenthal, ed.)
- Subjective Perceptions Related to Migration (Amit and Blum, eds.)

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17 The contributions in this appendix have been submitted by each journal’s respective chief editor(s), and have not been edited.

18 Articles cited in the journal editor’s contribution can be found at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14682435.
• Migration and Social Class (Bonjour and Chauvin, eds.)
• Precarity, Illegality, and Temporariness: Implications and Consequences of Canadian Migration Management (Hari and Liew, eds.)

Some selected thematic trends

The academic literature on migration responds in part to trends in migration phenomena and policy as well as to shifts in migration-related theory and previously published literature. Normally, there is a discernible time lag between the onset of a phenomenon and the appearance of scientific literature, this owing to the time required for research and then for publishing. The literature on the Syrian refugee crisis is now beginning to appear in significant amounts, and we can expect that the literature on the United Nations’ Global Compacts will start appearing in 2019. But looking back only slightly, to 2017 – 2018, we see discussions of earlier trends and phenomena, some of which we have selected here.

Migrant vulnerability

To a large degree, the UN Global Compacts illustrate the current global concern over protecting the human rights of migrants. Although there is clear recognition of the benefits that migrants bring to both their destination and home societies, states are now being asked to foreground migrants’ needs and to provide supports, especially as they relate to human rights. In tandem with this, many scholars looked at the vulnerabilities of migrants over the past two years, whether the vulnerabilities concern human trafficking (Rocha-Jiminez et al.), earnings gaps as compared to nationals (Wu et al.), discrimination in other forms (Gong), slave-like working conditions (Palmer), disparities in health care provision (Geeraert), the special vulnerabilities of refugees and women and children (Pavez-Soto and Chan), and even the vulnerabilities of migrant entrepreneurs who find themselves in competition with locals (Pineteh).

Families and migration

When Oded Stark and David Bloom published their now iconic article, “The New Economics of Labour Migration”, in 1985, they not only created a new way of looking at migration economics but they launched continuing investigations into the relationship between migration and development, the role of remittances in migration, how people make decisions to migrate, and the role of their families in these decisions. The emphasis on families in the migration literature continues to grow, and International Migration has been among those journals to feel this emphasis. A major interest is with those family members who are left behind, the emotional difficulties they may face, as described by Fuller, despite modern ICTs; the effects on schooling as described by Yabiku and Agadjanian and, separately, by Kuépié; and the effects on marriages themselves which, as shown by Davis and Jennings and separately by Silver, et al., can be deeply troubling. But migration can itself be for marriage, and this phenomenon has received a great deal of attention, especially in Asia and especially in South Korea where marriage migration represents a high proportion of all migration to that country. The multicultural families that result are the object of Kim and Kilkey’s study on integration outcomes for foreign brides to South Korea; Kim and Kilkey looked at the country’s policy on multicultural families, regarding it as designed with the country’s future population size in mind; and Cho considers cultural aspects of marriage migration to that country. The population prospects might not be as rosy as some hope, however, if what Mora, Fernandez, and Torre found regarding fertility rates of migrants to Spain and the US.
Migration and development

One of the more enduring areas of recent scholarship has been on the relationship between migration and development, a field that has been greatly stimulated by the discussion within the international community. The core feature of these studies remains remittances, both their effects and the propensity of migrants to send them. Diaspora philanthropy was the emphasis of Koff’s study, while Petreski, Petreski, and Tumanoska considered the effects of remittances on household vulnerability. Urama et al. looked at the effects of remittances on the homeland labour supply; Akcay and Karasoy linked remittances to calorie consumption; Arouri and Nguyen found a strong connection to poverty reduction; Kumar et al. saw a strong correlation with long-term economic growth; Valatheeswaran and Khan noted the positive effects on the education of children left behind; and Agwu, Yuni, and Anochiwa found that remittances help close the gap between the lower and middle income segments of society.

Emerging areas of study: immigrant entrepreneurship; climate migration, cities

As we signal the economic benefits of migration to destination societies, most thought has been given to migrants as employees. Less attention has been given to migrant entrepreneurs, but it appears that it is a growing area of interest to scholars. Chavan and Taksa looked at Indian entrepreneurs with high human capital levels in Australia and suggested how policy could enhance even more their benefits to the Australian economy. ICT entrepreneurs in Italy are the subject of Brzozwski, Cucelelli, and Surdej’s exploration of transnational entrepreneurship. Less happily are the fortunes of Somali entrepreneurs in South Africa whose presence is seen as a threat, this forcing them to adopt specially-tailored defensive mechanisms.

It is no surprise that more scholars are writing of climate migration, some with an emphasis on atoll island states whose very existence could be threatened by climate change. Yamamoto and Esteban look at migration policy as an adaptive response to the effects of rising sea levels on these states. In a ground-breaking study, Rahaman et al. looked at the health effects on climate migrants living in slums which may become even more densely populated in areas near to where climate change will bring about more urbanization.

Cities are overwhelmingly the destination of most migrants and a great many articles refer to cities as a matter of course. One article from the last two years that received a great deal of attention was that by Bauder on Sanctuary Cities in which he compared self-described sanctuary cities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada and how they accommodate their undocumented populations. The concept of the sanctuary city he found to be highly ambiguous, and he parses the concept in its different locations in the search for commonalities and found that the ideas in one locale are often transferred to others whether by modern telecommunications or by travelling activists.

This brief survey does not claim to offer a comprehensive account of the issues covered by International Migration’s authors. Although there are evident common themes, our authors also presented innovations and covered less often seen themes including migrants in private militaries, brain drain from developed economies, the relationship between natural disasters and human trafficking, slave like conditions faced by migrants in the fishing industry, and the relationship between attitudes towards migrants and the willingness to accept risks in life. We appreciate the work that our authors have done to stimulate our collective thinking about international migration, a subject of endless possibilities.
International Migration Review focuses on the interdisciplinary study of international migration. It publishes 30 to 40 articles a year, along with shorter research notes and book reviews. Led by an interdisciplinary editorial team from economics, sociology, and geography and guided by an international and interdisciplinary editorial board, IMR seeks to publish articles that both are grounded in rich empirics and push the boundaries of how, where, and from what perspective we examine the complexities of international migration. The interplay between the two ‘I’ words associated with IMR – interdisciplinary and international – guides what we, as editors, seek in publications. Among the manuscripts submitted to IMR, we prioritize those that have reach beyond specific disciplines, perspectives, or methodological approaches and that situate their findings vis-à-vis wider international trends.

A close examination of IMR publications since 2016 (about 100 articles) identifies a number of trends. First, in terms of geography, around 80% of articles focus on North America or Western Europe, with a significantly smaller percentage focused on Asia (just over 10%) and an even smaller number on Latin America, the Middle East, or Africa. This uneven geographic coverage reflects one of the main shortcomings of migration studies – limited attention to migration dynamics beyond North America and Western Europe. It also highlights the challenges that scholars writing about the wider geography of international migration face in attempts to situate their work in relation to hegemonic perspectives about two global regions.

Second, if we look at the populations studied in IMR, beyond a general focus on international migrants, we find equal attention to native-born and second-generation groups, a critical mass of articles focused on immigrant youth, but far less work on refugees. Thus, the issue of generation is central to IMR articles, but the distinctions and overlaps between different kinds of migrants (i.e., skilled migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, etc.) receive less analysis. Not surprisingly, much of the research on North America examines some aspect of Mexican migration, while much of the work on Western Europe analyzes the experiences of or attitudes toward Muslim migrants, making these two groups – Mexican and Muslim migrants – the lens through which much recent scholarship has examined the complexities of international migration.

Third, methodologically, IMR articles draw primarily on survey data, especially longitudinal administrative data and repeated survey data, approached in a range of ways. IMR also publishes rich ethnographic studies, if in smaller number, as well as work based on interviews and focus groups. Although not common, studies drawing on big data, satellite imagery, and field experiments round out a robust collection of methodologies represented in the journal. Finally, IMR publications address a diverse set of topics, from migrant welfare to immigrant health and stereotypes, but broadly speaking, pay particular attention to immigration policy, public attitudes, education, family and household activities, wages and employment trends, legal status, and gendered dynamics and ideologies.

Beyond this overall picture, what have been IMR’s key contributions since 2016? Here, we highlight a few such contributions that, in our view, epitomize IMR’s goal of pushing existing knowledge about international migration in a new or different direction. Some of that ‘pushing’ carries both a political and a policy component. Jean Beaman’s 2016 article on the second generation in France, for example, showed that the adult children of

19 Articles cited in the journal editors’ contribution can be found at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/mrx.
20 This discussion is based on articles officially published in an IMR volume. It does not consider articles published ‘early view’ online but not yet assigned to a journal volume.
migrants from North Africa did not understand religious identity, especially Muslim identity, as incompatible with a French identity. Instead, these young adults saw themselves ‘as French as anyone else,’ thus challenging public and academic arguments about the mutually exclusive nature of religious and secular-national identity in Europe.

In a related policy vein, Marie-Laurence Flahaux (2017) looked at Senegalese return migration, finding that migrants were less likely to return to Senegal when the possibility of re-entering the host county was slim. As Flahaux’s work suggests and as was corroborated in a study by Mathias Czaika and Hein de Haas (2017) of global migration and visa data, migration restrictions tend to decrease circular migration and to make migrants more likely to settle permanently in the host country, giving the political decision to tighten borders the unintended policy outcome of transforming circular migration into permanent settlement.

Other *IMR* articles jump into the interdisciplinary debate about assimilation, examining standard measures like marriage and language patterns, as well as less common measures, such as norms about body size (Altman, Van Hook and Gonzalez, 2017). Mieke Maliepaard and Richard Alba’s 2016 article on cultural integration among children born to Muslim parents in the Netherlands examined this group’s gender norms, concluding that an explanation of either assimilation toward a Dutch norm or maintenance of ‘traditional’ gender views was too simplistic to understand this group’s complex, sometimes-contradictory gender ideologies and highlighting the need to disaggregate internal dynamics within ethnic communities. Ayumi Takenaka and her co-authors (2016) took these ideas a step further in their examination of immigrant economic mobility in Japan. As they note, standard explanations of assimilation do not fully explain immigrant economic success or failure in Japan, demonstrating the need for a more diverse geographic base for migration theories.

Another key theme in *IMR* publications is interpersonal contact. Benjamin Schulz and Lars Leszczensky’s 2016 article on friendship dynamics between native-born and immigrant youth in Germany found that among the immigrant backgrounds studied (Yugoslavian, Southern European, Turkish, and Polish), different relationships between national identification with Germany and share of native friends emerged, driving home the need to critically interrogate group differences among immigrants. Judith Koops and her co-authors (2017) tweaked this model to study contact not only between ethnic minorities and the majority population but also among different immigrant groups, finding different patterns between these two sets of dynamics and arguing for attention to interactions among minority ethnic groups in the study of international migration.

Although many *IMR* articles focus on the national scale, others make strong arguments for attention to local dynamics. Andrew Felenon’s article (2017) analyzes health outcomes among Mexican immigrants in the United States, documenting a survival advantage among Mexican immigrants in new destinations and challenging universal claims about immigrant enclaves’ protective health effects. Amrita Pande (2018) takes an even finer-scaled approach in her study of domestic migrant workers in Lebanon, which argues for attention to the ‘intimate’ spaces of daily life which these migrant workers use to resist and complicate dominant images of domestic workers and their lived realities.

A number of *IMR* articles tackle foundational concepts like citizenship, examining how residential concentration and naturalization rates are linked (Abascal 2017) or offering synthetic overviews of citizenship scholarship in migration studies (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017). Others grapple with popular concepts like “crisis” in public discourse around international migration, highlighting the political work such terms do while also showing how a ‘crisis’ might feel quite ordinary to migrants already experiencing chronic and slowly unfolding ‘crises’ of their own (Bylander 2018).
Moving forward, we hope that *IMR* will continue to seek rigorous, innovative, and interdisciplinary research. Expanding the geographic coverage of *IMR* publications is a clear goal, as is attention to newer themes like forced and climate-related migrations, the impact of new media in migrant experiences, and the incorporation of data science into migration studies. As much as the detailed and thorough empirical research that sits at *IMR’s* heart remains a high priority, we also hope to see more agenda-setting pieces like Tomas Jimenez and his co-authors’ recent discussion (2018) of the “next chapter” in the study of assimilation. The interplay between empirical investigation and theoretical engagement, between testing theories and proposing them, forms the core of interdisciplinary engagement and, we hope, will shape *IMR’s* trajectory until our next report.

*Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies*  
*Chief Editor: Anna Triandafyllidou*

The JIRS is one of the few academic journals that has a double focus on both labour migrants and asylum seekers/refugees, and a truly interdisciplinary focus that spans from social work and social policy, to migration and ethnic studies, media and public discourses, to asylum policy and practice. The focus of the journal, originally North American, has now shifted to pay more attention to Europe but also Asia Pacific and to some extent South and East Asia. There has been also a clear increase in recent years of articles focusing on the Middle East and particularly on Turkey, and the Syrian conflict.

The contributions published in the journal can be organized along two main thematic axes.

The first thematic axis brings together a variety of quantitative and qualitative approaches for studying migrant/asylum seeker arrival, settlement, and integration processes. These include articles looking at resettlement policy and practice, and analyzing the work of non-governmental and governmental organisations and local authorities in providing arrival support and integration. Interestingly we have published articles that look at the challenges that social workers and civil society organisations face in their work but also papers that look at the integration barriers that migrants and settled refugees face once at the destination country. There is clearly a focus on the gender dimension and particularly on the challenges faced by women, but also on issues of parenting and on the special integration and belonging challenges faced by youth.

These research topics are valid across world regions and probably this is an important finding in meta-analysing immigration related research. Thus for instance in 2018, we published papers on refugee resettlement in North America and Australia (“My world is upside down” Transnational Iraqui Youth and Parent Perspectives on Resettlement in the United States; Integration or Building Resilience: what should the goal be in refugee resettlement?; ) but also on how migrants activate their networks to find their place in their new home countries (A grounded theory of Korean Immigrants’ experiences of re-establishing everyday activities in New Zealand; A Study on Transnational Communication among Iranian Migrant Women in Australia; Negotiating Refugee Empowerment in Resettlement Organizations (in the USA); or “Asking Around”: Immigrants’ Counterstrategies to renew their residence permit in times of economic crisis in Italy).

The JIRS offers a unique virtual transnational space where different systems of reception and integration and different populations coming into the host countries under a variety of regimes (labour or family migrants, asylum seekers or resettled refugees) may face similar challenges (including that of mental and physical

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21 Articles cited in the journal editor’s contribution can be found at: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/wimm20.
health), learning the ropes in their new environment, activating their social capital resources, and eventually carving a place for themselves in their destination country, are discussed. The double background of the JIRS from social work/community studies, and from sociology/ethnic studies pays well in bringing these different topics together.

The second major topic that has occupied a salient position in our published research in both 2017 and 2018 is the governance of irregular migration and asylum seeking. During this period we published three special issues that actually develop different aspects of this theme.

Our second issue for 2017 was a Special Issue (guest editors, Alexandra Ricard-Guay, European University Institute, and Thanos Maroukis, University of Bath) focused on human trafficking in domestic work looking at severely exploited migrant women domestic workers in different European countries. Contributions to this special issue highlighted the gaps in human trafficking research that has focused typically on sex work overlooking ‘shadow’ areas such as live-in domestic work, au-pairs turned into slaves, and pointed to the gaps in national and European anti-trafficking legislation. Papers in this special issue showed how migrant domestic and care work is part and parcel of welfare systems in the ageing European societies and analysed both sociologically and legally the case of trafficking in domestic work. The findings highlighted how loose conditions surrounding domestic and care work in private homes can lead to vulnerability and severe exploitation. Indeed we could speak of a ‘slippery slope’ where migrant live-in workers are not aware of their rights and families who employ them are not aware of their obligations while the state fails both to monitor and control this sizeable labour market sector. Thus extra working hours and low payment, may slowly become no payment at all, restriction of one’s privacy and liberty, severe physical and emotional abuse, thus raising a case of trafficking rather than simple exploitation.

During the same year we ran another special issue (guest editor Marie McAuliffe IOM research) focusing on irregularity and protection in southeast Asia. Building on the crisis in the Andaman sea in May 2015, contributions to this Special Issue pointed to the special features of irregular migration in southeast Asia and most notably the reluctance or inability of several host and origin countries to register their minorities and migrants and to provide them with a secure residence status. Indeed in southeast Asia the challenge of irregular labour migration or asylum seeking is particularly complex as several minority groups and most notably the Rohingya face problems of statelessness. This Special Issue sadly coincided with the new Rohingya crisis in summer and fall 2017 when Myanmar engaged into an ethnic cleansing strategy in the Rakhine state leading nearly 700,000 Rohingya to flee to neighbouring Bangladesh.

Third but no less important, we ran in early 2018 a double special issue (guest editors Michal Krzyzanowski, Orebro University, Anna Triandafyllidou, EUI, Ruth Wodak, University of Lancaster) analyzing the media coverage and political discourses on the Mediterranean ‘refugee emergency’ of 2014-2016. This special issue followed an imaginary path of discourses from Greece west and north along the Balkan route, to Central, Nordic, Western and Eastern Europe. It looked at how the whole issue was presented in the media and particularly how it was debate in Parliaments, by party leaders or in official Twitter accounts. Interestingly comparing the results of our country cases we found significant convergence among a solidarity/humanitarian and control/security frame which were at odds with one another. This tension was however solved with a discursive framing that privileged viable and sustainable responses to the refugee flows. Thus humanitarianism was brought together with realism, with ‘rationality’ being emphasized as the key quality of specific policy responses that aimed at reducing the flows. The notion of crisis was present in all the different country discourses examined and was used also among European countries to designate the ‘bad’ and ‘good’ Europeans.
Indeed these three special issues reflect the salience of the governance of irregular migration and asylum seeking issues not only among citizens and politicians but also within the academic community. The main difference of course between the two discourses (the public and the academic) being that the latter seeks to privilege in depth analysis that help us understand the causes, effects, dynamics of different phenomena, their legal and policy framework and of course the ways they can be portrayed as existential threats to the non-migrants or indeed as ethical and political obligations in building a fairer world.

Interestingly and perhaps reflecting the zeitgeist and the rise of both migrant/refugee flows and of related xenophobia and racisms, during these two years there has been in our journal a lesser attention to issues of employment or labour market integration or for instance on highly skilled migration or brain drain/brain circulation. Another thematic area that could attract more attention is intra-regional labour and asylum related migration flows and what is termed (perhaps erroneously) South-South migration.

Journal on Migration and Human Security

In 2013, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) established the Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS), an online, peer-reviewed, public policy publication. JMHS draws on the knowledge, expertise and perspectives of scholars, researchers, public officials, faith communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business leaders and others. Its theme of human security is meant to evoke the widely shared goals of creating secure, sustaining conditions in migrant source communities; promoting safe, legal migration options; and, allowing immigrants to lead productive, secure lives and to participate fully in their new communities.

Without sacrificing academic and analytical rigor, JMHS papers take a human-centered approach to migration scholarship, focusing on (typically) at risk, vulnerable, and marginalized persons who are misunderstood and often scapegoated in migration policy debates. JMHS requires that each published paper begin with an executive summary and end with a series of policy recommendations. This increases the accessibility of JMHS papers to policymakers, policy influencers, and the general public. JMHS promises potential authors that their work will be rigorously reviewed, published in a timely fashion (if accepted), and distributed through research and university library databases, to JMHS’s extensive dissemination list, and to tailored lists of policymakers, the press and others with a special interest in the topic. JMHS also publicizes its papers via social media, both upon their release and subsequently in response to news hooks and relevant policy discussions.

Many JMHS papers receive extensive media coverage and attention by policymakers. This has included a set of papers – authored by Robert Warren and occasionally co-authored by Donald Kerwin – based on CMS estimates of the US undocumented and other populations, derived from the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. This series has documented the falling US undocumented population, their characteristics, and the fact that most newly undocumented residents enter the United States legally and overstay their visas, rather than illegally cross a border. The latter point – elaborated in several JMHS papers – has been referenced in more than a hundred discrete media outlets since 2017 and has become a staple of the public debate on the Trump administration’s proposed US-Mexico border wall.

Articles cited in the journal editor’s contribution can be found at: https://journals.sagepub.com/home/mhs.
JMHS has also published exhaustive profiles on other populations targeted by the Trump administration, including potential DREAM Act beneficiaries (undocumented persons brought to the United States as children), refugees, Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients, persons with a close family relationship to a US citizen or lawful permanent resident (LPR) that would potentially qualify them for a visa, and long-term residents who may be eligible to naturalize. These papers—which illustrate the deep and longstanding ties of these groups to the United States—have garnered substantial attention from national and local government officials, policymakers, academics, researchers, the business community, NGOs, and the press. Although extremist groups and politicians occasionally dispute (without evidence) CMS’s estimates, the JMHS papers in this series offer a factual basis and rare common ground in the US immigration debate.

In its short existence, JMHS has proven to be an invaluable tool in addressing—whether through special collections or multiple papers on the same theme—public policy issues that raise human security themes. In 2016, for example, CMS hosted a three-day conference in anticipation of the UN Summit to Address Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants. The Summit culminated in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which led to the adoption in 2018 of the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The special collection of JMHS resulting from its conference—entitled Strengthening the Global Refugee Protection System—informed these processes. In particular, policymakers, academics and other leading authors contributed papers on:

- New frameworks for displaced persons not traditionally seen as meeting the international refugee definition (Susan Martin);
- Ethical perspectives on refugee protection (David Hollenbach, SJ);
- The challenge of inclusive communities (George Rupp);
- State responses to refugee influxes, with a focus on Lebanon (Ninette Kelley);
- Refugee responsibility sharing (Volker Türk);
- Matching systems for refugees (Will Jones and Alex Teytelboym);
- Safe and voluntary repatriation (Jeff Crisp and Katy Long);
- The right to remain in one’s home community (Daniel Kanstroom);
- The externalization of migration controls (Bill Frelick, Ian Kysel and Jennifer Podkul); and deterrence strategies (Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nikolas F. Tan) as barriers to refugee protection;
- Migrant smuggling research (Gabriella Sanchez);
- Detention by non-state actors (Michael Flynn);
- The perspectives of Central American child migrants (Susan Schmidt);
- Lessons from the large-scale migration of Central American women and children (Karen Musalo and Eunice Lee);
- US refugee protection legislation (Tara Magner);
- National security and refugee protection as complementary imperatives (Donald Kerwin);
- Public opinion data (Brad K. Blitz);
- Variations in refugee economic outcomes (Alexander Betts, Naohiko Omata, and Louise Bloom);
- The need for egalitarian, redistributive, long-term development for refugees and their host communities (Leah Zamore); and,
- Recommendations for the Global Compact on Refugees (Kevin Appleby).

This special collection followed an earlier JMHS collection consisting of 11 papers on reform of the US refugee protection system (writ large) which commemorated the Refugee Act of 1980 on its 35th anniversary. More
recently, in 2018, JMHS published a study on how 1.1 million refugees who resettled in the United States between 1987 and 2016 integrated and fared over time, compared to non-refugees, the foreign-born, and the overall US population.

Since January 2017, JMHS has extensively documented and critiqued the Trump administration’s immigration policies. In January 2018, JMHS released a special collection of papers titled *The US Immigration System: Principles, Interests, and Policy Proposals to Guide Long-Term Reform*, which covered:

- The national interests and values that should guide long-term reform of the US immigration system (Donald Kerwin);
- Nativism and US immigration policies (Julia G. Young);
- The future of citizenship (Peter J. Spiro);
- Immigration federalism (Cristina Rodriguez);
- The effectiveness of border enforcement (Edward Alden);
- Restoring the rule of law to the removal adjudication system (Lenni B. Benson);
- The merits of a subject-centered approach to legal non-compliance (Emily Ryo);
- Post-deportation barriers to family reunification (Deborah A. Boehm);
- The case for family unity (Zoya Gubernskaya and Joanna Dreby);
- Creating cohesive immigration policies (Pia O. Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny);
- Labor standards enforcement as an essential element of immigration reform (Janice Fine and Gregory Lyon);
- Economic development as an antidote to involuntary migration (John W. Harbeson);
- Possible directions for the US agricultural sector and workers (Philip Martin);
- The national interests served by US immigration policies, and how to replace an immigration system characterized by illegality with robust legal immigration policies (Donald Kerwin and Robert Warren).

In addition, a subsequent paper by Ruth Wasem examines the history of US immigration governance, identifies the many US immigration functions, and makes recommendations for reform.

*JMHS* also produced a special collection devoted to the US immigration enforcement system, *The Law That Begot the Modern US Immigration Enforcement System: IIRIRA 20 Years Later*. This collection covers the consequences of immigrant detention, criminal prosecution, and removal on deportees, US families and communities. It includes a study by Michael Coon on the impact of immigration enforcement by localities. More recently, *JMHS* published a study on US deportees in Mexico and the family members of deportees remaining in the United States. This report has been the subject of substantial roll-out, public presentations, and Capitol Hill briefings.

Immigrant detention – both from a US and global perspective – has been regularly covered in *JMHS*, most recently in an influential paper on the privatization of detention by D. Gilman and L.A. Romero. CMS has also begun to publish a series of papers — some of which will appear in *JMHS* — on the rule of law, access to justice and due process in the US removal adjudication system. These papers are dedicated to Juan P. Osuna, the former Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which oversees the US immigration court system.

While this short summary has highlighted special editions and thematic sets of papers, *JMHS* also accepts submissions on a range of issues which are poorly understood and often deliberately distorted in the public arena. The journal’s growth and vitality will also increasingly be tied to papers with greater geographic and
topical diversity. To that end, JMHS has published important work on the negotiation process for the Global Compact on Migration, wage and income inequality among farmworkers, forced labor and human trafficking around the World Cup and other major sporting events, Europe’s anti-smuggling initiatives, and different national responses to the Syrian refugee crisis. At a time of rising nationalism and hostility toward immigrants, JMHS plans to redouble its efforts to publish timely, fact-based, policy-relevant papers on human security themes.

*Migration Studies* 23

Chief Editor: Alan Gamlen

*Migration Studies* is an international refereed journal dedicated to advances in theory, methodology and comparative research concerning all forms of human migration. Published by Oxford University Press, each year it receives around 200 submissions from 70-80 countries. After blind peer review through a global editorial board representing each major social science discipline and each major world region, *Migration Studies* publishes around 20 full-length original research articles and half a dozen or so reviews of books, films and other media. We occasionally publish Research Notes and Special Issues. In 2017-18 the journal was included in the core journal collection of Oxford University Press journals available to many libraries around the world, which increased its visibility. It was also assigned an official SSCI Impact Factor, a credential that lets professional migration researchers to trust the journal with their best research.

Advances in theory, methods, and comparative data

In 2017-18 *Migration Studies* has covered most aspects of migration, from emigrant decision-making in origin places; to processes of movement through complex regulatory systems; to dynamics of immigrant adaptation; to practices of transnationalism. It has contributed to longstanding discussions on issues the relationship between forced and free migration, and the role of gender in migration dynamics, and to major contemporary discussion of the so-called ‘European migration crisis’, and the current evolution of a global regime to govern migration.

Migration research continues to focus heavily on the drivers of migration on one hand, and processes of immigrant adaptation on the other. In 2017-18, Migration Studies pushed forward scholarship on both fronts. We published several large-scale analyses on migration determinants. Matthew Hayes and Rocio Pérez-Gañán examined the under-researched case of North–South lifestyle and retirement migration to Ecuador, while Maryann Bylander compared two South-east Asian migration corridors, challenging the theory that “the poorest of the poor are generally less likely to migrate”, and exposing the importance of “worker-borne costs” and levels of formalization of migration processes. Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Simona Vezzoli revealed that the closure of formerly open Caribbean colonial borders caused a strong increase, not a decrease, in emigration — towards a wider array of other destinations. Speaking to abiding concerns about the ‘failure’ of migration policies to impact migration, Jan-Paul Brekke, Marianne Røed and Pål Schøne showed that restrictions during the 2015 European migration crisis both reduced asylum outflows and deflected them other countries. Examining the integration strategies of Iranian students in Western Europe, Ahmad Karimi and Sandra M Bucerius argued that “the processes of immigration and integration begin long before emigration actually takes place”.

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23 Articles cited in the journal editor’s contribution can be found at: https://academic.oup.com/migration.
In 2017-18 we also showcased work on various forms of *immigrant adaptation*, including several contributions to longstanding debates on labor market incorporation. Sukanya Basu examined the wage-assimilation profiles of ‘new’ and ‘old’ immigrant cohorts from Asian countries. Christel Kesler and Mirna Safi compared barriers to labor force participation and employment for immigrants France and the United Kingdom, while Ivana Fellini found that the European ‘crisis’ has changed the dominant patterns of labor of incorporation in Italy and Spain. Karsten Paerregaard studied immigrant entrepreneurship amongst Peruvian migrants, while María Sánchez-Domínguez and Susanne Fahlén compared how different institutional contexts shape the ability of immigrant women in Spain and Sweden to move beyond and above ethnic niches.

*Wider processes* of immigrant reception and adaptation have also featured prominently. Several papers looked at adaptation in terms of class and capital accumulation. Maja Cederberg showed the complexity of class positioning among female migrants in the UK, and Suzanne Huot argued that immigrants experience “misrecognition” of their social and human capital, which drives them into specific occupations to compensate. Moving beyond economic outcomes, Silvia Maja Melzer and Ruud J. Muffels spoke to the growing literature on migration and happiness, using German panel data to examine subjective wellbeing in connection with east-west migration after reunification. In contributions to the literature on contexts of reception, Timothy B Gravelle examined why Canadians hold closed vs open views towards refugees and immigrants, while Roy Germano demonstrated the use of video methods “to promote empathy, reduce xenophobia, and illustrate concepts in the study of international migration”.

*Migration Studies* has published groundbreaking studies on *processes of movement* itself, including how it is regulated and shaped by policies at various levels. Cecilia Menjívar, Juliana E Morris and Néstor P Rodríguez studied the far-reaching consequences of deporting Honduran migrants, while Nora El Qadim explored the symbolic nature of visa policies between Morocco and Europe. Basia D Ellis and Henderikus J Stam revealed how Polish migrants in Canada “learn to become ‘irregular’”, and Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp and colleagues exposed the underground market for immigrant papers in Cape Town. Marianne Takle focused on the contribution of migration statistics to the EU border control, and Sara Cosemans examined the phenomenon of post-colonial East African Asian diasporic refugees. In a significant contribution to the literature on migration governance, the journal ran a full special issue on migration regimes in November 2017, guest edited by Kenneth Horvath, Anna Amelina, and Karin Peters.

In 2017-18 Migration Studies also showcased new work on the topic of *transnationalism* that has dominated migration research in recent decades. For example, using Mexican data, Ana Isabel López García ascertained the varying effects of remittances on voter turnout in different migration contexts. Robtel Neajai Pailey studied the evolution of dual citizenship in Liberia, and Ali Chaudhary compared the transnational orientation of Pakistani immigrant organizations in London and New York. In a significant methodological contribution, John Gibson and David McKenzie demonstrated the reliability of survey methods for researching remittances.

*Building migration management capacity*

Through scholarship that is policy relevant but not policy driven, Migration Studies is one of a range of academic journals contributing to *building migration management capacity* in communities and governments around the world. The past several years have seen a worldwide proliferation of graduate programs and think tanks specializing in migration issues. At the same time, the rising political salience of migration has created a growing need for policy makers, journalists and NGO professionals in other areas to gain working familiarity with migration issues. In view of these trends, in the past two years Migration Studies has run two series
intended to contribute to the theory and practice of higher education on this topic. The first is a series called *Teaching Migration Studies*, involving brief descriptions and reflections on the professional practice of teaching about the topic in different parts of the world, written by senior scholars working in key graduate programs that prominently feature migration and related issues. The second series is entitled *Classics in Migration Studies*. Edited by Advisory Board member Robin Cohen, this series features reviews of canonical books and articles in the history of migration scholarship, written by leading migration scholars from around the world.

Through efforts like this, *Migration Studies* has contributed to a growing international community of migration experts. As well as concerning themselves with social scientific progress, many members of this community are deeply engaged in public debates about migration, and are contributing to public life by informing and impacting the thoughts and decisions of politicians, policy makers and practitioners of migration policy at every level, from local NGOs, to municipal governments, to national governments and international organizations. We are particularly pleased to have helped cultivate such community at a time when sound facts and rational arguments about migration are so urgently needed in public debates in so many countries.

**Challenges ahead**

As a journal, *Migration Studies* faces several challenges going forward. First is the need to connect with the growing community of natural scientists studying migration using methods such as genomic analysis. These methods enable previously unimaginable insights about the nature and history of human migration, but also raise profound ethical questions. As the field of genomic migration research develops, it should happen in closer dialogue with critical social scientists, who may help prevent the emergence of a new eugenics.

Second, *Migration Studies* needs to engage more deeply with migration research in psychology and the health sciences. Like the social sciences, these fields increasingly feature migration research, but because of their disciplinary position they largely remain ships passing in the night.

Third, *Migration Studies* faces the ongoing challenge of balancing disciplinary rigor and interdisciplinarity relevance in an increasingly commercial academic environment. A major question facing all academic journals is how to maintain scholarly standards as academic publishing continues to strain already-stretched researchers by demanding their free labor – particularly as peer-reviewed outlets face competition for clicks from a vast array of open source publications.

Finally, on a personal note, I would like to thank all the reviewers, authors, editors, advisors, production staff, publishing team members, and everyone else involved, for the expertise, energy, and enthusiasm they have contributed to the journal not only in the past two years, but since our founding in 2013 – itself the result of several years of collective preparation. It has been a great honor to lead the journal throughout this period, and as I prepare to hand over the reins to the next editor at the end of 2019, I am proud to reflect on the contributions that the journal makes towards understanding one of the most important issues of our time.
The *Refugee Survey Quarterly* published 44 articles in 2017 and 2018, focusing on the challenges of forced migration from multidisciplinary and policy-oriented perspectives with a broad range of academic backgrounds (such as sociology, political science, law, history, geography and economics). The diversity in scope and content of these articles is the result of an editorial re-orientation of the journal undertaken since 2010. While the journal has been published by Oxford University Press since its creation in 1982, it was previously managed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). During that time, the journal primarily published bibliographies and official documents on the protection of refugees, especially those produced by UNHCR. It then included as well special issues dedicated to a particular theme and guest edited by experts in the relevant area.

When UNHCR pulled out of the journal in 2010, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* experienced a major turnaround to become a genuine academic publication and, today, a reference journal in the field of forced migration. In addition to the establishment of a rigorous blind peer review process, the journal started to welcome submissions on an ongoing basis. An editorial strategy was also put in place to diversify the scope and content of articles to better reflect the rapid developments in the field of refugee protection. This strategy has borne fruit as illustrate the articles published in 2017 and 2018.

First, the objective has been to broaden the geographical scope of submissions. Prior to 2010, articles tended to predominantly focus on refugee issues in the Global North, especially in Europe. A larger geographical coverage was thus needed to better account for the obstacles raised to international refugee protection worldwide. It is well-known indeed that the vast majority of refugees are hosted in the Global South, while some States have emerged as new destination countries for the past decades. In addition to articles on Africa which are regularly published in the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, the 2017 and 2018 contributions included papers on Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and the Gulf countries, as well as on Latin America, such as El Salvador, Mexico and Brazil.

Particular efforts were also made in the past years to attract articles on Asia which tends to be underrepresented in the refugee literature. These efforts seem to have responded to a real need from readers as one of the articles published in 2018 and focusing on China has gathered almost 5,000 views and downloads at the time of writing (see L. Song, “China and the International Refugee Protection Regime: Past, Present, and Potentials”, in Vol. 37(2), 2018, pp. 139-161; in open access). Despite the diversification of the journal’s geographical scope, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* of course continues to publish articles on more “traditional” regions of asylum, such as North America and Europe.

Second, the editorial strategy for the past years has also been to widen the thematic focus of the journal. Despite its name, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* is not only about refugees. It is more generally concerned by all aspects relating to forced migration. Beyond more traditional questions of resettlement, protection or humanitarian assistance, the 2017 and 2018 contributions notably cover issues related to statelessness and internally displaced persons. Contributions also tackle the question of protection against climate change and disaster (see B. Burson, W. Kälin, J. McAdam and S. Weerasinghe, “The Duty to Move People Out of Harm’s Way in the Context of Climate Change and Disasters, Vol. 37(4), 2018, pp. 379-407), as well as gender, displacement...
The content of the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* has also logically broadened as asylum and migration have become increasingly blurred in the past decades in both policy and practice. For instance, the special issue on “Undesirable and Unreturnable Aliens in Asylum and Immigration Law” tackles the question of asylum-seekers refused international protection for security reasons, but who are nonetheless unreturnable to their country of origin, especially due to the protection afforded by the principle of *non-refoulement* (guest edited by D.J. Cantor, J. van Wijk, S. Singer and M.P. Bolhuis, Vol. 36(1), 2017). The securitization of asylum was also the subject of other contributions, especially from the perspective of detention and its disastrous effects on asylum-seekers, alongside articles on the impact of border controls on refugee protection. The limits and dangers inherent to such a security approach are well exemplified by several case studies focusing on Australia, Canada and European States. Another interesting contribution analyses refugee policy in the United States as a reflection of its foreign policy when it comes to the resettlement of Iraqi and Afghan refugees (N.R. Micinski, “Refugee Policy as Foreign Policy: Iraqi and Afghan Refugee Resettlements to the United States”, Vol. 37(3), 2018, pp. 253-278).

While the thematic coverage of the journal will continue to evolve with the new developments in forced migration, the *Refugee Survey Quarterly* will remain dedicated to publish high quality and original articles on issues of both academic and policy interest. In this regard, the journal is thankful to peer reviewers who have kindly offered their time and expertise, despite the increasingly demanding workload entailed by academic positions. One of the main challenges for the years to come will be to further diversify the geographical origin of contributors to the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*. While efforts have been made in this sense in the past years, submissions are still dominated by scholars from the Global North. This is not peculiar to the *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, but more broadly reflects the prevailing biases in academic research and publications.

In this field like in many others, the production of knowledge remains largely structured by the Western-centric priorities of research funding that is financed by wealthy states and fuelled by the dominant discourse of the governing elites. This trend is further exacerbated by the enduring misperceptions spread by mass media, as illustrated by the rhetoric – if not the obsession – about the so-called refugee crisis in Europe. While it may have less implications in other fields, the geographical representation of researchers is particularly crucial in migration to account for the multifaceted dimensions and challenges of such a worldwide phenomenon that concerns every region of the world. There is more than ever a vital need for developing a more nuanced, representative and comprehensive understanding of migration through independent and evidence-based knowledge.
analysing migration and border policies and practices as well as the experiences of migrants. IJMBS contributed knowledge in three interrelated areas, in particular: the criminalisation of migrants; borders as sites of deterrence and containment; and strategies to promote mobility and the human rights of migrants.

The criminalisation of migrants

The IJMBS contributions typically dealt with the current global and national contexts where migrants’ mobility has been constrained by restrictive measures. States have resorted to the criminalisation of migration or crimmigration to deter and to punish asylum seekers and irregular migrants. The process involves an increased reliance on the criminal law to enforce immigration statutes. Violations of immigration law carry criminal consequences without the implementation of procedural protections applicable to criminal law. Problematic measures include arbitrary detentions, enhanced surveillance practices, interception strategies and deportations. States have also tightened the criteria for granting refugee status with a view to limiting the number of persons granted asylum with the pretext of deterring ‘abuse’. Against this background, IJMBS explored important theoretical and empirical implications associated with crimmigration and how this phenomenon is constructed and challenged in diverse settings. To illustrate, a historical lens was used in a contribution to examine the ideological roots pertaining to the Belgian policy of migrants’ deportation. Such an approach demonstrated how framing the foreigner as an unethical subject legitimised the exceptional power of deportation. Similarly, several authors adopted a comparative perspective to illuminate the commonalities between histories, rationales, and implementation of criminalizing policies in different jurisdictions. One such example is the safe country of origin criteria used in refugee status determination both in the European Union (EU) and in Canada as a tool to delegitimise certain refugee claims and to reduce the number of ‘undesirable’ asylum seekers.

A common theme across contributions is the impact of crimmigration on the human rights of migrants. Take the Canadian immigration detention regime where there are no clear statutory time limits or meaningful independent oversight. This situation clearly aggravates the risk for arbitrary and inhumane detention of migrants. The United States President Donald Trump’s travel bans offer another illustration of how crimmigration violates individual rights like the right to privacy and the presumption of innocence. In addition, these travel bans require states to provide information relating to their citizens and resident foreigners to the United States authorities in return for being left off the list of banned countries. Indeed a number of contributions in IJMBS highlighted that migration management has become a major dimension of interstate relations. Destination countries increasingly cooperate with source and transit countries to enable them to efficiently control their borders and contain irregular migrants. Often characterised by an imbalance of power between states, the externalisation of migration controls has been detrimental to migrants’ rights as exemplified in the case of smuggled asylum seekers in Indonesia. The ‘illegality’ of this population has been constructed as a result of Indonesia’s enhanced cooperation with Australia. This had a transformative effect not only on Indonesian law but also on social attitudes towards asylum seekers in this country. Arrangements with third-countries are also part of the current debates at the EU level, with the aim to confine refugees in countries outside or on the periphery of the EU. In some instances, the strategic alliances between states were embedded in systems of reciprocal conditionalities. An example is the proactive engagement of North African and Sahel countries in the EU’s immigration control efforts. This engagement was largely motivated by these countries’ own interests and expectations from the EU, such as military assistance, financial support and regime legitimacy.
Exclusionary borders and transit migration

Borders are complex spaces that involve discursive, spatial, and temporal dimensions. The evolving nature of borders has been a main focus for IJMBS which systematically examines how border controls operate in practice. As highlighted in a contribution, border officials are confronted with tasks that entail both discretionary decision-making and coercive measures where they have to balance a professional ethos with their personal moral values.

Many IJMBS articles examined the shifting conception of borders as tools of governance and as boundaries of belonging. A perfect illustration is the ‘anticipatory interdiction’ measures implemented by Canada to manage the geopolitical ‘threat’ posed by asylum claimants from Mexico. Measures such as the United States-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, the Mexican visa imposition, and the safe country of origin scheme formed a virtual border to effectively filter and exclude migrants from Mexico. In a similar vein, the EU border control regime generated exclusion and precarity of migrants during the so-called ‘European refugee crisis’ in 2015. As an IJMBS contribution put it, when over a million people reached Europe, intense political debate on the ‘crisis’ has prevented public opinion from seeing how its root causes lie in the intrinsic weaknesses of the solidarity and responsibility sharing mechanisms in the EU. Indeed another article argued that the EU’s political priority to counter migrant smuggling affected the provision of humanitarian assistance and access to rights for irregular immigrants and asylum seekers. Civil society actors, especially those critically monitor and politically mobilise for the rights of migrants in Europe, have faced prosecutions and criminal convictions when assisting this population. Authors pointed almost invariably to the pressing issue of ensuring transparency and accountability at the border.

The IJMBS contributed to the understanding of how the logics of borders are confronted by migrant realities and everyday experiences. Research has documented the increasingly protracted nature of migrants’ journeys. Being in transit has become the daily lived reality of many people on the move. Accordingly, special attention was paid by IJMBS to the concept of transit as a space constructed through mobility restrictions regimes and the above-mentioned systems of reciprocal conditionalities. In particular, there has been a mounting pressure on the first countries of asylum to double efforts to locally integrate refugees they are hosting. However these countries struggle to meet the social and economic needs of refugees who often face discrimination. As described in an article, the desire to move on with their lives and escape the interminable temporariness in Turkey propelled some Syrian refugees to engage in secondary movements throughout the EU, despite the risks of the journey. For similar reasons, the vast majority of one million refugees who landed in Greece and Italy in 2015-2016, then engaged in secondary movements to escape the temporary status and the exploitative economies of transit. Another contribution shed light on the situation of asylum seekers confined in Indonesia and who hope to be resettled in Australia. It demonstrated that limbo in transit encouraged migrants to agree to assisted voluntary return, in many cases, to places where they may face persecution.

Migrant agency, the limits of resistance and the way forward

The resilience and the agency of migrants are among priority topics explored in IJMBS. As demonstrated in one of the contributions, young temporary migrants from China and Hong Kong, China in the United Kingdom have been able to deploy strategies such as marriage and the use of sexual capital to prolong their stay in this country. In other cases, migrants can manage their own migration trajectories through resourceful use of new technologies. Mobile technology can serve to shape routes, destinations and facilitate the financing of irregular migration. Sadly the IJMBS contributions also show the limits of resistance and the ways in which
migrant agency is harnessed by the state to justify further migration controls and denial of protection. A typical example is the precarious situation of unaccompanied minors who travelled from Mexico and Central America to the United States in 2014. The framing of children as ‘illegal migrants’ by the United States and Mexican authorities allowed increased deportations. As well, border controls were implemented under the guise of assisting minors, who were cast as agentless victims.

Many of the IJMBS articles touched on the counterproductive effects of border control regimes. In addition to the migrants’ human rights violations, the proliferation of migrant smuggling and human trafficking had been a by-product of these regimes. As emphasized by an author, a meaningful attempt to address migrant smuggling requires states to develop legal and safe avenues for accessing countries of asylum. Indeed, the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants called on states to ensure safe, orderly and regular migrations. The recent global compacts signal a move towards more inclusive and principled approaches to the governance of human mobility. As the Global Compact on Refugees underlined it, refugee resettlement policies are of key importance in this respect. An IJMBS special issue contributed to the debate by comparing and contrasting refugee resettlement in four major receiving countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Policies were examined in several key areas of settlement support, including employment, healthcare, education, social welfare and social security. The issue offered an in-depth discussion on whether and to what extent resettlement policies are adequate. It also critically analysed the policy variance among states and between areas of settlement policy. Policy recommendations formulated in the contributions inspire constructive change and inform policy makers and other stakeholders in the countries studied and globally. Importantly, a comparative analysis of resettlement policies shows that more solidarity with refugees and countries in the global South that are currently hosting them is possible.

Overall, the research published in IJMBS functions as a plea for the facilitation of human mobility across borders. It dispels the myth that migration can be regulated by deterrence-based policies. Contributions provide evidence that such policies are counterproductive and highlight the need for an effective human rights-based global framework that would enhance mobility.

Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales25
Chief Editors: Emmanuel Ma Mung and Véronique Petit

The European Review of International Migration (REMI) is a specialised journal on international migration and inter-ethnic relations. Multidisciplinary (sociology, anthropology, demography, geography, history, political science, etc.), it publishes in French, English and Spanish in-depth articles of empirical or theoretical orientation, as well as research notes that present the first results of ongoing research. Each review number includes a thematic issue which is supplemented by varia. A legal chronicl since 2016 takes into account the growing importance of legal issues related to international migration and migration policy issues. This reborn chronicl is moderated by a group of specialised lawyers who are developing a network around issues such as international migration law (conventions, protocols), reception and protection conditions for unaccompanied minors, protection and promotion of the social rights of migrants, human rights as protection of migrants’ rights, access to health, labour law for irregular migrants.

25 Articles cited in the journal editors’ contribution can be found at: https://journals.openedition.org/remi/.
REMI celebrated its 30th anniversary by publishing a special issue entitled “Renewing the Migration Issues” (32/3-4 2016). This special volume brought together original and diversified contributions. In addition to the classic articles, this issue features interviews with journal editors, researchers and artists. Through these exchanges, the function of scientific journals in a rapidly changing world of publishing and research, the use of categories and concepts in understanding migration issues and inter-ethnic relations, as well as the place of migration in multicultural societies are examined. Other articles deal with epistemological challenges by reporting on survey methods in an urban context (use of photography, sound recordings), the measurement of migratory flows, the mapping of migratory flows, the museography of migratory histories. Other articles analyse more current and topical situations: the United States’ migration policy and the revival of the “Silk Road” between Asia and Europe.

The issue of violence is a recurring theme in the latest dossiers. The importance of this issue reflects the tragic consequences of migration policies in particular contexts or crises, and the emergence of work around migrants’ journeys. The dossier “Speaking out against border violence. Putting into words migration to Europe” (33/2-3, 2017) coordinated by Cécile Canut and Anaïk Pian addresses border violence by adopting a language approach. Considering language practices as an integral part of migration practices in the context of migration to Europe, the articles analyse how the actors put into words death and violence at borders. Death is considered in multiple dimensions: social death, physical death, disappearance, institutional and security arbitrariness, etc. These language practices are understood at different sociological and political levels, whether it is their production from institutional spaces (international organisations, political spaces at European or state level) or their reception by migrants, during their life in Europe or afterwards when they arrive there, or when they return to their country after an expulsion. The language approach, corresponding both to a consideration of the discourses produced on migrants and of the narratives taken by migrants in plural discursive frameworks. This perspective makes it possible to think of the border object while offering a grid for interpreting socio-spatial inequalities in the era of globalization.

The issue of violence and migration routes is also addressed through the refugee situation. Karen Akoka, Olivier Clochard and Albena Tcholakova in the dossier “Recognised refugees and after? ” (33/4, 2017) question the fate of refugees once they have obtained this status. Indeed, they start from the observation that research on recognised refugees remains too rare in studies on asylum conditions in Europe. The vast majority of academic work focuses on the situation of candidates for refugee status before their application is recognised or rejected. The articles presented in this dossier examine this “after” time. They question the widespread image that makes refugee status a kind of outcome and invite us to question its effects in terms of social, identity and political reconfigurations. Different case studies, referring to different populations and periods (Armenians, Africans, Cambodians, Tamils) shed light on the refugee status as an individual and collective experience.

The experience of exile and life after it is also examined in the dossier “Living, thinking, writing in exile” (33/1, 2017) coordinated by the historian Ralph Schor, who strives to understand the paths and identity choices of a particular category of exiles: writers and thinkers. Many of them left their homeland, voluntarily in the case of those on an unprecedented intellectual adventure, or forced in the case of political refugees. Articles in history or social science describe the living conditions of writers far from their country in order to understand the formation and expression of their thought. Some authors articulate a double corpus: discursive data from interviews with authors and migrants of the same origin, and a corpus constructed from their literary works. These articles examine the literary and anthropological writing of migration, the narrative of oneself and others, the expression of emotions and feelings, and the viewer’s perspective. Some varia articles
focus on the links between film and migration experiences in countries with a film industry. In what way do cinema and photography open up new discursive spaces? A special richly illustrated dossier is devoted to the links between photography, migration and cities (43/3-4, 2016). How cinema and photography reflect migrants’ migratory experiences, imaginations, living, housing and working conditions? These articles also show how images contribute to current events and the production of memory, instilling emotions, reflections, mobilizations and denunciations.

Contemporary situations are also examined through the lens of history, which makes it possible to grasp ruptures and continuities and to develop comparative perspectives. This was the case in the dossier on “Romanian Roma migration in Europe: inclusion policies, strategies for distinguishing and (de)building identity borders” coordinated by Mihaela Nedelcu and Ruxandra-Oana Ciobanu (32/1, 2016). It is also the perspective adopted in the dossier “Migratory movements of yesterday and today in Italy” coordinated by Paola Corti and Adelina Miranda (34/1, 2018) which critically reviews Italy’s migratory history, at a time when this country is becoming increasingly present on the international scene due to policies of refoulement of foreigners at national borders. The analysis of the Italian case suggests, in the wake of the migration studies, that it is not possible to define the migration fields within which old and new protagonists move through the simple analysis of territorial trajectories. The research presented shows, on the one hand, that the adoption of a distant perspective is essential to relativize current analyses and, on the other hand, it shows the heuristic interest in varying the focus of the historical perspective on migration facts. Similarly, since it is no longer conceivable to use categories that semantically reflect the typologies used by a political discourse that instrumentalize them, it is useful to consider the various spatial-political scales - local, regional, national and international - while appropriating the subjective level to understand the complexity of the phenomenon. This historical perspective is also present in the dossier “Training elites: mobility of students from Africa north of the Sahara in the countries of the former socialist bloc” coordinated by Michèle Leclerc-Olive and Marie-Antoinette Hily (32/2, 2016), which sheds light on a forgotten part of our history, examines collaboration between countries in the name of an ideological project, and the “qualified migration” that these programmes generate between these States. The presentation of these experiences leads to a discussion of the descriptive categories of these “mobilities” and “elites”.

Finally, the last dossier “Mental health in international migration” (34/2-3, 2018) coordinated by Véronique Petit and Simeng Wang is the first dossier that REMI has devoted to mental health. It is published at a time when migration policies in France and Europe, due to their deleterious effects, are undermining the rights, access to healthcare and health of many migrants. Articles provide empirical researches describing the use of care and therapeutic relationships in mental health for migrants at different points in their migration route. The mental health perspective renews the reading of the social relationships in which the migrant is inserted. It also makes it possible to analyse the social conditions of production, expression and management of psychological suffering at the micro, meso and macro-social levels. The methods of care (institutional, social, legal, health) for migrants diagnosed “as having mental disorders, psychological difficulties or in a state of suffering” link the effects of migration policies, the dynamics of reception and care of migrants, the organisation of care systems and the production of subjectivities and self-expression.
Chapter 6

Appendix A. Terms and definitions relating to migrants’ inclusion and social cohesion

Various terms have been used to refer to migrants’ inclusion in receiving societies and to social cohesion. The choice of one particular term depends on the interlocutor (who/which stakeholder), the particular period of time (when), and the historical, political, social, cultural and economic contexts of a particular host country or society (where).

The table below provides an illustration of some of the terms often used, together with a potential definition. These definitions are, however, only suggestions as to how these terms can be understood, as no universally agreed definitions exist.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
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<tr>
<td>Acculturation</td>
<td>“[A]cculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups.”</td>
<td>Redfield, Linton and Herskovits, 1936, in Berry, 1997.</td>
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<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>“The selective and often conscious attempt to modify certain aspects of cultural practice in accordance with the host society’s norms and values.”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002.</td>
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<td>Assimilation</td>
<td>“A one-directional policy approach to integration whereby an ethnic or social group – usually a minority – adopts the cultural practices of another – usually that of the majority ethnic or social group. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, mores and behaviour normally leading the assimilating party to become less socially distinguishable from other members of the receiving society.”</td>
<td>IOM, 2019.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>“This can refer to denial of access to certain rights, resources or entitlements normally seen as part of membership of a specific society. Immigrants are often included in some areas of society (e.g. labour market) but excluded from others (e.g. political participation).”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>“The process whereby immigrants or refugees become participants in particular subsectors of society: education, labour market, welfare system, political representation, etc. The emphasis is on active and conscious processes: that is policies of public agencies or employers, as well as on the role of the newcomers themselves. This is seen as the antithesis of exclusion and social exclusion.”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002.</td>
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<td>Incorporation</td>
<td>“Incorporation of immigrants is seen by some social scientists as a fairly neutral term to refer to the overall process by which newcomers become part of a society. It is seen as avoiding the normative implications of such terms as assimilation, integration and insertion.”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insertion</td>
<td>“The process through which immigrants and refugees are brought into various social subsectors. The term originates in the French Republican Model of individual assimilation of immigrants, and carries the implication of being inserted into an unchanged social institution – in other words, that the immigrant has to assimilate to existing structures.”</td>
<td>Castles et al., 2002.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>“The two-way process of mutual adaptation between migrants and the societies in which they live, whereby migrants are incorporated into the social, economic, cultural and political life of the receiving community. It entails a set of joint responsibilities for migrants and communities, and incorporates other related notions such as social inclusion and social cohesion.”</td>
<td>IOM, 2019.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interculturalism</td>
<td>“[A] technique for bridging differences and creating bonds and social capital. That is, it promotes relations between people who share certain characteristics (bonds), as well as relations between individuals from different backgrounds (promoting interaction between people across different religions, languages, etc.) who are predisposed to respecting others’ differences […] It is a way, then, to avoid the confinement and segregation of people, which may condemn them to a timeless social exclusion.”</td>
<td>Zapata-Barrero, 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td>“A model of integration policies that welcomes the preservation, expression and sometimes even the celebration of cultural diversity. This approach encourages migrants to become full members of society while retaining their cultural identities. It combines the recognition of varied backgrounds, traditions and ways of seeing the world with certain universalist values, such as the rule of law or gender equality, that override cultural differences and guarantee the same rights for all. The integration relationship is then best captured in the image of a mosaic enabling minority ethnic groupings to live side by side with the majority constituency.”</td>
<td>IOM, 2019, adapted from IOM, 2017b.</td>
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### Social Cohesion

“While there is no one universal definition, social cohesion is usually associated with such notions as ‘solidarity’, ‘togetherness’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘harmonious coexistence’ and refers to a social order in a specific society or community based on a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; where the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and positively valued; those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.”

*Source: IOM, 2019, adapted from Demireva (2017), citing Cantle, 2005.*

### Social Exclusion

“Social exclusion pertains to a situation in which an individual or group suffers multiple types of disadvantage in various social sectors (e.g. education, employment, housing, health).”

*Source: Castles et al., 2002.*

### Social Inclusion

“The process of improving the ability, opportunity, and dignity of people disadvantaged on the basis of their identity, to take part in society.”


### Transnationalism

“Transnationalism broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation-states.”

*Source: Vertovec, 1999.*
Appendix B. The legal framework of migrants’ inclusion

As introduced in chapter 6, the different key policy areas of migrants’ inclusion correspond to and are grounded in some specific rights to which all individuals are entitled, including migrants. The figure in this appendix provides an overview of some of the rights that are essential for migrants’ inclusion.

All these rights are based on specific international treaties, especially those part of international human rights law and international labour law. Without prejudice to other relevant international and regional instruments, these treaties include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International human rights law</th>
<th>International labour law</th>
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<tr>
<td>• The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
<td>• The Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
<td>• The Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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</table>
| • The 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families

While these treaties are only legally binding for the States that have ratified them, the two Covenants of 1966 have now been ratified by virtually all States.\(^{26}\) Moreover, some of the rights in the figure below are commonly recognized to be part of customary international law. They are thus legally binding on all States, irrespective of their ratification of specific treaties or conventions. These customary rights most notably include the main pillar of migrants’ inclusion: that is, the principle of non-discrimination, which ensures that the rights of all individuals, including migrants, are not nullified or impaired on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”, including migration status.\(^{27}\)


\(^{27}\) UN HRCtte, 1989: para. 7. However, as noted by the Committee: “Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]” (ibid.: para. 13). On the customary law nature of the principle of non-discrimination, see Chetail, 2019.
right to acquire a nationality for children
right to vote for nationals but possibility for States to extend it to regular migrants
right to respect for family life, right of children not to be separated from their parents, family reunification, principle of the best interests of the child
right to work, decent working conditions, prohibition of forced/compulsory labour, freedom of association, right to join/form trade unions
right to education
freedom of religion
right to an adequate standard of living (such as housing)
right to health
principle of non-discrimination
right to health
Legal framework of inclusion
Appendix C. Main findings of the *Immigrant Citizens Survey*

The *Immigrant Citizens Survey*\(^\text{28}\) was piloted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, and conducted in 2011–2012 with 7,473 migrants born outside the European Union and residing in 15 cities in seven EU member States. Survey questions concerned six dimensions of inclusion, resulting in the following key findings:

1. **Employment**
   - Problems on the labour market are often local, from few legal contracts in Southern Europe to discrimination and distrust of foreign qualifications in Northern Europe.
   - For immigrants, the major problem is job security.
   - 25–33% of working immigrants feel overqualified for their job.
   - Educated immigrants often get their foreign qualifications recognised if they apply, but few apply.
   - Most working-age immigrants want more training.
   - Immigrants have greater problems balancing training, work, and family life than most people do in the country.

2. **Languages**
   - Immigrants generally speak more languages than the average person in their country of residence.
   - For immigrants – like for most people – time is the major problem for learning a new language.
   - Getting information on learning opportunities may be more difficult for immigrants than general public.
   - Wide range of immigrants participated in language or integration courses.
   - Participants highly value courses for learning language and often for socio-economic integration.

3. **Political and civic participation**
   - Most immigrants are interested in voting (often as much as nationals are).
   - Most immigrants want more diversity in politics – and many are willing to vote in support of it.
   - Immigrants’ broader participation in civic life is uneven from city to city and organisation to organisation.
   - Whether immigrants know or participate in an immigrant NGO depends heavily on their local and national context.

4. **Family reunion**
   - Only limited numbers of first-generation immigrants were ever separated from a partner or children.

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\(^{28}\) Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.
• The majority of separated families have already reunited in most surveyed countries.

• Most separated immigrants today do not want to apply for their family, some because of family choices but others because of policy obstacles.

• Family reunion helps immigrants improve family life, sense of belonging and sometimes other integration outcomes.

5. Long-term residence
• 80–95% of immigrants are or want to become long-term residents.

• Most temporary migrants in new countries of immigration also want to become long-term residents.

• The average person applies not long after the minimum period of residence.

• Documents and powers of authorities cited as major problems for applicants in certain countries.

• Long-term residence helps most immigrants get better jobs and feel more settled.

6. Citizenship
• Around 3 out of 4 immigrants are or want to become citizens.

• The few uninterested in citizenship often either do not see the difference with their current status or face specific policy obstacles.

• Major reasons not to naturalise are difficult procedures in France and restrictions on dual nationality in Germany.

• Naturalisation more common among established immigration countries and among facilitated groups in Hungary and Spain.

• Immigrants who are eligible for naturalization often take years to apply.

• Citizenship helps immigrants feel more settled, get better jobs, and even get more educated and involved.

Source: Extracted from Huddleston and Dag Tjaden, 2012.
Chapter 7

Appendix A. Key priorities and actions for monitoring migrant health and developing migrant-sensitive health systems

**Monitoring migrant health**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities to address</th>
<th>Key actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure the standardization and comparability of data on migrant health.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase the better understanding of trends and outcomes through the appropriate disaggregation and analysis of migrant health information in ways that account for the diversity of migrant populations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improve the monitoring of migrants’ health-seeking behaviours, access to and utilization of health services, and increase the collection of data related to health status and outcomes for migrants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify and map: (a) good practices in monitoring migrant health; (b) policy models that facilitate equitable access to health for migrants; and (c) migrant-inclusive health systems models and practices.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop useful data that can be linked to decision-making and the monitoring of the impact of policies and programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identify key indicators that are acceptable and usable across countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Promote the inclusion of migration variables in existing censuses, national statistics, targeted health surveys and routine health information systems, as well as in statistics from sectors such as housing, education, labour and migration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use innovative approaches to collect data on migrants beyond traditional instruments, such as vital statistics and routine health information systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clearly explain to migrants why health-related data are being collected and how this can benefit them, and have safeguards in place to prevent use of data in a discriminatory or harmful fashion.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Raise awareness about data collection methods, uses and data-sharing related to migrant health among governments, civil society and international organizations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Produce a global report on the status of migrants’ health, including country-by-country progress reports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Migrant-sensitive health systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities to address</th>
<th>Key actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure that health services are delivered to migrants in a culturally and linguistically appropriate way, and enforce laws and regulations that prohibit discrimination.</td>
<td>• Establish focal points within governments for migrant health issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Adopt measures to improve the ability of health systems to deliver migrant-inclusive services and programmes in a comprehensive, coordinated and financially sustainable way.</td>
<td>• Develop standards for health service delivery, organizational management and governance that address cultural and linguistic competence; epidemiological factors; and legal, administrative, and financial challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Enhance the continuity and quality of care received by migrants in all settings, including that received from NGO health services and alternative providers.</td>
<td>• Develop frameworks for the implementation and monitoring of health systems’ performance in delivering migrant-sensitive health services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop the capacity of the health and relevant non-health workforce to understand and address the health and social issues associated with migration.</td>
<td>• Develop methods to analyse the costs of addressing or not addressing migrant health issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Include diaspora migrant health workers in the design, implementation and evaluation of migrant-sensitive health services and educational programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Include migrant health in the graduate, postgraduate and continuous professional education training of all health personnel, including support and managerial staff.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Lessons learned in advancing a National Migration Health Policy and action framework in Sri Lanka

Sustained economic growth and peace dividends since the cessation of protracted civil conflict in 2009 has re-established Sri Lanka as a booming economy in the South Asian region. International migration continues to be a catalyst to Sri Lanka’s development. Sri Lanka is both a labour-sending country (with over 2 million of its citizens working abroad as labour migrants), and a labour-receiving one – with a growing number of migrant workers from countries such as India and China arriving to work on large-scale infrastructure projects such as new highways, seaports and airports. These developments will further increase population mobility into and within the island. The end of war also led to a return of Sri Lankan refugees from India, with many more internally displaced persons from other parts of the country, to their places of origin. Addressing health challenges of a dynamic range of population flows therefore becomes important.

Figure 1. Advancing a National Migration and Health Policy process in Sri Lanka
In recognizing the intersectoral nature of addressing migration and health, an evidence-informed, “whole-of-government” approach was adopted by the Government of Sri Lanka to advance the National Migration Health Policy process. The process was led by the Ministry of Health with technical partnership from IOM. Sri Lanka remains one of the few countries to have a dedicated National Migration Health Policy and Action Plan, which was launched in 2013.

**Six key lessons in advancing the National Migration Health Policy**

1. **Adopt an intersectoral, participatory approach**
   An interministerial mechanism was established, led by the Minister of Health, to galvanize the migration and health agenda. The multisectoral coordination framework is comprised of three elements: (a) a dedicated secretariat within the Directorate of Policy and Planning to drive daily coordination; (b) a National Migration Health Taskforce (MHTF) to drive technical cooperation; and (c) a National Steering Committee to drive legal and executive level action. The MHTF enabled participation from civil society, the nongovernmental sector, academia and intergovernmental organizations, and migrants themselves.

2. **Adopt an inclusive approach**
   After extensive deliberation, the MHTF targeted migrant categories across all three migration flows: inbound, outbound and internal. Inbound migrants include foreign migrant workers and returning refugees; outbound migration encompasses categories such as labour migrants, international students and military; and internal migrants include categories such as free trade zone workers, seasonal workers and internally displaced persons. Considering the large numbers of migrant workers, the left-behind children and families of international migrant workers were included as a dedicated fourth section for the policy.

3. **Adopt a strong “evidence-informed approach”**
   A hallmark of Sri Lanka’s policy development was emphasis on an evidence-based approach to developing policy formulary and guiding interventions. A country migration profile was developed during the formative phase and a National Migration Health Research Commission was undertaken over a three-year period. Efforts were made to undertake multidisciplinary research studies that were not only rigorous but adopted high ethical standards. The findings were shared though a series of National Symposiums on Migration Health Research, with the participation of government agencies, migrant community representatives, civil society, development partners, United Nations agencies, the private sector and academia.

4. **Adopt a pragmatic and responsive approach**
   An important feature of the policy development process was the imperative placed on responding to any nationally important migration and health challenges the country would encounter, rather than remain a static process, only for purposes of policy formulation. The utility of an interministerial taskforce in taking practical action was recognized. For example, a National Border Health Strategy was developed to enhance point-of-entry capacities to better prepare, respond to and mitigate global health security risks, and improve disease surveillance and coordination at points of entry.

5. **Embed an accountability framework**
   Tracking progress and sharing regular progress reports at the national, subnational and global levels is a key aspect of policy implementation. Sri Lanka formally reported progress made against the four intervention domains detailed in World Health Assembly resolution 61.17: Health of migrants, in 2010 and 2011. A national report card on migration and health was also developed by the MHTF, and can be read in full at
www.migrationhealth.lk. A recurrent challenge has been to sustain the coordination efforts both within the Ministry of Health and between ministries and partners.

6. **Ensure global health diplomacy and engagement**
In a globalized world, individual member States cannot “do it alone” in effectively advancing their national migration health agendas. Multilateral diplomatic efforts need to be made with both sending and receiving countries, recognizing that health vulnerabilities diffuse across all phases of migration and across borders.
Appendix C. Health in the implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

**Objective 1: Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies**

The action on developing country-specific migration profiles with disaggregated data in a national context should include health data to develop evidence-informed migration policies. This can begin with practical platforms for connecting research experts, scholars and policymakers globally to strengthen information systems to analyse trends in migrants’ health, disaggregate health information and facilitate the exchange of lessons learned.

**Objective 7: Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration**

The actions on addressing vulnerabilities in migration include provision of health care, and psychological and other counselling services, in particular for migrant women, adolescents, and for unaccompanied and separated children across the stages of migration. This would also require addressing migrant experiences, including xenophobia, migration restrictions for migrants with health needs, and other policy gaps and inconsistencies, as well as efforts to enhance migrant resilience, through adequate information, education and empowerment for self-help.

**Objective 10: Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration**

Protection and assistance for trafficked persons will require integration of measures for physical and psychological health, including service delivery and capacity development. This will require cross-border cooperation and partnerships to harmonize intersectoral policies and practices, and ensure continuity of care and health responses to particular health needs of women, men, girls and boys.

**Objective 15: Provide access to basic services for migrants**

This objective encourages governments to “incorporate the health needs of migrants in national and local health care policies and plans, [...] including by taking into consideration relevant recommendations from the WHO Framework of Priorities and Guiding Principles to Promote the Health of Refugees and Migrants”, which were developed in collaboration with member States, IOM and other United Nations partners. These commitments are linked with governments’ plans for health-related SDG results (SDG 3 and others), including strengthening migrant-inclusive health-care systems.

**Objective 22: Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits**

Inclusion of health-related actions in this objective will require assessment and enhancement of financial risk protection in health services, to reduce the burden of catastrophic health expenditures on migrants. Social protection in health should be an integral component of reciprocal social security agreements on the portability of earned benefits for migrant workers at all skill levels, for both long-term and temporary migration.
Chapter 9

Appendix A. Policy processes of significance for the governance of environmental migration

Beyond the UNFCC and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, environmental migration continues to be discussed in various thematic policy processes. This includes but is not limited to, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the work under the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the discussions conducted by the tripartite constituents of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Executive Committee as well as IOM governing body mechanisms. All these global policy spaces have devoted specific sessions to migration and displacement in the context of climate change, disaster and environmental degradation. Other processes – such as the small island developing States focused SAMOA Pathway or dealing with key environmental issues such as oceans, ecosystems or water – are also incorporating migration issues. The infographic below summarizes the main elements of the various policy forums and mechanisms.

Of particular note is the Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), which is a State-led initiative that seeks to bring migration and environmental change together to address the protection gap for persons displaced across borders, and in particular to implement the Nansen Protection Agenda adopted by 108 countries in 2015. The PDD focuses primarily on displacement and also has a work plan aimed at increasing adaptive capacity of all people who may move in relation to environmental stresses like disasters and climate change. For example, the PDD's recently updated strategy promotes managing displacement risks through moving “out of harm’s way in a dignified manner, through the creation of pathways for safe, orderly and regular migration”. The PDD’s work plan states that migration can be a response to disaster risk.

29 States have increasingly engaged at intergovernmental level on migration, environment and climate change within IOM’s intergovernmental policy dialogues, including the International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) and the regular meetings of IOM’s governing bodies (such as IOM Council), as well as regional policy discussions linked to regional migration consultative processes supported by IOM. See, for example, IOM, 2007.

30 Nansen Initiative, 2015.

31 PDD, 2019.

32 Ibid.
Summary of migration and displacement in global policy processes

**Migration in adaptation**
Work programme on Loss and Damage created: paragraph 14(f) calls for Parties to take “measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels” to enhance action on adaptation.

**Migration in loss and damage**
COP agreed on their role in addressing loss and damage. Paragraph 7(vi): “advance the understanding of and expertise on loss and damage, which includes — how impacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility.”

**Implementation of Warsaw International Mechanism**
The 2-year workplan and structure of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) was approved by COP.

**Launch of clearing house for risk transfer**
On behalf of the Task Force on Displacement, IOM and PDD organized a stakeholder meeting to take stock of progress under the different areas of the Task Force’s workplan and inform the development of the integrated recommendations that were presented at COP24 in Katowice, Poland.

**Warsaw International Mechanism**
for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change (WIM) created, to help developing countries that are particularly vulnerable, with three pillars:
- Enhancing understanding;
- Dialogue, coordination, coherence, and synergies; and
- Action and support

**Task Force on Displacement**
The Task Force on Displacement established under the WIM in the Paris Agreement; created a clearing house to gather and disseminate information related to risk.

**Task Force on Displacement Recommendations**
“Recommendations from the report of the Excom/WIM on integrated approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change”, adopted by the UNFCCC Parties in Decision 10/CP.24.

**COP of solutions**
WIM reviewed and a 5-year rolling work plan approved by COP. Ban Ki-Moon and François Hollande highlighted the importance of human migration, and over 20 events were organized dedicated to addressing human migration.

**Source:** Figure created by IOM’s Migration, Environment and Climate Change Division.
National policy developments

A 2018 mapping conducted under the Task Force on Displacement workplan highlights that national policies on migration on the one hand, and climate change on the other hand, increasingly consider environmental migration issues. Out of 66 countries and territories reviewed, 53 per cent made reference to climate change and environmental factors in their national migration and displacement frameworks. Out of 37 countries and territories having submitted national climate change adaptation policies, plans or strategies, 81 per cent referred to human mobility.

Different dimensions of human mobility are touched upon (migration, displacement and planned relocation), through a variety of thematic lenses (such as security, urbanization, labour, adaptation and health). This demonstrates an increased level of integration of the environment-migration nexus in national policies, in line with the greater awareness witnessed at the global level. However, gaps remain in terms of national policy coherence, although efforts are made to create synergies between climate/environmental and human mobility communities.

The full report is available at https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/iom-pdd-task-force-displacement-stakeholder-meeting

33 IOM, 2018.
Chapter 10

Appendix A. Different crisis situations, different impacts on migrants

Main sources

### Chapter 11

Appendix A. Timeline of main multilateral initiatives, processes, agreements and declarations devoted or relevant to migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Launch of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Creation of the Central American Commission of Migration Directors (Comisión Centroamericana de Directores de Migración (OCAM))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Launch of the Budapest Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1994 | Cairo International Conference on Population and Development  
Start of negotiations on Mode 4 on the movement of natural persons of the General Agreement on Trade in Services during the Uruguay Round |
| 1996 | Launch of the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM or Puebla Process)  
Launch of the Inter-governmental Asia–Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants (APC)  
Launch of the Pacific Immigration Directors’ Conference (PIDC)  
Inclusion of Mode 4 commitments (on the movement of natural persons) under the Third Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) |
| 1998 | Launch of the International Migration Policy Programme |
| 2000 | Launch of The Hague Process on Refugees and Migration  
Launch of the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA)  
Launch of the South American Conference on Migration (SACM)/Lima Process  
Adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (Millennium Development Goals) |

34 As the focus of this timeline is on migration generally, it does not encompass – and is without prejudice to – other more specific initiatives, including initiatives relating to refugees per se, such as those of UNHCR or the Commonwealth of Independent States Conference (1996–2005).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2001 | Creation of the Berne Initiative  
Launch of the IOM International Dialogue on Migration (IDM)  
World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (Durban Conference I)  
Launch of the Cross-Border Co-operation Process (Söderköping Process)  
Launch of the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA) Process |
| 2002 | Launch of the Coordination Meeting on International Migration, United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs  
Launch of the Regional Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western Mediterranean (5+5 Dialogue)  
Launch of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime  
Delivery of the Migration Working Group’s Report to the Secretary-General (Doyle Report) |
| 2003 | Establishment of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)  
Establishment of the Geneva Migration Group  
Launch of the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue (MTM)  
Launch of the Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia (Colombo Process)  
Launch of the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) |
| 2004 | Adoption of the non-binding ILO Report VII Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global Economy, International Labour Conference  
Adoption of the non-binding Berne Initiative International Agenda for Migration Management |
| 2006 | Establishment of the Global Migration Group (GMG, formerly the Geneva Migration Group)  
First High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2006 HLD)  
Appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration and Development by the United Nations Secretary-General  
Launch of the Euro–African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process)  
Adoption of the non-binding ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration |
<p>| 2007 | Launch of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2008 | Launch of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development – Regional Consultative Process on Migration (IGAD-RCP)  
Launch of the Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia (Abu Dhabi Dialogue) |
| 2009 | Durban Review Conference |
| 2011 | Launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Panel on Migration and Asylum (incorporating the Söderköping Process)  
Adoption of the Istanbul Declaration and Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries, Fourth United Nations Conference of the Least Developed Countries |
| 2012 | United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20)  
Launch of the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement  
Launch of the Migration Dialogue for Central African States (MIDCAS)  
Adoption of the non-binding IOM Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF) |
| 2013 | Second High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (2013 HLD)  
Launch of the Almaty Process on Refugee Protection and International Migration  
Launch of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) RCP – MIDCOM |
| 2014 | Launch of the Migrants in Countries in Crisis (MICIC) Initiative  
Launch of the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development  
Adoption of the non-binding report Fair Migration: Setting an ILO Agenda, International Labour Conference  
Adoption of the non-binding SIDS Accelerated Modalities of Action Pathway (SAMOA Pathway) |
| 2015 | Launch of the Intra-Regional Forum on Migration in Africa (IRFMA or Pan-African Forum)  
Launch of the Arab Regional Consultative Process (ARCP)  
Adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development  
Adoption by the IOM Council of the Migration Governance Framework  
Adoption of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development  
Adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction  
Adoption of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change  
Adoption of the non-binding Nansen Initiative’s Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2016 | World Humanitarian Summit and launch of the Grand Bargain  
Adoption of the *New Urban Agenda*, United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Development (Habitat III)  
Adoption of the non-binding MICIC Initiative’s Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disasters  
Adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants by the United Nations Summit on Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants |
| 2017 | Informal consultations (April–November) and stocktaking phase (December) of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration  
Thematic consultations (January–December), NGO consultations (June) and stocktaking phase (December) of the Global Compact on Refugees |
| 2018 | Launch of the United Nations Network on Migration (successor to the Global Migration Group)  
Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration  
Endorsement of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration by the United Nations General Assembly  
Endorsement of the Global Compact on Refugees by the United Nations General Assembly |

*Source: Bauloz, 2017 (updated).*
Appendix B. Convergence and divergence between the Global Compact for Migration and prior global migration initiatives and processes

The Global Compact for Migration builds on previous global migration initiatives and processes, including on thematic areas upon which these initiatives were already converging prior to the Compact. These areas of convergence are reproduced in the table below along three main thematic clusters: (a) minimizing the negative aspects of migration by addressing the drivers and consequences of displacement and irregular migration; (b) acknowledging and strengthening the positive effects of migration; and (c) protecting migrants’ rights and ensuring their well-being.

The Global Compact for Migration also confirms thematic trends that have emerged through the years raising new migratory and policy challenges, such as environmental migration and the focus on sustainable development, as outlined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (see table below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of convergence</th>
<th>Minimizing the negative aspects of migration</th>
<th>Areas of convergence</th>
<th>Strengthening the positive effects of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Tackling the drivers of forced and irregular migration: poverty, human rights violations and armed conflicts</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Improving money transfers and lowering remittances fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Addressing irregular migration through effective border control policies</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensuring fair recruitment practices, including reducing recruitment agencies’ fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperating in preventing and combatting human trafficking and smuggling</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Facilitating voluntary return and reintegration of migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ratifying and implementing the Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Protocols</td>
<td>For countries of origin</td>
<td>• Improving transfers of knowledge and skills of highly skilled and other migrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Encouraging and creating opportunities for diaspora engagement in development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For host countries</td>
<td>• Capitalizing on (temporary) labour migration to meet labour market’s needs</td>
<td></td>
<td>For countries of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Attracting skilled migrant workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Capitalizing on the skills and entrepreneurship of the diaspora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capitalizing on the skills and entrepreneurship of the diaspora</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Interrelationship between migration and trade (Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Interrelationship between migration and trade (Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Areas of convergence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengthening the positive effects of migration</th>
<th>In general</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Integrating migration issues into development planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Need for more evidence-based research on the interrelationship between migration and development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improving partnerships for managing labour migration, including with the private sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protecting migrants’ rights and ensuring their well-being</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Combating discrimination, racism and xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Securing migrants workers’ rights and labour standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Protecting migrants from abuses, exploitation and human trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ratifying and implementing core international human rights treaties, ILO conventions and instruments on human trafficking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Treating women and girls, children and victims of human trafficking as migrants in vulnerable situations requiring special protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integrating (long-term) migrants in society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Thematic trends

- Environmental drivers of migration (for example, natural disasters, man-made catastrophes and environmental degradation)
- From development to sustainable development and the role of migration
- From brain drain to temporary and/or circular migration
- Stranded migrants as migration in a vulnerable situation

### Key tension points

- Recommendation for opening up more legal avenues for migration
- Consideration of low-skilled labour migration outside temporary migration policies
- Ratification and implementation of the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Member of Their Families

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**Source:** Bauloz, 2017. This summary was made on the basis of a comparative thematic mapping of the following nine migration initiatives and processes: the Berne Initiative; the annual meetings of the International Dialogue on Migration; the 2002 Doyle Report; the Global Commission on International Migration established in 2003; the Global Migration Group; the 2006 and 2013 First and Second High-level Dialogues on International Migration and Development; the Global Forum on Migration and Development; and the 2016 United Nations Summit for Refugees and Migrants.

However, if the Global Compact for Migration covers issues that were already ranking high on the global migration governance agenda before the adoption of the Compact, it also goes beyond previous endeavours by:

- Placing more emphasis on some specific thematic areas, including on:
  - Collecting and utilizing accurate and disaggregated data (Objective 1) to “foster […] research, guide[…] coherent and evidence-based policy-making and well-informed public discourse […]” and facilitate the effective monitoring and evaluation of the Compact’s commitments.
- Enhancing the availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration (Objective 5), especially through labour migration and skills matching at all skills levels, in addition to family reunification and academic mobility. Regular avenues are also considered for migrants compelled to leave because of sudden-onset natural disasters and other precarious situations by providing, for instance, humanitarian visas, private sponsorships, access to education for children and temporary work permits. It provides as well for planned relocation and visa options in the specific cases of slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation.

- Addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration (Objective 7), covering a broad illustrative list of migrants in a situation of vulnerability, regardless of migration status.

- Introducing one thematic area which was not covered in previous global migration initiatives:
  - Saving lives and establishing coordinated international efforts on missing migrants (Objective 8), nevertheless already reflected in the 2016 New York Declaration.

While these developments constitute steps forward in global migration governance, some Global Compact for Migration objectives, commitments and actions appear not to be as far-reaching as one would have expected. If one compares the final text of the Global Compact for Migration with its first draft, some issues seem to have been more delicate during States’ negotiations. This is, for instance, the case of the detention of migrant children. The first draft referred in categorical terms to “ending the practice of child detention in the context of international migration”, while States have only committed to “working to end the practice of child detention” in the final text of the Compact. Similarly, two specific issues have not been included in the final text of the Compact:

The non-criminalization of irregular migration: Instead, the Global Compact for Migration provides for potential sanctions to address irregular entry or stay without expressly prohibiting criminal ones, except for smuggled and trafficked migrants.

The regularization of undocumented migrants: Regularization is only indirectly envisaged by “facilitat[ing] access for migrants in an irregular status to an individual assessment that may lead to regular status, on a case by case basis and with clear and transparent criteria”.

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36 UNGA, 2018a.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 UNGA, 2016.
41 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018a.
42 Ibid., para 27(g).
43 UNGA, 2018a, para. 29(h).
44 UNGA, 2018a: Objective 11, para. 27(f). These sanctions nonetheless have to be “proportionate, equitable, non-discriminatory, and fully consistent with due process and other obligations under international law”.
45 Ibid. This contrasts with the more straightforward commitment applying to both refugees and migrants in the New York Declaration (UNGA, 2016).
46 UNGA, 2018a: Objective 7, para. 23(i), contrasting with the express reference to regularization made in the Global Compact for Migration zero draft, (Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 2018a: para. 30(g)) on “[f]acilitat[ing] access to regularization options as a means to promote migrants’ integration […]”. See also UNGA, 2016., Annex II, para. 8(p).
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