Migration is a constant and dynamic phenomenon increasingly requiring diversified policy intervention in order to maximize its potential benefits and minimize related costs for both countries of origin and destination as well as migrants themselves. Better knowledge and enhanced capacities in different policy areas are essential to ensure the protection of migrants, the facilitation of legal migration, the integration of migrants into the country of destination, the support for sustainable voluntary return and the greater interlinking between migration and development.

The challenge remains in translating improved understandings into policy and practice on the ground. State capacities around the world for managing migration are limited. Legal frameworks may need to be updated or overhauled to focus on new areas of migration, or to handle new influxes or outflows of migrants; staff working on the front line may need equipment, training and support; civil society and migrants themselves may not be adequately integrated into the process of data-gathering and making and implementing policy; vulnerability factors and health risks inherent to the migration process need to be better understood and addressed.

International migration is likely to transform in scale, reach and complexity, due to growing demographic disparities, the effects of environmental change, new global political and economic dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks. These transformations will be associated with increasing opportunities, exacerbate existing problems and generate new challenges.

The World Migration Report 2010 provides a tool for self-evaluation in terms of future scenarios, and demonstrates the need for a far more comprehensive approach to capacity-building for migration than has typically been adopted. The aim is not to prescribe ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies and practices, but to suggest objectives of migration management policies in each area, to stimulate thinking and provide examples of what States and other actors can do.

Part A of the report focuses on identifying core capacities in key areas of migration management, raising key concepts and outlining important examples of existing practices in these areas. Part B provides an overview of migration in the world today, from both the global perspective and through six regional chapters, drawn from the most up-to-date data.
This volume is the fruit of a collaborative effort by a team of contributing authors and the Editorial Team under the direction of the Editors-in-Chief. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of IOM or its Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

Unless otherwise stated, this volume does not refer to events occurring after August 2010.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.
# IOM Editorial Team

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A complete list of the seminars and related information can be found online at: http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/world-migration-report-2010/interagency-seminar-series

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- “The Future of European Migration: Policy Options for the European Union and its Member States” by Rainer Münz and Elizabeth Collett
- “Building Capacity to Manage Labour Mobility in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries” by Mohamed Dito
- “Building State Capacities for Managing Contract Worker Mobility: The Asia – GCC Context” by Nasra Shah
- “The Future of Migration Policies in the Caribbean” by Elizabeth Thomas-Hope

Migration Governance and Irregular Migration
- “Migration Governance: Alternative Futures” by Alexander Betts
- “Irregular Migration and Mixed Flows” by Ryszard Cholewinski
- “The Global Economic Crisis and Governance of Human Mobility: Can We Turn the Current Crisis Into a New Global Opportunity for the Future?” by Bimal Gosh
- “The Future of Migration Governance and Regional Consultative Processes” by Jobst Koehler and Randall Hansen
- “The Future of Labour Migration Costs” by Philip Martin

Migration and its Linkages with Employment, Health, Integration and Development
- “The Future of Diaspora Policy” by Dovelyn Agunias
- “The Future of Integration Policy” by Thomas Huddleston
- “Family Migration Issues in North-East Asia” by Hye-Kyung Lee
- “Future Capacity Needs in Managing the Health Aspects of Migration” by Greg Irving and Davide Mosca
- “The Future of Health Worker Migration” by Binod Khadria

Climate Change and Environmental Degradation: Migration as an Adaptation Strategy
- “Climate Change and International Migration” by Susan Martin
LIST OF WMR 2010 INTER-AGENCY SEMINARS

http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/migration-research/world-migration-report-2010/interagency-seminar-series

- “Approaches and Capacity Needs in Managing the Health Aspects of Migration” by Greg Irving, Health Programme Officer of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Regional Mission for East & Central Africa.


- “The Impacts of Remittances on Poverty: Some Lessons from Asia and South Pacific” by Richard Brown, Associate Professor at the School of Economics, University of Queensland.

- “The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where Do We Go from Here?” by Bimal Ghosh, Emeritus Professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Public Administration.

- “Development on the Move: The Place of Migration in Future Development Strategies” by Laura Chappell, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR).

- “The Role of Local and Regional Authorities in Migration Management” by Nadan Petrovic, along with Prof. Luigi Melica and Nuria Díaz Sacristán.

- “Global Migration Futures Project” by Carlos Varga-Silva, International Migration Institute (IMI).

- “The Role of Migrant Care Workers in Ageing Societies” by Lindsay Lowell, Director of Policy Studies, Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University.

- “Connecting the Dots: A Fresh Look at Managing International Migration” by Sergio Marchi, Special Advisor to the Secretary General, International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC).


- “A Public Goods Approach to Managing Migration” by James F. Hollifield, Director of the Tower Center for Political Studies, SMU.

Prof. Bimal Ghosh, Emeritus Professor at the Columbia Graduate School of Public Administration; former Senior UN Director; and Ambassador Sergio Marchi, Senior Fellow at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD); former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration of Canada on “Migration governance: towards a global integrated migration regime?” - 06/2010.

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Dr. Howard Duncan, Executive Director of Metropolis, Citizenship and Immigration Canada; and Prof. Michael Keith, Director of the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford; former member of the UK Government’s Commission on Integration and Cohesion on “Integration and rights of migrants: policy priorities and directions for new capacity building measures” - 03/2010.

Theodoros Skylakakis, Member of the European Parliament; former Special Representative for Climate Change of Greece on “Climate change and migration: impacts and policy responses” - 02/2010.
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World Migration 2010: The Future of Migration: Building Capacities for Change, is the fifth report in IOM’s WMR series. This year’s report focuses on the future of migration and the capacities that will be required by States, regional and international organizations, civil society and the private sector to manage migration successfully over the coming decades.

Ten years ago when we published our first World Migration Report 2000 there were 150 million migrants. Now, the number of migrants has grown to 214 million, and the figure could rise to 405 million by 2050, as a result of growing demographic disparities, the effects of environmental change, new global political and economic dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks.

In response to these trends, many States are likely to need to invest in developing their migration management capacities. Already, many States report that they require assistance to develop the capabilities to respond to a diverse range of new migration challenges. Capacity-building does not necessarily imply an increase in public spending and resources; it can also refer to the elimination of outdated, inappropriate or inefficient systems, laws or policies.

Recognizing that migration is a constant but dynamic phenomenon, the World Migration Report 2010 argues that it is essential for States to be able to develop the comprehensive knowledge and efficient, flexible institutions that they will need to promote and implement humane and orderly policies for the movement of people, now and in the future.

Part A of the World Migration Report 2010 focuses on identifying core capacities in key areas of migration management. The aim is not to prescribe ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies and practices, but to suggest objectives of migration management policies in each area, to stimulate thinking and provide examples of what States and other actors can do.

Part B of the World Migration Report 2010 draws on the most up-to-date data to provide overviews of global and regional migration and remittances trends. In recognition of the importance of the largest global economic recession since the 1930s, this section has a particular focus on the effects of this crisis on migrants, migration and remittances.

As with previous World Migration Reports, the World Migration Report 2010 distils the conceptual and practical expertise and experience of IOM colleagues throughout the world, through consultation sessions and an external advisory board that includes the staff of other agencies, external scholars, and government practitioners. I thank them all for their support, and hope that the result will be useful in providing guidance on how migration can be managed in the future for the benefit of all.

William Lacy Swing
Director General
building capacities for change
Over the next few decades, international migration is likely to transform in scale, reach and complexity, due to growing demographic disparities, the effects of environmental change, new global political and economic dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks. These transformations will be associated with increasing opportunities – from economic growth and poverty reduction, to social and cultural innovation. However, they will also exacerbate existing problems and generate new challenges – from irregular migration, to protecting the human rights of migrants. Most States in the world (and not just in the developing world) lack the capacity to effectively manage the international mobility of persons today, not to mention respond to new dynamics. This report is intended to help States, regional and international organizations, civil society and the private sector to prepare for future opportunities and challenges in migration and build capacities for change. It provides a tool for self-evaluation in terms of future scenarios. It also demonstrates the need for a far more comprehensive approach to capacity-building for migration than has typically been adopted.

There are far more international migrants in the world today than ever previously recorded, and their number has increased rapidly in the last few decades, if not their percentage of world population (which has remained relatively stable) – Immigrant growth rates during the last five years are illustrated in map 1. If the migrant population continues to increase at the same pace as the last 20 years, the stock of international migrants worldwide by 2050 could be as high as 405 million. International migration involves a wider diversity of ethnic and cultural groups than ever before; significantly more women are migrating today on their own or as heads of households (for regional differences in female migrants as a percentage of the stock of international migrants, see map 2); the number of people living and working abroad with irregular status continues to rise; and there has been a significant growth in temporary migration and circulation. The key recent global and regional trends in international migration are presented in more detail in the overviews appended to this report, which mainly focus on international migration, while acknowledging that there are far more internal migrants than international migrants worldwide.

The global economic crisis has slowed emigration in many parts of the world, although it does not appear to have stimulated substantial return migration (see the regional overviews in part B of this report, regarding the impact of the global economic crisis on international migration trends). With economic recovery and job growth, most experts expect this slowdown to be temporary. Indeed, the scale of migration may well soon exceed prior levels, as the underlying dynamics of migration have not disappeared, and also as a
result of emerging structural features in the global economy. One such factor is the rapid growth in the labour force in less developed countries compared to that in the more developed countries: the labour force in more developed countries is projected to remain at about 600 million until 2050, while the labour force in less developed countries is expected to increase from 2.4 billion in 2005 to 3 billion in 2020 and 3.6 billion in 2040. At the same time, employment is expected to stagnate in certain parts of the developing world, prompting widening differences in economic opportunities between less developed and more developed countries – at least until 2030. The demand for migrant labour is likely to increase in the developed world, for various reasons – including as a response to the social and economic consequences of ageing populations (see map 3 – illustrating population changes in European countries) – and to attract students and highly skilled migrants. Just as the momentum associated with migration networks is expected to increase as these networks extend in scale and reach, migration agents are predicted to become increasingly influential in international migration, further generating the so-called migration industry. While the relationship between environmental change and migration is complex and remains unpredictable, the number of migrants, especially in the less developed world, is expected to increase significantly as a result of environmental changes.

Carefully managed migration can be a powerful force for economic growth and innovation in destination countries, and poverty reduction and development in poorer origin countries, as well as provide important human freedom and human development outcomes for migrants and their families. At the same time, the growing pressure to migrate, whether for economic enhancement or to avoid or escape the effects of environmental change, far outstrips the availability of legal opportunities to do so and therefore will continue to test the ability of States to manage their borders and address the complexities of irregular migration. More effective systems will be required to match supply and demand in the labour market. Growing numbers of migrants, from increasingly diverse backgrounds, can increase diversity and cultural innovation but will also make the development of effective integration policies more challenging. Indeed, in all countries of migration, dedicated attention to managing social change associated with migration will be required. Protecting the human rights of migrants will become an even more pressing priority, while the question of the rights of irregular migrants and how to protect them will become increasingly acute. New forms of migration – for example, the crossing of international borders as a result of the effects of environmental change – will necessitate a reflection on and possible reconsideration of existing legal and normative frameworks.

The future of international migration, together with its opportunities and challenges, is the subject of a growing body of research and literature. This report is intended to complement and advance these and other recent initiatives by focusing the spotlight on the capacities that are and will be needed to manage the movement of people. It is divided into two main parts. The first part focuses on capacity-building for the future of migration. The second part provides an overview of the latest regional trends in international migration, focusing particularly on the impact of the global economic crisis.

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1 UN DESA (2009).
2 ILO (2009).
3 OECD (2009).
4 Khadria (2010).
5 Martin, P. (2010).
6 UNDP (2009).
7 OECD (2009).
8 UN DESA (2009).
10 Protecting the human rights of international migrants will become an even more pressing priority, while the question of the rights of irregular migrants and how to protect them will become increasingly acute. New forms of migration – for example, the crossing of international borders as a result of the effects of environmental change – will necessitate a reflection on and possible reconsideration of existing legal and normative frameworks.
11 In 2009, the OECD published The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries, assessing ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors for international migration to the OECD States over the next 50 years and developing a series of likely scenarios. The University of Oxford is currently assessing future global and regional migration trends and their effects on countries of origin – mainly in Africa, Asia and the Middle East – and on countries of destination in Europe. The European Policy Centre has established a Reflection Group to identify and formulate responses to key challenges and developments facing the European Union between now and 2030, including the management of migration flows and migrant integration. The most recent UNDP Human Development Report (2009) focused on human mobility and how to enhance human development outcomes in the future. From the developing world, the Jawaharlal Nehru University’s International Migration and Diaspora Studies (IMDS) Project has launched the India Migration Report, the inaugural issue of which made projections about India’s ‘demographic dividend’ helping to meet the global demand for workers by 2020.
Overall, like the *World Migration Reports* that have preceded it, this report is intended to contribute to the realization of the mandate of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and societies. IOM works together with its partners in the international community to uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants; encourage social and economic development through migration; assist in meeting the growing operational challenges of migration management; and advance understanding of migration issues. Specifically, recognizing that migration is an integral feature of the world today, this report aims to promote a focus on building capacities to enable States and other stakeholders to respond to, and plan for, migration effectively and in a sustainable way. In this report, this aim is achieved in three ways. First, an ‘inventory’ of capacities required for coping with likely changes and challenges in international migration will be developed, distinguishing and highlighting core capacity requirements. This is intended as a working ‘checklist’ for States and other stakeholders in preparing for change. Second, and drawing on IOM’s extensive and global Field presence and partnerships, the report presents a selective review of existing activities, to help identify effective practice for capacity-building as well as gaps and weaknesses. Third, the report identifies a series of recommendations to States, civil society and international organizations, for building capacities for change.

After defining capacity-building, the report focuses on six main areas of international migration where change is expected to yield particular capacity challenges: labour mobility, irregular migration, migration and development, integration, environmental change, and migration governance.
The term ‘capacity-building’ is often used by donors and international organizations in a narrow sense – for example, to refer to staff development through formal education and training programmes to redress the lack of qualified personnel in a project in the short term.\(^\text{13}\) Even where the concept is understood more broadly, there are competing definitions (for example, those provided by UNDP and the UN General Assembly), and further confusion is added where the concept ‘capacity development’ is used, although normally capacity development refers to a process of change driven internally – for example, by and within institutions or governments – rather than the external support typically implied by capacity-building. Given its currency among most governments and international organizations in the international migration context, this report uses the term ‘capacity-building’, which it defines as:

the process of strengthening the knowledge, abilities, skills, resources, structures and processes that States and institutions need in order to achieve their goals effectively and sustainably, and to adapt to change.

As understood in this report, capacity-building does not necessarily mean the creation of new processes or systems. It can also refer to the elimination of outdated, inappropriate or inefficient systems; enhancing the efficacy or cost-effectiveness of existing systems; strengthening existing systems; and transferring lessons from other national contexts and settings.\(^\text{14}\) Budgets alone are an imperfect measure of capacity. Spending more money does not necessarily result in a higher-quality outcome. For many States and institutions, technical know-how – the operational knowledge and skills needed to pursue goals effectively – presents a greater challenge than lack of financial resources. At the same time, this report acknowledges that even a comprehensive approach to capacity-building is only a first step. Capacity-building needs to be followed by implementation, enforcement, monitoring and evaluation.

In the migration context, capacity-building is normally understood to include the following key components:\(^\text{15}\) more timely and accurate migration and labour market data; assistance in defining national migration policy goals and priorities; training of migration officials; development of an effective and equitable legal framework; coherent administrative structures; consultation mechanisms between government and other national stakeholders; and international cooperation. The African Capacity Building Centre is a good example of an initiative that addresses many of these various aspects of migration capacity-building (see textbox 1). The overall goal of migration capacity-building, as recommended in this report, is to facilitate the development of humane and orderly policies for the movement of people.

\(^\text{13}\) OECD (2006).
\(^\text{14}\) Lavergne et al. (2004).
\(^\text{15}\) GCIM (2005).
The African Capacity-building Centre (ACBC) in Moshi, the United Republic of Tanzania, was created in 2009 to (a) promote international understanding of migrants and migration issues; (b) promote sound migration governance in Africa; (c) develop, institutionalize and deliver on-site and off-site migration management training programmes; and (d) build the migration management capacity of African States.

In order to achieve its objectives, the ACBC conducts the following range of activities:

- provides technical expertise to requesting African States to identify and respond to key migration challenges in areas such as migration and border management, migration policy, and legislative, administrative and operational reform;
- analyses and identifies training needs and training priorities of African States in the area of migration, in consultation with those governments and the respective IOM Field Offices;
- engages in research initiatives and networking in an effort to provide reliable, timely and up-to-date information on migration issues affecting the continent;
- compiles, collates and disseminates Africa-specific migration information.

ACBC focuses primarily on the development, coordination and delivery of customized, needs-targeted migration and identity management training. However, ACBC also provides assistance and training in other areas, such as human rights and detention, counter-trafficking and victim counselling, labour migration, migration and health, and plans to further broaden these activities in the future.

ACBC has different resources at its disposal for multi-country training courses in migration and border management for migration officials from all over Africa aimed at the facilitation of migration, passenger processing and mobility. For example, the Documents: The Developer’s Toolkit, for instance, helps governments redesign and produce identity documents; the Passport Examination Procedure Manual provides a useful tool for detecting document fraud; and the Essentials of Migration Practice – Level 1 aims to satisfy the learning requirements of immigration recruits. ACBC also assists in the implementation of a Personal Implementation Registration System (PIRS).


Besides distinguishing it from current initiatives on the future of international migration, this report focuses on capacity-building for several key reasons. First, and fundamentally, it is good governance to plan for the future, especially during a period of economic downturn when the tendency is to focus on immediate impacts and the short-term period of recovery. Second, capacity-building is widely acknowledged to be an essential component of effective migration management and, indeed, is a core element of IOM’s mandate to “...help ensure the orderly and humane management of migration, to promote international cooperation on migration issues, to assist in the search for practical solutions to migration problems, and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need.”

Third, a concrete focus on specific activities also helps avoid the speculation that is rife in debates about the future of migration (especially in the context of environmental change), and that can be detrimental to policymaking by failing to deliver clear evidence or consensus. Even if there were to be no dramatic changes in the dimensions or dynamics of international migration, in most countries – and not just the developing world – capacity-building is required simply to address current challenges. A focus on capacity-building also allows for an incremental approach, recognizing differences in capacity requirements among States and other stakeholders, and the need for policy to identify priorities.

Capacity-building is a growth area in the field of migration policy development, partly because it is widely accepted that international migration cannot be managed on a unilateral basis. Through IOM, donors contribute some USD 100 million per year to capacity-building initiatives, which includes preparing for future challenges, especially in the field of integrated border management and the fight against human trafficking. In 2009, IOM’s Technical Cooperation Division alone oversaw nearly 100 projects worldwide. The European Commission (EC) also funds a growing number of major capacity-building initiatives – for example, the Migration: EU Expertise (MIEUX) programme aimed at developing the capacities of origin and transit countries to respond to irregular migration and mixed flows. The International Labour Organization (ILO) contributes to capacity-building on labour migration through a number of technical cooperation programmes and through its International Training Centre in Turin, Italy. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) works on developing capacities for statistical systems in international migration. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) works with governments, other United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to meet the emergency reproductive health needs of migrants and provide reproductive health services and counselling for victims of trafficking, as well as technical assistance, training and support to governments and other agencies for the development of policies and legal frameworks to combat the problem. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) works with governments to develop capacities to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) provides training, facilitates dialogue, and encourages partnerships to strengthen capacity in the field of international migration. The World Bank’s Capacity Development Resource Centre (CDRC) works on migration issues ranging from the ‘brain drain’ to engaging diasporas.

One of the headline messages of this report is that, in preparing for future challenges, a far more comprehensive and coherent approach to capacity-building is required. Capacity-building assistance for migration often tends to be narrowly focused on a limited number of policy areas, which may reflect donor and destination country priorities rather than those of origin or transit countries. Existing initiatives are geographically uneven, focusing on particular countries or subregions. They also tend to be focused more on specific issues – in particular, border management, counter-trafficking, return migration and reintegration. Few capacity-building initiatives aim to develop comprehensive national strategies. Many are also short-term.

In recent years, migration has come to be recognized as an integral and essential feature of modern life and of an increasingly integrated global economy, holding tremendous development potential for individuals as well as societies of origin and destination. This recognition, however, has not yet been matched by sufficient investment in developing or strengthening the tools needed to realize the positive potential of migration while minimizing potential negative consequences in a holistic, balanced and comprehensive way.

The main focus for this report is building capacities for change at the State level and, at times, distinctions are made between different capacity requirements in origin, transit and destination countries for migrants, equally recognizing that most States in the world today are, to some extent, all three. Another feature of contemporary international migration that needs to be acknowledged from the outset, however, is the proliferation of stakeholders – or actors – involved in migration policy, besides the State. Indeed, a critical component of State capacity is the ability to cooperate and consult with other stakeholders. Within government, important new actors include local governments, especially in urban areas, where international migrants are increasingly concentrated. Intergovernmental forums, such as regional consultative processes (RCPs) on migration, are also increasingly active in certain aspects of migration policy. Outside government, relevant stakeholders include civil society (including migrant associations, the media and academia), the corporate sector (for example, employers, unions and
recruiters), international organizations, and national and international NGOs. This report also therefore includes examples of, and recommendations for, capacity-building among this range of additional stakeholders in migration policy.

In adopting a global perspective, this report acknowledges that there are enormous divergences in existing capacities – for example, between some developing and developed countries. But it does not advocate a standardization of capacities across all States, since a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach is not appropriate for the different migration realities of different countries around the world. Instead, it focuses on addressing the gap between existing capacities in individual States or among particular stakeholders, and the capacities that will be required to meet the challenges they will face in the future. There may be States that have modest, yet adequate, levels of capacity and that are unlikely to be significantly affected by new migration trends, making further capacity-building a low priority. Conversely, there may be States with very advanced migration capacities, where significant capacity-building will nevertheless be required because of the anticipated impact of migration changes. In other words, this report is not intended to be prescriptive. By distinguishing core capacities, it is intended to provide a tool that allows States and other stakeholders to assess their own capacities for dealing with future scenarios.
3. LABOUR MOBILITY

After a temporary dip during the global economic crisis, labour mobility is expected to resume worldwide and even to exceed prior levels. It has been predicted that new patterns of mobility may be observed – in particular, as the emerging economies of Asia become even more important countries of destination for labour migrants.\(^{17}\) Emerging countries of destination will need to develop new capacities to cope with new labour migration. At the same time, more traditional countries of destination may also need to strengthen existing capacities to cope with changes in labour mobility. Changing patterns will also affect origin countries. Particular challenges that have been identified in the coming years for the Pacific Islands, for example, include coping with rising emigration and even depopulation; adjusting to the loss of human resources; and how to compete effectively with other origin countries in establishing seasonal temporary labour migration programmes.\(^{18}\) It has been suggested that the economic downturn provides a window of opportunity for reforming labour migration policies and instituting new approaches before the demand for labour resumes.\(^{19}\)

One of the primary policy challenges confronting labour mobility is how to match the supply of, and demand for, labour at a regional and global level. The combined effects of factors such as ‘youth bulges’, structural unemployment, agricultural intensification and industrial restructuring are likely to lead to a growing labour surplus in many developing countries, and demands for greater access to labour markets in the developed world and emerging economies. While demand for migrant labour is likely to grow across much of the developed world in the short term (for example, in response to the effects of the ‘demographic crisis’), as well as in emerging economies, it will not be at a sufficient level to meet supply. Furthermore, legal opportunities for migrant labour are likely to be selective, focusing primarily on migrants with skills in short supply in destination countries (for example, in health care), and on highly skilled migrants and students, although low-skilled migrants will still be required.\(^{20}\) Indeed, there is a persistent mismatch between policy and reality in this regard. Real demand exists at both high- and low-skilled levels for migrant labour but, in the absence of adequate legal channels for migration, this demand is met, in many instances, through irregular migration or employment, reflecting the continuing dependency of economies in many parts of the developed world on cheap, unprotected migrant labour. In addition, alternative or complementary strategies, such as increasing the capital- or technology-intensity of production, relocating to countries where labour costs are lower, increasing the working hours of currently employed workers, recruiting inactive workers, and switching to less labour-intensive services, are all trends

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\(^{17}\) Hugo (2010).
\(^{18}\) UNESCAP (2008).
\(^{19}\) WEF (2010).
\(^{20}\) IOM (2008).
that may limit or eventually reduce the demand for migrant labour in some developed countries and emerging economies.

The anticipated accentuation of the global mismatch of labour supply and demand places pressures on destination and origin countries to develop the capacity to effectively assess foreign labour demand while protecting the domestic labour force, regulate admissions, and ensure migrant workers’ rights. It will increase the need to train migrants, strengthen and implement bilateral or other labour mobility agreements, and develop capacities for return and reintegration. Regimes for the free movement of labour, furthermore, may make it more difficult for policymakers to manage migration through migration levers. The mismatch may result in an increase in irregular migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, and mixed flows. The capacities required to more effectively respond to these challenges are discussed in section 4.

While some of the capacity requirements implied by these changes lie outside the immediate realm of migration policymaking (for example, relating to school-to-work transitions and employment promotion within the domestic labour force), they also have direct implications for building capacity for migration. Effective capacities may be required in the following ten core areas:

1. determining policy goals;
2. assessing labour markets from the migration perspective;
3. regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers;
4. determining conditions attached to employment permits;
5. training of migrant workers and placement services;
6. protecting migrant workers’ rights;
7. reducing labour migration costs;
8. strengthening and implementing bilateral or other labour mobility agreements;
9. returning migrants and their reintegration;
10. implementation.

### 3.1 Determining policy goals

An initial decision to be made by policymakers in States confronting new or changing demands for foreign labour is what the main policy goal for labour migration programmes is, as this will influence what type of policy approach is most appropriate and, in turn, what capacities are required. Usually, the primary goal is to alleviate labour shortages. Additional policy objectives, however, may include the reduction of irregular migration, which is a major policy objective in many bilateral recruitment agreements, such as those struck by Spain and the Republic of Korea. Some programmes, such as the working holidaymaker schemes in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, are also intended to promote special post-colonial or political relationships and cultural ties and exchanges. Another goal may be to protect native workers through restricting migration into segmented labour markets, as is the case for low-skilled non-farm labour migration programmes in the United States of America (USA). Circular migration programmes have an additional objective promoting development in origin countries. The Netherlands is among a number of European Union (EU) countries currently establishing pilot programmes for circular migration. From a country of origin perspective, the primary goal might include the protection of rights of nationals working abroad and the enhancement of the benefits from the migration process for national development (see textbox 2 on the National Labour Migration Policy formulated in Sri Lanka).

A second decision to be made at an early stage concerns whether to prioritize temporary labour migration or migration channels that lead to a secure residence status or permanent settlement. As a generalization, traditional countries of immigration such as Australia, Canada and the USA have determined that an element of permanent immigration is required to ensure economic growth and to sustain basic welfare provisions. Most European countries, however, still emphasize facilitation of temporary labour migration, although, in certain European countries, such as the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, policies are being developed to facilitate the acquisition of permanent residence status by migrant workers. The effects of the demographic crisis in Europe may require a shift towards more permanent immigration in the coming years.

Temporary migration programmes can have considerable benefits for destination countries
commitments from origin countries that may not have the institutional capacity to fulfil the commitment. Too many restrictions on migrant workers may drive them underground. Temporary migration programmes can contribute to irregular migration if migrants overstay their temporary visas and there are socio-economic costs for migrant workers, particularly as a result of family separation and lack of access to social security benefits.

Textbox 2: Formulation of the National Labour Migration Policy for Sri Lanka: Process and outcome

The ILO assisted the Government of Sri Lanka in the formulation of a National Labour Migration Policy (NLMP), in response to a request by the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare (MFEPW).

The serious challenges relating to governance of labour migration and protection of migrant workers faced by Sri Lanka provided the backdrop to the formulation of the national policy. As reiterated in the National Policy for Decent Work in Sri Lanka, vulnerability of workers who migrate under risky and unsafe conditions is a major issue, despite all safeguards introduced. The concentration of labour migration in low-skilled categories dominated by female domestic workers, particularly to Gulf countries, had led to serious problems relating to protection, poor conditions of work, and resulting limited gains from migration.

The formulation of the national policy involved a wide range of stakeholders concerned with migration in Sri Lanka: ministries and government agencies (particularly the MFEPW, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, the Ministry of Labour and Manpower, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Health Care and Nutrition), social partners (employers’ and workers’ organizations), the recruitment industry, civil society, academics, concerned NGOs, and relevant international agencies (ILO, IOM, UNFPA and UNDP). A Tripartite Steering Committee was set up under the guidance of the Minister of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare, reflecting the above-mentioned groups. Thematic working groups steered the preparation of the national policy in three areas: governance and regulation of labour migration; protection of migrant workers; and promotion of the development contributions resulting from migration.

The main objectives of the new national labour migration policy are: developing a long-term vision for the role of labour migration in the economy, improved protection of the rights of migrant workers, and enhancing the benefits while minimizing the negative impacts of migration. The NLMP also contains an Action Plan for implementation of the policy elements.

The draft NLMP was validated at a national tripartite consultation in October 2008 and the Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare adopted the policy document and obtained the approval of the Cabinet of Sri Lanka in April 2009.

The key features of this process are: deep commitment of the responsible ministry to the process; its links to the national development strategy and the National Action Plan for Decent Work; ownership of policy development by local stakeholders, with the ILO acting as a facilitator only; a rights-based approach consistent with international norms; consideration of gender as a cross-cutting issue; and a clear action plan for implementation.


3.2 Assessing labour and skills shortages

The capacity to make an accurate and regular assessment of the demand for migrant workers in the labour market is a fundamental requirement for well-managed labour mobility – not just for destination countries, in selecting and admitting migrant workers, but also for origin countries (for example, in terms of providing appropriate training to potential migrants). Different capacity requirements call for different methods of assessing the need for foreign labour in a destination country or in particular regions or employment sectors. Establishing quotas and labour market testing are the two main methods used.22

Quotas set fixed numerical limits for the admission of labour into a country. They are usually set annually, often at a high level of government (as, for example, in the Republic of Korea), and are normally determined in consultation with social partners. The allocation of responsibility to a particular ministry or government agency, as well as the development of effective consultation mechanisms, has immediate capacity-building implications. Furthermore, there is no consensus on how to define and measure labour shortages. A variety of models exist, but the extent to which these might work in countries establishing new systems remains to be established. The British Government has created quarterly sector-based panels to compile updates from employers on the labour market situation. The Netherlands carries out employment projections, based on flows in and out of the labour market and on expectations of labour demand, to assess potential future shortages within occupations and sectors. In France, Germany and Spain, local authorities play an important part in identifying labour shortages. The Spanish Government also establishes fixed quotas after consultation with social partners and regional governments and authorities to identify shortage sectors in the labour market.23 In Kazakhstan, local authorities submit estimates of the required number of foreign work permits to the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection.

An advantage of establishing quotas is that they provide a clear reference framework on the admission of foreign labour for politicians, administrators, employers, civil society and the general public. Quotas can also serve important political objectives regarding the need for migrant labour and can help to alleviate public concerns regarding migrants. Quotas are usually adjusted every year in response to economic and political changes. Governments can also create subquotas – for example, according to sector (as in the United Kingdom), occupation (as in Italy), receiving region (as in Australia), and firm size (as in Germany). An important drawback with quota systems, however, is the difficulty of ensuring that the number of permits allocated in advance matches the actual labour market needs.24 Additionally, quota systems often involve a high level of regulation and bureaucracy and are therefore frequently criticized by employers for their lack of flexibility and their inability to respond to fluctuating labour demands. Finally, it can be difficult in practical terms to match potential migrant workers with employers, thus creating opportunities for unscrupulous foreign labour intermediaries or agents who take advantage of vulnerable workers.

Most migrant destination countries in Europe apply a labour market test to first-time applicants for a work permit and also to migrant workers seeking to change jobs if they have not met the minimal time requirements for free access to employment. Labour market tests assess whether there are workers available for the work in question in the domestic labour market. The labour market test normally requires employers to advertise the post with the national labour authorities for a specified period or to demonstrate that they have taken other active steps to recruit for a specified period of time. It thus involves considerable capacity requirements, ranging from establishing a national labour authority, to informing employers of procedures and monitoring their compliance.

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22 ILO (2009).
23 Collett and Münz (2010).
In countries with low unemployment rates and strong employment services, the process of labour market testing tends to be quick and straightforward – as in Ireland, where (after the enlargement of the EU) the annual number of permits issued was simply determined by employers’ demand for migrant workers.25 However, when employers request migrant workers in countries with high unemployment rates, the process can be contentious – as in the USA, where some farm employers made such requests, or in Germany, where employers requested temporary farm workers from Poland. With unemployment also rising in a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially among the male youth, labour market testing also has the potential to become contentious.26 The extent to which these tests may be effective in new countries of destination will therefore vary significantly according to the national labour market context.

3.3 Regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers

The next step in countries of destination following an assessment of the demand for foreign workers is to develop effective mechanisms for regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers. The main models currently in use are employment-based immigration programmes and temporary labour migration programmes.

Employment-based immigration programmes promote the admission of migrant workers with a view to their settlement in the destination country, and tend to focus on skilled workers. They are a well-established feature of immigration systems in Canada and the USA, but have limited applicability in countries that do not intend labour migration to result in long-term settlement. There are three main mechanisms for regulating admission and selecting migrants under these programmes: points systems; work permits; and processes that enable foreign students to work and eventually settle after completing their studies.

Australia, Canada and New Zealand have, for many years, applied points systems for admitting migrant workers, and several European countries have now adopted a similar approach. The criteria against which points are awarded vary between countries, but tend to include education and qualifications, work experience and certain indicators that the applicant has the potential to settle in the destination country in the long term. Bonus points may be awarded to attract skilled workers to particular sectors or regions.

The main advantage of points systems is that points can be modulated year by year and by varying the criteria for obtaining bonus points. Governments can thus easily steer the system – for example, in the case of the Canadian Live-in Caregiver Programme – to respond to labour shortages in specific sectors (see textbox 3). At the same time, points systems have three major drawbacks: first, they imply a system for verifying qualifications and diplomas awarded in countries of origin; second, they assume the transferability of qualifications; and third, they assume that qualifications are equivalent to skills.27

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27 Koser (2009b).
Textbox 3: The Canadian Live-In Caregiver Programme (LCP)

A programme unique to Canada that enables care providers to migrate to Canada is the Live-in Caregiver Programme, or LCP. The LCP, established in 1992 (replacing the Foreign Domestic Worker Programme, in place since 1981), is a variant of the economic class programme that enables workers to gain entry to work in Canada without having to meet the qualifications of the immigration points system, family sponsorship or refugee status. Like many developed nations, Canada has a shortage of care providers available to live in the homes of clients in need of care, and this is expected to become more acute with population ageing.

According to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), the LCP exists primarily to fill the shortage of caregivers needed to live in the private residence of their client (who may also be their employer). The term ‘live-in caregiver’, as defined in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, is “a person who resides in and provides childcare, senior home support care or care of the disabled without supervision in the private household in Canada where the person being cared for resides”. To work as a live-in caregiver, one must apply directly to CIC. The current requirements include:

- a job confirmation letter from Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) to the employer, outlining its opinion that the labour market situation necessitates a live-in caregiver;
- a written contract with the employer;
- successful completion of an equivalent of Canadian secondary school education;
- at least six months of recognized formal full-time training in a field related to the job, or at least one year of full-time paid work experience (including six months with one employer) in a field related to the job, within the three years preceding the application;
- good knowledge of English or French (Canada’s two official languages);
- a work permit before entering Canada.

Although LCP was not established to facilitate residency for migrant care providers, in some cases it can lead to permanent residency. Recent changes in the LCP facilitate transitions to permanent residence and also enhance protections for live-in caregivers from potential exploitation and abuse, including an LCP hotline and emergency processing of new work permits for LCP victims of abuse in the employer’s home. The LCP programme has evolved and holds clear potential in its revised form to better address the needs of caregivers and clients.


Work permits are usually issued for temporary employment. Although the rules that apply to the work permit system vary across countries, the following procedures normally apply: 28

- application for admission is usually made outside the country in response to a formal job offer;
- permission for admission is granted by consular officials in the origin country;
- an employment or work permit is granted to the employer or worker – sometimes both;
- the worker often has to obtain separate permission for residence;
- the employment or work permit is time-limited, but can usually be renewed if the job is still available;
- free access to employment of their choice can be granted to migrant workers after a certain number of years of work or residence.

There are a number of drawbacks with work permit systems. First, where work permits are held by the employer and not the worker, there is a risk of exploitation. A second issue is that the increasing diversity of work permits has resulted in a growing number of new types of residence permit. Third, there have been criticisms that work permit systems can be overly bureaucratic. 29

29 IOM (2008).
In several destination countries, attention is being paid to the future of foreign students. The enrolment of overseas students remained robust, even during the global economic crisis, and the global competition for students is expected to intensify in the future. Traditional and new destination countries for students will need to strengthen their capacity to compete in this market – for example, by offering incentives to overseas students. One such incentive is to allow students to stay on and work after the end of their studies. The 2007 Employment Permit Act in Ireland, for example, introduced a two-stage system that permits graduates of tertiary education institutions in Ireland to remain there for six months after termination of their studies to search for employment. If they are then offered a job, they can apply for a change of status.

Temporary labour migration programmes are designed with the intention that migrant workers will return home after the completion of their employment. The main types are: seasonal programmes, sector-based schemes, working holidaymaker schemes, trainee programmes, and domestic workers. In order to make up for sector-specific labour shortages, temporary migration programmes may admit migrants for employment in specified sectors only. In the United Kingdom, the Sector Based Scheme (SBS), for example, was intended for the temporary employment of workers in low-skilled occupations in the food manufacturing and hospitality sectors.

Temporary labour migration programmes may be open to nationals of any country, as is usually the case for skilled migration programmes or those targeting specific sectoral shortages, or they may operate on the basis of bilateral recruitment agreements and memorandums of understanding (MoUs), discussed in more detail below (see section 3.8).

In some countries, recruitment of temporary labour to fill sectoral gaps in the labour market is done by the government, either centralized at the national level or devolved to local or regional authorities. In most OECD Member countries, senior staff in employment, labour or immigration ministries conduct the negotiations with local or regional governments. In a few cases, however, national employment offices develop and implement the recruitment procedure with origin countries – as, for example, in Germany, where the Federal Employment Agency hires seasonal workers directly in the origin countries through their respective local employment services. Policy development and design of recruitment schemes normally also occurs within employment, labour or immigration ministries. Often these schemes are designed with the assistance of, or in consultation with, representatives of employers, trade unions and foreign workers. In Spain, the government contracts IOM to recruit on its behalf low-skilled temporary workers from Ecuador.

Recruitment can also be managed by employers facing labour shortages. They sometimes recruit directly in origin countries where no bilateral agreements exist, or they can use intermediaries such as private recruitment agencies in origin or destination countries. The recruitment procedures of the Commonwealth Caribbean and Mexican Agricultural Seasonal Workers Programme in Canada are often cited as a model. The programme allows Canadian farmers to employ foreign workers for up to eight months a year from a range of countries including Guatemala and Mexico. In both cases, migrant workers are recruited and employed under the terms of a government-to-government MoU that makes the Mexican and Guatemalan Governments responsible for recruiting workers and negotiating their wages with Canadian authorities. A second programme admits Guatemalan workers specifically to Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. The Guatemalan Ministry of Labor recruits workers, and the Guatemalan consulate in Montreal provides liaison services to migrants while they are in Quebec.

A third main mechanism for recruiting foreign workers is private recruitment agencies. These operate in both origin and destination countries. Their function can range from

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30 Ibid.
a straightforward matching service to a comprehensive hiring package consisting of recruitment, skills testing, travel, visa and living arrangements.\textsuperscript{32} How to regulate and monitor private recruitment agencies is considered in section 3.6.

3.4 Determining conditions attached to employment permits

States that employ foreign labour, especially temporarily, need to make clear and transparent decisions about the conditions attached to employment permits, and have the capacity to monitor and enforce these conditions. There is a wide range of experiences relating to the conditions attached to employment permits, in terms of their duration and renewability; occupational mobility; procedures governing migrants’ rights upon loss of employment; possibilities for permanent residence; family reunification; and other social rights. As a generalization, better conditions are attached to employment-based immigration programmes, and offered to skilled workers, although this approach has raised concerns from an equity perspective.

The length of time a work permit is valid needs to be considered carefully as it can have important consequences. In particular, programmes with permits with too short a duration and no possibility for renewal may find it difficult to attract even low-skilled workers. Most seasonal temporary labour migration programmes impose quite strict limits on permit holders. Seasonal workers admitted to the United Kingdom under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS), for example, are issued a work card with a validity ranging from five weeks to six months. If the work card is issued for less than six months, it is possible to apply for a new work card when the first one expires, and any new work card will take into account any time already spent as a seasonal worker. After six months, it is not possible to extend the work card. Workers are permitted to reapply to the SAWS programme after a three-month gap, during which time they will not have permission to remain in the country.

In contrast, temporary labour migration programmes aimed at more skilled workers tend to offer longer initial periods for permits, a straightforward procedure for renewal, and often also a path to permanent residence. Skilled workers are granted an initial permit for three years in France, and for five years in the United Kingdom.

In general, entrants under highly skilled migration programmes can also be ‘free agents’ with free access to the labour market, either immediately upon entry or after a certain number of years. Low-skilled migrants, in contrast, tend to be tied to particular employers either for the duration of their permit or for longer periods than is the case for highly skilled migrants, and the rules governing their access to other jobs are more rigorous. The freedom to change jobs in destination country labour markets can be an important protection for lower-skilled migrants, allowing them to escape abusive employers.

Regional free labour markets such as the EU allow freedom of movement, so that EU nationals can move and seek jobs on an equal basis with local workers. Foreign students, working holidaymakers, and other migrants who are primarily in the destination country for a purpose other than work, are also generally free agents in the labour market.\textsuperscript{33}

There is a consensus in the specific ILO and UN standards that if a migrant worker loses his or her job, he or she should not necessarily or immediately have to leave the country but should be viewed as part of the normal workforce. In cases in which migrants involuntarily lose their jobs because of illness, or because the employer terminates the employment relationship or goes bankrupt, ILO Convention No. 143 (Article 8) considers that:

1. On condition that he has resided legally in the territory for the purposes of employment, the migrant worker shall not be regarded as in an illegal or irregular

\textsuperscript{32} OECD (2004).

\textsuperscript{33} Martin, P. (2007).
situation by the mere fact of the loss of his employment, which shall not in itself imply the withdrawal of his authorization of residence or, as the case may be, work permits.

2. Accordingly, he shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals in respect in particular of guarantees of security of employment, the provisions of alternative employment, relief work and retraining.

Normally migrant workers should be allowed a reasonable period (not less than six months) to seek employment in the event of the termination of previous employment; this is seen as a basic entitlement that should be granted even to temporary migrants to safeguard their rights (including the right to access core benefits) and to protect them from exploitation.

It is also important to determine other social rights, such as access to public services. In Ireland, for example, migrant workers’ access to public services and benefits, including unemployment benefits, is regulated by the ‘habitual residency test’, which means that migrants become eligible for certain benefits only after they have been in the country for a certain minimum period of time.34 The term ‘habitually resident’ is intended to convey a degree of permanence evidenced by a regular physical presence enduring for some time. It implies a close association between the applicant and the country from which payment is claimed and relies heavily on fact. The following are the relevant factors that have been set down in Irish and European law:

- length and continuity of residence in Ireland or in any other particular country;
- length and purpose of any absence from Ireland;
- nature and pattern of employment;
- applicant’s main centre of interest;
- future intentions of applicant as they appear from all the circumstances.

Another issue that arises in this context is the extent to which any contributions made by migrant workers to social security systems are portable back to their origin country. The consensus is that best practice for benefit portability is bilateral social security agreements, preferably based on multilaterally agreed standards.35 The innovative regional arrangement in CARICOM countries holds promise for regional approaches and mechanisms.36

Generally, temporary labour migration programmes do not provide the right to family reunification. In contrast, employment-based immigration programmes targeted at more skilled workers tend to permit family reunification, although conditions vary. Procedures also vary as regards the ability of dependants to work. In the United Kingdom, dependants of Ordinary Work Permit holders are entitled to undertake any employment or self-employment, provided they hold a valid UK Entry Clearance.

Employment-based immigration programmes, such as those in Australia, Canada and the USA, tend to be oriented towards the possibility for permanent residence, and the main variation is the number of years a worker needs to wait before being permitted to apply. Possibilities for applying for permanent residence for workers admitted on temporary migration programmes are more limited. Some destination countries facilitate a strictly limited and regulated transfer of migrants employed on temporary labour migration programmes into permanent residence based on a set of clear rules and criteria. One alternative is a ‘points’ system. To be eligible for permanent residence in Canada, for example, applicants must:

- meet certain minimum work experience requirements;
- prove that they have the funds required for settlement;

34 Ruhs (2006).
• earn enough points on six selection factors: education, language skills, experience, age, arranged employment in Canada and ‘adaptability’.

Destination countries may also grant temporary migrants permanent residence on non-economic grounds such as marriage to a citizen or a permanent resident. Under the new Immigration and Integration Law in France, spouses of French citizens must wait three years before applying for a ten-year residence permit. Four years of marriage are required for the spouse of a French citizen to apply for French citizenship.

3.5 Training of migrant workers and placement services

While destination countries with a need for labour migrants need to develop capacities to facilitate the orderly admission of workers and guarantee their associated rights, there is also a responsibility on origin countries keen to promote labour migration to train potential migrant workers, and to work with destination countries to identify job openings, ensure that qualifications are recognized, and also protect migrant workers’ rights. Although this function is usually fulfilled by the private sector, some governments are looking into carrying it out themselves – Mauritius is one example. With the assistance of IOM, a database for foreign placement has been established, and the Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with IOM, undertakes the selection. In Indonesia, IOM recently finished working with the Government to develop placement and pre-departure systems, mechanisms for the protection of labour migrants, a better statistical overview of the situation of Indonesian labour migrants, and enhanced labour migration management capacity and cooperation, particularly with Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia and Singapore.

Increasingly, these activities take place through Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) (see textbox 4). MRCs provide support for training, either through referral to training facilities and financial support for training, or through direct provision of training. The Migration Information Centre (MIC) in Slovakia is an example of good practice in this area. After an intensive programme of personalized counselling and interviews to assist migrants to develop a personal development plan and to identify appropriate courses, the MIC provides grants to migrants for job-related training. Staff members follow the migrants’ progress and help them make links with employers. The process is evaluated by staff at the end of the course to ensure that appropriate training has been provided.

Providing support to persons seeking employment is another key part of the work of many MRCs. Currently, this assistance tends to be provided indirectly, especially in the absence of concrete multilateral or bilateral agreements providing recruitment support mechanisms. One example is the Maison des Congolais de l’Etranger et des Migrants (MCDEM) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has a job portal on its website with links to job websites both in-country and abroad. This provides an opportunity to see which jobs are available and to apply for them. The Migration Information Centre in Croatia provides information on quotas open to Croatians overseas, similarly enabling individuals to target their migration project towards specific positions.

MRCs also play an important, if indirect, role in ensuring that migrants’ qualifications are recognized wherever they are. A lack of recognition of qualifications can be an important factor preventing migrants and returnees from being able to access employment that matches their skill sets. A number of MRCs have engaged in negotiations for the recognition of foreign qualifications in the country of destination. In Portugal and Slovakia, where systems of qualification recognition are already in place, MRCs provide migrants going through this process: the Centro Nacional de Apoio ao Imigrante (CNAI, or National Immigrant Support Centre) in Portugal, for example, works as a facilitator and information service provider to link migrants and government schemes for the recognition of qualifications.

37 IOM study on migrant resource centres, GFMD, 2009.
Textbox 4: Migrant Resource Centres

Since the 1970s, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) and other similar facilities in both countries of origin and destination. This interest in MRCs reflects the support they provide in migration management. Indeed, MRCs aim to become reference points in regular migration processes.

Although MRCs go under a number of different names, reflecting the diversity of actors involved in their set-up, functioning and the objectives that they serve, they share a number of key features. Principally, they provide an independent and impartial structure through which migrants are able to obtain accurate information on legal migration procedures; the rights and responsibilities that migrants have throughout the migration process; and information on how to protect themselves so that migration is a positive experience.

In providing this service, MRCs support a number of key policy objectives, directly or otherwise. These objectives include:

- facilitation of regular migration;
- protection of regular and irregular migrants;
- prevention of irregular migration;
- promotion of sustainable, voluntary return (where relevant);
- integration of migrants into the country of destination (where relevant);
- promotion of the links between migration and development.

In recent years, the number of MRC physical structures providing services to migrants to facilitate and empower them to migrate in a regular, voluntary, orderly and protected fashion has grown significantly. They represent good practices in empowering migrants to facilitate development and ensuring that through this empowerment they can better protect themselves:

- In relation to empowering migrants for development, MRCs play an important role in providing migrants with information on how their migration, remittances and return plans can be linked to development.
- In relation to providing services which enable migrants to protect themselves, MRCs gather and actively distribute information to enable migrants to exercise their rights and prevent their exploitation. Moreover, a number of MRCs also provide services to migrants to ensure they are able to access their rights.


3.6 Protection of migrant workers’ rights

The protection of migrant workers’ rights is a significant challenge, especially for workers in the informal and unregulated sectors of the economy such as domestic work and those involved in forced labour. Migrant workers with irregular status are particularly vulnerable to exploitation in work. Areas of concern include: threat or physical harm to the worker; restriction of movement and confinement to the workplace or to a limited area; debt bondage; withholding of payment or excessive wage reductions; retention of passports and identity documents; and threat of denunciation to the immigration authorities where the worker has an irregular immigration status. As labour mobility increases, these concerns are likely to become even more acute for low-skilled and irregular migrants.

Migrants have rights under two sets of international instruments: the core human rights treaties currently in force, namely ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT, ICERD, CEDAW, CRC, CRPD and ICRMW, and international labour

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law, which includes the two specific ILO Conventions concerned with the protection of migrant workers (Nos. 97 and 143). The trafficking and smuggling protocols, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, also refer to protecting the human rights of trafficked persons and smuggled migrants. There is a particularly vigorous debate around the Convention on Migrant Workers, which has been ratified by 42 States, none of which is a major developed country of destination or an EU Member State. Some of the main reasons provided for non-ratification include: the Convention’s breadth and complexity; the technical and financial obligations it places on States that have ratified; the view that it contradicts or adds no value to existing national migration legislation; and concerns that it provides migrants (especially those with irregular status) rights that are not found in other human rights treaties. The ILO has played an important role in defining labour standards, which have had a significant impact, especially on domestic law in ILO Member States. The human rights of migrants are also protected under regional bodies (e.g. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)).

At the same time, there are significant shortcomings and implementation gaps in international labour and human rights standards concerning migrant workers, as was explored at the IOM International Dialogue on Migration in 2009, focusing on Effective Respect for Human Rights: A Shared Responsibility.39 Human rights protection for migrants remains much less developed than the international refugee protection system and no international institution has a specific legal protection mandate applying to all migrants. The dynamics and dimensions of labour migration have changed since the main labour standards and conventions were adopted, especially with regard to: the decreasing significance of the State in the recruitment of migrant labour and the increasing importance of private agents and intermediaries (although ILO Convention No. 181 aims to regulate private employment agencies); the feminization of migrant labour with the overrepresentation of women migrant workers in ‘extremely vulnerable positions’; the increasing short-term nature of migration and the expansion of temporary migrant worker programmes; and the growth in irregular migration and the need to balance control measures with measures to facilitate labour migration and to protect migrant workers. Significant problems persist in the implementation of the principles to which States have formally agreed, sometimes due to a lack of political will, but also a lack of capacity and resources.

In response, it has been proposed that capacities be developed to provide supplementary and complementary mechanisms for protection. One focus is to enhance national protection – for example, through national courts applying international human rights law, case law and advisory opinions from regional treaties to cases that come before them. A number of national policies can also be cited as comprising good practice in protecting the rights of migrant workers – for example, the ‘state-managed’ policy for the employment of Filipino nationals overseas; the extensive consular network of Mexico; the United Kingdom’s Gangmaster Act (2004); the issuance of ‘T’ visas in the USA; and the Live-in Caregiver Programme in Canada, which allows temporary migrant workers to change employers while in the country, provided that the new employment offer is confirmed by the authorities.

Capacity-building is also required among civil society to increase its effectiveness in: lobbying for the human rights of migrants and migrant workers; monitoring and reporting on conditions for migrant workers; and providing migrant workers with services and information. Trade unions across Western Europe have been active in protecting migrant domestic workers; the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT) in Spain is one example. In the Philippines and Sri Lanka, civil society has lobbied for standard contracts as a means of enforcing minimum wages for their migrant workers.

An enhanced role for UN Special Mechanisms has also been proposed: the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants has a mandate to improve knowledge of the circumstances of migrants, establish dialogue with governments, and give practical effect to human rights principles. But the international mechanisms that implement UN human rights treaties are chronically underfunded. Finally, there may be value in articulating the dispersed legal and normative framework in a single compilation of all treaty provisions and other norms that are relevant to the protection of the human rights of migrants to facilitate the consistent implementation of the provisions, noting the contribution that IOM’s *Compendium of International Migration Law Instruments* has made in this regard.\(^{40}\)

### 3.7 Reducing labour migration costs

One of the obstacles to the effective matching of labour supply and demand across borders is the upfront costs of labour migration — for example, the costs incurred in obtaining information, documentation, health checks, pre-departure orientation and training, and paying for transportation. ILO and UN conventions call for employers to absorb the economic costs of migration.\(^{41}\) Yet, while employers typically pay these costs for professional and highly skilled migrant workers, the migrant-paid share of migration costs tends to rise as skill levels fall. One reason is that destination States, especially in the developed world, increasingly depend on private recruiters to identify foreign workers and match them with job openings in the labour market. In some cases, recruiters exploit migrant workers — for example, by promising them more wages and benefits than they will actually receive. But even in the case of legitimate recruiters, there has been a tendency to shift the costs of recruitment from employers to workers.

There are three broad government responses to private recruitment costs. One is to step up enforcement to eliminate unscrupulous agents — for example, by requiring recruiters to identify themselves to authorities via registration, ensuring that they can meet minimum standards by requiring them to pass tests, and generating some financial security for migrants by having agents post bonds that can be tapped if agents do not fulfil their promises. A second is to encourage more legitimate agents to become involved in the migrant brokerage business so that competition gives migrants options and leads to effective self-regulation and ratings to guide migrants towards better agents. A third approach is to try to increase the role of public employment service agencies in moving workers over borders, in the hope that public agencies will be most likely to ensure that minimum standards are satisfied in recruitment and deployment.

Responsibility for reducing labour migration costs lies as much with origin countries as with destination countries. The Philippines is considered a leader in regulating recruiters.\(^{42}\) The government operates three agencies to serve and protect migrants: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) regulates recruitment and provides pre-departure orientation; labour attachés stationed at consulates abroad provide assistance to migrants while they are abroad; and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) operates centres in areas with concentrations of Filipinos that cover the cost of emergency repatriation and provide various services to families left behind. These activities are financed by fees collected from migrants, including a PHP 3,000 (USD 60) processing fee charged by the POEA, whose governing board includes representatives of the recruitment industry, and a USD 25 fee paid to the OWWA.\(^{43}\) While the Philippine system is often considered a model for regulating recruitment and protecting migrants abroad, there is an active debate among migrant organizations, some of which allege that over-regulation of recruitment raises the costs of Filipino migrants to foreign employers,

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\(^{41}\) Martin, P. (2010).

\(^{42}\) Ibid.

\(^{43}\) Abella et al. (2004).
reducing the number of foreign jobs for Filipinos. Most recruiters, as well as the Union of Filipino Overseas Contract Workers (OCW-Unifil), want less government regulation of recruitment, arguing that it increases the costs of sending migrants abroad at a time when other countries in the region that offer lower-wage workers are aggressively expanding deployment. Furthermore, cost implications may mean that the Philippines’ systems are not easily replicable in other developing countries.

Another initiative proposed in an important origin country for labour migrants – Bangladesh – is aimed at reducing pre-departure loan costs for migrants. The Bangladeshi Government proposed at the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Brussels (2007) that donors consider expanding the country’s active microfinance industry to migrants leaving the country. Pre-departure loans for Bangladeshi migrants would go primarily to men who leave the village, and the benefit of the loan would come in the form of remittances and the return of migrants with experience gained abroad. Under one proposal, a partnership of banks and NGOs could assess risks, make low-cost loans and ensure repayment, as NGOs with a presence in the migrants’ home villages form partnerships with banks seeking to expand their customer base.

3.8 Strengthening and implementing bilateral labour mobility agreements

Bilateral labour mobility agreements have been identified as a promising mechanism for ensuring that the potential benefits of migration accrue both to origin and destination countries, as well as to migrants themselves. Some countries recruit labour on the basis of MoUs – for example, in the case of programmes between Spain and major origin countries for migrants there, including Colombia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, and between Germany and Poland to facilitate a contract worker scheme. The majority now rely on more formal bilateral agreements that are legally binding.

There has been a significant increase in bilateral agreements in recent years – in 2004, there were reported to be 176 bilateral labour agreements signed by OECD countries. The reason that increasing numbers of countries are signing bilateral labour agreements is that they offer an effective method of regulating the recruitment and employment of foreign workers; they allow for greater State involvement in the migration process; they can be tailored to the specific supply and demand characteristics of the origin and destination countries; and they can provide effective mechanisms for protecting migrants.

Destination countries normally select a bilateral partner origin country for four main reasons. Some countries use bilateral agreements to manage migration by asking origin countries to sign, in exchange, re-admission agreements for migrants in an irregular situation. This is the case for agreements signed between Italy and Romania, and between Spain and Morocco. Some countries may wish to promote specific economic ties or wider regional economic integration, as is the case for bilateral agreements signed between Germany and some Central and Eastern European countries. Another objective is to strengthen cultural ties between partner countries, as is the case for the Working Holiday Maker programme in Australia. Finally, some countries may sign bilateral agreements to prevent indiscriminate international recruitment in specific sectors, particularly health – as is the case for a number of bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom and sub-Saharan African nations. This range of goals makes the effectiveness of bilateral agreements difficult to gauge, because such goals can sometimes conflict, and the effectiveness of agreements will depend on the weight assigned to each goal.

The ILO has identified 24 basic elements to be addressed in bilateral labour agreements,

45 World Economic Forum (2010).
while IOM, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the ILO have developed a matrix of good practice.\textsuperscript{49}

MoUs or bilateral agreements may also be agreed between the government of the origin country and representatives of specific employment sectors in the destination country. Provisions in such sector-based MoUs may include the identification of longer-term measures to be taken by employers in that sector for filling labour shortages domestically. Consequently, they may provide for temporary foreign labour migration in the short term, but preclude such migration becoming a permanent solution over the long term. Employers may also be subject to obligations to guarantee security in the workplace and provide basic language training necessary for undertaking the work.\textsuperscript{50} Alternatively, MoUs or bilateral agreements may be agreed by particular subnational regions in destination countries to respond to specific local labour shortages. Australia, Canada and Italy have all merged regional and rural development with immigration goals. In Italy, for example, the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region has been actively recruiting agricultural workers in Romania.

At the same time, one of the principal challenges relating to bilateral agreements is their implementation (some 25\% of bilateral agreements in OECD countries are not implemented) and implementation itself presents a significant capacity-building priority.

### 3.9 Return and reintegration

Return migration is a critical element of migration management, including as a strategy to prevent or deter irregular migration and maintain the integrity of asylum and migration systems, as well as in promoting circular migration. Capacity requirements in each of these areas are considered elsewhere in this report, while this section is particularly concerned with capacity-building for the reintegration of returning labour migrants.

Although returns did not take place at the scale initially predicted, the effects of the global economic crisis made it clear that many origin countries are ill-prepared for the return and sustainable reintegration of labour migrants, especially during a period of economic downturn. Yet there are good reasons to suppose that return migration will become more prevalent in the future – for example, shocks to the global economic system are cyclical and should be expected again, and temporary migration programmes and circular migration depend on return. For these reasons and more, a core capacity required in preparing for future challenges of labour mobility relates to return and reintegration.

The World Bank concluded over a decade ago that managing worker retraining programmes requires strong professional expertise and coordinating capacity, which may be beyond the means of many developing country governments. More extensive (and recent) evidence from developed countries indicates that government-managed worker retraining and skill-acquisition programmes are costly undertakings with marginal benefits, and that private sector involvement is essential.

In spite of its importance, the reintegration of migrants is among the most overlooked policy interventions in the migration cycle. Existing experience with reintegration programmes has tended to focus on providing protection and support to vulnerable humanitarian migrants rather than labour migrants. Such programmes tend to focus on assisting victims of human trafficking, returning refugees and internally displaced persons and, in some cases, migrants who have been deported back to their country of origin. These services range from counselling and education (in the case of child victims of human trafficking), to land grants and agricultural equipment (in the case of some returning refugees) and vocational training (for some deported migrants).

Increasing numbers of countries of origin are establishing new institutions, or assigning an existing one, to assist in the reintegration of at least a portion of the return flow of migrants, including those who may have lost their jobs abroad. There is some evidence

\textsuperscript{49} http://www.iom.int/jahia/jahia/pid/2056
\textsuperscript{50} OSCE/IOM/ILO (2006).
that these types of measures have become more important during the global economic crisis (see Asia Regional Overview, in part B). Ecuador’s ‘Welcome Home’ programme, for example, provides guidelines on the customs and tax regulations that returning migrants face; and Morocco’s National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC), which (among other things) helps returning migrants to reintegrate into professional life.

In the Philippines, the National Reintegration Center for Overseas Filipino Workers is a one-stop centre catering to the needs of returning overseas Filipino workers and their families. Operated by the Department of Labor and Employment, this PHP 7 million (USD 140,000) facility is funded by the Overseas Worker’s Welfare Administration – a government-run migrant welfare fund – and offers an array of services, from providing referrals to local and overseas jobs, skills training programmes and psychosocial services, to helping well-financed returnees to access formal investment instruments. In early 2009, the Philippine Government also initiated a new project – the Filipino Expatriate Livelihood Support Fund (FELSF) – aimed at providing loans of up to PHP 50,000 (USD 1,000) to migrant workers displaced due to the global economic crisis. The PHP 1 billion fund (USD 20 million) is administered by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) and has the support of government lending institutions, such as the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP).

A limited number of other programmes provide support to returning labour migrants – typically, vocational training, job-placement assistance and entrepreneurship support. The EU and Mali’s joint Centre on Migration Information and Management (Centre d’Information et de Gestion des Migrations, CIGEM) offers job placement and training services for migrants returning to Mali. Under the aegis of Spain’s co-development agreements with Colombia, Ecuador and Morocco, some NGOs provide training to migrants while they are working in Spain and microfinance support for enterprise development upon their return to their home countries. It is important to note that successful reintegration in the home country begins in the host country. Migrant Resource Centres can also be involved in training and job placements for returnees – for example, the MRC in Sri Lanka provides training targeted at returning women migrants.

Reintegration policies for the families of migrants are also important – both at the most basic levels of public services, such as education and health care, and in efforts to attract highly skilled expatriates. The challenges are magnified when a migrant returns with a foreign-born spouse or children who have been raised abroad. Those who do not speak the local language may find themselves isolated, while the foreign credentials of a spouse may not be recognized. Since 1982, the Mexican Ministry of Public Education has operated a programme aimed at addressing the educational needs of students who move regularly between Mexico and the USA, including facilitating the reintegration of the children of return migrants into Mexican schools. Under the Binational Migrant Education Program (PROBEM), school administrators in the USA and Mexico have developed the ‘Binational Student Transfer Document’. This document conveys a student’s academic achievements and progress between school officials on both sides of the US–Mexican border so as to minimize the disruption that can occur in a students’ academic progress when students move between countries.

3.10 Implementation

The challenge of implementation has been registered several times in this section already – for example, in the context of international labour standards and human rights, and bilateral labour mobility agreements. Indeed, as indicated in the introduction to this report, effective implementation is fundamental to successful capacity-building in any aspect of migration. Even at the stage of developing new policies or programmes, or revising existing ones, it is vital that attention be paid to the extent to which such policies and programmes will be implementable.
First, care is needed in assessing the extent to which policies and procedures in other countries can be directly transferred. As already indicated, the specific policy goals for labour mobility will influence their configuration. It is particularly important that policies and procedures be tailored to the national context. There are significant contextual differences between destination countries, whether established or emerging – for example, in terms of levels of economic development, regulation of labour markets, culture, establishment of democratic institutions, international relations with origin countries, the role and independence of the judiciary, and the capacity of the State to act and implement certain policies. Finally, it is generally very difficult to evaluate how effective labour migration policies are and, thus, to what extent they might work elsewhere. Pilot programmes are a common method for testing new policies on labour mobility.

Second, it is important to understand that the success of labour mobility programmes requires complementary policies that include a strong commitment to enforcing immigration and employment laws, especially against employers; active regulation of the cost at which migrant workers are made available to employers; and more effective mechanisms for encouraging employers to search for local workers before demanding migrant labour.51 Specific policies and procedures for employment and work permits should be part of a wider policy framework.

Finally, it is important that new policies conform to international standards for the protection of the rights of migrant workers. ILO Conventions and Recommendations establish a core set of rights for migrant workers and encourage the development and sharing of best practices worked out in social dialogue between unions, employers and governments. The rights of migrant workers should include equal protection under labour, anti-discrimination and family law. Effective practice stresses empowering migrants by providing them with information about their rights in the labour market, giving them the identification, rights and tools needed to access banks and other institutions abroad, and developing incentives to encourage migrants to report abuses of their rights.

It is important to put any discussion on irregular migration into context. The overwhelming majority of migration is fully authorized. Estimates, while not exact (as will be discussed below), suggest that only some 10–15 per cent of today’s 214 million international migrants are in an irregular situation. Most of these migrants enter legally but overstay the authorized stay. Moreover, as South–South migration is as significant as South–North migration, it is important not to fuel fear and negative perceptions of the North being overrun by poor migrants from the South, while of course not ignoring the vexing incidence of irregular migration today. One of the key questions requiring further exploration is how to get to the root of the phenomenon – most notably, underlying disparities in livelihood and safety opportunities. As indicated in the UNDP Human Development Report 2009, where a person is born is the single most significant determinant of human development outcomes.

Data on stocks and flows of irregular migration, at the local, national, regional and global levels, vary widely and are usually imprecise. There is also a lack of comparable data, both over time and between locations. In the absence of an authoritative single source on irregular migrant numbers, analysis inevitably depends on widely fragmented sources, some of which are significantly out of date. Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that the number of irregular migrants has grown in recent years. It has been suggested that, during the global economic crisis, irregular migration flows reduced temporarily, but irregular migrant stocks increased as laid-off workers stayed on in destination countries without authorization, rather than leaving the country at the risk of not being able to return after the recovery (see the regional overviews in part B of this report).52

As indicated in the last section, the predicted global mismatch between labour supply and demand may result in a further increase in irregular migration, with more people moving to find work than will be facilitated by labour mobility agreements. Indeed, most experts today would agree that there are already inadequate legal channels for migration and especially for migration for work, indicated by skills – at high and low levels – as well as demographic gaps. Crossing borders without authorization is only one of a number of ways that migrants can find themselves in an irregular situation, and there are reasons to suppose that some of these other processes may also accelerate in the foreseeable future. Another form of irregularity arises, for example, where migrants work without authorization, even if they entered the country legally – for example, by overstaying on visas or work permits. The segmentation of labour markets between formal and informal sectors, which is already acute in many developed destination countries, is expected to continue there and become more visible in emerging

52 Koser (2010).
economies, thus providing expanding opportunities for irregular or unauthorized work. People moved by migrant smugglers or human traffickers (main countries of origin and destination of victims of human trafficking are illustrated in maps 4 and 5, respectively) usually also find themselves in an irregular situation – initially, at least – and most commentators agree that both phenomena are on the increase, despite concerted efforts to combat them (see map 6 on the number of signatures/ratifications of the UN Palermo Protocol on human trafficking), partly because of the huge profits they generate. It is also worth noting that, while irregularity is a deliberate choice or decision for some, many others find themselves in an irregular situation due to administrative obstacles or a lack of information. The problem is compounded by the fact that, in most countries, the procedures governing most forms of migration are becoming more complex rather than more streamlined.

Current and future challenges of irregular migration result not only from increasing numbers. Irregular migration is also becoming more complex, not just because of the variety of routes into irregularity, but also because of the difficulties in distinguishing the particular needs and rights of various types of persons forming part of irregular migration flows – for example, asylum-seekers or unaccompanied minors. This is a particular challenge in transit countries. As discussed in section 7, the effects of environmental change may exacerbate this complexity – for example, where people cross an international border as a result of the effects of environmental change leading to uncertain and non-uniform legal protection.

Fundamentally, irregular migration should be curbed because it undermines the rule of law and exerts a heavy human toll on the migrants themselves. When destination countries tolerate high levels of irregular migration, they undermine their own legal immigration systems. There is little credibility for immigration law if migrants and migrant smugglers and human traffickers are allowed to circumvent the policies in place to determine who enters, for what purposes, and for what period of time. Irregular migration also undermines public support for immigration. Often, the public reacts negatively to migration because it feels that the government no longer has control over who is to be admitted. High levels of irregular migration can thus create a backlash that extends to legal immigration as well. Irregular migration also undermines the rule of law in other respects. Generally, smuggling operations cannot function effectively without the aid of corrupt officials in origin, transit and destination countries. It also thrives when there is access to counterfeit and fraudulently obtained documents, which, in turn, create opportunities for identity theft. Many irregular migrants work in the informal economy, allowing unscrupulous employers to violate labour laws with relative impunity, since the irregular workers are unlikely to complain to the authorities.

Added to these concerns is the human cost to the migrants who enter through unauthorized channels or who remain illegally in the country. Clandestine migration is dangerous, as is evident in the statistics on deaths along the US–Mexican border or in the Mediterranean Sea. When migrants cross deserts, are packed in containers, or cross in unseaworthy boats, they put themselves at risk of serious harm. When they use the ‘services’ of smugglers who are only interested in profit, their lives are at further risk. Even if irregular migrants are able to arrive safely to their destination, they usually find themselves in very vulnerable situations as they attempt to evade authorities and work illegally. They have few rights and risk being apprehended and removed. Irregular migrants find it difficult to maintain contacts with families, since they are not eligible for family reunification unless they are able to obtain legal status.

Against this background, this report considers the curbing of irregular migration to be a priority. Effective capacities will be required in the following ten core areas, in order to respond to the future challenges of irregular migration:

53 GCIM (2005).
1. generating better data on irregular migration;
2. enhancing law enforcement;
3. regularizing migrants’ status;
4. managing detention and deportation;
5. regulating migration and employment;
6. capacity-building in transit States;
7. combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking;
8. addressing mixed flows;
9. enhancing information dissemination;
10. building partnerships and cooperation.

4.1 Better data on irregular migration

Responding effectively to irregular migration is hampered by a serious lack of verifiably accurate data, making it difficult to identify trends or compare the scale of the phenomenon in different parts of the world. While there is an ongoing debate about the utility and uses of statistics on irregular migration, there are strong arguments for improving existing data-collection systems for irregular migration. States need statistics to justify the allocation of resources, to try to anticipate the economic and social impacts of irregular migration, and to plan local, regional and national responses. Responsibly handled, statistics can be used by the media to inform the public. International and non-governmental organizations, including trade unions, involved with addressing irregular migration flows or assisting irregular migrants, need reliable statistics in order to allocate resources, procure assistance, establish logistical systems, raise money and account for the organization’s expenditure. Enumerating irregular migrants can also help serve the interests of migrants themselves – for example, in identifying and targeting protection and assistance for those in vulnerable situations.

There are both conceptual and more practical challenges associated with measuring, collecting and interpreting data on irregular migration. Irregular migration is a complex and diverse concept that requires careful clarification. Data normally distinguish flows from stocks; in both cases, obtaining reliable data is problematic. As described above, it is important to recognize that there is a wide variety of routes into irregularity. It is also important to separate out asylum from aggregate statistics on irregular migration. Another conceptual complexity arises because a migrant’s status can change – often rapidly. A more practical problem is that people without regular status are likely to avoid speaking to the authorities for fear of being apprehended and deported, and thus often go unrecorded.

Various methods have been used to try to estimate numbers of irregular migrants, and each of them has drawbacks. In high-income destination countries, the most widely available and commonly used source of data on immigrants is the population census, which is administered in most countries on a regular decennial cycle. There are a number of reasons, however, why censuses are imperfect sources for estimating irregular migration. One is that de jure census systems enumerate people at their place of legal residence and, since irregular migrants, by definition, have no legal residence, they are likely to be excluded. A de facto census, in contrast, enumerates people wherever they are on the census day. In addition, censuses do not include questions on the legal status of respondents; thus, although many irregular migrants may be enumerated, it is not possible to know which respondents are in the country legally and which are not. Another problem arises from the fact that most censuses take place so infrequently that data on immigration from these sources are perpetually out of date. Inter-censual surveys may overcome this problem, while otherwise having the same limitations as other censuses.

There are three more direct methods that have been used to try to enumerate the scale of irregular migration. First, files from government administrative bodies (including information on refusals for entry visas, work and residence visas and rejected asylum-seekers) can be used as data sources to indicate potential irregular migrants. Data from police checks

54 Koser (2010).
55 Crisp (1999).
56 European Migration Network (2005).
57 Massey and Capoferro (2007).
and apprehensions or labour inspections can also be useful.\(^{58}\) In this context, regulated and standardized data collection, management and protection are essential aspects of border-management capacity-building. Second, special surveys have sometimes also been conducted – for example, on illegal employment in host countries, or among migrant-sending families in origin countries.\(^{59}\) These are, however, usually based only on small and not necessarily representative samples.

A third direct source of numbers is regularization programmes, which are periodically declared in certain high-income economies in order to permit foreign nationals residing or working without legal authority to regularize their status (see section 4.3). As an indicator of numbers, however, regularization programmes have several limitations. No programme attempts to cover the entire range of irregular migration, targeting instead certain sectors, nationalities or people who entered before a particular cut-off date; they usually occur infrequently and it is not always clear whether or not the number of applicants includes family members. There can also be administrative problems – for example, where applicants apply to local and national authorities simultaneously.\(^{60}\) The status granted to successful applicants also varies – for example, in some cases, they are legalized for only one year, after which their status becomes irregular again. Finally, once a regularization process is complete, there is a tendency for new irregular migrants to simply replace the previous ones.\(^{61}\)

There is also a series of indirect methods for measuring the size of the irregular migrant population.\(^{62}\) Such methods aim to infer the size of the population by comparing different population censuses and registers, including data on births and deaths, and have the advantage of not relying on an actual count of irregular migrants.\(^{63}\) They include the residual method, which makes use of census and immigration data, and the sex-ratio method in origin countries, which compares expected populations with contemporary, observed populations to estimate the irregular migrant component.\(^{64}\) Another indirect method is that of conducting surveys of employers. Estimates compare population registers and residence permit data to reveal those persons who are employed and have an expired residence permit, no permit, or a permit issued for reasons other than work. There are, however, problems inferring the size of the irregular migrant population from estimates of the scale of illegal employment, partly because a proportion of irregular migrants do not work.

Although the above-mentioned methods yield some useful insights into the role and patterns of irregular migration in many destination countries, existing information often remains scarce, out of date or unreliable. Thus, in recent years, several efforts have been made to enhance capacities to collect data on irregular migration. Successful experiences include the IOM Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM), the CIREFI (Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration) or EIL (Enforcement of Immigration Legislation) statistics collected by the European Commission, together with Eurostat, the research project ‘Clandestino’, coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), improved data exchange and information lead by Frontex (the European agency for coordination of cooperation between EU Member States in the field of border management), among others:

- The European Commission/DG Justice, Liberty and Freedom developed, together with Eurostat, what used to be known as ‘CIREFI statistics’ – i.e. a data-collection system regularly compiling statistics on refusals, apprehensions and removals provided by EU Member States. Since the implementation of the Migration Statistics Regulation EC/862/2007, these data are called ‘EIL statistics’, which are put online and accessible to everyone: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database)

\(^{58}\) Pinkerton et al. (2004).

\(^{59}\) Massey and Capoferro (2007).

\(^{60}\) Clarke et al. (2003).

\(^{61}\) Garson (1999).


\(^{63}\) IPPR (2006).

\(^{64}\) Clarke et al. (2003).
Since its inception in 1999–2000, the IOM Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM)/Trafficking Database has allowed for the collection of information relating to nearly 16,000 victims of trafficking in over 90 countries of destination around the world. The database now operates in 72 IOM missions globally, although usage of the tool varies from mission to mission (for more information, see commentary maps 4 and 5 and IOM, 2007). Within the ASEAN region, where the database is currently used by Country Offices in Thailand and Indonesia, IOM developed a data guide highlighting best practice principles for the collection of data on human trafficking and for using such data in combating trafficking.

The ICMPD interdisciplinary project ‘Clandestino – Undocumented Migration: Counting the Uncountable Data and Trends Across Europe’ was designed to support policymakers in developing and implementing appropriate policies regarding undocumented migration. It essentially aims to provide an inventory and comparative analysis of data and estimates on undocumented migration (stocks and flows) in selected EU countries, as well as proposing a new method for evaluating and classifying data/estimates on undocumented migration in the EU. Besides country reports for the 2000–2007 period, the main output of the project is a database (http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net/), which presents and classifies (as low-, medium- or high-quality) estimates and data on irregular migration in the EU and in selected Member States.

In 2009, Frontex tried to improve its operational data collection and analytical outputs by, inter alia, including trafficking in human beings in its research. Furthermore, Frontex provided technical training on data exchange to the risk-analysis units of the western Balkan countries, and assisted in the arrangement of a platform for information exchange.

Irregular migration is a growing concern for many countries in the developing world, particularly those that are now countries of transit and destination.

### 4.2 Law-enforcement strategies

Prevention of unauthorized entry is a cornerstone of immigration-related enforcement actions. States are increasingly seeking to enforce their domestic immigration laws beyond their own borders, thus managing enforcement as early as possible and prior to arrival at the border. The further away the prospective entrant, the more time government officials have to examine the individual and his or her travel documents. Once travellers reach the border, inspection officers are pressed to make quick decisions so as not to unduly inconvenience other travellers. Indeed, the entire notion of expanding borders to a place of first contact – whether through physical or electronic means – is a reality of today’s mobile and information and communication technology-intensive world.

Visa issuance is generally considered to be the first line of defence against irregular migration, particularly for those deemed likely to overstay their permission to remain in the host country. Visas generally give foreign nationals permission to travel to a destination country, although the visa holders may well be subject to further inspection on arrival. Pre-departure and en route pre-clearance and pre-inspections by destination State personnel are a further way of preventing the arrival of irregular migrants. Many countries deploy immigration officials to work with foreign governments and airline personnel to identify persons travelling with fraudulent documents and to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking operations. Pre-enrolment of frequent travellers is a further way of pre-clearing certain foreign nationals, allowing greater time and attention to be paid to visitors about whom the authorities have less information. The Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) pre-clears crossers at the US–Mexican border.
to determine whether they have a secure residence in one of the border towns, and whether they pose any security risk.

Sanctions against carriers who transport migrants ineligible to enter a destination country are a further means of preventing irregular migration. Domestic law in a number of States requires common carriers (including by sea, air and land) servicing their territories internationally to verify travel documents of all boarding passengers. Fines are imposed upon carriers that fail to comply.

Most countries subject arriving passengers to some type of inspection at the border, including those already granted visas. Entry controls suffer from the same weaknesses as visa issuance, in that officials must make judgements about likely overstays, based on little or no hard information. One of the most ambitious inspection systems is the US-VISIT (United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology) system, which captures automated information about each arriving (and, possibly, departing) passenger. It collects information on date of arrival and departure; nationality; complete name; date of birth; citizenship; sex; passport number and country of issuance; country of residence; US visa number, date and place of issuance (where applicable); and complete address while in the USA, among other data. It also records biometric information, which includes a digital photograph and fingerprints of the right and left index fingers. The system was first introduced at air and sea ports of entry and then extended to the land ports of entry, which have far more crossings each day. The departure controls – scanning of the visitor’s visa or passport and recording of the two fingerprints again – are being tested at 12 major airports.

Identifying counterfeit and imposter documents used by irregular migrants is a further enforcement measure. One way to reduce counterfeiting is through the issuance of machine-readable passports and visas, and the incorporation of biometric data into travel documents. In this regard, the African Capacity Building Centre has been working with a Technical Advisory Group on Machine-Readable Travel Documents (TAG-MRTD) with 12 African States that currently do not issue machine-readable passports. Incorporating security features into passports, visas and residence documents makes them more expensive and more difficult to forge. Documents may also incorporate biometric features such as fingerprints or digital photographs, which are almost impossible to replicate. For maximum effect, the documents should be linked to a database that allows for identification of bona fide recipients of the documents. Increases in document security also need to be supplemented by staff training on identifying fraudulent documents. Among the many initiatives supported by IOM in this field is the Personal Identification and Registration System (PIRS). PIRS is a Border Management Information System (BMIS) that allows for the capturing of biographical data of travellers entering and exiting border points, providing an entry-level, comprehensive, flexible, cost-effective and affordable solution for States that have inadequate or non-existent data-capture systems. In the past few years, IOM has undertaken technical assessments of identity management in a variety of countries including Belarus, Jamaica and Mauritania.

Border enforcement is another critical element of law enforcement. Strategies to curb clandestine entries include more and better-trained personnel to patrol borders and seaways, and technology to help identify those seeking entry. Interdiction on the high seas, preferably close to the embarkation point, is used to deter departures by boat. Such border enforcement measures attract significant capacity-building already, but much more work remains to be done, as demonstrated by the fact that, despite massive investment, there are still significant clandestine crossings over the US–Mexican border. IOM recently carried out border management assessments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Jordan, Namibia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic and Uganda.

To the extent that irregular migration is fuelled by the demand for labour, enforcement at the worksite is another important deterrent. Many
countries impose sanctions on employers who hire irregular migrants. The standard differs as to the level of knowledge that an employer must have about the worker’s immigration status. In the many countries where systems for verifying identity are weak, employers are often able to avoid sanctions because they have not ‘knowingly’ hired the irregular migrant who poses as an authorized worker. In countries in which there are more rigorous systems for verifying identity, the hiring of a person unauthorized to work may be a violation. In addition to immigration status verification, enforcement at the workplace includes violations of basic labour standards, including payment of minimum or prevailing wages, health and safety standards, overtime payment, and child labour restrictions. Employers may also be investigated for failure to pay required taxes on wages.

4.3 Regularization

Another strand of a comprehensive policy strategy to address irregular migration is regularization – in other words, providing legal status to unauthorized migrants who are already in the country.\(^{67}\) Often, regularization takes place in conjunction with new prevention efforts – in effect, wiping the slate clean while the new enforcement measures are put in place. Policymakers often prefer the term ‘regularization’ to what opponents often call ‘amnesty’. Amnesty connotes forgiveness for past misdeeds, whereas regularization is promoted as a way to address irregularity by giving migrants authorization to reside and work.

Proponents often explain that regularization will apply only to those irregular migrants who have broken no laws other than immigration provisions. Regularization usually requires that migrants earn their legal status by continuing to be gainfully employed in the host country.\(^{68}\) A number of southern European countries have had recurrent legalization programmes, granting a one-year work permit to migrants who have been illegally residing and working there. If they retain their employment, they are able to renew their residence and work permits. After a specified period, they may be granted indefinite residency, which puts them on the road to citizenship.

Regularization may apply to the entire irregular population, or it may be limited to a subsection of the migrant population (often defined by their length of residence). Alternatively, different regularization approaches may be taken for different groups. In the 1986 regularization programme in the USA, for example, non-agricultural workers could obtain legal status only if they had been in the country for a lengthy period (since before 1 January 1982), whereas Seasonal Agricultural Workers (SAWs) had the possibility of legalizing their status if they could demonstrate that they had worked a minimum number of hours in agriculture during the previous three years.

While regularization programmes attract the most public policy attention, there are other ways in which irregular migrants are able to gain legal status. They may become eligible for regularization by marrying a citizen or legal permanent resident; they may obtain asylum or other status that precludes their deportation; or they may find a job that affords them the opportunity to convert to a legal status. Countries differ as to the ease with which irregular migrants who become eligible for a recognized status are able to avail themselves of the opportunity. Many countries require migrants to return home to apply for a visa – something that irregular migrants may be reluctant to do if they fear that they will be denied re-entry. The USA has passed legislation to allow irregular migrants who arrived before a certain date to adjust their status within the USA, rather than face potential bars on their re-entry. The legislation is generally time-limited, however, and does not provide a means by which new migrants can adjust their status.

Regularization initiatives, whether formal or informal, can be counterproductive if implemented without adequate measures to prevent future flows. If it appears that everyone who enters illegally is able to adjust

\(^{67}\) Martin, S. (2008).
\(^{68}\) GCIM (2005).
their status if they manage to stay long enough, regularization serves as a magnet for more irregular migration. By contrast, implemented in combination with new enforcement or legal admission measures, regularization can allow authorities to focus attention on preventing new movements rather than apprehending those who have already established links and equities in the destination country.69

4.4 Detention and return

Although prevention is the preferable policy approach for deterring future irregular flows, and regularization often makes sense when introducing new prevention measures, the removal of some irregular migrants may be in the best interest of the destination country. For the most part, however, locating irregular migrants can be difficult.

States attempt to track the presence of foreign nationals within their territories through registration requirements, checks of identity documents, and systems for matching entry and exit from the country. Tracking systems are costly mechanisms that, if inappropriately implemented, may infringe on privacy and civil liberties of citizens and foreign nationals alike, without efficiently and effectively identifying those in the country or engaged in employment without proper authorization. Tracking systems are particularly problematic when they appear to involve racial, ethnic or religious profiling. Profiling is not necessarily problematic if based on solid information encompassing a wide range of indicators and used in conjunction with other law-enforcement tools. When profiling is based on crude characteristics, such as those who look or sound foreign, however, it can be counterproductive for law enforcement, as it risks violating the rights of innocent persons.

The capacity to identify, detain and return irregular migrants is limited in all countries. Generally, efforts to do so are focused on targeted groups, and those who pose security risks – suspected terrorists and criminals, for example – are the principal targets. Others are put into removal proceedings because they come to the attention of authorities – for example, in workplace raids or because their application for asylum or an immigration benefit has been rejected.

Generally, it is easiest to remove people at ports of entry, rather than those who have resided for a longer period in the destination country. States have different processes for removing individuals found inadmissible at ports of entry. The USA, for example, has an expedited exclusion procedure that permits inspectors to issue an order for removal of all aliens who enter with no documents, counterfeits or legitimate documents fraudulently obtained. If removed under these provisions, the foreign national may not re-enter the USA for five years. The only exception to the expedited process is for those who request asylum.

Detention can play an important role in securing persons prior to their removal. Absconding is a significant risk and detention is one solution. Detention policy varies across the world. In some countries, such as Australia and the USA, detention is automatic and can be used for an extended period for certain categories of foreign nationals, particularly those arriving without proper documentation and those who have committed certain criminal offences. In other countries, detention is used on a case-by-case basis and only for short periods. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), for example, does not permit long-term detention unless a Member State has the real possibility of removing someone. Even in the European Union, however, there is variation in detention policies, and the standards regarding arbitrary detention under the ECHR are not clearly spelled out.

Return is an integral component of comprehensive approaches to irregular migration and, wherever possible, should be voluntary, based on the informed choice of the individual, with respect for the individual’s dignity, and with the prospect of reintegration in the country of origin. In contrast, deportation is costly, often unpopular in public opinion, may create tensions in countries of origin, and rarely addresses the root causes of irregular migration.

– which could be achieved by, for example, assisting returnees in becoming productive upon their return to their origin countries. IOM has been operating Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes for almost three decades, which, although not exclusively focused on irregular migrants, do provide assistance for irregular migrants and unsuccessful asylum-seekers. Activities cover the pre-departure and transportation phase and, importantly, also the post-arrival stage, including training, educational assistance and reintegration grants. Often these activities are targeted at returning communities, rather than just individual returnees.

4.5 Regulating migration and employment

A comprehensive approach to irregular migration provides alternative avenues for employers to hire foreign workers when domestic workers are unwilling or unable to perform the jobs that irregular migrants hold. Establishing legal work programmes or increasing the number and types of work permits issued can provide an alternative to irregular migration for some migrants. The extent to which legal programmes offset irregular migration will be determined by a number of factors, including: the sanctions and incentives in place for employers to hire legal workers rather than maintain an irregular workforce; the eligibility of those in irregular status for the legal work programmes; the relative size of the work programmes; the procedures used to process applications from employers; and the requirements imposed on would-be workers to obtain visas.\(^{70}\)

As explained in the previous section, legal foreign worker programmes can admit migrants for different durations of stay. Seasonal programmes generally assume that the work is temporary and the migrants will remain only through the season, returning home when the job is finished. This type of programme often involves circulation, with workers coming the following year to perform the same service. Temporary work programmes are usually of longer duration but the assumption is also that foreign workers will return home. The duration of stay can be from several months to several years. Problems arise, however, when temporary workers are hired for permanent jobs. As there is no natural end to the job, there is often pressure to overstay the visa. Employers do not want to lose good workers, and employees do not necessarily want to return home. Increasingly, temporary work visas are actually transitional visas that admit workers for a testing period. If the employer wants to retain the worker, he or she can apply for permanent residence. Or, if the worker’s visa is renewed a certain number of times, and the migrant can demonstrate the potential for continuing employment, the government may issue a permanent work permit. Few countries give unskilled workers immediate avenues of entry for permanent residence and, in many cases, do not provide any vehicle for transition. In these cases, foreign workers are highly dependent on the goodwill of employers and may be reluctant to question their wages and working conditions.\(^{71}\)

Reducing irregular migration may require targeting foreign worker programmes for particularly risky occupations. The majority of irregular migrants work in a relatively small number of occupations within a small number of industries, few of which tend to have a large proportion of irregular migrants among the workforce. Industries can change quickly in their reliance on foreign labour, however. In the USA, for example, food processing shifted from a largely native-born workforce to a largely immigrant workforce within a decade.

The danger in a new foreign worker programme is that industries that were not dependent on foreign labour shift to this new supply of workers, while those comfortable with their existing workforce continue to employ irregular migrants. In this scenario, the legal programmes do not serve as a substitute for irregular migration. Furthermore, if demand exceeds the legal supply of workers, the new programmes can actually precipitate new irregular migration to fill the jobs.

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\(^{70}\) Martin, P. (2010).

\(^{71}\) Shah (2010).
systems can also help deter irregular migration for family reunification purposes as well as direct employment purposes. In the USA, for example, there are routine waits of five years before the spouses and minor children of legal permanent residents can obtain their own green cards. Residents of Mexico face even longer waiting times. These waits arise because of statutory limits on the number of family visas issued each year, as well as administrative delays in processing applications. Rather than endure such long separations, many spouses and children migrate through irregular channels.

It is often assumed that only destination countries have an interest in reducing the number of irregular migrants. The Philippines is an example of an origin country that has also acted to reduce the probability that migrants leaving the country become irregular. The Philippines has conducted awareness campaigns among prospective migrants against illegal recruitment and introduced penalties for recruiters who violate the law. The Philippines has been successful in reducing the number of migrants who leave the country irregularly, in protecting its migrants overseas, and generally in managing the flows of migrant workers.

One area for specific capacity-building in origin countries relates to the bureaucratic nature of the process of exit. The costs and ease of obtaining a passport, for example, can be significant. In addition, prospective migrants normally have to obtain some kind of certificate confirming that they have had no criminal convictions and medical clearance before even approaching a labour recruiting agent or foreign consulate for a work visa. Although these requirements are imposed by prospective destination countries, the ease of obtaining the documentation, apart from via consular visits, is largely a function of origin country bureaucracy. Official charges, but also the effort required to navigate complex government departments where petty corruption may be rife, may mean a long and increasingly costly process just to obtain permission to leave. An alternative is to go to an agent who will arrange all documentation, perhaps fraudulent ones, to facilitate a speedy exit. In some cases, migrant smuggling and irregular migration can be as much a function of bureaucratic failure in origin countries as immigration policy failure in destination countries.

4.6 Capacity-building in transit States

Increasing numbers of migrants pass through transit States, often becoming stranded there. Their situation draws attention to the need for more capacity-building in transit States, where recent research indicates that national laws and policies are often inadequate or ineffectively implemented. Moreover, as patterns and policies of international migration change in the near future, significant new transit States may emerge.

Whereas international and regional human rights and refugee, criminal and labour laws provide a sound base for the development, establishment and strengthening of existing legal frameworks at the national and regional level, effectively applying these standards in practice to the complex migration management situations posed by irregular migration and faced in transit States remains problematic. Equality and non-discrimination are the linchpins of any rule of law framework, and IOM works with governments and other stakeholders in various parts of the world to counter discrimination and xenophobia against migrants. For example, in Ukraine, the ‘Diversity Initiative’ has attempted to foster more positive attitudes towards the migrant community and supports the Government, together with its counterparts, in its activities to encourage intercultural dialogue and to develop policy and legislation.

The formulation of coherent policy and the development of appropriate legislation and programmes, however laudable and innovative, cannot succeed alone. Complementary capacity-building activities are essential. In particu-

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72 Skeldon (2008).

73 Crisp and Rossi (2010).

74 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/2026
lar, government officials have to be trained so as to raise their awareness of the complexity of irregular migration and mixed migratory movements and to enable them to identify not only possible asylum-seekers and refugees through, for example, protection-sensitive border procedures, but also the needs of particularly vulnerable migrants such as victims of trafficking, unaccompanied and separated minors, and those who have been subjected to gender-based violence. IOM carries out training activities in various parts of the world in the fields of international migration law, counter-trafficking and border management, in the context of which the complexities and challenges posed by mixed migratory movements are addressed and the human rights and needs of migrants can be properly identified. IOM capacity-building activities, including training, also target other stakeholders, such as the private sector and civil society groups. In India, for example, IOM Hyderabad engages private sector companies to train and create opportunities for trafficked persons, while, in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, such activities are aimed at civil society and address counter-trafficking, mixed flows and the provision of first assistance.

The capacity to return irregular migrants in transit is another important strategy. IOM implements a number of AVRR programmes aimed at strengthening the capacity of transit countries to manage their return caseloads, including in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, South-East Asia and the Americas. Countries of destination have at times provided funding and expert support for these programmes, in an effort to strengthen migration management links in the transnational chain of irregular migration.

4.7 Combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking

Within the broader context of irregular migration, policy reviews have highlighted a number of specific weaknesses in national responses to migrant smuggling and human trafficking where targeted capacity-building initiatives have the potential to make an impact, particularly in the field of data collection, strengthening national laws and policies, law enforcement, services for victims, border management, and national coordination and consultation mechanisms.

Very few countries undertake systematic collection of data on migrant smuggling or human trafficking. Even where they do, conceptual and practical problems preclude the availability of reliable data. Different States, for example, define migrant smuggling and human trafficking in different ways, and migrants can shift overnight between regular and irregular status and from being smuggled migrants to being victims of trafficking. There is also a series of more practical problems. Human trafficking is generally an underreported crime, with victims scared of reprisals from traffickers or penalization by the State. Most sources agree that the majority of irregular migrants – including those who are smuggled or trafficked – are not recorded. Another problem is access to data (however limited they may be) that have been collected. In many States, such data are collected by enforcement agencies and are not made publicly available. Alternatively, information and data that may establish a person’s irregular status are frequently dispersed between different agencies such as government departments, the police and employment offices, making cooperation and access to data difficult.

National policies on migrant smuggling and human trafficking are evolving in different ways, but most States are intensifying their efforts aimed at policy and legislative reform, following the signing of the Palermo Protocols. Most countries already have legal provisions against aiding and abetting illegal border crossings. Many governments now provide for significant criminal penalties against human traffickers. Measures on money laundering and the identification, tracing, freezing, seizing and confiscation of means and assets from crime, are important additional means of preventing and reducing smuggling and trafficking. The prosecution of smugglers and traffickers is often inadequate in national legislation, and there is frequently insufficient protection for witnesses and victims. Additionally, there is an
urgent need to develop capacities to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of policies aimed at combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking, as recommended by the US Government Accountability Office.\textsuperscript{75}

Limited research indicates that corrupt government officials located in origin, transit and destination countries are often part of the networks facilitating migrant smuggling and human trafficking.\textsuperscript{76} Training and anti-corruption initiatives therefore need to reinforce technical assistance for law and policy development.

Another integral component of stemming migrant smuggling and human trafficking is criminal investigation. In a number of countries, agencies responsible for the investigation of financial crimes have extended their functions to include investigations into organized crime, including human trafficking. An alternative approach is to establish new units. There has been some international cooperation in developing investigative capacities: Interpol facilitates, coordinates and provides technical advice for national investigative structures, as does the South East Asia Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre for Combating Trans-border Crime (SECI). Nevertheless, robust investigative capacities are mainly found in developed countries, and common problems in less developed countries have been found to include a lack of resources, limited technical expertise and corruption.

The needs of trafficking victims may differ from those of smuggled migrants, but some common approaches are required. Awareness-raising is of particular importance in providing victims with information on the protection, assistance and other services that are available to them (see also textbox 5 on IOM’s GAF and HASM). Likewise, the training of prosecutors, judges, police officers, border guards, labour inspection units and social workers is also required, so as to strengthen the capacity of States to provide victims with adequate and appropriate protection. Given the number of women and children (including unaccompanied minors) who are smuggled and trafficked from one country to another, such services must evidently be provided in a gender- and age-sensitive manner. They must also be fine-tuned to address the different levels of exploitation and abuse that are involved in the discrete, but often interconnected, crimes of migrant smuggling and human trafficking.

Certain components of broader strategies for secure border management are especially relevant to combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking, which often depend on fraudulent documents and illicit border crossings. These include improved frontier and pre-frontier management – for example, through passenger pre-inspection, the deployment of immigration liaison officers, advanced passenger information agreements, and carrier sanctions, as well as improved personal documentation for migrants, including identity cards, machine-readable codes on passports and travel documents, and the use of biometrics.

To enhance intra-governmental coordination in combating smuggling and trafficking, governments such as the Australian Government, the Philippine Government and the US Government have created inter-ministerial mechanisms to deal with the multifaceted policy issues of the phenomena. Effective national policies also require consultation with civil society, especially migrant groups. For example, analysis of why it may be difficult to transfer Australia’s successful policy approach to migrant smuggling and human trafficking to other national contexts includes the observation that certain of these policies would be difficult to implement in European countries, in particular, where they might risk causing tension among ethnic communities.\textsuperscript{77}

### 4.8 Mixed flows

Mixed flows, or ‘mixed migratory movements’, occur when refugees are included in migratory movements. They use the same routes and

\textsuperscript{75} GAO (2006).

\textsuperscript{76} Koser (2008).

\textsuperscript{77} Koser (2005).
means of transport, they employ the services of the same smugglers, and they purchase fraudulent documents from the same suppliers. They move along the same routes, through the same transit countries, and often in the hope of reaching the same countries of destination. In many cases, these refugees are joined by other people on the move with specific protection and assistance needs and rights, including victims of human trafficking, as well as unaccompanied and separated children. There is a broad consensus that such movements are likely to increase in the years to come.78

The people involved in mixed flows, be they refugees or other types of migrants, experience many of the same hazards and human rights violations in the course of their journey. These include detention and imprisonment in unacceptable conditions, physical abuse and racial harassment, as well as vulnerability to theft, extortion, impoverishment and destitution. Those who travel by boat are at risk of interception, abandonment and drowning at sea, while those who move by land may be returned or transferred to remote or dangerous locations. People on the move who lose or destroy their identity documents may be unable to establish their nationality, becoming effectively stateless and finding it very difficult to return to their own country.

Such flows are of growing interest to a number of organizations and regional bodies, including IOM, the International Federation for Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), a number of RCPs (including the Mediterranean Transit Migration Dialogue), the Council of Europe, and the African Union (AU). UNHCR also has a particular concern that national measures intended to deter irregular migration may be applied indiscriminately and make it very difficult, if not impossible, for refugees to enter a country where they can apply for asylum. UNHCR is working with governments and other stakeholders in an attempt to ensure that the drive to impose stricter forms of migration management does not compromise the right of asylum. The basis of this strategy is to be found in an initiative entitled ‘Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: a 10 Point Plan of Action’. Key elements include: putting in place arrangements for refugees and asylum-seekers to be identified upon arrival and to be given the opportunity to have their asylum applications properly considered; improving current arrangements relating to the safe and speedy disembarkation of passengers who are rescued or intercepted at sea; and strengthening the capacity of States to develop the policies, practices and institutions needed to admit asylum-seekers to their territory, to assess their claims and to provide solutions for those who qualify for refugee status.

IOM is undertaking five major areas of work in response to the challenges of mixed flows. The first is to provide direct assistance to migrants – for example, via the Global Assistance Fund (GAF) and the Humanitarian Assistance to Stranded Migrants (HASM) Fund (see text-box 5) to provide assistance to trafficked men, women and children, as well as other stranded or particularly vulnerable migrants. The second is to help States develop appropriate policy and legislation, and to implement it in an equal and non-discriminatory manner. The third is to provide training to relevant stakeholders, including government officials, private sector companies (for example, in India) and civil society (for example, in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), as well as assisting policymakers at the regional level – for example, through the African Capacity Building Centre (in the United Republic of Tanzania) and the Migration Research and Training Centre (in the Republic of Korea). The fourth involves the dissemination of information to potential migrants and in destination countries – for example, via radio campaigns in Somalia and awareness-raising programmes for schoolchildren in the South Caucasus. The final area of focus involves promoting partnerships and cooperation, including at the inter-State level and inter-agency levels. These last two initiatives are considered separately in the final two sections below.

78 Crisp (2008).
Textbox 5: IOM’s Global Assistance Fund (GAF) for the Protection and Reintegration of Trafficked Persons and the Humanitarian Assistance to Stranded Migrants (HASM) Fund

In view of the increasing number of vulnerable migrants in countries of destination, transit and origin, IOM created the Global Assistance Fund (GAF) as an emergency support mechanism to provide case-specific assistance to men, women and children who have been trafficked across international borders, and who are not eligible for assistance through comparable regional or national-level projects. It aims to provide safe accommodation, medical care, psychosocial support, legal assistance, assistance with retrieving lost or stolen travel documents and career counselling, to mention a few.

GAF also offers the option of assisted voluntary return in cases in which the beneficiary expresses a wish to return to his or her home country, as well as reintegration assistance, which may consist of post-arrival reception assistance, educational support either for the beneficiary or for his or her children, skills training, or small business grants to support income-generating activities.

Funded by the US Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM), GAF has provided direct assistance to more than 1,120 victims of trafficking since its inception in 2000 and serves an increasingly diverse range of beneficiaries every year.

Similarly, IOM has created the Humanitarian Assistance to Stranded Migrants (HASM) Fund, providing assistance to stranded migrants regardless of their status (i.e. smuggled or trafficked, irregular or regular) so long as there is an established humanitarian need and a confirmed desire to move, and the migrants are not eligible for any other programme administered by IOM or other agencies.

The objective of the HASM is twofold:

• to provide flexible and speedy humanitarian assistance to stranded migrants in difficult circumstances for whom support is not readily available from any known sources or programmes;
• to derive, from the information collected in providing such assistance, a clearer picture of changing tendencies in irregular migration in order to assist in devising counter measures that can be included in future IOM programming.

Since 2006, HASM has assisted 1,286 individuals in returning to their home country.


4.9 Information campaigns

An important, more general, response to mixed flows and irregular migration is information dissemination targeting potential migrants who might be contemplating hazardous journeys and information campaigns aimed at host communities. IOM has extensive experience in this field. For example, in September 2009, in partnership with the other members of the Mixed Migration Task Force (MMTF), IOM launched a radio campaign to prevent mixed migratory movements through Somalia, help migrants make informed decisions and improve the capacities of host communities to receive migrants and to assist and protect them. In West Africa, in areas of high emigration pressure, where unemployed youth are most likely to seek better economic opportunities via irregular migration routes to Europe or the Maghreb, IOM has set up targeted youth-employment projects that include training and access to microcredit, and carries out information and awareness-raising campaigns on the dangers of irregular migration. With regard to counter-trafficking, IOM works in the countries of the South Caucasus to develop and introduce modules on trafficking in persons (aimed at older schoolchildren) into the national education curricula. Information dissemination initiatives on counter-trafficking also include collaboration with the international advertising company Saatchi & Saatchi on a campaign urging consumers and businesses to ‘buy responsibly’; the campaign was launched on the third EU Anti-trafficking Day on 18 October 2009.
In collaboration with the governments concerned, IOM also supports the establishment and operation of migrant resource centres in countries of origin. The centres perform the dual task of providing impartial, accurate and reliable advice and information to prospective migrants about regular migration opportunities, the labour market and living conditions in destination countries, as well as alerting them to the risks of irregular migration. One example is the network of centres recently established in western Balkan countries under the auspices of a European Commission AENEAS project and implemented by IOM in partnership with the ILO and local employment offices.

4.10 Partnerships and cooperation

Cooperation, both between States and between agencies, as well as with civil society, is critical to reinforcing the understandings of irregular migration forged at the grass-roots level and to sharing good practices across countries and regions.

At the inter-State level, RCPs, such as the Puebla Process and the Bali Process, provide an important platform for dialogue and cooperation, particularly in regions where mixed migration movements are especially prevalent. In recent years, the Colombo Process – an RCP for the management of overseas employment and contractual labour for Asian countries of origin and supported by IOM – has been particularly active in promoting legal migration as a means of reducing irregular migration. The first-ever meeting hosted by a destination Gulf country (the United Arab Emirates), bringing together the 11 Asian labour countries of origin and the GCC countries of destination, was held in Abu Dhabi on 21 to 22 January 2008 and resulted in the creation of the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. It highlighted the potential of contractual labour mobility to benefit overseas workers as well as the development of both countries of origin and destination in Asia, through the establishment of key action-oriented partnerships. The concluding document, the Abu Dhabi Declaration (2008), focused on:

- enhancing knowledge in the areas of labour market trends, skills profiles, temporary contractual workers and remittance policies and flows and their interplay with development in the region;
- building capacity for effective matching of labour demand and supply;
- preventing illegal recruitment practices and promoting welfare and protection measures for contractual workers, supportive of their well-being and preventing their exploitation at origin and destination;
- developing a framework for a comprehensive approach to managing the entire cycle of temporary contractual mobility that fosters the mutual interests of countries of origin and destination.

As part of its efforts, the Colombo Process has been providing training courses for labour attachés and overseas employment administrators in various countries. It has carried out policy studies on topics such as the protection of migrant workers, minimum standard employment contracts, best practices in pre-departure orientation programmes, and training and skill development for migrant workers. Initiatives such as the Colombo Process and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, if followed up by implementation of the proposed actions, can play a useful role in reducing irregular migration and enhancing the benefits of regular migration for the migrants as well as the countries involved.

At the inter-agency level, the Praesidium Project constitutes a model response whereby, at the request of, and in collaboration with, the Government of Italy, IOM worked together with UNHCR and the Italian Red Cross to provide information, counselling, protection and assistance to the large numbers of migrants arriving by boat on Lampedusa and other locations in Sicily. The three agencies also pre-screened the arrivals to identify persons in need of special assistance, and to ensure that

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79 Attaining Energy-Efficient Mobility in an Ageing Society (AENEAS) is a new European project in the framework of the Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE) programme. The project’s objective is to become the cornerstone for international reference projects in the field of urban mobility of older people.

80 Shah (2010).
they were referred to appropriate procedures or structures, according to their specific needs. Other pertinent forms of inter-agency collaboration include those taking place within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and with the EU Border Agency (Frontex) and the World Health Organization (WHO), which are two of the partner organizations in the ‘Increasing Public Health Safety Alongside the New Eastern European Border Line’ (PHBLM) Project, co-funded by the European Commission, which provides individualized health care to migrants. The project also aims to build the capacity of border management and public health staff, and to minimize public health risks. With regard to providing assistance to migrants in detention, IOM Lisbon collaborates with the Government of Portugal and the Jesuit Refugee Service to monitor conditions in closed detention centres in which arriving irregular migrants may also be temporarily held until their situation is verified.

Civil society can also be an important partner, especially in protecting the rights of vulnerable irregular migrants. Often irregular migrants are unwilling or unable to access even basic services to which they may actually be entitled, and the burden of assistance falls on church groups and non-governmental organizations. Besides providing immediate assistance, such civil society actors can help identify irregular migrants with particular needs, victims of trafficking or those who may be eligible for refugee status. Equally, through its unique access and the trust that is often developed with irregular migrants, civil society can also help identify sources of exploitation, from unscrupulous employers to agents including smugglers and traffickers.
5. MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

In recent years, there has been a sea change in thinking about migration and development. For many years, the focus was on migration as a problem, either because it was seen as a consequence of a lack of development, or because of fears about a ‘brain drain’ of skilled workers. Today, there is a much greater recognition among policymakers that migration can contribute to development, and that these benefits can be enhanced where policymakers have the capacities to manage migration effectively.

In addition to contributing to economic growth in destination countries, migration can contribute to poverty reduction and economic growth in origin countries, particularly as a result of the remittances sent back by migrants (see map 7 – comparing remittance flows with foreign aid received by region), through investments by diaspora associations, and when migrants go home.

A huge amount of attention is already being paid to realizing the full potential of migration for development, including through a range of capacity-building initiatives. Looking to the future, there are sound reasons to suppose that this potential will only increase, thus accentuating the need for capacities to respond to the challenges. One reason is that the predicted increase in labour mobility worldwide is expected to result in an increase in remittances sent home by migrants – these already amount to over USD 300 billion per year and their volume has risen rapidly in recent years, apart from a temporary dip during the global financial crisis. The rise of the global Internet is accelerating the pace of technological diffusion, making it easier for individual migrants and their associations to influence and invest in their countries of origin – for example, the Web is predicted to become a critical tool in distributing educational content. Meanwhile, the growing impetus towards temporary migration programmes and circular migration means that the scale of return migration – both temporary and permanent – is also likely to increase in the future. As explained in section 2, the significant political will and institutional momentum around the ‘migration–development nexus’ represents another reason and opportunity to focus on capacity-building in this area.

Capacity-building is required not just to enhance the positive outcomes of migration for development, but also to reduce or prevent potentially negative outcomes. In certain circumstances, for example, remittances can become a disincentive to work for those left at home, and diaspora investments can exacerbate disparities, including gender disparities. Return migration is often not sustainable for the migrants involved. Migration can also result in the departure of a country’s brightest, best-educated and most entrepreneurial citizens, depriving the State of revenue and preventing countries of origin from gaining an early return on the investment.

81 Ratha et al. (2010).
they have made in the education and training of those people. This is a particular challenge in the health sector, and may be exacerbated by the increasing demand for health-care workers that has been predicted for OECD countries in the next 20 years, if this demand cannot be met through the domestic labour force.\textsuperscript{82}

A final caveat is that the global financial crisis made it clear that enhancing the linkages between migration and development cannot replace development policies. Shocks to the global economy are cyclical and can be expected again, and during economic downturns migrants are often the first to lose their jobs or suffer deteriorating working conditions, including remuneration. Remittances may be reduced, albeit temporarily, and destination countries often introduce policies to prioritize nationals in the labour force.\textsuperscript{83} Migration should be an integral part of national development plans, but not a surrogate for them.

To realize more fully the potential of migration to contribute to development, more effective capacities may be required in the following ten core areas:

1. mainstreaming migration in development plans;
2. optimizing formal remittance flows;
3. enhancing the developmental impacts of remittances;
4. engaging diasporas;
5. consolidating knowledge networks;
6. strengthening the links between return and development;
7. promoting circular migration;
8. training to retain;
9. developing ethical recruitment policies;
10. institutional capacity-building.

5.1 Mainstreaming migration in development plans

There is a strong case for mainstreaming migration in national and regional development plans and poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). This allows for migration to be embedded in the broader development debate, which fosters a coherent approach rather than piecemeal uncoordinated actions; it ensures that migration is included in national development priorities, which usually enjoy a high level of political support; it facilitates coordination among all government departments and the creation of synergies between the work of national actors; it places migration issues within a holistic planning framework that involves assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation; and it can facilitate funding and technical assistance for migration activities through the mobilization of resources from international partners for development plans.

Nevertheless, migration as an issue is still rarely acknowledged in development planning tools. Some of the reasons for this, which require targeted capacity-building, include: a lack of understanding of the linkages between migration and development; inadequate financial resources; the fact that migration as a portfolio is often fragmented across government departments and thus there is no single ‘champion’ within government to mainstream the topic; and the multiplicity of development planning tools used by developing countries, which hinders the effective, coherent integration of migration as a development issue.

A recent inter-agency handbook identifies in detail the capacity-building priorities for mainstreaming migration into development planning (see textbox 6).\textsuperscript{84} Critical steps include: establishing a plan to collect and analyse relevant data; preparing national migration profiles; creating an institutional migration and development structure; developing a national plan of action on migration and development; securing international organization expertise; setting up a core team including a national focal point and expert facilitator; awareness-raising for government, donors, international organizations, NGOS, academia and the private sector; undertaking a scoping mission; and

\textsuperscript{82} OECD (2009).
\textsuperscript{83} Koser (2010).
\textsuperscript{84} IOM (2010).
developing a funding proposal. Cross-cutting capacity requirements include expert advice on institutional reform, leadership capacities, training and mechanisms for accountability. What is needed now is to test the handbook in some pilot countries to demonstrate how capacities to mainstream migration into national development plans can be enhanced.

**Textbox 6: Handbook on mainstreaming migration into development strategies**

Mainstreaming migration in development and poverty reduction planning may be defined as the process of assessing the implications of migration on any action (or goals) planned in a development and poverty reduction strategy, including legislation, policies and programme, and at all levels (local, national and, if applicable, regional). It is a process for integrating migration issues in a balanced manner into the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in any sphere related to development and poverty reduction. The goal of this process is to provide support for a more development-friendly approach to migration.

However, migration as an issue is rarely acknowledged in development planning tools and remains at a conceptual rather than practical level. Some poverty reduction strategy papers refer to the benefits of remittances (as in Bangladesh, Ghana and Liberia), while others refer to migration in a more negative light, focusing on human trafficking, the loss of skilled professionals, health-related problems and the spread of disease (Uganda), increased poverty and slum-dwelling (United Republic of Tanzania) and criminality (Zambia). Policy measures linking migration with development therefore tend towards law-enforcement activities (curbing irregular migration and trafficking and strengthening immigration and customs services), rather than harnessing beneficial effects such as remittances.

Recognizing this gap, IOM, UNDP, the ILO and UNICEF collaborated to develop Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners. The aim of this handbook is to show how migration can be systematically integrated into development planning, and to guide governments and their partners through this uncharted process in order to give practical meaning to the concept of migration and development. The handbook does not prescribe a uniform policy or programme, but rather provides guidance, ideas and suggestions so that countries can tailor their migration and development approach to suit their context.

The handbook targets government officials as well as officials from international, regional and national organizations who are supporting the development planning process (UN agencies, donors, private sector, civil society, academia), providing a step-by-step guide for those most closely involved in directing the mainstreaming process. The handbook comprises two main parts that address:

- a process for mainstreaming migration into development, which describes the institutional structures and policy frameworks that need to be implemented and how migration can be integrated at different levels of the development planning cycle;
- a compilation of migration and development programme experiences that show how migration can be used to benefit development in a practical way, through programmes, interventions and projects (intended as a reference section prompting ideas and providing inspiration for action).

Source: Global Migration Group, “Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners”, to be published by IOM.

Another capacity requirement that crosses all the stages of this process is consultation. For a migration and development initiative to be successful and sustainable, it needs broad national ownership and should involve government, civil society and donors/development partners, parliamentarians, academics and the private sector. Participation of stakeholders can be at different levels: some may be involved in broader development planning consultations, while others may be convened in specialist working groups.

### 5.2 Optimizing formal remittance flows

It is generally agreed that remittances transferred through formal rather than
informal systems are more likely to be leveraged for development. In addition, formal transfers can reduce the risk that migrants and recipients will be exploited by clandestine money-laundering networks. The best ways to optimize formal remittance flows are already well understood. These include reducing the costs and increasing the speed and efficiency of formal transfers – for example, through the promotion of competition between transfer providers; disseminating information to both migrants and receivers about opportunities for formal transfers and the risks of informal transfers; providing training in financial literacy; and promoting the development of new technologies for money transfer (for instance, using cell phones). Achieving these goals, however, requires considerable capacity-building in both origin and destination countries and among an array of stakeholders. Some of the more innovative examples of capacity-building are outlined below.

An initial capacity requirement involves assessing what proportion of transfers in any given remittance channel is sent informally, and to understand the reasons why. An example of data collection and research undertaken by a civil society organization is the Information and Resource Centres for Labour Migrants (IRCLMs) in Tajikistan, which has systematically gathered and integrated information on remittances as part of its work – for example, by including questions on remittances in the brochures and leaflets they distribute to clients.

A good model of how origin countries can enhance the developmental impact of remittances is the Government of Albania’s National Action Plan on Remittances.85 It is comprehensive, including specific measures to improve data collection, expand banking services, develop partnerships between Albanian banks and those in the main destination countries for Albanian migrants (especially Greece and Italy), strengthen Albanian microfinance institutions (MFIs), increase knowledge of and access to formal remittance channels for migrants and their families, and strengthen relations between the government and the Albanian diaspora. In the Republic of Moldova, IOM and the ILO, working with local partners, are developing a comprehensive mass information campaign on remittances and financial literacy, utilizing television and radio, using a volunteer network for field outreach, and working with the Border Guard Service to distribute materials at border-crossing checkpoints.

In host countries, a relatively new target for capacity-building is employers’ and workers’ organizations. Employers can, for example, pool transactions to reduce costs and ensure the safety and efficiency of remittance transfers by having them sent directly to the employee’s home account. There is also scope for payroll deduction of transfers, which can result in bulk discounts in the transfer process. Employers can offer on-site banking with access to an ATM machine or mobile bank units, which is an attractive alternative to paying migrant workers through a pay cheque that needs to be cashed at considerable expense by those without a bank account. Knowledge gaps around affordable money transfer mechanisms have been found to particularly affect women’s remitting capacity (as women tend to send less money but more frequently than their male counterparts) and workers’ organizations and civil society can also play an important role in developing financial literacy among women migrants in host countries.

More generally, there has been found to be a correlation between the level of integration of migrants and their preponderance to remit, thus highlighting the importance of capacity-building in the field of integration for promoting the links between migration and development. Legal status, for example, is an important variable in determining the extent to which migrants make contributions to their country of origin. Capacity-building for integration is considered in more detail in the next section.

In terms of developing the appropriate physical infrastructure to facilitate formal remittances, and testing the value of new

technologies such as cell phones, partnerships are required between migrant origin and destination countries, often involving not just bilateral governmental agreements, but also the private sector and civil society. Filipino Overseas Workers Resource Centres (FWRCs), for example, gather information on cheaper remittance transfer options, and also identify and engage with local money transfer agencies in order to reduce costs and speed up transfers. The FWRCs’ links to the government also enable them to negotiate cost-reducing bilateral agreements with service providers. In some countries, new legal frameworks will be required to facilitate and secure remittance transfers through new technologies. IOM has worked with the Universal Postal Union to establish a new formal channel for remittances between the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda, which it is considering expanding to other countries.

5.3 Enhancing the developmental impacts of remittances

While it is important to understand that remittances are private monies, and that the scope for policy to intervene in how they are spent is thus appropriately limited, capacities can still be developed to encourage the investment of remittances in projects that contribute to community development and have an impact beyond that of the immediate recipients (see textbox 7 on the Joint Migration and Development Initiative supporting civil society organizations and local authorities in linking migration and development).

In the Republic of Moldova, for example, a proposal currently under consideration by the Government involves providing special privileges, such as temporary exemptions from all taxes and from State inspections, for enterprises set up with capital financed from remittances. Another initiative, also in the Republic of Moldova, involves establishing a scheme for loans to migrant families using remittances as a guarantee. In Colombia, IOM has worked with the Chamber of Commerce in the town of Armenia (MICROS) to increase access to microcredit for Colombian migrants in Spain, using remittances. IOM has also promoted the AESCO Microcredit Fund, focusing on migrants’ families in Colombia and using remittances for repayment of the credit. The credit is oriented towards productive projects and education.

Such initiatives are of limited value unless remitters and recipients are aware of them and have the capacity to engage. In several countries, Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) facilitate the use of remittances for development by providing information on opportunities for investment. In the Philippines, FWRCs provide comprehensive information on philanthropic investment opportunities in the Philippines to migrants and their families, and have also encouraged temporary contractual workers from the same region to pool their resources to fund the construction of classrooms in their home region. Similarly the Congolese Maison des Congolais de l’Etranger et des Migrants (MCDEM) provides information on business-related investment opportunities for returnees and migrants.

Working with particular communities of origin in Colombia, IOM has developed pre-departure training programmes on how to develop business plans and how to orient remittances towards income-generating activities and productive projects for prospective migrants. In Tajikistan, Information and Resource Centres for Labour Migrants (IRCLMs) provide information on IOM projects focusing on the investment of remittances in social infrastructure.

A critical aspect of capacity-building to support all such initiatives is the development of a banking system and business environment that is conducive to investment. Best practice, in this regard, is to adopt an integrated and holistic approach, thus improving the investment climate for all enterprises, rather than creating new distortions by granting special privileges to one particular sector. The Ministry of Economy and Trade in the Republic of Moldova has acknowledged the need for

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analysis of successful models and policies from other remittance-affected countries to develop concrete proposals for their application in the Moldovan context. An initial proposal involves the establishment of a legal, regulatory and institutional fiscal framework to support the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Even more fundamental than such business- and investment-specific capacities is the overall need in countries trying to attract remittances and enhance their impact on development to cut red tape, sustainably combat corruption and establish the rule of law. This is another example of where capacity-building outside the direct area of migration is essential for the effective management of migration, and the importance of coordination between different parts of government is further addressed in section 8.

Textbox 7: Joint Migration and Development Initiative

The EC–UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI), a EUR 15 million, three-year programme funded by the European Commission and implemented by UNDP in close partnership with IOM, ILO, UNFPA and UNHCR, supports civil society organizations and local authorities seeking to link migration and development. The specific focus of the JMDI is justified by the fact that civil society and local authorities are among the most active players implementing concrete initiatives in this field, yet they are the ones most in need of support. The JMDI sets out to provide that support through a EUR 10 million call for proposals, which provides grants to 55 projects linking small-scale groups and local authorities in the European Union and in 16 target countries in the developing world (Algeria, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Morocco, Nigeria, the Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Tunisia). In addition to funding projects, the JMDI has also launched an online global community, M4D-Net (www.migration4development.org), which brings together individuals and groups from around the world to exchange information and ideas on migration and development, develop skills and provide mutual support.

One of the main aims of the JMDI is to support the capacity development of civil society groups and local institutions working on migration and development. At the overall programme level, applicants for funding were guided throughout the application process and pre-selected applicants received feedback on their proposals. Grantees have access to advice and support from JMDI staff in Brussels and on the ground, and an online training tool is being developed. One of the final outputs of the programme is a set of policy recommendations on migration and development, which will draw on the lessons learned and good practices arising from JMDI-funded projects and from discussions among the online community supported by the JMDI. Alongside the policy recommendations, which will also be geared towards the governments of migrant-origin and -destination countries, the JMDI is contributing to the ongoing UN–IOM effort to mainstream migration within developing countries’ poverty reduction strategies.

At the project level, a number of JMDI-funded projects also specifically focus on building the capacity of civil society organizations, local authorities and other actors such as local credit unions or health-care professionals – as in the case of an initiative implemented in the Kayes region of Mali by local authorities, assisted by a French research group, to map and codify good practices in the area of migration and development, or of a Senegalese project that links local credit unions with the French ethical finance circuit.


5.4 Engaging diasporas

Besides sending home money on an individual basis, migrants can also make contributions to their origin countries collectively, via migrant or diaspora associations, including hometown associations. Particularly where these are professional associations – for example, of engineers, doctors or education professionals – additional short-term contributions can be made through arrangements such as secondment or sabbatical arrangements. In other cases, members of the diaspora may choose to return permanently – for example, at the end of a conflict in their origin country – and how to link permanent return with development is considered below (section 5.6).
In recent years, an array of government initiatives has been introduced to harness the potential of diasporas for development. For example, a 2009 review of measures taken in 30 developing countries reveals the existence of 45 different types of diaspora institutions occupying different levels of government and exhibiting diverse priorities and degrees of organization. While a growing number of governments increasingly acknowledge the importance of diaspora engagement, many still lack the capacity to design effective diaspora policies and to implement them on a meaningful scale.87

Lessons learned from existing initiatives, such as IOM’s Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) programme, highlight a series of capacity-building requirements.88 A matching procedure is required, for example, whereby members of the diaspora who wish to return on a short-term basis can be matched with work opportunities in their origin country. The capacity requirement in the origin country is therefore that of identifying and prioritizing the sectors where returnees can contribute. Placements under MIDA also take place in the private sector, where defined terms of reference and monitoring by the hosting institution are required. Finally, placements also need to be linked to existing development and reconstruction strategies.

Equally, diaspora communities need to be aware of opportunities for return, which highlights the need for information dissemination. Preparatory visits can be necessary to ensure that facilities for placements are adequate in the host institution. If the migrant has been overseas for a long period of time, or was born abroad, cultural orientation may be required – for example, about the particular sector to which he or she plans to return to work in. Virtual networking and teleconferencing can be a useful way to make initial contact between the migrant and host institution, even before return, and to maintain contacts and knowledge transfer after the end of the secondment period.

One of the main challenges of achieving diaspora engagement is that, by definition, a range of stakeholders is involved. The governments of the origin and host country will be involved in legal aspects, such as the issuance of visas, and often also contribute funding; the migrant’s employer in the destination country will need to authorize a period of leave, while the host institution in the origin country will need to have the capacity to take full advantage of the return opportunity; and migrant associations in the destination country can play an important role in information dissemination, while the logistical expertise and coordination experience of international organizations such as IOM is usually necessary. Clear institutional responsibilities and coordination mechanisms are thus important capacities to develop. One of the recommendations of an internal review of the MIDA programme in the health sector in Ghana, for example, was that IOM transfer ownership of the programme to the Ministry of Health in Ghana, on the basis of clear milestones. Another was to more proactively contact industries and other development projects in Ghana and abroad for financial support and for supplies and equipment for specific projects. A further recommendation was to hold an annual stakeholder conference that includes staff of teaching hospitals, medical directors in hospitals, regional directors of health, key medical facilities and the donor community, to review progress.

Partly because of the coordination efforts required, and the corresponding financial requirements, civil society, especially in origin countries, has not yet become fully engaged with diaspora mobilization, and this represents a significant capacity-building requirement. There are some examples of good practice. In September 2009, the Centre d’Information et de Gestion des Migrations (CIGEM) in Mali launched a series of initiatives aimed at involving Malians residing abroad in co-development projects, within the framework of an EC-funded diaspora-engagement programme. The Congolese MCDEM actively maintains links with diaspora groups, such as the Belgian-based diaspora NGO Entreprendre-CEDITA, and these groups

87 Agunias (2010).
88 http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/的伟大/全球战略_mida.pdf
jointly organized the Forum Economique de la Diaspora Congolaise (The Economic Forum of the Congolese Diaspora) in August 2009, to promote dialogue between the Government and around 400 members of the diaspora to facilitate their investment in the country.\textsuperscript{89} As a further example of civil society activities in destination countries, the Portuguese National Immigrant Support Centre (CNAI) has assisted in outreach for the IOM ‘DIAS De Cabo Verde’ initiative, which aims to mobilize the human, social and professional resources of the Cape Verdean diaspora for the development of their country of origin.

While there are many new diaspora initiatives, a key problem stems from a lack of sustained commitment within governments.\textsuperscript{90} Critical technical know-how is acquired typically through years of trial and error, but many government initiatives on diasporas tend to be short-lived, according to an assessment prepared for this report.\textsuperscript{91} Furthermore, longstanding programmes such as the Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA) in the Philippines have not been subject to a great deal of monitoring and evaluation.

### 5.5 Consolidating knowledge networks

Given the types of bureaucratic hurdles to even short-term return, highlighted in the previous section, another way to engage the diaspora is through the development of knowledge networks, allowing for the transfer of skills and expertise without necessitating a physical return (sometimes referred to as ‘virtual return’). Alternatively, these can be complementary approaches, with knowledge networks established, for example, to maintain momentum after an initial secondment.

The rapid growth of the Internet is making this an increasingly feasible option, although there are important reservations. There are three main areas for capacity-building to establish and consolidate such knowledge networks. First, members of the diaspora need to be employed in relevant sectors and occupations – giving rise to capacity-building requirements (described below) concerning issues such as the integration of migrants, access to the labour market, and recognition of qualifications. Second, the appropriate technology is needed both in origin and destination countries to allow for knowledge transfer – including the Internet and video-conferencing. Third, the origin country needs to have the capacity and, in particular, appropriately trained personnel to implement the knowledge that is transferred.

A concrete example of a knowledge network is the RAICES Programme established in 2007 by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (SeCyT) in Argentina. It aims to link Argentine scientists abroad with local research groups in order to help the country capitalize on the work carried out by Argentine scientists living abroad. The SeCyT provides technical and electronic support and carries out coordination and promotion activities. It also offers access to its building and technological infrastructure, meeting rooms and videoconferencing systems. SeCyT subsidies are used to finance knowledge networks and hold virtual forums, seminars and workshops.

### 5.6 Strengthening the links between return and development

Some of the capacities required to achieve sustainable return were considered in section 3.9 – for example, regarding counseling, training and job placement. Sustainable return is not necessarily the same as return that contributes towards wider development, however, and this is a distinction that is often not appreciated.\textsuperscript{92} In most countries, there has been even less investment in linking return with development than in trying to achieve sustainable return, and even the latter goal has proved hard to achieve.

\textsuperscript{89} Allafrica.com (2009).
\textsuperscript{90} Agunias (2010).
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
One promising avenue for strengthening the link between return and development is to support enterprise development among return migrants. There is evidence from Colombia, for example, that the participation of return migrants in small business helped stave off economic recession during the 1990s. A number of factors have been cited in the research literature as facilitating entrepreneurial activities among returning migrant workers. One is their capacity to save while abroad. Another is their ability to create synergies with local government that often cannot be formed by foreign investors without national ties. A third factor is the scale of public and private investments in business compared to the quantity of people returning. Additional factors cited in the literature include length of time spent abroad, gender, marital status, number of dependants, education and work experience. The evidence on the significance of reintegration programmes as a factor facilitating enterprise development is mixed. It has been suggested that too much attention has been paid to providing start-up financial capital and training in business techniques, and too little to the development of social capital—for example, through developing local networks of trust. It has also been found that the main obstacles to enterprise development among returning migrant workers are the constraining and restricting national policies, laws and regulations in the countries to which migrant workers are returning—for example, concerning permits to build premises or employ workers.

A series of practical capacity-building interventions can be conceived to support entrepreneurship among returning migrants. One is an analysis of national labour and product markets in the return country, in order to provide better information and data on which to base more effective matching of labour market and product market demands and returning migrant workers. A second is to review existing reintegration and enterprise programmes applicable to returning migrant workers, to develop a framework for best practice in designing interventions on reintegration and enterprise development within the specific national context. A third is the establishment of a programme of assistance for enterprise development among returning migrant workers, including vocational training and counselling services, access to microcredit financing, and technical assistance for national and regional-level policymakers, legislators and representatives from trade unions and the private sector. A good example is the Georgia reintegration centre, which provides job counselling and referrals for return migrants. A fourth intervention would be the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation programme, to ensure that those enterprises that are established are sustainable and make a maximum contribution to poverty reduction and economic development.

5.7 Promoting circular migration

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (2007) used the following working definition of circular migration: “the fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or permanent movement, which, when it occurs voluntarily and is linked to labour needs of countries of origin and destination, can be beneficial to all involved.” Without underestimating challenges such as the protection of the rights of short-term migrant workers and of their reintegration back home, considerable political momentum has developed around promoting circular migration. In the specific context of development in origin countries, its advantages include the fact that human capital is not lost permanently, that circular migrants may be particularly incentivized to send home remittances to prepare for their return, and that when they do return they may bring back new skills.

Capacity-building is required throughout the cycle of circular migration, from pre-departure, through insertion in the labour market, to reintegration in the origin country and procedures to potentially permit periodic re-entry into the destination country to work.

As part of an EU–Aeneas-funded programme on circular migration between Colombia and
Spain – the Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) programme – training and counselling sessions (involving conflict resolution and team work, among other things) were provided for temporary migrants before their departure, along with their families, to prepare them for the process of separation and help them maintain family ties. Counselling continued with family members after the departure of the migrant workers.97

In response to an identified need to gather and disseminate information on nationals interested in working abroad, the Mauritius Circular Migration Database (MCMD) was developed by IOM and the Government of Mauritius as an online tool for storing information on candidates interested in job opportunities abroad, in order to match the local labour supply with demand of foreign employers for temporary workers. The MCMD also enables foreign employers to make an online selection of candidates who best suit their desired profile. The Mauritius circular migration programme is also noteworthy for providing robust pre-departure training for potential migrants, including training on their rights and obligations in destination countries, cultural issues and access to services, as well as practical information, such as emergency hotlines.

In destination countries, many of the capacity requirements identified in section 3 regarding temporary migration also apply – for example, with regard to the duration of the work permit, conditions for switching employer, and the protection of migrant workers’ rights, as well as identification of sectors that lend themselves to circular schemes. In the specific context of circular migration, the main policy challenge that recurs in current debates concerns how to encourage return. Options to incentivize return include longer contracts that allow the migrant to pay off the transaction costs associated with migration and earn sufficient additional income; providing an option for re-entry through preferential visa regimes; guaranteeing portable social security benefits; and, in limited cases, providing the option for permanent immigration rather than return. It is widely expected that such incentives will be more likely to succeed if circular migration programmes also contain an element of enforcement, and proposals in this regard include imposing financial security bonds on either migrant workers or their employers; introducing mandatory savings schemes for temporary migrants; and the strict enforcement of employment and immigration laws. While identifying the capacity requirements for achieving these policies is relatively straightforward, the greater challenge involves assessing which combination of policies will actually work. In the particular case of circular migration, pilot programmes are probably a precursor to recommendations on specific capacity-building, in most contexts.

In the case of the TCLM programme between Colombia and Spain, specific efforts are also made in Spain to promote the contribution of migrants to local development upon their return to Colombia. This includes training in entrepreneurship, consultancy workshops aimed at defining and formulating productive social initiatives, courses for co-development community projects, and mentoring in the preparation of business plans.

While it has been made clear in this report that capacities for return and reintegration of migrants tend to be very poorly developed in most origin countries, these gaps are magnified in the case of circular migration. Procedures are required to continue to match workers with potential job openings in the destination country after their return; there may be particular socio-psychological problems arising from short-term return and reintegration into the origin society; and, in order to genuinely fulfil the potential of circular migration for origin countries, returning migrants should be assisted in re-entering the local labour market, even if this is only for a relatively short period of time. For circular migration to become more than simply a one-off temporary migration experience, significant new capacity-building in these sorts of areas will be required in origin countries, in close collaboration with partner destination countries.

97 IOM (2009a).
5.8 Training to retain

One way to reduce the potentially deleterious impact on origin countries of the migration in disproportionate numbers of skilled workers, such as those trained to be doctors, nurses and teachers, is to train more of them and provide incentives for more of them to stay in the origin country rather than migrate for career enhancement. Such an approach is certainly preferable to efforts to prevent workers from legally migrating when their labour is in demand, which run counter to human rights principles regarding the right to leave any country.

There is genuine potential in this approach for responsibilities for capacity-building to be shared among a number of partners. Ultimately, responsibility for providing decent work for citizens rests with their State. Equally, destination countries can benefit from investment in training and retention by increasing the pool of skilled labour available to them, while also reducing the negative impacts on origin countries, and promoting conditions that encourage the return of migrant workers. Additionally, for the private sector in origin countries, there is a clear benefit to ensuring a sustainable supply of appropriately skilled workers.

In the context of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the World Bank has identified a number of key steps for achieving better training and retention of workers: skill development to promote the emergence of knowledge-based economies; improvement of higher education management and provision to promote knowledge-based economies; activation of labour markets; improvement of social protection and labour management for migrants; and promotion of income opportunities and the active citizenship of young people.

Globally, a number of alternative approaches have also been proposed. One is to target incentives in the form of wage supplements for public-sector workers, for whom remuneration and career trajectories are often particularly poor. A second is training tailored to skills that are useful in origin countries but less tradable across borders (for example, paramedics rather than doctors). A third is to reform education financing to allow for private-sector provision so that people seeking training as a way to move abroad do not rely on public funding; this is already taking place in the Philippines, with particular regard to nurses. A fourth is to expand investment in alternative technologies (such as cellphones, Internet telephony and website-enabled distance services) so that skills in short supply can benefit larger numbers of people in the origin country. Finally, development assistance might be better targeted towards, for example, regional and national research institutions, to make up for the loss of innovation and investment occasioned by migration.

5.9 Ethical recruitment policies

The Commonwealth Code of Practice for International Recruitment of Health Workers is often cited as a model for ethical recruitment. In part, its purpose is to ensure the sorts of protections referred to in the previous section on labour mobility (section 3) – for example, regarding providing information so that workers can make an informed decision before migrating, full disclosure of requirements and conditions attached to employment, and the development of sanctions against unethical private recruiters. Its ethical stance is partly derived from its objective of reducing the negative impacts of migration by controlling the outflow of personnel in large numbers from regions and countries where their skills are in short supply and high demand, and by encouraging governments to consider methods of compensation, reparation and restitution for countries affected, including through promoting return. More recently, WHO developed a code of practice intended to establish and promote voluntary principles, standards and practices for the international recruitment of health personnel.

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98 GCIM (2005).
An initial capacity requirement for the introduction of ethical recruitment policies is that of identifying particular sectors in particular developing countries that risk being adversely affected by the emigration of skilled workers.\textsuperscript{101} This will require a coordinated effort to pull together a growing but disparate literature and develop a robust methodology. Understanding the complete picture of the impacts of emigration will require combining quantitative (e.g. modelling demand/growth in training in particular sectors, rate of growth in wages and conditions) and qualitative (e.g. surveying migration intentions) efforts. It will also require considerable context-specific evidence such as information on vacancy rates in key sectors, historical and comparative changes in the distribution of certain key workers, the size and nature of the origin economy, and the migration experience of those who leave (relative incomes, remittances, return). One proposal is for a global audit of so-called ‘brain drain hotspots’ to be carried out.\textsuperscript{102}

Even if such ‘hotspots’ can be identified and appropriate recruitment guidelines developed (perhaps following the Commonwealth Code of Practice), there is evidence that further capacities are required, particularly in the implementation of such guidelines, to make them effective.\textsuperscript{103} They are likely to be most effective, for example, if adhered to by both public- and private-sector recruiting bodies. Their effect will be limited if they are voluntary, and also if private sector recruitment agencies are exempt. It follows that an effective monitoring process is required, combined with enforcement where the guidelines are not adhered to by signatories. These requirements, in turn, point to the need to establish multilateral agreements on this issue, and for governments to work in partnership with the private sector, particularly international recruitment agencies.

\textbf{5.10 Institutional capacity-building}

Effectively linking migration with development requires considerable institutional capacity-building. Within governments in migration origin countries, for example, there is a need to: improve the understanding of, and ability to facilitate, the use of remittances for economic growth; strengthen the institutional, human and infrastructural resource capacities of relevant ministries to implement migration and development policies; improve the reliability of migration and remittance data and the capacity to collect, share and apply such data; improve the knowledge and capacity of migrant workers and their families to channel and use their remittances for investments; facilitate the links between remittances and innovative financial services; and improve the linkages of the government with its diasporas.

Within governments in migrant destination countries, policies specific to migration and development outlined in the preceding section need to be complemented by wider migration capacity-building – for example, with regards to entry to the labour market, integration and policies on return. An immediate implication is that greater coordination between diverse ministries and government agencies is required to effectively improve the contribution of migrants and migration to development.

Equally, partnerships are required between particular sets of origin and destination countries – for example, to facilitate remittances and manage circular migration.

At the same time, the private sector, diaspora associations, workers’ organizations and other non-governmental stakeholders also have an essential role to play in supporting migration and development initiatives. Non-State actors are critical, for example, to establishing and maintaining an ethical and regulated recruitment industry; disseminating information to migrants; lowering the costs of remittances; and engaging diaspora associations. The development of effective consultation mechanisms between government and other stakeholders in society, in both origin and destination countries, is another institutional capacity-building prerequisite.

\textsuperscript{101} GCIM (2005).
\textsuperscript{102} Sriskandarajah (2005).
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid (2005).
Integration can be defined as ‘...the process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups’.\textsuperscript{104} Integration is a two-way process, involving immigrants and the society in the destination country. Furthermore, it takes place both at the individual and collective level. A distinction is often made between economic, social and political integration by migrants and migrant communities. A further distinction exists between different ‘models’ of integration – primarily, assimilation and multiculturalism. In some parts of the world, as emphasized in section 3 above, migrants are generally admitted on a temporary basis only, and thus integration is not always intended as a pathway to permanent settlement or citizenship. Key components of integration policy include: labour market policies; policies related to ethnic entrepreneurship and self-employment; support for vocational or professional training; support for education; housing policies; health policies; naturalization policies; and promotion of civic and political participation.\textsuperscript{105} Particular attention has been paid in recent years to integration in urban areas, and the role of local and regional governments in the process.\textsuperscript{106} The immigrant integration policies adopted in Portugal provide a good example of coordinated and coherent intervention by different stakeholders (see textbox 8).

As has been emphasized throughout this report, significant capacity-building is still required in most countries in the world – and not just developing countries – in order to respond more effectively to current challenges, as well as anticipating future trends. This is certainly the case in the area of migrant integration. On the one hand, across the world, migrants are disproportionately unemployed or underemployed; they are poorly represented at the high end of the labour market; they experience either directly or indirectly prejudice, discrimination and marginalization; they have children who under-perform at school; they do not benefit from adequate political or civic participation; and they under-achieve on a whole range of other indicators of successful integration. In some countries, the global economic crisis has only magnified these effects. In others, there is also a lack of clear political leadership, with political leaders often susceptible to populist pressures.

Multiculturalism is openly questioned and ethnic diversity and social cohesion are widely thought to be irreconcilable. The securitization of migration in the post 9/11 era has only exacerbated suspicion about immigration in the minds of the public. Recent surveys of public attitudes to migrants illustrate the extent of the misconceptions about migration. Yet the challenges of integration are only likely to increase worldwide in the near future. As has already been highlighted, it is expected that some countries that have traditionally been predominantly origin countries for migration will begin to experience increasing

\textsuperscript{104} Penninx (2003).
\textsuperscript{105} Bosswick and Heckmann (2006).
\textsuperscript{106} ECOTEC (2008).
immigration – for example, in Eastern Europe and South Asia – and will need to adapt policies oriented towards the export of labour to policies directed at facilitating the integration prospects of new members of society. In many countries that are already primarily countries of destination, new challenges may include growing numbers of immigrants, increasing diversity of migrants (the term ‘hyper-diversity’ has been coined to describe the scenario whereby no single ethnic group forms the majority of immigrant populations in destination countries), and the increasing concentration of migrants in urban areas, exacerbating congestion effects in schools, housing and health care. In Europe, Japan and other parts of the world that will undergo a demographic transition in the near future, there may well be a decline in the proportion of nationals to migrants, placing still more emphasis on policies for managing diversity and promoting social cohesion in the future. A particular challenge for certain societies in East Asia will be the need to manage marriage migration, the demand for which is rising as a result of demographic imbalances within the population.\footnote{Lee (2010).}

Ten core areas for capacity-building to promote migrant integration are:

1. strengthening economic participation;
2. encouraging civic participation among migrants;
3. simplifying rules on citizenship, nationality and dual nationality;
4. family migration;
5. managing temporary migration;
6. promoting migrant education;
7. strengthening anti-discrimination policies and practices;
8. promoting migrant health;
9. fostering public dialogue;
10. mainstreaming integration across government.

6.1 Strengthening economic participation

The impact on human capital development of the lack of integration of migrants into the formal labour market is clear.\footnote{UNDP (2009).} Research demonstrates that migrants are especially prone to poverty and social exclusion. When they enter into relative poverty, this can become a vicious circle, as poverty and exclusion lead, in turn, to a further set of barriers and obstacles to accessing the labour market, including: isolation, lack of access to information and networks, and physical disability; lack of work experience and references; homelessness; lack of affordable help with caregiving responsibilities; dependence on the welfare system; crime; mental health, drugs, drinking and other health problems; and prejudice by employers. In this way, limited integration prospects inhibit or restrict the potential of migrants to realize their potential as well as to contribute to development in origin and destination countries.

The development – or reinforcement – of a strong legislative framework on access to the labour market for migrants is a fundamental target for capacity-building. In most developed countries, equal job security and workers’ rights are guaranteed in legislation for migrant residents, although this is often not the case in developing countries. Even in developed countries, however, there are legislative gaps and inconsistencies surrounding the rights of temporary migrant workers – for example, concerning the extent to which they can renew their permits or take a period of time to change employers or look for a new job, should they become unemployed, and conditions regarding access to unemployment benefits. As highlighted previously in this report, clear policies on the rights of temporary migrant workers are critical for the effective and future management of labour mobility, including circular migration, and these are also discussed in further detail in section 6.5.

Action by civil society actors at the local level can address some of the reasons why certain migrant populations have limited access to the labour market, even where strong legislation is in place. Civil society can support sensitivity to the employment potential of, and to the barriers to employment for, immigrant populations; build up sustainable
relationships with local employers to support flexible approaches to employment; develop a holistic approach, bringing together a variety of agencies to tackle the multifaceted problems faced by these persons; and provide outreach services to hard-to-reach groups that are isolated from mainstream services in the fields of information, training and entrepreneurship. Such activities are particularly critical in cities, and urban areas are likely to become increasingly important new loci for capacity-building to strengthen the governance of migration.

Surveys reveal that trade unions are often the mainstream organizations in which immigrants are most likely to participate.110 Because trade unions were the historical cradle of immigrant inclusion, because equal rights were granted to all members (regardless of citizenship or legal status) to vote and participate within the organization, they represent a best practice for other economic and civic actors to study. The right to freedom of association is one area where national and international courts play an active role in the review of changing interpretations or restrictions. In 2007, the Spanish Constitutional Court, for example, ruled that certain fundamental rights pertain to every person, regardless of administrative status, among which stand the rights to association and demonstration. At the EU level, a 2004 decision by the European Court of Justice encouraged Austria to extend to all third-country national workers the right to stand for elections as shop-stewards and delegates to the Chamber of Labour.

Textbox 8: Immigrant integration policies in Portugal

Although Portugal has only recently become a country of immigration, the investment made in integration policies in the past few years has had positive outcomes that merit attention. Public attitudes towards immigration, as shown by a 2007 Eurobarometer poll, are among the most positive in Europe (Portugal was the second-most positive country in the EU-25), with the majority of those questioned stating that the contribution of immigrants to Portuguese society was positive. Also in 2007, the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) placed Portugal in second place out of 28 countries in terms of best practice for each policy indicator, set at the highest European standard. Moreover, in the UNDP Human Development Report 2009, Portugal was the country with the best score in terms of attributing rights and providing services to immigrants. The awareness of immigrants’ needs that underlies these policy developments and public opinion reflects Portugal’s emigrant experience. This framework has been very important in terms of public debate and legislative activity on immigration and integration. Recent years have seen the passing of two significant pieces of legislation in Portugal:

- In December 2006, the new Nationality Law was unanimously approved by parliament, and with great consensus in society. This law, which aims to engender a more cohesive society, has significantly liberalized the process for acquisition of nationality. A year after the new law had come into force, over 35,000 applications for nationality had been made – more than triple the number of applications in 2005.
- In May 2007, after broad public consultation, the Immigration Law was also changed and passed by a majority in the Portuguese parliament. The new legislation simplifies procedures and reduces bureaucratic requirements, seeks to promote legal migration, combats irregular migration and facilitates family reunification.

In 1996, recognizing the importance of having a coherent integration policy for immigrants, Portugal also created a State service that intervened on a cross-cutting basis, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. Hence, in Portugal, there is a whole-of-government approach to immigrant integration. In 2007, this State service became a public institute – the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue (ACIDI) – thereby officially recognizing its importance for immigrants, reinforcing its powers, and expanding its areas of activity.

6.2 Encouraging civic participation among migrants

As just described, governments in some developed countries have shown renewed interest in civic participation as a means of making more effective and democratically legitimate decisions on policies affecting a diverse population. This area of integration is, however, one where policies diverge significantly between developed and developing countries, and within the EU, between Western and Eastern Europe.

Granting voting rights is one way of increasing the capacity of migrants to participate in civic life. North and north-western European countries were among the first to grant local voting rights in the 1970s and 1980s and, today, EU citizens living in another Member State can vote and stand for local election in all EU Member States, while non-EU citizens can vote in 15 Member States. This trend has recently re-emerged first in the Czech Republic in 2001, followed by Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia in 2002, Luxembourg and Slovakia in 2003, and Belgium and Ireland in 2004. Local enfranchisement is regularly proposed in political debates in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain, and recently also in cities in Canada and the USA. Once these electoral rights are granted, they are not revoked or seriously challenged. In practice, allowing immigrants to participate in elections comes with neither high implementation nor maintenance costs, and has none of the negative effects often imagined by their opponents.\footnote{Huddleston (2010).}

At a less formal level, the civic participation of migrants can be encouraged through promoting active migrant associations. Indeed, ongoing comparative research in different European cities demonstrates that authorities should invest in immigrant self-organization as a means of integrating into public life. The more foreign residents create their own associations and link up together, the more they trust in public institutions and participate in mainstream organizations and politics. The more government supports, consults and delivers services through these organizations, the more likely they are to become active and effective in public life.\footnote{Huddleston (2009).} Yet, in some countries, there are restrictions on foreigners’ rights to form an association, suggesting the requirement for legislative reform. In many other countries where immigrants are allowed to form associations, dedicated public funding for immigrant associations’ political activities is often unavailable, and funding is therefore another important focus for capacity. Even where migrant associations do exist, they often lack the competencies, skills or networks to effectively participate in public affairs. An example of capacity-building to address
this particular challenge is the ‘Active and Competent Migrants in Civic Society’ project implemented by IOM in Warsaw, Poland, which has convened a series of seminars and workshops to try to establish a sustainable platform for cooperation between migrants and Polish institutions.

6.3 Simplifying rules on citizenship, nationality and dual nationality

Certainly in the European context, it is widely accepted that the State has a democratic, social and economic interest in facilitating the acquisition of nationality by the long-term, non-national population, especially by children born in the country. Immigrants who plan to settle down in their country of residence have an interest in taking up nationality and its full set of rights and responsibilities, including the right to access employment in all parts of the public sector, free movement rights, and full formal democratic rights. Naturalization, which is a form of civic participation in itself, removes the legal obstacles to full civic participation and has an important catalysing effect on the integration process.

The acquisition of nationality represents a major area of weakness in the integration strategies of most recent countries of immigration, partly because there are few international standards governing the process. In the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, for example, domestic laws of citizenship have inconsistent rules on acquisition, and often limit the rights to citizenship for children of migrants. Surveys of policies and rates of migration in developed countries show that most foreign nationals naturalize in traditional settlement countries, such as Australia and Canada, that emphasize the public’s interest in encouraging shared national citizenship. In contrast, in Europe, only a very small proportion of the foreign national population goes through the procedure, a gap that the European Commission has identified as an important area for improvement. For instance, many European countries are adopting more inclusive policies for migrants to obtain a long-term residence status, without facilitating access to nationality. Developing countries often make the acquisition of citizenship for immigrants and their descendants even more onerous, if not impossible. As the settled non-national population increases in many countries in the future, there will need to be a re-examination of the purpose and effect of naturalization policies that may exclude one part of the settled population from shared citizenship. Policies that acknowledge the growing trend towards dual and multiple citizenship/nationality will also need to be explored, since increasing numbers of people are connected to more than one place, either sequentially or simultaneously.113

A particularly politicized debate in the EU concerns the extent to which individual assessments of language ability, civic knowledge or ‘integration’ promote civic participation. It is now relatively common for naturalization procedures to require that applicants, who have lived in the country for many years, have a basic ability in one of their official languages. In 2001, Germany was the only EU country that imposed such conditions on long-term residents; by 2007, this practice had been adopted by Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These language and integration conditions may or may not have the effect of promoting integration. The rationale for introducing these assessments or ‘tests’ is that they act as incentives to learn the country’s language and other salient facts. In the past, however, some countries have removed or simplified such assessments, viewing them as legal deterrents that amplify administrative discretion and serve policy goals other than integration. The outcome of these conditions may simply be a reduction in the number of participating legal residents. Those not selected may not necessarily be those least integrated or fluent, but rather those less educated, less affluent, the elderly, the preliterate, victims of post-traumatic stress disorder, and women in vulnerable situations.

In the future, more and more of the children born and educated in countries to which

113 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/policy-research/international-dialogue-migration/intersessional-workshops/migration-and-transnationalism
their parents immigrated will face unequal opportunities to develop and participate, partly due to their citizenship. Born and socialized in the country of destination (for their parents), like the children of nationals, the so-called second and third generations often see their country of birth as an important part of their identity and know no other country as their own. Many EU Member States have taken a generational approach to meeting their integration objectives in nationality law. The introduction of *ius soli* (birthright citizenship) for immigrants’ descendants means that birth is the sufficient basic criterion for eligibility for nationality. The second generation has an automatic right at birth in traditional countries of immigration such as Canada and the USA. A similar right can be claimed by the third generation in countries such as Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and, since 2009, Luxembourg. For the second generation, however, European countries have moved towards conditional *ius soli*. Citizenship can be acquired only sometime after birth, as in France, and/or only by those born to a legal resident, as in Belgium, Germany and Ireland. The extent to which such generational approaches are appropriate and effective is consistently raised in public debates in the Baltics, Greece, Italy and Switzerland, and is likely to become more important in new countries of destination too.

The global trend towards tolerating multiple nationality (either in part or in full) is removing one of the main obstacles to naturalization, which is a reflection of the reality that, with globalization, more people are leading multi-sited lives – born in one country, educated in another, living and working perhaps in a third, and retiring in the place of origin or yet another location. The majority of EU Member States, for example, no longer require applicants to renounce their previous citizenship, while most others do so only under exceptional circumstances. Origin countries are also recognizing the value of dual citizenship – Ghana’s Citizenship Act of 2001, for example, determines that ‘a citizen of Ghana may hold the citizenship of any other country in addition to his citizenship of Ghana’ (Part III, 16(1)). Overall, the standards and effects of conditions for naturalization need to be regularly evaluated to establish whether or not they are efficient or effective integration incentives. For example, after the introduction of the Australian citizenship test led to a significant drop in applications and a higher failure rate among humanitarian immigrants, a citizen test review recommended that the content should focus on the basic legislative requirements and that the format be simple and in clear English. Economic resource conditions should also be evaluated in terms of the labour market context and implications for democratic governance. For instance, Portugal abolished its ‘means of subsistence’ test for citizenship in 2006. Instead, any registration or declaration regarding nationality, as well as any certificates required, are made free of charge for those with an income that is equal to or below the national minimum wage.

6.4 Family migration

The rights to family reunification and to found a family are widely recognized as fundamental aspects of integration. There are at least four categories of family migration: family reunification, family formation (or marriage migration), the migration of the entire family, and migration by sponsored family members. Definitions, patterns, processes and current policy developments pertaining to all these categories are discussed in depth in chapter 6 of the last IOM *World Migration Report* (2008).

For the purposes of this report, where the focus is on capacity-building for future challenges, four areas are highlighted. The first relates to gaps in existing international and regional instruments. The right to family reunification has been included in two human rights conventions: the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (in particular, Article 9), and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (in particular, Article 44). As already explained above, however, relatively few States – and no major
industrialized countries of destination – have yet ratified the latter Convention. At a regional level, the EU Council Directive on the right to family reunification for third-country nationals lawfully residing in the EU has not yet been transposed into the laws of all EU States, and also allows for a large measure of discretion in its application under national law. In contrast, the ‘Agreement on Residence for Nationals of MERCOSUR States, Bolivia and Chile’, of 6 December 2002, provides for the right to family reunification and equal treatment of migrants with nationals concerning all civic, social, cultural and economic rights.

The second capacity issue is the need for clearly defined national rules on family reunification, while recognizing differences in national priorities and goals. There are currently many inconsistencies. Temporary labour migration programmes deny the right to family reunification, whereas employment-based immigration programmes targeting more skilled workers tend to permit family reunification, although conditions vary. In Ireland, Green Card holders are entitled to bring their family with them, whereas holders of regular work permits must live and work in Ireland for at least one year before their family can join them. In the United Kingdom, Ordinary Work Permit holders may also be joined by a dependant defined as a husband, wife, civil partner or eligible partner or children under 18. Under exceptional circumstances, work permit holders in the United Kingdom may also be joined by children over 18 and dependent parents. In both cases, the dependants require a visa, and proof must be provided that they can be supported without drawing on public funds.

The third area of focus relates to the rules and regulations that apply to the family members that join migrants abroad through family migration. In the United Kingdom, dependants of Ordinary Work Permit holders are entitled to undertake any employment or self-employment, provided they hold a valid UK Entry Clearance. In Japan, dependants of all five categories of skilled migrant work permit holders are eligible to apply for a part-time work permit that allows them to engage in part-time employment for up to 28 hours per week. In France, in an effort to prevent immigrant families from becoming dependent on France’s welfare system, the law requires immigrants to prove that they can independently support all family members who seek to come to France. Specifically, they must earn at least the French minimum wage and not be reliant on assistance from the French State. Access to government assistance is also limited to EU citizens. Those who reside in France longer than three months without working or studying must be able to support themselves without relying on social or medical benefits from the French Government.

Finally, a series of capacity-building requirements arise in the specific context of marriage migration – a phenomenon that is expected to increase significantly in the future, especially in East Asia. In the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, free language classes, public health coverage, and other support programmes have already been developed for marriage migrants; however, in both countries, there is a noticeable gap between the stated goals of migrant integration policies and the situation on the ground. One problem is that both governments tend to view marriage migrants as being primarily wives, daughters-in-law and mothers, and most programmes are hence oriented towards childcare, care of the elderly, and domestic work, rather than wider aspects of integration for these populations. The second problem is that marriage migrants tend to be viewed as ‘beneficiaries’, and their role as potential active citizens is often ignored.

Specific capacity-building recommendations that arise from this analysis include the need to develop training and support programmes that empower marriage migrants to become more independent, and that do not segregate them from other migrants and nationals who may also be targeted by similar programmes. Another capacity gap is at the level of international cooperation to assist those who fail in their international marriage and wish to return to their country of birth. Although the exact number is not known, the divorce rate of international marriages is increasing; when individuals return to their home country, follo-
wing the breakdown of their marriage, they may have lost their citizenship status as a result of rules restricting dual nationality and, hence, their national entitlements.\textsuperscript{117}

In addition to these four categories of family migration, capacity-building is required to support governments in guaranteeing the protection of particularly vulnerable family and household members such as children and adolescents. A good example is provided by UNICEF’s efforts in Guatemala, raising awareness on the impact of the economic crisis on children and adolescents and enhancing the capacities of consular services to assist unaccompanied migrant children (see textbox 9).

\textbf{Textbox 9: UNICEF capacity-building on migration, children and human rights in Guatemala}

As a country of origin, transit and destination whose social and economic development is partly supported by remittances sent from abroad, Guatemala is a country in which international migration over the past few years has become a policy priority. In response to this reality, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Guatemala has given increasing priority to protecting the rights of children and adolescents in this context. In particular, together with IOM, UNICEF Guatemala has supported the strengthening of government and civil society capacity on several fronts.

\textit{Building evidence-based capacity in the face of the current economic crisis}

In order to measure the impact of the economic crisis and resulting decline in remittances, UNICEF Guatemala and IOM conducted a joint survey of 3,000 remittance-receiving households. The results of this study were published in \textit{Cuadernos de trabajo sobre migración 27, Encuesta sobre remesas 2009, niñez y adolescencia} (Migration Working Papers No. 27, Survey on remittances in 2009, childhood and adolescence) and highlight the impacts of the crisis on households, in particular on children and youth.

UNICEF Guatemala also produced a paper, in support of its joint work with IOM, entitled \textit{Impacto de la crisis económica mundial en la niñez y adolescencia de Guatemala} (Impact of the global economic crisis on childhood and adolescence in Guatemala). This paper is meant to raise awareness on the impact of the crisis on vulnerable populations, especially children and adolescents, providing recommendations for institutional strengthening in the face of the deterioration of living conditions.

UNICEF Guatemala continues to monitor the impact of the crisis on Guatemalan households, and particularly on children and adolescents. In collaboration with the Central American Institute for Fiscal Studies (ICEFI), it is using the 2009 UNICEF–IOM survey data on migration and remittances to highlight the need to act and make decisions and economic policies aimed at ensuring the rights of children and adolescents.

\textit{Building the capacity of consular services to protect the rights of migrants and their families}

The crisis is still severely impacting Guatemala and affecting the development opportunities of children and adolescents. Accordingly, UNICEF Guatemala has supported the Guatemalan Government in building the capacity of its consular services in an effort to handle the increased number of migrants returning from Mexico and the USA, as well as the increased number of deportations from the USA.

The Guatemala Directorate General for Migration, in collaboration with Mexican officials, agreed to launch the Oficiales de Protección a la Infancia (Child Protection Officers) (OPIs) in Guatemala. UNICEF Guatemala has been involved in providing training to both Guatemalan and Salvadoran migration officials (OPIs) in charge of receiving unaccompanied migrant children and adolescents on their borders and accompanying them through the repatriation process to their countries of origin.

\textbf{Source: UNICEF, Division of Policy and Practice, 2010.}

\textsuperscript{*}Ibid.
6.5 Managing temporary migration

Given the expected rise in the scale of temporary migration, for the reasons already alluded to in this report, many destination countries will be faced with the challenge of elaborating integration rules on temporary migration. While migrants are entitled to respect of their basic human rights, regardless of the duration of stay (and, indeed, regardless of whether they are in a regular or irregular status), a balance must be struck between permitting migrants to stay long enough so that they can succeed and generate savings, and not diminishing the likelihood of return. Specific challenges already considered in this report relate to whether and how to provide temporary migrant workers the freedom of movement between jobs or sectors, and how to incentivize or enforce return and circularity. Additional challenges include questions of access to health care, education and other social benefits.

From a rights-based perspective, liberal democracies should not maintain migrants indefinitely without extending to them broad integration rights, including access to permanent residence and the right to family reunification. Research also shows that the lack of a long-term perspective of settlement in host countries can marginalize migrants in host societies.118 The lack of consistency in procedures for transferring temporary employment permits for migrant workers to permanent employment permits and, ultimately, residence rights has already been discussed in section 6.1 above. One of the most contentious debates regarding circular migration concerns whether or not these policy frameworks should also include provision for the limited transfer of selected migrants into a permanent immigration programme. Proponents, including trade unions in many countries and a number of civil society organizations, have argued from a rights-based approach that the restrictions associated with strictly temporary workers’ schemes may not be compatible with a liberal democratic framework. Other commentators have acknowledged these reservations, but argued that ensuring temporariness is, in practice, the best available compromise. They also argue that creating the expectation of permanence may undermine the notion of circularity, although one way to avoid that is to guarantee that rules and criteria are transparent and accessible for all migrants from the outset.

Where the possibility for limited permanent immigration has been considered, the Canadian model for temporary migrants is widely cited as good practice: in order to be eligible, applicants must satisfy certain requirements, including a certain minimum work experience; sufficient funds to settle; and no criminal record in Canada. Points are then allocated to identify successful applicants on the basis of education, language skills, experience, age, arranged employment, and adaptability. The programme is open to both non-residents and resident migrants on temporary work permits.

6.6 Promoting migrant education

In recent years, the main focus for policymaking in the area of migrant education has been newcomer students. In most countries, the basic right to compulsory education is already guaranteed for all children – except, in some cases, the children of undocumented migrants – and capacity-building is therefore largely required in implementing this basic right. A good example is the ‘bridging schools’ initiative in Japan, created for the children of Peruvian–Japanese and Brazilian–Japanese descendants to respond to the impact of the economic crisis on migrant households (see textbox 10).

118 GCIM (2005).
Textbox 10: Social protection and integration of immigrants during the economic crisis: The example of ‘bridging schools’ in Japan

Since the end of 2008, the economic crisis has severely affected migrants in Japan, including Japanese descendants such as Japanese–Brazilians and Japanese–Peruvians, many of whom used to work in the automotive sector. A number of migrant children have dropped out of private ethnic schools, where they are taught in their mother tongue, since their unemployed parents can no longer pay the high tuition fee. Because many of these children have difficulty transferring to Japanese public schools due to the lack of support mechanisms, particularly in Japanese language education, a substantial proportion of them do not attend school.

To assist in the establishment of bridging schools for these out-of-school children, prior to their transfer to Japanese public schools, IOM implemented a three-year project in August 2009 which is part of the “Support Program to Facilitate School Education for Foreign Children” funded by the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture, Science and Technology (MEXT) with a total budget of JPY 3.7 billion (approx. USD 39 million) and 42 partner organizations selected to date. Under this programme, IOM Tokyo set up a Japanese Bridging School Fund through which to establish free bridging schools and community spaces for migrant children to learn the Japanese language, school subjects and Japanese culture, so that out-of-school children can smoothly transfer to Japanese public schools.

The Fund also: a) supports grass-roots activities to promote mutual understanding between foreign residents and local communities; b) creates new employment opportunities for Japanese teachers, multilingual instructors and integration coordinators, thereby helping to reinvigorate local communities; and c) conducts a comprehensive review of the current teaching materials and methodologies in Japanese-as-Second Language (JSL) education, including school subjects and the development of practical, visual and online resources in close coordination with the bridging schools supported by the Fund.


There is a range of areas where policies and common practice guidelines are required, including: equal access to school services and financial support; information about the general educational system; designation of special resource persons; intensive language support, upon arrival, in compulsory education; minimum support for newcomers in the mainstream classroom; adoption of official intercultural education goals; extracurricular/remedial provision of tuition for certain mother tongues and countries of origin; criteria and support for assessments of newcomers’ prior educational attainment; a statutory right for parents and newcomers to access interpretation services; information about pre-primary education; adaptations of assessment mechanisms or limiting class sizes for migrant pupils; adaptations of daily school life to enhance participation of diverse pupils, implementation and funding of intercultural education, especially in teacher training and learning materials for all subjects; and monitoring of migrant pupil performance and evaluation of targeted policies.

An example of training to promote migrant education is the ‘Psychological and Cultural Integration’ project (adopted by IOM Warsaw), which targets teachers and school administrators in order to increase their intercultural competencies and prepare them for working with multicultural classes. The project also promotes open and non-discriminatory attitudes among Polish schoolchildren towards other cultures by utilizing intercultural activities.119

While educating newcomer students, especially children, is critical, it is also probably true that continuing education and adult-learning are even more important among migrant populations than non-migrants, particularly in terms of learning to adapt to new cultures and understanding practical procedures. An unusual example of adult education for migrants is the INTI programme implemented in Helsinki by IOM, which aims to develop the competencies of migrant

119 www.iom.pl
religious leaders in their roles as counsellors – for example, by providing them with training on relevant legal and social issues in Finland, such as divorce, gender issues, education and the role of the media.

6.7 Strengthening anti-discrimination policies and practices

A State’s capacity to promote equal opportunities for diverse populations lies in its anti-discrimination laws and equality bodies. Individual migrants and nationals who want to participate in different areas of life cannot be treated less favourably because of, for example, their race, religion, gender, disability, nationality or language ability. European and international law have often encouraged States to introduce dedicated anti-discrimination laws. Because of the EC anti-discrimination directives, the legal definitions of discrimination and mechanisms to enforce them have been one of the areas of greatest and most recent progress in the capacity of EU Member States to fight discrimination. Most now have laws that are designed to protect residents of different races and ethnic origins from discrimination in employment, education, vocational training and housing, as well as in access to health care and social protection and advantages. However, a significant gap remains in terms of religious and nationality discrimination. A high number of countries in the EU effectively allow a form of unequal treatment that undermines the ability of immigrants to exercise, and service providers to deliver, comparable rights for nationals and non-nationals.120

A theme that has pervaded this report is the need for capacities to implement national laws and policies, and this is particularly important in the anti-discrimination arena, where the legal framework is relatively well-developed, in many countries, but discrimination remains a significant challenge. An important capacity-building requirement is the adoption of equality policies that empower civil society actors and the private sector to apply and use the law in practice, and to secure equal opportunities within their organizations. National equality bodies and support NGOs have been recently established in EU Member States, for example, to give advice and support potential victims. To do their work effectively, many equality bodies will need greater legal standing and investigative powers, and NGOs will need greater legal opportunities for class action and situational testing. Aspects that need to be developed, in turn, by and for civil society actors, include the ability to monitor equality policies’ implementation, improved statistics, public opinion and victim surveys, and regular reporting on anti-discrimination cases and their outcomes.

A critical additional element in combating discrimination is public education and awareness-raising. Following the xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008, IOM Pretoria initiated the ‘ONE movement’ project – a ‘social-change’ campaign to promote human rights, unity in diversity, and the overall integration of migrants in South Africa. The campaign uses multipronged strategies drawing on behavioural change methods aimed at addressing the prejudicial attitudes that lead to racism, xenophobia and other discriminatory practices. Specific capacity-building initiatives have included dialogue in schools and communities, as well as media and public information campaigns broadcast through television programmes, and debates through interactive media platforms such as Facebook, blogs and SMS. The campaign actively seeks multisector partnerships by facilitating public and private sector involvement. Another example is the Diversity Initiative in Ukraine, through which IOM provides a platform for exchange between international, civil, corporate and government actors to promote cultural understanding.

6.8 Promoting migrant health

The challenges surrounding the access of migrants – especially migrants in an irregular status – to health care in the developed world should not be underestimated. Restricted access on the part of migrants also highlights capacity-building requirements – for example, concerning information dissemination among migrants, cross-cultural education to reduce

120 Huddleston (2010).
the stigma around health conditions associated with certain migrant groups, and procedures that reduce the discriminatory delivery of even basic health care (for instance, on the basis of legal status). At the same time, the greatest capacity-building requirements in this field occur in the less developed world, partly because migrants often suffer a higher incidence of disease in these countries. IOM and other international and non-governmental organizations invest significantly in building capacities to promote migrant health – indeed, IOM has a dedicated Migration Health Division – providing extensive assistance in the developing world.

A survey of capacity-building requirements in the field of promoting migrant health, commissioned for this World Migration Report, nevertheless identified a series of systemic gaps. One is the need to mainstream migration health within governmental structures. Specific examples of capacity needs include the establishment of Coordinating Units on Migration Health to facilitate coordination within government and between governments, and also to strengthen collaboration between the various stakeholders, including the private sector, migrant networks and NGOs. Policy development is also identified as crucial for developing effective and sustainable means of meeting the health needs of migrants. This involves reviewing policies related to health, immigration, security, finance and labour, among others.

Another capacity-building requirement relates to the establishment and implementation of financing options to meeting the health needs of migrants, including increasing health literacy, primary health care and access to more advanced care. Options for supporting the costs of migrant health include increasing the engagement of the private sector in extending health insurance, and allowing migrants to pay into the government health-insurance schemes of host countries. Other innovative schemes include harnessing remittance flows for supporting the health of migrants and their families back home, as well as those facilitating migrants’ access to health services while abroad, while paying into the national scheme of the country of origin.

A related broad area for further capacity-building involves establishing sustainable and innovative delivery structures that engage migrants. In particular, capacity must be built for the provision of services through mechanisms that are accessible, affordable and meaningful for migrants. One example of a successful service-delivery mechanism is the training and deployment of migrants within governmental structures. Migrant health workers, healthcare volunteers and translators are able to act as a bridge between marginalized communities of migrants and the services available to them. Participatory community mapping can be undertaken jointly by health-care providers and migrant communities in order to delineate population demographics, identify available social resources, and find vulnerable households in need of assistance. Family health folders, bilingual mother–child health records, and migrant involvement in the development of educational materials are additional options that are already being deployed. Other innovative practices are migrant reception desks at hospitals, mobile clinics that reach remote areas, and the establishment of health posts in migrant communities. Building a more migrant-friendly health-care workforce is another aspect of capacity-building in this area. The capacity of health workers to engage with migrant clients in an effective and culturally sensitive manner requires strengthening. This can be implemented by integrating sensitivity training into curricula for health professionals, running workshops on effective interpersonal communication, assessing client testimonies, anthropological research and feedback sessions, international exchange visits, and other means.

Another major area in need of capacity-building is the transborder dimension of health-care systems, which needs to be strengthened. One way of doing this is to increase the surveillance and control of communicable diseases carried through increased international travel – for example, through ‘fit-to-travel’ health
assessments for prospective migrants, as IOM currently undertakes in the context of several government immigration and refugee-resettlement programmes. A second aspect involves strengthening the health-care systems in border areas, which often exhibit weak health infrastructures, where counterfeit drugs are common, and a largely unregulated private sector often fills the service provision gap. Governments on both sides of borders need to work together in dealing with border area populations as a single health community. This will entail increased collaboration on surveillance of health and disease issues, development of common standard operating procedures, and targeting of programmes for the heterogeneous populations living in border sites. A third challenge relates to capacity needed to assist particularly mobile populations (e.g. truck drivers, sex workers, commercial fishermen, nomads, etc.) in accessing services at the appropriate times and locations. Health records of individuals need to be available in facilities along the main stopping points of transport corridors using smartcard (or other) technology – or carried on the person as a ‘health passport’.

Treatment guidelines need to be harmonized between countries in order to appropriately refill prescriptions. Communication strategies and programme monitoring and evaluation systems must encompass the migration route instead of being boxed within individual countries or non-governmental organizations. To better address the transborder dimensions of health care, it will be important to build the capacity of regional economic communities and intergovernmental bodies to increase collaborative efforts. Technical resources and personnel, in particular, are required to advocate programming and to mobilize national counterparts. In addition, the way that donors, international partners and governments work with stakeholders to facilitate the development of transborder health-care programming should be more closely examined, as establishing bilateral and multi-country initiatives requires up-front financial and time investment to ensure inclusion of stakeholders and political commitment of countries. Many transborder partnerships fail to materialize due to the complexity of distilling the programme focus into an achievable list of priorities based on empirical evidence, rather than the special interests of development partners and donors. Moreover, the proposed programme must fill gaps not met by country programmes, complement national strategies, and clearly show the added value of regional or cross-border approaches. Many regional initiatives that are funded place too much emphasis on the regional coordination aspects, with expectations that country-level resources will fill the gap, which rarely transpires. Countries will need to be capacitated with sufficiently committed focal points who are able to influence and harness country-level resources for implementation of regionally coordinated initiatives.

A final area of migrant health care that requires particular attention relates to persons who have been trafficked, who often have specific needs in terms of physical health, psychological and emotional trauma, shelter, protection and reintegration, as well as, potentially, seeking redress through legal channels. The health aspects relate to physical trauma, sexual and reproductive health, disability and infectious diseases. Capacity is required to ensure that functioning systems are in place to address the needs of trafficked persons, while respecting their rights. Referral needs to be carefully managed in order to respect the choices and privacy of survivors. Social service providers and law-enforcement agencies need to have increased understanding of the health aspects of trafficking, and to know how to deal effectively with such cases. Likewise, health-care providers need to know how to identify suspected cases of trafficking, to offer the appropriate medical care, and to appropriately refer patients to other practitioners for assistance. In this respect, the report Caring for Trafficked Persons: Guidance for Health Providers is widely viewed as establishing good practice.\(^{122}\)

\(^{122}\) IOM/UNGIFT/LSHTM (2009).
6.9 Fostering public dialogue

Integration policy is not just about improving the lives of migrants. The well-being of all residents in any country of immigration is at stake. This message needs to lie at the heart of renewed efforts to foster public dialogue on, and support for, migrant integration.

Though integration will be increasingly prioritized, it need not be politicized. The level of politicization is a result of the extent to which integration policy is still an area of political contention versus consensus. The more different political parties agree on common integration objectives, the greater the likelihood that the resulting policy will be designed around the needs of both immigrants and receiving communities. For instance, the main Portuguese political parties agreed not to politicize the major 2006 nationality law reform. As a result, the parliament was able to give unanimous approval to the idea that all immigrants, regardless of their origins, should have equal opportunity to become Portuguese and that their children's children should no longer be treated as foreigners. On the other end of the scale, the more that parties use integration to distinguish themselves on the political spectrum, the more likely that policy will be designed around winning votes from majorities and swing voters – most worryingly, from the extreme right. Whether or not integration policies are changed for mere electoral gain will greatly depend on how local and national contexts change – and how opinion-formers and policymakers choose to respond to these changes.

One practical way to foster public support for immigration is through citizenship ceremonies. While these have existed for many years in traditional immigration countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, they are newly present in countries such as Austria, Denmark, Estonia, France, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. Some have revived the tradition – as is the case for Norway, after a 30-year interruption. Others have started from scratch, inspired particularly by North American models. High levels of participation of naturalizing citizens and their families, politicians, the media and members of the public turn ceremonies into a rallying point for public awareness-raising, giving voice to immigrants, and promoting mutual interaction between new and old citizens. The main concern, when performing such ceremonies, is to remove any requirement that might exclude successful applicants from participating in them or in any way prevent them from receiving their national citizenship. In France, the High Authority for the Fight against Racism and for Equality (HALDE) and the Interior Ministry have ensured, for example, that prefectures do not exclude participants who wear religious garments such as the Islamic headscarf.

6.10 Mainstreaming integration across government

One of the obstacles to better integration is that, in many countries, responsibilities are not centralized, and integration policy is driven by local and regional factors and often depends on the vision and limited capacity of local administrations. Where guidelines exist in the form of national integration plans, they are often not binding and cannot be enforced by legal action. A very mixed picture of integration achievements results from this deficit. Some communities – for example, where political and civil actors have formed alliances – are able to present considerable success. Others are registering rising problems. But even the success stories show structural deficits: notwithstanding the fact that, in most cases, there are very engaged people with ambitious objectives, no commonly defined goals or indicators of success exist, nor are the integration activities properly evaluated. Furthermore, as an increasing number of administrative and civil society actors become engaged in integration programmes, there is a risk of overlap and a lack of coordination. In some countries, integration has effectively become a business, whereby the competition for financial resources for integration sometimes becomes more important than the integration outcomes themselves.

123 Klingholz (2009).
One response to these challenges is to define integration as a national mandatory task, in the same way that education, health-care systems or internal security are national tasks in most countries. This would raise the profile of integration and also enable governments to define standards and the legal framework under which integration activities should be carried out. One of the capacity requirements for achieving this goal relates to institutional reform and, in particular, coordinating efforts across government. One approach is to designate a lead ministry to take responsibility for mainstreaming integration; another is to transfer the integration portfolio from ministries of interior or social affairs and employment to new ministries and agencies dedicated to integration; and a third is to establish inter-ministerial coordinating committees. This does not mean that national governments should take over the whole responsibility for integration or push aside local authorities and civil society. They should, however, set defined integration goals and the framework for a better and coordinated organization of the work to be done.

Another way to overcome a lack of coordination between proliferating governmental and non-governmental institutions involved in the integration process proposed by the European Commission in the Common Agenda for Integration\(^{124}\) is to develop ‘one-stop-shop’ services to provide information, interpretation and translation, mentoring and mediation services. As an example, in 2004, Portugal, through the High Commission for Immigration and Ethnic Minorities (now the High Commission for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue – ACIDI), developed ‘one-stop-shops’, called National Immigrant Support Centres (CNAIs), in Lisbon, Porto and, subsequently, Faro. These centres, created exclusively for immigration issues, bring together under the same roof a number of services related to immigration. Through shared responsibility and partnership between various levels of the Portuguese Government, the centres involve six branches of five Ministries (Foreigners and Borders Service, Working Conditions Authority, Social Security, Central Registry Office, Health and Education) and offices that provide specific support, specifically with regard to legal advice, family reunification and labour market integration. The services are enhanced through the involvement of 61 cultural mediators from the different immigrant communities. These stakeholders, representing immigrant associations and working in partnership with the government, have played a key role in bridging the gap between the immigrants and Portuguese public administration. In 2006, IOM undertook an independent evaluation of the outcomes of these support centres, concluding that the National Immigrant Support Centre model “...is effectively an initiative and an experience that should be disseminated, and that can be internationally replicated within other institutional contexts, obviously always taking into consideration the various specifics that characterize different international migration scenarios”\(^{125}\).

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Probably the best available data on environmental migration are the figures on the number of persons displaced by natural disasters. In 2008, for example, 20 million people were displaced as a result of sudden-onset climate-related weather events, compared to 4.6 million internally displaced by conflict and violence. There is, however, no global database on migratory movements related to natural disasters. At best, there are estimates that can be derived from displacement data relating to particular crises. Although the number of disasters has increased significantly over the last two decades (see map 8 showing the change in the number of natural disasters between 1990 and 2009), there has not been a major impact on international migratory flows, as much displacement is short-lived and temporary, and those who are displaced do not have the resources or networks to migrate abroad. This is why it is often asserted that environmental change is likely to contribute to more internal rather than international migration. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that, although extreme environmental events such as cyclones, hurricanes and tsunamis tend to capture the media headlines, gradual changes in the environment are likely to have a much greater impact on the movement of people in the future. For example, over the last 30 years, twice as many people worldwide have been affected by droughts as by storms (1.6 billion compared with approximately 718 million).

Most commentators agree that migration resulting from environmental change is likely to continue to increase in the foreseeable future. The effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate this trend, although it is not always appropriate to ascribe environmental changes that might precipitate migration to climate change. For example, environmental degradation may be the result of changes in average annual temperatures or rainfall levels, but it may equally be the result of deforestation or poor land management — or a combination of these factors. Additionally, it can be difficult to isolate environmental factors from other drivers of migration. In the Middle East and North Africa, for example, it has been predicted that environmental degradation will reduce the amount of fertile arable land and thus compound a shortage of employment for a youthful population expanding quickly as a result of demographic trends, a proportion of whom may thus migrate to look for work. In this case, environmental degradation, demographic trends and economic factors (a lack of employment) combine as potential drivers for migration. There is no agreed definition or defined category and no explicit legal or normative framework pertaining to people moving as a result of the effects of environmental change. In other words, even

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126 UN-OCHA/IDMC (2009).
127 IOM (2009b).
128 Leighton (2010).
129 IOM (2009b).
130 Zetter (2009).
131 Koser (2009b).
if such movements are already taking place or are likely to in the future, they may not be recognized, categorized or counted as distinct from other types of movement.

At the same time, the outlines for an analytical framework for trying to understand the links between environmental change and migration are emerging. A distinction is usually made between slow-onset processes and extreme environmental events or natural disasters – distinguishing, for example, desertification from floods. In this context, there is growing recognition that migration is not always the only response to the effects of environmental change – in the case of slow-onset events, for example, adapting settlement and land use practices may mean that people can remain at home safely and productively. Some will move for sheer survival, others as part of a family strategy to maximize household incomes. Equally, not all migration arising from environmental change effects will be long term. Natural disasters tend to generate temporary movements if the affected area is still habitable, while slow-onset processes may lead to long-term or permanent migration. This section of the report considers capacity-building requirements during the pre-migration, migration and resettlement stages.132

It needs to be acknowledged that policymakers in both the developed and developing world may be unwilling to invest significant resources in planning to respond to potential migration outcomes from environmental change, given short-term political horizons and the budgetary impact on already strained resources, especially in countries where there is no immediate threat. In making a case for migration capacity-building in response to future challenges arising from the effects of environmental change, the need for policymakers to be able to justify their priorities is evident in this report. Thus, as an essential first step in capacity-building, it identifies the need to establish a more robust evidence base on the relationship between environmental change and migration. Second, it focuses on adapting and strengthening existing laws and policies, rather than starting from scratch. Third, it suggests changes to the legal and normative framework that, once in place, will provide the scaffolding for future policymaking, even if that policymaking need not take place in every country straight away.

Consequently, capacity-building requirements are identified in the following ten areas:

1. establishing a better evidence base;
2. disaster risk reduction;
3. developing adaptation strategies;
4. preparing evacuation plans;
5. filling gaps in the legal and normative framework;
6. implementing national laws and policies on internal displacement;
7. amending national immigration laws and policies;
8. establishing proactive resettlement policies;
9. providing humanitarian assistance;
10. planning for resettlement.

7.1 Establishing a better evidence base

A global database on migration resulting from the effects of environmental change would be one step in establishing a better evidence base for new policies. The challenges relating to establishing such a database would be significant, including the need to standardize definitions and develop internationally comparable indicators. It would also rely on national-level reporting, raising significant capacity challenges – particularly in poorer countries – relating to data collection and analysis.133 Furthermore, to be of real value, such a database would need to be freely and widely accessible. An international organization, such as IOM or one of the UN agencies – or, ideally, an inter-agency collaborative effort – might be best placed to initiate such a project. In this context, IOM has proposed the establishment of an independent Commission on Migration and Environment Data (CMED) to bring together experts and

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133 IOM (2009b).
representatives from agencies that collect data to develop practical guidelines on collecting and sharing data relevant to this context. The Climate Change, Environment and Migration Alliance (CCEMA) is a multi-stakeholder global partnership that also advocates a more integrated approach to research and policy in this area.

Besides reliable and regularly updated estimates of numbers, there is also a need for more comprehensive and comparative research on the relationship between environmental change and migration – in order to, for example, better understand why, in some circumstances, climate change does contribute to migration but, in others, it does not.

There is also a need to collate in one single location a description of existing laws, policies and programmes that pertain to environmental migration at the national, regional and global level. One advantage would be to facilitate a more systematic analysis of the gaps in the existing legal and normative framework (see section 7.5 below). In moving towards more coherent frameworks, learning the lessons of the past will also be useful, particularly in the context of those countries that foresee the possibility that planned resettlement, including internationally, may be needed. More systematic examination of previous planned resettlement programmes – for example, in the context of transmigration, villagization and development projects – would help ensure that resettlement programmes do not fall victim to the problems identified in earlier initiatives. Identifying the best case examples of resettlement is as important as identifying the pitfalls in programmes that failed.

A recent IOM publication makes a series of recommendations on how to improve the current evidence base.\(^\text{134}\)

### 7.2 Disaster risk reduction

A first step in mitigating migration arising from the effects of environmental change is to reduce the likelihood of its negative impact on people. Disaster risk reduction involves ‘systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events’.\(^\text{135}\)

Probably the most widely known international instrument on the prevention of disasters is the Hyogo Framework for Action, which was adopted at an international conference convened by decision of the UN General Assembly, although it remains legally non-binding.\(^\text{136}\)

The Hyogo Framework sets out five priority areas of action for governments and other stakeholders for the period of 2005–2015:

1. ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation;
2. identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning mechanisms;
3. use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels;
4. reduce the underlying risk factors;
5. strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

Arising from these priority areas, a number of specific capacity-building recommendations can be identified, mainly targeting governments:\(^\text{137}\)

1. Develop specific national platforms and policies on disaster risk reduction, consonant with the Hyogo Framework. Responsibilities for risk reduction and early warning should also be integrated into institutional arrangements for disaster relief and recovery to ensure a holistic approach.
2. Ensure that zoning regulations and building codes are in place and attuned to addressing disaster risk, and ensure that they are adequately enforced. Care should be taken to mitigate the potential negative effects of such enforcement on the poor and marginalized.

\(^{134}\) IOM (2009b).

\(^{135}\) UNISDR (2009).

\(^{136}\) GA resolution 58/214, 23 December 2003.

\(^{137}\) Fisher (2010).
3. Countries that face the possibility of floods should ensure that a comprehensive approach to flooding mitigation, including environmental regulations and zoning, are included in their legislation and plans.
4. Devote adequate attention to equitable solutions for insecure land tenure issues to increase incentives for communities to make their own land less vulnerable.
5. Disaster risk reduction activities should be assigned specific budgets and be sufficiently funded.
6. Incorporate risk reduction elements into development planning.
7. Ensure that agencies tasked with disaster risk reduction activities regularly report to legislative oversight bodies.
8. Provide a legal remedy to affected communities where disaster-related damage is attributable to gross negligence by government actors.
9. Ensure that adequate procedures are in place to provide populations with early warnings of impending hazards, involving community-level actors as much as possible in the implementation process.
10. Ensure that procedures are in place to regularly collect data on potential hazards and on populations in order to support contingency planning, and ensure access to such information.
11. Seek and promote the involvement of civil society and communities in risk reduction and, particularly, early warning initiatives. The role of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, as auxiliaries to the public authorities in the humanitarian field, should be clearly set out in disaster legislation.
12. Ensure that gender issues and the needs of vulnerable groups are adequately taken into account in disaster risk reduction legislation and planning.

As emphasized above, migration will not necessarily be an automatic response to the effects of environmental change. Developing strategies to support alternative ways of adapting to these effects and, hence, avoiding the need to move, are thus an important aspect of improved migration management (see textbox 11).

Textbox 11: Building local capacity for disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation: The case of Mozambique

Mozambique is one of the most natural hazard-exposed countries in Africa: between 1976 and 2007, there were at least 45 significant incidents of natural disasters, including floods, cyclones, earthquakes and droughts. The impacts of these events are compounded by chronic vulnerability resulting from high poverty levels, almost 30 years of conflict, weak infrastructure, substantial transit migration flows to South Africa, increasing incidence of HIV and weakened government and local-level capacities. As a result, disasters claim a high human toll: in 2005, the World Bank estimated that 25 per cent of Mozambique’s population faced a high mortality risk from natural disasters (Dilley et al., 2005). Displacement as a result of natural disasters is another major risk for the local population: floods, for instance, displaced 200,000 people in 2001, 163,000 people in 2007 and 102,000 more in 2008 (INGC, 2009). Climate change is expected to further raise the risk and severity of cyclones and lead to rising sea levels and coastal erosion. Furthermore, increasingly erratic rainfall patterns are expected to result in both more prolonged periods of drought and higher flood risks during the rainy season.

In recent years, with the assistance of the international community, the Government of Mozambique has made significant progress in strengthening its national response capacity and shifting from a reactive to a proactive and systematic approach focusing on disaster risk reduction rather than responding to individual events. The reality of climate change further increases the need for holistic, proactive approaches that incorporate the expected changes into existing disaster risk reduction plans and call for an approach to climate change adaptation involving the whole of government.

At a local level, IOM has supported this process by implementing projects with the UN and local partners, ranging from providing assistance in emergencies to families affected by the 2007/2008 floods in the Zambezi Valley, to community stabilization activities for these internally displaced communities and
disaster risk reduction initiatives. The latter involves working with local partners, including NGOs, to support capacity-building and provide technical assistance to existing community radio stations in areas affected by natural disasters to develop disaster preparedness programming material with local community groups in order to ensure that broadcast messages are accessible and contain locally understandable content (IOM, 2009b).

As a next step, IOM, together with its partners, is working to strengthen the communities’ food security and overall resilience to natural disasters and climate change by increasing their capacities to use improved and more sustainable farming techniques, fishing and food storage, and complementing emergency assistance measures with longer-term sustainable solutions aimed at helping rural communities to live and cope with recurrent floods and droughts.

Among the key lessons learned from IOM’s engagement in Mozambique and other such initiatives is the importance of working in close cooperation with local authorities and communities. Building partnerships at the local level and empowering communities is essential to instilling a sense of ownership of disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation measures and to ensure their long-term sustainability. In developing such partnerships, it is important to ensure that different groups within the community are involved, including women and young people. Their involvement helps to reduce their vulnerability to trafficking, while also being an effective way to disseminate knowledge within communities and promote behavioural change. In the context of migration and displacement, it is also essential to involve not only the migrants and displaced themselves but also the entire affected community, with the aim of preventing further displacement. Receiving communities and their concerns also need to be factored into the decision-making process. Such involvement not only gives community members ownership of the process, but also allows for the process to be built on local knowledge (IOM, 2009).


7.3 Developing adaptation strategies

Adaptation refers to “initiatives and measures to reduce the vulnerability of natural and human systems against actual or expected climate change effects”.138 National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) are the principal mechanisms through which low-income developing countries identify adaptation needs and programmes. The relevant and widely accepted international instrument is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which states that NAPAs “provide a process for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to identify priority activities that respond to their urgent and immediate needs to adapt to climate change – those for which further delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage”.

To date, 38 countries have submitted plans, although fewer than ten of them have been implemented. In submitting NAPAs, countries prepare syntheses of available information, undertake a participatory assessment of vulnerability, identify key adaptation measures and criteria for prioritizing activities, and select a prioritized shortlist of activities. The guidelines on developing NAPAs specify that they should take a “complementary approach, building upon existing plans and programmes, including national action plans under the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, national biodiversity strategies and action plans under the Convention on Biological Diversity, and national sectoral policies”.139 They also should be consistent with policies aiming at sustainable development, gender equality, cost-effectiveness, simplicity and flexibility of procedures based on individual country circumstances.

NAPAs do, however, have limitations as a mechanism for identifying the full range

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139 http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf#page=7
of adaptation needs and plans. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) made the following assessment of NAPAs in its 2007/2008 Human Development Report:

Many of these plans include useful analytical work, providing important insights on priorities. However, they suffer from two basic shortcomings. First, they provide a very limited response to the adaptation challenge, focussing primarily on ‘climate-proofing’ through small-scale projects: the average country financing proposal generated in the plans amounts to USD 24 million. Second, the NAPAs have, in most countries, been developed outside the institutional framework for national planning on poverty reduction. The upshot is a project-based response that fails to integrate adaptation planning into the development of wider policies for overcoming vulnerability and marginalization.140

NAPAs nevertheless remain one of the few planning instruments for least developed countries that are facing the prospect of large-scale population movements due to environmental change, and their scope could eventually be expanded to include developing countries in general, as a means of ensuring more adequate and targeted assistance for adaptation efforts.

According to Theodoros Skylakakis, Member of the European Parliament and former Special Representative for Climate Change of Greece (in an interview on ‘Climate change and migration: impacts and policy responses’), “national adaptation plans are in their infancy due to the uncertainty inherent in the climate change phenomenon. The best thing we can do to mainstream migration into them is to create trusted networks of legal short-term (e.g. seasonal) migration. In this way, when disaster strikes and migration pressures rise we can use these networks to channel activities in a meaningful and mutually productive way, prioritizing environmental migrants that need a temporary solution to their economic needs, while the rebuilding effort is organised.”141

In some cases, the NAPA identifies migration as an adaptation strategy in itself. This perspective appears in two contexts. First, some countries see migration as a way to reduce population pressures in places with fragile ecosystems. Second, some countries recognize that resettlement of some populations may be inevitable, given the likely trends, and should be accomplished with planning. IOM has undertaken considerable capacity-building to raise awareness and facilitate adaptation to environmental change through planned and authorized migration. In Egypt, it works in partnership with the Government to increase awareness of the actual and potential impacts of sea-level rise on migration, and identify and implement strategies to best respond through migration. The Colombian Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) programme offers a livelihood alternative for families confronted with natural disasters. In Mali, IOM has partnered with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to implement selected projects from the NAPA and demonstrate the usefulness of mainstreaming migration and human security in national and local strategies to adapt to climate change.

The majority of NAPAs see the adaptation strategies they describe as ways to reduce migration pressures and allow people to remain in their original settlements. The strategies generally seek to adapt agricultural practices, management of pastoral lands, infrastructure such as dykes and coastal barriers, fishing patterns and other strategies to reduce pressures on fragile ecosystems, thereby allowing populations to remain in place. Other NAPA approaches focus on early warning and emergency preparedness to reduce displacement due to natural disasters associated with climate change. Tuvalu has proposed a project – Strengthening Community Disaster Preparedness and Response Potential – that includes a post-disaster resettlement and rescue plan. Mozambique has proposed establishing an early warning system that will help identify risky and vulnerable areas and resettle the affected populations from flood- and cyclone-prone areas. Bangladesh’s NAPA reflects policies also promulgated in its 2005 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP),

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141 IOM/EurAsylum (2010).
which presented the need for a Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme, with the following objectives: professionalizing the disaster management system; mainstreaming risk management programming; strengthening community institutional mechanisms; expanding risk reduction programming across a broader range of hazards; and strengthening emergency response systems.

The Copenhagen climate change conference in December 2009 made some progress in identifying funding mechanisms to support adaptation initiatives. Paragraph 8 of the Copenhagen Accord specifies:

Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention.

The parties to the Accord pledged to provide USD 30 billion for the period from 2010 to 2012, with funding allocated between adaptation and mitigation. The most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small-island developing States and African countries, will be given priority for adaptation programmes. Developed countries also committed to a goal of jointly mobilizing USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. Whether and how some of these funds might be utilized in a migration-related context is yet to be tested.

7.4 Preparing evacuation plans

There may be circumstances where the evacuation of populations is required – for example, as a result of early warning of a flood or hurricane or, in the longer term, of sea levels rising to a critical level. As for many of the capacity-building areas identified in this report, preparing for such an eventuality will be a higher priority in certain States (and localities within those States) than in others.

Where evacuation plans are prepared, it is important that they prohibit the arbitrary displacement of people from their home or place of habitual residence, unless justified by compelling and overriding public interests. In the case of natural disasters, such displacement is arbitrary, “unless the safety and health of those affected requires their evacuation“. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement also require that “the authorities concerned shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in order to avoid displacement altogether. Where no alternatives exist, all measures shall be taken to minimize displacement and its adverse effects“.

Capacity is also required to ensure that evacuation plans include the following critical steps. One is to ensure that a specific decision authorizing the evacuation has been taken by a government authority empowered by law to order such measures. Second, the affected populations should, if at all possible, be informed of the reasons and procedures for their evacuation. Where possible, those affected should also be involved in the planning and management of their relocation. It is also important that proper accommodation be provided to those evacuated, that evacuations take place in satisfactory conditions of safety, nutrition, health and hygiene, and that family members are not separated.

7.5 Filling gaps in the legal and normative framework

The gaps in the existing legal and normative framework pertaining to environmental migration have been systematically analysed and are well understood. One significant gap is that there is no agreed definition for people who migrate as a result of the effects of environmental change. IOM uses the term

142 UN-OCHA (1998).
144 Zetter (2009).
'environmental migrants’ to describe them, and uses the following working definition:

Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.145

However, the term ‘environmental migrants’ is not accepted universally, and there are a number of competing definitions; a first step in filling gaps in the legal and normative framework therefore involves achieving consensus around terminology and a definition.

A number of gaps have also been identified with regard to the protection of affected populations. Cross-border environmental migrants, for example, fall in the gap between the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as they have crossed a border) and existing frameworks for protecting other international migrants or refugees, which do not specify environmental factors as a cause of migration. In a few cases, ad hoc responses have developed to protect those who move across borders temporarily, while the needs of those who are forced to migrate permanently across national borders have yet to be addressed.

The capacity-building challenge for the international community involves strengthening the legal and normative framework to fill such gaps. A number of options are being debated, ranging from adapting or building on existing norms and instruments, to the development of guidelines on environmental migration in a ‘soft law’ approach, and the elaboration of a new binding instrument or convention. As emphasized above, the reason that achieving consensus on the legal and normative approach should be a priority is that it can pave the way for the development of national laws and policies.

The application of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement at the national level provides a model for the adoption of ‘soft law’ guidelines in national laws and policies. Currently, about 30 countries worldwide have developed national laws or policies on internal displacement, and there have been four main approaches.146 One is a brief instrument, simply adopting the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, exemplified by the one-page Instrument of Adoption of Liberia. The wholesale incorporation of the Guiding Principles may appear an effective way of ensuring the implementation of all provisions of the principles, suggesting absolute agreement with the principles and ensuring against the dilution of its provisions. Such an approach, however, limits opportunities that the development of a more tailored law would present for national authorities, relevant governmental bodies, civil society, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) themselves. A second approach has been to develop a law or policy to address a specific cause or stage of displacement. The Indian National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project Affected Families, for example, addresses displacement only as a result of development projects. The Angolan Norms on the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Populations, as well as laws and policies adopted in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Nepal and Serbia, address only return and resettlement. A third approach is a law or policy developed to protect a specific right of the internally displaced, examples of which include the Turkish Law on the Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the Fight Against Terrorism and the US Hurricane Education Recovery Act, which was developed following Hurricane Katrina and addresses, among other issues, the needs of displaced students and teachers. The final approach is a comprehensive law or policy addressing all causes and stages of internal displacement. The Colombian Law 387 and Ugandan National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons most closely approximate a comprehensive law on internal displacement.

146 Wyndham (2007).
7.6 Implementing national laws and policies on internal displacement

Given that a significant proportion of people displaced by the effects of environmental change are expected to move within their own countries, strengthening national laws and policies on internal displacement is an immediate capacity-building requirement in order for those affected to be afforded assistance and protection. Unlike the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement explicitly include people displaced as a result of natural disasters and, in this sense, the normative framework is adequate (although the Guiding Principles are not binding). At the same time, such laws and policies need to be extended to more than the 30 or so countries where they currently exist. But it is equally important to ensure that such laws and policies are effectively implemented at the national level.

The Framework for National Responsibility identifies a number of concrete steps that governments can take to implement national laws and policies on internal displacement, and each step represents a target for capacity-building efforts. One is the need to raise awareness of the problem of displacement – for example, through information and sensitization campaigns targeting relevant authorities, including the military and police, as well as the public. Data collection is another step, with the important proviso that such efforts should not jeopardize the security, protection or freedom of movement of those displaced. Training on the rights of the internally displaced is also a necessary component, targeting government policymakers at the national, regional and local levels, the military and the police, camp administrators, commissioners and staff of national human rights institutions, parliamentarians and civil society, as well as the displaced themselves, among others.

The adoption of a national policy or plan of action is another important tool in the enactment of national legislation. Such a plan could usefully spell out national and local institutional responsibilities for responding to internal displacement, indicating the roles and responsibilities of different government departments, and identifying a mechanism for coordination among them. Indeed, designating a national institutional focal point on IDPs is identified in the Framework for National Responsibility as another critical step towards implementing laws and policies. Such an approach includes various options, such as allocating overall responsibility to an existing government agency, designating a new body with an exclusive focus, and establishing a task force that brings together officials from the relevant ministries and departments. A role is also identified for national human rights institutions, particularly with regard to monitoring the conditions of the displaced, conducting inquiries into violations of their rights, following up on early warnings of displacement, advising the government on the rights of IDPs, monitoring and reporting on government implementation of national legislation, undertaking educational and training programmes, and networking among other civil society actors.

Another important recommendation is that governments devote, to the extent possible, adequate resources to address the needs and protect the rights of the displaced. Where a government lacks sufficient financial or other capacity to provide for the security and well-being of the displaced, it should invite and accept international assistance and work with international and regional organizations to provide assistance, protection and solutions. Specifically, such organizations can: provide technical cooperation on issues such as data collection, registration, and the development of national action plans; offer training on international guidelines; undertake field visits to assess the conditions of the displaced; establish a monitoring presence; support the formation of IDP associations; and facilitate dialogue between government, civil society and displaced populations.

7.7 Amending national immigration laws and policies

While most of the movements within a State’s borders that can be envisaged as a result of the effects of environmental change are included within the remit of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, a significant gap, as explained above (section 7.6) that remains unaddressed in the current legal and normative framework is that of cross-border environmental migrants, especially those moving permanently. Even if a ‘soft law’ approach is adopted to address these current shortcomings, achieving consensus and then translating it into national laws and policies is a lengthy process. A shorter-term option is to amend national immigration laws and policies, which should be a priority for States either neighbouring or with strong migration channels with countries or regions that are likely to be impacted by the effects of environmental change in the relatively near future.

The immigration policies of most potential destination countries are not conducive to receiving large numbers of environmental migrants, unless they enter through already existing admission categories – for example, for labour or for family reunification, or on humanitarian grounds. The Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) programme between Colombia and Spain is an unusual example of an existing labour mobility programme that specifically extends to populations in high-risk zones of natural disasters.

Some countries have, however, established special policies that permit individuals whose countries have experienced natural disasters or other severe upheavals to remain at least temporarily without fear of deportation. The USA, for example, enacted legislation in 1990 to provide temporary protected status (TPS) to persons “in the United States who are temporarily unable to safely return to their home country because of ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions.” Environmental disaster may include “an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected.” In the case of environmental disasters, as compared to conflict, the country of origin must request designation of TPS for its nationals. Importantly, TPS applies only to persons already in the USA at the time of the designation. It is not meant to be a mechanism for responding to an unfolding crisis in which people seek admission from outside of the country. It also only pertains to situations that are temporary in nature. If the environmental disaster has permanent consequences, a designation of TPS is not available, even for those already in the USA, or it may be lifted. Another significant factor is that the designation is discretionary and can only be granted by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

At the European Union level, the Temporary Protection Directive establishes temporary protection during ‘mass influxes’ of certain displaced persons. The term ‘mass influx’ refers to situations where large numbers of people are suddenly displaced and where it is not feasible to treat applicants on an individual basis, and it is defined on a case-by-case basis by a qualified majority of the European Council.

Sweden and Finland have included environmental migrants within their immigration policies. Sweden includes within its asylum system persons who do not qualify for refugee status but require protection. Such a person in need of protection “has left his native country and does not wish to return there because he: has a fear of the death penalty or torture; is in need of protection as a result of war or other serious conflicts in the country; is unable to return to his native country because of an environmental conflict.” The decision is made on an individual, rather than group, basis. Although many recipients of this status are presumed to be in temporary need of protection, the Swedish rules foresee that some persons may be in need of permanent solutions. Similarly, in the Finnish

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Aliens Act, “aliens residing in the country are issued with a residence permit on the basis of a need for protection if [...] they cannot return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster.”

A number of other countries provide exceptions to removal on an ad hoc basis for persons whose countries of origin have experienced significant disruption because of natural disasters. Following the 2004 tsunami, for example, Canada, Switzerland and the United Kingdom temporarily suspended deportations of individuals from such countries as the Maldives, India, Indonesia, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Thailand.

7.8 Establishing proactive resettlement policies

To date, there are no examples of legislation or policies that address resettlement as a result of slow-onset processes that may destroy habitats or livelihoods in the future and make return impossible.

The Green Party in Australia launched an initiative in 2007 to establish a ‘climate refugee visa’ in immigration law. The initiative had three components: to amend the Migration Act to incorporate a Climate Change Refugee Visa class; to establish a programme for the migration of up to 300 climate change refugees from Tuvalu per year, 300 from Kiribati, and 300 from elsewhere in the Pacific, where appropriate; and to push the government to work in the UN and other international forums for the establishment of an international definition and framework on climate change and environmental refugees. The visa would be available to persons who had been displaced as a result of a ‘climate change-induced environmental disaster’, which, in turn, was defined as:

A disaster that results from both incremental and rapid ecological and climatic change and disruption, that includes sea level rise, coastal erosion, desertification, collapsing ecosystems, fresh water contamination, more frequent occurrence of extreme weather events such as cyclones, tornados, flooding and drought and that means inhabitants are unable to lead safe or sustainable lives in their immediate environment.

The bill was defeated in 2007.

New Zealand, under similar pressures regarding the potential need for resettlement of Pacific Islanders affected by rising sea levels, also has not yet established a specific category of admissions. The Government has introduced a Pacific Access Category (PAC), under which 75 people from Tuvalu, 75 from Kiribati, and 250 from Tonga may immigrate to New Zealand each year. The programme is, however, based on employment rather than environmental factors. The immigrants must be 18–45 years old, have an offer of employment in New Zealand, have English skills, meet a minimum income requirement, undergo a health check, and have no history of illegal entrance. The programme is not intended to provide access to those who may be most vulnerable to climate change-induced displacement, such as the elderly or the infirm.

A number of origin countries see the potential need for large numbers of their population to relocate internationally if the worst-case scenarios of climate change come to pass. President Mohamed Nasheed announced at the end of 2008 that the Maldives was establishing a sovereign wealth fund that could be used to purchase a new island for the country’s population. According to Nasheed, “this trust fund will act as a national insurance policy to help pay for a new homeland, should future generations have to evacuate a country disappearing under the waves.” Hoping that the funds would never be used for this purpose, Nasheed used the announcement as a call for renewed action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Anote Tong, President of Kiribati, has also made it clear that the population of his island might be forced to relocate en masse. His focus has been on identifying immigration possibilities for Kiribati nationals in nearby countries, particularly Australia and New Zealand. In a recent trip to New Zealand, he suggested that the best educated people
of Kiribatis should emigrate first, in an orderly fashion, and then establish communities that others could join as the situation requires.

7.9 Providing humanitarian assistance

Even in the absence of a legally binding international or national framework to protect the rights of people who have been forced to migrate as a result of the effects of environmental change (whether internally or across borders), many will be in need of immediate humanitarian assistance – for example, as a result of losing shelter and access to their livelihoods.

A number of principles could usefully guide the formulation of plans for providing humanitarian assistance in such circumstances, although their full implementation is unlikely. Ideally, for example, governments could ensure that national law guarantees the right to request and receive, without discrimination, humanitarian assistance in the form of adequate food, water, medical supplies, clothing and similar necessities, as well as essential services, such as emergency medical care and sanitation measures. Laws and policies on humanitarian assistance should be as concrete as possible, without becoming overly rigid, as to types and amounts of assistance to be provided. Particular budgets might be assigned to humanitarian assistance and would need to be adequately provided for. Procedures for establishing eligibility for assistance should ideally be accessible, expeditious and well disseminated to affected populations. National law could also set out minimum quality standards for humanitarian assistance provided by the government, consistent with internationally accepted standards.

The provision of assistance would, ideally, be terminated only once the humanitarian need has been met, and in a manner linked with measures to assist with rehabilitation, including livelihood development. The right to medical care in disaster settings should include psychological, reproductive and preventive care and be made available without charge in the period of emergency. Special attention could also be paid to the needs of vulnerable groups, including children, the disabled and elderly persons. Gender barriers and discrimination need to be specifically addressed. Assistance plans should also clearly designate institutional responsibilities across different ministries and levels of government. Provincial and local governments should retain sufficient authority to contribute to assistance activities, but should also be effectively coordinated. National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other relevant domestic actors should be fully integrated into national assistance plans and policies.

Where domestic means are insufficient to provide the necessary humanitarian assistance in disaster settings, national law could provide for a request for international assistance. It would clearly set out procedures for assessing needs and domestic capacities in order to rapidly decide upon the need for international assistance in disaster settings. Joint needs assessments with international relief providers should be encouraged. National law should clearly set out rules for the facilitation, regulation and coordination of international humanitarian assistance, including how it is initiated and terminated.

Where international assistance is requested, procedures are required to expedite its effective delivery. Visas and work permits for relief workers should be waived or expedited, and customs barriers should be lowered and duties and charges banned to expedite the import and use of vehicles, telecommunications and information technology, and appropriate medicines. Similarly, national law should provide for expedited registration of foreign humanitarian organizations, providing them with full domestic legal standing. Expeditious means should also be available for the temporary recognition of foreign qualifications of humanitarian professionals (such as doctors). National law or policy should also include the obligation to ensure the security of relief personnel, goods, vehicles and equipment.

7.10 Planning for return and resettlement

As explained in the introduction to this section, migration resulting from the effects
of environmental change can range from short-term to permanent. In the case of short-term movements – for example, as a result of a flood or hurricane – capacity is required for the return of the affected populations to their home areas as soon as it is safe. In the case of permanent movements, the affected populations will need to be resettled either elsewhere in their own country or in another country.

The manual Human Rights and Natural Disasters: Operational Guidelines and Field Manual on Human Rights Protection in Situations of Natural Disaster, issued by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator and the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, provides guidance to State authorities on return. It defines the conditions for the return of displaced persons thus:

The return of persons displaced by the disaster to their homes and places of origin should only be prohibited if these homes or places of origin are in zones where there are real dangers to the life or physical integrity and health of the affected persons. Restrictions should only last as long as such dangers exist and only be implemented if other, less intrusive, measures of protection are not available or possible.

Conversely, people should not be required to return to areas in which their safety may be compromised:

Persons affected by the natural disaster should not, under any circumstances, be forced to return to or resettle in any place where their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at further risk.

The term resettlement is not defined in international law, and is subject to various interpretations and application. An important challenge for the international community is thus to agree internationally accepted minimum benchmarks concerning the resettlement of environmental migrants (and other displaced communities). Indicators might, for example, include: provision of adequate housing; provision of cultivable and irrigated land; proximity to natural resources, livelihood sources, workplaces, schools and markets; access to health care, safe drinking water and basic services; provision of public transport and proper roads; child-safe spaces, including crèches and play areas; spaces for community activity, such as community centres; and safety and security for women.

The World Bank and the regional development banks have also promulgated guidelines for measuring the adequacy of resettlement plans adopted in the context of large-scale development programmes. These guidelines are pertinent to the management of resettlement in the environmental context. The World Bank recommends that baseline surveys precede resettlement, identifying two types of surveys: a census of all affected persons and assets, and a survey of the socio-economic conditions of the affected persons. Baseline surveys are important for developing resettlement plans and for measuring the impact of resettlement on the socio-economic status of the affected persons.

The World Bank also recommends a Resettlement Action Plan, which consists of several basic features: a statement of policy principles; a list or matrix indicating eligibility for compensation and other entitlements or forms of assistance; a review of the extent and scope of resettlement, based upon a census of those affected by the project; an implementation plan establishing responsibility for delivery of all forms of assistance, and evaluating the organizational capacity of involved agencies; a resettlement timetable coordinated with the project timetable, assuring (among other things) that compensation and relocation are completed before initiation of civil works; and discussion of opportunities afforded to those affected to participate in the design and implementation of resettlement plans, including grievance procedures.

Consultation with the affected populations (those who are resettled and the communities

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they join) is an essential part of managing resettlement. The Inter-American Development Bank\textsuperscript{150} describes the benefits of an effective participatory process:

Participation can facilitate the provision of information and helps ensure that the resettlement plan reflects the needs and aspirations of those affected. It promotes greater transparency and encourages the community to take a more active role in economic development and in the operation and maintenance of local infrastructure. Effective consultation is also essential to avoid the creation of undue expectations and speculation.

\textsuperscript{150} Cited in IASC (2010).
8. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

So far, in this report, capacity requirements have been identified for strengthening the response of governments and other important actors in international migration, across the areas of labour mobility, irregular migration, migration and development, integration, and responding to the effects of environmental change on migration. In this final substantive section of the report, capacity-building to improve the overall governance of international migration is considered. As emphasized in the introduction, the overall aim of migration governance should be to facilitate humane and orderly migration policies for the benefit of all.

An important aspect of achieving this aim is strengthening the capacity of governments to adopt a comprehensive approach to migration management. At the government level, capacity-building requirements vary enormously, and a first critical step is to develop assessment tools through which to gauge capacity levels and gaps. In some countries, the priorities are basic, such as training staff or establishing administrative structures; in others, they are more sophisticated – for example, developing mechanisms to ensure coordination between different ministries with responsibility for migration portfolios. The trends highlighted in this report so far, including increasing labour mobility, growing irregular migration, more opportunities for migrants and migration to contribute to poverty reduction and development, the challenges of increasing diversity, and the predicted impacts of environmental changes on migration, all indicate the need to strengthen migration management across all countries, even if the priorities and degree of urgency differ.

It is not just at the national level that migration management needs to be strengthened. International migrants are increasingly concentrated in urban areas, where new regulatory frameworks and administrative structures may be required to respond to an issue normally dealt with by central government. Certain subregions within a particular country may be more likely than others to be impacted by the effects of climate change, thus requiring an appropriate distribution of resources at the national level. Greater cooperation between States is another important aspect of better migration governance. How to improve bilateral agreements between States has already been addressed in this report (section 3.8). There has also been a rapid expansion in recent years in regional consultative processes (RCPs) focusing on migration, but gaps and inefficiencies remain here too. At a global level, there is growing consensus that even greater cooperation between States will be required in the future.

Furthermore, greater capacity is not just a requirement at the governmental level. Another theme in this report is the growing importance of non-State actors in contemporary migration patterns and processes. Private employers and recruiters are
playing an expanding role in temporary labour migration programmes; civil society can be an invaluable partner in identifying vulnerable irregular migrants; community associations are critical in mobilizing and engaging diasporas for development; and non-governmental organizations have an important role to play in supporting integration, especially among marginalized migrant groups. Recognizing the potential role of non-State actors, consulting with them and, where appropriate, including them in policy formulation and evaluation are also important aspects of strengthening migration governance.

A final aspect of migration governance considered here is the capacity of international institutions and organizations to cooperate more effectively at the level of global governance in responding to change.

Capacity-building requirements are therefore considered across the following ten areas, progressing from the national (and subnational) to the regional and global levels:

1. developing a national migration policy;
2. strengthening migration management at the national level;
3. enhancing coordination of policymaking and implementation;
4. better research and data;
5. policy evaluation;
6. developing urban governance;
7. engagement with the private sector;
8. enhancing the role of civil society;
9. effective RCPs and cooperation between regional processes;
10. more coherent global governance.

8.1 Developing a national migration policy

Good governance of migration begins at the national level. While the level of capacity-building required may vary significantly, there is scope in most States for strengthening the national capacity for coherent policymaking and implementation in relation to international migration. For a coherent national approach, States need agreed national objectives for their migration policies, as well as agreed criteria for the entry and residence of non-citizens, that are consistent with international law. Although the exact nature of these objectives and criteria will vary – for example, according to national specificities, requirements and circumstances – they should, according to the Global Commission on International Migration, at least address the following issues:

- the role of international migration in relation to economic growth and development;
- family reunification, asylum, refugee protection and resettlement;
- the prevention of irregular migration and the promotion of regular migration;
- integration, including the rights and obligations of migrants, citizens and the State;
- the protection of migrants’ rights.

In those States with very poorly developed systems of managing migration, an initial aspect of any capacity-building effort is to assess capacity requirements against current and projected migration trends, and to identify priorities within a particular national setting. Many States may require technical and financial resources, access to appropriate expertise and training simply to undertake this initial assessment of their capacity requirements in migration management. IOM’s Essentials of Migration Management Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners provides a valuable foundation.

It is important that national migration policy balance and take into account a range of priorities affecting and affected by migration – that is, as a social, economic and cultural phenomenon, migration policy needs to take account of labour, health, development, security, human rights, integration, environment and other related realms of policy.

Moreover, as indicated above in reference to countries such as Ireland, Mexico and Portugal, States can rapidly change from being countries of origin, transit or destination to all three simultaneously. Therefore, comprehensive and flexible policies are needed
to address each of these perspectives and allow for regular adjustment to accommodate changing circumstances.

8.2 Strengthening migration management at the national level

Strengthening migration management is already one of the most important aspects of migration-related capacity-building support provided for poorer countries by donor countries and the international community. At times, however, it can take place in an uncoordinated and ad hoc manner, or focus on particular aspects of governance rather than adopting a comprehensive approach. A snapshot analysis of IOM capacity-building initiatives for migration management across 30 countries, prepared for this report, found that the majority of the 112 separate initiatives surveyed focused on counter-trafficking, irregular migration, public dialogue, awareness-raising and research. Only four were concerned with monitoring and institution-building.

A model that addresses some of these concerns is the Capacity-Building in Migration Management Programme (CBMMP) established by IOM as a framework for technical assistance. The specific aims of this programme are to:

- harmonize national and regional policy and practice consistent with international norms;
- improve the facilitation of regular migration;
- reduce irregular migration;
- strengthen the protection of migrants’ human rights;
- expand international cooperation.

These aims are achieved by addressing specific needs:

- policy, legal and administrative framework review and updating;
- improvement of operational systems related to migration management;
- training and human resource development;
- economic and community development in areas of high migration pressure;
- increased joint planning and action.

The type of assistance provided within CBMMP includes:

- technical assistance in assessing and implementing migration management initiatives;
- project design and management services;
- training and human resource development programmes for migration officials;
- transfer and exchange of experts;
- regional forums and technical meetings.

Recent examples of where the model has been successfully deployed are within the East African Community (EAC), where it has contributed particularly to reducing irregular migration in the region, and in China (PRC), where it has, among other things, promoted cooperation on migration between China and the European Union.

8.3 Coordinated policymaking and implementation

In countries where there is already a well-established governance structure on international migration, the ministerial setting for migration issues can range from a single ministry dealing with all or most of the issues involved, to a department within a broader ministry holding these portfolios, and the portfolios being spread across several ministries. The UK Border Agency is one example of the first model, as is Canada’s Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), which deals with immigration, refugees, asylum, integration and citizenship policies. Its mandate covers the admission of immigrants and visitors to the country; resettling, protecting and providing a safe haven to refugees; and helping newcomers adapt to and integrate in Canadian society. As well as policymaking, CIC also deals with implementation at all levels of the immigration service. Indeed, the only migration-related area that is outside CIC’s mandate is border management, which
is the responsibility of the Canadian Border Security Agency (CBSA). The Netherlands is an example of the second model, where there is a Minister for Immigration and Integration, who is supported by a civil service apparatus that forms part of the Justice Ministry. In most other EU States, responsibility for migration issues is divided between interior ministries, ministries of foreign affairs, and ministries dealing with social affairs and employment. (Annex 1 in a recent publication by the European Policy Centre (EPC) lists the location of immigration in national governments across the EU-27.151) At the same time, there has not yet been a systematic review of these different models of governance to establish whether one really is more effective than another or whether each national context dictates its own response or approach152 (see, for instance, the approach used by the Mexican Government, as described in textbox 12).

Textbox 12: Mexico builds ‘hospitable doors’

Over the last 15 years, Mexico has consolidated its position as a country of origin, transit and destination for migrants, in the context of more governmental and social participation in regional integration and globalization processes. In that time, increased international mobility has been demonstrated by a doubling in the numbers of tourists, business people and other visitors entering Mexico, who now exceed 21 million per year. Mexican emigration to the USA has ranged between 200,000 and 400,000 permanent emigrants per year, while irregular transit migration flows through Mexico towards the USA have had similar volumes, as a result of an increase in human trafficking.

In order to address the current migratory dimension in Mexico and its future tendencies, in 2009 the migratory authority started a ‘transformation’ process of migration management in the country. This involved the consolidation of the Instituto Nacional de Migración and changes in its structure, better use of IT, the development of a new culture to assist migration through dedicated officials and agents, and the creation of a new regulatory framework that replaces the current legislation, which dates back to 1974.

The Mexican Government’s draft migration Bill seeks to deal with the international mobility of people in the country in an inter-institutional and integrated manner, and respond to current global migratory dynamics. It includes previous governmental, legislative and civil society proposals and it harmonizes national legislation with the diverse international instruments on migrant rights that Mexico has signed and ratified.

The basic premise for this legal adjustment is a ‘hospitable doors’ policy that can facilitate the documented international movement of people and guarantee migrants’ rights, modernize legal and institutional structures in the migratory field, and generate better conditions for dealing with entrances that could be hazardous to national, public or border security.

To this end, the draft bill simplifies processes and reduces discretion in the authorization of both entrance and stay in the country, and it also offers foreigners more clarity regarding compliance with migratory procedures. In addition, it strengthens migrant security and reduces the gaps exploited by organized crime to plague undocumented transit migrants. This new legal framework will also provide better mechanisms for combating crimes related to human trafficking.

The bill retrieves the decriminalization of undocumented migration, adopted by the legislature in June 2008, and it clearly defines the rights and obligations of foreigners in Mexico. It grants the migratory authority the ability to penalize its officials for serious or recurrent violation of migrants’ rights.

The draft bill confirms principles such as unconditional respect for migrants’ rights, family unity, equal treatment, migrants’ acquired rights, more protection for child migrants or foreigners in a vulnerable situation, a global approach to migratory policy and shared responsibility among governments and national and foreign institutions.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM), Mexico, 2010.

152 Van Selm (2005).
It is often recommended that, where the governance of migration is divided between ministries, as is usually the case, mechanisms for coordination need to be established, because migration is very much a cross-cutting issue. Again, there are various models for addressing this. In Costa Rica, for example, the General Directorate of Migration Planning Unit has been established to encourage coordination between the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, international organizations (including IOM) and civil society. In Mauritius, the Prime Minister’s Office (Home Affairs Division) is the national focal point for coordination of migration policies, working with several ministries. Ghana has encouraged ministries and agencies to set up migration focal points, while the National Development Planning Commission, which has principal responsibility for preparing the 2010 medium-term development plan, has responsibility for ensuring consultations with major stakeholders regarding the migration component of the plan.\footnote{GFMD (2009).}

In recent years, particular attention has been paid to coordinating policymaking on migration and development, especially in developing countries. As already highlighted elsewhere in this report, this can be achieved by mainstreaming migration in poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs)/national development plans (see section 5.1), as well as by integrating migration in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) (see section 7.3). Other methods include paying greater attention to migration in mid-term reviews of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

8.4 The need for better research and data

The need for better migration research and data is regularly identified as a significant capacity-building requirement at the national level, as is the need for coordination between States to allow for greater comparability. Indeed, the recent Report of the Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy of 2009, Migrants Count,\footnote{Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy (2009).} concluded that data on international migration are so limited that even some of the most basic questions concerning the future of international migration cannot be answered, and that there is the risk of a ‘default’ migration policy being made on the basis of anecdotes and emotion rather than evidence. At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that progress has been made in collecting and disseminating data, particularly on the links between international migration and development over the last decade or so. Mechanisms for data collection and dissemination include the UN Population Division’s Global Migration Database, the World Bank’s data on remittances and tabulation of highly skilled migrants, the ILO’s International Labour Migration database and the OECD’s SOPEMI\footnote{The Permanent Observation System on Migration (French acronym SOPEMI) provides Member States of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with a mechanism for the timely sharing of information on international migration, based on annual country reports prepared by a group of national experts.} and SICREMI.\footnote{The Continuous Reporting System on Labour Migration (Spanish acronym SICREMI) is a continuous reporting system of standardized and up-to-date information on labour migration for the Americas. It is based on the model of SOPEMI, created by the OECD for its Member States. http://www.sedi.oas.org/ddse/documentos/mide/BrochureSicremi_e.pdf}

One problem in many States is a basic lack of data; another is that the data that do exist at the national level are scattered and not effectively shared within or between countries, and States often lack the capacities to analyse the existing data that they do collect. In this regard, Migration Profiles, initiated by the European Commission (EC), have become a useful low-cost tool for helping governments identify data gaps and capacity-building needs, as well as being a tool for promoting policy coherence (see textbox 13). They have evolved from concise statistical reports that provide a snapshot of migration trends in a particular country, to a means of collating data from a wide range of sources and developing strategies to address data gaps. Ultimately, it is hoped and expected that they will become the basis for the development of national migration policy and for ensuring effective linkages with development and other related policies.
Textbox 13: Migration Profile as an information tool for strategic policy planning

Lack of data and indicators on migration in many developing countries is a major constraint to mainstreaming migration into development plans. The Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research and Policy (CGD, 2009), for instance, cites the non-existence or inaccessibility of detailed, comparable, disaggregated data on migrant stocks and flows as the greatest obstacle to the formulation of evidence-based policies to maximize the benefits of migration for economic development around the world. On the other hand, countries already collect a wealth of data on foreign citizens but often fail to take full advantage of this storehouse of knowledge as a means of better understanding migration processes.

In 2005, the European Commission (EC) proposed a tool for generating more data on the migration situation in developing countries – Migration Profiles. According to the text, migration profiles should “aim to gather information on issues such as the labour market situation, unemployment rates, labour demand and supply and present or potential skill shortages by sector and occupation, skills needs in the country, skills available in the diaspora, migration flows, incoming and outgoing financial flows linked with migration, including migrant remittances, as well as relevant gender aspects and those related to minors” (EC, 2005).

Originally, Migration Profiles were conceived of as a concise statistical report, prepared according to a common framework, which could make it easier to understand, at a glance, the migration situation in a particular country. IOM first tested the basic Migration Profile in Ecuador and Senegal in 2006 and has subsequently prepared migration profiles in over 30 countries around the world, including in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Over time, the Migration Profile has evolved from being a means of bringing together data from a wide range of sources, to a more elaborate process involving consultation with many different actors in an effort to help identify and develop strategies to address data gaps and produce the evidence required – both from a range of ministries and from the local non-governmental sector – to inform policy. IOM’s Migration Profile exercise in West and Central Africa has shown that the process of preparing Migration Profiles can improve the basis for coherent policymaking and coordination between ministries and other stakeholders, as well as foster country ownership. It was the first project to test a methodology linking the preparation of comprehensive reports to a range of capacity-building and policy-development activities.

While the lessons from this pilot initiative still need to be fully put into practice, it has become clear that establishing migration profiles as a government-owned framework for data collection and analysis and as a national policy-development instrument is a process requiring extensive capacity-building and government support. The capacity-building would allow the country to assume full ownership of the creation and the regular update of the reports. As a regularly updated information tool, Migration Profiles will enable countries to better plan and evaluate their policies related to migration and development. As such, Migration Profiles can be a critical tool in any migration-mainstreaming exercise.

The *Migrants Count* report developed a series of recommendations aimed at helping States to more rapidly develop better data sets on migration.\(^{157}\) First, it recommends that population censuses should include questions on the place of birth, country of citizenship, and place of residence for each person enumerated – and that the tabulations of these results should be openly disseminated. Second, it recommends that existing administrative data should be compiled and released. Third, the Commission recommends that those States with frequent and detailed labour force surveys should give permission for those surveys’ individual records to be unified into a single, harmonized, annually updated database. Fourth, it is recommended that National Statistical Offices that already collect data on migrants through general or specialized surveys make anonymous data on individuals available to researchers. And the final recommendation is to include migration modules in existing household surveys in migration countries of origin. In the longer term, the Commission recommends capacity-building to strengthen institutional capacities to collect and disseminate migration data in developing countries. Specific steps would include the convening of a task force to bring together national policymakers, statisticians, researchers and migration specialists, and the preparation of annual or biannual national migration data reports, very much along the lines of what is being done with the Migration Profiles.

Just as important as developing sound national and international databases on international migration, and promoting research, is making sure that these, in turn, feed into the policymaking process. The ad hoc Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) reported that governments often find it difficult to absorb the growing amount of information on migration and often overlook research that might be valuable because it is not presented in an accessible form. It also reported that there is often a lack of consultation between research institutions and governments on shared priorities and insufficient research capacities in developing countries. Among its recommendations is the establishment of national working groups to ensure the exchange of data and information and stimulate the identification and dissemination of best practices.\(^{159}\) Another important recommendation concerns the need to invest in research capacity-building to enable developing countries to gather the evidence required to implement policies effectively. A good example of a research capacity-building project is the Intra-ACP Observatory on Migration (see textbox 14).

In addition to collecting and analysing data, there is also significant scope for collating existing research or supporting new research on policy-relevant migration issues. In Colombia, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has compiled a list of recent seminar reports, studies, statistics and unpublished reports. The Government has also strengthened its relationship with universities and national and international institutions in order to access relevant data and research. In Jamaica, the Government is undertaking research itself. The Population Unit of the Planning Institute of Jamaica has collaborated with other units in the Social Policy and Planning Division to undertake two studies: one on estimating the scale and impact of the ‘brain drain’ from Jamaica, and the other a legislative review.\(^{158}\)

\(^{157}\) http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422146/

\(^{158}\) GFMD (2009).

\(^{159}\) Ibid.
Textbox 14: The Intra-ACP Observatory on Migration

Much of the recent debate about migration and development has focused on South–North migration, and the importance of South–South migratory flows has tended to be overlooked. South–South migration seems to be overwhelmingly intraregional, including within the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States; however, solid and reliable knowledge on migration and development in this region requires capacity-building and enhanced data collection in the South, as available data are scarce and/or not comparable. Where relevant data do exist, they are often not adequately shared between stakeholders and analysis of such information may be limited. There is a clear need for help in ACP countries to strengthen their research networks and train and support experts from those countries in improving data and information management on intraregional migration and link them with policymakers.

In order to build capacity in the area of research, the Secretariat of the ACP and the European Commission have entrusted IOM and a consortium of 19 research partners with setting up an Intra-ACP Observatory on Migration. This Observatory is one of three components of a larger ACP Migration Facility, which aims to foster institutional capacity in ACP countries and strengthen civil society with the ultimate aim of including migration issues in national and regional development policy strategies. It will establish a network of observatories on migration in the six regions of the ACP Group of States: West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The Observatory will work through the network of regional observatories to provide policymakers, civil society and the public at large with reliable and harmonized data through applied research and research-based action on intraregional migration.

The regional observatories will consolidate existing migration data, identify gaps, develop common methodologies, undertake research projects, facilitate the exchange of expertise and data, and help train, support and link multidisciplinary Southern specialists and experts in collecting, processing and disseminating policy-oriented information on human mobility within the ACP, with a focus on linking migration to development. They will also ensure the wider dissemination of their information to academics, civil society and policymakers, as well as provide training to build their capacity in gathering and using harmonized data.

Programme activities will start in 12 pilot countries: Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Republic of Tanzania. However, the aim is to progressively extend the Observatory’s activities to other interested ACP countries.


8.5 Policy evaluation

Evaluating policy is an essential component of good governance, including for migration. It is important to provide evidence to the public that policies represent good value for money. It is also important to maintain public confidence in government generally, and in the ability of government to manage migration in particular, especially as migration continues to rise on the political and media agenda. It is also good practice to learn lessons from previous policy experiences in devising new policy approaches to prepare for future challenges. A recent review of policy responses to financial and economic crises during the twentieth century, for example, has demonstrated that many of the impacts of the more recent global economic crisis on migration replicate earlier impacts and that, in some cases, current policy responses have not taken into account the mistakes of previous responses.160

It is often not clear exactly what evaluation entails. A study on how the costs and impacts of migration policies are evaluated offers the following working definition: “a relatively regulated and systemic exercise looking at the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, internal and external coherence, synergies, impact, added value, and sustainability of policies or

160 IOM (2009a).
pro grammes”. Using this definition, there are at least three key dimensions in evaluating public policy on migration. First, evaluation is required to estimate the impact of policy on individual migrants, as well as on the host population. Second, policy should be examined from a macroeconomic perspective to assess the extent to which it yields net social gains. Third, from a cost-benefit perspective, it is necessary to assess whether the best possible outcome has been achieved relative to the cost of each policy. This analysis would take into consideration each country’s specific immigration system – for example, whether it is labour-market driven or focuses more on family reunification.

The ad hoc Working Group on Policy Coherence, Data and Research of the GFMD concluded that, in most countries, there is insufficient evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of policies and programmes on migration, and mechanism that facilitate the exchange of information and lessons learned, both within and between States, are lacking. It recommends the development of indicators or benchmarks at the national level, against which to assess the effectiveness of policies. At a multilateral level, it recommends a workshop to take stock of policy evaluation that does exist, in order to compare appropriate methodologies and best practice. The World Bank and IOM are developing a partnership to take this initiative forward, together with interested governments and institutions.

The study cited above identifies a number of specific challenges that may need to be overcome to improve migration policy evaluation. First, many public administrators tend to hire evaluation experts, rather than migration experts, to conduct evaluations of policy implementation. Second, there is usually limited interaction between public administrations and migration researchers, and limited mobility between the civil service and academia. Third, NGOs are rarely involved in conducting evaluations or in formal government-appointed independent advice bodies. Fourth, evaluation reports tend to be published selectively, without any explicit criteria guiding the publication policy. Finally, there are rarely systematic rules or mechanisms to ensure that evaluation findings can feed into policy formulation or revision.

8.6 Developing urban governance

It is likely that the majority of the world’s international migrants already live in urban areas, and this trend is likely to intensify in the future. The decisions that municipal governments make concerning land use, building regulations, economic development, public health, social services, transportation, libraries, culture, parks, recreation and police forces have a profound impact on the reception and settlement experiences of migrants. Yet, in most countries, migration policy is set at the national level, with little attention to capacity-building at the local level, where policy is usually implemented.

In strengthening urban governance for international migration, an important first step is to establish a constitutional and legislative framework in which municipal authorities can assume responsibilities for migration from central government. In Canada, for example, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of 2001 authorizes the Federal Minister to sign agreements with the provinces to facilitate the coordination and implementation of immigration policies and programmes. Thus, in 2007, the Toronto City Council ratified an MoU, negotiated with the provincial and federal governments, in which the three levels of government agreed to collaborate on research, policy and programme development related to immigration and settlement issues affecting the city. Subsequent steps that have been identified through a comparative review of how Canadian cities respond to international migration include formulating and adopting formal immigration and settlement policies; establishing advisory bodies to advise elected officials; formulating and disseminating vision statements, particularly to attract public support; developing strategic plans; and creating administrative structures.162

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162 Tossutti (2009).
All of these steps give rise to significant capacity requirements, especially as regards funding mechanisms and the establishment of a trained cadre of local officials. Another interesting example is the city of Montreuil, outside Paris, which has effectively developed a local citizen policy and practice to ensure full integration of migrants into social, economic and civic life.163

It is also often the case that international migrants depart from urban areas and, in such situations, there may also be merit in developing policies at the city level to manage migration outflows. One example comes from the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in the north-eastern Chinese province of Jilin. The prefecture has responded to high levels of international emigration originating there by establishing policies on pre-migration training, financial assistance, and labour market insertion in the destination country.164 These policies are implemented through a network of prefectural administrative bodies, including the Prefectural Departments of Commerce, Labour and Social Security, Municipal Foreign Trade Offices, and village- and township-level Labour and Social Security Service Stations.

8.7 Engagement with the private sector

There are a number of reasons why engagement with the private sector is an important component of strengthening the governance of international migration. First, as has been highlighted elsewhere in this report, the private sector (for example, in the form of employers, trade unions and private recruiters) plays an important role in managing labour migration, in particular. Second, and in keeping with the overall theme of this report on capacity-building, private sector investments can support government efforts to manage immigration and further integration, while also making good ‘business sense’. Over the last ten years, the Spanish food service company Grupo Vips, for example, has leveraged training subsidies from the Spanish Government to prepare workers for jobs before they arrived in Spain, and offered immigrants the opportunity to develop long-term careers with the company (including the prospect of moving from entry-level to managerial positions).165 Third, there are ongoing tensions between the private sector and government – for example, relating to practical obstacles inhibiting the free movement of skilled labour, which are best overcome through dialogue.

As one of the chief beneficiaries of labour migration, the private sector should have an interest in engaging with governments to plan and prepare for orderly migration and mitigate potential adverse consequences of labour mobility. Given the general consensus that migration is good for business, it is surprising that the private sector does not engage more proactively. A business round-table discussion convened in preparation for the Global Forum on Migration and Development in Athens in 2009 identified a number of reasons why, including a concern on the part of business leaders that they might experience a public backlash for supporting migration, in particular they might lack influence among policymakers, and why policymakers might be unwilling to countenance their recommendations, especially with regard to lowering obstacles to migration.166 The round-table participants identified several strategies for overcoming reluctance on the part of the private sector to engage in discussions on international migration. An initial step would be for the private sector to better articulate its needs to policymakers. At the same time, it is important to recognize the diversity of private sector actors: their needs may not always align. Second, there may be lessons to learn from other global advocacy campaigns. Businesses that get involved, speak out, and frame their recommendations cogently. In particular, business advocates need to be clear about their audience – for example, targeting different messages towards local authorities, national governments and international organizations.

164 Luova (2008).
165 GFMD (2009).
166 GFMD (2009).
It was also recommended that business leaders recognize the wider context for migration. While migration may be primarily an issue of economics and competitiveness for business leaders, others see it differently. For instance, the general public may view migration in terms of the costs and contributions of both immigrants and their children, and is concerned about how fast their communities are changing. At the same time, the private sector has a significant role to play in promoting their positive experiences of migration, working to build durable partnerships and publicizing the benefits of managed migration. In reality, companies have already achieved much in terms of training, education, research and development but have often not been very successful in publicizing these positive results.

8.8 An enhanced role for civil society

Civil society – including non-governmental organizations, policy advocacy groups, educational establishments, religious organizations, trade unions and the media – has an important role to play in migration governance. It can help gather data and conduct research, thus strengthening the evidence base for policy. It can access the least-accessible of migrant populations (for example, irregular migrants) and work in partnership with authorities to deliver assistance. It can also campaign for more coherent policies. A good example is the Public Services International (PSI) – the global union representing around 7 million workers in the delivery of health and social care – which is embarking on a programme on migration in the health and social care sectors. The aim is to strengthen the capacity of public sector trade unions in addressing the causes, impact and challenges of migration in the health and social care sectors through capacity-building, education and information dissemination, organizing and outreach, union-to-union bilateral partnerships, advocacy and campaigns, union representation and collective bargaining. Yet the involvement of civil society in the migration arena outside operational activities, and especially in contributing to migration policy, has been limited compared to its involvement, for example, in environmental and development policy. In these latter fields, civil society has made a significant impact – for example, with regard to defining the international agenda, providing information, exerting ‘moral authority’, monitoring and building consensus.

A number of obstacles to an enhanced role for civil society in migration governance have been identified, with capacity-building implications for civil society organizations, States and institutions. One reason why it has been difficult for civil society to engage has been that migration policy covers such a broad scope and comprises extensive inter-linkages, such as with trade, development, the environment, security and conflict management. Civil society organizations tend to have narrow and specialized interests – for example, in human rights advocacy – and may lack the breadth of expertise required to engage in migration policy. One possible response is for civil society organizations to establish coordinating mechanisms to provide a broader base for engagement. A related challenge for many civil society organizations is a lack of financial resources. While, in certain circumstances, States may fund civil society organizations, it is also incumbent upon such organizations to raise funds, and there is a capacity-building requirement for training on fund-raising within these organizations.

Equally, access by civil society organizations to formal policy forums is often limited by States. The Global Commission on International Migration concluded that, “... the policy-making process is more likely to be effective when it is based on widespread consultation […] with diverse components of civil society” and, where they do not already exist, governments might consider the potential benefits of establishing formal mechanisms for consultation with civil society.

167 Chappell (2010).
168 GCIM (2005).
Some of the regional consultative processes (RCPs) on migration (discussed below) have vigorous mechanisms for the participation of civil society actors in regional migration policy dialogue – for example, the Regional Conference on Migration (or ‘Puebla Process’), the South American Conference on Migration, and the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. The IOM Council and its International Dialogue on Migration engages non-governmental partners on an equal footing with governments in the development and conduct of its regular workshops and senior policy-level discussions.

The GFMD represents an innovative effort to achieve dialogue on migration policy between governments and civil society at the global level, certain aspects of which could easily be replicated at the regional or national level. Currently, a broad range of civil society organizations convene in advance of the meeting of governments, discuss the same agenda, and present key recommendations to the governments. This process provides the opportunity for consensus-building within civil society and for access to governments, but also does not undermine open government-to-government dialogue. A number of concrete recommendations have been made for making the Civil Society Days at the GFMD more effective. One is to help ground the discussion and generate concrete best-practice recommendations with smaller sessions that are focused on specific issues. A second is to select chairs with experience in dealing with governments in international forums so that there is a clearer message to governments. Additionally, it has been suggested that a basic administrative structure be established to support civil society, in order, for example, to raise funds and thus reduce dependence on the host institution, and to provide training in advance of the meetings.

8.9 Effective RCPs and cooperation between regional processes

There has been a proliferation of RCPs on migration in recent years (see map 9). These processes are usually not officially associated with formal regional or other institutions, and they provide States with the opportunity for dialogue centred on regionally or thematically relevant migration issues in an informal and non-binding setting. Although experiences vary widely across RCPs, a comparative analysis of some of the main processes has concluded that they have been effective in building trust between States, increasing understanding of migration issues, helping States better understand their capacity requirements, fostering the exchange of information and experiences, breaking down divides between States and, within States, between departments, creating networks and harmonizing regional positions.

Providing the opportunity to exchange experiences and learn from policy initiatives in neighbouring countries is an important capacity-building element of RCPs. As emphasized in the introduction to this report, capacity-building need not be about reinventing the wheel, although it is equally important to understand that experiences cannot simply be transferred without understanding the specific national or local context. RCPs have also been more directly involved in capacity-building, particularly through providing regular workshops and seminars at the technical level, and supporting pilot projects. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development Regional Consultative Processes on Migration (IGAD-RCP), for example, carried out an EU-funded border assessment that resulted in training for officials and the provision of better equipment by IOM with EU support. In Lebanon, there is currently a pilot project organized through the Mediterranean Transit Migration (MTM) dialogue on capacity-building in detention centres, including staff training and the development of standard operating procedures, with support from UNHCR and Caritas.

Building the capacity of RCPs is therefore a way to increase cooperation between States at the regional level, and promote further capacity-building, often in conjunction with other partners. A review commissioned as a background paper for this report has collated a series of lessons learned on the circumstances in which RCPs are most effective, and each of

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169 Hansen (2010).
these represents a potential area for capacity-building. Networking is identified as critical, particularly between and after meetings. This effect can be supported through the designation in participating States of RCP focal points, and facilitated, for example, through the tabulation, distribution and maintenance of e-mail and telephone lists. The Bali Process, for example, has established a liaison network. Networking is easier where RCPs are relatively small. Where large numbers of participating States are involved, one way to promote networking and continue to build trust and consensus is to devolve responsibility to working groups and task forces that bring together a smaller number of the States involved. The level and type of participation is also important, preferably combining political and technical officials, from the full range of government ministries involved in migration issues, and with consistency of representation. Another recommendation is for a two-level structure, allowing for technical-level workshops and seminars, and a political-level meeting to establish consensus and, if necessary, coordinate a regional position.

As has been emphasized is the case for individual States, capacity-building requirements will vary significantly between RCPs depending, for example, on how new they are, which region they cover, what their goals are, and to what extent they face significant current or future migration challenges. Another focus for capacity-building in this area relates to the promotion of greater cooperation between RCPs, and between RCPs and more formal Regional Economic Communities (RECs). This may not always be appropriate because the migration priorities of concern to RCPs may be so different; however, sharing experiences on administrative and technical issues may still be of value. Sometimes it is, in effect, already taking place – for example, where a single State participates in more than one RCP. One option for greater cooperation is to provide opportunities for non-members to attend RCP meetings in an observer capacity. Another is to convene on a regular basis meetings that bring together representatives of the various RCPs, as was done in June 2009 jointly by the Thai Government and IOM.

8.10 Addressing the need for more coherent global governance

It is not within the scope or remit of this report to reflect upon the mandate of IOM or to comment on those of its partner organizations in the field of international migration. At the same time, any discussion of capacity-building requirements for migration governance needs to acknowledge a growing consensus that the current global institutional framework on migration lacks coherence. A background paper on the global governance of international migration commissioned for this report reaches the following conclusion:

Global migration governance is currently made up of a range of informal Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs); formal Regional Economic Communities (RECs) engaging in regional integration; international dialogues such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) and the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development; coordination mechanisms such as the Global Migration Group (GMG) and the UN DESA Migration Annual Coordination Meeting; and a range of international organizations often competing over resources and mandates. At the moment these structures lack coherence, and are not based on a rational institutional design to address the realities of migration in the Twenty-First Century.

While there is still no single international institution or agency with overall responsibility for international migration, it is worth noting that, at the operational level, and through a series of more informal networks, there is already extensive cooperation between intergovernmental organizations. IOM, for example, although outside the UN system, has a long-standing and close working relationship with UN organizations at a
number of levels. It has observer status at the UN General Assembly, it is a regular member and a full participant in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) mechanism and it has signed a cooperation agreement with the UN (in 1996). Through its Permanent Observer Office in New York, IOM maintains active liaison with the UN Secretariat, and New York-based UN bodies such as UNFPA, UNICEF and UNDP, and has memorandums of understanding with the vast majority of UN entities whose work touches upon aspects of migration, including UNEP and WHO. At an operational level, IOM Chiefs of Mission are regularly invited by UN Resident Coordinators to participate in UN Country Teams. Within the IASC ‘Cluster Approach’, IOM has taken the lead role for the Camp Coordination/Camp Management Cluster in natural disasters and also plays an important role in various other clusters including shelter and logistics.

IOM is also a founding member of the Global Migration Group (GMG) (and its predecessor, the Geneva Migration Group), an inter-agency group that meets at Heads of Agency and working levels with the aim of promoting the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments relating to migration, and the provision of more coherent and stronger leadership to improve the overall effectiveness of the UN and the international community’s policy and operational response to international migration. Current members of the GMG are: the ILO, IOM, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNDP, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNFPA, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNHCR, UNICEF, UNITAR, UNODC, the World Bank, and UN regional commissions. While the GMG has yet to realize its full potential to contribute collectively to more effective governance of migration, recent changes to its operating procedures (for example, the creation of a troika to ensure continuity from one chair to the next, and the development of an annual workplan) are promising. Pooling the collective expertise and resources of the 14 participating agencies in the field of capacity-building to devise and undertake joint programming could go a long way towards creating better coherence and capacity.

The GFMD will be assessed following its sixth iteration with a view towards a recommendation on its future, which could be considered during the 2013 second UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. Among the current questions for discussion are whether to maintain the GFMD and, if so, whether to maintain it in its current State-led, non-binding format outside of any institutional structure but with loose links to the UN through the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Migration and Development and the contributions of the GMG, or whether to ‘move it into the UN’. Integrally linked to these questions is IOM’s relationship to the UN and whether, as well as under what conditions, IOM could or should become a part of the UN system. These are all questions to be taken up by the Member States of the respective organizations and, in the context of this report, ought to reflect consideration of how the collective capacities of the international system can best be organized so as to enhance prospects for delivering timely, coherent and sound advice and services to governments and migrants on the multifaceted aspects of migration, while avoiding duplication, bureaucratic responses and unproductive internal competition.
Most States in the world – and not just in the developing world – do not have adequate capacity to effectively manage migration today. Despite a temporary dip during the period of the global economic crisis, global migration is expected to resume to pre-crisis levels. The need for better migration management will, therefore, not go away. Indeed, the current lull may be a good time to try to catch up.

At the same time, this report has identified a series of structural trends – ranging from growing disparities in demographic growth, to environmental change – that are likely to result in more, and more complex, international migration, in the not-too-distant future. Every State will be affected. In some, migration and its impacts may diminish, over time. In others, current capacities can be expected to continue to cope with future changes, albeit imperfectly. In perhaps the majority of States, however, significant changes will require significant new capacities or adaptation of existing capacities. It has become clear, through this report, that capacity-building is already a growth area in international migration: as has been demonstrated, hundreds of millions of dollars are spent each year by numerous donors and international organizations in strengthening migration capacity all over the world. Equally, it is clear that there are significant gaps in capacity-building, which is often short-term and rarely comprehensive. In many cases, its effects are not fully evaluated and, where they are, it is often not as effective as it might be.

This report confirms that migration capacity-building is an essential and worthwhile investment – as it should be. At the same time, however, it highlights a need for better capacity-building – across a range of migration areas and a variety of migration actors – that is effective, sustainable and prepared for the future.

Against this backdrop, this report has had three main objectives. The first has been to develop a preliminary inventory of core capacities required across the breadth of international migration, both to make management more effective today and to prepare for the future. These core capacities are summarized in the checklist that follows. Second, drawing particularly on the wide range of activities in the field of migration capacity-building implemented by IOM and partners, it has compared existing models, provided examples and highlighted effective practice – from how to assess labour markets from a migration perspective, to addressing the need for more coherent global governance, in countries ranging from Armenia to Zimbabwe. Third, the report has made preliminary recommendations on capacity-building for stakeholders including governments, UN agencies and civil society.

It is hoped that this report will provide a solid basis for further action, and this final section considers the next steps to be taken.

First, a more rigorous analysis of core capacities should be undertaken. This report has been
selective in its choice of migration topics (labour mobility, irregular migration, migration and development, integration, environmental change, and migration governance). These aspects have been selected because they are expected to undergo significant transformations in the coming years as the dimensions and dynamics of international migration change. It may be contended that some topics that have been subsumed in this report deserve greater attention in their own right – for example, migration health, gender or border management. Other topics, such as forced migration, migrants’ rights and internal migration, certainly deserve greater attention than space allowed here. Under each heading, this report has focused on just ten core capacities and has had to be selective – for example, in citing examples of good practice from around the world. Equally, there may well be core capacities that have not been identified or paid sufficient attention. Perhaps the most important objective of such an exercise would be to try to achieve some degree of consensus around an inventory or ‘checklist’ of core capacities. This would have the potential to serve the donors that fund capacity-building, the international organizations that often deliver it, and the States and other stakeholders that benefit from it, to prioritize as well as achieve a degree of comprehensiveness, while always acknowledging that capacity requirements will vary according to national and regional contexts.

A second step that is required is to undertake a more systematic review of existing capacities worldwide. Certainly, more work is needed to collate examples and models from around the world and this, in itself, is a pressing capacity requirement. At times, this report has found it difficult to provide examples, particularly from the developing world, because there is insufficient readily accessible information on capacity-building initiatives and, more importantly, on their effectiveness. Initiatives funded or supported by the international community can normally (although not always) be identified, but capacity-building is also undertaken by States and other stakeholders without widespread recording or reporting. On the basis of the inventory discussed above, it is possible to envisage a regional or even global survey to gather information on existing capacity-building programmes and practices. Such a capacity-building ‘database’ could provide alternative models and examples of best practice that might be adopted elsewhere.

A third step implied by this report but deliberately not undertaken here is to assess current capacities. There are several aspects to this process. The first involves undertaking a needs-assessment exercise to determine the migration issues facing particular States, institutions or other stakeholders. To an extent, this is already taking place – for example, under the auspices of national development plans, poverty reduction strategy papers, and migration profiles – but it is by no means systematically done. The second involves assessing current capacities and, in particular, determining how effective they are. As was emphasized earlier in this report (see section 8.5), all too often, migration policies and programmes are not adequately evaluated. The third aspect of this process involves identifying the capacity gaps – the migration-related areas in which States, institutions and other stakeholders are currently failing. The entire process is, of course, even more challenging when looking at possible future scenarios, which may be why most States have not done this. Yet the same issues will need to be addressed: what are the likely changes in migration trends in the near future, how will these affect States, institutions or other stakeholders, and to what extent will current capacities suffice?

A fourth step would require individual States, institutions and other stakeholders to identify priorities in capacity-building. The inventory of core capacities discussed above may provide a template – for example, for States dealing for the first time with significant labour migration, or those that are particularly susceptible to climate change – but it will need to be adjusted according to national and regional contexts. As already emphasized, this report is intended to provide guidance rather than being prescriptive. While making the assessment may be the responsibility of the specific actors
involved, there is certainly a supportive role to be played by regional and international organizations – for example, in terms of funding, training and sharing expertise. Similarly, while non-State actors at the national level may be ultimately responsible for developing their own capacity, there is a case for bringing their needs to the attention of the State and even international donors. Certainly, this report has demonstrated the interconnectedness of migration governance across all levels, with capacity required at the international, national and subnational level simultaneously, and across all involved actors, in order to effectively manage migration for the future.

As stated in the introduction to this report, however, capacity-building is only the beginning – even though it is, in many ways, an ambitious beginning. Implementation, enforcement, monitoring and evaluation, are just as important. These processes, in themselves, require significant capacity and far more systematic attention in the future.
Checklist of core capacities in international migration

Labour mobility

• determining policy goals
• assessing labour markets from the migration perspective
• regulating admissions and selecting migrant workers
• determining conditions attached to employment permits
• training of migrant workers and placement services
• protecting migrant workers’ rights
• reducing labour migration costs
• strengthening and implementing bilateral or other labour mobility agreements
• returning migrants and their reintegration
• implementation.

Integration

• strengthening economic participation
• encouraging civic participation among migrants
• simplifying rules on citizenship, nationality and dual nationality
• family migration
• managing temporary migration
• promoting migrant education
• strengthening anti-discrimination policies and practices
• promoting migrant health
• fostering public dialogue
• mainstreaming integration across government.

Environmental change

• establishing a better evidence base
• disaster risk reduction
• developing adaptation strategies
• preparing evacuation plans
• filling gaps in the legal and normative framework
• implementing national laws and policies on internal displacement
• amending national immigration laws and policies
• establishing proactive resettlement policies
• providing humanitarian assistance
• planning for resettlement.

Irregular migration

• generating better data on irregular migration
• enhancing law enforcement
• regularizing migrants’ status
• managing detention and deportation
• regulating migration and employment
• capacity-building in transit States
• combating migrant smuggling and human trafficking
• addressing mixed flows
• enhancing information dissemination
• building partnerships and cooperation.

Migration and development

• mainstreaming migration in development plans
• optimizing formal remittance flows
• enhancing the developmental impacts of remittances
• engaging diasporas
• consolidating knowledge networks
• strengthening the links between return and development
• promoting circular migration
• training to retain
• developing ethical recruitment policies
• institutional capacity-building.

Migration governance

• developing a national migration policy
• strengthening migration management at the national level
• coordinated policymaking and implementation
• generating better data and research
• policy evaluation
• developing urban governance
• engaging with the private sector
• enhancing the role of civil society
• effective RCPs and cooperation between regional processes
• addressing the need for more coherent global governance.
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an overview of international migration trends
This section of the World Migration Report 2010 aims to provide readers with a brief overview of regional and global trends in international migration. This section highlights some of the key migration trends that have occurred since the publication of the 2008 World Migration Report. In particular, this year’s report examines how the global economic crisis has affected migration trends around the world.

Regions

Each regional overview aims to include the following information:

- migrant stock in the region and general trends;
- percentage of stock within region, as percentage of total global migrant stock;
- net migration rates;
- main countries of origin and destination;
- emigration trends;
- remittance inflows and outflows, in general for the region (in absolute terms) and in relation to main recipients and senders (in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP);
- major migration corridors;
- gender dynamics;
- urban areas with more than 100,000 foreign-born residents;
- persons displaced by natural disasters;
- internally displaced persons and refugees;
- irregular migration;
- effects of the global economic crisis on jobs, returns, remittances and migration flows.

Although efforts have been made to use the latest available and most comparable data on migration trends in each of the six regional overviews presented below, there are clearly many gaps in information, given the paucity of international migration data. (See the annex for a full discussion of sources and definitions used and of the limitations of existing migration data.) It should also be noted that this report was finalized at the end of April 2010.
Global stocks

- The total number of international migrants worldwide in 2010 is estimated to be 214 million persons. This figure has remained relatively stable as a share of the global population, increasing only by 0.1 per cent, from 3.0 per cent to 3.1 per cent, between 2005 and 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).
- The United States of America (USA) still hosts the largest migrant stock of any country worldwide, while six of the top ten countries with the largest foreign-born populations (France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) are found in Europe (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Countries with the largest foreign-born populations in 2010 (in millions)

- USA
- Russian Federation
- Germany
- Saudi Arabia
- Canada
- France
- United Kingdom
- Spain
- India
- Ukraine

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
Fifty-seven per cent of all migrants live in high-income countries – up from 43 per cent in 1990. Migrants make up 10 per cent of the population of high-income regions (compared to 7.2 per cent in 1990) (UN DESA, 2009).

When migrants are considered as a percentage of a country’s population, the picture changes. Among the countries with a population of more than 1 million, only Saudi Arabia features in the top ten countries of destination. In some small countries, migrants account for more than half the population (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Percentage of foreign-born in population in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of foreign-born in population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>43.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong SAR</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>28.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Most of the main destination countries consider their current level of immigration to be “satisfactory”, as do 152 governments worldwide. Only France, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia consider their current level of immigration to be “too high” (31 other governments worldwide share this opinion), while Canada is one of the 9 governments that consider current levels of immigration to be “too low”. Compared to 1996, 14 governments (almost all from countries in Africa or the Middle East) changed their opinions about immigration from “satisfactory” to “too high” while, on the other hand, 20 governments (about half of them from countries in Europe) considered the level of immigration to be “satisfactory” in 2009, compared to “too high” in 1996 (UN DESA, 2009; see map 10).

There are more than 20 cities across the world (9 in North America, 4 in the Middle East, 3 in Europe, and 2 each in Asia and Oceania) with over 1 million foreign-born inhabitants; the total foreign-born population of these cities alone accounts for 37 million migrants. Twenty-five cities around the world also had populations consisting of over 25 per cent foreign-born (Price and Benton-Short, 2007).

Many of the main countries of destination (Germany, India, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) are also among the top ten countries of origin of migrants (see figure 3).
Figure 3: Countries with the largest emigrant populations in 2000 (in millions)

- The absolute numbers of both male and female migrants have grown over recent years, with the proportion of male migrants remaining steady at around 51 per cent (UN DESA, 2009). However, national and regional variations in this figure are significant (see map 2), and women are particularly represented among highly skilled migrants (UNIFEM, 2008).

- Although comprehensive and comparable data are lacking, it is clear that youth and child migration are important phenomena. Much of this migration takes place in the context of family reunification in destination countries; however, it seems likely that an important proportion of children and young people are migrating independently (McKenzie, 2007). According to a cross-country census-based study of child migration in Argentina, Chile and South Africa, around 4 per cent of all children were international or internal migrants, representing around a quarter of all migrants (Yaqub, 2009).

- According to the UNDP 2009 Human Development Report, there are an estimated 740 million internal migrants in the world (UNDP, 2009).

- A new cross-country study on migration and development (IPPR/GDN, 2010) suggests that, although the numbers involved in return migration movements vary, this kind of movement can involve from 12 to 37 per cent of people who go abroad for more than three months.

**Remittances**

- Remittances in 2009 are estimated at USD 414 billion, of which over USD 316 billion went to developing countries—a drop of 6 per cent from USD 336 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2010a; Ratha et al., 2010).

- Although this figure represents the first recorded drop in remittances since 1985, reflecting the effects of the global recession (see ‘Migration and the economic crisis: 2008–2010’ below) remittances are still at a higher level than in 2007 (when the figure stood at USD 385 billion).

\[1\] The countries analysed by this study include Colombia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Jamaica, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Viet Nam. The results refer to trends observed in these countries and, thus, may differ from return patterns only elsewhere.
• The top ten recipients accounted for over USD 200 billion of this flow, with China and India receiving almost USD 100 billion between them (see figure 4).

• In relative terms, remittances in ten countries accounted for over a fifth of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008; in the case of Tajikistan, remittances represented almost half of the country’s GDP (see figure 5).

**Figure 4: Top ten remittance receivers in 2009 (in USD millions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Remittances received (in USD millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>49,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>47,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>22,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>19,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>10,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>9,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>9,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9,515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ratha et al., 2010.

**Figure 5: Percentage of GDP in 2008 represented by remittances**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Moldova</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ratha et al., 2010.
Internally displaced persons

- According to the latest figures from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, 2009), at the end of 2008, there were 26 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world – the same figure as in 2007.

- Despite an important 1.1 million-person drop in the IDP population in Sudan, it remains the most affected country, with 4.9 million IDPs; numbers in the other most affected countries have, however, increased.

- In particular, Colombia has seen the lower estimate of its IDP population increase by over 600,000 since 2007 to 3.3 million (the upper estimate is over 4.9 million, up from 3,940,164).

- Other notable changes:
  - The upper estimate for the number of IDPs in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Afghanistan almost doubled to 1 million, 400,000 and 235,000, respectively.
  - The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s IDP population increased from 1.36 million to 2.1 million.
  - New data on IDPs in Pakistan (data had previously not been available) suggest this population numbers around 1.25 million.
  - Iraq’s IDP population decreased by around 35,000 to 2,842,191, while the number of IDPs in Somalia reached 1.3 million – up from 1.1 million in 2007.
  - Progress has also been made in Uganda and Timor-Leste, which have seen their IDP populations fall from about 1 million and 100,000 in July 2008, to 437,000 and 400, respectively (see map 11).

Refugees

- The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that there were 15.2 million refugees worldwide at the end of 2008 (UNHCR, 2009).

  - According to UN DESA figures, the proportion of refugees in global migrant stocks is 7.6 per cent (UN DESA, 2009).

  - Four fifths of the world’s refugees are located in developing countries (UNHCR, 2009).

  - Pakistan, the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran host the largest number of refugees, with 1.8 million, 1.1 million and 980,000 refugees, respectively.

  - Afghans (2.8 million) and Iraqis (1.9 million) make up the largest groups of refugees (UNHCR, 2009; see map 12).

Health migration

- The medical brain drain continues to be an issue of concern. Although there are no global figures on the subject, data

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2 This figure includes ‘refugees’ (9.05 million at the end of 2008) and ‘people in refugee-like situations’ (estimated at 1.4 million at the end of 2008), both in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate, as well as refugees in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate (estimated at 4.7 million at the end of 2008). ‘Refugees’ are persons recognized under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol and the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, as persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection, while ‘people in refugee-like situations’ represent a category that is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.
from Africa suggest that 19 per cent of doctors and 8 per cent of nurses born in African countries (and 28% of doctors and 11% of nurses born in sub-Saharan African countries) are working in nine key countries of destination.3

• In some cases, the majority of health workers born in African countries work abroad: for example, 75 per cent of Mozambican doctors and 81 per cent of Liberian nurses are working outside their country of origin (see map 13).

• According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007), based on Census 2000 data, India is the top country of origin in terms of the absolute number of doctors in OECD countries (nearly 56,000), followed by Germany (over 17,000), the United Kingdom (under 17,000), the Philippines (around 16,000) and China (around 13,000). In terms of the expatriation rate of doctors (the share of doctors working in OECD countries as a total of the doctors from that country), Antigua and Barbuda show the highest rate (89.3%), followed by Grenada (72.7%), Guyana (72.2%), Mozambique (64.5%) and Angola (63.2%).

• In terms of nurses, the Philippines is the main country of origin for nurses, with over 110,000 Filipino nurses working in OECD countries, followed by the United Kingdom (just under 46,000), Germany (under 32,000), Jamaica (over 31,000) and Canada (just under 25,000). The top five countries in terms of emigration rates of nurses are all Caribbean: Haiti leads with an expatriation rate of 94 per cent, followed by Jamaica (87.7%), Grenada (87.6%), St Vincent and the Grenadines (81.6%) and Guyana (81.1%) (OECD, 2007).

• In all, there were 2.8 million students in the world in 2007 (UNESCO, 2009). The top three countries of origin of students, accounting for almost a quarter of all international students, are all Asian: Chinese students alone account for around 15 per cent of the world’s mobile students, while Indian (5%) and Korean (4%) students are second and third, respectively.4 Between them, the countries highlighted in map 14 hosted nearly 2.5 million foreign students in 2007, with students from Asia representing half of this number. The United Kingdom and the USA together account for almost a million foreign students, while France is the main destination for African students.

• There are certain regional hubs: South Africa, for example, is the main country of destination for students from Southern African countries as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe; around 60,000 of the roughly 97,000 mobile students in Central Asia go either to Kyrgyzstan or the Russian Federation; Australia attracts over 135,000 of the nearly 800,000 student migrants in the Asia-Pacific; almost a quarter of mobile Eastern European students go to Germany; and, among Western European and North American students, the United Kingdom is the study destination of just under 24 per cent of students (UNESCO, 2009).

Student mobility

• The migration of people pursuing educational opportunities is an important trend with implications for future highly skilled migration flows.

Irregular migration

• Data on irregular migration are inevitably difficult to gather, and there has been no global update on estimates since a 2002 study estimated that 10–15 per cent of the migrant population in OECD countries was irregular (Hatton and Williamson, 2003). More recent estimates suggest that around one third of all migration from developing countries could be irregular (UNDP, 2009).

• Some data sources from countries of destination, such as law-enforcement

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3 The countries of destination are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, the United Kingdom and the USA.

statistics and census data, can be used, however, to give an indication of the number of migrants in irregular situations.

- The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2010), for example, estimated the unauthorized immigrant population at 10,750,000 in January 2009. In the fiscal year 2007–2008, 358,886 people were deported (an increase of around 40,000 deportations on the 2006–2007 figures) (DHS, 2009). However, border apprehensions decreased in 2008 to 724,000 – their lowest level since 1976. The overwhelming majority of irregular migrants in the USA are from Latin America: Mexicans alone accounted for 62 per cent of the unauthorized immigrant population, with 6,650,000 irregular Mexican migrants in the USA (DHS, 2010).

- In Australia, meanwhile, in 2008–2009, 6,818 migrants in irregular situation were removed, voluntarily or involuntarily (DIAC, 2009).

- Finally, in Europe between 2005 and 2007, around 1.4 million people were apprehended for being illegally present in European Union (EU) countries, and almost 760,000 removals were undertaken (EC, 2009). Albanians and Moroccans form the largest groups of apprehended and returned migrants. The Clandestino Project, meanwhile, estimates that there were between 1.9 and 3.8 million migrants in an irregular situation in the EU-27 in 2008, between 7 and 13 per cent of the overall migrant population (HWWI, 2008). CARIM (2009) estimates that the deaths of migrants crossing on boats from South-Eastern Mediterranean countries to Europe decreased from 1,765 in 2007 to 1,235 in 2008.

- New research on regularization programmes in the EU estimated that 5.5 to 6 million people applied for regularization between 1973 and 2008, of whom at least 4.3 million were regularized. Most of these regularizations took place in southern Europe in countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; most regularization programmes were undertaken in the ten years between 1998 and 2008 (Kraler, 2009).

- Data from Brazil suggest that the regularization programme launched in July 2009 has regularized over 40,000 persons, nearly 17,000 of whom are Bolivian (Brazilian Ministry of Justice, 2010).

- A regularization of migrant domestic and health-care workers in an irregular situation in Italy, meanwhile, resulted in about 300,000 requests (Italian Ministry of Interior, 2009).

Environment

- The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that sudden-onset natural disasters led to over 36 million people being displaced or evacuated in 2008; 20,293,413 of these people were evacuated or displaced because of climate-related disasters, with the Sichuan earthquake responsible for the displacement of 15 million people alone. Asia, with 31,397,358 persons displaced due to natural disasters, was the most affected region, followed by the Americas (OCHA/IDMC, 2009).

- Although media and policymakers often focus their attention on sudden-onset disasters (cyclones, hurricanes and tsunamis, inter alia), slow-onset changes in the environment are likely to have a greater impact on migration in the future. Over the last 30 years, twice as many people have been affected by droughts as by storms (1.6 billion compared with approximately 718 million) (IOM, 2009).
The negotiating text for the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (2009) explicitly mentioned that migration should be considered as part of adaptation strategies. Although no final text was adopted, a draft decision on enhanced action on climate change adaptation by the Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action explicitly identified the need to pay further attention to climate-change-induced migration.

Migration and the economic crisis 2008–2010

Since the publication of the last World Migration Report in 2008, the world has been affected by the worst global recession since the 1930s. Global GDP declined by 2.2 per cent in 2009 (World Bank, 2010b). The international financial crisis that began in the USA in 2008, and quickly transformed into a global crisis by the second half of 2008 and into 2009, has had a substantial impact on international migration.

At the time of writing (the first quarter of 2010), the world economy is beginning to recover. Though economists are still debating the ‘shape’ of the economic recovery, it is expected that the recovery in 2010 and 2011 will be marked by continued unemployment, especially in developed countries hardest hit by the crisis, as economic growth will not automatically translate into new jobs (World Bank, 2010b).

The depth, scope and duration of the economic crisis have varied according to country, geographic region and labour market sector. Although it remains difficult to determine the full scale of the impact of the crisis on migrants and migration, several effects of the crisis have already been identified.

The overall stock of migrants has not decreased in response to the crisis. However, flows of new migrants have slowed in many parts of the world, either because news of the decrease in opportunities spread through migrant networks or because the more restrictive policies of certain destination countries took effect.

Confronted with the crisis, some governments have responded by trying to send migrants back home. Special voluntary return programmes for migrants have been created in a number of countries, such as the Czech Republic, Japan and Spain. In the Czech Republic, only 2,089 people returned under voluntary return programmes, although the quota had been set at 4,000. A similar programme in Spain has resulted in 8,724 people taking up the offer – about 10 per cent of the potential beneficiary population (IOM, 2010). In Japan, according to figures available up to October 2009, 13,188 applications have been received for its voluntary return programme (MPI, 2009).

More broadly, although data on return migration trends are limited, there seems to be relatively little evidence, so far, of a mass return of migrants to countries of origin. This is largely due to factors such as the high level of social protection in some host countries’ system and the fact that conditions at home may be much worse than in the country of destination. Nonetheless, some countries, such as India, the Republic of Moldova and Poland, have reported an increase in the scale of returns for certain categories of labour migrants.

Reports suggest that the flow of irregular migrants slowed throughout 2009 on the US/Mexican border and southern Europe (MPI, 2009). Another consequence of the crisis, which is less easy to document, is the likely increase in the number of migrant workers who move into irregular forms of employment in the shadow economy in the country of destination. Migrants may adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach, preferring to take on new employment opportunities, possibly in the informal sector, or even overstay on their current visa, while waiting for an economic upturn.

The situation of migrants who have remained in their countries of destination has generally deteriorated. During
economic downturns, migrants are often among the most vulnerable category of workers affected by job losses, as they tend to be younger, are more likely to be in temporary jobs, have less formal education, and are concentrated in sectors of employment most affected by the recession, such as construction, manufacturing and services.

- This certainly seems to be the case in the current downturn. Although there are no global figures on migrant unemployment and conditions, it seems that migrants have generally faced higher levels of unemployment than native workforces:
  - Comparing figures from selected European countries from the first three quarters of 2008 and 2009, map 15 shows that, with the exception of Luxembourg and the United Kingdom, levels of unemployment increased more among migrants than among natives. Some of the largest increases in unemployment took place in countries most heavily hit by the recession (such as Spain, where the unemployment rate among migrants (28%) was nearly twice as high as the unemployment rate among nationals (15.8%), Iceland and the Baltic countries), which also tended to be newer countries of destination.
  - Migrants in the USA have also suffered: unemployment for Mexicans and Central Americans stood at 11.5 per cent, compared to 9.5 per cent of Americans in October 2009. Unemployment was 2.1 per cent higher for migrants in Canada than for the native-born in October 2009 (MPI, 2009). In Japan, up to 40 per cent of Brazilians are unemployed, while the impact of the crisis on Dubai has seen high levels of unemployment among South Asian workers.
  - The recession can also have an impact on those migrants who remain in employment: for example, migrants in the Russian Federation who are able to find work face reduced wages, or move into irregular work (ICG, 2010).
  - Recently arrived migrants are particularly vulnerable as they may have fewer entitlements to social protection and unemployment benefits.
  - Rising unemployment among migrant workers has negative effects on the flow of remittances, which, in turn, can increase poverty and inequality in countries of origin. As noted earlier, for 2009, the World Bank estimated that USD 316 billion were remitted to developing countries – a decrease of 6 per cent, compared to 2008 (Ratha et al., 2010). In some countries and regions, however, the fall in the level of remittances has been much greater. For example, in Nigeria, which is the top remittance-receiving country in Africa, remittances fell by nearly 20 per cent during the first part of 2009; and, in Uganda, the figure was nearly 40 per cent (see Africa section).

- However, some regions have been less affected than others or have experienced an increase in remittance transfers. For example, countries that send large numbers of migrants to the Gulf States, such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines, have seen remittances grow in 2008–2009.
  - For 2010 and 2011, remittance flows are expected to rise again, at around 6 and 7 per cent, respectively. However, uncertain employment opportunities and unemployment rates that are expected to remain high in advanced, industrialized countries will probably result in a lower rate of growth than before the beginning of the economic crisis. In 2010, remittance flows to developing countries are estimated at USD 335 billion – almost equal to the level recorded in 2008 (Ratha et al., 2010).
  - According to World Bank regional analyses, the economic crisis revealed that (i) “the more diverse the migration destinations, the more resilient remittances” (e.g. remittance flows from Filipino and Indian migrants fell only modestly as they originated in different countries, in contrast to those sent by migrants from Latin American and Caribbean countries,
which primarily originated in the USA and were dependent on the US economic cycle); (ii) “the lower the barriers to labour mobility, the stronger the link between remittances and economic cycles in that corridor” (the integrated EU labour market and Russia’s border porosity with neighbouring countries, for instance, allow migrants to leave and return easily to their country of destination and, thus, these migrants might be more inclined to return home instead of staying and searching for a job in order to send home remittances); and (iii) “exchange rate movements produce valuation effects, but they also influence the consumption-investment motive for remittances” (e.g. the depreciation of the Indian rupee against the US dollar in 2008 augmented the value of remittances increasingly invested in cheaper assets) (Ratha et al., 2010).

- Across the world, new migration policy measures have been introduced in response to the crisis. Broadly speaking, these measures have tried to achieve three objectives: protect labour markets for native workers, restrict the inflow of migrants, and encourage their return. For example, a range of restrictive immigration policies were introduced in 2009 to protect the local labour market in Italy, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, all of which reduced the numerical scope of their respective quotas. In the same year, a stop on all new entries of foreign workers was put in place in some East, South-East and Central Asian countries. However, not all countries have pursued restrictive policies: Sweden, for instance, implemented its new demand-driven labour migration model, which still allows trade unions to review job offers but without the possibility of vetoing an application from a foreign worker (IOM, 2010).

- Several countries of origin have also responded to the crisis by actively monitoring the situation of their nationals abroad, instituting further skills training back home and seeking alternative employment possibilities for their workers abroad (see regional overviews for Asia and Europe, for further information). Some Latin American and Caribbean countries have taken action to assist returning migrants. Colombia and Ecuador, for example, both introduced measures to support the reintegration of returnees (see the Americas).

- Despite the deep recession, an international survey of public opinion conducted by the German Marshall Fund (GMF) in 2009 found that, in most of the countries surveyed, despite some recent hardening of attitudes towards migrants, the majority of people still considered immigration to be “more of an opportunity than a problem” (GMF, 2009).
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US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

World Bank

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The number of international migrants in Africa in 2010 is estimated to be 19 million – an increase of 1.5 million migrants since 2005. Africa hosted just 9 per cent of the total global stock of migrants in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009). This figure is probably an underestimate, given that migration data are particularly poor in Africa.

Africa remains a continent with strong international migration dynamics. Conflicts, income inequality and environmental change result in very low levels of human security that act as push factors for people to move from their countries of origin in Africa. Nearly 40 per cent of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world are living in East and Central Africa. Furthermore, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), almost 700,000 people were displaced in Africa in 2008 as a result of environmental disasters (OCHA/IDMC, 2009).

Although there were 291 million Africans living in urban areas in 2006, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2009a) estimates that 1.2 billion people will be living in cities in Africa by 2050. As a result of both higher growth rates in cities and rural–urban migration, it is expected that urban areas will host 68 per cent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa in 2050 – up from 38 per cent in 2006. This process is complicated, however, by the fact that rural-to-urban migration in Africa is often temporary; indeed, the high costs of living in urban areas have led to widespread return to rural areas in countries such as Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe (UN-HABITAT, 2008).

While the total net migration rate in Africa remained neutral in 2005–2010 (with no change from the period 1990–1995), some countries have experienced positive net migration rates in the period 2005–2010 (the top three being Burundi, Liberia and South Africa), while others have experienced negative rates (the most notable cases being Zimbabwe, Sao Tome and Principe, and Guinea) (UNDP, 2009).

According to estimates based on the Census 2000 data, the total number of migrants from Africa is almost 23 million, with approximately half of them moving to, and/or living in, a sub-Saharan country (see figure 1) (DRC, 2007). With the exception of North Africa, intraregional

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migration represents the most common form of migration, accounting for almost three quarters of migration outflows in East, Central and West Africa. Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco and Nigeria are the most important countries of origin of African migrants (DRC, 2007), while Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa are the top receiving countries in the continent, with over 1 million foreigners each (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 1: African emigrants, by region of origin and destination, in 2000 (in millions)


- The World Bank estimates that the region received approximately USD 30.3 billion in remittances in 2009, while USD 4.6 billion were sent in 2008 by migrants residing in the region (see figure 2). Despite the recent crisis, remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa experienced a slower negative growth compared to the rest of the world in 2009 (falling a modest 3%) (Ratha et al., 2010) and are expected to grow slightly faster in 2010 and 2011 (1.8% and 3.9%, respectively) (Ratha et al., 2009).
Despite the importance of remittances in the continent, the African remittance market exhibits a low level of competition and actors have a limited presence in rural areas. Two major money transfer companies control 65 per cent of all remittance payout locations. Effectively, 80 per cent of African countries restrict the type of institutions that can offer remittance services to banks (IFAD, 2009).

**EAST AND CENTRAL AFRICA**

- The total migrant stock in East and Central Africa remained unchanged at 6.7 million between 2000 and 2010, mainly as significant decreases in migration stock in some countries (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia) were matched by commensurate increases in other countries (Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda) (see figure 3). As the number of international migrants increased by less than the growth of total population, the stock of international migrants as a percentage of total population decreased from 1.7 per cent in 2005 to 1.5 per cent in 2010 (see figure 4) (UN DESA, 2009). Forced displacement remains the main driver behind the changes in stocks of international migrants in this subregion.
Figure 3: Stock of migrants in East and Central Africa, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
Migration from East Africa is primarily intraregional, with considerable flows of forced and voluntary migrants, which results in many countries being source, transit and destination countries at the same time. Migration outside the region is primarily to Southern Africa, the Middle East and, especially for countries in the Horn of Africa, Europe (ICMPD, 2007).

Internal displacement is significant in East and Central Africa. An estimated 26 million people were internally displaced worldwide at the end of 2008, with at least 10 million (38%) living in East and Central Africa (see figure 5) (IDMC, 2009). In addition to conflict and instability, environmental degradation and natural disasters result in population movements across the region. The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia host more than 1 million IDPs each, as a result of entrenched conflict but also renewed instability.
Figure 5: Internally displaced persons (IDPs) in East and Central Africa

- In East Africa, a recent prolonged drought has caused widespread crop failures, killed thousands of cattle and kept food prices high, leaving much of the population struggling to survive in the driest regions of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. The impact of environmental change could lead to a large number of people moving to cities or across borders, especially among pastoralist communities who live in the most arid parts of East Africa. For instance, in 2009, the number of Kenyans in urgent need of food aid had risen to 3.8 million from 2.5 million (Financial Times, 29 September 2009).

- After a 5 per cent increase between 2007 and 2008, remittance inflows to countries of East and Central Africa are estimated to have declined by 3 per cent in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009). Kenya is the top receiving country in the region, with nearly USD 1.6 billion received as remittances in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009).

Note: This figure includes the most recent available country figures. These refer either to 2009 (Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda) or 2008 (Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Somalia) data. For Burundi and Zimbabwe, the estimates are for 2006 and 2005, respectively.

Countries of East and Central Africa also recorded significant remittance outflows, reaching USD 1.7 billion in 2008; Angola was the top sending country, with USD 600 million in remittances sent in 2008 (see figures 6, 7 and 8) (Ratha et al., 2009).
Regional economic communities, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the East Africa Community (EAC), have developed initiatives aimed at fostering regional integration and management of mobility between participating countries, as well as increased awareness of the correlation between migration and development (ICMPD, 2007).

IGAD’s Health and Social Development Programme explicitly includes a migration policy dialogue component and, in 2008, it launched a regional consultative process (RCP) on migration for IGAD countries, comprising Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, to develop a common regional migration policy that would harmonize laws, standards and procedures, and share information on migration issues (IGAD, 2008a).

The IGAD-RCP will promote a continuous migration dialogue for the East Africa Region, bringing together representatives of IGAD Member States and other stakeholders, including countries of transit and destination.

The IGAD-RCP will support Member States in integrating migration issues into their national development plans, including poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), in order to contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Further, it will establish a follow-up mechanism, as well as ensuring regular reporting on implementation of the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and related activities (IGAD, 2008b).

NORTH AFRICA

The total migrant stock in North Africa decreased between 1990 and 2005. Over the last five years (2005–2010), however, it has increased, reaching 1.8 million migrants in 2010. Similarly, the stock of international migrants as a percentage of total population increased slightly from 1.3 per cent in 2005 to 1.4 per cent in 2010 (see figures 9 and 10) (UN DESA, 2009).
Figure 9: Stock of migrants in North Africa, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 10: Stock of migrants in North Africa, by destination, as a percentage of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
Remittance inflows to North Africa are estimated to have declined by nearly 9 per cent between 2008 and 2009, with decreases in remittances to Morocco accounting for most of this change (see figure 11). According to Ratha et al. (2009), Algeria, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia rank among the top five remittance-receiving countries in Africa, with an aggregate of USD 14.0 billion remittances received in 2008 (12.8 billion estimated for 2009), which accounts for over 40 per cent of recorded total remittance flows to Africa (see figures 12 and 13). In 2007, remittances represented 9 per cent of GDP in Morocco, 4.9 per cent in Tunisia, 3.8 per cent in Sudan and 1.6 per cent in Algeria. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is the main sending country of remittances, with almost USD 1 billion remitted by migrants in 2008 (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 11: Remittance inflows in North Africa in 2007–2009 (in USD millions)

Figure 12: Remittance inflows in North Africa, as a percentage of GDP, in 2008

Given the important changes in the population age structure of countries of origin in the Maghreb, demographic pressure will remain high and will possibly increase in the coming decades. This suggests that the number of potential migrants will be on the rise in the next two decades, as international migration has traditionally provided a solution to labour market disequilibrium in this region in the past. However, given the age structure of the population, this migration potential is likely to rapidly decline from 2030 onwards (OECD, 2009b).

The impact of climate change on sea-level rise is likely to be important for migration. However, experience from the past in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia suggests that, while environmental hazards (droughts, earthquakes and floods) affect large numbers of people, those displaced have a high propensity to return to their homes after a disaster, whenever possible. This may then mitigate the role of climate change in shaping future migration patterns from these countries (OECD, 2009b).

North African countries, which have traditionally been countries of origin of migrants, are progressively becoming transit and destination countries for African and other migrants, most of them en route to Europe. Increasingly, African migrants are remaining in North African countries, with only a minority estimated to make the onward journey to Europe (IOM, 2008).

In order to manage these migration flows through and from North Africa, countries in the region have resorted to establishing bilateral agreements with countries of destination, in addition to various cooperation methods on re-admission, including exchanges of letters, memorandums of understanding, administrative accords and police cooperation agreements with clauses concerning re-admission (OECD, 2009a). Calculations based on the MIREM database\(^\text{10}\) show that 18 agreements related to re-admission have been signed by countries of the Maghreb, while ten further agreements were being negotiated as of August 2009 (MIREM, 2010).

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\(^{10}\) The MIREM project was created to support the reintegration of return migrants in their country of origin and to understand the impact of return migration on the Maghreb countries. See http://www.mirem.eu/
SOUTHERN AFRICA

- The total migrant stock in Southern Africa reached 2.2 million people in 2010 – with an average annual increase of 7.3 per cent since 2005. South Africa hosts the vast majority of these migrants (1.9 million) (see figure 14). The stock of international migrants as a percentage of total population increased from 2.7 per cent in 2005 to 3.7 per cent in 2010. While Namibia is the country with the highest number of migrants as a percentage of the total population (6.3%), Botswana and South Africa experienced the highest increase in the number of migrants, both as a result of higher rates of economic growth and political and economic crisis in neighbouring countries, especially Zimbabwe (see figure 15) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 14: Stock of migrants in Southern Africa, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
Figure 15: Stock of migrants as a percentage of total population in Southern Africa in 2000, 2005 and 2010

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

- Countries of Southern Africa received almost USD 1.6 billion in remittances, half of which went to South Africa alone (see figures 16 and 17). South Africa is also the top sending country in the region, with over USD 1.1 billion sent by migrants working in South Africa (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 16: Remittance inflows in Southern Africa in 2007–2009 (in USD millions)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.
Figure 17: Remittance inflows in Southern Africa, as a percentage of GDP, in 2008

- In 2005, as part of efforts to build an integrated community, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) produced a Draft Protocol on Facilitation of Movement of Persons, meant to enable citizens of the community “to enjoy freedom of movement of persons, namely visa-free entry, residence and establishment in the territories of Member States.” As of 2008, nine Member States had ratified the protocol, with South Africa expected to complete the ratification process in 2009. Even though the signature of the Protocol by at least nine Member States should have prompted agreement over the implementation framework, the framework has not been developed. The degree of overall compliance with the protocols on the movement of persons is low in Southern Africa, with only Mauritius and Zimbabwe 75 per cent compliant, while the figures for other countries are between 30 and 45 per cent (UNECA, 2008).

WEST AFRICA

- Compared to 2005, the total migrant stock in West Africa increased by 700,000 people (1.8% annual average growth rate), reaching a total migrant stock of 8.4 million people in 2010, which represents 2.8 per cent of the total population (UN DESA, 2009). Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria alone host two thirds of the international migrants in West Africa (see figures 18 and 19). Whereas 89 per cent of migrants in Côte d’Ivoire work in agriculture and the informal sector, the majority of the migrants in Ghana and Nigeria are employed in industry and services. According to the Nigerian Manpower Board, Nigeria also attracts foreign managers. Most of the migrants working in technical/managerial professions (47.4%) are from Europe (IOM, 2009a, b, c).
### Figure 18: Stock of migrants in West Africa, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>2,336</td>
<td>1,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Stock of migrants (in thousands)**

• Widening economic disparities between and within ECOWAS\textsuperscript{11} countries, where growth is concentrated in urban and coastal areas, and progress in the application of the ECOWAS Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment result in most West African nationals moving to other countries in the ECOWAS region (OECD, 2009a).

• It is expected that urban and coastal areas will experience a higher level of in-migration from rural areas and neighbouring countries. In 2006, 39 per cent of the population in ECOWAS countries was living in urban areas. This figure is expected to rise to 75 per cent in 2050 (OECD, 2009a).

• Countries of West Africa received an estimated USD 12.7 billion in remittances in 2009. Nigeria is the top remittance-receiving country in Africa, with over USD 9.5 billion received in 2009, which accounts for approximately three quarters of all remittances received in West Africa (Ratha et al., 2009).

\textsuperscript{11} The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of 15 countries, founded in 1975 to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity. http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=member&lang=en
The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons represents the founding block of migration management systems in West Africa. The main aim of the Protocol is to make ECOWAS a region where nationals of the 15 Member States can move, reside and work freely. The implementation of the protocol is not uniform across the different countries; however, all ECOWAS States have abolished visa and entry requirements for ECOWAS nationals for a 90-day stay. Seven countries issue ECOWAS travel certificates that allow for easy travel in the region and are substantially cheaper to produce and acquire than national passports. In addition to the travel certificate, Benin, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal have issued the ECOWAS passport to their nationals, and Ghana is expected to begin doing so in April 2010. Holding either one of these documents exempts a Community citizen from completing immigration and emigration forms when entering or leaving ECOWAS Member States. Eventually, the passport is expected to replace the travel certificate (OECD, 2009a).

West African countries have also started to resort to the use of bilateral re-admission agreements, following the growth of such agreements in North African countries. Fifteen agreements related to re-admission have been signed, and a further 11 are currently being negotiated between West African countries and countries of the European Union. However, such agreements can put some West African States in a delicate position in relation to the ECOWAS free movement protocols, as they may require ECOWAS States to restrict the free movement within the ECOWAS region. As a consequence of these potentially conflicting demands on countries in the region, an increasing number of transit migrants remain stranded in ECOWAS countries and North Africa en route to Europe (OECD, 2009a).
Effects of the economic crisis

- Remittance flows to sub-Saharan Africa are estimated to have only slightly decreased in 2009 (USD 20.7 billion compared to USD 21.3 billion in 2008), but still remain at a higher level than in 2007 (USD 18.7 billion) (World Bank, 2010a). However, it is expected that a lagged response to a weak global economy will result in a slow recovery for African countries.

- The first countries to have been affected by the crisis were those that were more integrated into global financial markets, such as South Africa. The ripple effects of the crisis were felt in less globalized African economies, due to a reduction in demand for key African exports (namely oil, for countries such as Angola, Gabon and Nigeria, and commodities, for countries such as Botswana and Zambia), lower tourism volumes and levels of official development assistance. Overall, GDP growth in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have decelerated by 4 percentage points between 2008 and 2009. Growth in middle-income countries, such as Botswana, Seychelles and South Africa, is projected to increase from 0.3 per cent in 2009 to 3.5 and 4 per cent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. In addition to stronger external demand and growth in the tourism sector, the recovery will also be led by stronger remittance inflows. Oil-exporting countries, such as Angola and Gabon, are likely to be the first to experience growth in 2010, reaching 4.9 per cent in 2010, and 5.3 per cent in 2011. For low-income countries in Africa, the recovery will be slower due to weaker recovery in key economic sectors. Fragile States will see slightly more robust growth, due to less exposure to global economic dynamics, and will experience benefits, in some cases, from the peace dividend (World Bank, 2010b).

- Overall, the recovery is expected to be modest, with GDP expanding by a comparatively small 3.8 and 4.6 per cent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. These estimates are subject to growth at the international level and thus are uncertain. Stronger growth in key economic partners will result in stronger external demand and more foreign direct investment flows. Incomes in countries dependent on workers’ remittances are expected to remain subdued, largely owing to continued high unemployment in key African and OECD destination countries (World Bank, 2010b).

- The flow of Moroccan migrants to Spain declined less than flows from other countries of origin, which are more recent and labour-market driven. In addition, while the National Statistics Institute of Spain estimates that the number of migrants leaving Spain doubled from 120,000 in 2006 to 232,000 in 2008, anecdotal evidence suggests that the bulk of unauthorized sub-Saharan African migrants have stayed in Spain, largely because of poor economies in their home countries (Fix et al., 2009).

- Closures in the mine and smelter sector, which has traditionally employed migrants from neighbouring countries, have led to mass layoffs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (100,000), South Africa (40,000) and Zambia (3,000) (Fix et al., 2009).

- World Bank data (2009) from major origin countries of North and West Africa reveal negative growth of remittance inflows, starting from the fourth quarter of 2008 and deepening in the first part of 2009 to reach almost -20 per cent for Morocco and Nigeria. Data from the second half of 2009 show a slowdown in the negative year-on-year growth, signaling that, while remittance inflows are still decreasing, it can be expected that the first part of 2010 will see a slight growth in remittance flows (compared to the same period in 2009) (see figures 21 and 22). It should, however, be noted that the decrease in remittance growth takes place in the context of high remittance growth, prior to the crisis, and currency fluctuations due to pervasive instability in the financial markets.
Data on remittance inflows from major countries of origin in East Africa reveal an even more marked decrease on a year-on-year basis. The first signs of a decline in remittance inflows were felt as early as the third quarter of 2008, with negative growth reaching almost -40 per cent in Uganda in the first quarter of 2009 (World Bank, 2009).

Against this trend, data from Cape Verde’s Central Bank registered annual increases in remittance inflows between 2008 and June 2009. However, this was mostly due to exchange-rate fluctuations (Fix et al., 2009).
According to IOM (2009d), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Morocco reported increased irregular migration in the months following the beginning of the financial crisis. In Morocco, the number of Moroccan migrants returned through IOM Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programmes from destination countries decreased from 2007 to 2008 but increased in early 2009. In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the number of migrants returned through IOM AVR programmes from destination countries decreased from 2007 to 2008, while the number returned to source countries remained stable.
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United Nations Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)

World Bank


The number of international migrants in the Americas has increased over the last two decades, from almost 47 million in 2000 to over 57.5 million in 2010. Just over a quarter (27%) of all migrants in the world reside in the Americas (UN DESA, 2009).

Migration in the Americas is overwhelmingly between countries within the region. According to the Census 2000 data, the main country of destination for migrants in the Americas is the USA, which hosts over two thirds of Latin American and Caribbean emigrants and over 70 per cent of Canadian emigrants (DRC, 2007).

Net migration rates vary, depending on the subregion. Generally, net migration rates are positive for North American countries and negative for Latin American and Caribbean countries (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Net migration rates per 1,000 population in 2000–2005 and 2005–2010*

Note: *For convenience, the subregions defined by UN DESA have been used here.
Source: UN DESA, 2008.
• The sex ratio of migrants in the region is balanced, with practically the same number of male and female international migrants (UN DESA, 2009).

• As a result of the global economic crisis, remittances sent to Latin America and the Caribbean were expected to decrease by 9.6 per cent to almost USD 58.5 million in 2009 (World Bank, 2010). Latest estimates on remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean indicate a drop of 12 per cent in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2010). However, even though migration outflows in the region have decreased, they are still positive and there is no evidence of a large-scale return to countries of origin.

NORTH AMERICA\(^{12}\)

• In total, migrants account for 14.2 per cent of the total population in North America. The number of international migrants in North America increased from 40.4 million in 2000 to 50 million in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).

• The USA remains the top migrant destination country in the world, with 42.8 million migrants in 2010 – around 23 per cent more than in 2000 (see figure 2a). However, relative to population size, Bermuda has the highest share of migrants, followed by Canada and Saint Pierre et Miquelon (see figure 2b). Compared to 2000, Bermuda, Canada and the USA have seen an increase in their immigrant stocks in both absolute and relative terms (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 2a: Stock of migrants in the USA and Canada, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

\(^{12}\) This section covers Canada, the USA and three dependent territories or overseas departments (Bermuda, Greenland and Saint Pierre et Miquelon).
• As an immigration subregion, emigrant stocks are significantly less important than immigrant stocks in North America. Around 3.6 million North American citizens lived outside their country of birth (see figures 3a and 3b), over 60 per cent of which came from the USA. However, in relative terms, less than 1 per cent of the North American population lives abroad.

Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data. Values for Saint Pierre et Miquelon are not available.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- The USA remains the top migrant destination country in the world, hosting around a fifth of all migrants. Here, migrants account for 13.5 per cent of the population (UN DESA, 2009) and they come mainly from Mexico, followed by the Philippines, Germany, India, China, Viet Nam, Canada, Cuba, El Salvador and the United Kingdom (World Bank, 2008).

- Latin American and Caribbean migrants currently account for 53 per cent of the total foreign-born population in the USA. Mexicans alone make up 30 per cent of the total migrant population living in the USA. Asians are the second-most numerous group, with over 10 million people – a 27 per cent share of the total migrant population, made up of nearly 2 million Chinese, 1.7 million Filipinos and 1.6 million Indians (see figure 4) (MPI, 2008).

Source: Migration Policy Institute (MPI), based on Decennial Censuses 1960 to 2000 and 2008 American Community Survey.
Overall, migration to the USA is slowing (Fix et al., 2009), which is likely to be due not only to the economic crisis, but also to stricter immigration and border enforcement, increasing anti-immigrant sentiment and improving conditions in some sending countries (Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009).

The USA is by far the largest source of remittances in the world, with USD 47.2 billion in outward flows recorded for 2008, which represents 17 per cent of the world total remittance outflows. However, the USA’s share of global outward flows has decreased: in 2000, it was the source of 28 per cent of global remittances (World Bank, 2009). This decline may be related to world migration patterns being characterized by a more diverse range of destination countries.

Following the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, the US Government granted Haitians in the country Temporary Protected Status, ensuring that Haitians living in the country are protected from deportation and enabling them to work. Hondurans, Nicaraguans and Salvadorans already benefit from this status (USCIS, 2010).

It is estimated that 30 per cent of the foreign-born population in the USA is in an irregular situation; at least 40 per cent of this population is made up of women (Latapi, A. et al., forthcoming).

**CANADA**

In 2010, Canada is estimated to host 7.2 million immigrants, who comprise 21 per cent of its total population (UN DESA, 2009). Unusually, for a country in this region, most of the top countries of origin of these immigrants (China, India, Italy and the United Kingdom) are not in the Americas (World Bank, 2008).

Canada is also a country of emigration, with 1.3 million citizens living abroad in 2005 – around 4 per cent of the total population. The USA is the primary country of destination, followed by the United Kingdom and Australia (World Bank, 2008).

Although no data on remittances to or from Canada are available, Canada is likely to be an important source of remittances: a study by Statistics Canada found that nearly 30 per cent of new arrivals remitted an average of CAD 1,450 (around USD 1,350) per year (Statistics Canada, 2008).

**LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

The number of international migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean is estimated to have increased from 6.5 million in 2000 to 7.5 million in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).

Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, with 1.4 and 1 million immigrants in 2010, respectively, remain the two top destination countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, while Mexico has replaced Brazil in third place. Among the ten main destination countries in the region, Argentina, Paraguay, Puerto Rico and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have seen a reduction in the number of migrants since 2000 (see figure 5a). On the other hand, Ecuador has experienced the highest relative increase compared to 2000, ranking now as the seventh-most important country of destination (UN DESA, 2009).

Relative to population size, overseas departments and dependent territories of the larger countries have the highest proportion of immigrants. The Cayman Islands rank first, followed by the US Virgin Islands and French Guiana (see figure 5a) (UN DESA, 2009).

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13 This section covers 14 Caribbean countries (Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Grenadines, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago); 8 Central American countries (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama); 12 South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)); and 10 dependent territories or overseas departments (Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, United States Virgin Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands).

14 In previous World Migration Reports, Mexico has been considered as part of North America; however, to bring the regional definition more closely into line with that provided by other agencies, it has been decided to include Mexico in the Latin American and Caribbean region for 2010.
The growing participation of women in the labour market over the last decades has been accompanied by the feminization of migration in the subregion. The share of female migrants in the international migrant stocks has grown from 44.2 per cent in 1960, to 48.1 per cent in 1980 and 50.1 per cent in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 5a: Stock of migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 5b: Stock of migrants in Latin America and the Caribbean, as a share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
• Over the last few decades, Latin America and the Caribbean has become a region of net emigration. Between 2000 and 2010, emigration flows in the countries of the region surpassed immigration flows by 11.0 million people. This difference between the flows of emigrants and immigrants is widest in Central America (6.8 million), followed by South America (3 million) and the Caribbean (1.2 million) (UN DESA, 2009).

• According to the Census 2000 data, around 26.6 million Latin American- and Caribbean-born people live outside their country of birth (DRC, 2007). Emigration from Latin American and Caribbean countries accounted for about 15 per cent of international migration in the world.

• The top emigration countries in the region are Mexico, Colombia, Puerto Rico\(^\text{15}\) and Cuba, followed by El Salvador, Brazil, Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Peru (see figure 6a). Mexico is the top emigration country in the world, with 10.1 million people living abroad (about 10% of the country’s total population) (DRC, 2007).

• Antigua and Barbuda, the Netherlands Antilles and the US Virgin islands are among the top ten countries with both the largest number of emigrants and immigrants relative to their total population (see figure 6b) (DRC, 2007; UN DESA, 2009).

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\(^{15}\) Puerto Ricans are US citizens and are thus able to travel freely to the USA, where around 90 per cent of Puerto Rican migrants reside.
• According to the Census 2000 data, the main destinations for Latin American migrants were the USA, Argentina and Spain, followed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Canada, with 68 per cent of the total subregional emigrant stock residing in the USA. More than half of these emigrants came from Mexico (see figure 7). The Mexico–USA corridor is the largest migration corridor in the world, with 9.3 million migrants (DRC, 2007). This reflects the particular “historical and geographical relation” between the USA and Mexico (Durand, 2009).
Latin American and Caribbean emigration towards Canada, although numerically smaller than flows towards the USA, has shown a significant growth during the last decades, particularly from the English-speaking Caribbean countries (Pellegrino, 2003).

Migration towards Latin American and Caribbean countries is dominated by corridors between bordering countries – from the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay towards Argentina; from Colombia towards the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; and from Nicaragua towards Costa Rica.

Emigration to Europe is predominantly to Spain: migrants from Latin American and Caribbean countries make up nearly 38 per cent of all Spain’s immigrants (DRC, 2007).

Brazil is unusual, for a mainland Latin American country, in that it receives more migrants from outside the region. Its extra-regional emigration flows are also significant: almost 20 per cent of Brazilian migrants live in Japan, making up the third-largest group of migrants in the country (DRC, 2007). Most of these migrants are of Japanese origin, taking advantage of facilitated visa arrangements and comparatively high wages (Durand, 2009).

Civil conflict in Colombia displaced over 200,000 civilians within the country in 2008. Overall, the Government estimates that around 6 per cent of the population (over 2.5 million people) are internally displaced, meaning that Colombia hosts one of the three largest IDP populations in the world (IDMC, 2009).

Several Central American and Caribbean countries are heavily dependent on migrants abroad. In Honduras and Nicaragua, in Central America, and in the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Guyana, in the Caribbean, 60 per cent of the population has relatives abroad and about half of those households receive remittances (Orozco, 2009a).

According to migrant remittance data provided by the World Bank, Latin American and Caribbean countries received USD 64.7 billion in remittances in 2008 (World Bank, 2009), which represents about 1.5 per cent of the regional GDP. This makes it the region with the highest level of remittances per capita (Awad, 2009). Four out of every five remittance dollars sent to Latin American and Caribbean countries come from migrants in the USA (Ratha et al., 2008).

Since Latin America and the Caribbean is an emigration subregion, its outward flows are much smaller; they measured USD 4.4 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2009).

The country with the highest remittance inflows is Mexico, which received USD 26.3 billion in 2008 (41% of the total inflows into the countries in the region), making it the third-largest remittance recipient in the world. At a regional level, Mexico is followed by Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala (see figure 8). In relative terms, in 2007, remittances accounted for more than 10 per cent of GDP in seven economies, six of them in Central America and the Caribbean: Guyana (25.8%), Honduras (21.5%), Jamaica (18.8%), El Salvador (18.2%), Haiti (18.2%), Nicaragua (12.9%) and Guatemala (12.6%) (World Bank, 2009).

Remittance inflows to most Latin American and Caribbean countries began to fall from 2006 onwards. This took place primarily as a result of the first signs of stagnation and decline in the construction sector in the USA and Spain – two top destinations for Latin American emigrants and two economies particularly hard hit by the recession.
Effects of the economic crisis

The economic crisis began in the USA and its impacts have been severe, leading to unemployment climbing to 9.2 per cent in 2009, and GDP shrinking by 2.5 per cent. Canada also experienced rising unemployment and falling GDP (OECD, 2009a). In Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC16 (2009) estimates that the GDP of the region fell by 3.1 per cent by the end of 2009, resulting in the loss of 3.4 million jobs.

Central American countries have been hurt more than South American countries by the economic crisis, due to their strong ties to the North American economy (Cox, 2009).

Economic output in the region is expected to grow in 2010. Regional GDP is projected to increase by 3.1 per cent in 2010 and 3.6 per cent in 2011. However, many small countries in Central America, which are highly dependent on migrant remittances, are likely to lag behind the overall recovery in output (World Bank, 2010).

Unemployment

- Rising unemployment in key destination countries, such as Spain and the USA, adversely affected migrant workers from Latin America and the Caribbean. The recession has had a harsh impact on the employment of Latin American immigrants in the USA. In particular, the unemployment rate for Mexican and Central American immigrants (11.4% in June 2009) is greater than the unemployment rate for native-born Americans (9.5%) and 2.6 times greater than the rate recorded in 2007 (4.4%) (Fix et al., 2009). Migrants have been vulnerable to the effects of the recession due to their over-concentration in sectors such as construction (13% migrant workers) and manufacturing, which have been hardest hit by the recession; 1.1 million construction jobs were lost between January 2007 and early 2009. Migrants are also strongly represented in the North American hospitality sector, which also suffered significant job losses (OECD, 2009b). Migrant workers also hold a disproportionate number of vulnerable temporary or part-time jobs in the retail trade, food services and construction sectors (OECD, 2009b). In Portugal, over 10,000 Brazilian migrants were reported as unemployed at the end of 2009 (IOM, 2010).
Higher unemployment rates for migrants are not only due to their over-representation in sectors that are particularly sensitive to the business cycle. Minority and immigrant groups in the USA have been affected differently, indicating that factors beyond immigration status, such as education, language fluency or duration of stay, are also important. Additionally, the economic crisis has been more widespread than previous recessions and has caused job losses in a wide range of industries (OECD, 2009b). Surveys of migrants in the USA in 2008 found that the majority of migrant remitters thought their employment situation was unstable (Orozco, 2009a).

Lack of social protection for migrants in some countries, such as the USA, makes migrants particularly vulnerable during an economic crisis. Recent legal immigrants and undocumented immigrants are ineligible for unemployment benefits or underemployment programmes. Undocumented immigrants are also ineligible for all federal benefit programmes and services except minimal emergency services (Orozco, 2009a).

Spain, another key country of destination for Latin American and Caribbean migrants, saw its unemployment rate reach 17.4 per cent in March 2009 – an increase of 1.8 million additional unemployed workers compared with March 2008 (OECD, 2009c). Migrant workers are strongly represented in the construction sector, which saw a 107 per cent increase in unemployment (Awad, 2009; IOM, 2010).

Remittances

Rising unemployment, along with immigration controls and fluctuations in exchange rates, affects remittance decisions among migrant workers and has had a significant impact on remittance flows (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2009).

The impact of the economic crisis on migrant remittances was felt strongly and early in Latin America and the Caribbean because of the existing links with Spain and the USA – two countries among the first to be severely hit by the recession and key destinations for Latin American migrants.

Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, which had increased by more than 15 per cent between 2000 and 2006, slowed their growth in 2007 and 2008 (World Bank, 2009), reflecting mainly the problems in the US job market (Ratha et al., 2009a). The World Bank projected that remittance flows into the region would decline by 9.6 per cent overall by the end of 2009 (World Bank, 2010).

Remittance inflows to every Latin American and Caribbean country were expected to drop in 2009 and the steepest declines occurred in Mexico, Colombia, Jamaica, Honduras and El Salvador. Mexico was hardest hit by the recession as it felt the effects of the crisis first, with a 3 per cent decline in remittances between 2007 and 2008, and experienced the largest drop in 2009, with a 13 per cent decrease (see figure 9).
According to the latest data reported by central banks, this decline seems to have bottomed out, with remittances expected to start rising again following the recovery of the US economy (Ratha et al., 2010).

It is estimated that 1 million households that previously received remittances did not receive money in 2009, and an additional 4 million households received 10 per cent less than in previous years. Some households may have lost as much as 65 per cent of total household income (Orozco, 2009a).

Andean countries in South America are also affected by reductions in remittance flows from Spain. Remittances to Ecuador fell by 13 per cent in the third trimester of 2008 (Santiso, 2009).

Until the third quarter of 2009, remittance flows to countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region show larger declines than expected. However, the decline in flows appears to be bottoming out in most countries across the region. Remittances are also expected to remain more resilient than private capital flows and will become even more important as a source of external financing in many developing countries (Ratha et al., 2009b).

However, only a modest recovery is estimated for remittances in the 2010–2011 period, due to weak labour market conditions in the USA and other high-income countries (World Bank, 2010).

Irregular migration

US Border Patrol data show that fluctuations in migrant apprehensions closely track changes in labour demand. Given the high proportion of irregular migrants from Mexico to the USA in 2008 (it is estimated that 55% of Mexican migrants, and 80–85% of recent arrivals, in the USA are unauthorized), the recent steep drop in the flows from Mexico (from 1 million in 2006, to 600,000 in 2009) is largely due to potential irregular Mexican migrants deciding to stay at home, as legal immigration levels have remained largely unchanged. As a result, the overall number of Mexicans in the USA has remained essentially unchanged during a period when it would have been expected to grow by 1 million (Fix et al., 2009).

However, the downward trend in irregular migration is the consequence...
of a combination of the recession and increased enforcement against undocumented workers (Martin, 2009). Besides a significant reduction in labour demand in economic sectors that traditionally employ migrant workers, many countries of destination have reinforced their internal measures against employers of irregular migrants, while stepping up their use of return programmes, enforcing residence laws more strictly, and stiffening border controls (Fix et al., 2009).

Return

- The crisis has not caused a mass return of Latin American and Caribbean migrant workers to their home countries (Awad, 2009). Migration flows from many countries appear to have been negatively affected by the financial crisis and by weak job markets in countries of destination, but flows are still positive.
- Return migration is more often linked to conditions in the source country than in the destination country (Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009).
- Surveys from 2008 indicated that only 10 per cent of migrants in the USA plan to return home, and none of them plans to return home within one year (Orozco, 2009a).
- The net outflow of Mexicans from the USA dropped by over 50 per cent between August 2007 and August 2008 (INEGI, as cited in Awad, 2009) and additional data from the Mexican Government’s Survey of Migration on the Northern Border of Mexico show that return migration from the USA appears to have declined in recent years. About 210,000 migrants returned in the first quarter of 2007, compared to about 199,000 in the first quarter of 2008 and 166,000 in the first quarter of 2009. There appears to have been more returns to Mexico at the time of the last recession in 2001 (240,000) (Fix et al., 2009).
- The crisis in Spain has also produced declining immigrant inflows, although the bulk of Latin American migrants seem to be staying, largely because of weak economies in their countries of origin (Fix et al., 2009).
- Intraregional migration, such as migration within Central America, is not expected to fall significantly. Foreign labour will continue to be needed for traditional export products such as coffee, sugar and fruits. These are the largest agribusinesses in the subregion and major sources of demand for migrant workers (ILO, 2009).
- Governments of countries of destination have adopted a series of policy responses in order to pursue three main objectives: protect labour markets for native workers, restrict the inflow of migrants, and encourage their departure.

Policy responses

- Some of the primary destination countries for Latin American and Caribbean migrants have implemented policies that make it harder to recruit foreign workers. The US financial stimulus package, for example, placed limitations on hiring foreign nationals if native-born workers are available, and Spain reduced its quotas for non-seasonal workers to be recruited from abroad by 90 per cent in 2009, compared to 2008 (IOM, 2010). Canada left its permanent and temporary immigration targets unchanged, but created stricter job advertising requirements, particularly for unskilled and low-skilled jobs (Awad, 2009). Such policies contribute to the current reduction in labour migration flows (OECD, 2009b).
- Although the temporary work permit caps have not been changed in the USA in recent years, employers using temporary permits have become subject to more stringent authorization procedures and control mechanisms, such as the E-Verify system for checking the immigration status of new employees. Additionally, temporary permits have become more difficult to renew (OECD, 2009a).
- These measures resulted in a 16 per cent decline in the issuance of H-1B visas (the main temporary employment visas) in 2008 and, in 2009, for the first time, the cap for filling H-1B visas was not reached.
in the first week that applications were being accepted (OECD, 2009a).

- In addition to being affected by the recession in the USA, immigrants have also faced increasing border enforcement and deportation. In 2007, almost 320,000 migrants were deported; 96 per cent were from Latin America. Since 2004, deportations have risen by 50 per cent overall (Orozco, 2009a). Between fiscal year 2004 and 2009, the US Government budget for border enforcement rose 82 per cent – from USD 6 billion to USD 10.1 billion – largely to increase the number of border patrol agents and build physical and virtual fencing along the US–Mexico border (Meissner and Kerwin, 2009).

- In response to rising unemployment, Spain and Japan offer economic incentives, such as paid one-way tickets home and payments in exchange for migrants’ promise to leave the country for a period of time or even indefinitely.

- In 2009, Spain (the main country of destination for South American migrants in Europe), offered return bonuses to non-EU foreigners who would leave Spain for at least three years, whereas Japan introduced a programme that pays USD 3,000 to unemployed immigrants of Japanese descendants from Latin America (mainly from Brazil and Peru), plus USD 2,000 for each dependant to return to their countries of origin until the economic conditions have improved in Japan (Ratha et al., 2009b).

- These programmes have had only modest results, to date: during the first eight months of Spain’s programme, only 5,391 people (5% of the eligible population) applied and 90 per cent of them were Latin Americans, primarily from Ecuador (IOM, 2010). Partly because of the weak response to financial incentives, Spain and other European countries are now considering alternative immigration measures (Ratha et al., 2009b).

- Some Latin American and Caribbean countries have introduced direct measures to assist returning migrants. Additionally, social and employment policies implemented to address the consequences of the economic crisis may affect migration trends as well.

- Ecuador has new programmes to aid returning migrants. A plan called Welcome Home was initiated in 2007 to facilitate return in a number of ways, such as by providing an aid package and social reintegration programmes. Ecuador also signed an agreement with a university in Madrid to begin a training programme for Ecuadorian nationals returning to jobs in Ecuador’s agricultural sector (Awad, 2009). Colombia has also launched a plan to assist Colombian returnees. The Welcome Home programme (an initiative of the Mayor of Bogota, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IOM) facilitates the process for those who need psychosocial or legal assistance, guidance on entering the job market, access to educational and health services, and support in setting up income-generating projects.

- In some countries, policies aimed at alleviating the consequences of the economic crisis on labour markets are expected to have an impact on migration trends. The use of unemployment insurance is being increased and initiatives that consider the medium- and long-term implications of the crisis, such as vocational education and professional training, are receiving increased attention. Peru is providing job retraining for people who have been laid off because of the crisis, and Costa Rica is proposing financial assistance to families to keep students in school longer. Direct and indirect government job-creation policies are also being strengthened, particularly in Chile and Colombia. Finally, programmes such as Mi Primer Empleo and ProJoven, which address unemployment among youth, are being emphasized in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and Peru (ECLAC/ILO, 2009).
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Santiso, J.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)


US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

World Bank


The stock of international migrants in Asia\(^{17}\) in 2010 is estimated to rise to 27.5 million, which represents just under 13 per cent of the total global figure (UN DESA, 2009).

There has been a slight increase in the number of female international migrants in all the subregions of Asia, except for South-Central Asia. Almost half of all international migrants in Asia (48%) are women (see figure 1) (UN DESA, 2009).

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\(^{17}\) These data do not include the Central Asian countries of the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) or Turkey. Please see the regional overview for Europe for data on these countries.

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Figure 1: Female migrants as a percentage of international migrants in 2000, 2005 and 2010

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
The net migration rate for Asia continues to be negative, at -0.3 per 1,000 of population between 2005 and 2010. This is also true for the subregions of Asia (see figure 2). The top five countries with negative rates in 2005–2010 are Sri Lanka (-3), Lao People’s Democratic Republic (-2.4), Myanmar and the Philippines (-2) and Pakistan (-1.6). By contrast, Singapore and Macau, China, continue to have high net migration rates with 22 and 19.3 per 1,000 population, respectively, in 2005 and 2010. Hong Kong SAR (Special Administrative Region of China) and Bhutan are among the few countries in Asia with positive net migration rates (3.3 and 2.9, respectively) (UN DESA, 2008).

**Figure 2: Net migration rate per 1,000 population in 1995–2000, 2000–2005 and 2005–2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Central Asia</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN DESA, 2008.

In absolute numbers, China, Bangladesh and India are among the top ten emigration countries worldwide (World Bank, 2008). According to the Census 2000 data, Pakistan, with 3,426,337, and the Philippines, with 3,399,794, remain important origin countries for migrants moving both within and outside the region (see figure 3) (DRC 2007).

Approximately 37 per cent of Asian migrants move to OECD countries; of the remainder, 43 per cent migrate within the region and the rest migrate to other countries outside the region (see figure 4a).

**Note:** DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
**Source:** DRC, 2007.
Asian countries, primarily Bangladesh and Pakistan, followed by Pakistan (with nearly 2.8 million intraregional migrants), Hong Kong SAR (nearly 2.5 million), Iran (almost 1.9 million) and Malaysia (almost 1.7 million) (see figure 4b) (DRC, 2007).

According to the 2000 Census Round Data, the USA was the main destination for Asians, with 7.9 million emigrants recorded there. However, countries within Asia are also important destinations for migrants from the region, with India registering 6.1 million immigrants from Asian countries, primarily Bangladesh and Pakistan, followed by Pakistan (with nearly 2.8 million intraregional migrants), Hong Kong SAR (nearly 2.5 million), Iran (almost 1.9 million) and Malaysia (almost 1.7 million) (see figure 4b) (DRC, 2007).

Four of the top ten migration corridors worldwide include Asian countries, led by Bangladesh–India (3.5 million migrants in 2005), and followed by India–United Arab Emirates (2.2 million), the Philippines–USA and Afghanistan–Iran (both 1.6 million) (World Bank, 2008).

Undocumented migration is increasingly an issue within the region. It is estimated that some of Asia’s largest undocumented migration flows may be among the largest overall contemporary flows, with the Bangladesh–India corridor alone involving up to 17 million people (Hugo, 2010).

It should be noted that migration to both the Hong Kong SAR and Macau, China, are dominated by migrants from mainland China, who are counted as foreign-born.
The number of refugees in Asia is rising: from 2.9 million refugees in 2005, there are now 3.9 million refugees in 2010, accounting for 14 per cent of all international migrants in the region and almost a quarter of the world’s refugees. The increase of the refugee stock in South-Central Asia is the largest of the subregions (UN DESA, 2009).

There has been an increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disaster-related hazards and the impacts of this trend are already highly visible in Asia. In 2008, the earthquake in the Sichuan Province displaced 15 million people in China, accounting for over 40 per cent of all persons displaced by natural disasters in 2008. Some 31 million (86%) of all people displaced by disasters in 2008 were living in Asia. Of the 20 disasters that caused most displacement in 2008, 17 were in Asia (IDMC/OCHA, 2009).

The total remittance inflow in Asia was USD 162.5 billion in 2009 (39% of total global remittances). This is only a small decrease compared to the USD 165.8 billion the region received in 2008. India and China (both of which received USD 47 billion) account for over half of these remittances; these countries also rank first and second on the list of the ten leading remittance-receiving countries worldwide. The list also includes the Philippines (USD 19 billion), Bangladesh (USD 10 billion) and Pakistan (USD 8.6 billion) (see figure 5a) (Ratha et al., 2009).

In 2008, the largest remittance outflows came from Malaysia (USD 6.4 billion), China (USD 5.7 billion) and Japan (USD 4.8 billion) (see figure 5b) (Ratha et al., 2009).

Figure 5a: Remittance inflows to selected countries in Asia in 2002–2008 (in USD millions)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Figure 5b: Remittance outflows from selected countries in Asia in 2002–2008 (in USD millions)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.
• In the last quarter of 2009, the region may even have experienced a surge in remittances, as migrants sent money to help relatives affected by natural disasters, such as the typhoons in the Philippines and earthquakes in the Pacific Islands and Indonesia (Ratha et al., 2009).
• Karachi, Nagoya, Osaka, Seoul and Taipei are all global metropolitan areas – cities of 1 million or more people – with at least 100,000 foreign-born residents. Hong Kong SAR and Singapore are urban areas that host more than 1 million foreign-born residents (MPI, 2007).

EAST ASIA

• East Asian countries host nearly 6.5 million migrants, with almost all countries of this subregion experiencing a growth of their migrant stock. East Asia hosts the highest percentage of female international migrants in the region (55%).
• The Hong Kong SAR is the main destination of international migrants in East Asia, with about 2.7 million migrants, followed by Japan (around 2.2 million). While the Republic of Korea ranked fourth in the subregion as a country of destination in 2000, China surpassed the Republic of Korea in 2010 (see figure 6a) (UN DESA, 2009).
• When migrants are considered as a proportion of the total population, Macau, China emerges as the main destination for migrants, with 54.7 per cent, followed by Hong Kong SAR (38.8%), Japan (1.7%), the Republic of Korea (1.1%) and Mongolia (0.4%) in 2010 (see figure 6b).

Figure 6a: Stock of migrants in East Asia, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong SAR, China</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>2,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>2,669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>1,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>1,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau, China</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>2,717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: East Asian countries showing negligible values on the scale are not included in this table.
Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 6b: Stock of migrants in East Asia, as share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macau, China</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong SAR, China</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: East Asian countries showing negligible values on the scale are not included in this figure.
Source: UN DESA, 2009.
In 2009, remittance inflows decreased slightly – from USD 55 billion in 2008 to USD 52 billion (Ratha et al., 2009). The largest amounts go to China and the Republic of Korea (see figure 7). Together with Japan, these two countries are also the source of the largest outflows. In 2008, remittances from East Asian countries totalled USD 15.3 billion.

Figure 7: Remittance inflows to East Asia in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)

Note: Remittance inflows for 2009 are estimates.
Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Chinese students represent almost 25 per cent of students in Australia, making them the most important source of overseas students (Koser, 2009).

There is a significant increase in family-formation migration (marriage migration) in East Asia. This is especially the case in Taiwan Province of China, the Republic of Korea and Japan, and has the potential to be a source of future chain migration (Lee, 2009). In the Republic of Korea, the number of immigrants naturalized through marriage rose from 75,011 in 2005 to 109,564 in 2007 (Hugo, 2010). This marked increase in international marriages has led to growing policy interest in the Republic of Korea in promoting integration and multiculturalism.

Given their status as rapidly ageing societies, Japan and the Republic of Korea are increasingly considering migration as part of a strategy to offset the labour market and social welfare costs of this process. Public opinion in Japan, especially among the younger generation, seems to be shifting towards more favourable views on the subject (Llewellyn and Hirano, 2009).

SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Malaysia and Singapore are the main destinations for international migrants in South-East Asia, with about 2.4 million and almost 2 million migrants, respectively, in 2010. They are followed by Thailand and the Philippines. Indonesia is ranked fifth, although the total number of migrants is expected to decrease in 2010 (see figure 8a) (UN DESA, 2009). When migrants are considered as a proportion

19 Please note that the World Bank only provides data for China, Hong Kong SAR, Macau, China, the Republic of Korea, Japan and Mongolia in comparison to the countries in the subregion of East Asia used in the World Migration Report.
of the total population, however, Singapore is the top country of destination followed by Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia (see figure 8b).

- Migration in the subregion is dominated by labour migration, with over 1.2 million of the almost 10.2 million migrants from the region working in Malaysia alone, and emigration to Saudi Arabia accounting for almost 700,000 migrants from the region. The main country of destination is the USA (almost 3.2 million migrants).

The Philippines may be the country most affected by global labour migration, with an estimated 3.4 million migrants abroad (DRC, 2007). Over half of the Filipinos employed abroad are women, and there are growing complaints that families pay a high price for this migration (Migration News, 2010). Other important countries of origin in the region include Viet Nam (2 million emigrants) and Indonesia (1.8 million) (DRC, 2007).

**Figure 8a: Stock of migrants in South-East Asia, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)**

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

**Figure 8b: Stock of migrants in South-East Asia, as share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)**

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Note: South-East Asia countries with a share below 0.3 of top population are not included in this figure (Myanmar, Viet Nam and Indonesia).
• Remittances in the subregion increased slightly in 2009,20 from USD 36.9 billion in 2008 to around USD 37.2 billion in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009). This slight increase in remittance flows represents, however, a significant slowdown compared to the high growth rates recorded in previous years (Ratha et al., 2010). The Philippines and Viet Nam received the largest amounts—an estimated USD 19.4 billion and almost 7 billion, respectively, in 2009 (see figure 9). Concerning outflows, migrants in Malaysia sent the largest amount—USD 6.4 billion in 2008.

Figure 9: Remittance inflows to selected South-East Asia countries in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)

- Extreme weather conditions led to high floods, such as the Jakarta flood in February 2007, which inundated 70,000 houses and displaced 420,440 people (Jakarta Post, 2009). Similarly, severe earthquakes, such as the one in Aceh, impact societies and cause major, mostly internal, displacement. Tropical storms, such as those in the Philippines in September and October 2009, displaced around 1 million people (Jakarta Post, 2009). Typhoon Parma, for instance, caused heavy rainfall, triggering floods and landslides that killed people and displaced about 170,000.

• Population projections suggest that, by 2019, nationals will only constitute 46.2 per cent of Singapore’s total population, while foreigners with permanent residence status will make up the majority (The Temasek Review, 2009). This partly reflects Singaporeans’ low fertility rate of 1.28 children per woman, which has resulted in an increasing median age for Singapore’s nationals; facilitated citizenship of foreigners and engagement of Singaporeans abroad are two potential ways of offsetting this trend (National Population Secretariat, 2009).

SOUTH-CENTRAL ASIA

• Despite the decrease in the number of international migrants in South-Central Asia from 15.7 million in 2000 to 13.8 million in 2005, their number is on the rise again, with an estimated 14.3 million international migrants in 2010. This increase seems mainly based on the change in the migrant stock in Pakistan—the second-most important

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20 Please note that the World Bank does not provide data for Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Timor-Leste in comparison to the countries of South-East Asia used in the World Migration Report.
destination country in the subregion, from -3.5 per cent between 2000 and 2005, to 3.5 per cent between 2005 and 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).

- India remains the main country of destination in Asia, although its migrant stock decreased by 1.6 per cent between 2005 and 2010 (see figure 10a) (UN DESA, 2009). India is also a country of origin; the Indian diaspora numbers almost 25 million persons, 10 per cent of whom can be found in the USA. Other major destinations include Singapore, Malaysia and the Gulf States (Khadria, 2009).

**Figure 10a: Stock of migrants in South-Central Asia, by destination, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5,436</td>
<td>5,887</td>
<td>6,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>2,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Maldives is not included in this figure as its value is negligible at this scale.

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

**Figure 10b: Stock of migrants in South-Central Asia, as share of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
• In relative terms, the largest estimated number of international migrants in South-Central Asia is in Bhutan, representing a share of 5.7 per cent of the total population of this small country (see figure 10b) (UN DESA, 2009).
• In addition to India, Bangladesh (6.9 million emigrants), Pakistan (3.4 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million) and Nepal (1 million) are major countries of origin in the region. According to the Census 2000 data, almost half of the emigrants remain within the region (12.1 million), while 5.1 million work in countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2.4 million live in the USA and Canada, and the United Kingdom hosts around 1.1 million (DRC, 2007).
• In 2009, overall remittance inflows to South-Central Asia, fuelled by increases in inflows to Bangladesh and Pakistan, have only slightly decreased from USD 74.4 billion to USD 73 billion in 2009 (see figure 11). Financial outflows in 2008 amount to USD 2 billion, which were mostly sent from India.

![Figure 11: Remittance inflows to selected countries in South-Central Asia in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)](image-url)

**Note:** Remittance inflows for 2009 are estimates.
**Source:** Ratha et al., 2009.

• The newly created Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare has just released a National Policy on Labour Migration, aiming to ensure that Sri Lankan migrants’ interests are protected (News Blaze, 2009). The biggest demand for Sri Lankan workers (male and female) exists in the Middle East – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Qatar accounted for 86 per cent of migrant employment (Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), 2009).

• In 2009, 475,278 Bangladeshis went abroad to work – down from 875,000 in 2008. Their top destinations were Oman, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (see figure 12) (Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), 2010). These figures indicate the significant impact of the global economic downturn on the deployments of Bangladeshis to foreign jobs.
• Pakistan hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide (almost 1.8 million in 2008), almost all of whom are Afghans; The Islamic Republic of Iran hosts the third-largest number, with 980,000 refugees (UN DESA, 2009; UNHCR, 2009).

Effects of the economic crisis

Unemployment and return

• In Asia, unemployment rates rose in many countries throughout 2009. Where impacts were most severe, it was largely due to the effect of the downturn on exports as a result of the economic crisis on export-dependent economies. In East Asia, for example, the unemployment rate was estimated at 5 per cent for men in 2009, and 3.7 per cent for women (ILO, 2010).

Figure 12: Overseas employment of workers from Bangladesh in 2009 (in thousands)


- The slowdown of export activities in East Asia had severe effects on South-East Asian countries, because of their dependence on foreign trade and investment flows. The large bulk of migrant workers in Malaysia and Thailand, for instance, were particularly hard hit. Significant returns to Indonesia took place due to the increase in unemployment in Malaysia. In Singapore, there are 900,000 migrant workers, concentrated largely in the manufacturing and services sectors, who face large-scale job losses equivalent to 30 per cent of the labour force (Koser, 2009; Awad, 2009). The share of workers have not been stopped (GMG/UNESCAP, 2009).

- Between January and November 2008, there was an 84 per cent increase (from 3,642 to 6,707) in the number of foreign workers seeking relocation to new jobs in the Republic of Korea. The government decided to stop issuing visas even to ethnic Koreans seeking employment (Awad, 2009).

- In China, one of the effects of the current economic downturn is a significant reversal of rural-to-urban internal migration (Kundu, 2009). By the early months of 2009, 20 million internal migrant workers, highly concentrated in export-oriented, labour-intensive industries, had lost their jobs, reflecting “a rapid decline in labour demand” leading to un- and underemployment (Fix et al., 2009; IMF, 2009; ILO, 2010).

- The impact of the recession on migrant workers depends on the sector and country in which they work. The contraction of economic activities in sectors such as electronics and car manufacturing in countries such as China led to rising unemployment among migrant workers, while other sectors, such as health, have been less affected. With the exception of Dubai, the infrastructure projects that employed large numbers of male migrants from Asia in the GCC countries
entering Thailand from Cambodia dropped 10 per cent (NTS, 2009).

- It is noteworthy that, for the Philippines, worker outflows actually increased by 28 per cent in 2008 over the previous year, reaching a total of 1.38 million (see figure 13). According to the Department of Labor (DOLE, 2010), until January 2009, Filipino workers were mainly going to Taiwan Province of China (3,494), the United Arab Emirates (297), Brunei Darussalam (69), and Macau, China (45). Throughout 2009, the Philippines experienced a continuing stable outflow (DOLE, 2010).

Figure 13: Deployment of land-based overseas Filipino workers, by region of destination (new hires and rehires, excluding seafarers), in 2002–2008 (in thousands)

![Deployment of land-based overseas Filipino workers](image)

Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POAE), 2009.

- India and Pakistan, as the largest economies in South-Central Asia, are less export-reliant than many economies in East Asia and South-East Asia. Therefore, countries in South-Central Asia were spared a larger shock to growth.

- The feminization of the migrant labour force has been striking in Sri Lankan migration. Women made up an average of 54 per cent of the roughly 200,000 Sri Lankans who leave each year; in 2006, it was estimated that around 60 per cent of female migrants were domestic workers (IOM, 2009), while 88 per cent of female migrants who left Sri Lanka in 2008 went to work as housemaids. However, the financial crisis appears to have at least temporarily reversed this trend: recruitment of men increased by over 24 per cent in 2008 (SLFBE, 2009). This could be explained by an estimated 15–20 per cent drop in demand for women domestic workers from the Gulf and Middle East, when the crisis first erupted (Awad, 2009). Other migrant domestic workers are likely to be facing worse working conditions as a result of the crisis (GMG/UN-ESCWA, 2009).

- The impact of the crisis on Dubai has been particularly acute, leading to the suspension of USD 582 billion worth of infrastructure projects and prompting the return of largely Indian nationals (Koser, 2009). However, some countries in the GCC countries, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, seem not to be affected as much.

Remittances

- Despite the economic slowdown, remittance flows to South-Central and East Asia have been relatively robust. According to the World Bank, “Remittance inflows to South Asia contracted by a modest 1.8 per cent in 2009, compared with a 7.5 per cent decline for developing countries, excluding South Asia” (World Bank, 2010). Remittance inflows have therefore been supportive, particularly in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Flows to Bangladesh and Pakistan have grown significantly in 2009 but have started to slow down since the last quarter of 2009, mainly due to a decrease in inflows for emigrants working in the GCC countries.
India experienced a sharp drop in remittance inflows in the first quarter of 2009, followed by an increase throughout the rest of the year. According to the latest estimates, overall, “remittance flows to South Asia (and, to a lesser extent, East Asia) continued to grow in 2009, although at a markedly slower pace than in the pre-crisis years” (Ratha et al., 2010).

- A continuing growth in remittance flows from the Gulf States can still be observed, although Bangladesh and Pakistan, for instance, are simultaneously experiencing falling remittance inflows from the USA (Ratha et al., 2009). Nevertheless, in total, the Central Bank of Bangladesh recorded increasing inflows towards the end of 2009 (USD 873.86 million in December), compared to the slight declines in the year before (USD 758.03 million) (Bangladesh Bank, 2010). Pakistan has also continued to record positive growth in 2009, as Pakistani authorities actively took measures to increase flows through formal channels, including the provision of subsidies for marketing expenses to providers of remittance services (World Bank, 2010).

- In June 2009, remittances transferred to the Philippines through banks amounted to USD 1.5 billion – an all-time high. This record represents a 3.3 per cent year-on-year increase compared to June 2008. In the first half of 2009, the accumulated funds sent by migrants in that six-month period, which amounted to almost USD 8.5 million, were 2.9 per cent higher than for the same period the year before. Remittances were sent mainly from the USA, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. The continuing demand for highly skilled and skilled Filipino overseas workers, together with the government’s active search for new markets for Filipino workers and improved access to financial products and services for migrants and their families, led the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) (the central bank of the Philippines) to expect positive remittance growth prospects for 2009 (BSP, 2009).

**Policy responses in destination and source countries**

- In destination countries within the region, policy measures in response to increasing unemployment have been introduced. The Government of the Republic of Korea, for instance, reduced the quota of employed foreign workers from 100,000 in 2008 to 34,000 in 2009. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand responded to the economic crisis by ceasing to issue or renew work permits, especially in the manufacturing and services sectors (Koser, 2009).

- Malaysia had 2.2 million registered migrant workers at the end of 2008; this number fell by 300,000 to 1.9 million in August 2009, as expiring work permits were not renewed. There were about 32,000 registered layoffs in the first half of 2009 (Migration News, 2009a). Malaysian authorities also introduced a policy for fast-track deportation that could affect an estimated 1 million unauthorized workers residing in Malaysia (Fix et al., 2009).

- In response to job losses, the Government of the Taiwan Province of China announced plans to cut the number of low-skilled foreign-worker permits to create jobs for local workers, as unemployment of all Taiwanese workers reached 5.3 per cent (up from 4.1 per cent in 2008) (Fix et al., 2009).

- In Japan, ethnic Japanese Brazilians (‘Nikkei Brazilians’) are the third-largest immigration community, after Korean and Chinese immigrants. The crisis dramatically affected them because many hold part-time or non-regular jobs. Estimates suggest that 40,000 (12%) of them have already returned to Brazil (Financial Times, 2009). In April 2009, the government implemented a repatriation programme – or voluntary ‘pay-to-go’ programme for the Nikkei, which offers migrants money if they and their families leave the country (Fix et al., 2009).

- In South-East and South-Central Asia, many countries of origin responded to the current economic downturn in largely similar ways. Some have formulated
programmes to facilitate the reinsertion of returnees into their labour markets, or they intend to ensure the protection of the rights of their migrant workers. Some are also exploring new labour markets for their workers. More specifically, countries such as the Philippines and Nepal offer reintegration and skills training.

- The Overseas Workers Welfare Association (OWWA) of the Philippines provides an Expatriate Livelihood Fund with loans for returnees who want to start businesses (OWWA, 2009).

- In India, the responses have been formulated at the State level, since not all States were equally affected. For example, in Kerala (a major region of origin of emigrants going to work in the United Arab Emirates), a loan programme to assist returning migrants from the Gulf States was established (Fix et al., 2009).

- Sri Lanka and Bangladesh built up task forces to monitor the effects of the crisis on nationals working abroad and to offer assistance in finding new employment (Awad, 2009).

- Between January and September 2009, around 358,000 Bangladeshi migrants went abroad – down almost 50 per cent from 689,000, compared to the same period in the previous year (Migration News, 2009b). According to the Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training of Bangladesh, over 13,000 repatriations occurred in the first two months of 2009. Malaysia alone revoked the visas of 55,000 workers (NTS, 2009).
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An estimated 72.6 million migrants in 2010 lived in Europe and Central Asia – a figure 5.1 million higher than the migrant stock in 2005. One in three of all international migrants in the world live in Europe. Migrants represent 8.7 per cent of the total European population (UN DESA, 2009).

Net international migration rates have increased across Europe in the period 2005–2010, compared to the previous decade. While the picture varies within different subregions, the majority of Western and Central European countries have witnessed an increase in net immigration, with Cyprus, Luxemburg, Spain, Iceland and Ireland being the most affected countries. Eastern European, Central Asian and new Member States of the EU have experienced a reduction in their net emigration, with the vast majority of them reporting a net migration rate between -1.5 and 0 per 1,000 population cent in 2000–2005. A few countries, such as Albania, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Lithuania and Tajikistan, still remain essentially ‘sending’ countries, although to a lesser degree than in the 1990s (see figure 1) (UNDP, 2009).

![Figure 1: Net migration rates per 1,000 population in selected European countries in 1990–1995 and 2005–2010](image)


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21 For the purpose of this report, Europe comprise countries of Western and Central Europe (see specific section for country breakdown) and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (see specific section for country breakdown).
During the last five years (2005–2010), southern Europe accounts for the biggest share of the increase (3.4 million people, with an annual average growth rate in migrant stock of 5.2%), while Central Asia was the only region to witness a decline (-0.4% annual average growth rate of migrant stock).

Intraregional migration flows in Europe remain strong, particularly since the enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007. According to the estimates based on Census 2000 data by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC), at the University of Sussex, the vast majority of Western and Central European migrants move within EU countries or to North America, while Central Asian and Eastern European migrants migrate mostly to other former Soviet republics (especially the Russian Federation) or Western Europe (see figure 2). The Russian Federation is both the most important country of origin in Europe and the most important country of destination, with over 12 million people originally native-born now living abroad, and 12 million foreign-born living in the country. As a country of destination, the Russian Federation is followed by Ukraine (5.9 million), the United Kingdom (4.2 million), Germany (4.1 million) and Kazakhstan (3.6 million) (UN DESA, 2009; DRC, 2007).

While the number of female migrants increased by 2.7 million between 2005 and 2010, reaching a total of 36.5 million women migrants in Europe, the percentage of women in the total stock of migrants in Europe remained stable at 52.3 per cent, with no significant change between 2005 and 2010. While female migrants are evenly distributed among the various subregions, Eastern Europe records the highest proportion of female migrants (57.3% of total migrant stock), while the proportion is lowest in Western Europe (49% of total migrant stock) (UN DESA, 2009).

Urban centres in Europe attract a significant number of migrants. London, Paris and Moscow all host more than 1 million foreign-born. Among 85 cities with a population of between 100,000 and 1 million foreign-born, 30 cities are located in Europe. In Amsterdam, Brussels, Frankfurt
and London, foreign-born persons represent over a quarter of the total population (MPI, 2007).

- Seven of the world’s top ten remittance-sending countries in 2008 were countries located in Europe, namely the Russian Federation (USD 26.1 billion), Switzerland (USD 19.0 billion), Germany (USD 15.0 billion), Spain (USD 14.7 billion), Italy (USD 12.7 billion), Luxembourg (USD 10.9 billion) and the Netherlands (USD 8.4 billion).

- The top five remittance recipients in 2009 were France (USD 15.6 billion), Spain (USD 11.7 billion), Germany (USD 10.8 billion), Belgium (USD 9.1 billion) and Poland (USD 8.5 billion).

- Tajikistan, the Republic of Moldova and Kyrgyzstan are among the top five countries worldwide, in terms of remittance inflows as a percentage of GDP, with 49.6, 31.4 and 27.9 per cent, respectively (Ratha et al., 2009).

- Europe is the destination and origin of four out of ten top global remittance corridors, namely the Russian Federation–Ukraine, Ukraine–the Russian Federation, Turkey–Germany and Kazakhstan–the Russian Federation (World Bank, 2008).

- Owing to the global economic crisis, virtually all European countries have seen a sharp increase in unemployment rates, prompting governments to introduce measures to protect domestic labour markets. Combined, the measures have amounted to new immigration restrictions aimed at reducing the inflow of migrants and encouraging their return. A significant reduction in labour demand, reinforced measures against employers of irregular migrants, return programmes, stricter enforcement of residence laws, enhanced border management and rising unemployment rates in EU Member States have done little to counter the increasing negative public opinion regarding migrants and migration in Europe.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

- Western and Central Europe host 51 million migrants, representing two thirds of international migrants residing in Europe. The top five destination countries are Germany (10.8 million migrants), France (6.7 million), the United Kingdom (6.5 million), Spain (6.4 million) and Italy (4.5 million) (see figure 3) (UN DESA, 2009).

- Western European countries registered an increase of 5.6 million migrants between 2005 and 2010. Spain and Italy have seen the highest increase in the number of immigrants (1.8 and 1.4 million, respectively), followed by the United Kingdom (610,000), Ireland (280,000) and France (210,000) (UN DESA, 2009).

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22 This section covers the 27 EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Malta, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the three other European Economic Area (EEA) countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), as well as Switzerland and two EU candidate countries for which negotiations are open – Croatia and Turkey.
Figure 3: Stock of migrants in Western and Central Europe, by destination: top ten destinations in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

- With the exception of a few countries, the number of migrants as a percentage of total population has also increased almost across the board in Western and Central Europe, reaching 35 per cent in Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, 23 per cent in Switzerland and almost 20 and 18 per cent in Ireland and Cyprus, respectively (see figure 4) (UN DESA, 2009).

- The drivers behind the increase in the number of migrants (both as a total stock and as a percentage of total population) vary but include rapidly declining populations (especially in Southern Europe), family reunification and natural growth of long-term foreign-born population (in France, Germany and the United Kingdom), and high rates of economic growth before the economic crisis (Ireland).

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
While Europe experienced sustained increases in inflows of migrants, it is important to note that emigration of the foreign-born population remains significant. Data from the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD), from some of the top destination countries in Europe in 2007, show that significant outflows of foreign-born population have reduced net migration by over a third in Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (see figure 5) (OECD, 2009a).
As a result of the EU enlargement in 2004, it was predicted that between 2 and 8 per cent of the population of new Member States (EU-10 countries) would move to the old Member States (EU-15 countries) in the long run. Evidence suggests that migration flows between the eight Eastern European countries that joined in 2004 and EU-15 Member States have been quite modest, on average, but EU enlargement had a significant impact on migration flows from new to old Member States, including to those States that did not initially open their labour markets, such as Austria and Germany. Data show that EU Member States with more open economies managed to attract the bulk of educated and younger migrants from the new EU Member States (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2009).

Emigration from Europe is mostly within the continent and towards other countries of the OECD. In 2006, 1.7 million OECD country nationals moved to another OECD country, with the outward movement of British citizens putting the latter among the largest emigrant groups (OECD, 2008). Data from selected major destination countries in Europe show that migrants from EU-15 countries in 2007 represent between 60 and 20 per cent of the total foreign-born population (see figure 6) (OECD, 2009a). Overall, 34 per cent of immigrants to EU Member States come from other EU Member States (Eurostat, 2008).
• Migrants residing in Western and Central Europe sent USD 120.9 billion worth of remittances in 2008, representing over 40 per cent of global remittance outflows.

The major sending countries include Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland\(^{23}\) (see figure 7) (Ratha et al., 2009).

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\(^{23}\) In the case of Luxembourg and Switzerland, some remittances are related to border residents working in one of these two countries during the day but living in a neighbouring country. These workers are not, strictly speaking, considered to be migrants.
• Western and Central Europe is expected to receive USD 106.1 billion of remittances in 2009 – a 5 per cent decrease from 2008. The top five receiving countries in 2009 are France (USD 15.6 billion), Spain (USD 11.7 billion), Germany (USD 10.8 billion), Belgium (USD 9.1 billion) and Poland (USD 8.5 billion). Bulgaria, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany are the top five recipients of remittances as a percentage of GDP (see figure 8) (Ratha et al., 2009).

![Figure 8: Remittance inflows to Western and Central Europe, as a percentage of GDP in 2008: top five countries](image)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

- Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Central Asia and Central Europe hosted 25.6 million migrants in 2010. While the number of migrants in top receiving countries has increased, albeit slightly, declines in the number of migrants residing in Central Asian countries and in the number of refugees in countries of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus (such as Serbia and Armenia) have resulted in a decline of 400,000 in the total number of international migrants, compared to the levels in 2005.

- The Russian Federation (12.3 million), Ukraine (5.3 million) and Kazakhstan (3 million) are the top three destination countries, hosting 80 per cent of the international migrants in the region (see figure 9) (UN DESA, 2009).

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24 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kazakhstan, UN Security Council Resolution 1244-Administered Kosovo (hereinafter referred to as Kosovo/UNSC 1244), Kyrgyzstan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova (Republic of), Montenegro, the Russian Federation, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
The number of international migrants as a percentage of total population remained at 8.6 per cent in 2010, with almost no change since 2005 suggesting that the decrease in the total stock of international migrants took place within the context of population decline in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Migrants represent more than a tenth of the population in Kazakhstan (19.5%), in Ukraine (11.6%), the Republic of Moldova (11.4%), Belarus (11.4%) and Armenia (10.5%) (see figure 10) (UN DESA, 2009).
• Immigration to the Russian Federation is dominated by the inflow of ethnic Russian citizens residing in countries of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). However, while most of the registered immigrants that arrived in 2007 already had Russian citizenship (75% of those who arrived from Commonwealth of Independent States and Baltic countries and 71.1% of those who arrived from other countries), labour migration by non-ethnic Russian citizens of former Soviet republics may become the main driver of the increase in migration inflows in the future. A large proportion of labour migrants are already living permanently in the Russian Federation. The reform of migration laws in 2006 simplified migrant legalization for citizens of former Soviet republics. Before 2006, unregistered migrants represented almost half (46%) of the total, but this share decreased to 15 per cent after 2007. Most migrants (85%) registered their presence and thus regularized their residence status. In 2007, three quarters of labour migrants also obtained work permits. This compares with only 15–25 per cent of migrants that were employed by employers on a legal basis before 2007 (Vishnevsky and Bobylev, 2009).

• Some of the more prevalent migration corridors worldwide are located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, including the route between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, with migration flows in both directions, as well as migration flows from Belarus to the Russian Federation and from Uzbekistan to the Russian Federation (Ratha et al., 2009).

• According to World Bank estimates, in 2009, the region received USD 27.1 billion in remittances – a 14 per cent de-
cline from 2008. The Russian Federation (USD 5.5 billion), Serbia (USD 5.4 billion), Ukraine (USD 4.5 billion), Bosnia and Herzegovina (USD 2.6 billion) and Tajikistan (USD 1.8 billion) – the top five countries in the region, in terms of remittance inflows – received over 70 per cent of the remittances sent to Eastern Europe and Central Asia (see figure 11) (Ratha et al., 2009). Latest estimates indicate that the fall in remittance flows has been higher than expected, partially due to the depreciation of the Russian rouble (the currency of the main destination country for migrants in the region) against the US dollar (Ratha et al., 2010).

![Figure 11: Remittance inflows in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: top five countries in 2007–2009 (in USD millions)](image)

**Note:** Values for 2009 are estimates.

**Source:** Ratha et al., 2009.

- This region contains some of the most remittance-dependent economies in the world. Remittance inflows represent half of the GDP in Tajikistan (the highest figure worldwide), 31 per cent in the Republic of Moldova, 28 per cent in Kyrgyzstan, and 15 per cent in Bosnia and Herzegovina (see figure 12) (Ratha et al., 2009).
• Remittance outflows from countries in the region reached USD 31.7 billion in 2008, with over 80 per cent of outflows originating from the Russian Federation (USD 26 billion) (see figure 13) (Ratha et al., 2009).
Effects of the economic crisis

- The economic downturn affecting the global economy since mid-2008 has turned into a jobs crisis for migrant workers. As a result, following many years of continuous increase, a fall in labour migration has become apparent since the second half of 2008 in virtually all EU countries, due to a significant decline in international recruitment by employers (OECD, 2009b). As the economic crisis affected output in specific sectors, such as industry, construction and retail trade, it has had a stronger impact on specific categories of workers, including young people, the low-skilled and men rather than women. Migrants, from outside the EU, especially low-skilled and male migrants, have also been particularly affected (European Commission, 2009).

- Data from the European Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, 2009a) reveal that, while unemployment rates have increased across the board for nationals and EU nationals working in the EU but outside their country of origin, it is migrants from outside the EU that have witnessed the sharpest increase in job losses, with men more affected than women. On average, the unemployment rate of EU nationals increased by 1.7 per cent between the beginning of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009, while the unemployment rate of male and female third-country nationals increased by 6.6 and 2.2 per cent, respectively (see figure 14).

![Figure 14: Unemployment rates in EU-27 countries in 2008–2009 (in %)](image)

Source: Eurostat, 2009a.

- In general, migrants have been hit harder by the crisis than the native workforce. According to an IOM report (2010), unemployment rates for migrants (already higher than those for nationals, before the crisis) have increased at a faster rate in 2009, reaching between 9.4 and 10.75 per cent in Austria, Greece and Italy and 27.5 per cent in Spain (an increase of over 16% compared to 2007). According to the same report, while Irish nationals represent the vast majority of
people receiving unemployment benefits in Ireland, the number of foreigners receiving these benefits in Ireland rose to 77,500 in December 2009, and over half of these were nationals from new EU Member States; this represents a 173 per cent increase between June 2008 and the end of 2009.

• Net migration flows in the United Kingdom were also affected by the crisis. While national outflows increased from 83,000 in the first quarter of 2008 to 93,000 in the third quarter, the positive flow of foreigners decreased from 274,000 at the beginning of 2008 to 226,000 in the first months of 2009 (Office for National Statistics, 2009). This trend is confirmed by data on national insurance number registrations for foreigners entering the United Kingdom for the first time. According to these data, the number of people registering each quarter fell by 74,000 between early 2008 and mid-2009 – a decline of almost 40 per cent. The decline was led by citizens of what the United Kingdom defines as ‘A8 countries’ (the eight Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004\(^25\)), which experienced a decrease of 50 per cent, followed by Asia and the Middle East (which, together, experienced a 31% decline) (see figure 16) (DWP, 2009).

Unemployment of immigrants from EU10 countries, many of whom were employed in the construction sector, rose from 2.3 per cent in February 2008 to 8.2 per cent in February 2009, in comparison to the average unemployment rate, which rose from 3.3 per cent to 6.6 per cent (see figure 15) (OECD, 2009b).

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\(^{25}\) The A8 countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
According to the Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA) (IOM, 2010), the economic crisis has not had as negative an impact on migrants in Germany as in other countries – for example, migrant unemployment in December 2009 was actually lower than in December 2007.

The economic crisis has also had an impact, albeit limited, on migration to the EU10 and countries looking to accede to the EU. The number of work permits issued in Croatia decreased from 10,242 in 2008 to 7,877 in 2009 and 6,948 in 2010. In addition to a decrease in new arrivals of foreigners (from 20,000 per quarter in early 2008, to 9,500 in the third quarter of 2009), in 2009, the Czech Government established two special governmental voluntary return programmes for regular and irregular migrants, both of which were concluded in December 2009 (IOM, 2010, forthcoming).

Web surveys targeting Polish migrants in the United Kingdom have revealed that nearly 12 per cent of respondents lost their jobs as a result of dismissals and job cuts. When asked about their future intentions, nearly 90 per cent of respondents said that they were not planning to return to Poland (IOM, 2010).

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG, 2010), migrant workers make up 40 per cent of the construction workforce in the Russian Federation, which has undergone major bankruptcies and cessation of activities since the onset of the crisis (Awad, 2009). According to a study by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Aid Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED) (OSCE/ACTED, 2009), the salary of Kyrgyz migrants decreased by 20–30 per cent, on average, during the first months of the crisis, while the amount of remittances received by households decreased by 25–40 per cent. However, according to the same survey, only 10 per cent of respondents had returned to Kyrgyzstan due to the crisis, and 60 per cent of them plan to go back to the Russian Federation once the economic outlook improves, which suggests that the long-term impact of the crisis may be limited. Many migrants are staying on, accepting worse conditions and diversifying their destinations and sectors (ICG, 2010).

Many European countries have instituted new policies aimed at stemming the inflows of migrants, including more stringent conditions for admission under labour migration programmes and reduction in quotas (as is the case in the Czech Republic, Italy, Lithuania, Spain, the Rus-
sian Federation and Ukraine), stricter labour market tests (as in Estonia and the United Kingdom), decreased possibilities to change status and/or to renew work permits, and stricter controls on family and persons entering on grounds of humanitarian protection (Italy) (OECD, 2009b; IOM, 2010). In December 2008, Italy set a cap of 150,000 for entries after receiving 700,000 applications the year before. However, the new 2010 decree on immigration flows and quotas has been registered by the Corte dei Conti (State Auditors’ Department). This year, contrary to expectations, there will not be a quota for regular workers but only 80,000 seasonal workers (for tourism and agriculture), which also include 4,000 self-employed workers.

- In addition to enacting restrictions on entry and stay, some countries have witnessed a reduction in the number of migrants applying for residence and work permits. The number of migrants who entered under the employer-nominated system (Regime General) in Spain fell from more than 200,000 in 2007 to 137,000 in 2008. Notably, in Catalonia, the highest receiving area of foreigners, applications fell by 15 per cent in 2008 (IOM, 2010). In the first quarter of 2009, the number of approved initial applications to the Workers’ Registration Scheme in the United Kingdom decreased by 54 per cent (from 46,600 to 21,300) compared with the same quarter of the previous year (OECD, 2009b). In Iceland, the number of labour migrants in 2008 was approximately one third of that of the previous year, and it fell to almost zero in early 2009 (OECD, 2009a).

- A report published by the EU border agency Frontex (2009) suggests that worsening employment opportunities will prompt more irregular migrants to postpone their migration decisions until the economy recovers, while those irregular migrants already present in the EU are likely to remain, as increased border enforcement at external borders represents a clear disincentive to return, given that re-entry would be riskier.

- The economic crisis has resulted in a reduction in the number of work permits for migrants in the Russian Federation. In addition, new government regulations ban the employment of migrants in specific sectors, including retail and trade, which are traditionally dominated by migrant workers from republics in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At the same time, Russian authorities have sought to decrease the influx of temporary migrants by applying a differential tax rate for migrants residing for more than a year (13%) and those identified as non-resident migrants (30%) (OSCE/ACTED, 2009).

- Return migration increased within the free mobility regime of the EU when economic conditions and job opportunities in migrant destination countries (such as Ireland and the United Kingdom) deteriorated more than those in origin countries (such as Poland) (OECD, 2009b). In September 2008, Spain enacted a law to encourage the return of migrant workers to their country of origin, by providing reintegration support. The offer was taken up by 8,724 migrants, representing approximately 10 per cent of the beneficiary population (IOM, 2010). The Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation established programmes to assist returning nationals. As admission to the EU and Russian labour markets tightened, authorities in Uzbekistan sought alternative destinations for their labour migrants.

- Increased forced return measures have been taken in France, Italy and Ukraine (IOM, 2010; Awad, 2009). There were varied reports from source countries about the changes in the number of migrants returning from destination countries. While Kosovo/UNSC 1244, Latvia, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia reported declining numbers of returning migrants, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine reported increasing numbers of returnees. In many cases, data are not available and, when available, do not distinguish between forced and voluntary returns (see figure 17) (IOM, 2010).
The factors influencing flows of irregular migration to the EU during the current crisis are very complex, according to a report by Frontex (2009), which suggests that irregular migration inflows mainly act as a function of labour demand in destination countries. The report suggested that the decline in the number of irregular migrants coming to the EU, due to the worsening employment situation, is likely to be felt mainly in the latter part of 2010, although at different levels, depending on the EU Member State.

The German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends survey on attitudes towards immigration noted a rise in the number of people in Europe seeing immigration as a problem rather than an opportunity. On average, the number of Europeans with a negative attitude increased from 43 to 50 per cent between 2008 and 2009, with the British being the most sceptical (66% of respondents indicated it was a problem), followed by the Spanish (58%). The biggest shift in attitude was found in the Netherlands, where the proportion of respondents showing a negative attitude towards immigration increased from 36 to 45 per cent. However, in most of the countries surveyed, the majority of respondents still considered immigration to be more of an opportunity than a problem (German Marshall Fund, 2009).

Remittances

Remittance inflows to countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia are expected to experience a decline of 14 per cent – from USD 34.3 billion in 2008, to USD 29.6 billion in 2009 (see figure 18) (Ratha et al., 2009).
The significant decline in remittance inflows to countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe can be partly explained by the devaluation of the Russian rouble vis-à-vis the USD. For example, according to Ratha et al., remittance flows to Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Tajikistan declined by 15 per cent, 33 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively in the first half of 2009 compared to the same period in 2008 in USD terms. However, if measured in rouble terms, remittances to Kyrgyzstan actually increased 17 per cent in the first half of 2009 on a year-on-year basis. In Armenia, the year-on-year fall in rouble terms was only 8 per cent and, in Tajikistan, it was 10 per cent. Similarly, a significant part of the decline in remittance flows to Poland can be explained by a depreciation of the British pound against the US dollar by over 25 per cent between the third quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 (Ratha et al., 2009). Latest World Bank estimates indicate that remittance flows fell more than expected in 2009, partially due to the large declines recorded in Poland and Romania (Ratha et al., 2010).

Remittance outflows from EU countries increased by 20 per cent between the first and last quarter of 2008 and then returned to slightly below the previous year’s quarterly average in 2009. The seemingly unchanged remittance outflows from Europe, however, conceal a number of variations. While remittances to the Russian Federation increased by 20 per cent, remittances sent to Brazil, China and India decreased considerably over the course of 2009, with a decrease of 60 per cent in remittances sent to Brazil in the second quarter of 2009 (Eurostat, 2009b) (see figure 19).
Figure 19: Remittance outflows from EU to non-EU countries in 2008–2009 (in %)

Note: Indexed at 2008 Q01 = 100; Value in the first quarter of 2008 was EUR 1,713 million for the total remittance outflow, EUR 35 million to Brazil, EUR 48 million to the Russian Federation, EUR 133 million to China and EUR 17 million to India.

Source: Eurostat, 2009b
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Vishnevsky A. and S. Bobylev


World Bank

• The stock of migrants in the Middle East\textsuperscript{26} in 2010 stands at an estimated 26.6 million migrants (around 13.5\% of the total global migrant stock). The region saw an increase of 4.5 million migrants, compared with the 2005 figure. The Middle East thus continues to be one of the fastest-growing migrant-receiving regions, with an annual average growth rate in migrant stock equal to 3.8\% per cent. Migrants represent 11.9\% per cent of the total population in the region (UN DESA, 2009).

• The net international migration rates in the region have remained positive over the period 2005–2010, with the mean net migration rate increasing from 9.2 migrants per 1,000 population between 2000 and 2005 to 9.8 in the period 2005–2010. The growth is mainly due to a significant increase in Qatar (from 59 to 94 migrants per 1,000 population), although this has been counter-balanced by decreasing rates registered in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (see figure 1) (UN DESA, 2009).

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\textsuperscript{26} Following the regional classification used in IOM (2005), this section examines the \textit{Arab Mashreq} (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen), the \textit{Gulf Cooperation Council} (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and Israel.
• Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel remain the main destination countries in the region. While some countries in the Mashreq are still countries of origin of migrants, Jordan and Lebanon are also slowly becoming destination countries for Arab and Asian migrants. According to the World Bank (2008), the United Arab Emirates–India remittance corridor is among the top ten remittance corridors worldwide.
• Economic growth and labour shortages in the GCC countries, as well as conflict and insecurity in the Mashreq region, acted as the main drivers of mobility to and from the region in recent years.
• In 2010, there were 10.2 million women migrants in the Middle East – a 20.4 per cent increase from 2005. Women are estimated to represent 38 per cent of the total number of migrants in 2010, but there is considerable variation across the region, with figures ranging between 55.9 per cent in Israel and 20.8 per cent in Oman (UN DESA, 2009).
• Major urban centres in the region attract a high number of migrants. Between 1 million and 500,000 foreign-born live in Jeddah and Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), Dubai (United Arab Emirates) and Tel Aviv (Israel), in addition to Muscat (Oman), Medina (Saudi Arabia) and Jerusalem, where the foreign-born represent a quarter of the total population (MPI, 2007).
• According to the World Bank, the region is both a major source and receiver of workers’ remittances. In 2009, it was estimated that the region received approximately USD 22.7 billion in remittances, while USD 25 billion were sent by migrants residing in the region. It is expected that remittance flows from the Middle East and North Africa will experience an annual growth of -7 per cent and 5 per cent for 2009 and 2010, respectively (Ratha et al., 2009).

ARAB MASHREK

• The migrant stock in the Arab countries of the East Mediterranean increased by 1.8 million between 2005 and 2010, reaching 8.7 million migrants (see figures 2 and 3) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 2: Stock of migrants in the Arab Mashreq in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
According to estimates (based on Census 2000 data) elaborated by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC) (2007), of 6.6 million migrants from the Mashreq and Yemen, over 70 per cent live in other Arab countries (especially Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries, but also increasingly Jordan, Lebanon and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), with the rest living mostly in OECD countries (see figure 4).

Note: (a) DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data; (b) MENA refers to Middle East and North Africa; (c) OPT - Occupied Palestinian Territories; (d) GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

• Forced migration was the main driver behind the increase in the number of migrants in the region, due to the external displacement of Iraqis and the demographic growth of Palestinian and other refugees in the region. The vast majority (77%) of the 8.7 million migrants in the Mashreq were refugees (UN DESA, 2009). The region hosted 4.7 million Palestinian refugees (UNRWA, 2009) and 2 million Iraqi refugees (UNHCR, 2009a).

• A growing trend seems to be the increase in mixed flows of African migrants and refugees arriving irregularly across the Gulf of Aden into Yemen, mostly from Somalia but also increasingly from Ethiopia. UNHCR (2009b) estimates suggest that this number grew by nearly 50 per cent from 2008 to 2009 – from 50,000 to 74,000.

• In addition to external displacement, internal displacement in Iraq has been significant. Since February 2006, more than 1,600,000 Iraqis (270,000 families) have been displaced – approximately 5.5 per cent of the total population (IOM, 2009). Conflict-induced internal displacement in Yemen has now reached 200,000, according to UNHCR (2010). Meanwhile, droughts affecting up to 60 per cent of the land of the Syrian Arab Republic have led to between 40,000 and 60,000 families migrating away from affected regions (OCHA, 2009).

• Besides insecurity, conflict and climatic factors, demographic and socio-economic trends acted as the other structural forces influencing migration dynamics from and to the Middle East. As Mashreq countries have begun their demographic transition, according to UN DESA (2008), 57 per cent of the population in Mashreq countries will be younger than 24 years of age in 2010. This, coupled with relatively high literacy rates and youth unemployment ranging between 14 and 50 per cent (ILO, 2007), indicates that the Mashreq will remain a source of young migrants – a significant proportion of them skilled migrants.

• Remittance inflows to countries of the Mashreq have been steadily increasing. With USD 7.8 billion, Egypt ranked as the fourteenth-most important remittance-receiving country in the world in 2009. Lebanon and Jordan were the seventh-and eleventh-biggest receivers of remittances as a percentage of GDP in the world in 2008 (see figure 5) (Ratha et al., 2009).

![Figure 5: Remittance inflows in Arab Mashreq, as a percentage of GDP, in 2008](source: Ratha et al., 2009.)
GCC COUNTRIES

- Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council remained among the major destinations of migrants at different skill levels, especially those from South and South-East Asia as well as the Middle East. According to UN DESA (2009), by 2010 the migrant stock in the six countries of the GCC countries will have reached 15.1 million, an increase of 2.4 million (19%) compared to 2005 (see figure 6).

- The structural needs of oil-rich GCC labour markets, especially in those countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain that have been promoting the creation of service- and knowledge-based economies to diversify the source of their revenues, indicate that contractual foreign workers will continue to represent a high share of the population and, as a consequence, of the labour force in the GCC. In 2010, temporary contractual workers are expected to represent significantly more than two thirds of the population in Qatar (86.5%), the United Arab Emirates (70%) and Kuwait (68.8%) (see figure 7) (UN DESA, 2009).
• According to Ratha et al. (2009), Saudi Arabia was the fourth-biggest remittance-sending country in the world in 2008 (see figure 8).

• The sponsorship system (Kafala) remains the basis for migration management in the GCC. Recently, however, significant attempts at reforms have been made. In May 2009, Bahrain’s Labour Minister transferred the responsibility of sponsoring the visas of migrant workers from kafils (sponsors) to the Labour Market Regulatory Authority (Human Rights Watch, 2009). This move is expected to decrease the dependence of foreign contractual workers on their kafils and facilitate access to different jobs in the market. Since August 2009, foreign employees are also able to change employers without the consent of their current employer (Al Jazeera, 2009).

• In 2009, the Shura Council of Saudi Arabia passed and submitted for approval to the Cabinet a bill for the protection of domestic workers (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

• In 2009, the United Arab Emirates rolled out a Wage Protection System, whereby all businesses must choose an agent through which their workers will be paid. When wages are received by the agent, the responsible ministry is notified, which enables it to ensure that payments are made. More than 100,000 workers received their wages through the system in July and August 2009 – up from 28,000 in June of the same year. Companies guilty of ‘incessant violations’ in failing to pay workers face legal action and may be prevented from receiving work permits (The National, 2009a).

Figure 7: Stock of migrants in Gulf Cooperation Council countries, as a percentage of the total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UN DESA, 2009.
ISRAEL

- The stock of international migrants in Israel increased by 10.5 per cent between 2005 and 2010, reaching almost 3 million migrants in 2010, which represents 40 per cent of the total population (see figures 9 and 10).

- Migration to Israel is regulated by the 1950 Law of Return, which facilitates the migration of persons of Jewish ancestry to Israel. In recent decades, substantial inflows of Russian and Ethiopian Jews have contributed to the population and labour force growth in Israel. With the number of workers from the Occupied Palestinian Territories diminishing in recent years, a total of 30,300 non-Jewish migrants were granted work permits in 2008 – down from 36,500 the year before. Main countries of origin (in addition to Member States of the European
Commonwealth of Independent States) include Thailand (5,800), the Philippines (5,500) India (2,700), and China and Nepal (2,300 each). In contrast to 2007, the majority of work permit recipients were women (55%) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009a).

With a large Israeli diaspora abroad and a substantial number of migrants in Israel, remittance inflows and outflows in Israel tend to be significant, with approximately USD 3.6 billion remittances sent by workers in Israel and USD 520 million sent by Israeli citizens abroad in 2008. However, the financial crisis resulted in slower growth and decline in inflows and outflows in the last quarter of 2008 and the first three quarters of 2009 (see figure 11).

Figure 10: Stock of migrants in Israel, as a percentage of total population, in 2000, 2005 and 2010

Source: UN DESA, 2009.

Figure 11: Growth in remittance flows in Israel in 2008 and 2009 (in %)

Effects of the economic crisis

- While the financial crisis unfolded in main receiving countries of migrants from the Middle East (especially OECD countries and GCC countries), remittances to the Arab Mashreq region started showing signs of slower growth or even decline. Recruitment agencies in Egypt and Jordan reported a drop by up to a half in demand for labour in the Gulf region since the beginning of 2008, especially for skilled labour (Awad, 2009).
- Traditionally, the demand for temporary contractual workers in the GCC countries has been driven both by structural factors, such as labour shortages, demographic trends and rigidities of the labour market, and by cyclical factors, such as demand for goods and services and the construction boom fuelled by high oil prices. Figure 12 below shows that demand for workers from Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines in the six GCC countries has been following the trends in the price of oil. Based on trends from previous years, migration flows to the GCC countries could have been expected to decline in 2009 and 2010 if the financial crisis resulted in lower oil prices, which would depress the level of aggregate demand, investment and, therefore, demand for foreign labour in the GCC countries. In Kuwait, there was “a small decline in the total number of non-Kuwaitis between June 2007 and December 2008”, in contrast to an upward trend in the proportion of non-nationals between 2000 and 2007 (Shah, 2009).

![Figure 12: Migrant flows from Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Philippines to GCC countries (in thousands), and oil prices (in USD per barrel), 1999–2009](image)

**Note:** Data for Philippines and Pakistan for 2009 are based on projections from historical data.

**Source:** Based on data from New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), Bangladesh Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), Pakistan Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, and Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POAE).
According to the estimations of Ratha et al. (2009), the financial crisis has had a noticeable impact on temporary contractual workers in GCC countries. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, where more than two thirds of the population is made up of non-nationals, media polls show that 10 per cent of nationals participating in the survey reported having lost their jobs because of the financial crisis. Non-nationals’ responses were mainly “staying in the United Arab Emirates and looking for another job” (58%) and “planning to leave (either to their countries of origin or another country)” (33%) (The National, 2009b).

The workforce demand in the construction sector of Dubai, a major employer of temporary contractual workers, was expected to decline by 20 per cent in 2009. The anticipated departure of workers was expected to lead to a population decline of 8 per cent in 2009 (UN-ESCWA, 2009).

The result of this unemployment is that, after years of substantial growth in remittance outflows, such growth is projected to have halted, as of the end of 2008, in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The reason for such a decline might be attributable to the loss of income of foreign workers that have become unemployed and either stayed in the region to look for employment or returned to their country of origin. IOM research on the remittance behaviour of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia revealed that over 85 per cent of respondents expected remittances to decline in the future as a result of the crisis, while 32 per cent expected the impact of the financial crisis to be severe. While 20 per cent of Pakistani contractual foreign workers have stated that they did not foresee alternative options, if remittances declined in the future, 29 per cent saw returning and seeking employment in Pakistan and opening a new business or expanding existing ones (25%) as a potential solution (Arif, forthcoming).

Data from the central banks of Mashreq countries show that remittance growth slowed but remained positive in the last quarter of 2008. In the first quarters of 2009, money sent by migrants experienced negative growth, possibly as a result of some migrants sending their savings home at the end of 2008 before returning in 2009 (see figure 13).

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**Figure 13: Growth of remittance inflows in selected Mashreq countries, 2008–2009 (in %)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008 (Q1-Q3)</th>
<th>2008 (Q4)</th>
<th>2009 (Q1)</th>
<th>2009 (Q2)</th>
<th>2009 (Q3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>-22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>-68.7</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Data for Lebanon are available only for 2008 but include remittance inflows and outflows. Total remittances in 2008 reached USD 8.7 billion in Egypt, USD 2.2 billion in Lebanon and USD 1.4 billion in Jordan, according to the respective banks.

**Source:** Based on data from respective central banks.
• Analysis of remittance inflows to Egypt reveals that remittances from North America started declining in the third quarter of 2008, while remittances from European and Arab countries peaked in the third and fourth quarters of 2008, respectively, and then decreased. The third quarter of 2009 witnessed a negative growth of remittance inflows of between -1 and -29 per cent (see figure 14).

**Figure 14: Growth of remittance inflows to Egypt, according to sending country, 2008–2009 (in %)**

- Migrants working in the Mashreq countries have also been badly affected by the crisis. A study conducted by the Phoenix Centre for Economic and Informatics Studies claimed that, out of 10,500 workers in several sectors that lost their jobs in 2009, 6,750 were foreign workers, concentrated mostly in the textile factories in the Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan *Jordan Times*, 2010).

- Egyptian Government statistics revealed that Egyptians in the United Arab Emirates remitted USD 1.12 billion between July 2008 and March 2009, compared with USD 941.6 million over a similar period in 2007/2008. The spike could be attributed to laid-off Egyptians receiving a severance package, emptying their bank accounts and returning home (Al Masry Online, 2009). Data on remittances sent from GCC countries to Egypt and Pakistan show that the growth in remittances experienced in the first quarter of 2009 slowed down in the following period, registering negative growth for Egypt until the third quarter of 2009. While the biggest drop has been experienced in remittances sent from the United Arab Emirates, migrants in other GCC countries have been equally hard hit by the crisis, with a drop of 20 per cent in remittances sent to Egypt in the second and third quarters of 2009. Remittances sent from GCC countries to Pakistan have experienced declining growth rates, but no negative growth until the end of 2009 (see figures 15 and 16).
Figure 15: Growth of remittance outflows from GCC countries to Egypt in 2009 (in %)


Figure 16: Remittance outflows from GCC countries to Pakistan in 2009 (in %)

Source: Based on data from the State Bank of Pakistan, 2009.
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World Bank
OCEANIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

- Oceania\(^{27}\) hosts over 6 million international migrants, who make up 16.8 per cent of the population in the region. Although only accounting for less than 3 per cent of the global migrant stock, Oceania is the region with the highest proportion of migrants in its population (see figure 1) (UN DESA, 2009).

Figure 1: Stock of migrants (in thousands) and share of total population (in %) in Oceania in 2000, 2005 and 2010

\(^{27}\) Oceania includes the following countries and subregions: Australia, New Zealand, Melanesia (Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu), Micronesia (Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federates States of), Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau), and Polynesia (American Samoa, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, Pitcairn, Samoa, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Wallis and Futuna Islands).
In recent years, 21.8 per cent of the population growth experienced by the region has been directly related to the arrival of new migrants (UN DESA, 2009).

Migrants represent 25 per cent or more of the total population in four cities in the region: Sydney, Melbourne, Perth (Australia) and Auckland (New Zealand). Sydney and Melbourne host the highest number of migrants, with 1,235,908 and 960,145 foreign-born residents, respectively (MPI, 2007).

Oceania remains a region of immigration, with more people entering the continent than leaving. However, latest estimates project an increased outflow of migrants from the region; although the net migration rate remains positive, it decreased from 4.1 migrants per 1,000 population between 2000 and 2005 to 2.8 between 2005 and 2010. The consistent positive migration rate is largely due to Australia and New Zealand, which remain attractive destination countries for international migrants (UN DESA, 2008).

According to Census 2000 data, there are over 1.5 million28 emigrants originating from Oceania. Emigrants from the Pacific Islands account for 37 per cent of this figure, followed by emigrants from New Zealand (35%) (see figure 2). Among the Pacific Islands, Polynesia is the subregion with the highest number of emigrants (DRC, 2007). Around half of this migration is intraregional, with Australia alone receiving nearly 455,000 migrants from within the region. Emigration outside the region is largely directed towards the USA and the United Kingdom, which together account for nearly 471,000 migrants from Oceania (DRC, 2007).

The percentage of female migrants in Oceania is steadily growing – from 50.7 per cent of international migrants in 2005, to 51.2 per cent in 2010 (UN DESA, 2009).

For the first time since 2005, remittance inflows decreased from USD 7 billion (in 2008) to USD 6.9 billion (in 2009), reflecting the effects of the economic crisis (Ratha et al., 2009).29

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**Figure 2: Emigrants from Oceania, by place of origin, in 2000 (in %)**

![Pie chart showing emigrants from Oceania, by place of origin, in 2000 (in %)](chart)

**Note:** DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.

**Source:** DRC, 2007.

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28 The statistics do not include data on Pitcairn.
29 The figures refer to remittance inflows in the following countries: Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Kiribati, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu.
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

- The migrant population in Australia and New Zealand increased consistently in the last decade, accounting for over a fifth of the total national population in both countries and reflecting the policy of both Governments to promote immigration. In Australia, international migrant numbers grew from 4 million in 2000 to an estimated 4.7 million in 2010. New Zealand experienced an even steeper increase – from 685,000 in 2000 to 962,000 in 2010 (see figure 3a). The percentage of migrants as a share of the total population has also increased steadily. In 2010, for the first time since 1990, New Zealand will host a higher percentage of migrants as a share of the total population than Australia (see figure 3b) (UN DESA, 2009).

![Figure 3a: Stock of migrants in Australia and New Zealand in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)](source: UN DESA, 2009)

![Figure 3b: Stock of migrants as a percentage of total population in Australia and New Zealand in 2000, 2005 and 2010](source: UN DESA, 2009)
• British migrants make up the largest group of migrants in both countries, with migration between the two countries also being significant. Overall, intraregional migration is more important for New Zealand, accounting for nearly a quarter of immigration, compared to 11 per cent of immigration to Australia.
• According to Census 2000 data, Australian and New Zealander emigrants follow similar routes, moving either towards their main neighbouring country (i.e. New Zealand and Australia, respectively), or towards the English-speaking countries of the United Kingdom and the USA. These destinations host 55 per cent of the Australian emigrant population and 84 per cent of New Zealand’s emigrant population. Australia is the main destination for New Zealand emigrants, with 68 per cent of its total migrant population (see figure 4b) (DRC, 2007). This is facilitated by the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement, which gives citizens of Australia and New Zealand the right to visa-free travel and residence between the two countries. For Australians, the United Kingdom remains the primary destination, with 25 per cent of emigrants moving there, followed by the USA and New Zealand (see figure 4a).

![Figure 4a: Emigrants from Australia in 2000, by country of destination (in %)](image1)

Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.

![Figure 4b: Emigrants from New Zealand in 2000, by country of destination (in %)](image2)

Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.
• Australia and New Zealand have historically recorded more immigrants than emigrants. This trend is likely to continue in future years, although at a slower pace (see figure 5) (UN DESA, 2008).

![Figure 5: Net migration rates per 1,000 population from Australia and New Zealand in 1995–2000, 2000–2005 and 2005–2010](image)

Source: UN DESA, 2008.

• In Australia, 66 per cent of the total population growth recorded between 2008 and 2009 was due to net overseas migration (NOM). This increase, estimated at 297,400 persons, represents the largest increase recorded in the country since the quarterly Estimated Resident Population survey began in 1981 (ABS, 2009). Further, since 2004, migration flows have accounted for an increasing share of national population growth, rising from 45.6 per cent in 2004, to 59.5 per cent in 2008 (DIAC, 2009a). This steady increase was due to an increase in the number of overseas students, the resilience of the Australian economy and larger migration programmes.

• In the financial year 2008–2009, 32,000 British migrants were registered as permanent additions to the resident population (14.2% of this group), along with around 26,000 New Zealanders, 25,000 Indians, 24,000 Chinese and 12,000 South Africans (DIAC, 2009b).

• New Zealand’s net migration rate peaked in 2003, although it has remained positive ever since. In detail, however, the flow is much more complex and multifaceted; at the country level, the numbers of New Zealanders going to Australia have historically outpaced the Australians coming to New Zealand (see figure 6). Regarding British residents, the trend has changed since 2002, with more British citizens going to New Zealand than New Zealanders going to the United Kingdom. In 2009, the positive migration balance recorded by China and India strongly increased (Statistics New Zealand, 2008 and 2009).

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30 These figures refer to the period September 2008 to September 2009.
31 According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), net overseas migration (NOM) is the difference between those leaving and arriving permanently (permanent migrants, settlers who were granted visas offshore) or for at least 12 months out of the 16-month period (long-term migrants, which include temporary residents and students).
32 These figures reflect migration flows recorded up to June of the indicated year (12-month period).
According to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship in Australia, it is estimated that, in 2008, almost 50,000 immigrants were staying irregularly in the country. The majority of these (84%) entered the country as tourists and overstayed their visas. Citizens of China and the USA represent the highest number of ‘overstayers’, accounting for 10 per cent of the total (DIAC, 2009a). From August 2008 through July 2009, 28 boats with irregular migrants landed or were intercepted by the Australian authorities (Koser, 2009).

In Australia, the stock of foreign-born workers has increased consistently since 2000, making up about a quarter of the total working population (see figure 7). After a slight decrease, in relative terms, in 2004 and 2005, the number of foreign workers rose significantly in 2007 (from 24.9% of total labour force in 2006, to 25.8%) (OECD, 2009a).
• The number of temporary workers in Australia showed a dramatic increase – from 36,000 in 2002, to 87,300 in 2007 – outpacing numbers of permanent settlers, which still steadily increased but at a much lower rate (see figure 8) (OECD, 2009a).

Figure 8: Comparison between inflows of permanent settlers and inflows of temporary foreign workers to Australia in 2000–2007 (in thousands)

Source: OECD, 2009a

• From 2000 to 2007, temporary migration rose to an even higher level in New Zealand, where the annual inflow of foreign workers doubled in five years – from 59,600 in 2002, to 121,500 in 2007 (see figure 9). The inflow of permanent migrants over the years appears to be more stable. Nevertheless, after a peak of 14,500 reached in 2005, the numbers declined to 12,400 in 2007 (OECD, 2009a).

Figure 9: Comparison between inflows of permanent settlers and inflows of temporary foreign workers to New Zealand in 2000–2007 (in thousands)

Source: OECD, 2009a.

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Permanent settlers are skilled workers in the following categories: Australian Sponsored, Regional Designated Area Sponsored, Employer Nomination Scheme, Business Skills, and Special Talents and Independent, including accompanying dependants. Temporary workers are included in the following categories: Skilled Temporary Resident Programme, including accompanying dependants and Long Stay Temporary Business Programme. Period of reference: fiscal year (July to June of the indicated year).
• Temporary work schemes for Pacific Islanders in both countries, such as the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) Scheme in New Zealand and the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWP) in Australia, have been designed with an explicit focus on linking migration to the development of the country of origin (Hugo, 2010).
• The number of overseas students admitted into Australia has strongly increased in recent years. In 2008, 409,136 temporary permits were issued, compared to 321,631 in 2006. In relation to the countries of origin, Chinese and Indian students account for the largest share of arrivals, with 90,900 and 49,800 students, respectively (see figure 10) (DIAC, 2006, 2008 and 2009a). While official figures for 2009–2010 are not yet available, it is estimated that a significant slowdown of recruitments for 2009–2010 will occur. Following the economic crisis, families in the two leading source countries – China and India – are experiencing a reduction in the value of their savings, which is likely to have diverted the flow of resources used for their children’s education towards educational institutions closer to home (Koser, 2009).

Figure 10: Student arrivals in Australia, by country of birth: top five countries in 2006–2008

![Graph showing student arrivals by country of birth](image)


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34 Students are defined as people approved for entry into Australia for a specific period of time, for the purpose of undertaking formal and non-formal studies.
MELANESIA, POLYNESIA AND MICRONESIA

- The migrant population increased in all Oceania subregions between 2000 and 2010 (see figure 11a). Micronesia is the subregion with the highest number of migrants – 151,000 – which represents also the highest percentage in the region, relative to the total population. However, this rate decreased slightly from 27.5 per cent in 2000 to 26.4 per cent in 2010 (see figure 11b) (UN DESA, 2009).

![Figure 11a: Stock of migrants in Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia in 2000, 2005 and 2010 (in thousands)](source: UN DESA, 2009)

![Figure 11b: Stock of migrants as a percentage of total population in Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia in 2000, 2005 and 2010](source: UN DESA, 2009)

- The corridors for emigration from the Pacific Islands are strongly linked to geographical ties. According to Census 2000 data, 50 per cent of the Pacific Islands’ migrants left their countries and remained within the region, with New Zealand being the leading country of destination, with 20 per cent of the total, followed by Australia (17%), and other Pacific Islands (13%) (see figure 12). Canada and the USA receive 36 per cent of the Pacific Islands’ migrants (DRC, 2007).
The political and economic disparities between the Pacific Islands and neighbouring countries (to which migration has long been seen as a potential solution), coupled with the associative status of many islands granting their inhabitants free movement to, or citizenship of, countries such as New Zealand and the USA, and the active recruitment policies of New Zealand, in particular, have resulted in continued high out-migration from the Pacific Islands. However, the negative rate has been decreasing overall since 1995–2000 (Stahl and Appleyard, 2007).

The outflow differential of migrants has more than halved in Micronesia, from -9.6 in 1995–2000, to -3.8 in 2005–2010 (see figure 13). Polynesia remains the region with the highest negative migration rate, with -8.5 migrants per population of 1,000 recorded between 2005 and 2010 (UN DESA, 2008). New Caledonia and French Polynesia are the only countries where the migration rate is positive, due to labour migration in the mining sector and in the professional and administrative sectors, respectively (World Bank, 2006).

Note: DRC estimates are based on 2000 Census Round Data.

35 Free Association grants free movement to Micronesians and inhabitants of the Marshall Islands to the USA; the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau are associated with New Zealand.
This outflow, combined with the Pacific Islands’ small populations, means that diasporas from some Pacific Island countries outnumber the resident populations. This is the case in Niue, where the diaspora represents 294.2 per cent of the resident national population, and in Tokelau (138.5%) (Hugo, 2010).

Emigration is particularly relevant among skilled workers, and 52 per cent of the Pacific Islands’ emigrants residing in OECD countries have a post-secondary education.36 On the list of the top 30 countries with the highest migration rates for skilled migration in OECD States, eight are States from the region: Palau (80.9%), Tonga (75.6%), Samoa (73.4%), Nauru (72%), Tuvalu (64.9%), Fiji (62.8%), Kiribati (55.7%) and Marshall Islands (42.8%). Emigration rates are especially high among women, with 63.1 per cent of them being skilled migrants (Docquier et al., 2008).

Effects of the economic crisis

Although the economic crisis hit the Oceania region after other areas of the world, the effects have nonetheless been significant. Australia and New Zealand are facing slow or negative economic growth, as well as rising unemployment rates; unemployment is expected to continue to increase in 2010 (OECD, 2009b).

Migrants have been affected by job losses. In New Zealand, for example, the unemployment rate among recent migrants was 6.7 per cent, compared to 5 per cent for the wider population through 2008–2009 (IMSED, 2009a). Furthermore, although the impact of the global crisis was delayed in the region, the same is predicted of its recovery. This slow recovery could affect migration trends for a longer period of time.

Australia and New Zealand were the first nations in the region to introduce restrictive migration policy measures in response to the economic crisis, in order to protect local workers.

The decline in remittances could particularly affect several Pacific Island States that are highly dependent upon

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36 Figures refer to year 2000. The statistics reflect only the population over 25 years of age.
migrant transfer of funds for their economic and social development.

- In Australia, inflows of remittances dropped in 2009 after several years of strong increases. In 2009, they accounted for USD 4.5 billion – down from USD 4.6 billion in 2008. In New Zealand, after a peak of USD 1.3 billion in 2002, remittances have been steadily declining, reaching USD 615 million in 2009 (see figure 14). In Australia and New Zealand, the ratio of remittances to GDP remained marginal at 0.5 per cent in 2008.

**Figure 14: Remittance inflows to Australia and New Zealand in 2000–2009 (in USD millions)**

![Graph showing remittance inflows to Australia and New Zealand](source)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

- World Bank data for 2009 and 2010 remittance outflows from Australia are not yet available; however, the funds transferred by migrants to their countries of origin are expected to fall. This would be the second consecutive decrease recorded in the country after 2008, when remittances declined from USD 3.0 billion in 2007 to USD 2.9 billion in 2008. In New Zealand, remittance outflows have been inconsistent over the years. In 2008, migrants sent home USD 1.202 billion – a drop from USD 1.207 billion in 2007 (see figure 15) (Ratha et al., 2009).

**Figure 15: Remittance outflows from Australia and New Zealand in 2000–2008 (in USD millions)**

![Graph showing remittance outflows from Australia and New Zealand](source)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.
• Unemployment affected Pacific Island workers residing in New Zealand, including migrants who were particularly vulnerable in the labour market due to their relative youth and low-skilled status (Department of Labour of New Zealand, 2009).

• As a result of the financial crisis, the Australian Government reviewed its migration policy for 2009–2010, reducing the number of permanent and temporary migrants admitted, for the first time in ten years. In 2009, the programme for permanent skilled admissions was reduced from 155,000 to 108,000 persons (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 2009; Thomson Reuters Australia, 2009). Many trades previously on the Critical Skills List, such as bricklaying, plumbing and carpentry, have been removed. Additionally, the Government revised the requirements for temporary visas (457 Visas), compelling local employers to give priority to Australian workers. In June 2009, the 457 Visas Scheme recorded a drop of 45 per cent in received applications, compared to the same month of the previous year. Additionally, more demanding English-language skills were introduced for categories such as trades, chefs and lower-skilled occupations for both temporary and permanent applicants (Fix et al., 2009).

• In Australia, in the third quarter of 2009, for the first time, Chinese immigrants accounted for the largest share of settlers moving to Australia, with 6,350 individuals, compared to 5,800 and 4,740 from the United Kingdom and New Zealand, respectively. The curtailment of the skilled migration programme particularly affected British settlers, who previously formed the largest group of applicants for skilled visas. Chinese migration, linked mostly to family reunifications, was less affected (Australian Visa Bureau, 2009).

• Faced with rising unemployment and slow or declining economic growth, due to the economic crisis, the New Zealand Government has modified some of its key active migration policies. In July 2009, the General Work policy was replaced by the Essential Skills policy – a new temporary work policy framework that mandates officers processing work permit applications to ensure that no local workers are available for any given position. Furthermore, the length of these permits has been reduced from three years to one year, for low-skilled migrants. The number of approvals under this category has declined significantly: 20 per cent fewer approvals were given in the month of December 2009 than in December 2008. This also reflects the fact that the number of applications has decreased by 34 per cent in the second half of 2009, compared with the same period in 2008 (IMSED, 2009b).

• Temporary work permits were also affected: the number of approvals was 3 per cent lower in the second half of 2009 than in the second half of 2008 (IMSED, 2009b).

• The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy, which has been in place since 2007 and has been very relevant for migrants coming from the Pacific Islands, was also revised. In 2009, the Supplementary Seasonal Employment (SSE) policy was introduced to replace the previous Transitioning to Recognised Seasonal Employer (TRSE) policy. The permits issued under the SSE policy are now subjected to a Labour Market Test, are not available for those previously holding a TRSE or SSE permit, and do not allow migrants to support applications

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38 Fiscal year: from 1 July to 30 June.
39 The 457 Visa Scheme is a long-stay business visa that allows employers to sponsor an overseas worker for up to four years.
40 According to the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), settlers are defined as immigrants holding a permanent or temporary visa and New Zealanders and persons otherwise eligible that have a clear intention to settle.
41 The Essential Skills work permit is the standard skill-shortage work permit, consisting of occupations on the Immediate Skill Shortage List (ISSL) and the Long Term Skill Shortage List (LTSSL).
42 Temporary work permits include several types of permits, along with the Essential Skills permits, such as Working Holidays, Specific Purpose and Student permits.
43 RSE and SSE allow the horticulture and viticulture industries to hire seasonal workers. In the recruitment process, Pacific Islands have been given priority.
44 The eligible Pacific Island countries are the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Fiji was excluded, in response to the 2006 military coup.
for their partners or children. In 2008, up to 8000 places were available to overseas workers under the RSE Policy (Immigration New Zealand, 2009).

- However, the planning level for permanent residence approvals in 2009–2010 remains unchanged from 2008–2009, although the actual number of approvals has decreased (IMSED, 2009b).

- In August 2008, the Australian Government announced the introduction of a Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme (PSWPS), modeled on the New Zealand RSE policy, with selected Pacific Island countries. The scheme was expected to distribute initially 2,500 temporary visas per year. Owing partly to the worsening economic conditions, the implementation of the programme proceeded slowly (Bedford, 2009).

The first migrants participating in the scheme were 50 Tongan workers who arrived in February 2009 (PITIC, 2009).

- Inflows of remittances are traditionally very important for Pacific Island economies. In 2009, after years of steady increases, the Pacific Islands recorded a decline of remittances – to USD 1,819 million, down from USD 1,834 million in 2008. The money sent home by migrants is particularly important in Tonga, Samoa, Kiribati and Fiji, where remittances accounted for 37.7, 25.8, 6.9 and 5.9 per cent of the GDP in 2008, respectively. French Polynesia was the only Pacific Island State that recorded an increase in remittances in 2009 – from USD 751 million in 2008 to USD 761 million (see figure 16) (Ratha et al., 2009).

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**Figure 16: Remittance inflows to Pacific Islands in 2004–2009: selected countries (in USD millions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remittance inflows (in USD millions)</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
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<td>180</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>90</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Figures for 2009 are estimates.
**Source:** Ratha et al., 2009
Figure 17: Remittance inflows to selected Pacific Islands in 2008, as a share of GDP (in %)

Source: Ratha et al., 2009.

Figure 18: GDP annual percentage change in selected Pacific Island countries, 2005–2010

Note: Figures for 2010 are estimates.
Source: IMF, 2009 (IMF estimates are calculated at constant prices).
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Migration is, by nature, a difficult variable to capture. The multidimensional and multidirectional characteristics of migration today, as well as its temporary and circular patterns, require sophisticated data-collection systems and methodologies – which, in most cases, countries are not prepared to apply or lack the capacity to do so. One of the main challenges of measuring international migration remains the fact that countries still define ‘international migrant’ differently. This lack of consistency and conformity is one of the main obstacles to setting accurate measurements allowing for comparability at the regional and international levels.

The UN Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration (UN DESA, 1998) prepared a series of definitions and classifications of migratory movement aimed at forming a basis for data collection on migration. However, countries collecting data on migration do so to support their own national legislative, administrative and policy needs and are therefore often reluctant to adopt concepts and definitions that would allow for regional and international coherence at the expense of their own specific use of the data collected.

An example of these methodological inconsistencies is the use of residency to define migrant status, in some cases, and nationality or country of birth, in others. In addition, the migrants’ duration of stay is often unspecified in migration data, and thus information referring to permanent, temporary or even short-term migration remains vague.

Another source of continuous misunderstanding is the difference between stock and flow data. Stocks of migrants indicate the total number of migrants present at a determined location at a specific point in time, which accounts for lifetime migration – i.e., for the population that has migrated at any point in time in the past and is still present in the analysed location. In other words, migrant stocks are the cumulative result of past flows. On the other hand, flows of migrants measure the number of migrants who have arrived at, or departed from, a certain location during a specific period of time. Knowing what migration statistics published by governments, academic bodies or international organizations are aimed at measuring is critical to understanding the migration phenomenon. A misunderstanding of the different concepts can lead to false conclusions and, therefore, to inaccurate policy recommendations by the users of the data, such as policymakers and the wider public.

In addition, there is a perceived sensitivity around the issue of migration. Given the volume of migrants around the world, as well as their impact on both countries of origin and destination, migration is perceived as a sensitive political issue. Governments have a sense of ownership of the data collected and, given this sensitivity, may prefer not to release the information available. This can result not only in a lack of available information on the issue, but also a hindrance to putting into practice new systems of data collection that address the weaknesses of existing systems. In
this introduction, the aim is to discuss the data quality of the main sources of information used in the different regional overviews, in order to assess their comparability and reliability, and explain the potential limitations of the data provided.

**Immigration and emigration**

There are generally two types of sources of information regarding immigration and emigration data: international and national migration statistics. These information sources are usually based on different assumptions and follow a different methodology of data collection. As a result, they are meant to address different needs. While national statistics might include country-specific data and, therefore, be more accurate for national purposes, international statistics generally allow for better comparability. This is why the regional overviews presented here include data of the latter type.

The data used to estimate a country’s number of immigrants and emigrants are measured in terms of stocks rather than flows. While flows allow for a more dynamic and chronological analysis of migration, it is generally easier to compute comparable stock rather than flow data, given most current migration data-collection methodologies. Given the limited information available in terms of migration, stock data facilitate the assessment of migration patterns, especially when accompanied by additional socio-demographic and economic determinants.

**Immigration estimates**

In terms of international immigration, the regional overviews draw primarily on the statistics provided by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (UN DESA, 2009). UN DESA provides estimates of migrant stocks on a regular basis, basing its calculations mostly on population censuses corresponding to the decennial rounds of censuses from 1950 to 2000, though some of the basic data used were obtained from population registers and national surveys. In the majority of cases, the sources available provided information on place of birth, which allows for the identification of the foreign-born population. Thus UN DESA migrant stock estimates define international migrants as the foreign-born population, whenever possible. In most countries where information on place of birth was not recorded, information on citizenship (i.e. legal nationality) was available. In these cases, international migrants are defined as foreign citizens.47

Census and survey data are the main sources of stock data on migrants. Most countries have carried out censuses and surveys, yet not all are in a position to determine their migrant stocks, due to the high cost of processing the information; and the countries that do produce their own stocks of migrants use them internally because this information is usually not comparable regionally or internationally, due to differences in definitions. Estimates from the UN DESA are especially helpful in providing information that has considerable value for migration analysis and that is, at times, the only available information.

Furthermore, it is important to point out that the UN DESA immigration data included here for 2010 are projections based on long-run tendencies and may not accurately predict the effect of unexpected short-term fluctuations, such as the 2008–2009 economic crisis.

**Emigration estimates**

Measuring international emigration is an even more challenging task than measuring immigration. Reliable estimates of emigration (either flows or stocks) are necessary for policymakers in order to manage international emigration and assess its consequences for countries of origin.

Currently, the most effective (even if not yet totally reliable) method of measuring emigration stocks is through the destination

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47 For more detailed information regarding the methodology used by UN DESA for estimating the stock of migrants, please refer to: http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=4
countries’ censuses, gathering information on the foreign-born population or on foreign nationals. However, many problems remain, especially in terms of the level of comparability across the different calculations of the destination countries’ censuses (such as the different definitions and categories of migrants used, as well as the different points in time when the censuses are carried out.

The regional overviews presented here obtain their information on emigrant stocks from the Global Migrant Origin Database (version 4) compiled by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC, 2007), based at the University of Sussex, England. This database consists of a 226x226 matrix of origin–destination stocks by country and territory. It is primarily based on the national population censuses conducted during the 2000 round of censuses and other secondary sources, and estimates the missing data via a variety of techniques.\(^{48}\) It combines foreign-born and foreign-nationality migrant stock data to create a single complete bilateral matrix: it uses information on foreign-born migrants as a default, making use of foreign nationality data only where data on foreign-born migrants were unavailable (Parsons et al., 2007).

However, as with every cross-country source of international migration data, when using the information provided by this source, the heterogeneity in the original underlying migration statistics should be taken into consideration. This responds to several factors, such as disparities across countries in data-collection practices, differences in definitions used to classify migrants, shifting borders, undercounting of irregular and forced migrants, high non-response rates in poorer countries, and varying rates of naturalization of the foreign-born – all of which affect comparability of migrant stocks across countries.

Several caveats should be applied to the international estimates presented here. The first, as mentioned before, is the definition of migrant. In the databases used here, migrants are defined as either foreign-born or with foreign nationality (where data by country of birth were not available). These two definitions are not conceptually the same, yet they are merged in order to achieve a global database. For example, counting migrants by foreign nationality would exclude the foreign-born who have acquired citizenship in other countries (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). However, in the absence of complete information for all countries by country of birth, international databases (such as those developed by UN DESA, OECD, DRC and the World Bank) combine data on country of birth and country of citizenship to arrive at global estimates of migrant stocks.

Interpreting the meaning of migrant stocks also presents some difficulties, such as measuring children born abroad to seasonal migrants who may appear as foreign-born, but are not necessarily migrants. Another example is the case of foreign students who are included as migrants in some national migration statistics but not in others.

In addition, the disintegration and reunification of countries cause discontinuities in the international migrant stocks. The disintegration of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, accompanied by the breakdown of the former Yugoslavia in 1992, as well as that of the former Czechoslovakia in 1993, dramatically changed the volume of migrants in the world. Since an international migrant is defined as a person who was born in a country different from the one in which he or she resides, when a country disintegrates, people who had been internal migrants because they had moved from one part of the country to another may, effectively, become international migrants overnight, without having moved from their place of residence. Such changes introduce artificial but unavoidable discontinuities in the trend of the international migrant stocks.

Finally, estimates of global migrant stocks appear to undercount the actual stock of migrants in a number of countries because

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\(^{48}\) It refers to the period 2000–2002. Data prior to 2000 were scaled to the United Nations (2004) mid-year totals for 2000, whereas data for 2001 and 2002 were not scaled to the United Nations totals. The result is a complete bilateral matrix for the years 2000–2002.
of the lags in census data collection and the underreporting of irregular and forced migrants (Ratha and Shaw, 2007).

All of this indicates that migration data are in need of a serious overhaul in terms of availability, timeliness, quality and cross-country comparability. Ultimately, the quality of migration data is determined by the quality of the population censuses of the different countries, many of which have not conducted censuses recently or regularly.

Remittances

In general, the quality and coverage of existing data on remittances are inadequate, and the definition of remittances is still under debate. While some international agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), count only workers’ remittances, the World Bank maintains that compensation of employees and migrants’ transfers should also be counted. In addition, there is the problem that many types of formal remittance flows are not recorded, in some countries, due to weaknesses in data collection. For example, reporting of ‘small’ remittance transactions made through formal channels is sometimes not mandatory, and remittances sent through post offices, exchange bureaux, and other money transfer operators (MTOs) are often not reflected in official statistics (de Luna Martinez, 2005). Moreover, remittances are often misclassified as export revenues, tourism receipts, nonresident deposits, or even foreign direct investment (FDI) (World Bank, 2008). However, the most important challenge arises when trying to add to the calculations flows that go through informal channels, such as unregulated money transfer firms and family, friends or acquaintances who carry remittances.

The remittance data shown in the regional overviews come mostly from the international remittance information gathered by the Development Prospects Group of the World Bank. Even though the data from the national central banks may be more accurate for national purposes, the World Bank data allow for better comparability. Where they are of particular interest, national bank data have been included.

World Bank data on remittances

The World Bank defines migrant remittances as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers (World Bank, 2008). Data for these variables are mostly obtained from the balance of payments (BoP) data file of the IMF. Besides the fact that, in some countries, many types of formal remittances are not recorded and that, in all countries, remittances sent through informal channels are underestimated, it also has to be taken into consideration that many countries do not report data on remittances in the IMF BoP statistics. For these latter countries, the World Bank has used alternative estimates of workers’ remittances based on either country desk or central bank data.

According to the World Bank:

Workers’ remittances, as defined in the IMF Balance of Payments Manual, are current private transfers from migrant workers who are considered residents of the host country to recipients in their country of origin. If the migrants live in the host country for a year or longer, they are considered residents, regardless of their immigration status. If the migrants have lived in the host country for less than a year, their entire income in the host country should be classified as compensation of employees.49

However, this rule is not always followed:

Many countries compile data based on the citizenship of the migrant worker rather than on their residency status. Further, data are shown entirely as either compensation of employees or as worker remittances, although they should be split between the two categories if the guidelines were correctly followed. Therefore, the distinction between these two categories appears to be

entirely arbitrary, depending on country preference, convenience, and tax laws or data availability (World Bank, 2008).

On the other hand, migrants’ transfers are the net worth of migrants that are transferred from one country to another at the time of migration (for a period of at least one year). As the number of temporary workers increases, the importance of migrants’ transfers may increase. Therefore, in order to get a complete picture of the resource flow from migrants, the three items – workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants’ transfers – have to be considered together.
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Map 1: Immigrant growth rates (2005–2010), immigrant stocks and immigrants as a percentage of total population in 2010

Note: Regions in this map relate to IOM regions as defined in the regional overviews.
Europe was the region that recorded the largest number of migrants in 2010, with 77.1 million foreign-born\(^1\) living within this region. However, proportionally, migration’s most significant effect on population composition was seen in Oceania and the Middle East, where a smaller number of migrants made up much larger proportions of the population (16.8% and 12%, respectively). By way of comparison, in Asia, a larger number of migrants account for a relatively small proportion of the overall population (0.7%).

Migrant stocks worldwide continued to grow between 2005 and 2010 in most countries of the world. Ecuador saw the largest year-on-year growth, with the migrant stock increasing at the rate of 23 per cent; Iceland, Qatar and the Syrian Arab Republic also saw a year-on-year migrant stock growth rate of over 10 per cent.

At the other end of the spectrum, the annual growth rate was negative in over 60 countries, with the most important falls being recorded in Iraq (-8.6%), Armenia (-8.4%), Sierra Leone (-7.1%), Tonga (-6.3%) and Burundi (-5.9%).

Between 2005 and 2010, in North America, Western Europe and Scandinavia and the Middle East (with the exception of Iraq) most countries registered growth in the numbers of migrants living in their country. However, Central and Eastern European and Central Asian countries (with the exception of Kazakhstan) registered consistent decreases in such numbers. Other clusters of shrinking migrant stocks can be seen in parts of Western Africa, Central Africa, South America and South-East Asia.

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\(^1\) According to UN 1998 Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration – Revision 1, the foreign-born population of a country include “all persons who have that country as country of usual residence and whose place of birth is located in another country”.
Map 2: Female migrants as a percentage of international migrant stock, 2010

Note: Regions in this map relate to IOM regions as defined in the regional overviews.

Source: UN DESA, Population Division (2009), Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision
This map shows that the Middle East remains the region with the lowest share of female migrants in relation to the total migrant population. Only 38 per cent of the migrant stock in Middle Eastern countries is made up of female migrants, with the figure being particularly low for countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Women make up 20.8 per cent of the migrant stock in Oman, 25.8 per cent of migrants in Qatar, 27.4 per cent of migrants in the United Arab Emirates, 30 per cent of migrants in Kuwait, 30.1 per cent of migrants in Saudi Arabia, and just under a third of migrants in Bahrain (32.9%).

Other countries where a large majority of migrants are male include Bangladesh (86.1%), Bhutan (81.5%), Cuba (71.1%), the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (64.5%), Viet Nam (63.4%), Papua New Guinea (62.6%) and Zimbabwe (62.2%), to mention a few. Apart from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, noted above, Côte d’Ivoire, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan and South Africa are countries of destination with a migrant stock of over 2 million that is over 54 per cent male.

Globally, Nepal is the country with the most feminized migrant stock (68.2%), followed by Mauritius (63.3%), Montenegro (61.5%), Barbados (60.7%) and Estonia (59.6%). Hong Kong SAR, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Uzbekistan are major countries of destination where migrant stocks are heavily feminized.

1 Please note that these numbers might not represent the full scale of female migration in the region, due to the high number of female domestic workers, which are not often captured in official statistics.

2 Feminization of migration also occurs in qualitative terms – i.e. female migrants moving autonomously abroad in search of job opportunities, rather than as a household dependant or in the context of family reunification.

Proportions of female migrants among migrants in Eastern European and Commonwealth of Independent States countries are consistently among the highest in the world. The highest proportions can be found in Montenegro (61.5%), Estonia (59.6%), Latvia (59.3%), Poland (59%), Armenia (58.9), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (58.3%) and Kyrgyzstan (58.2%). This trend means that Europe and Oceania are the only regions that have a majority of females in migrant stocks – 52.6% and 51.2%, respectively – while, in the Americas, females and male migrants are almost equal (50.1% females). However, these values are regional averages; at the country level, some additional differences become clear: female migration to Canada and the Southern Cone of South America compensates for a predominantly male migrant stock in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Mexico, Suriname and the USA, while, in Europe, Germany, Greece, Slovenia and Spain have a majority of male migrants.
Map 3: Total population change in Europe due to net migration and natural population change (NPC), 2008

Notes:
(a) 'Total population change' is the difference between the size of the population at the beginning and at the end of a given period. It can be calculated by adding the country’s natural population change (see b below) and net migration (including corrections). There is negative change when both of these components are negative or when one is negative and has a higher absolute value than the other.
(b) 'Natural population change' (NPC) shows the difference between the number of live births and the number of deaths during a given period. The natural increase (or natural decrease) is negative when the number of deaths exceeds the number of births.
(c) 'Net migration' shows the difference between the number of people entering and leaving the country during a given period. The net migration rate is negative when more people leave the country than enter it.
(d) ‘France’ stands for the whole of France, including its overseas departments.
With the exception of Germany, most Western and Central European countries experienced an increase in their populations in 2008. For the majority of these countries, this increase is due to both positive natural population change (a higher number of live births than deaths during the year) and positive net migration (a higher number of immigrants than emigrants).

The benefit of immigration is perhaps most evident in Italy, where a positive net migration rate offsets a low birth rate.

In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland and Turkey, the number of emigrants is larger than the number of immigrants; however, a higher birth than death rate keeps the total population growing.

In Austria, Croatia, Estonia, Germany and Latvia, positive net migration rates are not sufficient to entirely offset low birth rates compared to death rates. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Romania face both negative net migration and negative natural population change.
Map 5: IOM Assisted Victims of Human Trafficking (VoT), by country of destination, 2000–2009

Notes: The Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM)\(^1\), known also as the IOM human trafficking database, is the largest transnational database containing only primary data on victims of trafficking (VoT). It was developed and implemented by IOM in 1999–2000 in UNSC/Resolution 1244-administered Kosovo and its usage has since increased to include all regions of the world. The structure follows the format of two accompanying IOM VoT questionnaires used by IOM missions and partner organizations involved in direct assistance. The IOM Screening Interview Form is an institution-wide form intended to assess whether the individual is a victim of trafficking and thus eligible for an IOM assistance project; and the Assistance Interview Form aims to track the nature of direct assistance given, as well as documenting further details of the trafficking experience (for more information, see IOM, 2007\(^2\)). The database now operates in 72 IOM missions globally, although usage of the tool varies from mission to mission. Although not every IOM mission is able to use the IOM human trafficking database, additional data from non-users have been integrated to increase accuracy and completeness of all IOM-assisted VoT cases. While the system was initially designed as a case-management tool for IOM counter-trafficking direct-assistance programmes, it has since demonstrated its added value to research.

Source: IOM, Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM) Database, March 2010.

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\(^1\) The database is referred to as the ‘CTM’ internally as this is the formal technical name. For ease of understanding, in the context of this section, we refer to the IOM human trafficking database.

Over the ten years that the IOM human trafficking database has been operating, IOM has collected information relating to nearly 16,000 victims of trafficking in over 90 countries of destination around the world. With the exception of Oceania, there are data on victims assisted after being trafficked to, from, or within, all regions of the world.

It is important to duly contextualize the information presented within the map and care should be taken when interpreting these figures. Importantly, the data relate only to IOM-identified and -assisted cases encoded into the data-management system. Moreover, the number of people assisted by IOM forms just one part of our understanding of human trafficking and does not necessarily relate to the overall size of the number of trafficking victims. At any given point in time, the number of unidentified or unassisted trafficking victims remains unknown. The IOM case-management information may also reflect the interplay of other factors, such as:

- the existence or not of an IOM counter-trafficking project in a country and/or the length of time this project has been running;
- the thematic focus of this project (e.g. with regard to eligibility – that is, the type of trafficking and/or the sex and/or the age of the victim);
- the existence of more or less active outreach programmes in the country;
- better or worse relations with authorities who may or may not provide automatic referral and/or full case information to IOM;
- more or less active enforcement measures;
- better or worse identification of victims by authorities;
- the ability or inability of victims to escape from their situation;
- rejection of ‘victim’ status and the declining of IOM assistance by victims.

The above-mentioned issues can lead to unintentional biases in the dataset. For example, during the earlier years of implementation, the IOM human trafficking database was primarily used in South East Europe and the former Soviet Union where IOM was only, at that time, involved in providing assistance to females trafficked for sexual exploitation. Similarly, high assistance figures are not necessarily reflective of the actual incidence or severity of trafficking within a country, because of the above-mentioned factors.
Map 6: Signatures/ratifications of the UN Palermo Protocol on human trafficking, January 2010

Note: This map shows the ratifications of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (one of the two so-called Palermo Protocols). Please note that some countries acceded to the Protocol (Belize, Bahrain, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Sao Tome and Principe, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Zambia), Finland and the Netherlands accepted, the European Community approved and Montenegro succeeded to the Protocol.

The Palermo Protocols (the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air), adopted by the United Nations in 2000 in Palermo, Italy, together with the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, have seen a rapid entry into force through widespread ratification. As this map shows, by early 2010, the overwhelming majority of countries (137 countries out of the 192 Member States of the United Nations) had ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, with 2009 alone seeing ratifications in Chad, Indonesia, Iraq, Luxembourg, Jordan, Malaysia, Qatar, the Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, Togo and the United Arab Emirates.

Few countries in Europe and the Americas have not ratified the Protocol: Andorra, San Marino, Ireland, the Czech Republic and Greece are the only countries in Europe not to have done so, while in the Americas, the Caribbean countries of Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Haiti, Santa Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines have not ratified the Protocol. Asia, particularly South-Central and South-East Asia, is a major region where ratification is not so widespread: countries such as Bangladesh, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand have either not signed or not ratified the Protocol. East Africa is also an area where there is still progress to be made in ratification, as Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda have yet to ratify the Protocol; in West Africa, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana have yet to sign the Treaty, as does Angola in the south-west.
Map 7: Remittances and foreign aid, total values and ratio by region, 2007

Notes: (a) Foreign aid includes official development assistance (ODA) and official aid.
(b) Regional figures correspond to regions as defined by the World Bank for remittance flows and not to the regional groupings, as used by IOM. Please note that World Bank regional figures do not include high-income OECD countries or high-income non-OECD countries in these regions. In addition, figures for the EU Member States Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and Romania have also been excluded. Regional figures used by the World Bank for foreign aid, however, do include some additional countries such as EU Member States, Australia, Japan, etc., which are not highlighted in the map as the amount of foreign aid received by these countries is considered to be insignificant.

The growth in remittances continues to outstrip the growth in foreign aid (official development assistance (ODA) and official aid). The difference is most pronounced in Latin America and the Caribbean, where the ratio is USD 9.3 of remittances to USD 1 of foreign aid, followed by East Asia and the Pacific (USD 8.3 of remittances to USD 1 of foreign aid). At the other end of the spectrum, sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where foreign aid outstrips remittances, with almost USD 2 of foreign aid for every USD 1 of remittances.

Since 2005–2006, these differences have become more pronounced: while there has been large-scale growth in remittance flows to all regions, the level of foreign aid has grown much more slowly – or, indeed, shrunk: foreign aid to East Asia and the Pacific, for example, shrank by 10.4 per cent, while remittances grew by 41 per cent; and, in sub-Saharan Africa, the importance of foreign aid is diminishing as there are 91 percentage points’ difference between the percentage growth of remittances and foreign aid.

However, the distribution of remittances tends to favour middle- rather than lower-income countries, with the former receiving nearly USD 265 billion and the latter only USD 25 billion in 2007, amounting proportionally to only a 0.4 per cent increase in the share of remittances going to developing countries.

\footnote{See map 8, World Migration Report 2008. Please note that, for Middle East and North Africa as well as for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, comparison is not possible as the countries included have been changed.}
Map 8: Growth in the number of natural disasters

Note: The type of natural disaster used for this comparison includes droughts, earthquakes (seismic activities), floods and storms.
This map compares the number of natural disasters that occurred during the period 1990–1999 with the number that occurred in 2000–2009. The total number of disasters increased by almost 50 per cent (2,117 disasters occurred in the first period, compared to 3,151 during the last decade). Similarly, the number of countries experiencing an increase in disasters (137 countries) is significantly higher than those registering a decrease in disasters (37); 15 countries did not present any change in the number of disasters.

Regionally, the picture is more varied, with increases in disasters in some areas being offset by decreases in disasters in others. The highest increases in the number of natural disasters occurred mainly in South and East Asia – in particular, China, India, Indonesia the Philippines and Viet Nam. Other countries presenting a significant increase are Haiti (in the Caribbean), Romania (in Europe) and Algeria, Burundi, Kenya and Mozambique (in Africa).

Based on the total number of disasters that took place over the past ten years, Asia emerges as the continent most affected by natural disasters. Indeed, seven out of the top ten countries are located in that region: Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and Viet Nam. The other three countries are the USA (which ranked second in the 2000–2009 period), Mexico and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

On the other hand, a few countries presented an important decrease in the number of natural disasters, with the largest being in the USA, followed by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Bangladesh, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Belgium.
Map 9: Memberships of regional consultative processes (RCPs), January 2010

Notes:
(a) Fourteen of the major RCPs have been considered for the elaboration of this map, as follows: IGC (Inter-Governmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees), Budapest Process, Söderköping Process or CBCP (Cross-Border Co-operation Process), Puebla Process or RCM (Regional Conference on Migration), SACM (South American Conference on Migration), 5+5 Dialogue (Regional Ministerial Conference on Migration in the Western Mediterranean), MIDSA (Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa), MIDWA (Migration Dialogue for West Africa), MTM (Dialogue on Mediterranean Transit Migration), APC (Inter-Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants), Bali Process (Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime), Colombo Process (Ministerial Consultation on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin in Asia), Abu Dhabi Dialogue (Ministerial Consultations on Overseas Employment and Contractual Labour for Countries of Origin and Destination in Asia), and IGAD-RCP (Inter-governemental Authority on Development – Regional Consultative Process on Migration).
(b) New Zealand was a Member State of APC until 2003.
(c) Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal are MTM Partner States (not members).
Most countries participate in one or more regional consultative process on migration (RCP). In general, Asian countries have tended to belong to more than one of these informal inter-State dialogues on migration. Countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Viet Nam and others participate in four different RCPs. Several European and North American countries are also members of multiple RCPs.

Most Latin American and Caribbean countries participate in either the Puebla Process or the South American Conference on Migration. Similarly, countries in the Middle East Region and Southern Africa are members of only one RCP. Governments in West Africa, the Mashreq region and Eastern European countries often participate in two different RCPs.

Several countries are not members of any single regional consultative process on migration. These include Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Haiti, Israel and Rwanda.

Overall, countries of Central Africa and the Caribbean regions show the lowest levels of membership in RCPs.

For the purposes of the elaboration of this map, only membership of an RCP is considered. Countries that are observers are not in any way reflected in this mapping exercise.

Please see the Summary Report of Chairs and Secretariats of Regional Consultative Processes on Migration for a matrix outlining the memberships of the different RCPs.¹

¹ See www.iom.int/rcps and http://www.iom.int/jahia/webday/shared/shared/main/microsites/rcps/rcp_bkk/bkk_final_report.pdf for profiles of different RCPs and other background material.
Map 10: Government views on the level of immigration in 1996 and 2009

This map compares the results of the latest surveys of governments’ views on the level of immigration (in 1996 and again in 2009), administered by the Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA). Governments were asked if they considered the prevailing level of immigration to be too high, too low, or satisfactory, in relation to other social and economic conditions.

The overwhelming majority of governments surveyed considered current levels of immigration to be “satisfactory”. This included governments from six of the top ten countries of destination (Germany, India, Spain, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the USA), as well as 146 other governments worldwide. Overall, 20 countries changed their rating from “too high” to “satisfactory” in the period 1996–2009 (including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Lebanon, the United Kingdom and Zambia); this, arguably, indicates an increasingly positive attitude towards migration – in particular, among European countries.

Of the major countries of destination, only France, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia considered their level of immigration to be “too high” in 2009; 31 other governments worldwide shared this opinion. Compared to 1996, 14 governments changed their opinions about immigration from “satisfactory” to “too high”, with the large majority of them located in the Middle East or in Africa.

Canada is one of nine governments that considered levels of immigration to be “too low” in 2009, and five other countries changed their status from “satisfactory” in 1996 to “too low” in 2009. Israel and New Zealand are the only countries that considered immigration to be too low in both 1996 and 2009. In Suriname, the government perceived the level of immigration to be “too low” in 2009 but “too high” in 1996 (UN DESA, 2009).
Map 11: Internally displaced persons worldwide: March 2010

Note: IDMC monitors internal displacement caused by conflict, situations of generalized violence and human rights violations. Updated versions can be accessed at http://www.internal-displacement.org/worldmap and further details are available in IDMC’s annual Internal Displacement: Global Overview.

Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), Norwegian Refugee Council, 2010.
Compared to the figures for 2008, there have been important changes in the populations of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 2010. Although, at the time of writing, global figures for the IDP population were not available, country-level analysis suggests the following:

Despite an important 1.1 million-person drop in the IDP population in Sudan, it remains the most affected country, with 4.9 million IDPs; there has also been a slight drop in the IDP population in Iraq – from 2,778,000 to 2,764,111, although this, too, remains high (Iraq has the third-largest IDP population in the world, as of 2010). Numbers in the other most affected countries have, however, increased. Colombia has seen the lower estimate of its IDP population increase by over 600,000 compared to 2008; it now stands at 3.3 million (the upper estimate is over 4.9 million – up 1 million from 3,940,164). The upper estimate for the IDP population in the Democratic Republic of the Congo almost doubled to 2.1 million, while new data on IDPs in Pakistan (data had not previously been available) suggest this population numbers around 1.2 million.

Other major changes include the IDP population in Yemen quintupling compared to 2008, while, in Afghanistan, it has more than tripled – growing from an estimated 132,000 in 2008 to 414,000 in 2010. Upper estimates for Ethiopia and Zimbabwe almost doubled to 350,000 and 1 million, respectively.

Other previously important IDP populations have remained largely unchanged: this is the case in Azerbaijan, Kenya, Nepal, Peru, Senegal, Turkey and, despite their upheavals, Georgia and Sri Lanka. In Georgia, it seems that most of the displaced (apart from ethnic Georgians displaced from Abkhazia and South Ossetia) have returned to their homes, while, in Sri Lanka, the displacement caused by the conflict was partially offset by returns.

Elsewhere, however, progress has been made – such as in Uganda, which has seen its IDP population decrease by half, and in Timor-Leste, where the IDP population decreased from 100,000 to 400. Bangladesh has also seen a major reduction in its IDP population – from 500,000 in 2008 to around 60,000 in 2010. Indonesia’s IDP population has also shrunk – from 150,000–200,000 to around 70,000.

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2 http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/7E8CFF7278FB54DC1257683002DE8D97?OpenDocument#44.2.1
Map 12: World's refugees by region of asylum and region of origin, 2008

Notes:
(a) Dates are provisional and subject to change.
(b) Figures used to create this map include all persons recognized as refugees under the 1951 UN Convention/1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention, in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, persons granted a complementary form of protection and those granted temporary protection. People in refugee-like situations (estimated at 1.4 million at the end of 2008) and refugees in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate (estimated at 4.7 millions at the end of 2008) are not included in this map.
(c) Regional distribution by country of origin does not include 14,171 stateless refugees, nor does it include 168,381 refugees for whom the exact origin was either not reported or unknown at the time the figure was recorded. These refugees together represent about 2 per cent of the total number of refugees recorded at the end of 2008.
(d) Regions in this map relate to IOM regions as defined in the regional overviews.
In comparison to 2006, the overall number of refugees in the world at the end of 2008 had decreased by nearly a million – from 9.9 to 9.1 million.

Decreases in the refugee population elsewhere have been partially offset by the growth in the number of refugees from the Middle East. In 2006, this region was the region of origin of 18 per cent of refugees; at the end of 2008, it was the region of origin of almost a quarter of the world’s refugees. Most refugees seem to have remained within the region: in 2008, the Middle East hosted 24 per cent of the world’s refugees – up from 17 per cent in 2006. This means 23 per cent more refugees come from the Middle East, and 29 per cent more find asylum there. The only other region to show a major increase as a region of origin was Oceania, although the absolute size of the increase can be measured in hundreds.

By contrast, there has been an important fall in the number of refugees from the main two regions of origin: Asia and Africa. Asia saw a 10 per cent decrease in refugees from this region, and Africa a 14 per cent decrease. However, these regions are still the regions of origin for 62 per cent of the world’s refugees.

In terms of regions of asylum, the main decreases in the number of refugees are recorded in North America and Oceania, with the former registering a drop of 55 per cent (from almost 1 million to less than half a million) and the latter a drop of 60 per cent. Asia and Africa also saw a fall in their refugee populations (13% and 10%, respectively), although, between them, they still host 52 per cent of the world’s refugees and, thus, remain the most important regions of asylum. The Latin America and Caribbean region, meanwhile, saw a 25 per cent growth in the number of refugees – although, again, the absolute number remains small.
Map 13: Emigration rates of health professionals in Africa, 2000

Note: Estimates based on last census data of the following countries: France, 1999; the USA, 2000; Australia, Belgium, Canada, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and the United Kingdom, 2001.
Emigration of health professionals (i.e. physicians and nurses) is particularly evident in the African continent, with significant implications for the health-care conditions of the local population.

The figures presented by Clemens and Pettersson (2007) indicate that, in general, emigration rates are higher for physicians than for nurses. For physicians, the most affected countries are Mozambique (where 75% of trained physicians had left the country), Guinea-Bissau (71%), Angola (70%), Equatorial Guinea (63%), Liberia (63%) and Sao Tome and Principe (61%); however, in a number of other countries, almost 50 per cent of physicians had left.

Emigration of trained nurses seems, instead, to be particularly relevant only in Liberia (where 81% of nurses worked abroad), Burundi (78%), Gambia (66%), Mauritius (63%), Sierra Leone (49%), Sao Tome and Principe (46%), Cape Verde (41%), Equatorial Guinea (38%) and Eritrea (38%). All other African countries present values inferior to 30 per cent and, thus, may suffer less from the emigration of nurses.

Liberia is the country with the highest rate of emigration of physicians and nurses (with 63% and 81%, respectively), followed by Gambia (53% and 66%), Burundi (37% and 78%), Mauritius (46% and 63%), Sao Tome and Principe (61% and 46%), Equatorial Guinea (63% and 38%), Guinea-Bissau (71% and 25%), Mozambique (75% and 19%), Cape Verde (51% and 41%) and Sierra Leone (42% and 49%).

However, to obtain a clear indication of the real impact of the medical ‘brain drain’ (i.e. the lack of physicians or nurses vis-à-vis the population’s need for care), the ratio of nurses to inhabitants also needs to be considered; indeed, the total number of trained nurses can differ significantly, independently from the total population of a country. According to the sampled 2000 Census Round Data, in Equatorial Guinea, 258 nurses were trained, whereas 7,192 were trained in Mauritius, despite the fact that the latter’s population was only twice as high as the former’s. This means that, although there is a lower emigration rate of nurses from Equatorial Guinea than from Mauritius, the result is potentially more damaging to the former, as only 160 nurses remain in the country, as opposed to 2,661 in Mauritius.
Map 14: Foreign students in higher education, 2007

Note: Regions in this map relate to UN regions (see http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm), rather than the IOM regions used for the regional overviews.

In all, there were about 2.8 million internationally mobile students in 2007. The main destinations for international students in higher education continue to be Europe, North America, Japan and Australia. The top six countries of destination for students (Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA) accounted for 62 per cent of all mobile students.

Asian students are prevalent among internationally mobile students. Asian students represent a large majority of foreign students in Canada and the USA (42% and 65%, respectively) as well as in Australia (80%) and Japan (94%). In Europe, Asian students are present in most European countries – in particular, in the Russian Federation, where they represent 57 per cent of total foreign students, and in the United Kingdom, where almost 50 per cent of foreign students are Asian.

Western Europe alone hosts around 1.2 million foreign students. Students from Africa mainly go to universities in France and the United Kingdom, and they account for two out of three international students in Portugal.
Map 15: Changes in unemployment rates of nationals and foreigners, in selected European countries, 2008–2009

Note: Values for 2008–2009 comparison are the average unemployment rates for the first three quarters of each year.
This map shows the impact of the recession on migrant unemployment in selected European countries. Migrant unemployment rates are generally higher than unemployment rates for nationals and have grown faster than unemployment rates for nationals between 2008 and 2009. Estonia had one of the largest differences in unemployment between migrants and nationals at the end of the third quarter of 2009, with the increase in migrant unemployment being almost 6 percentage points higher than the increase in unemployment among nationals, when comparing the first three quarters of 2008 and 2009, followed by Spain (a difference of 5.4%), Portugal (4.7%), Latvia (3.9%) and Ireland (3%).

Elsewhere, the effect is less severe, although the trend is still one of faster growth in migrant unemployment. However, the difference in growth was negligible in some countries: in the Czech Republic, the difference in the growth of unemployment rates among migrants and nationals was 0.1 percentage points; in Denmark and Finland, it was 0.2; and in the Netherlands, 0.3 percentage points.

There are, however, two particularities: migrant unemployment grew more slowly in the United Kingdom and Luxembourg. In the United Kingdom, unemployment grew among both groups; however, whereas the growth was 1.8 percentage points for migrants, the growth was 2.2 percentage points for nationals. In the case of Luxembourg, a large third-quarter drop in 2009 unemployment among migrants actually meant that the average unemployment for migrants decreased in the first three quarters of 2009, compared to the first three of 2008, while unemployment among nationals increased by 0.3 percentage points over the same period.

1 However, it is important to bear in mind that many of the unemployed non-nationals belong to the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia.

2 The underrepresentation of migrant workers in sectors of cyclical demand may explain why migrants in the United Kingdom were less affected by the crisis than the general population, although further investigation is required. Another factor that might have contributed to a slow increase in migrant unemployment compared to the overall population in the United Kingdom is out-migration.
Migration is a constant and dynamic phenomenon increasingly requiring diversified policy intervention in order to maximize its potential benefits and minimize related costs for both countries of origin and destination as well as migrants themselves. Better knowledge and enhanced capacities in different policy areas are essential to ensure the protection of migrants, the facilitation of legal migration, the integration of migrants into the country of destination, the support for sustainable voluntary return and the greater interlinking between migration and development.

The challenge remains in translating improved understandings into policy and practice on the ground. State capacities around the world for managing migration are limited. Legal frameworks may need to be updated or overhauled to focus on new areas of migration, or to handle new influxes or outflows of migrants; staff working on the front line may need equipment, training and support; civil society and migrants themselves may not be adequately integrated into the process of data-gathering and making and implementing policy; vulnerability factors and health risks inherent to the migration process need to be better understood and addressed.

International migration is likely to transform in scale, reach and complexity, due to growing demographic disparities, the effects of environmental change, new global political and economic dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks. These transformations will be associated with increasing opportunities, exacerbate existing problems and generate new challenges.

The World Migration Report 2010 provides a tool for self-evaluation in terms of future scenarios, and demonstrates the need for a far more comprehensive approach to capacity-building for migration than has typically been adopted. The aim is not to prescribe ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies and practices, but to suggest objectives of migration management policies in each area, to stimulate thinking and provide examples of what States and other actors can do.

Part A of the report focuses on identifying core capacities in key areas of migration management, raising key concepts and outlining important examples of existing practices in these areas. Part B provides an overview of migration in the world today, from both the global perspective and through six regional chapters, drawn from the most up-to-date data.