WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2011
COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY ABOUT MIGRATION
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Unless otherwise stated, this volume does not include data made public after June 2011.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOM EDITORIAL TEAM</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES, TABLES, MAPS AND TEXTBOXES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PART A

### CHAPTER 1- COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY ABOUT MIGRATION  

- **INTRODUCTION**                                                                 | 3    |
- **THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT MIGRATION**                           | 5    |
- **PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT EMIGRATION AND RETURN MIGRATION**                        | 16   |
- **PUBLIC OPINION: PUTTING SURVEY FINDINGS INTO CONTEXT**                        | 20   |
- **POLITICS AND THE MEDIA: ROLE, RESPONSIBILITY AND BALANCE**                   | 24   |
- **CONCLUSION**                                                                | 36   |
- **REFERENCES**                                                                | 40   |

### CHAPTER 2- INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ANNUAL REVIEW 2010/2011

- **INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TRENDS**                                            | 49   |
- **GLOBAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS**                                                | 58   |
- **AFRICA REGIONAL OVERVIEW**                                                   | 62   |
- **AMERICAS REGIONAL OVERVIEW**                                                 | 64   |
- **ASIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW**                                                     | 68   |
- **EUROPE REGIONAL OVERVIEW**                                                   | 71   |
- **MIDDLE EAST REGIONAL OVERVIEW**                                             | 75   |
- **OCEANIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW**                                                  | 78   |
- **CONCLUSION**                                                                 | 80   |
- **REFERENCES**                                                                | 82   |
PART B

CHAPTER 3 - THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION:
RENEWAL AND GROWTH SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR 93

| INTRODUCTION | 93 |
| THE EVOLUTION OF IOM SINCE 1989 | 95 |
| IOM AND GLOBAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT: RESPONSES TO GLOBAL TRENDS | 99 |
| THE ISSUE OF GOVERNANCE: AN EMERGING POLICY SPACE | 111 |
| CONCLUSION | 115 |
| REFERENCES | 116 |

CHAPTER 4 - STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF IOM’S ACTIVITIES 2001–2010 123

| INTRODUCTION | 123 |
| MOVEMENT | 125 |
| MIGRANT ASSISTANCE | 129 |
| EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISSES AND POST-CRISIS ASSISTANCE | 144 |
| CAPACITY-BUILDING | 148 |
| IOM PUBLICATIONS | 152 |
CHAPTER 1 - COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY ABOUT MIGRATION

Figure 1: Public concern about immigration, 1974–2009
Figure 2: Support for increased immigration in relation to the rising proportion of immigrants in the populations of certain OECD countries (%), 1995–2003
Figure 3: Correlation between level of unemployment and those believing immigration levels to be too high (%), in Australia, 1974–2010
Figure 4: Proportion of respondents in European Union countries agreeing that immigrants contribute a lot to the country, 2006
Figure 5: Percentage of surveyed persons who think there are too many immigrants living in Germany, 1984–2008
Figure 6: Australian attitudes towards expatriates (% of respondents)
Figure 7: Impact of media coverage of immigration on public concern, 2000–2006
Figure 8: GDP growth contribution (%) based on worker ethnicity in the United States of America, 2000–2007
Figure 9: Ratio of benefits received from public social services to taxes paid in the United States of America, 2008

Table 1: Perceived and actual percentage of the population made up of migrants, in four transatlantic countries, 2010
Table 2: Percentage who agreed that the United Kingdom had too many immigrants, 1999 and 2008
Table 3: Attitudes to immigration intake (% of respondents), selected countries, 2003
Table 4: Public opinion about immigration levels in Australia (%), selected years
Table 5: Government views on the level of immigration, 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2009
Table 6: Top 10 tips for engaging with the media
Textbox 1: Key questions to ask when analysing opinion polls on migration
Textbox 2: Italian media sensitization campaign
Textbox 3: Migrants in the Spotlight
Textbox 4: Education meets entertainment in South America’s radio programming
Textbox 5: Using social media to promote cultural understanding

CHAPTER 2 - INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION ANNUAL REVIEW 2010/2011

Map 1: Number of third-country nationals assisted by IOM/UNHCR to return home from MENA region, June 2011
CHAPTER 4- STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF IOM’S ACTIVITIES 2001–2010

Figure 1: Number of persons resettled, by region of departure, 2001–2010 125
Figure 2: Major movements involving voluntary repatriation assistance, between 2001 and 2010 126
Figure 3: Number of AVRR beneficiaries, 2000–2010 130
Figure 4: AVRR programmes, by sending and receiving region (in %), 2010 130
Figure 5: Number of cases of AVRR, top 10 sending and receiving countries, 2010 131
Figure 6: Number of instances of assistance to individual trafficked persons, 2000–2010 132
Figure 7: Assisted trafficked persons, by gender and age (in %), total 2000–2010 133
Figure 8: Assisted trafficked persons, by type of exploitation (in %), total 2000–2010 133
Figure 9: Type of immigration and visa support services provided (in %), total 2006–2010 134
Figure 10: Number of requests for immigration and visa support services handled, 2006–2010 135
Figure 11: Number of migrants trained, 2001–2010 138
Figure 12: Number of health assessments, by country of destination, 2001–2010 139
Figure 13: Health assessments for refugees and migrants, by sex and age (in %), total 2004–2010 140
Figure 14: Number of health assessments, by region of origin, 2001–2010 140
Figure 15: Expenditure on health promotion and assistance to migrants, by region (in %), total 2001–2010 141
Figure 16: Expenditure on health promotion and assistance to migrants (in USD million), 2001–2010 142
Figure 17: Expenditure on migration health assistance to crisis-affected populations (in USD million), 2001–2010 143
Figure 18: Expenditure on migration health assistance to crisis-affected populations, by region (in %), total 2001–2010 143
Figure 19: Number of emergency and post-crisis projects, 2001–2010 144
Figure 20: Number of emergency and post-crisis projects, by region, total 2001–2010 145
Figure 21: Number of beneficiaries in top 10 emergency and/or post-crisis projects (in thousands), between 2001 and 2010 146
Figure 22: Estimated number of beneficiaries of capacity-building activities, 2001–2010 148
Figure 23: Number of beneficiaries of international migration law (IML) training and courses, 2004–2010 151
Figure 24: International Migration Journal – total subscriptions from libraries and annual downloads of articles, 2001–2010 152

Table 1: Major external voting programmes, 2001–2010 147

Map 1: Number of persons given resettlement assistance, by regions of departure and citizenship, 2001-2010 127
Map 2: Number of persons given resettlement assistance, by regions of arrival and citizenship, 2001-2010 128

Textbox 1: Milestone figures in IOM’s 60 years of existence 154
Textbox 2: Data sources 158
The World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration is the sixth report in IOM’s World Migration Report (WMR) series. This year’s report shines the spotlight on the issue of public perceptions of migration.

With international migration likely to continue increasing in scale and complexity over the next decades, societies of the future may be expected to exhibit increasing social and economic diversity. The successful integration of migrants into the host society and, more broadly, the manner in which the community at large experiences migration will constitute one of the major policy challenges for IOM Member States.

Part A of the World Migration Report 2011 examines how perceptions and attitudes shape public opinion and, in so doing, influence policies. It also examines the role media play in both communicating and shaping opinions and policies. The World Migration Report 2011 highlights the need for innovative approaches to the construction of a positive public image of migrants and migration. The report underlines, in particular, the need for the promotion of a better understanding and recognition of the benefits of migration, more evidence-based policymaking and a more effective engagement with migrants themselves. Part A also reviews the major migration trends of 2010/2011. It offers a brief overview of developments in policy, legislation, international cooperation and dialogue on migration at the global level and thereafter outlines some of the key regional trends in migration.

On the occasion of IOM’s 60th Anniversary in 2011, Part B of the World Migration Report 2011 offers a historical overview of how the organization’s conception of migration and its migration management activities have evolved in response to the significant political, economic and social changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. A concise statistical overview of IOM’s programmatic activities during the last decade (2001–2010) completes the picture.

As in years past, the World Migration Report 2011 is a result of consultation and collaboration among external scholars and IOM colleagues. We are grateful for their many contributions. We also wish to thank warmly the government of Australia and the MacArthur Foundation for their continuing financial support.

William Lacy Swing
Director General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Few areas of public policy are subject to greater misrepresentation in public and political discourse, yet more influenced by public opinion, than international migration. Despite the communications revolution, many remain poorly informed about the scale, scope and socio-economic context of migration. Communicating effectively about migration is critical since managing migration also implies managing how migrants are perceived in society. Accurately informing relevant stakeholders and the wider public about migration may be the single most important policy tool in all societies faced with increasing diversity.

Societies with a rich diversity of skills and experiences are better placed to stimulate growth through their human resources, and migration is one of the ways in which the exchange of talent, services and skills can be fostered. Yet migration remains highly politicized and often negatively perceived, despite the obvious need for diversification in today's rapidly evolving societies and economies. Nevertheless, international migration is likely to increase in scale and complexity due to growing demographic disparities, new global and political dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks, with profound impacts on the socio-economic and ethnic composition of societies. This will result in new policy challenges related to the successful integration of migrants into the host society, how they are perceived in their countries of origin and, more broadly, the way migration is experienced by the community at large. In this context, the image of migrants in their home and host societies acquires fundamental importance.

IOM's World Migration Report 2011: Communicating Effectively about Migration directly addresses the challenges faced in this era of globalization and unprecedented human mobility by calling for a fundamental shift in the way we communicate about migration. In order to benefit from the diversity that results from migration and to rise with the challenges generated by such diversity, an informed and transparent political and public debate must take place. The risk of maintaining the status quo is threefold:

1. Continued politicized debate will only serve to foster sectarian agendas, rather than promoting broader national, regional and international interests. One of the greatest challenges for those who seek to foster a rational debate is to prevent migration from being used as a platform for other political, social and economic issues.

2. Negative attitudes and reactive approaches are likely to continue to dominate over positive attitudes and proactive approaches.

3. Both integration and reintegration efforts will inevitably be undermined unless migrants themselves become active participants in the migration debate, rather than being the subject of debate.
The report also includes a review of migration trends and major migration policy issues in 2010/2011. In celebration of IOM’s sixtieth anniversary, a special section of the report is dedicated to a historical look at the work of the organization, in terms of its policy and its operations.

ADDRESSING PERCEPTIONS ABOUT MIGRANTS AND MIGRATION

While there is growing recognition that migrants can build cross-border social capital, that increasing cultural diversity can provide impetus for the stimulation of entrepreneurship, or that culturally diverse workforces are among the most profitable, the overall perception of migrants in many societies tends to be negative. Part of the reason for such negative perceptions is that migratory flows are more visible and more diverse than ever before, generating questions about the value of migration that, if left unanswered, result in misinformation and misperception.

Understanding public opinion and perceptions

Public opinion and perceptions about migration vary between and within countries (as well as between subgroups within a community) and over time. Given such nuances, it is not possible to isolate a single public opinion, yet claims based on public opinion often gain saliency in political and public discourse. The findings presented in this report, based on an extensive review of existing surveys and survey analyses globally, explore some of the more consistent factors influencing public opinion and what often lies at the core of prevailing negative sentiment.

One of the most consistent findings is the over-estimation of the absolute numbers of migrants in a given country/region or of the proportion of the population that migrants represent. Estimates tend to be even higher for irregular migrants. Research findings also show that when survey respondents are provided with more information about migrants/migration, rather than simply being asked if they think there are “too many migrants”, their responses tend to be more favourable. Findings are therefore influenced by prevailing conventional wisdom, the way survey questions are worded (biased or not) and the respondents’ understanding of what ‘migrant’ means (labour migrant, refugee, asylum-seeker, irregular migrant). The latter can also influence the extent to which migrants are perceived to contribute or not to a given place.

The vast majority of research, however, focuses on opinions and perceptions in countries of destination. Considerably less empirical research has been done on the country of origin perspective, with regard to emigration or return, although both factors are increasingly recognized at the policy level as being highly important issues. Findings of smaller-scale surveys or qualitative studies show that public opinion can vary greatly, with emigrants being considered, by some, to have abandoned the home-country and, by others, to be national heroes. Opinions are also shaped by factors such as the length of time the migrant is abroad, the impact on the community or family left behind, the economic situation of the home country, and an understanding of the migration process or the migrants’ experience abroad.
However, such perceptions and opinions are not static or formed in a vacuum. In both countries of origin and destination, they are sensitive to socio-economic and demographic factors such as age, level of education, type of employment and political inclinations. Although such factors are relatively constant in determining whether opinion is likely to be more positive or negative, findings show that opinion can and does change over time, particularly following increased levels of interaction with migrants and an increased understanding of what a migrant is and is not.

Attitudes are also often shaped by contextual factors. During periods of economic recession when unemployment levels are high, or in times of political turmoil or conflict, doubts about the value of migration can and do arise. Additional findings show that such instances are typically followed by restrictionist political agendas or discourse and heightened negativity in the media. But these concerns, even when strongly felt, are also time-sensitive, and they can recede when conditions improve.

A closer look at public opinion reveals that, even in times of economic recession or crisis when negativity towards migrants may be higher, migration is not the issue of primary concern. It is, nonetheless, consistently present in opinion polls, which is not surprising, given its cross-cutting nature and linkages to wider socio-economic issues. The populist nature of migration debates in many parts of the world today has created a climate in which it is all too easy to see migrants as responsible – directly or indirectly – for unemployment, security issues or a lack of social cohesion, among others. These concerns, rooted in much more complex processes of change, will not be dispelled simply by making migration policies more restrictive. By unilaterally addressing migration, the wrong message is sent: that migration was indeed the cause of the perceived problem. What it does not do is address what is at the core of a population’s concerns, which may or may not be migration, per se. When considering more carefully what is behind opinion poll results, it becomes clear that not all opinions are necessarily negative and that any deep-rooted concerns expressed often go beyond solely migration.

**Media, politics and the evidence base**

Mobility is an accepted feature of contemporary society and there is a certain level of understanding, recognition and even appreciation of the fact that migration brings added benefits to the economy. However, distorted communication about migration can trigger a vicious cycle that leads to misinformation being perpetuated through government policy, the mass media, the public at large and vice versa, which can, in turn, skew discourse at all levels. Policies and political discourse can therefore play a major role in shaping the image of migrants in home and host societies. One of the biggest challenges in this regard is what and how governments communicate about migrants and migration policy to the wider public. It is apparent that migration is often the catch-all issue that masks the public’s fears and uncertainties relating to unemployment, housing or social cohesion (in countries of destination) or loss/waste of human capital and economic dependency (in countries of origin).

Although direct causal links between media reporting and the influence on public opinion or policy cannot be made, the media do shape attitudes in significant ways. The findings of media content analysis, presented in the report, show that the media are often the public’s primary source of information (statistics, trends, analysis) about migrants and migration. Furthermore, the media can frame the debate by highlighting certain aspects of migration and not others (such as illegality), through episodic coverage or by exaggerating the facts.
Unbalanced coverage may also be a reflection of the evolving nature of the media, which have become increasingly commercialized over the last two decades.

Despite the growing body of evidence attesting to the benefits and costs of migration, there is a disconnect between the producers (academics, political analysts) and users (politicians, media, the wider public) of the evidence base. The report points to several reasons for this: discourse tends to focus more on politics rather than facts – for example, opinions of key stakeholders such as employers are often underreported; academic research has also only recently begun to take account of migration as an independent priority interest; policymakers face challenges in communicating migration facts and figures to the public, together with the related policies; a lack of migration policy evaluation prevents any firm conclusions being drawn about which policies are effective; and, finally, there is a lack of knowledge among the media on how to accurately report on migration issues. The limited use of evidence in migration policymaking (or the misuse of evidence for political purposes) and the lack of evaluation of the impact of migration policies can also mean that any policy failures are more easily attributed to the migrants themselves.

Finally, inaccurate representation of migrants and migration directly impacts migrants themselves. In host countries, the mass media often serve as a reference point for incoming migrants about the society they now live in. Evidence shows that migrants are very much aware of stereotyping and negative portrayals, especially in the media, which can lead to a sense of marginalization if left unchecked or if migrants’ views are not given equal coverage.

**The way forward**

The report highlights several examples of good practice among governments, civil society, international organizations and the media who have actively worked towards communicating effectively about migration. These initiatives do so by, for example, promoting a positive image of migrants and their contributions, dispelling migration myths through information or media campaigns, and giving migrants a voice in sharing their experiences. However, for such initiatives to have a lasting impact, they often need to be scaled up, adjusted to fit local contexts and, most importantly, be supported by strong political will as part of a long-term strategy.

**1) Building an open, balanced and comprehensive migration discourse**

Here, the emphasis is on expanding the migration debate so that it does not simply revolve endlessly around the problems – real or imagined (both of which are generously aired) – but examines the broader picture. It is important that the new debate be proactive and not simply reactive to the dominant discourse. There are two questions that are commonly used as starting points for discussions on migration, not to mention migration policy formulation: 1) **How to deal with the migrant constituencies already in the country?** 2) **How to deal with those migrants who may be coming?** A constructive, better-informed debate will begin with a broader consideration of the place that migration might realistically occupy in demographic, social and economic planning. From this perspective, it may be possible to reframe the discourse so that it yields a more informed mainstream consensus, rather than a parochial view.

The discourse should also extend beyond the national level to multilateral forums such as regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs), IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD).
2) De-politicizing the debate and directly addressing issues of concern

Many of the negative perceptions surrounding migration have their origins in partisan interpretations, rather than fact. There is, in any case, a need to openly discuss effects – both positive and negative – in an open and balanced way. The discourse should also address the broad national interest, rather than focusing on the interests of particular segments of society. Much of the research on the positive effects of migration relates to an entire society and economy. The force of these messages can be lost if the focus is placed upon impacts on particular subgroups in a given society or economy. On the other hand, discussion of local anxieties – for example, about what can be done to curb irregular migration, or local pressures on infrastructure caused by population growth – need not be avoided; the public should, instead, be informed about what has and has not worked, without blame for failed policy initiatives being placed solely on the migrant.

A lack of readily available information for the public, which directly addresses all of these issues, is perhaps the greatest cause of continuing misunderstanding. The dissemination of information that addresses the concerns at hand, clearly explaining the rights of citizens and non-citizens, helps eliminate misunderstandings and ensures that policies are perceived as fair and respectful of everyone’s rights.

3) Working with the media to support balanced media reporting

The media have significant influence over public discourse, shaping public opinion and thereby affecting all stakeholders, especially policymakers and politicians. A fundamental question must therefore be asked: How can the media be engaged to present a more balanced picture of migration and its impacts? Balanced media reporting means avoiding single-issue headlines, over/under-representation of particular groups, and blanket labelling. It also implies recognition of the fact that migrants are not a homogenous group and that migration is often linked to many other public issues.

Governments play a crucial role in creating the social and political climate in which fair and accurate reporting can thrive and the evidence base is correctly used. Leadership is therefore important in delivering a more balanced picture about migration. This places significant responsibility on political opinion leaders, but they should not be the only source of leadership on this issue. Other stakeholders, such as civil society, the private sector and the academic research community, also have an important role to play. Their role may involve working more closely with the media than has been the case in the past. While this may also be outside of the media’s comfort zone to some extent, it is the responsibility of these actors to meet the media halfway, to ensure that the media are better informed of the complexity of migration issues.

Providing guidance on how to report on migration is another key element. Building the capacity of reporters and journalists, among others, either through trainings or informational materials, can help to create a core group of media specialists who are able to more accurately report on the topic. The provision of easily accessible guidelines on how to talk about migration provides a good starting point. Such guidance should ideally include the development of communication strategies, on the part of researchers, and the creation of partnerships within the media. The research community itself can play a key role in ensuring that its findings relate to the relevant policy and political context and that it actively engages in the debate, using the evidence and their expertise, without compromising their academic integrity.
Balanced media reporting also requires breaking down the barriers of diversity within the media. The removal of structural discrimination in mainstream media institutions to include a diverse group of people serves, in turn, to break down content discrimination by offering alternative points of view.

4) Acknowledging migrants as active communication agents

Clearly, one of the greatest challenges for all those wishing to promote accurate perceptions about migrants and migration is that of enabling the authentic voices of migrants to be heard. There is clear evidence that the more exposure non-migrants have to migrants, on a person-to-person basis, the less negative they are inclined to be towards them. However, migrants are too often viewed as passive agents in the migration debate, in both their countries of origin and their countries of destination.

One significant way of reducing the level of misperception and its impact on migrants, whether as a result of political discourse or media reporting, is to ensure that migrants become active participants in the public debate. This can be done in many ways – for instance, by creating more space for ethnic media alongside mainstream media, integrating diversity into mainstream media, or encouraging the use of new social media tools to allow migrants to engage with a wide audience (migrants and non-migrants) and to portray more accurate images of who they are and what they do.

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION:
ANNUAL REVIEW 2010/2011

Slow recovery from the economic crisis reveals resilience of international migration

The 2010/2011 period was characterized by the slow and sometimes hesitant march towards economic recovery from the worst global recession in decades. GDP growth rates swung positive for most high-income countries in early 2011, while many emerging and developing economies posted healthy indicators of growth. A wide range of predictions about effects on migration flows had been offered as the crisis unfolded but they were only partially confirmed by available evidence. In many ways, the 2008/2009 economic crisis and its aftershocks have mirrored at a global level what had happened at the regional level, following the Asian economic crisis a decade earlier: i) while a number of global trends were observable, there was considerable variation at the regional and local levels; ii) migrant stocks built up over several decades remained largely unchanged; iii) there were many indications of reduced migratory flows to destination countries; iv) many major countries of destination adjusted their migration programme targets downwards, either in anticipation of a reduced demand for migrant workers or simply to protect their domestic labour markets; and v) fears of greatly reduced remittances proved to be unfounded; following relatively small decreases, they rebounded healthily in 2010 and are expected to continue to increase in the coming years. Overall, international migration has shown its resilience in the face of economic downturns and can be expected to grow further in size and complexity over the next few decades.
Rise in the number of environmental displacements highlights the need for increased capacities, consultation and coordination

The exceptionally disruptive natural disasters in 2010, such as the earthquake in Haiti, continued to highlight the impact of environmental factors on migration patterns and the need for governments to achieve and maintain readiness to manage population movements triggered by such catastrophes. While there has been an increasing interest in issues related to climate and environmental change at the policy level (for example, the Cancun Agreements and the Kampala Convention), many governments still lack the necessary capacities to address the resulting challenges in a comprehensive and coherent manner. The Cancun Agreements represent a positive step towards integrating migration into climate adaptation plans by recognizing migration as part of adaptation. However, at the national level migration has yet to be systematically integrated into climate change adaptation plans.

Crisis in Middle East and North Africa: Focus on Libya

Starting in early 2011, social and political upheavals (most notably in the Middle East and North Africa) have given rise to a type of population movement rarely seen on such a scale in the past: large flows of migrant workers caught up in conflict situations in their destination country, requiring assistance in returning home. In the absence of international help, these migrants are confronted with the difficult choice of either staying put and weathering the hostilities or fleeing to a neighbouring country. In the context of the ongoing crisis in Libya, and in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), IOM arranged for the evacuation of 143,000 migrant workers back to their country of origin (as of 31 May 2011). Challenges remain in addressing the current needs of the evacuated, and those who may be stranded. Several countries in Africa and Asia require assistance in reintegrating the large numbers of returning migrant workers from Libya.

The Global Forum for Migration and Development continues to provide an effective platform for dialogue and collaboration in the field of migration

In 2010, the Mexican Chair of the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) focused on improving levels of cooperation between migrant-sending and -receiving countries by introducing the concept of shared responsibility, collective benefits and partnerships. The approach adopted by the Swiss GFMD Chair in 2011 aimed instead at building upon the key outcomes of previous GFMD meetings and moving towards the practical application of resulting recommendations through various planning tools (such as Migration Profiles and the Global Migration Group handbook, *Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning*). At the regional level, advancements made by regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) – for instance, as a result of the ministerial meetings held by the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) and the Colombo Process – should further encourage governments to increase inter-State dialogue and to deliberate on migration issues of common concern. Possible synergies and further opportunities for cooperation between the GFMD and RCPs in the field of migration management will arise in the lead-up to the second United Nations High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, to be held in New York in 2013.
SPECIAL FEATURE: IOM’S SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY – A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION

A global organization assisting Member States in better managing migration

Since its creation 60 years ago in 1951 as the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has evolved into the only organization with a global mandate on migration.

Throughout the history of the organization, IOM’s programmatic responses have been reactive to change and key global events, and proactive in light of emerging migration issues and trends. Although IOM’s initial focus was on the resettlement of refugees and other persons displaced by the Second World War in Europe, its portfolio of services has expanded both geographically and thematically over the years. It is now a global institution, with worldwide interests and the capacity to act in every region of the world while retaining its essential focus of working with its Member States to promote the humane and orderly management of migration.

Over the last two decades, in line with its holistic approach to migration management, IOM has developed a portfolio of programmes that includes a comprehensive range of services for migrants, IOM Member States and interested stakeholders. It had, in fact, become apparent at a very early stage in IOM’s history that the transportation of migrants and refugees implied much more than the simple movement of migrants or refugees from one location to another and that other essential services needed to be provided simultaneously.

Today, IOM’s global activities cover all aspects of migration management. The organization recognizes the fact that contemporary migration is a complex process and its approach to global migration management therefore takes into account the relationship between migration and contemporary political, social and economic issues in order to maximize the benefit and contribution of migrants to society. Currently, IOM programmes include facilitating migration (whether in the form of labour migration or movement in emergency and post-emergency contexts), combating irregular movements such as human trafficking, effective border management, resettlement, integration of migrants in host societies, voluntary return and reintegration of migrants, provision of health-related services, and programmes aimed at enhancing the development potential of migration.

In addition to its operations on the ground, IOM has also been closely involved in nurturing and supporting multilateral consultative forums on international migration over the last two decades. While these are informal and non-binding, they play an important part in enhancing international cooperation, coordination and coherence in policy development. Many of these consultative processes are regional in nature but, in recent years, the Global Forum on
Migration and Development has offered a broader platform for the exchange of information and discussion of issues. IOM has also emerged as a major source of expert information on migration issues, publishing more than 600 reports on migration over the last decade. Over the years, IOM’s publications have become an increasingly important communications tool, and the research conducted by the organization has enabled it to develop a growing number of new programmes in response to emerging migration issues.

**IOM in numbers: 2001–2010**

IOM’s growth has been particularly strong over the last 10 years: membership has increased to 132 Member States, the budget has quadrupled in size, and IOM’s portfolio of activities has become increasingly diversified. Although statistics related to IOM’s operations worldwide have been provided in the past on an ad hoc basis, this is the first time that a comprehensive overview has been released.

IOM collects statistics relating to its operational programmes and projects in over 133 countries. Its statistical files include data on persons assisted by IOM since the establishment of the organization in 1951. The statistics included in the *World Migration Report 2011* cover the last 10 years of IOM’s work and include data on different types of movement-related activities (such as resettlement or repatriation) but also other forms of intervention that have grown considerably over the years, such as facilitating labour migration, assisting victims of human trafficking, voluntary return and other forms of migrant assistance.

- More than 60 million internally displaced persons, refugees, stranded migrants and former combatants, among others, benefitted from IOM emergency responses to humanitarian crises and post-crisis assistance from 2001 to 2010.
- IOM provided movement assistance to 810,000 refugees resettling in a third country from 2001 to 2010.
- A total of 130,610 persons were assisted under IOM’s repatriation schemes in the same period.
- Almost 330,000 migrants have benefited from Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) to more than 170 countries since the year 2000.
- Over the last decade, IOM has provided assistance to individual trafficked persons on more than 46,000 occasions.
- IOM facilitated the recruitment and employment of some 20,000 temporary foreign workers from 2003 to 2010.
- Between 2001 and 2010, 352,328 migrants benefited from IOM migrant training activities.
- Between 2006 and 2010, IOM handled 382,133 immigration and visa support services (IVSS) requests.
- Travel health assistance was provided to, and migration health assessments carried out for, more than 1.5 million migrants from 2001 to 2010.
IOM’s role in the future

After years of rapid growth, there are certainly several areas – such as migration and development – that have gained prominence and will continue to be key components of IOM’s work. There are also emerging issues – such as migration linked to environmental change – that will become increasingly important and in which the organization has taken a prominent lead. The organization will continue its traditional activities, while remaining open to emerging trends and responsive to crises as they occur. Building the capacity of States and other stakeholders in migration management will, as discussed in IOM’s World Migration Report 2010, undoubtedly become an increasingly important core component of IOM’s work.

There will also certainly be further debate on the holistic approach to migration management and, particularly, on the global search for an appropriate model of international governance of migration. IOM research and forum activities will continue to develop this theme in the future and to explore ways of more effectively cooperating internationally, including through mechanisms such as the GFMD and RCPs.

IOM increasingly cooperates with various interagency mechanisms and acts as part of the United Nations Country Team in several locations. Officially, however, it retains an Observer status within the United Nations, which brings several advantages and disadvantages in terms of operations and launching new initiatives. This relationship is bound to remain a matter of interest for Member States.

As a phenomenon now firmly embedded in the social fabric of today’s global society, migration will only increase in significance and political interest in the foreseeable future. Over the last 60 years, IOM has been at the forefront of the international migration debate, evolving in its thinking and operations as migration trends evolved. As the only organization with a global mandate on migration, it has a central role to play in the future, both on the international scene and in the service of its Member States.
INTRODUCTION

Few areas of public policy are subject to greater misrepresentation in public and political discourse, yet more influenced by public opinion, than international migration. The understanding of contemporary migration has been considerably advanced by theoretical work based on neoclassical economics, new household economies, dual labour market theory, network theory, world systems theory, cumulative causation and more recent developments in transnationalism theory (Massey et al., 1993, 1998; Vertovec, 2001). There is also a growing body of empirical research relating to migration. Arguably, however, neither theory nor research has had as much impact on policy formulation as political discourse, media reports and public opinion on the nature, purpose and socio-economic impact of migration.

The background to the debates is a global migration landscape that is likely to increase in scale and complexity due to growing demographic disparities, new global and political dynamics, technological revolutions and social networks. In many parts of the world, this is already happening. Long-term demographic, social, environmental, political and economic trends have had – and will continue to have – a considerable impact on the scale and patterns of migratory movements.

These migratory flows often have profound impacts on the socio-economic and ethnic composition of societies, resulting in new policy challenges related to the successful integration of migrants into the host society, how they are perceived in their countries of origin and, more broadly, the way migration is experienced by the community at large. With nearly all countries exposed to migration in some way, societies are realizing that the choice they are facing is not whether to manage change, but how to manage it. Coming to terms with a changing and diverse society means addressing fundamental questions about the nature and fabric of a society, but equally very practical considerations regarding the design, organization and functioning of public institutions, policies and regulations in order to balance the economic and social opportunities and costs arising from migration.

In this context, the image of migrants in their home and host societies is of fundamental importance. While there is growing recognition by some that migrants can build cross-border social capital, that increasing cultural diversity can provide impetus for the stimulation of entrepreneurship, and that culturally diverse workforces are among the most profitable, the overall perception of migrants in many societies tends to be negative. There is often a fine
line between realistic and honest debate about challenges stemming from migration and politicized stereotyping and scapegoating. Part of the reason for such negative perceptions is that migratory flows are more visible and more diverse than ever before, generating questions that, if left unanswered, result in misinformation and misperception. It is clear that migrants in general, as well as persons of certain nationalities and persons belonging to certain ethnic groups, are frequently stigmatized in destination countries. Stigmatization is not limited to migrants abroad, however; it also exists in countries of origin, fuelled by the idea that migrants have abandoned their country or by the unrealistic hopes and expectations of the migrants’ families and communities of origin.

Distorted communication about migration can trigger a vicious cycle that leads to misinformation being perpetuated through government policy, the mass media, the public at large and vice versa, which can, in turn, skew discourse at all levels. Policies and political discourse play a major role in shaping the image of migrants in host societies. One of the biggest challenges in this regard is what and how governments communicate about migrants and migration policy to the wider public. Informing and educating the public may be the single most important policy tool in all societies grappling with migration, since managing migration also involves managing how migrants are perceived in society.

The first part of this chapter analyses the findings related to the range of public perceptions and attitudes regarding migration globally and the extent to which they shape public opinion and, in turn, influence policy. It then considers the context in which these are shaped and the role of media in both influencing and communicating these opinions. Examples of good practice among governments, civil society and the media are also included here. Finally, there is a discussion of how key migration issues can be more effectively communicated, thereby generating better policymaking and more effective engagement with migrants themselves.
THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT MIGRATION

There are numerous studies of public opinion about migration and migrants, most of them focusing on destination countries. However, there is little systematic study of attitudes concerning emigration and emigrants in countries of origin, despite the increasing focus on the potential benefits that emigration can deliver to them (United Nations, 2006; World Bank, 2006; GCIM, 2005). This chapter covers both aspects, and the material examined ranges from small-scale qualitative studies to regional, national and international comparative surveys. However, the quality of research on public attitudes about migration is very uneven.

There is a heavy reliance on opinion polls or surveys in public attitudes research. It is important to recognize, however, that these methodologies have been criticized in terms of their technical application and the way in which their results are interpreted. Interpreting survey results as a reflection of public opinion can be problematic in several ways. On the one hand, it assumes that individuals have the ability to form an opinion on any given subject and, therefore, the importance of non-responses within the survey sample is often ignored. On the other hand, aggregating individual survey responses as representative of public opinion, although not based on a set of commonly understood criteria, may be misleading by assuming consensus (OECD, 2010).

In some country contexts, public opinion research is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as other research areas—for example, an assessment of studies of immigration and public opinion in Australia found that, due to a lack of a research culture in this area, “Opinion polls become the plaything of the media; reporters are required to generate provocative headlines” (Markus, 2011). Furthermore, the same assessment found several examples of Australian opinion surveys where the questions asked were partial or leading respondents towards a particular response. They included examples of surveys that led respondents towards positive or negative answers depending on how questions were worded, where they were placed within a survey, and the survey sample, methodology and administration. As a result, what may be considered to be the majority opinion on a range of issues is often vague and even inconsistent, since “a survey respondent may typically support both assimilation and multiculturalism, favour cultural diversity and indicate concern over the division [that] it provides” (ibid.). It is equally telling in the same study that an analysis of the media found a consistent pattern of sensationalist reporting of these flawed survey findings.

Another factor influencing the vagueness of opinion poll findings is the lack of a common understanding of what is meant by ‘migrants’ or ‘migration’. In all countries there are many different types of migrants, yet many surveys fail to define which groups of migrants are being assessed. Respondents may have different ideas about what the term ‘migrant’ means and they may also have different attitudes towards different categories of migrants. In many cases, the complexity of these attitudes is not captured in the surveys.

1 In addition to the challenges discussed in this section, it is worth mentioning that the majority of studies do not specify the composition of the sample used. Depending on the scope of the study, the sample might include migrants themselves as respondents, possibly skewing the results in one direction or another.
Surveys and opinion polls relating to migration can, therefore, be part of the problem if their methodologies are questionable. When analysed with due regard to contextual factors, opinion polls and surveys can provide valuable insights, as the following sections demonstrate. However, careful and critical scrutiny of the sources of opinion is a basic requirement for an informed and fair discussion of migration issues at local, national and international levels. Textbox 1 presents a list of the types of questions that analysts of opinion polls on migration could use when interpreting the results of such polls.

### Textbox 1: Key questions to ask when analysing opinion polls on migration

- Is the methodology used robust and sound?
- Does the poll clearly define the terms migrant and/or migration?
- Is the survey representative of the total population?
- Do the questions lead respondents towards particular answers?
- How were non-responses dealt with in the survey?
- Do the questions capture the full complexity of attitudes or force respondent into dichotomies?
- Was the timing of the survey such that it could have been influenced by a single event?

### Public opinion about immigration and the factors influencing it

*It is too crude and simplistic to limit our understanding of public opinion to headline banners.*

(Kleemans and Klugman, 2009: 19)

Popular views on migration as reflected by public opinion polls are often negative and there are claims that they have become even more so in recent years. What is certain, however, is that public opinion about migration varies between and within countries, and over time. There are patterns of difference between different subgroups of the population within countries, which can also reflect external intervening factors or issues. In this respect, it is often misleading to speak of a single public opinion when there is considerable variation in opinions and in their intensity. A more nuanced understanding of attitudes towards migration requires an appreciation of those variations and volatilities. This section explores some of the more consistent factors influencing public opinion and patterns of difference between groups in terms of migration attitudes.

### Real/perceived/preferred immigration levels and migrant status

Actual increases in migration flows or, more accurately, the extent to which perceived migration levels are considered to exceed “acceptable levels” often have a negative impact on public opinion. Some also attribute general growing public anxiety and negativity about migration not only to migrant flow increases but to the pace at which they occur (Papademetriou and Heuser, 2009). Regardless of the level or pace of migration, opinion is further influenced by the formal immigration status of those who move – that is, whether they are regular or irregular migrants. Preferred levels of migration are thus not reducible to a simple question of numbers asked in isolation from questions related to the origin and status of the migrants.
Figure 1 shows how the percentage of the population in the United Kingdom voicing concern about immigration has risen in the last decade along with an increase in immigration levels. It has also been reported that in the United Kingdom people have considered migration levels to have been too high since the 1960s. This sentiment has remained fairly constant, although the actual levels of migration have fluctuated, indicating that what has changed in recent years is the salience of migration issues (Hurrell, 2010).

Figure 1: Public concern about immigration, 1974–2009

From a cross-national perspective, a study by OECD (2010) comparing International Social Survey data between 1996 and 2003 found that there was a fall in public support for immigration in some OECD countries as migration flows increased (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Support for increased immigration in relation to the rising proportion of immigrants in the populations of certain OECD countries (%), 1995–2003

Note: Percentages do not take account of non-responses. Weighted data.
While these findings suggest a fairly clear relationship between numbers and negative attitudes, it is important to remember that people in destination countries often have false notions of the scale and nature of migration and the policies influencing them. A study of eight migrant-receiving countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) found that, in all of them, respondents were inclined to overestimate significantly the size of the migrant population (Transatlantic Trends, 2010: 6), as indicated in table 1. To test whether knowledge of the facts would alter attitudes, some of the respondents were asked whether there were ‘too many’, ‘a lot but not too many’ or ‘too few’ migrants in their country, with accompanying information about the actual size of the migrant population, while the other respondents were not given the supporting data. The former group was found to be less likely to say there were too many migrants in the country. Inaccurate perceptions of the actual number of migrants are common in destination countries and this is significant, since as pointed out in a Policy Network seminar (Hurrell, 2010), the appropriate scale of immigration is the “basic fault line in the immigration debate”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Perceived</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the United States of America, there have been consistent indications that a majority of Americans favour a decrease in the level of migration or maintenance of the current level. The Gallup Polls, which feature some of the longest time series and are the most utilized, have been surveying immigration issues since the 1960s. The polls generally show that a small majority (58% in 2001, 51% in 2006 and 50% in 2009) think that migration should be decreased. Interestingly, Gallup Polls show that, since 2001, immigration has been considered by the majority (58% in 2003, 67% in 2006 and 57% in 2010) to be a good thing for the country. In the 2006 and 2008 surveys, a strong majority of respondents (74% and 79%, respectively) also believed that illegal (irregular) immigrants did not take jobs away from Americans, since they took low-paying jobs that Americans didn’t want. Surveys by Gallup indicate a more positive public opinion on immigration and immigrants than do other surveys such as the Vision Critical/Angus Reid Public Opinion. In late 2010, this survey found that 57 per cent believed immigration had a negative effect in the United States of America, 39 per cent wanted to see the number of legal immigrants decrease, and 56 per cent said illegal immigrants were taking jobs away from American workers.

In 2006, the Pew Hispanic Center reviewed a number of polls taken in early 2006 and concluded that the public appeared almost evenly divided on whether immigration overall was good for the country or not. However, Americans were split over preferred levels of legal

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2 See [http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx](http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.aspx)

3 IOM’s preferred terminology is regular/irregular migration. However, in order to accurately reflect the wording of the polls, the terms legal and illegal migration may also be used in this document.

(regular) immigration; roughly a third favoured keeping legal immigration at its present levels and a third favoured decreasing it. A smaller share favoured increasing legal immigration and most Americans saw illegal immigration as a serious problem.

There are few studies on attitudes to immigrants in developing or newly industrialized countries, but a 2006 national survey of 3,600 Southern African adult citizens carried out by the Southern African Migration Project found that the proportion of those wanting a total ban on immigration increased from 25 per cent in 1999 to 37 per cent in 2006, while 84 per cent felt that South Africa was allowing “too many” foreign nationals into the country (Crush, 2008). Similarly high percentages of respondents in countries such as Malaysia, Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela agreed with the proposition that immigration should be further restricted and controlled (Pew Research Center, 2007).

It is unclear whether attitudes towards migration become more or less positive as the proportion of migrants within the total population increases and/or they come to be seen as an integral part of the community. In a World Values Survey, 214,628 persons were interviewed in 86 countries and asked if they would object to living next door to a migrant. There are, unsurprisingly, several high-migration countries where the percentages of objections are low (for example, Australia, New Zealand, Spain and Switzerland). However, there are also several countries with significantly high levels of migration where the proportion of the population objecting to a migrant living next door is high, especially in the Middle East and parts of Asia. This may be related to the relative newness of migration in those countries, as well as the specific migration dynamics in those regions. Clearly, however, there is no consistent correlation between the acceptance of migrants and the share of migrants in the national population.

There are, nonetheless, clear indications of differences in opinion towards different types of immigrant flows. For example, according to the OECD, public opinion is generally more favorable towards refugees than other migrants. However, residents of countries accepting large numbers of refugees are more worried about the consequences of migration than other countries (OECD, 2010). Furthermore, there are some variations in attitude, depending on the immigrants’ countries of origin.

**Economics, jobs, inequality and perceived level of migrant contribution**

Attitudes towards migration are strongly influenced by the availability of jobs, according to the World Values Survey referred to in the previous section (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009). In most of the 52 countries surveyed in 2005–2006, while most respondents endorsed restrictions on migration, many linked these restrictions to the availability of jobs. However, several countries of medium-to-high human development (as ranked by the Human Development Index)\(^5\) favoured greater restrictions on migration, regardless of the job vacancy levels (ibid.).

Linkages between attitudes towards immigration and job availability are also evident in Australian time series data. Figure 3 shows that the proportion of Australians indicating that immigration levels are too high closely shadows the unemployment rate over the 1974–2010 period. A significant relationship was found between attitudes about migration and unemployment levels for 34 countries (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009). In Europe, evidence

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also suggests that, during periods of economic downturn, opinion turns against immigration (Kessler and Freeman, 2005).

Figure 3: Correlation between level of unemployment and those believing immigration levels to be too high (%), in Australia, 1974–2010

Source: Markus, 2011.

People in countries with greater inequality, as measured by the Gini Coefficient, are more likely to think that locals should be given priority in the job market (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009). Nevertheless, countries with similar levels of inequality can have quite different attitudes towards discrimination. In addition, countries with a higher GDP are “more negative towards letting people in (immigration policy) but more positive once they are in: they believe in equal treatment on the labour market and are less likely to mind living next door to a migrant” (ibid.).

Furthermore, economic or employment concerns reflect not only job availability and inequality but also the perception that migrants take jobs away from nationals or place a strain on a country’s resources. Thus, the linkage between migration and employment raises the broader matter of the nature and level of migrants’ contributions to the host society. Again, there are wide differences across countries. The Eurobarometer Standard Survey of the European Commission (2006) sought to gauge public opinion across the countries of the European Union with regard to migrant contributions, among other issues. Respondents were asked whether they agreed/disagreed with the statement: immigrants contribute a lot to our country. Figure 4 presents the proportion of respondents agreeing with this statement. On average, across the European Union (EU) 40 per cent of the population agreed, but a small majority (52%) disagreed. However, as illustrated in figure 4, there is considerable variation across countries. Above-average levels of agreement were observed in Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. On the other hand, there were very low levels of agreement in several Eastern European countries.

6 For further explanation, see http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4842 (accessed on 22 August 2011).
A survey of life in Qatar found that an overwhelming majority of Qatari nationals value the contribution of foreigners to the development of their country because of their hard work (89%) and their talents (89%) (SESRI, 2010). They also agree that foreigners – expatriates as well as labour migrants – make the country more receptive to new cultures. However, some 75 per cent believe that the number of foreign workers puts a strain on the country’s health services (ibid.). An International Labour Organization (ILO) (2010) survey of how migrant workers were perceived in Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand found that the majority of respondents believed that migrant workers were needed to fill labour shortages. An average of 80 per cent in the Republic of Korea and Singapore believed that migrant workers made a net contribution to the economy (40% in Thailand and just under 40% in Malaysia). By contrast, a 2006 survey in South Africa concluded that migrants were largely considered a threat to the socio-economic well-being of the country, with 67 per cent indicating that migrants “use up resources” and 62 per cent claiming that they “take jobs” (Crush, 2008). As will be discussed further in subsequent sections, such perceptions are often rooted in wider socio-economic and cultural contexts and cannot be analysed in isolation.

Source: Adapted from the European Commission, 2006.
**Age, socio-economic background, ethnicity, geographic location and education level**

Attitudes towards migration also vary significantly among subgroups within countries, on the basis of age, socio-economic status and level of education. The relationship between age and attitudes is significant. A typical snapshot of this is provided by the United Kingdom, where it is clear that the older population is the most negative about migration (see table 2). Between 1999 and 2008, however, the largest increase in those indicating that the United Kingdom had too many immigrants was among the younger adult age groups. The table also suggests there is a significant social class differential, with the skilled working class being the most negative.

Table 2: Percentage who agreed that the United Kingdom had too many immigrants, 1999 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>+7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Class</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle class</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled working class (C1)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>+23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled working class (C2)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>+15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled working class and those dependent on state pensions</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: Skilled working class (C1) refers to those engaged in supervisory, clerical and junior managerial, administrative and professional work. Skilled working class (C2), as per the classification of social grades in the United Kingdom, includes households wherein the main breadwinner does skilled manual work that requires an apprenticeship or training, such as plumbing or car mechanics.

In Australia and Germany similar trends are noted, though the change in opinion among younger age groups over time was not observed in the studies reviewed. In a survey carried out in Germany, the more favourable view of migrants was found to be among 16–24-year-olds. This could be due to reported higher levels of contact with migrants, including having migrant friends and acquaintances. Some 65 per cent of young people felt this way, as opposed to 32 per cent of those aged 60 or older (Abah, 2009). In Australia, negative views towards migrants are most likely to be held by persons who are over the age of 65; have no post-school qualifications, trade or diploma-level qualifications; describe their financial circumstances as “struggling to pay the bills” or “poor”; have a profession as a machinery operator, driver or labourer; indicate a religious affiliation, but attend religious services infrequently; and are widowed or divorced (Markus, 2010).
Skill level and geographic location were also significant influencing factors in the OECD’s analysis of European Social Survey and International Social Survey data, which found that least skilled workers were most inclined to favour restrictive policies and those from rural areas were more likely to feel that migration had negative impacts (2010). In Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand, survey results suggest that those who know and interact with migrant workers, whether professionally or socially, are more favourable towards them (ILO, 2010).

Another common finding in attitude studies is that higher levels of education are associated with more positive attitudes towards migration (Rothon and Heath, 2003; McLaren and Johnson, 2004; Statistics Canada, 2003; European Commission, 2006). However, when education levels, GDP and the Human Development Index intersect, a more nuanced scenario emerges: views about migration are more positive among the highly educated population in rich countries, but less so in poor ones (Kleemans and Klugman, 2009). Furthermore, based on survey analysis by Kleemans and Klugman, it was found that all variables relating to income level and social class are positively associated with attitudes to migration, and that people living in larger cities are more positively disposed towards migration (2009).

In addition, polls and studies consistently show that those with migrant backgrounds are most likely to be in favour of migration (Pew Research Center, 2006; GCIM/IPPR, 2004). However, there is some variance between foreign-born migrants and second-generation migrants born in-country, as opinions of the latter may shift closer to that of the native population.

**The importance of the time differential**

Research has consistently shown that perceptions, attitudes and opinions about migration and migrants do shift over time. While some attitudes in some groups are deeply entrenched and intransigent, overall public opinion can and does change, which emphasizes the importance of providing balanced and sound information to the general public. This is also encouraging for those who seek to break down the misinformation, bias and intolerance that characterize some of the public discourse on migration.

Several studies demonstrate this tendency towards a change in attitude. Figure 5, for example, shows how the perception of immigration in Germany changed over the 1984–2008 period. Abah suggests that “While sentiments against migrants have been strong at times ... a process of familiarization has taken place with a growing acceptance of immigrants among the general public” (2009: 31). A similar trend in the acceptance of migration over an extended period was seen in Australia and the United States of America, as the number of migrants increased (Suro, 2009; Betts, 2005).
This pattern of increasing acceptance over time, however, is by no means consistent and can be influenced by various other intervening factors. In the United Kingdom, for example, public concerns about immigration reached unprecedented levels in the last decade, peaking in 2008. These concerns only diminished when they were superseded by economic concerns due to the global financial crisis (Page, 2009).

The volatility of opinion is further illustrated by the Australian case. As Markus (2011: 6) points out, Australia (along with Canada) ranks among the countries most receptive to immigration. Markus illustrates this with the data shown in table 3, drawn from the International Social Survey Program. This indicates that, in 2003, Australia was second only to Canada (68%), with 61 per cent of respondents indicating that they wanted the number of immigrants coming to the country to increase or stay the same. This compares with 44 per cent in the United States of America, 30 per cent in Germany, 22 per cent in the United Kingdom and 18 per cent in the Russian Federation. However, Markus (2011: 8) uses data from a number of polls (including those undertaken for the Scanlon Foundation) to show considerable volatility in the proportion of a population regarding immigration intake to be about right or too low. Table 4 shows that this rose from 28 per cent in 1997, to 57 per cent in 2003, and back to 46 per cent in 2010.
Table 3: Attitudes to immigration intake (% of respondents), selected countries, 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of immigrants coming to country</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>Remain the same</th>
<th>Increase &amp; remain the same</th>
<th>Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany – West</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: The Australian survey was completed by 2,183 respondents, from 27 August to 24 December 2003. The question employed a five-point response frame: Do you think the number of immigrants to [COUNTRY] nowadays should be increased a lot; increased a little; remain the same; reduced a little; reduced a lot? Subtotals may vary by +/-1%, due to rounding (ZA, 2005, cited in Markus, 2011).

Table 4: Public opinion about immigration levels in Australia (%), selected years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Too high</th>
<th>About right / too low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most analyses of attitudes towards international migration and migrants have focused on the destination end of the process and, thus, upon immigration. However, migration also has profound impacts on sending countries and their populations. Emigration has become an issue of increasing significance, not only because of its increasing scale but also because of the increasing evidence of its impact on development in recent years (World Bank, 2006). Therefore, as with immigration, attitudes and perceptions about emigrants can play a role in shaping policy and/or vice versa. However, unlike with immigration, relatively little empirical research on public opinion about emigration has been undertaken. This is particularly the case in developing countries, which have become important sources of migrants to high-income economies as well as to other developing countries. Some qualitative and smaller-scale survey work is available, but with little coverage of return migration. This is changing, as return is increasingly recognized as a core component of the migration cycle.

The Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 44 countries in 2002\(^7\) found that emigration was considered by a significant percentage of the population to be a “very big” problem in a number of countries, especially in Latin America (Honduras (63%), Argentina (58%), Guatemala (53%) and Mexico (52%)). Concerns over emigration were also recorded in Bulgaria (58%) and South Africa (52%). However, the way emigrants and return migrants are perceived by the public or the State ranges from negative sentiments towards home-country abandonment, to the attribution of national hero status to those abroad. Furthermore, opinions seem to also be shaped by issues such as the length of the stay abroad, the impact on families or the community left behind, and the prevailing economic situation of the home country.

In Mexico, the Pew Research Center interviewed 1,000 adults in 2009 and found that, while a majority of Mexicans (62%) said that they would not move to the United States of America if they could, a sizeable minority (33%) would do so. Among those who would move, 55 per cent (representing 18% of the total sample) said they would be inclined to do so without authorization. About half of the respondents (48%) said that it was bad for Mexico to have so many of its citizens living in the United States of America and 42 per cent said it was good for Mexico. Some 81 per cent said it was a big problem that people left Mexico for jobs in other countries. Mixed views about emigration were also reported in a small-scale study of four local provinces in Viet Nam, although the majority view was positive. Quantitative and qualitative studies revealed that most people, as well as the local authorities at all levels, support labour migration. A majority of respondents think that migration is good not only for their family but also for the community. About 11 per cent of respondents do not support migration, with the highest rate of opposition (16%) registered among 36–45-year-olds. More women (13%) are opposed to migration than men (7%) (Yen et al., 2010).

Similarly mixed opinions about emigration exist in northern Ghana, influenced largely by the different types of migration, whether seasonal/temporary or longer-term/

permanent. As part of a study of emigration in the region, interviews were carried out with 204 rural household heads who were asked to express their opinion about the consequences of seasonal, long-term and return migration. Their responses indicated a differentiated opinion, depending on the type of migration. For instance, almost all respondents were positive about the consequences of seasonal labour migration – particularly its impact on food security and as a way to access goods. However, in the case of long-term migration, the responses were more ambivalent. On the one hand, it was felt that long-term emigration reduced the pressure on farmland and that living standards could be improved for some. On the other hand, it was further felt that many migrants were unable to achieve their economic goals upon migrating or they lost their ties with their home community (van der Geest, 2010).

In Guatemala, public opinion about emigration reflects the economic circumstances of the country, with migration generally seen as a solution rather than a problem. According to the Guatemalan CID Gallup\(^8\) polling agency, four out of five Guatemalans know someone who emigrated to the United States of America in search of work (cited in Gilbert and Bauder, 2005).

By contrast, a study conducted by Soruco et al. (2008) in the Cuenca region of Ecuador explores the determinants of negative prevailing views on emigration in this part of the country. The author identifies three distinct reasons why emigration is viewed unfavourably for the region (Cuenca), for the emigrants themselves, and especially for their families: a) emigrants are considered to be irrational, failing to use their remittances in productive and sustainable activities and therefore failing to contribute to the national economy; b) emigrants are viewed as irresponsible because they abandon their families; and c) emigrants’ children are considered to do worse in school compared to non-emigrant children, as they are not integrated into society because they are expected to leave the country as their parents did (Soruco et al., 2008). In terms of socio-economic grouping, discriminatory perceptions are more likely among urban, high-income, well-educated, married, and older people (ibid.).

Studies carried out in Senegal seem to indicate a very different scenario. In Senegalese popular discourse, the emigrant is often regarded as a symbol of success, and popular culture portraits migrants as “gold mines” (Riccio, 2005, cited in Fall et al., 2010), as well as positive role models for youth. Regional variations do exist, however, and young people in Dakar, for example, are more interested in Western than other African destinations. However, socio-economic status also plays a role, with France as a destination among the educated elites. Those from rural areas tend to migrate to Spain and Italy, often after having migrated to Dakar first (Fall et al., 2010).

Positive views on emigration also exist in developed countries of origin, such as Australia. A poll of 1,000 Australians taken to gauge attitudes towards expatriates and the diaspora indicated that there is generally a positive attitude towards Australians moving overseas, as seen in Figure 6 (Fullilove and Flutter, 2004). Similarly, Australians are positive about the existence of a sizeable community of Australians offshore. It was found that younger people were generally more positive than older respondents.

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\(^8\) Consultoría Interdisciplinaria en Desarrollo (CID) [Interdisciplinary Development Consultants].
Return migration

Return migration is perhaps the aspect of the migration cycle that has received the least attention, possibly because most research resources are located in highly developed countries, while most returnees go back to developing countries. This is all the more regrettable because perceptions about the return process and attitudes towards return have a significant impact on the experience of the returning migrant and on his/her receiving community. A better understanding of the values – positive or negative – attached to returning migrants would be a first step towards devising effective policies and communication strategies on return.

As a general rule, returning migrants who are seen to have achieved financial success abroad are viewed favourably and can even acquire role-model status. On the other hand, those who return home due to an aborted attempt at gaining employment and residence abroad can be made to feel that they have let down family and friends. Perceptions are nuanced further, depending on whether the return was voluntary or involuntary.

The assessments are often mixed. In the case of Senegalese migrants, as mentioned previously, return to the country of origin is often seen as desirable, and the return of successful migrants displaying material gains has a positive impact on how emigration is perceived. On the other hand, returnees may face suspicion about how their money was earned abroad and how it is spent, in addition to being criticized for behaviours and attitudes that they may have developed while away – for instance, “behaving like Europeans” (Fall et al., 2010).

Ambivalence towards returnees can also result from the unfulfilled economic expectations of family and friends, in addition to concerns over their “Westernization”. For example, in a survey of Afghan returnees, the prevalent responses centred on economic loss, failure of the migration experience and even suggestions that, by having been abroad, the migrants lost their religious beliefs (de Bree, 2008). Perhaps one of the most striking findings of that same survey was that many returning migrants found their return traumatic. The majority of them had been forcibly returned, which generated a sense of shame associated with failure, and 75 per cent of the survey respondents stated that the experience of migrating and returning had affected their life in a negative way (ibid.).
Similar findings were also reported in an IOM study in the South Caucasus, where returning migrants experienced stress or deteriorated health associated with the failure to improve the socio-economic conditions of their families. However, for 18 per cent, family relations actually improved, largely due to the happiness of being reunited with their families and satisfaction with their socio-economic progress. For the remainder, their temporary stay abroad and their return home did not change their relationship with family members in any way. Around two-thirds of the respondents reported receiving assistance from their family, especially in terms of making the returnees feel at ease (IOM, 2002).

With regard to returning victims of human trafficking, perceptions are similarly mixed due to a lack of understanding of human trafficking or the resulting sense of shame or stigma associated with victims among their families or in the wider community. In a study carried out in Viet Nam, many of the victims experienced suspicion, stigma and discrimination from their family, neighbours and community. Results of the study showed that the discrimination was stronger in rural areas than in urban areas. Some people expressed a “blame the victim” attitude, based on the misperception that the trafficked person’s circumstances were the consequence of an indulgent lifestyle and greed. Additional negative perceptions were based on the assumption that, in the case of trafficked women, they may have worked as prostitutes (Yen et al., 2010).
PUBLIC OPINION: PUTTING SURVEY FINDINGS INTO CONTEXT

As indicated in previous sections, survey questions relating to migrants and migration need to be carefully worded and defined, as they strongly influence results. Furthermore, public opinion about migration can be volatile and sensitive to a whole range of externalities, including economic cycles, rates of unemployment, types of migration, or political and social concerns of the moment. What is certain, however, is that it has the potential to influence policy and policymakers. As subsequent sections highlight, the public opinion–policy–media feedback loop is strong. Nonetheless, it is never easy to make direct causal links between media coverage and policy trends. For this reason, it is important to consistently examine issues arising from opinion polls and to place them in the wider political, social and economic context in which they are formed, before addressing additional actors, such as the media.

The broader global picture

It is helpful to consider the broader global picture regarding migration, as was attempted with the 2002 Pew Global Attitudes Survey. Interestingly, this survey found that immigration and emigration were not seen as the principal national problem in any of the 44 countries surveyed. Nevertheless, a high percentage of people said that immigration was a “very big” problem in their country; for instance, 63 per cent in South Africa, 61 per cent in Lebanon, 59 per cent in Honduras and 55 per cent in Italy considered this to be the case. Emigration is also seen as a ‘very big’ problem in a number of countries as referred to earlier.

Although, in most people’s minds, immigration does not rival other issues as a major national problem, immigrants and minority groups are generally seen as having a bad influence on the way things are going in most countries. According to the Pew Survey, only in Canada does a strong majority of the population (77%) have a positive view of immigrants. Among other major industrialized countries, there is greatest support for immigrants in the United States of America (49%). Nevertheless, a large minority (43%) believes immigrants are bad for the country. Immigrants are particularly unpopular across Europe. In every European country except Bulgaria, immigrants are seen as having a bad influence on the country. In Western Europe, strong negative sentiments towards immigrants were registered in Germany and Italy (60% and 67%, respectively). Negative sentiment is even higher in Eastern Europe, where strong majorities in the Czech Republic (79%) and Slovak Republic (69%) take a dim view of immigration, as do the majority of Russians (59%).

A later survey carried out by Pew in 2007 found that, with the exception of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, majorities in the 47 countries surveyed said their countries should further restrict immigration – very much in line with earlier reported findings that most people would like to see migration levels decreased. Yet a United Nations survey (see table 5), which expresses the views of governments rather than the community

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10 The survey further revealed that 94 per cent of the population in Côte d’Ivoire and almost as many in South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia (89%) agree to restricting immigration. The majority of Americans (75%) and Canadians (62%) also say that there should be more restrictions on people entering their countries than there are today. These concerns are shared by Latin American populations: about three quarters of Venezuelans (77%), Chileans (74%) and Bolivians (73%) agree that their countries should further restrict and control immigration, as do the majority of Brazilians (72%), Mexicans (71%) and Argentines (68%) and just over half of Peruvians (51%). Among European populations, Italians expressed the most concern about the levels of immigration to their country; 87 per cent agreed that their country should further restrict and control the entry of people. This sentiment was shared by approximately three quarters of the population in Spain (77%), the United Kingdom (75%), the Czech Republic (75%) and the Russian Federation (72%), and by 68 per cent in France, 66 per cent in Germany, 64 per cent in Slovakia and 63 per cent in Ukraine.
(as in the Pew surveys), shows that, between 1996 and 2009, there was a drop in the number of more developed countries who considered immigration to be too high, and an increase in the number who considered it to be too low. Increases in the number of countries who considered migration to be too high occurred only in less developed countries.

Table 5: Government views on the level of immigration, 1976, 1986, 1996 and 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Too low</th>
<th>Satisfactory</th>
<th>Too high</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Number of countries</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| More developed regions |         |              |          |       |                     |            |
| 1976 | 1       | 27           | 6        | 34    | 3                   | 79         |
| 1986 | 0       | 26           | 8        | 34    | 0                   | 76         |
| 1996 | 1       | 31           | 16       | 48    | 2                   | 65         |
| 2009 | 4       | 41           | 8        | 49    | 8                   | 84         |

| Less developed regions |         |              |          |       |                     |            |
| 1976 | 10      | 102          | 4        | 116   | 9                   | 88         |
| 1986 | 6       | 99           | 25       | 130   | 5                   | 76         |
| 1996 | 3       | 117          | 25       | 145   | 2                   | 81         |
| 2009 | 5       | 111          | 30       | 146   | 3                   | 76         |

| Least developed countries |         |              |          |       |                     |            |
| 1976 | 2       | 39           | 1        | 42    | 5                   | 93         |
| 1986 | 1       | 40           | 7        | 48    | 2                   | 83         |
| 1996 | 0       | 41           | 8        | 49    | 0                   | 84         |
| 2009 | 0       | 41           | 8        | 49    | 0                   | 84         |


What is revealing about such findings is that, although migration may not be considered the top national issue and there may be some variation in the findings, its saliency as an issue of concern is remarkably consistent. This should not be surprising, however, given the cross-cutting nature of migration. Attitudes about migration are rarely, if ever, developed in isolation from adjoining social and economic issues. They are strongly affected by perceived linkages to matters as varied as the condition of the labour market, the perceived pace of cultural change, and even environmental considerations. Yet it is repeatedly treated as an independent issue, which is why it is so important to carefully consider the responses to, and the context of, survey questions.
A closer look at public opinions and the migration narrative

In general, the attitude surveys can loosely be defined as gauging three dimensions: economic, security and socio-cultural. In most countries, the migration debate is framed in the same way. The extent to which one or the other or a combination of all three is taken into account depends significantly on the country’s migration narrative and is partly a function of the policy responses provided. However, in recent years in many parts of the world, policy has fallen into a populism trap (Citrin and Sides, 2008), losing sight of what is at the core of the migration-related issues being debated. The politicization of migration issues has created a situation that inevitably leads to misperception, misinformation and unsuccessful policymaking. In this climate, it is all too easy to see migrants as being responsible, whether directly or indirectly, for issues of unemployment, security or social cohesion that are rooted in much broader and much more complex processes of change. It is interesting to note, for example, that the recent Transatlantic study (2010) report suggests that, despite some heightened negativity towards migrants during the ongoing economic crisis, which began in 2008, the priority issue for all countries involved in the study (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States of America) was not migration.

These deeper concerns relating to, inter alia, job insecurity, housing and education, important as they are, will not be dispelled by simply making migration policies more restrictive. There are several reasons why: when such actions are taken unilaterally, they may send the wrong message – that migration was, indeed, the cause of the perceived problem. Furthermore, such measures are often ineffective, since migration does not simply stop due to restrictions, nor do such policy measures address the situation of migrants already in-country or the public’s concern about their presence. Although the adoption of a strongly restrictive approach may temporarily quell public calls for action, it is unlikely to put the broader issues to rest and they will undoubtedly resurface in the medium-to-long term (Hurrell, 2010). A more comprehensive approach to migration management, providing a balance of control measures and opportunities for movement, offers greater promise of success.

The dominant migration narrative and popular understanding of societies and States can remain anchored in particular historical interpretations that do not reflect the reality of contemporary population mobility. Such understanding may ignore or exclude different identities, cultures, languages, religions and national origins. “The promotion or retention of such concepts not only often ignores changing national realities, but risks fanning the flames of exclusionary and xenophobic responses to immigration” (ILO et al., 2001). In political and public discourse, the deliberate association of migration/migrants with criminality, illegality in terms of status, disease, unemployment and other social problems allows for migrants to become scapegoats, thereby marginalizing them, and increasing their vulnerability.

Integration is another important aspect of migration often at the heart of migration debates. Recent political discourse in Europe, Australia and elsewhere has re-ignited debate about the concept of multiculturalism. It is fully understandable that, in a world that is increasingly characterized by social diversity, questions should be raised about the policy model or models most likely to be effective. Concerns about cultural threats and cultural identity cannot be summarily dismissed. It is important, however, to ensure that the discussion be framed appropriately. As the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (2008) has pointed out, “Public debate on integration seems to have shifted from a more technical debate, in which different areas of disadvantage were examined and addressed, to a more general
debate on the cultures and values of different groups and, ultimately, on the inherent worth and mutual compatibility of such cultures and values” (Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, 2008). What this means is that it is best to focus on the design of effective policies to address the situation, rather than placing the onus of integration solely on migrants, or focusing on lifestyles, religions, values or identities that are perceived to be superior (Spencer, 2011; Castles, 2008; Malik, 2011).

The impact of migration narratives on public opinion is not limited to countries of destination. In several countries of origin, public perceptions have undergone a positive shift, in recognition of the potential benefits of emigration and in light of national economic situations. Some of the most visible ways in which this has been done is through the creation of links with diaspora, through dedicated government ministries or policies, or via specific diaspora programmes. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that these positive perceptions are not unalloyed. They are not infrequently, mitigated by concerns, for instance, over the brain drain or the vulnerability of migrants to exploitation and abuse.

The Philippines offers one of the best-known illustrations of positive discourse towards emigration. The Government of the Philippines has taken a proactive stance in communicating the value of overseas Filipino workers – for example, by referring to them as the country’s new heroes and organizing several national events commemorating their work (Asis, 2008). The Government of Senegal has also taken a proactive stance in migration management by creating its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese abroad. Several Arab governments have also recognized that emigration can help alleviate pressure on the domestic labour market. As early as the 1960s and 1970s, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia began actively facilitating the international mobility of their nationals (Fargues, 2006). However, such facilitation is generally of those in lower skilled categories (ibid.).

Understanding public opinion within a specific country context and migration narrative requires an understanding of what drives public opinion and how public policies are interpreted, since these two elements can sometimes be in opposition to each other, while claiming to respond to public demands. The following section takes this one step further, exploring how opinions, political discourse and the media interplay and the impact they have on what is communicated about migration, and how it is communicated.
In addition to being strongly influenced by a population’s characteristics and the national context, public opinion about migration/migrants is also shaped by a number of stakeholders, interest groups and societal actors – particularly employers’ associations, labour unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government, political parties and the media.

As migration has increasingly attracted media attention over the past decade, gaining saliency in political debates, it is important to consider the critical role the media play in both influencing and reflecting public opinion. Similarly, in terms of policy, the media have the ability to act as “both an agenda setter and driver on immigration issues, and a mirror reflecting debates going on in public and policy circles” (Papademetriou and Heuser, 2009: 23). Accurate and balanced reporting is therefore a key role and responsibility of the media in partnership with relevant actors, particularly policymakers.

Assessing the content of media coverage of migration: A reflection and shaping of opinion

Though direct causal links between public opinion and media reporting are not always clear, it is arguable that the media do shape the attitudes of both policymakers and the wider public in several significant ways.

First of all, the media provide information about the phenomenon of migration – sometimes by drawing attention to statistics, trends and analysis, but more often through reportage on migration-related events that are deemed to be of interest – (this is the aspect of the media’s role that tends to attract the greatest attention from researchers). Furthermore, the media ‘frame’ the discussion of a topic. By highlighting certain aspects of migration and not addressing others, by using particular language and certain kinds of rhetorical devices (such as analogies), journalists not only provide people with facts about migration, they also give them a sense of how that information should be interpreted (Chappell and Glennie, 2011). Referring to migration as a ‘flood’ of people, for example, suggests it may overwhelm. Since the media are selective about what dimension of migration they cover, the extent and nature of their coverage can powerfully shape public opinion. It follows that the media can play a major role in influencing the success or failure of migration policy interventions, by positively or negatively analysing and reflecting on such interventions (Papademetriou and Heuser, 2009).

As various forms of media are often the primary source of information about migrants and migration, particularly for those who have had little or no contact with migrants, the images portrayed can have a far-reaching effect. By deciding what issues to focus on, the media determine whether or not people even think about an issue, while increasing the relevance of some topics in the public mind and diminishing others. Issues that receive more regular coverage often become more salient for the public, helping to shape political and social priorities (Chappell and Glennie, 2011). This means that the extensive coverage of migration by the media, in many countries, makes it a more prominent issue than it might otherwise be in the publics’ mind.
In some circumstances, the media have played a part in developing or exacerbating unsubstantiated ideas that migration threatens national sovereignty and national social cohesion, as well as in promoting uninformed stereotypes regarding migrants, while failing to report the positive dimensions. However, it is equally important to recognize that certain media representatives may be willing to report more positive stories but are limited by the inability or reluctance of those most directly involved in the issues (such as NGOs and migrant associations) to engage in dialogue. Textbox 2 shows how the Italian media have tried to educate the public about migration.

**Textbox 2: Italian media sensitization campaign**

Against a background of sustained negative migration coverage in Italy, IOM joined forces with the advertising agency, Publicis, to launch several projects aimed at sensitizing both the media and the general public to the realities of migration. The campaign provided a picture of migrants that often goes under reported – the migrant as a positive contributor to society. First launched in 2009 and again in 2011, the Typical Migrant in the News Campaign, published in numerous Italian newspapers, features a poster showing an African-born migrant doctor saving the life of an Italian man, but with a stereotypical and ironic negative headline suggesting that, once again, a migrant is the subject of front-page news. Its simple messaging is direct and represents, according to IOM, “the silent majority of immigrants who work hard and contribute to the development of the Italian social and economic system.”

Source: [http://www.italy.iom.int/](http://www.italy.iom.int/)

Studies of media coverage of migration have ranged from sophisticated quantitative content analyses of representative cross-sections of the print and electronic media, to more qualitative assessments. These conclude that there seems to be a relationship between media coverage on migration and the extent of public concern about migration. A study of media coverage in the United Kingdom shows that peaks and troughs in the level of public concern about migration appear to coincide with the levels of newspaper coverage of it, as shown in figure 7 (Page, 2009).

A number of studies conclude that the media rarely give a balanced view of migration and its effects. Papademetriou and Heuser (2009: 24) argue that some of the characteristics of media coverage in both Europe and North America obstruct the path to migration policy reform, primarily by emphasizing illegality and the role the migrant plays in the process, thus diminishing the role that government or employers might play. The media also tend to report in dips and waves, over-focusing on a moment of crisis and allowing the loudest, most extreme views to be heard. Since such views are rarely counter-balanced by reporting that portrays migration as the social process that it is (with costs and benefits), it is only natural that public opinion becomes polarized.

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11 For a comprehensive overview of content-analysis studies of immigration coverage, see the OECD 2010 SOPEMI report.
Others have focused on the media’s role in shaping public opinion and policy – for instance, by seeking to establish a relationship between migration, crime and urban violence, or by blurring the distinction between irregular migrants, regular migrants and even second-generation migrants. A study of media practice in the United States of America revealed that “Deeply ingrained practices in American journalism have produced a narrative that conditions the public to associate immigration with illegality, crisis, controversy and government failure” (Suro, 2009: 186). What is perhaps most striking is what Suro refers to as the “cumulative effect” of reporting, suggesting that, while individual articles or accounts about migration may be correct, the cumulative effect of over- or under-reporting on a particular angle ends up distorting the reality. Coverage of migrants and migrant groups, using blanket terms such as ‘migrant’, ‘Africans’, ‘Asians’, has a similar effect (Norwegian Directorate of Integration and Diversity, 2009).

In summary, much migration-related media coverage, in countries of immigration and emigration, tends towards the following:

- Episodic coverage – surges of coverage due to a particular migration-related event, usually of a negative nature.
- A focus on illegality – often the case, even though any offending migrants might represent a minority of all migrants.
- Exaggeration of the facts – for example, in Australia, asylum-seekers in 2008 numbered 5,020, which was only 1.3 per cent of all asylum-seekers worldwide (UNHCR, 2011: 6) and only a tiny fraction of the net overseas migration gain in 2008–2009 of 315,686 (ABS, 2011: 11). Nonetheless, media coverage of immigration in Australia in 2008 was overwhelmingly focused on the arrival of asylum-seekers in boats on Australia’s northern shores.
• Lack of context – in the United States of America, for example, it is claimed that media coverage of migrants rarely considers the central role of the American labour market in determining the size and characteristics of immigrant flows.

Two additional observations deserve mention. First, the nature of the media has changed dramatically over the last two decades, altering the nature of migration-related coverage. Growing commercialization of mass media has, in several instances, led media networks to adopt a more sensationalist approach to issues, including migration, which often serves to reinforce negative perceptions (OECD, 2010). A study in the United Kingdom (Threadgold, 2009) points to the complexity of media coverage of migration with regard to the relationship between media corporations and government and between journalists and political sources. “The policy focus is transmitted to news workers and the stories media organisations produce feed back into policy discourse. Understanding the professional and newsroom cultures in which journalists work – and the commercial rankings and marketing cultures that influence them – is a complicated proposition” (ibid: 226). Furthermore, others maintain that the proliferation of media and the development of new forms of media have fragmented the media landscape. In the United States of America, for example, Suro (2009) claims that impartial journalism is now only one way in which to report on a given issue, and that the changes in the media have resulted in a wider range of often more partisan voices.

Second, although the nature and mechanisms of media reporting may have changed, those doing the reporting have remained relatively constant. Media integration or the inclusion of reporters and journalists of different cultural, religious or ethnic backgrounds is still a challenge, especially in mainstream media outlets. Thus there is both structural and content-related discrimination in the media (Lüken-Klaßen and Heckmann, 2007). Consequently, viewpoints that may resonate more with migrant communities are often excluded from the mainstream media, although they may then find expression in parallel media streams such as ethnic or foreign-language newspapers and specialty programmes on television or radio. Although these forms of media might be seen to further isolate migrants, rather than fostering integration, they can respond directly to the concerns of a given community by reporting on issues often missed in the mainstream media (ibid.). Furthermore, ethnic media often ‘translate’ mainstream media – both culturally and linguistically – thus creating a heightened level of understanding. NGOs such as New American Media seek to address this issue by connecting ethnic and mainstream media through joint projects and professional development seminars for ethnic media journalists. Other initiatives, such as the EC-funded IOM project Migrants in the Spotlight (see textbox 3) also aim to work with both native and migrant journalists to promote enhanced awareness of migration issues.
Textbox 3: Migrants in the Spotlight

Migrants in the Spotlight, funded primarily by the European Commission, aims to contribute to improved understanding, awareness and reporting on migration issues, third-country nationals, integration and related topics among media and students of journalism, including immigrants themselves, in order to facilitate more effective and accurate reporting on migration issues in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. Implemented by IOM, this initiative includes conducting a series of 12 trainings for media professionals (including members of the migrant media channels and journalism students) on how to accurately and effectively portray migration issues. An international conference, Promoting Migrant Integration through Media and Intercultural Dialogue, was also held in May 2011 and included the awarding of prizes to young people who entered a writing/documentary competition on migration-integration issues in their respective countries.


Policy, media and the evidence base: a not-so-perfect union

Despite the growing body of evidence on the costs and benefits of migration, there appears to be some miscommunication or at the very least, a lack of communication between those producing the evidence and the public. However, since public opinion is not formulated in isolation from political discourse or media reporting, how policymakers and the media choose to use the evidence and interact with the public on migration issues is a crucial factor that must be addressed if migration-related issues are to be resolved in a balanced and rational way.

There are several examples of the dominant public perception regarding the impact of migration or migrants being contradicted by the body of research relating to that issue. One such contradiction relates to the commonly voiced view in destination countries that migrant workers will take jobs away from nationals, although this is not necessarily the case. Migrants are usually complementary to the labour market, filling gaps that might not otherwise be filled (IOM, 2008 and 2010). These could be skill gaps that the local training/education system has been unable to fill, or jobs that locals are unwilling to take. Indeed, exhaustive research on the impacts of immigration in traditional immigration countries has shown that the impact of migration on the local populations, in terms of jobs, is benign and that migration can even result in the creation of new jobs (Wooden et al., 1994).

A second misconception depicts migrants as being an ‘economic cost’ to the destination country whereas, in fact, they contribute economically in a number of ways. Rapid economic growth, fertility decline and ageing often means that fast-growing economies cannot always meet their own labour market needs. Shortages in the numbers or types of workers becomes a constraint on growth, which migrants can assist in overcoming. Migrants also contribute economically to the destination country, and the services they draw upon are largely offset by the taxes they pay. Indeed, their per capita net contribution to the economy is often greater than that of non-migrants, since the host nation has not had to bear the cost of educating or training the migrant. The host country may not have to bear the cost of old-age dependency either, if the migrant chooses to retire in the country of origin.
Figure 8 provides an example of the type of positive migration-related story that rarely makes the news, despite its striking nature. In this case, immigrants accounted for almost a third of GDP growth in the United States of America between 2000 and 2007.

**Figure 8: GDP growth contribution (%) based on worker ethnicity in the United States of America, 2000–2007**


Similarly, figure 9 shows the relationship between the value of the benefits migrants received from public social services and the amount of taxes paid in the United States of America. This clearly shows that natives get more for their taxes than do migrants.

**Figure 9: Ratio of benefits received from public social services to taxes paid in the United States of America, 2008**

In origin countries, emphasis is often placed on the negative effects of emigration through the loss of human capital, leadership and skills. While such losses are no doubt of real concern to developing and, more particularly, least developed countries, there is increasing evidence that emigration can have a positive developmental impact on families and communities left behind. The most commonly cited positive impact of migration on development is that of financial remittances sent back home. Migrants’ remittances in 2010 were estimated at USD 325 billion (World Bank, 2011), and these remittances are often higher than either overseas development assistance (ODA) and, in net terms, probably greater than net foreign direct investment (FDI).

Why, then, do policymakers and the media appear less than confident when it comes to the evidence base? There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the discourse on migration tends to focus much more on emotional and political issues rather than on facts, which can be quickly subsumed in the heat of debate. It is also the case that some of the evidence is not given much airing. According to Suro (2009), one of the most silent voices in the US media on the migration debate is that of employers. The opinions of employers – key stakeholders in migration matters – are severely underreported, despite a general consensus that the migration and integration experience begins primarily in the workplace (FRA, 2010; US DHS, 2008). Another example of selective communication involves the social, economic and political barriers faced by migrants, which are well researched yet poorly reported on.

Secondly, the main thrust of research in the social sciences has only recently begun to take account of migration as an issue of priority interest. Traditionally, migration has been addressed not as an independent research topic, but as a matter of subsidiary interest, in terms of its linkages to larger national objectives, such as industrialization or nation-building. As Castles (2008) succinctly puts it: “...mainstream social science was always behind the game” on migration. Today, a more accurate understanding of migration in its own right is emerging, but policymakers are still struggling to come to terms with it. There is a flip side to this, and it is the temptation to seek made-to-measure research that is aimed at supporting particular policy objectives (ibid., 2008).

Thirdly, policymakers face a real challenge in communicating to the community, via the media, migration-related facts and figures, as well as the policies that respond to them. This involves more than just the simple transmission of information. Table 6, adapted from Chappell and Glennie (2011), outlines a comprehensive approach to media communication in the field of migration.
Table 6: Top 10 tips for engaging with the media

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hire communications people who know about the media, even if they don’t know a lot about</td>
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<td></td>
<td>migration. Their knowledge of migration can be developed.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Forget about producing promotional or publicity materials for the media. They are not interested</td>
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<td></td>
<td>in brochures. Whatever you produce for them should have a potential story in it.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Policy briefs are fine for policymakers but they should not be expected to double as resources for</td>
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<td></td>
<td>the media. Policymakers and the media are usually interested in different angles.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Material provided to the media should be a maximum of four pages long and preferably one page.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Encourage media network-building throughout the organization. The more contacts the organization</td>
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<td></td>
<td>has with the media, the better.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Maintain an up-to-date list of media contacts, with e-mail addresses and phone numbers.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>React quickly; the earliest voices in any debate are likely to be called upon later, if the debate</td>
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<td>continues.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>A good media person spends almost as much time researching potential targets (journalists or</td>
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<td>strategic partners) and building relationships with them, as they do producing media material.</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Think creatively about how to launch your research findings. Do press releases, for example, as</td>
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<td>well as organizing launches and dissemination events.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>Don’t rely exclusively on the media; they should only be part of a wider communications strategy.</td>
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Source: Chappell and Glennie, 2011.

Fourthly, a migration policy evaluation culture is almost non-existent. Migration is one of the few areas of public policy not systematically evaluated (Arditis and Laczko, 2008), which perpetuates the gap between the evidence base and the drawing of firm conclusions about the policy approaches most likely to be effective. In these circumstances, it becomes a challenge to communicate new policies to the public with conviction.

Other suggestions as to why migration coverage in the media does not reflect the best available research include: lack of knowledge of migration issues among journalists; reporting negative stories is often easier than reporting positive ones; migration is a complex phenomenon and it is easier and more effective (in terms of selling newspapers) to focus on the negative stories, especially in the tabloids; some reporters consciously present their own views rather than those of the wider public; the media may be selective about what they report to cater to the views of their actual or perceived audience; and the media view may reflect that of the owners of the media outlet or of the political elite who exert pressure on the outlet (Chappell and Glennie, 2011).

Given the above-mentioned factors, simply calling for more evidence is not enough, nor is it the only way to move towards more accurately communicating with the public. This is not to deny the importance of the evidence base. Rather it places the onus on those using it for policy or media reporting to do so more accurately and for the public to demand higher standards. Nor does it mean simply shifting in the other direction towards putting an uncritical, positive ‘spin’ on reporting of migration issues. What’s required is a dialogue that considers in a critical but balanced way the interplay between political discourse, existing policies, evidence-based research and media coverage.
Where is the migrant? Media impact and engagement

Who am I, really? When I run the 800-metre race for the national youth team, I am Norwegian. But when the media run stories about Somalis, people come up to me and ask whether I am a drug dealer and mugger. Then, all of a sudden, I am Somali.

Mohamed Abdi, former member of the Olympic national youth team in athletics, quoted in an interview with Aftenposten (cited in Norwegian Directorate of Integration and Diversity, 2009)

In most debates about public perceptions of migrants and the importance of balanced reporting and informed dialogue, there is often a critical element missing: the migrant. Far too often, in this type of analysis, the migrant takes on the role of the passive actor – one who is spoken of, who is at the centre of a heated debate, yet who remains almost peripheral to the analysis. Just as the public discourse on migration can be shaped and influenced by biased information and one-sided discourse, so too can the image of the migrant be affected.

There are two angles of interest to policymakers at this juncture. The first is the public image attached to migrants – whether positive or negative – and how it is constructed. This point has been largely addressed already and, as mentioned earlier, if misperceptions are allowed to go unchecked, they can result in marginalization and stigma of migrants.

But what are the migrants’ perceptions of themselves, and what factors might play a role in shaping them? Migration networks or social networks are the most commonly cited resources used by migrants for guidance during the migration decision-making process and upon arrival in the host country. They provide useful information about economic opportunities, or more specific matters such as employment, accommodation or social services. Other information sources, such as television, radio, newspapers and the Internet also play a role, and have an impact on migrants’ perceptions and interactions in the host society.

The relationship between migrants and different forms of media can be viewed from several perspectives. Prior to migration, foreign media sources represent an important channel of information for potential migrants, often tending to “reinforce the idea of migration as a trip towards El Dorado” (Braga, 2007). Regardless of whether the information is correct or not, different migrants have different interpretations of what they see and hear, and their interpretations have an impact on how they imagine their future life (ibid.).

In the host country, the mass media also serve as a reference point for incoming migrants, providing sociocultural information and references about the society in which they now live. In many countries, the media is one of the principal means through which a sense of national unity and belonging among the population is created. However, by focusing principally on that sense of national identity, the media may – purposely or otherwise – exclude certain other groups, such as migrants. Studies conducted with migrants reveal that they are very much aware of the stereotyping and negative portrayals of them in the media. This can contribute to a sense of marginalization and a questioning of their sense of belonging. Several studies (Mainsah, 2009; Widyawati, 2005/2006) point to the frustrations that can arise when blanket terminology and stereotypical imagery are applied to all migrants as if they are made up of one homogenous category. They point out that an even greater sense of frustration arises from the disconnect between the typically negative media depictions and the more positive interactions that migrants actually experience in their everyday exchanges with local people.
Beyond the headlines:
Promoting understanding and combating perceptions on the ground

Confronted by the risks inherent in the politicization of migration issues, and the prevalence of negative attitudes towards migrants, governments and other stakeholders have reacted with a wide range of interventions, often through partnerships at the local, grass-roots level. While these initiatives do not appear in the headlines, a rapid analysis indicates that there is no dearth of positive responses. Such initiatives, often broadly grouped under the umbrella of integration programmes, include activities such as awareness-raising, information dissemination, direct assistance to migrants and promotion of intercultural understanding and anti-xenophobia efforts. The channels of communication used are as varied as educational institutions, social and cultural manifestations, and even sporting events. The creation of Harmony Day in Australia in 1999, managed by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC), as an occasion for all Australians to celebrate cultural diversity is one such example. At the European Union level, dedicated funds are allocated for integration initiatives as part of the European Commission Fund for the Integration of Third Country Nationals. In other instances, bodies dedicated to combating discrimination and xenophobia have been created. These include El Instituto Nacional contra la Discriminación, la Xenofobia y el Racismo (INADI) in Argentina and the Observatorio Español del Racismo y la Xenofobia in Spain. Governments in countries of origin have targeted returning migrants, seeking to maximize their contributions back home through the National Reintegration Center for Overseas Foreign Workers in the Philippines or the Paisano programme in Mexico. Ultimately, however, their capacity to shape perceptions and attitudes successfully may well depend on the persistence of these efforts and how they are communicated to the public at large.

One way of fostering more positive interactions and combating negative perceptions among the local people is to convey more accurate messages through alternative channels of communication. For example, Untold Stories: Learning with Digital Stories—a joint IOM/Cross Czech project—enables foreigners living in the Czech Republic to tell their stories through digital media. These stories are then made available on a public website that allows Czech society to become better acquainted with migrants in their country. Another approach, described in textbox 4, involves using radio ‘soap operas’ for a similar purpose.

13 See: http://inadi.gob.ar/institucional/
14 See: http://oberaxe.es/
15 See: http://www.nrco.dole.gov.ph/About.aspx
16 See: http://www.paisano.gob.mx/
17 See: www.iom.hu; www.untoldstories.eu
Textbox 4: Education meets entertainment in South America’s radio programming

In 2006, the radio drama Pueblo de Paso was launched with the aim of promoting public awareness, understanding, respect and integration of migrants. Fictional characters and events portrayed everyday interactions between migrants and host societies to provide an entertaining yet informative account of migration. The programme challenged myths and stereotypes of migrant populations, without preaching to audiences. This campaign was broadcast by 184 radio stations in Latin America. It altered the working agenda of NGOs in Nicaragua, inspired local workshops and forums in El Salvador, and helped civil society organizations in Panama garner more attention for migration-related issues. Although there are challenges to be overcome in reaching younger listeners, understanding the programme’s effect on audiences and developing pedagogical tools to help share production experiences, this campaign effort is a successful example of cultivating a positive cross-national dialogue on migration.

Note: Pueblo de Paso was produced by the Centro de Comunicación Voces Nuestras (Our Voices Communication Centre), with the support of the Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church Development Services) (EED, Germany), the Royal Embassy of the Netherlands, and the Asociación Latinoamericana de Educación Radiofónica (Latin American Association of Educational Radio) (ALER)

Continued negative portrayals pose a significant risk for society and migrants alike. Migrants who regularly find themselves depicted as criminals or illegal may eventually internalize this belief and act upon society’s low expectations (Lüken-Klaßen and Heckmann, 2007). The greatest risk category is often second-generation migrants who may continue to be treated as outsiders by the native population. By actively incorporating migrants into mainstream coverage and eliminating stereotypical labelling, these types of risks can be averted.

Migrants have not remained passive, however, and have sought a voice for themselves and their communities through ethnic media outlets. In recent years, navigating the identity space between home and host country has become increasingly fluid. The advent of social media and networking sites has facilitated interactions among migrants and host societies in both new and traditional ways. One of the new ways in which it does so is through its global reach and its potential to foster solidarity globally and across diverse national backgrounds. Social media sites have become a way for migrants (or ‘digital diaspora’) to discuss issues that concern them – issues that may not be easy to communicate about normally, such as racism, cultural taboos, identity, conflicts and what it means to be a migrant. What is particularly powerful is that such online initiatives are open to all – migrants and non-migrants alike – and they offer rich opportunities for the development of more inclusive and better informed conversations about migrants and migration. Textbox 5 presents one example of how a social media site created at the global level attempts to reach a wide audience of migrants and migration organizations.
Textbox 5: Using social media to promote cultural understanding

Social media, which can foster public interactive exchange and connect people, places and ideas, are increasingly being used as a way to spark change, share a common public space, and exchange innovative ideas. Migration issues are no exception. The creation of Integration: Building Inclusive Societies, by the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) and IOM, as a unique virtual platform, seeks to promote intercultural understanding, reduce intolerance and promote good migration-integration practices within a community of integration practitioners. The core component of the platform is a global database of good practices on integration, as well as a database of integration practitioners themselves. Updates on migration news globally, access to discussion forums and the latest research serve to create an online community promoting harmony and cohesion in migrant-hosting societies.

For further information, see: www.unaoc.org/communities/migrationintegration
CONCLUSION

The world is changing at an unprecedented speed, challenging societies to react with adaptability and creativity. Migration is one of the ways in which the exchange of talent, services, skills and a diversity of experience is achieved. Yet migration remains politically sensitive and often publicly misunderstood, in contradiction to the way our societies and economies are evolving. Recent events in Norway and elsewhere over the past two decades only serve to reinforce the need for the international community to urgently address the issue by promoting an informed, open and honest debate on matters of concern to all migrants – whether immigrants, emigrants or returnees – and to the societies of origin and destination with which the migrants interact.

This chapter has outlined the reasons for this, focusing primarily on how migration is communicated and why it is so susceptible to misinformation and bias. While there is a growing body of research-based evidence relating to the causes and impacts of migration on economies, societies and environments, the debate around it often fails to take such evidence into account. Key stakeholders in the debate – politicians, policymakers, employer organizations, civil society, the media and even migrant associations – often ignore the evidence or use it in a selective or even self-interested way. Research evidence, policy debate and media reporting combine to generate blurred perceptions where clear and accurate analysis is needed. The complexity of the migration issue and its human dimension are then lost within political arguments that are designed for electoral purposes and political gain.

As this chapter has highlighted, public perceptions and opinions about migrants are not formed in a vacuum. They are influenced by socio-economic and demographic factors such as age, level of education, type of employment, and political leaning. Furthermore, there are external factors such as periods of economic recession when unemployment levels are high, moments of political turmoil or conflict triggering sudden outflows of migrants, and uncertainties about national security in the wake of a terrorist attack, which can create doubts about the value of migration. But these concerns, even when strongly felt, are also time-sensitive, and they typically recede when conditions improve. One of the greatest challenges for those who wish to foster a rational debate is to prevent migration from becoming the convenient surrogate cause for other political, social and economic issues that create discomfort in societies faced with change in a globalizing world. It is fairly apparent that migration is often the catch-all issue that masks the fears and uncertainties beneath the public's concerns – be they unemployment, housing or social cohesion (in countries of destination) or loss/waste of human capital and economic dependency (in countries of origin).

A careful study of poll and survey results suggests that opinions in the community are, at the same time, more nuanced and more susceptible to change than we are often led to believe. There is acknowledgement, at a variety of levels, that mobility is a feature of contemporary society. There is also a certain level of understanding, recognition and even acceptance of the fact that migration brings added benefits to the economy and society, and that migrants complement, rather than compete with, natives in the labour market. In other words, there is enough available material to begin a thoughtful, balanced debate about migration – a debate that does not portray migration as having benefits without costs but establishes its rightful place and value in our interconnected societies.
It is important to stress that the way communication about migration is managed will affect not only the perceptions of home and host societies, but also the self-perception and behaviour of the migrant population. This chapter has argued against the treatment of migrants as passive onlookers in the debate about migration, rather than as essential actors in the process. Assignment of a passive role will leave them vulnerable to negative stereotyping and ultimately create an unnecessary divide between them and the host community. Migrants occupy complex living spaces, navigating between their countries of destination and countries of origin, as well as between the two corresponding societies. Their willingness and ability to integrate into their host society will be significantly shaped by their perception of their location – whether in its mainstream or at its edge – and of the value placed on their contribution to that society’s socio-economic well-being.

The chapter has highlighted several good examples of how governments, civil society, international organizations and the media have worked towards promoting a balanced image of migrants and their contributions, locally or in the media, dispelling migration myths through information campaigns and giving migrants a voice in telling their experiences through new media. However, for these and other initiatives to have a consistent impact on public perceptions and attitudes, they need to be scaled up, adjusted to fit local contexts and, most importantly, be supported by strong political will as part of a long-term strategy. To this end, four broad orientations are worth exploring:

1) **Building an open, balanced and comprehensive migration discourse**

Here, the emphasis is on expanding the migration debate so that it does not simply revolve endlessly around the problems – real or imagined (both of which are generously aired) – but examines the broader picture. It is important that the new debate be proactive and not simply reactive to the dominant discourse. There are two questions that are commonly used as starting points for discussions on migration, not to mention migration policy formulation:

1) *How to deal with the migrant constituencies already in the country?* 2) *How to deal with those migrants who may be coming?* A constructive, better-informed debate will begin with a broader consideration of the place that migration might realistically occupy in demographic, social and economic planning. From this perspective, it may be possible to reframe the discourse so that it yields a more informed mainstream consensus, rather than a parochial view. A long-term strategy is likely to be required with key messages injected into the media upon the release of new sets of research, but also when they are of relevance to a topic under discussion.

The broadening of the discourse cannot take place only at the national level, but equally in multilateral fora such as regional consultative processes RCPs, IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD).

2) **De-politicizing the debate and addressing the issues of concern**

While migration is undoubtedly of political interest, it should not be addressed solely as a political issue. Many of the negative perceptions surrounding migration have their origins in partisan interpretations, rather than fact. In most migration debates, there is a need to openly discuss effects – both positive and negative – in an honest and balanced way. The discourse should also address the broad national interest, rather than focusing on the interests of particular segments of society. Much of the research on the effects of migration regarding the
positive impacts it can deliver relates to an entire society and economy. The force of these messages can be lost if the focus is placed upon impacts on particular subgroups in a given society or economy. On the other hand, discussion of local anxieties – for example, about what can be done to curb irregular migration, or local pressures on infrastructure caused by population growth – need not be ignored. The public should, instead, be informed about what has and has not worked, without placing the onus of a failed policy initiative on the migrant.

A lack of readily available information for the public, which directly addresses all of these issues, is perhaps the greatest cause of continuing misunderstanding. The dissemination of information that addresses the concerns at hand, and clearly explains the rights of citizens and non-citizens, helps eliminate misunderstandings and ensures that policies are perceived as impartial and respectful of everyone’s rights.

3) Working together with the media to support balanced media reporting

The media have a significant influence over public discourse, influencing public opinion and thereby impinging on all stakeholders, especially policymakers and politicians. A fundamental question must therefore be asked: How can the media be engaged to present a more balanced picture of migration and its impacts? Balanced media reporting means avoiding single-issue headlines, over/under-representation of particular groups, and blanket labelling. It also implies recognition of the fact that migrants are not a homogenous group and that migration is often linked to many other public issues.

Governments play a crucial role in creating the social and political climate in which fair and accurate reporting can thrive and the evidence base is correctly used. Leadership is therefore important in delivering a more balanced picture about migration. This places significant responsibility on political opinion leaders but they should not be the only source of leadership on this issue. Other stakeholders, such as civil society, the private sector and the academic research community, also have an important role to play. The role of other elites and prominent people should also be considered. There have been many examples of such people taking up social justice-based causes and having an important impact on both the media and public opinion regarding such causes. The role of these opinion leaders may involve working more with the media than has been the case in the past. While this may be outside of the media’s comfort zone, to some extent, it is the responsibility of these actors to meet the media halfway and ensure that media practitioners are better informed of the complexity of migration issues.

Providing guidance on how to report on migration is another key element. Building the capacity of reporters, journalists etc., either through trainings or informational materials, can help to create a core group of media specialists on the issue, who are able to more accurately report on the topic. The provision of easily accessible guidelines about how to talk about migration (such as those available at www.ethicaljournalisminitiative.org) provides a good starting point. Such guidance should ideally include the development of communication strategies, on the part of researchers, and creating partnerships within the media. The research community itself can play a key role in ensuring that its findings relate to the relevant policy and political context and that it actively engages in the debate, using the evidence and their expertise, without compromising their academic integrity.
Balanced media reporting also requires breaking down the barriers of diversity within the media. The removal of structural discrimination in mainstream media institutions to include a diverse group of people serves, in turn, to break down content discrimination by offering alternative points of view.

4) Acknowledging migrants as active communication agents

Clearly, one of the greatest challenges for all those wishing to promote accurate perceptions about migrants and migration is that of enabling the authentic voices of migrants to be heard. There is clear evidence that the more exposure non-migrants have to migrants, on a person-to-person basis, the less negative they are inclined to be towards them. However, migrants are too often viewed as passive agents in the migration debate, in both their countries of origin and their countries of destination.

One significant way of reducing the level of misperception and its impact on migrants, whether as a result of political discourse or media reporting, is to ensure that migrants become active participants in the public debate. This can be done in many ways – for instance, by creating more space for ethnic media alongside mainstream media, integrating diversity into mainstream media, or encouraging the use of new social media tools to allow migrants to engage with a wide audience (migrants and non-migrants) and to portray more accurate images of who they are and what they do.
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This chapter reviews the major migration trends of 2010/2011, including developments in policy, legislation, international cooperation and dialogue on migration. It offers a brief global overview and thereafter outlines some of the key regional trends in migration, focusing on six regions of the world (Africa, the Americas, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Oceania).

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION TRENDS

Despite the ongoing effects of the global economic crisis, the total number of migrants worldwide has not fallen in recent years. Migratory flows to developed countries somewhat slowed down during and immediately following the crisis – for example, in the United States of America, the number of foreigners entering the country dropped from 1,130,818 in 2009 to 1,042,625 in 2010; in the United Kingdom, the number dropped from 505,000 in 2008 to 470,000 in 2009; in Spain, it dropped from 692,228 in 2008 to 469,342 in 2009; in Sweden, from 83,763 in 2009 to 79,036 in 2010; and, in New Zealand, from 63,910 in 2008 to 57,618 in 2010 (UNDESA, forthcoming). However, there were no staggering reversals in the patterns of movement, and thus, the global stock of migrants that had built up over the course of several decades was hardly affected: in 2010, the total number of international migrants in the world was estimated at 214 million people – up from 191 million in 2005 (UNDESA, 2009). Given that the estimated number of internal migrants is 740 million (UNDP, 2009), around a billion people (roughly one in seven of the world’s population) are migrants. Additionally, underlying this picture of general stability, were a number of specific developments that were evident during 2010/2011. Some of the key trends are highlighted in the following sections.

I. Political transitions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

The political transitions in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 have had a tremendous impact on migration patterns in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and beyond. Demonstrations against Tunisian President Ben Ali prompted him to resign on 14 January 2011, and the unrest in Tunisia was followed by demonstrations in other Arab countries, including Egypt, where President Mubarak stepped down in February 2011. In Libya, there was a rapid breakdown of law and order following the government’s attempts to repress the mass demonstrations that broke out in a number of provincial cities, as of mid-February 2011. The confrontations between the demonstrators and the security forces rapidly escalated into a major civil conflict that became the source of large outflows towards neighbouring countries in the east, south and west. By the end of June 2011, according to

Data presented in this chapter include new figures released in 2010 and at the beginning of 2011. Unless otherwise stated, this chapter does not include data made public after June 2011. Given the relative scarcity and still fragmented nature of migration data, newly released data included in this chapter do not always provide 2010 figures and may, instead, offer figures for previous years, which are still useful for the analysis proposed in this chapter.

Other countries included Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen.
IOM, more than 600,000 migrants (including about 280,000 third-country nationals (TCNs)) had left the country, representing a significant share of the 1.5 million migrants (the largest migrant worker population in North Africa) hosted by Libya before the outbreak of hostilities (UC Davis, 2011a). Major cross-border movements were recorded at the border with Tunisia and Egypt, with 256,000 and 184,000 arrivals, respectively. A significant number of these arrivals were Libyan nationals, with the vast majority going back and forth across the border for economic purposes, while their families stayed in Egypt. Arrivals outside the region were mainly recorded in Malta and Italy; as of the end of June 2011, more than 43,000 migrants had landed on Lampedusa Island since the beginning of the crisis — 19,200 departing from Libya and 24,100 from Tunisia. No significant outflows were reported from other countries in the region, including Egypt.

The media have often promoted the perception that the crisis in North Africa would result in much more irregular migration to Europe. In reality, a very small proportion of those displaced by the conflict took boats to cross the Mediterranean, with the others seeking return to Libya or assistance to move to another country in Africa or Asia. Many of these migrant workers were able to return home with the help of IOM, working in partnership with UNHCR. By the end of June 2011, more than 143,000 third-country nationals from around 50 different countries had been evacuated (see map 1). The largest numbers of assisted returns were to the following seven countries: Bangladesh (31,000), Chad (26,000), Egypt (24,000), Sudan (17,000), Niger (12,000), Ghana (11,000), and Mali (10,000).

These figures for assisted cases do not, however, reveal the full scale of return movements. IOM figures suggest, for example, that up to 200,000 migrants returned to Egypt. In addition, some Asian countries, such as the Philippines, require departing migrants to pay a fee into a fund that can later be used to bring home stranded migrants if they need to be evacuated from a country. Some 26,000–30,000 Filipinos (mostly workers) were in Libya before the uprising began, and approximately 10,000 of them were evacuated from the country and repatriated, according to the Philippine Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

The sudden return of large numbers of migrant workers to developing countries in Africa and Asia may have a serious impact on the economic stability of these States. Many of these countries are already struggling with high unemployment, and now they face the prospect of trying to absorb large numbers of returnees into their labour market. These countries are also likely to be hit financially, as migrant workers returning home will no longer be able to send remittances. Neighbouring Chad and Niger, for instance, saw 70,000 and 80,000 nationals, respectively, return home from Egypt and Tunisia, on their own or with the support of IOM, within the first three months of the Libyan crisis. Such massive return movements have raised concerns about food security in receiving communities and highlighted the need for reintegration options and community stabilization programmes to absorb the high number of.

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3 In the context of the Libyan crisis, a third-country national (TCN) is a migrant who crossed the border from Libya to a country that is not his or her country of origin.
5 Others were recorded at the border with Algeria, Chad, Niger and Sudan.
6 For example, on 10 May, the International Herald Tribune published an op-ed article entitled Look who’s coming to Europe, even though the article pointed out that most of those leaving Libya were migrant workers returning to their countries of origin in Asia and Africa.
Map 1: Number of third-country nationals assisted by IOM/UNHCR to return home from MENA region, June 2011

Source: IOM, 2011.
returnees without destabilizing the subregion and to mitigate the risk of a humanitarian crisis related to livelihood failure.9

In some countries, action has already been taken to assist returnees in re-integrating. In Bangladesh, for example, the World Bank has approved a Repatriation and Livelihood Restoration for Migrant Workers project. This project covered the cost of repatriation, along with a one-time cash grant of approximately USD 775 (equivalent to about 30 months of the average wage in Bangladesh)10 to cover migrants’ immediate needs and enable them to establish livelihoods in Bangladesh. The project has a total budget of USD 74.1 million with a large component (USD 40 million) implemented by IOM on behalf of the Government of Bangladesh. The Nepalese Government is another example of a country that has used its Foreign Employment Welfare Fund to cover repatriation costs.

Some of the people leaving Libya cannot return easily to their home countries. These include Somalis and Eritreans, who may require special assistance to help them re-establish themselves in a third country. However, despite extensive media coverage, suggesting that tens of thousands of migrants from North Africa would seek to enter Europe irregularly, only a few of those leaving Libya have actually moved to Europe. As of end of June 2011, arrivals by sea to Malta and Italy from Libya represented less than 3 per cent of the total outflows from that country, and were largely Eritreans and Somalis. Similarly, the number of Tunisian nationals who have left their home country since mid-February was lower than initially forecast.11 Moreover, according to UNHCR, only a small proportion of these people were refugees. The vast majority of migrants seeking a better life in Europe have been young Tunisians – predominantly single males in their 20s – who have taken advantage of the situation to seek work abroad.

II. Increase in natural disasters and displaced people

In 2010, the estimated global number of displaced persons due to sudden-onset natural disasters was over 42 million, which represents an increase of 6 and 25 million, in comparison with 2008 and 2009, respectively. The large majority (38 million) were displaced by climate change-related disasters (primarily flooding and storms) (IDMC/NRC, 2011). The significant overall rise in 2010 was mainly due to the unusually heavy floods in mid-2010 in China (which displaced over 15 million) and Pakistan (which displaced at least 11 million), as well as the earthquakes in Chile, Japan and Haiti. Bangladesh, India and the Philippines were also severely hit by natural disasters, making Asia the most affected region (ibid.). In 2010, the total number of natural disasters was 321 – slightly more than the 290 recorded in 2009, but close to the average for the last 10 years (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011).12 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that the number of natural disasters has doubled over the last two decades (from about 200 to over 400 per year). As a result, displacement figures due to disaster are much higher than those recorded for displaced people due to conflict, which accounted for around 2.9 million additional displacements in 2010 (IDMC/NRC, 2011).

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9 See online IOM reports at: www.migration-crisis.com/libya/ (accessed on 31 May 2011).
12 Figure extracted on 25 March 2011 from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT): www.emdat.be
The January 2010 earthquake that devastated Haiti and the severe floods later that year that hit Pakistan are prime examples of displacement-inducing natural disasters. Each of these disasters has been the focus of major international humanitarian intervention, but the livelihood, housing, health and other general service needs have yet to be fully met in both countries, and reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts continue.

The Haiti earthquake killed more than 300,000 people and displaced around 1.5 million. Significant waves of emigration were expected in the aftermath of the earthquake but they did not occur (United Nations Foundation, 2011). This may be largely due to the lack of resources for Haitian nationals to engage in a costly and dangerous journey. On the other hand, the problem of internal displacement remains a concern. A year after the earthquake, IOM found that 810,000 people were still living in informal sites in Port-au-Prince and provinces.13

In late July 2010, “Pakistan was struck by the worst floods in the country’s history, affecting more than 18 million people across Pakistan, making 11 million homeless [and] killing some 1,750 persons ...”14 The entire country was affected, with floods initially starting in the northern mountainous areas and slowly spreading to the southern low-lying regions of Punjab and Sindh. They were compared to a “slow-motion” tsunami as areas of the Sindh region close to the sea were flooded in September and October – more than two months after the rains that triggered the flow of water from the north. A significant part of the more than 11 million people displaced during the floods in Pakistan still need assistance and relocation to their places of origin.15

Between May and August 2010, China was hit by severe flooding and landslides. The Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs reported that more than 3 million people were temporarily displaced in central China in the last two weeks of July 2010 alone (IFRC, 2010). The February 2010 earthquake in Chile affected approximately 2.6 million people, 800,000 of whom were displaced (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011; American Red Cross, 2011).

Data on the impact of gradual, slow-onset environmental events on the movement of people are more difficult to obtain, but there are some indications that more and more people are being affected by droughts (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011) – for example, in Somalia, droughts have displaced over 52,000 people since 1 December 2010, with many moving to the capital, Mogadishu. Though migration in the face of drought is not uncommon, this appears to be the first time a large inflow of pastoralists has migrated to the capital, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (IRIN, 2011). Similarly, the so-called Dzud effect in Mongolia led to changes in the usual nomadic movement patterns. Rural populations moved to the outskirts of the capital, as the result of an extremely cold and dry winter that killed cattle – the traditional source of income.

III. Overall numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers remain stable

At the end of 2010, it was estimated that there were 15.4 million refugees and 845,800 asylum-seekers globally. While the number of refugees increased slightly (by 153,000, compared to 2009), new asylum claims received by UNHCR or governments decreased by 11 per cent in 2010. The increase in refugees was mainly due to the deterioration of the situation in Somalia, which resulted in an additional 119,000 Somalis fleeing to neighbouring countries during 2010 (UNHCR, 2011a). As a result of conflicts that flared at the beginning of 2011 in North and West Africa, particularly in Libya, but also in Côte d’Ivoire, the number of refugees in 2011 is expected to increase.

In contrast, UNHCR data reveal an important decrease in the number of asylum-seekers in industrialized countries over the last 10 years. “A total of 358,800 asylum applications were lodged in industrialized countries in 2010, which was 5 per cent fewer than in 2009. The latest number was the fourth lowest in the last decade and almost half (42%) of the 620,000 applications filed in 2001” (UNHCR, 2011b).

IV. Migration and the global economic crisis: some signs of recovery

In 2010/2011, there were significant (although mixed) signs of recovery in the global economy. Emerging and developing countries experienced an average GDP growth rate of 7.1 per cent in 2010, compared to 2.6 per cent in 2009, but recovery was more modest in advanced industrialized economies (from -3.4% in 2009, to 3% in 2010) and unemployment is still high, as of mid-2011 (IMF, 2011). Since February 2011, declining trends in unemployment rates have been recorded for the majority of the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for the first time since the beginning of the global economic crisis. At that same point in time, about 45 million persons were unemployed in OECD countries – a decrease of 2.1 million when compared to February 2009, but an increase of 14.3 million when compared to February 2008 (OECD, 2011).

Since the beginning of the global economic crisis in 2007–2008, numerous forecasts have been made about the potential impacts of the crisis and ensuing recovery on migration. Among others, predictions have included the following: a sharp reduction in migration inflows, an abrupt halt in the growth of the foreign population in high-income countries, a radical reduction in remittance inflows for migrant-sending countries, and an increase in return migration due to higher unemployment rates of migrants living abroad. The available evidence now suggests that predictions of the patterns and magnitude of migration flows remain inaccurate.

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17 This figure includes refugees (9.95 million at the end of 2010) and people in refugee-like situations (597,000 at the end of 2010), both of which fall within the Office of the UNHCR mandate. It also includes refugees covered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) mandate (estimated at 4.82 million at the end of 2010). “Refugees are individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; or those enjoying “temporary protection”. People in “refugee-like situations” represent a category that is descriptive in nature and includes groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained.

18 According to the UNHCR definition, asylum-seekers (pending cases) are individuals who have sought international protection and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been assessed. The 845,800 people mentioned above refer to claimants whose individual applications were pending at the end of 2010, irrespective of when they may have been lodged.

19 The data refer to the following 44 industrialized countries: the 27 European Union countries, Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iceland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, the United States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
While it is, for instance, difficult to fully assess how the economic recovery will affect job opportunities for migrant workers, the latest figures from a number of countries suggest a mixed picture. In some countries, there are indications of an increase in immigration; in others, the number of migrants is expected to fall. In Canada, for example, the number of foreign workers entering the country is increasing again (from 178,271 in 2009, to 182,322 in 2010), reaching almost the level registered in 2008 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2011). In the United States of America, the number of new arrivals in 2010 was higher than that registered in 2009 and 2008 (476,049 vis-à-vis 463,042 and 466,558, respectively) (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011). In Germany, the foreign population increased by about 58,800 (0.9%), which represented the first rise in five years, after a slight reduction between 2006 and 2009 (Federal Statistical Office – Destatis, 2011).

On the other hand, in the United Kingdom, it is projected that the migrant population will decrease by some 360,000 by 2015, as compared with the pre-recession projection in July 2008, and will reduce the UK labour force by 200,000 (UK Department for Communities and Local Government, 2009, cited in Ghosh, 2011: 73). In Ireland, it was estimated that a net outflow of 60,000 persons occurred in the year ending April 2009; a further net outflow of 40,000 people was anticipated (Ghosh, 2011).

IOM’s World Migration Report 2010 and a new IOM/Hague Process publication entitled The Global Economic Crisis and Migration: Where do we go from here? (Ghosh, 2011), argue that the recent economic crisis has highlighted some of the key challenges for future migration patterns and their management, going far beyond the impact on remittance flows. The global economic crisis seems to have had at least five different types of impact.

First, several thousand migrants lost their jobs or could not get their labour permit renewed due to significant job losses in the labour market of destination countries. For example, more than 7 million jobs had been lost in the United States and 1.6 million had been lost in Spain – mainly in the construction and manufacturing sector – by the end of 2009 (MPI, 2010a). In addition, the levels of unemployment were increasing faster among foreign workers than among natives (particularly in Spain) (IOM, 2010a). This happened partly because migrants were concentrated in sectors of the economy that were most vulnerable to recession, such as the construction sector, and partly because migrants tend to be younger and have less job security than natives.

Second, the overall stock of migrants did not decrease as much as expected because, even after losing their jobs, many migrant workers chose not to return home, despite incentives to do so being introduced in some countries, and because the economic situation was often worse in the country of origin than in the country of destination. For instance, the Plan de Retorno Voluntario – a ‘pay-to-go’ system introduced by the Spanish Government in June 2008 to give unemployment benefits to non-European Union (EU) nationals who agreed to return home – only recorded 11,660 applications as of April 2010 (compared to the anticipated 87,000 applications) and only 8,451 immigrants actually returned home (Lopez, 2011). Similarly, programmes offering return incentives to migrants in the Czech Republic and Japan had only limited impact. On the other hand, the example of Poland highlights how the economic performance of a country of origin can affect migrants’ decisions to return. Since 2008, the number of Polish returnees has increased, probably due to the fact that, “Poland is the only

WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2011 | COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY ABOUT MIGRATION
member of the European Union that has not fallen into a recession and ... has continued to grow economically due to a relatively high domestic demand and because foreign trade makes up a small share of Poland’s GDP” (Kaczmarszyk et al., 2010).

Third, increased joblessness among migrant workers probably made them much more vulnerable on the labour market, although the extent to which the crisis led to more precarious employment for migrants has not been fully documented. There were, however, indications of a hardening of public attitudes towards immigrants, with an accompanying decrease in levels of tolerance of foreigners, making migrants increasingly vulnerable to discrimination and xenophobia.

A fourth effect of the crisis was a reduction in irregular migration flows. In the EU, for example, the number of border apprehensions for attempted illegal entry at EU borders fell by a third between 2008 and 2009 (Frontex, cited in WMR, 2010).

Fifth, although there was some decline in remittance sending, perhaps reflecting the rise in unemployment among migrant workers, remittances remained resilient, in many cases, because return migration was not as high as expected. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2007–2008, remittance flows have shown great resilience compared to other financial flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) (World Bank, 2010). In 2010, remittance flows seemed to bounce back to levels registered in pre-crisis years. Total amounts of recorded remittances were estimated to have exceeded USD 440 billion in 2010, with the biggest share (USD 325 billion) being sent to developing countries. This represents an increase of almost 6 per cent, compared to remittances recorded in 2009 (USD 416 billion globally, of which USD 307 billion went to developing countries) (ibid.). Growth rates of about 7–8 per cent are expected for the coming three years (2011–2013), which would result in global remittances exceeding the USD 500 billion benchmark in 2012 and reaching USD 536 billion in 2013 (with USD 375 and USD 404 billion, respectively, going to developing countries) (World Bank, 2011a).

Overall, it appears that the changes in the labour markets and patterns of migration caused by the global economic crisis were relatively short-lived. Nevertheless, a key question for the future is how will the slow general economic recovery affect employment prospects for migrant workers? Job recovery often lags behind output recovery, thus creating a need for more emphasis on job-creation measures that specifically include or target migrants. To date, however, migrants have not been targeted in any economic stimulus measures launched by governments.
V. The relevance of human trafficking

The year 2010 marked the tenth anniversary of the United Nations Anti-Trafficking (Palermo) Protocol, yet there have been few indications of a decrease in human trafficking since the protocol was signed.

The global number of trafficked persons – including adults and children in forced labour, bonded labour, and forced prostitution – has remained high and was estimated at 12.3 million in 2010 (U.S. Department of State, 2010). Globally, almost 2 out of 1,000 people are victims of trafficking, while in Asia and the Pacific this ratio is as high as 3 per 1,000 inhabitants.

There are, nonetheless, indications that the international community is taking a more serious view of the problem. For example, the number of signatories to the Palermo Protocol has risen by almost 50 per cent in 10 years – from 80 signatories in 2000 to 117 signatories at the end of 2010. This is an important achievement that has coincided with an increase in the number of ratifications by countries of destination (for example, China and Ireland). However, according to the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 2010 Report, 62 ratifying countries have yet to convict a trafficker under laws in compliance with the Palermo Protocol, while 104 countries have no laws, policies or regulations to prevent victims’ deportation. There has also been progress at the regional and national level. On 14 December 2010, the European Parliament adopted the text of a new EU Directive on human trafficking, which replaces the Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. This represents an important step towards tougher action against human traffickers and stronger protection for victims. The Directive provides for criminal law to cover a wider range of activities, including grooming and sex tourism. It also provides for measures to improve the situation of children when dealing with prosecutions.

In 2010, as South Africa hosted the first Football World Cup on the African continent, renewed attention was given to the link between trafficking and sporting events. With considerable international concern that this event would contribute to a sharp increase in trafficking, primarily for the purpose of sexual exploitation, religious leaders, teachers, government and non-governmental stakeholders, as well as representatives from the private sector, came together to put forth a strong, effective and unified message against trafficking in persons during the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The aim of this initiative was to inform communities of the dangers and warning signs of human trafficking, as well as to better inform communities on how to identify victims, to whom to refer cases of trafficking, and how to assist victims.

22 The new Directive applies to trafficking of humans for the sex industry as well as for labour exploitation. Reforms include a broader definition of trafficking (e.g. forced begging, forced removal of organs, forced criminal activity), longer penalties for violators (10 years instead of 8), child protection, no prosecution of victims, providing legal services and health services for victims, and establishing or strengthening policies in Member States that aim to prevent trafficking. See: http://www.ungift.org/doc/knowledgехub/resource-centre/Governments/DIRECTIVE_OF_THE_EUROPEAN_PARLIAMENT_AND_OF_THE_COUNCIL.pdf (accessed on 4 July 2011).
GLOBAL POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Global Forum on Migration and Development becomes more action-oriented

The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD)23 – a voluntary, intergovernmental, non-binding and informal consultative process – was hosted in November 2010 by the Government of Mexico in Puerto Vallarta and attended by 131 governments. This fourth meeting of the GFMD included, for the first time, a round-table discussion on the linkages between climate change, migration and development, gender and family, and a “common space” that allowed for an interface between government and civil society participants. Additionally, the IOM-initiated and Global Migration Group (GMG) endorsed handbook, Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning, was presented to States. The publication of this handbook and its subsequent endorsement at the GFMD IV paved the way for its implementation in developing countries that seek to ensure that migration is fully taken into account in their development plans.

In all, discussions between States at GFMD IV produced 47 recommendations, most addressed directly to participating States, which may implement them, at the national, and as applicable, regional and international levels.

In 2011, the GFMD under the Swiss chair, introduced a new format for the process. Instead of organizing a full annual GFMD meeting, the 2011 Chair has organized a series of smaller, focused and action-oriented meetings around the world in support of its flagship theme: Taking Action on Migration and Development – Coherence, Capacity and Cooperation. Under three thematic clusters: labour mobility and development; addressing irregular migration through coherent migration and development strategies; and planning tools for evidence-based migration and development policies, some 14 meetings were held in various locations around the world. The GFMD 2011 concluding debate will present the preliminary results of an assessment of GFMD achievements since its creation.

Also of related interest, on 19 May 2011, the General Assembly of the United Nations held a one-day informal thematic debate on international migration and development. This debate was intended to build on the on-going dialogue on international migration and development within the framework of GFMD, and to contribute to the process leading to the second High Level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development, to be held by the General Assembly in 2013.

Regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs)

Regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) are privileged information-sharing and discussion platforms for States with an interest in the promotion of cooperation in the field of migration management. Many RCPs made major advancements in 2010 and 2011.

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23 The GFMD is open to all States Members and Observers of the United Nations, with the goal of advancing understanding and cooperation on the mutually reinforcing relationship between migration and development, and fostering practical and action-oriented outcomes. For more information, see: http://www.gfmd.org/en/process.html (accessed on 24 June 2011).
The Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) convened for the first time in ten years of existence at the ministerial level in Windhoek, Namibia, in November 2010. The aim was to promote reflection on how best to facilitate improved regional cooperation on migration and the development of migration policy. Recommendations were made on how to improve and harmonize regional migration data, expedite ratification of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons, increase public awareness of the dangers of irregular migration, and reduce the impact of brain drain within the region.\(^{24}\)

In April 2011, Bangladesh hosted the fourth Ministerial Consultation of the Colombo Process, with discussions focusing on the promotion and protection of migrants’ rights, welfare and dignity, the improvement of services for migrants, capacity-building activities for governments and national partners, and better information exchanges regarding migrant workers. IOM prepared a study (Labour Migration from Colombo Process Countries: Good Practices, Challenges and Ways Forward) reviewing existing policies and programmes and highlighting a number of good practices in labour migration management.\(^ {25}\)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development Regional Consultative Process on Migration (IGAD–RCP) held its first meeting as an RCP to discuss and agree a plan of action. Other advancements were made by the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (see Regional Overviews).

In terms of gaps in the global RCP landscape, interest in the development of new RCPs advanced among the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) group of countries, who continue to pursue the possibility of establishing an RCP in the region. In the Caribbean – the only region that is lacking in RCP coverage – discussions continued among a small group of Caribbean countries with a view of putting in place a platform for regular deliberations on common migration issues.

These developments signal the growing interest among countries across the migration spectrum in coming together to deliberate on migration issues. The role that RCPs and similar interregional forums dealing with migration issues can play in addressing migration policy coherence within and between regions is now widely acknowledged. However, meaningful interaction between such forums is often impeded by the uneven capacities of RCPs. IOM continues to focus on capacity enhancement at the request of RCP-participating States, in order to put them on a firmer footing towards predictability and regularity of meetings – crucial factors in building and sustaining trust and promoting cooperation within and between regions. In line with the growing interest in promoting cooperation across regions and in the cross-fertilization of ideas and practices – as also recommended at the 2009 Global RCP Meeting– the Government of Botswana and IOM hosted the Third Global Meeting of Chairs and Secretariats of RCPs under the broad theme of “Enhancing cooperation on migration through dialogue and capacity building”, in 2011.

The 2011 consultation, like its predecessors, allowed representatives from the various RCPs to exchange information and good practices on migration issues of interest to individual RCPs. In addition, it encouraged a discussion of possible improvements that States could make to

\(^ {24}\) The complete list of recommendations and MIDSA goals can be found at: [http://www.migrationdialogue.org/midsa/](http://www.migrationdialogue.org/midsa/) (accessed on 4 July 2011).

their respective RCPs in terms of organizational and operational arrangements, to enhance the regularity with which they meet and thereby increase their effectiveness. In doing so, this consultation served a capacity-building function in addition to further strengthening the role played by RCPs in international migration. It also examined the potential relationship with other mechanisms in facilitating inter-State dialogue, partnership and cooperation on migration at the regional, interregional and global levels, such as GFMD and HLD.

**Environmental and climate change: Policymakers increasingly recognize the implications for migration**

Although there has been a recent upsurge of interest in the effects of climate and environmental change and natural disasters on migration, most States have yet to determine what their national response policies will be. Indeed, international cooperation mechanisms as well as regional and national-level policies to manage environmental migration flows are still at an early stage of development. Existing policies for managing such flows tend to be ad hoc, rather than being part of a more coherent system of migration management. Nevertheless, several countries have taken steps to promote consultation and debate on potential solutions to problems of environmental migration or to formulate legislation, thereby placing migration and the environment more firmly on political agendas.

At the national level, the United States enacted its Temporary Protected Status (TPS) legislation as a measure of temporary protection for the Haitian migrants already in country and unable to return as a result of the 2010 earthquake. This was accompanied by a provision to temporarily suspend deportations. Currently, TPS and similar legislation in other countries (such as in Sweden and Finland), enacted on an exceptional basis, are the only legal instruments available specifically designed for this purpose, although they are not intended as measures to facilitate migration in the face of natural disasters or other environmental events (Martin, 2009). In Bangladesh, the national-level Policy Dialogue on Environment, Climate Change and Migration, organized by IOM and the BRAC Development Institute (BDI) in May 2010. The policy dialogue was the first of its kind aimed at fostering debate on the nexus between the environment, climate change and migration in Bangladesh and encouraging dialogue among concerned stakeholders in development, government and civil society (IOM, 2010c). In March 2010, the Kenyan Government presented a draft national policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs), which considers displacement due to conflict, natural disasters and development projects, with three main objectives: 1) to ensure adequate protection for IDPs; 2) to prevent future displacement; and 3) to fulfil the country’s obligations under international law (IDMC/NRC, 2010a).

Kenya’s draft policy is in accord with the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Africa (the Kampala Convention). The Kampala Convention is the first regional legally binding instrument of its kind globally that obliges States to protect and assist IDPs. The Convention applies to displacement due to a wide range of causes, such as conflict and natural or man-made disasters, as well as from development projects, and it provides standards for the protection of people from arbitrary displacement, the protection of IDPs while they are displaced and durable solutions to their displacement. Adopted by the African Union (AU) in October 2009, the Convention must be ratified by 15 countries to enter into force and become legally binding. To date, it has been signed by
31 African Union Member States (11 in 2010)\textsuperscript{26} and only ratified by 6 in total,\textsuperscript{27} with Uganda being the first to ratify the Convention in February 2010.

As mentioned above, for the first time since its inception in 2007, the GFMD held a dedicated round-table discussion on the relevance and impact of climate change on migration and development during its 2010 meeting in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. The inclusion of environmental and climate change-related issues in the discussion is a clear indication not of the increasing global importance of these issues. It also demonstrate that global discussions on migration and development can no longer ignore the integral role of environmental and climate change.

Finally, at the global level, the Cancun Agreements reached at the 2010 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancun, Mexico represent perhaps the single most important policy outcome of 2010 on the issue of migration and environment. The objectives defined by the Cancun Agreements included, among others, reducing greenhouse gas emissions and providing assistance to vulnerable groups worldwide in adapting to the impacts of climate change. More specifically, the Cancun Adaptation Framework, included as an element of the Cancun Agreements, explicitly refers to migration and displacement within the context of adaptation:

\textit{The Conference of the Parties}

14. \textit{Invites} all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, by undertaking, inter alia, the following:

... (f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and international levels; (UNFCCC Conference of the Parties Decision 1/CP.16)\textsuperscript{28}

Referring to migration in the Agreements is an important step towards a more concerted global effort to address the issue of climate change-induced migration and to promote concrete actions to reduce vulnerability and build resilience, particularly among those most affected in developing countries.

Before looking at the regional migration trends for 2010/2011, there are two other global developments that are worthy of note. First, a non-binding code of practice on the international recruitment of health personnel (with a focus on fair recruitment and employment conditions for migrant health personnel, as well as on refraining from recruiting in countries facing critical health-care shortages) was adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2010. Second, a report by the International Labour Organization (ILO) introducing a rights-based approach provided a comprehensive synthesis of all applicable principles and guidelines for formulating sound migration policies (United Nations, 2010).

\textsuperscript{26} In 2010, these were: Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and the United Republic of Tanzania.

\textsuperscript{27} To date, these are: the Central African Republic, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia. See: \url{http://www.internal-displacement.org/kampala-convention} (accessed on 20 June 2011).

\textsuperscript{28} See: \url{http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2} (accessed on 19 April 2011).
AFRICA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Importance of intraregional migration

Despite a common perception in the media that Europe risks being swamped by a flood of migrants from Africa, the percentage of Africans migrating abroad remains relatively modest. According to official data, some 30 million Africans (about 3% of the population) have migrated internationally (World Bank, 2011b). About two-thirds of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa move to other countries in the region. Only 4 per cent of all migrants living in OECD countries come from sub-Saharan Africa (ibid.). In 2010, 64 per cent of the sub-Saharan migration was intraregional and employment-related, directed mainly towards countries such as Burkina Faso, Kenya and South Africa. Migration flows in West Africa are perhaps the best example of this intraregional inclination, with more than 70 per cent of movements within the subregion; in Southern and East Africa, interregional movements account for 66 and 52 per cent of flows, respectively (World Bank, 2011c; IOM, 2011b). By contrast, the large majority (90%) of migrants from North Africa travel to countries outside the region (World Bank, 2011c). Overall, about half of Africa’s migrants live outside the continent, the majority of them in Europe.

Remittances back to pre-crisis levels

Sub-Saharan Africa has, perhaps, been less affected by the global economic crisis than other developing regions in the world. After a modest reduction in remittance flows (by USD 0.8 billion, to USD 20.6 billion in 2009) flows increased again in 2010 (up to USD 21.5 billion), reaching the level recorded in 2008. A recent continent-wide household survey revealed that, in 2010, an estimated 30 million Africans living abroad sent over USD 40 billion back home, representing 2.6 per cent of Africa’s GDP and four times the total amount recorded in 1990 (World Bank, 2011c). Remittances are the African continent’s largest source of net foreign inflows after foreign direct investment (FDI). The cost of sending remittances to sub-Saharan Africa is high, averaging almost 10 per cent of a typical USD 200 transaction, compared with less than 8 per cent for most other developing regions (ibid.).

Ongoing interest in regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs)

Governments in key regions of Africa renewed their dialogue on migration in 2010, within the framework of informal regional processes on migration. As noted earlier, the year 2010 saw the first ministerial meeting of the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) process in 10 years and, in Eastern Africa, the IGAD-RCP held its first meeting as an RCP to discuss and agree a plan of action. Furthermore, interest in the establishment of new RCPs advanced significantly among Central African countries, which decided to constitute an RCP for the region, involving countries that were already a part of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

East African Common Market entered into force

On 20 November 2009, Heads of State from the East African Community (EAC) signed a Protocol establishing the East African Common Market, which entered into force on 1 July 2010. This protocol “provides for ‘Four Freedoms’ – namely, the free movement of goods,
labour, services and capital” — in the subregion. Such free movement regimes provide a basis for well-managed south–south migration, which, in turn, can contribute to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 

While African countries have created half a dozen free trade areas, designed to facilitate free trade and freedom of movement since the late 1960s, outcomes are still unknown (UC Davis, 2010a).

**Elections and impasse in Côte d’Ivoire**

The November 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire resulted in a violent political standoff as the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo refused to hand over power to his political rival Alassane Ouattara, despite the evidence from Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that the latter had won the election. The election standoff came to an end in April 2011, when troops loyal to internationally recognized President Alassane Ouattara arrested former president Gbagbo, but the four months of intense fighting between forces loyal to the two sides had resulted in hundreds of deaths and extensive displacement within and from the country. As of 25 March 2011, the violence had resulted in over 462 deaths.

On 15 April 2011, OCHA estimated that around 1 million people had been displaced within the country, while UNHCR reported that more than 147,000 people had fled to Liberia (USAID, 2011).

**Referendum in South Sudan**

On 9 January 2011, the referendum on the self-determination of the status of Southern Sudan revealed overwhelming support in favour of secession (effective on 9 July 2011). While the voting process was orderly and peaceful, in the run-up as well as in the post-referendum period, the movement of massive numbers of Southern Sudanese living in the north (estimated at 1.5–2 million) towards the south has been recorded. The majority of them were previously working in Khartoum and other economic centres in the north and decided to return home, either because of fear of reprisals or in anticipation of better economic prospects. More than 120,000 Southern Sudanese had returned prior to the referendum – at the rate of an average of 2,000 people per day since mid-December 2010. After the referendum, clashes in the provinces along the disputed border between Northern and Southern Sudan (particularly in the oil-rich Abyei Province and in South Kordofan) displaced some 140,000 people and increased the risk of renewed hostilities (UNHCR, 2011c).

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32 IOM’s Out-of-Country Registration and Voting Programme enabled 60,000 registered voters in eight different countries to participate in the referendum. For more information, see: [http://www.southernsudanocv.org/](http://www.southernsudanocv.org/) (accessed on 4 July 2011).
Over 1 million displaced due to Haiti’s earthquake at the beginning of 2010, marking the start of complex humanitarian responses

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the year 2010 began inauspiciously for the Americas. On 12 January, the magnitude 7.0 earthquake that devastated Haiti killed more than 300,000 people and displaced around 1.5 million. As of May 2011, IOM found that 680,000 people were still living in informal sites in Port-au-Prince and the provinces, facing particular vulnerability as a consequence of the annual rainy/hurricane season and a cholera epidemic (IOM, 2011c). Although this represents a significant decrease (56%) compared to the estimated 1,500,000 internally displaced people in July 2010, it still suggests that much remains to be done in terms of humanitarian assistance and sustainable reconstruction and recovery. Indeed, displacement induced by natural disasters is often temporary. Nonetheless, return movements can take time as the appropriate provisions need to be made, including access to land and property. Since just after the earthquake, IOM has been coordinating and managing displaced persons in camps, and more than 1.3 million people have been registered and referred to services and programmes, including those relating to reconstruction and return.33 As part of the international community’s humanitarian assistance efforts, IOM played a major role in the provision of shelter and acted as the major consignee for non-food items distributed to affected families. The information collected from camps by IOM is also used in the formulation of reconstruction and recovery policies. Furthermore, IOM is involved in land and property issues (one of the main obstacles to reconstruction), community-based infrastructure and violence reduction through the US-funded PREPEP Programme (Programme de Revitalisation et de Promotion de l’Entente et de la Paix), as well as community shelter assistance programmes.

United States still the top country of destination, with Hispanic population nearly doubling over last decade

In 2010, the United States hosted around 43 million foreign nationals, representing 13.5 per cent of the total US population (World Bank, 2011b). Results of the 2010 Census indicate that Hispanics34 made up 16.3 per cent of the total population and that the population increased from 35.3 million in 2000 to 50.5 million in 2010 (Pew Hispanic Center, 2011a). About 11.6 million immigrants came from Mexico, which means that almost one out of three immigrants originated in Mexico (ibid.).

The estimated number of irregular migrants in 2010 remained at about 11.2 million, after a two-year decline from a peak of 12 million in 2007, according to the Pew Hispanic Center (2011b). It is likely that this decline is linked to the overall decline in migration from Mexico since 2007, due to the economic crisis. Although the economy has begun to recover, this has not yet been reflected in terms of employment.

34 Please note that “Hispanics” include both foreign-born and those of Hispanic origin born in the United States.
Remittances sent from the United States remained relatively stable during the economic crisis, compared to the impact on other economic factors in 2010: total remittances sent back to Latin American and Caribbean countries were about USD 58.1 billion, which represented an increase of 1.2 billion when compared to 2009 (World Bank, 2011b). Remittances to Latin America are expected to grow further, given the initial stabilization and revitalized growth of the US economy indicated at the beginning of 2011 – for example, in the first quarter of 2011, the GDP grew by 1.8 per cent; the unemployment rate declined by 0.6 per cent (down to 9%) and is expected to further decrease to 7.8 per cent in 2012. While remittances declined sharply in 2009 and remained almost flat in 2010, the first quarter of 2011 recorded an increase of about 7 per cent compared to previous years (World Bank, 2011a).

Immigration reform stalled in United States, while controversy ensued over state-level immigration laws

Highly politicized immigration debates led to further stalling of comprehensive immigration reform in the United States. Although anti-immigrant sentiments are not a new phenomenon, particularly with regard to irregular migration, they seem to be amplified during economic slowdowns, particularly when unemployment rates are high among the native population. The DREAM Act,35 put forth on the US Congress agenda in September 2010, which would have legalized certain categories of young migrants. This Act, however, lacked bipartisan support and had not passed the Senate by the end of the year. However, the urgent need for immigration reform and the US Government’s determination to advocate for the passage of the DREAM Act was reaffirmed by President Obama in May 2011 in El Paso, Texas, who stressing that, the large flows of immigrants into the United States throughout history have made the country “stronger and more prosperous”. He also pointed out that periods of economic decline are often met with fear and resentment towards newcomers, but underlined his conviction that immigration remains good for the US economy and that there is a need to attract skilled workers.36

At the state level, controversial legislation in Arizona made headlines in April 2010 with the passage of Senate Bill 1070. Several provisions – such as those authorizing law enforcement authorities to question a person’s immigration status if there is reasonable suspicion of irregularity, and requiring immigrants to carry proof of status – were strongly criticized and challenged in court. They were temporarily suspended by the US District Court in July. In the meantime, however, 23 other American states introduced similar restrictive provisions on immigration, which is a reflection of local populations’ perceptions of immigration (MPI, 2010b).37

At federal and provincial levels, Canadian immigration reforms focused primarily on students and the highly skilled

As a consequence of the global economic crisis, the Canadian Government initially reduced the size of its skilled-migrant programme. However, in 2010, with the situation on the labour market improving, labour visa arrangements were fine-tuned to ensure that the country would

35 The purpose of the Development, Relief and Education of Alien Minors Act, also called the DREAM Act, is to provide qualifying individuals with an opportunity to enlist in the military or to go to college as a pathway to citizenship, which they would not otherwise have without this legislation. Supporters of the DREAM Act believe it is vital for the people who would benefit from it and also for the United States as a whole. It would give undocumented immigrant students a chance to contribute back to the country and a chance to utilize their hard-earned education and talents. See: http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/dream/index.htm#facts (accessed on 19 June 2011).
37 For more details, see: http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=809 (accessed on 19 June 2011).
have access to the precise mix of skills needed to contribute to economic recovery. Changes to immigration laws throughout the country in 2010 resulted in a combination of restrictions in certain foreign labour programmes and other measures to increase highly skilled immigration levels. At the federal level, reforms were made to the Federal Skilled Worker Program in order to reduce application backlogs and place greater emphasis on economic recovery. The biggest change was the creation of a cap system, which established a processing limit of 20,000 applications, with a maximum of 1,000 per occupation. This affected mainly those who fulfilled the requirements but lacked a formal job offer from a Canadian employer (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2010). Occupations listed under this programme were also reduced from 38 to 29. In four provinces (British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec), under Canada’s Provincial Nominee Programs, restriction levels were eased for students who have completed their studies in Canada, thereby facilitating access to residency (ibid.).

**New policy responses needed as migration patterns shift within Latin America**

Intraregional mobility in Latin America is not a new phenomenon, although it is becoming increasingly important. New migration patterns are emerging in Latin America, with new migrants coming from outside the region – particularly from other Southern countries. Notably, flows include sub-Saharan Africans travelling to Brazil by boat and then moving to other South American countries, with some migrants managing to travel by sea directly to Argentina, Chile or Uruguay (*The Miami Herald*, 2010; Reuters, 2009; United Nations Multimedia, 2009). These migrants mainly come from Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia and Zimbabwe, and their presence has become more visible (although their numbers are significantly smaller) in Argentina and neighbouring countries (such as Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay) in the past few years (ibid). Migrants also come from South Asia as, for example, in Ecuador, where the numbers of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Nepali and Sri Lankan migrants have increased over the last three years by 300 per cent (BBC, 2010). Although there have been some policy responses to facilitate migrants’ access to legal residence and to provide protection of their social and human rights (including the right to access health care and education), discrimination and exclusion are often reported. In a few cases, the increased presence of migrants created social tensions, which, in turn, sparked anti-immigrant sentiments. In Argentina in 2010, for instance, a group of migrants (mainly from Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru) were attacked by groups of native Argentines after homeless migrants occupied a local park in Buenos Aires protesting poor housing conditions.\(^{38}\) Irregular migration is also an inevitable aspect of increased immigration flows. In 2010, in an effort to respond to high irregular migration levels, Panama decided to grant an amnesty to any irregular immigrant who had resided in Panama for more than two years.\(^{39}\) It is estimated that around 20,000 irregular migrants benefited from this regularization programme.

**Intraregional migration, migration and development, and economic recovery: Key topics in regional processes and forums in Latin America**

Regional mechanisms such as MERCOSUR.\(^{40}\) (Mercado Común del Sur), CAN (Comunidad Andina de Naciones) and UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas) recognize the

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40 Further information on MERCOSUR is available at: [www.mercosur.int](http://www.mercosur.int)
importance of free movements of persons, as well as trade and economic cooperation, within South America. MERCOSUR even promotes the regularization of irregular migrants, considering enhanced mobility to be a positive factor in increased regional integration. On 11 March 2011, the Constituency Treaty of UNASUR entered into force, making free movement within South America region a closer reality (UNASUR, 2011).

In other major forums, such as the Ibero-American Forum on Migration and Development, government officials from the 22 Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries that are members of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), met in San Salvador in 2010 to discuss the financial crisis and its continued impact on migrants and their families in 2010 (IOM, 2010d). Other key topics included strategies to harness the development potential of migration and to promote and uphold the human rights of migrants, regardless of their immigration status. In 2011, the annual ministerial meeting was held in the Dominican Republic under the theme Migration and Labour: Co-responsibility among the States. Similar thematic areas were also reflected in the convening of the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) (also known as the Puebla Process) in May 2010 in Mexico. The meeting marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Puebla Process, at which ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the process and strengthened regional cooperation on migration. In addition, the meeting focused specifically on migration’s impact on the family, and recognizing the challenges posed by extraregional immigration (RCM, 2010).
ASIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Millions of people displaced by several natural disasters that hit the Asian region in 2010

Asia was hit in 2010 by several natural disasters that affected millions of people and displaced many of them internally. Asian countries dominated the Natural Risk Index 2010, with Bangladesh and Indonesia as the top two at “extreme risk” of natural disasters. Meanwhile, other Asian countries such as Afghanistan, China, India, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka were among the top 15 countries affected (IRIN, 2010). In terms of numbers affected by extreme weather events, 249.2 million were affected in 2010, with the overwhelming majority affected by floods (176.6 million), followed by droughts (66.5 million) and storms (6.1 million) (EM-DAT/CRED, 2011). Between July and August 2010, Pakistan was faced with severe floods that displaced over 11 million people. Further east, flooding in China displaced several million people. Storms primarily impacted Bangladesh, China and the Philippines (ibid.).

Asia still a region of high emigration and among the top remittance receivers globally

At the beginning of the global economic crisis, several forecasts predicted significant reductions in migration and remittance flows from and within Asia. However, available evidence indicates similarities with what happened following the previous Asian financial crisis – relatively short-term effects with uneven, but overall moderate, impacts on countries across the region (IOM, 2009). This was partly due to increasing oil prices (which more than doubled between early 2009 and the first quarter in 2011) and the recovering economies in oil-exporting countries (destination countries of a significant share of Asian migrants), which maintained remittance flows to South-East Asian countries (World Bank, 2011a).

In 2010, 5 out of the top 10 emigration countries were in the Asian region – notably, Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan and the Philippines (World Bank, 2011b). In 2010, migration within the region to countries or regions such as Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong SAR and the Republic of Korea represented an important migration stream. A significant number of migrant workers from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines migrated to Malaysia and Singapore, while Thailand was a major destination for migrants from neighbouring Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar (IOM, forthcoming). However, temporary labour migration towards the Middle East and, in particular, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries represented the dominant flow. The latest data from 2009 suggest that approximately 97 per cent of migrants from India and Pakistan and 87 per cent of migrants from Sri Lanka migrated to GCC countries (ibid.).

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41 The Natural Risk Index was created by Maplecroft – a global risk analysis agency, based in the United Kingdom, specializing in social, political and environmental risk assessment. See www.maplecroft.com
42 Please note that affected includes displacement but also homeless and evacuated. The countries/regions considered are: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Macau – China, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam. The events considered are complex disasters, drought, earthquakes, floods and storms. See: http://www.emdat.be
Growing population rates and high rates of unemployment in several countries can be a source of pressure on the local economy, and emigration is often seen as part of a viable solution. In the case of Viet Nam, for example, the largest share of the population is aged 15–19 years and its integration into the national labour market represents a serious challenge for the Vietnamese Government. Providing education and training to this young workforce could facilitate employment opportunities abroad, thereby alleviating pressure on the local economy. Similarly, countries such as Bangladesh, with its capital Dhaka (one of the fastest growing cities in the world) expected to host over 20 million people by 2025, are likely to remain among the top emigration countries of the world (UN-Habitat, 2009).

Despite a temporary slowdown in some countries, as a result of the economic crisis in 2008–2009, remittances continued to play an important role in fostering development in the region, with total remittances estimated to have reached USD 170 billion in 2010. In the first quarter of 2011, Bangladesh and Pakistan recorded an increase of 11.4 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively, although nationals of both countries were highly affected by the crisis in the MENA region. Not surprisingly, the top emigration countries were also among the top remittance-receiving countries (with China and India, for example, receiving USD 53.1 billion and USD 51.3 billion, respectively) (World Bank, 2011a). However, in terms of percentage of GDP, remittance flows to Bangladesh and the Philippines represented a higher share at 12 per cent each, while the percentages for China and India was significantly smaller (World Bank, 2011b).

Measures have also been taken by governments to facilitate the sending of remittances. In the case of Bangladesh, which received USD 11.1 billion in remittances in 2010, the government approved the creation of an Expatriate Welfare Bank in May 2010 to facilitate low-cost remittance-sending to Bangladesh. The bank also provides loans at a maximum interest rate of 10 per cent to Bangladeshis after they obtain an employment contract abroad (UC Davis, 2010c).

**Governments across Asia take steps to increase migrant welfare, support and protection**

Protection of migrant workers and increased support to migrant workers abroad were clearly on the political agenda in 2010 as governments continued to take steps to improve migrant protection and support services. This has been done through new labour migration policies, signing of agreements or memoranda of understanding with key destination countries, and other measures to improve transparency in recruitment and increased awareness-raising among migrant workers.

In 2010, both Pakistan and the Philippines either put forth new labour migration policies or amended existing ones. Pakistan’s National Labour Policy 2010 (awaiting Cabinet approval) includes a comprehensive social insurance scheme for Pakistanis abroad, raises the minimum wage for migrants and establishes a labour market information system (IOM, forthcoming). The Philippines 1995 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act was amended in 2010 to include stricter penalties related to illegal recruitment, as well as the extension of welfare services among other provisions (ibid.). In terms of new memoranda of understanding, Indonesia signed several in 2010 with a number of destination countries, such as Australia,

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Kuwait, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. In particular, the amended MoU with Malaysia called for increased protection of domestic workers (UC Davis, 2010a and 2010b).

In addition to policies and agreements, other protection measures were put in place in 2010, such as Sri Lanka’s new system that requires all new migrant employment contracts to be signed in front of a Ministry of the Board of Foreign Employment representative, prior to a migrant’s departure, so that the representative can explain the terms and conditions of the contract. Similarly, in Indonesia, the new Ministerial Regulation 14/2010 also requires migrants to sign contracts before an official of the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, during pre-departure briefings (IOM, forthcoming). In an effort to raise awareness about migration and overseas employment and to facilitate access to related information, Nepal established a Migrant Resource Centre (MRC), which serves to counsel prospective and current migrants (ibid.).

**Efforts made to curtail irregular migration from and within the region**

Irregular migration within and from Asia remains a primary issue. In an effort to regularize the situation of migrants in Thailand, the Thai Government introduced a registration programme that would grant a two-year work renewal permit to those who completed a nationality and biographical verification process by the end of February 2010. This process applied to certain categories and primarily targeted the 60,000 migrant workers (mainly Burmese) whose permits were due to expire in January 2010. Meanwhile, the Korean Government granted amnesty to 178,200 irregular migrants, authorizing their departure (without payment of the usual fines) between May and September 2010 (UC Davis, 2010c).

At a regional level, the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime organized different workshops throughout the year 2010 – for example, on regional cooperation regarding refugees and irregular movements and on repatriation and reintegration assistance. In March 2011, it held its fourth ministerial meeting, discussing possible strategies for revitalizing cooperation on trafficking in persons (including, for the first time, a proposal for a regional cooperation framework to address the irregular movement of people and to combat people smuggling) and reaffirming the commitment of participating States to effective cooperation on border control and law enforcement initiatives to combat people smuggling.⁴⁶

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⁴⁶ For more information, see: [http://www.baliprocess.net/](http://www.baliprocess.net/) (accessed on 20 June 2011).
EUROPE REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Slow recovery from crisis but unemployment challenges continue

In 2010, Europe’s recovery from the global economic and financial crisis seemed to be on the right track, albeit incomplete. The European Union (EU) estimated a GDP average growth rate of 1.8 per cent for 2010 (a significant improvement over the -4.2% in 2009)\(^{47}\) but at the same time, the average unemployment rate increased from 8.9 per cent in 2009 to 9.6 per cent in December 2010. The foreign labour force, in particular, continued to be more likely to be jobless than their native-born counterparts (IOM, 2010a; MPI, 2010a). For instance, in Spain, at the end of 2007, 12.4 per cent of immigrants were jobless, compared with 7.9 per cent of native-born Spaniards. By mid-2010, those figures had gone up to 30.2 per cent and 18.1 per cent, respectively (ibid.). In Germany, “the unemployment rate among migrants in summer 2010 was almost twice that of Germans – 12.4 compared to 6.5 per cent” (UC Davis, 2010a). In the United Kingdom, the situation affected various groups of immigrants in different ways: Eastern and Central European nationals were relatively unscathed by the rise in joblessness, unlike migrants from Africa, Bangladesh and Pakistan (ibid.). In Southern Italy, the unemployment of seasonal workers led to unprecedented social tensions and anti-migrant riots (The Economist, 2010). However, unemployment also hit nationals – in some cases generating new emigration flows from and within Europe. Ireland, for instance, has experienced significant waves of nationals leaving the country to look for better work opportunities, due to its recent economic crisis. At the end of 2010, net emigration from Ireland reached about 60,000 people (compared to 7,800 in 2009), making it the highest level since 1989. It is estimated that the cumulative net emigration may total 160,000 people, over the period 2009 to 2013, if the labour market situation does not improve (ESRI, 2010).

The Stockholm Programme and tighter control of external EU borders

From a policy perspective, issues related to migration and asylum remained a priority for the EU throughout 2010. In line with the objectives of the Global Approach to Migration,\(^{48}\) adopted by the European Council in 2005 and confirmed in 2006, several efforts were made to foster partnerships with third countries to promote comprehensive and coherent migration policies – including, for instance, the facilitation of labour migration and the improvement of border management.

On 22 November 2010, the European Commission adopted a Communication called EU Internal Security Strategy in Action,\(^{49}\) recommending several actions targeting the most urgent security threats facing Europe. In this regard, the Commission was planning to “strengthen security through border management” and decided to establish a European external border surveillance system (EUROSUR); identify “hot spots” at the external borders; issue joint reports

\(^{47}\) Some countries, such as Bulgaria, Ireland and Spain, had a GDP growth rate of only 0.1–0.2 per cent, according to Eurostat. See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database (accessed on 20 June 2011).

\(^{48}\) The EU Global Approach to Migration originated from a need for a common, global immigration policy, widely recognized and encouraged by the European Commission and EU Member States. Partnership with third countries, solidarity and shared responsibility are at the core of the approach, with the aim of promoting comprehensive and coherent policies that address migration-related issues, bringing together different policy areas (development, social affairs and employment, external relations and justice, and home affairs) and taking both short-term actions and a longer-term vision to address the root causes of migration and forced migration. See: http://www.europa.eu-union.org/articles/es/article_7589_es.htm (accessed on 20 June 2011).

on human trafficking, human smuggling and the smuggling of illicit goods, as a basis for joint operations.

Also in 2010, the European Council presented the Stockholm Programme – “An open and secure Europe, serving and protecting the citizen”. This multi-annual programme (2010–2014) defines strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the areas of freedom, security and justice. “The EU strategy has two major components: more effective control over external borders to preserve internal freedom of movement, and cooperation with sending countries to accept the return of their citizens and to cooperate to reduce illegal out-migration” (UC Davis, 2010a). To this end, “the Stockholm Programme expanded the role of the European Union (EU) Border Agency Frontex\(^{50}\) and provided the agency with a budget of 83 million Euros in 2010 (compared to 6 million in 2005) (UC Davis, 2010c)”. Bilateral readmission agreements between the European Union Member States (EU MS) and countries of origin or transit are an integral part of the programme. One such agreement was concluded with Pakistan in October 2010: “The main objective of this agreement being to establish rapid and effective procedure for the identification and safe and orderly return of Pakistanis staying illegally in the EU territories.”\(^{51}\) Tighter EU border control not only contributed to more apprehensions (during the third quarter of 2010, 34,000 irregular border-crossings were detected, representing an increase of about 4,000, compared to the third quarter in 2009), but also deterred potential migrants from moving towards EU borders (during the first quarter of 2010, only 150 immigrants reached Italy and Malta, compared to the 5,200 for the first quarter of 2009 (Frontex, 2010).

However, the Stockholm Programme also includes several measures aimed at facilitating labour migration, highlighting the fact that migration remains a priority issue within the EU. In particular, it places the Global Approach to Migration and the external dimension of the EU’s migration policy (based on partnership with third countries) at the centre of the policy debate. The Stockholm Programme also emphasizes equal rights between third-country nationals and EU nationals, as well as the importance of integration programmes. Furthermore, the preparation of the Action Plan for the implementation of the Stockholm Programme between 2010 and 2014 promoted discussions within the European Commission on the development of community legislation in the field of seasonal employment and admission of third-country nationals in the context of intra-corporate transfers. The introduction of the European Blue Card system for skilled migration (adopted in 2009; implementation expected in 2011) represents one step towards such a common labour migration strategy (IOM, 2010a; Collett, 2010).

### The Europe 2020 Strategy and the creation of the Directorate-General for Home Affairs

On 17 June 2010, the European Council adopted the Europe 2020 Strategy (replacing the Lisbon Strategy (2000–2010), with the aim of promoting job growth and competitiveness in the EU. It also includes raising employment levels to 75 per cent and better integration of legal migrants.\(^{52}\) Although the demand for foreign workers decreased in certain economic

\(^{50}\) Frontex is a specialized and independent body tasked with coordinating the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security.


sectors during the crisis, the European Commission recognizes that “a long-term, well-organised legal immigration policy will continue to play an important role in filling labour shortages and meeting the EU’s demographic challenges”. The aim is to promote Europe’s sustainable economic development through free interregional movement, responding to the skill needs demanded by the labour market. In this regard, the Commission will focus on labour-matching mechanisms, skills recognition, the protection of seasonal workers and the effective implementation of integration policies, among other initiatives. The subsequent month, the Directorate-General (DG) for Home Affairs was created as a result of splitting the division of DG Justice, Freedom and Security into two Directorates-General. The new DG for Home Affairs aims at “ensuring European security and putting solidarity at the heart of the European migration policy. The Stockholm Action Plan constitutes the roadmap to implement these priorities” and should promote the creation of an “area without internal borders where EU citizens and third-country nationals may enter, move, live and work, bringing with them new ideas, capital and knowledge or filling gaps in the labour market, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy”.

Restrictive national policy measures and bilateral return agreements

At a national level, some governments decided to introduce stricter regulations for the entry of migrants – for instance, by reducing visa quotas, setting up points systems, limiting the acquisition of citizenship or conducting integration examinations. While often perceived by the media and general public as anti-migrant policies, these limitations were introduced essentially with the intention of mitigating the impact of the global economic crisis on domestic unemployment rates, which were increasing, particularly for foreign workers. On 4 December 2009, Switzerland decided to reduce the quota for workers outside the European Economic Area (EEA) by half – to a maximum of 2,000 for long stays and to 3,500 for temporary/short stays. Similarly, on 6 April, the United Kingdom introduced its first immigration cap on economic migration for non-EU migrants for the period 2011–12. Only 20,700 non-EU nationals will be permitted to work in skilled professions in the United Kingdom from April 2011, under Tier 2 of the Points Based System (PBS) system. Furthermore, “skilled and highly skilled migrants must now pass the Life in the UK Test if they want to demonstrate that they have met the knowledge of language and life (KOL) requirement for settlement in the UK”. Likewise, the Danish Government introduced a new points system, making family reunification more difficult. It also established new prerequisite conditions for foreigners intending to marry a Danish citizen: they must be at least 24 years of age and able to provide proof of financial independence and an active commitment to Danish society. Southern European countries such as Spain and Italy also started stipulating cooperation agreements with migrant-sending or transit countries, “offering aid and guest worker slots in exchange for cooperation to reduce illegal migration” (UC Davis, 2010c). These agreements led to an important drop in arrivals in the EU by sea, mainly in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Malta. However, tighter controls and

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54 Ibid.
57 For details of the requirement, see: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/newsfragments/44-kol-skilled (accessed on 27 June 2011).
cooperation regarding returns seemed to have only shifted the problem. Indeed, a sharp increase in overland arrivals in the north-eastern region of Greece via Turkey was noticed in 2010.\textsuperscript{60}

In addition to returns on the basis of bilateral agreements, there were also deportations of foreigners irregularly present on national soil. The mass deportation of Roma populations by the French Government led to prolonged protests by human rights activists and civil society organizations when a circular (dated 5 August 2010) from the Ministry of Interior that specifically targeted Roma populations was made public. Between 28 July and 17 August 2010, France sent back 979 Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, 828 of whom were accompanied to the border voluntarily, while 151 were expelled.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
Recovery from the crisis in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region: growth in GDP, remittances and salaries

In 2010, the MENA region overall experienced a significant recovery from the global economic crisis, mainly due to rising oil prices and production levels, as well as supportive fiscal policies. According to estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the GDP of the region grew by 4.2 per cent in 2010 (almost double the 2.3% increase experienced in 2009), while growth for 2011 was projected at an even higher level (4.8%) (IMF, 2010). The humanitarian crisis in Libya and the unsettled conditions in some neighbouring countries are likely to have the greatest impact on remittance-receiving countries in South Asia, which have an estimated 11 million expatriate workers living in the region (World Bank, 2011a).

A rise in average salaries (estimated at 6.6% for the years 2011, compared to 6.1% in 2010) made GCC countries popular for contractual workers within and outside the region.61 Indeed, the composition of the foreign labour force in the region appears to be increasingly mixed, with foreign workers originating from Africa, South America and the Far East, while difficulties in hiring from traditional source countries, such as India and the Philippines, seem to be promoting a rapidly growing Chinese presence.62 In 2010, 8 of the top 10 countries with the highest share of international migrants, relative to their native population, were located in the Middle East region – notably, Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, international migrants account for 87 per cent, 70 per cent and 69 per cent, respectively, of their total population.

Similar to GDP growth rates, remittance inflows to the MENA countries increased significantly in 2010, compared to 2009 (USD 35.4 billion and USD 33.7 billion, respectively) almost reaching the pre-crisis level recorded in 2008 (USD 39.5 billion). Remittances sent back home every year by temporary workers filling the labour shortages in low-skilled sectors represent a crucial source of income for many households and, in some cases, a significant share of the GDP of the country of origin. For example, remittances sent to Lebanon and Jordan in 2009 represented 22.4 per cent and 15.6 per cent of GDP respectively (World Bank, 2011b).

Fast-growing populations and widespread youth unemployment

The Middle East has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, and the vast majority of the population is under the age of 25.63 Consequently, the demand for employment opportunities will continue to remain high,64 with nationals looking more and more for highly skilled jobs as a result of increased spending on education in most GCC countries in recent

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62 Ibid.
63 Only Africa is likely to have a younger population by 2020.
64 However, the rapid population growth registered in recent years (4% annual growth rate in 2005–2009) in the six GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) is expected to gradually come to an end (with a projected average annual increase of 2.6% between 2009 and 2020), as a result of the decline in the natural population growth rate and the reduced influx of low-skilled migrants due to fewer job opportunities in labour-intensive work sectors such as construction. For more information, see: [http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/eb/Gulf2020part2.pdf](http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/eb/Gulf2020part2.pdf) (accessed on 20 June 2011).
years. However, with GCC economies relying on the growth of labour-intensive sectors (such as construction), the majority of the work opportunities may, for some time, continue to be for low-skilled workers with moderate salary expectations, thereby creating a mismatch between the expectations of the national labour force and the available jobs in the domestic labour market (EIU, 2009). In Saudi Arabia in 2010, for instance, the government faced increasing unemployment rates and difficulties in providing employment to its citizens. The fact that 4.7 million foreign workers outnumbered the 4.3 million Saudi nationals in the labour market (ILO, 2011) created additional pressure for policymakers, although foreign workers are mainly employed in low-skilled sectors of less interest to Saudi nationals. High unemployment rates among their citizens were also recorded in other GCC countries and in the Arab Mediterranean Region\(^\text{65}\) where the average unemployment rate in 2008 was almost 15 per cent of the total labour force and the official labour participation rate was below 46 per cent of the working-age population (compared to the world average of 61.2%). Moreover, unemployment mainly affected young, first-time job-seekers; indeed, the unemployment rate for nationals aged 14–24 was 21.6 per cent – well over the world average of 14 per cent. It was estimated that more than 1.5 million additional jobs would be needed annually in the coming 10 years in order to keep the number of unemployed stable (European Commission, 2010).\(^\text{66}\) This situation has led to alternative policy measures in many Middle East countries, such as in the United Arab Emirates, where the government tried to encourage employers to hire citizens rather than foreigners (UC Davis, 2010a).

**Improvements in the protection of migrants’ rights**

Another policy trend that emerged in 2010 relates to the protection of migrant workers’ rights. The impact of the global economic crisis (although overall it was less pronounced in the Middle East) was mainly felt by migrant workers (ILO, 2011). Their vulnerable situation is generally linked to a lack of legislation protecting foreign workers or a lack of enforcement of labour laws.\(^\text{67}\) In the United Arab Emirates, in 2010, several companies had to close. Some of these companies abandoned their foreign workers, leaving them without passports or pay. This was the case, for example, for over 300 Indians workers on a monthly salary of 800 dirhams (USD 217), who reported not having been paid for at least six months (UC Davis, 2010a). However, some governments in the region took some positive steps towards improving the working conditions and increasing respect of migrant rights. In August 2009, Bahrain modified the *kafeel* (sponsorship system) to make “the government rather than the employer the official sponsor of migrants, enabling them to change employers more easily” (UC Davis, 2010c). In Kuwait, after several reported abuses and pressure from civil society, the government finally decided to set minimum wages for expatriate workers in the private sector to ensure decent living conditions for them.\(^\text{68}\) In September 2010, the government also announced its intention to abolish the *kafeel* system in 2011 (Human Rights Watch, 2010), which would represent an important step towards greater respect of international migrants’ rights. However, not all countries in the region are committed to such changes. For example, although the Labour Minister of the United Arab Emirates acknowledged the need to “examine” the *kafeel* system,

\(^{65}\) Includes Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia, as well as the Occupied Palestinian Territory.


\(^{68}\) See Kuwait Times – Kuwait to enforce minimum wage. 1 April 2010. Available at: http://www.kuwaittimes.net/ (accessed on 27 June 2011).
he made it clear that the system was “here to stay” (UC Davis, 2011b). On the other hand, some of the main migrant-sending countries started stipulating bilateral labour migration agreements with main destination countries, with the aim of guaranteeing the rights of their nationals working abroad. In 2010, for instance, Lebanon and Nepal agreed to sign a bilateral agreement regularizing the process of labour migration between the two countries in order to reinforce the protection of Nepalese migrants in Lebanon and to reduce the problems caused by irregular channels of migration.69

**Ongoing displacement of Iraqi nationals**

The high number of displaced Iraqi nationals constitutes a major issue in this region. At the end of 2010, “one in ten Iraqis was still internally displaced, totalling 2.8 million people” (IDMC/NRC, 2010b) and the total number of displaced Iraqi nationals was estimated at 15 per cent of the total population (an estimated 30.2 million in 2010) (IDMC/NRC, 2010c). The majority of these people were displaced either because of the repression of Saddam Hussein’s government, as a result of the 2003 invasion, or following the 2006 bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which triggered a wave of sectarian violence. However, since 2009, few new displacements have been recorded outside the disputed northern areas of Kirkuk and Ninawa, although there were several attacks and threats against Christian communities in Iraq in 2010, which led to internal and international displacement mainly from Mosul and Baghdad (IOM, 2011d). In 2010, the overall number of displacements had been decreasing, up until September of that year; following the attacks on Baghdad’s Saidat al-Najat church, however, the last two months of 2010 saw an increase in the number of families displaced (ibid.). Issues of growing concern for displaced Iraqi nationals include the significant shortage of housing, the high number of displaced minors (often with no access to education), and the impact of prolonged-migration-induced demographic changes on social cohesion, religious coexistence and access to resources such as land, water and oil (ibid.).

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OCEANIA REGIONAL OVERVIEW

Shifts in migration patterns and an increase in asylum-seekers in Australia intensified the already highly politicized migration debate

In 2010, Oceania hosted 6 million international migrants. Although accounting for less than 3 per cent of the total global migrant stock, this number represented 16.8 per cent of Oceania’s total population of about 35 million people. This proportion is even higher for the main destination countries – Australia and New Zealand – where international migrants accounted for 21.9 per cent and 22.4 per cent, respectively, of the total national population (UNDESA, 2009).

Although significant migration flows are nothing new to the region, awareness of recent shifts in migration patterns led to fervent public debates and discussions in Australia in 2010, notably during the pre-election campaigns. The increasing arrivals of migrants by boat (2,849 in 2009 and 6,879 in 2010) was the subject of much political controversy (Phillips and Spinks, 2011).

Australia, which is traditionally a main destination for migrants from Europe and the United Kingdom, now receives large migrant contingents from Asia as well as from neighbouring countries within Oceania.

Changes to migration policy in Australia and New Zealand even more focused on the highly skilled

In 2010, the Government of Australia maintained its preference for attracting the highly skilled and carried out reforms to its General Skilled Migration (GSM) programme. The reforms, which redefine and sharpen selection criteria for this category of migrants, are aimed at better facilitating the matching of supply and demand in particular sectors. The reformed policy gives preference to applicants who already have a job offer (Employer Nomination Scheme) or who qualify under the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS). The new Skilled Occupation List (SOL) has replaced the previous Migration Occupations in Demand List (MODL) and the Critical Skills List (CSL), and applicants must have a nominated occupation on the SOL at the time of application.70

The Australian Permanent Skilled Migration Program was already cut in January 2009 by almost 15 per cent, due to the impact of the global economic crisis, and it was further reduced by more than 108,000 places in 2009–2010 (OECD, 2010). In New Zealand, the situation was no different in 2010: the number of permanent and long-term arrivals declined (down by about 6,000, compared to 2009), creating additional labour force shortages (Statistics New Zealand, 2011).

Recognizing the need to attract more highly skilled migrants, particularly among young people, New Zealand initiated a new Silver Fern Work Policy in early 2010, which consists of the Silver Fern Job Search visa/permit and the Silver Fern Practical Experience visa/permit (Immigration New Zealand, 2010). The Silver Fern Job Search Policy allows up to 300 young people with

recognized qualifications to enter New Zealand each year in search of skilled employment for up to nine months. In order to qualify, applicants must be between 20 and 35 years old, reside outside of New Zealand, hold a qualification that meets the needs under the programme or in general under New Zealand’s Skilled Migrant Policy, meet language requirements and have a minimum amount of maintenance funds for the period of stay in New Zealand. The Silver Fern Practical Experience Policy offers a work permit that is valid for a maximum of two years for applicants who hold a Silver Fern Job Search permit or a Silver Fern Practical Experience permit, hold an offer of skilled employment for at least 12 months, and meet certain health and character requirements, as with the Silver Fern Job Search permit. Under both of these programmes, partners and dependants are not eligible for visas or work permits.  

Australia and New Zealand still main destinations within the region for migrants from Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia, with future climate change impacts a major concern

Migrants from Polynesia, Melanesia and Micronesia continue to migrate to Australia and New Zealand. Both countries have special entry visas that facilitate migration for nationals of several of the island states, such as Australia’s Pacific Seasonal Worker Scheme and New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category (PAC). The Pacific Seasonal Worker Scheme is only for citizens of Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Vanuatu who have been invited by an approved employer. Under the scheme, seasonal workers are able work in Australia for four to six months, are permitted multiple entries into Australia during this period and may return to work in future years. However, they are limited to working with approved employers and are not eligible to apply for other visas during their stay or to bring any dependents with them (Australian Government Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2010).

In New Zealand, the PAC (a residence scheme) was established in July 2002 for Pacific countries with which New Zealand has close cultural and historical ties. The current PAC allows for up to 250 citizens of Tonga, 75 citizens of Tuvalu, and 75 citizens of Kiribati (including their partners and dependent children) to be granted residence in New Zealand each year. In 2009–2010, 357 people were approved for residence through the PAC, compared with 360 in 2008–2009 (New Zealand Department of Labour, 2010). Although it is not intended as a migration scheme to facilitate movement in the face of anticipated climate change impacts on the Pacific Islands, it may serve as a bridge head for future migration flows as migrants build social ties and networks (McAdam, 2011).

The impact of climate change (particularly sea-level rise) on Pacific Islands was high on the agenda, especially before and during the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancun in 2010. In preparation for the convention, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) coordinated a meeting in November 2010 of the Pacific Island countries, to assist them in preparing for the Cancun discussions, where a strong representation from the Pacific region, including Heads of State, environment ministers and ambassadors of the Pacific, was expected (SPREP, 2010).

CONCLUSION

2010/2011 was a time of transition for the world – a time when the international community began its slow and sometimes hesitant march towards economic recovery from the worst global recession in decades. GDP growth rates swung positive for most high-income countries, while many emerging and developing countries posted healthy indicators of growth. For observers of international migration, it was a time to look back at the impact of the crisis on migration, in light of the forecasts made.

A wide range of predictions had been offered as the crisis unfolded – some clearly defined, others rather tentative and more than a few contradictory. For example, given the probability of job losses in countries of destination, especially in migrant-intensive sectors such as health care, construction, manufacturing and tourism, it was thought that labour migration flows would slow down. The adoption of tighter immigration policies and/or cutbacks to migration programmes were also thought to be very likely. A number of analysts believed that there would be increases in both the level of irregular migration (to circumvent the expected cutbacks in labour migration programmes) and the number of returns to countries of origin. Finally, there was also a widely held expectation that the level of migrant remittance transfers would be significantly reduced, to the detriment of the economies of developing countries.

While it will take some time for all the relevant data to be gathered, and even more time for them to be properly analysed, it is possible to draw some initial conclusions. What happened at the global level following the 2008/2009 economic crisis mirrors, in many ways, what happened at the regional level in the following the Asian economic crisis a decade earlier, and can be summarized up as follows:

1. While a number of global trends emerged, there was considerable variation at the regional and local levels.
2. Migrant stocks built up over several decades remained largely unchanged.
3. There were indeed many indications of reduced migratory flows to destination countries.
4. Many major countries of destination adjusted their migration programme targets downwards, either in anticipation of a reduced demand for migrant workers or simply to protect their domestic labour markets.72
5. Fears of greatly reduced remittances proved to be unfounded. Following relatively small falls, they rebounded healthily in 2010 and are set to continue to increase in the coming years.

All in all, the events of the last two years demonstrate, if nothing else, the resilience of migration in the face of social, political and economic upheavals.

On a different front, the exceptionally disruptive natural disasters during 2010 highlighted the impact of environmental factors on migration patterns and the necessity for governments of achieving and maintaining readiness to manage population movements triggered by such

72 At this point in time, however, the cause/effect pattern is unclear and it is not possible to say whether these decisions were, in fact, responsible for the decrease in movements or whether the latter anticipated the widely expected cuts.
catastrophes. While there has been an increasing interest in issues related to climate and environmental change, many governments still lack the necessary knowledge and capacities to address the resulting challenges in a comprehensive and coherent manner. The Cancun Agreements, the Kampala Convention and national initiatives such as the Policy Dialogue among Bangladeshi stakeholders are meaningful initial steps forward, but more consultation and coordination is needed to identify and implement effective solutions to environmental migration.

More recently, social and political upheavals (most notably in the Middle East and North Africa) have given rise to a type of population movement rarely seen on such a scale in the past: flows of migrant workers caught up in conflict situations in their destination country and requiring assistance in returning home. Each of these situations is a reminder of the vulnerability of migrant workers who may see their jobs (and employers) disappear overnight, and then have to make the difficult choice between weathering the hostilities, at the risk of their lives, or fleeing to a neighbouring country in the hope of obtaining a passage home. The international community has supported the response to this migration crisis – with 33 countries of origin requesting IOM’s assistance in the return of their respective nationals – but more needs to be done to address this emerging form of forced mass displacement in order to provide protection to those affected and to offer appropriate solutions.

The challenge of international cooperation in the field of migration remains considerable. The Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) is thus the best hope for improved dialogue and collaboration at the international level. In 2010, the Mexican GFMD Chair tried to reduce the polarization between migrant-sending and -receiving countries by introducing the concept of shared responsibility, collective benefits and partnerships. The more action-oriented approach adopted by the Swiss GFMD Chair in 2011 intended to build upon the key outcomes of previous GFMD meetings and move towards its practical application through different planning tools. These tools included the development of Migration Profiles which, in 2010, received increased attention at national level and within the GFMD and GMG, and the roll-out of the GMG Handbook on Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning. At a regional level, some major advancements made by regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) (for instance, as a result of the ministerial meetings held by MIDSA and the Colombo Process) could further stimulate governments to increase inter-State dialogue and to deliberate on migration issues of common concern. Possible synergies and opportunities for cooperation between the GFMD and RCPs in the field of migration management need to be explored, especially in view of the forthcoming second United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, to be held in New York in 2013.

73 Migration Profiles are country-owned tools prepared in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, and designed to enhance policy coherence, evidence-based policymaking and the mainstreaming of migration into development plans.
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INTRODUCTION

Sixty years ago, the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (IOM’s predecessor, subsequently renamed the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration – ICEM\(^1\)) was created at the December 1951 Brussels International Conference on Migration.\(^2\) It was designed primarily as an operational institution charged with the orderly movement of persons displaced by World War II in Europe.

Underlying the creation of ICEM was the desire for an urgent collective response to the perceived problem of the “surplus population” in Europe, consisting of persons (including, but not limited to, refugees living in camps), who were considered to be in excess of the number of people that European economies could integrate and support at the time (Jacobsen, 1953). This pressure was considered a major economic and political problem, for several reasons. First, poverty and unemployment were linked to overpopulation in certain areas, which was seen as an obstacle to European economic recovery, supported at the time by the Marshall Plan. Second, in the minds of policymakers, the situation was reminiscent of the 1930s and of some of the conditions that had led to the recent world conflict. Finally, it was believed that the “surplus population” and its associated low standard of living could render segments of the population vulnerable to communist propaganda. It was perceived as a source of instability that could affect not only European States but also the wider Atlantic community. The founding of ICEM reflected the need for an international entity that would address these issues and perceived threats by facilitating orderly migration.

Transportation was therefore the organization’s original central function, although the 1953 Constitution also assigned to it the broader task of providing services directly relating to a specific movement of migrants. Additionally, it should be noted that the organization was to concern itself with the movement of migrants as well as refugees (ICEM Constitution, 1953: Article 1.3), although no formal definition of those categories was established in the Constitution.

\(^1\) Note that, since 1951, the organization has changed its name three times. Originally labelled the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), it became the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in 1952, then the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) in 1980 (although this was not translated into a constitutional amendment), and finally the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 1989. For better clarity, and since it focuses mainly on the post-1989 period, this report will mainly refer to IOM or ‘the organization’.

\(^2\) The ICEM Constitution was adopted in 1953 and entered into force in 1954.
Importantly, the organization was originally conceived as a “non-permanent organization” (ICEM Constitution, 1953: Preamble), “set up to face problems that, notwithstanding their complexity, seemed at the time to be of typically temporary character” (Resolution No. 610, 1979: 1). Moreover, it was established outside the United Nations system, for two reasons: First, the main founding countries (especially Australia, Canada and the United States of America), wished to have full discretion in determining the numbers and types of migrants they would admit. The organization was thus created as a State-owned institution, fully respecting the sovereign rights of States in migration matters (ICEM Constitution, 1953: Article 1.2). The second reason was a direct consequence of the Cold War: Article 2.b of the ICEM Constitution stated that it was open solely to “governments with a demonstrated interest in the principle of the free movement of persons”, thereby excluding communist, communist-dominated or communist-controlled countries, which had powerful constraints on entry and exit, and also ruling out any formal affiliation with the United Nations (Karatani, 2005). Finally, ICEM was originally designed as a small, flexible, efficient and inexpensive operational institution (Perruchoud, 1987) and, consequently, the need to develop its activities in cooperation with other relevant international organizations was imperative.

From these small beginnings, IOM has grown into an organization with a global outreach. The first five decades of this progression were extensively documented in a study published on the occasion of the organization’s fiftieth anniversary (Ducasse-Rogier, 2002). This chapter will focus on IOM’s more recent history, analysing how the organization’s conceptualization of migration and its migration management activities have evolved in response to the significant political, economic and social changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold War.
THE EVOLUTION OF IOM SINCE 1989

In the 1970s, faced with the growing gap between its constitutional provisions (which were, as explained above, essentially aimed at the facilitation of migratory movement out of Europe) and the reality of the Intergovernmental Migration Committee’s activities, Member States began considering the need to amend the Constitution (ibid.). It was not until 1984, however, that the Council “decided to review the Constitution to bring it into line with the global realities under which ICM was already carrying out its activities” (MC/1631, 1989: 4). Those global realities included, inter alia: the manifestation (notably in South-East Asia and Central America) of large mixed-population outflows of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants; an awareness that solutions to these flows required political and economic resources that were beyond the means of the affected regions, let alone individual States; and, consequently, an enlargement of the circle of States seeking broad international responses to their mobility-related conundrums. Particularly, in Latin America, there was also an early interest in the relationship between migration and development, with a focus on the recruitment of highly qualified professionals to supply much-needed skills and expertise.

After lengthy consultations, the amendments addressing these issues were finally adopted in May 1987. The new Constitution entered into force two years later, on 14 November 1989.

The key objectives underlying the amendments to the 1953 Constitution can be summed up in two ways: the expansion of activities and membership in line with emerging needs, and the adoption of a holistic approach to migration. Indeed, it was believed that new international migration patterns pointed to a:

greater need than ever before for a comprehensive approach to migration planning – that is, the need to see that migration is both related to and an important by-product of economic, political and social shifts among and within nations and, therefore, that solutions to migration issues can no longer be devised and implemented in isolation, but in the context of an increasingly interdependent world (MC/1631, 1989: 6–7).

Over the last two decades, this principle has been translated into IOM’s core activities, principles, governing documents and publications, emphasizing the fact that migration is “now a multinational process and can no longer be managed bilaterally or unilaterally” (IOM, 2003: 17; MC/INF/255, 2002).

Although it represented an important juncture, the adoption of the new Constitution did not revolutionize the work of the organization. In many ways, it was a process of aligning the Constitution with the administrative changes that had been gradually introduced through the adoption of various Council Resolutions. The amendments “transformed a de facto situation into a de jure situation” (MC/1631, 1989: 6). For example, the global reach of the organization had already been recognized in a Council Resolution as early as 1979 (Resolution No. 610, 1979). These adjustments led to the intensification and expansion of many IOM activities and goals that had developed in the 1970s and 1980s.

3 Resolution No. 724.
While the organization remained faithful to the philosophy and concepts established by its “founding fathers”, and continued to respect the sovereignty of States in migration matters, as well as the flexible, efficient and cost-effective functioning of the organization, several changes were made. The most significant of these were:

- The organization formally changed its name and became the International Organization for Migration.
- Reference to the temporary character of the organization was deleted.
- Although the need to promote cooperation and coordination with other international, governmental and non-governmental organizations was retained, the services of the organization were no longer defined vis-à-vis the services provided by other organizations.  

Another significant change in the organization’s outlook was the decision to no longer “promote migration”. In this particular context, promotional activities refer to the information campaigns conducted in post-war Europe to inform displaced populations that migration opportunities were available to those wishing to begin a new life abroad. The new Constitution adopted a broader view of migration in line with an emerging view that mobility was becoming an established feature of the global landscape. As such, the membership acknowledged that migration was effectively “a process which can have positive and negative effects” (MC/1631, 1989: 5). Consequently, IOM endeavoured to maximize the positive effects, while minimizing the negative.

The first major event in IOM's history, after the end of the Cold War and the adoption of the new Constitution, was its intervention on behalf of nearly 1 million contractual workers who had been left stranded after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990/1991 (Georgi, 2010). IOM assumed responsibility for a massive emergency effort covering the registration, uplift and return of these workers to their homes –mostly in Asia or elsewhere in the Middle East. At more or less the same time, concern was growing in Western Europe about steadily increasing flows of asylum-seekers from Eastern and Central Europe, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Overall, there was a sense that changing political and economic circumstances were giving rise to new, and at times unpredictable, patterns of mobility.

By 1992, the membership felt that there was a “need for stocktaking, for serious examination of future trends and needs, and for clarification of the potential contributions of an intergovernmental migration agency in light of changed circumstances” (MC/1842, 1995: 1). Subsequently, *IOM Strategic Planning: Toward the Twenty-First Century* (MC/1842, 1995) and Council Resolution No. 923 on the Future of IOM Activities, of 29 November 1995, defined the strategic objectives that guided IOM actions until 2007.

Most notably, Resolution No. 923 outlined an ambitious vision for the organization. It stressed that IOM was “committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society” and should act to “assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and work towards effective respect of the human dignity and well-being of migrants.” Meanwhile, MC/1842 encouraged the organization to develop a better understanding of migration issues, new regional approaches and improved management
of migratory flows. It also called for a “further expansion of the Organization’s membership base” in an effort to “forge an IOM that is the leading global organization on migration by the year 2000” (MC/1842, 1995: 4).

The creation of the Gender Coordination function in 1995 was one significant outcome of the organization’s efforts to respond to the exhortations of its membership, through the mainstreaming of gender issues across the organization’s activities and programmes. This gesture was also an acknowledgement of the differentiated needs of male and female migrants in a global context in which more women were migrating independently and no longer solely as part of the family unit.

In the years following 1995, the Administration received numerous requests from Member States to further elaborate IOM’s strategic approach to the discharge of its constitutional responsibilities, in light of continued global challenges and transformations. In 2007, after a three-year review process, the IOM Strategy was presented to IOM’s membership, with a view to incorporating the strategy into IOM’s legal framework (Council Resolution No. 1150 of 7 June 2007). The 2007 IOM Strategy did not drastically change the 1995 approach but distilled the self-defined priorities of its Member States into 12 points designed to advance the “primary goal of IOM”: “to facilitate the orderly and humane management of international migration” (MC/INF/287, 2007: 3).

During the three-year process that led to the IOM Strategy in 2007, the question of the protection of migrants was highlighted. At issue was the definition of the role of IOM in terms of the protection of individuals, which some considered to be outside of its mandate. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) criticized the fact that IOM did not have a protection mandate or a “normative authority” (Bengtson et al., 2008: 6–7; Human Rights Watch, 2003). Since the late 1980s, however, despite being a non-supervisory and non-monitoring organization, IOM has maintained that its Constitution and certain Council decisions provide the basis for IOM’s protection role, particularly in promoting the human rights of migrants, while maintaining that its “protection role and activities in no way absolve States from their duty to ensure effective respect of the human rights of migrants.” It further explains that IOM activities are to support and supplement the activities of States in the application of their obligation to protect (MC/INF/298, 2009: 4).

The rationale behind IOM’s role in the protection of migrants is as follows:

Directly or indirectly, IOM works towards the respect of human dignity and the protection of the individual in the implementation of its activities – that is, through its action. For example, by providing safe transportation or evacuation in conflict situations and related support, IOM protects the physical integrity of the beneficiary and contributes to the full realization of the right to leave any country and to return to one’s country of nationality. IOM’s provision of shelter to victims of trafficking protects the fundamental human right not to be held in slavery or servitude. IOM’s special resettlement or emigration programmes in situations of internal strife contribute to the implementation of the right to find

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5 Calls for increased membership, both in the 1989 Constitution and in that of 1995, resulted in a surge of new Member States during the 1990s and 2000s. Between 1990 and 2000, the organization doubled its membership – from 39 to 79 States – and then added another 53 new members between 2000 and 2011, to reach its current total of 132 Member States worldwide.
safe haven abroad. IOM’s medical programmes ensure migrants’ fitness to travel and facilitate health care follow-up in receiving countries, thus promoting the right to an adequate standard of living, including health and well-being (IOM, 2007: 2).

As the nature of migration has changed, IOM has evolved accordingly, gaining increased political significance. The demonstrated ability of the organization to adapt and respond has ensured that its strategic purpose remains in line with the needs of migrants and the requests of its Member States.
IOM AND GLOBAL MIGRATION MANAGEMENT: RESPONSES TO GLOBAL TRENDS

Throughout the history of the organization, IOM’s programmatic responses have been both reactive to change and key global events, and proactive in light of emerging issues and trends. Over the last two decades, in line with its holistic approach to migration management, IOM has developed a portfolio of programmes that has evolved to include a comprehensive range of services for migrants, IOM Member States and interested stakeholders. It had, in fact, become apparent at a very early time in IOM’s history that the “transportation” of migrants and refugees implied much more than their simple movement from one location to another. Transport could not be provided successfully without the simultaneous provision of other essential services, which, in turn, led to the diversification of the range of services offered (Perruchoud, 1987).

Gradually, the services offered by IOM were expanded to include pre-departure, transit and reception assistance, transportation assistance, vocational language training, provision of country information, legal advice, integration loans, health insurance and medical screening. For example, the organization developed and applied (first in Latin America) its concept of Technical Cooperation on Migration (TCM), designed to help governments build their capacity in the fields of migration policy, legislation and administration (Ducasse-Rogier, 2002). In the 1960s and 1970s, “more and more requests were received for advice on and technical cooperation in movements from one country to another and [IOM’s] advice and help were requested to update migration activities, organize frontier offices and assist in cooperation with certain governments” to launch meaningful programmes, especially in Latin America (MC/1631, 1989: 3). This evolution was reaffirmed and developed with the adoption of the new Constitution in 1989, through Article 1.1.c, which defined the objective of such activities as follows: to “provide, at the request of and in agreement with the States concerned, migration services such as recruitment, selection, processing, language training, orientation activities, medical examination, placement, activities facilitating reception and integration, advisory services on migration questions.”

Today, IOM’s approach to global migration management (MC/INF/255, 2002) therefore takes into account the relationship between migration and contemporary political, social and economic issues, in order to maximize the benefit and contribution of migrants to society. Migration management, as referred to in IOM’s World Migration Report 2008, is not considered to be a synonym for “control” or “restriction”; instead, “it refers to a planned and thoughtful approach to policy development; and to the careful selection and implementation of appropriate policy responses to the key questions confronting the international community” (IOM, 2008a).

IOM recognizes the fact that contemporary migration is a complex process. The complete migration process comprises a variety of elements, including the motivation for migrating, the decision to migrate (whether as a regular or irregular migrant), entry, integration and possibly return and reintegration. These various stages are interlinked and bring into play a wide range of stakeholders including employers, governments, international organizations, civil
society and individual families. The process is further influenced by policies relating to labour, security, health, social welfare and the economy, among others. Therefore, the challenge in managing migration effectively, lies in maintaining a balance across these areas and stages of the migration process, while fostering the necessary cooperation among actors at national and international levels.

Today, IOM’s activities include all components of comprehensive migration management set within appropriate socio-economic and political contexts, such as: the facilitation of migration (whether labour migration or movement in emergency and post-emergency contexts), combating irregular movements such as human trafficking, effective border management, resettlement, integration of migrants in host societies, voluntary return and reintegration of migrants, provision of health-care services and programmes aimed at enhancing the development potential of migration.

IOM in action: 1990–2011

IOM’s presence in humanitarian interventions

In 1951, humanitarian interventions had not been envisaged as being at the core of the organization’s mandate, although its activities were, in some respects, humanitarian in nature. It was mandated to deal with refugees and displaced persons and to help alleviate the population surplus in Europe, thus contributing to Europe’s recovery from the Second World War and providing new opportunities to would-be migrants. In addition, rather early in its history, IOM mounted operations with a relief and humanitarian focus and this aspect of the organization’s activities grew in importance, particularly in terms of evacuation missions. Notable examples include interventions relating to forced population displacements in Hungary (1956–1957), Czechoslovakia (1968), Uganda (1972), Chile (1973) and Indochina (from 1975) (MC/INF/249, 2002). It has been argued that, in the process, IOM developed unique expertise in providing “international humanitarian transportation” – that is, in moving large numbers of people under difficult circumstances (Ducasse-Rogier, 2002: 60).

Although the 1989 Constitution did not make specific reference to humanitarian activities, the 1989 strategic document explained that “some of its activities on behalf of refugees and displaced persons” had a “humanitarian motivation” and could “contribute to easing tensions in a given area, thus helping in the restoration of peace” (MC/1631, 1989: 15). Again, in 1995, IOM insisted that it did “not view itself primarily as an emergency response organization”, although one of its main objectives was to “provide migration assistance to persons affected by emergencies” (MC/1842, 1995: 5–4). Finally, as noted previously, the 2007 strategy document assigned IOM the following mission: to “enhance the humane and orderly management of migration and the effective respect for the human rights of migrants in accordance with international law” (MC/INF/287, 2007: 3), both in and outside of an emergency context. These strategic documents have therefore promoted the expansion of IOM’s humanitarian work, although an external review recently noted that “IOM has not found a need to clearly define “humanitarian assistance” as a concept in its operations or to even categorise its operations in those terms” (Bengtson et al., 2008: 19).

An important foundation for the development of the organization’s activities in the field of forced migration was the definition of the categories of people on whose behalf it could act. Indeed, Article 1.1.b of the 1989 Constitution states that IOM should “concern itself
with the organized transfer of refugees, displaced persons and other individuals in need of international migration services.” This article is significant because it covers the whole spectrum of categories of people on the move, especially those considered to be in the “grey zone”. This expression was used at the time to designate those people who did “not fit into either the refugee category, on one end of the spectrum, or the national migrant category, on the other.” In 1989, referring to those “grey zone” migrants, IOM’s Director General made the following observation: “It would appear that, today, no other international organization has the general mandate and authority to deal with them” (MC/1631, 1989: 17).

This approach has allowed for a great deal of flexibility and the possibility of acting on behalf of migrants excluded from other international organizations’ mandates and legal instruments. For IOM, the term “displaced persons” broadly includes persons who fall outside the scope of the conventional definition of refugee but have had to leave their homes due to factors such as armed conflict, widespread violence, natural and/or man-made disasters, or violations of human rights. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) are also included in that category since the “reasons for their displacement are the same” (MC/INF/258, 2002: 2). Since the 1990s and 2000s were fraught with population displacements that did not fit into the usual categories (for instance internal displacements or displacements linked to natural disasters), this proved to be a very important factor in IOM’s humanitarian contribution to the international community.

During the post-Cold War period, emergency and post-conflict capabilities were strengthened and, on many occasions, IOM had to evacuate or repatriate large numbers of civilians in the context of crises due to civil wars, sudden natural disasters, droughts and famines. However, until the early 1990s, IOM’s emergency operations were focused primarily on movement and related medical and registration activities. From that time on, IOM interventions underwent a significant shift due to the need for a wider range of responses that involved expanding pre- and post-movement activity in situations where local capacity was insufficient. IOM’s principal comparative advantage in this field has been “in combining the strength and recognition of an intergovernmental organization with unusual speed and flexibility of response” (MC/INF/260, 2002: 2).

Since the early 1990s, activities have been expanded, particularly in the realm of conflict/post-conflict situations to encompass elements such as development, reconstruction, demobilization and rehabilitation efforts. Such activities have included:

- demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia (2001), Mozambique (following the 1992 civil war) and Angola in 1995;
- elections support, such as assistance for nationals living abroad with out-of-country voting during elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1996–1999), East Timor (1999) and Iraq (2005), as well as support for European Union (EU) Election Observation Missions in third countries;
- emergency shelter construction in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 1998 and following the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, India;
- a range of general voluntary return programmes and as well as more targeted arrangements for the return of qualified nationals to UNSC resolution 1244-administered Kosovo and Timor-Leste;
- the distribution of non-food items and medical assistance in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami;

Hereinafter referred to as Kosovo UNSC/1244.
• the evacuation of third-country nationals during the Lebanon crisis in 2006;
• disaster risk reduction in Central America, Pakistan, and Timor-Leste among others;
• technical assistance in reparation programmes in Guatemala, Iraq, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Turkey (MC/INF/249, 2002; IOM, 2009c).7

Most recently, over the course of 2010–2011, IOM has been heavily involved in three major emergency responses: in relation to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, the floods in Pakistan in 2010, and the crisis currently unfolding in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region; in particular, the evacuation of third-country nationals from Libya.

Finally, it is equally important to note that such programmes and services are often provided in association with a wider range of services linked to health, psychosocial support and community stabilization efforts, as well as capacity-building for both governments and vulnerable communities in emergency and post-crisis contexts. For example, complex emergencies such as the Kosovo/UNSC 1244 crisis in 1999 resulted in a comprehensive IOM response that included assistance with movement, evacuation, return, ex-military reintegration, medical capacity-building and psychosocial support training.

In addition to these new areas of activity, the refugee resettlement activities that the organization began in 1951 have also, since 1989, been expanded in terms of the services provided and geographic regions served, due to changes in global refugee trends. Most of the refugees that IOM has resettled in recent years come from Africa, the Middle East and Asia and are resettled primarily in Australia, Canada, the United States of America and the Nordic countries, though other European and Latin American countries have recently begun to accept refugees for resettlement as well. Core resettlement services consist of movement assistance, processing of documents and medical screenings, but they also extend to counselling, cultural orientation and pre-departure training, as well as language and skills training designed to facilitate the resettlement process at destination.

It is important to highlight that humanitarian activities have increasingly been conducted within an interagency context, despite IOM’s independence from the United Nations system. IOM has played an important role in the Cluster Approach of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), assisting in the start-up of many of the clusters as well as developing the cluster strategies. IOM leads the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster in partnership with UNHCR: IOM is the lead for natural disaster-induced displacements and UNHCR for man-made emergencies. IOM also contributes to five other clusters. According to an external evaluation of the role of IOM in humanitarian assistance and its added value, according to other organizations, IOM “fills clear gaps” as it is “organized to respond quickly and to mobilise quickly” (Bengtson et al., 2008: 49). Therefore, it is believed that, due to IOM’s broad mandate, the organization is able carry out work in new areas without the restrictions faced by other organizations (ibid.). It is noteworthy that, since the mid-1990s, this rapprochement with the United Nations system has generated internal discussion as well as exchanges with the United Nations system, regarding future interactions between IOM and the United Nations.8

7 For further information, see IOM’s website: http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/activities/by-theme/movement-emergency-post-crisis/cache/offence/
Facilitating regular migration and integration

As conflicts abated and economies recovered in various parts of the world throughout the 1990s and, in particular, the 2000s (such as in the Balkans, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Latin America and South-East Asia), there were new opportunities for labour migration, and countries of destination adjusted their policies so as to be more competitive in the global skills market. Traditional countries of immigration, and other OECD countries, increasingly targeted highly skilled migrants, as well as others who could fill labour shortages in particular sectors. At the same time, the EU sought to both expand intra-EU labour mobility and attract highly skilled third-country nationals in order to compete globally. There were also changes in patterns of movement. Traditional North–South movements continued to exist, but South–South movements became more pronounced, as did intraregional flows, such as those from the CIS to the Russian Federation, and from within Asia to Malaysia, Singapore, Korea and Hong Kong SAR, while new destinations also emerged in the Gulf countries.\(^9\) New flows to South Africa from neighbouring countries were also evident, although they were often temporary in nature. Thus, as the dynamics surrounding labour migration changed, so did the need for countries of destination and origin to enhance their abilities to more effectively manage migration flows in two ways: by promoting the benefits of migration for migrants and society through the facilitation of regular migration, and by curtailing irregular migration (as described in the following section). The protection of migrant workers also rose on political agendas as an issue of international concern.

Since then, IOM has increasingly been called upon by its Member States and other stakeholders to provide services with regard to capacity-building in labour migration policy and management. Both its Constitution and Strategy outline specific areas of intervention (in particular, Article 1.1 mentioned above, refers to recruitment, selection, processing, language training, orientation and integration services), while the Strategy stresses the need “to support the efforts of States in the area of labour migration, in particular short-term movements, and other types of circular migration” (MC/INF/287 2007). IOM’s activities have therefore evolved from providing purely movement-related services to providing information and awareness raising services to migrants, such as through innovative Migrant Resource Centres (MRC) globally (IOM, 2010a), as well as training for labour migration officials in origin and destination countries on managing labour migration systems.\(^10\) IOM has also facilitated recruitment and circular migration schemes, such as the Temporary and Circular Labour Migration (TCLM) model between Colombia and Spain (IOM, 2008a).

Diversified migration flows have given rise to new integration opportunities and challenges for both traditional and new countries of destination. Although the discourse on integration ranges in tone across countries, it is one of the most salient and politicized issues in recent times (see Part A for more detail). IOM’s Strategy states that IOM’s role is to “assist States [in facilitating] the integration of migrants in their new environment...” (MC/INF/287, 2007); in practice, however, IOM’s exercise of that role often starts before departure, continues after arrival in the country of destination, and may extend to include assistance to migrants after they have returned to their country of origin (as explained below). This approach also goes beyond solely addressing the rights and obligations of migrants; it includes those of the host country as well, which reflects the shift in discourse on integration

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\(^9\) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

\(^10\) Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China.

\(^11\) See, for example, IOM/ILO/OSCE, 2006.
in recent years. Several International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) workshops have focused on this and related themes, such as the Image of Migrants in Society, since 2005. IOM integration projects have greatly expanded over the last decade, particularly in Europe, due to the prominence of the topic and a dedicated integration fund at the EU level. Projects such as Integration: A Multi-faith Approach, for example, respond to the needs of host communities to reach out to migrants through the bridge of their religious communities. By offering religious leaders training in civic affairs, a link is established between the host community and migrants. However, projects are not limited to Europe and include, for example, regional South–South initiatives such as The One Movement anti-xenophobia campaigns in South Africa, which began in 2008 in response to anti-immigrants riots there (IOM, 2009d).

Irregular migration and combating human trafficking

Drivers of irregular migration do not differ greatly from those affecting regular migration and are therefore largely shaped by socio-economic variables. Channels available to potential migrants are, however, largely defined by the policies of destination countries. In the early 1990s, there was an upsurge in irregular migration due to a combination of many factors, including conflicts (for instance, in the Middle East and in the Balkans), political unrest, and restrictive migration policies. Furthermore, the emergence of cross-regional smuggling and trafficking networks gained importance as people sought alternative and often high-risk routes (with the help of human smugglers or traffickers) to reach their destination.

Irregular migrants can be men, women or children and they are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and human rights abuse. Irregular migrant flows also impede the legitimate functioning of government authorities, aimed at regulating the entry and stay of non-nationals in a given territory. Human trafficking is a particularly exploitative form of migration (both regular and irregular) that violates the human rights of migrants and undermines the sovereignty of States.

Consequently, IOM introduced several programmes that aim to prevent such human rights abuses and exploitation during the migration cycle, and to enhance security by providing support to States through the establishment of computerized border management information systems for collecting data, border management assessments, and training of border management officials. Effective border management, coupled with safe and legal migration channels, is an essential feature of global mobility and a necessary means of facilitating migration while preventing illicit movement and upholding the respect and human rights of migrants.

Although the issue of human trafficking has risen on political agendas over the last two decades, it is not a new phenomenon. It was framed in more limited terms at the end of the Second World War, in recognition of the international trade in women – in particular, for commercial sex purposes, as reflected in the 1949 United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others. Though the provisions were non-binding and featured self-reporting mechanisms, the convention represented one of the first global protection efforts in this area.

The 1980s and 1990s brought changes in the thinking around human trafficking, with greater awareness of global trends and an increase in counter-trafficking efforts. Sex tourism and
exploitation in South-East Asia, the trafficking of women and girls from Eastern European countries towards Western Europe, and trafficking to North America, among others, raised concern among governments and human rights groups alike (IOM, 2005; ASEAN/IOM, 2007). In Europe, in particular, the socio-economic transformation of Eastern bloc countries, the growth of transnational organized crime, on-going wars in the former Yugoslavia, and the demand for cheap labour in Western Europe, among other factors, created the conditions in which persons could become vulnerable to trafficking.

IOM’s counter-trafficking activities, which began in 1994, initially focused on the trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation in the aftermath of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The same year, it also held a global international conference in Geneva: International Responses to Trafficking in Migrants and the Safeguarding of Migrants Rights, where initial definitions of human trafficking were explored. The expansion of IOM activities throughout the 2000s included prevention, awareness-raising, direct victim assistance and reintegration programmes in Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America and North America. Research on the subject also rapidly increased between 1995 and 2005, with 40 publications produced by IOM alone (IOM, 2005). In 2000, IOM also created its Counter Trafficking Module database, which is now the largest victim-centred database globally. In 2007, IOM’s role in counter-trafficking was explicitly defined in the IOM Strategy Note as that of “[assisting] States in the development and delivery of programmes, studies and technical expertise on combating migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, in particular women and children, in a manner consistent with international law” (MC/INF/287, 2007).

At the international level, the increased political imperative of combating human trafficking and smuggling resulted in the adoption, of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and, the two Palermo Protocols – the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.

Though the initial focus, both globally and in IOM’s approach, was on the trafficking of women and girls for sexual exploitation, this has recently begun to change. Trafficking in men and boys is recognized as an increasing global trend, along with an increase in trafficking for labour exploitation, including domestic work (IOM, 2010c). An increasing number of the beneficiaries of IOM’s programmes are men who have been trafficked for forced labour and labour exploitation (see chapter 4 for more detail).

**Voluntary return and reintegration as an integral component of migration management**

Although various approaches to return migration can be traced back to the 1960s, the issue of return migration did not become significant until the 1980s. At the time, an increasing number of readmission agreements were concluded, between origin and host countries particularly in Western Europe. This was against a background of significant increases in the number of people seeking access to industrialized countries as a consequence of persecution, conflict or economic distress in many parts of the world. The introduction of more stringent domestic asylum laws in the 1990s, especially in Europe, as well as high rejection rates, meant that more migrants had to either return home or remain in host countries under irregular status (Keely and Stanton Russell, 1994). Due to these increasing pressures on immigration and asylum systems, the issue of return migration gained particular political significance. Facilitating the
return of persons who did not meet protection or humanitarian criteria became a major issue in many countries and return migration and reintegration became as integral components of migration management. Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) is now a key part of the migration and asylum policies of many countries or regional bodies, such as the European Union. It is also becoming an important component of cooperative responses to address irregular transit migration, providing return assistance to stranded migrants who are in distress and often destitute. From an even broader perspective, the concept of return is also relevant in circular migration schemes.

Consequently, since the 1980s, activities related to the return of migrants have been increasingly important for IOM. These activities represent a significant evolution in its scope, as the organization had previously focused primarily on emigration (Perruchoud, 1994). In performing this service, IOM has consistently asserted that “the human rights of migrants, including procedural rights, should be a central priority” (MC/INF/293, 2008: 2) and that it does not engage in forced returns, although IOM representatives recognized that “it is sometimes difficult to evaluate whether a decision to leave a country is voluntary or not, given the pressures or incentives that might play a preponderant role in the decision-making process” (Perruchoud, 1994: 5).

It is now widely recognized that labour migrants may choose to return on their own terms, once they have accumulated adequate resources or become motivated to return home to re-establish themselves in a familiar environment and community. An analysis of return migration over recent decades reflects the growing complexity and diversity of international migration, as well as the gradual broadening of the return migration spectrum. Whereas initial analyses portrayed return merely as the end of the migration cycle once migrants had accomplished their economic goals (or as an acknowledgement of migrants’ failure to accomplish those goals), more recent approaches have increasingly taken into account the context in which migrants evolve at home and in their host society. The context determines both the circumstances in which the return takes place and the conditions in which returnees may reintegrate themselves into their home communities in a sustainable manner and contribute positively to the development of their country of origin.

Over the past three decades, IOM’s rationale for its involvement in the facilitation of assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes has followed a similar progression, reflecting the changing migration realities. IOM’s long-standing principle of “voluntary” return, considered to be the result of an informed and coercion-free decision, is a prerequisite to any involvement in a specific return endeavour, and closely mirrors the aforementioned concern for preparedness of return as a key element in return sustainability. Similarly, IOM is at the forefront of efforts to promote post-arrival and reintegration assistance mechanisms as key elements of the return process. IOM places emphasis on the anticipation of return and reintegration prospects at an early stage, as well as the promotion of measures designed to help migrants mobilize and tap into additional resources, either prior to their return, or once they have settled back in their home country.

Three decades ago, many IOM AVRR programmes merely offered basic support to facilitate arrangements for return transportation. They have since evolved into more comprehensive programmes that integrate a range of services in order to promote the sustainability of returns. Reintegration is now an integral part of AVRR programmes, for example, in Belgium, Ireland, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Many initiatives not only support the reintegration of individual returnees, but also offer help to the communities receiving them back.
In addition, the link and contribution of return to development has been increasingly examined, although more research is needed in order to review lessons learned and to identify ways in which the management of return migration can be enhanced as to benefit all those involved: migrants and affected countries and societies. Increased understanding and cooperation in implementing AVRR remain paramount to such efforts and endeavours.

Harnessing the development potential of migration

It is now generally agreed that the development potential of migration is closely tied to the facilitation of migration through regular channels, integration, reintegration and the ability to curtail irregular migration flows that increase the vulnerability of migrants to exploitation and abuse (see World Migration Report 2008, particularly chapter 12).

However, until the 1990s, migration was often perceived by the wider international community as having a negative impact on development. For example, the issue of the “brain drain”, or the movement of highly skilled migrants from developing to developed countries, was at the forefront of the debate in the 1960s and 1970s. Another area of focus was the extent to which targeted development efforts could help to stem migratory pressures. When it became apparent that such efforts would (initially, at least) have the effect of triggering rather than dampening outflows, interest in the relationship between migration and development quickly diminished. A more positive outlook emerged towards the end of the 1990s when the international community took full cognizance of the contribution of migrants to the development of both countries of origin and countries of destination – in the case of the former, through the transfer of financial remittances or of skills and expertise (commonly referred to as social remittances) and in the case of the latter, through an injection of human capital at varying skill levels.

Throughout the 2000s, numerous international forums, such as the United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development in 2006 and the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in 2007, established the issue firmly on the international agenda. Furthermore, several regional consultative processes on migration (RCPs) included migration and development as a key theme. As a result, most stakeholders now consider the positive effects of international migration for countries of origin, and migrants are regarded as potential agents of development (IOM, 2004).

Within IOM, the migration and development equation has been addressed, with varying levels of interest and enthusiasm over the years. The notion of migration and development was at the heart of the creation of IOM. The Resolution that established the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe in 1951 explicitly noted “that a close relationship exists between economic development and immigration” (Brussels Conference Resolution, 1951). As mentioned earlier, it was believed that the organized migration of the “surplus” European workforce to countries overseas would facilitate European recovery after World War II by acting as a “safety valve” and stimulating the creation of new economic opportunities in countries lacking manpower (Elie, 2010a). Later, the 1989 Constitution would also make explicit reference to this notion by recognizing in its Preamble that “migration may stimulate the creation of new economic opportunities in receiving countries and that a relationship exists between migration and the economic, social and cultural conditions in developing countries.”
In the 1960s and 1970s, the migration and development concept was realized through the development of specific Selective Migration (SELMIG) schemes for Latin America, which aimed to support development through the immigration of highly skilled migrants from Europe (Ducasse-Rogier, 2002). As concerns rose in the early 1970s over the effects of brain drain on developing countries, the IOM strategy shifted from the short-term deployment of experts to the implementation of programmes to encourage the permanent return of qualified nationals (RQN) – initially to Latin America (Oates and de Boeck, 1998). Starting in the 1980s, these programmes focused increasingly on expatriates mainly from Asia and Africa, where the brain drain problem was perceived as having reached epidemic proportions (IOM, 2009a).

In recent times, the most innovative IOM initiatives in this field have been carried out predominantly in Africa. One such experiment was a phased scheme that became known as the RQAN (Reintegration of Qualified African Nationals) programme (MC/INF/244, 2000), which aimed to enhance the “role and the utilization of knowledge and expertise of highly skilled migrants to support the socio-economic, technical and scientific development processes of their countries of origin” (IOM, 2009a: 25). Through the 1980s and 1990s, the number and complexity of the programmes expanded, leading to more returns and new features. For example, in 1991, Phase III of the RQAN programme introduced financial and technical assistance to entrepreneurs setting up small-scale enterprises (Oates and de Boeck, 1998), using job-creation schemes in developing countries in an attempt to limit migratory pressures.

However, by the end of the 1990s, despite some successes, it was clear that RQAN programmes did not always generate the expected results. In particular, brain drain was still an important issue and the programmes did not necessarily produce long-term or permanent returns. New approaches were needed to continue countering brain drain effects and to streamline development and migration programmes. Important adjustments were introduced into the RQAN programmes but they focused increasingly on post-crisis and recovery situations. However, one such adjustment enabled nationals to engage in shorter-term returns, for periods of 3 to 6 months, as it became clear that qualified nationals often preferred to maintain their positions in their host countries while engaging in development projects in their country of origin (IOM, 2009a).

Building on the RQAN experience, IOM launched its Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) initiative in 2001. Based on a more adaptable and inclusive framework, it focused on the contributions of highly skilled diaspora to their home communities through sequenced short-term returns, as well as through the transfer and sharing of knowledge and skills using available modern technology. The MIDA scheme featured a broader concept of diaspora that incorporated migrants with dual citizenship (those holding the citizenship of both the host country and the country of origin) and second- or third-generation migrants, as well as the use of virtual and financial transfers (IOM, 2009a). The MIDA strategy recognized the importance of remittances and partnerships between the private sector and diaspora communities in realizing development objectives, and within this scheme, more attention was given to establishing coherence between IOM programmes and the broader national and regional development strategies.

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13 Although RQN projects have rarely been carried out in Europe, the end of the Cold War led to the implementation of programmes focusing on technical cooperation and transfer of qualified human resources, especially those targeting the Russian Federation and other Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union, as well as the Republic of Albania.
The last two decades, the focus on the potential of diaspora and their remittances to boost development has also been an important feature of IOM programmes in other regions, especially Latin America and Asia. It is noteworthy that IOM’s focus in Latin America and the Caribbean has shifted from return programmes to the realization of the development potential of migrants’ remittances and skills. Indeed, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean are now among the world’s largest remittance receivers (IOM, 2008a). In the case of Asia, the magnitude of political upheavals and related refugee movements was a significant obstacle in implementing the more traditional migration–development programmes previously used in Latin America and Africa. However, the Asian economic boom in the late 1990s led to a significant increase in labour migration (mainly temporary migration, with higher numbers of female migrants), particularly within the region (IOM, 2008b). In recent years, IOM programmes in the region have focused on facilitating the transfer of remittances through reduced transaction costs, raising awareness about the gender implications of remittance sending and usage, and enhancing the knowledge base regarding main remittance corridors (IOM, 2009a).

The last 20–30 years have therefore been crucial to the evolution of migration–development debates, policies and projects. Numerous other dimensions, such as policy coherence on migration and development, contributions of diaspora to development, managing population dynamics and skilled resources and mainstrea migration into development planning and poverty reduction strategies, are also being explored or implemented (MC/INF/281, 2005; GMG, 2010).

**Promoting migrant health**

IOM’s migration health services were among the services originally provided by the organization to its Member States. For a long time, however, this field remained relatively limited in volume and was confined to providing pre-departure screening for migrants, including necessary treatments and inoculations, and ensuring fitness for travel. IOM’s involvement in humanitarian emergencies and massive population displacement, such as those linked to the Indochina crisis, has led to an increase in the volume of medical services rendered, especially as part of evacuation and resettlement schemes, arguably making the IOM the “largest provider of immigration health assessment and evaluation services” in the early 2000s (IOM, 2003: 89). Although migrant health assessments and treatment prior to departure continue to be a core component of health-related programmes, the provision of medical services was gradually extended to encompass all aspects of migrants’ health starting in the 1990s (Ducasse-Rogier, 2002). In particular, along with emergency displacements, “labour migration and irregular migration, especially trafficking, created a need for a growing diversification of migration health issues and related operational activities” (IOM, 2003: 87).

Therefore, a broader understanding of the interplay between migration and health emerged over the years. It was recognized that “mobility not only affects the health of the people on the move, but also the health of communities in which they stay” as well as the “home communities to which they return” (MC/INF/262, 2003: 4). Consequently, IOM started to consider the relationship between health and mobility as being fundamental to public health in general, warranting comprehensive approaches. It adopted an approach to migration health that would “concern all mobile populations and their host and home communities, and potentially cut across all areas of IOM’s work.” Within this framework, the role of IOM’s Migration Health Division (MHD) has been defined as follows: to “promote migrants’
physical, mental and social health, to deliver high-quality health services to migrants, and to respond to the need for migration health management strategies through research, technical cooperation and policy guidance” (MC/INF/275, 2004: 1). IOM considers itself equipped to directly deliver equitable health services to individuals and communities, at the request of and in agreement with concerned States, as well as to provide policy advice and capacity-building to governments for developing national, regional and global policies to promote and protect the health of migrants (IOM, 2003: 87; IOM, 2009b: 11–12).
THE ISSUE OF GOVERNANCE: AN EMERGING POLICY SPACE

As the issue of migration has gained international prominence over the last 20 years, many questions have arisen about how best to achieve effective global governance of migration. Perhaps one of the biggest challenges faced by most States is that of striking the delicate balance between maintaining national sovereignty on migration issues and engaging in a whole spectrum of supranational initiatives, ranging from informal dialogues to international legal instruments.

The fallout from the events of 11 September 2001 added to the complexity of the situation as links were increasingly made between migration, security and international terrorism, causing several destination countries to take unilateral measures to address growing national concerns (IOM, 2003 and 2010d; Aleinikoff, 2003). Nonetheless, unilateral approaches to a multilateral issue such as migration are inherently limited and numerous forms of cooperation are required. Such approaches include bilateral and regional agreements between countries (for example, on labour mobility and re-admission), new forms of informal and non-binding regional and multilateral cooperation, and various forums dedicated to migration policy dialogue on a wide range of migration issues.

Although the rest of this section will focus primarily on the rise of informal and non-binding mechanisms, a brief overview of existing multilateral and regional instruments will set the context for the emergence and role of these mechanisms. There are many global instruments that have a bearing on international migration but they are not conveniently clustered and “there is currently no single overarching regime governing migration at the global level” (Hansen, 2010). A notable exception is the 1990 United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. This instrument does focus squarely on migration but it is signed primarily by countries of origin – an indication of the reluctance of major destination countries to be party to the Convention (see, for example, MacDonald and Cholewinski, 2007 and Piper and Iredale, 2003).

Other, more targeted, migration-related legal instruments exist, such as the two International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions – Convention No. 97 concerning migration for employment (revised in 1949), and Convention No. 143 concerning migrations in abusive conditions and the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment of migrant workers (1975) – the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children (2000), and the United Nations Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (2000). Other instruments relate to migration indirectly and include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).

In recent years, greater advancements have been made at the regional level than at the global level. Labour mobility or the free movement of persons has become more formally established within the context of several regional economic integration processes – for example, within
the European Union, as a result of the Schengen Agreement and the Amsterdam Treaty. Others include MERCOSUR\textsuperscript{14} and UNASUR\textsuperscript{15} in Latin America, the African Union (AU), ECOWAS\textsuperscript{16} in West Africa, and ASEAN\textsuperscript{17} in South-East Asia. In addition, numerous bilateral labour agreements have been increasingly signed between origin and destination countries worldwide, with \textquotedblleft an unprecedented burst since 1991\textquotedblright\ (IOM, 2003).

\textbf{The role of non-binding mechanisms in migration governance and IOM}

In the absence of a global migration regime, non-binding or informal mechanisms in migration governance (whether regional or centred on a specific theme) represent an opportunity for States and relevant stakeholders to exchange information and good practices, and to cooperate on workable solutions to common problems.

IOM’s focus on developing and promoting international dialogue on migration has matched and, in fact, contributed to the increase in the number of forums addressing migration issues since the mid-1980s. Back then, the focus was mainly on ways of addressing problems resulting from the rise in the number of asylum-seekers. The following excerpt summarizes the situation in 1984:

\begin{quote}
In 1984, the number of asylum seekers in Western Europe increased by 50 per cent over the previous year. Only two major fora existed for intergovernmental discussions of this unexpected development: the Sub-Committee on Protection of UNHCR’s Executive Committee, and CAHAR – the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees, and Stateless Persons – within the Council of Europe. Between 1984 and 1991, the number of asylum seekers in Western Europe alone increased more than five-fold; in North America and Australia they nearly quadrupled. In the latter year, more than 100 meetings on the subject were held in the framework of some 30 different fora (Stanton and Keely, 1994: 6).
\end{quote}

The 1989 Constitution established that one of IOM’s roles was to “provide a forum to States as well as international and other organizations for the exchange of views and experiences, and the promotion of co-operation and co-ordination of efforts on international migration issues, including studies on such issues in order to develop practical solutions” (Art. 1.1.e). In 1995, the Council endorsed the organization’s role of “advanc[ing] understanding of migration issues” and becoming a “reference point for information on international, regional and internal migration” (Resolution No. 923: 1995, paragraph 2; MC/1842, 1995). In 1995, the organization was also given the following objectives: to “provide leadership in the international debate on migration” and to “take a leading and active role in the international debate on migration issues (…) so as to foster greater international cooperation in the migration field” (MC/1842, 1995: 6).

Furthermore, in 1989, IOM officials considered that the organization “should develop its own capacities to act as a catalyst for such discussions and become the agency entrusted with the implementation of the migration policies resulting from such dialogue” (MC/1631, 1989: 12, 19). These discussions, which came to be known as regional consultative processes on

\textsuperscript{14} The Common Market of the South – the South American regional economic organization. See: http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/Portal20Intermediario/

\textsuperscript{15} The Union of South American Nations. See: http://www.pptunasur.com/

\textsuperscript{16} The Economic Community of West African States. See: http://www.ecowas.int/

\textsuperscript{17} The Association of Southeast Asian Nations. See: http://www.aseansec.org/
migration (RCPs), developed in the mid-1980s and took on special significance throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Thouez and Channac, 2006). RCPs address a wide range of issues, such as labour migration, migration and development, migration and trade, integration of migrants, protection of migrants’ rights, human smuggling and trafficking and migration and health (Klein Solomon, 2005). They are repeated, informal, non-binding and government-led regional meetings of States, purposefully created to discuss migration issues that result from the strong desire of States to maintain discretion and flexibility in the area of migration management (Hansen, 2009). In RCP meetings, States “try to find partial consensus on regional migration policies and initiate cooperative projects” (Georgi, 2010: 55).

As non-binding processes, RCPs do not aim to produce normative outcomes. As such, they should not necessarily be seen as direct building blocks for the creation of formal institutions or a binding migration regime (Klein Solomon, 2005). However, the recommendations, declarations and plans of action that result from RCPs appear to have had an important impact at the national and regional level. Arguably, “much of the value” of RCPs actually “lies in their informal, non-binding nature” (Klein Solomon, 2005: 10) because this format facilitates cooperation, coordination and coherence at the national, regional and international level (especially through confidence-building processes), the sharing of data and information, and important capacity-building measures for States inexperienced in migration management.

Since the mid-1990s, IOM has participated in most RCPs as a member, partner or observer. It has played an important role in the development and sustainability of those processes by facilitating the largest number of RCP secretariats and, in some instances, being responsible for follow-up activities such as research, information dissemination, capacity-building, technical cooperation and project implementation (Thouez and Channac, 2006). In particular, IOM has played an important role in the Puebla Process in the Americas, the Colombo Process in South Asia, and the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA). Regional processes can serve as the foundation for a common framework for migration management and have, in fact, helped inspire the creation of other non-binding and informal platforms on migration management, including the Berne Initiative and IOM’s own International Dialogue on Migration.

Throughout the 2000s, several new informal mechanisms were also initiated in addition to RCPs. In 2001, with the support of IOM, the Swiss Government launched the Berne Initiative – a government-led global consultative process – and produced its final report in 2004, entitled International Agenda on Migration Management. In addition, in April 2003, together with the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), IOM created the Geneva Migration Group, which became the Global Migration Group (GMG) in 2006. The GMG is an inter-agency group that aims to bring together 16 heads of agencies to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international migration. At the end of 2003, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) was launched by the United Nations Secretary-General and a number of governments. It was created as an independent body with “the mandate to provide the framework for the formulation of a coherent, comprehensive

18 See the GMG website: http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/
and global response to the issue of international migration” (GCIM). The GCIM closed in 2005 and its findings and recommendations were published that same year.  

The creation of the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD) in 2007 launched another major global-level forum – in this case, a forum specifically focused on the migration–development nexus, stemming from the recommendations of the 2006 United Nations High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. Now in its fifth year, the GFMD was created as an informal, non-binding, voluntary and government-led process aimed at producing recommendations for governments to improve their policies and practices in favour of sending and host societies as well as the migrants themselves.  

IOM’s role vis-à-vis the GFMD varies, depending on the needs of the host government, but it generally involves the secondment of a Senior Advisor who works with each of the chairing governments to help prepare and manage their chairmanships. It also involves the preparation of input to the GFMD, at the request of the organizers and/or participating governments and in particular of civil society. IOM also hosts an independent Support Unit that assists the work of the GFMD Chair-in-Office (MC/INF/302, 2010).

Finally, building on the expertise that it developed in the context of RCPs, at the turn of the century, IOM launched its own forum activities at the global level – namely, the annual International Dialogue on Migration (IDM), launched on the occasion of IOM’s fiftieth anniversary session of Council in 2001. During that Council session, Resolution No. 1055 was adopted “to strengthen the role of the Council as a forum for migration policy dialogue, consistent with the Organization’s Constitution” (2001). Therefore, the creation of the IDM appears to be the realization of one of IOM’s main objectives, as set forth in 1989. Recognizing that migration was discussed in many international forums, the organization considered that a “framework to bring together all the threads, and to permit discussion of migration as a whole, as distinct from its various parts” was lacking and that “one of the major vocations of the ICM of the future” was actually to develop such a “holistic approach” to migration dialogue (MC/1631, 1989: 15–18). In 2007, IOM Member States confirmed the IDM as a priority activity through its inclusion in the IOM Strategy. Like other consultative processes, IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration is an informal and non-binding consultation mechanism and its purpose is not to develop norms or binding resolutions. IDM thus works through IOM’s Council and serves as a “platform for IOM Member States and observers to exchange views and experiences with a view to facilitating inter-State cooperation on international migration, and to promoting coherence between migration and related policy domains as well as with other stakeholders and actors” (Klein Solomon, 2005: 5).

Although a global migration regime does not exist, the governance of migration has gained political salience in recent years. The emergence of informal mechanisms at regional and global levels is a clear indication of the recognized need for cooperation and exchange beyond unilateral measures. However, is the informal nature and structure of these forums sustainable in the long term and, if not, what alternatives might there be? The challenge in the coming years lies in determining whether there is a need, and if so, how to move towards concrete plans of action embedded in institutions and legal frameworks.

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20 See the GFMD website: [http://www.gfmd.org/](http://www.gfmd.org/)
CONCLUSION

Since the late 1980s, the International Organization for Migration has evolved, developing a holistic approach to migration management in response to global changes in migration trends. This chapter has analysed this evolution through a review of the growth of IOM’s programmes, and its expanded global scope and strategic approach. It is clear that the organization has maintained and increased its relevance, since IOM is now a global institution, with worldwide interests and the capacity to act in every region of the world and to address the full spectrum of migration and related issues. Despite its changes and the level of expansion, IOM has retained its essential focus of working with its Member States to promote the humane and orderly management of migration.

After 20 years of rapid growth, one might ask: in what direction will the organization evolve? There are certainly several areas – such as migration and development – that have gained prominence in the last few years and will continue to be important issues. There are also newer areas – such as migration linked to environmental change – that will become increasingly important and in which the organization has shown leadership. Looking ahead, it is therefore clear that the organization will continue its traditional activities while remaining open to emerging trends and responsive to crises as they occur. Building the capacity of States and other stakeholders in migration management will, as discussed in IOM’s World Migration Report 2010, continue to be an increasingly important core component of IOM’s work.

There will also certainly be further debate on the holistic approach to migration management and particularly on the global search for an appropriate model of international governance of migration. Research and forum activities will also continue to develop this theme in the future and to explore avenues for more effective international cooperation. Such activity will also be relevant to the future of other mechanisms, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development or the RCPs discussed previously.

Finally, in the coming years it will be interesting to observe the evolution of the links between IOM and the United Nations system on migration issues. As indicated previously, IOM increasingly cooperates within various interagency mechanisms and acts as part of the United Nations Country Team in several locations. Officially, however, it retains an Observer status within the United Nations and with that comes several advantages and disadvantages in terms of operations and launching new initiatives. The relationship is bound to remain a matter of interest for Member States.

Migration is a phenomenon embedded in the social fabric of today’s global society. It is an issue that will only increase in significance and political interest in the foreseeable future. Over the last 60 years, IOM has been at the forefront of the migration debate, evolving in its thinking and operations as migration trends have evolved. As the only organization with a global mandate on migration, it has a central role to play in the future, both on the international scene and in the service of its Member States.
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INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in 1951, IOM has played an increasingly important role in the international migration field, serving migrants and Member States around the world. Growth has been particularly strong over the last 10 years: State membership has more than doubled; the budget has quadrupled in size; and IOM’s portfolio of activities has become so diversified that its stakeholders find it hard to keep track of what the organization does, and where, how and under what circumstances it intervenes. In this sixtieth anniversary year, it therefore seemed appropriate to prepare a statistical overview to the *World Migration Report* to provide a concise overview of IOM’s activities. It is hoped that the figures presented will provide a baseline against which to measure future activity levels.

IOM collects statistics relating to its operational programmes and projects in over 133 countries. Although operational data are mainly collected for project development, evaluation and management purposes, they are equally important for research, and they also enable the organization to report on its activities to Member States and donors. IOM’s statistical files include data on persons assisted by IOM since the establishment of the organization in 1951, although this documentation is not without occasional gaps and inconsistencies. An analysis of this material was first carried out in 2001 and it resulted in the publication of a book entitled *The International Organization for Migration: 1951–2001*.

The statistics included in this overview cover the subsequent 10 years of IOM’s existence. They include different types of movement-related activities (such as resettlement or repatriation) but also other forms of intervention that have grown considerably in diversity over the years. In particular, this chapter will present, statistics related to services provided by IOM in emergency situations, such as assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees.

The fact that IOM collects statistics essentially for project development, evaluation and case-management purposes implies certain limitations to the compilation and analysis of aggregate data. IOM’s operational data relate mainly to the implementation of programmes.
and projects, rather than to trends or types of migratory flows. In other words, available data are primarily compiled by service events (i.e. the type and number of services provided) and not necessarily by the number of beneficiaries or type of migrants assisted. Furthermore, the following considerations need to be kept in mind when looking at the figures included in this statistical overview (see also textbox 2 on data sources, at the end of this chapter):

a) **Time series**: Statistics included in this chapter cover the period January 2001–December 2010. However, for some of IOM’s activities, data have been compiled systematically only in recent years, thus figures may not be available for the whole time period or be best available estimates. Other activities may have short timelines because they were begun after 2001.

b) **Focus on IOM activities**: Figures represented in this statistical overview relate only to IOM services and often reflect data skewed in favour of countries in which IOM has had long-established programmes or where emergency situations have required major interventions. Consequently, these figures should not be seen as indicators of global migration patterns (e.g. for returns or counter-trafficking). They can, however, be used to supplement or cross-check external data sources.

c) **Data breakdown**: As a consequence of data being primarily collected for programme and project management purposes, breakdowns of trends or types of migratory flows are often not available. For example, return programmes can include different categories of returnees (such as temporary protected persons, unsuccessful asylum seekers and trafficked migrants). However, available data on return movements cannot currently be disaggregated into these different categories, which would be expected to vary significantly in terms of attributes such as age and gender.

d) **Multiple counting**: IOM often offers a number of different services to individual migrants – and sometimes in both the country of origin and the host country – depending on their specific needs. Some migrants can therefore be recorded by more than one of IOM’s service areas, or by more than one IOM mission. In the absence of a fully integrated data system capable of tracking individual data registrations, figures for the total number of beneficiaries could be biased due to multiple counting or inconsistent registrations. For this reason, the statistics included in this chapter refer, at times, to the number of services rendered rather than the number of beneficiaries.

e) **Coverage**: Overall, a response rate of between 80 and 90 per cent of all missions has been achieved, allowing for the calculation of reliable estimates for most indicators. However, for some services, the available information was not sufficient to generate a global estimate, thus only national or regional aggregates were included in the chapter.

This statistical overview will present figures for the last 10 years, initially focusing on movement activities (i.e. resettlement and repatriation) followed by migrant assistance services (e.g. assisted voluntary return and reintegration, assistance to victims of human trafficking, immigration and visa support services, recruitment and employment facilitations, migrant training programmes, and health assessments). Assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, stranded migrants and former combatants, is included under emergency response to humanitarian crises and post-crisis situations. Thereafter is a brief discussion of capacity-building programmes targeting government officials, representatives of IOs, NGOs and civil society, including seminars on international migration law and migration management. Finally, key facts and figures on IOM publications since 2001 will be presented. At the end of the chapter, two textboxes provide milestone figures highlighting activities characterizing the 60 years of IOM’s existence and a description of data sources used for the elaboration of this statistical overview.
Resettlement

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<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of resettlement covered</td>
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<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
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<td>Total expenditure</td>
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<td>Number of beneficiaries (refugees)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The facilitation of the resettlement of refugees to States offering them temporary protection or permanent resettlement has been one of IOM’s major activities since the organization was created. Over the last decade (2001–2010), IOM has provided movement assistance to 810,000 refugees resettling in a third country. The movements carried out within the framework of refugee resettlement represent 49 per cent of the overall IOM movement assistance to persons in need of international transport support. The gender balance of the refugee caseload was nearly equal: 51 per cent of refugees moved by IOM during the decade were male and 49 per cent were female.

Movement assistance under the refugee resettlement category declined significantly in 2002 and 2003, following the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent slowing down of the United States of America refugee admissions pipeline, largely due to security-related constraints. As security issues were resolved, the number of persons admitted to the United States of America grew steadily throughout the decade. During that period, the refugee resettlement caseload continued to diversify and/or expand in terms of the numbers of groups/nationalities offered refugee status, the geographic locations from which refugees were resettled (see figure 1 and map 1), and the number of States offering resettlement as a durable solution to persons in need of international protection.

Figure 1: Number of persons resettled, by region of departure, 2001–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
Between 2001 and 2010, a total of 532,078 refugees travelled to the United States of America, representing 66 per cent of those who benefited from resettlement assistance worldwide. A total of 103,282 persons were provided with assistance to resettle in Canada, 60,000 were assisted in resettling in Australia, 74,300 were resettled in Nordic countries, and 25,388 were resettled elsewhere in Western Europe (see map 2).

### Repatriation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repatriation</th>
<th>2001–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries of departure covered</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries of resettlement covered</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure USD</td>
<td>41 million</td>
<td>1.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries (refugees)</td>
<td>130,610</td>
<td>13,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 2001 and 2010, a total of 130,610 persons were assisted under IOM’s repatriation schemes. Repatriation activities focused largely on assisting individuals or groups of refugees in voluntarily returning to their countries of origin, such as Angola (49,841), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (44,375), the Republic of Liberia (8,060), Sudan (7,841), Ethiopia (3,312) and Iraq (1,010) (see figure 2).

Repatriation support was provided under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and IOM.

**Figure 2: Major movements involving voluntary repatriation assistance, between 2001 and 2010**

![Source: IOM, 2011.](image-url)
Map 1: Number of persons given resettlement assistance, by regions of departure and citizenship, 2001-2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
Map 2: Number of persons given resettlement assistance, by regions of arrival and citizenship, 2001-2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
Assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) is one of IOM’s core activities, providing vital assistance to tens of thousands of migrants returning home every year. The Return and Emigration of Asylum-Seekers from Germany (REAG) programme in 1979 constituted the first framework formalizing assisted voluntary return (AVR) arrangements, which was followed by similar programmes in Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and many other countries. Initially, these AVR programmes only provided migrants with information, counselling, transportation back to their home country and limited reintegration assistance, while more recent programmes have more substantial reintegration components as well as monitoring and evaluating activities to promote the sustainability of returns. Many initiatives also address the concerns of the communities of return in facilitating effective and sustainable returns. With an increasing number of States (both hosting countries and countries of origin) now seeing AVRR as an essential component of an effective and humane migration management framework, it is a growing area for IOM. Activities are being implemented in all regions of the world and increasingly also between developing countries (i.e. South–South, in addition to North–South returns). Today, AVRR is implemented by IOM, through over 80 projects worldwide.

Almost 330,000 migrants have been provided with AVRR assistance to more than 170 countries since the year 2000 (see figure 3). From 2001 to 2008, the number of assisted migrants was relatively stable, with annual figures ranging between 20,000 and 30,000. In 2010, IOM assisted 34,014 migrants in returning home in a dignified and humane manner and/or in reintegrating in their countries of origin.
Although, in the past, AVRR programmes have largely been based in the EU, they have recently been extended to other geographical regions, including the Americas, Asia and Oceania, and Africa and the Middle East. In 2010, 85 per cent of migrants were returning from Europe, followed by Africa and the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean, with 6 per cent each (see figure 15). In the last three years, 8 of the top 10 sending countries (excepting Libya and Mexico) were located in Europe. In 2010, IOM operated AVRR projects in 26 EU Member States, plus Norway and Switzerland.

From the receiving perspective, AVRR programmes were more balanced, with 37 per cent of migrants returning to countries within Europe, 23 per cent returning to both Africa/the Middle East and Asia and Oceania, and 17 per cent to Latin America and the Caribbean (see figure 4).
Returning migrants were mainly males aged 20–30 years when leaving their countries in search of better living conditions, sometimes with accompanying family members. The decision to return was generally motivated by personal and/or socio-economic reasons. Most of the beneficiaries had applied for asylum but been rejected. Other categories of migrants assisted under IOM’s programmes included undocumented migrants or migrants with no legal means of staying in the host country (e.g. their visa had expired). In addition to assisting this main group of beneficiaries who return under the scope of IOM’s AVRR programme, IOM continues to provide reintegration assistance to migrants who return home under separate arrangements conducted by either the country of origin or the country of destination.

Counter-trafficking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-trafficking</th>
<th>2000–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>~ 85</td>
<td>~ 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>&gt; 750</td>
<td>&gt; 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>USD 193 million</td>
<td>USD 35 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of instances of assistance to individual trafficked persons by distinct IOM offices</td>
<td>46,554</td>
<td>5,911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IOM’s counter-trafficking programme provides a unique source of international data on trafficking, through the collection of information obtained directly from victims of human trafficking (VoTs) who have been assisted by IOM and/or service providers assisting VoTs. Data are collected through the MiMOSA Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM)\(^2\) and the ‘sister’ core variable approach (for all non-IOM trafficking database missions, with a requirement to share data with IOM Headquarters on a quarterly basis).\(^3\) The IOM trafficking database, funded by

\(^2\) Hereafter referred to as the IOM trafficking database.

\(^3\) The context and necessary caveats surrounding IOM case data should be kept in mind when looking at the represented figures:

i) the data are only reflective of IOM-assisted cases and, therefore, cannot provide an accurate picture of trafficking in a particular country or region; ii) the initial focus on trafficking for sexual exploitation and cross-border movements led to a tendency to neglect other types of victims (e.g. males), other forms of trafficking (e.g. labour) or cases of internal trafficking, which, in turn, has led to a sometimes distorted presentation of the phenomenon; iii) data collected through the ‘sister’ core variable approach cannot always be validated against duplicate entries; it is likely that an IOM mission in a destination country will report upon some of the same cases assisted by an IOM mission in a source country, especially where there has been a voluntary return movement provided by IOM. Nonetheless, assistance is still provided on both occasions and thus warrants documentation; and iv) as of May 2011, six IOM missions (4%) had yet to share data and/or confirm non-implementation of a trafficking project.
the US Department of State Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (G/TIP), is the single largest database containing primary data on registered VoTs. Created in 1999–2000 in Kosovo/UNSC 1244, the database was subsequently expanded to include surrounding countries of origin in South-Eastern Europe, and then other countries and regions globally.

IOM takes a comprehensive approach to the provision of individualized direct assistance to trafficked persons. This includes the provision of shelter, health care, psycho-social assistance, legal aid, facilitation of voluntary return (after a risk assessment) and reintegration assistance. IOM works to counter trafficking and assist victims in countries of origin, transit and destination. While IOM direct assistance projects were first targeted at females trafficked for sexual exploitation, they now cater to men, women and children trafficked for all forms of exploitation around the world and within their home country.

The database is today installed in 72 IOM missions globally, with levels of data collected varying from mission to mission. As of the end of December 2010, the system contained single-case data on approximately 16,000 registered IOM-assisted victims in more than 85 source countries and more than 100 destination countries. To complement these data, IOM sought additional information from a total of 106 missions implementing counter-trafficking programmes. The combined data reveal that IOM has, over the last decade, globally provided assistance to individual trafficked persons on 46,554 occasions (including assistance provided in more than one location as part of the same assistance experience), with 5,911 instances of assistance provided to individual trafficked persons by unique IOM offices in 2010 alone (see figure 6).

Figure 6: Number of instances of assistance to individual trafficked persons, 2000–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.

IOM assistance case data on human trafficking reveal a predominant number of females and adults aged 18 or older (63% and 65%, respectively). About one quarter of cases are minors (22%) and males (26%), while the age and sex of roughly 10 per cent of trafficked individuals have not been recorded (see figure 7).

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4 There is no degree of double counting in this figure.
5 This figure does not relate to the total number of trafficked persons, since one individual case might receive assistance by both an IOM office in, for example, the country of exploitation and then again in their home country. Both IOM missions have reported on this case.
These individuals have been assisted by IOM after being trafficked mainly for purposes of sexual exploitation (42%), forced labour (30%), combined sexual and forced labour (4%) and begging (3%) (see figure 8). The nature of the exploitation is unknown in 18 per cent of the cases.

The figures emphasize the need to move beyond addressing trafficking simply as a form of sexual exploitation of women and children. While IOM case data reveal that just under 50 per cent of the total number of cases assisted involved trafficking for sexual exploitation, more than one third of assisted victims were trafficked into a forced labour setting. The proportion of victims identified as having been trafficked into forced labour has increased every year since 2005. This has coincided with increased recognition and identification of cases of trafficking in men or for forced labour (see footnote 3). In 2010, for the first time, IOM assisted more victims who were trafficked for forced labour than for sexual exploitation. It is also worth noting that less than 1 per cent of IOM-assisted victims were kidnapped at the point of trafficking and, conversely, over 50 per cent were recruited through a personal contact.
Finally, there is the common misconception that trafficking implies the crossing of an international border when, in fact, more than 25 per cent of all individuals assisted by IOM are victims of internal trafficking.

**Immigration and visa support services**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigration and visa support services (IVSS)</th>
<th>2006–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>&gt; 50</td>
<td>&gt; 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>&gt; 65</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of services (assisted IVSS requests)</td>
<td>382,133</td>
<td>84,901</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the important facets of IOM’s work in the migration management service area is the provision of direct immigration- and visa-related support services to governments and migrants – primarily for visas related to family reunification, study and, to a lesser extent, labour. IOM’s package of specifically tailored services includes the operation of visa application centres, visa application assistance, logistics and liaison duties for immigration officers, interviews, verification of documents and integrity checking, passport/visa/document handling and the provision of country information (see figure 9). In 2010, IOM handled 84,901 requests for immigration and visa support services (IVSS).

**Figure 9: Type of immigration and visa support services provided (in %), total 2006–2010**

Source: IOM, 2011.
IOM’s solutions are driven by service excellence, with a focus on ensuring that visa applicants and recipients are treated with dignity and respect at all times, and are empowered with information in their own language to understand the visa application and issuance processes as well as their rights and responsibilities. In the delivery of all immigration- and visa-related service solutions, IOM consistently communicates to migrants that the visa decision-making process rests entirely with governments.

For governments, such services are designed to enhance data collection, simplify and streamline visa-related processes, reduce time-consuming administrative functions, lower costs, improve service standards, combat fraud and improve security at diplomatic or consular missions. IOM may also be called upon to provide representational or logistical support in relation to immigration- and visa-related matters, in locations where no full-time representation exists or where visa processing takes place offshore.

Immigration and visa support service activities also include travel assistance services for migrants and governments. These include special reduced migrant airfares, a more generous baggage allowance, information on air travel and country of destination, ticket issuance, advanced sponsor notification, assistance in completing required departure and arrival documentation, medical and non-medical flight escorts, and departure, transit and arrival assistance in some countries. In 2010, IOM provided travel assistance to 15,791 migrants bound for Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States of America.

### Recruitment and employment facilitation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment and employment facilitation</th>
<th>2003–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>&gt; USD 6 million</td>
<td>&gt; USD 0.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(only fees for pre-selection and pre-departure services; air tickets paid by the employers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries (migrant workers)</td>
<td>&gt; 20,000</td>
<td>&gt; 3,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IOM assists Member States in identifying and establishing a wide range of labour migration projects and initiatives that include capacity-building on labour migration management; protection of migrant workers in accordance with international standards; promotion and conceptualization of circular migration; facilitation of the recruitment of temporary foreign workers; education and awareness-raising on legal labour migration channels; and the promotion of interstate dialogue and regional cooperation on labour migration.

IOM’s recruitment facilitation services were launched in the 1970s in parallel with the establishment of selective migration programmes in Latin America. The overall objectives of the services are to contribute to the establishment of transparent systems of administration for all stakeholders, to build confidence among partners, and to ensure the protection of migrant workers. Such services are generally provided within the framework of bilateral labour agreements between countries of origin and destination, or other arrangements designed to safeguard the rights of migrant workers.

IOM’s role in the recruitment of foreign labour can therefore vary, depending on the circumstances, needs and existing frameworks in each country. The menu of specific services available includes: information dissemination, database set-up and registration of potential migrant workers, matching skills with demand, selection and pre-departure orientation, transit and post-arrival assistance, complementary orientation in the receiving country, job placement, and return and reintegration in the country of origin.

Over the last decade, in close collaboration with the relevant governments and private employers, IOM has facilitated the recruitment and employment of some 20,000 temporary foreign workers from Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mauritius, for Canadian, Italian and Spanish companies in various sectors, including agriculture, livestock, poultry, dairy, food processing, care-giving, manufacturing and general services.

Around 80 per cent of temporary migrant labourers assisted by IOM were Guatemalan workers going to Canada (15,997) on a circular migration programme that started in July 2003. The level of actual circularity is high, with about 55 per cent (8,908) of the Guatemalan migrants returning to Canada for at least two consecutive years, and the other 45 per cent being new workers. The rate of return to Guatemala after fulfillment of the work contract is impressively high (99.8%), while the early dropout rate is very low (2.5%). In terms of numbers, the second most important country of origin of migrant workers assisted by IOM over the last 10 years is Colombia, with 3,789 workers deployed to Canada, Spain and Italy between 2003 and 2010.

### Migrant training programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant training programmes</th>
<th>2001–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>&gt; 50</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries (migrants)</td>
<td>352,328</td>
<td>40,749</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since the early 1950s, IOM has been conducting training programmes for migrants, to facilitate a smooth transition and adjustment process, both prior to their departure and after their arrival in some instances. Training includes a wide range of activities designed primarily to ensure the smooth and successful integration of migrants – both permanent and temporary – in the country of destination.
Migrant training activities provide participants with critical information about the country of destination, while at the same time helping them to identify and develop the skills needed to succeed in their new environment. In addition to providing factual information, training activities also explore the attitudes and behavioural changes needed for successful integration.

Participants in IOM’s migrant training programmes include refugees, humanitarian entrants, family reunification cases, skilled migrants, marriage migrants, immigrants and temporary foreign workers. At its most effective, the training helps reduce the costs associated with integrating migrants by enabling newcomers to rapidly become self-sufficient and productive members of the receiving society. This reduces their vulnerability while fostering their effective participation in their new community.

Over the 2001–2010 period, a total of 352,328 migrants directly benefitted from IOM’s migrant training (see figure 11). Approximately 86 per cent of the participants were resettlement-related. Training activities for refugees and humanitarian entrants focus largely on pre-departure orientation, which may include cultural orientation, language or literacy training, pre-embarkation training, or a combination of these activities. Pre-embarkation or pre-departure briefings are mainly arranged for first-time air-travellers and address what to expect at the airport, while in transit, in flight and upon arrival in the country of destination, including customs and immigration formalities. Information about in-flight safety, travelling with infants and children, diaper-changing and appropriate clothing is also provided. Trainers may also be requested to inform airline staff and crew about the specific requirements of a given refugee population. The United States of America Cultural Orientation (USCO) sessions accounted for 48 per cent of all migrant training participants; and migrants of various categories, including refugees, skilled and family class, investors and live-in caregivers bound for Canada, accounted for 34 per cent. Australian Cultural Orientation (AUSCO) participants made up 11 per cent.

Fourteen per cent of training participants consisted of skilled and unskilled labour migrants, asylum-seekers, marriage migrants, immigrant visa applicants and family members of trafficked persons. These individuals attended either pre-departure, pre-employment, or financial literacy training courses, or a country-of-destination briefing designed to prepare them for their relocation, whether for work, study or extended living purposes. Temporary labour migrants bound for Canada from Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mauritius accounted for an estimated 10 per cent.

Of note is the consistent gender balance across programmes (45–52% of all participants are women), with the exception of the large-scale labour migration programmes out of Central America, which are male-dominated.

Migrant training activities have been implemented in over 50 countries, with significant activity in Africa (which has 54 refugee-processing sites), Asia (in Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines and Thailand) and the Middle East/North Africa (in Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic).

As refugee resettlement quotas increase and integration policies become a higher priority for States, especially within the EU, IOM migrant training is expected to increase in both demand and visibility on national agendas. The relevance of migrant training in integration-promoting
activities only serves to demonstrate both its timeliness and its value as a key instrument in improving integration prospects worldwide.

Figure 11: Number of migrants trained, 2001–2010

Migration health assessments and travel health assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration health assessments and travel health assistance</th>
<th>2001–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>USD 223 million</td>
<td>USD 43 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries</td>
<td>&gt; 1.5 million</td>
<td>265,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The provision of health assistance to migrants has been a function of IOM since its inception in 1951, starting with the delivery of medical services during the movement of European migrants following the Second World War. Since then, health activities have evolved and responsibilities have expanded in response to the changing needs of migrants and governments, as well as an increased international awareness of the health-related dimensions of migration patterns and trends.

The Migration Health Assessments and Travel Health Assistance Programme (HAP) is one of the largest migration management services provided by IOM, in terms of migrants served, number of staff involved, and operational costs.

For the benefit of both migrants and host communities, migrant health assessments carried out prior to departure aim to prevent the cross-border transmission of diseases of public health concern, ensure migrants’ fitness to travel, and inform and empower migrants to access health-care services upon arrival at their destination countries.

Once migrants have fulfilled the immigration application requirements, the majority travel to their new country of residence through transportation services arranged by IOM, primarily by air. Individuals in need of travel health assistance (medical escorts) during transportation are identified at the time of the health assessment to ensure that they travel safely and without
undue hardship to themselves or to other travellers. The IOM medical escort also ensures the use of reporting systems that refer the migrant to appropriate health and immigration officials, or to family members on arrival at the final destination. IOM’s migration health assessments are increasingly being used as a public health tool to prevent diseases by means of immunization and to promote the health of prospective migrants and refugees through awareness-raising, health education and care. As such, the assessments are an effective tool in facilitating the integration of migrants into receiving communities.

Over the past decade, the number of health assessments has grown considerably. Between 2001 and 2010, the number of health assessments provided for both refugees and immigrants nearly tripled, reaching over a quarter of a million beneficiaries in 2010 alone, in over 50 countries. The total number of IOM health assessments performed over the last 10 years is more than 1.5 million.

Health assessments were performed primarily on behalf of major destination countries, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (see figure 12). The United Kingdom was the most common destination for assisted immigrants, as a result of the IOM United Kingdom Tuberculosis Detection Pilot Programme, which started in 2005. Immigrants tended to be students and other adults aged 20–29 years. The United States of America was consistently the most common destination for assisted refugees, due to the fact that by the end of the decade, IOM was performing health assessments for over 90 per cent of all US-bound refugees worldwide, under the rubric of the United States of America Refugee Admissions Programme (USRAP).

Figure 12: Number of health assessments, by country of destination, 2001–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
Health promotion and assistance to migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health promotion and assistance to migrants</th>
<th>2001–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>~ 100</td>
<td>&gt; 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>USD 68 million</td>
<td>USD 14 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to HAP, IOM ensures the provision of, and access to, good-quality equitable health services for migrants and mobile populations, including migrants in irregular situations (such as trafficked persons and stranded migrants), as well as labour migrants and host communities. This is done by building the capacity of partners from the public and private health and non-health sectors, as well as migrants and host communities themselves. This ensures the sustained delivery of comprehensive, good-quality health and social services throughout the migration cycle. Public and primary health-care issues that are addressed by IOM include mental health, psychosocial response, cultural integration, emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, non-communicable diseases, pandemic influenza, tuberculosis, malaria, sexual and reproductive health, and sexually transmitted infections including HIV.

IOM has expanded the breadth and scope of programmes in this category, and implemented 131 projects worldwide in 2010 (nearly 50 per cent of which were HIV-related). With expenditures amounting to approximately USD 68 million over the last decade (see figure 16), this area of health-related activities has become an increasingly significant part of IOM’s health programming.

Figure 15: Expenditure on health promotion and assistance to migrants, by region (in %), total 2001–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
Note: Total expenditure for 2001-2010 was USD 68 million.
Migration health assistance to crisis-affected populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration health assistance to crisis-affected populations</th>
<th>2001–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>USD 44 million</td>
<td>USD 7 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Emergencies – whether natural or man-made (that is, arising from political strife or conflict) – often trigger population movements and have serious consequences for the health of affected populations. IOM health assistance to crisis-affected populations can be divided into the following three major areas: emergency assistance; early recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation activities; and Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS). With total expenditure over the last decade reaching approximately USD 44 million (see figure 17), migration health assistance to crisis-affected populations has traditionally been IOM’s third-largest area of health activity.

IOM has provided health assistance in various emergency and post-emergency contexts throughout the last 10 years, notably in Afghanistan, Haiti, Indonesia, Kenya, Kosovo/UNSC 1244, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

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7 This section only reflects programmes and projects managed by IOM’s migration health service area. However, since health issues cut across all areas of IOM’s work for crisis-affected populations, migrant health activities are partially reported in other sections of this chapter.
Figure 17: Expenditure on migration health assistance to crisis-affected populations (in USD million), 2001–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.

Figure 18: Expenditure on migration health assistance to crisis-affected populations, by region (in %), total 2001–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
Note: Total expenditure for 2001–2010 was USD 44 million.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO HUMANITARIAN CRISSES AND POST-CRISIS ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency response to humanitarian crises and post-crisis assistance</th>
<th>2001–2010</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Countries covered</td>
<td>&gt; 70</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of projects/programmes</td>
<td>&gt; 1,120</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>USD 1,902 million</td>
<td>USD 496 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of beneficiaries (IDPs, refugees, stranded migrants, former combatants, etc.)</td>
<td>&gt; 60 million</td>
<td>10.4 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although emergency and post-crisis operations have been an integral part of IOM activities since the creation of the organization, they have evolved significantly since the early 1990s. Over the last 10 years, in response to a fast-changing operational environment characterized by a steady increase in the number and magnitude of natural disasters and by the escalation of conflicts at national and regional levels, emergency and post-crisis responses have become the largest area of IOM operations in terms of both budgetary expenses and assisted beneficiaries. Between 2001 and 2010, the organization responded to major migration crises that resulted in forced displacements, large-scale evacuations and mass returns in over 64 countries (see figures 19 and 20). The organization provided immediate assistance to affected populations and tailored solutions to specific local contexts. More than 1,120 projects and programmes were successfully implemented, benefiting over 60 million people worldwide.

Figure 19: Number of emergency and post-crisis projects, 2001–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
Taking advantage of its operational flexibility and a network of over 400 field offices, IOM has implemented a broad range of crisis mitigation and recovery activities covering life-saving interventions, restoration of coping mechanisms, community stabilization, as well as governance and institution-building. The primary beneficiaries of these activities are internally displaced persons, refugees, stranded migrants, victims of gross human rights violations, former combatants, and other vulnerable individuals compelled to move in the aftermath of a conflict or natural disaster.

Emergency responses in humanitarian crises focus on the provision of emergency shelter, the distribution of non-food items, camp management, profiling and registration, logistics support, transportation, protection, awareness-raising, medical assistance and psychosocial support. In 2005, IOM subscribed to the humanitarian reform process which established the Cluster Approach and was entrusted global leadership of the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster in natural disasters. In close cooperation with the United Nations system, via the Inter Agency Standing Committee and through its participation in the United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), IOM ensures that its activities and programmes are well coordinated and harmonized with globally agreed standards and that they contribute to the efforts of the international community. In 2010, IOM held the position of cluster lead for CCCM, Emergency Shelter, Early Recovery, Health and Protection in 15 countries.

Over the last 10 years, more than USD 1,902 million have been spent for emergency response and post-crisis operations. Noteworthy interventions include emergency evacuations from Iraq (in 2003), relief operations in the Indian Ocean after the tsunami (2004) and in Pakistan after the earthquake (2005) (see figure 21). More recently, the catastrophic earthquake that devastated Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and neighbouring regions, caused the displacement of millions of Haitians. IOM assumed the responsibility of cluster lead for CCCM and implemented 30 emergency projects, including distribution of non-food items, the provision of transitional shelters, and displaced population tracking and registration. The organization also supplied the logistical support for emergency relief via its humanitarian partners, reaching out.

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to more than 1.5 million direct beneficiaries at a total cost of USD 96 million. In August 2010, the unprecedented floods that struck Pakistan, affecting some 20 million people, required a massive international response in which IOM played a significant role. The organization led the Emergency Shelter cluster, implementing 18 large emergency projects that involved providing shelter, distributing non-food items, handling logistics and mass communication for more than 4.6 million people, with a budget of USD 32 million.

Figure 21: Number of beneficiaries in top 10 emergency and/or post-crisis projects (in thousands), between 2001 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Beneficiaries (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM, 2011.

IOM’s post-crisis operations focus on the provision of technical assistance to governments and support to affected communities in the recovery and transition phase. Areas of expertise include the return and reintegration of IDPs, refugees and vulnerable segments of the population, the reintegration of former combatants and discharged military personnel, livelihood restoration, community stabilization through reconstruction and rehabilitation of social infrastructure, and disaster risk reduction. Over the last 10 years, IOM post-crisis operations have been carried out in more than 70 countries, following humanitarian interventions and, in some cases, preceding them, thus ensuring a strategic presence in disaster-prone and unstable regions. Noteworthy operations include the post-conflict stabilization efforts in Colombia, Kosovo/UNSC 1244 and Sri Lanka, where hundreds of thousands of former combatants were reintegrated into civilian life; voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees to Afghanistan, Angola and Iraq; community violence reduction and environmental rehabilitation in Haiti; and community stabilization through the construction of essential social infrastructure in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Iraq, where thousands of vulnerable individuals were offered cash-for-work opportunities to improve their livelihood and millions of people from the communities benefited from better public infrastructure. These kinds of programmes, implemented over the medium-to-long term, benefit not only the direct recipients of grants and project activities, but also the communities at large, at the local and national levels.

Working in close cooperation with the United Nations and its specialized agencies, regional organizations (such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) and other international and local partners, IOM provides technical assistance in the field of peace-building, justice and governance as crucial elements in the transition from conflict to peace and stability.
Within these activities, IOM is recognized as having experience and expertise in reparation programmes and electoral support.

IOM provides legal and technical advice and implementation services in the areas of property conflict, property restitution and the large-scale reparation for victims of displacement, conflict, natural disaster and gross human rights violations. These services are provided to national and transitional governments and to international actors engaged in post-conflict peace-building, reconciliation and recovery, or post-natural disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. Between 2000 and 2010, IOM was inter alia an implementing partner for the following programmes: the German Forced Labour and Property Loss Compensation Programmes, registering over 400,000 compensation claims from 90 countries in 27 languages; the Holocaust Victim Assets Programme, registering over 50,000 compensation claims; and collective reparation programmes, mostly for Sinti and Roma survivors of Nazi persecution, with over 90 assistance projects in 17 countries for almost 100,000 beneficiaries.

Democratic institutions and the enforcement of human rights have a stabilizing effect on communities and prevent forced displacement. IOM has been supporting election processes in countries in political transition or post-crisis situations, providing access to voting for diaspora and supporting European Union (EU) Election Observation Missions in third countries. Between 2001 and 2010, IOM participated in 47 Electoral Observation Missions as implementing partner to the EU, providing administrative, technical and logistical services. IOM also implemented some of the largest external voting programmes to date, assisting hundreds of thousands of verified eligible nationals to exercise their vote and participate in the political processes of their countries of origin in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo/UNSC 1244 and Southern Sudan (see Table 1).

### Table 1: Major external voting programmes, 2001–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registration</th>
<th>Voting</th>
<th>Number of countries participating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo/UNSC 1244 Assembly Elections</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>145,142</td>
<td>80,653</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Presidential Elections</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,584,752</td>
<td>846,776</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Transitional National Assembly Elections</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>279,785</td>
<td>265,148</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese Referendum on the Independence of Southern Sudan</td>
<td>2010–2011</td>
<td>60,219</td>
<td>58,203</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM, 2011.
To assist States and other external beneficiaries in effectively managing human mobility, IOM carries out a wide range of capacity-building activities. Capacity-building is viewed as “the process of strengthening the knowledge, abilities, skills, resources and structures that States and institutions need in order to achieve their goals effectively and sustainably, and adapt to change”. IOM’s capacity-building activities relate to the provision of various forms of assistance that contribute to comprehensive migration management policies and programmes in a way that also effectively supports broader national policies and objectives.

According to reported data, over half a million people (579,000), including government officials, representatives of international organizations, NGOs and civil society, participated in an IOM-led capacity-building activities over the period 2001–2010 (see figure 22).

**Figure 22: Estimated number of beneficiaries of capacity-building activities, 2001–2010**

![Graph showing estimated number of beneficiaries of capacity-building activities, 2001–2010](source: IOM, 2011.)

*Note:* The peaks recorded in 2005 and 2009 relate to large-scale capacity-building efforts in Indonesia, following the earthquake in 2004 and the tsunami in 2008.

**Strengthening migration health capacities**

In relation to migrant health, capacity-building activities include the strengthening of migrants’ capacities to exercise their right to health or increasing the capacity of migrant associations, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, health service providers, and government departments to facilitate migrants’ access to health-care services.

Between 2001 and 2010, an estimated 34,000 individuals attended a migration health-related training programme.

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9 The statistics presented in this section are based on information reported by over 100 missions for the period 2001–2010 and are intended to provide an indication of the size and scope of IOM’s capacity-building activities. Thus, figures presented here do not necessarily reflect all capacity-building activities implemented by IOM since 2001 which are likely to be much higher.

10 Although the target beneficiaries of the activities presented in this section are mainly government officials, representatives from international organizations and civil society institutions, some services have also been provided directly to migrants. Similarly, some of the services described in the previous section (i.e. migration assistance) can also be considered as capacity-building activities.

Managing immigration and border movements

The goal of IOM’s immigration and border-management capacity-building activities is to equip governments with the appropriate policy, legislation, administrative structures, operational systems and human resources needed to respond to migration management challenges. The courses and trainings are intended not only for government officials who work in the area of immigration and border management, but also for representatives of international organizations, civil society and the media. They focus on the technical and practical needs of migration practitioners. Core training packages include the Essentials of Migration Management, the Essentials of Migration Practice, the Passport Examination Procedure Manual, as well as a large range of more specialized courses. A network of specialists and focal points throughout the world (located in the United Republic of Tanzania for Africa, in Austria for Europe, in Thailand for Asia, in Costa Rica for the Americas, and in Switzerland for global oversight) enables IOM to offer and respond to related calls for assistance in a timely manner.

Furthermore, IOM’s African Capacity Building Centre (ACBC), based in the United Republic of Tanzania, provides African States with the technical expertise to identify and respond to key migration challenges in areas such as migration and border management, migration policy, legislative reform and administrative reform. It also helps African States to analyse and prioritize their training needs. The ACBC is proving to be an extremely successful working model, with more than 1,000 persons being trained in 2010 on travel document fraud, border management and related information systems, One Stop Border Posts (OSBPs), data and statistics, identity management, and interview and investigation techniques.

Globally, an estimated 298,000 people attended an immigration and border management training programme between 2001 and 2010.

Improving assisted voluntary return and reintegration

IOM’s capacity-building initiatives in the area of assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) are largely built on the notion of “co-management” – i.e. the enhancement of cooperation and promotion of partnerships among countries of origin, transit and destination, in particular through consultation and information exchange. One such effort has been the “cluster” initiatives, which have brought countries of origin, transit and destination together to find common and practical solutions to problems of irregular and return migration.

Since 2001, an estimated total of 3,500 individuals have attended a capacity-building activity addressing return and reintegration issues.

Addressing counter-trafficking

IOM’s migration management approach aims to address human trafficking as part of a broader, comprehensive effort to assist vulnerable migrants. In the last decade, IOM provided regular training on international standards and best practices in the identification and protection of trafficked persons, in addition to data collection and management. It also strengthened national anti-trafficking legislative and policy frameworks, national action plans, and referral systems to promote effective and efficient cooperation among stakeholders, as well as promoting monitoring and evaluation components in order to facilitate best practice.
Between 2001 and 2010, approximately 97,000 individuals participated in training on counter-trafficking.

Building capacities in emergency and post-conflict situations

In this area, the focus of IOM’s attention is on building and strengthening national capacities to address the challenges posed by migration crises induced by natural disasters and conflict. Capacity-building components are present in most projects implemented in emergency and transitional environments and are crucial to ensuring national ownership and the long-term sustainability of interventions.

One important objective, in this context, is the strengthening of the role and capacity of national authorities (including government officials, local administrations, civil protection agencies, police and security officials) and NGOs in a number of technical areas of expertise. This is facilitated through the transmission of experience-based knowledge and skills, best practices and lessons learned to improve the living conditions of forced migrants and displaced persons, and to benefit affected societies. Some of the major issues addressed are camp coordination and management, management of emergency displacement, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, socio-economic reintegration of returnees, sustainable livelihood restoration for IDPs and vulnerable communities, land restitution and reparation for victims, voter registration in out-of-country voting processes, and information management.

It is estimated that, since 2001, more than 85,500 individuals have benefited from capacity-building activities in emergency and post-conflict situations. The majority of the training programmes have been carried out in Haiti and Indonesia – two countries recently ravaged by natural disasters.

Managing labour migration

Capacity-building in the field of labour migration policy-making and management is offered to governments, the private sector, civil society and migrants themselves. The overarching aim is to promote humane and orderly migration, while specific projects cover the development of legislative frameworks, policy formulation and programme management.

Since 2001, over 35,500 participants have attended training on labour migration management.

Training on international migration law

IOM also plays an active role in assisting governments and other stakeholders in improving existing migration legislation and procedures, thereby strengthening their capacity to manage migration more effectively and in accordance with international migration law standards.

In particular, IOM strengthens existing capacity by providing advice to governments with regard to the development and implementation of migration legislation and legal reforms, based on international migration law standards, and by promoting a better understanding of international migration law issues, primarily through a variety of tailored courses and trainings.
The courses and trainings are intended for government officials, academia (e.g. university professors and post-graduates), as well as representatives of international organizations, civil society and the media who deal with migration. They address the international legal framework governing migration, with a focus on the rights and responsibilities of States and migrants. Core trainings include the Annual Course on International Migration Law at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo, Italy, designed for government officials and members of the civil society, and the training for diplomats at the United Nations in New York, within the framework of the UNITAR/IOM/UNFPA Migration and Development Seminars.

Since IOM began providing this capacity-building service in 2004, various courses, trainings, seminars, conferences and round table discussions have been organized in countries around the world. A total of almost 2,000 personnel working in the area of migration have benefited from these activities since 2004, with some 440 being trained in 2010 alone (see figure 23).

Figure 23: Number of beneficiaries of international migration law (IML) training and courses, 2004–2010

Source: IOM, 2011.
IOM has always had a strong research interest. In recent years, the number of major research studies published annually has grown considerably. About 50 new titles were released in 2010, with particular emphasis on the theme of migration and the environment, and on the development of country-specific migration profiles. Overall, it is estimated that more than 600 publications have been produced by IOM worldwide in the last 10 years.

A number of titles are published regularly: the World Migration Reports (2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2011), the International Dialogue on Migration series (16 issues since 2001); the Migration Research Series (MRS) (41 issues since 2001), the International Migration Law series (24 issues since 2004); Migration Profiles (more than 35 country reports), and the Migration Magazine (32 issues since 2001).

IOM’s *International Migration* journal was first published in 2001, with 6 issues now coming out each year (the journal is edited by the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University and distributed by Wiley). Total subscriptions from libraries increased from 621 in 2001, to 3,400 in 2010, while the annual number of articles downloaded has grown from 6,218 in 2001, to over 100,000 in 2010 (see figure 24).

Figure 24: *International Migration* Journal – total subscriptions from libraries and annual downloads of articles, 2001–2010

IOM also publishes handbooks, manuals and training tools such as *The IOM Handbook on Direct Assistance for Victims of Trafficking*, in 2007, and the *Introduction to Basic Counselling and Communication Skills: IOM Training Manual for Migrant Community Leaders and Community Workers, and Caring for trafficked persons* – both in 2009. Furthermore, IOM produces information sheets on a variety of programmes, as well as policy briefs on different topics, such as *Migration, Climate Change and the Environment, Migration and the Millennium Development Goals and The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Migrants and Migration*.
In 2009, IOM launched its online bookstore (http://publications.iom.int/bookstore) to provide worldwide access to the full range of IOM publications. E-mail alerts about new publications are sent to over 7,000 individuals and institutions worldwide. More than 1,350 users and 1,650 book orders were registered in 2009, and both figures increased to almost 2,000 by the end of 2010.
Textbox 1: Milestone figures* in IOM’s 60 years of existence

1951  At the initiative of Belgium and the United States of America, an International Migration Conference was convened in Brussels, resulting in the creation of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements of Migrants from Europe (PICMME). The following year, PICMME became the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).

1950s ICEM arranged the processing and emigration of over 406,000 refugees, displaced persons and economic migrants from Europe to overseas countries.

1956-57 ICEM assumed responsibility for the resettlement of some 180,000 Hungarian refugees who had fled to Austria and Yugoslavia.

1960 **By this year, 1 million migrants had been directly assisted by ICEM.**

1964 ICEM began Migration for Development Programmes aimed at recruitment and placement of highly qualified migrants to developing countries in Latin America.

1968 ICEM organized the resettlement of 40,000 Czech refugees.

1971 ICEM started providing resettlement assistance to Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union. ICEM assisted UNHCR in the resettlement of 130,000 refugees from Bangladesh and Nepal to Pakistan.

1972 ICEM assisted in the evacuation and resettlement of Asians from Uganda.

1973 A special resettlement programme helped over 31,000 Chileans resettle in 50 countries. **By 1973, 2 million migrants had been directly assisted by ICEM.**

1974 ICEM became a forum for international discussion and exchange of experience among governments and other organizations on migration issues. ICEM launched the Return of Talent Programme for Latin Americans residing abroad.

1975 ICEM initiated a resettlement programme for Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons.

1980 ICEM’s Council changed the organization’s name to the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), in recognition of its increasing global role. **By 1980, 3 million migrants had been directly assisted by ICM.**

* Figures indicated in this textbox refer only to movements and do not include beneficiaries of other forms of migration assistance provided by IOM, as described in the statistical overview chapter.
1983 ICM extended the Migration for Development Programme to qualified nationals from African countries.

1985 Migration for Development Programmes were extended to Asia.

**By 1985, 4 million migrants had been directly assisted by ICM.**

1986 One million Indo-Chinese refugees had been assisted since 1975.

1989 ICM became the International Organization for Migration (IOM), upon the amendment and ratification of the 1953 Convention.

1990 IOM repatriated migrants stranded in the Middle East, following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. From September 1990 to January 1991, IOM returned 165,000 people to Egypt and various countries in Asia.

**By 1990, 5 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.**

1991 IOM assisted in the return of some 800,000 displaced Iraqi Kurds.

**By 1991, 6 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.**

1992 IOM provided logistical support and medical assistance to the displaced populations of former Yugoslavia.

IOM began the Yugoslav Emergency Programme (YEP) for the evacuation and family reunification of displaced persons from former Yugoslavia. In the following eight years, YEP assisted over 130,000 persons.

IOM began providing technical assistance on migration issues to Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

1993 Following the signing of the Mozambican peace agreement, IOM organized the return of almost 500,000 internally displaced persons (including demobilized soldiers and vulnerable groups) and refugees.

**By 1993, 7 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.**

1994 IOM assisted in the return of 1.2 million Rwandans from neighbouring countries and in the relocation of some 250,000 refugees inside former Zaire.

**By 1994, 8 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.**

1995 Following the outbreak of war in Chechnya, IOM evacuated almost 50,000 vulnerable people to safety in Ingushetia and Dagestan.

**By 1995, 9 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>IOM evacuated Kurdish populations from northern Iraq. In just over three months, 6,000 people are resettled in the United States of America. IOM assisted more than 190,000 Bosnian refugees in Europe in returning home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>By 1997, 10 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>IOM provided shelter assistance to Hondurans left homeless by Hurricane Mitch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>IOM organized the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, airlifting some 80,000 Kosovar refugees from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to over 30 host countries. By the second half of 1999, IOM had begun returning Kosovars home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>IOM assisted some 180,000 Kosovars in returning home, and organized the return by land, sea and air of some 170,000 East Timorese refugees. IOM also assisted in the repatriation from Iran of some 160,000 Afghan refugees. IOM started a programme for the identification and indemnification of former forced and slave labourers under the Nazi regime in Germany. By 2000, 11 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>IOM organized the return by sea from Guinea to Sierra Leone of some 37,000 refugees. IOM also assisted in building shelters for the Indian victims of the Gujarat earthquake. By 2001, 12 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>IOM organized the return of some 45,000 internally displaced persons to Sierra Leone. IOM also provided assistance for the repatriation from Iran and Tajikistan of 71,000 Afghan refugees and organized the return of some 370,000 internally displaced persons to Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>IOM organized the evacuation and return of some 5,000 third country nationals from Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>In the context of the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration programme, IOM organized the return of some 74,000 former combatants to their area of origin in Liberia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>IOM completed a large out-of-country voting programme for Iraq in 14 countries. IOM provided assistance following the tsunami that hit South-East Asia in December 2004.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IOM provided shelter assistance following the earthquake that hit Pakistan in the autumn of 2005.

2006 IOM organized the evacuation and return of some 13,500 third country nationals from Lebanon and provided assistance for the repatriation from Zambia of some 58,000 Angolan refugees.

2007 IOM assisted in the return and relocation of some 120,000 internally displaced persons in Sudan.

By 2007, 13 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.

2009 IOM provided assistance to some 44,000 refugees for their repatriation from Zambia to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

2010 Following the 12 January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, IOM helped the 1.3 million people displaced in make-shift camps in Port-au-Prince and other affected provinces.

IOM provided shelter assistance to 830,000 households displaced by the floods in Pakistan, representing 48 per cent coverage of the estimated need.

IOM organized the return of some 236,000 internally displaced persons in Sri Lanka.

In the last decade, IOM assisted 810,000 refugees in their resettlement in a third country; it helped 180,000 persons, under its migrant processing and integration programme; and it assisted over 380,000 migrants with voluntary return and reintegration.

IOM supported the provincial authorities of South Sudan in organizing the out-of-country voting in eight countries for the referendum on the status of South Sudan, which took place in early January 2011.

By 2010, 14 million migrants had been directly assisted by IOM.
Textbox 2: Data sources

Since January 2010, MiMOSA (Migrant Management Operational System Application) has been the IOM institutional tool used by all IOM missions to process movement data managed by the Resettlement and Movement Management Division (RMM). MiMOSA replaces the former database, known as Mosaic, which contained statistics for IOM movements dating back to January 1992. MiMOSA is currently installed in over 90 IOM offices worldwide, enabling IOM staff to share data on different activities, such as medical health assessment, movement, AVRR and counter-trafficking, within their mission. The data are then consolidated in a central data repository (CDR) that users can query for reports through a web application. The database includes migrant and refugee biographic and demographic information, such as citizenship, sex, age, family composition and origin/destination. MiMOSA movement data are also replicated in the Integrated Global Airline Ticket Order Record application (iGATOR), where all the migrant air-ticket information is recorded and transferred to the financial Processes and Resources Integrated Management System (PRISM). IOM operational staff members are trained in the use of these tools, in conjunction with the guidelines and standard operation procedures outlined in the Movement Management Manual, in order to generate financial and narrative reports of IOM programmes and projects as required by IOM Headquarter and in conformity with the expectations of the donor community.

Data on health-related activities (e.g. health assessments, travel health assistance) were collected and analysed with the help of the specific IOM-developed applications, MiMOSA and the United Kingdom Tuberculosis (UKTB) Global Software. Over the last 10 years, most of IOM’s medical activities were covered by MiMOSA, while the UKTB Global Software is a global web-based application designed to provide comprehensive coverage of IOM activities within the UK Health Assessment Programme, currently implemented in eight countries and assisting over 100,000 immigrants a year.

For activities falling under service areas such as assisted voluntary return, counter-trafficking, migrant training and immigration and visa support services, MiMOSA has not yet been fully implemented as the IOM official standard tool for capturing related information. The fragmented use of the tools, due to the current non-mandatory nature of MiMOSA for all non-movement-related activities, remains the main barrier to capturing the existing wealth of information. Instead, information is either collected through specific databases (i.e. the Counter-Trafficking Module (CTM) database) or through mission reporting. Therefore, reporting across all service areas is not always standardized, although ways of improving the coordination and capture of data are under discussion and will ideally result in MiMOSA becoming mandatory for all IOM activities by the end of 2011/early 2012.

To overcome this limitation, an ad hoc survey was carried out in early 2011 with the support of all IOM missions worldwide. The survey results complemented the data recorded in MiMOSA and provided additional figures for activities not yet captured in a systematic manner, such as those relating to the services provided in emergency and post-emergency situations.
The recent global economic crisis has highlighted the resilience of migration and further confirmed that human mobility forms an integral part of our globalized world. Migration is one of the ways in which the exchange of talent, services, skills and a diversity of experience is achieved. Yet migration remains politically sensitive and governments face the difficult task of dispelling the misunderstandings surrounding it. Indeed, misinformation and misperception can trigger a vicious cycle which influences government policy, and in turn, perpetuates negative attitudes in mass media and the community at large. Policies and political discourse can therefore play a major role in shaping the image of migrants in home and host societies. Communicating effectively about migrants and migration policy to the wider public remains one of the biggest challenges governments in countries of origin and destination face.

The World Migration Report 2011 presents available evidence on public perceptions and attitudes regarding migration globally. It analyses the way in which they are shaped and how they can influence and be influenced by policy as well as the media. Furthermore, the media’s role in communicating opinions, reporting trends and framing migration discourse is analysed. Examples of good practice in communicating a positive and balanced image of migrants among government, civil society and the media are also included. Finally, the report suggests several ways to improve communication about migration in order to promote a better understanding and recognition of the benefits of migration, more evidence based policymaking and effective engagement with migrants themselves. These include: building an open, balanced and de-politicized migration discourse; promoting a new proactive debate rather than one reactive to the dominant discourse; directly addressing the public’s issues of concern to avoid migrant scapegoating; collaborating with the media to support balanced and accurate media reporting based on available evidence; and acknowledging migrants as active communication agents who participate directly in the public debate about migration.

Part A of the World Migration Report 2011 addresses this year’s chosen theme: Communicating Effectively about Migration. It also analyses major migration trends in 2010/2011 offering an overview of developments in policy, legislation, international cooperation and dialogue on migration at the global and regional level.

In celebration of IOM’s 60th Anniversary, Part B reviews the evolution of IOM’s approach to migration management and the diversification of its programmatic activities since the end of the Cold War. It also presents a statistical overview of IOM’s programmes and projects over the last decade.