Policy coherence between migration and development agendas is of increasing interest in current times; there is growing recognition that migration policies should support rather than hinder investment in international development. The United Nations High-Level Dialogue of September 2006 and the Global Forum on Migration and Development of July 2007 both raised the attention given to this issue.

Now that the interface between migration and development has been recognized, the challenge is to turn this interest into working-level policies and programmes. The aim of this study is to build on existing international research and take the analysis to the next higher level showing how these connections can be made in practice. Policy makers often focus on remittances as the main means of translating the migration-development nexus into reality. However, this paper shows that there are many stages in the migration cycle, from departure to return and reintegration back home, that present opportunities to make migration more “development friendly” and, conversely, to raise development awareness of migration factors.
Migration and Development: Achieving Policy Coherence

Examples of working-level policies and practices from Albania, Canada, Guatemala, Italy, The Netherlands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the UK and elsewhere.

Prepared for IOM by

Asmita Naik
Jobst Koehler
Frank Laczko
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**Albania and Italy** - prepared by Jonathan Chaloff, formerly with CESPI Rome, now Senior Researcher with OECD’s migration team.

**Canada** – Irena Omelaniuk, Senior Adviser to the Secretariat of the Global Forum for Migration and Development.

**Guatemala** – Jennifer Petree, at the time of writing Project Officer, Migration Management Services, IOM.

**The Netherlands and South Africa** – Lynel Long, independent consultant.

**Sri Lanka and UK** - Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, Institute for Public Policy Research, London.

Asmita Naik took the lead in preparing a synthesis of the main findings of the literature review and case study reports presented in this publication.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Policy coherence between migration and development agendas is of increasing interest in current times; there is growing recognition that migration policies should support rather than hinder investment in international development. The United Nations High-Level Dialogue of September 2006 and the Global Forum on Migration and Development of July 2007 both raised the attention given to this issue. This debate takes place within the broader context of calls for more coherence between development policy and a range of other areas such as agriculture, trade, investment, environment and conflict prevention.

Now that the interface between migration and development has been recognized, the challenge is to turn this interest into working-level policies and programmes. The aim of this paper is to build on existing international research and take the analysis to the next higher level showing how these connections can be made in practice. Policy makers often focus on remittances as the main means of translating the migration-development nexus into reality. However, this paper shows that there are many stages in the migration cycle, from departure to return and reintegration back home, that present opportunities to make migration more “development friendly” and, conversely, to raise development awareness of migration factors. This publication draws on research carried out in 2006 in a joint IOM/World Bank project which included a literature review of development-friendly migration policies, and five case studies on policies and practices in selected countries (United Kingdom and Sri Lanka; Canada; Netherlands and South Africa; Guatemala; Albania and Italy).

The paper examines policy coherence from various perspectives. It considers coherence at the institutional level, i.e. at high government level, both in terms of coordination among departments and coherent strategies. Some receiving countries have sought to foster greater institutional coherence by adopting policy frameworks, setting up cross-governmental coordination mechanisms and enhancing analytical capacity. However, progress remains limited, largely due to inherent tensions between the different objectives of departments dealing with migration and development policy, respectively. Sending countries are beginning to recognize the links between migration and development, but these overlaps have yet to be institutionalized and coordination between government departments often needs to be reinforced.

Though challenges to coherence at a high institutional level remain, research shows coherence can work from the bottom up through working-level policies and programmes. Indeed, many new migration and development policy initiatives discussed are not the result of initiatives taken by agencies with lead responsibility for migration management, but rather by local governments, development agencies, diaspora com-
munities, international organizations, NGOs and private banks. The paper describes a variety of initiatives at different stages of the migration cycle which are seen to promote coherence:

- Efforts to manage emigration by sending countries can have positive development effects. Experience shows that where migration is occurring, countries with explicit policies to regulate and manage migration processes (to protect migrant workers abroad and help them secure improved working conditions) are better able to harness potential positive spin-offs for development, such as a greater flow of remittances.

- Temporary migration (or circular migration) programmes for low-skilled workers, especially those with repeat migration possibilities and proper protection safeguards, have clear development benefits. They provide secure and legal migration routes to workers who might otherwise turn to irregular migration channels that often lead into vulnerable exploitative situations where they are unable to protect themselves or contribute to the development of their home countries. Research shows that where temporary worker schemes are designed with the development needs of sending countries in mind, they can lead to increased economic gain as well as and the retention of human and social capital needed for further development.

- Brain drain through loss of skilled workers has potential negative effects for the economy and public services of sending nations. While the net long-term effect of such migration is not yet established, what is evident is that in the short term, developing countries do experience acute shortages in skilled personnel, especially in the health and education sectors, when professionals migrate abroad. One policy response was the development of ethical recruitment codes but, so far, this has not proven to be particularly effectual. Firmer measures by developed receiving countries are called for, such as skills replenishment or compensation to off-set immediately visible losses to developing home countries in terms of investment in education and human capital.

- The potential impact of remittances on development is well recognized. However, a review of available experience shows that much needs to be done by both receiving and sending countries to facilitate transfers and to ensure that remittances are geared towards development purposes. Measures can include improved access to formal banking structures by migrants and migrant dependents left at home, the facilitation of cheaper and easier transfer methods, the stimulation of the private sector and the creation of sending/receiving country partnerships to foster a more targeted approach.
• Diasporas hold great promise for home country development, but for many developing countries this potential has yet to be realized. There is much that governments of receiving countries can do to facilitate this process in terms of financial incentives, technical assistance, capacity building, co-development schemes and business/knowledge exchange. Dual citizenship arrangements can help foster ties and investments in both countries. Countries of origin also need to ensure that diaspora communities have the confidence to invest and that their support is put to optimum use.

• Countries of origin are beginning to realize the potential benefits of returnees, but measures to encourage return and reintegration appear limited and small-scale. Key factors that deter migrants from returning to their home countries include difficulties in making a living and readjusting to life back home, bureaucratic obstacles and cultural differences. Return programmes that do exist are usually initiated by countries of destination, mainly out of concern about returning irregular migrants. It is reasonable to assume that return that is voluntary, compliant with human rights norms and well supported will lead to more successful reintegration and, consequently, greater dividends in terms of home country development.

The paper then goes on to review how coherence between countries can be addressed by integrating development concerns into bilateral and multilateral agreements on migration. Bilateral agreements offer scope to address issues of relevance to development such as improved migration and working conditions for migrants, skills development and the transfer of remittances. However, there appears to be some reluctance among receiving states to negotiate such agreements. Multilateral arrangements regarding labour market access for migrants from poor countries may offer greater benefits for home countries than piecemeal bilateral arrangements; but, to date, little progress has been made either at the regional or global level.

The analysis carried out by this paper sheds light on one further area of policy coherence: that between the migration-development agenda and the human rights framework. This is particularly timely in light of the focus on human rights by the 2008 Global Forum on Migration and Development, meeting in the Philippines. Research shows that a re-emerging theme at each stage of the migration cycle is the importance of ensuring safe and secure channels for migrants with decent working conditions and remuneration in the receiving country. This is important for safeguarding the individuals concerned, but also means that migrants are better able to make positive contributions to both countries of origin and host countries, when they are protected and empowered socially and economically through the realization of their basic human rights.
1. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 21st century, migration continues to loom very large as a subject of media interest, community preoccupation and political controversy.

Nevertheless, the discourse has evolved significantly in recent years, both in terms of substance and tone. For instance, at both the UN General Assembly High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD), held in September 2006, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), held in 2007, participants were disposed to agree, on the whole, that migration holds considerable potential for economic and social development. It was apparent at the same time, however, that much distance still needs to be covered before agreement can be reached on the management strategies to be put in place, whether at international or national levels, for the promise to be realized. Nevertheless, participants at both meetings identified greater policy coherence between migration and development agendas as a way forward towards realizing development potential of migration (GFMD, 2007a).

This discussion takes place within the broader context of calls for more policy coherence for development generally. While there is no internationally agreed definition of policy coherence, it recognizes that achievement of international development goals requires policy decisions across a wide range of issues and unified action at different government levels and in a number of areas such as agriculture, trade, investment, migration, environment and conflict prevention where such coherence is necessary.

Achieving greater coherence is difficult when multiple stakeholders and interests are involved. Some degree of incoherence may be inevitable, but trade-offs between competing interests should be transparent, and appropriate measures taken to mitigate negative impacts [OECD, 2005a]. Institutional approaches, such as committed political leadership, increased analytical capacity, cross-institutional policy coordination mechanisms, government-wide policy briefs, vetting legislation for coherence, identification and consultation of stakeholders, coherence-friendly administrative culture and effective negotiation skills, can help foster coherence [OECD, 2005a]. High-level coordination mechanisms and policy frameworks play an important role; however, they alone are not enough and commitments need to be followed by concrete implementation.

Building on existing research on policy coherence for development more generally, this paper directs the spotlight more closely on how migration and development can be better integrated (GFMD 2007a). Thus the work takes analysis of policy
coherence to the next level. Now that the interface between migration and development is acknowledged, the challenge is to turn this into working-level policies and programmes. Policy makers often focus on remittances as the main way of translating the migration-development nexus into reality. However, as this paper will show, there are many stages in the migration cycle from departure to return and reintegration back home, and numerous opportunities for policy interventions to make migration more “development-friendly”. The paper focuses on how coherence is brought to life by practical experiences and examples on the ground.

Coherence is a two-way process; it means integrating development concerns into migration policies and also ensuring that development policies take migration into account. This publication considers both aspects. Traditionally, the links between migration and development have been seen from a prevention perspective, i.e. the need to alleviate migratory pressures by addressing root causes, such as poverty and economic underdevelopment (Lucas, 2005). These links have often been explicit; for instance, in the EU High-Level Dialogue on Asylum and Migration, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The current debate on migration and development comes from a more neutral and holistic position, it is not about preventing migration as such, but about maximizing the positive impact of migration on development. The coherence referred to means ensuring that migration policies are “development-friendly”, and that development policies recognize the role of migration; it is not about enhancing development to stop migration.

This paper looks at policy coherence from various perspectives:

- Coherence at the institutional level; for instance, high-level strategies committed to coordination as well as cross-governmental coordination mechanisms.
- Coherence at working level. The paper burrows further down to look at coherence among working-level policies.
- Coherence between countries. A further dimension is how development and migration issues are mingled in bilateral or multilateral agreements.

This publication draws on research carried out in 2006 in a joint IOM/World Bank project that included a literature review of “development-friendly” migration policies, prepared by Jobst Koehler and Frank Laczko, and eight case studies on policies and practices in selected countries prepared by the following experts:

**Albania and Italy** - Jonathan Chaloff

**Canada** – Irena Omelaniuk
Guatemala – Jennifer Petree

The Netherlands and South Africa – Lynel Long

Sri Lanka and UK - Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah

The literature review surveyed existing studies and reports on immigration and emigration policies, particularly those assessed or evaluated as affecting development either favourably or adversely, explicitly or implicitly, including, but also going beyond, migrant remittances. The countries for the case studies were selected partly on the basis of their various policy experiences. Some of destination countries, such as the Netherlands and the UK, for example, have all recently prepared national policy papers and plans to enhance the benefits of migration for development. Canada also exemplifies a longstanding immigrant country striving for more policy coherence in this area, with the recent establishment of inter-ministerial groups on migration and development. South Africa, Albania, Sri Lanka and Guatemala are all middle-income countries with some policies already in place, but with disparate implementation experiences. The eight countries were also chosen for the range of policy perspectives they give on the four regions: the Americas, Africa, Asia and Europe. In total, over 100 interviews with policy makers were held in these countries. References to material gathered by the literature review and the case studies are made throughout this text. The case studies and the literature review cover policy developments up to 2006. While recognizing that there have been a number of new initiatives since 2006, this paper limits its analysis of policy developments up to 2006. The primary aim of this paper is to shed light on the broader policy dynamics facilitating or impeding efforts to create greater policy coherence rather than highlighting specific initiatives.

The terminology used in this paper and the status of some of the measures described require explanation. The distinction between strategies, policies, initiatives, projects, pilots is often blurred and definitions of what constitutes a ‘policy’ will vary. This paper refers to a range of measures, some of which will be national level policy, and others which are small-scale projects not having the status of ‘policy’, but which nonetheless can prompt ideas for policy direction. The ultimate aim of this paper is to show a variety of ways of integrating development and migration at an operational level.

The three sections of the paper cover the following issues:

- Coherence at institutional level: this section looks at the efforts of some countries like the UK and the Netherlands to achieve greater coherence at high government level in terms of coordination between departments and government-wide policies. These measures have proven difficult due to in-
herent tensions between the two agendas. The section also considers efforts to foster coherence at local and regional levels in countries like Italy, where central coordination is weak.

- Coherence at working level: this section moves down one level to consider working level policies and practices at different stages of the migration cycle. It looks at how migration management by sending countries can enhance development impacts; how migration policies of receiving countries in terms of schemes for temporary, low and high-skilled workers can negatively or positively impact development in sending countries, and what can be done to mitigate negative effects. The section then focuses on how development policies can take account of migrants, remittances and the role of diasporas. The final part looks at return home, an issue of importance to both sending and receiving countries.

- Coherence between countries: although coordination between countries appears elsewhere in the paper, the final section takes a closer look at bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation on migration and development.

This paper also looks at another area of coherence, that of the relationship between the migration-development agenda and the human rights framework. In light of the focus on human rights by the 2008 Global Forum on Migration and Development held in the Philippines, this paper revisits this theme at various points. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of what research tells us about the conditions of achieving policy coherence in migration and development in destination and sending countries.

The paper is wide-ranging, covering a broad scope of issues and country contexts. The research process leading up to this paper yielded a great wealth of empirical material. This publication seeks to pull together the threads and lessons from this material, distilling the key points, and providing in-depth snapshots on certain aspects. It uses a variety of devices like mini case studies, boxes, indentations, summaries at the beginning of each section and key messages at the end to help the reader navigate this material. It presents a wide variety of examples in order to facilitate learning between countries and organizations and mingles issues of concern to sending and receiving countries as often policy measures require cooperation and complementary action at both ends of the migration spectrum.
2. COHERENCE AT INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

SUMMARY

There is growing recognition of the need for coherence at institutional level, i.e. at high levels of government, both in terms of coordination among departments and harmony in strategies. Some receiving countries, such as the UK and The Netherlands, have sought to foster greater institutional coherence by adopting policy frameworks, setting up cross-governmental coordination mechanisms and enhancing analytical capacity. Though such countries are able to demonstrate greater policy coherence than others, progress remains limited largely owing to inherent tensions between the different objectives and departments dealing with migration and development policy, respectively. Migration policy takes centre stage in the domestic agenda and is not easily amenable to other concerns; promoting international development is a secondary priority.

Some countries, like Italy, with devolved decision-making structures on migration, have sought to foster greater coherence at local and regional levels instead. Sending countries are beginning to recognize the links between migration and development, but these overlaps have not yet been institutionalized. Coordination between departments dealing with these issues appears to be weak. Some countries, such as Sri Lanka and Albania, have tried various ways of integrating these issues, e.g. setting up coordination mechanisms, including development in migration policies and migration in poverty reduction policies. Thus, challenges to coherence at a high institutional level remain.

Policy coherence operates at a number of different levels. There is growing recognition of the need for coherence at institutional level, i.e. at high levels of government both in terms of coordination among departments and harmony in strategies. The OECD has proposed a variety of ways to strengthen institutional capacities to achieve such coherence, including committed political leadership, increased analytical capacity, cross-institutional policy coordination mechanisms, government-wide policy frameworks, adequate identification and consultation of stakeholders; a coherence friendly administrative culture, and effective negotiation skills [OECD, 2005a]. Coherence for migration and development is a two-way process and is usually taken to mean ensuring that development concerns are mainstreamed into migration policies and that migration concerns are integrated into development policies. This publication
considers both aspects, but focuses primarily on how migration policies can be more development friendly. This section will look at some recent efforts to foster greater coherence at institutional level among receiving and sending countries.

2.1. MIGRANT RECEIVING COUNTRIES

There is a growing awareness among receiving countries of the need to harmonize actions in migration and development and to bring together different departments dealing with these issues in order to avoid inconsistencies and develop common objectives. Various countries have introduced measures to foster institutional coordination in this area. Canada, for example, set up an inter-departmental working group on international migration (International Migration Group) in 2004, comprising several key government agencies. Steps to engender greater policy coherence in destination countries have primarily focused on three aspects of institutional coherence: establishing overarching policy statements, creating mechanisms for institutional coordination, and increasing analytical capacity. For example, the Netherlands government and the House of Commons both drew up strategic policy documents identifying areas of incoherence and raised awareness of the issue within the government.

Recognizing the vital importance of policy coherence, the UK development institutions have made considerable efforts to ensure that UK policies on a range of issues, for example trade, migration, security, support, or at least do not undermine the attainment of development objectives. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has issued policy papers (1997 DFID White Paper, and 2006 draft policy paper ‘Moving out of poverty – making migration work better for poor people’), and established a migration team within its policy group. There are some efforts to foster cross-government action on migration e.g. the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DFID, attended the European Commission’s High Level Working Group on Migration. DFID also sits on the Home Office Voluntary Returns Steering Group. The UK parliament also supports these efforts (Sriskandarajah, 2006).

The various elements of institutional coherence often go hand in hand and the development of a policy framework can facilitate the case for new institutions, such as the establishment of cross-institutional mechanisms and consultative fora with the diaspora and other civil society actors:

The 2004 Netherlands policy memorandum on Development and Migration (DGIS, 2004) had various effects in that it:
- played an important role in stimulating debate on migration and development at the European level;

- provided the basis for action by different parts of government by helping to identify areas of coherence/incoherence and raising awareness of the issue;

- led to the establishment of cross-departmental groups, e.g. national consultative mechanism involving development and migration ministries as well as migrant/diaspora representatives; policy coherence unit between the ministries of development cooperation and justice;

- provided the basis for advocacy and dialogue between government and civil society. It is worth noting that countries with such a strategic framework tend to have official consultation mechanisms with diaspora groups and NGOs.

Relatively speaking, the development agencies of the Netherlands and the UK have been successful in bringing migration and development issues onto the wider government agenda. Nonetheless, achieving institutional coherence has proven a challenge. The Netherlands experience shows little concrete policy action despite changes in governance structures. In the UK, despite several years of concerted efforts, the UK development community has not yet managed to ‘mainstream’ migration into the UK development policy agenda, migration rarely features in DFID’s bilateral assistance plans and there is a persistent a lack of consensus in DFID on prioritizing this issue (Sriskandarajah, 2006). Coherence flowing the other way, mainstreaming development into migration policies, has been even more challenging. Despite efforts, there remains a lack of coherent thinking across government on this issue (Sriskandarajah, 2006). Box 1 provides further details on the challenges facing the UK in synergizing these policy areas.

The main obstacle to greater institutional coherence have been the inherent tensions between policymaking on migration and development: they are usually the responsibility of different departments governed by different interests. The UK’s internal interests and its domestic agenda take priority over its development commitments to sending countries. Even where departments agree to cooperate, they may have different objectives, e.g. the development department may be interested in ensuring that remittances reach the poorest, whereas finance ministries may be more concerned about legalities (Sriskandarajah, 2006 and see Box 1). There are also advocacy challenges in persuading officials of the value in making these links, and a general lack of coordination, e.g. the fact that priority countries for development assistance are often not the same as those from which migrants come, thus making development work difficult for both ministries and diaspora groups in receiving countries. Interestingly,
the drive for coherence in both the UK and the Netherlands comes from departments dealing with development and foreign affairs as are the overarching policy frameworks. More leadership from the centre of government pressing for these linkages may be one way of encouraging greater buy-in from wider government departments. While these kinds of tensions and trade-offs apply to all areas of public policy, they do highlight the challenges in making migration more development friendly. Furthermore, optimizing the development impacts of migration requires the engagement of NGOs and diasporas and cannot be managed by government alone.

Whether or not there is institutional coherence, experience suggests it is not sufficient to bring about overall policy coherence between the migration and development agendas. A key challenge is to translate high-level commitments into concrete working-level policies and programmes. The thrust of the next section of this paper is therefore to demonstrate how synergies can be found at lower levels.

**BOX 1
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF DESTINATION EXPERIENCES**

**Challenges to migration-development policy coherence in the UK**

Despite several years of concerted efforts to engender greater integration between migration and development policies, there are two major challenges to effective policy coherence:

*Mainstreaming migration into development:* The UK development community has not yet managed to mainstream migration into the UK development policy agenda, partly due to a lack of consensus on the impacts of migration on development and the types of measures to be taken. There is tension between prioritizing structural factors (e.g., bad governance, inadequate infrastructure) or migration-related interventions. Activities on remittances and the rest of the migration-development nexus also appear operationally disconnected. Migration rarely features explicitly in DFID’s bilateral assistance plans (only three out of the top ten recipient countries in 2004/5 - Bangladesh, India and Ghana – made cursory references to migration in Country Assistance Plans). There are some DFID programmes to address brain drain issues, e.g. UK support to the Malawi government with GBP100 million over five years to address human resource shortages.

*Mainstreaming development into migration policies:* There are some
efforts to foster cross-government action on migration, e.g. Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Offices and DFID, attended the EC High Level Working Group on Migration. DFID also sits on the Home Office Voluntary Returns Steering Group. However, on the whole, there is a lack of joined-up thinking within government as a whole in this area, primarily because of the inherent tensions in policymaking on migration and development. Development policy is made by DFID, and asylum and migration policy by the Home Office. Policy incoherence results principally from a hierarchy of ministries and of policy priorities, in which development priorities in sending countries comes second to the UK’s immediate interests. There are also inherent conflicts of objectives, e.g. DFID is concerned that remittances reach the poorest, whereas the Treasury is focused on the legality of transfers; migration authorities may want to play down country risk assessments because of the implications for asylum claims whereas DFID may want to highlight the need for preventive humanitarian action; trade negotiators may be reluctant to open the door to lower-skilled workers from developing countries while DFID may be supporting developing country negotiators to obtain more development-friendly outcomes.

Adapted from UK-Sri Lanka Case Study (Sriskandarajah, 2006)

Greater coherence at local levels may be one way of addressing the lack of institutional coherence at the centre. The devolution of migration policy responsibilities and the decentralization of development cooperation provide new opportunities for policy coherence at local and regional levels (Koehler and Laczko, 2006). The activities of sub-national authorities can sometimes compensate for policy inertia in central government. Under decentralized cooperation, local and regional authorities in Italy, Spain and France have made financial resources available from their limited budgets to finance a range of migration and development projects. Decentralization brings with it both risks and opportunities. A bottom-up approach can make development work more sensitive to the needs of local communities through links with grass-roots actors and neighbourhood partnerships. However, an initial assessment of the Italian situation (see Box 2) indicates that policy fragmentation rather than coherence may occur due to a duplication of tasks and the lack of coordination resulting from the absence of a general national policy framework (CESPI, 2004).
Regional initiatives for migration and development in Italy

Local and regional administrations in Italy have partly filled the gap in national policy coherence by taking action themselves. This has been made possible by the fact that regional migrant labour needs are difficult to address centrally, the boom in immigration coincided with a transfer of responsibility to the regions, and civil society organizations and migrants themselves are better placed to support local authorities. Local governments have intensified international cooperation activities since the 1990s, particularly with Mediterranean and Balkans countries, through innovative partnership initiatives. Italian regional migration legislation makes explicit links between immigration and development, and projects have been initiated covering workforce training, selection and recruitment projects; return migration; employment creation and reduction of migratory pressures, and remittances.

Examples include:

* Training project in the Veneto region for the selection and training of 23 workers in Albania for placement in the local building sector in Italy for six-month apprenticeships – 82 per cent were still working in the sector at the end of the project. Such projects generally fail to take account of wider issues such as brain drain, but as they are small-scale they may have little negative impact.

* Return projects linking voluntary return and entrepreneurship, e.g. Ag-fol Vocational Training Agency project, run by the Veneto Region with EU funding in 1995, involved the selection of 30 Albanian immigrants for professional training and apprenticeships in Veneto enterprises in order to enable them to establish their own businesses in Albania. The collapse of the government-supported investment scheme (“the pyramid scheme”) in 1997 disrupted the project, but some returnees were successful and are still managing fairly large enterprises.

* Few examples of programmes assisting the socio-economic reintegration of irregular migrants. Alnima, a EU funded project, assisted the return of 120 Moroccan and Albanian prisoners and Nigerian traffick-
ing victims by providing raining in prisons and subsidies for further training, apprenticeships or microenterprises upon deportation. While the project did not seem to stop recidivism, it did at least serve to improve the conditions of forced returnees. Local authorities have also started making contacts with local authorities in sending countries, especially Romania, to support the return of unaccompanied minors.

*Adapted from Italy-Albania Case-Study (Chaloff, 2006)*

### 2.2. Migrant Sending countries

Policy coordination rather than policy coherence is the key issue for countries of origin. Sending countries generally face less of a trade-off between migration and development policy objectives. It is generally recognized that migration can be good for development and, moreover, in devising policies, sending countries are only required to take account of their own national interests. Receiving countries, on the other hand, are required to take into account the development needs of sending countries as well, and may sometimes perceive that these are in conflict with their own national interests.

Evidence shows that policy coordination between departments dealing with migration and development in sending countries is weak, suggesting that they are not fully cognisant of the migration-development nexus or aware of how the management of migration can improve development outcomes. Challenges for countries of origin in improving coordination are twofold:

- lack of institutional knowledge and capacity to optimize the linkages between migration and development;

- owing to the designation of responsibilities to different departments, migration will usually be managed by a different ministry from that dealing with poverty reduction and development - the cross-sectoral nature of the issue means that no particular institution is responsible and that some issues fall through the cracks.

There are various ways to improve coordination:

- Designating responsibilities clearly: Sri Lanka has established a coordination mechanism, the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, which acts as a “migration champion” within the government structure.
- Building migration into development strategies. Sri Lanka has made explicit linkages between labour migration and poverty reduction by including migration in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers.

- Building development into migration strategies. Albania’s National Strategy on Migration makes explicit links between migration and development. It has a section on emigration and the development of Albania and proposes various policy measures to benefit from Albanians abroad by providing them with more support, mobilizing expatriate communities, encouraging the flow of remittances into business investment and managing circular migration/brain circulation. Full implementation of this policy has yet to be achieved and faces a lack of resources, capacity and a lack of coordination within government (Chaloff, 2006).

Destination countries can also instigate a process leading to a more coherent policy framework in sending countries. For instance, Albania’s current migration law “On the Migration of Albanian Citizens for Employment Purposes” (L.9034) was drafted within the framework of the Stability Pact and the EU accession process. While the law seeks to limit irregular migration, the National Strategy on Migration makes an explicit link between migration and development, especially in its discussion of “benefiting from Albanian emigrants abroad” and the measures proposed in the area of circular migration, return and brain drain. This approach creates its particular problems of ownership. While the government is officially the owner of this policy development, the strategy might still be viewed as a foreign process imposed on the government. In the Albanian case, a weak sense of ownership accounts for the uneven implementation of the National Migration Strategy. There is great uncertainty as to coordination of the strategy within the government, with different departments jockeying for control of the portfolio. Frequent staff changes also impede the development of technical expertise at the ministerial level to carry forward the strategy. Furthermore, low capacity at the ministerial level has meant that no guidance and support has been given to the local government in implementing the strategy (Chaloff 2006).

A further factor inhibiting the ability of sending countries to optimize the migration-development nexus is the unwillingness of receiving countries to give them voice and influence over migration policies. Developing countries may wish to maximize the development effects of migration, but they can only do so if they have the support and cooperation of developed destination countries. Efforts are being made to take up such issues in multilateral fora if bilateral dialogue is not possible; e.g. the Sri Lankan government has been instrumental in establishing a regional consultative process in 2003 (better known as the Colombo Process\(^1\)) that brings together labour ministers from Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam to focus on optimizing the impacts of emigration, the
protection of vulnerable migrants and capacity building, data collection and interstate cooperation. The Colombo Process initiated a dialogue on labour migration in South Asia, which expanded in 2008 to become the Abu Dhabi Dialogue and to include India, China, the Gulf States, Malaysia and Singapore. The outcome of the dialogue was the Abu Dhabi Declaration through which the participating states decided to launch a collaborative approach to address temporary labour mobility and maximize its benefits for development.

**Key Message**

An integrated policy framework can facilitate the case for more developed coordination mechanisms, but owing to conflicting interests in receiving countries between domestic needs and commitments to international development it remains a challenge to translate this commitment into action.

A clear regulatory framework for promoting labour migration by countries of origin can facilitate the integration of migration into development strategies, but only if the issue of mainstreaming of migration into development is taken up by a migration policy “champion” within the government assuming clear responsibility for the migration and development agenda.
3. COHERENCE AT THE WORKING LEVEL

This section deals working level policies and practices. It moves through the various stages of the migration cycle from pre-departure through to migration, stay in the receiving country and return home. It identifies various ways in which international development actors have sought to find synergies in these two fields. The boundaries between policies, practices, initiatives, projects and so on are particularly blurred at this level, as it is often difficult to distinguish where policy ends and operations start. The section examines a range of measures in the hope of prompting ideas for new policy direction among those seeking to integrate migration and development agendas.

3.1 MANAGING EMIGRATION

SUMMARY

Efforts to manage emigration by sending countries can have positive development effects. Although it is not possible to say conclusively whether migration brings net benefits to countries of origin, experience shows that where migration is occurring, countries with explicit policies to regulate and manage migration processes, can better harness potential positive spin-offs for development. These measures fall into two categories both with distinct implications for the sending country’s economy:

* Regulation of migration to better protect migrant workers abroad. Aside from serving the well-being of nationals abroad, these initiatives can mean that nationals have better-paid and more secure employment, thus, hopefully, enabling a greater flow of remittances back home. The Philippines experience shows that regulation of the recruitment process does not necessarily render foreign workers less competitive, but can, in fact, enable them to assert their rights more effectively and gain higher wages in the long run. Many of these efforts link directly to the protection of migrant workers under human rights standards.

* Promotion of migration and seeking labour markets abroad can help the home economy by relieving domestic unemployment. Having an emigration policy can in and of itself have a development impact, as emigration creates demands for new services and businesses, sometimes making a significant contribution to the economy.
3.1.1. BACKGROUND

This section considers how policies by sending countries aimed at managing emigration can have positive development effects. Although the net benefits of migration to countries of origin are not conclusive, experience shows that where migration is occurring, countries with explicit policies on regulating and managing migration processes, are better placed to harness potential positive spin-offs for development.

Most developing country governments do not have explicit policies to manage the levels and outcomes of emigration, although there has been a marked increase in the number of developing and developed countries that have programmes and policies to encourage their citizens to return. In 1996 only 56 countries had explicit policies to encourage the return of their citizens, compared to 79 by 2007 (United Nations 2007).

Where emigration policies exist they are sometimes part of negotiated agreements with receiving countries and are thus tailored to the requirements of developed countries of destination rather than the needs of countries of origin. Cooperation agreements often serve the interests of developed nations in controlling irregular migration and include readmission clauses, e.g. the EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with East European and Central Asian countries, as well as bilateral programmes between Morocco/Spain, and Italy/Tunisia (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). The EU-African Conference on Migration and Development held in Rabat, Morocco, in July 2006, yielded an agreed plan of action to control South-North migration by trading African cooperation to restrict migration for European development assistance. The irony of this agreement is that Africa benefits far more from remittances (and thus from regular/irregular migration) than it does from European development aid, which amounts to USD 3.16 billion annually compared with USD 60 billion annually in remittances[Noll, 2006].

A range of measures can be taken to manage the emigration process in order to enhance its development impact (MPI, 2005, GFMD 2007 b). The Philippines is at the forefront of governments seeking to manage emigration. It has designed an emigration policy to regulate the full cycle of labour migration from the application for an overseas job to the reintegration of workers upon their return. Three government bodies are responsible for processing and protecting migrant workers: the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA, overseeing recruitment and pre-departure orientation), the network of labour attachés in consulates abroad (assistance while abroad) and the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (concerned with the welfare of workers abroad and families left behind) (MPI 2005:36). Although less extensively regulated, similar migration regimes exist in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Pakistan. This section reviews measures to regulate and promote migration.
3.1.2. POLICY APPROACHES

3.1.2.1. Regulating emigration

Governments may take a variety of policy measures to facilitate the passage of nationals abroad. An unregulated recruitment market exposes migrants to various risks, such as hazardous travel, unsafe working conditions, debt bondage and exploitation. Government measures aimed at ensuring protection from such dangers and enabling better integration in countries of destination can serve the well-being of nationals abroad and also lead to development effects in that nationals with enhanced economic opportunities (better paid more secure employment) may send more remittances to communities back home and bring back more skills and investment to their country of origin. The Philippines, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are perhaps best known for regulating emigration. Other countries, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Mexico, have also introduced regulatory frameworks in a move to ensure the safety and welfare of their expatriates (Brand 2002).

Policy measures to improve the protection and welfare of citizens abroad include the following (MPI 2005, Waddington 2003):

- Passing legislation that permits emigration only to host countries which have labour and social laws protecting migrant workers.
- Licensing private recruitment agents.
- Using standard foreign employment contracts.
- Having labour attachés in major consular offices. Aside from intervening in cases and providing support when needed, some countries have taken preemptive steps to facilitate the life of nationals abroad. As Box 3 shows, the Guatemalan government has started to issue consular ID cards which can help their nationals’ access facilities in the receiving country, and also lobbies to ensure recognition of its citizens abroad.
- Providing welfare insurance.
- Carrying out pre-departure training, information, dissemination and counseling sessions.

Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Bangladesh run pre-departure orientation programmes for their migrant workers, particularly those at the lower end of the occupational spectrum who may be particularly vulnerable to abuse. Training covers a range of topics such as migrant rights and obligations, travel documents and procedures, living and welfare conditions abroad, health and safety and social welfare. Efforts have been made to enlist wider support and,
in the Philippines, over 100 organizations, including family associations, migrant worker cooperatives, trade unions, business groups, banks, remittance centres, insurance companies and even employers’ associations, work to support overseas Filipinas.

A key question is whether such market regulation makes emigration more costly and migrant workers less competitive on the international labour market. These concerns seem unfounded. In the Philippine case, despite extensive regulation of labour emigration, the government nonetheless manages to negotiate some of the best wages and conditions of employment for its overseas foreign workers in places like Hong Kong SAR and Singapore (Orozco, 2005). The government prohibits private recruitment agencies from deploying workers who are not covered by a government approved employment contract; expects host countries (under the Philippines Overseas Act) to enact labour and social laws that protect migrant workers; signs multilateral conventions and enters into bilateral arrangements (IOM 2005a). Filipino domestic workers in the Gulf States are near the top of the wage scale for that sector because of their awareness of rights and legal protection; English skills have enabled Filipina maids in Hong Kong SAR to attain at least the minimum wage in contrast to maids from Indonesia (Martin, Abella and Midgley, 2003). The Philippines experience shows that migration management does not necessarily render foreign workers less competitive but can, in fact, enable them to assert their rights more effectively and gain higher wages in the long run. Research on whether this leads to more remittances and better development effects is still outstanding (Koehler and Laczko 2006).

**BOX 3**
**CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EXPERIENCES**

**Efforts by the government of Guatemala to document its citizens living abroad**

The Guatemalan government sees the issuance of ID documents and the regularization of its citizens abroad as a key ‘development-friendly’ strategy. Consular ID cards or passports can assist irregular migrants abroad to access essential services. Consular cards are accepted in the US by some organizations and enable Guatemalans to open accounts for utilities and insurance, allow passengers to board flights in the US bound for Latin America, obtain library cards, driving licenses, entry to public buildings and access to education. Corruption and the falsification of identity documents is a key challenge.
The government has also lobbied receiving countries to regularize the status of illegal Guatemalans. The problem posed by thousands of irregular Guatemalan migrants living in the US was highlighted following the humanitarian crisis in the wake of Hurricane Stan in October 2005. Given the large number of Guatemalans from the region affected by Hurricane Stan living in the US without a visa, the government quickly realized the implications for its expatriate citizens; not only would this make their return home difficult, it would also create a huge problem for the government struggling with recovery and faced with a premature influx of its nationals. The tragedy motivated the government to submit a formal petition to the US government requesting Temporary Protection Status (TPS) – temporary work permits and postponement of deportation orders - for some 500,000 irregular Guatemalan migrants living in the US.

Adapted from Guatemala case study (Petree, 2006).

3.1.2. Promoting labour migration

BOX 4
STATE RECRUITMENT

The Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) set up an in-house facility for migrants to facilitate travel, foreign exchange, banking and document processing. These measures appear to have had some effect on emigration patterns, as SLBFE has successfully increased recruitment to a wider range of destination countries (Gunatilleke, 1991). Not all state recruitment agencies are as successful and the role of the private sector in filling gaps can make a significant difference to the ability of labour exporting countries to respond to demands for expatriate labour (Abella, 1997). The Philippines, for example, which saw a growth in private agencies from a mere handful in 1975 to nearly one thousand ten years later, and a parallel rise in workers placed in jobs in the Middle East from 1,552 to 311,517 in the same period (almost all placed through private agents), fared better than Pakistan, which experienced a decline in the outflow of migrant labour in the same period, largely seen as associated with a reduction in the number of private recruitment agents (Abella, 1997).
Some labour sending countries seek to align their emigration policy with labour market needs and actively encourage migration for a variety of internal reasons, including, e.g., relieving domestic unemployment, seeking to optimize remittances by steering the direction and composition of labour migration, avoiding over-dependency on one or two labour markets. These ‘labour-export oriented’ migration regimes place great emphasis on foreign market development and manpower management.

There are a variety of policy measures that can be taken by countries seeking to steer labour migration:

- Marketing missions abroad to identify and meet potential clients.
- Publishing information for job seekers and recruiters on existing demand abroad.
- State recruitment. Some countries seek to control placement directly and manage foreign clients in-house, matching their employment needs to categories of potential migrants by providing testing services, selection procedures and travel document services. The success of state recruitment initiatives appears mixed. Box 4 indicates that, while Sri Lanka has had some success in increasing recruitment to a wider range of destination countries, the Philippine case shows that private recruitment agencies continue to play a key role in stimulating growth of overseas markets.
- Corporate labour export measures have been favoured by some countries to generate income not only from wages but also from the profits of companies that send workers to foreign countries as project contractors.

Turkey, India, the Philippines and Indonesia have all pursued such policies to encourage engineering companies to pursue joint ventures and sub-contracting arrangements for construction projects abroad (Abella, 1997). In China, Vietnam and Cuba, such corporate initiatives are organized exclusively by the state, viz. the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation coordinates the overseas contracting activities of some 100 large engineering and construction companies (Waddington, 2003).

Having an emigration policy can in and of itself have a development impact, as emigration creates demands for new services and businesses, sometimes making a significant contribution to the economy, e.g. the 1,200 licensed recruitment agencies in the Philippines in 2004 had a combined annual revenue of over USD 400 million a year (Martin, 2005).
Key Message

Policies by countries of origin to regulate migration flows and protect migrants abroad not only serves the well-being of nationals abroad, but can also help to enhance the development effects of migration.

3.2. TEMPORARY MIGRATION

SUMMARY

Temporary labour migration schemes, especially those with repeat migration possibilities, such as the Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Worker Schemes and small-scale European schemes, are shown to have valuable development effects. They provide secure and legal migration routes to workers who might otherwise enter via irregular channels and therefore end up in vulnerable situations where they are little able to contribute to the development of their home countries. The human rights dimension is clearly evident in this policy area and experience shows that bilateral programmes which incorporate labour standards can have better development effects. The need for specific legislation to protect migrant workers in receiving countries emerges as key.

Most temporary worker schemes are set up to respond to the labour market needs of receiving countries and not the development needs of sending countries. Nonetheless, evidence shows that where this is considered, such programmes can lead to increased remittances, investments in home communities and tangible changes to family life, including greater access to health care and schooling. Such temporary migration schemes work best for development where they ensure the protection of migrant workers. They can further be enhanced by including skills training of use to countries of origin.

3.2.1. BACKGROUND

Temporary labour migration schemes that allow circularity of movement through seasonal, time-limited or project-based labour, especially for low-skilled workers, are generally accepted as generating benefits to the home country. Managed migration
programmes which combine temporary migration of low-skilled workers with incentives for return are seen as the most realistic way of improving the development impact of migration (WB, 2006, GFMD 2007b) partly because temporary labour migrants are known to remit more than permanent migrants (Bauer and Sinnig, 2005; Rosenzweig, 2004), and also because their frequent returns can stimulate the home economy with the injection of funds and new skills (Ellerman, 2003). Temporary migrants can remain engaged with their home communities e.g. through agriculture, bringing social benefits in terms of maintaining family and community cohesion as well as economic well-being.

Such programmes also have a positive development effect by providing alternatives to irregular migration. Without such schemes, irregular channels are often the only means by which migrants from developing countries can enter developed nations. Aside from the personal risks of irregular migration, research shows that migrants in an irregular position are less likely to remit funds home given lack of access to bank accounts and funds needed for expensive money transfer operations (World Bank, 2006). Sending countries are less able to maintain contacts with undocumented expatriates and to capitalize on their diaspora for development purposes (Koehler and Laczko, 2006). The lack of regular migration channels has gender dimensions and particularly severe consequences for female migrants, as shown in Box 5.

Thus, programmes which enable circular flows back and forth through legitimate channels can be mutually beneficial: allowing host countries to meet short-term labour needs and countries of origin to retain a hold over their human capital through a joint planning framework which facilitates optimum worker conditions and employer satisfaction.

3.2.2. POLICY APPROACHES

The 1990s witnessed a revival of temporary worker programmes in Europe and North America. The programmes tended to be small, diverse (each having its own admission criteria) and driven by the needs of receiving countries in terms of labour market shortages and desires to curb irregular migration, notably programmes in Germany, Italy and Spain. There are a few programmes which consider development effects in their selection of low-skilled workers, but they are still primarily driven by labour needs in receiving countries. The Canadian Seasonal Worker programmes are some of the best examples of this model. While temporary worker schemes are popular among sending country governments, receiving countries continue to have reservations. The UK government is reluctant to operate schemes for non-EEA nationals, due to concerns about possible over-supply of low skilled labour following EU enlargement.
(Home Office, 2005; Cooley et. al, 2005) and fears about abuse of entry permissions and overstayers. This section reviews various types of temporary worker programmes, particularly in terms of their development outcomes.

### 3.2.2.1 Linking with efforts to combat irregular migration

One type of initiative expressly links access to the labour market for low-skilled labour migrants to increased efforts by countries of origin to combat irregular migration. These can be either “carrot” or “stick approaches”: Spain, Portugal and Italy use preferential quota-based temporary foreign worker schemes as an incentive for sending countries to improve their migration management, whereas the UK uses restrictions to penalize countries which do not cooperate with the return of their overstayers (Martin et al., 2006). The experience of Italy (see Box 6) shows that such schemes may have limited value in curbing irregular immigration, as quotas may be too small or fail to appeal to employers. Nonetheless, they may have some benefits for sending countries if training components are part of the package.

**BOX 5**

**RISKS FACED BY FEMALE IRREGULAR MIGRANTS**

Gender research emphasizes how migration policies can render female migrants more vulnerable than males, e.g. current tendencies towards admitting only highly skilled professions, where women are still underrepresented (Jolly and Reeves, 2005) may mean female migrant workers can often only enter as unskilled workers and/or as irregular migrants. Both routes carry a high element of risk, irregular migration exposes women to abusive practices associated with smuggling and trafficking, while legal routes of unskilled migration may afford greater protection but are rare, especially in the sectors in which female migrants are most typically employed. Examples of exploitation and abuse of Sri Lankan women in the Middle East and elsewhere can be found at [http://www.cenwor.lk/migworkersviolen.html](http://www.cenwor.lk/migworkersviolen.html), for example. In the Gulf States, domestic work is the most important category of employment for female migrants, attracting up to 85 per cent of Sri Lankan and 35 per cent of Filipina women, respectively, yet the sector is not covered by current labour laws in most Arab Leagues States (ILO, 2004a). In the Middle East and Malaysia, the “kafil” system of employer sponsorship limits the freedom of movement for many women in the domestic care sector, which may prevent them from fleeing life-threatening situations. However, it should be noted...
that highly selective immigration policies can also work in favour of women
in some places; for instance Australia’s immigration system is said to have
indirectly favoured the selection of independent skilled female migrants,
many of whom are from developing countries (Inglis, 2003).

BOX 6
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF DESTINATION EXPERIENCES

Italy’s quota-based systems linked to curbing irregular migration

The Italian experience shows that its quota-based systems are relatively
accessible to migrants from developing countries: of the 13 states currently
admitted under the scheme, all are developing countries (Pastore, 2006).
However, the quotas are often too small to induce cooperation by sending
countries and may serve as a disincentive to irregular migrants (Pastore,
2006). Quotas may also remain under-subscribed if they are not in line with
employer interests, as employers prefer to hire someone face-to-face rather
than go through the cost and bureaucracy of selecting someone from abroad.
Despite the fact that such programmes may not reduce irregular migration,
they may nevertheless have some positive outcomes for the sending country,
e.g. training of workers. Italian and Spanish “second generation” agreements
include pre-departure training for low-skilled migrants (OECD 2004 b).

Adapted from Italy-Albania case study (Chaloff, 2006)

3.2.2.2. Facilitating seasonal labour migration

The most common temporary labour migration schemes involve seasonal labour.
Current seasonal labour migration schemes are small in comparison to the earlier
programmes of the 1990s, but still yield considerable benefits to participants, their
families and the community, as documented in a number of remittance surveys. The
benefits which accrue to developing countries will depend on the design of particular
schemes and the extent to which they are accessible to low-skilled migrants from the
poorest developing countries, e.g. the largest seasonal worker schemes in Europe
recruit workers primarily from the relatively affluent countries of central and eastern
Europe (Koehler and Laczko, 2006; Werner, 1996).
The needs of countries of origin or considerations of equity rarely influence the selection process of temporary labour migration schemes. The Canadian seasonal agricultural worker (SAW) programmes, which enable migrant workers from Mexico, the Caribbean and Guatemala to enter as temporary labourers, are primarily guided by Canada’s labour market needs, but they do specifically target labour migrants who are poor, have little education, are landless and lack other means of making a living (Basok, 2003).

Details of how these programmes work are given in Box 7. However, it is worth noting that independent evaluations of these programmes indicate important development benefits for impoverished regions of the home country. Working conditions for migrants are generally good and employer compliance with labour regulations is relatively high in these programmes, which optimizes the productivity and earnings of migrant workers (Basok, 2002). The programmes no doubt lead to increased employment opportunities, higher wages and increased knowledge and skills among the participants. They also enjoy high return rates given assurances of repeat migration in following years (Griffith, 2003; Dunn and Mondesire, 2002; IOM Guatemala 2006). Researchers have been able to document specific development outcomes as follows:

- Remittances. Participants remit substantial sums, those in the Canada/Mexico programme remitted around USD 8,000 per migrant per season (or USD 90 million in aggregate per season to Mexico). An IOM study showed that 77 per cent of Guatemalan workers remitted several thousands dollars each season and that this money was spent on housing construction, repairs and expansion, debt repayment and the purchase of basic consumer goods, education, land purchase, savings and healthcare (IOM Guatemala, 2006).

- Increased standards of living and welfare of families. The Canadian programmes show improved food consumption, clothing, access to healthcare and home improvements (Verduzco and Lozano, 2004; North-South Institute, 2006; Basok, 2002). There is also evidence of more regular and longer school attendance and a higher incidence of children choosing non-agricultural occupations, even entering the professions (IOM Guatemala, 2006).

- Wider economic benefits. The majority of workers believe that labour migration to Canada and corresponding remittances has had profound and positive impacts on their communities of origin, such as improvements in housing conditions, expanded land ownership for agricultural production (sometimes generating additional employment for other community members), and local economic growth. Studies in Mexico and Jamaica show that migrants
invest in communities back home, set up new businesses, support health and education services and generally contribute to poverty alleviation (Dunn and Mondesire, 2002; Basok, 2003; North-South institute, 2006).

- Social changes. There can be other positive side effects, new customs and ways of thinking and a stronger sense of responsibility and concern among migrant workers towards their home communities’ well-being (IOM Guatemala, 2006). The Canadian programmes also found evidence of women’s empowerment with the increased participation of women in these schemes over time as well as growing authority for women left at home (IOM Guatemala, 2006).

While the development benefits seem self-evident, the costs to the country of origin must also be borne in mind. The Canada-Mexico SAW programme is costly for the country of origin because of travel subsidies and administration. There are no exact calculations, but the public investment per migrant could be around USD 500 per season (still considered cost-effective given the USD 8,000 in remittances that come back) (Verduzco and Lozano, 2004). This pinpoints the need for a deeper cost-benefit analysis of such bilateral agreements.

**BOX 7**

CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCE OF SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES WORKING IN PARTNERSHIP

**Canada and Mexico/Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAW) Bilateral Programmes:**

The long-standing bilateral Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programmes between Canada and the Caribbean/Mexico have been in place since the 1960s and provide annually assured jobs with Canadian farmers to some 18,000 farm workers from those countries (Mexico - 11,720 in 2005, and Jamaica 6,701 in 2005). Most are employed on fruit, vegetables and tobacco plantations in Ontario. The programmes are demand-driven at the provincial level and created with the principal orientation of supporting the health of Canada’s farm economy. At the Mexican end, the Ministry of Labour ensures selection of the most needy, based on poverty and unemployment levels, in collaboration with hundreds of state employment services, negotiates rates and prepares them for migration.
Canadian farmers offer a minimum work period (240 hours in six weeks, up to eight months a year – average stay is four months), wages commensurate with those of Canadian workers, free approved housing and meals or cooking facilities. Migrants are entitled to health insurance upon arrival. The farmers’ applications are approved by local Human Resource Centres and the Foreign Agricultural Resource Management Services (FARMS), which passes approvals on to the sending countries. Farmers deduct tax, health, unemployment insurance and advanced transportation costs. There is a probation period (14 days) and an evaluation by employers. Mexican officials provide reception and information to arriving Mexican workers, and can investigate housing and migrant grievances. Sanctions may be applied to employers who breach migration or labour laws (including termination of any government assistance in hiring foreign labour). The governments involved generally find that employer compliance is very high and sanctions rarely warranted (Ruddick, 2004).

Some 70-80 per cent of workers are repeat labour – re-hired by the farmers based on the trust developed over time between employer and employee. The migrants appear to save an average of CAD 1,000 a month. There is even some remittance support provision in some of the agreements, e.g. arrangements with Canadian banks allow agricultural workers to open accounts accessible to families in the home country. The Caribbean agreement includes a compulsory savings scheme, where 25 per cent of the migrants’ wages are automatically remitted to the respective governments to assure minimum foreign currency earnings. A five to eight per cent share of the remittances is retained by governments to cover administrative costs, and the rest placed in migrant accounts at the end of the season. In a 2002 survey this was welcomed by most Caribbean migrants (as disciplining their savings habits).

While the programme has numerous benefits for individual migrants as well as home country development (see main text), the programme is not entirely unproblematic for the migrants, with some complaints over conditions of employment (isolation on remote ranches), delayed payments or double-taxation by governments, lack of access to (un-)employment insurance, since unemployed SAWs are repatriated and hence do not collect benefit. Nevertheless, a recent survey showed that most migrants preferred the high security and lower costs of the Canadian programme to working illegally. Policy makers find that the programmes successfully meet agricultural needs with reliable workers during peak labour demand periods and benefits the
Canadian economy (Canada has moved from being a net importer to a net exporter of six of the seven key crops employing foreign SAWs, and Mexican and Caribbean workers account for ca. 18 per cent of Canada’s horticultural workforce).

Adapted from Canada case study (Omelaniuk, 2006).

3.2.2.3. Ensuring the protection of migrant workers

The fair treatment of foreign workers may be an issue if these matters are not expressly dealt with in bilateral agreements (as the Canadian examples above do). In many countries, labour migration programmes may be very restrictive; migrant workers may find it difficult, even impossible, to change employers or jobs, be reunited with their families, gain secure residence status or have access to the full range of social security protection in the country of employment. While these provisions are intended to ensure the temporary nature of these programmes, their social and economic costs may have negative implications for development. Migrant workers who are exploited or unfairly treated will have fewer resources to remit back home for the development of their countries of origin. Studies show that migrants with secure and predictable legal status, and whose rights are respected, are more likely to remit, for instance Egyptians in Saudi Arabia, Libya and Jordan, where their status is relatively precarious, remit considerably less than might be expected compared to Egyptians working in the US and Europe, where their status is also more secure (Collyer, 2004).

The protection of migrants’ rights is a controversial issue in international policy debates. While sending countries are keen to see the adoption of international legal standards, receiving countries can be reluctant to create additional legal bases, partly due to concerns over immigration controls. Box 8 shows the typical responses of sending and receiving countries to the issue of migrant worker exploitation.

BOX 8
CASE STUDY: THE EXPERIENCE OF SENDING AND RECEIVING COUNTRIES

Response of the UK and Sri Lankan governments to protecting the rights of migrant workers

The position of the UK and Sri Lankan governments illustrates some typical responses to the issue of migrant worker protection. For its part the
Sri Lankan government has been at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to see the wider ratification of multilateral instruments that create a legal framework for protecting migrants’ rights. The issue is raised consistently by Sri Lankan officials though, in practice, questions remain about how well laws and regulations protecting migrants are enforced under the Sri Lankan justice system itself, never mind in receiving countries (lack of attention by Sri Lankan courts to abuse and exploitation by recruitment agencies; need for voting rights for Sri Lanka expatriates (RMMRU and DFID, 2003).

On the other hand, the UK government seems reluctant to create additional legal bases in this area. It has not ratified the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, citing the argument that the rights of migrant workers are already protected under UK law in the form of existing commitments under international law. The government decision is also based on the fear that ratification of the Convention would result in fundamental changes to UK legislation and represent a serious challenge to the current immigration rules and system of frontier controls (HCIDC, 2004b). That being said, the UK government has certain measures in place to ensure that migrants coming to the UK are aware of their employment rights and responsibilities: the Gangmaster Licensing Act (2004), for example, contains provisions to ensure the prevention of exploitation of migrant workers by gangmasters in the wake of high profile cases, such as the deaths of Chinese cockle-pickers in Morecambe Bay. However, exploitation of migrant workers is still widespread.

Adapted from UK-Sri Lanka case study (Sriskandarajan, 2006).

### 3.2.2.4. Developing skills

Temporary worker schemes are most likely to benefit developing countries of origin if migrant workers have the opportunity to gain new work experience and develop skills which can usefully be employed on their return. Experience shows that vocational training plays an important role in circular migration: migrants who received vocational training in Germany were 11 per cent more likely to return to their home country than those who had received no vocational training, and also had a 74 per cent higher probability of repeat migration (Constant and Zimmermann, 2003). However, current “training cum work” schemes appear to have limited development benefits, for two reasons:
- Lack of accessibility to low-skilled migrants from poor countries. Germany’s guest worker training programmes, for instance, are aimed at young persons from countries of economic or political significance, which may not be the poorest countries of the developing world. Some schemes nominally admit nationals from developing countries, but places for poor low-skilled migrants tend to be limited (Koehler and Laczko, 2006).

The Commonwealth Working Holiday Maker Scheme (WHM) offers low-end job opportunities for the purpose of cultural exchange, but few vacancies are filled by low-skilled labour from developing countries: the Australian WHS, for example, grants access to migrants from developing countries such as Iran, Thailand, Chile, Turkey and Bangladesh, but only 100 Work and Holiday visas per country/ per year are permitted.

- Lack of relevant training. Even where programmes are accessible to low-skilled labourers from developing countries, they are unlikely to impart skills the worker can usefully employ back home. Skill transfer is most likely to occur if the jobs open to migrants require more and better skills than the migrant already has, the skills acquired during work abroad are appropriate to the labour market conditions in the home country and the worker can, in fact, use his acquired skills at home (Lucas, 2005).

A review of government-sponsored trainee programmes in Germany and Japan suggests that skills acquired may not necessarily be those needed back home. The technological divide between the two countries may be too for the new skills acquired during the trainee programme to be readily put to good use on return to the home country. The Overseas Youth Skill Training Programme supported by the Japanese Ministry of Labour had to stop accepting trainees from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India on account of a mismatch between the skills the trainees acquired in Japan and the labour market needs of the home country (Kuptsch and Oishi, 1994).

One approach to making training more relevant is to offer part of the training in the country of origin itself.

The Italian region of Veneto earmarked EUR 2.1 million for such ‘training abroad’ schemes for workers in Albania, Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia in 2002 (OECD, 2004c), and the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has also tried to give business trainees additional courses in their home country at the end of the main training programme (Kuptsch and Oishi 1994). However, most of these schemes are pilot initiatives involving small numbers and the actual outcome has yet to be assessed (Chaloff, 2005).
Key Message

Temporary migration programmes for low-skilled workers, especially those with repeat migration possibilities and proper protection safeguards have clear development benefits, bringing increased economic revenue to home countries and allowing them to retain the human and social capital needed for further development.

3.3. SKILLED MIGRATION

SUMMARY

The brain drain, or loss of skilled workers by sending countries has potential negative effects for the economy and public services of developing countries. While the net long-term effect of such migration is not yet known, what is evident is that in the short term, migrant-sending developing countries do experience acute shortages of skilled workforce, especially in the health and education sectors. A number of policy measures have been debated in international circles to try and mitigate this potential damage. These include measures by receiving countries to set up ethical recruitment codes, to provide compensation and skills replenishment for countries of origin, and to limit brain waste through clearer admission and skills recognition procedures, so that migrants can maximize their potential and thus have more resources to send back home. Brain drain owing to international student mobility is another area of concern and recent moves by western educational establishments to decentralize their programmes to developing countries may help to retain this group. All in all, there are various emerging policy responses to brain drain, but receiving country governments have thus far been reluctant to take any decisive action. Migration policies focus on internal needs and labour market interests rather than the impact of brain drain on sending country economies. Countries of origin, too, are somewhat ambivalent about concerted action in this area given the potential positive long-term benefits of skilled migration.

3.3.1. BACKGROUND

The emigration of highly skilled workers may have adverse consequences for countries of origin. Brain drain can mean lower economic productivity, a threat to the
provision of basic social services, such as healthcare and education, which rely on an educated workforce, as well as the loss of public investment in subsidized education (Lucas, 2005; World Bank, 2005). Small developing countries with a low skill base are particularly vulnerable to the negative impacts of skilled emigration. Box 9 describes one such migratory flow, the drain of nurses from Albania to Italy.

BOX 9
CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCE OF SENDING COUNTRIES

Drain of nurses from Albania to Italy

The shortage of nurses in Italy has led to policy changes allowing foreign nurses easier entry into the country. This has raised concerns in Albania about a shortage of nurses there. The recruitment agency, La Speranza, for example, has sent 500 nurses from Albania to northern Italy since 1999. While nursing in Albania is traditionally a profession for women, almost half the agency’s clients are men, who apparently went to nursing school only so they could emigrate. There is little doubt that the expansion of training for nurses (schools in at least six cities, with Tirana alone producing 300 graduates annually) is driven by emigration opportunities. None of the 500 nurses sent to Italy by the recruitment agency La Speranza has returned. Most of the 7,000 foreign nurses working in Italy (who represent about two per cent of all registered nurses) work in the private sector, as the public sector has been relatively slow in opening up to recruitment for nurses from abroad.

Adapted from the Italy-Albania case study (Chaloff, 2006).

Traditionally, skilled migrants have come from, and migrated between, developed countries, but the problem has become more pertinent in recent years for the developing world - Australia and Canada, for example, have witnessed a sharp increase in the arrival of skilled migrants from developing countries (UN 2004a: 39). This trend has been exacerbated by a shift in the late 1990s towards selective migration policies by developed countries, which give preference to skilled workers (OECD, 2003): France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and even the ‘newer’ immigration countries of central Europe (such as the Czech Republic), have all relaxed entry conditions for highly skilled workers.

These shifts have particularly affected certain sectors. Many OECD countries have relaxed entry requirements for healthcare workers: Britain, Canada, Australia, the
US and Ireland have all sought to expedite the entry and licensing of foreign training physicians (OECD bilateral 2004c; Forcier and Simoens et al., 2004). Similarly, in the education sector, countries with the highest teacher turnover, i.e. Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, have started to recruit teachers from overseas. Initial studies of teacher mobility reveal that a considerable amount of poaching of teachers is occurring between richer Commonwealth countries, but it is also true that poorer Commonwealth countries are also affected by this trend.

The negative effects of brain drain are only one side of the story, as highly specialized emigration may also bring tangible benefits to sending countries; a well educated diaspora “can improve access to capital, technology, information, foreign exchange and business contacts for firms in the country of origin” (World Bank, 2006), providing that it is able to gain employment commensurate with its technical expertise (Koehler and Laczko, 2006).

### 3.3.2. POLICY APPROACHES

There are several policy responses which can serve to mitigate the potential negative effects of brain drain on the development of countries of origin, but few of these measures are normally considered by receiving country governments when devising migration policies, and this perhaps for the following reasons:

- Developed receiving countries are focused on their own internal interests as a priority. Countries such as the UK face skills shortages in key areas. Other developed countries such as Italy are sending countries in their own right and are more concerned with their own brain drain and efforts to convince their own nationals to return home.

- Developing sending countries are ambivalent towards the brain drain. Many highly skilled migrants originate from large middle-income countries, such the Philippines, China, India and Mexico, which have adopted policies in favour of promoting, or at least not discouraging, emigration of their skilled nationals, in the hope that the initial loss of skills due to emigration may be off-set by higher remittances, potentially expanding economic relations and other non-financial transfers (World Bank, 2006). Middle-income countries, such as China and Pakistan, have objected to being placed on the UK National Health Service list of countries from where active recruitment is prohibited.
The lack of robust evidence of a brain drain or its adverse impacts makes it difficult to design and advocate in favour of effective policy responses. In terms of brain drain to Canada, for example, a study found that there were few health workers coming from the 25 focal countries of Canada’s bilateral development programme (e.g., in 2004, permanent health workers from the Canadian International Development Agency (“CIDA 25”) were no more than 150 from Pakistan, 48 from Ukraine, 17 from Guyana and 10 or fewer each from the remainder; and numbers of temporary workers were also negligible) (Omelaniuk, 2006). Often, evidence of a brain drain is usually not difficult to find, the real contention is whether the net long-term effect is in fact negative for the sending country. Box 10 describes the brain drain of doctors from Sri Lanka to the UK and the ambivalent position of both governments in this regard.

**BOX 10**

**CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCE OF COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION**

**Brain drain from Sri Lanka to the UK**

Concerns about a brain drain in the health sector in Sri Lanka are acute. The Sri Lankan Minister of Health suggests that Sri Lankan doctors are finding the lure of better money, facilities and training irresistible and that this was causing a grave problem for the national health service. There are only 800 specialists in Sri Lanka to serve a population of 18 million people. Each year around 60 doctors leave for the UK, Australia and other nations in the developing world to complete a year’s compulsory training, but only half of them actually return, exacerbating a growing crisis in healthcare services (The Observer, 13 February 2005). Another estimate suggests that in recent years between a third and one half of each batch of domestically trained doctors emigrated, as did around one in eight specialists. Perhaps the best indicator of a brain drain from Sri Lanka to the UK is the fact that more than half of ‘settled’ Sri Lankans (those who arrived before 1990) in the UK have a tertiary qualification, almost three times the rate of British-born people and double that of other ‘settled’ immigrants: even if some of these people obtained their qualifications before arrival in the UK, this suggests that highly skilled migration to the UK has been significant.

The UK is a significant pole of attraction for Sri Lankan medical professionals owing largely to the strong historical links between the two countries. Before 1972, Sri Lankan medical graduates were automatically registered in the UK and, since then, they have been required to complete at least some of
their training in an approved centre overseas, with the UK being the favoured destination for both specialist training and subsequent employment. Many practitioners used this as a route into long-term employment. Interestingly, restrictions to this route announced in early 2006 were motivated by changes in the domestic supply of doctors in the UK rather than by concerns about brain drain from developing countries.

However, it is important to note that very few of the Sri Lankan officials and experts interviewed saw brain drain as a significant problem, or one that Sri Lankan policy makers should or could do anything about. Interviewees tended to identify improving general economic conditions and opportunities for professionals locally as the best (and only) suitable policy intervention. Concerns about a brain drain are part of a wider set of challenges facing healthcare in Sri Lanka, including an uneven distribution of healthcare professionals within the country, a growing private healthcare sector that is drawing workers from the public sector and the competition from other sectors of the economy. The official UK response to accusation of poaching the best and brightest from poorer countries seems to be twofold: the UK has led the way in developing ethical recruitment codes, but there is also an implicit recognition (evidenced in the interviews) that not much can be done to stem these flows as these are matters of individual choice.

Adapted from Sri Lanka/UK case study (Sriskandarajah, 2006).

Whatever the ultimate net costs and benefits to a country of origin in the migration of its skilled workers, in the short term there will be some negative implications for developing countries from the loss of its specialized workforce. It is known that the lack of a coherent migration policy that takes both emigration and immigration into account can impede progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) owing to factors such as brain drain (IOM 2005e) and, in Zambia, IOM and UNICEF are supporting efforts of skills retention to combat these trends. This section discusses a range of policy measures that have been trialled to address the potential negative effects of brain drain.

### 3.3.2.1. Adopting ethical recruitment codes

One way of mitigating the potential negative effects of brain drain is to adopt ethical
recruitment codes, particularly in essential public service sectors such as healthcare and education, for which education and training is often subsidized. Other sectors, such as IT, have been of less concern as they are often perceived as a private-sector luxury financed by private education.

Codes of practice on ethical recruitment have been trialled in the health sector. The Commonwealth Meeting of Health Ministers endorsed a code of practice and an associated companion guide in May 2003. Not all destination countries were willing to sign this code despite agreeing with some of its principles. Neither the UK or Canada have signed it owing to a lack of support for certain provisions, such as compensation to countries of origin, right to migration as an individual choice, possible discriminatory effects against certain categories of professionals, action on all recruitment agencies and similar concerns (HCIDC, 2004). Similar efforts have been made to establish a code of conduct in the education sector; the Commonwealth Teacher Recruitment Protocol was adopted at a ministerial meeting in the UK in September 2004 at the request of Caribbean countries experiencing the large-scale loss of teaching staff (NASUWT, 2004). While codes of practice can be useful in disseminating good practices to employers and in ensuring transparency, implementation has been an issue and a lack of employer compliance has weakened the Commonwealth health sector code.

Apart from the UK, few governments have introduced an ethical recruitment code at the national level. Box 11 describes the UK government’s efforts to implement ethical recruitment codes and how these efforts have failed to stem the flow of medical personnel. This experience shows that such codes are unlikely to be effective unless they are carefully worded to cover all types of recruitment agencies/processes and are backed by strong enforcement powers. Doubts remain whether codes of good practice are the most effective means for managing migration: there is concern that prohibiting active recruitment from certain countries will merely divert the recruitment effort to other locations (Mensah et al., 2005).

**BOX 11**

**CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF DESTINATION EXPERIENCES**

**Ethical codes of conduct in the UK health sector**

As a leading destination country for healthcare workers, the UK was one of the first developed countries to produce guidance for the international recruitment of healthcare workers based on ethical principles which explicitly prevented the targeting of developing countries for active recruitment.
- 1999: Guidelines requiring the NHS (viz. the public sector) not to recruit actively from South Africa and the Caribbean.

- 2001: Code of Practice on International Recruitment of Healthcare Professionals which restricts active recruitment by the NHS in developing countries (as defined by OECD/Development Assistant Committee List of Aid Recipients), unless a bi-lateral agreement determines otherwise.

- 2003: list of less developed countries published to end uncertainty in NHS about which countries not to recruit from (Bach 2003).

- 2003: Context specific schemes developed based on the concept of mutual benefits to both the NHS and healthcare providers in developing countries. Agreement signed with South Africa to enable healthcare professionals from both countries to undertake time-limited placements offering opportunities for the exchange of knowledge/skills and to help develop collaborative approaches.

- 2004: Code revised to apply to private recruitment agencies supplying the NHS and to cover temporary staff. Recruitment agreements signed with Spain, India (four federal states: Andra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and West Bengal have exceptionally been targeted for recruitment prohibition, as these receive aid from the Department of International Development), the Philippines and, more recently, China.

How effective have these codes been? The NHS Code of Practice has been widely criticized as ineffective. Initial assessments show that it may have discouraged active recruitment, but has not necessarily reduced migrant flows from countries of concern. In March 2003, a year after the code came into force, only 34 recruitment agencies registered with the Department of Health, agreed to apply the code. Of the 92 other agencies involved in health recruitment, two-thirds had not adopted the code. The flow of nurses from many prohibited countries has continued, including from some of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland) in 2003/04. The problems with the code partly concern its content: limited reference to private recruitment sector (which led to overseas nurses coming to the UK private sector and then moving over to the UK public sector), geographical limitation to England, application to ‘active recruitment’ only,
3.3.2.2. Providing compensation

Another approach is for developed countries to pay compensation to developing countries from which skilled migrants are recruited. Discussions around the Commonwealth Code of Practice placed strong emphasis on mutuality of benefits for both countries. Many developing countries were of the view that developed countries should in some way compensate source countries in a variety of ways, such as building capacity in training institutions for the loss of personnel trained at great expense.

This approach has proved contentious for a number of reasons: difficulties in evaluating the sending country’s net loss (off-setting direct and indirect costs against migration gains, such as an increase in scientific knowledge and remittances) (Forcier, Simoens et al., 2004); seemingly rewarding countries which fail to manage their own health systems, and the unwillingness of recruitment agencies and receiving country governments to compensate. Notably, the main recruiting countries, Australia, Canada and the UK, have declined to sign the Commonwealth Code because of the compensation provisions (Bach, 2005).

3.3.2.3. Replenishing skills

An alternative to compensation would be for recruiting countries to replenish skills lost by the country of origin. Such schemes may take various forms, such as building relationships between academic institutions in sending and receiving countries, staff exchanges and educational support. Examples of such types of initiatives are presented in Box 12.

BOX 12
EXAMPLES OF SKILLS REPLENISHMENT ACTIVITIES

“Twinning” of institutions between source and destination countries to develop links, such as staff exchanges, staff support and the flow of resources to the source country.
In Egypt, the UK Department of Health established a programme to improve medical services for geriatric care, pathology and mental health and established a fellowship programme for Egyptian doctors to come to the UK for additional experience (Bach, 2005).

Health Canada projects in the Caribbean set up independently of migration concerns, and as part of technical cooperation with PAHO/WHO. The projects include the exchange of expertise and foster connections between Canadian and foreign educational establishments; for example, collaboration between the universities of Ottawa and the West Indies has led to the establishment of a nurses’ training curriculum in Canada.

Staff exchanges. The Reciprocal Educational Exchange of Healthcare Personnel Agreement enabled South African health professionals to work for a specified period in the UK National Health Service, and allowed UK doctors to work in South African hospitals.

Educational support for prospective migrants in the country of origin. An innovative example of this kind is the launch of a recruitment programme for nurses in 2002 by the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region of Italy with preparatory training and selection of candidates to be carried out locally prior to departure by a Romanian-based non-profit association. (OECD, 2004c).

There is uncertainty about the effectiveness of skills replenishment schemes. Staff exchange schemes may merely result in a one-way exchange if there are insufficient incentives for developed country nationals to go to developing countries. Similarly, educational support schemes may increase rather than decrease the flow of highly skilled migrants by providing training required by the developed countries. In the longer term, such proposals may generate a surplus of highly skilled workers who remain and augment the human capital base of the country of origin; but much depends on the conditions and the educational policies of the sending country and, in the meantime, the cost of training may be an issue and would be better borne by the recruiting country (Skeldon, 2005).

3.3.2.4. Limiting brain waste

Another response to brain drain is to reduce the risk of brain waste by ensuring that highly skilled migrants can fully utilize their talents whilst abroad and thus ultimately offer more to their countries of origin upon return. Evidence from Italy shows that highly skilled migrants may seek to enter through low-skilled labour migration
programmes if no other avenues are available, leading to a mismatch of jobs and skills and brain waste (Chaloff, 2005). Surveys of migrants entering under the quota for “domestic workers”, for example, found a high ratio of university graduates (about 25%). Receiving countries, too, have an interest in ensuring that highly skilled migrants are gainfully employed. An efficient selection system which ensures a good fit between labour market demands and migrant skills is thus of interest to all.

Admission procedures for highly skilled migrants affect their employment trajectories and performance in the labour market. A comparison of why migrants in Australia were less likely to be unemployed compared to their Canadian counterparts found the design of immigration policy to be an important factor in this outcome. The Australian system admits migrants who are more readily employable (having passed stringent requirements; being under 45 and of prime working age, and central qualification assessment being made prior to admission (Richardson and Lester, 2004)). One key aspect of admitting and settling migrants productively is to ensure that their skills are recognized and registered. Box 13 shows how non-recognition of qualifications has been a barrier to the effective integration of nurses into Canada’s labour market.

While evidence suggests that improved admission procedures can alter the personal experience of highly skilled migrants, there is no research to show the impacts on development, such as the eventual return of such migrants and their contribution to their home country (Koehler and Laczko, 2006). Links between admission policies, higher returns and remittance behaviour are complex and increasing the emphasis on skills may attract higher-income migrants who may have less need to remit funds back home (Hugo, 2005). Australia’s Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants, in fact, suggests that the largest group of migrants sending remittances in 1999-2000 were migrants with refugee or other humanitarian status, i.e. the poorest group with the highest unemployment rates and greatest reliance on benefits (Hugo, 2005).

**BOX 13**

**CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF DESTINATION EXPERIENCES**

**Brain waste among Canada’s migrant nurses**

Non-recognition of foreign qualifications is a notable barrier to labour market entry for foreign-trained nurses in Canada. To help redress this potential brain waste, a report was commissioned in 2005 by the Internationally Educated Nurses National Task Force (IEN). The report was part of a larger strategy to assess and improve the registration/licensure procedures for in-
ternational nurses and their integration into the Canadian nursing workforce. It found that despite a growing unmet demand for nurses in Canada, some two-thirds of internationally educated nurses in the country seeking registration fail to become licensed and thus remained a large untapped resource. The Conference Board of Canada estimates a cost to the Canadian economy of more than CAD 2 billion a year when foreign-trained professionals (e.g. doctors, engineers) are employed in low-level jobs.

Integration of foreign nurses into the workforce varies from province to province, creating further complications. Specific barriers include excessive bureaucratic processes, difficulty in obtaining work visas, lack of information in the country of origin about Canada’s registration/accreditation procedures, conflicts between the immigration entry points system which assigns points for “human capital” (academic qualifications, language ability and work experience) rather than occupations and subsequent skills assessment/recognition upon entry.

The report proposes the establishment of a central assessment service, a standard English language test, flexible bridging programmes and centrally located online information on licensing procedures. These recommendations are consistent with earlier government commitments. While these actions are aimed primarily at meeting Canada’s increasing nursing needs, they can also serve to better leverage the earning and remittance potential of migrants and thus to support home country development. However, there is as yet no official study of these linkages or of the potential “brain drain” effect on the country of origin of such strategies.

Adapted from Canada case study (Omelaniuk, 2006).

### 3.3.2.5. Internationalizing tertiary education

The growing numbers of students from developing countries going to developed countries for tertiary education adds to concerns about brain drain. The enrolment of non-OECD students in EU institutions increased by 55 per cent between 1990 and 2001 (OECD, 2003). Many non-OECD tertiary level students are likely to remain in the host country after completion of studies, as the requirements to obtain permanent residence status have been considerably relaxed (Hugo 2005; ICMPD, 2000) and host countries are increasingly recognizing the potential they have to offer. This pull factor...
is compounded by push factors which discourage return home: prior work experience is often crucial for students to reintegrate in the local labour market (Black et al., 2005) and that return is also most likely if there are more and better opportunities for employment in the home country.

The internationalization of tertiary education is one potential response to this problem with the possibility of exporting education programmes that can build human capital and advance economic development in developing countries (OECD, 2004b). Transferring service delivery of education programmes to developing countries reduces the foreign exchange costs associated with study abroad, and is likely to enhance domestic capacity in tertiary education. Although the extent of programme and institution mobility (PIM) is difficult to gauge, it is estimated that of Australia’s 157,296 international students, 45,030 are enrolled in PIMs, mostly in Asia. Because such developments are relatively recent, their effect on human capital growth in countries of origin is still a matter of conjecture, but it seems likely that middle-income countries with a relatively affluent middle class, rather than low-income countries, will attract the greatest interest among education service providers and thus benefit the most (Koehler and Laczko, 2006).

**Key Message**

**Brain drain and measures to minimize the negative effects of skilled migration merit further attention. Ethical recruitment codes have been largely ineffectual suggesting the need for firmer measures by developed receiving countries, such as skills replenishment to off-set immediately visible losses to developing countries of origin in terms of investment in education and human capital.**

### 3.4. REMITTANCES

**SUMMARY**

The potential impact of remittances on development is well recognized, but a review of experience shows that much needs to be done by both receiving and sending countries to facilitate transfers and to ensure that remittances are geared towards development purposes. Informal transfers, which are less amenable to government influence, still predominate. Both receiving and sending countries can do much to improve access to formal banking structures
by migrants and their dependants at home and to facilitate cheaper and easier transfers. Some countries have developed partnerships between sending and receiving countries to encourage a more targeted approach. The private sector can play a key role, but experience to date shows that few efforts have been made by governments to stimulate action by the banking sector and money transfer companies. Sending countries have found that mandatory remittance schemes, quite aside from the ethical dimension raised, do not actually work and that incentives for migrants to invest in home countries are more successful. Policies in this area need to take account of wider socio-economic and political issues if the impact of remittances on development is to be maximized.

3.4.1. BACKGROUND

There is growing awareness among receiving and sending countries that remittances can play a significant role in home country development. However, this potential has not yet been fully harnessed due to barriers that inhibit the optimum flow and use of remittance transfers at both ends. Formal transfers via banks, money transfer agencies and the like are seen as safer and surer ways to improve the welfare of poor families and to generate a potentially positive multiplier effect for developing economies (World Bank, 2005). However, high transfer costs and bureaucratic impediments in countries of destination lead to the continuing reliance on informal transfer methods.

Most destination countries, such as Australia, The Netherlands, Canada and Italy have taken a largely non-interventionist approach to remittance policies (Dutch House of Representatives, 2004; CIC and CIDA, 2004).

The UK government is alone in acknowledging the link between remittances and poverty reduction. It has developed policies to improve the access, transparency and choice in remittance transfer, though it continues to see them as private transactions rather than a developmental tool (UK Remittance Working Group, 2005). Specific measures, including the setting up of the Inter-Agency Remittance Task Force in cooperation with the World Bank to improve data collection and lessons learnt, and also a remittance survey.

There are barriers in countries of origin, too, as regulations may impede the receipt of remittances or a lack of government vision or strategy may mean that remittances are not harnessed for their full development potential, even though countries of origin
are becoming increasingly aware of the need to harness this potential. The Albanian government recognizes that remittances are essential for Albania, which, in 2004, accounted for 13.7 per cent of GDP and now form an important part of the National Strategy on Migration, though no concrete measures are in place as yet. Barriers persist in many developing countries. Box 14 describes the barriers faced by migrants wishing to remit from South Africa.

**BOX 14**

**CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCE OF COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION**

**Barriers to sending remittances from South Africa**

Although South Africa is both a sending and receiving country, this box considers the barriers faced by migrants wishing to remit funds back home:

- The banking system is highly formalized and all foreign exchange must be traded through certain authorized banks that follow set procedures and fill out a balance of payments form for every transaction. Of the standard international currency trading services, South Africa only authorizes Moneygram. The formal exchange system means time, high costs and paperwork.

- Customer verification requirements make it difficult for most immigrants to access formal channels. The government and banks are obliged to implement the anti-money-laundering (AML) requirements and to combat the financing of terrorism (CFT). The government is trying to increase access to financial services for low-income households (defined as earning less than USD 340 per month), but complying with the AML and CFT regulations undermines this objective. Out of the 27 million South Africans about half do not have bank accounts, 30 per cent live in traditional dwellings or informal structures, only 44 per cent have formal addresses including post boxes, and 38 per cent of the accounts fall within the low-income bracket. Thus, many people cannot meet the requirements necessary to open a bank account, and even less those to transfer money.

- The costs of formal transfers are also prohibitive. A migrant transferring USD 40 through an informal cash courier in 2004 had to pay a fee of between 10 to 20 per cent of the amount transferred, whereas banks and formal transfer agents, such as MoneyGram, charge between 50 and 64
per cent. Although these percentages decrease for larger amounts, most remittances concern small amounts.

- Some two to four million irregular migrants face further barriers because of their undocumented status. Most cannot access formal remittance systems without going through a third party. Without proof of legal residence, current AML/CFT regulations make it exceedingly difficult for any undocumented migrant to access formal remittance channels. Although reforming verification procedures, such as residency requirements to fit the South African context may help, many immigrants are also not included in the national registration system and lack national identity numbers and pass books. Thus, even if transaction costs and paperwork requirements were to be eased, irregular migrants would still lack direct access to formal channels.

Adapted from South Africa case study (Long et al., 2006).

3.4.2. POLICY APPROACHES

This section discusses various measures that can be taken by both sending and receiving countries to facilitate the flow and optimum use of remittances.

3.4.2.1. Improving financial services

Countries of destination can take various measures to enable migrants to remit funds home more easily:

- Information.- Unfamiliar and cumbersome banking procedures may deter migrants from using banks to remit funds. A number of European countries have taken concrete steps to improve information, support and transparency in this area by commissioning surveys, setting up websites and producing information material. Box 15 describes some of these initiatives.
BOX 15
PROVIDING INFORMATION ON REMITTANCES

- The UK government commissioned a survey in 2005: ‘Sending Money Home? A Survey of Remittance Products and Services’ in association with the UK Banking Code Standards Board, and set up a website www.sendmoneyhome.org which provides information for remittance senders and providers. A Dutch website www.geldnaarhuis.nl (Money to Home) was established in 2005 by NGO IntEnt (de Haas, 2006). The Netherlands government is publishing a website detailing different transfer options that take into account low versus high-volume corridors, current options available, advances in internet banking, and specialized financial products for different markets.

- IOM is developing a database through its MIDA projects on remittance flows, viable alternative financial products and investment opportunities in countries of origin for migrant and diaspora communities (Baruah in Novib, 2004).

- Access to banking services. Migrants with insecure migration status will remit less and less often than legal immigrants (O’Neil, 2003) making it imperative to improve their access to banking services by, e.g., issuing ID documents. The use of the “matricula consular mechanism”, a consular card in the US-Mexican remittance corridor, led to an increase in remittances the effect of which was said to be immediate, with Wells Fargo reporting that 400,000 migrants used the matricula card to open accounts at its branches (Ghosh, 2006).

- Specialized financial products and tools. These can help to enhance the volume and impact of remittance flows (World Bank, 2005). Development bonds have been discussed by the Netherlands government to encourage savings among migrant communities. Such bonds could be a means of increasing funding for development purposes, while also providing a partial guarantee on a long-term investment for migrants.

ERCMOVE, a Dutch-Philippines organization, has channelled remittances to develop school infrastructure. Women’s Credit Funds which operate both in the Netherlands and South Africa provide a source of credit for start-up ventures and emergency funding. Although they are a potential source of flexible and inexpensive capital, most have not substantially progressed due to lack of experience, training and/or backing from larger financial institutions.
• Tax and fiscal regimes. These may hinder remittance transfer; for instance, in South Africa, residents (96% of the population) are allowed to invest/remit 750,000 South African rands abroad; immigrants may take out up to R 1.5 million, but have to pay a 10 per cent exit levy, and mine labourers may take all earnings out of the country. However, three pieces of legislation create a regulatory regime that excludes most remitters from utilizing the formal exchange system and increases transaction costs (Genesis, 2005), they are: exchange control legislation, anti-money laundering, and immigration laws.

**Countries of origin** can also take steps to facilitate the receipt of remittances:

• Financial services for the urban poor and rural populations. The lack of such services is a problem which impedes access to and use of remittance flows for recipients. Though countries of origin could play an active role, they have tended to leave the development of services to the private sector.

In Guatemala, the government has not played a role in this market (save for money laundering regulations) and has left it to the traditional banking sector to open up to the remittance market. Banrural, one of the largest banks in Guatemala, has led the way, opening offices in rural areas, offering microloans to small clients at low rates, enabling migrant families to invest in housing, business and agriculture, and to use remittance income as collateral. It also attempts to make it easier for people to pay back loans from the US via electronic transfer or bank agreements and by being able to hold the money in local currency and US dollars.

• Easier and cheaper remittance transfers. Another strategy is to make the process more accessible and less expensive. In Guatemala, Banrural has created a prototype cash-machine capable of indigenous languages, making it easier for the growing number of indigenous families receiving remittances from the US to manage their transactions. There are also new forms of collaboration between financial service companies, such as a partnership between Visa and the microcredit organization, FINCA, to reduce remittance transfer costs and link remittances to expanded forms of credit. Box 16 is an example of an IOM scheme that facilitates the transmission of remittances to Guatemala.
BOX 16
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EXPERIENCES

Canada-Guatemala seasonal worker programme – facilitating remittances

One important dimension of the Canada-Guatemala seasonal worker programmes to enhance their development impact further is the linking of project participants with the Guatemalan bank, Bancafe. Under this new scheme, workers have the opportunity to open an account with Bancafe before leaving for Canada. During their stay, all Canadian farmers employing 20 or more Guatemalan workers will pool remittances from interested workers and regularly transfer the money collectively, via Citibank, to a central IOM account at Bancafe in Guatemala. The total transfer cost will be shared by the entire group of remitting migrant workers, saving them considerable fees. Once the money arrives in IOM’s account, it will be divided and distributed to individual accounts in the name of each participating workers who can then allocate their money as they wish, such as savings, debt repayment or family support. The initiative is designed to help reduce the risks of theft and assault facing workers who travel back home carrying large amounts of cash. It also aims to encourage savings, lower transfer costs and help workers build collateral with the bank.

Adapted from Guatemala case study (Petree, 2006).

3.4.2.2. Developing country partnerships

Agreements between receiving and sending countries can provide greater ease of access and foster more competition in money transfer markets. In the UK, DFID has established Country Partnerships with Nigeria, Bangladesh and Ghana, three countries considered of strategic interest to DFID’s wider development objectives and of particular interest in terms of remittance markets. These partnerships include measures to remove impediments to remittance flows and to strengthen the capacity of the financial sector to provide efficient and widespread transfer payment services. The Bangladeshi scheme is the most advanced and has a budget of GBP three million administered by DFID country offices, but even here it is too early to say how effective the partnership will be.
There are similar arrangements between other countries: the 2001 US-Mexico Partnership for Prosperity helped to reduce the cost for Mexican remittance transfers by 60 per cent; agreements between Spain and various Latin American financial institutions facilitate a reduction in transfer fees and foster the entry of new agents into the financial market, particularly in rural areas, and the German-Turkish remittance corridor which has led to one of the lowest volumes of informal remittances relative to formal remittance transfers in Europe (EIB, 2006).

3.4.2.3 Involving the private sector

Although the important role of the private sector in facilitating remittances is recognized, most governments are reluctant to be highly interventionist. Canada, for example, does not have policies in place to increase competition in the remittance industry and to reduce the costs of remittance transfers. The UK government is almost alone in taking action in this area. It believes that the private sector holds the key to improved access and lower costs and thus initiated a high-level dialogue with banks, money transfer companies and other stakeholders in June 2004, known as Remittances as a Market Opportunity. This has led to the formation of the UK Remittances Working Group with the private sector, with sub-groups focused on regulation, product development and information-sharing.

As for the banks themselves, their interest in remittances varies but is increasing in some countries. In Canada, the major remitting banks, such as Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) and Caisses Populaires Desjardins (CPD), have programmes tailored to seasonal agricultural workers from Mexico and the Caribbean. The Italian banking system is only now starting to create financial products for foreigners in Italy, but is not yet involved in broader development projects and has shown little interest in Albania. The World Bank has identified a need for the Albanian government to invest in developing the financial literacy of migrants in both Italy and Albania in order to increase awareness and strengthen confidence in financial institutions in both countries.

3.4.2.4. Mandatory remittances

Some countries of origin implement compulsory remittance schemes, either unilaterally or bilaterally. Bangladesh, China, Eritrea, India, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand require their nationals abroad to remit a portion of their earning through formal channels back home. However, such schemes do not appear to work that well in mobilizing resources in practice, as such measures are difficult to manage and evasion is difficult to prevent. Mandatory remittance schemes can also
be unnecessarily bureaucratic, lead to corruption (Ghosh, 2006) and raise fundamental ethical issues and human rights concerns in terms of appropriating worker’s pay without consent (Koser, 2003).

Incentive-based schemes to encourage remittance savings have been more successful. Foreign currency accounts and investments such as non-resident deposits or bonds are popular.

Most countries in Asia offer incentives to migrant workers to remit into foreign-currency accounts in domestic banks which are not subject to foreign exchange controls. India and Pakistan offer a premium over market interest rates (Waddington, 2003; Ghosh 2006). The Indian initiative to sell resurgent Indian bonds to expatriates at attractive conditions - no exchange rate risks, exemption from Indian wealth and income tax and earning attractive interest - had a remarkably positive response; the ‘Diaspora Bond’ was found to be a major factor behind the doubling of remittance flows to India between 2002 and 2003 (Kuznetsov, 2006).

One limitation of foreign currency bonds and accounts is that they attract mainly better educated and higher income migrants and thus may not reduce informal remittance flows sent by either irregular labour migrants or those in the lower labour market segments (Carling, 2005; Ghosh, 2006; Johnson and Sedaca, 2004). Box 17 shows some of the measures taken by the government of Sri Lanka to harness the potential of remittances.

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**BOX 17**

**CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCES OF COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN**

**Harnessing the potential of remittances to Sri Lanka**

Sri Lankan policy makers seem acutely aware of the importance of remittance receipts to the Sri Lankan economy. Successive governments since the late 1970s have taken measures, such as foreign exchange liberalization and increasing individual tax-free transfer thresholds, to facilitate remittance flows. In the 2006 Sri Lankan budget, the government announced that Sri Lankans returning home after two years foreign employment would be entitled to a special duty-free allowance of up to USD 5,000 in cash if they set up in self-employment in an approved area with six months of arrival. It is also likely that compared to similar developing countries Sri Lanka receives a greater proportion of its remittances through formal, official channels. Indeed, interviewees suggested that informal flows might only account for between five and ten per cent of formal receipts because of the relative cost
and ease of formal transfers. This, they believe, is due to factors such as the gradual lifting of foreign exchange controls over the last two decades and the possibility for migrants to operate foreign currency accounts. The relatively well developed banking infrastructure in Sri Lanka makes it possible and attractive for a migrant to remit directly to a Sri Lankan bank account, even in rural areas. Education and information provided by the government are also likely to have helped. There is also evidence that private banks and financial institutions in Sri Lanka have recognized the potential of the remittance market not only as a source of commercial activity but also as a gateway leading to new consumers. To this end, there seems to be healthy competition to attract remittance senders and receivers, something that should drive down transfer costs.

Adapted from UK Sri Lanka case study (Sriskandarajah, 2006).

3.4.2.5. Taking account of a wider range of factors

Efforts to regulate migrant remittances need to be linked with broader political and financial sector reform to enhance their effectiveness. Government regulations can affect remittance flows but macro-economic conditions in the countries of origin may have an even greater impact. The presence of exchange rate restrictions and black market premiums, general macro-economic instability, poor law and order, and risks of expropriation can all discourage migrants from sending remittances or using formal channels (Ratha, 2003).

Gender is another structural issue worth considering when developing policies on remittances. The actual role of women in the migration process has changed in recent years; women are increasingly migrating on their own as the main economic providers and not as dependants of their husbands, particularly from poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Latin America. Women have a greater propensity to remit a larger proportion of their income, send money home more regularly and earmark remittances for food and clothes for the family back home (IOM, 2004a). Examples from Sri Lanka (De and Ratha, 2005) and Mexico (Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005) show that remittances sent by women can have a positive effect on health, education and the mortality of children.

Remittance policies should be holistic in scope and take into account various factors. The Guatemalan government’s integrated rural development described in Box
18 comprises various elements, such as enhanced banking services, microcredit and rural development, and is one such example of a comprehensive approach.

**BOX 18**

**CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCES OF COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN**

### Integrated development approach in Guatemala

Guatemalan initiatives to enhance the development impacts of remittances include, i.a., enhanced banking services for migrants and the poor, expanded forms of microcredit lending for small and medium enterprise (SME) development, and the Integrated Rural Development programme. These initiatives are all intended to help increase employment, household income, investment and expand productivity, thus raising the standard of living and thereby reducing the need for migration. These policies have been proposed in response to the historic lack of investment and financial services outside the capital city, and in an attempt to encourage growing migrant remittance flows to the countryside.

To create these opportunities, the Guatemalan government has begun making some changes to laws and processes, e.g. changing banking laws to enable communities to combine resources and put up collateral for loans; creation of an agricultural/crop insurance system which aims to stimulate agricultural loans to small farmers (most likely to have a relative abroad sending remittances) by giving a government guarantee to loans made by banks. The rural development initiative is promising because it creates a structure for remittances to be absorbed by the economy through investments in productive activities, generating positive economic impacts for migrant households as well as Guatemala’s regional and national economy.

To complement this initiative, recent laws have helped improve the tracking and transparency of formal remittance flows. All financial institutions involved in remittance transfers (e.g., banks, remittance companies, exchange houses, credit unions) must now report their foreign exchange transactions on a daily basis to the Guatemalan Central Bank. This reporting mechanism has resulted in a significant rise in recorded flows and, in effect, helped to demonstrate the importance and growth rate of these funds, thus encouraging financial institutions to expand their services.

Besides the government’s Integrated Rural Development programme, other migration-linked economic development strategies are being considered.
by the government, e.g. increased export of traditional and non-traditional goods, some of which would be sold in the US targeting the diaspora market for “nostalgic goods”; expansion of Guatemala’s tourism industry, particularly historical and ecological tourism aimed at the wider diaspora community. Another strategy is the expansion of training opportunities to help Guatemalans to acquire new skills, enhance their competitiveness in the domestic job market and thus reduce the need to migrate abroad in search of work.

Adapted from Guatemala Case study (Petree, 2006).

Key Message

Remittances, as is already well known, play a major role in home country development and far exceed official overseas aid. Further steps are needed to facilitate transfers and to ensure their optimum use for development purposes.

3.5. DIASPORA

SUMMARY

Diasporas hold great promise for home country development but, aside from the major success stories of India and China, for many developing countries this potential has yet to be realized. Diasporas have for many years contributed to the development of home communities through small-scale private initiatives. Governments are now increasingly aware of and responding to the considerable potential contribution of these groups for poverty reduction and economic development. But harnessing this potential is not without its own challenges as both sending and receiving country governments need to find ways to identify and engage with diaspora communities. Most diaspora contributions are generated through social processes that are outside the scope of public policy. Nevertheless there is much that governments can do to facilitate this process in terms of financial incentives, technical assistance, capacity building and the promotion of information-based networks.

Some receiving country governments have started to take tentative steps
to engage diaspora communities in development planning and in co-funding schemes. Others have sought to facilitate business investment and promote the transfer of knowledge and skills. Both sending and receiving country governments are coming to the view that dual citizenship arrangements may help foster ties and investments in both countries. It is also clear that countries of origin need to ensure that diaspora support and investment are put to optimum use. A sound financial and economic environment and transparent and well functioning governance structures are essential prerequisites if diaspora support is to be garnered and put to good development use.

3.5.1. BACKGROUND

Diasporas hold great promise for home country development; the Indian returnees from Silicon Valley who have boosted India’s software industry, and the Chinese expatriates investing back in China are testimonies of the power of migrant communities. Diaspora communities usually demonstrate a strong interest to support communities back home, though priorities may change over generations, as broader development impacts may be of more interest as family obligations decline (Long, 2006). Despite this interest, it is often difficult to replicate the successes of the Chinese and Indian diasporas in small, fragile economies. Diaspora networks, being private initiatives, are not easily amenable to public policy.

3.5.2. POLICY APPROACHES

As countries of destination have started to recognize their responsibilities in harnessing the potential of diasporas for development, sending countries are also beginning to consider how best to engage diaspora support for development purposes. Box 19 describes the emerging efforts of the Albanian government to link with its diaspora. Experience shows that three preconditions must be met if diaspora networks are to play a positive role in economic development of their home countries: migrants must be employed in sectors and occupations that allow them to accumulate financial and social capital; a network or mechanism must emerge in some form, permitting the transfer of these different forms of capital, and the home country must be able to make good use of these contributions (Lucas, 2005). This section discusses various
measures for harnessing diaspora potential which are primarily related to the latter two categories, the development of means for transferring capital and the ability of the home country to make good use of diaspora contributions (IOM 2006a).

BOX 19
CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCE OF COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

Efforts by Albania to engage with its diaspora

The vast Albanian diaspora is divided into two main groups: an old diaspora in the USA, dating back to the late 1940s, and a much larger one comprising the post-1990 emigrants and located mostly in Greece (over 760,000) and Italy (over 320,000). The US diaspora, which is well settled and successful, is seen as a possible source of philanthropy, while the more recent diasporas are seen as a possible source of remittances and investment, social capital (networks) and human capital (returns and circulation).

The Albanian authorities seek to provide diaspora services primarily through the National Institute of Diaspora at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established in 1996. The definition of diaspora used by the Institute is rather broad and covers people who left Albania in the 16th century to recent temporary labour migrants. Its programme focuses on four areas: maintaining detailed information on the diaspora, including economic, intellectual and cultural potential; protection of rights of emigrants; supporting the integration of Albanians abroad by promoting a positive image of Albania, and language education for Albanians abroad. The Institute relies on consular authorities for information and support to its initiatives. It keeps databases, e.g. lists of Albanian media, associations, celebrities abroad. The Institute is said to maintain a low profile but does accompany delegations abroad and arranges prizes for cultural celebrities and meetings with migrant associations.

The Institute does not entertain great expectations regarding its diaspora. High initial expectations of investments were thwarted by difficulties facing foreign investors and the infamous collapse of pyramid investment schemes. Remittances are seen as more important than foreign direct investments. Diaspora contributions are left to personal choice rather than coordinated development projects. Diaspora associations abroad are perceived as weak and transitory, riven by internal conflicts, focused on social and cultural events and little inclined towards pooling of resources for the home country. Host
country pressure on Albanians to assimilate appears strong, with negative implications for homeland association; in Greece, for example, Albanian expatriates are known to change their religion and language.

Diaspora services are quite limited. The government says that it is difficult to organize cultural activities for Albanian workers abroad working long hours and with little time for recreation. Albanian associations in Italy criticize the ministry for more basic failings in consular services, such as inefficiency in issuing documents, delays in consular procedures, and high costs of services. Diasporas also complain about the lack of voting rights and the need for cultural support, media attention, return opportunities and better advocacy to protect the rights of Albanians abroad.

From Italy-Albania Case Study (Chaloff, 2006)

3.5.2.1. Engaging with diaspora communities

Both sending and receiving countries have taken steps to engage with diaspora communities.

• Carrying out research and data collection on diaspora members and skills relevant to development.

Receiving country initiatives include the French government database for skilled members of the Senegalese Diaspora, Italy’s Integrated Migration Information System on the Egyptian Diaspora or specially commissioned studies such as IOM London’s survey for the UK Department for International Development on the Zimbabwean Diaspora in the UK and South Africa. However, most of these data-collection initiatives are one-off studies which rarely translate into systematic data-collection mechanisms.

Sending countries have also stepped up data collection exercises. An IOM survey of 49 countries found that some three-quarters of respondents, mainly from low or middle-income countries, collected data on their diasporas and also organized events for their members (IOM 2005d, IOM 2006a).

The Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans abroad offers language and
cultural events for Moroccans living abroad (Brand, 2002), the Office des Tunisiens à l’étranger finances short-term study trips to Tunisia for expatriates and offers return and reintegration assistance.

- Setting up consultative bodies for migrant associations to provide input into receiving country policymaking on development.

The Netherlands has a National Ethnic Minorities Consultative Committee, while the French government encourages diaspora organizations to pool their efforts within the framework of an umbrella organization, the Forum des Organizations de solidarité internationale issues des migrations (FORIM) (Magoni, 2004).

It is too soon to comment on the effectiveness of such initiatives but evidence from the UK and The Netherlands suggests that the relationship between migrant associations and development organizations is not always easy. Obstacles include differing political agendas (migrant associations may pursue the narrow interests of family or home community, or wider political, ethnic or religious agendas which are not always compatible with a development approach); rivalry among migrant bodies, distrust of host country authorities and sometimes tension between diaspora and home country NGOs. Box 20 expands on efforts by the UK government to bring diaspora groups onto the development agenda.

BOX 20
CASE STUDY: EXPERIENCE OF COUNTRY OF DESTINATION

Efforts in the UK to engage with diaspora groups

The UK parliament has recognized that ‘the challenge for policy makers in developed and developing countries is to create an environment conducive to enhancing the diaspora’s contribution to development’. In its 1997 White Paper, the UK International Development Department (DFID) committed itself to ‘build on the skills and talents of migrants and other ethnic minorities within the UK to promote the development of their countries of origin’ and has instituted various initiatives since:

- DFID consulted the Indian and Nepali diasporas during the process of producing the new Country Assistance Plans. However, diaspora organiza-
- The Connections for Development initiative was a DFID-supported network of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) voluntary and community organizations that aim to mobilize civil society for action on international development. DFID supported and funded the initiative with a 2003 Strategic Grant Agreement, providing GBP 750,000 over three years. This network aimed, among other things, to inform BME communities about all aspects of development, promote the role in development policymaking, and connecting communities throughout the world. Despite the progress made in this particular area, at least one major UK diaspora organization, the African Foundation for Development, has called on DFID to report more regularly on its engagement with diaspora communities and, more specifically, on what it is learning from this dialogue.

- The latest DFID draft policy paper (DFID 2006, 18) pays explicit attention to the role that diasporas can play and suggests that DFID “will extend and develop further its networks with the range of UK diasporas in order to strengthen its partnership in support of activities that promote poverty reduction and development.”

Adapted from UK Sri Lanka case study (Sriskandarajah, 2006).

Despite the potential benefits, receiving countries have found a number of constraints to diaspora engagement:

- Lack of appropriate management and planning skills within the diaspora. Migrant associations often do not have the required expertise in development cooperation (Koehler and Laczko 2006).

The Netherland government’s Small-scale Local Activities Programme, which awards co-funding grants to migrant associations that have raised some funding for small-scale development projects in home countries, has not been sufficiently used by these associations (DGIS, 2004). IOM has faced similar problems in some of its Migration for Development (MIDA) projects, which target African professionals, entrepreneurs and experts in the diaspora, who are willing and able to contribute their skills, finances and other resources to the development efforts of their countries of origin. The MIDA programme
in Italy, for example, now includes a capacity-building component to make up for a lack of entrepreneurial capacity identified in the pilot phase (IOM 2005c, Koehler and Laczko, 2006).

- Lack of adequate mobilization of diaspora members. Diaspora members who support their homelands through home-town associations (HTAs) and the like, tend to do so in their spare time and without the concerted participation, leadership and coordination needed to make development projects effective. The degree of mobilization may, however, vary. A study of Italian decentralized cooperation, for instance, found that Senegal’s migrant associations (as sub-Saharan organizations in general) have a well-developed capacity for self-organization compared to migrant communities from Mediterranean countries, which are slower to organize (CSPI, 2004). Factors such as diaspora-home country relations, group dynamics, local conditions of settlement and broader integration policy, including naturalization, may affect the collective mobilization of the diaspora (Faist, 2003, Koehler and Laczko, 2006)).

- Fragmented policymaking structures on development issues (especially in federal systems) can lead to duplication and waste. It is necessary to ensure that diaspora projects complement other development works that may be in progress. Some of the new French co-development projects in Mali are tied into UNDP’s TOKTEN (de Haas, 2006). The IOM MIDA programme in Italy has also heeded the call for a more broad-based approach (IOM 2005c) and its work with Ghanaian diasporas in Italy focuses at both ends, establishing a cooperative in Ghana but also helping Ghanaian migrants in Italy to access the formal banking sector, reducing transfer costs for remittances, and training migrants and their partners back home in business skills (Koehler and Laczko, 2006).

3.5.2.2. Supporting hometown associations (HTAs)

Immigrants often join forces to support practical social projects back home through small grassroots organizations, known as hometown associations (HTAs). Such associations can play an important role in channelling savings towards the improvement of living conditions of people in the communities of origin via the financing of small-scale local infrastructure (e.g., water purification, sanitation, health infrastructure) (Johnson and Sedaca, 2004). Most often they are able to perform this role without government assistance, but sometimes the institutional capacity of HTAs’ requires support (World Bank, 2005; IFAD, 2004). Government and donor agencies are in-
creasingly assessing the potential synergies between the activities of HTAs and their own development activities.

Hometown associations can be important channels for collective as opposed to individual remittances. Although collective remittances are usually only a small fraction of total remittances (e.g. it is estimated that only one per cent of total remittances to Central America are collective, IFAD, 2004), they can nonetheless make a tangible difference and, in any event, are of a significant size when compared to overseas development assistance (it is estimated that Latin American countries received almost five times more in remittances than in ODA in 2002) and could be increased with the support of right strategies (Torres cited in IFAD, 2004). Box 21 describes the experience of a hometown-matched funding scheme in Mexico which, though successful in raising large funds, also raised questions about long-term sustainability of projects and the effectiveness and efficiency with which the work was carried out.

**BOX 21**

**HOMETOWN ASSOCIATION-MATCHED FUNDING SCHEMES IN MEXICO**

One of the most successful HTA schemes, the Mexican “tres por uno” scheme, had established projects worth USD 43.5 million by 2002, two-thirds of which benefited labour-intensive farming activities in four high-emigration states. While such evidence suggests that matching funds can be successful in raising considerable amounts of money, the efficacy of these schemes is still poorly understood. Though villages connected to HTAs tend to have better roads, access to electricity and more employment opportunities, it still remains to be seen whether matching funds can also generate self-sustaining economic activities (Soerensen, 2004). Obstacles often relate to local conditions. Some projects may be geographically too remote and isolated from production hubs, making it difficult for them to survive. Others may underestimate the costs of labour in “emigration communities”. In villages where emigration is an established livelihood strategy, labour can be expensive and render matching fund-supported enterprises uncompetitive. For matching-fund schemes to have a fair chance to succeed, hometown associations and expatriate communities abroad have to be more closely involved in the determination of their respective priorities and design (Orozco, 2002). Such schemes also raise concerns about the equitable distribution of benefits. Communities with large expatriate communities abroad are better able to benefit from such schemes, and these may not be the poorest. It has also been noted that excessive reliance on diaspora contributions can stifle indigenous initiatives and growth (Ghosh, 2006; Johnson and Sedaca, 2004).
Countries of destination have initiated various incentive schemes to enhance the contribution to be made by HTAs to development.

USAID provides capacity building to Mexican HTAs to strengthen their ability to be viable development partners. In Europe, funds are made available to local authorities to finance matching funds and other development activities related to diasporas (Terron, 2004; Chaloff et al., 2004). Under funding from the French Foreign Ministry for such partnerships in Africa, ACP and other francophone countries, the Malian migrant community and city of Montreuil have established a development project for Mali, migrants finance up to 20 per cent of the project with the rest coming from the local government, and the steering committee includes Malian expatriates (Magoni, 2004). Similar projects exist in Italy, Spain and other European countries (Terron, 2001, CSPI, 2004).

There are also examples of country of origin governments supporting such matching-fund schemes. A small municipal council in El Salvador is matching funds by the Canada-El Salvador Action Network (CELSAN) in a “three-for-one” programme, where every dollar contributed by the diaspora is matched by the El Salvadoran authorities.

Co-development programmes, such as matching-fund schemes, are relatively new and have yet to make a major impact, but nonetheless they have opened up new areas of development cooperation between non-traditional partners (Koehler and Laczko, 2006).

3.5.2.3. Facilitating business investment

Migrants are often likely to engage in entrepreneurial activities (Guarnizo, 2003) and those who succeed in business activities in their host countries are also likely to be investors in their countries of origin. Diasporas can help generate joint ventures and cooperation between businesses in both countries (Barre, 2003), especially given the growth in outsourcing of manufacturing and telecommunications. Chambers of commerce can play an intermediary role in providing networks and space to facilitate business partnerships. Bilateral chambers of commerce, which provide training for business start-ups and other services, are on the increase (Johnson and Sedaca 2004). Ethnic niche markets are also increasingly important for international business and the growth of “nostalgia” businesses; for example, some 40 per cent of tourists to the Dominican Republic are Dominican émigrés. Migrant entrepreneurs are establishing businesses in countries of origin to produce local goods, e.g. Roos Foods, Inc., based
in the US, manufactures and sells processed milk products in Central America and in the USA (to migrants from Central America and Mexico) (Orozco, 2002).

Some country of destination governments have chosen to step into this arena and help to support the diaspora role in business for development by facilitating relations and stimulating the private sector. Box 22 gives examples of these types of ventures.

BOX 22
SUPPORTING DIASPORAS IN BUSINESS FOR DEVELOPMENT

The Netherlands has taken the course of promoting public-private sector partnerships to steer diaspora activities, e.g. in 2005, the government supported the creation of the Netherlands Financial Sector Development Exchange, involving leading local banks to strengthen the financial sector in developing countries, among others to channel remittances into higher production and investment (de Haas, 2006).

In Italy, the decentralization of development policymaking has enabled the authorities of Emilia Romagna to work with a private companies and the Ghanaian diaspora on the Ghanacoop initiative, which is successfully conducting “nostalgia” trade with the diaspora.

Canada facilitates some relations between Chambers of Commerce in Canada and those in countries of origin, and provides support to small and medium-sized businesses (mostly through Canadian companies). However, the Canadian case study raises interesting questions about the appropriate role of the state in this field and whether these matters should rather be left to migrant communities themselves.

Diaspora businesses require complementary efforts by countries of origin. A key factor known to affect the success of these networks is the domestic policy environment of the sending country.

The IOM/MIDA microenterprises programme, for example, found that governments showed strong interest in preliminary discussions, but did not really own the project or set up the institutional arrangements needed to make it work (IOM, 2005c). Furthermore, if economic and institutional governance is poor, diaspora groups are
reluctant to invest. Distrust of national institutions is often a major impediment for diaspora entrepreneurs to return and invest, preferring instead to make funds available to institutions where they have personal ties and confidence (Black et al., 2005).

3.5.2.4. Allowing dual citizenship

Restrictive residence and citizenship laws in countries of destination may limit diaspora participation in programmes if prolonged absence means loss of residency rights. Some European countries have changed their laws to allow re-entry after a prolonged stay in the country of origin. Many European countries generally allow or dual citizenship or do so under certain conditions, because many migrants still retain strong loyalties to their homeland (Hansen and Koehler, 2005). Seven EU countries accept dual citizenship, while others such as The Netherlands and Germany tolerate some dual citizenship in practice (Hansen and Weil, 2004). Box 23 describes the fate of flexible residency schemes in Netherlands and South Africa.

BOX 23
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF DESTINATION AND COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EXPERIENCES

Flexible residence regimes in The Netherlands and South Africa

Flexible residence is a contemporary Dutch concept coined to describe migration schemes that encourage migrants to maintain dual citizenship, residency, work and social and business networks in both countries; e.g. trading passes, the right to hold passports of the host and home countries and to move freely between the two, and renewable service contracts. A contrast observed between first and second or third-generation migrants in The Netherlands is that their relationship to their countries of origin has shifted from supporting family consumption through remittances (the first generation) to providing technical assistance and supporting community investment and/or trade (the second and third generation). Experts in both countries argue that flexible or more open door policies regarding migration would allow their countries to legalize seasonal, short-term, temporary and/or circular migration flows that benefit both the sending and receiving countries. In South Africa, immigration and human rights lawyers and, in the Netherlands, Ministry of Justice officials observe that regularizing and legalizing such flows frees up scarce
resources for more effective law enforcement against actual criminals and terrorists, and also recommend that visitors, particularly from the African continent, should be made to feel welcome and that ultimately the only exclusion should be criminals or those who threaten South Africa’s stability, peace or security. While recommended as good “development” practice, both the Netherlands and South African governments are so far unwilling to open their doors quite so wide.

Adapted from Netherlands-South Africa Case Study (Long et al., 2006).

**Countries of origin** are also aware of how access to dual citizenship and absentee voting rights for second and subsequent migrant generations may affect diaspora relations with the home country.

India, for instance, explicitly amended its citizenship law in 2003 to grant dual citizenship to persons of Indian origin who live in wealthy countries in Europe and North America, while excluding persons of Indian origin from developing countries. The rationale for this differential treatment was that persons of Indian origin settled in economically more advanced countries of the world would have skills and expertise to offer in vital sectors (Indian government, 2003).

More than a hundred countries are now estimated to allow dual citizenship, many of them migrant-sending countries (Wucker, 2004). One effect of dual citizenship is the ability of the diaspora to be politically involved with their homeland, thereby increasing affinity and willingness to contribute to its development. The political rights accorded to nationals abroad vary, some 50 nations, including the Philippines, allow absentee voting, whereas India expressly excludes dual nationals from voting in elections or from holding government office (Wucker, 2004).

Dual citizenship can be a key mobility enhancing measure. Though there is little direct evidence to suggest that dual citizenship has an impact on development, there are indications that dual citizenship can enhance the ability of the diaspora to contribute to development – migrants with citizenship rights in countries of destination have higher rates of employment than those with less secure status (Munz and Fassmann, 2004), which increases the potential of financial and skills transfer to the country of origin. Furthermore, evidence from studies on transnationalism suggests that deeper involvement in adopted societies does not necessarily lead to less significant commitment to countries of birth. Anecdotal evidence shows that diaspora entrepreneurs
with dual citizenship do return, indicating that granting citizenship status may well promote rather than reduce the incentives for circular migration. On the other hand, there are also arguments that permanent migration offers as much scope for “circularity” as temporary migration schemes.

### 3.5.2.5. Promoting knowledge transfer

Millions of highly skilled and educated professionals from developing countries live outside their country of origin and this can be turned to home country advantage (World Bank 2005) by promoting mechanisms which encourage professionals to transfer skills back home through internet networks and short-term visits. Box 24 describes a range of such initiatives. Measures to promote the transfer of knowledge are largely still at a pilot stage and unable to show significant dividends for development.

**BOX 24**

**INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE THE TRANSFER OF KNOWLEDGE**

Professional Diaspora networks, like the Digital Diaspora Network Africa (DDNA), the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) and the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) (ILO, 2005), have proven a useful means for migrant professionals to pool their knowledge and contacts with professionals in their homeland. Internet and e-learning provide considerable potential for such transfer of skills. The influence of such networks is difficult to quantify as, on the one hand, collaboration appears to occur such as strong positive correlation between the country of birth of U.S. college faculty staff and the percentage of scientific articles originating in their countries with U.S. co-authorship (Lowell, 2004) and, on the other, some e-networks may lie dormant and unused for long periods.

The IOM Migration for Development Africa (MIDA) pilot initiative has sought to capitalize on this potential for distance learning by facilitating a virtual transfer of skills using ICT, and also through short and long-term visits. MIDA has sent five diaspora medical doctors (based in the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK) to Ghana to teach or work in Ghanaian hospitals. A full evaluation has not yet been conducted, but participants initially reported positive experiences.
Other programmes which facilitate diaspora exchange and technical assistance include UNDP’s Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) (short-term consultancies for qualified professionals in the diaspora (IOM, 2005c).

BOX 2
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EXPERIENCES

Guatemala’s approach to engaging and supporting its diaspora

The Guatemalan government has sought to take a holistic approach with a number of new initiatives aimed at enhancing the relationship between the country of origin and its expatriate communities:

**Providing Assistance:** An estimated 1.3 million Guatemalans live abroad; most live in the U.S. and Mexico, but Canada and Spain also have significant Guatemalan expatriate populations. 40 per cent of this diaspora, or over 500,000 people, are estimated to be of indigenous, Mayan extraction. The fast growing nature of the Guatemalan diaspora in the U.S. has resulted in a growing need for enhanced services to this population. The government has opened several new consulates, particularly in new migrant-receiving points such as Atlanta, Providence and Phoenix, with the responsibility to provide assistance to all Guatemalan citizens, regardless of their legal status or ethnic origin. However, these consular services are reported to be inadequate, particularly when it comes to services for indigenous Guatemalans who feel unable to communicate their needs because of language barriers and thus remain vulnerable and exposed in foreign lands. There is a need to diversify staff and bring in people who speak one or more of Guatemala’s 21 indigenous languages.

**Advocacy:** Enhanced advocacy efforts both in the U.S. and in Mexico includes requests for Temporary Protection Status for undocumented Guatemalans living in the U.S.; advocacy for the rights of undocumented Guatemalan workers in the U.S. to social security benefits; efforts to promote the better integration of Guatemalans in host countries (e.g. provision of identification documents, access to financial and social services in host cities), and monitoring and advocating for human rights and humane working conditions for Guatemalans working in the U.S. and southern Mexico.
Advocacy initiatives also flow in the other direction: Guatemalans living abroad may also promote their own agendas, e.g. voting rights. Perhaps the clearest evidence of the increasing importance of the Guatemalan diaspora in binational advocacy is the existence of the National Coalition of Guatemalan Immigrants in the United States (CONGUATE), a coalition of 25 Guatemalan migrant associations formed in 1998, that aims to promote the integration of Guatemalan immigrants in the U.S. and also work towards economic development and the strengthening of democracy in Guatemala itself. CONGUATE’s advocacy work is credited with bringing about several new Guatemalan government institutions charged with migration affairs, such as the Deputy Ministry of Human Rights and Migrant Affairs, the Commission for Migration Affairs of the Guatemalan National Congress, and agreement between CONGUATE and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman to help monitor and protect migrants’ rights highlighting the important role played by the diaspora.

Outreach and Collaboration: Outreach initiatives aim to facilitate co-investment in transnational economic activities, especially given the growing economic potential of diaspora as testified by the rapidly increasing size of remittance flows into the country. Examples of such initiatives include migrant-investment events in Guatemala City or in the U.S. for migrant families. There are also opportunities to work collaboratively with Home Town Associations, for instance Guatemalan migrant associations in the U.S. Some of these are engaged in transnational philanthropy through collective remittances (individual donations bundled together and sent to countries of origin, most commonly to improve physical infrastructure or provide migrant-sending communities with basic services, such as potable water or electricity). Guatemalan migrant groups have a history of remitting collectively, especially to support infrastructure development (MPI, 2006). Although the volume of collective remittances is relatively small compared with private remittances (estimated to be 1%), their aggregated value can have significant developmental impacts. This potential of collaboration between the government and Guatemalan formal and informal HTAs has not yet been fully exploited.

Adapted from Guatemala Case Study (Petree, 2006).
Key Message

The Diaspora has a considerable contribution to make and further efforts are needed by both countries of destination and origin to facilitate diaspora engagement. Diaspora contributions to development are generated through autonomous social processes that, however, can be facilitated by appropriate financial incentives, technical assistance, capacity building and the promotion of information-based networks.

3.6. RETURN AND REINTEGRATION

SUMMARY

Countries of origin are beginning to realize the potential benefits of circular migration and of returnee migrants. However, measures to attract migrants back and help them to reintegrate effectively appear to be still limited and small-scale and, where they exist, instigated by countries of destination, initially out of a concern to return irregular migrants, but, more recently, with some interest in stimulating home country development. The issue of respecting human rights standards may often arise in relation to questions of return. It is reasonable to assume that return which is voluntary and well supported will have a better chance of success for the successful reintegration in the home country.

There are numerous barriers for returnees which may deter them from considering a return home. These include difficulties in making a living, re-adjusting to life back home, bureaucratic obstacles and cultural differences. In some cases, return is made necessary by the admission criteria of countries of destination, while in other cases return can be encouraged by ensuring that social security is portable and by taking measures to encourage productive reintegration. Local co-development efforts which closely involve migrants and home communities appear to be a promising way of fostering successful returns.

3.6.1. BACKGROUND

Return to and reintegration of migrants in their countries of origin can have valuable development effects especially if the returnees bring with them new knowledge and
skills and financial/social capital. However, experience shows that there are many obstacles to return and the potential offered by returning expatriates is only seldom realized. Some of the barriers to return include lack of employment opportunities, lower wages and lower standards of living, institutional obstacles such as the lack of recognition of or ability to use returnee skills and qualifications, and cultural differences. Box 26 describes Albania’s experiences in encouraging migrants to return home.

BOX 26
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EXPERIENCES

Encouraging returns to Albania

Returnees represent important human, financial and social capital for Albania’s economy as they bring back skills, funds and social capital in the form of networks and contacts abroad. Obstacles to return include salary and workload issues, non-recognition of foreign qualifications, hostility by those who feel that their own positions are threatened by returnees, and (in the case of the public sector and universities) prevailing systems of patronage. The government has pursued positive discrimination policies, issued governmental orders to encourage the employment of foreign-educated persons and promoted these through visits abroad. These initiatives have been criticized as being biased and as devaluing the Albanian university system by favouring study abroad over other indicators of merit. For some, short-term returns, such as lecture cycles and exchanges, are possible.

Returnees are attracted back by a variety of jobs, political careers and also the NGO sector because it offers higher salaries and the possibility of helping to develop the homeland. A number of organizations are working on registers of qualified Albanians abroad with an interest in supporting and/or returning to their home country, in order to have a better understanding of the skills present in the diaspora. Attracting students back from abroad is seen as a powerful means to reform the institutional culture in the country. There is a poor return rate; many students left the country in the 1990s and are unaware of how Albania has changed and modernized since. Initiatives by AlbStudent, NGO Mjaft! and the Soros Foundation have trialled small-scale efforts to attract back Albanian students through apprenticeships or positions supported by salary supplements.

Adapted from Italy-Albania case study (Chaloff, 2006).
3.6.2. POLICY APPROACHES

Policy measures intended to foster the successful return and reintegation are generally scarce. Home country governments have only just begun to recognize the potential offered by their diaspora and to create an environment conducive to return movements. The following measures can play a role in encouraging migrants to return home and help develop countries of origin.

3.6.2.1. Creating obligations for return

Return can be rendered mandatory if the admission to the country of destination is made conditional on return. Enforcing the return of temporary foreign workers is at the crux of temporary foreign worker programmes and return is frequently built in from the start, as for instance, temporary labour migration schemes may not allow the renewal of work permits, only permit work in strictly seasonal or temporary jobs, or give preference to married men with families to ensure that the family back home acts as an inducement for return home (Basok, 2003). However, interestingly, research shows that it is the possibility of re-entry and re-employment rather than prohibitions that can serve as the most effective incentive and offer the highest rates of return home; e.g. the 1970s South African mine industry re-employment guarantees (Rogers, 1997), the Canadian-Mexican Scheme (Basok, 2000/2003) or the former Swiss seasonal worker schemes.

Financial return penalties often complement return regulations in temporary foreign worker schemes; e.g. employer liability to pay penalties if temporary workers do not leave.

Such systems are currently in operation in Singapore (where employers of non-Malaysian workers have to buy security bonds of SD 5,000 per employed worker) and in Greece, Israel, Malaysia, Spain and Taiwan Province of China. The success of such “bonding” schemes relies on employers having the practical means to return the migrants and the incentive to do so, but there is some scepticism as to their efficacy (Böhning 2004, Ruhs 2003). There are also compliance bonds for both employers and workers which may involve withholding part of the wages of a foreign worker and depositing it in an interest-bearing savings account accessible only by the worker and only from the country of origin (Papademetriou and Heppel, 1999).
The success of such schemes is mixed, however:

The Mexican Bracero programme foresaw that a share of migrant earnings be deducted for retirement in Mexico, but the policy ultimately failed as migrants never received the money and their claims for deferred wages have been under investigation for decades (Ruhs, 2005). By comparison, the compulsory deposit scheme in a home country bank, which forms part of the Caribbean/Canada seasonal worker scheme, appears to be welcomed by migrants as an encouragement to save.

**BOX 27**

**CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EXPERIENCES**

**Welcoming home the diaspora to South Africa**

Homecoming Revolution is a small NGO programme heralded by the government, which encourages skilled South Africans who are missing their country to return to South Africa. The programme has held seminars about employment opportunities and starting businesses in South Africa. Its website has had over 8,000 visits and its cultural events in the UK are said to be packed. Homecoming Revolution also organizes social events to help returnees to reintegrate socially. The programme initially targeted potential returnees in the UK and subsequently expanded to South Africa, Canada, the U.S. and New Zealand – the major markets for young South African migrants. The Homecoming Revolution promotion literature claims that one returnee generates ten new jobs in South Africa, and thus has significant development effects for the country. However, no data are available on how many people have actually returned in response to such programme outreach.

*Adapted from Netherlands-South Africa Case Study (Long et al., 2006).*

**3.6.2.2. Making social security portable**

The lack of portability of social security benefits may be a hindrance as returning migrants may lose years of contribution to the social security system of the host country. Similarly, dual payment of social security also means a loss of capital for the migrant as well as a potential reduction of investment and remittances to the home
country (Holzmann and Koettle, 2005). Most national laws in developed countries of destination allow the payment of pensions abroad even in absence of a special agreement to this effect. The transfer of social security benefits can be a significant form of remittances. Social security transfers can be very stable and grow at a higher rate than remittances, as shown by studies of Cape Verdians in the Netherlands and Pakistanis in Norway (Carling, 2005). Box 28 describes the social security situation of Albanian migrants in Italy.

However, countries of origin may subject pensions earned abroad to certain deductions, unless otherwise determined by bilateral agreement (Holzmann and Koettle, 2005). Migrants who have worked for various periods in several countries may not have satisfied minimum pension requirements (e.g. periods of contribution) and may therefore lose out on certain emoluments, or may receive payments so small that they are merely at subsistence level.

Transfer of migrant workers’ social security payments to their countries of origin is thus an important financial return incentive. The French programme of “reintegration aid” of 1984 and the German return programme of 1983 were both based on capitalization of social security funds. However, for various reasons these programmes only had a limited effect on return migration: many migrant workers were already settled with families by the time the schemes were launched; they did not take into account poor economic conditions in the home country; and further deterred those who might have been interested by precluding re-entry (Dustmann, 1996). In fact, research on Tunisian emigrants shows that this incentive even induced some to stay longer in the host country until they had enough capital to return home and also to take advantage of the scheme (Menard, 2004).

BOX 28
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF DESTINATION EXPERIENCES

Pension and insurance situation of Albanian migrants in Italy

All workers, whether foreign or Italian, are subject to the same pension requirements. Italy has a number of bilateral agreements on portability of pensions with other OECD countries, but Italy and Albania do not have such a bilateral agreement. In the absence of an agreement, Albanian workers in Italy are subject to Italian rules on the minimum number of years of contribution before pension eligibility. The 2002 immigration law in Italy eliminated the cash pay-out option opened by the 1998 law for foreign workers from countries with which Italy has no bilateral pension agreements.
In any case, the Italian pension institute, INPS, periodically reviews the situation of foreign workers in Italy to determine the most advantageous solution: bilateral agreements might be promoted when Italy sees them as economically favourable. A protocol for technical assistance between INPS and the Albanian Institute for Social Security is in force and was renewed in September 2005, but frequent changes in Albanian staff have made real cooperation more difficult. A joint working group (INPS, Italian ministries of labour, of foreign affairs and the interior) in Italy is working on solutions for such issues as paying out pensions in Albania, but no bilateral agreement is currently sought by Italy. Albania would like to sign an agreement, but has only been able to do so with Turkey.

Adapted from Italy-Albanian Case Study (Chaloff, 2006).

3.6.2.3. Enabling productive reintegration

The lack of employment and earning opportunities are among the major reasons inhibiting return. A number of return programmes provide reintegration assistance through start-up capital and job training. The UK’s Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VAARP) (see Box 29) has provided return assistance to several hundred Sri Lankans. Though it boasts a high success rate and is seen as a humane process by those who administer it, its critics see it as no more than forced removals and question the safety of those who return. In any event, it is not seen or conceived as a development project, though its effects may be development friendly.

There are other initiatives which are more overtly framed under development purposes, but the results of these development-related return schemes are mixed:

- French return programmes, such as the Programme développement local migrations and Programme co-développement migration, provide various loan and assistance schemes for regularized and non-regularized migrants from Senegal, Mali and Romania who intend to start a business in their home country. These programmes mark a shift from the earlier French preoccupation with sustainable return of unauthorized migrants. Because of the lack of regular monitoring, itself partly a reflection of the lack of motivation of government officials at both ends, it is difficult to establish how well these schemes have fared, but an initial independent evaluation suggests that re-
sults were mixed (IOM, 2001). Greater post-return monitoring was warranted as in some cases the schemes mainly benefited returning families rather than the community at large, but in other cases new enterprises were created that employed local staff. (IOM, 2001).

• Bilateral agreements between The Netherlands and Morocco, Tunisia, Yugoslavia and Turkey providing for development-related migrant returns similarly achieved only limited results relative to the high costs involved (Rogers, 1997, cited in de Haas, 2006).

Overall, the findings show that the main obstacles facing migrants are lack of networks and links with national business partners, as well as policies, laws and regulations in the home country. This suggests that factors affecting the sustainability of return are largely beyond the control of destination countries and have much more to do with country of origin policies (see Box 29) for details, Koehler and Laczko, 2006).

Experience shows that localized co-development projects are likely to have more success. In both France and Italy, diaspora-based co-development initiatives have in some cases achieved more sustainable local infrastructure and entrepreneurial activities in the country of origin through the combined support of development NGOs and migrant organizations, and financial assistance from governments. Their higher success rate is attributed to the fact that they are more translocal and closely involve the migrants themselves and the beneficiary communities in the home countries. Spain is also developing policies on local co-development projects (de Haas, 2006) instigated by Senegalese and Moroccan communities and trade unions themselves.

BOX 29
CASE STUDY: COUNTRY OF DESTINATION EXPERIENCES

The UK reintegration programme for Sri Lankan returnees

One of the clearest examples of ‘development-friendly’ migration policies in the UK, albeit on a small scale, is the funding of reintegration programmes for Sri Lankan returnees. The UK established the Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VAARP) in September 2000 in response to an increasing number of asylum seekers looking for specialized advice, information and assistance to facilitate their return home. Co-funded by the Home Office and the European Refugee Fund, the VAARP is administered by IOM London. Since the programme began in 1999, a
total of over 10,000 returnees have been assisted and, in October 2005, IOM London was helping over 300 asylum seekers and irregular migrants every month to return home.

In 2002, the Reintegration Fund was set up as an important component of the VAARP programme to facilitate sustainable return to the country of origin. On average, the Reintegration Fund allocates up to a maximum of GBP 1,000 per returnee to assist them in finding income-generating activities so as to become financially independent. Reintegration assistance tends to cover the establishment of small businesses and the purchase of equipment such as fishing boats, as well as vocational training courses and education. Returnees with reintegration assistance are monitored by IOM field offices after six months and then one year after return. In January 2006 a pilot scheme was launched by the Home Office which offers up to GBP 3,000 to failed asylum seekers as a cash incentive to return home.

Since 2002, IOM has facilitated the return of several hundred Sri Lankans, and Sri Lanka accounts for the largest portion of the reintegration fund. The vast majority of assisted returnees in Sri Lanka have used the reintegration assistance to set up small businesses, including a fishing business, a communications centre and a spare-parts shop. The success rate in Sri Lanka is estimated at around 80 to 85 per cent of recipients benefiting successfully from funded reintegration activities. In July 2005, an IOM evaluation in Sri Lanka found that many returnees needed additional support from family and friends to carry through their plans. Furthermore, a number of returnees explicitly stated that the amount of financial support should be increased, especially in light of the post-Tsunami price inflation. Despite this, the reintegration assistance was generally found to be extremely valuable in laying the foundations for a more sustainable return.

The issue of returns seems to be a central feature of bilateral relations between the UK and Sri Lanka, with at least two interviewees indicating that the issue has been raised during recent meetings between the UK Prime Minister and the President of Sri Lanka. The issue is also controversial outside policy circles, with voluntary return and reintegration programmes criticized as inappropriate given the political instability in Sri Lanka. It is claimed that returnees, particularly Tamils, are subject to harassment and are given little and inappropriate support.
In any case, it is clear that those who participate and implement the voluntary returns programme (e.g. IOM and Refugee Council UK) see the scheme as more humane and cheaper than detention and forced removals, and as a way of helping a country to achieve successful post-conflict reconstruction. However, whatever the actual positive development impacts, key stakeholders do not see voluntary return as a development project.

Adapted from UK –Sri Lanka case study (Sriskandarajah, 2006).

Key Message

Stronger efforts to enable the return and productive reintegration of skilled migrants can do much for the future development of the home country.
4. COHERENCE BETWEEN COUNTRIES

SUMMARY

Coherence between countries can be achieved by ensuring that development concerns are integrated into bilateral and multilateral agreements on migration. Bilateral agreements may enable countries of origin to secure jobs and negotiate appropriate wages, living conditions and job security for their nationals abroad. Although development is rarely their primary concern, better migration and working conditions can yield increased dividends for sending countries. In addition, bilateral agreements may explicitly address relevant issues such as skills development and the inflow of remittances. Given the time and resources required for implementing bilateral agreements, receiving countries are generally wary of entering into binding agreements and sometimes prefer unilateral measures. In comparison, multilateral arrangements regarding labour market access for migrants from poor countries may offer greater benefits for home countries than piecemeal bilateral arrangements; but to date, little progress has been made either at the regional or global level.

This section looks at coherence between countries and to what extent coordination agreements between sending and receiving countries at either bilateral or multilateral levels ensure that migration policies support development. Bilateral agreements have a chequered history and, though they seem to offer considerable benefits, in practice few governments have been willing to enter into such transactions. Multilateral agreements at regional or international level on trade, migration and related issues also hold promise of an efficient way of addressing the migration-development nexus, but this potential has yet to be realized.

4.1. Bilateral agreements for labour migration

The last decade has seen an upsurge in the number of bilateral labour agreements (BLAs): by 2000, there were 173 involving OECD countries, a fivefold increase since 1990 (UN 2004a; OECD 2004c) with a similar trend among non-OECD countries. Although the number of migrants covered by bilateral labour agreements is small compared to total labour migration flows, bilateral labour agreements between both sending and receiving countries can be an effective way of regulating the recruitment
of migrant workers: they can cater to the supply and demand in the countries involved, encourage the orderly movement of labour and promote good will and cooperation at the bilateral level. They can also address issues relating to temporary labour migration by including terms and procedures for return, and flexible visa arrangements in case of long-term or permanent options (Abella 1997, IOM/OSCE/ILO 2006 OECD 2004c). Bilateral agreements are traditionally seen as “labour-mobility” or “labour market access agreements”, but a new generation of agreements are motivated by economic, political and, in some cases, also development goals (OECD 2004c).

BLAs offer the following benefits to countries of origin:

- Increased access to the international market for their workers.
- The ability to negotiate appropriate wages, living conditions and job security for their nationals abroad and include appropriate terms for the protection of migrant workers in such documents. However, as the Guatemala experience presented in Box 31 shows, implementing these conditions and securing real protection of human rights on the ground can be difficult.
- Enable the development of human capital by enhancing vocational skills and qualifications and training opportunities.
- Facilitate technological transfer and business opportunities.
- Enable sustained remittance flows.
- Facilitate the repatriation of skills and knowledge.

BLAs signed by Spain with Colombia and Ecuador facilitate the voluntary return of temporary migrants through training and recognition of skills acquired in Spain, as well as through the creation of small and medium-sized binational enterprises, the development of human resources and transfer of technology (IOM/OSCE/ILO 2006).

- Help to off-set the negative effects of brain drain if agreements provide for the obligation of receiving countries to bear the costs of training additional staff, and/or to recruit staff for fixed periods, link training and development to staff returning to the source country and similar clauses (Buchan et al., 2005).

The agreement between the Philippines and the UK, for example, requires the UK National Health Service to pay the costs of the initial entry application, visa and initial airfare to the UK (provided workers remain in their posts for 12 months); to pay the Philippines authorities processing fees which go towards workers’ welfare funds (Bach, 2003), and to meet induction requirements and other forms of good practice.
BLAs are increasingly addressing issues related to development and, although their impacts are not fully researched, a number of factors are known to enhance their effectiveness. It is important to know given that 25 per cent of bilateral agreements in OECD countries are not implemented (IOM/OSCE/ILO, 2006).

- The involvement of employers, NGOs, trade unions and similar groups in the design and implementation of BLAs contributes significantly to their efficacy and, in some cases, has lowered administrative costs (OECD 2004c, IILS 2006).

The Spain-Ecuador/Colombia agreement, for instance, involved selection committees in the country of origin, as well as embassies and employers. The range of actors involved in the implementation of BLAs has become more diverse in recent years; NGOs, training bodies and trade unions often organize language training and selection procedures and provide migrants with information on the country of destination (e.g. Italy, Spain and France).

- Agreements that meet demand-supply imperatives rather than political objectives are more likely to be implemented.

    The Canadian Seasonal Agricultural Programme, and the UK agreement on recruitment of foreign nurses with Spain, India and the Philippines, are considered to work well. They match supply and demand, while also ensuring transparency in recruitment. The relative success of the latter scheme is attributed to the public ownership of the UK’s healthcare system, whereas countries with a large private health sector may find such an agreement difficult to enforce (Bach, 2005).

- Adoption of selective agreements which are easier to negotiate than comprehensive BLAs. Receiving countries are often reluctant to enter into BLAs as they perceive them to be time-consuming and resource-intensive and prefer mechanisms that allow maximum flexibility (Collyer, 2004).

    The Philippines has been relatively successful in negotiating BLAs by taking this approach. However, other sending countries, such as Sri Lanka, prefer to prepare their labour migrants for programmes with universal admission criteria.
Protection of temporary seasonal Guatemala migrant labourers in Mexico

Apart from migration to the US, there is also a century-long tradition of temporary, seasonal labour migration from Guatemala to southern Mexico for agricultural work. Every year, tens of thousands of Guatemalan workers, primarily from indigenous Mayan communities along the Guatemala-Mexico border who have a long tradition of crossing back and forth across what is their ancestral land, enter southern Mexico for a period of one to four months to harvest coffee, as well as other crops such as sugar cane, bananas, mangoes and papaya. Recently, this migratory flow has increased, indicating that indigenous farmers are no longer earning sufficient income from their own local economic activities to provide for their families. More than 45,000 Guatemalans crossed the Mexican border in search of work in 2003, an increase of nearly 6,000 over 2002, though these figures may underestimate the true flow, which the Mexican government estimates to be closer to 150,000.

On the basis of this long-standing migratory flow, Guatemala and Mexico established a bilateral agreement and created a special pass known as the “FMVA” (Forma Migratoria de Visitante Agricula), which documents and facilitates Guatemalan migration over the Mexican border to work on farms that offer seasonal agricultural employment in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. The main objectives of this agreement concern the fair treatment of migrant workers.

The effectiveness of this agreement is disputed. The abusive treatment and poor working conditions that Guatemalan workers face in Mexico have improved very little under this new regime due to:

- Lack of systematic documentation of labour violations over time and across the region, making it impossible to analyse the scale of the problem. Lack of reliable, complete information also prevents the Guatemalan government from negotiating with Mexico for better conditions.

- Lack of mechanism for collecting information directly from employers or from workers.
• Lack of unbiased monitoring or inspection of labour conditions and practices.

• Lack of large-scale information campaigns to disseminate information about workers’ rights and obligations, or how to contact a nearby Guatemalan consulate for assistance and/or information.

• Lack of regular binational meetings at the local, regional or national level between government ministries, civil society organizations, employers and migrant workers to discuss issues, exchange ideas and solve problems.

Other limitations of the migration agreement are its restriction to agricultural workers (excluding other Guatemalan workers, e.g. undocumented domestic child labourers), nor does it address migrant remittances or offer ways to facilitate these flows by reducing costs, or expanding transfer mechanisms. Nevertheless, this temporary, seasonal migration continues because of the significant economic benefits it provides to both countries.

Aside from Guatemala Case Study (Petree, 2006).

4.2. Bilateral co-development agreements

The French strategy of ‘co-development’ can be seen as a very particular subset of bilateral agreements. These agreements are not about the export of labour, but are concerned with involving migrants in addressing development issues in their regions of origin. The French government created the position of Ambassadeur Délégué au co-développement in 2002, to mainstream co-development into the general development agenda (de Haas, 2006). France has signed four co-development agreements with Senegal, Mali, Morocco and the Comoros under which local development projects funded by French ministries responsible for development and foreign affairs are implemented by migrant associations (and also partly funded by them), French NGOs and the French local authorities (IOM, 2005d). Other European countries also support a co-development policy, but have not yet set up clearly identifiable structure dedicated to co-development. The German Agency for Technical Cooperation intends to formalize such an approach (de Haas, 2006), the UK has negotiated country partnerships with Ghana, Nigeria and Bangladesh (de Haas, 2006).
The Italian experience of regional co-development programmes reveals a series of shortcomings: actions are isolated, sector-specific, lack continuity and are inadequately coordinated with other regions or central institutions or migrant associations. There is a shortage of specialized staff, regional budgets are limited and mostly spent on reception and social services for resident migrants. “Neighbourhood partnerships” between regions of origin and destination to promote spontaneous development of circular migration patterns, forms of migratory “commuting” and capacity building of institutions in sending countries offer some hope for the future of co-development. Numerous projects (such as Adriatic Secretariat, the Adriatic Arc, the Forum of Adriatic Cities or the Adriatic University) link the Adriatic coastal regions of Italy to Albania and its neighbours (Chaloff, 2006).

4.3. Multilateral agreements

Multilateral approaches to labour migration can address the needs of both sending and receiving countries. Receiving countries face a growing number of labour shortages in certain sectors and occupations, namely health personnel, information technology specialists, domestic workers and social services, and would therefore greatly benefit from the liberalization of labour migration. One study computed annual gains of some USD 200 billion if temporary work visa schemes were adopted multilaterally and allowed workers from developing countries (not exceeding a set quota of 3% of the local labour force) to be employed in developed countries for three to five years (to be replaced by a new inflows at the end of their term) (Rodrik, 2002 cited in UN, 2004a). Most of these gains would redound to the benefit of migrants and developing countries (World Bank, 2005).

There has been some progress at the regional level in removing technical and administrative barriers to the cross-border exchange of skilled personnel for business purposes in Europe, Latin America, Asia and parts of Africa. They range from relatively extensive labour mobility schemes covering general freedom of movement for the highly skilled (e.g. CARICOM), to agreements which provide for access for certain groups (e.g. NAFTA) to a system which, while not providing for access per se, facilitates the movement of certain groups by easing the migration procedures involved in their movement (e.g. APEC). However, with the major exception of the EU, regional arrangements have had little impact on the movements of less skilled foreign workers, the movement of which, however, may yield the greatest gains for sending countries (Ghosh, 1998; UN, 2004a). Regional initiatives are presented in more depth in Box 31.
Given the number of restrictions on labour mobility between developed and developing countries, considerable hope is being placed on Mode 4 of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to improve cooperation between countries of origin and destination on cross-border labour movements. Some governments, e.g., Sri Lanka, have been an active voice in calling for better market access within Mode 4 in the hope of increasing short-term migratory flows and the accruing benefits in terms of remittances, skills gain and return investment. For Sri Lanka this would also help with the government’s objectives of expanding and redirecting market reliance away from the Middle East and of increasing the per capita remittance receipt of each worker. Although the GATS Mode 4 agreement concerns primarily trade in services and not also migration, it does commit parties to adjust their migration regimes to include trade objectives. In other words, a number of regulations of national migration regimes concerning temporary migration are under closer scrutiny during the negotiations. To date, the GATs Mode 4 commitments concern mainly a limited set of temporary migrants, and access to GATS Mode 4 for low-skilled workers appears limited.

BOX 31
REGIONAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESSES (RCPs) IN THE FIELD OF MIGRATION

Regional initiatives can have some advantages over global multilateral fora such as GATS, which may be too restrictive for some purposes given its limited coverage of unskilled workers, and the slow and cumbersome nature of global negotiation. Bottom-up mechanisms of interstate cooperation have become a key component of migration management, especially in the developing world. Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) have emerged in the absence of powerful or well-developed regional institutions. Although informal and non-binding, RCPs have been credited with a number of achievements, particularly in the area of enforcement and security. They are relatively inclusive and provide important venues for dialogue between sending and receiving countries. The Regional Migration Conference, or the Puebla Process, launched by the Mexican government in 1996, for instance, has been credited with paving the way for the United States to legalize the status of many Central American nationals who had fled during the civil wars in the 1980s; to grant temporary protected status to Central Americans in the United States displaced during Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and after the earthquakes in 2001, and to encourage cooperation to improve safety at the Mexican-U.S. and Mexican-Guatemalan borders (Martin 2006; Rosenblum 2000; IOM 2005f). RCPs can also encourage countries to compare and explore good policy practices. In Asia, the Asian Labour Ministers Conference,
launched in 2003, for instance, provided a unique opportunity for regional labour sending countries to explore good practices in the area of labour migration (IOM 2005f). The recommendations from such conferences have led to legislative reforms, ratifications of UN conventions and new policies to better protect overseas workers (IOM, 2005a). There are many other consultative processes, including those between the EU and North Africa, among African countries and among Andean countries. However, one issue affecting RCPs is the lack of resources to meet their objectives (IOM 2005f) and, in the case of Africa, a serious lack of donor support for regional processes. In Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean there has been strong support from members from the North for the processes and to fund agreed programmes and a standing secretariat. There is also a lingering question about the extent to which regional migration processes can be upgraded to international levels of cooperation (IOM 2005f).

Key Message

Bilateral agreements can be an efficient means of incorporating development considerations into migration policies, while Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) can provide the appropriate venues for sending and receiving countries to discuss policy coherence issues within and between countries.
5. CONCLUSIONS

Research shows that policy coherence can sometimes occur purely coincidentally, as when migration policies actually support development without this having been their primary aim, yet by that same token rendering policy coherence equally fragile and subject to change; normally a conscious effort at policy coherence is required, and this hard to achieve because of conflicts of interests between the development and migration agendas. Coherence at the institutional level and in terms of coordination between governments requires deliberate efforts and concerted decisions by governments. At the working level, however, coherence may occur almost as a by-product - even if migration policies were not, as such, intended to be development friendly, they may still generate positive development effects.

Although in recent years some governments have made efforts to strengthen institutional coherence, synergies at that level are difficult to achieve largely because of intrinsic tensions between the development and migration agendas. Migration is a core domestic priority for receiving countries and pushes international development commitments into second place. Sending countries are beginning to acknowledge the synergies between migration and development, but do not always put in place the internal coordination measures needed to capitalize on these links.

At the working level, coherence takes different forms and has varying implications. From the viewpoint of making migration more development friendly, countries of origin and destination have different approaches and priorities:

For countries of origin, the two areas are naturally coherent given the generally acknowledged positive potential of migration for development. Thus, the question concerns rather coordination, especially as sending countries do not always seem to optimize these linkages. Indeed, the integration of migration issues into a comprehensive development agenda appears to be an area for which no institution ready acknowledges responsibility.

- Countries of destination frequently perceive conflicts of interest between migration policies that focus on internal needs, and external commitments to international development. Temporary migration and brain drain/skilled labour migration issues are two areas where the policies in receiving countries are based on their own needs, and where any related development dimension is not of primary concern. However, experience shows that measures to support development do not necessarily work against receiving country interests.
- Temporary migration schemes can work well for both: they provide the labour force needed by receiving countries, help combat irregular migration and, at the same time, provide secure migration channels for migrants which can generate greater dividends for sending countries through increased remittances.

- As far as brain drain is concerned, efforts to mitigate negative impacts have proven difficult, codes of conduct appear unworkable, but compensatory measures and skills replenishment schemes to compensate immediate losses suffered by developing countries have not yet been fully explored.

Return migration has the potential to suit the needs of both sending and receiving countries, depending on the timing, form and the skills acquired by migrants abroad and their useful application at home.

Coherence in the other direction, i.e. to ensure that development policies take account of migration, is less prone to tensions. The development policies in receiving countries can take account of migration without compromising their ultimate goals. The main challenge here is the lack of consensus among development communities on the level of priority to be assigned to this issue, as well as practical and logistical difficulties in harnessing the potential of remittances and diaspora engagement. For sending countries, the key issue is to raise awareness in ministries dealing with development and poverty reduction of the potential impacts of migration.

This paper shows that even where institutional coherence is difficult to achieve, a bottom-up approach to policy coherence can offer a way forward by synergizing policies at a practical level. Indeed, many new “migration and development” policy initiatives discussed are not the result of initiatives taken by agencies with lead responsibility for migration management. Instead, these schemes have been initiated by local governments, development agencies, diaspora groups, international organizations, NGOs and private banks. The paper describes a variety of initiatives at different stages of the migration cycle. Some of these are experimental or too small in scale to be judged as to their efficacy. However, a few preliminary observations can be made:

• An integration policy framework can facilitate the case for more developed coordination mechanisms in receiving countries, but conflicts of interest between internal needs and commitments to international development remain a challenge to translate this commitment into action.
• A clear regulatory framework for promoting labour migration by countries of origin can facilitate the integration of migration into development strategies, but only if the issue of mainstreaming migration into development is taken up by a migration-policy “champion” at the institutional level with clear responsibility for the migration and development agenda. Because of the cross-sectoral nature of migration, frequently no institution feels responsible for tackling the development challenges raised by migration.

• Temporary migration programmes for low-skilled workers, especially those with repeat migration possibilities and proper protection safeguards, have clear development benefits, bringing increased economic revenue to home countries and allowing them to retain the human and social capital needed for further development.

• Brain drain and measures to minimize the negative effects of skilled migration merit further attention. Ethical recruitment codes have been largely ineffectual, suggesting the need for firmer measures by developed receiving countries, such as skills retention or compensation, to off-set such losses to developing countries of origin arising from their investment in education and human capital.

• Remittances, as is already well known, play a major role in home country development and far exceed official overseas aid. Further steps are needed to facilitate transfers and to ensure their optimum use for development purposes.

• Diaspora contributions to development are generated through autonomous social processes that, however, can be facilitated by appropriate financial incentives, technical assistance, capacity building and the promotion of information-based networks. More efforts are needed by countries of destination and countries of origin to facilitate diaspora engagement.

• Linked to this, stronger efforts to enable the return and productive reintegration of skilled migrants can go a long way towards ensuring the development of the home country.

• Bilateral agreements can provide an efficient means of incorporating development considerations into migration policies, while Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs) can provide the appropriate venue for sending and receiving countries to jointly address policy coherence issues within and between countries.
This paper also sheds some light on another area of coherence: that of the relationship between the migration-development agenda and the human rights framework. This is particularly timely given the focus on human rights by the 2008 Global Forum on Migration and Development meeting in the Philippines. A re-emerging theme at each stage of the migration cycle is the importance of ensuring safe and secure channels for migrants, together with decent working conditions and remuneration in the receiving country. The risks to human rights posed by the migration process are well documented. It is also reasonable to assume that migrants are best able to contribute to development in both the home and host countries when they are protected and empowered socially, economically and in terms of their basic human rights, regardless of their migration status. Research has demonstrated that regular migrants are able to do more to support their home country development than irregular migrants suffering exploitation and abuse.

The paper highlights a number of policy measures governments can take to promote migrant rights:

- Sending country policies on migration management are largely concerned with ensuring that workers have safe passage, are not exploited and in a better position upon arrival to stand up for themselves.

- There are examples of temporary migration schemes negotiated under bilateral agreements which include provisions for the protection of migrant workers and are more successful in development terms for having done so.

- Some receiving countries have introduced specific national legislation on the rights of migrant workers or minorities.

- Finally, the adherence to human rights standards can also make a difference to productive return and reintegration.

The human rights framework touches on the migration-development nexus at many different points. The linkages are clear and migrants who enjoy the protection of labour standards and human rights will be in a much better position to contribute to home country development than those leading irregular lives in an environment characterized by exploitation and abuse.
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Migration and Development: Within and Across Borders, is the outcome of an expert meeting organized jointly by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS). The articles selected for this volume are revised versions of some of the workshop papers that focused on issues related to labour migration. This narrower topical focus not only facilitates the framing of internal and international migration within sending and receiving areas and on different levels of social organization but also makes possible an examination of related methods of research and links to policy. The essays in this volume make clear that the livelihoods of many rural families and communities depend on both internal and international migration. Although both types of migration seem to provide access to work that can raise incomes and reduce poverty, international migration seems to offer considerably higher levels of remuneration.

IOM is delighted to be able to publish this volume of research, as it is likely that interest in the subject of internal migration and its relationship to development is likely to grow in the future.

This publication includes the materials of the two-day workshop on “Migrants and the Host Society: Partnerships for Success”, held in Geneva, Switzerland on 12 and 13 July 2006. IOM would like to thank the Government of Australia for making this event possible.

This publication was prepared under the supervision of Philippe Boncour, Head, IDM Division, MPRC. It comprises two main elements. Part I contains the report of the workshop, which is based on the presentations and discussions. Special thanks for the preparation of Part I are owed to Karoline Popp and Jason Whiteley – the principal authors – and to Cynthia Bryant and Alina Narusova. Part II includes the workshop agenda and background paper. Finally, two Annexes are attached, the first being an information sheet on IOM’s integration activities and the second being the final list of participants attending the workshop.

2008, Softcover, 112 pages, ISSN 1726-2224, English, US$ 16.00
This report gives an overview of the international legal framework containing norm relevant to the protection of child migrants. Particular focus is on the International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), since this widely ratified instrument constitutes the most all-encompassing basis for the protection of children, including children who are outside their State of origin. The report provides a detailed examination of the rights found in the CRC which are of a particular relevance to migrant children. Furthermore, a review of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in the context of working children, and of other Human Rights and International Criminal Law instruments are included. The report aims to provide a comprehensive picture of the international norms which form the legal basis for the effective protection of children on the move, taking into consideration the specific situation of these children: their resourcefulness and their vulnerability alike.

2008, Softcover, 385 pages, ISSN 1813-2278, English, US$ 38.00
The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Publisher: International Organization for Migration
17 route des Morillons
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Tel: +41.22.717 91 11
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.
Policy coherence between migration and development agendas is of increasing interest in current times; there is growing recognition that migration policies should support rather than hinder investment in international development. The United Nations High-Level Dialogue of September 2006 and the Global Forum on Migration and Development of July 2007 both raised the attention given to this issue.

Now that the interface between migration and development has been recognized, the challenge is to turn this interest into working-level policies and programmes. The aim of this study is to build on existing international research and take the analysis to the next higher level showing how these connections can be made in practice. Policy makers often focus on remittances as the main means of translating the migration-development nexus into reality. However, this paper shows that there are many stages in the migration cycle, from departure to return and reintegration back home, that present opportunities to make migration more “development friendly” and, conversely, to raise development awareness of migration factors.