International migration is frequently discussed in association with development. There are some 232 million international migrants in the world (UN DESA, 2013), and when internal mobility is included this number jumps to one in seven people on the planet. These numbers emphasize the increasing significance of migration. Yet the topic remains a complex phenomenon. Great variations in the conditions faced by migrants are mirrored in its developmental impacts. Furthermore, migration can also be seen as a product of development. From the early movements of hunter-gatherers, to urbanization processes triggered by the industrial revolution, to the movement of health workers triggered by ageing populations, mobility is a core part of the human experience.

When we talk about migration and development in policy circles we tend to focus on how we can enhance the positives and mitigate the negatives. In doing so, there is often more of a focus on the more tangible channels through which migration can impact development: remittances, diaspora engagement and the highly skilled, and less so on other less tangible areas such as social remittances, and the reverse relationship between migration and development, where development impacts migration. However, these areas merit further investigation, because they lead us to consider what the evidence tells us about how migration, like technology or international trade, transforms realities. Additionally, internal migration has not been given the recognition it deserves within international frameworks, particularly given that urbanization processes are inherently linked to both migration and development.

It is clear that migration should be part of the discussions for the post-2015 development agenda. However we should tread with caution. Migration is also a topic that questions national sovereignty and, as such, an emotive and controversial topic in parliaments across the world.

Part A of this report provides a systematic update of the evidence base regarding migration’s relevance to and impact on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In doing so, it considers the role of migration as an enabler of development through a number of different channels: monetary and social remittances, the act of migrating and the impacts on those left behind. The evidence base for internal migration is often more robust and plentiful than for international migration and thus, where relevant, the impacts of internal migration on development are also considered.

Part B takes the debate a step further by first presenting argumentation for why migration is important and why mobility should be a component of the post-2015 development agenda. Following this, two ways in which migration could be incorporated in the post-2015 development agenda are considered: (1) locating migration alongside other “enablers” of migration such as trade in a reformulated version of MDG 8 on global partnerships; and (2) through the inclusion of migration-related indicators as a cross-cutting theme in the new development goals.
The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Publisher: International Organization for Migration
17 route des Morillons
P.O. Box 17
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 717 91 11
Fax: +41 22 798 61 50
E-mail: hq@iom.int
Internet: http://www.iom.int

ISSN 1607-338X
© 2014 International Organization for Migration (IOM)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Titles in the series are available from:
International Organization for Migration, Publications Unit
17 route des Morillons, P.O. Box 17, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 717 91 11; Fax: +41 22 798 61 50; E-mail: pubsales@iom.int
☑ The MRS can be downloaded for free or purchased from IOM website at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore.

Single issue: USD 16 + postage
Payments may also be made by international bank draft or money order payable to International Organization for Migration, Publications Unit, Geneva.
Acknowledgements

This paper was commissioned by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The paper was structured in accordance with guidelines stipulated in the Terms of Reference. We are grateful to Ronald Skeldon, Frank Laczko and Lars Johan Lonnback for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................. vii

Introduction ................................................................................ xi

Part A: Review of the Evidence .................................................. 1
  Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger ......................... 2
  Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education............................ 4
  Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women............. 6
  Goal 4: Reduce child mortality.................................................. 8
  Goal 5: Improve maternal health................................................. 8
  Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases .......... 12
  Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability........................... 13

Part B: Global Partnerships ....................................................... 17
  The significance of human mobility .......................................... 20

Endnotes .................................................................................... 41

Bibliography .............................................................................. 43
Executive Summary

- International migration is frequently discussed in association with development. There are some 232 million international migrants in the world (UN DESA, 2013b). When internal mobility is included, this number jumps to one in seven people on the planet. Although these numbers emphasize the increasing significance of migration, the topic remains a complex phenomenon. Great variations in the conditions faced by migrants are mirrored in its developmental impacts.

- Part A of this report provides a systematic update of the evidence base regarding migration’s relevance to and impact on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In doing so, it considers the role of migration as an enabler of development through a number of different channels – monetary and social remittances, the act of migrating and the impacts on those left behind. The evidence base for internal migration is often more robust and plentiful than for international migration and thus, where relevant, the impacts of internal migration on development are also considered. A brief synopsis of the findings per goal is listed below.

  - Poverty: The impacts of migration on poverty are complex, context-specific and dynamic. Nevertheless, it is relatively undisputed that migration can help people out of poverty through different channels – primarily through remittances, the highly skilled, the diaspora and the very act of moving.

  - Education: Migration can affect education and human capital formation in several ways. The prospect of migration can be an incentive to achieve either more or less education, and the effects of migration on the educational attainment of children left behind can be either positive or negative. Broadly speaking, remittances are associated with positive educational outcomes, while having an absent parent
can have negative impacts. The extent to which migration influences educational goals relates very much to contextual factors.

- **Gender**: In general, there are two major links between migration and female empowerment – the process of migration can itself be transformative, and migration can lead to challenging of gender norms. In general, in how far female migrants can benefit from migration seems influenced by the social, economic and cultural context in both the country of origin and the country of destination. While a favourable environment that helps to foster incorporation might lead to changing gender roles in the long run, experiences of discrimination and lack of integration can hinder them.

- **Child mortality and maternal health**: Migration is often linked to health outcomes through monetary transfers and social remittances. Monetary remittances can increase access to health services, and social remittances can improve health through transfer of norms and values relating to hygiene, preventative health care and so forth. Theoretically, the very act of moving – both internally and internationally – can also be beneficial to reducing child mortality and improving maternal health (and other more general health indicators) if it enables women more access to better-quality health services. Conversely, however, it can have negative impacts on children left behind. Brain drain is also an important point of discussion in the debate on the relationship between migration and health, although it is clear that a more nuanced debate focusing less on the negative implications is emerging.

- **Communicable diseases**: With increased globalization and mobility, individuals are increasingly connected. This increases the challenges associated with the management and control of public health, particularly regarding infectious diseases. Although much of the literature focuses on HIV/AIDS, the spread of other infectious diseases (i.e. hepatitis, tuberculosis, malaria, Chagas disease) has been associated with migration patterns.

- **Environment**: The relationship between migration and environmental sustainability is ambiguous, although since the 1990s it has been receiving increasing attention from researchers. It is generally assumed that environmental change will increase migration, particularly from those areas most at risk of climate-related shocks such as drought, desertification or flooding, although the empirical evidence does not currently support this. At the same time, migration can be a factor impacting the environment although less is known about this.
• Part B takes the debate a step further by first presenting argumentation for why migration is important and why mobility should be a component of the post-2015 development agenda. Following this, two ways in which migration could be incorporated in the post-2015 development agenda are considered: (1) situating migration alongside other “enablers” of migration such as trade in a reformulated version of MDG 8 on global partnerships; and (2) through the inclusion of migration-related indicators as a cross-cutting theme in the new development goals.

• There are a number of reasons why migration should be reflected in the post-2015 development agenda primarily relating to its scale, global reach and impact.

• Currently, there are roughly 232 million migrants in the world, and when internal migrants are included, this number increases dramatically. Furthermore, urbanization trends see increasing numbers of people moving towards cities. Particularly in developing countries, these urban migrants set up camps in informal settlements or slums. It was estimated that in 2012, 32.7 per cent of the urban population in developing countries were slum-dwellers, lacking basic access to clean water and sanitation as well as having poor structural quality of housing (UN-Habitat, 2013). By 2030, it is estimated that there could be 30 million more international migrants sending an additional USD 60 billion in remittances (UN DESA, 2013a). Thus, the scale of migration makes it a topic worthy of attention in development debates.

• The impacts of migration are also felt globally. Current evidence points towards a globalization of migration flows in which migrants from a growing number of origin countries are moving towards a decreasing number of destination countries. Although a simplification of a qualitatively much more complex phenomenon, this means that the impacts of migration – whether positive or negative – are felt by an increasing number of origin countries, who also have an interest in how migration is “governed”.

• Accepting that unrestricted mobility, at least at a global level, is politically unfeasible; it is still noteworthy that even modest changes to migration rates have the potential to have significant economic benefits. For example, Walmsey and Winters (2005) estimate that “by increasing developed economies’ quota on inward movements of both skilled and unskilled labour by just 3 per cent of their labour forces, world welfare would rise by USD 156 billion – about 0.6 per cent of world income” (690) and one and a half times the expected gain from full trade liberalization in goods and services.
From a largely economic perspective, the logic of global governance is to address market imperfections, to minimize impacts of negative externalities and to achieve economies of scale. It is evident that the policy decisions of one country in the area of migration have implications for another. Thus, there is a normative rationale for including migration in debates about global partnerships in the post-2015 development agenda. Nevertheless, differing views regarding the most appropriate form of migration governance exist. After a review of the current debate on global migration governance, the authors conclude that a regional approach to global partnerships is a logical precursor to global agreements and a better way of approaching a revamped global partnership goal for migration in the long term.

In addition to a focus on regional partnerships, another – not mutually exclusive – option for incorporating migration into the post-2015 development agenda is the inclusion of migration-related indicators for relevant development goals. In doing so, migration, as demonstrated in Part A, can be acknowledged as an enabler of development and as a cross-cutting issue that has implications for multiple development goals. This approach demands indicators that are measurable and to do so requires good quality data. The report concludes by providing an overview of selected migration indicators that could be incorporated into the post-2015 development agenda, including possible data sources.
Introduction

International migration is frequently discussed in association with development. There are some 232 million international migrants in the world (UN DESA, 2013b), and, when internal mobility is included, this number jumps to one in seven people on the planet. These numbers emphasize the increasing significance of migration. Yet, the topic remains a complex phenomenon. Great variations in the conditions faced by migrants are mirrored in its developmental impacts. Furthermore, migration can also be seen as a product of development. From the early movements of hunter-gatherers, to urbanization processes triggered by the industrial revolution, to the movement of health workers triggered by ageing populations, mobility is a core part of the human experience.

When we talk about migration and development in policy circles, we tend to focus on how we can enhance the positives and mitigate the negatives. In doing so, there is often more of a focus on the more tangible channels through which migration can impact development – remittances, diaspora engagement and the highly skilled – and less so on other less tangible areas such as social remittances, and the reverse relationship between migration and development, where development impacts migration. However, these areas merit further investigation, because they lead us to consider what the evidence tells us about how migration, like technology or international trade, transforms realities. Additionally, internal migration has not been given the recognition it deserves within international frameworks particularly given that urbanization processes are inherently linked to both migration and development.

It is clear that migration should be part of the discussions for the post-2015 development agenda. However, we should tread with caution. Migration is also a topic that questions national sovereignty and as such an emotive and controversial topic in parliaments across the world.
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Part A focuses on the evidence base regarding migration’s relevance to and impact on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This section represents a systematic update of the 2005 report published by the International Organization for Migration, *The Millennium Development Goals and Migration*. Since its publication, there has been a plethora of research looking at different migration and development issues, including, not least, the numerous background documents prepared for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development*. In looking at each MDG in turn, this section of the report considers the theoretical and, where the evidence is available, the empirical relationship between migration and development. Given that the primary focus of this report is how migration can act as an enabler of development, a largely positive story is told. Where relevant, however, caveats are presented to highlight and acknowledge those areas in which, depending on contextual factors, migration may have negative implications for development. These caveats also represent areas in which interventions at the multilateral level are justifiable.

Part B takes the debate a step further by first presenting argumentation for why migration is important and why mobility should be a component of the post-2015 development agenda. Following this, two key ways in which migration could be incorporated in the post-2015 development agenda are considered: (1) situating migration alongside other “enablers” of migration such as trade in a reformulated version of MDG 8 on global partnerships; and (2) through the inclusion of migration-related indicators as a cross-cutting theme in the new development goals.
Part A: Review of the Evidence

This section focuses on the evidence base regarding migration’s relevance to and impact on the achievements of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This section represents a systematic update of The Millennium Development Goals and Migration, a report published by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 2005. Since its publication, there has been a plethora of research looking at different migration and development issues, including, not least, the numerous background documents prepared for UNDP’s Human Development Report 2009: Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development. In looking at each MDG in turn, this section of the report considers the theoretical and, where the evidence is available, the empirical relationship between migration and development.

It is clear that the evidence is mixed and thus it becomes very apparent that we need to look beyond the question of whether migration impacts upon development and instead consider under which circumstances, and for whom, can migration support or hinder development. Additionally, if the MDGs are achieved, the state of development reached will have implications for human mobility.
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

**Target 1:** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day.

**Target 2:** Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

The discourse on migration and poverty is characterized by high complexity in terms of interlinkages, most of them positive. On the one hand, poverty is seen as the root cause of migration, since many migrate to improve their livelihoods. On the other hand, due to the high cost of migration, it is often the better-off (or at least not the poorest of the poor) who migrate and therefore the benefits of migration – primarily monetary and social remittances – might not reach the poorest of the poor. Additionally, poverty in itself is inherently complex, owing to its multidimensional nature. Thus, the impacts of migration on poverty are complex, context-specific and dynamic. Nevertheless, it is relatively undisputed that migration can help people out of poverty through different channels – primarily through remittances, the highly skilled, the diaspora and the act of moving itself.

At the micro level, remittances can serve as an additional income source for households, reducing poverty and improving the livelihood of migrant-sending households (Adams and Page, 2005; Brauw and Harigaya, 2007; Du et al., 2005; Kundu and Sarangi, 2007; Semyonov and Gorodzeisky, 2005; Shen et al., 2010). For example, Adams and Page (2005) found that a 10 per cent increase in per capita official international remittances leads to a 3.5 per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty. Studies show that remittances are used to invest in health and education, therefore fostering development in the long run (Adams, 2007; Ratha et al., 2011; Valero-Gil, 2008; World Bank, 2006). Even when remittances are used mainly for consumption, this can have positive multiplier effects, resulting in an increase in local economic activities, thus also benefitting non-migrant community members (de Haas, 2007). Reviewing the empirical evidence on internal migration, Housen et al. (2013) conclude that internal migration is also an important way out of poverty as internal remittances have great impact on the poorest households in countries of origin.

At the macro level, remittances can also have direct and indirect impacts on the economy of countries of origin as well as on the welfare of the population. The World Bank (2013a) estimated that the amount of remittance flows worldwide reached more than USD 529 billion in 2012. Developing countries
received USD 401 billion, and often remittance inflows to these countries far exceeded official development assistance.

For migrants themselves, migration can be developmental. Even though the largest gains are observed for people migrating from poorer to wealthier countries, migration to developing countries as well as internal migration can also have positive impacts (UNDP, 2009; IOM, 2013a).

Migration of the highly skilled can have a range of positive impacts such as remittances, technology and know-how transfer, and increased human capital in the case of return migration, which can counterbalance the negative effects associated with brain drain (Dumont and Lemaître, 2005).

Diasporas can contribute to poverty reduction through diaspora investment, transnational entrepreneurship, or the transfer of know-how and skills as well as making links with the destination country. Diaspora investment in the local economy can help to generate employment and provide greater economic stability, in particular in times when other investors might hesitate to invest due to economic or political instability (Nilsen and Riddle, 2010; Lowell and Gerova, 2004). Moreover, diaspora can have significant impact on trade flows, increasing imports and export in the long term. A well-known example is the involvement of the Indian diaspora in the United States, promoting outsourcing in the information technology (IT) sector (Arora and Gambardella, 2004). Diaspora organizations are actively engaged in the promotion of knowledge transfers and economic investments. Return of migrants who have gained knowledge, skills and financial resources that are lacking in the country of origin also foster the economic development in the country of origin (Stark, 2004). Diaspora philanthropy by hometown associations, faith-based groups, professional associations and diaspora foundations finance specific projects to advance human welfare in countries of origin, such as infrastructure improvements and building of schools and health-care centres (Newland et al., 2010).

Clemens and Pritchett (2008) use the novel indicator “income per natural” to highlight the developmental nature of mobility itself. Their argument is that “measuring economic progress as if migration is not a form of development leads to bizarre conclusions by making a line in the sand the only consideration” (423). In other words, while it is generally accepted that a migrant sending money home to the origin country has developmental impacts, it is rarely recognized that the income gains of moving may also have impacts. As their argumentation shows: “two of every five living Mexicans who have escaped poverty did so by leaving Mexico; for Haitians, it is four out of five” (423). Of course, one should
also consider that the cost of living may be higher in the destination country and that absolute income may not always be the best gauge of poverty, but in terms of reducing absolute poverty, migration clearly plays a role.

While the magnitude of the effect of remittances on poverty reduction has been questioned (Özden and Schiff, 2007), it is evident that migration does play and has played a role in progressions towards reaching the targets set by MDG 1.

Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education

Target 2A: By 2015, all children can complete a full course of primary schooling, girls and boys.

Migration can affect education and human capital formation in several ways. The prospect of migration can be an incentive to achieve either more or less education depending upon the payoff to education expected in the destination country. In addition, the effects of migration on children left behind can be either positive or negative. While it is assumed that the additional income through remittances is at least partly invested in education of children left behind, migration of one parent or both parents could also lead to a disruption in family life and therefore influences the child’s well-being and educational achievement in a negative way.

Regarding selectivity, the option for migration can be an incentive to achieve either more education (positive selection) or less education (negative selection) (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010). In general, empirical findings mostly draw on the analysis of Mexican migration to the United States. These studies conclude that the prospect of migration generally discourages education acquisition, particularly for boys, because the return to education in the United States is low (Ibarraran and Lubotsky, 2007; Fernández-Huertas, 2011; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010). Despite this, there is also evidence that the prospect of migration can encourage educational acquisition. A study of Beine et al. (2010) based on a sample of 127 developing countries showed that the prospect of migration can increase the motivation to invest in education and therefore promotes human capital formation in developing countries.

Migration can also have significant impacts on children left behind. Herein, again, there are mixed empirical findings. Many studies revealed that children left behind have higher school enrolment and better educational attainment (Arguillas and Williams, 2010; Dreby and Stutz, 2012; Mansuri, 2006; Nobles, 2011). Financial and social remittances are seen as major drivers for the
investment in education. For instance, a study of Adams (2005) comparing internal and international migrant households with non-migrant households found out that households receiving internal and international remittances spend 45 per cent and 58 per cent more, respectively, on education than do households with no remittances. In the case of the Philippines, a study of Yang (2008) revealed that remittances increase child schooling and educational expenditure, while child labour decreases. Similar results were observed in Ecuador, where remittances increased school enrolment and decreased incidence of child work, especially for girls and in rural areas (Calero et al., 2009). Apart from the reduced financial constraints through remittances, parental migration can also increase aspiration to obtain better education (Dreby and Stutz, 2012; Nobles, 2011). In the Philippines, Asis (2006) finds that migration of a parent can also increase the agency of children.

Yet, negative effects of migration are also sometimes witnessed due to the emotional cost of separation, thus leading to a disruption in schooling or lower educational attainment. Evidence from Latin America points out the risk of family breakdown, the adoption of risky behaviour, involvement in violence, and abuse of alcohol and drugs by adolescents left behind (D’Emilio et al., 2007). Some studies indicate that negative effects were observed in particular among younger children (Lu, 2012; Miluka and Dabalen, 2012; Frisancho Robles and Oropesa, 2011; Piotrowski and Paat, 2012) and if both parents migrate (Dreby and Stutz, 2012). Moreover, the absence of a parent can also increase child labour, both in the domestic and non-domestic spheres, if the children are obliged to fill the gap of the migrated household member (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010).

It seems that gender matters, with girls tending to benefit relatively more from parental migration than boys. Positive effects of migration on schooling for girls in comparison with boys were found in Mexico (Antman, 2012), the Philippines (Arguillas and Williams, 2010) and Pakistan (Mansuri, 2006), showing that migration can lead to reduced gender inequalities in access to education. Some studies also show that a mother’s migration has a positive effect on education, while a father’s migration seems to be either neutral or slightly negative (Dreby and Stutz, 2012; Piotrowski and Paat, 2012).

In general, individual, as well as household, characteristics such as income, age, gender and educational level seem to be important determinants whether migration has a negative or positive impact on children left behind. Moreover, quantity and quality of contacts and relationships might compensate for the physical absence of the parent. In addition, regional economic conditions, migrant networks, specific types of labour demand in the destination countries and the labour market situation in the country of origin might also influence the selectivity of migration.
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 3A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015:

- Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education
- Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector
- Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

In 2012, women represented 48 per cent of the international migrant stock (UN DESA, 2013a). Changing patterns of international migration have led to a feminization of international migration in recent years. While in the past women were mostly seen as passive actors following their husbands or other family members as dependants, changing immigration legislation, gender-selective demand for labour in the destination country, and changing gender relations in countries of origin have resulted in women migrating increasingly independently or as heads of families themselves (Carling, 2005).

In general, there are two major links between migration and female empowerment: the process of migration can itself be transformative and migration can lead to challenging of gender norms. An important caveat to reflect upon is the increasing recognition that the concept of gender involves both male and female roles in society and the relationship between these roles (Carling, 2005). Hence, men have recently been given more attention in the gender discourse.

Migration can positively affect the self-esteem, employment situation and human capital accumulation for women (Zontini, 2004). Migration can also change values and attitudes towards gender roles within households and society (Ghosh, 2009). Social remittances can transmit broader values and norms on gender equality such as higher age of marriage and a greater emphasis on girls’ schooling and therefore influence societal norms in the country of origin in the long run (Fargues, 2006).

In patriarchal societies, male migration can promote female empowerment, since women assume a functional role as head of the household in the absence of men (Deshingkar and Grimm, 2005). This often increases decision-making power and increases engagement in the public sphere outside the domestic domain (Chemali Khalaf, 2009). Particularly for poorer households, remittances can improve female well-being by providing an additional source of income (Gartaula et al., 2012).
While migration can offer new opportunities and roles for women, it can also involve additional duties, responsibilities and obligations, which results in greater burden and tremendous pressures, influencing the well-being of women in a negative way (Zontini, 2004). Moreover, the decision to send remittances and the usage of them is not a choice that women make always independently. Often, these are negotiated in a complex decision-making process among different members of the household, based on gender power relations (Wong, 2006; Kunz, 2008). So even if women experience new roles, these are not necessarily recognized by men and the society in general (Zontini, 2004). Deciding to migrate and presenting this within the bounds of traditional gender norms can further enforce these norms in the country of origin (Hofmann and Buckley, 2012; Nowak, 2009).

Migration often also contains more risk for women than for men. Women and girls account for about 75 per cent of the trafficking victims detected globally who face tremendous risk of exploitation in the domestic sector or the sex industry (UNODC, 2012). Often, migrant women, being both foreign and female, experience double discrimination in the labour market. This increases the risk of unemployment or informal employment and hinders their economic integration and empowerment in the destination country (IFP, 2003; Sundari, 2005).

Due to the feminization of migration, more attention has recently been given to the effect of migration on men and how this is interlinked with changing gender roles in migrant households. For example, studies have found that men left behind take over the role as caregiver and are more likely engaged in domestic activities, while women take over the role as breadwinner from abroad (King and Vullnetari, 2006; Hoang and Yeoh, 2011). The same can also be true for male migrants moving without their partner. This new experience has led, in some cases, to appreciation and respect for domestic work, which was traditionally performed by women (Pribilsky, 2004). While this, in the long run, could lead to changing gender roles and therefore women empowerment, these studies also acknowledge that men are often under tremendous pressure to behave in line with the locally accepted masculine ideals (Hoang and Yeoh, 2011). In the case of Mexico, it was also shown that the social pressure to “be a man” was one of the reasons for migration in order to provide for family needs. Those men who decided not to leave put on overstated displays of masculinity including bouts of drinking and domestic violence (Boehm, 2008). Thus, while migration could lead to changing gender roles, it could also manifest and reinforce the existing ones.
In general, in how far female migrants can benefit from migration seems influenced by the social, economic and cultural context in both the country of origin and the country of destination. While a favourable environment helping to foster incorporation might also lead to changing gender roles in the long run, experiences of discrimination and lack of integration can hinder them. The effects of migration on gender equality and female empowerment are thus context-specific, varying across different types of households and communities and shaped by cultural factors in both origin and destination countries (Schmalzbauer, 2009; Foroutan, 2009; Parrado and Flippen, 2005).

**Goal 4: Reduce child mortality**

**Target 1:** Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the mortality rate of children under five.

**Goal 5: Improve maternal health**

**Target 1:** Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.

**Target 2:** Achieve, by 2015, universal access to reproductive health.

Due to the interrelations between child mortality and maternal health, evidence relating to Goals 4 and 5 is considered in this section.

Migration is linked to health outcomes through monetary transfers and social remittances. Monetary remittances can increase access to health services and social remittances can improve health through the transfer of norms and values relating to hygiene, preventative health care and so forth. Theoretically, the very act of moving – both internally and internationally – can also be beneficial to reducing child mortality and improving maternal health (and other more general health indicators) if it enables women more access to better-quality health services. Conversely, however, it has been challenged for having negative impacts on children left behind.

Evidence has long shown that remittances can have positive impacts on health outcomes such as child mortality rates, low birth rates and other more general health outcomes (Frank and Hummer, 2002; Kanaiaupuni and Donato, 1999;) since the additional income allows recipients to access or spend more
on health-care services (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2011; Valero-Gil, 2008; Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 2006). In turn, this can have positive spillover effects for migrant and non-migrant households (Kanaiaupuni and Donato, 1999) by reducing the emergence and transmission of preventable diseases within a community (Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 2006). Remittances can also have indirect health benefits: for instance, increased expenditure on education has also been associated with greater life expectancy and lower child mortality rates (Zhunio, Vishwasrao and Chiang, 2012). A small caveat to note is that remittance recipients are often not from the poorest households (Chauvet, Gubert and Mesplé-Somps, 2008; Drabo and Ebeke, 2011) and that the use of remittances has been more associated with emergency situations rather than preventative care (Ponce, Olivié and Onofa, 2011).

Transfer of social remittances (norms, values and ideas that are passed on between migrants and non-migrants) can also have significant health impacts. These knowledge transfers have been linked to changed behaviours in relating to child and maternal health, hygiene and fertility (Kanaiaupuni and Donato, 1999; Hildebrandt et al., 2005a; Beine, Docquier and Schiff, 2008). The return flows of people and ideas to migrant-sending areas are also capable of reducing the rural–urban gap in health-seeking behaviour (Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 2006). “By raising expectations of health services while simultaneously encouraging and facilitating political and civic organizations, social and economic remittances have the potential to result in better health programs and infrastructure” (Frank and Hummer, 2002:761).

The effects of rural–urban (internal) migration on child mortality and maternal health received great attention during the 1980s and 1990s, especially in African countries, where outcomes were particularly poor. Rural–urban migration does improve child mortality rates; however, child mortality rates are still higher among urban migrants when compared with non-migrants. The factors that positively impact child mortality rates include greater access to health care and adaption to urban living arrangements regarding sanitary conditions, nutrition and the use of health-care facilities particularly as their length of stay increases (Amankwaa, Bavon and Nzansah, 2003; Brockerhoff, 1990; Brockerhoff, 1995; Islam and Azad, 2008). Several factors may hinder positive health outcomes for urban migrants, including difficulties in forming new social networks (Konseiga, Zulu and Yé, 2006), the fact that migrants often live in city peripheries and slums, where access to safe drinking water and hygienic toilet facilities is inadequate (Ssengonzi et al., 2002; Matthews et al., 2010), the continuation of village practices (Brockerhoff, 1995), and barriers to access to health services due to factors such as the lack of legal status, low socioeconomic situation, low education and lack of insurance (Shaokang, Zhenwei and Blas, 2002).
The impacts of international migration on child mortality and maternal health outcomes seem to be varied. While some studies find that migrants have better health outcomes than natives in the country of destination (Davis, Goldenring, McChesney and Medina, 1982; Page, 2004), others indicate the contrary (Bollini et al., 2009; Ziol-Guest and Kalil, 2012). The difference in results could be due to the migrant population being assessed, as well as to the characteristics of the country of destination. Unlike the case of rural–urban migration, these studies are not able to compare outcomes of migrants with those of non-migrants in the home countries. Furthermore, they are often based on hospital records, which do not provide enough background information on the mothers’ previous health status and context before migration.

Some of the factors that positively relate to better child mortality outcomes are the elevated social status that a migrant may have in the country of destination (Forna et al., 2003), as well as the healthy migrant effect, which refers to positive selection of migrants (Forna et al., 2003; Landale, Oropesa and Gorman, 2000). Additionally, the support some migrant women may have from family members also present in the destination country, advice from mothers and other female relatives, reduced use of tobacco and alcohol, and the role of religion have been shown to positively affect child health outcomes in the destination county (Page, 2004). Factors such as length of stay of the migrant in the destination country, access to health care, specific vulnerabilities of migrants and cultural differences have been differently correlated to health outcomes of migrant mothers and their children. It is therefore important to differentiate between groups of foreign-born women (Forna et al., 2003).

On the other hand, migration may impact negatively on health outcomes if it results in downward social mobility (Davis et al., 1982). Negative acculturation as a determinant for worse child and pregnancy outcomes as the length of stay in the destination country increases has been highlighted by a number of studies (Davis et al., 1982; Landale et al., 2000; Madan et al., 2006; Page, 2004). Although migration can lead to better access to and information on pregnancy and fertility care (Hawkins et al., 2008), a number of barriers exist for migrant women to effectively make use of these services, particularly relating to irregular legal status (Wolff et al., 2008; Ziol-Guest and Kalil, 2012) and loss of social networks due to migration (Ny et al., 2007). Undocumented women have shown higher rates of unintended pregnancies and delayed prenatal care, fewer use of preventive measures and higher exposure to violence during pregnancy (Wolff et al., 2008).
A final word regarding the impacts of migration itself on health outcomes relates to the impact on those left behind. Hildebrandt et al. (2005b) analysed the effect of Mexican migration to the United States on the health outcomes of children left behind and found that migration improves child health outcomes through lower infant mortality rates and higher birth weights. However, the study suggests that migration may have long-term negative effects on child health through the phenomenon of absent parents (Hildebrandt et al., 2005b). The evidence base on this is currently mixed, however, with some studies finding that migration can have a negative impact on the health of children where the migration experience is deemed to be unsuccessful (Yabiku et al., 2012) and others finding that there is no statistical association between the absence of a parent and the multidimensional well-being of children (Gassmann et al., 2013).

In discussions relating to the relationship between migration and the achievement of health-related development goals, it is impossible to ignore brain drain. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the shortage of health-care professionals – in part due to high levels of emigration – hinder the provision of health care (Bhargava and Docquier, 2008), which has spillover effects on health (Gerein, Green and Pearson, 2006). However, a more nuanced consideration of brain drain has emerged in recent years. While migration can exacerbate problems within the health-care system (Dumont, 2010), Clemens (2007) argues that “Africa's generally low staffing levels and poor public health conditions are the result of factors entirely unrelated to international movements of health professionals” and that that emigration has increased the production of health workers, not all of whom migrate. Strategies for better management and retention of health workforce in developing countries have been proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO), including the improvement of working conditions, the provision of better equipment, and the facilitation of professional development and training (Dumont, 2010).
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target 1: Halt and begin to reverse, by 2015, the spread of HIV.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target 2: Achieve universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS for all those who need it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target 3: Halt and begin to reverse, by 2015, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With increased globalization and mobility, individuals are becoming more connected through multiple links (Wilson, 2003). More countries are becoming origin and destination for a greater variety of individuals. This increases the challenges associated with the management and control of public health, particular regarding infectious diseases (Gushulak and MacPherson, 2004). “While migration is not a direct risk factor for HIV infection, there are economic, sociocultural and political factors in the migration process that make migrant workers particularly vulnerable” (UNDP, 2008:5). A study by UNDP examined HIV/AIDS vulnerability of women migrating from four countries in Asia to three host countries in the Arab States. Some of the factors that increase the vulnerabilities of women migrants to HIV include:

- Poor access to information and lack of preparation of migrants;
- Excessive recruitment fees and poor wages, which may lead migrant into debt traps and consequently into sexual exploitation;
- Abusive and exploitative working conditions, which lead women into cycles of poverty and vulnerability.

Additionally, UNDP and other international organizations such as Human Rights Watch highlight that when deporting HIV-positive migrants, the host country should take into account these migrants’ health and availability for care when in detention, and in the home country in case of deportation (Carballo and Nerukar, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2009; UNDP, 2008).

Furthermore, Vearey (2008), in a study about migration and HIV in South Africa, recommends that access to HIV testing, health-care counselling and anti-retroviral treatment for migrants regardless of their documentation status is an essential public health strategy. Not only do early detection and treatment reduce the burden on the public health system but also on communities and individuals. The author also stresses that particular groups of migrants should...
be the focus of intervention campaigns (Vearey, 2008). High-risk groups include older male travellers (Kramer et al., 2008), miners (Deane, Parkhurst and Johnston, 2010; Rees et al., 2010), truck drivers (Deane et al., 2010; Ramjee and Gouws, 2002) and commercial sex workers (Huda, 2006). Additionally, circular migration patterns may present simultaneous risks to both the origin and destination communities (Kramer et al., 2008; Rees et al., 2010).

These findings highlight the importance of future research on HIV and infectious diseases focusing on how different mobility patterns affect health outcomes (Carballo and Nerukar, 2001; Deane et al., 2010; Rees et al., 2010).

Although much of the literature focuses on HIV/AIDS, the spread of other infectious diseases (e.g. hepatitis, tuberculosis, malaria, Chagas disease) has been associated with migration patterns. Tuberculosis, for instance, has been found to affect particular groups of migrants. According to Carballo and Nerukar (2001), tuberculosis is a disease of poverty, and is therefore associated with highly vulnerable migrant groups. Factors that increase risk for the disease include poor housing and overcrowded conditions (Carballo and Nerukar, 2001).

The spread of mosquito-vectored diseases such as malaria (Conn et al., 2002; Cruz Marques, 1987; Martens and Hall, 2000; Prothero, 2001), Chagas disease (Schmunis, 2007) and dengue fever (Wilson, 2003) is also associated with changed mobility patterns of humans and animals, and larger habitat areas for disease vectors as a consequence of climate change (Martens and Hall, 2000; Prothero, 2001).

**Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability**

**Target 9:** Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources.

**Target 11:** By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers.

The relationship between migration and environmental sustainability is ambiguous, although since the 1990s it has been receiving increasing attention from researchers. It is generally assumed that environmental change will increase migration, particularly from those areas most at risk of climate-related shocks such as drought, desertification or flooding. At the same time, migration can be a factor impacting the environment, although less is known about this. Thus, again, a complex and multifaceted relationship exists between migration and the environment.
Since the 1990s there has been increasing recognition that environmental change can have an impact on migration flows (Myers, 2002; Stern, 2008). Due to criticisms relating to weak empirical evidence, a growing body of studies and research analysing the impact of environmental change on migration has emerged.\(^1\) Recent debate is more nuanced and recognizes structural economic, political, social and demographic contexts as the main driver of migration. Environmental change is interlinked with these factors and therefore affects migration indirectly, through, for example, change in livelihoods or conflicts over resources (Black et al., 2011).

Several quantitative studies conducted at the country level confirm this multicausality, as it has been found that environmental variables appear as one of the several drivers of migration. In addition, migration is often not the only response to climate-related factors, as many people adopt adaption strategies (Gray and Mueller, 2012). For instance, a study analysing the effect on migration in the aftermath of the 14 April 2004 tornado in Bangladesh revealed that the disaster had no significant effect on outmigration (Paul, 2005). Confirming this, Henry et al. (2004) use retrospective longitudinal data to test the association between climate change and migration over a period of 30 years in Burkina Faso and find no association between decreasing rainfall and outmigration, although internal rural–rural migration is highest in areas with lower average rainfall. Other studies have also found evidence that environment-induced migration is generally short-distance migratory movement either within a country or to neighbouring countries (Massey et al., 2007; Dillon et al., 2011).

In conflict-affected areas, movement of people often happens spontaneously and in great numbers. Studies have identified negative environmental impacts due to population displacement in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malawi and Sudan (Hagenlocher et al., 2012; Allan, 1987; Jacobsen, 1997). Yet, it should be acknowledged that there is little evidence at the global level showing that refugees and internally displaced persons contribute significantly to environmental degradation.

In 2010, it was estimated that more than half of the world population lived in cities, and in 2012, around 32.7 per cent of the urban population in developing countries were slum-dwellers lacking basic access to clean water and sanitation as well as having poor structural quality of housing (UN-Habitat, 2013). Studies show that many slums host large numbers of internal and international migrants (Erulkar et al., 2006; Beguy et al., 2010). Compared with other groups, rural–urban migrants are often more vulnerable in terms of housing, health and income (Li et al., 2006; Lu, 2010; Khan and Kreamer, 2013). Thus, in order to achieve the targets of this goal, it seems important to give attention to the improvement of livelihood of migrant slum-dwellers.
Apart from these challenges, slums are also providing alternatives and new opportunities for migrants. They are affordable entry points and are often seen as areas of transition that, in the long run, can transform into formal settlements with better infrastructure. For instance, a study on migrant slum-dwellers in India finds that migrant well-being improves over time (Mitra, 2010). Slums may also serve as transit points for migrants seeking to embark on international migration (Owusu et al., 2008).
Part B: Global Partnerships

Part A of this report has provided an update of the evidence base relating to the relationship between migration and the current MDGs, and considered the various channels through which these impacts are felt. It is evident that de Haas’ (2010) call for more nuanced perspectives is supported by evidence alluding to both positive and negative impacts of migration on development. Nevertheless, it is also clear from the evidence that human mobility and development are intrinsically intertwined and that the potential developmental impacts of migration for sending, receiving and transit countries at various stages of development, and vice versa, are significant. Most other policy fields involving cross-border matters, such as climate change, international trade, finance and communicable diseases, have State-created cooperative mechanisms, primarily through the United Nations System, and are championed for their development impacts. Global migration governance is far more fragmented and yet its impacts are theoretically of equal or greater magnitude. There is, therefore, a clear case for including migration in the post-2015 development agenda.

Table 1, reproduced from Buil and Siegel (2013), neatly summarizes some of the key developmental implications – both positive and negative – of migration for sending and receiving countries at the micro, meso and macro levels, many of which have been discussed in Part A.
### Table 1: Developmental implications of migration for sending and receiving countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sending countries</th>
<th>Receiving countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Positive**     | • Remittances can increase households’ resources (which can have positive effects on health and education).  
                    • Migration can increase the incentive to invest in education, thus resulting in brain gain.  
                    • Migration can lead to female empowerment.  | • Multicultural diversity brings people into contact with new foods, traditions and ideas. |
| **Micro**        | • Inequality among individuals and households can be reduced.  
                    • Transfer of cultural, social and political norms can lead to positive changes.  
                    • Entrepreneurship and investments through connections with migrants and migrant networks can have positive developmental implications (for example, through collective remittances). | • Migrants can increase productivity in communities. Productivity has been found to be higher in culturally diverse cities. |
| **Meso**         | • Returnees bring new knowledge and skills and thus migration can lead to brain gain.  
                    • The networks and professional connections, capital and entrepreneurial skills of returnees can contribute to economic development of the origin country.  
                    • Remittances can improve a country’s creditworthiness and are a stable source of external funding.  
                    • Migration can reduce unemployment rates.  
                    • Migration can reduce wage and income disparities between sending and receiving countries.  
                    • Diasporas may have positive impact on conflict and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation processes in origin countries. | • Immigrants help to reduce labour shortages and deal with demographic changes: migrants do the jobs that nationals are not able or willing to do.  
                    • Migrants can contribute to the economy though creation of businesses: can generate jobs, promote innovation and increase trade with origin countries. |
| **Macro**        | • Returnees bring new knowledge and skills and thus migration can lead to brain gain.  
                    • The networks and professional connections, capital and entrepreneurial skills of returnees can contribute to economic development of the origin country.  
                    • Remittances can improve a country’s creditworthiness and are a stable source of external funding.  
                    • Migration can reduce unemployment rates.  
                    • Migration can reduce wage and income disparities between sending and receiving countries.  
                    • Diasporas may have positive impact on conflict and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation processes in origin countries. | • Immigrants help to reduce labour shortages and deal with demographic changes: migrants do the jobs that nationals are not able or willing to do.  
                    • Migrants can contribute to the economy though creation of businesses: can generate jobs, promote innovation and increase trade with origin countries. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sending countries</th>
<th>Receiving countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Micro**      | • The absence of carers can have negative implications for household members left behind, especially for the more vulnerable (children and the elderly).  
• If men leave, it can increase women's work burden. | • Local fears about the impact of immigration on their country may lead to xenophobic attitudes, which can have negative implications for immigrants and society as a whole. |
| **Meso**       | • Large-scale emigration of healthy, economically productive adults and the absence of individual carers can affect the functioning of communities. | • Residential segregation could limit the interactions between members of different communities, and immigrants may be forced by social and economic factors to reside in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. |
| **Macro**      | • Migration can lead to brain drain and this is especially pervasive for small nations.  
• Brain waste can occur if people cannot or do not leave a country where there is a surplus of people with their skills, or if migrants cannot find employment in line with their skills.  
• Remittances can result in exchange-rate appreciation and lower export competitiveness (Dutch disease).  
• Remittances can decrease labour participation by reducing the incentive to work. | • Migration can lead to brain drain and this is especially pervasive for small nations.  
• Brain waste can occur if people cannot or do not leave a country where there is a surplus of people with their skills, or if migrants cannot find employment in line with their skills.  
• Remittances can result in exchange-rate appreciation and lower export competitiveness (Dutch disease).  
• Remittances can decrease labour participation by reducing the incentive to work. |

Source: Adapted from Buil and Siegel (2013).
Note: This table provides an indication of the main developmental implications of migration and is not an exhaustive list.

The breadth of the potential impacts of migration provides a clear indication for the logic of including migration in the post-2015 development agenda. Part B takes this observation a step further by first presenting argumentation for why migration should be a component of the post-2015 development agenda. Following this, two ways in which migration could be incorporated into the post-2015 development agenda are considered: (1) situating migration alongside other “enablers” of migration, such as trade, in a reformulated version of MDG 8 on global partnerships; and (2) through the inclusion of migration-related...
Part B: Global Partnerships

Indicators as a cross-cutting theme in the new development goals. Given that migration is a politicized field – the control of which is often described as the “last bastion of state sovereignty” (Kunz et al., 2011:1) – reaching global agreement on migration is clearly tricky, yet not impossible. Therefore, when examining whether and how to incorporate migration into the post-2015 development agenda, political feasibility should be considered.

The significance of human mobility

There are a number of reasons why migration should be reflected in the post-2015 development agenda.

Sheer numbers

Although the number of migrants as a proportion of the world’s population has remained stable (at around 3% of the global population), due to exponential population growth, the number of migrants in absolute terms has increased. There are currently around 232 million migrants in the world (UN DESA, 2013b). By 2030, it is estimated that there could be 30 million more international migrants sending an additional USD 60 billion in remittances (UN DESA, 2013a).

In 2010, it was estimated that more than half of the world population lived in cities and it is assumed that this trend will continue over the next decades as a result of natural population growth, and also due to internal and international migration. According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Population Division, the population living in urban areas will increase by 2.6 billion from 3.6 billion in 2011 to 6.3 billion 2050 (United Nations, 2012). Most of this growth is expected to happen in cities and towns of the lesser developed regions, like Asia, Africa and Latin America. Furthermore, it was estimated that in 2012, 32.7 per cent of the urban population in developing countries were slum-dwellers lacking basic access to clean water and sanitation as well as having poor structural quality of housing (UN-Habitat, 2013). This trend confronts policymakers with both challenges and opportunities.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2013) estimated the number of refugees at 10.4 million in 2011, with developing countries hosting 80 per cent of the global refugee population. Additionally, 15.5 million internally displaced persons, including the 2.9 million people who were newly displaced in 2011, received assistance from UNHCR.
When internal migration is included, the numbers vastly increase, although estimates vary and the evidence base is imperfect. Nevertheless, estimates for China at the beginning of the 2000s placed the number of internal migrants at 140 million (Ping and Shaohua, 2005, in Black and Skeldon, 2009) and similar estimates for India for 1991 placed the figure at 220–230 million (Black and Skeldon, 2009). These estimates alone outnumber current international migrants. It is also argued that the developmental impacts of internal migration are much greater, and the evidence base better (Black and Skeldon, 2009); therefore, internal migration should be reflected in any migration indicators developed for the post-2015 development agenda.

In conclusion, the scale of migration makes migration a topic worthy of attention in development debates.

Global scope

It has been frequently argued that international migration represents “one of the most obvious contemporary manifestations of globalization” (Betts, 2011:1). Migration does not just affect destination countries. Czaika and de Haas (2013) highlight the globalization of migration flows in which migrants from a growing number of origin countries are moving towards a decreasing number of destination countries. Although a simplification of a qualitatively much more complex phenomenon, this observation means that the impacts of migration – whether positive or negative – are felt by an increasing number of origin countries, who also have an interest in how migration is “governed”.

Remittances

In 2012, recorded remittances to developing countries were about USD 401 billion and were expected to grow by an average of 8.8 per cent per year from 2013 to 2015 to approximately USD 515 billion in 2015 (World Bank, 2013b). Since 1996, global remittance flows have been larger than global overseas development aid. It is likely that remittance flows were larger than development aid before 1996, however, as much of the growth in remittances is commonly attributed to better monitoring and data collection (Black and Skeldon, 2009). Remittances are also the largest global source of foreign exchange (Hansen et al., 2011).

Beyond the numbers, it is an uncontested fact that remittances can reduce poverty at the individual and household levels, making migration a key enabler of achieving development goals on poverty reduction. We know that many people
escape poverty through the very act of moving (Clemens and Pritchett, 2008). Additionally, migrants often send remittances back to relatives and friends left behind which, for many recipients, allows them to also escape poverty. There is clear evidence that remittances have helped towards the achievement of other MDGs such as access to education, safe water, sanitation and health care (World Bank, 2013c).

On a macro level, remittances represent a stable source of external finance and might even increase when the recipient economy suffers a downturn, natural disaster, or political conflict, because migrants may send more funds during times of hardship to help their families and friends. Due to their stability, remittances can improve creditworthiness and thereby enhance a country’s access to international capital markets. In addition, through remittances, countries are able to raise external and long-term financing. Due to their often positive effect of on education, health and investment, remittances could also impact economic growth in the long run (World Bank, 2006).

Knowledge transfer

Knowledge is widely acknowledged to be a key contributor to the development of modern economies and yet the role of migration in the transfer of knowledge is often understated (Williams, 2007). The case of India is a good example here, demonstrating that “when conditions are right, skilled migrants are able to generate symbiotic networks of investment, trade, technology transfer, and skill acquisition that increase the productivity in the home country while extending the global technology frontier and lowering the cost of products used by billions of people worldwide” (Goldin, Reinert and Beath, 2006:175–176). Thus, when considering enablers of development, migration should also be acknowledged for the role it plays in the transfer of technology.

Magnitude of potential impact on development

There is also a theoretical interest in the impacts that migration can have on development. Although relatively few researchers have sought to understand the impact of emigration on development, some theorists have attempted to model the scenario in which barriers to labour mobility (or trade or capital flows) are removed. Table 2, recreated from the work of Michael Clemens (2011),
highlights the magnitude of migration’s potential impact on development. Clemens (2011:85) describes the mobility-related estimates as “gasp-inducing numbers” while acknowledging that estimates rest on model assumptions that simplify the complex nature of human mobility. Nevertheless, this is also true for models estimating the developmental impact of eliminating barriers to the transfer of goods or capital.

Table 2: Efficiency gains from elimination of international barriers (% of world GDP)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Efficiency gains from elimination of international barriers (% of world GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goldin, Knudsen and van der Mensbrugghe (1993)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dessus, Fukasaku and Safadi (1999)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson, Francois, Hertel, Hoekman and Martin (2000)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2001)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank (2001)</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anderson and Martin (2005)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hertel and Keeney (2006)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Efficiency gains from elimination of international barriers (% of world GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caselli and Feyrer (2007)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Efficiency gains from elimination of international barriers (% of world GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton and Whalley (1984)</td>
<td>147.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton and Whalley (1984)</td>
<td>96.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iregui (2005)</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klein and Ventura (2007)</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Clemens, 2011.

Accepting that unrestricted mobility, at least at a global level, is politically unfeasible, it is also worth noting that even modest changes to migration rates have the potential to have significant economic benefits. Walmsey and Winters (2005) estimate that “by increasing developed economies’ quota on inward movements of both skilled and unskilled labour by just 3 per cent of their labour forces, world welfare would rise by USD 156 billion – about 0.6 per cent of world income” (690) and one and a half times the expected gain from full trade liberalization in goods and services. The estimate itself is not the most important point here, but, rather, that increased mobility – or decreased
barriers to mobility – can have significant financial benefits for individuals and societies (Skeldon, 2013).

**Human trafficking, irregular migration and the migration industry**

There is an increasing recognition that not all flows can be regulated by national governments alone. A case in point here is the flow of clandestine migrants from Mexico to the United States, where it is estimated that half as many migrants enter the country either irregularly or through overstay visas as those who enter through formal channels\(^2\) (Passel and Cohn, 2008, in Hansen et al., 2011). Irregular migration, however, is generally the by-product of a mismatch between the demand for labour and the opportunities available to migrate through formal channels. Where formal opportunities are not available, migrants may resort to informal ways of entering countries – often facilitated by smugglers. This makes them vulnerable to being exploited, either through the high costs of migrating in this fashion, or at risk of being trafficked. The boundaries between human smuggling and human trafficking are often unclear.

Thus, by focusing attention on better matching supply and demand – a process that requires input from more than one country – irregular migration can be largely addressed. This is arguably the rationale behind the European Mobility Partnerships in which access to labour markets within the European Union is agreed upon based on commitments to tackle clandestine migration towards the European Union (Hansen et al., 2011). Thus, where converging interests come together, partnership working becomes a rational decision for States.

**Global migration governance**

This section considers how migration could be situated alongside other “enablers” of development, such as trade in a reformulated version of MDG 8 on global partnerships. From a largely economic perspective, the logic of global governance is to address market imperfections, to minimize impacts of negative externalities and to achieve economies of scale (Betts, 2011). It is evident that the policy decisions of one country in the area of migration have implications for another. Thus, there is normative rationale for including migration in debates about global partnerships in the post-2015 development agenda: “The existence of policy interdependence and externalities resulting from policy discussions represents a normative basis for developing institutionalized cooperation insofar as it results in the choices that are made leading to outcomes that are
sub-optimal in comparison to those that would have maximised the aggregate welfare of society” (Betts, 2011:25).

The global governance of migration can be “loosely defined as the creation of a more or less formal set of norms and rules to regulate the behaviour of states with respect to the movement of people across international borders” (Papademetriou, 2011:1).

Nevertheless, feasibility should ground recommendations regarding the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 development agenda under a newly formulated goal on global partnerships: “The very nature of transnational migration demands international cooperation and shared responsibility. Yet, the reality is that most states have been unwilling to commit fully to the principle of international cooperation in the area of international migration...” (GCIM, 2005:67). Thus, in this section we argue for a model of global migration governance that builds on the current system of migration governance, which, while often criticized for being absent, does exist on different layers (unilateral, bilateral, regional, multilateral) and varies by category of migration – described by Kunz et al. (2011) as “islands of migration governance” (refugees, labour migrants, student migration and so forth). For example, while a system for refugees is well defined through the clear mandate of UNHCR as head agency and international law, other areas, such as labour migration, are less well defined.

Thus, this section primarily focuses on understanding what global migration currently looks like in order to make pragmatic suggestions as to where the conversation about the role of migration in the post-2015 development agenda should go, in terms of both location (i.e. at the regional level) and thematically (i.e. labour migration). In order to achieve this, we first briefly consider the development of global migration.

In 2002, the Doyle Report considered whether there should be a UN agency for migration. Different scenarios were explored, but the idea was ultimately shelved due to feasibility issues. Nevertheless, migration and development were placed very clearly on the UN agenda, as evidenced in subsequent developments in the migration and development governance landscape. The creation of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) (2003–2005), the appointment of a Special Representative on Migration and Development (2006), the convening of the High-level Dialogue on Migration and Development (2006), and the creation of the more informal Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) (2007) all testify to an ongoing debate about the global governance of migration (Betts, 2011). However, it was the Berne Initiative (2001) that substantiated the potential role of partnerships in global migration governance most notably stated in the International Agenda for
Migration Management (IAMM): “To work effectively together in partnership to manage migration and to reduce its negative impacts and maximise its beneficial impacts” (IAMM, 2004, in Kunz et al., 2011:5). This IAMM was agreed upon by 100 participating governments at the Berne Initiative’s second conference in October 2004 (which is significant when contrasted to the 32 governments participating in GCIM) (Kunz et al., 2011).

The lack of a multilateral framework for the governance of international migration is frequently acknowledged and often lamented. This has led many authors to muse about how best to develop a global system for migration governance as seen in other fields frequently acknowledged to be enablers of development, such as trade. Betts (2011) develops the idea of “architecture of global migration governance” although there is no clear agreement that the multilateral governance of migration is desirable.

Betts (2011) presents three potential options for the future global governance of migration:

- Informal network governance
- Formal multilateral governance
- Coherent pluralism

**Informal network governance** involves “small coalitions of the willing” (Betts, 2011:321) and builds on the regional consultative processes (RCPs) – the current modus operandi of global migration governance. It is criticized for supporting forum shopping and the creation of distinct groups of countries, which may serve to reinforce existing power asymmetries. However, it is also argued to be a potentially good place to start when approaching a global partnership on migration governance.

**Formal multilateral governance** would involve the appointment of an institute – most likely through the United Nations System – that centres work on migration and addresses current fragmentation evident in governance of different areas of migration.³ While this is described as unrealistic, Betts (2011) also points to the fact that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was developed in the post-war era, but that it was only after the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 1990s that States really started to act in this area. When considering that migration governance only really started to be discussed at the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, it is a relatively new kid on the block and thus it is not unthinkable that such an institution could be established in the future.
The final option, **coherent pluralism**, is described as the best option currently available and builds on the existing state of affairs in the governance of migration globally. The establishment of the Global Migration Group, the GFMD and inter-RCP meetings are all examples of an increasing acknowledgement of the need to improve coordination and communication between actors working at different levels on migration issues.

Buil and Siegel (2013) evaluate options for global migration governance specifically relating to labour migration, which account for the majority of migration flows when broadly defined as migration for the purpose of work. They critically discuss six options:

1. **Official UN Multilateralism** through the creation of a World Migration Organization;
2. **Official UN Multilateralism** through the designation of a lead UN agency from among existing institutions;
3. Development of the **Global Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS)**;
4. Building on the proposal of Straubhaar (2000) to develop a **Global Agreement on the Movements of People (GAMP)**;
5. **Informal network governance** through the GFMD;
6. **Coherent pluralism**, in which different types of migration are managed under different governance structures (closely related to the current observed reality of a strong governance structure of refugees under UNHCR but weak governance structures in other areas such as irregular migration).

Buil and Siegel (2013) draw similar conclusions to Betts’ (2011). While they agree that the appointment of a global body may be an efficient way of bringing more coherence to migration governance, they also acknowledge that the political feasibility of such an option is low. Therefore, they argue that a combination of coherent pluralism and informal network governance is the most feasible way of improving global migration governance in the current political climate.

Authors such as Hansen et al. (2011) and Kunz et al. (2011) approach the argument from slightly different perspectives with the former interested in understanding “the conditions under which states in the international system cooperate to manage the flow of voluntary migrants across international
Differing views of the most appropriate form of migration governance exist. For example, Hansen et al. (2011) argue that partnerships will only form if there is a functional reason for them to do so and that “there is nothing natural or inevitable about cooperation” (220). Thus, they argue that informal cooperation mechanisms will be the most likely to work. Betts (2011), however, argues that informal network governance, characterized by RCPs, is undesirable and instead argues in favour of “coherent pluralism” in which there is some sort of multilateral architecture that brings together the currently fragmented forms of migration governance.

Commonalities between the differing approaches include an acknowledgement that governance of migration occurs at different levels (unilateral, bilateral, transregional, multilateral) and varies depending on the type of migration (i.e. refugee, labour, tourist). Thus, “despite the absence of an international migration regime, international migration today is regulated through a multilayered architecture” (Kunz et al., 2011:15–16). Figure 1 provides a non-exhaustive overview of some of the key elements of the current landscape governing migration.

Figure 1: Multilayered migration governance

| Multilateral | For example, G8 recommendations on remittances, international refugee regime, international human rights law, international labour law and guidelines on internally displaced persons |
| Transregional | For example, RCPs, regional economic communities and European Union mobility partnerships |
| Bilateral | For example, Swiss migration partnerships and memorandums of agreement on migration |
| Unilateral | State policy |

Source: Prepared by authors.
In general, unilateral governance is the go-to option for most States. However, where there is a functional reason for engaging another partner, bilateral and, increasingly, transregional approaches are taken (Hansen et al., 2011). For some issues, notably the refugee regime, a multilateral framework does exist. Additionally, migration is implicitly governed by other “issue areas” such as trade, labour law and maritime law. For example, the mobility of the highly skilled is governed to an extent by the GATS Mode 4; remittances, by security policy; environmental migration, by human rights legislation; and refugees, by the principle of non-refoulement. In fact, some international lawyers have gone as far as to say that “one may conceive of the existence of international migration law (IML) based on...pre-existing bodies of law” (Cholewinski et al., 2007, in Betts, 2011:15).

However, for the most part, a global framework seems to be politically unfeasible. This is partly due to regional differences in interest in and perceptions of migration, which have clear implications for reaching global agreements. For example, there is no word for migration in Arabic that is devoid of the connotation of settlement and permanence. Yet, this point has been relatively neglected both by the international relations literature on migration, as well as in migration studies more generally (Betts, 2011).

Thus, it has been argued that it is at the bilateral and transregional levels that efforts leading towards any form of global governance of migration should focus: “Given the difficulty of achieving agreements on the above development issues, including migration, at the global level, a shift towards approaches at the regional level may provide an interim strategy. Within regions, a greater commonality of interest is likely to exist so that a ‘regional compact among states’ becomes realistic” (Skeldon, 2013:8).

RCPs, in particular, are identified as being a key component of migration management (UN DESA, 2004). RCPs are “process-oriented tools to foster dialogue and information exchange on migration issues among interdependent countries (Kunz et al., 2011:11). They have three key features: they are only about migration; they are informal and non-binding; and they are not normally linked with formal institutions (Hansen et al., 2011). RCPs are also said to have developed against the backdrop of failed attempts to get ratification for global conventions (e.g. for the UN convention in 1990) (Hansen et al., 2011). At this stage, therefore, a regional approach to global partnerships may be a logical precursor to global agreements (Skeldon, 2013) and a better way of approaching a revamped global partnership goal for migration in the long term.
Measuring the impacts of migration

Another option for incorporating migration into the post-2015 development agenda is the inclusion of migration-related indicators for the relevant development goals. In doing so, migration can be acknowledged as an enabler of development and as a cross-cutting issue that has implications for multiple development goals, as demonstrated in Part A.

This approach demands indicators that are measurable, and this requires good quality data. It is well recognized that migration data is not always robust. It is clear that basic numbers on migration indicators expected to influence development, such as migrant skill levels, return volumes, circularity and remittances, are essential in guiding governments interested in maximizing the development impacts on origin countries. However, it is also necessary to have linkable data on contextual factors such as health and education to be able to better monitor the relationship between migration and development over time and place. A clear recommendation, to which most countries would probably agree, would be the improvement of migration-related data.

While it should be acknowledged that we do not yet know what the post-2015 development agenda will look like, IOM (2013b) have developed a set of indicators based on the 12 indicative goals and 54 indicators proposed by the United Nations for the post-2015 development agenda (United Nations, 2013). The focus of these indicators is on three areas: (1) facilitation of movement; (2) respect for rights; and (3) engagement of migrants and diasporas. From our discussions, it is clear that migration affects and is affected by many of these areas. As with the MDGs, there are incidents of dual causality, whereby migration may both contribute towards the achievement of a target and yet simultaneously also be affected by their achievement. Additionally, indicators are frequently intertwined when a migration lens is applied. Table 4 presents an overview of some suggested migration-related indicators that have potential to be included as part of the measurement framework for the achievement of goals set in the post-2015 development agenda. The table includes suggested data sources for measuring the achievement of indicators as well as comments relating to each indicator where relevant.
A few key guiding principles were kept in mind when developing these indicators:

• The focus was on creating enabling environments and increasing choices. If people choose to migrate, then they should be able to do so in a safe manner and have access to a full set of rights.

• The principle of “leave no one behind” (United Nations, 2013) is particularly applicable to migrants and thus it is not always necessary to specify migration-related indicators providing that the universality of indicators is emphasized.

• Indicators should apply to internal and international migration.

• Indicators need to be measurable, and where this is not the case, steps to improve data collection should be considered. Irrespective of whether migration is included in the post-2015 development agenda, better data is needed to understand the linkages between migration and development (Black and Skeldon, 2009; Sturge et al., 2014).
### Table 3: Suggested migration indicators for the post-2015 development agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrative goal</th>
<th>Suggested target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. End poverty</strong></td>
<td>a. Bring the number of people living on less than USD 1.25 per day to zero and reduce by x per cent the share of people living below their country’s 2015 national poverty line.</td>
<td>Cost of remittance transfers reduced to 5 per cent in all remittance corridors.</td>
<td>Remittance Cost Data from the World Bank and other websites is recommended.</td>
<td>It is undisputed that remittances do a lot to alleviate monetary poverty. Reducing the costs of transfer can serve to increase the benefits accrued to migrants and their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number or percentage of people having access to bank accounts – indicator on access to financial services.</td>
<td>Data from the World Bank is suggested.</td>
<td>Not specifically a migration indicator but can be migration-related. This is a more inclusive indicator that will also have positive effects for migrants (i.e. through services for transmitting remittances, through formal channels which can increase access to foreign currency and create multiplier effects and the like).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of countries participating in regional and bilateral mobility agreements (increased rights to mobility).</td>
<td>Data is currently not available, but it is easy to collect.</td>
<td>Omitting trade-in services agreements because this aspect is the least followed within GATS Mode 4. Also, the scope should be broadened from least developed countries. Can be easily collected, but the development of a central database (perhaps incorporated into NATLEX of the International Labour Organization (ILO)) would be useful. This could also be incorporated into the IOM Migration Profiles. This indicator could also be moved to illustrative goal 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of people who have the right to choose to migrate: a) within a region; or b) globally.</td>
<td>The data for this could come from bilateral migration matrices or migration stock databases. Then look at the number of migration corridors – bilaterally and regionally – that allow for free movement.</td>
<td>It may be interesting to look at this by skill level (i.e. agreements to facilitate the mobility of the highly skilled are more politically feasible than those for the low-skilled – despite both being necessary). The indicator could be the number of people with tertiary education who have the right to choose to migrate through mobility agreements. This indicator could also be moved to illustrative goal 12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative goal</td>
<td>Suggested target</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. End poverty</td>
<td>b. Increase by x percent the share of women and men, communities and businesses with secure rights to own land, property and other assets.</td>
<td>Number or percentage of adults having access to loans or financing.</td>
<td>World Bank Data on Financial Access is recommended.</td>
<td>This could be incorporated into the IOM Migration Profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number or percentage of adults having the right to own property in destination countries.</td>
<td>The easiest way to assess this would be to use the legal right to own property per migrant category (for example, it may only apply to migrants from within the same region based on a regional agreement). Using migrant stock data, the percentage of adults having the right to own property can then be computed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Cover x percent of poor and vulnerable people with social protection systems.</td>
<td>Number of migrants covered by bilateral agreements ensuring: a) portability of pensions; and b) access to unemployment insurance.</td>
<td>List all countries with bilateral agreements for pension portability and then use migration stock data to estimate the number of people who are covered by agreements relating to the portability of pensions. These are people with access to unemployment insurance in the destination country.</td>
<td>This could be incorporated into the IOM Migration Profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Build resilience and reduce deaths from natural disasters by x percent.</td>
<td>Taking mobility into account in planning for disasters (in low-elevation coastal zones and other climate-vulnerable zones).</td>
<td>Data is about whether migration is taken into account or not in risk assessments.</td>
<td>Data is easy to collect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Taking mobility into account in disaster risk reduction strategies.</td>
<td>Data is about whether migration is taken into account or not in risk assessments.</td>
<td>Data is easy to collect.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative goal</td>
<td>Suggested target</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Empower girls and women, and achieve gender equality</td>
<td>a. Prevent and eliminate all forms of violence against women.</td>
<td>Reduced sex trafficking by x per cent.</td>
<td>Currently, data on trafficking is very much focused on the prosecution side and thus this is an area where better data collection, monitoring or definitions would need to be explored.</td>
<td>For this, we need a baseline. Reducing a phenomenon requires a baseline, and human trafficking data is rife with problems. Ideally, we would set it to zero, but this is not necessarily achievable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced forced marriage by x per cent.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced forced labour among women by x per cent.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Eliminate discrimination against women in political, economic and public life</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased number of countries ratifying C189.</td>
<td>NORMLEX database of the ILO.</td>
<td>These statistics could be disaggregated into migrant-sending, migrant-receiving and transit countries in order to check the types of countries indicating their support for migrant-relevant instruments. For example, if a primarily sending country, such as the Philippines, ratifies an international convention, this is likely to have less impact on improving the conditions for migrants than its ratification by a key destination country, such as Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative goal</td>
<td>Suggested target</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Provide quality education and lifelong learning</td>
<td>a-c</td>
<td>See Comments</td>
<td>See Comments.</td>
<td>For 3a-c, a migration-specific indicator is not specifically needed since this relates very much to the poverty indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Increase the number of young and adult women and men with the skills needed for work, including technical and vocational, by x per cent.</td>
<td>Number of people going through temporary return programmes for the purpose of knowledge transfer.</td>
<td>This data could be collected from different organizations focused on return programmes, such as IOM and GIZ.</td>
<td>This would not include virtual returns, which can also facilitate knowledge transfer. This could also be included in the IOM Country Profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reduced barriers to migration for study.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of countries that grant migrants, regardless of their status, equal access to preventative and curative health services.</td>
<td>This can be disaggregated to also include the percentage of migrants in a country who have access to health care (including those with irregular status).</td>
<td>This measures the legal situation for migrants, although migrants may face other issues in access to health care, such as language, and thus further indicators may be required. This applies in general to indicators related to access to health care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Number of countries with systems in place to ensure sharing of medical records across borders.</td>
<td>Data is currently not available, but it is easy to collect.</td>
<td>This may be problematic in terms of capacity, as many countries struggle to transfer internally, let alone internationally. This could be incorporated into the IOM Migration Profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ensure healthy lives</td>
<td>e. Reduce the burden of disease from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, neglected tropical diseases and priority non-communicable diseases.</td>
<td>Number of countries that grant migrants, regardless of their status, equal access to preventative and curative health services.</td>
<td>This can be disaggregated to also include the percentage of migrants in a country who have access to health care (including those with irregular status).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative goal</td>
<td>Suggested target</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ensure food security and good nutrition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Since this may be achieved through other targets, a specific migration indicator is not necessary, as it again goes back to the poverty indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Achieve universal access to water and sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Since this may be achieved through other targets, a specific migration indicator is not necessary, as it again goes back to the poverty indicators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Secure sustainable energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A specific migration indicator is not necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Create jobs, sustainable livelihoods and equitable growth</td>
<td>8a. Increase the number of good and decent jobs and livelihoods by x per cent.</td>
<td>Number or percentage of adults having the right to establish businesses in destination countries.</td>
<td>The easiest way to assess this would be to use the legal right to establish a business. Using migrant stock data, the percentage of migrants having the right to put up a business within a country can then be computed.</td>
<td>This could be incorporated into the IOM Migration Profiles. This would also relate to other indicators such as financial access (universal).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8b. Decrease the number of young people who are out of school, unemployed or not receiving training by x per cent.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8c. Strengthen productive capacity by providing universal access to financial services and infrastructure such as transportation and information and communications technology.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8d. Increase new start-ups by x per cent and value added from new products by y per cent by creating an enabling business environment and boosting entrepreneurship.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X number of successful matches.</td>
<td>As above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Data should include monitoring the number of matches that are made.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative goal</td>
<td>Suggested target</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Manage natural resource assets sustainably</td>
<td>f. Prevent and eliminate all forms of human trafficking, especially trafficking in women and children (new proposed indicator by IOM, 2013b).</td>
<td>Ratio of prosecutions related to human trafficking violations.</td>
<td>This could be calculated through crime statistics, by looking at the ratio between human trafficking prosecutions and the number of reports of human trafficking.</td>
<td>A specific migration indicator is not necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Ensure good governance and effective institutions</td>
<td>g. Reduce incidences of irregularity and statelessness by x per cent.</td>
<td>Reduced number of victims of trafficking by x per cent.</td>
<td>Refer to previous indicator.</td>
<td>A target on this would need to be established. Ultimately, the goal would be to increase the prosecution rate of human traffickers. Establishing an acceptable ratio would require further investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. Prevent and eliminate all forms of human trafficking, especially trafficking in women and children (new proposed indicator by IOM, 2013b).

This could be calculated through crime statistics, by looking at the ratio between human trafficking prosecutions and the number of reports of human trafficking.

A target on this would need to be established. Ultimately, the goal would be to increase the prosecution rate of human traffickers. Establishing an acceptable ratio would require further investigation.

Reduced number of victims of trafficking by x per cent.

Refer to previous indicator.

As in illustrative goal 2, for this we need a baseline. Reducing a phenomenon requires a baseline, and human trafficking data is rife with problems. Ideally, we would set it to zero, but this is not necessarily achievable.

Reduce the number of persons without legal residence status by x per cent (whether stateless or irregular migrants).

Current estimates on irregular migration are “spongy” (Black and Skeldon, 2009) and so the data to investigate this indicator would need to be critically thought through.

It is important to be aware of how this reduction is operationalized (i.e. through deportations/amnesties). It is also then important to get baseline data. In many countries, there are now ways of calculating the number of irregular migrants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrative goal</th>
<th>Suggested target</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Ensure stable and peaceful societies</td>
<td>c. Stem the external stressors that lead to conflict including those related to organized crime.</td>
<td>Existence of frameworks for managing large-scale population displacement and burden sharing.</td>
<td>Data is currently not available, but it is easy to collect.</td>
<td>Based on the principle that displacement can also perpetuate conflict, particularly where the majority of flows are to neighbouring countries that may not have the resources to manage the displaced groups effectively, burden sharing is included. This could be incorporated into the IOM Country Profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. Enhance the capacity, professionalism and accountability of the security forces, police and judiciary.</td>
<td>Number of countries that have adopted codes of conduct and provide human rights training for border enforcement agencies and personnel.</td>
<td>Data is currently not available, but it is easy to collect.</td>
<td>This could be incorporated into the IOM Country Profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Create a global enabling environment and catalyse long-term finance</td>
<td>f. Promote collaboration on and access to science, technology, innovation and development data.</td>
<td>Number of countries with established expatriate or diaspora networks to facilitate the circulation of knowledge, ideas and technologies.</td>
<td>Data is currently not available, but it is easy to collect.</td>
<td>This could be incorporated into the IOM Country Profiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>g. Create cooperative agreements related to human mobility to enable safe, lawful, less costly migration across or within borders (new indicator by IOM, 2013b).</td>
<td>Number of people who have the right to choose to migrate: a) within a region; or b) globally.</td>
<td>The data for this could come from bilateral migration matrixes or migration stock databases. Then look at the number of migration corridors – bilaterally and regionally – that allow for free movement.</td>
<td>Suggest removing the number of people moving under these agreements as about the right to move and using the indicator developed for illustrative goal 1a – number of people who have the right to choose to migrate: a) within a region; or b) globally – as opposed to the original wording: number of arrangements for freedom of movement under regional integration frameworks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative goal</td>
<td>Suggested target</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Comments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Existence of provisions for the recognition of foreign qualifications.</strong></td>
<td>Data is currently not available, but it is easy to collect and compile into a database.</td>
<td>Disaggregate by profession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Number of agreements concerning the portability of benefits.</strong></td>
<td>See illustrative goal 1b.</td>
<td>See illustrative goal 1b.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Recruitment costs for migrants reduced to 0.</strong></td>
<td>Data is currently not available, but it is easy to collect and compile into a database.</td>
<td>The cost of recruitment is the main facet of ethical recruitment which can alleviate debt bondage and allow migrants to maximize the positive benefits of migration for their own development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Prepared by authors.*
Endnotes

1. For a detailed overview of the discourse on migration and environmental change, see Piguet (2013).
2. It is also estimated that there are 2.4 million irregular migrants in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taipei and Thailand alone (Chanda and Gopalan, 2011, in Hansen et al., 2011).
3. IOM would be a logical candidate for such a role, provided that a new mandate and adequate resources are given.
4. Indicative indicators relevant to migration are considered in this table. The indicator designations (1a, 2f, 3f) refer to the designations assigned in IOM (2013b). Some indicators have been omitted.
Bibliography

Adams, R.H.

Adams, R.H. and J. Page

Allan, N.J.R.

Amankwaa, A.A., A. Bavon and P.T. Nkansah

Amuedo-Dorantes, C. and S. Pozo
Antman, F.M.  

Arguillas, M.J.B. and L. Williams  

Arora, A. and A. Gambardella  
2004  The globalization of the software industry: Perspectives and opportunities for developed and developing countries. Working paper series no. 10538, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Asis, M.M.  

Beguy, D., P. Bocquier and E.M. Zulu  

Beine, M., F. Docquier and M. Schiff  
2008  International Migration, Transfers of Norms and Home Country Fertility. Département des Sciences Economiques, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

Beine, M., F. Docquier and H. Rapoport  

Betts, A. (ed.)  

Bhargava, A. and F. Docquier  
Black, R. et al.

Black, R. and R. Skeldon

Boehm, D.A.

Bollini, P. et al.

de Brauw, A. and T. Harigaya

Brockerhoff, M.

Buil, C. and M. Siegel

Calero, C., A.S. Bedi and R. Sparrow
Carballo, M. and A. Nerukar
2001 Migration, refugees, and health risks. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 7(Supplement 3):556.

Carling, J.
2005 Gender dimensions of international migration. Global Migration Perspectives research series, no. 35, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva.

Chanda, R. and S. Gopalan

Chauvet, L., F. Gubert and S. Mesplé-Somps

Chemali Khalaf, M.

Cholewinski, R., R. Perruchoud and E. McDonald

Clemens, M.A.

Clemens, M.A. and L. Pritchett
Conn, J.E. et al.

Cruz Marques, A.

Czaika, M. and H. de Haas

Davis, J.M. et al.

Deane, K.D., J.O. Parkhurst and D. Johnston

de Haas, H.


D’Emilio, A.L. et al.
Deshingkar, P. and S. Grimm

Dillon, A., V. Mueller and S. Salau

Drabo, A. and C. Ebeke
2011 Remittances, public health spending and foreign aid in the access to health care services in developing countries. Working paper, Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International, Clermont-Ferrand, France.

Dreby, J. and L. Stutz

Du, Y., A. Park and S. Wang

Dumont, J.-C.

Dumont, J.-C. and G. Lemaître

Erulkar, A.S. et al.
Fargues, P.  

Fernández-Huertas Moraga, J.  

Forna, F. et al.  

Foroutan, Y.  

Frank, R. and R.A. Hummer  

Frisancho Robles, V. and R.S. Oropesa  

Gartaula, H.N., L. Visser and A. Niehof  

Gassmann, F. et al.  
Gerein, N., A. Green and S. Pearson  

Ghosh, J.  

Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM)  

Goldin, I., K.A. Reinert and A. Beath  

Gray, C. and V. Mueller  

Gushulak, B.D. and D.W. MacPherson  

Hagenlocher, M., S. Lang and D. Tiede  

Hansen, R., J. Koehler and J. Money (eds.)  

Hawkins, S.S. et al.  
Henry, S., B. Schoumaker and C. Beauchemin

Hildebrandt, N. et al.

Hoang, L.A. and B.S.A. Yeoh

Hofmann, E.T. and C.J. Buckley

Housen, T., S. Hopkins and J. Earnest

Huda, S.

Human Rights Watch

Ibarraran, P. and D. Lubotsky
International Agenda for Migration Management

International Food Policy Research Institute

International Organization for Migration (IOM)


Jacobsen, K.

Kanaiaupuni, S.M. and K.M. Donato

Khan, M.M.H. and A. Kraemer

King, R. and J. Vullnetari
Konseiga, A., E.M. Zulu and Y. Yé  

Kramer, M.A. et al.  

Kundu, A. and N. Sarangi  

Kunz, R.  

Kunz, R., S. Lavenex and M. Panizzon (eds.)  

Landale, N.S., R.S. Oropesa and B.K. Gorman  

Li, X. et al.  

Lindstrom, D.P. and E. Muñoz-Franco  
Lowell, B.L. and S.G. Gerova  

Lu, Y.  

Madan, A. et al.  

Mansuri, G.  
2006 Migration, school attainment and child labor: Evidence from rural Pakistan.

Martens, P. and L. Hall  

Massey, D.S., W.G. Axinn and D.J. Ghimire  

Matthews, Z. et al.  
2010 Examining the “urban advantage” in maternal health care in developing countries. PLOS Medicine, 7(9):e1000327.

McKenzie, D. and H. Rapoport  
Miluka, J. and A. Dabalen

Mitra, A.

Myers, N.

Newland, K., A. Terrazas and R. Munster

Nielsen, T.M. and L. Riddle

Nobles, J.

Nowak, J.

Ny, P. et al.
Owusu, G., S. Agyei-Mensah and R. Lund

Özden, Ç. and M.W. Schiff (eds.)

Page, R.L.

Papademetriou, D.G.
2011 The governance of international migration: Defining the potential for reform in the next decade. Council statement from the 6th plenary meeting of the Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.,

Parrado, E.A. and C.A. Flippen

Passel, J.S. and D. Cohn

Paul, B.K.

Piguet, E.
Ping, H. and Z. Shaohua

Piotrowski, M. and Y.-F. Paat

Ponce, J., I. Olivié and M. Onofa

Pribilsky, J.

Prothero, R.M.

Ramjee, G. and E. Gouws

Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra and E. Scheja

Rees, D., J. Murray, G. Nelson and P. Sonnenberg
Schmalzbauer, L.  

Schmunis, G.A.  

Semyonov, M. and A. Gorodzeisky  

Shaokang, Z., S. Zhenwei and E. Blas  

Shen, I.-L., F. Docquier and H. Rapoport  

Skeldon, R.  

Ssengonzi, R., G.F. De Jong and C.S. Stokes  

Stark, O.  

Stern, N.  
Sturgeon, G., E. McGregor and M. Siegel
2014 Watching a World in Motion: Reflections on the IS Academy Project. IS Academy Policy Brief No.19, United Nations University–Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU–MERIT), Maastricht.

Sundari, S.

United Nations


United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), Population Division


United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UN-Habitat

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Valero-Gil, J.
2008  Remittances and the household’s expenditures on health. Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper No. 9572, University Library of Munich.

Vearey, J.

Walmsley, T.L. and L.A. Winters

Williams, A.M.
2007  Listen to me, learn with me: International migration and knowledge transfer. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 45(2):361–382.

Wilson, M.E.
2003  The traveller and emerging infections: Sentinel, courier, transmitter. Journal of Applied Microbiology, 94(Supplement 1):1–11.
Wolff, H. et al.

Wong, M.

World Bank


Yabiku, S.T., V. Agadjanian and B. Cau

Yang, D.

Zhunio, M.C., S. Vishwasrao and E.P. Chiang
Ziol-Guest, K.M. and A. Kalil

Zontini, E.
IOM Migration Research Series

1. *Myths and Realities of Chinese Irregular Migration*
   Ronald Skeldon, December 2000

2. *Combating Trafficking in South-East Asia: A Review of Policy and Programme Responses*
   Anuska Derks, December 2000

3. *The Role of Regional Consultative Processes in Managing International Migration*
   Amanda Klekowski von Koppenfels, May 2001

   Khalid Koser, May 2001

5. *Harnessing the Potential of Migration and Return to Promote Development*
   Savina Ammassari and Richard Black, August 2001

6. *Recent Trends in Chinese Migration to Europe: Fujianese Migration in Perspective*
   Frank N. Pieke, March 2002

7. *Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation: The Case of the Russian Federation*
   Donna M. Hughes, June 2002

8. *The Migration-Development Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options*
   Ninna Nyberg-Sorensen, Nicholas Van Hear and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, July 2002

9. *A Review of Data on Trafficking in the Republic of Korea*
   June J.H. Lee, August 2002

10. *Moroccan Migration Dynamics: Prospects for the Future*
    Rob van der Erf and Liesbeth Heering, August 2002

11. *Journeys of Jeopardy: A Review of Research on Trafficking in Women and Children in Europe*
    Elizabeth Kelly, November 2002
12. *Irregular Migration in Turkey*  
Ahmet Içduygu, February 2003

13. *Bordering on Control: Combating Irregular Migration in North America and Europe*  
Philip Martin, April 2003

14. *Migration and Development: A Perspective from Asia*  
Graeme Hugo, November 2003

15. *Is Trafficking in Human Beings Demand Driven? A Multi-Country Pilot Study*  
Bridget Anderson and Julia O’Connell Davidson, December 2003

16. *Migration from Latin America to Europe: Trends and Policy Challenges*  
Adela Pellegrino, May 2004

17. *The Development Potential of Zimbabweans in the Diaspora: A Survey of Zimbabweans Living in the UK and South Africa*  
Alice Bloch, January 2005

18. *Dynamics of Remittance Utilization in Bangladesh*  
Tom de Bruyn, January 2005

19. *Internal Migration and Development: A Global Perspective*  
Priya Deshingkar and Sven Grimm, February 2005

20. *The Millennium Development Goals and Migration*  
Erica Usher, April 2005

Dr Savina Ammassari, May 2005

22. *Migration and Development: Opportunities and Challenges for Policy makers*  
Macha Farrant, Anna MacDonald, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, April 2006

23. *Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe*  
Jorgen Carling, September 2006
24. *Domestic Migrant Remittances in China: Distribution, Channels and Livelihoods*
Rachel Murphy, September 2006

25. *Remittances in the Great Lakes Region*
Tom de Bruyn and Johan Wets, October 2006

26. *Engaging Diasporas as Development Partners for Home and Destination Countries: Challenges for Policymakers*
Dina Ionesco, November 2006

27. *Migration and Poverty Alleviation in China*
WANG Dewen and CAI Fang, March 2007

28. *A Study of Migrant-Sending Households in Serbia Receiving Remittances from Switzerland*
Nilim Baruah and Jennifer Petree, April 2007

29. *Trafficking in Human Beings and the 2006 World Cup in Germany*
Jana Hennig, Sarah Craggs, Frank Laczko and Fred Larsson, April 2007

30. *Migration, Development and Natural Disasters: Insights from the Indian Ocean Tsunami*
Asmita Naik, Elca Stigter and Frank Laczko, June 2007

31. *Migration and Climate Change*
Oli Brown, January 2008

32. *Irregular Migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union: An Overview of Recent Trends*
Hein de Haas, April 2008

33. *Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate Flows*
Dominic Kniveton, Kerstin Schmidt-Verkerk, Christopher Smith, and Richard Black, April 2008

34. *Migration and Development: Achieving Policy Coherence*
Asmita Naik, Jobst Koehler, Frank Laczko, September 2008

35. *Migration, Development and Environment*
Frank Laczko, November 2008
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>IOM Global Database Thematic Research Series: Trafficking of men – A trend less considered: The case of Belarus and Ukraine</td>
<td>Rebecca Surtees</td>
<td>December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>The Impact of Financial Crises on International Migration: Lessons Learned</td>
<td>Khalid Koser</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>An Assessment of Principal Regional Consultative Processes on Migration</td>
<td>Professor Randall Hansen</td>
<td>January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Angola: A Study of the Impact of Remittances from Portugal and South Africa</td>
<td>Sandra Paola Alvarez Tinajero</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Migrant Resource Centres: An Initial Assessment</td>
<td>Paul Tacon, Elizabeth Warn</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>The Role of Migrant Care Workers in Ageing Societies: Report on Research Findings in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada and the United States</td>
<td>Sarah Spencer, Susan Martin, Ivy Lynn Bourgeault, Eamon O’Shea</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Climate Change, Migration and Critical International Security Considerations</td>
<td>Robert McLeman</td>
<td>January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Gallup World Poll: The Many Faces of Global Migration</td>
<td>Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, Anita Pugliese, PhD</td>
<td>November 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Ending the 2006 Internal Displacement Crisis in Timor-Leste: Between Humanitarian Aid and Transitional Justice</td>
<td>Peter Van der Auweraert</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Regional Inter-State Consultation Mechanisms on Migration: Approaches, Recent Activities and Implications for Global Governance of Migration</td>
<td>Charles Harns</td>
<td>April 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Migration and Development within the South: New Evidence from African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
<td></td>
<td>September 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
47. *Displaced Youth’s Role in Sustainable Return: Lessons from South Sudan*  
Marisa O. Ensor, October 2013

48. *Mobility of Health Professionals to, from and within the European Union*  
Caroline Schultz and Barbara Rijks, February 2014

49. *The South–South remittance corridor between Argentina and Bolivia*  
Matteo Mandrile, March 2014
The new issue of Migration Policy Practice focuses on a broad range of national, regional and global migration policy areas. The first article, by Vinod Mishra from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, reports on the findings of a new global survey that asks governments to indicate their migration policy priorities and to provide information on both their immigration and emigration policies. Contrary to the often negative reports about migration in the media, the survey finds that many more governments around the world have shown “openness to regular immigration in the last two decades,” especially those in developed regions such as Europe. Two thirds of governments had policies in place in 2011 to promote the integration of migrants. The survey also finds that around half of the countries in the world now permit dual citizenship. Conversely, a quarter of countries around the world have policies to discourage emigration. Moreover, many countries, especially in developing regions, are trying to encourage the return of their citizens and encourage investment in their countries by their diasporas. The second article in this issue focuses on new policy developments in a small country – Switzerland – which has a high percentage of migrants among its population. In February 2014, the Swiss population adopted an initiative aimed at stopping mass immigration. Vincent Chetail, Director of Geneva’s new Global Migration Centre, discusses the background to the vote and the implications of the results for Switzerland and the European Union. He argues that despite the vote, Switzerland will not find it easy to change its immigration policy given the broad range of treaties that the country has already signed which limit its ability to impose immigration restrictions. The third article by Poonam Dhavan and Davide Mosca, from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), focuses on migration and health and the post-2015 development agenda. In particular, the article focuses on the links between tuberculosis (TB) and migration. The article argues that it will be difficult to make further progress towards the Millennium Development Goal targets without expanding health coverage for TB services to migrants who remain a “key affected” and marginalized population in several countries. The fourth article provides an outline of recent trends in migration between China and Europe. The article, by Frank Laczko and Tara Brian, from IOM, shows how Europe and China have become increasingly connected by migration. Although the European media often focus on irregular migration between China and Europe, the article shows that Chinese migration is much more diversified. The challenges for policymakers in Europe and China are about how best to maximize the benefits of this increased mobility between China and Europe while reducing the risks associated with irregular migration and trafficking. The final article outlines the role of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Migration, Refugees and Displaced Persons. The work of the Committee has not always achieved the attention it deserves. The Committee focuses on supporting policies to protect the rights of migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and displaced persons. It also promotes dialogue between the members of the Council of Europe to encourage the integration of migrants. In addition, the Committee is especially concerned to find ways to address the needs of internally displaced persons, especially those who have been displaced for a long period of time.
The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IOM concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.

IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

Publisher: International Organization for Migration
17 route des Morillons
P.O. Box 17
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 717 91 11
Fax: +41 22 798 61 50
E-mail: hq@iom.int
Internet: http://www.iom.int

ISSN 1607-338X
© 2014 International Organization for Migration (IOM)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher.

IOM Migration Research Series (MRS)

Editor: Frank Laczko
Head, Migration Research Division
International Organization for Migration
17 route des Morillons
P.O. Box 17
1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 717 91 11
E-mail: flaczko@iom.int

Titles in the series are available from:
International Organization for Migration, Publications Unit
17 route des Morillons, P.O. Box 17, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland
Tel.: +41 22 717 91 11; Fax: +41 22 798 61 50; E-mail: pubsales@iom.int
The MRS can be downloaded for free or purchased from IOM website at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore.

Single issue: USD 16 + postage

Payments may also be made by international bank draft or money order payable to International Organization for Migration, Publications Unit, Geneva.
International migration is frequently discussed in association with development. There are some 232 million international migrants in the world (UN DESA, 2013), and when internal mobility is included this number jumps to one in seven people on the planet. These numbers emphasize the increasing significance of migration. Yet the topic remains a complex phenomenon. Great variations in the conditions faced by migrants are mirrored in its developmental impacts. Furthermore, migration can also be seen as a product of development. From the early movements of hunter-gatherers, to urbanization processes triggered by the industrial revolution, to the movement of health workers triggered by ageing populations, mobility is a core part of the human experience.

When we talk about migration and development in policy circles we tend to focus on how we can enhance the positives and mitigate the negatives. In doing so, there is often more of a focus on the more tangible channels through which migration can impact development: remittances, diaspora engagement and the highly skilled, and less so on other less tangible areas such as social remittances, and the reverse relationship between migration and development, where development impacts migration. However, these areas merit further investigation, because they lead us to consider what the evidence tells us about how migration, like technology or international trade, transforms realities. Additionally, internal migration has not been given the recognition it deserves within international frameworks, particularly given that urbanization processes are inherently linked to both migration and development.

It is clear that migration should be part of the discussions for the post-2015 development agenda. However we should tread with caution. Migration is also a topic that questions national sovereignty and, as such, an emotive and controversial topic in parliaments across the world.

Part A of this report provides a systematic update of the evidence base regarding migration’s relevance to and impact on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In doing so, it considers the role of migration as an enabler of development through a number of different channels: monetary and social remittances, the act of migrating and the impacts on those left behind. The evidence base for internal migration is often more robust and plentiful than for international migration and thus, where relevant, the impacts of internal migration on development are also considered.

Part B takes the debate a step further by first presenting argumentation for why migration is important and why mobility should be a component of the post-2015 development agenda. Following this, two ways in which migration could be incorporated in the post-2015 development agenda are considered: (1) situating migration alongside other “enablers” of migration such as trade in a reformulated version of MDG 8 on global partnerships; and (2) through the inclusion of migration-related indicators as a cross-cutting theme in the new development goals.