South-South migration is a traditional livelihood strategy for millions of people in the global South. Despite its importance, mobility between developing countries has only recently been target by researchers and policymakers.

Drawing from research commissioned by the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration, this issue of the Migration Research Series provides innovative insight on the realities of South-South mobility and explores how these movements may question our traditional conception of the migration paradigm. Concepts such as return migration, the role of diaspora for the national development and cross-border mobility have a specific meaning in the South-South context.

This publication draws attention to the often unexplored potential for development of migrants within the South and provides key recommendations to strengthen the relevance of migration research. These outputs come at a very significant moment for the international community in light of the United Nations High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, where the necessary integration of migration in the post-2015 development debate will be discussed.
Migration and development within the South: New evidence from African, Caribbean and Pacific countries

ACP Observatory on Migration
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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FOREWORD

With an increasing number of international migrants – and even more internal migrants residing in developing countries – human mobility is a reality in the South, with an ever-increasing potential to positively impact on development. Growing international awareness of the possible contributions of South–South migration to human development comes at a crucial moment. In October this year, the United Nations General Assembly will, for the second time, hold the High-level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development. On this occasion, the international community will not only discuss migration and its contributions to development, but also propose ways of integrating migration into the post-2015 development agenda. The second HLD, therefore, provides a unique opportunity to recognize migration as a key enabler of inclusive and sustainable economic and social development to promote the positive role of migrants as agents of development, and to improve cooperation and partnerships on migration governance.

South–South mobility can play an essential role in these global efforts, to maximize the development potential of migration as increasing numbers of migrants in the developing world are moving intraregionally and internally. In fact, South–South migration is just as important in magnitude as South–North migration; yet, most research continues to focus primarily on those migrating from developing countries in the South to more affluent ones in the North.

This edition of the IOM Migration Research Series, authored by the staff of the ACP Observatory, sheds light on the specific characteristics of South–South migration and presents evidence on the manifold avenues for increasing its contribution to development. This publication outlines key findings of three years of research in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries carried out by the ACP Observatory on Migration. The ACP Observatory is an initiative of the Secretariat of the ACP Group of States, supported by the European Union, Switzerland, IOM and its Development Fund and the United Nations Population Fund. It is implemented by IOM, in collaboration with a research consortium of 16 academic partners, as well as policymakers and researchers in ACP countries. This publication, therefore, represents a concrete result of the active collaboration between the ACP Group of States and IOM.
We hope that the ACP Observatory’s research on South–South migration will serve as a valuable contribution to the upcoming discussions at the second HLD, especially on the crucial role of migrants in the South as agents of human development.

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Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States

William Lacy Swing
Director General
International Organization for Migration
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFMD</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLD</td>
<td>UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communication technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIDSA</td>
<td>Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTOs</td>
<td>Money transfer operators</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN DESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

If greatest attention has traditionally been given to migration from the South to the North, recent years have seen an increasing focus on migration taking place within the global South. The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration was established in 2010 by the European Union and the ACP Group of States in order to provide policy-oriented research on migration trends and patterns within ACP countries.

Thus far, the ACP Observatory’s activities – producing research and assessments on the major aspects of migration – have focused on 12 countries, with the aim of developing an evidence base to address key issues in the migration–development nexus. This publication recaps the main findings of these studies and contributes to the overall knowledge on South–South migration.

The report begins by highlighting the key findings of the ACP Observatory studies and is organized according to the following thematic areas: labour mobility; the impact of South–South migration on development; diaspora and remittances; internal migration and displacement; and irregular and return migration, as well as some cross-cutting themes such as human rights and environmental migration.

The section on labour migration gives an overview of the main trends and patterns of South–South economic migration, insisting on its intraregional nature and on the importance of family-, community- and ethnicity-based networks in shaping the way migration takes place. This section also highlights that origin countries in the South are most often also countries of destination and transit, and that transit countries, in response to evolving policies in the North, can often become final destination countries. The mobility of highly skilled migrants is underlined as an important feature of South–South migration, contrary to the perception that highly skilled migrants tend to travel to the North. Additionally, specific trends, such as seasonal mobility, are important features, especially in the African context.

Particular focus has to be given to the development outcomes of South–South migration. The ACP Observatory studies show that these impacts are mainly felt in the educational sector. In this sense, South–South mobility can be looked at as a medium- to long-term livelihood strategy that aims to diversify income sources and risks faced by households, as well as provide a way to ensure better education for the next generation. The development outcomes of South–South migration are similarly evident in non-monetary transfers; the experience brought home by return migrants
and the networks they formed while abroad are very valuable, although these are given less policy attention than issues related to emigration.

The contributions of migrants to their families and communities of origin is directly linked to the topic of South–South diasporas. Like other aspects of South–South migration, focus has traditionally been on diasporas in the North. However, although data are still lacking, the studies commissioned by the ACP Observatory show that the development potential of diasporas in the South is high. Indeed – probably due to the intraregional nature of South–South migration, and to sometimes-variable political and economic stability – migrants return home more frequently than if they resided in the North. Furthermore, these migrants often invest in their country of origin and express willingness to participate in skills transfer programmes. Moreover, diaspora groups in the South create large associations and link to their respective home countries. An enabling environment – created through policies oriented towards transnationalism, such as those regarding dual citizenship and voting rights – would facilitate diaspora engagement. For this to be possible, it is important to acquire greater knowledge of and better data on diasporas in the South – in order to promote diaspora policies that are in line with the realities of intraregional migration. Of course, in addition to the lack of data, other challenges remain, such as political instability, corruption and xenophobia.

Among the contributions of migrants, remittances have probably received the greatest attention. In this area as well, the lack of overall data prevents a full understanding of South–South remittances. Quantifying remittances in the South is made even more challenging by the fact that most South–South transfers (up to 87.4% in Lesotho) are made through informal channels. Lack of access to formal banking services and high transfer costs are among the main challenges. Innovative technologies, such as mobile transfers, are very promising and even seem to increase savings among users. In addition, the studies reveal different patterns than are commonly assumed in terms of who among the family members receives remittances and who remits.

Historical factors (for example, the colonial past of ACP countries and the delineation of arbitrary borders), may blur the lines between internal and international migration. The existence of several ethnic groups within the same country, or even the distribution of an ethnic group between two or more countries, must be taken into account when considering migration in the South. Given this reality, it is relevant to discuss inter-ethnic migration: a migrant may face the same differences when migrating within the same country as internationally, and vice-versa.
As internal migration most often takes place towards urban areas, there are important implications for urban planning and policy development. Internal migration may also be the result of displacement, which can be provoked by several factors, from local political instability, to economic and industrial development.

Irregular migration and trafficking are well-known issues, although these remain characterized by a lack of data. The porosity of borders, the indentation of coastlines and governance-related issues are among the factors contributing to this problem. It is important to point out that while much irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking are intraregional, there also are large extraregional channels within the South, for instance, between the Caribbean and Central and South America; between Asia and Africa; and between African countries and the Gulf region, Europe or Central Asia.

Finally, the findings of the studies highlight the specificities of South–South migration, noting the importance of factors rooted in national identity and history in defining migration patterns and trends.

Chapter 2 outlines the importance of analysing and sharing migration data as a tool for effective decision-making and planning at all levels. Assessments of migration data and management carried out in 10 ACP countries reveal that migration data do exist, yet are currently not fully analysed and shared among ministries or with the public.

Chapter 3 analyses key findings and trends, and provides an overview of the main characteristics of South–South migration. It notes both the pitfalls and the value of defining a global “South” and “North,” and calls for the unique characteristics of South–South mobility to be taken into account. The publication closes with conclusions on the most important findings and situates them within the context of the global discussions on development and migration, namely, the UN High-level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development in October 2013 and the ongoing discussions on the United Nations post-2015 development framework.

Finally, it is important to mention that while this report focuses on South–South migration, these flows are part of a global system. Therefore, South–South migration should be addressed according to its specificities, while keeping in mind that its drivers not only originate from within the global South.
1. INTRODUCTION

When the European Union and the African, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) Group of States launched the call for the establishment of an observatory on migration in 2008, the idea of looking at migration from a perspective focusing on the “global South” was a promising (Ratha and Shaw, 2007), though little explored, subject.

A mere five years later, migration within the South of the world and its impact on development is now a recognized topic. The importance of South–South migration is supported by statistical evidence from the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), which shows that in 2010 about 73 million international migrants born in the South were residing in the South, while 74 million originating from the South were living in the North (UN DESA, 2012). One third of the entire migrant stock in 2010 originated in and was living in the South (UN DESA, 2012). Migration within the South is thus equally important to movement from the South to the North.

Today, migration within the South is also receiving political recognition from governments involved in the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). A specific round table was dedicated to the issue in 2012 (GFMD, 2012). The topic also received considerable global attention from economists and development practitioners in the 2013 Human Development Report (HDR): The Rise of the South (UNDP, 2013). In the report, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) not only highlights that, within this decade, the joint GDPs of Brazil, China and India will overtake the combined economies of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France, Canada, Italy and Germany. The report also points out that an increase in South–South relations is allowing developing countries to copy and adopt strategies from their neighbours, rather than looking only towards the North for inspiration. The 2013 HDR identified more than 40 countries in the South that have experienced significantly greater gains in the Human Development Index (HDI) since 1990 than what was predicted based on their previous HDI performance. Progress in these countries has accelerated markedly over the past 10 years.

While the concept of “South” remains useful, changes in global development have called the distinction between “North” and “South” into question. According to the UNDP definition, the term “North” refers to the more developed regions or countries in the world – that is, those with “very high” HDIs. The term “South,” on the other hand, refers to the less developed regions or countries, that is, those with “high,” “medium” and “low” human development. The latest HDR notes that this old distinction between developed and less developed countries is not as clear as it once was. Financial crises and austerity measures, traditionally associated with the developing world, have now
hurt many countries in the North as well. Furthermore, “North” and “South” may be
difficult to define in certain regions such as the Caribbean, where overseas territories
are included in the North by some definitions despite facing challenges similar to
those of their neighbouring independent States.

The global panorama on migration has changed and will continue to change at
an increasing speed. The BRICS (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and
South Africa) countries and other regional poles will play an increasing role in shaping
geopolitical, economic and social change. At the same time, it is expected that the
continuing financial crisis, recession and slowed growth in the North will foster even
more restrictive immigration policies in those countries.

Studies on South–South migration are scarce. Furthermore, there is general
difficulty with conducting comparative research on international migration because
of the variety of information sources and concepts involved. For instance, to date
no universally accepted definition of “international migrant” exists, despite the
recommendation by the United Nations (UN) in 1998.1 The relative scarcity of
existing migration data sources in the South adds to the complexity of definitional
issues across countries.

In this context, the ACP Observatory on Migration, established in 2010, aims to
produce data on South–South migration within ACP countries to be used by migrants,
civil society and policymakers; enhance research capacities and capabilities in ACP
countries; and facilitate the creation of a network of research institutions and experts
on migration research. Through a bottom-up approach, the Observatory is linking
research and data with a network of national stakeholders that includes governments,
academia and civil society. These activities are supported by an academic consortium
of research and university centres from ACP countries and Europe. The Observatory’s
activities, which involves research on and assessments of major aspects of migration,
have focused on 12 ACP countries: Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Timor-Leste,
Trinidad and Tobago and the United Republic of Tanzania. Through its activities, the
ACP Observatory aims to address issues which are becoming increasingly important
for the ACP Group of States as part of the migration–development nexus.

This publication aims to recapitulate major research findings carried out in the
above-mentioned 12 ACP countries, as well as in the ACP subregions, and offers a
glimpse of the features of the South–South migration and development landscape. We
hope that this publication will expand the evidence base on South–South migration
by offering specific case studies without generalizing the findings. The studies carried
out within the framework of the ACP Observatory, as well as the conclusions drawn in
this publication, must be viewed as exploratory, but nevertheless constituting one of
the first systematic contributions towards mapping the characteristics and impacts of South–South migration among ACP countries. These findings, subject to refinement and further inputs as data analyses improve and the debate expands, indicate that South–South migration must be taken into consideration in the study of migration dynamics, as well as in the design of migration policies in ACP countries.
2. SPOTLIGHT ON THE ACP: KEY FINDINGS OF CASE STUDIES BY THEMATIC AREA

This chapter presents a brief overview of recent migration trends in ACP countries, and then focuses on the key thematic findings of studies commissioned by the ACP Observatory on Migration in the 12 countries. Areas covered by these research activities include labour mobility; the impact of South–South migration on development; diasporas and remittances in the South; internal migration and displacement; and irregular and return migration, as well as cross-cutting themes, including the human rights of migrants and migration and the environment (see Annex 1 for a detailed overview of the ACP studies).

To enhance methodological quality and improve comparability among the studies, the ACP Observatory produced Research Guide of the ACP Observatory on Migration (2011), which covers the methodologies, concepts and definitions to be used in the research process. These guidelines were designed before the national and regional in-depth studies were carried out to ensure a coherent approach.

This chapter provides an overview of the patterns that characterize South–South migration in ACP countries. These will be further analysed and synthesized in Chapter 3.

Map 1: The 79 ACP countries

Source: ACP Observatory on Migration, 2013.
2.1 Migration trends in ACP: Labour migration in a South–South context

Labour mobility has historical roots in most ACP countries that date back from the colonial era and continue to influence present-day trends and patterns. In Africa, especially in the sub-Saharan region, much of the labour migration that occurs is from South to South. Most studies show that the last three decades have seen very significant increases in labour migration. Large- and medium-scale movements of migrants have been increasingly observed, not only to Europe and North America, but also within Africa, as well as to the Middle East. The same can be said of the Pacific and the Caribbean regions (Pacific Dialogue Ltd., 2013; Kairi Consultants Ltd., 2013).

2.1.1 Trends and patterns

The quality of data on labour migration in most ACP countries remains poor due to several factors, including weak coordination among the agencies responsible for collecting the data, as well as the lack of migration components in available census data. The porosity of borders and the high rate of irregular migration make it even harder to collect reliable data (Awumbila et al., 2013), which are of paramount importance in drafting effective policies. As South–South migration is mainly intraregional, regional analysis that complements national data is crucial to understanding South–South migration dynamics and related issues in a comprehensive manner.

South–South migration mainly occurs between neighbouring countries or between countries that belong to the same geographical region. This is particularly true for Africa. To some degree it also happens in the Caribbean and the Pacific, where migration is still mainly South–North. Regarding intraregional labour migration, factors such as ethnic and transnational family ties play an important role in shaping migration trends and patterns, as well as how migration and migrants are perceived in host countries (Coulibaly et al., 2013).

South–South labour migration in ACP countries is mainly driven by market forces and regional stability. This is evident, for instance, in the case of migration movements in the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal which are characterized by mineral extraction and extensive plantations (Awumbila et al., 2013). Indeed, increased political stability, oil and gas reservoirs, the development of the tourism industry and heavy investment in the mining and construction sectors have all led to rapid economic growth in several countries of the South, driving labour migration. This has happened, for instance, in
Angola, where oil production has spurred the growth of the construction industry. The liquefied natural gas project that started in 2007 in the Soyo area employs over 7,000 workers, 50 per cent of whom are Angolan nationals, while the rest are immigrants from neighbouring countries (Martins Almeida, 2010). Similarly, in Papua New Guinea, collaboration between the Government and Exxon Mobil in the liquefied oil sector led to massive employment of workers from neighbouring Melanesian and Asian countries. Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago has long attracted immigrants due to both its geographical proximity to Latin America and its strong oil sector. (Anglo Pacific Research Ltd., 2013; Kairi Consultants Ltd., 2013)

Another significant pattern that is being observed in some African countries is the replacement of departing emigrants with incoming immigrants. This happens when people from rural areas move to towns to occupy positions vacated by nationals who have moved abroad. All over the ACP regions, the following migration pattern was found: people first move from rural areas to cities, and then from cities to foreign destinations. This trend has been documented in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali and Senegal (Awumbila et al., 2013). It has also been observed that foreign workers sometimes occupy positions vacated by nationals who have emigrated. Good examples include African health professionals who migrate to the Caribbean to replace Caribbean doctors who have migrated to the United States (Kairi Consultants Ltd., 2013), and Filipino doctors who migrate to Fiji to fill gaps that were left by Fijian doctors who have migrated to the North. Such cases help to highlight the close interrelationship between internal and international migration, as well as between South–North and South–South migration, suggesting the importance of looking at migration as a global phenomenon with local and regional specificities.

Recent research carried out in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region also shows a trend of settled migrants employing co-nationals who have arrived more recently (Awumbila et al., 2013). This trend may sometimes lead to particular migrant groups or individuals from the same country or ethnic group dominating a particular industry or trade. A survey of the fisheries sector in Gambia (Mendy, 2009), for example, highlights that a significant proportion of fishermen are foreign-born, mainly of Senegalese origin (Awumbila et al., 2013). This also shows the importance of South–South diasporas and highlights the role that family, ethnic and national links play in intraregional migration.

Migration networks – together with increased access to the Internet – play a key role in providing access to information on migration opportunities, facilitating the search for employment, and supporting migrants while looking for work. Ethnic, community and family ties help reduce the costs and uncertainties involved in migration, while migrant networks play a critical role in defining the way migration takes place. In
some areas, diasporas are longstanding: the arrival of a significant number of Basotho, Swazis and Tswanas in South Africa, for instance, is linked to movements of ethnic groups way back in the nineteenth century.

Labour mobility would be more effective and robust if workers had more information about employment opportunities abroad. It is costly to move when international borders are involved, and reliable information is essential to making sound decisions. The lack of data on labour markets is a handicap for both employers and migrants, as it hinders the capacity of States to efficiently manage migration; in this framework, network dynamics play a major role in providing information to migrants, somewhat mitigating the effects of the lack of formal data. However, this also bears risks for migrants, who may fall into exploitative situations – and for States, which are often unable to have a clear idea of their labour markets.

If the rationale for labour mobility in a South–South context remains economic, the ACP Observatory studies confirm that the modalities of such mobility, and the factors and parameters that affect it, are complex and interrelated. While migration takes place within a global economic framework, it is affected by regional and national economic and political patterns as well, and variables such as ethnicity and family networks are key towards understanding its dynamics.

2.1.2 Sending, receiving and transit countries

It has been observed that in many cases, sending countries are at the same time migrant-receiving countries. Most ECOWAS countries, for instance, are both immigration and emigration countries. Guinea, Ghana, Senegal and Nigeria send almost the same number of emigrants as the immigrants they receive (Awumbila et al., 2013). Kenya has positioned itself as a dominant economy in Africa and as an important destination country for migrants from Central and Eastern Africa. At the same time, Kenya is also a major sending country of labour migrants to Eastern and Southern Africa, Europe and North America, as well as Australia and New Zealand; in addition, Kenya is a source, transit and destination country for irregular migrants. In 2010 Kenya received USD 1.8 billion in remittances, which constitutes 5.4 per cent of the country’s gross domestic product. Kenya was one of the top 10 receivers of remittances in the world in that year (World Bank, 2010; Oucho et al., 2013).

The phenomenon whereby countries of origin are also countries of destination is likewise observed in the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean. In the Pacific Islands, for instance, there is a mismatch between available and needed labour skills, which implies not only a high rate of emigration, but also of immigration of foreign labourers (Pacific
Dialogue Ltd., 2013). In the Caribbean, as mentioned previously, the immigration of African doctors responding to the emigration of national health professionals is an illustration of this phenomenon.

It is important to mention that even if South–South labour migration is mainly intraregional, it does not necessarily happen between neighboring countries. In this framework, transit migration is an important trend observed in Niger, which constitutes a passage for labour migrants from sub-Saharan Africa bound for the Maghreb (Awumbila et al., 2013). Niger receives increasing numbers of migrants who find themselves stuck on the way to another destination or to an increasingly closed Europe. Through this kind of process, transit countries often become destination countries, and clearly, intraregional migration patterns are affected and complicated by this phenomenon. Thus, South–South migration is very complex and decentralized, characterized by networks and hubs more than by migration corridors, which characterize South–North migration.

2.1.3 Seasonal migration

In some African countries, regional variations in agricultural production schedules accommodate mobility. Such seasonal mobility includes pastoralists leading their animals across borders for better grazing grounds and migrants travelling to take advantage of differences in harvesting seasons. In West Africa, the main international migration movements supply labour for commercial agriculture, for instance, from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, and from Mali and Guinea to Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal (Awumbila et al., 2013).

Regardless of income differences, seasonal migration may occur as individuals take advantage of weather patterns. There is also some evidence, largely from studies of internal and regional migration, that migration between areas of similar income levels can help families diversify income sources and thus reduce risk. For instance, seasonal labour migrants from Sahel countries in Africa take advantage of the rainy season to cultivate in their countries of origin and move to the forest zone when the rains cease (Awumbila et al., 2013).

2.1.4 Extraregional migration

Although most South–South migration is intraregional, extraregional migration is also significant. In the Caribbean, for example, there are significant migrant flows towards Asia: it is estimated that Pakistan ranks eighth among the top destinations of Caribbean migrants (numbering 60,000 migrants, with around 10,000 Cubans,
Dominicans, Haitians and Jamaicans); the Philippines and Kuwait rank twelfth and thirteenth, respectively (Ponce, 2010).

The ACP Observatory studies identified historical (including colonial) and linguistic links as crucial factors influencing South–South migration patterns. In the framework of British colonial rule, ethnic Indians established communities in the Caribbean, Africa and the Pacific Islands. Africa, for instance, currently hosts 13 per cent of the Indian diaspora (Naujoks, 2009). Similarly, Lebanese migrants were brought into Africa under French colonial rule to foster commercial activities. Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence of Angolan and Mozambican refugees in Brazil (Tourinho Baptista, 2008; Baeninger and Guimarães Peres, 2011); however, the majority are probably former colonialists fleeing independence in the 1970s. Most other refugees stayed within their respective regions and only a few made their way to Brazil. These anecdotes would need to be bolstered up by comprehensive research.

Given the global political power shifts in recent times, extraregional migration in the South–South context is experiencing changes in patterns. A few years back, South–South extraregional migration was driven by oil-based economic development, as in the case of Gulf countries. Today it is linked to the rise of China and, more generally, of the BRICS countries. Nowadays, the China is not only the source of a large number of the world’s international migrants, but is increasingly becoming a destination for labour migrants, including those from sub-Saharan Africa. The main factors behind this emerging migratory phenomenon are both China’s continuing economic growth and its increasing political and diplomatic linkages with African countries. In this framework, migrants seem to play a crucial role in the emerging Sino-African trade system (Fowale, 2008; Skeldon, 2011; Østbø Haugen, 2012; Manente, 2012).

2.1.5 Skills circulation

Skills remain an important factor in the context of South–South labour migration. Contrary to public perception, highly skilled migrants also move within the South. In particular, movements of the tertiary-educated are high within and towards certain subregions, such as East Africa (Oucho et al., 2013) and the Caribbean (Anatol et al., 2013; Kairi Consultants, 2013), and to regional hubs like South Africa. Relatively stable countries such as Kenya and South Africa have become regional power and economic centres, dominating the regional skills markets (Oucho et al., 2013). Some of the migrants from ECOWAS countries are highly educated; in recent years, a number of Togolese university graduates have moved to Ghana and Nigeria in search of jobs. Some of these graduates teach French in Ghanaian schools. Similarly, some highly skilled migrants move between Nigeria and Ghana (Awumbila et al., 2013).
This presents opportunities for development, but also requires regional approaches that aim to restrict the expansion of inequalities between countries participating in the same regional market.

The growth in the labour mobility of skilled workers is equally impressive within national borders. This is the case in Nigeria and Kenya, where a considerable share of labour mobility has been internal (Awumbila et al., 2013; Oucho et al., 2013).

The issue of skills is also remarkable in the Pacific. In Papua New Guinea, for instance, there is a mismatch between the skills needed by the labour market and those actually provided by universities and training programmes (Anglo Pacific Research Ltd., 2013). On the other hand, in Fiji, highly educated students tend to migrate once they obtain their degrees, contributing to skills shortages in the country. However, some argue that skills shortages are highlighted in order to justify the recruitment of cheaper workers from Asia, for instance, in the construction sector. Emigration can also function as a safety valve in light of an oversupply of skilled workers. The match between available and needed skills is indeed a fundamental requirement in view of employment-related challenges; if a mismatch is not addressed properly, it could lead to brain drain accompanied by high unemployment rates.

Reasons for migrating include the search for employment or business opportunities, the hope for a higher income and the desire to attend university (first, second and third most important reasons, respectively, for emigrants from Cameroon) (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). Migration for further education, however, has not received much attention, despite long traditions of regional movements. Particularly in small island States, such as those in the Caribbean and the Pacific, regional universities like the University of the West Indies and the University of the South Pacific are often among the few opportunities available to pursue higher education (Melde, 2013b). Education is likewise an important motivation in African countries, specifically among immigrants in Cameroon (of which 15% were enrolled in education programmes); Cameroonian emigrants elsewhere in Africa (31.3%) (Zourkaleini et al., 2013); Kenyan emigrants surveyed in other African countries (22%) (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013); and 19.1 per cent of Nigerian diaspora members surveyed in South Africa and Ghana. Migrants from Nigeria, in particular, are characterized by high levels of education (21.8% have secondary degrees, 40.9% with university degrees and 36.4% with master’s degrees) (Olatuyi et al., 2013). However, these figures could be the result of selection bias attributable, for instance, to the use of Internet-based questionnaires which may not capture the poorest.

Interestingly, contrary to the main trends in skilled immigration in Europe and other destination countries in the West, the skills of labour migrants in the South are
fully utilized, that is, “brain waste” is not an issue. Research on Kenyans living in the United Republic of Tanzania and South Africa has shown that most are employed in their chosen skilled professions (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). Similar findings were obtained by a survey of Nigerians in Ghana and South Africa, with four out of five respondents being employed. Self-employment is the predominant type of employment (Olatuyi et al., 2013) among these immigrants, a finding echoed by a study in Cameroon (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). This may highlight the high degree of entrepreneurship among those immigrants or may otherwise indicate their inability to find work in their respective professions, which points to issues regarding the recognition of qualifications by destination countries, among others. This distinguishes these Kenyan and Nigerian migrants from those moving North, where deskilling and underemployment often occur. Immigrants seem to fill existing gaps and, particularly in the case of South Africa, vacant posts left by South African emigrants (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). While it is not possible to generalize this finding from one study to others, it adds an important nuance to the debate surrounding highly skilled migrants.

2.1.6 Labour migration and health

Health is a key determinant of economic growth and poverty reduction. When migrants are healthy, in addition to their own personal development, they are able to work towards and contribute to economic growth in the host country, as well as improve the livelihoods of their families by sending remittances (MIDSA, 2009).

Health has always been a significant issue in debates and governmental policy frameworks in both sending and receiving countries, as well as on international platforms. States all around the globe are taking different health and safety precautions and control measures to safeguard migrants and their local populations. Diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS still pose serious challenges to health-care and migration management agencies in Southern and sub-Saharan Africa, and mobility can facilitate the spread of contagious diseases.

The right to health care, crucial for the protection of both migrants and nationals, is far from being universally granted. Migrants are often discriminated against in this respect. This discrimination can occur even in a country where a legal framework exists to protect migrants who, because of their status (for example, “irregular,” “working in the informal sector,” “temporary,” among others), cannot access their health rights. For instance, Haitian migrants in the Bahamas are often irregular, prefer to work informally and, therefore, lose access to health care (Marcelino, 2013).
2.2 The impact of South–South migration on development

Migration and development and the links between them have been in vogue in international debates for more than a decade. Yet concrete impacts of one on the other are still not well known. Such gaps are even more apparent when it comes to South–South and intraregional migration in developing countries, which have hardly been studied at all.

The ACP Observatory on Migration has commissioned several studies concerning the impact of South–South migration on development. The findings of nationally representative household surveys conducted in Cameroon and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the study of the impact of migration on local development in the Casamance region of Senegal are the basis of the discussion in this section. These are complemented by insights from other studies the ACP Observatory commissioned.

2.2.1 Emigrants: A positive impact on education and income levels

The impact of emigration to other countries in the South on the human development of both the migrants and their family members has been found to be positive. Households with a member living abroad spend more on education. The recent study on the impact of South–South migration on human development in Cameroon (Zourkaleini et al., 2013) demonstrates that the impact of emigration on the savings and food expenditure of household members in Cameroon were positive when considering all directions of migration. The impact was more significant in the case of households with migrants in the North as opposed to those with migrants in the South. These results confirm the findings of a similar study on Senegal (Lessault, Beauchemin and Sakho, 2011). A study commissioned by the ACP Observatory on Cameroon also found that mobility to other countries in Central Africa, as well as elsewhere in Africa, has not affected self-employment of household members (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). This may indicate that South–South migration does not necessarily lead to such dependence on remittances and the other tangible benefits of migration as South–North migration. However, in the case of Cameroon, remittances from developed countries increase reliance on them, as indicated by the lower share of household members participating in the labour market. In other cases, such as Lesotho’s, however, South–South migration (mainly to South Africa) has increased dependency on remittances as an economic lifeline (see Nalane et al., 2013; and Crush et al., 2010).
The study on Cameroon also shows the remarkable effect of emigration on income levels. Almost four out of five (79.2%) return migrants who had moved to another country in the South earned more abroad than in Cameroon before they left (see Table 1). The study also found that earning a higher income was the second most important motivation to emigrate, after the search for employment and before pursuing education. While wage differentials for Cameroonian returnees from the North were positive for more respondents (87.3% of return migrants had higher wages while in the North than in Cameroon before they left) (Zourkaleini et al., 2013), it is rather surprising that earnings increased for a large majority of South–South migrants as well.2

Table 1: Distribution of return migrants by their income abroad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income abroad</th>
<th>South–South migration</th>
<th>North–South migration</th>
<th>Total migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Earned more</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earned less</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earned about the same</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Zourkaleini et al., 2013.

While there may not be a considerable impact in terms of improved access to health care, in the case of Cameroon the above finding may highlight the role of mobility as a livelihood strategy, that is, by finding employment abroad and diversifying income sources. Sometimes it is simply a matter of diversifying income rather than increasing earnings.

Migrants predominantly move to countries with higher development levels (75%) (UNDP, 2009). This has been confirmed by a recent study on the impact of South–South migration on development in Trinidad and Tobago commissioned by the ACP Observatory on Migration. Almost two out of three immigrants stated that their standard of living was higher in Trinidad (62.7%) and nine out of ten in Tobago (90.3%) than in the country of their origin (see Figures 1 and 2). This could be due to the relatively good economic performance of the country (Anatol et al., 2013).3 Generally, however, wage differentials and the effects of South–South migration on the standards of living are underresearched. Many scholars expect income differentials to be much smaller in South–South migration than in South–North migration, but it seems that in the case of Cameroonian return migrants, income differentials are higher – though it is not clear by how much.4 This shows a positive effect of South–South migration on income – one of the three dimensions of the human development concept.
Figure 1: Immigrants’ perceptions of whether their standard of living improved after migrating to Trinidad

Source: Anatol et al., 2013.

Figure 2: Immigrants’ perceptions of whether their standard of living improved after migrating to Tobago

Source: Anatol et al., 2013.
2.2.2 Positive potential of return migration in the South

The impacts of return migration seem to be positive as well. In the case of Cameroon, the effects of return, which is not necessarily the final part of the migration cycle, appear to positively influence household income. However, the observation that income was higher in households with return migrants than without may be due to selection bias if those families with emigrants had higher wages to start with, which is probably the case, as it is usually not the poorest who migrate. Almost half of the returnees brought back savings, a finding that highlights the economic reasons for leaving and returning. Expenditure on health care and education is also higher among households with return migrants than among non-migrant households. It is highest in households with members who are currently abroad. Households with returnees also have a higher rate of employment among its members compared to those without. In addition, self-employment is higher among households with return migrants (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). This is possibly due to household members having less available income once migrants have returned, as returning migrants’ wages are lower back in Cameroon. Further research is needed in order to understand the reasons for the higher rate of employment in households with return migrants.

2.2.3 Economic crisis in the North and South–South migration

Most studies on the impact of the financial and economic crises on migrants focus on migrants residing in countries in the North. Evidence from Cameroon suggests that South–South migration has increased since the beginning of the crisis. The largest share of emigrants from Cameroon who moved to other countries in the South left in the period between 2010 and 2012 (31.1%). This share increased by more than 10 per cent from the 2008–2009 period (18.2%). In contrast, migration of Cameroonians to the North was slightly higher from 2008 to 2009 (20.7%) than in the 2010–2012 period (20.3%) (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). This could be an indication that migration patterns are changing due to declining opportunities in countries in the North.

2.2.4 The effects of immigration: Livelihoods and integration

The case of Cameroon is particularly interesting, as it is an important destination country in the region. When comparing households with and without immigrants along measures of labour market participation, spending on health care, education, food and savings, the differences are insignificant (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). This “zero effect” may point to equal opportunities for immigrants and citizens of Cameroon. The proportion of members engaged in gainful employment is 10 per cent higher.
among immigrant households in Cameroon, however, which possibly indicates that immigrant households rely on other family members also being employed more than non-migrant households (Zourkaleini et al., 2013).

While the findings of the study on Cameroon indicate that the impact of South–South migration on human development is neither positive nor negative, it seems that migration presents an important livelihood strategy in which mobility does serve as a key income diversification mechanism to maintain a certain standard of living. The finding that immigration had neither a positive or negative effect on the human development of immigrants’ family members may be a sign that there are factors other than finding employment that play an important role in the decision to migrate to Cameroon. Personal security, for example, of those fleeing political instability and violence, is one of these important other factors.

Most countries in the South do not realize that they are immigration countries, and, as such, they face specific integration challenges, often due to the limitedness of funds available for social services. A 2011 report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates that integration approaches in the South need to reflect the diversity of languages, cultures and ethnicities in these countries. The authors of this report recommend addressing the protection of human rights of migrants to prevent their marginalization; specific measures currently targeting immigrants seem unrealistic. Many services are not even available to the general public, and targeted interventions for immigrant integration would probably only give rise to further resentment among local populations.

In terms of integration, the study in Trinidad and Tobago found that most participants in the household survey agreed that immigrants should be treated better (see Figures 3 and 4) (Anatol et al., 2013). Equality and fairness are key issues that need to be addressed by a coherent integration strategy. Trinidad and Tobago, which has become a destination for migrants from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia, represents an example of positive immigrant perception. In the recent household survey, almost 50 per cent of participants agreed to a certain extent that foreigners in the country carry out important work that otherwise would not be done. The authors attribute this tolerant attitude to the ethnic diversity of Trinidad and Tobago, as well as the existence of well-established immigrant communities (Anatol et al., 2013). The growing importance of Spanish as a second language in the country equally demonstrates that immigrants from the South, particularly from Latin America, are playing an increasingly important role. In addition, the country shows a demand for workers that cannot be satisfied by the local labour supply. However, locals seem rather ambivalent towards immigrants, with both strong supporters and resistance, the latter due to the perceived costs they create. Half of the survey respondents expressed
that government services are impacted by the presence of these immigrants (Anatol et al., 2013).

Figure 3: Return migrants’ perceptions of whether there needs to be more effort to ensure that immigrants are treated fairly in Trinidad

Source: Anatol et al., 2013.

Figure 4: Return migrants’ perceptions of whether there needs to be more effort to ensure that immigrants are treated fairly in Tobago

Source: Anatol et al., 2013.
2.2.4 The effects of social remittances of migrants on local development

Another study by the ACP Observatory on Migration focuses on how intangible transfers made by immigrant fishermen from Ghana, the Peuhl of Guinea and Mali, and Manjack migrants from Guinea-Bissau impact local development in Senegal’s Casamance region. Ghanaian fishermen, for example, pass on their knowledge in the conservation and treatment of fish to local women in Senegal and the Gambia. These women were then better able to export fish products to Ghana and the United Kingdom as a result of improved hygiene measures. This has resulted in economic cooperation between Ghanaian immigrants and local women in the Gambia and in Casamance in Senegal (Gueye, 2013).

Local engagement of return migrants and migrants abroad by civil society organizations in the Casamance region has led to the construction of schools and hospitals. These investments, however, sometimes lacked coordination with local authorities and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), leading to duplication and a shortage of staff in one of the hospitals. In the case of the newly established schools, the construction of separate bathrooms for girls and boys and migrants’ support for a school canteen improved the conditions under which children learn. In other cases, teachers’ salaries were supplemented with the hope to improve schooling. The local people now assign a higher value to attending school; education is generally valued more. This initiative has also contributed to higher pass rates in the final mid-level school exams.

Other intangible transfers by migrants include new forms of music (which may be introduced to and influence local artists through festivals), better hygiene practices, language skills and gender equality in community associations and in school attendance. Attitudes have been altered – as seen, for instance, in the reduced sacrificial offerings during funerals – through migrants’ suggestions and their passing on of experiences earned through migration. Attitude change is also observed in return migrants often investing in local businesses, as they consider it a better idea to bring long-term benefits than let their relatives wait for remittances.

The transfer of knowledge and capabilities by both return migrants and immigrants has been found to be beneficial for the development of the whole community. Furthermore, links with financial transfers, such as investments, have often been made when know-how is passed on (Gueye, 2013).

In the case of Cameroon, new family structures may result from the migration of family/household members. These include single-parent households, reunited families,
families with several cores in different locations and families split between several households, among others. Family and household structures are influenced by mobility and reconfigured in many contexts. Particularly in societies where extended families and/or households (as opposed to the nuclear family in many “Western” countries) play an important role, changing configurations may alter social relations as well. Impacts on gender relations are also likely and noteworthy (see, for instance, Melde, 2012).

In conclusion, the impact of South–South migration on human development is not readily obvious and requires a closer look. Emigrants and return migrants (and their respective families) in the South may experience positive human development outcomes; for instance, households with a member who has emigrated are likely able to invest more in education than households without an emigrant. Mobility is a key livelihood strategy to uphold living standards, which directly influences the human development of families and communities; therefore, mobility should not be considered a result of the failure of development. This has also been highlighted in several studies on internal mobility (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). Indeed, rapidly developing countries are more likely to produce more emigrants.

In the case of Cameroon, the positive impacts of migration (on housing, food and savings), as well as the negative (on the economic dependency of household members, for instance), seem to be greater for South–North mobility than for South–South mobility or return migration (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). This underlines that immediate and visible economic impacts may be greater, but also more diverse, in South–North than in South–South migration. In the South, smallholding farmers may move elsewhere to earn wages. In other cases, however, migrants are motivated to move to the North, as well as the South, because of wage differentials.

Mobility between developing countries, and its impact on development, tends to receive less attention. Non-monetary transfers, for example, also occur in the context of South–South migration and deserve greater analysis. Good practices, such as those in the fisheries sector in Ghana, can be passed on by migrants to host communities. Thus, immigrants can make important contributions that should be valued and which should receive more positive attention in public communication and in the media (IOM, 2011). This would foster integration and help address the xenophobia that immigrants face in many countries in the South. Lastly, many countries of destination in the South still tend to focus on emigration rather than on the large numbers of immigrants and transit migrants that some of them host.
2.3 Diasporas in the South: Drivers of development

A remarkably resilient idea, despite scholars providing a more nuanced approach, is the concept of “brain drain,” which refers to the outflow of large numbers of highly-skilled migrants, a phenomenon considered detrimental to the development of origin countries. Governments in developing countries, especially in small islands and landlocked states, consider skilled labour emigration a subsidy to destination countries. Nevertheless, UNDP (2009) found the effects of brain drain on countries of origin less negative than commonly assumed. Underlying structural constraints, such as few vacancies for tertiary educated personnel, lack of equipment (and, in the medical sector, medicines) and low pay act as push factors. Addressing these factors should be part of any strategy to retain skilled personnel. However, most health personnel in Africa tend to work in the private sector and not in the public sector to serve areas critical for the poor, namely, poor neighbourhoods and rural areas (Clemens, 2007). This internal brain drain from the public to the private sectors may even be greater in some cases than the brain drain of skilled personnel moving to other countries. While many highly skilled migrants from developing countries do move to countries in the North, a substantial portion of them also move to “regional and global labour hubs” (Bakewell, 2013) in other developing countries. At the same time, large-scale emigration of lower-skilled migrants is usually not viewed as an issue by governments.

This section focuses on the types of and trends among migrants residing in the South. In particular, it focuses on the long-overlooked diaspora members residing within the region of their origin country (Crush, 2011; Ratha and Plaza, 2011).

In this report, diasporas are defined as “people living outside their country of origin, irrespective of citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of their origin country and/or community” (ACP Observatory on Migration, 2011). This concept distinguishes diaspora members from migrants, who are defined as those who have changed their usual place of residence for at least one year. Diaspora members have an interest in maintaining a link to their community or country of origin. On the other hand, not all migrants aim to engage themselves in the development of their home country or community. At the same time, however, descendants of migrants can establish links with the country of origin of their ancestors and would thus be considered diaspora members. In practice, the two concepts often overlap, partly because of the issue of country of birth versus nationality versus identity and engagement.

There exist critiques of the view that migrants are “agents of development” (see de Haas, 2010 and 2012). Poverty alleviation and development policies are usually
understood as the responsibility of governments. Leaving “development work” to migrants, diasporas and markets has thus been criticized by de Haas (2012), who sees this as a neoliberal approach that considers migrants as “cash cows.” Other authors have highlighted a gradual change in the prevailing attitude among many migrant-sending countries from a “remit and return” approach to a transnational approach that views migrants as “economic and political ambassadors” (see Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

Emigrants are not a homogenous group; they have different interests, and their remittances consist of private funds. Some may, nonetheless, be interested in setting up businesses in their countries of origin, passing on their knowledge to others or supporting local initiatives with the know-how, contacts, funds and savings that they have.

The overall focus of diaspora studies has been on diaspora members residing in the North, especially Europe, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Melde, forthcoming). Several destination countries in Europe, such as the Netherlands and Germany, have actively engaged diaspora members residing in their territories to establish links to their home communities abroad. In Africa, this North-centric vision of the diaspora is reinforced by the declaration of the African Union that considers diaspora members in the North as the sixth African region (see Sakho, 2012a). Much less is known about diaspora members who reside in countries within their region of origin or those who have moved to other developing countries in Africa (Crush, 2011), Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Asia-Pacific region.

In an attempt to fill this gap by looking at diaspora members in the South, some key findings emerged from the studies carried out by the ACP Observatory on Migration.

### 2.3.1 Lack of data on diaspora members in the South

Possibly like their counterparts in the North, most diaspora members residing in Africa and other countries in the South do not seem to register with their consulates. For instance, in the case of Kenyans surveyed in 10 African countries, for every diaspora member registered with an embassy and consulate abroad, another six Kenyans living abroad are not (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). Data on Haitians residing in other countries in the Caribbean and Latin America are also rare (Marcelino, 2013). For Basotho migrants, available data are mainly on those working in South African mines and have migrated regularly under a bilateral agreement (Abadura et al., forthcoming). This makes it difficult for governments to know the profile and interests of diaspora members.
Official statistics on emigrants in ACP and other developing countries are often incomplete. Different data sets (such as World Bank migration data and the Global Migrant Origin Database of the University of Sussex) use varying definitions of the terms “migrant”\(^1\) and “diaspora” (Ratha et al., 2011). In addition, censuses—the most reliable source of immigrant numbers—often take place only once every 10 years (or at even greater intervals) and do not always collect accessible and cleaned-for-use data on migrants. The numbers of international migrants, in particular those residing in ACP and other developing countries with less sophisticated statistical systems on migrants, can thus vary greatly. Furthermore, not all migrants can automatically be counted as diaspora members for the reasons outlined above.

\[2.3.2 \text{Frequent returns and interest in skills transfer programmes}\]

Return migration may be a lot more feasible in the context of South–South migration, as highlighted elsewhere (Oomen, 2013).\(^1\) For instance, many migrants and diaspora members visit their relatives and friends in the countries of origin on a regular basis. A survey on Kenyan diaspora members in Africa reports that most return at least once every two years and often do not stay longer than two months each time (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). This finding confirms research on Senegalese migrants in Europe between 1975 and 2007, where only 15.4 per cent stayed for at least a year after their return and before emigrating again (Sakho, 2012b). Similar patterns can be observed both in South–North and South–South migration in certain cases. Obstacles to permanent return are mostly of a financial nature, highlighting the predominantly economic motivations for migration. Onward migration to other countries is the preferred option for those who see political instability and economic turmoil in the origin countries as an impediment to return (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013).

Rates of South–South return migration seem to be particularly among Cameroonian (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). Four out of five surveyed return migrants came back from another country in Africa and almost seven out of ten were men. The percentage of women among return migrants from the South is considerably higher than among return migrants from the North (31.6% compared to 23%) (see Figure 5). The same is true of Senegal, where almost two thirds (64.6%) of emigrants who had gone to another African country returned between 2000 and 2007 (Sakho, 2012b; Sakho and Beauchemin, 2009). In the case of Trinidad, only 3.7 per cent of the surveyed households who had an member living abroad indicated that this emigrant went to reside in another country in the South. For Tobago, this figure is 8.1 per cent. On the other hand, 8.8 per cent of interviewed return migrants to Trinidad and 19.1 per cent of returnees to Tobago came from another country in the South (Anatol et al., 2013). Returnees from within the region and other countries in the South are thus
overrepresented compared to migrants who previously lived in the North. These two examples from Cameroon and Trinidad and Tobago could be an indication that return from another country in the South is more feasible, due to lower costs and the shorter distances involved, than moving back from a country in the North. However, other factors, such as the standards of living in the destination country and whether or not the migration process has been relatively successful, may explain fewer returns from destination countries in the North.

Figure 5: Distribution of return migrants to Cameroon by sex and the region from which they are returning (North or South)

Evidence shows that political stability, improvement in the security situation and economic growth in origin countries are important reasons for return migration to some African countries. For instance, a significant proportion of people who left Sierra Leone and Liberia in the 1990s have returned. Ghana (Manuh, 2010) and Angola (Melo, 2013) have also been experiencing return migration of their respective nationals in response to political stability and economic development.

Oil and natural gas discoveries, an improving economic climate, as well as political stability, have attracted immigrants, particularly expatriates, from outside of Africa to Ghana, as well as encouraged return migration of Ghanaian professionals and semi-skilled migrants (Awumbila et al., 2013).
While many temporary return and skills transfer programmes exist in the context of South–North migration, South–South knowledge transfers are less explored. Both Kenyan and Nigerian diaspora members surveyed (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013; Olatuyi et al., 2013) expressed their interest in such programmes in a South–South context (see Table 2).

This underlines a large and yet unexplored potential, as migrants returning in an intraregional migration context may be prone to a relatively milder cultural shock than those returning from the North (Melde and Ndiaye-Coic, 2009). The greater cultural proximity and similarities between countries in the same region also mean that the effects of social remittances – that is, the ideas, behaviors, identities and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities (Levitt, 1998) – could be more impactful, depending on the context.

Table 2: Desired length of stay in Nigeria on a skills transfer programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Desired length of stay</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
<th></th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;2 weeks</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - 4 weeks</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 2 months</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 6 months</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 12 months</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>More than 1 year</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Olatuyi et al., 2013.

2.3.3. Investments

Many diaspora engagement programmes aim to leverage the investment potential of those residing abroad. Studies have shown that they need to target the actual profile of migrants rather than follow unfounded assumptions about migrants’ characteristics and interests (Orozco et al., 2010). Most migrants from countries in the South are rather poor compared to other groups of migrants. This is confirmed by studies on remittances transferred to Lesotho (see, among others Crush et al., 2010; and Nalane et al., 2013). A recent study also found that hardly any remittances sent to Lesotho are used for investment, highlighting the central role of remittances in poverty reduction and livelihood security (Nalane et al., 2013). The issue of the dependency on these remittances has been highlighted repeatedly in the context of Lesotho as well (see, among others, Crush et al., 2010; and Nalane et al., 2013).
Different profiles arise in other contexts, underlining the need to study each particular case. Of the respondents in a recent study on Nigerian diaspora members in Ghana and South Africa, a remarkable 97 per cent indicated having made investments and/or owning property in their home country (Olatuyi et al., 2013). About two out of three Kenyan migrants in Africa indicated that they owned property or assets, or had made other investments in Kenya (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). It seems that these migrants are rather well-off and do not represent a poor segment of society. This is in line with the overall finding of the study that it is usually not the poorest who migrate. Interestingly, more than nine out of ten of the surveyed diaspora members indicated interest in investing in Kenya (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). Sectors of greatest interest among these potential investors were agriculture (24%), finance (14%), manufacturing (12%), tourism (12%) and commerce (11%) (see Table 3).

Table 3: Diaspora investment in Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Query and response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owns property/assets/private Investments?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interested in private Investments?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If interested, what type(s) of private investment? (multiple responses possible)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture/horticulture</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplying</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013.
These examples highlight the need to thoroughly assess the potential and interest of diaspora members in the South, which can vary considerably among countries and should not be generalized. A universal one-size-fits-all approach does not seem to be adequate. Thus, diaspora groups may need to be approached differently based on nationality or country of origin.

2.3.4 Protecting migrants’ rights: The importance of dual citizenship and voting rights for diaspora members

Dual citizenship has been found to foster links between diaspora members and their origin country (Ratha et al., 2011). Links to the country of origin are manifold. One aspect that is receiving increased attention by policymakers and the international community is out-of-country voting. By being able to cast their ballots abroad, emigrants can maintain a link to their respective countries of origin and make their voices heard. Since the adoption of the new Constitution of Kenya in 2010, Kenyans living abroad have been granted these rights. The recent elections in Kenya can provide a case study on how this has worked in practice. A thousand Kenyans residing in countries in the East African region were allowed to vote. Associations have worked closely with embassies to support diaspora members in obtaining the required identity cards to cast their ballots (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). The production of identity or consular cards for immigrants in these destination countries – like the ones produced by Nicaragua for its nationals residing in Costa Rica – is also recommended. This was recently demonstrated by a study on the Haitian diaspora in the Caribbean. Such identity cards would enable migrants to better access services that are linked to a proof of identity (Marcelino, 2013). It would equally address the problems of statelessness faced by Haitian migrants in certain countries, an issue that particularly affects children.

Furthermore, holding the citizenships of both origin and destination countries can foster integration in the latter as many rights are based on citizenship, in particular political and civil rights, such as the right to vote and own land. Employment, trade, investments and travel between countries is also greatly facilitated (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013).

Although the 2010 Constitution grants dual citizenship rights to Kenyans, obstacles to its implementation remain; these include the high administrative burden on the part of Kenyans trying to obtain dual citizenship (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). In the case of Nigerians in South Africa, citizenship in the country of destination is often taken up to avoid the stigmatization and discrimination that many Nigerians encounter there. However, because these emigrants cannot maintain their Nigerian citizenship, some links to their country of origin are unavoidably severed (Olatuyi et al., 2013).
Basotho people in South Africa tend to take up South African citizenship, if possible, and to legally access services and employment. Since South Africa has barred dual citizenship for migrants whose origin countries do not allow dual citizenship, such as Lesotho, this means that such migrants have to cut their legal ties with their respective countries of origin (Abadura et al., forthcoming; Nalane et al., 2013).

### 2.3.5 Diaspora associations in the South

Migrant associations are a key form of linking with like-minded persons and fostering cultural practices and economic, social, sport and other types of engagement. These associations vary greatly and can range from professional networks (for example, of doctors and lawyers) to cultural and political associations. Much is known about these types of associations of diaspora members in Europe, the United States and Canada. However, hardly any light has been shed on associations existing in the countries of the South (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013).

In the case of surveyed diaspora members from Kenya and Nigeria, associations of Kenyans and Nigerians, hometown associations, Internet-based social networking groups, academic associations and investment groups are the most common type of associations and networks. Other types include networks based at workplaces, and those linked to the government and religious groups. It is noteworthy that Internet-based communication tools are the predominant means of information-sharing, followed by face-to-face meetings, contact with embassies, word of mouth, newsletters and mobile phones (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013; Olatuyi et al., 2013). Almost 20 per cent of surveyed immigrants in Cameroon, with nine out of ten being from other African countries, belong to an association. The most common focus of the engagement in these associations is volunteer work, followed by rescue services and political work. It is remarkable that two thirds of those associations aim to engage with the host country and only about a third with the origin country of immigrants (Zourkaleini et al., 2013).

While one would expect those migrant associations in the South to be smaller than those in the North, due presumably to lower financial means, some are surprisingly large in terms of membership. New Vision Kenya, based in South Sudan, has 6,000 members; the Association of Kenyans in Rwanda, 3,000; three associations in South Africa have a combined 6,500; and the Association of Kenyans in Burundi has 500 (see Table 4) (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). These are important structures for government engagement that can be utilized for diaspora policies and engagement. In particular, the role of consulates and embassies needs to be strengthened. Embassies can support diaspora members by providing information on investment and employment in the country of origin (Olatuyi et al., 2013). Political considerations, however, should
be taken into account when aiming to mobilize diaspora members: people who are close(r) to the opposition might have reservations about actively engaging with the government.

Table 4: Selected diaspora associations in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of association</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Association of Kenyans</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Vision Kenya</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Diaspora (KEDASA)</td>
<td>Pretoria/Johannesburg, South Africa</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya and Friends Association (KEFA)</td>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Community</td>
<td>Cape Town, South Africa</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations of Kenyans</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013.

One also has to keep in mind that such organizations do not exist in all places. Basotho migrants, for instance, do not identify themselves as “diasporas.” This can be due to a number of factors, including that Lesotho is a very small, landlocked country within South Africa, which creates the feeling among migrant that they have not emigrated at all. Basotho migrants apparently do not establish formal networks other than mine workers’ associations, among which one was started by the High Commissioner of Lesotho in South Africa (Abadura et al., forthcoming).

2.3.6 Limited government engagement with diasporas in the South

While many countries in the South have ministries or other entities, such as “diaspora desks,” devoted to engagement with diaspora members in the North, the link to members residing in other countries within the region is often limited and incoherent. This is true of Kenya (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013), Nigeria (Olatuyi et al., 2013), Haiti (Marcelino, 2013) and Lesotho (Abadura et al., forthcoming). In the context of Lesotho, particularly, the concept of “diasporas” is hardly known. In addition to the reasons outlined previously, this may be linked to lower levels of education among these migrants and, thus, less knowledge about the concept. Most migrants are rather poor and do not have the means to engage in anything more than providing an economic lifeline to their families and relatives (Abatura et al., 2013). In the case of Ghanaian immigrants in Guinea-Bissau and the Casamance region of Senegal, migrant associations work well with other NGOs but are without a link to decentralized government organizations (Gueye, 2013).
Nonetheless, there is great interest among governments to engage with their diasporas in ACP and other countries in the South. Since the debate on international migration and development, including in forums such as the annual and state-led Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), has focused on South–North migration, it does not come as a surprise that diasporas in the South have been “off the radar.” Studies produced by the ACP Observatory on Migration help to increase the visibility of these diaspora members.

**2.3.7 Challenges: Political instability, corruption and lack of accountability**

It is now accepted in migration and development debates that an enabling environment is needed to enhance the positive impact of mobility on development. Development can also influence migration, when, for example, political instability and the lack of human rights protection become reasons to leave a country. As an intrinsically dynamic process, development can both improve people’s lives and uproot them from their places of residence and traditional livelihoods. On the other hand, the development potential of mobility will be difficult to realize and unsustainable without the rule of law, business-friendly environments and environmental protection. Political instability, corruption, lack of accountability, poor governance, unemployment and lack of opportunities, and health issues have all been cited in studies as reasons why diaspora members refrain from engaging with and returning to their countries of origin (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013; Olatuyi et al., 2013). The absence of targeted diaspora engagement and trade policies has also been identified as an obstacle to diaspora mobilization (Olatuyi et al., 2013).

Public opinion is a key factor influencing how migrants are perceived and can foster stereotypes. While xenophobia is a recognized issue in many destination countries, it is less well studied and recognized in destination countries in the South. Crush and Ramachandran (2009) cited unemployment, increasing inequalities, poverty and poor service delivery as contributing factors to xenophobia in the South. The relative absence of measures and policies to counter xenophobia can further contribute to its increase. A good practice in linking with diaspora associations is the case of the Government of Mali. The Government meets with and participates in the activities of the Fédération des Communautés Africaine (Federation of African Communities), which represents 22 associations of nationals of other Member States of ECOWAS. The Government of Mali aims to facilitate the integration process of ECOWAS nationals through this engagement, something that could be replicated in other contexts (Seydou, 2013).
In certain destination countries in the Caribbean, migrants from both without and outside the region are stigmatized based on their nationality, particularly those from Africa (Kairi Consultants, 2013). Haitians, particularly are targets of discrimination, which has led researchers to suggest creating a special task force within the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad to address the issue of public perception of Haitians in the region (Marcelino, 2013). Kenyans in South Africa and South Sudan are likewise facing discrimination (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013), in addition to Nigerians in South Africa (Olatuyi et al., 2013). This is by far not a complete picture, but it highlights the fact that these are issues destination countries in the South need to address, in the same way they expect destination countries in the North to address similar issues concerning their own emigrants there.

2.4 South–South financial transfers

Remittances have long been one of the key aspects of the migration and development debate. While their qualities as a “development mantra” (Kapur, 2004) have been questioned by Kapur almost a decade ago, a remarkable trust in official remittances statistics continues (Melde, forthcoming).

Several shortcomings of official remittances statistics are highlighted in this section to draw out the specificities of transfers in a South–South and intraregional context. More attention needs to be given to South–South transfers, which represented an estimated 30 to 45 per cent of global remittances figures in 2005 (UNDP, 2013) and which less likely flow through official channels.

2.4.1 Understanding the statistics

The financial transfers of migrants to their origin countries, often understood as “remittances,” have been regarded for a long time as the most important link between migration and development. However, different international remittance statistics are based on different underlying definitions, complicating their measurement. Therefore, official statistics must be viewed in light of their limitations. Official remittances may refer to wages of migrants who reside abroad for less than 12 months, although they may never be transferred (at least not entirely) to the origin country; wages of personnel of embassies and transnational corporations; and transfers from one individual to another. In the last one, it is not clear who the recipient is, as the balance of payments of countries usually do not include information on the person who made the transfer (Melde and Schicklinski, 2011; Melde, forthcoming; 2013). International remittance statistics, therefore, should not be confused with the actual money that
migrants send, which is estimated to be 50 per cent higher on average when including informal transfers (World Bank, 2010). In-kind transfers, such as food and consumer items, sent through buses across borders and within countries, do not also appear in statistics despite their importance in South–South contexts, particularly within Africa.

2.4.2 The predominance of informal transfers

Informal transfers have been found to be the most important type of money transfer mechanism among countries in the South, according to estimates by the World Bank and confirmed by studies of the ACP Observatory. As a share of all transfers made, informal transfers have been as high as 87.4 per cent in the case of Lesotho (see Table 5) (Nalane et al., 2012). Formal transfers, such as those made through banks, are often marginal and negligible in the context of South–South migration. Access to banks is often restricted to large cities, transfer fees are often high and procedures may be complicated, for example, when remittances are covered anti-money laundering legislation. Money transfer operators (MTOs), such as Western Union and Money Gram, are a lot more widely used (80% in a study on emigrants from Cameroon; Zourkaleini et al., 2013). Efforts to decrease the cost of sending remittances in a South–South context should thus focus on MTOs and informal social networks, as they are widely used. Taxis, bus companies and sex workers have set up channels for money transfers, as most people do not have access to banks and costs for MTOs can be considerable. In-kind transfers are also an understudied field. Another innovative way to send money to family members and relatives is by using mobile transfers, which have also been found to increase savings.

Table 5: Major cash remittance channels used by migrants sending money to Lesotho, 2005-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel/method</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bring personally</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via a friend/ co-worker</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via post office</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via wife's TEBA (Ubank) account</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via bank in home country</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via TEBA (Ubank) own account</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via bank in South Africa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via taxis</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Via bus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other method</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,707</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: SAMP LRS, in: Nalane et al., 2012.*
2.4.3 The success of mobile banking and its repercussions

Innovative channels that are in use include mobile transfers, such as the M-Pesa system pioneered in Kenya. Such has led to a large increase in internal transfers. In some contexts, internal remittances have even been found to exceed international transfers – for example, in Kenya, Ghana and India (McKay et al., 2011) – which may reflect the fact that internal migration is three times as large as international migration (UNDP, 2009).

A rather unexpected side effect of mobile transfers has been an increase in savings among users (Muliro, 2012). For instance, many Kenyans now use their mobile phones to save money on transfers. Thus, this has shown itself to be an innovative way of “banking the unbanked,” and access to financial services is increasing tremendously through the use of mobile phones. Before 2006, 20 per cent of adults in Kenya had access to financial markets. By 2010 this share had increased to 75 per cent. While this still means that the entire country has yet to be covered (Muliro, 2012), the figure is considerably higher than the coverage of commercial banks. Overall, the M-Pesa system seems to be a remarkable success that deserves to be replicated elsewhere, as it has been in Fiji, for instance.

2.4.4 Expanding the ICT infrastructure

Information and communication technologies (ICT) are a key feature of our times. However, access to them remains highly unequal. Research in Lesotho (Nalane et al., 2012) recommends that an expansion of ICT infrastructure would facilitate the introduction of new remittance products if Internet connectivity is extended in the country. Furthermore, with this measure, access to remittance services could be increased. At the same time, remittance products could be marketed in a better way and tailored to the different needs of women and men. In addition, because postal services usually have better coverage than commercial banks, their expansion to remote areas could support increased access for remittance receivers in rural areas (Nalane et al., 2012).

Similar recommendations have been made for Haitian diaspora members in the Caribbean. Pay cards and mobile services need to be expanded, and improved internet access will be necessary (Marcelino, 2013).
2.4.5 Questioning assumptions about remittance senders and receivers

The study on diaspora members from Kenya undertaken for the ACP Observatory made an interesting discovery about recipients of financial remittances: while most studies refer to “family members and relatives” in general, it is often assumed that the spouses and children receive most of this support. In the context of Kenyan diaspora members surveyed in the research mentioned, of the most common remittance receivers were parents (28%), followed by other relatives (15%) and only then by children and spouses (12% each). Thus, close and extended family members were the most important receivers of financial aid from diaspora members (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013). Parents are considered to be more trustworthy and at the same time in greater need of support (Kinyanjui Kinuthia, 2013), probably due to the lack of formal social safety nets and services. An additional possible explanation for these figures is that grandparents are often entrusted with the care of children, who are staying in the country of origin. However, not much research has been done on remittances and the informal social security of the elderly, and the education or care of children who were left in the country of origin.

In the case of Cameroon, return migrants often sent money to two (27.4%) or three (17.9%) households (Zourkaleini et al, 2013). Less than a third of migrants in the South sent money to just one household (30.1%). While this finding is not specific to South–South migration, it sheds light on how family structures also influence remittance transfers. Since families in Cameroon tend to be large and involve several households, including through polygamy, remittances also need to be split into various parts. The benefits of emigration and remittance transfer reach more people than are apparent at first sight.

Trust and social obligations towards extended families seem to be important considerations when analysing the relationships between senders of remittances and receivers. It is also noteworthy that the concept of “family” in many African countries extends well beyond the nuclear family of just parents and children. In addition, some, such as Nigerian migrants surveyed in Ghana and South Africa view these transfers as social obligations (Olatuyi et al., 2013).

In addition to the fallacy that remittances are only sent to the closest family members, another equally false assumption is that all migrants send remittances. Not all migrants want to stay in contact with their families, or even have families in their places of origin (for example, if the entire household migrates), or need to send remittances. The household survey in Cameroon found that only 45.8 per cent of migrants in the South sent remittances over a one-year period until August/September.
2012 (60.8% in the North; 52.5% on average). Among return migrants, only about a third sent money to their families (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). Thus, remittances are not an automatic link between migration and development; rather than being one of the most important types of external financial inflows at the macro-level, the impact of remittances depends on who benefits directly from them at the micro-level.

Zourkaleini et al. (2013) assert that certain factors influence the ability of migrants to send money, such as the type of activity the migrant carries out in the host country, the level of financial independence of the migrant, the duration of the stay abroad and the type of responsibility the migrant has for family members (see also Carling, 2008 for migration to Europe). Status and gender of the migrant probably play a role as well. It is therefore essential to question the assumption that all migrants are sending money back to their home countries and look at the finer details.

Cameroonian migrants in the South (53.8%) are more likely to send more money in the case of emergencies than those in the North (42.3 %). For both regions of residence, however, this type of remittance is the most frequent one (Zourkaleini et al., 2013), indicating that remittances are often not a constant flow of money, but are sent rather intermittently. This has important implications for policymakers who want to “leverage” them for development.

In some cases, families in origin countries even send money to their migrant members, especially since the 2008 financial crisis. For Cameroonian families, having emigrants residing in the North is “more expensive” than if those emigrants were instead residing in countries of the South. The amount that households transferred to migrants in the North was higher than for South–South migrants (Zourkaleini et al., 2013). Thus, migration can also incur costs for the families involved, particularly if an emigrant is pursuing further education without simultaneously earning income, or when plans for income generation at the destination country does not work out.

2.4.6 Social remittances in the South

Social remittances – meaning the transfer of ideas, attitudes, identities, and social capital (Levitt, 1998) – have received increased attention in the context of South–North migration, but less so in a South–South perspective. Despite little research, it is evident that social remittances do have a positive impact on the friends and family members of emigrants residing in the South. A recent study carried out in the United Republic of Tanzania shows, for instance, that among emigrants, return migrants and the friends and relatives they left behind, attitudes and practices related to education, health, employment and business, gender, the environment, politics, human rights
and the distribution of wealth can positively change, thanks to the social remittances transferred in the framework of a migration experience in the South (see Figure 6) (Helgesson Sekei et al., forthcoming). Diaspora engagement can also take the form of “brain circulation,” or human capital transfer, through return (either facilitated by programmes or made independently, i.e. self-led return); diaspora tourism (i.e. when diaspora members return for holidays); diasporic or nostalgic goods, which has a niche in the market of the country of destination; trade opportunities; and, possibly, diaspora philanthropy (Agunias and Newland, 2012).

Figure 6: Respondents in Tanzania who report changing their opinion and/or behaviour

Source: Helgesson Sekei et al., forthcoming.

2.5 Internal migration and displacement

The dynamics of international and internal migration movements in Africa continue to be influenced by the continent’s history of colonization and decolonization, when colonial powers imposed borders that often divided people belonging to the same ethnic group. Colonial state delineation, which fractured Africa into States, commonly divided groups into two or more. These splintered subgroups continue to maintain familial ties with their kin both within national borders and internationally, making the divide between internal and international migration a blurred one in which customary links may overrule administrative borders. This is described by Oyeniyi (2013), who wrote about intraethnic migration:

The movement of members of sub-ethnic groups that may have been grouped with other ethnic groups to form a nation-State during the colonial rule, into their main ethnic group in another country is considered to be international migration. This is in spite of the fact that to such people, no international migration had occurred. Besides
familial ties, Africa’s porous borders, linguistic and cultural similarities, among others, have ensured that these splintered subgroups moved across borders as if no international borders exist.

Internal migration, like international migration, is mainly driven by factors such as the search for employment, even though other factors leading to migration exist, such as marriage and education, and even human trafficking and displacement.

2.5.1 Impacts of internal migration

Internal migration is mainly linked to urbanization; urban areas attract people from rural areas, who, in turn, contribute to their expansion. The Nigerian example is quite illustrative: in 1960, after the declaration of the country’s independence, the Government of Nigeria reorganized its territory into states, which encouraged internal migration. New state capitals became the home of different state agencies, departments and related businesses. These motivated job-seekers, which included construction workers, traders and civil service employees, to move. The decision of the Nigerian Government brought internal migrants to newly organized areas providing basic services and goods. Most of these migrants had access to education, health care, clean water and food due to financial gains (Oyeniyi, 2013). In the case of Angola, different motivating factors are complementing each other. Internal migrants moved during the civil war to flee the violence, but also equally because of the search for better opportunities (Lopes et al., 2013).

Internal migration can indeed have an impact on a country’s economic growth and human development. For example, internal migration has become more important for women seeking jobs in garment factories in the urban areas of Lesotho. These employment opportunities have, in turn, been effective in easing migrants’ financial burden of feeding their families (Melde, 2010). Similarly, migration towards urban centres enables access to health services, education and jobs, making migrants effective actors of development. Internal migrants indeed participate in urban development. In addition, they may become employers, either in the formal and informal sectors, and participate in the delivery of services (Meva’a Abomo et al., 2013).

Internal migration also poses risks and challenges when infrastructure and services, especially health services, do not match urban demographic growth. This has been shown, for instance, in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Meva’a Abomo et al., 2013; Gemenne et al., 2013), where migration to urban centres causes overpopulation and drives the establishment of spontaneous housing, often characterized by unhealthy living conditions and environmental degradation.
In this sense, urban planning is a determinant in defining the impact of migration on development (see also Lopes et al., 2013).

### 2.5.2 Ethnic ties

Internal migrants maintain links with their communities of origin. They establish networks based on family links and regional ethnic affiliation. This also supports survival in times of difficulty and crisis. Ethnic ties are indeed a very important parameter to take into account when analysing South–South migration, as they define not only the sense of belonging, but also the way networks are shaped and the way relationships function.

Internal migrants are sometimes treated like foreigners in their own country. They are frequently excluded from political participation, public programmes and scholarships in their places of residence. This happens partly because of strong local identities and inadequate policies pertaining to residence, including rights in the place of residence versus the place of birth. Here as well, ethnicity seems to play an important role, as it determines issues of perception among different communities, which affect the way integration takes place (Oyeniyi, 2013).

### 2.5.3 Displacement: Conflict and environmental factors

Ethnic, religious and civil conflicts, as well as natural hazards, can create situations in which many people become internally displaced. There are hundreds of thousands of Nigerians who are displaced because of conflicts, especially in cities in the north of the country. Similar trends appear in all countries that are, or were, affected by conflict, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, the Sudan (IDMC and NRC, 2013) and Angola. According to Nigeria’s National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, there were 3.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) between 2003 and 2008 in the country. De Haas suggests that population flows linked to IDPs in Nigeria are an important migration trend (Oyeniyi, 2013).

Displacement can also be influenced by development-related dynamics. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the growth of the mining sector and the establishment of nature parks have led to expropriations, which resulted in forced displacement. Relocation plans exist in such cases, but these are not always enforced, nor are effective, therefore leading to increased vulnerability and further migration (Gemenne et al., 2013). Environmental changes and occurrences are also of concern. For instance, in the ACP’s study on environmental migration in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, participants noted multiple potential environmental risks (see Figure 7).
In Haiti the 2010 earthquake provoked the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people into camps, creating long-term vulnerabilities in terms of the lack of employment, access to resources and health. The ACP Observatory study undertaken in Haiti shows that these vulnerabilities are reduced in cases of resettlement. However, these vulnerabilities are not eliminated entirely, as living costs tend to increase for resettled families compared to when they were still living in camps. Resettlement, if accompanied by appropriate policies strengthening the access to property and labour markets, is an important step towards the reduction of vulnerabilities created by natural disasters (Courbage et al., 2013).

2.6 Irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking

Irregular cross-border and transit movements, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are important facets of migration. As economies grow, the need for workers grows as well, creating a high demand for labour migration and driving irregular migration at times. In the Caribbean, irregular migration has been pointed out by various existing studies as an important trend in the region (Thomas-Hope, 2003; ECLAC, 2005; Gallina, 2010). At a crossroads between North and South America, the region is receiving undocumented migrants from Latin America, Asia, and sub-Saharan
Africa (see Map 2). This trend is also significant in Africa, and irregular migration probably represents a large share of total migration (Ponce, 2013; Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013).

The findings of different studies commissioned by the ACP Observatory confirm that it is not possible to provide exact figures on irregular migrants, smuggled migrants and trafficked persons. There are large data gaps both at the country level and on a regional scale. If only because of its clandestine nature, irregular migration creates many unknowns. It is difficult to quantify irregular migrants’ presence or activities in a country or within a region. Local and regional capacities to capture and address the phenomenon are also important issues to consider.

The phenomena of irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons are certainly rooted in existing disparities, exploitation and vulnerabilities. Also, people’s perceptions of their security and a strong desire or urge to migrate at any cost to flee poverty and oppression are closely connected to irregular migration. Furthermore, the lack of economic opportunities or possibilities for lower skilled workers to find employment, for instance, in South Africa, leads to more irregular migrant workers in less regulated sectors such as agriculture and domestic services (Crush et al., 2010). Irregular migration, in general, is facilitated by several factors such as indented and poorly guarded coastlines; in some cases, close proximity to the neighbouring country and the porosity of international borders; national and local governance issues, including corruption; and opportunist locals, such as fishermen, villagers and other citizens, who collude with human smugglers (Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013).
Definitive figures on the magnitude of migrant smuggling remain unclear because of the clandestine nature of these operations. It is difficult to collect data on trafficking in persons due to its covert nature and to the variety of stakeholders involved. Accurate data on trafficking are also difficult to obtain because trafficked persons usually do not seek protection nor report to the authorities for fear of reprisal from traffickers and authorities likewise (Melde and El Mouaatamid, 2011).

It is often presumed that migrant smuggling and human trafficking are organized by large, mafia-like criminal networks that are also involved in other criminal activities. The dynamics of human trafficking and smuggling are generally complex issues that take place at all scales.

Both trafficked and smuggled persons find themselves in vulnerable situations that compromise their ability to exercise their human rights, as well as their access to basic services, including health and education. Indeed, the frontier between smuggling and trafficking can be quite thin, as migrants who engage the services of smugglers can easily be deceived into situations of trafficking and exploitation. This is the case in Angola, where irregular migrants from the Democratic Republic of the Congo have
been reported to enter diamond mining districts and to then be subjected to forced labour or prostitution in the mining camps (Martins Almeida, 2010).

Human trafficking generates billions of dollars in profits for traffickers (UNODC, 2012). This encourages traffickers to continue to operate their networks despite the fact that many countries and law enforcement agencies are taking hardline stands. More than 80 per cent of ACP countries fully comply or have shown efforts to comply with the minimum standards of the US Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, compared to 77 per cent globally (Melde and El Mouaatamid, 2011), and 47 ACP countries have partial or full counter-trafficking laws in place (Melde and El Mouaatamid, 2011). The magnitude of the problem, however, makes it very resilient to law enforcement.

Irregular migration strongly affects the States’ capacity to manage their labour markets and also undermines their sovereignty over matters such as borders, where networks related to irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons can be very influential.

2.6.1 Human rights

As stated above, a major disadvantage faced by irregular migrants is that their status inhibits them from asserting their basic human rights in the destination country. From the moment of arrival they are vulnerable to unscrupulous actors who may take advantage of their vulnerability by offering them false work permits, passports and other settlement-related documents at exorbitant prices (Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013).

Irregular migration can also expose individuals to exploitation and abuse by authorities. The high rate of irregularity in South–South migration, coupled with weaker law enforcement in the South, implies that South–South migrants may face greater risks than those going North. This is why some migrants are avoiding the United Republic of Tanzania – specifically, because there is a high level of violence encountered at the hands of smugglers and officials, in addition to the risk of being detained (El Mouaatamid, 2010).

Because they lack legal status, irregular migrants are vulnerable to severe exploitation (see Figure 8). Many work and live in highly degrading circumstances, overcrowded houses or improvised camps. They work in informal and unregulated economic sectors. They are generally denied access to legal assistance, schooling and proper health care.
Figure 8: Type of abuse and exploitation reported by suspected victims of trafficking in Trinidad and Tobago

Type of abuse

- Physical: 9
- Sexual: 3
- Psychological: 4

Type of exploitation

- Domestic servitude: 12
- Forced labour: 4
- Sexual exploitation: 1
2.6.2 Sexual exploitation and forced labour

Even though women are not always the victims of human trafficking, they are particular vulnerable to being trafficked and forced into prostitution. It appears that traffickers utilize both legal and illegal means to transport their victims, in collaboration with local networks and corrupt government officials. Trafficking in persons in Trinidad and Tobago, especially of females, is motivated by the high demand for sex workers and the poor enforcement of existing laws. An IOM study on trafficking in persons in the Caribbean found that trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and forced labour were common forms of exploitation (Waldopt-Bonair et al., 2013).

Sexual exploitation also affects children, who are especially vulnerable. The overview study on Lesotho, for instance, shows that in some cases, children leave their houses and are forced to move to border towns in South Africa to work in asparagus farms, where they experience the exploitation. Trafficking of children from Maseru has also been carried out by long-distance truck drivers, who force these children into sex work along the way to Cape Town, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Melde, 2010).

Irregular migrants might spread diseases – including sexually transmitted diseases – during travel, as they usually do not have access to medical assistance during this time. In Africa, the largely temporary nature of migration, with migrants returning home to their families on a regular basis, creates a corridor for infection. Regions with high seasonal and long-term mobility have higher rates of HIV infection, particularly along transportation routes and in border regions.

2.6.3 Origin, transit and destination countries

There are some countries that serve as origin, transit and destination countries for human trafficking, both at the regional and global levels. The United Republic of Tanzania, for example, is both a sending and transit country for irregular migration and human trafficking, including some internal trafficking (El Mouaatamid, 2010). Similarly, Papua New Guinea is simultaneously an origin, transit and destination country for trafficking in men, women and children for sexual exploitation and forced labour from and to Asian countries. In addition, internal trafficking also occurs South–South (US DoS, 2010) (Melde and El Mouaatamid, 2011).

The same is true for the Caribbean, where trafficking in women, men and children happens in both intraregional and extraregional contexts, including from and to South and Central America, South and East Asia and from sub-Saharan Africa (ECLAC, 2009; US DoS, 2010; ACP Observatory, 2011).
Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal are also major origin, transit and destination countries of women and children trafficked to Europe, the Gulf States, other African countries and internally. In the case of Nigeria, some people are trafficked to Iran, Tajikistan and Turkey; Ghanaian boys are trafficked internally for exploitation in the fishing industry (Melde and El Mouaatamid, 2011).

2.7 Conclusion

Many assumptions about the migration–development nexus have been made in the South–North context and do not necessarily apply to South–South situations. Each context is specific and, due to the great diversity of countries across and within regions, evidence on these varied situations is of utmost importance for any policy development or adaptation.

Mobility has been a major part of life for centuries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. The fact that it has not been in the spotlight of international debates does not mean that mobility does not take place, nor that it is negligible. South–South mobility has important implications for origin and destination countries, and research and policy formulation should complement reflection on migrants in the North, with equal attention to migrants residing in other countries or regions.

Indeed, this would reflect the reality that mobility cannot be arbitrarily separated among flows within and between the North and South, but is rather a continuum in which the current era of globalization creates particular patterns according to historical and economic realities. In this sense, South–South migration is part of a wider global migration system, both influenced by it and influencing it.

The findings of the studies of the ACP Observatory suggest that the migration and development framework of South–South migration has its own specificities in several areas. The impact of South–South migration on the human development indicators of migrants and their families may be smaller than that of South–North in financial terms, but is nevertheless important for development in the long term. Furthermore, return migration seems more feasible in the South–South mobility context than in South–North migration. The importance of diaspora members in the South needs to be acknowledged, and efforts need to be made to reach out to them. The issue of South–South remittances must be approached in innovative ways so that benefits to economies, as well as to people, improve. Diaspora members from the South have a very dynamic and active profile, but they are almost invisible to governments and donors. Existing diaspora associations, innovative mobile transfers and the interest in returning among diaspora member in the South are just some aspects that merit greater attention.
Dynamics that are characteristic of diasporas in a South–North context similarly exist in South–South migration, also through regional identity-related networks. Ethnicity and family links are important factors in shaping how mobility takes place, by creating complex networks in which possible destinations, job opportunities, social security are often framed.

South–South migration is predominantly intraregional in nature. Issues related to identity and migration networks also need to be taken into account. Ethnicity, family and community links, as well as historical factors, are highlighted as important features that shape the way migration takes place within distinct regions.

Ethnicity, and more generally, the sense of belonging, not only influences interpersonal relationships (between migrants and locals, and between migrants and prospective migrants, among others), but also creates patterns of movement and residence in which borders and national identity are just parts of a more complex equation. It is therefore sometimes difficult to make a clear distinction between internal and international migration in contexts where borders are relatively recent and cut into pre-existing communities.

The examples provided in this chapter aim to highlight the specificities of South–South migration. As data on migration and their accessibility and processing is a key prerequisite for evidence-based policymaking, findings from national data systems in ACP countries are discussed in this report (in the following chapter).
3. ENHANCING MIGRATION DATA IN THE SOUTH

The large potential of migration to influence development has garnered increasing attention worldwide. As a result, there is now an awareness of the need for reliable and timely (statistical) data on migration and development that can inform and improve evidence-based policymaking and planning.

There is increasing evidence that South–South migration creates opportunities for development and human well-being. In this context, data on migration have become a crucial tool for governments to develop and implement policies that effectively harness the positive contributions of these flows to both individual and societal welfare. The ability to rely on well-collected and -analysed data on migration flows and characteristics is a fundamental precondition for day-to-day planning and decision-making, as well as long-term policy development. It is crucial for maximizing the benefits of migration and helping to minimize risks of xenophobia, abuse and exploitation of migrants.

Decision makers and policies have only limited chances to respond effectively to current migration challenges and opportunities if basic information on this phenomenon and its impacts is not available and easily accessible. Policymakers and other stakeholders must be able to rely on a comprehensive and reliable evidence base, rather than perceptions, anecdotes or discretionary decisions when planning and implementing migration and development actions.

In an effort to improve the availability of migration data in ACP countries, the ACP Observatory on Migration undertook assessments of migration data and its management in 10 of the 12 pilot countries in 2012 and 2013 (namely, Angola, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and the United Republic of Tanzania). The assessments were carried out in close coordination with the National Consultative Committees (NCCs), which are national platforms for government institutions, civil society and researchers promoting dialogue on migration and development.

The assessments provide an overview of existing national data sources that contain information on migration, including censuses and surveys, administrative records, registers and data collected along borders and at entry points. In addition, they describe migration data management and identify gaps in data availability and the way data on migration is collected, analysed and used. Finally, the assessments make recommendations for improving data collection, analysis, coordination and dissemination. These recommendations outline key measures to be taken up in the
short-, medium- and long-term to enhance the availability and quality of data on
migration for informed and timely planning, decision-making and development
of policies and programmes, as well as provide general information to the public.
Achieving this would benefit not only migrants and local populations in ACP countries,
but also governments, which will then be able to base their decisions on high-quality
data and information.

**Major sources of migration data in ACP countries**

(a) Records at border (entry and exit) points collected by immigration and border officials
(b) Censuses and household surveys collected by national statistics offices
(c) Registers of population and foreigners
(d) Administrative records of various different ministries and departments, including:
   (i) Issuance of visas by consulates abroad and at border (entry and exit) points
   (ii) Work permits issued by immigration or labour departments
   (iii) Residence permits issued by immigration departments
   (iv) Naturalization requests processed by immigration departments
   (v) Asylum requests processed by immigration and refugee departments
   (vi) Requests for the protection of trafficked persons (processed by immigration departments)
       and for services provided by various departments
   (vii) Balance of payments calculated by national banks
   (viii) Consular services (passports, visas, registration, identification, protection and the like)
       provided to migrants abroad
   (ix) Police records on the detention of irregular migrants and the removal/deportation,
       trafficking and smuggling of migrants

3.1 Data as a key tool for effective policymaking and planning

Key uses of migration data include the following:

(a) Effective planning relies on complete and accurate data. The numbers and
    characteristics of migrants entering at the border, those applying for visas
    or residence permits, or those requesting protection as asylum-seekers or
    trafficked persons, are essential for planning and budgeting of necessary
    government resources, including social services, staffing and infrastructure,
    be it at border posts or in other locations.
(b) Data on work permits, visa applications, residence permits, return and
    reintegration, assistance to trafficked persons and refugee status can be utilized
    to monitor administrative procedures and programmes linked to migration
    management, as well as to plan for proper response.
(c) Statistics can provide indicators on migration stocks, flows, profiles and
    dynamics, as well as on the impacts of migration on human development
    in countries of origin, transit and destination. Reliable data help to build a
comprehensive knowledge base of the actual migration context and needs, which is essential to providing targeted and effective responses and services:

(i) High-quality migration data and information help to make decisions and administrative processes more effective and have therefore a resource-saving component.

(ii) Knowing the volume and profile of migrants, for example, allows stakeholders to develop action plans that address the assistance and protection needs, such as those of children, trafficked persons or returnees.

(iii) Data on the education and skills of migrants allow policymakers to decide on the best labour integration strategies.

(iv) Access to information on the volume, costs and use of remittances, as well as the impact on receivers’ welfare, will allow policymakers to develop initiatives that can harness potential benefits for poverty reduction and human development.

(v) Knowing the volume, geographic distribution and characteristics of a country’s diaspora can allow for targeted services and initiatives to improve the well-being of diaspora communities and maximize the potential positive contribution to development in both origin and host societies through a wide range of programmes.

(d) Data on regional migration flows and profiles, as well as labour shortages and skills, can help facilitate mobility and cross-border cooperation on migration. Such information is also essential for regional initiatives fostering free trade associations or mobility schemes.

(e) The systematic collection of data on agreed indicators can provide relevant stakeholders with insights on progress and achievement of policy and programme objectives. Such indicators can help relevant stakeholders take corrective action or help identify those actions that are working well and could thus be replicated.

Relying on timely and accurate data is crucial for all governments that wish to move away from a discretionary and non-transparent approach to migration management. Governments that really wish to develop informed and effective policies on migration and development urgently require such data. To have it available will benefit countries in general and migrants in particular.

3.2 Existing statistical data and analysis on migration

International debates on migration and development often mention the lack of basic data on migration as a key challenge to migration and development governance
in the South (GFMD, 2012). Contrary to this perception, the data assessments carried out in 10 ACP countries found that all countries collect data on migration. Most of these countries possess several data sets that include information on migration. Administrative data sources often contain rich information on migration, which, however, is insufficiently utilized. Nonetheless, some countries show a limited statistical infrastructure and poor statistical information. Angola, for instance, has not carried out a census since 1970, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, since 1984 (Lopes, forthcoming and Lelu, 2013). Lesotho does not collect any data at border and entry points. Most of the countries assessed rely partially, and in some cases heavily, on paper-based data systems that render comprehensive compilation and analysis of data unfeasible (Dayang, 2013; Kweka, forthcoming; Lelu, 2013; Sefika, 2013). Furthermore, migration data is generally difficult to compare, which is also a recurrent problem in the North.

While migration data do exist in the South, they are often not systematically utilized, analysed and disseminated. As a result, public information and analysis are insufficient and not easily accessible to relevant stakeholders and policymakers. Most of the ACP government institutions assessed currently use data to meet specific internal administrative and regulatory requirements, such as tracking applications, enforcement actions and reporting (Dayang, 2013; Esteves, 2013; Fadayomi, 2013; Kweka, forthcoming; Lelu, 2013; Olum, 2013; Sefika, 2013). They often do not consider such data as a valuable national asset in policymaking and planning. Despite the many potential uses of migration data, security concerns tend to take priority over all others. While data protection is essential, this emphasis on security often blurs the bigger and more useful picture. Therefore, the key challenge of bringing together all data producers and users to develop a coordinated approach remains. Raising awareness on the importance of migration data as a tool in decision-making at all levels is crucial in this regard.

### 3.3 Data gaps

Inaccurate data and data gaps persist in many areas. The 10 ACP countries assessed have only limited data on diasporas, remittances, forced migration, human trafficking, as well as irregular and transit migration. In addition, basic information on the characteristics and profiles of migrants (reasons for migration, socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds, education and skills) remains unavailable in several countries. Furthermore, all assessed countries lack adequate information on the impact of migration on development and vice versa. The need for increased data collection and new methodologies on motivations, profiles and impacts of migration will be discussed further in subsequent sections.
3.4 Data analysis, reporting and sharing

Despite the gaps observed, several ACP countries possess rich sources of data, as mentioned previously. These sources often remain untapped – kept in computer files or filing cabinets. In fact, the major shortcoming identified in all of the countries assessed is the shortage of analysis and the querying of existing data sources. Data that are already available could be used much more effectively. Most government institutions collect data solely to fulfill internal administrative procedures and needs, as is the case with maintaining information about regulated entities and regulatory activities (for example, tracking applications, permits, site inspections and enforcement actions), rather than for more sophisticated analysis, reporting and/or sharing (Dayang, 2013; Esteves, 2013; Fadayomi, 2013; Kweka, forthcoming; Lelu, 2013; Olum, 2013; Sefika, 2013).

Sensitivities surrounding the topic of migration, as well as the perception of migration as a security issue, in many cases hinder existing efforts to make data available to relevant stakeholders. Although the importance of migration data for policymaking is increasingly recognized in public debates in many ACP countries, most government agencies continue to consider such as the property of the entity collecting it. Data collected by national statistics offices need to be accessible to, for instance, university researchers to ensure deeper analysis. National institutions in charge of administering migration statistics often neither have the necessary human resources nor is it their role to process and present data to external users. These factors often lead to limited national data reporting.

The assessments reveal that public institutions often view knowledge obtained by the government as the sole property of the ministry collecting it, not to be shared with researchers or even with other ministries. In many cases, existing regulations requiring ministries to share their data with national statistics offices are not enforced, further hindering the development of comprehensive statistical information (Dayang, 2013 and Lelu, 2013).

Some national actors, especially members of the National Consultative Committees (NCCs), have begun to improve the availability of migration data at the national level by promoting a collective approach across government institutions and establishing working groups on migration data, with focal points from all relevant institutions to connect data producers and data users.
3.5 Data management capacity

Challenges related to data management capacity in ACP countries include the continued reliance of several countries on partially or completely paper-based data collection systems. In these countries, data are often stored in filing cabinets in the offices of various government agencies, making analysis, reporting and dissemination nearly impossible. A second group of countries collects data on paper and subsequently converts them into digital format (primarily, Excel files or computer databases). When digital databases exist, they are mainly used to manage repositories of information related to a particular aspect of migration management, such as border control or the issuance of work permits (e.g. as with PIRS databases16). ACP countries, which receive a large number of tourists, tend to have better data, generated, specifically, by airlines, entry and exit points, as well as during hotel bookings.

None of the countries assessed has an integrated migration information sharing system. There is no network-based institutional framework supported by information technology to allow for data to be collected, integrated, shared and analysed between government ministries and departments. The data available are neither disseminated nor used to support decision-making. A migration information system would help increase the quality, efficiency, and accountability of decision-making processes through applications that systematically use migration information on migration. Harmonized migration data sets are the crucial result and benefit of improving data availability; facilitating access to data; ensuring that data are internally consistent; and ensuring that different data sets match each other.

In addition to these technological constraints, human resource capacities require strengthening in most of the ACP countries assessed. This is particularly important in areas such as statistical analysis methods and the analysis of migration data in general terms, as well as specific technical skills necessary for data analysis, reporting and sharing. Such skills can be utilized only if there is sufficient awareness of the importance of data on migration and the willingness to use it for planning and policy making.

3.6 Data legislation and procedures

Currently, data on migration – whether personal or statistical – are considered confidential by default. Little data is publicly released. Few countries have regulatory frameworks to protect and classify data. Without clear guidelines on data protection and sharing, government officials often choose to deny access to data across the board, to be “on the safe side,” which can significantly impede access to data cross-institutionally and among the public (Esteves, 2013).
3.7 Recommendations for enhancing availability and accessibility of migration data

Increased awareness of the importance of migration data and their potential uses is crucial in promoting a collective approach to data as a national resource for policymaking and planning in the areas of migration and development and as a necessary tool for maximizing the benefits of migration.

Minimal investments of time and resources often go a long way in improving the availability of better migration data to a wider range of data users in formats that they can easily access and use. A first step is to identify data that have already been collected by various institutions. These data can be compiled and analysed to produce more comprehensive information. Depending on needs, priorities and resources additional indicators should be identified that stakeholders wish to collect, analyse and publish in a regular national report.

Coordination between data producers and users is crucial. In this sense, existing platforms for dialogue and exchange on migration and development, such as the NCCs could act as important starting points for raising awareness on the importance of migration data for policymaking and governance. Such committees exist in some ACP countries and include researchers and civil society representatives, in addition to government entities. They also can help to create more avenues for coordination and sharing of data, at least at the national level. Research centres and universities are the missing link between the statistical data producers at the national level and the end users.

While data on migration in the South does exist, it is currently not fully leveraged, analysed or updated. Lack of access to such data is a key issue constraining its compilation and analysis. Enhanced awareness and political will, as well as supportive regulatory frameworks and institutional guidelines, are necessary for building the knowledge base that supports effective decision-making and planning on migration and development. It is equally important that decision makers realize the benefits of accurate and comprehensive migration data and the possible damage done when decisions are based on inaccurate and incomplete information.

Based on the findings of Chapter 1, which looks at South–South migration by thematic area, and this chapter’s assertion of the importance of analysing and sharing migration data, the next chapter tackles the place and role of South–South mobility in global migration.
4. SOUTH–SOUTH MIGRATION: TOWARDS A PARADIGM SHIFT?

The studies undertaken on behalf of the ACP Observatory on Migration, as described in the preceding chapters, brought interesting insights that raise questions about the way South–South migration is perceived and addressed by policymakers. The available studies and data on intraregional and extraregional trends indicate the need to consider mobility in a holistic way and to recognize both the diversity and interrelatedness of its patterns. Acknowledgement of the commonalities and differences between several patterns of migration that we tag as “South–South” is indeed a first and very important step towards new policy approaches, as well as towards overcoming the classical South–North divide and the way it is addressed by the international community. More than that, it is an important step towards taking into account the emerging trends brought about by globalization and by the “rise of the South” (UNDP, 2009), particularly the way they are shaping global, regional and local mobility, and influencing global economic and social dynamics.

The studies of the ACP Observatory seem to indicate that it is time to consider shifting, or at least complementing, existing paradigms to include a Southern perspective. The following sections outline the main issues that should be considered in this aim.

4.1 Issues of definition: Is the South a useful category?

The first question that arises when discussing mobility in the South is “What does this category mean and is it useful?” Bakewell (2009) pointed out that definitions of the global South vary widely. The World Bank considers the South to consist of all countries not considered “high-income”; the United Nations, the less and least developed regions; and UNDP, those countries without a very high Human Development Index (HDI). Different countries are thus considered to be part of the South or North depending on the definition used.

These definitional issues affect the figures that are presented when discussing South–South migration (GFMD, 2012). International migrant stocks in the South range from 36 per cent, following the World Bank definition; to 40 per cent, following that of the United Nations; to 44 per cent, according to the UNDP definition (UNDESA, 2012). According to the United Nations, many international migrants move
to other countries in the South, albeit with the flow increasing at a slower pace than South–North migration over the past 20 years (UN DESA, 2012).

While some academics criticise the dichotomy between South and North as reinforcing political divisions, we intentionally labelled the mobility among the countries not presenting with a very high HDI as South–South migration, with the aim of shedding light on it, specifically its characteristics and, consequently, to attract more attention from researchers and policymakers.

4.2 Data and methodological specificities in the South

Generally, the low level of visibility given to mobility in the South is attributed to the scant evidence base. However, and as highlighted in Chapter 2, data sources exist, but are not often accessible, analysed, updated and made public. Access to information is a key issue constraining the examination of statistics on mobility in the South. Different entities may collect certain types of data, but usually other government departments are not aware of these data due to low level of or non-existent data-sharing practices. Evidence from studies of the ACP Observatory shows that in ACP countries, the lack of political will and infrastructural and human resource capacity constraints tend to limit the understanding of the value of migration data, its multiple purposes and, consequently, the investment in capacity to effectively manage migration data. Where regulatory frameworks do not exist, they need to be put in place to protect data and consequently enable increased access to migration information.

As for methodologies, new and tailored approaches are needed to analyse and understand South–South migration. In particular, a context-specific approach should be applied. The need for such a contextual approach was brought to the fore by most studies of the ACP Observatory; for example, context-specific needs required that female interviewers were available in many cases. Berriane and de Haas (2012) highlighted in a publication, *African Migrations Research*, that innovative and cost-effective methodologies are needed for an improved and holistic understanding of mobility. Lessons can be learned from the studies of the ACP Observatory. For instance, those concerning diasporas used online surveys, a methodology which was found to have limited reach and to be affected by selection bias, as it reached only those who had access to the Internet and were, therefore, well connected on social networks, among other things. Such methods often needed to be complemented by face-to-face interviews.
4.3 Predominance of internal migration and its positive potential

Whereas international migration is receiving much attention, internal movements remain by far the larger type of mobility. UNDP (2009) estimated that globally internal migrants outnumber international migrants three to one, which means that one out of four migrants is an international migrant, while the remaining three are internal migrants. According to UNDP (2009), an estimated 136 million people have moved within China alone, and 42 million within India. Therefore, the numbers of internal migrants in these two countries alone almost equal international migrant stocks globally.

Despite the significance of internal mobility, policymakers and development practitioners often still consider it the result of the failure of local development efforts. Internal mobility is rarely considered as enabling and catalytic of local and national development. In contrast to this perception are the findings of some of the studies of the ACP Observatory, which have recognized the potential of internal migration for human development (Guterres et al., 2013; Lopes et al., 2013; Meva’a Abomo et al., 2013; Oyeniyi, 2013). It is still important to keep in mind that urbanization is increasing globally. It creates megacities that are facing huge challenges in terms of infrastructure and service delivery. A contrasting example to cities in Africa and Latin America, as well as other parts of Asia, is China, where mega-slums have not developed. Through very strict mechanisms and mobility controls, the development of mega-slums was avoided; cities in the country, however, face other challenges. Given the large number of internal migrants in ACP countries and elsewhere, a more balanced approach is needed to fathom the benefits and potential risks of this form of mobility.

Similarly, data on Kenya, as well as studies on India and Ghana, have indicated that internal remittances may outnumber cross-border transfers (McKay et al., 2011; Muliro, 2012; World Bank, 2013). This reflects the magnitude of internal migration, a topic hardly studied or discussed despite larger poverty reduction potential than international remittances for an even larger number of people. While this is generally true, it is also true that semi-skilled and low-skilled workers move to areas where remittances come from. This is one factor driving rural–urban migration.
### 4.4 Importance of intraregional migration

South–South migration is mainly intraregional. According to UN DESA (2012), “a large majority of international migrants residing in Africa (81%), Asia (75%) and Latin America and the Caribbean (60%) were born in their major area of residence.” This, of course, influences migration patterns and the way they are defined, as proximity, or regionalism, allows ethnic or family networks to play an important role. The ACP Observatory study on labour mobility in the ECOWAS region (Awumbila et al., 2013) highlighted these family and regional linkages, showing how, in certain sectors in West African countries, newly arrived migrants tend to be hired by their co-nationals, such that migrants from certain countries eventually dominate certain economic sectors in their country of destination.

Intraregional migration does not take place along a few fixed corridors, but rather through net-like patterns, in which countries of origin are also countries of destination and transit. In this context, the distinction between internal and international migration is made more complex by a wide range of factors ranging from ethnicity, to historical trends and family links. Indeed, questions like the following beg to be asked: Did colonization and the consequent creation of international borders turn pastoralist populations into migrants? Other movements, including seasonal ones, are scheduled according to climate patterns rather than to the presence of borders. Migration that follows agricultural production schedules, in which migrants circulate according to the seasonal need for labour, and cross-climatic areas, is a kind of mobility that may be an activity in itself, or a diversification strategy, and highlights the highly dynamic nature of intraregional migration.

Given the interrelatedness of internal and international migration, a scholar working on mobility in Nigeria has suggested the use of the terms “intra-“ and “inter-ethnic migration” instead (Oyeniyi, 2013). While a migrant moving from the north of Nigeria to the south over a distance of 3,000 kilometers is considered an internal migrant, another migrant travelling 300 m to cross the border and arrive at a place where people of the same ethnicity live is considered an international migrant. Thus, considering ethnicity, in addition to spatial movements, may more adequately reflect longstanding mobility schemes and patterns, while its fluidity and dynamic character may pose different challenges.

It is therefore important, when intraregional migration is concerned, to identify all the parameters that affect it and to keep in mind that these may vary from those involved in extraregional migration. This said, extraregional migration itself can influence intraregional migration. This has been shown in the case of rural migrants...
moving to urban areas from which urban dwellers, in turn, migrate to the North (as discussed in Chapter 1), as well as in the case of transit countries, such as Niger, that become destination countries for migrants who are stuck there due to changing migration realities in Europe (Awumbila, 2013; Brachet, 2012).

4.5 Emerging trends: Extraregional migration, the rise of regional and global hubs, and long-term transit

The traditional migration channels bringing people from the South to the North are an important reality, but they are now being mirrored within the South. More and more Africans are found establishing trade links, working, studying and teaching English in China (Fowale, 2008; Skeldon, 2011; Østbø Haugen, 2012) and South America, while Asians migrate to the Caribbean, (including to work in the construction sectors), the Pacific or Africa, following the trends of globalization (Manente, 2012). In this respect, it is indeed important to question the relevance of labelling all these movements as simply “South–South,” as underlying them are much more complex mechanisms related to both historical and emerging trends. Moreover, several African countries are increasingly acting as magnets, both at the regional and international levels, pulling migrants from both the North and the South.

Proposals for alternative categorizations of these movements not only include intraregional migration and extraregional migration, but also mobility anchored on regional and global labour hubs (such as the Gulf countries, and cities in China, India, Brazil and South Africa) and migration patterns based on historical ties (such as between Lusophone African countries) (Bakewell, 2013; Martin, 2009). These may reflect the current “rise of the South” (UNDP, 2013) that has altered and will continue to alter the economic and political predominance of “Western” countries, with repercussions on mobility patterns. Increasing anecdotal evidence of a rising North–South migration is just one of its implications (IOM, 2013).

4.6 Feminization is less pronounced

A recurring paradigm over the past years has been the “feminization of migration.” It refers to the increasingly active participation of migrant women in the processes of mobility. Though initial analyses of migration assumed that most migrants were young males, and that women would only move to reunite with their family members, a global trend showing an increasing feminization of migration became evident.
Nonetheless, this trend has not yet been confirmed for the entire South, where such a feminization is less apparent. Regional variations exist. According to UN data, in 2010, 45.3 per cent of all international migrants residing in less developed regions were women, below the global figure of 49 per cent and 51.5 per cent in more developed regions. Only in Latin America and the Caribbean is the percentage of female migrants (50.1%) shown to be higher than the global average of 49 per cent (UN DESA, 2009).

Feminization in the South thus seems to be less pronounced and can be as little as under 10 per cent in Swaziland and Mozambique and 16.4 per cent in Lesotho (Dodson et al., 2008). Thus, overall, mobility in the global South still seems to be a more masculine phenomenon. Women may face more difficult obstacles, including cultural, financial and human capital constraints, when participating in international migration which seem less pronounced in internal mobility. It is clear, as shown by the several studies cited in this report, that the question of gender in South–South migration is indeed complex, presenting new perspectives for future policy-relevant research.

### 4.7 Migrants are younger

While in more developed regions the share of migrants under 20 years amounted to only one out of nine migrants in 2010 (10.4%), almost one in four international migrants in less developed regions was in the same age group (23.2%) (UN DESA, 2011). In Africa, child and young migrants (0–19 years of age) represented 28.3 per cent of the total of migrant stock; in Asia, 21.3 per cent; in Latin America and the Caribbean, 22.5 per cent; and in Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, 20.1 per cent, 18.2 per cent and 24.3 per cent, respectively (UN DESA, 2011).

The tendency for migrants in the South to be younger does not seem surprising given the different demographics in most countries in the South. These societies tend to be younger overall and have lower life expectancies compared to ageing societies in the North. The lower average age in many of these countries is thus reflected in the characteristics of their emigrants. While recognition of the challenges faced by young people is not new, it has not yet been fully translated into policies focusing on minors and young people in international migration.

### 4.8 Remittances in the South are different, diasporas are overlooked

Discussions on migration and development at the international level seem to focus on both diaspora members residing in the North and the remittances sent by migrants
in the North to the South. Given the importance of intraregional migration, a shift is needed in these debates to put equal focus on diaspora members in the South. Some key issues in this regard have been pointed out in Chapter 1 and include the following:

(a) Skills circulation is already taking place in the South, probably also due to the selective nature of most immigration and regional free movement regimes.
(b) The motivation to earn higher salaries is also true of migrants in the South, not just of migrants residing in the North.
(c) There is an advantage to leveraging the interest of diaspora members in the South in transferring their skills and investing in their origin country.
(d) There is a lack of mapping and engagement with diaspora associations in the South on the part of their governments.

Financial transfers need to be studied in more depth, and the specificities of transfers in the South taken into account. Existing figures underestimate South–South financial transfers, which are mostly informal in nature. Innovative channels exist that need to be explored further. Many countries in the South have skipped certain technological advancements, such as landlines and computers, and have gone straight to using mobile phones or, in some cases, smart phones. These leaps need to be reflected in methods for transferring remittances as well, as it is unlikely that traditional bank transfers will become more feasible or at least more accessible than mobile technology.

### 4.9 Returns are more feasible and widespread

Return migration tends to be understood within the context of either: (a) a State expelling migrants from its territory because of a violation of its entry requirements or the rejection of their asylum applications, or (b) transferring skills, as with temporary return programmes. Return, however, is an integral part, though not necessarily the end, of the migration cycle.

Voluntary and temporary return migration seems to be more feasible in a context of intraregional mobility. However, the assumption that South–North migration is more relevant than South–South migration also means that return in a South–South context is less understood (Bastia, 2011). Due to the porosity of borders in the South, return migration is more difficult to distinguish from circular migration, cross-border migration and re-emigration (Oomen, 2013). Geographic and cultural proximity and lower travel costs may explain why return among migrants in the South seems to be a lot more common than is usually assumed. The greater ease of re-entry into destination countries in the South should return not be permanent is probably an equally contributing factor.
Land distribution issues seem to be of particular concern when forced migrants return. The properties of refugees are, in their absence, often occupied by other members of the community. Without access to land in their communities of origin, most return migrants tend to move to urban areas, which carries implications for infrastructure planning and labour markets (Melo, 2013).

Return in the South is an important dimension of mobility, with implications for reintegration and access to land and social services. Return can either be voluntary or forced, regardless of whether emigration took place at the free will of emigrants or was a result of force, as in the case of political instability, armed conflict or natural or man-made disasters.

4.10 Forced migration, crises situations and environmental influences are more likely

Contrary to public belief, particularly the image of a “tidal wave” (de Haas, 2008) of migrants coming to Europe, countries in the South host the majority of refugees (81% in 2012) (UNHCR, 2013), and all internally displaced persons (IDPs) (IDMC and NRC, 2013). Refugees represent 16.2 per cent of international migrants in less developed regions, compared to 1.9 per cent in more developed areas (UN DESA, 2012). Whereas personal security can be an important factor in the decision to move, not all persons that flee persecution seek refugee status. About half tend to live outside refugee camps, with their family members, and in urban areas.

The repatriation of migrants caught in crisis situations and of stranded migrants is of particular concern in several countries. Humanitarian crises can impact migrants, and consequently their human development, when income sources are lost, many workers are displaced or reintegration challenges in origin countries are not prepared for large-scale returns. Crises in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic have increased the numbers of refugees and IDPs to levels last seen 20 years ago (UNHCR, 2013; IDMC and NRC, 2013). Thus, in some cases, countries in the South are hosting large forced migrant populations, creating challenges to infrastructure, among others, for those countries.

The 2011 UK Foresight Report (UK Government Office of Science, 2011) found that most migration linked to environmental degradation and climate change takes place internally within countries in the South. The most important environmental factors influencing the decision to move are not sudden environmental events, but rather slow-onset changes such as desertification, droughts, sea level rise and floods. The poorest, meaning those without the means to migrate, are not able to move as
an adaptation strategy to these environmental stresses and must endure adverse conditions. At the same time and counterintuitively, many people are moving towards environmentally degraded and hazardous areas prone to landslides and floods, among others. This applies in particular to low-lying delta areas and large cities.

The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has shown that land-grabbing, deforestation and volcano eruptions can displace populations. People may not be willing or be able to move due to insecure land rights, the loss of which would take their livelihood source away. Economic hardships and insufficient planning have made migration more of a fact of life for affected populations than an adaptation strategy per se (Gemenne et al., 2013).

In the Pacific Islands, migration has been a part of life for centuries. Today, the contributions migrants make to their host countries may be a more important focus than their designation as “environmental migrants” or even refugees. Preparing for migration in light of environmental factors that might restrict the spaces in which people can live, such as sea level rise, should involve acquiring needed skills in potential destination countries (Weber, forthcoming).

Whereas many countries in the North are fearing an “invasion of refugees,” economic migrants and those fleeing from adverse environmental conditions, these types of migration are already taking place – but in the South. It is therefore time to move away from a Western-centric approach and take a broader perspective that includes existing host countries in the South and reinforces cooperation and capacities wherever needed.
5. CONCLUSION

Regardless of the definition of “South” or of the other terms used, global power constellations are changing, and migration patterns are changing with them. At the global level, the predominance of the West is being complemented with other emerging powers, leading to what UNDP (2013) has called “a more balanced world.” With the rise of the BRICS countries and other regional poles, such as Angola, Barbados, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, mobility to and from those countries needs to be put on the agenda. Reasons why intraregional mobility will likely increase further in the future include: lower cost of travel, an increasing importance of regional economic integration, restrictive immigration policies in the North (Hujo and Piper, 2010) and the impact of the economic crises in the North, leading to a slowdown of South–North migration and even intensifying reverse migration trends from the North to the South.

The growth of the BRICS countries, and in particular their middle classes, will give rise to an increased demand for migrant workers in these countries. Middle classes in the South increased from 26 per cent of the global share in 1990 to 58 per cent in 2010, and are expected to soon grow to 80 per cent, led by China and India (UNDP, 2013). These constellations may result in more migration towards these countries with increased needs for both specialized and low-skilled workers.

The fact that many countries in the South are also immigration countries is not new (see Hujo and Piper, 2007 and 2010, and OECD, 2011). Nonetheless, for reasons related to a predominance of South–North migration in both research and policy focus and to the dependence on donors from the North (Melde, forthcoming), this South–South perspective of mobility has not received the attention it merits. Advocating for looking at regional specificities, Czaika and de Haas (2013) call for “the need to look beyond global averages.” Countries as diverse as Angola, Barbados, Timor-Leste and the United Republic of Tanzania are attracting immigrants, a fact blurred by the South–North dichotomy in most studies and policies.

5.1 Main findings on mobility in the South

The main findings from the literature and the studies by the ACP Observatory question some of the prevailing migration-development paradigms and raise the following concerns to be addressed:

(a) The need to expand attention to movements away from a narrow focus on a number of South–North corridors. In particular, intraregional and extraregional mobility within the South must receive greater attention.
(b) Data on migration in ACP countries often exist, but are not processed, analysed or made available. Methodologies need to move away from Western-centric approaches and take local specificities into account.

(c) Internal mobility is the most important type of movements. Unlike common perceptions, it has a positive human development potential and is not just a development failure, as the case of Nigeria has shown.

(d) Except for Latin America and the Caribbean, feminization is less pronounced in the South, as examples of Cameroon and Southern African countries have shown; mobility is still mostly a mostly male phenomenon.

(e) Migrants in the South, such as Cameroonians who emigrated to other African countries, are younger than those in the North. Young migrants, be they children of migrants or independent child migrants, face particular challenges, for instance, in light of high youth unemployment rates.

(f) Diaspora members in the South are overlooked in research and policy discussion, despite skills circulation taking place and a high degree of organization in some cases, such as with Kenyan diaspora organizations in Africa.

(g) Remittances sent within the South are mostly informal – in some cases almost 90 per cent, as in Lesotho – and thus necessitate different and innovative approaches that take this into consideration.

(h) Return migration in a South–South context seems both more likely and to occur on a larger scale than in South–North migration, as the cases of Senegal, Cameroon and Angola have demonstrated.

(i) Most forced migrants reside in other countries in the South, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, creating specific protection needs.

(j) Migration influenced by the environment is already occurring in countries in the South and is not a future scenario, as evidence from the DRC and the Pacific Islands shows.

Overall, it is time for governments in the South to place greater emphasis on intraregional and extraregional South–South migration. Diaspora members in the South are also interested in engaging with their communities and countries of origin, but have been largely left out of the picture. Social and political transfers (Hujo and Piper, 2010) by diaspora members can be enhanced through innovative new channels and technologies that need to reflect the different contexts in each country. The reliance on mobile transfers and saving systems, as well as other, often more accessible channels for sending money and goods, provide good examples that can inform debates and policy interventions that better respond to the specific South–South migration context.

The geographical migratory focus must include a larger vision of migration dynamics and take into account that new migration magnets and regional hubs
have emerged. More development has also meant that more countries have become emigration countries because mobility is increasingly affordable to more people (see also Czaika and de Haas, 2013). Countries in the global South face some of the same challenges as the more traditional immigration countries in the North, such as those related to the integration of immigrants, migrant workers’ rights and gender issues, but also have their own set of particular considerations, in particular youth unemployment, which is creating push factors for mobility. These considerations call for a rethinking of mobility, in preparation for new patterns and challenges that will arise in the next decades.

5.2 Key recommendations: Making research policy relevant

While this publication shows that information and research is often available, the missing link is frequently bridging the gap between research and policy.

The rationale of the ACP Observatory is to address this shortcoming of many research projects. Its structure is based on demands by National Consultative Committees (NCCs) that bring together governmental representatives, researchers and civil society in the ACP Observatory’s pilot countries. This has proven to be a balanced approach that incorporates the interests of all three actors. The NCCs have provided a platform, in many cases for the first time, to discuss migration issues with other officials and ministries and to present concerns and findings by academia and civil society.

Similarly, by ensuring the policy relevance of the published studies, researchers working with the ACP Observatory had to consider the implications of the empirical evidence they presented. Without concrete and feasible policy recommendations, policy design or adaptation will be hampered. Equally, government representatives appreciated the provision of concrete data and information to inform their actions.

How this knowledge will be used now depends on the consultation processes at the national level, as well as political will. In certain cases, this has already taken place, for instance, regarding migration policy in Lesotho, and diaspora policy in Nigeria. Furthermore, in Trinidad and Tobago, the Minister of National Security has shown marked interest in the research of the ACP Observatory and has inquired regarding follow-up. The NCC has also been institutionalized under the leadership of the ministry. In Papua New Guinea, the NCC has been formalized as the Working Group on Migration and Development, under the leadership of the Immigration Services of Papua New Guinea. This is the first platform existing in the country to discuss migration issues. Kenya is using the results of the ACP studies on labour migration and diasporas to better inform the country’s new migration policy.
5.3 New policy challenges in the South

Countries in the global South face certain challenges, such as data collection and dissemination, integration of returnees and xenophobia, to name a few. In addition, migration flows from other countries in the South, and in some cases the North, need to be regulated and integrated into public policies, where they exist. Where migration policies are being developed for the first time, these changing migration dynamics need to be taken into consideration.

Contrary to public belief, many countries in the South are enacting highly restrictive and exclusionary policies towards immigrants, similar to the ones in the North (UNDP, 2009). The role of the South in global migration dynamics, which is not entirely new in historical terms, but still has not been fully embraced and realized, needs to be accompanied by a global discussion on international migration policies. Learning from the failure policies that did not work in countries in the North that have more long-standing experience with immigration policies should be one pillar. The second should be to inspire migration policy design in the South on best practices everywhere, whether North or South. New policy challenges in the South should thus be approached from a holistic view transcending the South–North dichotomy.

The year 2013, which will see the second United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, offers a chance to open the discussions on the migration-development nexus to perspectives from the South, and to move beyond the dichotomy of countries of origin in the South versus countries of destination in the North. Most States today – including those in the North – are origin, transit and destination countries. It is important to move beyond those traditional lines of thinking and focus on the often fast-changing reality on the ground.

Expanding the evidence base is just the first step. The post-2015 framework offers an opportunity to use our existing knowledge base for integrating mobility in global development cooperation. In 2010 one of seven people on this planet was either an international or internal migrant. It is time for this type of mobility to fully enter the development debates as an enabler of human development with potential risks and not as a failure from the outset, particularly in the context of highly mobile countries in the global South.

Key recommendations from a South–South perspective to take into consideration during the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the discussions on the post-2015 development framework are the following:
(a) Make better use of existing migration data through capacity-building and resource identification.
(b) Include the South–South perspective fully in all migration and development discussions.
(c) Consider recent developments, such as the rise of mobility to BRICS countries and other regional and global migration hubs, in policy discussions and development.
1. Most ACP countries define the period of usual residence as between 3 and 6 months, while the United Nations recommends at least 12 months as the threshold for long-term migrants and between 3 and 12 months for short-term migrants. Usually, statistics are only based on the former. The ACP Observatory on Migration has therefore prepared a Research Guide (ACP Observatory, 2011) to ensure the consistency in the definitions of concepts used in its studies (for data collection beyond national statistics on international migrants, as these are based on definitions used by respective countries and are specified in the study reports).

2. See, for instance, Ratha and Shaw (2007), who assume them to be relatively small.

3. Trinidad and Tobago is expected to be classified as a high income country by 2014. Under the UNDP classification, it has a high HDI.

4. This is a difficult aspect to research, as there is hardly any available official data on income levels. In addition, most survey respondents are very reluctant to indicate concrete amounts when it comes to financial data.

5. Migrants may re-emigrate.

6. Those surveyed were the heads of households that are: (a) without migrants, (b) with immigrants, (c) with emigrants and (d) with return migrants.

7. Levitt (1998) coined the term “social remittances,” referring to the transfers of ideas, behaviours and knowledge by migrants to their origin communities. “Social remittances” and “intangible transfers” are used as synonyms in this report.

8. Ethnic group, mostly from Guinea and Mali.

9. Ethnic group from Guinea-Bissau.


11. Defined either by nationality or country of birth. This can lead to some with the nationality of a country to be counted as immigrant if the person was born abroad, to give an example.


13. Such programmes include Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) and the Return of Qualified Nationals (RQN), implemented by IOM, as well as the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) programme of UNDP.

14. Internal remittances were estimated at USD 7 billion in 2010 (Muliro, 2012) and international remittances inflows at USD 686 million (World Bank, 2013).


17. Czaika and de Haas (2013); Bakewell (2013) and Skeldon (2013). They point out that global migration patterns are changing, whether in the South or in the North, and call for a reconceptualization that takes regional specificities into consideration.

18. This has been referred to by some as “the greatest single migration in world history.”

19. Countries in the South, however, are equally restrictive in their immigration policies. See UNDP, 2009.
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The World Migration Report 2013 contributes to the global debate on migration and development in three ways: First, the focus of the report is on the migrant, and on how migration affects a person’s well-being. Many reports on migration and development focus on the impact of remittances: the money that migrants send back home. This report takes a different approach, exploring how migration affects a person’s quality of life and their human development across a broad range of dimensions. Second, the report draws upon the findings of a unique source of data – the Gallup World Poll surveys, conducted in more than 150 countries, to assess the well-being of migrants worldwide for the first time. Third, the report sheds new light on how migrants rate their lives, whether they live in a high-income country in the North, or a low or middle income country in the South. Traditionally the focus has been on those migrating from lower income countries to more affluent ones; this report considers movements in all four migration pathways and their implications for development i.e. migration from the South to North, between countries of the South or between countries of the North, as well as movements from the North to the South.

The first three chapters of the World Migration Report 2013 provide an introduction to the chosen theme ‘Migrant Well-being and Development’, present the current global migration situation across four migration pathways and review existing research on the emerging field of happiness and subjective well-being.

Chapter four presents original findings on migrant well-being from the Gallup World Poll, looking at outcomes on six core dimensions of well-being across the four migration pathways.

The final part draws conclusions and makes recommendations for future initiatives to monitor migrant well-being and the impact of migration on development, with reference to the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 global development framework.
The Diaspora Ministerial Conference held on 18–19 June 2013 is a landmark in the history of the global debate on migration and development. Amid the flurry of international events leading up to the 2nd United Nations High Level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development in October 2013, the diaspora conference marks the first and only gathering of high-level politicians from all parts of the world responsible for diaspora and their engagement in the development of their countries of origin. International Organization for Migration (IOM) dedicated its International Dialogue on Migration in 2013 to the diaspora theme with the full support of its Member States, and with a view to contributing a diaspora perspective to the HLD 2013 and the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. IOM was well positioned to organize such a high-level dialogue in view of the fact that it has assisted States in creating the institutions and strategies to adapt to the new realities of a transnational world. The conference highlighted the importance of diasporas not only in closing the distance between societies, cultures and economies, but also in assisting in crisis and post-crisis situations. It encouraged governments to champion and engage diasporas at the highest political levels and mainstream diasporas in local, national and regional labour markets and development planning. Diasporas should also be included in any post-2015 development goal on global partnerships. Embassies and consulates need to be strengthened to provide outreach and services to diaspora communities, and business environments in the countries of origin need to be robust enough to attract diaspora investments or involvement in sustainable development projects to generate jobs and growth. More solid data are needed on the impact of national immigration, labour market and development policies on the behaviour of diaspora. By all accounts, the conference has set a new framework for global dialogue on diaspora. IOM has been requested to make the Diaspora Ministerial Conference a regular event.
South-South migration is a traditional livelihood strategy for millions of people in the global South. Despite its importance, mobility between developing countries has only recently been target by researchers and policymakers.

Drawing from research commissioned by the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Observatory on Migration, this issue of the Migration Research Series provides innovative insight on the realities of South-South mobility and explores how these movements may question our traditional conception of the migration paradigm. Concepts such as return migration, the role of diaspora for the national development and cross-border mobility have a specific meaning in the South-South context.

This publication draws attention to the often unexplored potential for development of migrants within the South and provides key recommendations to strengthen the relevance of migration research. These outputs come at a very significant moment for the international community in light of the United Nations High Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, where the necessary integration of migration in the post-2015 development debate will be discussed.