Introduction
Marie McAuliffe

The Global Compact for Migration: An agenda for academic research
Elizabeth Ferris

Delivering and demonstrating migration dividend through the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration
Gibril Faal

Research to support the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration: A role for civil society
Anne T. Gallagher

Why cities hold the key to safe, orderly migration
Harald Bauder and Loren Landau

We need to talk about integration after migration. Here are four ways we can improve it
Anne T. Gallagher

Migrants will keep coming. We should give them the skills they need to thrive
Michael Clemens

Migrant smugglers are winning. Here’s why
Anne T. Gallagher and Jorgen Carling

Refugees are victims of the crisis, not the creators
Liliana Lyra Jubilut

Unintended consequences: How migrant smugglers are exploiting the international protection system
Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser

Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

The views in this journal are those of the authors and don’t necessarily reflect the views of the International Organization for Migration or Eurasylum Ltd. Any errors or oversights in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors.
Introduction

Marie McAuliffe¹

On the eve of the Intergovernmental Conference to formally adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, scheduled to take place in Marrakech on 10–11 December, this issue examines a specific aspect of the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration: that of migration research and analysis. While acknowledging that migration research output has significantly increased in volume and diversity globally, as outlined in the International Organization for Migration (IOM) World Migration Report 2018 (Chapter 4), the natural starting point for an examination of this issue in the context of the Global Compact and international migration governance more broadly is the Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate.²

In early 2017, IOM established the Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate, comprising senior migration researchers from around the world, to support the development of the Global Compact for Migration. The Syndicate has 36 members with diverse geographic origins, thereby enabling perspectives from traditional origin, destination and transit countries. The Syndicate was designed as a policy-focused interdisciplinary group and includes researchers from a range of disciplines including law, geography, economics, demography, international relations, sociology and political science. Importantly, the Syndicate initiative served as a framework and space to enable leading members of research and policy practitioner spheres to contribute their knowledge and ideas to the Global Compact process. One of the key outputs of the Syndicate was a collection of technical papers on a range of salient migration issues, such as regular migration pathways, integration and inclusion, return and reintegration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, migrants’ rights and migration narratives.³ The deep knowledge of Syndicate members is an even more important global resource as we move into the next phase of the Compact, and so we invited Syndicate members actively involved in global governance processes to contribute to this issue.

While the Global Compact for Migration may not be legally binding on States, there is wide recognition that it is a critical step forward in international cooperation, and one that can be construed as “politically binding”. The Global Compact is the first agreement covering a wide spectrum of migration issues that has been negotiated intergovernmentally at the global level and heralds a significant step forward in international cooperation. The negotiations followed a series of thematic consultations as well as a stocktaking exercise that in many ways were similar to previous international and regional dialogues, meetings and other events on international migration over recent years. The intergovernmental negotiations phase, however, represented the first time that States sat side-by-side to negotiate and agree upon specific text on international migration. The significance of this cannot be overstated, including because it has taken place in an environment increasingly challenged by toxic political discourses that can at times result in misrepresentation of key facts on migration as well as confound and confuse the public, who may feel sometimes overwhelmed by what they read on migration.

At the time of writing, we do not yet know exactly how many States will formally commit to the Global Compact at the International Conference in Marrakesh next month. Some States have withdrawn from the Compact process or signaled an intention to do so; however, it is equally clear that the vast majority of States will be committing to the Global Compact. Attention therefore is understandably turning to its implementation. Unsurprisingly, the first dialogue

---

¹ Marie McAuliffe is the Head of the Migration Policy Research Division at the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Geneva.

² More information on the Syndicate, including its members and advisers, can be found at: www.iom.int/migration-research-leaders-syndicate

³ The Syndicate papers can be accessed here: https://publications.iom.int/books/migration-research-leaders-syndicate. The views expressed in the papers do not necessarily reflect those of IOM or its Member States.
at the Conference is titled “Promoting Action on the Commitments of the Global Compact for Migration”, and the related concept note specifically refers to the importance of data, research and analysis as a means of underpinning policy development:4

Kick-starting GCM implementation

8. Deepening our shared knowledge of migration: As the first GCM objective underlines, good migration policy must rest on a strong base of disaggregated data, research and analysis. Member States have recognized the need for a stronger evidence base to guide policymaking.

With this in mind, this issue presents three articles on how migration research and analysis can contribute to the implementation of the Global Compact. It also includes short pieces on critical migration and displacement topics, written by Syndicate members, and published in partnership with the World Economic Forum’s online Agenda platform.5 Topics include cities and migration (Harald Bauder and Loren Landau), migrant integration (Anne Gallagher), global skills transfer (Michael Clemens), migrant smugglers (Anne Gallagher and Jorgen Carling), refugee crises (Liliana Lyra Jubilut) and the smuggling of refugees (Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser).

In the first article on an agenda for academic research, Elizabeth Ferris outlines how the 23 objectives of the Global Compact provide a useful framework for academic research both to support implementation and also to help frame courses and students’ studies. Ferris also raises the issue of capacity-building and migration research, including the need for efforts to support migration academics and academic institutions in developing States.

In the second article on how the migration dividend can be delivered and demonstrated through the Global Compact implementation, Gibril Faal outlines the case for greater research collaboration with the private sector. In doing so, Faal notes that the sector is already deeply involved in a range of migration-related areas, such as travel/transport, banking/finance and education/training, providing opportunities for knowledge-sharing and research in key areas.

Anne Gallagher’s article explores the role of civil society in the Global Compact implementation, including its recent and ongoing contributions to knowledge production around migration. Gallagher highlights recent civil society research, for example, on the exploitation of migrant workers in the fishing industry, which ultimately led to improvements in the protection of workers and changes to supply chains. Finally, the author would like to thank the contributors to this issue of Migration Policy Practice, as well as co-editors Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko, for the invitation to edit this special issue. It has provided an opportunity to reflect on the potential for migration research and analysis in the Global Compact context at an important time in history, as the next advances in international cooperation on migration globally get underway.

The Global Compact is the first agreement covering a wide spectrum of migration issues that has been negotiated intergovernmentally at the global level and heralds a significant step forward in international cooperation.

---


5 Please see www.weforum.org/agenda/. One article was published by the APPS Policy Forum.
The Global Compact for Migration: An agenda for academic research

Elizabeth Ferris

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global Compact for Migration) affirms the importance of research and offers opportunities for academic researchers to do more. For a researcher, it is refreshing to see a document that acknowledges the importance of data and evidence from the very beginning. In its opening paragraphs, the Global Compact for Migration acknowledges that “This Global Compact is the product of an unprecedented review of evidence and data gathered during an open, transparent and inclusive process” (paragraph 10). In fact, the first of the 23 objectives in the compact is to (1) collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies. The Global Compact for Migration affirms the centrality of data and research for good policymaking; or, as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Global Migration Data Analysis Centre puts it more poetically, “data are the lifeblood of decision-making and the raw material for accountability”.

The need for data, evidence and research runs throughout the Global Compact for Migration though there are many more references to data (paragraph 42) and evidence (paragraph 17) than to research (paragraph 5). The document includes important recommendations to strengthening the research base, including 11 specific suggestions on issues such as: elaborating and implementing a comprehensive strategy for improving migration data at the local, national, regional and global levels (paragraph 17a); improving international comparability and compatibility of migration statistics (paragraph 17b); and establishing and supporting regional centres for research and training on migration (paragraph 17d).

All of this is music to researchers’ ears. Following are four specific suggestions for building on the Global Compact for Migration’s call for more data and more research on migration.

First, the 23 objectives of the Global Compact for Migration offer not only a useful framework for action by States and other stakeholders but also an agenda for research by the academic community. For example, Objective 7 of the Global Compact for Migration includes 12 specific suggestions for addressing and reducing vulnerabilities in migration – every single one of which would benefit from more robust data and better research. For example, developing gender-responsive and child-sensitive policies requires – at a minimum – understanding the gender and age breakdown of particular groups of migrants. But we should go further. Data on migration, which are disaggregated not only by gender and age but also by factors such as disabilities, literacy, economic conditions and intentions of migrants, would give policymakers better evidence on which to base policies. Another example: Objective 18 of the Global Compact for Migration calls for “mutual recognition of skills, capacities and competences” of migrants. Research to identify existing best practices for recognition of skills and to compare national policies could support the development of regional and global standards for skills recognition.

Using the Global Compact for Migration as an agenda for research opens up a range of possibilities for researchers and students alike. Wouldn’t it be useful to encourage a generation of graduate and undergraduate students to focus their research on migration-related issues – in their courses, master’s theses and doctoral dissertations – on the framework offered by the Global Compact for Migration? Wouldn’t it be useful if the results of such research (now mostly available in individual academic institutions, research institutes and academic journals) could be posted somewhere online under the relevant Global Compact for Migration objectives? Wouldn’t it be useful to busy policymakers considering how to implement the various implement the 23 objectives of the Global Compact for Migration to have access to research in one place?

1 Elizabeth Ferris is a Research Professor at the Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University.
2 See: https://gmdac.iom.int/
Secondly, we need more data and more research carried out by researchers in the Global South. Most migration happens within regions; learning more about both the drivers and dynamics of such migration would not only contribute to our understanding of the role regional migration plays in national economies and regional relations but also could more firmly undergird more action by regional organizations. The Global Compact for Migration calls for the establishment and strengthening of regional centres for research and training on migration. Building up such centres will require resources and the author hopes that donors take note of the importance of building migration research capacity in the regions. But there is also much that academics in the Global North can do to support such efforts, including strengthening student and faculty exchange programmes, prioritizing collaborative research proposals and developing online educational opportunities. A number of such initiatives are already underway, but more could and should be done.

Thirdly, let us recognize that while data are important, numbers are not everything. In particular, the author sees a desperate need for policy research and particularly for comparative migration studies. Research comparing national policies within a region – say between El Salvador and Honduras, Germany and France, or Fiji and Vanuatu – would be particularly useful to policymakers in those regions. Comparative analyses are also needed on the way governments tackle specific issues such as comparative analyses of policies towards migrant children or the effectiveness of policies to counter trafficking. For example, while there are some great studies on immigrant integration, do we know what works? Are efforts to support language acquisition more effective for migrant and refugee inclusion than job placement? Is it better for long-term inclusion of migrants to encourage them to settle in sparsely populated rural areas or in neighbourhoods with their fellow migrants? Carrying out comparative policy research requires more than better data collection. It requires thinking about difficult conceptual issues, such as indicators of “good” migration policy and measurements of “effective” policies. IOM’s global Migration Governance Indicators offer a starting point for such research but more is needed.

Fourthly, although it is not explicitly acknowledged in the Global Compact for Migration, there is an affirmation in the Global Compact for Migration of IOM’s important work in producing, disseminating and valuing research on migration. From the World Migration Report to the Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate to the Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, IOM has been a global leader in knowledge management on migration. This role should continue and be strengthened.

Finally, the author hopes that academic researchers, governments, international organizations, civil society organizations and others will take seriously the many recommendations in the Global Compact for Migration to improve data collection and research. Most international and regional meetings on migrants that the author has attended over the past two decades have ended up calling for more research and better data on migration. Wouldn’t it be wonderful to go to an international meeting on migration and not automatically agree that our data are insufficient and call for more?

Data are the lifeblood of decision-making and the raw material for accountability.

---

3 See: [https://gmdac.iom.int/migration-governance-indicators](https://gmdac.iom.int/migration-governance-indicators)


5 See: [www.iom.int/migration-research-leaders-syndicate](http://www.iom.int/migration-research-leaders-syndicate)

6 See: [https://gmdac.iom.int/](https://gmdac.iom.int/)
Delivering and demonstrating migration dividend through the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration

Gibril Faal

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Global Compact for Migration) requires that the first International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) be held in 2022, for “Member States to discuss and share progress on the implementation of all aspects of the Global Compact, including as it relates to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development . . . [resulting] in an intergovernmentally agreed Progress Declaration. . . .” The option and opportunity exist for the Progress Declaration to move away from the general observations and innocent platitudes that sometimes characterize United Nations outcome documents. It can be a declaration and report on the extent to which the diverse direct and indirect stakeholders have gained a migration dividend – being the surplus of financial, economic, social, political, and other human development benefits over and above the costs and inputs associated with migration.

The Global Compact for Migration is the first global migration governance framework, deserving appropriate new approaches and toolkits, in the pursuit of enhanced efficacy, in the spirit and letter of United Nations reform. Member States are committed to implement the Global Compact for Migration in cooperation and partnership with diverse stakeholders, including the private sector, trade unions and academia. The tasks of the connection hub of the Global Compact for Migration capacity-building mechanism includes “identifying main implementing partners within and outside of the United Nations system, in line with their comparative advantages and operational capacities”. Applied research is needed, among other things, to facilitate the use of relevant tools and techniques from the private sector, for the focused purpose of delivering and demonstrating a migration dividend for all sectors and sections of society at the local, national, regional and global levels.

Composite indicator of migration benefit

It is only a relatively small group of xenophobes, “nativists” and other extremists who deny the value of migration or reject the fact that migration is as old and inevitable as humanity itself. One of the root causes of anti-migration sentiments and actions is the perception and conviction that the sociocultural and politico-economic costs of small- or large-scale migration are greater than the actual or supposed benefits. Migration dividend as an approach and composite indicator can address this core contention. It also highlights “net migration loss” where it exists and identifies the appropriate practical actions to be taken to ensure that migration is beneficial to all or most affected parties. Academic researchers have examined the costs and benefits of both internal and international migration over the past 50 years. These tended to make assessments from the perspective of the migrant, a locality, or a specific industrial sector or case study. A composite migration dividend indicator

1 Gibril Faal is a visiting professor in practice at the Institute of Global Affairs (IGA), London School of Economics (LSE). He is also the Director of GK Partners (a UK company that specializes in socially responsible business models, social enterprise, development finance and programme implementation) and the Chairperson of the Global Forum on Migration and Development Business Mechanism Committee.

2 For the Final Draft of the Global Compact for Migration, see: https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180711_final_draft_0.pdf


can capture benefit (or loss) of principals as well as the other direct and indirect migration stakeholders. It offers the simplicity of a bottom line, derived from a mass and mesh of complexity. It presents the multifaceted rewards gained by host communities that receive and integrate migrants. It can focus the migration narrative and discourse on the legitimate interests and concerns of affected stakeholders, and help limit or neutralize the toxic, extremist and xenophobic rhetoric. In recent years, there has been some private sector research on the topic of migration, such as the work of PwC and McKinsey. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also collaborated with the Economist Intelligence Unit on Migration Governance Index, and with McKinsey Center for Government on migration data. Through programmes such as Universities Without Borders (UWB), the Institute of Global Affairs at the London School of Economics will undertake research and provide executive training on the implementation of the Global Compact for Migration and related topics.

**Responsible private sector**

There is a need for greater research collaboration on how other concepts and practices from the private sector can be applied to the Global Compact for Migration implementation. Some policymakers are concerned about the profit motive of the private sector, and the anti-globalization sentiments against multinational corporations. Despite these legitimate observations, the private sector remains a suitable and valuable partner in delivering public benefits. Firstly, no single sector comes devoid of entrenched weaknesses. The whole-of-society approach seeks to harness the various strengths of the whole while minimizing the weaknesses of the parts. Secondly, as in other sectors, the private sector is already deeply involved in migration, especially the travel/transport, banking/finance and education/training sectors. Businesses extract profits through practical implementation, without overt participation in the wider policy process. Thirdly, prior to the Global Compact for Migration, there was indeed the UN Global Compact, being a network of about 10,000 companies in 160 countries, across all sectors, committed to 10 principles of responsible business, covering human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption. It is important that private sector engagement and cooperation is based on responsible, sustainable and social entrepreneurial collaboration.

**Perception, actuality and reality**

Reality is the coincidence of actuality and perception. A phenomenon may occur actually and factually, yet if it is not perceived, it fails to be reality. There is a high likelihood that no action or reaction emanates from unperceived actuality. On the other hand, erroneous notions and falsehoods may be perceived, contrary to the facts and actuality. In such instances, actions and reactions are likely to occur. It is as if actuality is passive and perception active.

Negative perceptions about migrants and migration are a major challenge to the Global Compact for Migration implementation, especially in regions such as Europe where these perceptions are high. Migrants are...
the quintessential “outsider”, irrationally feared and often blamed for umpteen local ills. Perceptions and emotions are more potent than actuality and reason. This is accepted as a given in the commercial world. Effective marketing tools are readily deployed to address antipathy, suspicion, and apathy to new and existing products and services. Social marketing tools and business analytical frameworks such as “hierarchy of loyalty” may be more effective in combating anti-migration sentiments. The private sector bottom line often goes beyond preventing antipathy and scepticism, or providing for needs and necessities; it is to positively create perceived and actual wants, and a new form of self-identity. This partly explains why new products and services gain phenomenal success. The sharp psychological tools used by the private sector can increase effectiveness in the Global Compact for Migration implementation in particular and international development in general.

Development entrepreneurs in the era of implementation

With the Sustainable Development Goals, the Global Compact for Migration and the other global policy frameworks in place, the urgency for the world of multilateralism and development is not better policies but expansive and enhanced delivery of practical results of social good. In private sector operational analysis, the diverse direct and indirect stakeholders are segmented into categories ranging from hostile/sceptic to friend/supporter, so as to facilitate precise audience targeting and application of relevant tools. Products and services (interventions) are subjected to ongoing and relentless product life cycle analysis, innovation and improvement. Production, operations and delivery are refined, systemized and on continuous improvement, informed by scientific research and development. Communication to categorized stakeholders is in the form of tailored direct, indirect and intermediated messages, using plain, subtle, subliminal, creative and other psychologically effective pivots. Service delivery and campaigns based on untargeted generalizations and inappropriate techniques are simply deemed failures and can put an entity out of business. The Global Compact for Migration and development implementation can do with more of the result-focused primacy that dictates most of commercial action. This is more urgent as the human development benefits of the Global Compact for Migration are more important than many of the commercial services that are delivered so well. Beyond the growing number of social entrepreneurs, there is a need for a cadre of “development entrepreneurs” to transform dire challenges into practical human development opportunities, through brave ethical ambition, practical intersectoral excellence, and calculated risk-taking for the benefit of the excluded and the vulnerable.

Migrants are the quintessential “outsider”, irrationally feared and often blamed for umpteen local ills.

---


Research to support implementation of the Global Compact for Migration: A role for civil society

Anne T. Gallagher

The civil society community that will be involved in supporting implementation of the Global Compact for Migration is a rich and diverse one. It includes human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs), migrant support agencies, faith-based bodies, trade unions, employer associations and diaspora organizations. Despite their many differences, members of this disparate group are united through their shared conviction of the need for a radical change in migration policy and practice, and their firm commitment to ensuring the success of this “new deal” for people on the move.

Thus far, discussions around implementation of the Global Compact for Migration have largely focused on structures and procedures. That is understandable, but it is not enough, and we should also be thinking about the bigger picture of how priorities will be established and taken forward. This means asking the hard questions around research and evidence. Such questions are important and timely, not least because they encourage reflection about what needs to be done and by whom.

Civil society strengths

The need for implementation-focused research is clear: unless we understand exactly what is happening and why, it is near impossible to develop approaches that will lead to real and lasting impact. Research is also essential for measuring and evaluating progress. Not all the mechanisms, procedures and strategies put in place to secure implementation of the Global Compact for Migration will be successful. Good research can tell us what is working, what is missing, what needs to change, what deserves support and funding, and what is a waste of time.

States, international organizations, think tanks and the academic community have traditionally led the charge when it comes to migration-related research. As we move into a new era for migration, it will be essential to embrace new ways of thinking about how we collect, analyse and apply information. This must necessarily include consideration of how the resources, energy and contacts of those who are closest to the migration experience can be used.

One of the author’s main fields of work – trafficking in persons – provides a compelling example of how civil society can make valuable—and unique—contributions to knowledge production around migration. Until several years ago, there were rumours of wide-scale exploitation of migrants in the fishing and seafood processing industries of South-East Asia. But the lack of reliable information made it impossible to exert pressure on those who were implicated. Humanity United, a civil society group active in the anti-trafficking space, funded a series of research projects led by expert NGOs and business consultancies. Resulting and concurrent media reports, several of which won a Pulitzer Prize for the Associated Press journalists involved,2 drew heavily on contacts and information provided by grassroots civil society groups. Importantly, the research that emerged through this collaboration went much further than documenting exploitation: it also showed how migrant vulnerability is established and maintained, and how very different players benefit from that vulnerability. The impact of public exposure, through a combination of human stories, hard facts and deep context, was considerable. In the face of overwhelming evidence of their complicity, governments were compelled to act to protect migrant workers. The seafood sector—from boat owners to corporate giants including Costco and Walmart—was forced to confront its own responsibility for the workers’ exploitation.3 None of this would have been possible without the research shaped by and directly involving civil society. And

1 Dr Anne T. Gallagher, AO is the President of the International Catholic Migration Commission.
2 Available from: www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/
it is telling that, while global attention is inevitably drawn elsewhere, civil society groups continue to use research to promote real and lasting change in this highly exploitative, migrant-dependent industry.⁴

What does this case tell us about civil society strengths when it comes to research on migration? Perhaps, most importantly, it shows the value of proximity. Of all those involved in research, it is human rights organizations, migrant support networks and faith-based groups that will almost always be closest to migrants and the migrant experience. It is these groups that are uniquely placed to secure the information, insight and analysis that may be otherwise inaccessible, and that can push policymakers to pay attention. Another example of this particular strength can be found in the documentation of migrant deaths: civil society groups closest to the issue began the process, later taken over by IOM, that has been so important in focusing attention on the brutal human cost of forced migration.⁵

Both examples point to the capacity of civil society to “politicize” research in ways that others undertaking migration research may not: not least by interrogating the broader political, economic and social forces that shape how we think about and respond to migration.

Civil society priorities

Civil society will undoubtedly be called upon to support – or even directly facilitate – certain aspects of the Global Compact for Migration implementation research. For example, the household surveys that will be critical to monitoring change on the ground will depend heavily on involvement of local community groups. More generally, civil society is well placed to advise academic and applied researchers as well as government authorities on design and delivery of research programmes and specific projects. This will be especially important in relation to research related to those Global Compact for Migration objectives (e.g. Objectives 4, 13, 16 and 21), which are strongly focused on community-level action.

These forms of involvement are important and should be encouraged. But we should also be thinking creatively about other ways that civil society could contribute. The following suggestions focus on the big picture: on leveraging the unique capacity of civil society to explore and challenge aspects of the Global Compact for Migration implementation with a specific focus on the concerns and needs of those most directly implicated – migrants and the communities that send and receive them.

- **Diversify and amplify the research agenda:** Knowledge production around migration has long been directed towards what powerful countries of destination care most about, including irregular migration and temporary labour migration. The Global Compact for Migration has expanded the list of concerns in important ways. Civil society involvement in the Global Compact for Migration implementation research can help to ensure an appropriately diverse research agenda: one that will help us to understand what is happening – and what is changing – from the perspective of migrants, migrant communities and countries of origin. One example is integration, an aspect of migration that governments are often reluctant to openly address and that continues to be underresearched. Another is the issue of equity when it comes to sharing the benefits and burdens of migration policies.⁶

- **Challenge the dominant narratives:** Observers have pointed to the sharp “convergence” that has developed on key political questions around migration: for example, that “managed migration” is the only way to forge a path between the twin specters of a borderless world and one comprised of fortress States; or that the relationship between migration and development is a mutually beneficial one; or that aid aimed at addressing the “causes” of migration should always be welcomed; or that the categories we have created to differentiate one migrant from another make sense; or that “safe, orderly and regular migration” is a realistic policy

---


⁶ See further: A.T. Gallagher, AO “We need to talk about integration after migration: Here are four ways we can improve it”, Global Agenda section, World Economic Forum (2018), available from www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/10/we-need-to-talk-about-integration-after-migration/
While such assumptions may be defensible, the convergence is worrying because we know very well that everything around migration is complex, messy and sometimes contradictory. If we are not open to questioning our basic assumptions and the politics that underlie them, then it is likely that mistakes will be made and never corrected. Civil society involvement in the Global Compact for Migration research is not a silver bullet because civil society can just as easily yield to the temptation of embracing comforting assumptions. But with its relatively greater connection to migrants and the migrant experience, the civil society pillar will be an important bulwark against unhelpful, de-politicized group-think.

**Monitor integration of human rights**: The Global Compact for Migration explicitly affirms the centrality of human rights to this “new deal”. But that affirmation rests on shaky foundations because the consensus around rights in the migration space is fragile, perhaps even illusory. The international community has struggled for decades to agree on a basic set of legal entitlements for migrants, most especially those in an irregular situation, with very limited progress. We cannot afford to take for granted that research under the Global Compact for Migration will support and advance its lofty human rights goals. Of course, civil society involvement in setting priorities and conducting research cannot be expected to resolve the underlying stalemate. But those whose raison d’être relates directly to the safety, dignity and well-being of the world’s migrants have a powerful stake in ensuring that human rights remain central to how we think about – and respond to – migration.

The purpose of research under the Global Compact for Migration is clear: a new approach to migration requires that all those involved in making decisions have access to better information and evidence. Civil society is being brought into the process in ways that go well beyond its traditional focus on service delivery and advocacy. Its inclusion reflects an acceptance of the importance of giving voice to those most affected.

Success is not guaranteed: the new partnerships envisaged under the Global Compact for Migration require effort and goodwill on both sides. Traditional gatekeepers of migration research must be open to working with new partners whose perspectives may be different and challenging to the established wisdom. And civil society must prove itself a capable, valuable and trusted partner: one that is fully committed to rigorous research and willing to call out unbalanced advocacy and selective evidence wherever and whenever it appears.

Good research can tell us what is working, what is missing, what needs to change, what deserves support and funding, and what is a waste of time.

---

Why cities hold the key to safe, orderly migration*
Harald Bauder and Loren Landau1

Migration is largely an urban phenomenon. According to the 2018 World Migration Report, “nearly all migrants, whether international or internal, are destined for cities”.2

Cities respond very differently to migration. Many cities are supportive, boost the rights of migrants and reap the benefits of migration. The mayors of these municipalities are frequent panelists and speakers, extolling the virtues of migration, and proudly proclaiming that the future of migration is local. Other cities, however, seek to restrict migration and actively exclude migrants from social, economic and political participation.

This dual role poses a challenge to the implementation of the United Nations’ ambitious agenda, presented in the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.3 The Global Compact for Migration, as it’s also known, is an intergovernmental agreement on multiple dimensions of international migration; this agreement is expected to be adopted by the vast majority of UN member states in December 2018.

In support of migration, the mayors of major migrant destination cities, such as New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, are standing up against national policies that treat migrants unfairly and deny them rights and services. In January of 2017, New York’s Mayor Bill de Blasio proclaimed that “we’re going to defend our people regardless of where they come from, regardless of their immigration status”.4 With this proclamation, De Blasio reaffirmed New York’s status as a sanctuary city that protects the city’s most vulnerable inhabitants.

Cities in other countries pursue a similar approach. In 2013, the Canadian city of Toronto declared itself a sanctuary city,5 inspiring other Canadian cities to follow suit.6 Cities like Barcelona in Spain or Quilicura in Chile pursue a similar approach, although they don’t call themselves sanctuary cities but a “Refuge City” and “Commune of Reception” respectively.7

Although African cities have been notably missing in many of the global debates on refugee support or migrant integration, they too are stepping tentatively on to the stage. Although often constrained by highly centralised financial and political authorities, they are exploring options for building services that can accommodate mobility in all its forms. Arua in northern Uganda, for example, has embraced its role as a destination for migrants and refugees from South Sudan. The Cities Alliance is now working with “secondary cities” across Asia, Africa and Latin America to find ways to incentivize similar responses. These cities are assuming responsibility in addressing and reducing the vulnerabilities in migration, which is one of the key goals of the Global Compact for

* Originally published by the World Economic Forum in its Agenda blog on 4 October 2018. Republished with the permission of the Forum.

1 Dr Harald Bauder is Professor of Geography and the Director of the Graduate Program in Immigration and Settlement Studies, Ryerson University, Toronto; Dr Loren Landau is South African Research Chair for Mobility and the Politics of Difference, African Centre for Migration and Society, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.


Turning a blind eye to a range of other international police in rounding up Somali refugees, even while Nairobi authorities have cooperated with national authorities in conducting immigration raids. In 2006, the Pennsylvania town of Hazleton pioneered – albeit ultimately unsuccessfully – this type of local policy by making it more difficult for irregular migrants to rent housing or get employment in the municipality. In Canada, the Quebec town of Hérouxville took a swipe at Muslim migrants by introducing a “code of conduct” in 2007 that, among other measures, prohibited the stoning of women. Other cities simply passively comply with or support national immigration raids and exclusions.

African cities are not immune to creating hostile environments for migrants. The mayor of Johannesburg, Herman Mashaba, has been accused of anti-migrant tactics and announced earlier this year that he will actively cooperate with national authorities in conducting immigration raids. In Nairobi, authorities have cooperated with national police in rounding up Somali refugees, even while turning a blind eye to a range of other international migrants living in the city. Other municipal or sub-municipal authorities across Africa have also actively and sometimes violently moved to exclude outsiders. Sometimes these are refugees and international migrants. Sometimes they are migrants from within their own countries.

These cities are, in fact, increasing the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face, counteracting the intentions of the Global Compact for Migration.

Cities around the world encounter diverse situations as migrant destinations, transit hubs or places of departure; they have different histories and find themselves in different geopolitical situations; some cities are richer and others are poorer; and cities in different countries possess different levels of autonomy from national and regional governments.

What is clear, however, is that the successful implementation of the Global Compact for Migration requires the cooperation of cities.

Cities that lack a strong local pro-migration constituency will require incentives to be inclusive of migrants. Such incentives might involve financial support and access to resources and programmes from national and international bodies. Enhancing local authority and participation can ironically make it more difficult for local authorities to fight for unpopular refugees and migrants. Global norm-setting can help counter such moves, but advocates and authorities also need to operate more quietly, stealthily incorporating refugees and migrants into...

---

their programmes across sectors. Indeed, migration policy per se is likely to offer few protections if local policies for housing, employment, education, commerce, trade and planning do not consider mobility.

As recent as 2015, William Lacy Swing, the director-general of the International Organization of Migration (IOM), lamented at the Conference on Migrants and Cities that “city and local government authorities have so far not had a prominent voice in the global debates on human mobility”. This situation is changing. Cities increasingly assert their voices and are recognizing that they are key partners in tackling the challenges of migration.

Cities increasingly assert their voices and are recognizing that they are key partners in tackling the challenges of migration.

References


We need to talk about integration after migration. Here are four ways we can improve it*

Anne T. Gallagher

Integration is the delicate, critical transition of the migrant from outsider to insider – the process by which migrants become part of their new community. Successful integration is hard to measure because it is multi-layered, touching every part of the migrant experience from education to housing, from political participation to civic engagement. We might not be able to capture it well, but few doubt its importance. While many migration issues remain hotly contested, integration is widely considered to be a good thing for migrants and for the societies they have moved into.

Why then, is it so hard to discuss, debate and agree on both the big picture and the specifics of integration? An indication of the sensitivities around this issue can be found in the final draft text of the two Global Compacts which are slated for adoption in December of this year by almost all UN Member States. The Global Compact for Migration, contains four, largely non-substantive references to integration. The Global Compact on Refugees is only slightly better, dealing briefly with integration over three of its more than one hundred paragraphs. What happened?

Integration is difficult for States because it exposes a truth that many are reluctant to publicly acknowledge. Despite the overwhelming international focus on return and reintegration of migrants back into their home communities, many migrants will not – often cannot – go home. The 325,000 refugees granted protection in Germany in 2017 are now establishing new lives for themselves in that country. Less than 3% of the 12 million migrants living without legal status in the United States are returned in any one year. And questions about integration are not just for wealthy countries. It is possible that the million-plus refugees fleeing sectarian violence in Myanmar who entered Bangladesh over the past 12 months will need to call that country home for generations to come. No-one can predict when – indeed if - the refugees from Syria and Palestine who currently make up around thirty percent of Lebanon’s population will be able to leave. The collective silence around these awkward realities is understandable, but it’s not helpful.

Integration is also difficult to discuss and deal with because it is not amenable to anything resembling a quick fix. Building a wall, establishing a camp, creating a new border force, stopping the boats — these are all political shorthand for decisive action. Even if they don’t amount to much in the end, they give the impression of control amid chaos; they hold out the hope of immediate results. By contrast, if it is to be done properly, integration of migrants is a long and often fraught process for all involved. It requires migrants to yield to the reality of their new lives and to agree to taking those lives forward in ways that may not have been their choice. It requires receiving communities and governments to accept new arrivals, to accommodate their presence with material and


1 Dr Anne T. Gallagher, AO is President of the International Catholic Migration Commission.
2 A.T. Gallagher, 3 reasons all countries should embrace the Global Compact for Migration, Agenda, 22 August 2018. Available at www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/3-reasons-all-countries-should-embrace-the-global-compact-for-migration
8 European Commission, 2018.
spiritual generosity, to be open to the possibility of enrichment.

The consequences of ignoring integration – or doing it badly – are devastating. Across the world we see evidence of failed integration in vast refugee camps that have long abandoned any pretense of impermanence; we see it is ghetto communities that are separated, in all the ways that matter, from the society to which they have been nominally attached. We see failed integration in the metrics that show migrants lagging far behind established populations across a broad swathe of good-life indicators including academic achievement and workforce participation.

And integration failures have deeper, darker effects that are too often ignored. For example, public opinion about the value of migration appears closely tied to perceptions about integration. Gallup’s Migrant Acceptance Index confirms that attitudes to migration are much more positive in the United States and Australia – which both have a strong record when it comes to integration – than in Europe, where integration has been much more problematic. The message in clear: those seeking to promote more open and liberal migration policies need to be playing a long game: they need to pay close attention to what happens to people after they have moved. If things don’t work out well, the goodwill that enabled their move in the first place can quickly dissipate, further complicating their journey from outsider to insider.

Support for generous migration policies crumbles where migrants exist (or are perceived to exist) outside the social and cultural fabric of the receiving community. It is no surprise that integration failures have been widely cited as a major force behind the growing influence of malign political movements. Populist parties ascribing to a policy of exclusive nationalism are still hovering on the fringes in most countries. But even when outside government, their capacity to influence immigration and integration policy can be profound. In the Netherlands, for example, nationalist political movements have successfully weaponised concerns around integration: manipulating mainstream parties into adopting policies that are much less friendly to migration and to migrants.

So how can we do better? Common sense and recent experience point to the following:

Receiving communities need help

The costs of integration are not evenly shared, either within or between countries. It is unfair that those who are being called on to exercise the greatest generosity are too often those with the least to give and the most to lose. At the country level, central governments should ensure that towns and cities tasked with the real work of receiving and integrating migrants are adequately supported, not just in terms of the direct integration expenses but also to guard against the erosion of existing services that can easily fuel resentment within the broader population. At the international level, the idea of ‘burden sharing’ between countries on migration matters must extend to integration: this is a collective good and a collective responsibility.

Success requires planning

Recent analysis of large-scale resettlement of refugees has demonstrated “the power of place”: in short, where new migrants end up can determine both their future and the long-term health of the society they have moved into. For example, we know that employment is critical to integration, bringing individuals and families into their new communities while exerting a positive effect on public perception of migrants. When resettlement is carefully planned to maximise real employment opportunities and, more broadly, to match migrant with destination, the experience on both sides improves dramatically. Technology is helping to make this kind of targeted, locally-relevant policy-making a reality.

Honesty and genuine partnership are rewarded

Integration is difficult and problems are inevitable. Receiving societies, and indeed migrants themselves, deserve the respect of honesty. Anything less represents an indefensible betrayal of the trust that should exist between a government and its people. It is also a strategic mistake. The now-common strategy of pretending that everything is fine when it is not too often backfires. Communities that are suffering the effects of inadequate integration – for example strained services and social tensions – rightly

---

10 Akkerman, 2018.
11 Immigration Policy Lab, n.d.
feel ignored or patronised when their concerns are dismissed or mischaracterised. In the same way as migrants, those who are receiving them deserve attention and compassion. Most importantly, integration must be presented and experienced as a two-way process: a partnership between the community and the migrant. We have seen that when partnership is the agreed starting point, relationships are transformed: migrants become more than the passive objects of charity; communities become more than unwilling cogs in a policy machine they do not feel part of.12

Evidence matters

Our knowledge of what works — and what doesn’t — is still very limited, not least because it may be years before the impact of a particular approach can be properly assessed. This means that the evidence base for integration policies and practices is often shaky. Most immediately, it is very difficult to work out how to invest for maximum return. We can’t afford to make big mistakes, but we also can’t afford to wait. Policy-makers should be brave enough to acknowledge gaps in our knowledge and forward-thinking enough to support initiatives that will help close those gaps. They should be tapping into recent work that is finally helping us to understand integration better: for example, the role that cost-benefit analysis can play in deciding where to focus attention and resources13; and the ways in which big data can be used to improve our understanding of how integration happens.14

The two Global Compacts acknowledge a truth we all know: human movement it is the life-blood of human progress, it cannot be stopped but it can be managed much better than we are doing at present. The Compacts lay out a vision for the future: one where countries, working together, succeed in making sure that migration is overwhelmingly safe, legal and beneficial for all. But for that to happen, we need to keep integration — the long-term health of our migrants and the communities that are receiving them — front and centre.

When resettlement is carefully planned to maximise real employment opportunities and, more broadly, to match migrant with destination, the experience on both sides improves dramatically. Technology is helping to make this kind of targeted, locally-relevant policy-making a reality.

12 ICMC, 2018.
13 Benton and Diegert, 2018.
14 Bansak et al., 2018.
References


Migrants will keep coming. We should give them the skills they need to thrive*

Michael Clemens1

The world urgently needs better tools to manage international migration. But few agree on how to make those tools, or even which ones we need.

We have a rare window of opportunity now to do this. The world has set its attention on migration as hundreds of thousands of people move across Libya, Myanmar, Mexico and elsewhere. Migration has shaken the world’s most influential elections and alliances. And the United Nations has opened negotiations2 for a new Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration – due in 2018.3

The world cannot hope for “safe, orderly, and regular” migration without innovation: new kinds of legal migration.

No alternative to innovation

More migration is certainly coming. Consider the 800 million new working-age people in sub-Saharan Africa by the year 2050. 4 That increase is 24 times the size of today’s entire labour force in the United Kingdom. This is wonderful news – some of the best news of our time – because it mostly results from the collapse in African child mortality in recent decades.5

But these pressures, combined with aging and sometimes shrinking workforces in many advanced economies, essentially guarantee rising migration pressure. The question isn’t whether more migration will happen, but whether it will happen on terms that unleash the potential of those young people, or waste it.

The problem is that more migration in the same old channels is profoundly controversial. Not just in countries of migrant destination, but in countries of migrant origin, too. In fact there is a crack in the core of current negotiations on a Global Compact for Migration: Many migrant-destination countries see their interests as best served by relatively skilled migration (if any). And many migrant-origin countries are deeply suspicious of high-skill migration, preferring relatively low-skill migration (if any).

The global compact is a rare chance to strike a deal that benefits everyone.

One new tool among many

Here is one innovation that could help, among many that we need. A Global Skill Partnership is a bilateral agreement designed to sensibly share the benefits and costs of skilled migration between the migrant-destination countries and migrant-origin countries.6 Employers and governments in migrant-destination countries support technical training for migrants in their country of origin, before they move, with cross-subsidies to train non-migrants.

Done right, a Global Skill Partnership can benefit all involved. Young people looking to work abroad can pursue enormous opportunities for themselves and their families. The countries of destination get migrants with precisely the skills they need to contribute the most and integrate fast. The countries of origin get finance and technology transfer to

---

* Originally published by the World Economic Forum in its Agenda blog on 15 November 2017. Republished with the permission of the Forum.

1 Dr Michael Clemens is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development and Research in Washington D.C.


support the training of both migrants and non-migrants – an engine of finance and human capital creation, not a drain.

Why it can work

The economic heart of a Global Skill Partnership is a dual arbitrage opportunity. The first is that workers like nurses, hospitality workers and mechanics can be hundreds of percent more valuable, in strictly economic terms, providing their services in a rich country rather than in a poor country. The second is that training those workers can be done in a poor country at a small fraction of the cost in a rich country. These mean that a Global Skill Partnership doesn’t mean taking away from some to give to others. Like all arbitrage opportunities, it is a chance to add value, to increase the size of the pie for shared benefit.

Some features of this approach have been tested in numerous settings. Public-sector models include the Australia-Pacific Technical College7 and Germany’s groundbreaking work on overseas training of nurses.8 Private-sector models include the Porsche Training and Recruitment Center Asia.9 These programmes train workers in hospitality, health, mechatronics and other fields for between a few months and two years. In all of these arrangements, destination-country governments or firms support training for future migrants in their home countries. They have worked out many of the obvious logistical hurdles of such a global enterprise.

A rare opportunity

The Global Compact on Migration marks an uncommon opportunity to achieve political consensus and commitment to safe, positive and pragmatic migration governance. Global Skill Partnerships offer a new kind of migration that addresses widespread, legitimate concerns about some kinds of migration we have now.

As the compact participants prepare for their December stock-taking meeting in Mexico,10 the draft and ultimately the final text of the compact should commit to piloting Global Skill Partnership agreements between developing countries of migrant origin and developed countries of migrant destination. It should commit to many other innovations as well. The Migration Leaders Research Syndicate11 of the International Organization for Migration has offered several potentially fruitful innovations. These include Anna Triandafyllidou’s proposal that labour migration be regulated by economic sector to reflect its high segmentation by sector,12 and Jørgen Carling’s proposal for development policy to reduce the number of unsuccessful attempts at irregular migration.13

A global compact that fails to consider new lawful channels for migration will be overwhelmed by reality. A global compact that calls for more migration in the same old channels will fall on deaf ears. A global compact that proposes specific, new, mutually beneficial kinds of migration will become an important tool for the challenges ahead.

The world urgently needs better tools to manage international migration. But few agree on how to make those tools, or even which ones we need.

We have a rare window of opportunity now to do this.

---

11 International Organization for Migration. “Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate.” Available from www.iom.int/migration-research-leaders-syndicate
References


International Organization for Migration. “Global Compact for Migration.” www.iom.int/global-compact-migration

International Organization for Migration. “Migration Research Leaders’ Syndicate.” www.iom.int/migration-research-leaders-syndicate


Migrant smuggling: moving people across borders for profit, is reported to be one of the fastest-growing and most lucrative forms of organized criminal activity. Smugglers crowd their human cargo into shipping containers and onto boats and trucks. Many migrants arrive safely and consider the investment well spent. But migrant smuggling is a dirty business: excessive profiteering and exploitation routinely place the lives and wellbeing of smuggled migrants at serious risk.

The current international narrative around migrant smuggling, most clearly spelled out in the ongoing negotiations around a Global Compact for Migration, identifies smuggling as a criminal enterprise that must be stopped at all costs – and clearly asserts that it can be stopped with sufficient resources and cooperation between states.

This analysis reflects a distorted view of reality. It makes the challenge seem straightforward, but it is fundamentally misguided. Smugglers are winning and they will continue to do so for the following reasons.

A near perfect business model

About 3% of the world’s population live outside their country of birth, but nearly three times as many people wish that they did. Some are hoping for safety from violence and human rights abuses, some want a way out of poverty, and others simply seek to take advantage of opportunities for economic or social advancement that are not available at home. Yet, for the vast majority of aspiring migrants, restrictive immigration policies block the pathway to the benefits of living elsewhere.

Migrants smugglers are therefore implementing a business model that other entrepreneurs can only dream of: they are in the straightforward business of bridging desire and opportunity. Put simply: migrant smuggling will inevitably be found where pressures to migrate are not matched by opportunities to do so safely and legally. It is only if borders were truly open that the market for smugglers would cease to exist.

Robust, flexible organizations

In the face of clumsy, oppressive law enforcement, smugglers have become increasingly sophisticated: professionalising their operations and developing the intelligence and connections necessary to withstand well-funded counter-smuggling operations. Recently, smugglers have demonstrated a breathtaking level of flexibility and creativity in taking advantage of the presence of humanitarian organisations seeking to rescue migrants in distress.

Migrant smugglers have also adapted to increased pressure by developing resilient organizational forms in which the lower tiers are flexible and expendable. In fact, at the bottom levels, the lines between smugglers and clients are frequently blurred, with individual migrants enticed or coerced into taking on responsibilities such as navigating boats. They might face arrest and prosecution upon arrival, while the smuggler who organized the journey and reaps the profits is shielded from risk.

---

* Originally published by the World Economic Forum in its Agenda blog on 1 November 2017. Republished with the permission of the Forum.

1 Dr Anne T. Gallagher, AO is the President of the International Catholic Migration Commission; Dr Jorgen Carling is Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo.


False communication

States understand that battling migrant smugglers requires them to address demand for the services they provide. This explains the vast resources spent on awareness raising campaigns that seek to dissuade prospective migrants from procuring smuggling services. Such campaigns often employ stark imagery of suffering and death. They never acknowledge that it is the fight against migrant smuggling that typically makes the journey more dangerous.

The result is a fundamental mismatch between information pushed by governments and the reality for prospective migrants. First, many clients of migrant smugglers know all too well that the journey is dangerous. Their decision to accept facilitated migration is based on a calculation of risk. Depending on the strength of the imperative to move, a decision that factors in risk of harm or even death may be eminently understandable.

Second, prospective migrants face a genuine challenge in separating the “good” smugglers from the bad ones. They must identify someone who will take them to the destination as safely as possible for an agreed price. They are well aware that while most will deliver the agreed service, others will not. In the context of this challenge, campaigns that portray all migrant smugglers as intrinsically ruthless and exploitative are neither credible nor useful to their target audience.

The limits of the liberal state

Ultimately, the modern, liberal, democratic state is simply not up to the task of stopping facilitated irregular migration. As the United States and Australia have already learned, and countries of southern Europe are coming to appreciate, ending unwanted migration in the face of strong counter-forces can only be effectively achieved through the continuous deployment of immense force and violation of individual rights on a massive scale that grossly offends liberal values.

Certainly, there is strong and growing public tolerance for increased militarization of migration control — and even for the criminalization and detention of migrants. Within liberal democracies, there is little sustained public appetite for these large scale, violent interdictions; mass incarcerations; and forced returns that would inevitably be required to disrupt migrant smuggling.

The irony is that the features of preferred destinations that prevent them from acting effectively against migrant smuggling, are the same qualities that attract many migrants in the first place: respect for the rule of law; in-principle commitment to human rights; acceptance of the right to asylum; and rejection of discrimination. Migrant smugglers understand and exploit this paradox.

Time for some honesty

The lies and obfuscation around migrant smuggling waste time, energy and good will. They also prevent us from facing a few stark truths. The first relates to refugees: without smugglers, most of those fleeing war and persecution would never stand a chance of reaching safety. Attacking smuggling without acknowledging — and at least attempting to deal with — the fatal flaws of the global asylum regime is deeply dishonest.

It also renders a single-minded law enforcement approach not only inefficient, but dangerous. When smuggling represents the only route to safety, cracking down on smugglers will simply make the...
journey more expensive, difficult or dangerous for the people who still need smugglers’ services. The smuggling of refugees is perhaps the most intractable part of the migrant smuggling challenge. Yet it falls between the cracks in the international community’s efforts to improve migration governance and refugee protection.10

The second truth is even more uncomfortable. Without significant structural change to global migration regimes, there is really no solution to the organized, for-profit facilitation of irregular migration. Migrant smuggling is, in fact, the textbook example of the “wicked problem”: one that is hard to define, that keeps changing, and that fails to present a clear solution because of pre-existing factors that are themselves highly resistant to change.

It is only by accepting the complex, muddled reality of migrant smuggling that we take the first step towards anything representing progress. There will be no simple solution, but until this phenomenon is addressed with humility and honesty, the smugglers will keep winning.

References


Refugees are victims of the crisis, not the creators*

Liliana Lyra Jubilut

Refugees and refugee protection have become global issues, in a number of ways. Firstly, geographically. There is no region of the world not affected, whether as a producer or a receiver of refugees, or as a country of transit. Secondly, in the causes of migration. These form a broad spectrum, including forced migration, due to persecution, conflict, environmental issues and violation of human rights; economic migration; voluntary migration; and, in several cases, people migrating for different reasons but following the same routes at the same time. This variety creates a challenge for the specific needs of refugee protection, especially when global actions and policies contributing to migration are not made accountable.

Thirdly, in the sheer number of refugees. There is a record high of 65.6 million persons forcibly displaced due to conflict, persecution and human rights violations, according to the UNHCR, of which 22.5 million are refugees and 2.8 million are asylum seekers.

A rhetoric presenting the current flow of refugees as a “refugee crisis” has emerged. Considering the numbers, this may be so. But in a historical context, the picture is different. In 2015, the EU’s 27 member states received 942,400 refugee claims. But during the 1992 refugee crisis, with only 12 member states, the EU received 696,500 refugee claims. Twenty-five years ago, the EU was receiving many more refugee claims per state, pro rata.

The current rhetoric of a “refugee crisis” underscores, in reality, a lack of political will to protect refugees. This is reflected by the closing of borders, the securitization of migration and the criminalization of migration and of migrants, presented through the logic of “national security”. States are not rejecting human rights outright, in favour of “national security”. Instead, they adopt a logic of “human rights but”. They acknowledge human rights, but claim that other concerns such as national security and economic protection - justified or not - are more relevant and should take priority. This creates a huge gap between the protection needs of refugees, and what states are willing to provide. This is the crux of the real crisis for refugees.

This approach by states contributes to further human rights violations, such as migrants’ deaths and increased risks during their journeys, coyotes, smugglers and traffickers, unaccompanied or

---

* Originally published by the World Economic Forum in its Agenda blog on 6 November 2017. Republished with the permission of the Forum.

1 Dr Liliana Lyra Jubilut is Professor of International Law, Human Rights and Refugee Law, Universidade Católica de Santos, Brazil.


5 Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies Online Research and Teaching Tools, York University. “Securitization of Migration.” Available from http://rfmsot.apps01.yorku.ca/glossary-of-terms/securitization-of-migration


8 International Organization for Migration, “Missing Migrants: Tracking deaths along migratory routes.” Available from https://missingmigrants.iom.int/
separated children migrating alone, and disappearances of children once they have reached “safe territories” (perhaps up to 60% of those who do, according to some estimates).

It also fosters a logic of “us vs others”, in which migrants are cast as “others”, “strangers at our doors”, and tools in other political battles. This creates a crisis for refugees, in which they are caught up in a circle of constant human rights violations - sometimes even through the policy of a state.

Such policies include:

1. push-backs (i.e. not allowing refugees to cross borders or even returning them after they have reached the border)
2. transfer agreements (as in the EU-Turkey case)
3. violations of the principle of non-refoulement (the cornerstone of International Refugee Law)
4. severe violation of human rights, such as: a) detention of migrants (including refugee children, and for long periods); b) selling of refugees as slaves; c) trafficking of refugees; d) organ trafficking; e) violations of the right to life
5. lack of respect to specific vulnerabilities (such as those of children, women, the elderly, persons with disabilities and LGBT refugees).

These violations occur when refugees are on the move, once they have reached “safe” territories, and even when they have found shelter. Consider refugee camps, for example, in which access to economic and social rights, and durable solutions, are scarce. Furthermore, the number of resettlement places is diminishing, along with funding that even at its highest levels was not enough to meet the needs of refugees.

Refugees are persons fleeing from a well-founded fear of persecution due to religion, nationality, race, political opinion or belonging to a social group. In some parts of the world, such as Latin America, they are also fleeing from gross and generalized violation of human rights. A person remains as a refugee for 20 years, on average. While refugees are already victims of human rights violations, the current international scenario is re-victimizing them while they seek protection.

---


15 International Detention Coalition, “What is immigration detention? And other frequently asked.” Available from https://idcoalition.org/about/what-is-detention/


However, such ongoing violations do not stop migration. They only make it harder and more hazardous. They endanger the lives of refugees, and jeopardise the right to migrate.

We must face these challenges. Refugees are not solely an issue of 2015 or 2017, but one of the contemporary world and its nation states. Refugees are an issue of human rights and protection, and a defining issue of this century so far.22

Refugees are not the problem - they are not the creators of the crisis. Refugees are the victims of the crisis. Protection strategies need to be re-designed, reformulated, and implemented in different ways to confront the current scenario.

The main challenges involve:

- safe access to territories
- creating legal pathways for mobility
- access to safe territories for all (potential) refugees
- creating more resettlement slots
- access to refugee status determination (RSD) procedures
- adequate RSD procedures
- respect of particular vulnerabilities
- local integration
- integral protection

While migration is a constant phenomenon, forced migration cannot be seen as unchangeable or unimportant. “The refugee crisis is humanity’s crisis”, as Zygmunt Bauman stated.23 It is essential to rethink the logic of migration governance, with the human being as its axis. The protection of other humans must take centre stage. It must guide every strategy, policy and action. When it does, refugees’ rights and human rights will be respected.

References

Ashley, Kirk. “Mapped: The journey that refugees are taking to get into Europe.” The Telegraph, 19 February 2016. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/12121845/Mapped-%20The-journey-that-refugees-are-taking-to-get-into-Europe.html


Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies Online Research and Teaching Tools, York University. “Securitization of Migration.” http://rfmsot.apps01.yorku.ca/glossary-of-terms/securitization-of-migration


---


Refugees are not solely an issue of 2015 or 2017, but one of the contemporary world and its nation states. Refugees are an issue of human rights and protection, and a defining issue of this century so far.
Unintended consequences: How migrant smugglers are exploiting the international protection system*

Marie McAuliffe and Khalid Koser

Migration smuggling may once have been the bastion of small-scale operators seeking to move people across borders illegally. The emergence of ghost ships carrying hundreds of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea shows how times have changed. They are a warning sign that smugglers may be in the ascendency and that the international protection system risks being undermined.

This new tactic by migrant smugglers is potentially very lucrative for them. It is reported that the organisers of the Ezadeen merchant ship rescued in Italian waters in January earned around USD 3 million, with each of the 350 migrants on board paying up to USD 8,000. Only two days earlier a larger ghost ship carrying around 800 migrants was saved in the Mediterranean Sea from what could have been a massive maritime disaster.

The on-water abandonment by smugglers is a new development in large-scale maritime smuggling operations. Where previously small vessels were used to transport migrants from North Africa, Turkey, Syria and elsewhere, larger cargo vessels were used more frequently during 2014.

Using cargo ships for migrant smuggling is anything but small-scale. It’s not able to be done hastily. It’s not ad hoc. It would take considerable time as well as planning, organisational and delivery capability, and many people would be involved directly and indirectly. While it is difficult to judge whether the use of ghost ships will become more common, they signal greater sophistication and some ominous signs for policymakers, migrants and others.

What it shows us is that firstly, operational feasibility is increasing. There are fewer constraints on smugglers as telecommunications improve, international monetary flows enable pooling of resources, the number of migrants able to afford smuggling increases and there are officials who seem willing to collaborate. In a recent research project on the assisted voluntary return of migrants, we found that every single one of the 273 migrants interviewed in the 15 countries had paid smugglers. Migrant smuggling has become the norm.

Secondly, demand is high. The increase in displacement is an important factor but migrants’ search for a better life fuelled by limited opportunity at home is also driving demand. At the end of June 2014, the total number of refugees was the highest for almost 20 years at 13 million. The migrants on the Ezadeen were almost all Syrian.

Thirdly, the international protection system is under growing pressure. An increasing number of people are on the move for a range of reasons, but the international protection route provides the only valid avenue for people without visas to access the industrialized countries that are the target destinations for many migrants today.

The result is that the international refugee protection system no longer provides protection for a sizeable proportion of those in need; nor is it able to adequately protect states’ rights to manage migration and

* Originally published by the Asia and the Pacific Policy Society in its APPS Policy Forum blog on 12 February 2015. Republished with the permission of the Forum.

1 Marie McAuliffe is the head of the Migration Policy Research Division in IOM; Dr Khalid Koser is Executive Director of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund.


their borders with requisite integrity. Instead, it has become about who can pay, and one of its greatest beneficiaries has become the migrant smuggling industry. Some analysts estimate that smugglers extracted USD 1 billion from migrants along the Mediterranean Sea route during 2014.

Migrant smuggling and its intersection with the international protection system poses many policy challenges for governments. How can migrants’ rights be maintained, irregular movements of asylum seekers be managed effectively, and smuggling operations be stemmed? How can refugees be better assisted in their home countries? Are there better ways to provide information to asylum seekers about the reality of being smuggled?

In our view, a range of responses is required. Firstly, we need to further develop a strong evidence base so we can understand the various actors, their roles, their connections, their operating strategies, their successes and their failures. This is worthy of ongoing investment, particularly given the dynamic nature of migration flows as well as the fluidity of asylum and refugee policy and practice. Research on smuggling has illuminated aspects, however, its exploitation of the protection system needs to be further explored.

Secondly, we need to be honest and clear about some of the weaknesses of the international protection system while acknowledging its substantial strengths. The Refugee Convention is extensively ratified and its core principles widely supported. UNHCR’s frontline operations provide critical support and stability in often highly unstable environments. There remain, however, glaring weaknesses. The inability to return failed asylum seekers is a fundamental issue but so is the absence of a practical response to secondary movements, adequate support for refugee host countries, the lack of accountability of states that cause displacement in the first place, and the failure of existing durable solutions.

Finally, we need to look beyond the media headlines and think in iterative and strategic terms. Understanding and appreciating the increasing interconnectedness of not just countries and regions but people smugglers and potential migrants underpins sustainable responses.

Policies that are able to account for migration patterns and monetary flows, geography, migrants’ rights, motivations and decision-making, as well as bilateral and regional sensitivities have a much greater chance of developing into long-term solutions. The current policy and operational framework in Australia has been successful at halting maritime migrant smuggling, but at a cost.

Creating a safer and more certain future based on evidence, a critical and honest appraisal of the current international protection system and greater recognition of our inter-connected prosperity is a pressing global priority.

Research on smuggling has illuminated aspects, however, its exploitation of the protection system needs to be further explored.

References


Publications

**MRS No. 54 - Without choice? Understanding war-affected Syrian families’ decisions to leave home**
2018/14pages
ISSN 1607-338X
English

Authored by Prof. Bree Akesson and Kearney Coupland, this new publication in the IOM Migration Research Series explores the decision-making processes of war-affected Syrian families before leaving home. Drawing upon collaborative family interviews with 46 Syrian families resettled in Lebanon, the research methodology included narrative discussion—spanning life in Syria, the journey from Syria to Lebanon and life in Lebanon—as well as drawing and mapmaking. The findings are divided into four themes: (1) how long it took for families to decide to leave, (2) the push factors that influenced the family’s decision to leave, (3) why families decided to journey to Lebanon versus another neighbouring country, (4) the push/pull factors in deciding to resettle in a third country. The findings indicate that there is much diversity in the decision-making processes that families engage in and underscore the importance of family agency in making informed decisions.

**État de la migration dans le monde 2018**
2018/400 pages
ISSN 1020-8453
English

L’OIM publie les rapports État de la migration dans le monde depuis l’année 2000. Le Rapport État de la migration dans le monde 2018, est le neuvième de la série, et a été conçu pour contribuer à améliorera compréhension de la migration à travers le monde.

Il présente des données et des informations clés sur la migration ainsi que des chapitres thématiques sur des questions migratoires très actuelles, et est structuré de manière à mettre l’accent sur deux contributions clés pour les lecteurs : Partie I : informations clés sur les migrations et les migrants (y compris les statistiques relatives aux migrations) ; et Partie II : analyse équilibrée et fondée sur des données factuelles des questions migratoires complexes et nouvelles.
Despite increasing recognition of global migration’s impact on development, there has been far less discussion regarding how to incorporate migration into plans for meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This special issue of Migration Policy Practice, guest-edited by Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Katy Long, explores how migration intersects with a number of key development areas, and how these relationships affect the delivery of the SDGs. It draws from a series of 12 policy briefings by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) that analyse the interrelationships between migration and key development areas, namely, poverty, decent work, urbanization, gender, education, health, social protection, water and sanitation, energy, citizenship, technology and climate change. The five articles included in the special issues look into a specific area in which migration intersects with development, setting out the case for including migration in SDG planning in persuasive terms.

First, Michael Clemens – taking a historical lens – argues that there is an urgent need to stop thinking of migration as a consequence of poor development outcomes and instead see rising migration as not only the result of improved development but also a catalyst for further positive change.

Next, Katy Long, Elisa Mosler Vidal and Amelia Kuch set out the case for why ensuring long-term migrants’ access to citizenship is crucial in order to prevent this group’s exclusion from community opportunities for development and social protection, which can otherwise result in multigenerational marginalization.

In the third article in this issue, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and Elisa Mosler Vidal discuss the importance of social protection and make a strong case for why migrants’ access to social protection, including through improved portability of benefits, also helps strengthen State governance and increase the resources available to support development in host and origin countries.

Next, Fiona Samuels explores the particular challenges faced in incorporating migrant populations into healthcare responses and explains why such inclusion is vital if public health SDGs are to be met.

Finally, Marta Foresti steps back from the specific issues raised in these different development silos to deliver an overview of how migration and its links to development fits into not only the SDGs but also the wider global political process, including the Global Compact for Migration, the terms of which were agreed in July 2018.

This guide is designed to serve government actors, both national and local, involved in any process of Sustainable Development Goal implementation, including those working specifically in migration, and those working in other sectors who are interested in integrating migration. It is also for government actors working in the migration field who wish to integrate the SDGs into their work.

The focus of this guide is to help policymakers implement the migration aspects of the SDGs. Policymakers can use this guide to integrate migration into local or national development planning, by designing and implementing interventions that relate to migration in the context of the SDGs. These interventions may take the form of legislation, policies, programmes, projects or other activities, and may relate to core migration topics or integrate migration into activities in another sector. For example, policymakers may use this guide to design interventions that directly address human trafficking, as well as interventions in the health sector that help protect victims of trafficking.

For actors with experience in migration mainstreaming, this guide offers a new approach that is based on the 2030 Agenda. For those with no experience in migration mainstreaming, it offers an introduction on how migration and development are linked in the context of the SDGs, and how to take action around these connections.

It is accompanied by two complementary tools that help illustrate linkages between migration and the SDGs: (i) a comprehensive booklet which outlines the linkages between migration and each SDG and (ii) a poster which summarizes these linkages.
Call for authors/Submission guidelines

Since its launch in October 2011, Migration Policy Practice has published over 205 articles by senior policymakers and distinguished migration policy experts from all over the world.

Past authors have included, inter alia:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) and Special Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil society activities in the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global Forum on Migration and Development; Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje, Chair of the GFMD 2013-2014; Mark Cully, Chief Economist at the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations; Khalid Koser, Chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration; Khalid Malik, Director of the Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs (2010–2014); Ali Mansoor, Chair of the GFMD 2012; Andrew Middleton, Director of Culture, Recreation and Migrant Statistics, Australian Bureau of Statistics; Najat Maalla M’Jid, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (2008–2014); Robert A. Mocny, Director of the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), formerly US-VISIT, US Department of Homeland Security; Imelda M. Nicolas, Secretary of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), Office of the President of the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes International Federation; Kelly Ryan, Coordinator of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees – IGC, Geneva; Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament (2012–2014); David Smith, Director of Economic Analysis Unit, Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; Sir Peter D. Sutherland, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Migration (2006–2017); Ambassador William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM); Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US Department of State.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

• Not exceed five pages and be written in a non-academic and reader-friendly style.
• Cover any area of migration policy but discuss, as far as possible, particular solutions, policy options or best practice relating to the themes covered.
• Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant public administrations, or civil society, in other countries.

Articles giving account of evaluations of specific migration policies and interventions, including both evaluation findings and innovative evaluation methodologies, are particularly welcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

• Solon Ardittis (sardittis@eurasylum.org); and
• Frank Laczko (flaczko@iom.int)