ENGAGING THE ASIAN DIASPORA

By Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias and Kathleen Newland

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Executive Summary

Policymakers in the Asia-Pacific region increasingly recognize the value that diaspora populations bring to development efforts at home, not just as senders of remittances but also as sources of human capital and direct and indirect (capital market) investments. Governments facilitate such contributions in several ways, from creating conducive legal frameworks and diaspora-centred institutions to initiating programmes specifically targeting diasporas as development actors.

Yet these and other mechanisms of diaspora engagement, while positive, are insufficient if not integrated in a broad-based strategy that receives sustained attention over many years. Such a strategy must, of course, be tailored to the unique context of each diaspora population.

Across the board, however, governments would do well to consider four fundamental steps: (1) identify goals, (2) map diaspora geography and skills, (3) create a relationship of trust between diasporas and governments of both origin and destination countries and, ultimately, (4) mobilize diasporas to contribute to sustainable development.
Modern diasporas are ethnic minority groups of migrant origin residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin and their homelands (Sheffer, 1986).

At a minimum, “diaspora” implies a distinct identity relating to a community of origin. It is increasingly common to use the term to refer to migrants who have left their countries only recently and perhaps temporarily, as well as to refer to settled communities.

The term “diaspora” in this brief is equally broad. It refers to emigrants and their descendants who live outside the country of their birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, yet still maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. The common thread among these recent arrivals and members of long-established communities is that they identify with their country of origin or ancestry and are willing to maintain ties to it. These ties are, potentially, beneficial to development.

Source: Agunias and Newland, 2012.

II. Government mechanisms to facilitate diaspora engagement

Governments in Asia have engaged diasporas through three main mechanisms: (1) creating a viable framework conducive to diaspora engagement, usually by enacting legislation; (2) developing and creating diaspora-centred institutions, both at home and abroad; and (3) managing various programmes that specifically target diasporas as development actors.

I. Creating a legal framework for positive engagement

Creating an atmosphere that is conducive to diaspora engagement is seen as a critical first step toward engaging diasporas. The ultimate goal is to incorporate diasporas into a web of privileges and obligations connecting them to their countries of origin. This is usually achieved by enacting special legislation, which can come in many forms, including the following:

Flexible citizenship laws

Some countries (such as Australia, Bangladesh, Philippines, South Korea and Tonga) have passed some form of flexible citizenship law, enabling their diasporas to acquire dual or multiple citizenship. Pakistan also accepts dual citizenship but only for citizens in 16 countries, all but three (Egypt, Jordan

and Syria) of which are either in Europe or North America. China, on the other hand, has no provision for expatriation; thus, persons born in China are still considered Chinese citizens if they take another nationality, regardless of whether they desire or claim dual citizenship.

**Flexible residence and visa arrangements**

Flexible residence and visa arrangements to facilitate diasporas’ access to their home countries have also been adopted. For example, the Philippines’ balikbayan programme grants former citizens and their immediate families visa-free entry and stay for a period of one year (Agunias and Newland, 2012). An increasing number of countries are also issuing special registration and identification cards that allow members of the diaspora to enter and stay in the country visa free. For instance, Pakistan’s National Database and Registration Authority issues the Pakistan Overseas Card (POC) to its diaspora members. POC holders are allowed visa-free entry into Pakistan, can stay indefinitely in the country and are exempted from foreigner registration requirements.

**Political rights**

Some countries in the region also grant political rights to citizens while they are overseas, the foremost of which is the right to vote. A 2007 review by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) identified 115 states and territories with legal provisions for overseas voting. Although external voting provisions are most common in Europe, they are also found in some countries in Asia such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

**Property rights**

According special property rights is another increasingly popular means of engaging diasporas. In India, for instance, anyone who has ever held an Indian passport or whose father or grandfather was a citizen of India can acquire unlimited residential and commercial land. Individuals born in the Philippines and/or to a parent who was still a citizen at the time of his/her birth can purchase either residential or commercial land in the Philippines up to a total of 500 square meters or agricultural land of up to 1,000 square meters (Agunias and Newland, 2012).

**Reduced income tax rates**

A few governments are offering reduced income tax rates for returning citizens who have worked abroad for a certain number of years. For instance, Malaysia’s Talent Corporation hopes to “attract and retain the necessary skilled human capital” through its Returning Expert Program (REP). On top of tax exemptions for household and car imports, REP also guarantees a flat tax rate of 15 per cent on employment income for five years. Returnees, however, have to work within sectors that government planners consider as national key economic areas (NKEAs).

Creating a conducive framework is generally not tied to a specific development goal. It may, nonetheless, have a significant developmental impact, in part by gaining diaspora members’ trust and therefore encouraging their contributions to development.

1. **Developing and creating diaspora-centred institutions: Carving a niche in the inner workings of government**

Some governments have taken an extra step in institutionalizing their engagement with diasporas by creating special offices or directorates within government agencies. Examples are growing. Within Asia, 14 government institutions were created specifically to engage diasporas on a formal basis. They occupy different levels of government and exhibit diverse priorities and degrees of organization. For instance, some diaspora institutions are concerned with only their citizens abroad while others specifically target permanent residents, naturalized citizens and second and later generations.

**Institutions at the ministry level**

Five countries in the region have established ministries whose explicit purpose is to address the needs of diaspora populations. By establishing a separate, ministry-level diaspora institution, a government recognizes that traditional ministries such as those of labour and foreign affairs cannot manage the expatriate portfolio in all its dimensions (see Table 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Stock of emigrants, 2010</th>
<th>Stock of emigrants as % of total population, 2010</th>
<th>Top destination, 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh*</td>
<td>Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment (MEWOE)</td>
<td>5,380,200</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>State Council, Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (SCOCAO) of the State Council; Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee</td>
<td>8,343,600</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (SOCAO) of the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India*</td>
<td>Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA)</td>
<td>11,357,500</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government of Kerala, Department of Non-Resident Keralites’ Affairs (NORKA); Government of Gujarat, Non-Resident Indian Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia*</td>
<td>Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration</td>
<td>2,502,300</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan*</td>
<td>Ministry of Overseas Pakistanans</td>
<td>4,677,000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Office of the President, Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO); Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs</td>
<td>4,275,200</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Labour, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Labour, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs, Office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers’ Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Overseas Koreans Foundation</td>
<td>2,078,700</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka*</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare</td>
<td>1,847,500</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Countries with diaspora ministries.
Source: Agunias and Newland, 2012.

For example, India created the Ministry for Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) in 2004 to address the lack of government policy coordination on migration and to implement programmes that reach out to the Indian diaspora, in particular to youth. One programme, Know India, is a three-week internship to promote social, economic and cultural awareness of India among the second and subsequent generations of emigrants. Another initiative, the Scholarship Program for Diaspora Children, is designed to assist emigrants in enrolling their children in Indian institutions of higher education. Other activities range from hosting an annual diaspora conference to facilitating diaspora investments (MOIA, 2008).

Bangladesh’s Ministry for Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment (MEWOE) and Sri Lanka’s Ministry of Foreign Employment, Promotion and Welfare focus mainly on ensuring the welfare of their expatriate workers, and on increasing their ability to find suitable employment abroad. Both ministries attend to complaints from migrant workers, provide international job placement services and conduct training programmes. The Bangladeshi ministry also operates a Wage Earners’ Welfare Fund financed by membership fees from migrant workers, interest earned from the deposits of recruiting agencies’ licenses and personal and institutional contributions. The fund covers the cost of providing financial, legal and other assistance mainly to distressed migrant workers.

Institutions at the subministry level

The Philippines has institutionalized diaspora engagement at the subministry level by creating special offices under the departments of labour and employment and foreign affairs. Faced with
increasing problems brought about by a rapidly expanding temporary worker population abroad, the government established the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) in 1981 as an agency under the Department of Labour and Employment. Tasked with protecting Filipino migrant workers, OWWA provides them with various services, from repatriation to business loans (Agunias and Ruiz, 2007). Another office, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which was created a year later, has the sole authority to regulate temporary overseas employment, including recruitment agencies (Agunias, 2008). Another body, the Office of the Undersecretary for Migrant Workers’ Affairs, was created in 1995 under the Department of Foreign Affairs. Like OWWA, the office focuses on migrant protection, mainly through providing legal advice and judicial support to distressed workers (Agunias and Newland, 2012). It was created as a response to increasing reports of maltreatment, illegal recruitment and even deaths of temporary workers.

Other government institutions at the national level

A few diaspora institutions in Asia fall short of full ministry standing but still report directly to the highest executive body. These institutions enjoy a fairly influential position within the government. For instance, China’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (SCOCAO) is uniquely positioned within the Chinese central government. It is an administrative office under the State Council, the country’s highest executive body (which includes the premier and ministers, among others). A SCOCAO staff of 120 supports the premier and assists in a wide range of activities. These include maintaining databases of information categorized by city, county and province (so that overseas Chinese can find their ancestral roots, homes and properties), and operating two universities catering mainly to the Chinese diaspora (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2001; the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2005, 2008).

Similarly, the Philippines’ Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) is directly under the Office of the President. Established in 1980 as part of an overall strategy that included OWWA and POEA, the commission has a dual role of promoting both economic and cultural ties between the Philippines and its diaspora.

Institutions at the local level

Diaspora engagement does not stop at the national or federal level. Since diasporas are often inclined to engage at the local level, usually in their place of origin, where they are familiar with the context and, in many cases, still have family ties (see, for example, de la Garza and Lowell, 2002), it is not surprising that special offices for diasporas have sprung up locally.

China has one of the most expansive networks of local diaspora offices. SCOCAO, described earlier, is replicated in 30 provinces as well as in some cities and townships across China. Although local diaspora offices get their overall policy direction from the central government office, they function with relative independence and are allowed to adopt innovative methods to attract diaspora investments. For example, since 2004, the Economic and Technology Division of the Shanghai government’s Overseas Chinese Office has strengthened alumni associations in the United States for all of its universities. The goal is to let Chinese graduates living in the United States know about business and research opportunities in Shanghai (Zweig and Fung, 2005). To coordinate its implementation of national diaspora policies, the central government annually convenes local diaspora offices (Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2001: 314).

Some states in India have diaspora offices, the most active of which can be found in Kerala and Gujarat. The Kerala government created the Department of Non-Resident Keralites’ Affairs (NORKA) in 1996, primarily to protect its migrant workers from abuse and exploitation. NORKA addresses complaints against illegal recruitment agencies, provides assistance to stranded Keralites and facilitates the repatriation of bodies. It also runs an insurance programme for unemployed returnees, unskilled labourers and domestic workers (NORKA, 2012).

In Gujarat the local government created a Non-Resident Indian (NRI) Division within its administration department. A review of the division’s objectives suggests a focus on development. Using a database that identifies migrants’ technical and professional skills, the NRI Division seeks to strengthen ties with Gujaratis abroad. For a USD 5 fee, the office also issues a “Gujarat card” to Gujaratis living in other Indian states and outside India, which entitles them to special treatment at Gujarat government offices and substantial discounts at local hotels and shops (Government of Gujarat, NRI Division, 2012).
III. Implementing programmes to leverage diasporas for development

Beyond the creation of a conducive framework and diaspora-centred institutions, another mechanism open to governments is the creation and support of diaspora-focused programmes with explicit development goals.

Tapping into diasporas’ human capital

Programmes engaging the Asian diaspora have so far focused on the transfer of human capital back to countries of origin. Governments typically identify successful individuals and then try to persuade them to return to conduct research or establish their own firms by offering to cover their moving costs, top up their salary, subsidize their mortgage if they purchase a new house, provide start-up funds or subsequent capital infusions for their businesses and the like. The approach is not new. For instance, since 1960, the Taiwan Province of China has recruited scholars in the diaspora by providing them various incentives such as a travel subsidy (which can cover airfare and related allowances for returning scholars and their dependents) and job placement assistance. Such incentives are offered through the National Youth Commission (NYC), a cabinet-level government office. Instead of starting from scratch, some governments have chosen to partner with international organizations and build on existing programmes with proven capacity for human capital transfer. For instance, following the ouster of the Taliban government in 2001, the Afghan Islamic Transitional Administration (later the Administration of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan) paved the way for Afghans abroad to return to their homeland. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), in cooperation with the new government, helped facilitate the return of educated and highly skilled Afghans from around the world. The goal was to identify Afghan nationals living abroad with relevant qualifications and backgrounds and facilitate their employment in different sectors of the Afghan economy (Altai Consulting, 2005).

Some countries have chosen to build partnerships between actors at home and in the diaspora by initiating a new wave of programmes that go beyond the return-of-talent model and aim to establish a more sustainable two-way exchange of resources and knowledge. Partnership projects typically target individuals and involve collaborative research. For instance, one of China’s recent initiatives, more commonly known as the 111 Project, allows for top scholars in the diaspora to team up with domestic researchers working in one of the 126 innovation bases located throughout China (see Box 2; Cai, 2009).

Box 2: The 111 Project: Attracting the best and the brightest

In an effort to attract the best and brightest among its diaspora, the Chinese government has stepped up the funding of its ambitious diaspora programmes. For the 111 Project, for instance, China allocated RMB 600 million (USD 88 million) or about RMB 1.8 million (USD 265,000) to each designated “innovation base” every year for five years. This grant may only be used to directly finance the innovation bases’ recruitment-related efforts, such as the payment of stipends to diaspora scholars during their short-term stay in China, airfare costs and other benefits. On top of the 111 Project funding, innovation bases got additional support from the federal government to finance actual collaborative activities and provide for and upgrade facilities and equipment as needed.

This substantial and long-term funding allows each innovation base to recruit from the diaspora’s cream of the crop, including Nobel Prize winners and other well-known and highly respected scientists and academics working in top universities and companies worldwide. Hongxing Cai, a Chinese scholar based in Australia, who is currently studying the 111 Project, found that at the beginning of the programme, many innovation bases “didn’t know how to use the money.” As Cai noted in an interview, for many innovation bases, the funding was so generous that it felt like it “came from the heavens” and was “simply out of their imagination.”

Source: Agunias and Newland, 2012.

Tapping into diaspora savings

Diaspora members have substantial financial assets beyond their current income, including savings and retirement accounts, real property and investments in stocks, bonds and other financial instruments (Terrazas, 2010).

Governments, banks and businesses in countries of origin have a strong interest in creating financial instruments that can attract these diaspora savings into investments that contribute to sustainable development, the most common of which are the following:

Special category of deposit accounts: Bangladesh and India have introduced a special category of deposit accounts at commercial banks in countries of origin, where members of the diaspora can deposit their savings. Holders of such special accounts are given
preferential interest rates as well as the option of having accounts denominated in a foreign currency. In some cases, interest from such accounts is fully or partly tax exempt.

**Diaspora bonds:** In recent years, governments have been increasingly using their consular networks to market diaspora bonds, designed to tap into diaspora assets. For instance, India issued diaspora bonds in 1991, 1998 and 2000 to avoid balance-of-payments crises and to shore up international confidence in India’s financial system during times of financial sanctions or special needs. Similarly, Sri Lanka has offered Sri Lanka Development Bonds since 2001 to a number of investor categories including non-resident Sri Lankans.

The issuance of diaspora bonds is a form of innovative financing that can help developing countries support infrastructure projects. Issuers of diaspora bonds gain access to fixed-term funding, often at discounted interest rates due to a “patriotic discount,” or the difference between the market interest rate for government debt and the interest rate that diasporas are willing to accept given their attachment to their country. However, India and other countries learned that this “patriotic discount” is often small in reality and sometimes does not materialize. The larger advantage of diaspora bonds is that they can mobilize relatively small amount of funds from the diaspora into substantial resources for development (Terrazas, 2010). Importantly, the default risk normally associated with international sovereign-debt holdings may be reduced for diasporas. Diasporas view the country’s ability to pay interest and principal in local currency as relatively strong, and thus find diaspora bonds attractive.

**Tapping into diaspora’s philanthropic contributions**

A number of very successful diaspora philanthropists have also made important contributions to their countries of origin, such as Filipino philanthropist Dado Banatao (see Box 3). An increasing number of governments are engaging directly with these individuals to find areas of mutual interest.

**Box 3: Dado Banatao: Giving back home and looking forward**

Diosdado (Dado) Banatao, a Filipino entrepreneur and electrical engineer, established three high-tech companies that made him a multimillionaire. He has made philanthropic contributions through the Banatao Family Filipino American Education Fund, which helps Northern Californian high school students of Filipino heritage to pursue a college education in science and engineering.

Banatao stresses the importance of education, particularly in the fields of science and engineering, which he sees as the foundation of technological development and economic growth. He returned to his hometown of Iguig in Cagayan province in the 1990s and built a computer centre equipped with modern computers at the public school he attended as a child (Solee, 2009). During 2011, as chair of the Philippine Development Foundation (PhilDev), he worked in concert with other Filipino Americans and the government of the Philippines to promote science and technology education, starting at the elementary school level, across the Philippines.

Source: Agunias and Newland, 2012.

Aside from individual contributions, organizations have also played important roles in developing countries and regions. Given a lack of resources, time or expertise, some diaspora members rely on philanthropic intermediaries to channel their donations to specific community projects in their countries of origin. In the United States, for example, U.S.-registered non-profit groups such as the American Indian Foundation (AIF) and the Philippine Development Foundation (PhilDev) are able to raise tax-deductible funds to channel to diasporas’ homelands. AIF has served over 1.5 million people by implementing programmes through over 115 Indian NGOs. It has held annual fundraisers in New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Washington, D.C. and Seattle (Diaspora Matters, 2011).

Similarly, PhilDev, formerly known as the Ayala Foundation USA (AF-USA), aims to strengthen and encourage philanthropy among Filipino Americans and to connect them to well-run non-profit organizations in the Philippines that work on finding strategic solutions to poverty. Its main focus is to build an ecosystem of science- and technology-based entrepreneurship and innovation for social and economic development in the Philippines.

**IV. Developing a road map and translating diasporas’ promise into reality**

The promise of diaspora engagement is clear. As discussed, governments facilitate diaspora contributions in several ways from creating conducive legal frameworks and diaspora-centred institutions to initiating programmes specifically targeting diasporas as development actors.

Yet these and other mechanisms of diaspora engagement, while positive, are insufficient if not
integrated in a broad-based strategy that receives sustained attention over years. Such a strategy must, of course, be tailored to the needs of each diaspora population, which has a unique relationship with its country of origin or ancestry and countries of destination or settlement. That said, policymakers will do well to consider four fundamental actions:

1. Identifying goals; mapping diaspora geography and skills; creating a relationship of trust between diasporas and governments of both origin and destination countries; and, ultimately, mobilizing diasporas to contribute to sustainable development. Figure 1 below summarizes these four items in graphic form.

Figure 1: A road map for diaspora engagement

Source: Migration Policy Institute, 2009.
The “destination” is arrived at when the diaspora is established as a true partner in the development of its country of origin. Throughout implementation, a diaspora engagement strategy must devote attention to strengthening the capacity of both government institutions and diaspora communities to work with one another and with other stakeholders.

Although they are presented as a series of stages, in fact these actions will proceed concurrently, loop back upon one another and leapfrog over any orderly progression from one stage to the next. Above all, there must be constant feedback among the processes. The arrows show the processes necessary to get from one stage to the next (remembering that no stage is ever complete but must always remain in a state of dynamic interaction with the others). The balloons to the side are representative of the kind of actions associated with each element of the strategy; they are neither exhaustive nor compulsory. Not all actions will be relevant for all governments; some are specific to countries of origin and others to countries of destination.

While many governments, at both origin and destination, acknowledge the importance of engaging diasporas for development, many lack the resources to actually design effective policies and implement them on a meaningful scale. This explains the gap between what are essentially “paper schemes” and truly effective policies and programmes that actually make a difference. Innovative funding schemes are key, especially private-public initiatives that could augment the budget crunch besetting many countries of origin. Countries of destination can make a difference by sharing costs. Facing the issue of state capacity head-on also calls for a re-evaluation of what types of engagement are most reasonable and cost-effective. For many countries of origin that are beset by limited state capacity, removing barriers to engagement rather than building bridges may be the most realistic approach and perhaps the most effective.

Diasporas’ potential role as agents of development cannot and should not be easily dismissed. As this brief indicates, a wide array of points of intervention are available to countries of origin and destination. The key dilemma for policymakers is to understand and facilitate the minimal conditions necessary for effective engagement. Factors such as the diaspora’s size, skill levels, culture and home bias and the socioeconomic and political conditions at both origin and destination are just some of the factors to consider when determining appropriate policy interventions. Strategic thinking is key. If the past is a good indicator of the future, then the prospect for many countries of origin is quite good. For example, in the 1990s the Chinese and Indian diasporas did not wait for all of India and China to develop, but found windows of opportunity in Bangalore and Shanghai. Creating just one point of attraction for diasporas can establish a foundation for diaspora engagement even when other building blocks are few.

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**Interview**

- Phone interview with Nissanka N. Wijeratne, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare, Government of Sri Lanka, by author, 29 August 2011.
Endnotes

1. The most celebrated case studies of these phenomena come out of California’s Silicon Valley. A very substantial amount of capital from the United States supported the growth of the Indian information technology sector, some of it provided by diaspora investors. In 2004, 19 of the top 20 Indian software businesses were founded by or managed by professionals from the Indian diaspora. Many of the key subsidiaries of these firms in important markets such as the United States were also diaspora led.


3. The 16 countries include the Australia, Belgium, Canada, Egypt, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, United Kingdom and the United States.


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Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias is a Policy Analyst at the Migration Policy Institute. Her areas of expertise include temporary and circular migration, particularly between Asia and the Middle East; diaspora policy; and the migration-development nexus. Her most recent publications include two books on diaspora engagement and various reports on labour migration and development.

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