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Migration is an essential feature of today’s world. Transnational networks, environmental change, growing labour shortages and ageing populations, are among the factors contributing to this reality. Research and analysis are key to understanding migration and to the design and implementation of effective and sustainable policies. Decision-makers across the world need to base their policies on information from reliable sources; they need to learn from the best knowledge and experience available. Many excellent studies are produced around the world, but this research sometimes has little impact on policy or programmes because it is not accessible to policymakers or programme managers, or is not always considered to be sufficiently timely or relevant to the needs of decision-makers.

IOM and Eurasylum are delighted to launch a new journal, *Migration Policy Practice*, which aims to provide a means for policymakers to reflect on and share information about their day-to-day policy practice, and which will provide a vehicle for sharing the results of policy-relevant studies. We are very grateful for the support of the eminent group of senior officials and experts, drawn from a range of different governments and organizations from all over the world, who have agreed to join the Editorial Board of *Migration Policy Practice*. We thank them all for their support, and hope that *Migration Policy Practice* will be useful in providing guidance on how migration can be managed in the future for the benefit of all.

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William Lacy Swing  
Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Geoffrey Care  
Chair of Eurasylum’s International Advisory Board
Welcome to the first issue of *Migration Policy Practice*, a new bimonthly journal that will publish articles from, and be overseen by, policymakers in national, regional and international administrations, as well as from civil society, worldwide. The journal was founded on the premise that, while an increasing number of journals, on paper and online, are being launched in the field of international migration, the majority of them are only targeted at the academic community and/or at specialized practitioners. Public officials in the field of migration, whether in government or in EU and international institutions, and senior civil society representatives, rarely contribute articles to existing journals, and more often than not, they rarely benefit, as readers, from articles published in scholarly and professional journals. This can be explained by a range of factors pertaining to the relative lack of topicality of articles, due in particular to the lengthy peer review and publication process; their lack of policy insights, relevance and applicability; and by the overly academic/specialized approach, style and language adopted by most journal articles. *Migration Policy Practice* was established to fill this gap, by offering a new medium for public officials and civil society to reflect and write about their day-to-day policy practice, their decisions and their experience, and to share such insights with like-minded colleagues nationally and internationally. The journal will be published every two months and, as a general rule, articles will not exceed five pages and will follow a non-academic and reader-friendly style. Articles will be published after consultation with relevant members of the editorial board, all of whom are policymakers in the field of migration policy. The selection of articles will be based on their policy relevance, their topicality, and the quality of the policy solutions/options they provide.

This first issue of *Migration Policy Practice* includes seven articles by policymakers in Asia, Australia, Europe and the United States.

The first three articles, by Mark Cully (Chief Economist at the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship), Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra and Elina Scheja (The World Bank) and Charles Harns (Director of the Migration Research and Training Centre in the Republic of Korea), discuss a range of topical policy issues such as Australia’s recent reforms to its skilled selection migration policies; current models and issues in technical cooperation with government agencies on migration policy; and recent evidence on the impact of migration on economic and social development. They all provide valuable data and suggestions for methodological and policy improvements in the conduct of various types of migration policy.

The four remaining articles, by Niels Keijzer and Henrike Klavert (European Centre for Development Management), Chris Hedges (UK Border Agency), Laura Chappell, Orlando Salazaar-Ruiz and Frank Laczko (IOM) and Ann Pawliczko (UNFPA), all discuss different aspects of migration policy evaluation. This includes the evaluation of EU-funded projects on integration; current approaches to the evaluation of migration and development projects; the experience of the Global Migration Group in conducting impact assessments of international migration projects; and innovative methods for evaluations (and evaluators) to inform the various stages of EU policymaking in the area of migration.

The special focus of this issue on the evaluation of migration policy interventions reflects both the increasing importance of evidence-based programmes and policies in the field of migration, and the journal’s intention to privilege articles that inform innovative methods of evaluating such interventions at various stages of implementation.

*Migration Policy Practice* now welcomes submissions from public officials in national, regional and international administrations, and from civil society representatives. As a general rule, articles should not exceed five pages and be written in a non-academic and reader-friendly style. They should cover any area of migration policy but discuss, as far as possible, particular solutions, policy options or best practice relating to the theme covered. They should also provide, as far as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant public administrations in other countries.

Please send any comments and articles to: sardittis@eurasylum.org and flaczko@iom.int.

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1 Solon Ardittis is Managing Director of Eurasylum Ltd and Frank Laczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOM Headquarters. They are co-editors of *Migration Policy Practice*. 
Skilled migration selection policies: recent Australian reforms

Mark Cully

Introduction

Australia has been operating migration programmes that are selective on the basis of skill since the 1970s. They are selective in the sense that certain threshold requirements must be met to be eligible for skilled migration – for example, an applicant must be recognized as competent to meet the Australian work standard for defined occupations – and also in the sense that applicants can be ranked and prioritized, which then determines if and when a skilled visa is granted.

The policies that determine the selection process have evolved over time. While they are complicated in their detail, at heart they favour those who are young, more qualified and experienced, more fluent in English and with skills in demand among employers.

Many countries now look to Australia, and other traditional settlement countries such as Canada, to emulate such policies. This article investigates whether skilled migration selection policies work, using Australia as a case study. It also provides an overview of recent reforms.

A brief outline of skilled migration in Australia

Since white settlement began in 1788, Australia’s population has been replenished with wave after wave of migrants. The lowest ebb was in the years following the Great Depression leading up to the Second World War. At the end of the war, migrants made up 10 per cent of the population. The Australian Department of Immigration was established in 1945 and, since then, more than 7 million people have been granted permanent residence. Behind Luxembourg, Australia has the second highest density of overseas-born in its population among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, around 27 per cent.

Skilled migration to Australia can be either permanent or temporary, and can be characterized as a “hybrid system” (Papademetriou et al., 2008). Traditionally, applicants for skilled migration were selected on the basis of their attributes and capabilities; permanent residence was granted with no requirement to have arranged an offer of employment beforehand. Selection under this route is by application, assessed using a government-administered points test. In shorthand, we call this “supply-driven” migration.

Since the mid-1990s, policies have altered to embrace “demand-driven” migration – hence, the hybrid. This was done in two ways. First, by giving greater weight in the points test to applicants whose skills were in demand among employers. Second, employers have been given, subject to certain eligibility conditions, the ability to themselves select migrants through employer sponsorship, for either permanent or temporary residence.

Temporary skilled migration is entirely demand-driven. Employers who are unable to fill a skilled vacancy within their local labour market can sponsor a migrant, subject to meeting sponsorship obligations and paying the going rate for the job. There is no cap on the number of visas that can be granted. Many temporary skilled migrants go on to become permanent residents through one of the several possible pathways open to them, most typically through their employer sponsoring them for permanent residence. In 2010–11, the number of skilled migrants coming through the demand-driven route, whether permanent or temporary, was almost twice as large as that coming through the supply-driven route, 66,900 compared with 34,900.

The cumulative operation of skilled migration programmes has transformed the character of the Australian workforce. At the time of the 2006 population census, migrants made up more than a quarter of the working-age population, namely those aged 15–64. Among these migrants, almost three in 10 held degrees, compared with less than one in five Australian-born.

Migrant selection

The process by which skilled migrants are selected can be separated into two discrete decision-making stages. In the first stage, the would-be migrant must determine that they wish to leave their home country for another country. In the second stage, a destination country must determine to accept the migrant.
The first stage (self-selection) is important because would-be migrants will have different attributes to those who have no wish to migrate. For example, they will differ with respect to age and skill, and perhaps also across attributes such as pluck, tenacity and love of adventure that may be predictive of success. They will most likely also differ from those who are willing to migrate but to a different country.

In a pioneering work, Borjas (1987) developed a model to characterize the self-selection of migrants as either positively or negatively selected. The positively selected are those who come from the upper end of the skill distribution in their home country. They do so because the pay off to their skill is likely to be greater in the destination country. The negatively selected are those at the other end of the skill distribution who migrate because the low skill penalty is less punitive in the destination country. For example, a relatively high minimum wage would encourage negative selection. The implication of Borjas’s model is that migration flows are driven by a range of factors that may be quite independent of migration policies.

It is only at the second stage (state selection) that a national government gets to impose its own migration selection policies. The effectiveness of state selection can only be judged against the counterfactual of what kind of migrants would have been chosen, and their associated settlement experiences, if selection at the second stage had been entirely random. For example, as shown above, educational attainment has risen among successive waves of immigrants to Australia, but we do not know how much of this is attributable to selection policies placing greater weight on skill and how much to an increase in the number of skilled people wishing to migrate to Australia.

There are many empirical studies that investigate these issues. For the most part, they find that the attributes of migrants entering under skilled programmes differs systematically from those entering under family reunification programmes. They also mostly find that skilled migrants perform better in the labour market, and that these differences largely disappear once the analysis accounts for age, qualifications and language proficiency. There is succour here for both academics and policymakers. For academics, visa category seems to have no or little bearing on the returns to education, while for policymakers, these studies show that countries can alter the composition of their migrant intake by preferring those that it favours and screening out those it does not.

The assessment of the preceding paragraph is not universally held. Jasso and Rosenzweig (2009) compare Australia and the United States and find “no evidence that the differences in the selection mechanism used to screen employment migrants in the two countries play a significant role in affecting the characteristics of skill migration.” Even if this finding is true, differences could arise if, as they do, the two countries assign different fractions of available migration places to economic migration versus family reunification.

Recent reforms to skilled migration in Australia

From 2009 onwards, the Australian government embarked on a series of reforms to skilled migration. Using the framework outlined in the previous section, these reforms can broadly be characterized as screening for negative selection and sorting for positive selection. Rather than catalogue the full range of reforms, in what follows, two are described in some detail.

As discussed earlier, the hybrid of supply-driven and demand-driven skilled migration was first given expression in the points test through assigning bonus points to applicants whose nominated occupation featured on the Migration Occupations in Demand List (MODL). The list was introduced in 1999 to make the skilled migration programme more directly responsive to labour market needs. It was updated twice yearly on the basis of evidence gathered from surveys of employers advertising skilled vacancies.

The government used the opportunity provided by the global economic crisis to institute a review of the MODL, prompted by concerns that it was no longer meeting its purpose. Among these concerns was the blow-out in the number of occupations on the list, which had reached over 100 by the end of 2008. It was also the case that would-be migrants and educational institutions had realized there was an almost seamless pathway for international students to attain permanent residence if they enrolled in a course of study which would qualify them for an occupation featuring on the MODL.

The review of the MODL found that it was an inefficient tool for assisting employers to remedy skill shortages. This was because the lag time between a new skill shortage becoming manifest, evidence of this becoming sufficiently compelling that the occupation was added to the list, and applicants incorporating this into their decision-making then migrating, probably took two years to unfold. In contrast, take-up of the temporary skilled migration visa had grown rapidly and it had demonstrably proven its worth in quickly enabling employers to fill job vacancies where no locals could be found.

2 For Australia, see Antecol et al. (2003), Cobb-Clark (2000), and Miller (1999).

3 All primary applicants for skilled migration need to nominate a skilled occupation and be pre-assessed as having the necessary competence to perform that occupation to the Australian standard.
Rather than persist with using the points test to give expression to the hybrid character of skilled migration to Australia, the government decided to cleanly divide the supply-driven route from the demand-driven. The MODL was revoked in February 2010, and along with it the bonus points in the points test. From this time, demand-driven skilled migration was to be met through the temporary skilled migration visa and the permanent employer-sponsored visa.

If that was to be the case, then what role was there for supply-driven migration? Here, the government decided to position supply-driven migration within its overall workforce development strategy. A newly established agency, Skills Australia, had been tasked with providing the government with advice on public provision of post-school education and training. It took the view that government ought to intervene only in the area of specialized skills, leaving it to the market to resolve other skill shortages. Specialized skills were defined as those that: took several years to learn; had high correspondence between a field of study and employment in a given occupation; resulted in high economic and/or social costs to local communities if the skill was in short supply; and had reliable information on which to make the preceding judgements.

Within this framework, Skills Australia was asked by the government to advise which occupations met these criteria and supply could be sourced, in part, through migration. Some occupations were deemed ineligible for migration, for example, because the work needed to be undertaken by an Australian citizen. Others were deemed temporarily ineligible because of evidence of an ongoing oversupply, the principle being that migrants should not displace Australian workers. The number of occupations for which skilled migrants could nominate was cut from more than 400 to around 180. Fashioned this way, the role of supply-driven migration is to complement the provision of post-school education and training to ensure an adequate future stream of specialized skills.

Would-be migrants coming through this route were still subject to the points test. A review of the points test was conducted and a revised test took effect from July 2011. The government also announced that it intended to fundamentally reform the administration of the points test, by prioritizing applicants according to their score. Up until now, applicants who meet the pass mark are granted a visa. In recent years there were more applicants than places available for skilled migration, resulting in a queue. The new system dispenses with the queue.

In practice what this means is that applicants will be sorted on the basis of their points test score. To put this scheme into effect, a new two-phase processing system is being introduced from July 2012. In the first phase, applicants will submit electronically an expression of interest in skilled migration, providing sufficient information from which to derive a points test score. In the second phase, people will be invited to apply for a skilled migration visa in descending order of their points test score. In effect, the points test pass mark from one year to the next will serve as a kind of equilibrium price, with the volume of invited applications roughly balancing the volume of these skilled visas allocated by the government on an annual basis.

Labour market integration of recent skilled migrants

Informing the development of these policy changes was evidence from a recurrent survey of recent migrants to Australia. Since 2009, cohorts of recent migrants have been surveyed twice a year. The focus of the survey is on the labour market absorption of new migrants.

Cully et al. (2011) pool data from three cohorts to investigate labour market absorption for different categories of new migrants. We follow an approach used by Aydemir (2010) in analysing short-term outcomes for new Canadian migrants. Our interest is in testing the efficacy of policy settings. What we therefore wish to estimate is, independent of human capital characteristics, the “effect” of the visa entry category on labour market absorption. Of course the outcomes are not independent of human capital characteristics; however, it is these precise characteristics which are determinative in the state selection stage of skilled migration.

Table 1 reports some results from this work. It shows the marginal effects of the probability of being employed in full-time skilled work for different visa entry categories, and earnings differentials, relative to a reference group of migrants entering as partners under the family reunification programme. The rationale for using these migrants as the reference group is that they essentially go only through the self-selection stage. So long as the Australian authorities are assured of the bona fides of their relationship, and other necessary checks are satisfied, a visa is granted. If state selection was having no effect, then differences in labour market absorption ought to be minor, recognizing of course that some partners will be more interested in establishing their home in Australia than immediately seeking out work.

As can be seen from the table the effects are very far from minor. For example, a female migrant coming through the employer-sponsored route was 74 per cent more likely to be employed full-time in a skilled job than an otherwise comparable female migrant coming through as a partner in the family stream. If both were

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4 The archetypal example here is hairdressers. It may take several years to become a proficient hairdresser; it may be the case that most people studying hairdressing become employed as hairdressers, but: are there significant social and/or economic costs to communities if hairdressers are in short supply?
The earnings differential was 52 per cent. Across the three skilled entry categories examined here – skilled independent and state-sponsored are subsets of the permanent supply-driven route – all had much superior outcomes to otherwise comparable partners, with the best outcomes enjoyed by those who were employer-sponsored. This provides support for the shift more than a decade ago towards embracing demand-driven skilled migration.

To reiterate again, the “otherwise comparable” construct adopted here ignores differences in education and experience for the very reason that these feature in the decision to grant a skilled visa. If these characteristics were also controlled for, much of the difference in outcomes shown in the table would evaporate. That issue – the returns to education and experience that accrues to migrants – is an important issue, but it is a second-order issue for policymakers relative to the issue of whether state selection is effective in promoting positive selectivity.

Cully et al. (2011) use the same survey data to examine the impact of the new points test. A new points test score is derived for survey respondents who had passed the former version of the points test. The new points test score is then used as an explanatory variable in an earnings equation. From these results, it is possible to predict the average earnings of skilled migrants at different points test threshold values. The results show that earnings are positively associated with higher threshold values. This provides qualified support for the new selection system, which will take effect in July 2012, of choosing first those applicants with the highest score, noting that the results are biased as the survey excludes, by definition, those who might pass the new points test but did not pass the former test. More definitive evidence will become available once the new arrangements are in place.

This article has shown that for a country like Australia, which is blessed in having more people wishing to migrate to it than the places it makes available, migrant selection policies do work: they deliver markedly superior labour market outcomes than would accrue if would-be migrants were chosen at random.

References


Table 1: Estimated labour market outcomes of recent migrants

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full-time skilled employment</td>
<td>Weekly earnings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employer-sponsored</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.544</td>
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<tr>
<td>Skilled independent</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-sponsored</td>
<td>0.261</td>
<td>0.291</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cully et al., 2011.

Notes: Reported as marginal effects. All results are statistically significant at 0.01.
Reference group are partners in the family stream.
Results are for migrants aged 18 to 45, and control for: whether a former international student; date of survey; years in Australia; state of residence; marital and dependents status; and whether born in a mainly English-speaking country or otherwise.
The earnings equation is estimated for employed migrants only, and includes the same controls plus whether the migrant is employed full-time.

5 The results found here are stronger than those for Canada reported by Aydemir. Some of that could be attributed to the Canadian data capturing migrant outcomes at up to two years after entry, as it is well established that differences tend to narrow over time.
Impact of migration on economic and social development

Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra and Elina Scheja

Introduction

International migration has significant implications for development. There are more than 215 international migrants and over 700 million internal migrants worldwide. According to official estimates, migrants from developing countries sent over USD 325 billion in officially recorded remittances to their origin countries in 2010—three times the size of official development assistance. Remittances flows to developing countries remained resilient during the recent global financial crisis compared to significant declines in private capital flows. Unlike commonly believed, around half of the official international migration from the South is to other developing countries rather than to wealthier countries in the North.

For a sending country, migration and the resulting remittances lead to increased incomes and poverty reduction, improved health and educational outcomes, and promote economic development. Yet these gains might come at substantial social costs to the migrants and their families. Both developed and developing countries that receive large inflows of international migrants face similar challenges with regard to the integration of immigrants and the fiscal costs of providing social services.

This article provides a review of the evidence on the development impact of migration and remittances on origin and destination countries, both in the North and the South. This paper also highlights some emerging issues such as the relationship between migration and climate change, the role of migration in the transmission of fertility norms and values, and the implications of migration for domestic institutions. It presents several policy recommendations calling for better integration of migration in development policies both in the South and in the North; improving data collection on migration and remittance flows; reducing the cost of remittances and better leveraging these funds for development; improving recruitment mechanisms; and facilitating international labour mobility through safe and legal channels.

Development implications of migration for the origin countries

The welfare implications of migration on the origin country are most often sizeable and positive. The main channels through which migration alleviates poverty and improves development outcomes are: increased incomes from remittances; improved health care, education and nutrition; ability to smooth consumption; and better access to finance for both recipient households and for countries. Countries of origin benefit from tapping on the knowledge and financial resources of the migrant diaspora. Yet, not all impacts are positive: exploitation of migrants by unscrupulous recruiters or employers is reportedly widespread, while the separation of household members can be stressful for migrants and their families.

Evidence from Latin America, Africa, South Asia and other regions suggests that remittances reduce the depth and severity of poverty, as well as indirectly stimulate economic activity. Remittances also smooth consumption as they rise in times of economic downturns, financial crises and natural disasters. In Ghana, Ethiopia and Mali, remittances were found to help households to minimize the effects of economic shocks on household welfare. Migration may raise inequality initially, as only the relatively well-off have the resources to send workers abroad, but the effect typically weakens once the cost of migration falls.

Migration contributes to human capital formation, as income from remittances is disproportionately spent on education and health. Evidence from rural Pakistan suggests that temporary migration is associated with higher school enrolment, especially for girls. Furthermore, migration has been observed to increase health knowledge, which has led to lower rates of infant mortality and higher birth weights in Mexico. Increased mobility of workers can, however, contribute to the spread of communicable diseases such as HIV: male Senegalese migrants were found to have higher rates of HIV-prevalence compared to non-migrants from the same origin area.

Migrant remittances increase domestic savings as well as improve financial intermediation, which can improve growth prospects. Evidence from the Philippines, Mexico and other countries suggests that remittances increase the accumulation of assets in farm equipment, promote self-employment and increase small business investments in migrant-sending areas.

1 Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra and Elina Scheja are officials in the Development Prospects Group of the World Bank, Washington D.C. The authors would like to thank Hans Timmer for extensive discussions and William Shaw for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Comments are welcome, and may be sent to dratha@worldbank.org. See the working paper version (available at http://go.worldbank.org/X9R1K8LZBO) for the detailed set of references for the evidence and views cited in the text. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank.
Factoring the remittance inflows correctly into macroeconomic analysis is also likely to improve the credit rating and external debt-sustainability of the remittance-receiving country. On the other hand, remittances can lead to exchange rate appreciation, which can reduce the competitiveness of the tradable sector, the so-called Dutch Disease. However, remittances are less likely than natural resource windfalls to result in persistent exchange rate misalignment, as the exchange rate implications of relatively stable remittance flows are likely to be easier to manage.

The migrant community abroad (diaspora) reduces the cost of migration for new migrants and contributes through philanthropic remittances to the development of their former communities. Further, access to information through the diaspora and returning migrants can improve technology transfers and trade linkages, and lower the fixed cost and knowledge requirements for setting up an international business.

High-skilled emigration or the so-called “brain drain” can imply a loss of public resources invested in education. The phenomenon is mainly affecting small economies and is mostly debated within the health sector. However, the possibility of emigrating abroad can increase the interest in and returns to higher education. Finally, recent studies find that the shortage of health professionals in Africa is likely to stem from causes entirely unrelated to international migration.

Empirical studies have found little evidence in support of a negative (or positive) impact of remittances on economic growth. In general, the inconclusive results on the impact of remittances and growth are largely due to the difficulty of separating the counter-cyclical response of remittances to growth and also because poorer countries (which tend to have greater governance issues and lower growth) tend to receive more remittances as a share of their gross domestic product (GDP).

Diaspora bonds and remittance-backed bonds can act as alternative sources of finance for infrastructure and social development. Migrants might be especially interested in financing infrastructure, housing, health and education projects. Sub-Saharan African countries can potentially raise USD 5–10 billion per year by issuing diaspora bonds. Furthermore, future flows of remittances can be used as collateral by governments and private sector entities to raise financing in international capital markets for infrastructure and social development projects.

At its best, migration can be a rewarding experience that is made in the interest of household welfare, but in most cases moving to another country and being separated from one’s immediate family takes place at considerable emotional cost. Temporary circular migration can increase the risk of eroded family structures and relationships, fragmentation of social networks and psychosocial stress. For instance, an absence of mothers has been found to be associated with greater incidence of children in conflict with the law in Jamaica.

Too often, the intended aspirations of the migrants do not materialize and wages and working conditions turn out worse than that promised by recruitment agents. In some cases, young women are promised legitimate work at the destination, but are then forced into prostitution upon arrival. The abuse of the migrant workers has led to calls for further regulation of middlemen and recruitment agencies across migration corridors.

Impact of migration on the destination countries in the North and the South

Economic simulations suggest that the welfare gain of immigration for the destination country is substantial due to the fact that immigration increases the supply of labour, which increases employment, production and thus GDP. The availability of low-cost childcare provided by immigrants can enable young local women to go back to work. Also, less-educated immigrants increase labour productivity as they complement the local labour force that will be better able to specialize in more productive complementary tasks. Furthermore, immigrants are often willing to do jobs that locals no longer are interested in, such as care for the elderly. Immigration of the high-skilled can also boost productivity through innovation and specialization. Data from the United States show that an increase in the share of migrant university graduates is positively associated with the number of patent applications and grants issued per capita.

Still, the public and the policymakers in the destination country usually believe that immigration can become an economic burden, despite evidence to the contrary. In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the aggregate effect of immigration on wages has been found to be very small, and similar findings have been reported in the context of South-South migration. Increasing inflows of migrants could still impose a challenge for migration management and integration for the host countries. In many of the developing countries, scarce resources, weak administrative capacity, and porous borders make it difficult to manage cross-border migration. The case of Côte d’Ivoire, where stripping immigrants of some of their rights sparked chaos that has led the once stable country to the verge of an internal conflict, illustrates growing intolerance of foreigners.

Most internal as well as international migrants end up in the cities of developing countries because of employment opportunities. When the excess supply of labour is combined with the poor ability of local authorities to manage immigration, the result is increased disparities and expansion of slum areas in cities. The interaction
between migration and rapid urbanization is likely to be important for policy in the receiving regions.

Emerging issues and policy conclusions

Before presenting the policy recommendations, it would be useful to point out a few emerging themes. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) already noted in 1990 that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on migration. The effects of migration on climate change, on the other hand, are less understood. When migration is induced by a conflict or a natural disaster leading to a sudden inflow of migrants, the displaced people may resort to unsustainable activities in the absence of other means of survival, exacerbating existing environmental problems and creating new ones.\(^2\) On the other hand, migration can work as a channel for adoption of new techniques and raw materials, leading to more environmentally friendly production and consumption practices.

Migration can have important implications for domestic institutions and politics. The emigration of capable people may cause loss of governance capacity in countries where institutions are already weak. Also, emigration can serve as a way to release political pressure, while remittances become increasingly critical for maintaining socio-economic stability. On the other hand, migrants may serve as a channel for democratic attitudes and behaviours absorbed in host countries to spread in their countries of origin, which can improve accountability.

Migration also shapes values and attitudes towards gender roles within the household. When the men emigrate, women are empowered to take a more prominent part in community decision-making, control their own income, and expand their role in the domestic sphere. Studies find migrants' fertility to resemble more closely that of natives at the destination, either due to social adaptation or self-selection of migrants by fertility preferences.

Although most remittances sent by migrants are legitimate transfers, the use of informal channels has raised concerns of money laundering, terrorist financing and financial crimes. The need for such alternative channels arise from the sustained high cost of remitting through formal financial institutions and cumbersome legislation related to money transfers. Studies show that such informality is particularly prevalent in the “South-South” remittance corridors.

Selected policy conclusions

Migration can be a powerful vehicle for the development of both sending and receiving countries. Targeted migration policies are needed to enhance the quality of labour mobility and leverage remittances for development. This section presents selected policy conclusions that emerge from the review:

- Migration should be an integral part of national economic policies and development cooperation strategies in the North, as well as of national poverty reduction strategies in the South. Some areas for cooperative efforts between sending and receiving countries include the drivers of migration in the source country, financing training and skill development of the global workforce, and integrating migrants into their destination countries.

- While many developing countries have large stocks of immigrants, very few of them have explicit policies on how to deal with immigration or the capacity to manage their borders effectively. Empowering sending and receiving countries in the South to plan for and manage international mobility will improve the welfare impact of migration.

- Statistics on migration and remittances are often of poor quality, especially in developing countries. Few statistics measure migration flows, and data are even scarcer when it comes to transit, circular or irregular migration. Official estimates of remittance flows are usually gross underestimates of true volumes, since a large portion of remittances are sent through unofficial channels. Improving data collection can facilitate better policies to enhance migration for development.

- The development community can leverage remittance flows for development by making them cheaper, safer and more productive for both sending and receiving countries. The G-8 group of countries endorsed the aim of reducing the global average cost of remittances by 5 percentage points in five years (the 5x5 objective) at their L'Aquila summit in 2009. An “International Remittances Agenda” would involve: (1) enhanced monitoring, analysis and projections; (2) improving retail payment systems through the use of better technologies and appropriate regulatory changes; (3) linking remittances to financial access at the household level; and (4) leveraging remittances for capital market access at the institutional or macro levels.

- As the labour market becomes increasingly global, financing education cannot be considered the sole responsibility of migrant-sending countries, although their educational policies will need to be revised to invest in skills that are needed within the country as well as in the global labour markets.

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\(^2\) One of the reported cases is the Virunga national park in North Kivu, where thousands of Rwandan refugees who were brought there in 1994 engaged in intensive woodcutting and poaching.
However, attempts to regulate skilled-worker mobility do little to address the underlying causes of emigration decisions. Complementary measures can be developed to ensure sufficient investment in education and to foster service provision in the source country.

- Immigration and border control policies need to recognize that migration is primarily an economic phenomenon. Evidence from the US–Mexico border suggests that increasing the number of border control agents increases smuggler’s fees, but is unlikely to curtail the number of migrants as intended. Providing legal channels for temporary migration is more likely to enhance the benefits of migration for all parties.

- Recruitment companies often account for the majority of the cost of migrating, especially when it comes to low-skilled migrants that can leave the migrant in debt, lower wages than promised, long hours and unsafe working conditions. Facilitating legal migration through better monitoring of recruitment processes and bilateral coordination will help to protect the rights of the migrants and fight exploitation and trafficking.

- Providing knowledge about the migration process and the language of the destination country will also enhance integration and quicker adjustment of migrants to the new labour market. For instance, the Philippine government organizes orientation courses for migrants prior to leaving; during orientation, migrants learn about destination-country customs and laws, the resources available to them at embassies or consulates, important contacts for any problems that might arise, and financial management. There are similar examples of successful programmes for newcomers in destination countries.

In conclusion, migration and remittances can be a valuable complement to broad-based development efforts. Yet, migration and remittances (collective or individual) should not be viewed as a substitute for official development aid, as they are private money that should not be expected to fund public projects. Also, not all poor households receive remittances, and official funds are needed to address the needs of these households. Although labour mobility will not reduce the need for domestic reform and poverty reduction, harnessing the development potential of migration and remittances can benefit both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries.

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Issues and models in technical cooperation with government on migration policy and practice

Charles Harns

Introduction

Migration management has become one of the foremost concerns of national, regional and global policymakers, as well as for civil society and advocacy groups of various kinds. It is an increasingly complex area of governance, inextricably linked with issues of economic and social development – particularly with the labour and population policy aspects, human rights, security, and regional and cross-regional cooperation. The ability to effectively address migration management issues has become a bedrock requirement for responsible national governance and productive international relations.

Effective migration governance is also increasingly a matter of effective joint management among States and between States and key non-State actors. Additionally, aspects of migration governance have become, in a sense, competitive, with governments sensibly seeking out the best or particularly successful practices from other administrations to either gain some advantage – such as in attracting the best talent among high-skilled migrants with choices of destination countries – or to avoid being tagged as laggards in some important transnational dimension of migration management, such as prevention of trafficking and protection of its victims. As a result, knowledge of comparative practices in other countries is important for building particular national capacities.

Given the complexities of the information and perspective needed to shape the best policies, programmes and procedures, and the skills needed to implement them, governments depend upon a range of resources and actors at the national and international levels to advise them and to help build their capacities. Research and training functions play an increasingly important practical and strategic role in informing government policy, and in enabling its effective implementation. Governments often have a good idea already of the kind of advice they will receive, based on who they ask. At times, they may seek support for staying the course with current policies that have come under criticism. On other occasions, they may seek advice or recommendations that may underpin a new and perhaps unpopular direction in migration policy. The extent to which advice may be offered that runs counter to the common thinking or the prevailing political wind will be affected by nature of the provider of the advice: their funding, reporting requirements, and their degree of intimacy of inclusion within governmental structures.

It is the purpose of this brief article to review some of the main approaches or models in technical cooperation with government on migration policy and practice. Technical cooperation will be here used to include any or all of the following assistance functions: research, training, technical consulting and strategic networking/partnership building. These approaches will be compared across a few key features, suggesting implications and particular situational advantages. Special mention will be made of an interesting new technical cooperation model now in its early implementation stages in the Republic of Korea (hereafter, Korea) – the IOM Migration Research and Training Centre (MRTC), a model which attempts to maximize both responsiveness to government and objectivity through the creation of wholly new legal and management formats.

Organizational models of technical cooperation on migration management

In broadest terms, forms of technical support to government on migration policy and practice may be either internal (within government) or external. There are, however, meaningful variations and grey areas that blur these lines. A progression can be suggested between the two poles, with much room for discussion on the best placement of certain models along the continuum. This discussion will briefly analyse three models across the following key factors: management reporting lines; degree of accountability to government and to the public; budget provision and control; and, primary staffing arrangements. The three approaches discussed are: purely internal approaches, external semi-autonomous approaches, and fully external models of technical cooperation. The examples are necessarily somewhat idealized and leave meaningful gaps for other approaches that fall at less precise points in the continuum.

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Internal government approaches

Commonly, and particularly in the better-funded civil services, the government entity or entities most responsible for migration policy will have their own internal research and policy development arms. Given that there is great diversity in the ways in which the migration portfolio is structured in governments, this internal policy support function may be a single entity with a clear and singular migration policy focus, or the function may be dispersed among various research and policy arms in key ministries or departments that each handle major aspects of overall migration management. At times, overarching coordinating bodies, such as presidential or prime minister’s committees are used to rationalize and synthesize the major elements into a coherent migration policy platform, though this overarching role may be ad hoc and episodic, rather than institutional and predictable.

Internal government entities of this kind commonly have the following management and accountability characteristics.

Management reporting lines: In this model the responsible managers in the research and policy development arms will be civil servants, responsible within their department or ministry’s reporting structure. The entity’s management reporting lines are generally direct and fully internal, within their broader organizational arm.

Degree of accountability to government and to the public: Broad government political mandates will have a strong effect on the priorities pursued by these entities, as governments commonly attempt to align overall political strategy downward through various governmental structures. While civil servants in many countries are entitled and at times obligated to act in a non-political manner, governmental policy priorities shift with political fortunes, and research and training agendas within government arms tend to strongly reflect those priorities in the direction of their research and policy support operations. Elections, where they happen in honest terms, have and should have consequences. The public may rightfully expect their government’s arms to all be rowing in the direction the polls indicated. Migration policy and practices have become key elements of the political landscape in most, if not all, countries and will not be immune from this kind of direct political influence and accountability.

Public sector accountability in this model is indirect at the level of the research and policy entity. It is unlikely that a particular individual with a lead role in the internal research and policy entity, or the entity itself, will come under strong direct public scrutiny. Their work is enmeshed in the larger government structure, which is likely to be the direct recipient of public pressure. However, one of the key features of policy research and analysis may be the anticipated public reaction to new policy initiatives.

Budget provision and control: Direct government arms are generally fully funded through government coffers, and as such are under significant control and accountability to government. The advantages of having arms of government, including those undertaking research and policy analysis, that are directly accountable to political leaders are evident in an active democracy, but less obvious in other forms of government. The downside, even in the most democratic environments, is the possible creation of policy “echo chambers” through which the conventional wisdom and dominating policies, no matter how representative of the majority’s will, are never strongly challenged.

Primary staffing arrangements: In this model, primary staff members are civil servants, or persons under special contracts that nonetheless ensure their direct accountability to the supervising civil servants. The use of external consultants, and contracting of certain work to external enterprises, is common, but the locus of control is firmly and finally with the civil servant staff of the internal entity.

In sum, internal government entities providing research and policy advice and other support in the area of migration have limited autonomy and naturally gravitate towards a role supportive of the migration policies that the government wishes to continue or newly implement. This is not so much a matter of distorting research findings towards certain unsupportable conclusions, but more so on the nature of the questions asked and the prioritization of the research and policy analysis agenda. If, for example, high-skilled migration is seen as the most advantageous intake for the nation, and the political environment is most supportive of fewer and “higher quality” immigrants, research and policy efforts may examine primarily the ways in which high-skilled migration has worked advantageously in other contexts. Other migration policy approaches may not receive similar attention, and possible disadvantages or overstatements of the contribution of the high-skilled migrants may not receive full attention.

These natural limiting factors notwithstanding, internal policy and research entities continue to make valuable contributions to migration policy research and practice. The fact that certain policy directions reflect particular political orientations does not necessarily obviate the value or validity of those policies. Those seeking
fuller perspective and more broadly objective policy foundations, though, will need to judge the value of the internally generated policy research as one voice within the choir of migration policy advice.

One of the great advantages of this model is its immediate responsiveness to government policy development needs. Provided resources are sufficient, the work of internal government policy arms can be focused or re-focused to provide the needed research, technical support or training required; whereas external contracting may require a more cumbersome and time-consuming process, and more contentious negotiation on the scope of the research and the dissemination of the results.

External, semi-autonomous approaches

Governments may form special long-standing partnerships with external institutions to provide important and regular input into government policies, including migration policy, and may in some cases fund the creation and sustaining of these institutions entirely or in large part. Think tanks of this kind, sometimes free-standing and sometimes linked with or an arm of a higher education institution, are not uncommon. These external partners can be seen as semi-autonomous in practical terms, with the level of absolute autonomy affected by their dependency upon continuous and substantial government funding, and other key factors. Korea uses this approach in many sectors of government (labour, health and social affairs, economic development), with several semi-autonomous think tanks funded through the central and ministerial budgets. Korea’s approach to migration technical assistance per se, however, departs from this model in meaningful ways. Special mention will be made of an interesting new technical cooperation model now in its early implementation stages in Korea – the IOM Migration Research and Training Centre (MRTC), a model which attempts to maximize both responsiveness to government and objectivity through the creation of wholly new legal and management formats.

Entities of this kind may have the following characteristics:

Management reporting lines: In this model, the responsible managers in the research and policy development arms will not usually be civil servants. They may be well-known experts or administrators from government or non-government backgrounds, not infrequently from academia. The entity’s management reporting lines are generally to a board of directors, if a free-standing entity, or to an overarching authority within the higher education intuition. Hybrid arrangements are possible where there may be a board specifically for the think tank structure, though also enmeshed within a higher education institution reporting authority.

Degree of accountability to government, public and private sectors: Broad government political mandates are likely to have a strong and direct effect on the priorities pursued by these semi-autonomous entities. However, and unlike the direct governmental arrangements earlier discussed, the level of influence is somewhat diluted. The intention with these structures is to gain a broader perspective, but still to have a partner that is quick to react and responsive to particular government policy development needs. It is unlikely that a semi-autonomous institution, directly included in recurrent government budgeting, will veer strongly off the course of policy advice supportive of the current administration. However, the semi-autonomous nature of these institutions usually allows them to pursue other sources of support. While these sources may be minor in overall budgetary terms, the work under non-governmental support sources can present alternate, even opposing, views to those of government; expanding partnership while retaining the base of support from government is a delicate balancing act for these institutions.

These institutions can also serve an important purpose when governments wish to significantly shift gears in migration policy, such as when a newly elected administration takes office and wishes to change or even reverse course from a previous administration’s policies. The external label on the advice received from these institutions can be influential in gaining political and public support for the policy shift.

Public sector accountability in this model is more direct. As ostensibly independent entities, with identifiable directors and a need for institutional public relations and public visibility, these institutions may come under direct public scrutiny or demands of accountability or promotion of certain policies. Their boards of directors may include representation from advocacy groups that hold positions different from those of government.

Budget provision and control: The semi-autonomous descriptor infers that these institutions are not fully independent in key ways, including in their budgeting. In the case of the Korean institutions earlier noted, virtually their entire budget is provided through a process of national and ministerial coordinated funding support. In other contexts, a similar institution may be dependent upon government funding for its primary support, but may also enjoy meaningful separate income sources.

Primary staffing arrangements: In this model, primary staff members are not civil servants, though they may be highly-thought-of persons who have recently left government service, or persons of strong academic
background. The locus of control is within the institution itself, and from its board of directors.

In sum, external semi-autonomous entities providing research and policy advice and other support in the area of migration have meaningful, but not full, autonomy. They can provide support to positions in conflict with those currently favoured by government, but do place themselves at some meaningful risk in doing so. Budgets can be cut when the apple is seen as falling too far from the tree.

These natural limiting factors notwithstanding, these kinds of entities can contribute greatly to the development of migration research and improvement of practices. While their fortunes may rise or fall, perhaps at times significantly, in relation to the particular administration in power, the institutions themselves tend to have staying power that allows their survival even through lean years. These institutions begin to lose their overall influence when they predictably support one narrow line of thinking, whether or not it is the dominant policy line at the time. National circumstances change, as does the regional and international context of migration. The most relevant policy advice will come from sources that understand these changes, and that can themselves adjust and refine positions on key issues as a result. Highly politicized institutions find this adjustment difficult; no matter if they are politicized in favour of, or in opposition to, the dominant politics of the moment.

One of the great advantages of this model is its stability due to dependable government core support, and its ability to provide somewhat more nuanced advice than purely internal entities. However, they can lack the advantage of being quickly responsive to urgent requests for support.

**Fully external models**

Apart from environments where governmental control of academia and civil society is significant and direct, fully external models of migration technical assistance are widespread and serve an important purpose in informing government and public discussion and policymaking. Generally these are think tanks of some kind, at times free-standing and at times enmeshed in a higher education structure. Although they are quite separate from government direct control, some may nonetheless be highly partisan in nature, perhaps receiving most funding through sources allied with specific political interests. Others are largely non-partisan and less predictable in their lines of inquiry and their policy advice conclusions.

The Americas, Australia and Europe have many well-known think tanks of this kind, and examples can be found in Asia as well, many with broad support for their activities spread across government sources, philanthropies, advocacy groups and other interested parties.

Entities of this kind may have the following characteristics:

**Management reporting lines:** In this model, the responsible managers in the research and policy development arms will not be civil servants. They may be well-known experts, not infrequently from an academic background. The entity’s management reporting lines are generally to a board of directors or a similar overseeing structure. These external models can be placed within higher education settings as well.

**Degree of accountability to government, public and private sectors:** The governmental position on migration affects these entities’ agendas, but primarily as a point of reflection and comparison. Direct government influence on the nature of the work and the conclusions or advice offered is minimal, though with the highly partisan external entities their agenda may at times directly reflect and support the government position, or dependably undercut it, simply depending on the position of the government then in power. The non-partisan entities aspire to provide fully neutral, evidence-based perspectives and advice on migration policy and practice. Not uncommonly, it is from this kind of entity that deeper background and more complex analysis is offered to support conclusions and advice.

Public sector accountability in this model is substantially direct. As independent entities, with identifiable directors and a need for institutional public relations, public visibility and (usually) the need for broad donor support, these institutions will feel pressure from many sides in relation to their work. Donors may come on board, or jump ship, based on particular conclusions or positions taken. Boards of directors may include representation from advocacy groups that hold quite different positions, but also may be significantly tempered by the inclusion of experts who value and insist upon identifiable mechanisms to keep the research and advice professional and objective, such as through diverse external jurying of research.

**Budget provision and control:** The fully external descriptor infers that these institutions are not largely dependent upon government for key funding. Government contracts are common in most cases, but do not dominate the funding base, and may come from various arms of government, reflecting somewhat different needs for the research. Support from philanthropies is often significant, as are funding sources linked specifically with higher education.
Primary staffing arrangements: In this model, staff members are not civil servants; they are usually time-vetted academics and policy analysts. In the highly partisan institutions, they may be persons closely affiliated with certain political groups or structures. In the more non-partisan models, they are rarely from identifiable highly partisan groups.

In sum, fully external entities providing research and policy advice and other support in the area of migration have substantial autonomy. This autonomy does not always translate into objectivity, as they may be both fully external and highly partisan. Yet their direct management and direct marching orders are not from government, and their budget is sufficiently diverse to avoid both the appearance and the reality of being “in the government’s pocket”.

Governmental policy positions can be impervious to facts, but do run the risk of being proven wrong, and predictably so, by their critics. Even the most partisan of administrations prefer to avoid such a scenario. The very partisan external entities serve the purpose of reminding us, if needed, what the partisan position is. They rarely provide wholly new and balanced information. Their best contribution is depth rather than breadth: finding additional angles, even questionable ones, to support their long-held conclusions. The less partisan fully external entities also adapt more readily to changing national and transnational circumstances affecting migration, as they are not wed to a position regardless of context and tend to better understand the subtleties of migration policy approaches. The highly partisan institutions, even if fully external from governmental control and funding, may find this adjustment difficult or counterproductive to their agenda.

The IOM Migration Research and Training Centre: a hybrid approach to migration technical assistance

The IOM Migration Research and Training Centre (MRTC) is a new model in technical assistance in migration, and one with some of the features of each of the three models already discussed. The challenge with MRTC was to establish an institution that would be fully responsive to government, but not beholden to it, that would bring international perspective into Korean policy thinking – at times challenging the comfort zone of current policymaking – and to make this institution work within the local environment. The final arrangements that allowed the formal launching of the MRTC in late 2009 were as follows, and represent a first-of-a-kind arrangement both for the International Organization for Migration and for Korea:

Legal status: The MRTC is both an arm of the IOM and a locally incorporated not-for-profit independent institution in Korea. It is not an arm of government, but is incorporated under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Justice, which includes the Korean Immigration Service.

Management reporting lines: In this unique model, and according to the formal Agreement on the MRTC, the Centre is run by an IOM Director. This helps assure an independent role and a global orientation, and helps facilitate the inclusion of IOM technical advice into the work of the Centre. The core staff members of the Centre are all Koreans, and the key researchers have all earned their advanced degrees abroad in either English or French-based institutions. Government secondees play an important role in the management of the Centre, particularly on the budget planning and facilities management side. All staff report to the Director or the Director’s designate. The IOM Director reports to the MRTC board of directors, which is chaired by the Commissioner of the Korean Immigration Service. The MRTC Director has also been assigned diplomatic status in Korea, consistent with IOM usual privileges in the country, and this further assures the Director’s and the Centre’s independence.

Degree of accountability to government and to the public: As the MRTC is funded through public funding sources in Korea, accountability to the government and to the public is high. This accountability is not based upon the provision of particular policy perspectives, but upon visible productivity and perceived and actual usefulness of the Centre’s work to all its governmental funding partners. The Centre must, on an annual basis, prove itself worthy of the public investment made in its operation. While being responsive to government, the Centre must also retain its independence and non-partisan credentials, to ensure it is serving the broader interests of Korea, regardless of the prevailing national or local political winds.

Budget provision and control: The Centre is fully funded by Government of Korea, including the costs of the IOM Director. Funding responsibility is shared between the central government, the provincial government and the hosting city. Budget control is significant, and the nature of the research, training and networking activities the Centre undertakes each year is a matter of negotiation among all parties. The Centre has been given increasing independence in shaping an agenda that responds to local needs, but which also brings in new perspective and, potentially, new partners. The Centre’s research conclusions are never dictated or pre-ordained by the funders; all have an interest in protecting the Centre’s independence and international status and perspective.
Primary staffing arrangements: In this model, some staff members are civil servants in Korea, and some are not. The research and education specialists are not. The planning and management staff members generally are. The Director is an international civil servant, and Korea is a Member State of IOM.

In sum, the MRTC is a unique legal and administrative approach to the provision of technical assistance to governments in the area of migration. The Centre attempts to balance the legitimate need of a government for advice it can readily access and which is directed toward its most pressing needs, with the also legitimate need for objective, evidence-based research and analysis. Similarly, the Centre attempts to adhere to the principle that an intergovernmental organization retains its international character and status, and its independence, and that it brings a fully international perspective into the thinking of its Member States.

Both IOM and the Government of Korea have tested new waters with the MRTC, and thus far, after approximately two years of operation, certain points of tension in the construct have predictably emerged. The IOM has, in effect, taken on a second legal status, as a not-for-profit foundation in Korea, while of course retaining its full intergovernmental status globally, and through its IOM Mission in Korea – which is separate from the MRTC. This dual status requires continued clarification among key partners, and affects many features of daily management.

Korea, however, has shown great vision and commitment in establishing and funding the MRTC, and in anticipating the expansion of its work to serve the region. Similarly, Korea has taken a significant step by not only agreeing, but advocating, that the Director of the Centre is a senior IOM official. These steps have shown with certainty that Korea understands its need to move beyond its enclosed traditions, to challenge itself, and to fully globalize Korea in cultural as well as economic terms.
Informing migration policies through evaluations: the case of the European Union

Niels Keijzer and Henrike Klavert

While several contributions to this journal’s volume, and elsewhere, have shared important and influential examples of how the evaluation of migration and development projects can be improved, this article looks more at the evaluation of migration policies which provide the basis and direction for such projects. The principal argument of this article is that such methodological innovations – and investments made to carry these out in practice – can only be relevant in function of the policy processes in which such evaluation findings are to be used in order to formulate, refine or correct migration policies. The European Union (EU) provides an interesting case to explore this argument, given that it is known for its relatively restrictive immigration policies while at the same time being legally committed to promote Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). This article looks into how the “evaluation culture” could be strengthened by specifically exploring how evaluations (and evaluators) can inform the various different stages of EU policymaking in the area of migration. The authors conclude that evaluators may best aim to influence the European Commission’s preparation of new policy proposals given its transparent and structured system for doing so, while at the same arguing that the ensuing discussions in the European Council and European Parliament present opportunities for evaluators to share their findings. By doing so, the authors also touch upon some wider issues, including the “evaluation culture” which is shaped by the relation between evaluators and policymakers who solicit their services.

Evaluating the effects and effectiveness of EU migration policy

Evaluation evidence can be seen as the main findings of evaluations that are judged as relevant to an ongoing decision-making process. In the case of the EU, evaluation evidence can be produced by various actors, including officials of the EU institutions, EU Member State administrations, academic researchers and consultants, think tanks and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Here, a distinction can be made between evaluations that are commissioned by the institutions responsible for implementing current policies and proposing new ones (in this case the European Commission), and a second group of evaluations that are commissioned by third parties. The first group of evaluations often has a more formal role to play in the decision-making process.

The question then becomes what the nature and purpose of such evaluation investments should be. What distinguishes evaluations from academic research is that investments need to be much more justified by the use made of these evaluations by decision makers and other relevant actors to be accountable to and learn from what is done. In this context, an influential work by the evaluation expert Michael Quinn Patton coined the term “utilization-focused evaluation” which, in a short checklist published in 2002, “begins with the premise that evaluations should be judged by their utility and actual use; therefore, evaluators should facilitate the evaluation process and design any evaluation with careful consideration of how everything that is done, from beginning to end, will affect use” (Patton, 2002). The key to this evaluation use focus can be found in working with clearly identified, primary intended users of the evaluation in question, given their responsibility to apply evaluation findings and implement recommendations. A checklist published by the author includes various criteria inviting the potential evaluator to avoid starting an evaluation without first having looked into the readiness, level of knowledge and willingness to cooperate of primary stakeholders, their expectations for the evaluation; understanding the political context; and identifying “any upcoming decisions, deadlines, or timelines that the evaluation should meet to be useful” (Patton, 2002).

Opportunities for using evaluation findings in EU migration policymaking

Although the EU Member States, through the Council of Ministers, remain the principal law-making institution in the EU, the past years have led to an increased and significant group of policy areas – including migration – where the Council has to share this competence with the European Parliament. Decision-making in this context is defined by the Treaty for European Union as the “ordinary legislative procedure”, even if it is still commonly referred to as “co-decision”. This procedure can be divided into two distinct phases: a first phase whereby the European Commission uses a

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systematic and relatively transparent process to develop its legislative proposal, after which a second phase starts whereby the Council and the Parliament aim to reach a consensus decision. Before putting forward a legislative proposal, the Commission usually publishes a Communication, often used to “test the waters” for new ideas. The two phases are quite different, yet both show various opportunities and ways in which evaluation evidence can be shared and put to use.

Phase 1 of the policy process: the European Commission

While sounding and often appearing as an immense institution, the European Commission consists of roughly as many public officials as the city of Amsterdam. As a result, it has to rely to a great extent on advice and information provided by third actors. Two specific and relatively formal opportunities for feeding evaluation findings into the process and get them on record can be distinguished: impact assessments (IAs) and separate public consultations.

Each year, the Secretariat-General of the European Commission, working in conjunction with the Impact Assessment Board and the Commission departments, screens all forthcoming initiatives and decides which of them require IAs. Such assessments are not either relevant to or appropriate for every single initiative. They are performed for the most important initiatives and those with the most far-reaching impacts, and in many cases, also for initiatives that are not included in the Commission's annual legislative work programme. A recent report by the EU Court of Auditors highlights that these unplanned policy initiatives make up around half of all IAs conducted.

Following the introduction of the system in 2003, the Commission’s Guidelines on Impact Assessments were revised in 2005 and 2009. The most recent version now pays more attention to assessing the impacts on developing countries.

The annexes to the Guidelines also list the qualitative methods (ranging from surveys, consultations, and secondary data to “guessing”) and quantitative methods (e.g. adapting existing models and econometric analysis) that can be used for gathering and interpreting data. Valid results can also be produced by combining the two types of method. Many IAs, however, are found to be hampered by the absence of good quality, reliable quantitative data on developing countries. This also goes for migration policy, where judgement is, for instance, hampered by the poor quality of data on migration flows and irregular migrants.

A recent study by the EU Court of Auditors (2010) found that IAs were not used by the Commission to decide whether to go ahead with a proposal. The decision whether to launch an initiative is generally taken before an IA report is finalized. The Commission rather uses IA to gather and analyse evidence that, during the policy development process, is used to improve its proposed initiative. The Commission’s IAs are systematically transmitted to the European Parliament and the Council, but the Commission is not often invited to present the report (rarely in the Parliament and, on a case-by-case basis, at the Council Working Party-level). However, the audit also found that the Commission’s IAs were not updated as the legislative procedure progressed, and the European Parliament and the European Council rarely performed such assessments on their own amendments.

With IAs playing a pivotal role in the Commission’s formulation of new legislative proposals, making sure evaluation findings are used and referred to in these reports is an important opportunity to influence the direction of the proposal and increase the chance that it gets used at later stages in the policy process. The team conducting IAs (Commission officials with or without the help of external consultants) may either draw on existing evaluations, or organize public consultations that aim to gather such research through written procedures or specific meetings. Past networking of evaluation experts with EU officials working on migration, for example during the drafting of the terms of references for the evaluations or otherwise, will likely improve prospects for the use of the concerned evaluation.

A second window of opportunity during this stage of the policy process can present itself if an additional public consultation is organized separately to the IA for a major policy initiative. One example where the Commission did so was during the public consultation on the EU’s global approach to migration. In those cases, similar to consultations during IAs, evaluation planning officials or professional evaluators need to pay close attention to the website run by the Commission which announces such consultations.2

Phase 2 of the policy process: the European Council and the European Parliament

At the end of the European Commission’s preparatory process of a new legislative proposal in the area of migration, the legislation is adopted at the College of Commissioners meeting that is chaired by President Barroso, after which it is published electronically together with the IA.

What follows is a rather complex though structured process whereby the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers aim to reach a consensus decision. As per the Treaty for European Union, this process of

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2 See: http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/consultations/index_en.htm. Alternatively, such consultations are announced on the website of the Directorate General in charge of preparing the policy initiative concerned.
“co-decision” starts with the Parliament adopting its position after its first reading of the proposal. The act is adopted if the Council approves the Parliament’s wording or if the Council does not adopt its own position and passes it back to the Parliament with an explanation. At the second reading, the act is adopted if Parliament approves the Council’s text or fails to reach a decision. The Parliament may reject the Council’s text, or modify it and pass it back to the Council. If the Council does not agree with the amendments, then a “Conciliation Committee” can be convened to allow representatives of the Council and the Parliament to work towards an agreement. The Commission also has a role throughout the process: it presents an amended proposal following the Parliament’s first reading, it sends a Communication in relation to the Council’s first reading, and publishes an opinion on the Parliament’s second reading.3

Both the EU Member States national administrations and their representations in Brussels, as well as Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the Committee for Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, depend on and use information and analysis that is provided by third parties. While Member States often rely to a large extent on their own analytical and research capacity to examine policy proposals independently, MEPs, with their travel-heavy and full agendas, and their policy assistants, cannot imagine doing their jobs without information provided by third parties. When drafting the Committee Reports, MEPs often solicit views or even textual proposals from such parties, or invite them to export meetings that feed into the preparation of these reports.

Given that the timing of the overall co-decision process is often subject to change, it cannot be expected of evaluators that they continuously stay in touch and network with Member State officials and MEPs (Rasmussen, 2011). Instead of expecting them to locate and use the evaluation reports as these are made available in the public domain, it would seem more effective for evaluators to ensure that such decision makers are at some point consulted or interviewed during the evaluation process.4 That way, they are made aware of ongoing research at a relatively early stage, and may use it later. Additionally, evaluators may proactively share public versions of their reports with third parties – including think tanks, civil society organizations and labour unions – which may use their findings in their much more intensive interactions with EU decision makers.

Exploiting opportunities to ensure evaluation use: implications for an EU evaluation culture

Despite the aforementioned opportunities for feeding evaluation evidence into decision-making, using these opportunities in practice will require strong changes in the “evaluation culture” of EU migration policy processes. Key to giving shape to this evaluation culture is the relationship between the contracting party and the decision makers that solicit their independent analysis. Although every evaluation process has unique features and offers lots of room to manoeuvre for both the evaluator and the contractors, what can be argued is that they generally are contractual, deadline-driven and output-oriented processes that are often conducted under significant time pressure. The relationship between both groups, as described in general evaluation policies and in terms of references for each study, is mostly given shape by perceptions among evaluation officials and their contractors as regards their respective responsibilities in the evaluation process. Changing these responsibilities from ensuring a “good-quality report” to ensuring a “good and utilization-focused evaluation process” would be a key step to reforming the evaluation culture, and would require important changes for both key actors:

- **Evaluation professionals** should not consider their job done once the final evaluation report is accepted by the contracting party, but should instead be focused on ensuring its use during and after the completion of this report. The assessment of their work should thus cover both the quality of their outputs and their role in the overall process.

- **Evaluation contractors** should reflect such changes in expectations in the terms of references for new evaluations, and should also aim to ensure that the evaluation report itself becomes available in the public domain as soon as the study is finalized. They should assess relevant evaluation reports that are commissioned by third parties as carefully as their own, but not reject these in advance as “partisan” information.

Conclusions: prospects for more evidence-based and coherent EU migration policies

A few conclusions can be drawn from the analysis in this article:

- The EU has committed to promote policy coherence for development and has identified migration as one of the areas where it wishes to do so more proactively. Yet, the EU struggles to make its policies more “development-friendly” as its policy

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3 This is a mere summary of this carefully constructed process, and no adequate representation. A visual representation and additional information is available here: http://ec.europa.eu/codecision/stepbystep/diagram_en.htm

4 It should be noted that the European Parliament President has established a working group to draw up a code of conduct for MEPS. Rasmussen (2011) puts forward a number of proposals on how the interaction between MEPS and lobbyists could be made more transparent, which might also be in the interests of evaluation experts intent on sharing their findings with the Parliament.
discussions have for a while and continue to be relatively polarized and often poorly based on evidence.

• Besides methodological innovation, several theoretical and conceptual issues as regards the role and focus of evaluations of migration policies (e.g. evaluating effectiveness or broader effects) need to be looked into.

• Further investments in improving the evaluation of migration policies as well as migration and development projects are needed, but these investments can only be justified by the use of such evaluations to improve the design of future policies and interventions.

• Independent evaluations should not be confused with disconnected evaluations: frequent networking with and participation of intended users does not necessarily reduce the independence of an evaluation and is an essential means to ensure follow-up and use.

• EU policymaking in the area of migration essentially goes through two phases: a first phase whereby the European Commission prepares a policy proposal through a relatively structured and transparent process, followed by a second phase whereby the European Council and the European Parliament are to reach a joint decision. It can be concluded from this paper that most opportunities to inform decisions through evaluation findings are in this first phase, where there are formal opportunities to feed this information. Having said this, the second phase may still provide opportunities even if the timing needs to be much more organically and informal. Networking with intermediary actors might provide a useful means in this setting.

• Making more of the opportunities provided by the policy processes would also require changes in the current evaluation culture, which could be taken forward by changing the shared responsibilities of professional evaluators and their contractors from ensuring a “good-quality report” to ensuring a “good and utilization-focused evaluation process”.

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Integration strategies and projects: measuring success

Chris Hedges

Background

Over recent years, the European Union and Council of Europe have undertaken extensive work on indicators of integration and social cohesion. Most recently, the Stockholm Programme in the area of freedom, security and justice called for the “development of core indicators in a limited number of relevant policy areas (e.g. employment, education and social inclusion) for monitoring the results of integration policies in order to increase the comparability of national experiences and reinforce the European learning process”. In order to make this aspiration a reality, an expert meeting was organized by the Swedish Presidency in Malmö on 14–16 December 2009, at which a process to identify European core indicators was developed. In June 2010, the Justice and Home Affairs Council asked the European Commission to undertake a pilot study on a common indicator framework, in order to ascertain what sources of data were available and to start to work on harmonization of data collection. The areas chosen were employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship; these areas are defined in more detail below. The results of the pilot survey can be found at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-11-009/EN/KS-RA-11-009-EN.PDF.

The “Communication on a European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals” was adopted by the European Commission on 20 July 2011 and, at the time of writing, an in-depth discussion of the Communication is planned with a view to Council Conclusions being agreed. This will mean that the Communication will have full political support across the EU and the provisions regarding monitoring will need to be adhered to.

For many officials, particularly those working in the statistical sphere, this will really be “business as usual”. EU Member States have been providing data for many years and there is little in this requirement that is entirely new. However, those of us working directly with European funding streams and with integration and social inclusion projects often struggle to utilize nationally gathered data to judge the success, or otherwise, of projects that we are supporting. The fundamental issue is that this data is essentially quantitative data that looks at hard outcomes such as employment rates, educational attainment, income and citizenship. At the moment, there is no accepted set of qualitative indicators that can be used to determine whether people who have undertaken integration programmes “feel” more integrated as a result of them.

This article therefore seeks to draw out some subjective indicators and ways of measurement that can be used to complement the hard indicators that are often required of, and gathered by, integration projects. The idea is not to utilize them as a substitute for hard data but as an adjunct to it. The purpose is to try to tease out specific issues that might inhibit the integration of individuals so that their needs can better be met. From this, it might also be possible to extrapolate barriers to integration that are more general – for example, personal circumstances that reduce or inhibit opportunities for interaction with the established community.

I should acknowledge the many innovative ideas suggested by Dr Alastair Ager whilst developing a series of indicators for refugee integration in the UK. Not all of his work was utilized but the focus groups that Ager worked with were an incredibly useful source of information on the subjective elements of integration. Another source of ideas for this article was the UK Citizenship Survey which, unfortunately, is a victim of expenditure cuts and will no longer be compiled.

How can “integrated” be defined?

Many researchers have made the point that integration is a “chaotic concept” and is a word used by many but understood differently by most. In some countries, integration means complete assimilation, whereas in others, it might simply mean not causing any trouble. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the feeling of “being integrated” is a highly personal one: of two individuals in almost identical circumstances, one may feel fully integrated, whilst another may still feel isolated and alone. But if integration is a stated policy goal, some form of operational definition of the term is clearly required. The concrete suggestion is that any definition should be tailored to suit the purpose for which the suggested indicators are to be used and should be as tightly drawn as possible. This paper therefore does not suggest a definition, but concentrates on the practical issue of developing indicators for particular initiatives or projects.

1 Chris Hedges is a senior official at the United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA) and the UK representative at the EU National Integration Contact Points Network.

2 Currently Professor of Clinical Population and Family Health, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University, New York.
It is suggested, however, that some or all of the following elements may be useful in devising a working definition of integration:

- Integration should mean neither assimilation nor a society composed of separate enclaves, whether voluntary or involuntary.
- Integration should go beyond mutual respect and tolerance between different groups and should involve continual interaction, engagement and civic participation in the social, cultural, educational, professional, political and legal spheres.
- The basis of good integration is how people behave towards each other collectively. A focus on those things that people have in common is what binds people together, rather than dwelling on difference and those things that cannot be changed.
- Although acquisition of citizenship is seen by the European Commission as a hard indicator of integration, being naturalized and being a good citizen are not necessarily the same thing. It is entirely possible to be a full and active citizen without taking the nationality of the receiving state and, conversely, to be naturalized yet not feel fully integrated.

The nature of indicators

It would be difficult to improve on the definition of indicators provided by Ager in 2002:³

Indicators are measures that indicate something about a phenomenon of interest. They do not ‘sum up’ or totally represent that phenomenon; rather they are an indication about the level or attainment of that phenomenon. This is not an abstract principle – it has important practical implications – and with a concept as multidimensional as integration, it is clear that no one form of measurement will ‘sum it up’. Rather, a series of measures will be required, each of which are imperfect but – taken together – they provide insight into the extent to which ‘integration’ is being achieved.

Hence, the suggested indicators outlined below are not intended to replace any indicators that already exist – they are simply intended to contribute to the bigger picture in respect of integration.

There is, of course, a distinction between “hard” and “soft” indicators. “Hard” indicators are quantitative and are usually represented in the form of numerical and categorical data. “Soft” indicators are more qualitative in nature and aim to measure the subjective experiences of the participants such as interpretations, feelings and attitudes. Whilst both hard and soft indicators will have their place in determining what outcomes have been achieved, the focus here is on “soft” indicators that can be used at grassroots level. They concentrate primarily on two of the areas identified in the 1988 Council of Europe report Measurements and Indicators of Integration:⁴

- Social – the extent to which migrants can access the same goods and services as the receiving society, as well as the level of interaction with other people from the same and differing backgrounds, including work colleagues, neighbours and friends; and
- Cultural – the level of engagement with the culture(s) of the receiving society, but also the level of retention of cultural roots; cultural integration is a level beyond simple interaction and tolerance.

Indicators and methodology

There is extensive literature on how to conduct surveys and develop “hard” indicators in fields such as employment and education. However, it is recognized that there may be less literature and experience in developing “soft” indicators, particularly in the field of social and cultural integration. So, what sorts of questions might be asked of respondents in order to develop indicators giving information about subjective feelings of belonging, involvement, empowerment and some of the other areas discussed above?

The suggested methodology is firstly to use written questionnaires for a representative sample of migrants and a control sample of persons from other sections of the community. The number of questionnaires distributed will of course depend on the finances and practical resources available to analyse them, but a sample size of around 10 per cent is usually recommended in order to be truly representative. It is good practice to then follow up written questionnaires with “focus groups”, each comprising around 10 respondents. Again, the number of focus groups will depend on what resources are available to facilitate them. The purpose of focus groups is to give respondents the opportunity to expand on the answers they have given in questionnaires. So if, for example, the responses from a particular area suggest that relationships with adjacent communities are poor, it should be possible to capture some quotations from focus groups that will give greater detail about the root causes of any tensions. There may also be, for example, recurring quotations that can give greater insight into the reasons for the reluctance to employ migrants.


It is important to emphasize that conducting a survey such as this will only give an indication of the “cohesion health” of communities that are analysed. It would be quite difficult to extrapolate a particular “score” that says definitively whether individuals or communities are integrated, although of course assumptions can be made. It will be more meaningful, if resources permit, to undertake a longitudinal study, returning to the same respondents perhaps annually or biannually over a period of several years. In this way it is possible to measure change – either for better or for worse – from the baseline observations taken in the first year.

Questionnaires should start with some factual information in order to give a baseline. In the case of migrants, the obvious starting points are the year in which the respondent arrived, where in the receiving country they settled and where they subsequently moved. Whilst there might be a separate survey on employment, it is useful in terms of assessing integration to ask baseline questions on employment, such as: “Are you working as an employee or are you self-employed?” and “Have you had a paid job in the last five years?”. Whether or not someone is employed will of course be a significant factor in their subjective assessment of how well integrated they feel, and it is likely that people who work will feel better integrated than those who do not.

Once the baseline questions have been asked, further questions along the following lines might be asked:

- To what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of society in your new country?
- Would you say that you have close friends that you feel at ease with or call on for help? How many?
- How many of your close friends would you say come from a different cultural group to yourself?
- How strongly you feel you belong to each of the following areas?
  - Your immediate neighbourhood, within one or two streets
  - Your local area, within a 15–20 minute walk from your home
  - This country
- Would you say that this is somewhere you enjoy living?
- To what extent would you say you can trust the people in your neighbourhood?
- To what extent do you agree or disagree that people here share the same values?
- To what extent do you agree or disagree that the local area (within 15–20 minutes walking distance) is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together?
- Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions affecting your local area?
- How important is it for you personally to feel that you can influence decisions in your local area?
- What would help you to feel more able to influence decisions in your local area?
- Please pick out any activities that you have taken part in, supported or helped, over the last 12 months. (Specify.)
- In the last 12 months, have you given unpaid help to any groups, clubs or organizations in the local area? (Specify.)
- About how often over the last 12 months have you generally done something to help?
- How did you find out about opportunities to give help?
- Thinking about the unpaid help you have given in the last 12 months, how often, if at all, have you mixed with people from outside your ethnic/cultural group?
- Here are some reasons people have given about why they don’t help groups, organizations or individuals. Which, if any of these, apply to you? (Specify.)
- Here are some things other people have said would make it easier for them to get involved in helping groups, organizations or individuals. Which of these, if any, might make you likely to get involved in the future? (Specify.)
- In the last 12 months, have you done any of the community activities listed below? (Specify.)
- Do you think a local doctor or hospital would treat you differently from people who were not migrants?
- Do you think a local school would treat you differently from people who were not migrants?
- If you have ever been refused a job, do any of the following reasons apply? (Specify.)
- Please think about all the occasions when you have mixed with someone or a group of people on a more personal level through a conversation or some other form of personal interaction. Where did the interactions take place? (Specify.)
- Which, if any, of these things do you think would encourage people from different backgrounds to mix together? Please read through the whole list and choose up to three that you think would be the most important. (Specify.)
- Which of these things, if any, would you say are the most important values for living in your new country? Please choose up to five. (Specify.)
• People from different ethnic, social and religious groups should adapt and blend into the larger society. (Agree/disagree)
• Different ethnic, cultural and religious groups should maintain their customs and traditions. (Agree/disagree)
• Individuals should take responsibility for helping other people in their local community. (Agree/disagree)
• How important is your national identity (your nationality of birth) to your sense of who you are?
• How important is your national identity (the nationality you have acquired through naturalization) to your sense of who you are?
• How important is where you live to your sense of who you are?
• How important is your social class to your sense of who you are?
• How important is your gender to your sense of who you are?
• How important is your age and stage of your life to your sense of who you are?
• How important is your level of education to your sense of who you are?
• How important is being a migrant to your sense of who you are?

This is by no means an exhaustive list and there is clearly scope within this outline for adjustments to be made to suit the particular circumstances of the area or country concerned. In addition, some thought will need to be given to precisely how questions should be framed, what sort of “scoring” mechanism might be used, and what activities might be included in some of the questions that require a list. Thought also needs to be given to how possible respondents can be identified and to how a cohort from within the respondents can be chosen for follow-up interviews so as to achieve the best outcomes. Last, but by no means least, consideration should be given to the structure of follow-up interviews and who should conduct them. Public officials are often seen as threatening in the migration context, so using them may inhibit frank and open discussion. However, the whole purpose of this initiative is to share good practices and to exchange ideas, so your contributions and thoughts would be most welcome.5

5 To discuss any further details of the methodology described in this article, or to obtain a copy of the full questionnaire, please contact the author at c.hedges@sky.com.
How to evaluate migration and development projects, programmes and policies: lessons from current approaches

Laura Chappell, Orlando Salazaar-Ruiz and Frank Laczko

What options are open to those wishing to evaluate migration and development policies, programmes and projects? What approaches can they take? What approaches have others taken? This article attempts to provide those interested in potentially conducting an evaluation with an analysis of the options open to them, drawing in particular on a survey we have made of migration initiatives that have been subject to an evaluation. Our aim is to try to demonstrate that undertaking evaluations of migration policies, programmes and projects is a more viable option than may have sometimes been thought.

This article presents the findings of our survey of evaluated migration policies, programmes and projects, outlining how evaluations have tended to be done in practice.

Evaluating migration policies, programmes and projects: lessons from current approaches

Different kinds of evaluation

Before reviewing the results of our survey, it is important to briefly make clear what we mean by evaluation, particularly as the term is used differently by different organizations. Chappell and Laczko (2011) use the following definitions, based on those provided by the World Bank:

Evaluation – a periodic, objective assessment of an ongoing or completed project, programme or policy.

Impact evaluation – an evaluation that seeks to answer cause-and-effect questions, and the changes in outcomes that are directly attributable to a policy, programme or project.

In other words, evaluations include efforts to systematically assess an intervention, which can focus either on process or impact. Impact evaluations, as described above, try to assess whether the intervention is actually delivering the outcomes that it was put in place to achieve – whether enhanced development, better protection of rights, reduced migration of skilled people, and so forth. It may also assess the effects that the intervention has on other outcome variables (i.e. side effects) that might not have been the focus of the intervention. Process-focused evaluations address the project process rather than its effects, examining questions such as whether the project is being implemented as planned, whether key outputs are being produced, whether timelines and budgets are being kept to, and how key actors are working together.

Based on the above definitions, what are the main trends in migration policy evaluation? What is being tried? How well does it seem to be working? This section addresses these questions, looking at what lessons can be learned from current approaches to evaluation in the sector. As discussed in the introduction, this information is drawn from a desk-based review of evaluations – both impact and process-focused evaluations – and is organized around specific policy areas, to make for more intuitive reading.

Policy area 1: seasonal and circular migration schemes

What is being done in this area?

Globalization and more flexible labour markets have brought about a shift in policy focus from permanent migration to temporary, seasonal and circular schemes. In 2008, more than 170 bilateral labour and recruitment agreements were in place in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and covered nearly 2.3 million temporary migrants, of which 600,000 were seasonal workers.

What is being evaluated and how?

One might be inclined to think that governments would be quite interested in knowing the effectiveness and impact of such an important set of schemes. Yet, as Holzmann and Pouget (2010), as well as Arditis and Laczko (2008), point out, very few of these temporary worker programmes have been evaluated. IOM’s review found that evaluations of temporary or circular migration programmes are both scarce (only 8% of those reviewed) and fairly recent (all published after 2005).
A notable example among those that have been completed is New Zealand’s Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) policy, which allowed 5,000 workers from neighbouring Pacific islands to work in the horticulture and viticulture sectors for roughly seven months a year (Ramasamy, 2008).

What can we learn?
The evaluation of the RSE proves that even relatively small programmes can benefit greatly from rigorous evaluations, and that good-quality evidence can have a profound effect on policymaking. Australia, which partially funded these evaluations, is already implementing its own pilot programme for seasonal workers, and it has created a similar methodology and advisory body to overview the evaluation. Canada is also planning to evaluate its famous agricultural worker programme, and IOM’s survey found that there are at least three other evaluations of this type of programme currently ongoing. The inclusion of the programme in the best-practice database of the International Labour Organization (ILO) merits being noted as well.

Policy area 2: social protection and protection of migrants’ rights

What is being done in this area?
As the number of international migrant workers increases, more and more governments are struggling to provide them with adequate protection. While the number of international migrants has surpassed 200 million worldwide, only 23 percent of them enjoy full access and portability of social protection, with most of them coming from high-income countries (Avato et al., 2009). Making migration safer, especially for low-income migrants, is essential for all parties involved to take full advantage of migration’s potential.

What is being evaluated and how?
Once again, our survey found a small number of evaluations of this kind of intervention – only 16 in total. Most of those available were performed by international organizations (usually the ILO) on specific projects or programmes. None assessed bilateral agreements. It is also worth noting that evaluations of rights and social protection measures appear to tend to focus more on the process and the performance of the project, and less on its impact.

What can we learn?
Few can argue that the existence of an enormous knowledge gap concerning the effectiveness and impacts of efforts to protect migrant workers is anything other than problematic. Moreover, with few evaluations being performed, and none looking rigorously at impact (at least according to the results of our survey), the perspectives for closing this gap any time soon are rather bleak. Even so, there are some lessons to be drawn from what we have.

Policy area 3: return and reintegration

What is being done in this area?
Return and reintegration (R&R) assist migrants who decide to return, and tries to make their reintegration as smooth as possible. IOM and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are the two biggest actors in this field; the former focusing on assisted voluntary returns as well as the return of trafficking victims, and the latter focusing on the return of refugees. Just in the past decade, each organization has helped hundreds of thousands of people return safely, and assisted in their reintegration (IOM, 2008).

What is being evaluated and how?
This area has a longer history of conducting evaluations and is the only one examined in our preliminary survey where evaluations undertaken after 2005 do not outnumber those implemented before. In IOM, 25 per cent of the evaluations concern return and reintegration, making it the most frequently evaluated type of intervention in the organization. UNHCR’s evaluations on return, although not as numerous, are among the most methodologically rigorous of all those reviewed.

What can we learn?
The evaluations in this area might not be as influential as those in other areas, but they certainly achieved what they intended. The usefulness of these evaluations also has prompted a series of recommendations about how evaluation can be more effectively utilized to improve project design and implementation – including, for example, a call to join up with other bilateral donors to support periodic external evaluations, and the importance of considering spending around 5 per cent of a programme’s budget on evaluation.

Policy area 4: diaspora engagement, remittances and brain drain

What is being done in this area?
The connections that countries have with their nationals abroad can be quite complex from the moment they leave, during their absence, and even long after their return. A wide array of actors implement projects and programmes that seek to maintain ties with their migrants while they are gone and maximize the social, cultural and monetary remittances they provide. Diaspora engagement and remittance-enhancing programmes are now a fairly common practice.

What is being evaluated and how?
Evaluations of diaspora engagement and other programmes that seek to maximize the development-promoting transfers of migration account for almost a third of all the evaluations found in the survey, making them by far the most widely available and accessible kind of assessment. Thirty-three per cent of these evaluations were performed either by international
cooperation agencies (ICAs) or development NGOs. This might help explain why these programmes are being evaluated more often than in other areas. As Chappell and Laczo (2011) recently noted, evaluation practice in the development field is much further ahead than in migration. Methods and indicators are more refined and stakeholders are more familiar with the process and aims of evaluation.

A small yet positive example of the types of evaluations done in this area comes from the Madrid City Council in Spain. The council is a very active player in Spain’s development cooperation, and migration and development initiatives are among its top priorities. For this reason, it has included a monitoring and evaluation component in all 15 of its projects that support Ecuadorian and Moroccan migrant associations in the development of their communities of origin. At the beginning of the year, it published a strategic evaluation of its migration and development programme with Ecuador worth 1.36 million.

**What can we learn?**

There are several lessons to be extracted from the Madrid City Council evaluation. First, it helps dispel the myth that impact cannot be considered quickly after a programme finishes. The evaluators made a strong effort to examine impact, despite the short time period between the programme finishing and the evaluation being due, through the use of focus groups, in-depth interviews and other participatory methods focused on gathering informed opinions. Second, it shows how a making single strategic evaluation for several projects with similar goals can save time and money. The total cost of the evaluation was EUR 60,000 (Ortiz et al., 2010). While this might be too costly in relation to a single EUR 200,000 to EUR 300,000 project, evaluating five related projects at once can be very cost-effective.

**Policy area 5: skills development and matching**

**What is being done in this area?**

Employment is without question one of the major factors affecting not only migrant integration in the destination, but also shaping migrants’ abilities to contribute to the development of their own countries. A wide variety of skills development and matching activities have been implemented both by destination and origin countries. Interventions have taken the form of bilateral agreements, skills recognition and qualification frameworks, points-based system admissions, vocational training, apprenticeships and the construction of databases on skills imbalances and recruitment possibilities.

**What is being evaluated and how?**

With such a plethora of schemes, it is somewhat surprising to see that a large number of them have not been formally evaluated. A few skilled worker schemes in Australia and Canada underwent evaluations to find out how successful new migrants were in integrating to the labour market and what their contribution was to the host’s economy. The EU and New Zealand have also evaluated pilot schemes for skills recognition, training and job matching. Most of these reports present descriptive data reflecting the situation before, during and after the implementation of the programme, and focus on questions like the time spent unemployed and employed, average income, occupation, country of origin and level of education.

**What can we learn?**

The increasing number of skills development and job matching schemes is proof of policymakers’ faith in them. They can potentially ensure that the benefits of migration reach all parties, an outcome which seems much less likely if migrants are unable to find work or are employed in jobs that do not make full use of their skills.

The approach taken to understanding their effectiveness, and helping to improve their design, has tended (aside from the New Zealand example) not to use control groups and randomized trials. This is understandable though, as depending on the programme, it may not be possible to carry out evaluations with experimental designs in this area. This is because, while smaller programmes could select migrants to participate and compare their performance with non-participants, larger-scale programmes would be nearly impossible to evaluate in this way since all migrants must go through the same process. What these reports tell us is whether or not migrants are making good use of their skills, finding jobs and earning well. What they don’t tell us is how migrants would fare without the programme or under alternative programmes.

**Conclusion**

So what can we learn about how to evaluate migration policies, programmes and projects from current approaches?

First, evaluators need to decide what kinds of project or policy information they want. Do they want to know how the implementers are performing, or do they want to examine the intervention’s impact? Our survey suggests that while policymakers often want information about what works, impact evaluations are substantially less common than those focused on process. This suggests a clear need for policymakers to reorient the evaluation effort towards impact evaluations, and build a better evidence base on lessons learned about which interventions deliver the outcomes that policymakers want, which don’t and why.
Second, while there may sometimes be quite technical components to an evaluation (especially when more rigorous impact evaluations are being conducted), evaluation is in fact an intuitive and manageable process, with a number of well-defined steps. Evaluation is always an eminently doable task, albeit one that many sometimes require some technical assistance with.

Third, there are a range of different approaches to evaluation which can be deployed under different circumstances. Perhaps the most significant differentiation is between “informed opinion” techniques, which are quicker and cheaper, but at a cost of much less rigour; and ones based on measurement, which cost more and tend to take longer, but are increasingly more accurate. The gold standard here is randomized control trials. Policymakers can select the approach from this toolbox that is most suitable for their needs and constraints.

Fourth, different kinds of approaches do, however, provide different quality of information. While there are no “wrong” approaches to evaluation, policymakers should be aware that they will get the best results from more careful, measurement-based methodologies. Where possible, it pays to be ambitious with the approach taken to evaluation.

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Impact assessments of international migration projects on development: the experience of the Global Migration Group

Ann Pawliczko

The Global Migration Group (GMG), which includes 16 United Nation agencies in addition to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), is currently undertaking an inventory of impact assessments of international migration projects and programmes on development carried out by its member agencies. The assessment is in progress and responses are still coming in. This article reviews some of the initial findings and early conclusions of this exercise.

Background

To undertake this inventory, three agencies of the GMG’s Working Group on Data and Research – the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Population Division), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and IOM – designed a brief questionnaire that was sent to all GMG agencies with the request to provide information on impact assessments of migration projects on development that agencies have carried out or which are planned – at headquarters, regional and country levels, as applicable.

The purpose of this exercise is to raise awareness of the importance of assessing the impact of migration projects and programmes, thereby enabling GMG agencies to work more strategically in the area of migration and development at country and regional levels to ensure that resources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible to achieve the desired results.

The survey questionnaire

The survey questionnaire focused on projects/programmes on international migration implemented (completed or ongoing) in the last five years. Agencies were requested to indicate how many projects and programmes had undergone an internal or external evaluation, and how many were subject to an impact assessment. Respondents were also asked to indicate the focus of the projects or programmes.

Agencies were asked if their projects and programmes on international migration were evaluated more or less often, or about the same as other types of projects and programmes. If projects were evaluated more often, respondents were asked to provide a reason for this. If less often, respondents were asked to choose from the following reasons: too difficult to evaluate, too politically sensitive, not a priority, lack of resources, evaluation experts do not have the expertise, or projects/programmes are too small. Respondents were also asked to identify the usual institutional arrangements for carrying out evaluations/impact assessments, including a specialized internal unit, part of the logical framework, part of donor reporting, or external expertise.

The second part of the questionnaire requested information on individual projects and programmes. Agencies were asked to limit their responses to the five most significant projects or programmes conducted and to select those with the most in-depth evaluations and/or impact assessments. They were requested to provide the following information for each project: title, time frame, budget, location, and implementing partners. A distinction was made between the different types of evaluation/assessment, namely evaluations of the implementation of migration-related projects and programmes; assessments of the impacts of migration-related projects and programmes; and assessments of the impacts of migration on development.

Respondents were first asked to provide information on monitoring and evaluation of their migration projects. They were requested to describe the objectives of the project, the main monitoring and evaluation indicators, the source of data and data producers, and the frequency of data collection. If the project was selected for an impact assessment, they were further requested to provide information on the budget, timeframe (whether the impact assessment was planned at the project outset or decided upon at a later date), evaluator and reason for assessment. They were asked to describe the desired outcomes/impacts, indicators, source of data and data producers, and frequency of data collection.

Respondents were asked if the impact assessment of the project or programme included a control group and if they used an experimental or quasi-experimental approach that explicitly tried to eliminate potential sources of bias in the comparison between the two groups. They were asked to describe the methodology and indicate what determined the selection of the methodology. They were also asked how successful they...
felt the impact assessment was, what worked well, and what could have been done differently.

Finally, respondents were asked whether the recommendations of the impact assessment were taken into account in future planning. Further comments and recommendations were welcome.

**Preliminary results**

At the time of publication, only a handful of GMG agencies had completed the survey. As expected, IOM reported the largest number of migration projects, with other GMG agencies having a few projects each. The projects addressed a wide range of migration issues, including: labour migration, temporary and circular migration, return and reintegration, highly skilled migration/brain drain, the costs of migration, diaspora engagement, refugees, reintegration and resettlement, remittance transfers, combating human trafficking, migrant integration, migrant health, and migration statistics. Most projects relied on joint collaboration between GMG agencies, governmental institutions, NGOs and national statistical offices, as well as other United Nations agencies such as the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the United Nations Volunteers.

Most agencies conducted evaluations of their projects. Most projects and programmes on international migration were evaluated with about the same frequency as other projects. Often, monitoring and evaluation was part of the logical framework or donor reporting.

Where migration projects were evaluated less often than other projects, the main reasons given included difficulty in evaluating, political sensitivity and a lack of resources. Only IOM reported a specialized internal unit for monitoring and evaluation; most agencies relied on external expertise to conduct evaluations.

Agencies provided information on the objective of the project with its respective monitoring and evaluation indicators, data sources, and information regarding the frequency of data collection. Some agencies submitted project documents and materials produced as a result of the project. All documents and publications will be reviewed to help better understand the process and learn from the experience.

**Examples of evaluations**

1. The UNITAR/UNFPA/IOM/MacArthur Foundation Migration and Development Seminar Series. The purpose of this project is to convene seminars on key migration and development topics for delegates of the Permanent Missions to the United Nations to enhance their understanding of these issues. Evaluations are conducted after each seminar by means of a questionnaire distributed to all participants.

The indicators used for the evaluation of this project include:

- attendance and active participation in seminars;
- level of participation within the United Nations Permanent Missions;
- feedback from evaluation questionnaires;
- feedback on substantive reports;
- number of hits/visits to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) “Key Migration Issues” website;
- feedback from financial reports;
- implementation and use of knowledge tools; expansion of partnerships within and outside the United Nations;
- soliciting of the Migration and Development Series organizers for information and assistance by Member States, other United Nations entities, and civil society actors; and
- visits to the UNITAR “Migration and Development Series” website and Migration Capacity Development Portal.

The sources of data produced by UNITAR include:

- an evaluation questionnaire for each seminar;
- substantive summaries of each seminar, as well as the Comprehensive Programme disseminated to Permanent Missions, other United Nations agencies and international organizations, and accessible to the wider public through the UNITAR New York Office website;
- an annual report prepared for donors;
- an annual financial report; and
- quantitative and qualitative assessment of the use of the knowledge products.

No impact assessment of the project was conducted.

2. The UNFPA project “Institutional Strengthening for the Prevention of Gender-Based Violence and Human Trafficking” (2010), San Luis Potosí, Mexico. The project’s objectives were: to design a state programme for prevention, sanction, protection and assistance to victims of human trafficking; to sensitize and train government officials on prevention, protection and assistance to victims of trafficking; to compile and systematize national data on trafficking; and to design and distribute materials on trafficking.

The indicators used for the evaluation of this project have included the following:

- state programme for prevention, sanction, protection, attention and assistance to victims of human trafficking designed and approved;
• workshop for government officials designed, tested and implemented;
• vulnerability analysis on human trafficking designed, implemented and analysed;
• human trafficking perception survey designed, conducted and analysed;
• state of law at the national and local levels elaborated; and
• media guide designed, approved and presented.

The sources of data have included the annual standard progress report produced by COESPO San Luis Potosí, the implementing partner. No impact assessment of the project was conducted.

Impact assessments of migration projects on development

GMG agencies were asked whether they conducted impact assessments of their migration projects and programmes. Responses thus far indicate that very few projects underwent an assessment to ascertain the impact of their migration projects on development. A few examples of impact assessments:

1. The IOM project on Mass and Micro-Information Campaign Awareness Impact Assessment – Information Campaign to Combat Trafficking in Women and Children in Cambodia (2002–2006). The project’s objectives were to raise the awareness levels of target audiences on essential aspects of trafficking; to encourage community organization and mobilization to combat trafficking; and to change attitudes towards trafficking.

The indicators used for the assessment of this project have included:

• increased awareness of the dangers of blind migration;
• increased awareness of precautions to protect oneself;
• increased awareness of the means of self-protection;
• awareness of where participants are most at risk of being trafficked;
• increased knowledge of the trafficking hotline;
• increased willingness to report trafficking;
• increased confidence in the authorities to act upon a report of trafficking;
• increased understanding of trafficking (definition);
• negativity of attitude towards trafficking;
• general change in attitude and behaviour;

• increased awareness of the illegality of trafficking; and
• negativity of attitude towards blind migration.

The sources of data produced include a field survey and baseline data from a 2004 survey.

In this example, the impact assessment included a control group (a group that did not benefit from the project). Focus group discussions were held with local authorities from district to village level.

A significant impact is measured through looking at certain indicators before and after the implementation of the activities. Therefore, raw data from the field survey have been compared with baseline data from the 2004 stakeholder analysis to look for a significant difference.

The recommendations of the impact assessment were taken into account in future planning.

2. ECLAC – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean project – Development Account: Sixth Tranche. Strengthening National Capacities to Deal with International Migration: Maximizing Development Benefits and Minimizing Negative Impact. An impact assessment is planned at the end of the project. The desired outcome/impacts include:

• number of countries making use of information regarding best practices on policy response to international migration challenges;
• number of countries incorporating international migration issues in their national development strategies;
• number of new or updated national, regional and global databases and analyses about relevant issues and emerging trends on international migration; and
• number of relevant national and regional institutions and academic centers contributing and making use of a Web-based interregional/regional network on international migration and development.

The indicators used for the assessment of this project include:

• records of government staff attending technical workshops on migration topics organized in the context of the project; the information will be gathered by project staff during the technical workshops;
Conclusion and next steps

Some agencies found it difficult to say exactly how many migration projects they had because migrants are considered part of “vulnerable populations”. One agency reported that there are few stand-alone “migrant health” programmes.

What does not always become clear is the difference between impact and monitoring and evaluation indicators. In one assessment, these were used interchangeably. While most agencies conduct regular monitoring and evaluations of their projects, usually as part of the logical framework or donor reporting, very few conducted or planned to conduct assessments to ascertain the impact of their migration projects on development.

There is an urgent need to cultivate a culture of evaluation and assessment. It is also necessary to plan and budget for assessments early in the process, preferably when formulating the project proposal. Impact assessments should be conducted to examine the effect projects are having on development. Among the questions to answer are: Do our projects make a difference? Is this the best use of limited resources? Is this the way we should be going?

Indicators and good data are an important part of evaluations and assessments. It is necessary to come up with solid indicators that are measurable. Data should be available, reliable and timely.

Results of evaluations and assessments should be shared among agencies and other partners in order to learn from each other’s experience. It is important to ensure that recommendations of evaluations and impact assessments are taken into account in future planning.