Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011

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Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011*

Prepared for IOM by
Susanne Melde and Dina Ionesco°
May 2011

* The contributions of UN-OHRRLS, UNFPA, UNITAR and UNICEF to this paper are gratefully acknowledged.
Table of contents

List of figures 5
Acronyms 7
Executive summary 9
Introduction 13

1. Migration and development in LDCs 15
   1.1 Context: Data and key trends 15
       Emigration from LDCs 15
       Population and immigration in LDCs 18
       Labour migration 19
       Irregular migration 21
       Remittance flows to LDCs 22
   1.2 The impact of the global financial and economic crisis on LDCs 23
       The consequences for LDCs and remittances 23
       The impact on migration flows 23
   1.3 The contribution of remittances and other diaspora resources to development 24
       The human development impact of remittances and migration 25
       The private sector and the trade contributions of diasporas 26
       Transfer of skills, technology and ideas 27
       The role of diaspora members in peace-building 28
   1.4 The environment, migration and development 29
       The links between climate change, the environment and migration 29
       Migration as an adaptation strategy 30

2. Policy implications and recommendations 31
   2.1 Major policy roles to guide policy action on migration and development in LDCs 31
       A “mainstreaming role”: Policy should favour coherence among poverty alleviation, development and migration, and policies/plans 31
       An “empowering role”: Policy should adopt a migrants-centred approach 32
       An “enabling role”: Policy should facilitate the contributions to development of migrants and diaspora communities 32
       A “partnership role”: Policy should implement a multi-stakeholder approach 33
       A “cooperative role”: Policy should foster bilateral and multilateral collaboration 33
2.2 Levels of policy implementation on migration and development in LDCs

- Local level
- National level
- Bilateral level
- Regional level
- Global level
- Transnational level

2.3 Strategic directions for the migration and development agenda in LDCs and policy recommendations

- Enhance data collection on migration in LDCs and on the links between migration and development as an important contribution to migration and development policies
- Maximize the benefits of human mobility as a key contribution to human resources mobilization for development in LDCs
- Facilitate migrant remittance transfers and channel remittances into development projects
- Leverage diaspora contributions as a major contribution to development, in particular to strengthen the private sector
- Enhance capacities and institutional reforms as key levers for maximizing the development effects of migration
- Target pro-poor measures to poor and vulnerable populations to help mitigate the consequences of climate change, the effects of the global economic crisis and other vulnerability factors
- Foster the development potential of internal migration

3. References

4. Annexes

- Annex 4.1: List of the 49 LDCs
- Annex 4.2: List of international migration and human rights instruments
- Annex 4.3: Ratification by LDCs of international human rights instruments pertaining to migrants
- Annex 4.4: The seven Commitments in the Brussels Programme of Action on poverty reduction and migration policy implications
- Annex 4.5: Levels of policy implementation

Endnotes
List of figures

Figure 1: Destinations of emigrants from LDCs, 2005  16
Figure 2: LDCs with the highest numbers of emigrants living in other LDCs, 2005  16
Figure 3: LDCs with the highest share of emigrants living in other LDCs, 2005  17
Figure 4: Share of skilled workers from LDCs in OECD countries from the top 30 skilled emigration countries, 2000  17
Figure 5: Emigration of physicians from LDCs, 2004  18
Figure 6: Remittances as a share of GDP 2008, top 10 LDCs  22
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>BPoA</td>
<td>Brussels Programme of Action</td>
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<td>CGD</td>
<td>Commission on International Migration Data</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade in Services</td>
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<td>GFMD</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development</td>
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<td>GMG</td>
<td>Global Migration Group</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross national product</td>
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<td>IDMC</td>
<td>Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced persons</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC-IV</td>
<td>Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries</td>
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<td>LDCs</td>
<td>Least developed countries</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MIDA</td>
<td>Migration for Development in Africa</td>
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<td>NAPAs</td>
<td>National Adaptation Programmes of Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official development assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN DESA/pop</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNITAR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Training and Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-OHRLLS</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States</td>
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Executive summary

While migration flows have continued to grow and diversify, it is only in the past years that they gained increased attention in development debates. A decade ago, migration was still largely absent in the discussions leading up to the adoption of the Brussels Declaration and Programme of Action (BPoA) in 2001. This background paper aimed to guide the discussions of the seminar on Migration, Development and Remittances in LDCs, held on 17 June 2010 in New York, towards the formulation of policy recommendations and the eventual inclusion of more structured references on how the development potential of migration might be factored into the outcome of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (LDC-IV) in Turkey in 2011.

Migration can promote economic and social well-being and contribute to improved education and health outcomes. It may be seen as an expression of free personal choice of where to live in the pursuit of new and better opportunities. Human rights play an integral part in the exercise of such free choice (UNDP, 2009) and are thus closely linked to migration and development aspects. Remittances may well be the most tangible and direct link between migration and development, but they represent only one of many aspects. The opportunities of migration depend on the existence of a minimum set of local and national socio-economic policies and legal frameworks, together with foreign direct investment (FDI), trade and official development assistance (ODA) to eradicate poverty and promote human development (Klugman and Pereira, 2009). While the actual development impact of migration depends on each individual country context, some key trends in least developed countries (LDCs) as a group are presented in part 1 of this paper, which should enhance understanding of the links between human mobility and socio-economic development.

In 2005, almost 22 million, or 2.9 per cent of the total LDC population, emigrated (World Bank, 2008). The large majority of emigrants from LDCs tend to move to other LDCs and developing countries, while workers with higher education tend to migrate to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (13.2%) (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006; Docquier et al., 2008). Measures aimed at preventing brain drain are unlikely to be effective as long as underlying structural deficiencies and the lack of incentives in LDCs are not resolved. The rate of urbanization in LDCs is 20 percentage points below the world average, indicating that the large majority of the poor still live in rural areas. Nonetheless, in absolute numbers, the urban population of LDCs is expected to grow by 120 million over the next decade (UN DESA/pop, 2008). LDCs will receive around 11.5 million (5.4%) of all international migrants in 2010 (UN DESA/pop, 2009a), in addition to a large portion of internal forced migrants.

Concerning labour mobility, overseas employment is predominant in some of the populous Asian LDCs and in the Island States. Intraregional labour migration is characteristic of small Pacific Island LDCs, and constitutes the predominant type of mobility on the African continent, as well as in Haiti. Even though flows have been slowing down, labour migration is continuing despite the global economic crisis. As underlying structural demands are unlikely to disappear, temporary low-skilled migration schemes could present an opportunity for a triple “win” situation for migrants and origin and destination countries.

The World Bank estimates remittance flows to LDCs at more than USD 24 billion in 2009 (World Bank, 2009b), an increase of approximately USD 1.5 billion over 2008. This resilience is especially significant as recorded total remittances are estimated to have declined (Ratha et al., 2010). Second only to ODA, remittance flows to LDCs outpaced FDI. In 2007, remittances to LDCs accounted for 4 per cent
Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011

of their combined GDP and they constitute an important source of external finance for the group of poorest countries. A lagged negative impact on remittance flows of the halting growth and the resulting unemployment among migrants could arise as a result of the global economic crisis (Ratha et al., 2009; 2010), posing a challenge for migrants, remittance-receiving households and home-country governments.

Besides remitting money, members of the diaspora community and migrants can promote the transfer of skills, technology, capital and ideas. The potential of the role of diasporas in the private sector is still to be acknowledged. The human and financial capital of diaspora members can also be beneficial for trade relations with the country of origin, and their expansion may positively influence the mobility of workers. Diaspora members can also play a potential role in peace-building efforts. Despite the importance of intraregional and interregional migration for LDCs, policymakers and researchers have tended to focus on establishing a beneficial link only with diaspora members established in developed countries.

The high vulnerability and low coping capacity of LDCs concerning external shocks is probably best illustrated by the impact of natural hazards, climate change and food crises. Given the high proportion of poor and rural populations in LDCs, environmental degradation and its effects on food and water security threaten the sustainability of the livelihoods and human security of populations in some of the poorest and most vulnerable countries.

In the final section, this paper proposes policy implications and recommendations on migration, development and remittances for LDCs based on a managed migration policy approach consistent with development policy strategies.

Five main roles for migration and development policies may be defined as follows:

- A mainstreaming role: Home and destination countries should mainstream migration into existing development strategies, such as National Development Plans and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and into donor and aid strategies for development and poverty reduction.
- An empowering role: Home and host countries should pursue a human rights and migrant-centred approach that acknowledges remittances as private funds and privileges the provision of and services for migrants, diasporas and their families.
- A conducive role: Home and host countries should adopt legislative, regulatory, economic, social and political measures and incentives to support and encourage the contributions to be made by migrants and diasporas to development.
- A partnership role: Home and host countries should facilitate a multi-stakeholder approach that favours partnerships between migrants, diasporas, the civil society and development stakeholders from private, public and non-governmental sectors.
- A cooperative role: Policymakers should commit themselves to dialogue and collaboration on migration and development at the national, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.

To be effective, migration, development and remittance policies have to be designed and implemented in close collaboration between countries of origin and destination. Such programmes can be implemented at different yet complementary levels (local, national, bilateral, regional, global and transnational levels).
Policy recommendations on migration, development and remittances in LDCs are organized thematically along seven main strategic lines. Gender is an important variable in understanding migration and development dynamics in LDCs for all seven strategic areas.

1. Strengthening and expanding the knowledge base through improved quantitative and qualitative data collection on migration in LDCs, a better understanding of intra-LDC and South-South migration and the various linkages between migration and development.

2. Maximizing the benefits of human mobility as a key contribution to human resources mobilization in LDCs through three priority areas of activities: facilitating temporary labour mobility agreements (in particular, the migration of low- and semi-skilled workers), reducing the impact of brain drain, and favouring the transfer of skills beneficial for home country development (e.g. through permanent, temporary and virtual returns).

3. Strengthening the development impact of remittances through innovative programmes that lower transfer costs, facilitate access to banking services and help channel remittances towards development projects.

4. Leveraging the contributions made by diasporas, in particular as regards the consolidation of the private sector, through general provisions (appropriate policies, favourable environments and incentives in countries of origin and destination) and by working with diasporas as business, entrepreneurs and partners for employment generation.

5. Enhancing capacities and institutional reforms as key levers to maximize the development effects of migration.

6. Implementing specific pro-poor measures to support the poor and vulnerable populations to deal with environmental hazards, climate change and migration, the effects of the global crisis and other migration-related factors (e.g. violation of human rights, displacement, trafficking, lack of access to services, children left behind).

7. Finally, fostering the development potential of internal migration by minimizing the risks associated with rural–urban, rural–rural, urban–urban and urban–rural migration.
Introduction

Covering the decade from 2001 to 2010, the Brussels Declaration and Programme of Action (BPoA) was adopted at the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries on 20 May 2001. This framework for international cooperation elaborates on the commitments to support and guide LDCs in fostering sustainable socio-economic development and to counteract poverty, inequality and social exclusion. In 2000, 13.2 per cent of the skilled population moved from a LDC to an OECD country (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). Yet, 10 years ago, international migrants were hardly mentioned in these discussions. Similarly, at the global level, the adoption in 2000 of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) made no reference to human mobility in achieving them.

Since then, migration issues in general, and the positive links between migration and development, in particular, have received increased public attention and remain high on the international agenda. In 2003, the United Nations Secretary General established the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Only in September 2006, did the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development of the United Nations General Assembly (UNHLD) focus for the first time on the multidimensional phenomenon of the movement of people and means of using the development potential of migration to advantage by optimizing the positive, and limiting its negative aspects (United Nations General Assembly, 2006). The UNHLD led to the creation in 2007 of the States-led annual Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) as an informal venue for the exchange of new ideas and experiences in this field, to be held for the fourth time at the end of 2010 in Mexico. The importance of the realization of the human rights of migrants continues to feature prominently in these discussions.

Over the past years, the observations and action-oriented debates on migration and development have moved away from a predominantly negative perception. This development reflects the interest of the international community to find innovative ways of realizing the positive aspects of migration and to foster human development in ways that allow the decision to migrate to be a true choice and not one imposed by necessity. As the movements of people continue to grow and diversify in a globalized world, they can no longer be ignored. Maximizing the positive links between migration and development is especially relevant for the 49 LDCs (see Annex 4.1 for a listing). A starting point is a proper understanding of the beneficial relationships and an assessment of the importance of migration in a particular country or regional context. A recent study by Black and Sward (2009) found that many PRSPs and other national development plans established by developing countries continue to refer to migration with a negative connotation, often without going beyond references to human mobility, or available evidence how migration and development might be linked in practice.

The acknowledgement by LDCs of the contribution of remittances to development and the need to enhance their transfer based on data and research, the role of diasporas in promoting development, as well as the importance of migration among countries of the global South, as expressed in the 2006 Cotonou Declaration, has been a first step. Recognizing the role of migration in supporting but not replacing development efforts, it was agreed at the Ministerial Conference of LDCs on Enhancing the Development Impact of Remittances in February 2006 in Cotonou, Benin, to launch the Migrant Remittances Observatory for LDCs (Conférence Ministérielle, 2006). Depending on the magnitude of migration, awareness of its potential contribution to development efforts needs to be fully taken into account in the aim to achieve the MDGs in LDCs, and in taking stock of the implementation of the BPoA. Human mobility is certainly not the solution for all development obstacles. Yet, original and
novel approaches can enable migrants to become agents of human development and contribute to the economic and social progress of their home communities and developing countries, as well as the destination countries where they work and live, while reducing the risks and costs associated with the movement of people. On the cusp of the next decade, immigration and emigration need to become integral parts of the long-term development agenda of LDCs at the local, national and regional levels.

In preparation for LDC-IV to be convened in 2011,9 a thematic event on “Migration, Development and Remittances in LDCs” was held in New York on 17 June 2010. Under the auspices of the Migration and Development series, co-organized by UNITAR, IOM, UNFPA and the MacArthur Foundation, and in cooperation with the Permanent Mission of Nepal, the pre-conference seminar served to highlight migration as an opportunity for development, thus seeking to integrate the numerous links of the migration portfolio into the development debate and practice in LDCs in the post-BPoA decade. This background paper aimed to guide the discussions of the pre-conference event towards the formulation of policy recommendations and the eventual inclusion of more structured references on how to factor the development potential of migration into the outcome of LDC-IV in Turkey in 2011. It intentionally goes beyond the discussion of remittances to contribute to a better understanding of the migration–development nexus in LDCs. The paper has been prepared by IOM and greatly benefited from comments by UNITAR, UNFPA, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN-OHRLLS, Michael Clemens,10 CGD and other participants at the workshop.

The first part of this paper begins by identifying important migration trends in LDCs in order to provide a basis for analysing links between human mobility and development in this group of countries. That section furthermore seeks to highlight the impact of the global economic downturn on migration-related development aspects, the different monetary and non-monetary contributions of migrants and diasporas to development, as well as the vulnerability of LDCs to the effects of climate change and environmental degradation as drivers of migration. While the concrete development impact of migration depends on each individual country context, some key trends in LDCs as a group are presented in the first part of the paper to increase understanding of the links between human mobility and development.

The second section is dedicated to policy implications and recommendations. It defines a number of significant policy roles, presents the different levels of policy implementation and proposes seven main strategic directions for the migration and development agenda in LDCs, with corresponding policy recommendations. Gender, human rights and migrant health are considered as cross-cutting issues throughout the document.

The underlying methodology includes a desk review of documents and literature related to migration and development issues of LDCs and major events in that field. Furthermore, international and national data sources, such as those provided by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division (UN DESA/pop), the World Bank and national statistics institutes have been consulted. However, the paucity of data related to migration and remittances and a lack of comparability of statistical information available impedes a comprehensive analysis of human mobility in some cases and remains a key challenge.
I. Migration and development in LDCs

Migration can promote economic and social well-being and improve education and health outcomes. It may be seen as an expression of the free choice of people where to live in the pursuit of new opportunities (UNDP, 2009). Human rights are an integral part in the exercise of such choices and participate in the decisions that affect people’s lives (UNDP, n.d.). The non-respect for fundamental human rights (e.g. rights of equality, liberty, personal freedom, safety and security and a decent standard of living, among others) can act as a major driver of emigration. Human mobility can be instrumental in the realization of the quest for the protection of human rights of migrants through better opportunities abroad, and improve the well-being of family members at home through the remittances sent. However, migration can also lead to a trade-off in rights by depriving migrants of their human rights if adequate protection in the host country cannot be assured. Diaspora members and migrants can promote the transfer of skills, technology, capital and ideas, while migration can be a livelihood strategy and improve the conditions of both the migrant abroad and family members left behind, including in conflict-affected and post-conflict situations. Financial remittances may well be the most tangible and direct link between migration and development, but these are only one of many dimensions. It is important that the opportunities of migration be seen as one factor among others in the context of necessary local and national policies, together with FDI, trade and ODA to eradicate poverty and promote human development (Klugman and Pereira, 2009).

1.1 Context: Data and key trends

Because of its volatile and multifaceted nature, migration is more difficult to capture than other demographic indicators of population change (Poulain and Perrin, 2003). The quality of migration and remittance data available in many countries, including LDCs, continues to be an obstacle in providing evidence-based and policy-oriented research. Migration statistics tend to be outdated, unreliable or not comparable at either regional or global levels. These data limitations have to be kept in mind when considering the migration and remittance trends referred to below.

Emigration from LDCs

Socio-economic and political conditions, wage differentials, transnational networks, a rapidly growing young population, and armed and political conflicts can be considered key determinants of emigration. According to the World Bank (2008), 21.8 million, or 2.9 per cent of the total population of all LDCs, migrated in 2005. According to bilateral estimates by Ratha and Shaw (2007), main emigration countries among LDCs are Bangladesh (4.9 million), Afghanistan (2 million), Mali (1.2 million) and Burkina Faso (1.1 million).

Contrary to common perception, South-South migration from LDCs appears to be significantly more important than South-North migration. As concerns individuals originating from LDCs, one in five migrated to another LDC, and almost half of all emigrants moved to another developing country. Only 26.6 per cent of migrants from an LDC moved to high-income countries (World Bank, 2008). Figure 1 shows that almost two thirds of migrants from LDCs migrated within the South, which has important implications for LDCs and other developing countries as countries of destination.
Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011

South-South migration tends to occur between neighbouring countries and where there are small wage differentials. Though income variations may be relatively small compared to South-North migration and the quality of earnings and the quantity of remittances may be of concern, the potential welfare gains for poor people can still be significant (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Based on calculations of 2005 data by Ratha and Shaw, with almost 700,000 emigrants, Eritrea is estimated to have been the main source country of intra-LDC migration in 2005, followed by Mali (about 400,000), Mozambique (335,000) and Guinea (300,000) (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: LDCs with the highest numbers of emigrants living in other LDCs, 2005

Source: Author’s calculations based on data by Ratha and Shaw, 2007.

Relatively speaking, more than four out of five migrants originating from Eritrea, Burundi and Rwanda moved to other LDCs (see Figure 3). Much more needs to be known about this significant migration phenomenon among the countries of the global South.
Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011

According to data by Docquier and Marfouk (2006), the emigration rate from LDCs to OECD countries was only 1 per cent in 2000, while it is more than 10 times higher among skilled workers (13.2%). Whereas a mere 2.3 per cent of the labour force in LDCs are skilled workers, one in three migrant workers from LDCs in OECD countries belonged to the tertiary educated group. While a large proportion of emigrants from LDCs move to other LDCs and developing countries, highly skilled migration from LDCs seems to be a predominantly South-North phenomenon. Densely populated Asian LDCs (Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and Cambodia) are less affected by such brain drain than African or small island LDCs with extremely high emigration rates among their tertiary-educated population (Haiti, Samoa, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Liberia) (see Figure 4).

Broken down by gender, this South-North brain drain is highly feminized. The emigration rate of skilled women stood at 17.1 per cent in 2000, considerably higher than the rate for men with tertiary education working in OECD countries (10.3%). This might reflect the unequal access for women in many countries of origin to positions requiring higher education. Despite this higher emigration rate to OECD countries, only about four out of 10 highly skilled emigrants from LDCs in 2000 were women, pointing to a considerable gender gap. As the human capital of women relative to men in LDCs is even scarcer as a result of unequal access to higher education, this female brain drain may be more detrimental than the emigration of skilled men (Docquier et al., 2008).
In the medical sector, the emigration of physicians exceeded critical levels in Haiti, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia. In Liberia, the emigration rate exceeds 50 per cent; similarly, more than a third of Haitian and Ugandan doctors left the country in 2004 (see Figure 5) (Bhargava et al., 2010).

**Figure 5: Emigration of physicians from LDCs, 2004**

![Graph showing emigration of physicians from LDCs, 2004](source: Bhargava et al., 2010.)

While the migration of the highly educated and the likely detrimental impact on countries of origin is widely referred to as brain drain, recent research by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2009) found the repercussions for home communities to be less negative than commonly assumed. Concerning the medical sector, improved public health systems, staffing levels of nurses and the availability of medication may, among other factors, be as important for the achievement of the MDGs in relation to public health as tackling the high emigration rates of doctors. Most highly skilled health personnel in Africa tend to work outside the public sector rather than in the areas most critical to the poor, that is, rural areas and slums (Clemens, 2007). The perceived non-existence of opportunities in countries of origin and the perceived better prospects abroad are important drivers of emigration. Measures that aim to contain the brain drain are unlikely to be effective unless the underlying structural deficiencies and the lack of incentives are also addressed. Furthermore, emigration opportunities for skilled workers have been shown to spur incentives and the demand to invest in human capital formation in the country of origin, resulting in increased numbers of training opportunities and, consequently, trainees or a net brain gain.

**Population and immigration in LDCs**

Over the past 20 years the populations of LDCs has increased by 330 million, accounting for 855 million or 12.4 per cent of the global population. Growing at double the rate of average global population growth, United Nations projections forecast that the population in LDCs will grow by a further 200 million over the next 10 years (UN DESA/pop, 2009b). While over the past five years, the average global total fertility rate stood at 2.6 per cent (1.6% in developed countries and 2.7% in less developed countries) it remained at 4.4 per cent in LDCs, reaching a peak of 5.1 in sub-Saharan Africa (UN DESA/pop, 2008 estimates). Life expectancy at birth in LDCs is some 20 years lower than in more developed regions at 56 years and 77 years, respectively.

The urbanization rate in LDCs is 20 percentage points below the world average (29.2%), indicating that the large majority of the poorest of the poor still live in rural areas. In contrast to urbanization rates in more developed regions (75%) and the world average (50%), only some 33 per cent of the population in the poorest countries live in urban centres. However, there are important variations regarding urban dwellers in LDCs, for instance, between countries like Djibouti (88.1%) and Burundi (11%). Nonetheless,
the urban population of LDCs is estimated to grow by 120 million over the next decade (UN DESA/pop, 2008), either through rural–urban migration or demographic growth. Such urban population growth is likely to place significant strain on public services and infrastructure, as well as the human development potential in urban centres.

For 2010, the United Nations Population Division (2009a) estimates that about 11.5 million or 5.4 per cent of all international migrants worldwide lived in LDCs. Even though overall migrant numbers in LDCs are increasing, relative to the rapid population growth in these countries, their relative share in the population has declined slightly. However, because of the inherent difficulty of measuring irregular migration, the actual volume of migrant stocks in LDCs may well exceed that estimate.

It is expected that LDCs may be faced with the necessity to provide asylum to some 2.1 million refugees this year. The number of forced migrants as a share of international migrant stocks has been steadily decreasing over the past 20 years. Representing almost half of all international migrants in 1990 (43.2% or 4.8 million), their numbers may decrease to under one fifth (18.6%) in 2010. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2009), in 2008, almost one in five refugees received protection in an LDC, with a quarter of all refugees worldwide originating from Afghanistan (2.8 million). In addition, LDCs are host to a large share of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2008, at least two out of five IDPs were forced to relocate within a LDC. Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the highest number of IDPs worldwide (37.3% to 38% of total IDP numbers). Hosting at least 10.5 million IDPs and some 1.8 million refugees in 2008 raises important protection and development issues for LDCs, and discrimination and human rights violations may persist while vulnerable populations seek protection.

Compared to the worldwide distribution (49%), the share of female migrants in LDCs is slightly lower and has remained stable at around 47.6 per cent over the past decade. Their role in migration has changed considerably and it is often referred to as the “feminization” of migration. If formerly, they travelled mainly as dependents accompanying male migrants, women now often migrate independently and are actively involved in migration for employment (IOM, 2008b).

Considering overall immigration and emigration trends from LDCs, the net migration rate has dropped by almost half from -0.7 per cent in the period from 1995 to 2005, to -0.4 per cent over the past five years (UN DESA/pop, 2009b). Therefore, in terms of net migration flows, between 2005 and 2010, more people left than moved to LDCs. Compared to immigrants, the stocks of nationals from LDCs living abroad are high as a result of the negative net migration rate over the years. The decline in this rate could either reflect the increase of immigrants in these countries, or a drop in outmigration. The role played by labour migration in LDCs is discussed in the next subsection.

**Labour migration**

Although the actual extent of global labour migration is not known owing to the lack of reliable data, the International Labour Office (ILO) estimates the number of economically active workers among global migrants in 2010 at 105.4 million, or about half of all migrants. According to the regional distribution, 8.4 million (8%) were working in Africa, 30.7 million (29%) in Asia (including the Middle East) and 3.2 million (3%) in Latin America and the Caribbean (ILO, 2008, 2010).

Overseas employment is predominant in some of the populous Asian LDCs and in the Island States. South Asian LDCs, such as Bangladesh and Nepal, have continued to rely heavily on the Middle Eastern labour market due to economic growth and labour shortages in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Intraregional labour migration from small Pacific Island LDCs is mainly directed towards Australia and New Zealand (Duncan and Voigt-Graf, 2008). In sub-Saharan Africa, the phenomenon of overseas employment is still at an early stage. Though countries such as Senegal and Mauritania
have over the past years entered into bilateral agreements with Spain (IOM, ILO and OSCE, 2008), intraregional migration still predominates on the African continent. This is also true of the only LDC in the Americas, as workers from Haiti emigrate primarily to the United States, Canada and the Dominican Republic for work, with some intra-Caribbean migration other than to the Dominican Republic also significant.

Although poor people may gain most from migration, they also face the biggest obstacles to migrate. Immigration policies in destination countries, including developing countries hosting migrants, tend to favour highly skilled workers. However, this does not mean that the demand for labour is limited to the tertiary-educated. The demographic change in advanced countries and the associated growing demand for care and health services for their ageing societies, as well the demand in other sectors such as agriculture, construction and hospitality, have created a growing market for lower-skilled workers from abroad. Despite the economic crisis and resulting high unemployment levels in OECD countries, the need for low-skilled immigrant labour is unlikely to change in these sectors that are not affected by the business cycle, and such structural demand is frequently met through irregular migration (OECD, 2009). The vast majority of workers in LDCs are in the lower-skilled category (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006) and leave in increasing numbers to satisfy emerging needs in developed countries.

Recent years have witnessed a surge in interest in temporary and circular migration schemes. Matching demand and supply by effectively managing migration can benefit migrants as well as origin and destination countries (IOM, 2009d). Labour mobility has been found to generate significant welfare gains for each of these, constituting a triple-win situation (see, for example, Chiswick and Hatton, 2002; Winters, 2003; OECD, 2007; IOM, 2008b; Puri, 2008). Within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), LDCs have been negotiating temporary market access under Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), specifically for low-skilled service providers. This temporary labour migration scheme is likely to benefit LDCs more given their small pool of skilled labour, which, due to the high emigration rates among the highly skilled from LDCs, has been further depleted with serious detrimental effects on the limited scope of LDC economies. Cross-border migration can help to better match the supply of and demand for skills, and generate important welfare and efficiency gains (Ratha and Shaw, 2007). It can also link people in remote or underdeveloped locations to economic centres (Luthria, 2009).

Historically, internal migration has been a coping mechanism for populations in many LDCs. Internal or cross-border intraregional migration may offer a viable alternative to poor people in their search for better livelihoods. Representing more than three times the volume of international migration, internal migration is also believed to play an important role in poverty alleviation (Black and Sward, 2009). However, considering the cost associated with migration, it is not the poorest but rather those with some means and existing migration experience or networks who are able to benefit from access to international migration possibilities over long distances.

Unemployment and underemployment are key drivers of migration. Over the coming decade, the number of young people in the poorest countries is expected to increase by a further 35.5 million (UN DESA/pop, 2009b). These millions of juveniles will enter the labour markets of their already struggling home economies. In the case of the Pacific LDCs and sub-Saharan Africa, the lack of FDI and of employment creation compounds unemployment and underemployment and risks generating a “youth bulge” (Duncan and Voigt-Graf, 2008), where unemployed youth, particularly young women, will pose a significant development challenge in the future.

Regardless of skill levels and migratory status, foreign workers can contribute to economic growth and welfare in destination countries, and support their families and relatives back home through remittances. Yet, their contribution is often unacknowledged, owing to the political sensitivity of
migration issues in many destination countries. Because of predominantly precarious working conditions and discrimination, the protection of the rights of migrant workers remains unsatisfactory. Although legal and policy frameworks regarding international migration and the protection of the human rights of migrants and migrant workers irrespective of their status (see Annexes 4.2 and 4.3 for the status of ratifications by LDCs of instruments concerning migrants), these rights still await implementation in many destination countries, including in the global South. The prevention of discrimination would allow migrants to access the labour market and gain social inclusion, and thus foster social cohesion. Translating the rights of migrants and migrant workers into practice would help to ensure their social protection and the necessary degree of self-reliance that are important factors in achieving positive outcomes of labour migration and its contribution to socio-economic development in host and origin countries (GFMD, 2009b; ILO, 2010). For their part, migrants must understand and accept that they have to live by the laws and regulations of the countries they transit and where they ultimately work (IOM, 2009a).

Irregular migration

Of the 214 million international migrants (UN DESA/pop, 2009b), 10 per cent to 15 per cent are believed to be in an irregular situation (ILO, 2004). Regarding international migrants in LDCs, this would mean that 1.2 million to 1.7 million are in an irregular situation. In view of the predominantly informal nature of the labour markets in LDCs, the number of irregular labour migrants in these countries might be considerably higher. The large majority of irregular migrants in Asia are Nepalese and Bangladeshi living in neighbouring India, and Afghan nationals living in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran (ILO, 2004). However, as the actual scale of irregular migration can only be speculated upon, such numbers are at best indicative.

Restrictive immigration policies, which are common not only in developed but also in developing countries, together with the continuing demand for cheap labour, are likely to contribute to irregular movements. The scale of irregular migration flows may reflect a certain mismatch between economic realities and political decisions (ILO, 2004), including in times of crises, such as the current one and its effects, as underlying structural demands for labour are unlikely to disappear (IOM, 2009c). Overstaying visa entitlements, moving between formal and informal occupations, using false documents or the services of smugglers to cover long distances to reach the intended country of destination, is a common occurrence for unauthorized migrants. The demand for cheap labour can also lead to people being forced to move within or to a third country and to work under slave-like conditions, endangering the security and life of the trafficking victims.

Irregular migrants are particularly vulnerable to becoming caught up in a vicious cycle of poverty, powerlessness, discrimination and exploitation (IOM, 2010), with women and children particularly exposed to sexual exploitation and forced labour. Frequently deprived of their documents and denied freedom of movement, irregular migrants are denied their basic human rights and access to basic social and health services. Delayed medical treatment, if at all, may lead to serious complications and exposure to infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis among the migrant community and beyond, which in turn become more difficult to treat and control and entail additional heavy public expenditures. Improving and augmenting the availability of regular migration channels would serve to protect human rights and the safety and security of migrant women and men facing irregular, exploitative and abusive conditions, and help to contain the risk of falling prey to human trafficking.

Such difficulties and dangers notwithstanding, migration, and in particular, labour migration in search of better opportunities often yield positive human development outcomes. The remittances migrants send home, as well as pension benefits, compensations and other financial transfers (World Bank, 2008) can lay the foundations for beneficial human development outcomes. The scale and impact of such flows are described in the next subsection.
Remittance flows to LDCs

In 2006, one out of every 10 persons worldwide was either sending or receiving remittances (IOM, 2006a). Remittances are private flows mostly used for consumption and should thus not be considered a substitute for support of the public sector through ODA, debt relief or FDI in the private sector. The remittances migrants transfer to LDCs are relatively small compared to those reaching non-LDC developing countries/economies in transition; therefore, the amounts reaching the poorest countries tend to be relatively small. Second only to ODA (USD 32.8 billion, or 7.4% of LDC/GDP), remittance flows to LDCs exceeded FDI (USD 12.7 billion, or 3% of GDP in 2007). Accounting for 4 per cent of GDP of LDCs in 2007, remittances constitute an important source of external finance for the group of poorest countries. Worldwide remittances amounted to over three times ODA, and, though they were much smaller than FDI in 2007, these private financial flows to LDCs are particularly relevant considering the modest amounts in FDI reaching these countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, where aid and foreign investment flows vary quite significantly on an annual basis, remittances represent a more reliable financial flow for the recipients (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007).

The World Bank estimated remittance flows to LDCs at more than USD 24 billion in 2009 (World Bank, 2009b), an increase of some USD 1.5 billion since 2008. This is especially significant given that worldwide remittances are estimated to have declined by 6.7 per cent, and flows to developing countries are projected to have fallen by 6 per cent in 2009 (Ratha et al., 2010).

Nonetheless, the volume of remittances is likely to be considerably higher as 11 out of 49 LDCs provided no transfer data; 13 had incomplete data for the past two decades, and just over half (26) presented complete data sets. Incomplete and unreliable data in this area remain a key challenge. In addition, the extent of unrecorded money sent through both formal and informal channels can only be guessed at. Estimates for some countries indicate that as much as half of all remittances might be sent outside official banking channels owing to burdensome procedures, high transfer costs and unfavourable exchange rates. In countries such as Uganda, the percentage of informal transfers is believed to reach 80 per cent (UN-OHRLLS and OSAA, 2006). Informal systems, such as the Hawala or Hundi structures in South Asia, are more accessible for the “unbanked” to receive money (ILO, 2004). The popularity of unofficial services among people without access to developed banking systems in LDCs contributes to the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on remittances.

In relative terms, the funds remitted by migrants can be of critical importance. In Lesotho and Samoa, they accounted for over a quarter of GDP in 2008, and around one fifth of GDP in Nepal and Haiti (see Figure 6).

Figure 6: Remittances as a share of GDP 2008, top 10 LDCs

1.2 The impact of the global financial and economic crisis on LDCs

The consequences for LDCs and remittances

The repercussions of the recent global financial and economic crises on LDCs were initially less evident because their financial markets are both less developed and less integrated into the global economy. However, the delayed effects of the crisis could affect LDCs as export earnings for commodities and revenues from tourism, remittances and external finance for infrastructure declined in the wake of weaker world trade and lower economic growth. Together with the sharp oil price increases and the 2007–2008 food crisis, the impact on the economies of LDCs would have been particularly severe as they depend heavily on external funds, notably ODA and FDI, which also tended to decline since the onset of the economic crisis, though the combined impact on individual countries depends on the length and intensity of the crisis, the particular socio-economic context and the local economy’s exposure to and dependence on international markets (GFMD, 2009a; UN ECA, 2009; UN-ESCWA, 2009; UN GA, 2009a; UN-OHRLLS, 2009b; World Bank, 2009a).

Despite the impact on LDCs of the economic and financial downturn in richer countries, remittances have proven to be relatively resistant. Thus, remittance flows to LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa actually registered higher growth rates or only a relatively modest decline (Uganda, Senegal and Mali). Remittances sent to Bangladesh and Nepal in the first eight months of 2009 actually increased by 16 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively (Ratha et al., 2009), while financial flows, particularly institutional and non-governmental assistance to Haiti, are likely to have considerably increased following the devastating earthquake of January 2010.

There is cautious optimism that such financial flows to developing countries would recover in 2010 and 2011, especially as remittance flows have generally shown themselves to be more stable than FDI and ODA. In times of weak economic growth in developed countries, remittances to LDCs may therefore represent an even more significant source of external financing. The greater diversification of migration destinations and labour mobility, the more robust remittance flows are likely to be, although the low growth and concomitant unemployment among migrants would also sooner or later affect remittance flows (Ratha et al., 2009, 2010). This poses a challenge for migrants and remittance-receiving households, as well as for home-country governments. Even though remittances should not be cast in the role of an insurance mechanism against economic hardships, the repercussions are likely to be felt in many LDCs, as the economic situation becomes increasingly difficult for migrants who have lost their jobs in their countries of destination and for those at home who have come to depend on remittances to supplement the family income and meet basic needs. Even in LDCs where some kind of social services are available, such a situation would put additional strain on already tight public resources.

The impact on migration flows

The impact of the global financial and economic crisis on migration flows showed considerable variations. While no reliable data are as yet available, there is some evidence to suggest that initial labour migration declined. In the first three quarters of 2009, the outflow of migrant workers from Bangladesh dropped by almost 50 per cent compared to the previous year. Restrictions on immigration and non-renewal of work permits in major destination countries and rising unemployment rates, especially in the construction, manufacturing and services sectors (Awad, 2009; Fix et al., 2009; and NTS Alert, 2009), reduced the demand for migrant labour (United Nations General Assembly, 2009a). The development impact of migration is thus closely linked to economic stability and the migration policies of host countries, in particular those policies concerning labour migrants. As migrant workers tend to be concentrated in less stable and frequently temporary occupations in sectors that are
particularly sensitive to economic downturns, they are also the first to be laid off (IOM, 2009c; Ratha et al., 2009). In contrast, the health care, domestic service and education sectors, with their high share of migrant workers, were less affected by the economic downturn and have actually witnessed a rise in employment (Awad, 2009). Even though flows have declined, labour migration is continuing despite the global economic crisis.

Women and men have been affected differently. While men may suffer job losses in mainly male-dominated sectors, such as construction and manufacturing, women migrant workers may feel the crisis through working disproportionately in less regulated sectors (e.g. in domestic services, as care providers for the elderly, and in the sex industry) that are frequently not covered by national labour laws. Women may experience discrimination both as women and migrants, and are frequently exposed to both verbal and physical abuse and exploitation, with no recourse to social services or legal assistance. As such, they are particularly vulnerable to the effects of economic downturns (GFMD, 2009a). Moreover, when they return home, women often have to relinquish their newly gained economic and social independence through migration, and they have to readjust to cultural and social hierarchical structures. However, the demand for health care and domestic services, usually dominated by women workers, is unlikely to diminish, given the ageing societies in many developed countries.

However, the expected large-scale returns of migrants did not occur, despite the financial incentives offered in some host countries. While some migrants decided to return, many others chose to remain in their destination countries and to sit out the crisis, concerned that they might not be able to re-enter if restrictions on immigration were to be tightened. Others felt that the situation in their home countries had not improved and offered no prospects of earning a decent living (Awad, 2009). Those who returned might experience reintegration problems and find it difficult to find work or to readapt to local conditions following their long stays abroad. However, if they remained and their visa entitlements expired in the meantime, they would be in an irregular situation and face the attendant precarious status and risks this implied.

Protecting the human rights of migrants is particularly relevant in the context of economic crises such as the one that occurred in 2008, the effects of which can still be felt. In times of economic downturns, migrant workers may experience growing resentment and may be made to feel that they were scrounging off the local social system at the expense of the local population. While human rights violations, abuse and exploitation of migrants are still widespread, migrants are particularly vulnerable to socio-economic marginalization, discrimination, hostility and acts of racism in times of crisis, notwithstanding that it has also been shown that migrants do generate employment and economic gains (IOM, 2009c).

1.3 The contribution of remittances and other diaspora resources to development

As with many other aspects of migration, generalizations regarding the impact of migrants’ transfers on development are not possible. At the macroeconomic level, they are an important source of foreign exchange and, in some cases, have led to the upgrading of a country’s creditworthiness, thus improving access to international capital markets (OSCE, IOM and ILO, 2006; Ratha et al., 2010). However, they may have the effect of rendering exports less competitive by raising the exchange rate of the local currency. High dependence on remittances as a share of GDP can pose an economic risk, though the same may be said of other capital flows, such as ODA, external debt and FDI. Overall, the impact of remittances on home-country development tends to be seen as beneficial (ILO, 2004; UN-OHRLLS and OSAA, 2006).

Although remittances supplement household incomes and thereby alleviate poverty and contribute to better living conditions, access to healthier nutrition and clean water, as well as to basic health care and
education for children, while also generating economic activities, remittances can only complement existing development policies and official aid flows, but not replace them. The potential benefits of interpersonal flows depend on the broader economic and political context and policies (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007; de Haas, 2010) and need to be supplemented by private and public investments in LDCs to generate employment and strengthen the local economy. The impact of migration and remittances on development greatly depends on the local institutional capacity and legal frameworks, which, however, are weak in most LDCs. The same applies to the transfer of skills, technology and ideas to countries of origin, whose impact will be small if minimal economic and political conditions are not in place. These effects are discussed in the following section.

The human development impact of remittances and migration

The potential benefits of money transfers on development are manifold. At the microeconomic level, a key role for remittances is to support family welfare and augment household incomes to cover or contribute to expenditures on food, health and educational needs. If saved, these private funds constitute a financial reserve during periods of instability and the loss of other means of sustenance, such as economic crises, conflicts, natural disasters and heavy or unexpected medical expenditures (UNDP, 2009; UN-OHRLLS and OSAA, 2006). An important function of these transfers is the alleviation of poverty by supporting family welfare (Bakewell, 2009; Ghosh, 2006; Luthria, 2009), thus representing a significant contribution to realizing the human right to a decent standard of living. In Uganda, the share of the poor is estimated to have declined by 11 per cent and in Bangladesh, by 6 per cent, owing to additional income through remittances (Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007). In a recent study on Angolans in South Africa and Portugal, in almost four out of 10 households, remittances supplement income, while 16 per cent of the surveyed households claimed to depend entirely on these private money transfers (Alvarez Tinajero, 2010). However, there is also evidence that the frequency and the amounts remitted tended to decline the longer a migrant remained abroad. This variation in sending patterns, coupled with a high dependency rate on monetary transfers, can cause significant social and economic costs for children and family members at home who rely on this additional income. Furthermore, remittances have also been shown to lead to income inequality between remittance-receiving households and non-migrant households, and that the poorest are also those least likely to be able to migrate and benefit from remittances.

A further function of remittances is to realize and maintain access to food, health care and education – fundamental human rights and key aspects of human development as enshrined in the MDGs. Households with a family member abroad are more likely to be better informed on health issues and preventive medical measures, including vaccinations. Migration might also play a role in curtailing child labour by financing health care, education and consumption (Yang, 2009), as borne out by more than half of remittances sent by female migrants in the Middle East to their families in Bangladesh (Ghosh, 2006). Female migration and human capital formation are closely linked as women tend to remit a larger share of their income over longer periods of time, and with a larger portion devoted to the education of children. Remittances can empower girls by enabling them to go to school in societies where females have almost no access to education (Docquier et al., 2008).

The migration experience can also affect gender and power relations within households. Female migration may empower women as they achieve social and financial independence or, in the case of women staying behind when their spouses or other male heads of households migrate, by assuming the responsibility for the household and the family and becoming de facto heads of households. This development may cause cultural and social difficulties when migrant women return and are expected to resume a traditionally subservient position within the family and society, thus making reintegration or the return to culturally determined gender roles problematic. The absence of a migrant parent, particularly of the mother, can also cause distress and difficulties for the children left behind in the care of
the remaining parent or, more often, with elderly grandparents or other relatives or even older siblings. The feminization of South-North migration is largely dominated by women working in the domestic service sector or as caregivers, whose absence leads to a reconfiguration of family and hierarchical relations at home. This can have a considerable impact on family dynamics among the women earning a living abroad and supporting the family back home, on the one hand, and parents, spouses, siblings, children and the elderly who have to readjust to new role patterns, on the other. As men are no longer the sole breadwinner, or are even being replaced in that role, it may be difficult for them to accept the potential loss of their decision-making power and social status within the household and the community. The feminization of migration may also lead to changes in reproductive behaviour. It is also not uncommon in migration situations, whether they be South-North or South-South movements, for unaccompanied minors, children accompanying migrant parents or children born of migrant parents to suffer from neglect and to be deprived of access to education or medical care, with the attendant negative effects on their personal and social development. As individual country experiences cannot be generalized, more cross-country comparative research and qualitative studies concerning diverse migration situations, including within and among LDCs, are needed to evaluate the impact of migration, including on gender relations, social and economic hierarchies, and on those remaining at home.

To the extent that remittances provide funding for human capital investments, help to generate jobs and offer access to small credit and microcredit for entrepreneurs, migrants’ transfers may act as catalysts to stimulate economic growth (UN-OHRLLS and OSAA, 2006). It is disputed whether a high share of household income spent on consumption, generating little or no productive capacities through investments, contributes to inflation by raising the local demand for consumer goods. However, it has been argued that in times of economic crisis, the stimulation of domestic demand could raise production and strengthen the economy, although such a result would depend on the existence of available productive capacity. Findings indicate that remittances in Bangladesh have a multiplier effect of 3.3 on gross national product (GNP), 2.8 on consumption and 0.4 on investment (ILO, 2004). The use of remittances varies among households and investment in health and education may be considered “productive” in terms of human capital formation, while business activities, if unsuccessful or depending on unpaid labour provided by relatives, for instance, do not necessarily contribute to development. A recent household survey in Angola revealed that remittances helped households to meet basic needs, buy consumables and pay for utilities (according to 67% of respondents). Fourteen per cent of the households also use a portion of remittances for business purposes; only 1 per cent of the respondents invested part of the remittances in agricultural activities (Alvarez, 2010). These findings show that despite the creation of jobs through increased domestic demand for goods and services and the additional economic effects generated by spending additional incomes, only a fraction of remittances tends to be directed towards productive investment. The next section discusses the role of investments promoted by members of the diaspora community.

The private sector and the trade contributions of diasporas

The acknowledgement of the role diasporas play in the private sector is still at an early stage. Enterprises, in particular small enterprises, are at the heart of economic development; they generate jobs and raise output and productivity. Compared to traditional investors, diaspora members are more inclined to finance businesses or projects in their country of origin, owing to a lower risk perception of investments (Ratha et al., 2008).

The outcome of productive investments of remittances can in turn increase household income (Yang, 2009). The private funds of migrants can offer capital for small and micro-enterprises, overcome obstacles to obtain credits in areas where financial systems are not sufficiently developed, and foster entrepreneurship. Transnational networks can be instrumental in promoting socio-economic development projects through the sharing of know-how and innovative practices. For instance,
Haitian migrants in the United States have established hometown associations (HTAs) to combine their financial and social resources to promote community development in their home towns (Ghosh, 2006). Community projects financed through remittances have made it possible to develop the local infrastructure in the Senegal River Valley, spanning four countries in West Africa (Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal) (Bakewell, 2009).

Remittances can support the development of the local financial sector, but even more so strengthen the manufacturing and industrial sector that are important elements in generating and sustaining economic growth. A business-friendly environment characterized by public confidence in well-functioning local institutions, political and economic stability, responsible monetary policy, a well-functioning financial sector and credible anti-corruption regulations are important prerequisites to achieve beneficial results. Otherwise, migrants and members of the diaspora would be inclined to act like any other rational investor and choose to invest in the host or other countries where the expected returns are likely to be higher, or they would turn to informal remittance channels (Ghosh, 2006; Ratha and Mohapatra, 2007). An important area to be further investigated concerns the respective investment behaviour of female and male migrants and how and to what extent their behaviour differed.

The human and financial capital of diaspora members can benefit trade relations in the country of origin, and their expansion can in turn have a positive impact on the mobility of workers. Familiarity with the local context and trade, investment and market conditions and opportunities in the country of origin, better access to information, and personal contacts and networks in both countries of origin and destination put diaspora members in a special position. In the Caribbean, diaspora networks have been established to promote trade, tourism and investment opportunities (Ghosh, 2006). Thus, trade links have been fostered through Samoan migration to New Zealand (Luthria, 2009). Diaspora members can also play an important role in facilitating trade by facilitating market entry, identifying market niches in destination countries for new or ethnic goods and services, and promoting the manufacturing and exchange of products and assets. Based on the knowledge and contacts of Ghanaian expatriates in Italy, a cooperative was set up in their origin community in Ghana, an initiative which opened new trade opportunities and allows local farmers to trade in local products, in this instance pineapples, directly on the Italian market (IOM, 2009d).

**Transfer of skills, technology and ideas**

Diaspora members can foster the flow of knowledge, skills and technology to the home country and into sectors where these are needed. They can be instrumental in encouraging political and social change through the transfer of new values, expectations, ideas and social capital. Such “social remittances” (Levitt, 1998) can include political values, increased participation in community decisions and support for democratic principles, as observed in Latin America (Yang, 2009).

Tapping into the human capital of skilled emigrants and diaspora members constitutes an important step in promoting development through migration. For instance, migrant workers from Vanuatu in New Zealand return home after five to seven months of work and having acquired valuable skills and knowledge of new irrigation techniques, agricultural productivity gains or computer skills. For instance, the latter of these newly acquired skills led to a demand for improved service delivery in terms of Internet connections in Vanuatu. Samoan migrants who experienced good governance in New Zealand transferred the demand and resulting capacities needed in this area to their home country. Acknowledging the need for sound institutional structures to foster development, these social transfers can generate important beneficial and long-term impacts on socio-economic stability (Luthria, 2009).

Recent innovative practices to share technology and knowledge include the donation of medical equipment by Ethiopian diaspora members and others living and working in the United States. As part
Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011

of the “MIDEth” project (Migration for Development in Ethiopia) of the Government of Ethiopia, UNDP and IOM, four hospitals in Ethiopia received equipment worth up to USD 2 million. Other examples of new approaches include the use of electronic communications technology. While enabling the virtual transfer of skills and promoting counselling via the Internet, connectivity problems in countries covered by the IOM project facilitating the temporary return of qualified expatriates to countries such as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Sudan, have impeded progress in this area so far (IOM, 2009d). Developing the frequently weak IT infrastructure could provide an avenue for LDCs to mobilize diaspora skills for development purposes (Oucho, 2009).

Despite the importance of intraregional and interregional migration for LDCs, policymakers and researchers have tended to focus on establishing a beneficial link with diaspora members living in developed countries. This may be due to the perceived outflow of large numbers of skilled migrants to OECD countries and the related interest of countries of origin to transform such outflows into “brain gains” (Bakewell, 2009). However, a small-scale project in Guinea demonstrated that Guinean diaspora members living within the region offered significant added value compared to those living in developed countries (IOM, 2009d). Such South-South initiatives could provide a model for similar intra-LDC and LDC-developing country initiatives.

The role of diaspora members in peace-building

Some LDCs are particularly affected by political instability, civil strife and armed conflicts. The aim of subsequent peace-building processes is to introduce, restore or strengthen democratic institutions and economic activities. In some cases, diaspora members from affected countries may themselves be or have been involved in the conflict and, having left the country, fuel the conflict further through their support. Yet, in other cases, they have played a significant role in reconstruction efforts, and provided a lifeline to relatives struggling to survive in “failed” states, such as Somalia (Oucho, 2009). The report of the United Nations Secretary-General, Peace-building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, (United Nations General Assembly, 2009) was submitted, after consultations with the Peace-building Commission, following the Security Council invitation (S/PRST/2008/16) to advise on how national efforts might be supported to secure sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively. The report contains several interesting aspects of post-crisis programming, as well as mechanisms available to the United Nations and the general international community to enhance the role of the return of qualified nationals in the context of national capacity development.

Remittances and the mobilization of diasporas to fill critical human resource gaps and generating employment, are possible avenues for the promotion of development and reconstruction. With a view to building and sustaining needed capacities, a number of Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) projects have enabled diaspora members from countries emerging from conflict to use their skills and knowledge to train local staff in essential services and sectors. Examples include Somali health professionals living in Finland and the transfer of skills by diaspora members to six post-conflict countries, including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Security continues to be a key challenge, as evidenced by the evacuation of Somali health personnel who wished to participate in a development project in Somalia in October 2008 (IOM, 2009d).

To engage members of the diaspora community could be politically sensitive (United Nations General Assembly, 2009) and underlines the need to foster and sustain trust and cooperation between the home government and the expatriate communities. Offering a platform for exchange, “Diaspora Dialogues” in the form of videoconferences and physical presence can go a long way towards creating and sustaining constructive links between diaspora members and government representatives in origin and host countries, as well as with other relevant actors (IOM, 2009d). The role of diasporas in peace-building processes can be explored and further strengthened as the above United Nations
Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011 report suggests. LDCs are arguably the group most affected by natural disasters and deterioration of their habitat as the effects of climate change encroach on their environment and livelihoods. This is the subject of the following section.

1.4 The environment, migration and development

The impacts of climate change, the havoc wreaked by natural disasters and recurring food crises that so frequently affect LDCs, dramatically highlight their vulnerability and fragile capacity to cope with such calamities that endanger the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. Though estimates vary widely, according to the United Nations, as many as 860 million people in LDCs and Small Island Developing States might be exposed to the detrimental effects of climate change and environmental degradation. It is widely recognized that LDCs are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of global warming as they lack the necessary resources to adapt to such changes (UN-OHRLLS, 2009a). Six out of the 20 countries with the highest incidence of disaster-related displacement in 2008 were LDCs (IDMC and OCHA, 2009) and up to 30 million people were displaced by droughts over the last three decades. River delta regions and coastal areas, such as in Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Asia-Pacific region, are particularly prone to flooding, increasingly intense and erratic monsoon patterns and storms, while low-lying Small Island States face threats to their very existence because of rising sea levels and incidental tsunamis. In Africa, almost 700,000 people had to move because of environmental degradation and natural disasters in 2008 (IDMC and OCHA, 2009). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) cites Africa as the continent most likely to be affected, owing to a number of stress factors and low ability to cope with severe climatic variations.

The links between climate change, the environment and migration

The relation between migration and natural disasters, changes in the environment and the effects of global warming is characterized by the dynamic interaction of a variety of socio-economic and demographic factors as well as security, gender and health issues (UNFPA, 2009; University of Adelaide et al., 2009). The environment as a driver of mobility is not a new phenomenon. When focusing on environmental factors, it is important to distinguish between climate processes involving gradual changes or sudden and severe climatic events (IOM, 2008a). The effects of climate change are expected to intensify the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events (e.g. floods, heat waves, droughts), on the one hand, and gradual processes of environmental degradation (e.g. desertification, soil and coastal erosion), on the other. Population movements related to the environment and climate change take two forms: the first is migration as a coping mechanism in response to the consequences of gradual environmental/climate change, while the second concerns displacements, often temporary, that are triggered by the sudden onset of extreme events that force people to move to safety.35 The first might be expected to generate the bulk of environmentally induced migration,36 most of which would generally occur within the area or region (IOM, 2009f).

Given the complexity of the mutual interaction between the environment and migration, the movement of people, especially on a massive scale, can itself negatively affect the environment. The process of moving can strain and endanger the local ecosystem along transit routes and at destination, potentially causing further movements (IOM, 2007). Hosting large populations of refugees and IDPs, LDCs experience the effects of such migration as an environmental and development challenge.

Global warming is believed to affect human health and well-being, and its impact on agricultural production and water resources endangers livelihoods as resource bases erode and cause the loss of livestock and harvests, loss of income, food shortages, hunger and extreme poverty (University of Adelaide et al., 2009; UN-OHRLLS, 2009a). The high share of poor and rural populations in LDCs makes environmental degradation and its consequences for food and water security a potential threat for
the livelihoods and human security of people living in the poorest and most fragile countries. Conflicts over scarce resources are a reality in many parts of the world and may be expected to increase over respective needs and claims that are further exacerbated by historical and political territorial delimitations. The poor stand to suffer most from the effects of climate change as they are also the least able to protect themselves. Together with substantial population growth and urbanization in large urban agglomerations in coastal areas, the effects of climate change could significantly increase the movements from huge conurbations in such LDCs as Bangladesh and Myanmar (University of Adelaide et al., 2009). Migration as a coping mechanism against the effects of climate change in national adaptation and emergency response plans is discussed below.

**Migration as an adaptation strategy**

Migration has for a long time been a response mechanism to environmental change and climate stress. Today, “National Adaptation Programmes of Action” (NAPAs), long-term planning frameworks for coping strategies for LDCs developed as part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) serve similar ends. The linkages between climate change and migration figure prominently in several of the existing NAPAs as the role of coping mechanisms to reduce population (and hence, migration pressures) and to enable populations to remain in their normal habitat, is being examined. From this perspective, migration is perceived as a form of adaptation failure rather than a natural coping mechanism. Only in some NAPAs is migration recognized as an adaptation strategy to either reduce population pressures in areas affected by gradual environmental degradation, or by acknowledging that populations may have to be relocated. The latter may take the form of internal migration or international resettlement, such as foreseen by the governments of the Republic of Kiribati and the Republic of the Maldives. The latter aims to create a sovereign wealth fund with which to buy new territories for the resettlement of the population if the atolls were to disappear under rising sea level (Martin, 2009).

Possible complementary risk-reduction and management mechanisms are labour migration and the related monetary transfers of migrants and diaspora members to support relatives affected by disasters and hazardous conditions. Rural–urban migration patterns in search of employment during times of drought illustrate internal coping strategies. Temporary labour migration can reduce pressure on already fragile local ecosystems, limited resources and labour opportunities. Whether this type of migration can be a long-term strategy remains to be seen. For instance, in the West African Sahel, which has been affected by droughts for the past three decades, the trend to migrate in search of work is actually decreasing (Brown, 2008).
2. Policy implications and recommendations

The preceding section reviewed the importance of migration and the different, potentially beneficial relationships between migration and development in the particular context of LDCs. This section examines the policy challenges and refers to existing good practices and the relevance of migration for the economic and social development of LDCs. Some policy recommendations are offered to guide the consideration of proposed activities in LDCs to ensure that the 2011 LDC-IV and the forthcoming Plan of Action for LDCs acknowledge migrants as part of the development solutions and as contributing to the achievement of development goals, and include migration as an integral part of long-term development agendas.

The BPoA for 2001–2010 is a comprehensive 10-year poverty reduction strategy with 30 internationally agreed development goals, defined in seven interlinked commitments (see Annex 4.4 for more details).

Policy can play an important role in supporting the positive aspects of migration by recognizing and supporting the contribution made by migrants to development, and promoting the social integration of migrants, the protection of the rights of migrants and combating acts of racism and xenophobia. This final section proposes ways to achieve this based on the observations of the first section.

The following section proposes five general policy roles to guide policy action on migration and development in LDCs; it outlines six different levels of policy implementation (section 2.2) and lists seven main strategic directions for the migration and development agenda in LDCs (section 2.3).

2.1 Major policy roles to guide policy action on migration and development in LDCs

Migration emerges as an important development strategy at the individual, household and community levels. Migrants, diasporas and returnees are important actors in development, able to generate wealth through diverse personal and group strategies, with remittances being one of the most important examples that, however, should not overshadow other types of contributions.

However, the risks associated with migration call for targeted policy responses. Mobility can either heighten or alleviate the vulnerability of populations: migration, development and human rights are all items on the common agenda.

As a group, the 49 LDCs face diverse challenges and problems within their local contexts, or as a result of regional circumstances. Their respective policy priorities will therefore also differ. However, migration and development management also raise common questions for LDCs. This paper first proposes the definition of five main policy roles to address the challenge of migration and development in LDCs:

A “mainstreaming role”: Policy should favour coherence among poverty alleviation, development and migration, and policies/plans

LDCs (see a listing in Annex 4.1) are characterized by limited human resources, low per capita GNP and fragile economies, all of which may be positively or negatively affected by migration. A carefully planned and sensitive approach to policy development (IOM, 2008b) is required to limit such potentially negative consequences and support positive outcomes. To achieve successful migration management outcomes, development frameworks have to integrate migration-related challenges and give equal consideration to the needs of both sending and destination countries.
Migration issues can be structurally and systematically integrated into operational development strategies. The mainstreaming of migration-related issues into long-term development schemes can be realized in particular by factoring migration concerns into MDG implementation strategies and other national and local development strategies, as and when appropriate. The Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners on Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning (2009), prepared by IOM and other Global Migration Group (GMG) agencies, proposes a step-by-step approach for mainstreaming migration into existing development plans.

Countries that have successfully included migration into their PRSPs (IMF website, 2010) include Bangladesh (2005), Burundi (2006), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2006), Ghana (2005), Rwanda (2007), Senegal (2006) and Sierra Leone (2005). The 2005 Bangladesh PRSP provides a good example of how migration issues can be mainstreamed into the development plan. Internal migration, the impacts of remittances on development and interregional migration are identified as significant elements to understand changes in development and poverty reduction trends. The document highlights the importance of providing services for migrants as part of the development strategy, such as information on safe migration, one-stop services for international women migration, pre-departure training, facilitation of interregional migration and the reduction of the initial costs of migration.

As to destination countries, a significant number of countries, in particular developed countries, have now integrated migration into their development programmes and budgets, e.g. the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France (with the co-development approach), Italy, Denmark, Sweden Norway, Switzerland, Japan and the United States.

An “empowering role”: Policy should adopt a migrants-centred approach

Successful examples of migration and development policies are based on the acknowledgment of the needs, priorities and strategies of migrants and diaspora communities. This calls for the acknowledgement of their ownership of activities and the discretionary use of remittances as private funds by receiving households. Incentives for migrants and diasporas to contribute to the development of home countries if they are supported by a regulatory framework providing access to voting rights, the possibility of allowing dual citizenship, the protection of private and commercial property, a free media and freedom of expression, adequate housing, education and health services, and adequate banking structures for migrants, diasporas, returnees and their families. The issue of the social integration (UN-OHRLLS, 2006) of migrants and their families remains a significant area of policy intervention in relation to LDCs with a view to contributing to the elimination of acts of racism and xenophobia. The protection of human and labour rights of migrants in destination countries should include non-discrimination, equal treatment, also in regard to working conditions, the monitoring and enforcement of labour regulations and access to basic health and social services.

An “enabling role”: Policy should facilitate the contributions to development of migrants and diaspora communities

Policy plays a key role in creating the appropriate conditions, conducive to enhancing the contributions of migrants, diasporas and their families. An enabling policy environment signifies the adoption of legislative, regulatory, economic, social and political measures. It also means building trust relationships with citizens and nationals abroad and allowing financial institutions to offer particular products to members of the diaspora and enable non-residents to purchase treasury bills and open foreign currency bank accounts, for instance. In the particular context of LDCs, it also means ensuring the sustainability of programme activities by integrating them into functioning structures and existing budgets. The positive gains of migration directly depend on economic and political developments in the LDCs.
A “partnership role”: Policy should implement a multi-stakeholder approach

Policy should ensure active participation and consultation of migrants, diasporas and civil society. Public initiatives can facilitate collaboration with development actors from the private sector, financial institutions, employers’ and workers’ associations, chambers of commerce, business networks, local authorities, as well as the media. The 2009 evaluation of the implementation of the BPoA (United Nations, 2009a) noted progress in the increased involvement of non-state actors, including the private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others.

A “cooperative role”: Policy should foster bilateral and multilateral collaboration

Programmes aimed at reducing the costs and maximizing the benefits of migration are based on cooperation between host and home countries. Migration and development policies require cooperative efforts, particularly in view of the reliance of the majority of LDCs on foreign aid and remittances, as well as the effect of migration policy measures in destination countries on migration trends in countries of origin. It is only by involving countries of origin and destination and the international community that the poverty reduction objectives might be achieved.

Schematic presentation of the five policy roles:
Based on the policy roles presented above, the following recommendations are proposed as guiding policy principles for migration and development activities in LDCs:

**Summary of key recommendations for policy principles:**

- Authorities at the local, national, regional and international level should acknowledge migration as an important development strategy for individuals, households and communities.

- Policymakers should consider the diversity of situations, context and priorities in LDCs in order to provide appropriate programmatic responses.

- Policymakers should acknowledge gender as an important variable in understanding migration and development dynamics in LDCs and take it into account when developing research programmes and projects.

- Home and destination countries should mainstream migration into existing development strategies such as National Development Plans, PRSPs, Sector-wide Approaches (SWAPs), NAPAs concerning climate change, country and local employment strategies and their donor, aid and development strategies (mainstreaming policy role).

- Home and host countries should adopt a human rights and migrant-centred approach, based on respect and services for migrants, diasporas and their families, acknowledgement of remittances as private funds and recognition of stakeholders as owners and drivers of activities (empowering policy role).

- Home and host countries should adopt legislative, regulatory, economic, social and political measures conducive to migrants’ and diasporas’ contributions to development (conducive policy role).

- Home and host countries should facilitate a multi-stakeholder approach favouring partnership between migrants, diasporas, civil society and development actors such as public and private sector stakeholders, financial institutions, employers’ and workers’ associations, chambers of commerce, business networks, local authorities and the media (partnership policy role).

- Policymakers should commit themselves to dialogue and collaboration on migration and development at the national, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels (cooperative policy role).

**2.2 Levels of policy implementation on migration and development in LDCs**

In order to ensure a comprehensive approach to migration and development, activities can be developed at different levels of policy intervention.

**Local level**

The achievement of the MDGs requires the involvement of local authorities, as it is at the local level that partnerships are most effective in terms of local planning and service delivery. Available evidence on diaspora strategies (IOM, 2006b) indicates that diasporas are often inclined to invest in their locality.
of origin, as they can often rely on family members there to oversee their investments or business activities and who are familiar with the local context and able to better measure the impacts of their contributions. The model of “co-development” pioneered by France, for instance in Mali, the Mexican “Tres por Uno” programme in the Zacatecas, where funds remitted by migrants for community projects are matched by local, state and federal funds, or the example of “hometown associations” prove that successful local development programmes can be based on the facilitation of cooperation with migrants and diasporas.

National level

Multidimensional and multisectoral policies are developed at the national level, and this is where the mainstreaming of migration into development plans should also be realized. It is also the main level of policy intervention to ensure national ownership of programmes and to evaluate capacity-building needs. The commitment to migration and development policies at a high political level, as illustrated by successful diaspora policies in Latin American developing countries, also ensures visibility of the means and commitment to carry out migration and development programmes.

Bilateral level

This concerns collaboration between countries of origin and of destination, while also acknowledging that countries generally fall within both categories, and concerns different types of policies: promoting circular mobility, human resources development, capacity-building and adequate transportation and banking services for financial transactions. Bilateral labour migration agreements often pursue the additional aim of promoting broader economic relations among countries, such as mutual trade exchanges. In doing so, such agreements should confirm the commitments made by LDCs on human rights at the international level (IOM, 2008b, chapter 13). Such cooperation would also assist countries of origin and of destination to mutually address and mitigate the repercussions of economic crises.

Regional level

For many LDCs, neighbouring countries remain dominant migration destinations, with more than two thirds of migrants from LDCs migrating within the South. In terms of migration management issues, regional organizations have paid increased attention to reaping the development benefits of human mobility, especially as regards facilitating labour mobility, remittances and addressing push factors. Noteworthy among different regional frameworks, in 2008 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a Regional PRSP referring also to migration (ECOWAS, 2008). ECOWAS members have also adopted an agreement on a “Common Approach on Migration Management” to promote a system of concerted migration management in West Africa, as well as a Protocol on the Free Movement, Establishment and Settlement of Persons, and are further exploring policies enhancing labour mobility, capacities, harmonization and public education. The ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services has facilitated the movement of skilled workers from LDCs (Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar) to neighbouring Malaysia and Singapore (UNCTAD, 2007). LDCs benefit from participating in a number of regional and subregional organizations, and regional integration processes, such as the African Union and ASEAN, various regional consultative processes on migration, and as members of the Commonwealth, which provide regional and interregional platforms for activities on diasporas and brain gain.

Global level

Multilateral support for LDCs mainly concerns socio-economic development, structural transformation and poverty reduction. The recent global initiatives on migration and development, such as the GFMD,
have accepted temporary labour migration programmes as a means to address the economic needs of countries of destination and of origin, as well as to control irregular migration. Migration and development issues are also included in a number of important binding and non-binding multilateral instruments, such as the EU–ACP Cotonou Agreement of 2000, the Nadi Declaration of 2002, the ACP Brussels Declaration on Asylum, Migration and Mobility of 2006, the Euro–African Partnership for Migration and Development (Rabat Declaration) of 2006, and the Africa–EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment, launched in December 2007.\(^{37}\)

**Transnational level**

Through individual initiatives, associations and networks and educational and professional bodies, transnational actors act as bridges between countries. As such, they promote the transfer and exchange of know-how, useful skills and practices and technology between host and home countries. Research, such as that being undertaken by IOM concerning sub-Saharan migrants in Switzerland, showed that the recognition, support and institutionalization of such initiatives through appropriate policies can maximize their results (IOM, 2009h).

Annex 4.5 offers a schematic presentation of the levels of implementation referred to above, and summarizes the rationale for each level, the actors involved and the types of interventions.

**2.3 Strategic directions for the migration and development agenda in LDCs and policy recommendations**

The last section offers recommendations for activities, organized thematically and using the levels of policy implementation outlined in the previous subsection. Seven key strategic directions are proposed for further policy discussion. The recommendations are based on the examination of the commitments of the BPoA,\(^{38}\) the analysis of development objectives as defined in diverse strategic development documents by LDCs and regarding the main migration trends and managements policy implications, as referred to in this paper.

The following seven strategic directions are proposed:

1. Enhance data collection on migration in LDCs and on the links between migration and development.
2. Maximize the benefits of human mobility as an important contribution to human resources mobilization for development in LDCs.
3. Facilitate the transfer of remittances and channel remittances towards development projects.
4. Leverage diaspora contributions as a major element in fostering development in LDCs, in particular to strengthen the private sector.
5. Enhance capacities and institutional reforms as determining levers to maximize the development effects of migration.
6. Target measures to poor and vulnerable populations to address climate change, the effects of the global economic crisis and other challenges.
7. Foster the development potential of internal migration.

Regarding the seven strategic directions referred to above, it is equally important to determine gendered policies. Gender-specific aspects are therefore included throughout the recommendations, and specific recommendations are provided for each of the seven strategic directions:

**Enhance data collection on migration in LDCs and on the links between migration and development as an important contribution to migration and development policies**

While data on migration exist for some LDCs, they are difficult to access for operational reasons and, more significantly, the collection and utilization of data is hampered by a lack of resources and capacities.
Based on the overview in the first section, two main general data collection priorities emerge: first, to gather existing quantitative and qualitative data on migration within a single information source and, second, to improve available knowledge on migration within LDCs and South-South movements. For instance, the “Migration profiles of 10 countries in West and Central Africa” is a data collection initiative developed by IOM and owned by national stakeholders, with funding from the European Commission (five of the 10 countries are LDCs: Mali, Mauritania, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Senegal). This initiative is based on a National Migration Data Report template adopted by the participating countries. The exercise includes the collection of available statistical data and policy analysis (IOM, 2009g). In terms of improving knowledge on South-South migration, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries migration initiative was launched in 2009 to create a network of observatories and analyses on ACP migration issues (ACP Migration Observatory).

Though the collection of data on remittances is often hindered by the scale of informal transfers, it is a priority area in terms of data collection in LDCs. In addition, as policies on diasporas take on greater significance, this area also calls for improved quantitative and qualitative data.

The knowledge gap on the impacts of migration on development in LDCs is a major challenge in the determination of appropriate policy measures; therefore, technical tools are needed to analyse migration dynamics and development impacts. For instance, the Threshold 21 (T21) model is a technical simulation tool developed by the Millennium Institute. The model is designed to support national development planning and to allow a comprehensive analysis of migration dynamics and their development impacts. Cape Verde used the model to support the PRSP process in 2003. The model also indicates how appropriate policy choices regarding the facilitation of migration and remittances can determine the impact of migration on the socio-economic development in LDCs (IOM, 2009c).

The report of the Commission on International Migration Data (CGD, 2009) is a useful source for specific recommendations concerning the improvement of data collection and utilization.

**Examples of policy recommendations on improved data collection and utilization in LDCs:**

- National authorities in LDC home countries should improve general data collection and utilization of data at low costs (based on CGD, 2009):
  - Add three migration-related questions in population censuses in LDCs, i.e. country of citizenship, country of birth, and country of previous residence.
  - Publish cross-tabulations of this information by age, sex and level of education; exploiting existing administrative data sources.
  - Use standardized modules of migration-related questions in household survey programmes.

- Home and host country authorities should, in coordination:
  - Improve data on remittances, in particular on the impacts of the global economic crises on remittance transfers and links to development, on inequalities among households resulting from remittances (e.g. the Benin-led initiative for the establishment of an International Migrant Remittances Observatory for LDCs initiative).
  - Improve data on diasporas (e.g. undertake surveys of diasporas in major host countries, identifying strategies, skills, entrepreneurial activities, impediments to home-country contributions and main incentives to overcome obstacles).
  - Compile data from national Labour Force Surveys into a single database.
  - Develop gender-specific data (e.g. systematically disaggregate data by sex and qualitative gender studies on remittances, transnational entrepreneurship, etc.).
  - Improve data and the sharing of information on labour migration from LDCs, and at regional and international levels.
National authorities, in coordination with regional and international organizations, should:

- Produce comprehensive country and regional migration profiles (e.g. on the model of 10 West and Central African migration data and policy migration profiles).
- Improve the collection and utilization of data on internal, intraregional and international migration, including South-South migration (e.g. the ACP Migration Observatory).
- Adopt technical tools to produce migration and development scenarios (e.g. the T21 model as used by Cape Verde).
- Develop project impact indicators at the micro, meso and macro levels to measure changes and assess the impact of international projects (e.g. the impact of the return of qualified migrants).
- Enhance knowledge on migration and development policies (e.g. through regular policy briefs and the exchange of best practices on diverse issues such as migration of low-skilled labour migrants, and the impact on LDC development, South-South migration trends, human rights issues in home and host countries, policies supporting transnational entrepreneurship and similar concerns).

Maximize the benefits of human mobility as a key contribution to human resources mobilization for development in LDCs

Most LDCs face structural human resource difficulties and important gender disparities concerning the access to education. Moreover, many of the positive effects of human mobility occur in countries that have reached a certain level of development, which is not the case for many LDCs, raising major challenges for these countries. Although migration cannot replace development efforts, it is an important complement. The potential of labour migration as a strategy to alleviate poverty and raise the standards of living is significant and should receive increased attention in the context of LDC development efforts. Immigration policies in particular, including in LDCs, can hamper the “triple-win” outcome of human mobility. Safeguarding the human rights of migrant workers and their families remains a key challenge.

Three main areas for policy action on labour mobility in LDCs can be identified: first, facilitating temporary/short-term labour mobility agreements, with special attention to the migration of low and semi-skilled workers; second, reducing the negative consequences of brain drain related to the migration of the highly skilled; and third, favouring permanent, temporary and virtual returns and transfers beneficial for home-country development.

Short-term labour migration can be encouraged through temporary migrant worker schemes featuring such tools as the refunding of worker-paid taxes or the portability of social security benefits that encourage migrants to return and invest in the development of their home country (IOM, 2008b). The labour mobility partnership agreement between Cape Verde and Portugal led to major adjustments in the Cape Verdean legislation to reflect migration priorities. As a result, the country has concluded a Mobility Partnership with a number of EU members aimed at facilitating regular migration, migration and development and preventing irregular migration (Council of the European Union, 2008). The partnership between Senegal and Spain (2006) led to the signing of 2,700 labour contracts by Senegalese nationals in Spain in 2008.

The migration of low- and semi-skilled workers requires particular attention, as they represent the vast majority of workers in LDCs (97.7%) and because the use of that concept itself can undervalue the level of their skills and the contributions they could make to development (Docquier and Marfouk, 2006). As up to now recourse to Mode 4 has been largely limited to higher skilled workers (IOM, 2008b), it could...
thus be an area in need of renewed commitment to widen its scope and the cooperation between countries of origin and destination of labour migrants. The regulated liberalization of lower skilled categories of workers is all the more significant for LDCs given that the welfare gains are expected to be larger than that of higher skilled workers (Puri, 2008; Winters, 2003). In an age of globalization, circular migration patterns deserve particular attention in LDCs to take full advantage of the benefits of labour mobility while minimizing the inherent risks, such as brain drain (Puri, 2010).

**Examples of policy recommendations to maximize the benefits of human mobility for LDCs:**

- **Favouring labour mobility:**
  - LDCs as home countries should include labour mobility into their development strategies in order to negotiate better market access and entry conditions for their workers in destination markets, through multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements, in particular for lower-skilled categories of workers. Authorities in home and host countries should manage temporary and circular labour migration to favour mobility for highly skilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled workers through bilateral and multilateral agreements committed to the protection of human rights. Developed destination countries could support special provisions for semi- and low-skilled workers in particular economic areas under Mode 4 negotiations of the GATS by expanding it to include semi- and lower-skilled workers and by developing new subcontracting schemes to include lower-skilled service providers. Home and host countries should cooperate to enhance labour mobility by accelerating the mutual recognition of qualifications.
  - Regional organizations could provide space for dialogue and agreements on intraregional labour migration as part of regional integration, more specifically regional economic integration.

National, regional and international authorities should inform the debate on labour migration management by identifying good practices, such as the mobility partnerships between Cape Verde/Senegal and EU members, and bilateral and multilateral management instruments from the Pacific Islands region (binding agreements, memoranda of understanding and informal agreements among employment agencies in countries of origin and of destination).

- **Countries should ensure the protection of human rights of migrant workers and their families, particularly children, especially in times of crisis:**
  - Destination countries should commit themselves to international human rights instruments and ensure their effectiveness through appropriate monitoring mechanisms.
  - Countries of destination and of origin should ensure access to basic health services and education for children of migrants and migrant workers.

- **Destination countries should develop schemes that foster brain gain while limiting brain drain from LDCs:**
  - They should develop and commit themselves to ethical recruitment guidelines in specific employment sectors (e.g. the voluntary WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel that aims to combine the rights, obligations and expectations of source countries, destination countries and migrant health personnel, World Health Assembly, 2010) and the Commonwealth Teacher Recruitment Protocol (CTRP).
  - Address the issue of deskilling in destination countries through training, professional career development and the recognition of diplomas (e.g. Commonwealth Secretariat initiatives).
  - Address the issue of brain drain in countries of origin through development programmes in developed countries (e.g. the UK Department for International Development (DFID) – Malawi programme, training doctors and nurses in Malawi and increasing their pay and job opportunities there).
- Home countries, in collaboration with host countries and regional and international organizations, should foster brain gain by favouring temporary and permanent returns and the transfer of virtual knowledge and technology, according to the interests and strategies of migrants and diasporas:
  - Facilitate sector-specific transfer programmes (e.g., health, education, information and technology, engineering, business) through agreements between universities and professional bodies and the harmonization of diplomas.
  - Enable the virtual transfer of knowledge and know-how through improved IT infrastructure, Internet connectivity and coverage and through e-learning initiatives.
  - Facilitate local development return programmes matching the supply and demand for skills and offering an institutional and financial context for the return of professionals willing to return temporarily or permanently, e.g., IOM MIDA Programmes such as the Ghana 2009 programme.
  - Prioritize local development programmes that contribute to improved employment opportunities and living conditions in order to guarantee sustainable return.
  - Propose brain-gain measures through the development of human resources rosters and databases of skills and competences available among migrants and the diaspora communities, and support to private and non-governmental transnational professional and educational networks.

- Local, national, regional and international authorities should adopt a gender-specific perspective on human mobility in order to provide adequate programmatic responses on:
  - gendered labour demand and the different impacts of the global economic crisis on male-dominated (such as construction work) and female-dominated sectors (such as domestic work);
  - gender as a key factor shaping the migratory experience, the strategies and sustainability of return migration and deskilling issues in destination countries;
  - the feminization of migration by young women, often adolescents and/or mothers, as caregivers, and the effects on family dynamics and changes in reproductive and productive behaviour.

Facilitate migrant remittance transfers and channel remittances into development projects

Two main areas for policy action emerge on how remittances could contribute to development: first, by reducing remittance transfer costs, thereby increasing the amounts of available funds for private use; and second, by channelling remittances into development projects, in particular into the consolidation of the private sector.

The costs of remittance transfers vary widely across LDCs, and high remittance transfer costs among developing countries are a drain on the income of poor migrants. Given that South-South migration remains the most significant migration pattern in LDCs, lowering transfer costs is an important measure to enhance the capacity of such transfers to reduce poverty and benefit migrants and their households. Moreover, to acknowledge remittances as private funds and that senders and receivers are free to determine their use is not in conflict with the aim to enhance the use of remittances for productive investments. Although migrants and migrant households are often interested in such use of their funds, they frequently lack the necessary means and information to do so, particularly in rural areas.
Examples of policy recommendations on remittances:

- Facilitate remittance transfers:
  - Home and host countries could lower transfer costs through appropriate technology, in particular as concerns mobile phones and e-transfers (e.g. IOM–Universal Postal Union pilot project, supporting an affordable electronic remittance transfer system between the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda).
  - Home and host countries could lower remittance transfer costs by adapting regulations, such as removing restrictions on outward remittances in the source country that facilitate exchanges between developing countries, and refraining from taxing remittances.
  - Home countries could support general access to formal remittance transfer channels by improving financial and banking services generally.

- Channel remittances into productive use, development projects and private sector activities:
  - National and local authorities in home and host countries could provide investment information and establish portfolios of secure and attractive investments in business areas of interest to migrants and their families (for instance, housing), in partnership with key development stakeholders (development, investment and employment agencies).
  - Private stakeholders, in collaboration with public authorities at the local, national and international levels, could contribute to linking remittances to financial products and services, for instance, cash payments and housing loan products similar to the initiative led by Casa Mutui, Société Générale des Banques for Senegalese living in Italy, Banque de l’Habitat du Mali, and the housing loan offered by Banque Commerciale du Burkina (BCB Burkina Faso), (Alvarez, 2009).
  - Home and host countries, in particular LDCs and developing countries, could encourage the development of formal financial systems and the integration of remittance senders and recipients into these systems to improve their savings and investment capacities.
  - Local and national home country authorities could facilitate partnerships with microfinance and microcredit institutions, banks, employers’ associations, business networks and chambers of commerce to channel remittances into productive activities, such as small business development in rural and urban areas and the creation and expansion of medium and large enterprises.
  - National, regional and international authorities should develop programmes and undertake studies on gender-specific remittance transfers and their use.

Leverage diaspora contributions as a major contribution to development, in particular to strengthen the private sector

The High-Level Asia-Pacific Policy Dialogue on the BPoA, organized in Dhaka (2010), emphasized that policy attention should be refocused on developing productive capacities. Private sector weakness in many LDCs is a reality for many reasons, such as limited governmental support, lengthy privatization processes, over-reliance on agriculture and the absence of a formal banking sector, concentration of employment in public enterprises, limited markets and geographical isolation. However, projects to improve the business climate are also underway in many LDCs. A striking progress in most LDCs is the growth of the telecommunications and information technology sector, offering employment opportunities, supporting infrastructure for business and facilitating financial and non-financial transfers from migrants and diasporas.

In terms of diaspora activities, tangible (lack of infrastructure, limited skills and administrative or financial capacities) and intangible obstacles (lack of trust, negative image of the home country) are particularly important impediments to development contributions in the LDC context (IOM, 2006b). Therefore, policy has a significant role to play in organizing outreach activities, fostering incentives for diasporas, building trust and helping diasporas match their own strategies with home-country development priorities.
Gender affects saving capacities, remittance sending and utilization patterns, as well as access to networks and business opportunities. In many LDCs, the “gender gap” limits women’s access to productive resources, credit and business. However, the gender approach should not emphasize women as vulnerable and less productive groups. On the contrary, women as migrants, members of diaspora communities or family members remaining in the home country are key actors in micro, small, medium-sized and large business activities.

Examples of policy recommendations on leveraging diaspora contributions for the development of the private sector:

- Favour diaspora contributions to development through appropriate policies, favourable environments and incentives:
  - LDC national authorities can establish collaboration with diasporas and define common objectives and strategies, recognize the contributions of diasporas to development at a high political level and institutionalize diaspora contributions through formal diaspora events, dialogues, surveys, skill-transfer platforms, student business and professional networks (e.g. good practices from Colombia, El Salvador, India or Morocco).
  - LDC national authorities could adopt incentives to encourage diasporas to become involved in the development of their home countries, such as improved consular services in host countries, lifting bureaucratic burdens, allowing dual citizenship, facilitating voting abroad and ensuring access to property rights.
  - Home and host countries should collaborate to facilitate diaspora contributions to development, such as, inter alia, providing for the transferability of social benefits, facilitating transnational trade and investments, improving transportation between home and host countries.
  - Home and host countries, in collaboration with regional and international authorities, could support projects enabling diaspora members from countries emerging from conflict to use their skills and knowledge to train local staff at home (e.g. IOM/MIDA Somali health professionals living in Finland).

- Engage diasporas as business, and employment-generating partners:
  - Local development authorities in home countries can support diaspora investments aimed at creating enterprises in regions of origin (e.g. the Senegalese Fond d’Appui à l’Investissement des Sénégalais de l’Extérieur FAISE).
  - Home and host country development authorities should support transnational entrepreneurship through the creation of one-stop diaspora entrepreneurship, investment and trade offices, facilitating diaspora involvement as business intermediaries and partners, and supporting diaspora entrepreneurship initiatives aimed at involving women in the development process.
  - National, regional and international authorities should support initiatives by diasporas that contribute to private sector development in LDCs through the transfer of technology, know-how and capital, such as the Development Marketplace (D-MADE) launched by the World Bank and its partners (World Bank, 2007).
  - Home and host countries, in cooperation with international agencies, could implement projects that promote diaspora involvement in key development sectors of the home country (e.g. Cape Verde “DIAS de Cabo Verde – DIASPora for Development”, Government of Portugal, the European Commission, IOM and local institutions).
  - Home and host counties could encourage or organize diaspora investment forums and events, bringing together investors, financial institutions, diasporas and public authorities to identify common strategies and agree on practical projects (e.g. the Axis African Investment Forum in Belgium and Africa Recruit initiatives).

42
Enhance capacities and institutional reforms as key levers for maximizing the development effects of migration

Most LDCs are among the poorest countries in the world, with only minimal government services and insufficient funds to develop their resource base. Improved capacity-building and institutional changes at national and local levels as part of public sector reforms, particularly in the social sector, and national decentralization policy reforms are key areas for development strategies in LDCs. In many LDCs, high-level political support and commitment to the migration agenda has led to the establishment of diaspora desks or ministries. However, mobilizing resources for capacity-building remains a major challenge, despite the progress noted in the evaluation of the implementation of BPoA (United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, 2009) concerning ownership of their development and migration management policies, and good practices such as improved coordination within and among ministerial structures (e.g. the National Forum, Interdepartmental Steering Committee in Gambia).

Examples of policy recommendations on enhancing capacities and institutional reforms in LDCs as key levers for maximizing the development effects of migration:

- LDC authorities, in cooperation with destination countries and regional and international organizations, could organize workshops, training and capacity-building activities and encourage the exchange of good practices on migration management:
  - Managing the mobility of human resources for development purposes (temporary labour migration schemes, migration of highly qualified, semi-qualified and low-qualified workers, based on capacity tools such as the *Handbook on Establishing Effective Labour Migration Policies* (OSCE, IOM and ILO, 2006), also available with regard to the Mediterranean region (2007).
  - Mainstreaming migration into existing national and regional development strategies, such as PRSPs, action plans and programmes of action, public sector policies, including the social sector, based on capacity tools such as *Mainstreaming Migration into Development Planning: A Handbook for Policy-makers and Practitioners*, published by IOM and the GMG in 2010.
  - Develop monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to learn from experience how to best integrate human mobility in development planning.
  - Identify impacts, results and good practices of temporary and permanent return programmes, based on the evaluation of such programmes (IOM, 2009c).
  - Organize capacity building and training workshops for regional and local authorities in the area of private sector development and migrants and diaspora contributions, in particular remittances and investments.
  - Share good practices in diaspora management policies (what works, what does not; incentives to enhance contributions to development; and how to finance diaspora-related public activities, build trust, establish a common working agenda and effectively use consular services).
  - Determine the domestic structural factors that lead people to migrate and that need to be tackled urgently through public reforms. To this end, based on surveys and dialogues, local authorities should consider the factors that lead migrants to move, such as: professional advancement; better pay; personal safety; a better future for their children, including education; the quality of public amenities; and the level of fair taxation (see Crush et al., 2005; Gibson and McKenzie, 2009).
  - Support activities to enhance the capacity of migrant and diaspora networks and associations.
  - Organize capacity-building programmes on internal migration and development.
  - Organize capacity-building programmes on managing policies for families left behind.
Target pro-poor measures to poor and vulnerable populations to help mitigate the consequences of climate change, the effects of the global economic crisis and other vulnerability factors

The migration and development relationship illustrates the degree of vulnerability of LDCs in relation to numerous factors, such as climate change, the global economic crisis, conflicts and lack of access to basic services such as health care and education. Social, pro-poor and humanitarian responses can address such issues.

While a better understanding of how migration might give rise to greater vulnerability, mobility that is well managed might also be a strategy to reduce vulnerability.

As referred to earlier in this paper, environmentally induced migration is a significant issue for many LDCs that have to rely largely on agrarian and subsistence-based economies that are themselves frequently disrupted by extended droughts (e.g. the Sahel region of Africa) and desertification, or rising sea levels threatening small island states. It is by now agreed that climate change and its impact on population movements and displacement can seriously hamper the development efforts undertaken in LDCs in the long run (United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, 2010). According to IOM (2009e), it is important for policy responses to take into account that facilitated labour migration can also act as an adaptation strategy by populations at risk through climate change.

The global economic crisis is a setback for LDCs, in particular for African countries, as it occurred at a time when economic performance and management in the region was making progress (UN ECA, 2009). Moreover, financial constraints limit the measures that LDCs can adopt to respond to the global economic crisis. The impact of the crisis on the LDCs underlined their vulnerability to external shocks. Measures to restore growth and financial stability should be accompanied by others to minimize the social impact of the crisis, such as pro-poor expenditures and enhanced service delivery. Protecting the human rights of migrants, migrant workers and their families and their children is especially important.

The Group of 20 (April 2009) agreed to provide USD 50 billion to support social protection, boost trade and safeguard development in low-income countries, and to provide USD 6 billion of additional concessional and flexible finance for the poorest countries over the following two to three years. In March 2010, the European Commission approved the first financing decisions in favour of 11 African and two Caribbean countries amounting to a total of EUR 230 million. This is the first package of financing decisions in the framework of the EUR 500 million V-FLEX mechanism, adopted in August 2009 in response to the economic crisis in ACP countries. The grants are complementary to the financial assistance provided by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional development banks, with whose support it was developed.

Vulnerability factors are gender-specific and magnified by poverty, conflicts, displacement, irregular migration (e.g. Haitians in the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas), trafficking of human beings and exposure to health hazards, with HIV/AIDS in particular devastating the productive potential of affected populations. For instance, half of HIV/AIDS cases in Kiribati were reported among seafarers, a major part of the country’s labour force working overseas (ILO, 2008). Finally, other vulnerable groups in LDCs as home countries are family members and particularly children left behind by migrants and, as destination countries, migrant children and children born to migrant parents. Hence, a comprehensive approach based on the recognition of migrant rights, and offering direct support to vulnerable groups can address the migration and development challenge in LDCs.
Policy recommendations on measures for poor and vulnerable populations:

- LDC authorities, in cooperation with regional and international authorities, can develop national policy plans for migration induced by climate change and environmental degradation, such as:
  - national adaptation programmes of action for climate change;
  - humanitarian responses to meet the protection needs of environmental migrants;
  - planning for orderly relocation and due consideration of local contexts in areas that are expected to become uninhabitable.
- Home and host countries, in cooperation with regional and international authorities, could contribute to mitigating the impact of the global economic crisis by providing social services for the most vulnerable populations.
- Developed countries, together with regional and international authorities, should mobilize international resources for pro-poor, social and humanitarian programmes.
- Home and host countries should commit themselves to the protection and realization of human rights, the respect of international norms, the rights of migrants and families left behind and the social integration of migrants through specific programmes to prevent xenophobia and racism.
- Home and host countries should facilitate civil society involvement and partnerships through dialogue and cooperation.

In conclusion, and despite the many important challenges LDCs face, they can articulate a harmonized position in forthcoming regional and global meetings, such as the GFMD, and strongly assert that new policy approaches can maximize the potential benefits of migration, while minimizing its costs. This presupposes the consideration of root causes of migration in countries of origin, the mainstreaming of migration into development strategies and ensuring that migration and a migrants-centred approach are included in the forthcoming Plan of Action for LDCs, and in its operational outcomes.

Foster the development potential of internal migration

The migration and development debate and practice focus mainly on international migration, even though it is frequently exceeded by internal movements. As a crucial and historically significant poverty alleviation factor in LDCs, internal migration has so far received less policy attention (IOM, People’s Republic of China and DFID, 2005). As part of enhancing the development impact of human mobility, the link between internal migration and urbanization as a livelihood strategy for poor populations needs to be recognized. Demographic growth and labour demand, in particular in the informal sector, are key drivers of internal migration in LDCs. The expected increase in the number of people being born in or moving to cities in LDCs in the coming decade require that local administrations have adequate capacities to alleviate the additional strain on infrastructure and on basic services, while fostering human development. In this context, adequate planning and the effective enforcement of good governance policies will become even more important.

Internal migration is as diverse as international movements, but involves less cost and is easier to realize for the poor and the poorest (IOM and SSRC, 2008). It not only involves rural–urban, but also rural–rural, urban–urban and urban–rural movements, including movements for marriage, and may be short-term, seasonal, circular or permanent, as well as forced. Just as international migration, internal mobility can have positive and negative effects. Remittances to rural areas can raise local living standards, help to alleviate poverty and facilitate access to education and health care. To maximize the positive impact of internal migration on poverty reduction, human development and economic growth, adequate policies and programmes need to be put in place to minimize the risks associated with this type of migration (IOM, People’s Republic of China and DFID, 2005).
Examples of policy recommendations concerning internal migration

- Local and national governments in LDCs, in cooperation with regional and international bodies, should aim to address potential pressure on local infrastructure, such as housing, health care, education, water and sanitation. This may be done by decentralizing and/or strengthening local authorities in areas that experience an increased influx of people, and thus avert the possible marginalization and vulnerability of internal migrants, in particular to health risks.

Local and national administrations, in cooperation with NGOs and other civil society actors, could work together to increase the dissemination of knowledge concerning available services to internal migrants and other measures to enhance their integration in host regions.

- LDC authorities at the local and national level should ensure the protection of internal migrants from exploitation, in particular in the informal sector, trafficking in human beings and other human rights violations, specifically in relation to women and children.
- Mainstream internal migration into local and national development plans and strategies, as well as public sector planning, particularly in the social sector.
- Internal migrant workers, including those employed in sectors experiencing increased pressure through competition in the global economy, and the extremely poor could be offered (re)training opportunities, vocational training and other (rural/urban) livelihood and agricultural diversification measures to expand the human resource base and protect workers from marginalization and socio-economic exclusion.
- To manage internal return flows in times of crisis, local and national authorities could facilitate such movements and support the reintegration of internal migrants into their communities of origin.
- Local and national authorities in LDCs can implement measures to protect those staying behind, in particular children and the elderly, as well as migrant children accompanying their parents.
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## Annex 4.1: The 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs)

### Africa (33)

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Notes:
- * Also Small Island Developing States (SIDS).
- # Also Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs).
Annex 4.2: International migration and human rights instruments

Core international human rights instruments
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1948
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1966
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 1966
- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), 1965
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979
- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 1984
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1989
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), 1990
- Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 2006
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 2006

Principal international instruments on migrants and refugees
- Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951
- Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967
- ILO Convention No.97 concerning Migration for Employment (Revised), 1949
- ILO Convention No.143 concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, 1975
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), 1990

Principal regional instruments on migrants and refugees
- American Convention on Human Rights, 1969
- Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1969
- Arab Charter on Human Rights, 2004
- ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, 2007

### Annex 4.3: Ratification by LDCs of international human rights instruments pertaining to migrants

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<td>Malawi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>2003 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td>2007 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td>2008 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1999 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td></td>
<td>2004 (a)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td>1995 (a)</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Republic of Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total number of ratifications by LDCs**: 10


**Note**: (a) = accession
### Annex 4.4: The seven Commitments in the Brussels Programme of Action on poverty reduction and migration policy implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brussels Programme of Action Commitments on Poverty Reduction</th>
<th>Migration policy implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) <strong>Fostering a people-centred policy framework</strong></td>
<td>Adopting a migrant-centred approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targeting diasporas, migrant households, children and families left behind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adopting a gendered approach to migration and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) <strong>Good governance at the national and international levels</strong></td>
<td>Mainstreaming migration into development strategies (favouring policy coherence and institutional change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing labour migration schemes that match international labour demand and supply, are committed to human rights, and foster legal channels of migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) <strong>Building human and institutional capacities</strong></td>
<td>Reinforcing the capacities of migrants, diasporas, migrant households, migrant and diaspora associations and networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building institutional capacities to deal with migration and development challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) <strong>Building productive capacities so that globalization might also be of benefit to LDCs</strong></td>
<td>Favours migrant, diaspora and migrant household contributions to development e.g. through remittances, investments, trade and the transfer of skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) <strong>Enhancing the role of trade in development</strong></td>
<td>Interlinkages between migration and trade, in particular concerning highly skilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) <strong>Reducing vulnerability and protecting the environment</strong></td>
<td>Interlinkages between migration and the effects of environmental and climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Managing migration to limit the vulnerability of particular groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) <strong>Mobilizing financial resources</strong></td>
<td>The role of remittances in development and poverty reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The role of other types of transnational financial transfers (e.g. diaspora investments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to banking services for migrants and their households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex 4.5: Levels of policy implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEVELS OF INTERVENTION</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
<th>MAIN ACTORS</th>
<th>TYPES OF INTERVENTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL</td>
<td>To include migrants, diasporas, returnees, migrant households in existing local partnerships. To improve the monitoring and ownership of initiatives by migrants, diasporas, returnees and their households. To mainstream migration into local employment creation, business and entrepreneurship strategies. To improve micro data and mobilize available sources of local funding.</td>
<td>Development agencies, local and regional chambers of commerce, entrepreneurship networks, migrant networks, home town associations, municipalities, regional assemblies, banks, private companies, local business clusters, industrial districts, business incubators, health care institutions, education institutions, employment agencies, media.</td>
<td>Channel diaspora investments and migrant remittances into local development projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL</td>
<td>To identify national migration management priority policies with a development component, and enhance the link between migration management and macroeconomic policies. To give a national impetus and visibility to mainstreaming migration into national development strategies, employment, investment and capacity-building activities. To improve the gathering of national data and their statistical use, and to mobilize national resources for migration management and development policies.</td>
<td>Public authorities dealing with migration, development and related issues, chambers of commerce, private companies and banks, media.</td>
<td>Mainstreaming migration into PRSP; capacity-building activities on migration and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BILATERAL</td>
<td>To coordinate migration and development policies in destination and origin countries and, in particular, to ensure coherence between aid, migration, development and trade strategies. To match international labour markets in terms of labour demand and supply, through bilateral temporary labour mobility schemes. To favour trade exchanges driven by migrants, diasporas and returnees. To improve bilateral data (migration, business creation, trade, remittances flows).</td>
<td>Embassies, consulates</td>
<td>Bilateral labour agreements, skill matching initiatives, migration management coordination, aid and development policies, diaspora policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIONAL</td>
<td>To implement regional dialogue on migration and development. To target activities to the needs of LDCs in terms of poverty alleviation, displaced populations, forced migration, labour mobility, environmentally driven migration. To refocus diaspora and remittance policies on intra-LDC and developing countries. To improve regional data and to mobilize available regional funding.</td>
<td>ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market) for Haiti, SADC (Southern African Development Community), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), EAC (East African Community), IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority of the Greater Horn of Africa), League of Arab States, Arab Maghreb Union (for Mauritania), ASEAN (South-East Asian countries - Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECAO) for Afghanistan and the Pacific Islands, Forum (Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu). African Union (AU) Commonwealth Secretariat. Regional consultative processes (RCPs): Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDWA), the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA); Migrant Remittances Observatory for LDCs</td>
<td>Global System of Trade Preferences among developing countries (GSTP). Improving regional and subregional connectivity in terms of all different modes, such as highways, railways, waterways, pipelines, information highways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOBAL</td>
<td>To provide a platform for the vision and common voice for LDCs. To make visible the international dialogue on migration and development. To define global responses to the global crisis and to environmental challenges. To mobilize and pool financial resources, in particular international aid strategies. To improve collection and sharing of global data and good practices.</td>
<td>International migration and development actors and initiatives</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), international programmes, international data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSNATIONAL</td>
<td>To expand sector-based initiatives (education, technology, health care, business, fashion, crafts, engineering, construction). To ensure that private and non-governmental actors drive and own initiatives. To improve transnational quantitative and qualitative data collection (e.g. on the functioning of transnational networks). To mobilize resources of transnational initiatives.</td>
<td>Transnational professional, business, educational investment networks.</td>
<td>Support with capacities and funding for transnational networks, skills databases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Endnotes

1. Based on criteria of low income, level of human capital/development and economic vulnerability. For details, please see http://www.unohrrls.org/en/ldc/related/59/

2. International migration is understood as “movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country” (IOM, 2008).

3. Migration is explicitly referred to in Commitment 3, 35. (c) of the BPoA: “Addressing effectively, including through appropriate policies, problems and conditions of labour supply and internal migration.” (United Nations General Assembly, 2001)

4. In the absence of a universally agreed definition, “migration and development” is understood in this paper as viewing migration as an opportunity for development, while also acknowledging associated risks.

5. The concept of “human development” is understood to be “about creating an environment in which people can develop their full potential and lead productive, creative lives in accord with their needs and interests. […] Development is thus about expanding the choices people have to lead lives that they value. Fundamental to enlarging these choices is building human capabilities—the range of things that people can do or be in life (such as) to lead long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living and to be able to participate in the life of the community” (UNDP, 2010).

6. International migrants now represent more than 3 per cent of the world’s population (UN DESA/pop, 2009a).

7. Neither the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness nor the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action mentions migration. For the full text, see OECD (2009), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/63/43911948.pdf

8. A notable exception is the PRSP of Bangladesh.


10. Michael Clemens, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development.

11. Key international sources on migration, such as the Trends in International Migrant Stocks by the United Nations Population Division (UN DESA/pop) of 2009 concerning immigration levels, rely on national censuses and surveys and therefore share their related shortcomings. In the case of United Nations Population Division data, these include the use of nationality to define migrants in 78 per cent of countries and areas, while in 18 per cent of countries and areas, the definition of migrants is based on foreign citizenship. No data are available for Eritrea and Somalia. Please see http://esa.un.org/migration/index.asp?panel=4. The bilateral estimate of migrant stocks determining the volume of emigration relies on a number of assumptions and interpolation.

12. The availability of data poses a serious constraint to analysing migration flows. Data on emigration of the tertiary educated is only available for 2000 and thus a decade old. As the compilation of migration data relies on national censuses and population registers, which only occur every five to 10 years, it is difficult to come up with timely and reliable data.

13. With increasing levels of development, migration tends to increase as more people can afford to leave and seek opportunities abroad. Only after a certain saturation point is reached can higher levels of development encourage people to stay and not migrate.

14. This effect may be less applicable to the medical sector. See Bhargava et al. (2010).

15. While the number of immigrants increased from 10.9 million in 2000 to 11.5 million in 2010, the population of LDCs grew by almost 180 million to 855 million during the same period (UN DESA/pop, 2009a, 2009b).

17. The number of immigrants minus the number of emigrants over a defined period, expressed as net number of migrants per 1,000 population. See http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=7

18. About 700,000 Bangladeshis are believed to work in the United Arab Emirates (Migration News, 2007).

19. France’s “co-development” schemes and the Mobility Partnerships of the European Union are just some examples. For examples of bilateral labour arrangements, please see http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/published_docs/studies_and_reports/compendium_version_2.pdf

20. A recent study on the migration and remittance patterns of Angolan migrants living in Portugal and South Africa showed that Angolans surveyed in South Africa considered themselves poor or from the lower-middle income group (Alvarez Tinajero, 2010). Intraregional migration, therefore, appears to potentially offer important poverty reduction gains for the poorest who cannot afford to travel overseas.


22. Defined as “movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the origin, transit and destination countries” (IOM, 2008).

23. According the ILO figures (2002), 65 per cent of non-agricultural employment in Asia is informal, reaching 72 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa (without South Africa, the figure stands at 78 %).

24. For examples of good practice policy elements in bilateral labour arrangements, see http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/2056

25. Calculations based on data by OECD (2010) and World Bank (2009b, 2009c). Data for both FDI and ODA were not yet available for 2008 or 2009.

26. Data on remittances face the same limitations as overall migration statistics. Some countries do not report data to the International Monetary Fund and in other countries the data collection method is unclear or weak. Informal transfers are even harder to estimate and existing household surveys can only provide indications rather than a complete picture of the size of remittances. For more details, see: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/Resources/476882-1157133580628/FactbookDataNotes.pdf

27. Based on analysis of World Bank 2009 data.

28. Such as Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. See Fix et al. (2009) and NTS Alert (2009).

29. Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Republic of Korea, Spain, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. See Awad (2009) and NTS Alert (2009).

30. See, for instance, media polls in the United Arab Emirates: The National (2009) “One in 10 residents has lost his or her job”, http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090712/NATIONAL/707119860/1133

31. In this paper, diaspora members are “broadly defined as individuals and members of networks, associations and communities who have left their country of origin, but maintain links with their homelands. This concept covers more settled expatriate communities, migrant workers based abroad temporarily, expatriates having taken the citizenship of the host country, dual citizens, and second-/third-generation migrants” (IOM, 2008: 493). The concept of diasporas is thus wider than the definition of migrants who changed their country of residence.

32. The Guinean rural business environment differed to such a large degree from those in Europe and North America that the training based on methods from these regions would not have been applicable to rural areas in Guinea. Based on these findings, the MIDA Guinea project was able to engage diaspora members in Senegal for the promotion of microenterprise creation among women.
33. Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, among others.
34. Such events have taken place with members of the diasporas of Benin, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania. Topics included health, agriculture, private sector development and investment.
35. These can include tectonic occurrences, such as earthquakes, possibly also generating tsunami waves or volcanic eruptions. These natural disasters, however, are not triggered through climate change.
36. The IOM working definition refers to “environmental migrant” as “persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their homes or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad” (IOM, 2007).
38. The Brussels Programme of Action for 2001–2010 represented a time-bound comprehensive poverty reduction strategy with 30 internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, defined in the seven interlinked commitments: 1) fostering a people-centred policy framework; 2) good governance at the national and international levels; 3) building human and institutional capacities; 4) building productive capacities to make globalization work for the least developed countries; 5) enhancing the role of trade in development; 6) reducing vulnerability and protecting the environment; and 7) mobilizing financial resources.
39. The ACP Migration Facility aims to support African, Caribbean and Pacific countries to better understand and manage the flow of migration within their borders. It was officially launched on 27–28 October in Brussels during a workshop organized by the ACP Secretariat in collaboration with the European Commission’s EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO). For further reference, see: http://www.acpsec.org/en/sg/migration09/acpmigration09_workshop.html
40. The International Migrant Remittances Observatory for LDCs is a project proposal aiming to document remittance flows, related factors (e.g. transfer costs, productive use and impact of remittances), exchange good practices and train LDC governments and institutional partners on building regulatory frameworks. For further reference: http://oitfm.org/index.php
41. Millennium Institute (2010), Threshold 21 Model, for further reference: http://www.millenniuminstitute.net/integrated_planning/tools/T21/
42. In particular ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa), CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market), SADC (Southern African Development Community), ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), EAC (East African Community), IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority of the Greater Horn of Africa), League of Arab States, Arab Maghreb Union, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Pacific Islands Forum.
46. Institutional changes in LDCs are related to larger programmes of public sector reforms promoted with the support of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, UNDP and other agencies and donors.
47. Ratifications as of 12 April 2010.
Integrating migration, development and remittances into the programme of action of the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries (UNLDC-IV) 2011