

# STUDY REPORT ON COMMUNITY INTEGRATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF BORDER SECURITY IN THE AGADEZ REGION





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## **The project “Engaging Communities in Border Management in Niger - Phase II”**

IOM contributes to the border security policies and strategies objectives of the Niger and of the subregion by integrating communities into border management. In close coordination with the Flintlock military exercise in Niger, the project is in line with the phase I conducted in 2017 in the Diffa and Zinder regions.

Implementation Period: September 2017 – January 2019

### **Main Beneficiaries:**

- Border communities in the regions of Agadez and Tillabéri;
- The authorities operating at the borders of the Agadez and Tillabéri regions;
- Central authorities in charge of border management.

**Activities:** Project activities were designed to promote dialogue and involvement of border communities with the authorities, improve the capacity of the Niger State to respond to humanitarian and security crises at the borders and strengthen cross-border cooperation.

### **I. Engaging rural communities in border management**

- Two field surveys within rural communities to assess their perceptions of cross-border threats and the role of authorities in border security;
- Creation of community prevention and coordination committees with the authorities;
- Provision of communication materials to local authorities and communities.

### **II. Strengthening the capacity of the Nigerien authorities in humanitarian border management**

- Training of local authorities on good practices in humanitarian border management;
- Organization of a study visit to a country with in-depth experience in managing cross-border migration crises in order to assimilate international standards and good practices.

### **III. Improving crisis planning and response**

- Two simulation exercises in Agadez and Tillabéri to assess crisis response capacities and identify areas for improvement;
- On this basis, development of a local contingency plan for each region.

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# Introduction

Located in the heart of the Sahel, the Niger extends over 1,270,000 Km<sup>2</sup>, three quarters of which are located in the Sahara Desert. The country shares borders with seven countries: Libya in the northeast, Chad in the east, Nigeria and Benin in the south, Burkina Faso and Mali in the west and Algeria in the northwest. The Niger's 5,690 km of borders are porous and largely unregulated or monitored, representing a major risk for the Niger's authorities in managing the security of the population.

Like the rest of the Niger, the Agadez region is characterized by fragile stability, threatened by various economic and security risks that are concentrated at its borders.

The lack of effective border control has been a determining factor in the unimpeded movement and development of various terrorist and criminal groups that occupy and regularly cross the border areas of the Agadez region.

The purpose of this study is to analyse local people's perceptions of border management in the Agadez region as well as the role of border authorities in pre-existing response mechanisms to massive flows of displaced or migrating populations. This work also seeks to ask populations their perception of the various security risks that threaten their environment, and in particular the terrorist risk. One of the objectives of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) office in the Niger is to strengthen the capacities of national and regional authorities to ensure full control of their borders. This will be done in particular by developing a structured and resilient community commitment that can support the work of local and regional authorities.

The first phase of this project was implemented by IOM from September 2016 to March 2018 focusing on the Diffa and Zinder regions. Following a field assessment of community perceptions and integration in border management, 46 prevention committees were established in border areas near Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, near Chad.

The role of these committees is to transmit information of interest relating to safety, health and population movements to local and regional authorities. They will thus report suspicious events or the presence of potentially dangerous individuals as soon as possible. In the event of a crisis at the border, the committees should ensure early warning by the competent authorities and services. They may also be requested to assist rescue services in the identification, orientation and care of displaced and/or vulnerable persons.

Prevention committees do not play a self-defence role or encourage the use of violence, even to deal with illegal activities. They are not intended to replace the authority of the State but simply to facilitate the work of its services in border management.

It is essential to build on the lessons learned from Phase I of the project in order to strengthen community engagement in border management within the Agadez region, covered by Phase II. The results of this study will help guide the creation of community prevention committees in Agadez. In addition, they will offer a decision-making tool available to the authorities by highlighting the concerns of the populations village by village

## Geography of Agadez

Located in the north of the Niger, the region of Agadez is a region which consists of mountains, plains and plateaus largely desert. Economic activities mainly concern pastoralism and market gardening in rural areas and trade, construction or crafts in the most urbanized parts.

The town of Agadez, capital of the region, is located in the centre of the Niger, at the southern end of the Air Mountain. This city, located 950 kilometres from Niamey, is a crossroads for trade flows through the country and the Sahel region. For many centuries, it has been a hub for trans-Saharan trade and it has been the seat of the Sultanate of Air since the 16th century. Located in the centre of a geographically austere region, Agadez represents the gateway to the Sahara and is ideally situated to reach Mali to the west, Algeria to the north-west and Libya to the northeast.

In 2016, the population of the Agadez region was estimated at 550,172 inhabitants on an area of 667,799 km<sup>2</sup>, which is more than half of the total territory of the Niger (1,267,000 km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>1</sup> A large part of the population of Agadez lives in urban areas (245,598, which represents 44.64% of the total population of the region) but the majority of this population lives in rural areas (304,574 inhabitants, i.e. 55.36%). Compared to the other regions of the Niger, the Agadez region has an extremely low population density, almost 20 times lower than the national average (0.8 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> compared to 15.7 inhabitants/km<sup>2</sup> nationally).<sup>2</sup>

## Agadez, a region at the heart of migration in the Sahel

The fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011 made Libya a platform for migration to West Africa and a privileged route for hundreds of thousands of migrants from West and Central Africa.<sup>3</sup>

Migration from sub-Saharan African countries has now existed for several decades, but strict border controls in southern Libya together with a relatively dynamic Libyan economy had helped to mitigate migratory flows through that territory.

However, this new opening towards the European continent has considerably favoured migration route that goes through the Niger and particularly through the Agadez region. In that sense, the transport of migrants has rapidly become a major economic issue. In 2016, it was estimated that 5,000 people on average were leaving the city of Agadez each week, en route to Libya, at an individual cost between 200 and 300 USD<sup>4</sup> (according to IOM figures, more than half of the migrants who had reached the island of Lampedusa in 2014 had passed through Agadez).

The Niger adopted the Act No. 2015-36 on the smuggling of migrants in 2015 in order to respond to the problems raised by the mass transit of migrants. Entered into force in September 2016, the main objectives of the Act, contained in the 1st article, were to prevent and tackle the smuggling of migrants, protect the rights of smuggled migrants and promote and facilitate national and

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1 "Tableau de bord social", *Institut National de la Statistique du Niger*.

2 Ibid.

3 T. WESTCOTT and P. TINTI, « The Niger-Lybia Corridor, Smuglers' perspectives », *Institute for Security Studies*.

4 Ibid.

international cooperation to prevent and tackle the smuggling of migrants in all its forms<sup>5</sup> The Act was adopted in September 2004. This law is implemented at the national and regional levels. It has resulted in a sharp decrease in migratory flows through Agadez.

## **The impact of migration on the Agadez region**

In contrast, the local economy of Agadez was heavily affected. In recent years the income of the city of Agadez and its region came partly from accommodation, catering, transport and various purchases that migrants made on their journey to Europe. The new legal framework has transformed migration into an underground activity, drastically reducing the revenues generated by this activity.

Moreover, the number and type of stakeholders involved in migration trade today has changed considerably. Trafficking and migration management are now largely controlled by foreigners, sometimes former migrants. The number of actors involved is also lower than before and now appears to be in the hands of a small group of illegal operators. The migration trade has also become more profitable for those still operating in Agadez.

In response to the new legal framework, smugglers have shifted from the main routes to less controlled and more dangerous routes. More and more migrants are thus abandoned in the middle of the desert by their smugglers, sometimes in order to limit costs or because of the risk of being caught by the security forces. A situation which de facto aggravates the security conditions in Agadez.

## **The security conditions in the Agadez region**

From a security point of view, the Agadez region is considered as a transit zone for traffickers and criminal groups from the Sahel zone. These various traffics use the corridor going from Tchirozérine to Arlit, Gougaram and Ifrouane to then reach the south of Algeria and especially the south of Libya via the department of Bilma. These smuggling operations focus on three main fields: drugs, arms and migrants (although the share of migrant smuggling has been reduced as a result of the implementation of the new legal framework).<sup>6</sup>

The reasons for this predominance of trafficking in the region are many but can be summarized by three factors. This is primarily due to the limited economic opportunities in the Agadez region. In addition to the new legal framework on migrant smuggling, some gold mining sites in the region, including the Djado mines in northern Agadez, have also been closed. This situation has deprived a large number of young people in the region of economic activity, often poorly educated and unemployed, and who therefore see in trafficking an opportunity to earn money easily and quickly.

Secondly, the geographical position of this region, at the crossroads of numerous trade routes, makes Agadez a favourable breeding ground for high-level smuggling. There are two main trafficking flows: from south to north trafficking is concentrated mainly on migrants and drugs, from the Niger to Libya. From north to south, from Libya to the Niger,<sup>7</sup> they concern vehicles, fuel, everyday products but also weapons.<sup>8</sup>

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5 [www.unodc.org/res/cid/document/ner/2015/loi\\_relative\\_au\\_trafic\\_illicite\\_de\\_migrants\\_html/Loi\\_N2015-36\\_relative\\_au\\_trafic\\_illicite\\_de\\_migrants.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/res/cid/document/ner/2015/loi_relative_au_trafic_illicite_de_migrants_html/Loi_N2015-36_relative_au_trafic_illicite_de_migrants.pdf).

6 T. WESTCOTT et P. TINTI, « The Niger-Lybia Corridor, Smugglers' perspectives », *Institute for Security Studies*.

7 S. DE TESSIERES, "At the crossroads of the Sahelian conflicts. Insecurity, Terrorism and Arms Trafficking in Niger", Small Arms Survey 2018.

8 Ibid.



According to the Small Arms Survey 2018, cross-border trafficking between these two countries is controlled by wealthy and powerful businessmen.<sup>9</sup> The report also stressed that the general worsening of the security conditions in the country, particularly as a result of the problems mentioned above, had increased domestic demand for various weapons, particularly small arms and ammunition.

Finally, the length of the borders, the desert type of land and the limited number of State representatives in border areas considerably complicate monitoring and controlling cross-border trade.

From a security point of view, the Niger faces various criminal and terrorist risks from its main borders: northern Mali, southern Libya and north-eastern Nigeria. Two of these three main threats border the Agadez region. The north of Mali today serves as a base for groups such as Jamaat Nosrat Al-Islam wal-Mouslimin (JNIM),<sup>10</sup> AQIM, the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (ISGS).<sup>11</sup> In addition, there are non-state armed groups advocating the independence of northern Mali: the Azawad Congress for Justice based in the Timbuktu region and the Azawad Salvation Movement based in the Menaka region.<sup>12</sup>

Although less affected by terrorism than Mali, the southern part of Libya remains extremely unstable. The main factors fuelling this instability are recurring conflicts between Arab, Tuareg and Toubous tribes over access to oil resources and traffic routes. Insecurity is also fuelled by the fall of Libyan institutions and the increase in wealth inequalities.<sup>13</sup> As in the rest of the country, security management in this area remains very uncertain. It consists mainly of a precarious collaboration between the former remnants of the regime (security brigades, police and intelligence forces) and new revolutionary groups composed of untrained youth and community mediators.<sup>14</sup>

Lastly, the region of Agadez itself is not immune from terrorism. On 23 May 2013, the Agadez region suffered a double terrorist attack: one against a military barracks in Agadez, the other on the Areva uranium deposit site in Arlit, a town located about 200 km north of Agadez. These attacks were jointly claimed by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and the katiba founded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, former leader of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Despite the high level of threat and the existence of unstable areas near its borders, however, the region remains relatively stable.

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9 JNIM was born in March 2017 following the announcement of an alliance of three main terrorist groups from northern Mali: Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the AQIM branch operating in the Sahara.

10 See : «Shifting relationships, growing threats: Who's who of insurgent groups in the Sahel», IRIN, February 2018.

11 EIGS was created in 2015 by the spokesman of MUJAO (now deceased).

12 «Shifting relationships, growing threats: Who's who of insurgent groups in the Sahel», Op cit.

13 F. WHEREY, "Insecurity and Governance Challenges in Southern Libya", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2017.

14 Ibid.

# Research Methodology

## Objective and expected results

This study is part of the project “Engaging Communities in Border Management in the Niger”, designed and piloted by IOM office in the Niger. Its main ambition is to understand the vision of communities living in border areas on their integration into border management, their understanding of migration dynamics and their perception of terrorism in the region.

This study will therefore lead national and international stakeholders to adapt their actions to better integrate communities, and act alongside them to better meet their needs. Ultimately, this study will demonstrate the need to remove communities from the role of potential victims of insecurity in order to make them key players in border management, through prevention committees.

## Background of the Study

### Output



**Table 1: Distribution of respondents by department and municipality**

Gender	Number of respondents	%
<b>Arlit</b>	<b>3,652</b>	<b>49.4</b>
CU-Arlit	1,072	14.5
Dannet	1,080	14.6
Gougaram	1,500	20.3
<b>Ingall</b>	<b>1,854</b>	<b>25.1</b>
Ingall	1,854	25.1
<b>Tchirozerine</b>	<b>1,883</b>	<b>25.5</b>
CU-Tchirozerine	1,883	25.5
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>


This survey was conducted in 65 different villages in the Agadez region. The selection of these villages was made by the mayors of 5 main municipalities in the region (outside Agadez): Ingall, Tchirozérine, Gougaram, Dannet and Arlit. These villages were identified according to criteria pre-established by IOM:

- The villages must be inhabited by more than 100 people;
- They must be representative of migratory or economic flows;
- They must be covered by a mobile telephone network.

In terms of ethnic representation, the villages selected for this study for the vast majority Tuareg villages. But there are also some villages with Toubous, Arabs, Fulani and Hausa communities. The investigators therefore ensured that all ethnic communities in the Agadez region were represented according to their presence on the territory.

Twenty-four investigators recruited locally based on their knowledge of the region, its security context and the various local languages, travelled within the territory during twenty-eight days of investigation. These investigators had been previously trained in order to fully accomplish this mission.

A total of 7,389 persons living in 79 villages were interviewed for this study.



This map is for illustration purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Each interviewer had a recorded questionnaire on the Kobo smartphone application consisting almost entirely of multiple-choice questions. These questions were divided into several chapters dealing with the perceptions of local communities on border management, security risks, community perceptions on terrorism, the effectiveness of border management and communication between authorities and communities on border security.

In addition, these questions were accompanied by an interviewer's guide whose function is to support the interviewer in his approach to the various themes and questions with respondents. Guidance is also provided on the most sensitive issues. Thus regarding the topic of "terrorism", it is specified that if the word "terrorism" does not seem to fit the local context, the investigator is encouraged to replace by different expressions such as "Yan bindiga dadi" ("those who love Gunmen" in Hausa).





This map is for illustration purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by International Organization for Migration (IOM).

## Methodological Approach

### Sampling

The sampling unit for this study is 65 villages with more than 100 inhabitants close to the border or affected by cross-border migratory, trading, trafficking flows. These localities were identified by the administrative authorities and local elected representatives of the five involved municipalities (Arlit, Dannet, Gougaram, In Gall and Tchirozérine) prior to the launch of the field survey.

### Investigation Methodology

Respondents were selected randomly, while ensuring an equitable representation of age groups, social categories, nationalities and ethnicities in the surveyed area.

Each interview was preceded by an oral consent procedure. The interviewer had to read aloud a paragraph explaining the purpose of the survey, the voluntary nature of the interview and IOM's commitment not to disclose respondents' personal data.

### Difficulties encountered during the investigation

The first issue concerns the difficulties to access to some of the villages. The geographical remoteness of some villages in the region but also the very important distance between some of the houses in a village resulted in complicating the task of the investigators. Furthermore, the deteriorated state of the roads in the region also forced investigators to travel very long distances during the various detours they had to take. In addition, the poor mobile phone network coverage in some parts of the region sometimes compromised the direct communication of the forms finalized by the investigators.

It should also be noted that some of the themes addressed, particularly the terrorist threat, sometimes led to some reluctance of the respondents. This problem remains difficult to address



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for many of them who avoid talking openly about what they may know about some of the groups, due to fear of reprisals. For this reason, some of them had difficulty answering these questions directly or preferred not to answer.

Finally, from a security standpoint, no incidents were recorded. It should be noted, however, that the risks remain, in particular because of the absence of defence and security forces in most villages in the region.

## Analysis Methodology

Most of the questions asked in this survey are closed multiple choice questions. For these cases, the analysis should highlight the proportions of respondents in relation to their selected responses. It is a matter of finding the numbers or percentages of people choosing an answer from the entire sample of the survey. In addition, the "other" answers accompanying each multiple-choice question allows respondents to specify their choice if it differs from the proposed possibilities.

However, the percentages expressing the respondents' choices may sometimes relate to their frequencies in the set of responses. Thanks to this, it was possible to highlight the relative extent of the answers given by the respondents, as well as the most frequent choices made by respondents. For this type of question, the sum of the percentages extracted from the answers may be greater than 100 per cent, each respondent having been able to give two or more answers.


With respect to the open-ended survey questions, the clean-up of the database revealed the most frequent and relevant responses given by the respondents.

For the different variables of the survey, graphical representations in the form of pie charts or bar charts were made on the basis of the percentages of the answers provided. For multiple-choice questions, the graphical representation chosen is generally the bar chart. For the single-choice closed-ended questions, pie charts were created to take into account the mutually exclusive nature of the different responses.

The results of the survey are sometimes detailed according to the regions or municipalities of the people surveyed, to take into account the significant differences in the answers, according to these geographical areas.

# 1. Sample profile

**Chart 1: Percentage of respondents by gender**



Within the sample of this survey a majority of men are represented, with just over 63 per cent of men and 37 per cent of women, reflecting a slight over-representation of men in relation to the regional situation. Data provided by the *Institut National de la Statistique du Niger*<sup>15</sup> indicate that the proportion of men in the Agadez region is slightly higher than that of women with 51.5 per cent versus 48.5 per cent. This is mainly due to cultural factors.

It is customary to consider the Tuareg communities of the Agadez region as matriarchal societies.<sup>16</sup> While it is true that women have a more important role and legitimacy in these communities than in other communities in the country, the “voice” of the household often remains assumed by men. Moreover, in the context of a survey on border control, knowledge of the territory and observation of insecurity phenomena, it seems logical that it was the men who volunteered to take part in this survey. Indeed, traditionally male tasks and activities (livestock farming, agriculture, trade, etc.) make it easier for them to cross these territories, unlike women who are mainly in charge of managing household affairs.




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<sup>15</sup> “Tableau de bord social 2016”, Institut National de la Statistique du Niger, *Ministère du Plan, de l’Aménagement du Territoire et du Développement Communautaire*, 2016 (in French).

<sup>16</sup> Les sociétés targaie sont également des sociétés de type matrilineaire, see “Le cas du Niger : les touareg du passé au futur” par Maman SALEY in *Civilisations, Revue internationale d’anthropologie et de sciences humaines*, April 1996 (in French).




**Chart 2: Percentage of respondents by age group**



Almost half of our respondents are within the 26–40 years-old age group, with 47.2 per cent. Next come the 41–60 years-old (26.9%) followed by the 18–25 years-old (20.7%). Finally, the oldest category (61 to 80 years old) is represented by 5.1 per cent of the respondents of this survey. There is therefore less representation of the youngest inhabitants, which is mainly due to the respect given to the head of the family, speaking on behalf of the household in many communities in the Niger and especially in Tuareg communities.


**Chart 3: Percentage of respondents by nationality**



This survey was conducted among local populations in the departments of Ingall, Arlit and Tchirozérine. For this reason, the vast majority (97.6% of our respondents are Nigerian nationals. Some Malians also participated in these interviews (1.3%), as well as more marginally, Algerians and Chadians (0.5% respectively). The relative distance of the borders from the villages surveyed explains the low presence of foreigners in our sample.

The nomadism of many Tuareg tribes<sup>17</sup> and their cousinhood with tribes from northern Mali also explain the notable presence of Malians among the surveyed people. Thus, some Tuareg tribes occupy a very large part of the Sahar-Sahel territory and are scattered between Algeria, Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso and Niger. Moreover, as a community living mainly from pastoralism and trans-Saharan trade, it seems logical to find a certain number of foreigners among the interviewees.

**Chart 4: Distribution of respondents by ethnic groups**



The interviewers were instructed to obtain an ethnic diversity representative of the Agadez territory. It is thus naturally that a very large majority of our respondents identify themselves as Tuaregs (82.4% of the sample). The region of Agadez is largely occupied by the Tuareg tribes who have lived in this region for several centuries, some of whom trace the arrival of Tuareg communities within the Aïr in the eighth century.<sup>18</sup> They occupy a major place and are the most important part of the community, political, economic and cultural fabric of this region.

The second most represented ethnic group among our respondents is the Hausa (7.6%), the majority ethnic group in the Niger<sup>19</sup> but a relative minority in the Agadez region. In reality, the vast majority of Hausa are found within the city of Agadez and less in the rest of the region. There is also a significant presence of Fulanis (5.5%) and a minority of Djerma (1.7%) and Arabs (1.6%).

The number of Toubous in our sample is low. This low share reflects their share in the national population, estimated at 0.4 per cent.<sup>20</sup> Within the territory of Agadez, the Toubous live in the department of Bilma, close to the Libyan territory.


<sup>17</sup> See "Le cas du Niger : les touareg du passé au futur" by Maman SALEY, Op cit.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> The latest official ethnic estimates by the Niger government put the Hausa share in the country at 55% of the population. See "Annuaire Statistique des Cinquante Ans d'Indépendance du Niger", *Institut National de la Statistique du Niger*, November 2010.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

**Chart 5: Percentage of respondents by main economic activity**



The economy of the Agadez region, like in the rest of the country,<sup>21</sup> is mainly oriented towards agriculture and pastoralism and in particular sheep and goat livestock as well as camels and donkeys.<sup>22</sup> Thus, almost half (46%) of our respondents identify livestock farming as their main professional activity and 12.3 per cent agriculture. The commercial activities are carried out by 16.8 per cent of our respondents.

Among the most cited categories, household chores (10.4%), mainly performed by women in the household. It should be reminded, however, that these categorizations are intended to define their main job and do not necessarily mean that they are full-time occupations. The rhythms of the seasons, periods of drought or famine or local economic disruption prevent a very large majority of these people from working throughout the year. However, these figures seem to provide a fair representation of the sectoral distribution of workers in the region.

21 The latest macroeconomic assessments provided by the Government of Niger establish the share of the primary sector around 43.1 per cent of the Gross National Product, 16.2 per cent for the secondary sector and 40.7 per cent for the tertiary sector. See "Annuaire Statistique des Cinquante Ans d'Indépendance du Niger", Op cit. (in French).

22 "Agadez en chiffres", Institut National de la Statistique du Niger, 2017.




## 2. Perceptions of local communities on border management

This part of the survey helps to better understand and measure the perceptions of local communities on the general issue of border management. In particular, it questions their knowledge of the very concept of borders, of their locality and of the authorities involved in managing and securing them. It also reflects how these inhabitants relate to their borders and what threats they pose. Finally, it identifies which solutions can be considered by the authorities in order to improve control and thus better ensure the safety of populations.

### 2.1 Functions and location of the border

**Chart 6: Percentage of respondents by border utility**




*Note:* Multiple answers are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

For many communities in the Niger, particularly the most nomadic Tuareg tribes, the border is a regular crossing point whose various functions are not clearly established. Furthermore, depending on localities, customs and education, the relationship to the border and its function might be fluctuating. The purpose of this first question, which accepted several answers, was therefore to survey populations on their understanding of the role of borders.

For 6 out of 10 people living in the villages surveyed (62% of the sample), the border's main function is to mark the separation between two States. Half of the respondents also stated that it is used to "ensure the safety of populations" (50.6%) and to "enable authorities to monitor the entry and exit" of the territory (48.9%). Finally, almost one out of ten (9.5%) respondents admitted that they did not know the role of a border.

Therefore, there is an equivalent distribution of answers between the different categories of function but no clear consensus as to the primary role of a border, either in its administrative and legal characteristics or in its security component. This lack of clear consensus on the administrative or security role of the border thus reveals a particular perception of space by the populations as well as of sovereignty in the region.

**Chart 7: Percentage of respondents by knowledge of the geographical situation of the border**




Two thirds of respondents (64% of the sample) say they know where the border is, compared to one third who do not. This relative lack of knowledge of the location of the border for more than a third of the respondents (36%) can be first explained by the relative distance between the villages questioned and the border (the nearest village is about 150 km from the border). Some of these villages are located in territorial areas that are relatively far from the border or very isolated, which limits de facto an acute knowledge of the territorial limits of the region. In certain areas of the region, particularly in the department of Arlit, the deterioration or absence of roads also prevents many villagers from having easy access to the rest of the territory and thus from being able to cross the border on a regular basis.

But this is also explained by the sedentary nature of some of the inhabitants of the Agadez region for whom travel or trade are primarily subnational but are not located outside the border. The border, especially in the most desert parts of the Niger, is also rarely physically materialized or represented, either by markers, signs or border posts. In addition, there is an absence of human settlement which could also indicate the presence of this border. Finally, for nomadic populations living in desert areas, with few inhabitants and very little control by the authorities, knowing the exact location of the border is of little interest.

## 2.2 Crossing Frequencies

**Chart 8: Percentage of respondents according to the moment of border-crossing**



The fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in 2011 and the difficult reconstruction of Libya, combined with internal struggles for power, have considerably weakened the ability of the Libyan authorities to ensure border control. As in the rest of the country, security management in southern Libya remains highly uncertain. It consists mainly of a precarious collaboration between the former remnants of the regime (security brigades, police and intelligence forces) and new revolutionary groups composed of untrained youth and community mediators. This instability from the north of the region was reinforced by a threat from the west from 2012 with the start of the Tuareg revolutions in northern Mali that opposed the Malian army against the *Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad* (MNL) and the Ansar Dine Salafist movement. Today, and despite the French military operations, Serval and then Barkhane, which aimed at stabilizing northern Mali as well as the presence of MINUSMA since 2013, this area is still not stabilized. The situation is even worsening. Attacks against the Malian Armed Forces and United Nations Peacekeepers have thus multiplied over the past few months.<sup>23,24</sup> These attacks are most often carried out by terrorist groups operating in the region, such as AQIM, JNIM or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahar.<sup>25</sup> Lastly, the Algerian directives on the fight against illegal immigration are seen by many stakeholders as particularly harsh towards migrants. Numerous testimonies and reports attest of several hundred migrants who were released in the middle of the desert following their arrest by the Algerian authorities.<sup>26,27</sup>

These areas of instability in the north and west have made border movements precarious for many inhabitants of the Agadez region. Border crossings are thus more dangerous than before

23 [www.jeuneafrique.com/548847/politique/mali-deux-casques-bleus-tues-dans-une-attaque-a-aguelhok/](http://www.jeuneafrique.com/548847/politique/mali-deux-casques-bleus-tues-dans-une-attaque-a-aguelhok/).

24 [www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180127-mali-attaque-camp-militaire-soumpi-niafunke-jiadistes](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180127-mali-attaque-camp-militaire-soumpi-niafunke-jiadistes).

25 See part 4 of this report on people's perceptions of terrorism.

26 [www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/03/20/l-algerie-accelere-les-expulsions-de-migrants-subsahariens-dans-le-desert\\_5273673\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/03/20/l-algerie-accelere-les-expulsions-de-migrants-subsahariens-dans-le-desert_5273673_3212.html)


27 [www.hrw.org/fr/news/2017/10/30/algerie-une-nouvelle-vague-dexpulsions-de-migrants](http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2017/10/30/algerie-une-nouvelle-vague-dexpulsions-de-migrants).

and the insecurity linked to the porosity of the borders makes the evolution within this zone more limited.

Therefore, it is important to understand how the relationship with the border has evolved for the inhabitants of the Agadez region since 2011. More than half of the respondents (56.1%) said they were crossing the border regularly before 2011 versus 43.9 per cent, who said the opposite.

After 2011 the trend is significantly downward. For example, less than one third of respondents still report using the border since 2011 versus 68.7 per cent who do not or no longer cross it. The share of those who continue to cross the region's borders has therefore dropped by 25 points since 2011.

**Chart 9: Percentage of respondents by times they crossed the border according to departmental zones**




The inhabitants of the urban communities of Tchirozérine and Ingall drastically changed their habits after 2011. When they were 57 per cent to regularly cross the border before 2011 they are now only 28.6 per cent to do so, a drop of almost half of these movements.

Thus, it seems that these events have had a more profound impact on the inhabitants of the department of Tchirozérine than on those of Arlit, although there has also been a decline in this area (from 55.1% to 34.1% of people claiming to cross the border before and after 2011). This can be explained in particular by a less important dependence of these communities on Libyan trade because of their greater distance from the Libyan border but also their ease of access to Agadez and the rest of the country. The choice to limit the comings and goings at the borders was therefore easier to achieve than for the inhabitants of Arlit who seem slightly more dependent on these crossings.



**Chart 10: Percentage of respondents by frequency of border-crossing**




Among the respondents who report having crossed the border since 2011, one out of two (52.1% of the sample) continue to cross the border at least once a year. The other half of respondents cross this border much more frequently: 30.2 per cent cross the border once a month, 7.2 per cent once a week and 5.1 per cent two to three times a week. Finally, 1.3 per cent use it on a daily basis and 2.6 per cent up to several times a day.

Nearly one out of two people crossing the border from 2011 continue to do so very frequently, at least once a month. For populations that are not located on the border and in spite of the risks inherent to these crossings, these figures show that the relationship to the border constitutes an important dimension of the life of the communities in the Agadez region.

## 2.3 Reasons for crossing borders

**Chart 11: Percentage of respondents by reason for crossing the border, by period**



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This question aimed to understand the main motivating factors that pushed the inhabitants of these villages to cross the border before and after the various disturbances that started in 2011. This question invited to choose one or several answers in order to reflect the multiplicity of reasons for crossing.

Before 2011 we note the prevalence of financial reasons (56.7%) followed by family reasons (47.1%) then finally commercial reasons (41.5%). Therefore, it appeared that before the security disturbances which began in 2011, the inhabitants of the Agadez region who crossed their

borders, to Mali, Algeria or Libya, did so largely for economic reasons. The stability of the Libyan regime together with a relative economic boom in this country were thus attractive factors for many Nigeriens whose work is often seasonal.

As mentioned earlier, livestock and agriculture remain the main forms of economic activity for the populations of Agadez. These two activities, particularly agriculture, cannot be carried out throughout the whole year and can easily be disrupted by climate or security problems. In this sense, the local populations of Agadez travelled to Libya or neighbouring Mali in order to trade or find a job for a few weeks or months. These regular transits and this legal or illegal trade in goods are facilitated in particular by the porosity of the borders within this zone.<sup>28</sup>

The family reasons are justified by the territorial dispersion of many Tuareg tribes which settled in the region of Agadez, the north of Mali, the south of Algeria and the south of Libya. Whether they come from nomadic or more settled tribes, the inhabitants of these groups thus have the habit of travelling regularly with various members of their families who are sometimes from neighbouring countries or have migrated there. These trips, particularly to northern Mali, are also facilitated by the ECOWAS Protocol (of which the Niger and Mali are members) for the free movement of persons and goods.



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The most striking aspect of these testimonies lies in the rise of economic and commercial reasons after 2011 in parallel with the reduction of family movements. Thus 43 per cent of respondents who continue to cross the border, do so for family reasons, with 47 per cent before 2011. In contrast, the share of those

28 E. GREGOIRE and A. BOURGEOT, "Désordre, Pouvoirs et Recompositions territoriales au Sahara", *Revue Hérodote*, 2011/3 (N°142).

who continue to cross borders for economic or commercial reasons jumped from 8 and 12 points, from 56.7 per cent to 64.8 per cent for economic reasons and from 41.5 per cent to 53.7 per cent for commercial reasons. These changes in crossing flows can be explained by several factors.


The first is the slow deterioration of the economic environment in the Agadez region, particularly since 2016 and the stop put to migratory movements.<sup>29</sup> In addition to this new legislation on migrant smuggling, some gold mining sites in the region, including the Djado mines in the north, have been closed.<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, the fall of the Libyan regime also affected exports of camels and sheeps from the Agadez regio.<sup>31</sup> These transactions now take place directly between Nigerien and Libyan traders, which explains the recrudescence of commercial border crossings since 2011.

Finally, the precarious flow of goods (mainly cigarettes) and trade caused by the development of insecurity in northern Mali and southern Libya also push the inhabitants of these villages to cross borders themselves in order to keep their trade activities, with the risk of being attacked by bandits and criminal groups.<sup>32</sup>

## 2.4 Knowledge of the Defence and Security Forces at the border

**Chart 12: Percentage of respondents according to their knowledge of DSF at the border**



More than two thirds (69%) of the respondents say they know well the Defence and Security Forces (DSF) operating at the border, for almost a third who admit they do not know them (31%). The proportion of those who acknowledge that they do not know which DSF are operating at the border correlates with the proportion of respondents who do not know exactly where the border is, i.e. those who are never or very rarely within the border areas of the Agadez region.


29 <https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/afrique-baisse-spectaculaire-du-nombre-de-migrants-traversant-le-sahel-vers-leurope>.

30 <http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2017/07/18/97002-20170718FILWWW00185-niger-fermeture-de-sites-auriferes-dans-l-ouest.php>

31 E. GREGOIRE, "Dangers extérieurs, dangers intérieurs : le Niger face au radicalisme islamique", EchoGéo, Sur le Vif, April 2015.

32 Ibid.

**Chart 13: Percentage of respondents according to their knowledge of the types of stakeholders operating at the border**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Among those who know these forces, nearly 7 out of 10 respondents mention police and military forces as elements of the DSF operating at the border, followed by gendarmes (64.5%) and customs officers (58.8%). Thus, it appears that respondents mention police, gendarmes and soldiers equally, a sign of some homogeneity in the perception of the presence of defence and security forces at the borders in the Agadez area.



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


## 3. Security risks at the border

Two of the countries with which the Agadez region shares borders are now partly occupied by criminal and terrorist groups. This situation poses many risks at the border: arms and drug trafficking, smuggling and terrorist threats. In addition to these risks, there is a worrying development of banditry that threatens populations and trade. This section details the communities' perceptions of these various threats as well as their views on the state of border security and the measures that can be taken to improve it.

### 3.1 Knowledge of nationalities and categories of persons crossing border crossing points

**Chart 14: Percentage of respondents according to their knowledge of the nationalities of persons crossing the border**




Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Three quarters of the respondents (75.2%) identify Nigeriens living outside the Agadez region as the first types of individuals using the different border crossing points. Next come Nigeriens living in the neighbouring village or hamlet, identified at a similar level with West African migrants, with 62.9 per cent and 62.2 per cent. Finally, Malians are also identified by 31.5 per cent of respondents, Algerians by 27.8 per cent of respondents and to a lesser extent Libyans by 15.2 per cent.

The answers provided by respondents offer important insights. They note the large proportion of Nigeriens who regularly cross the border, whether they come from the neighbouring area of the persons surveyed or from other regions of the Niger. This last category is in fact mentioned more than the category of West African migrants, although many passes through the Agadez region to join Libya. It is especially mentioned much more often than the neighbouring nationalities of the region of Agadez, thus showing that for the inhabitants of the region these flows at the border are much more outgoing than incoming.

**Chart 15: Percentage of respondents by knowledge of the categories of persons crossing the border**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

The Agadez-Dirkou-Toummo and Agadez-Arlit-Gougaram routes have been the preferred routes up until 2016 for migrants travelling to Libya and Europe. However, since the entry into force of Act No. 2015–36 on smuggling of migrants, the dynamics and flows of migration have been disrupted. Migrants now take other routes, less supervised by the authorities but more dangerous.

Because of these numerous migrant crossings alongside the roads and surveyed villages it is logical that they are the most mentioned by respondents (73.3%) as the category of people who generally cross the border. Then we find the traders (63.6%) who continue to cross these zones towards Mali, Algeria or Libya then the families with 51.4 per cent. Finally, refugees are mentioned by four out of ten respondents as one of the categories of people who use the border the most. This is explained both by the recent arrival of South Sudanese refugees who had to flee Libya due to how they were treated,<sup>33</sup> but also by the arrival of refugees who had left Libya in 2011 then Mali in 2012–2013.

These figures cannot reveal the exact share of these different categories of individuals who regularly cross the border, but they testify to the vision that respondents have of these movements.


## 3.2 Criminal activities at border crossing points

The porosity of the Niger's territory is caused by the absence of permanent controls at most crossing points along the country's borders.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, this porosity feeds the various trafficking and other criminal activities that agitate the region.

<sup>33</sup> [www.france24.com/fr/20180212-agadez-niger-rescapes-libye-migrants-soudan-asile-reportage](http://www.france24.com/fr/20180212-agadez-niger-rescapes-libye-migrants-soudan-asile-reportage).


<sup>34</sup> The post of Assamaka on the Algerian border is an exception.

**Chart 16: Percentage of respondents by locality affected at least once by a border insecurity problem**




One third of the respondents to this survey say that their village or hamlet has already been affected at least once by a border insecurity problem. If this figure represents a minority of our respondents, it does not remain less important with regard to the relative distance of the villages questioned from the border. The various incidents occurring at the border are therefore not confined to immediately adjacent areas but can also directly affect a large part of the villages and hamlets in the region, a sign of the mobility of these various threats.

**Chart 17: Percentage of respondents by opinion on border-crossing points used for criminal activities**



When local populations are asked about these various crossing points, more than half (53.5%) of respondents say that these crossing points are used in particular to commit criminal activities in the region and by persons breaking Nigerien law. Only 11.7 per cent of the respondents consider that these crossing points are not used to commit illegal activities when 34.8 per cent admits not knowing. In order to avoid any form of reluctance to express an opinion on such sensitive cases, it was recalled during the interview that the questionnaires were completely anonymous. This data therefore reflect the relative concern of local populations towards their borders, more than half of whom see them as crossing points for criminal activities.

**Chart 18: Percentage of respondents by type of security problems faced by local communities at the border**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

It is clear that attacks by armed bandits are prominently mentioned as the main criminal activity committed at the border. Thus over 70 per cent of the responses provided by respondents highlighted these activities as the most notable, reflecting the preponderance of such attacks in the region. As a matter of fact, in recent years the Agadez region has seen an increase in these armed attacks, particularly following the crises in Libya and Mali but also because of the sudden “gold rush” from 2014. The discovery of gold sites, especially in Djado, considerably increased silver and gold convoys from the gold-washing sites to the big cities, thus causing the arrival of bandits from the region and especially some coming from the south of Libya.<sup>35</sup>

Between January and September 2016, 90 attacks by armed bandits were reported to the gendarmerie in the Agadez region, involving the deaths of 11 people and injuring 37.<sup>36</sup> These attacks took place mainly in the northern part of the Agadez region, around the gold mines and near the Libyan border.

Second, drugs and arms trafficking is identified by half (50.3%) of respondents as major criminal activities threatening localized populations and occurring at the border. Arms trafficking increased sharply just after the fall of the Libyan regime and mainly involved small arms and light weapons in transit to Mali. However, the Serval and Barkhane operations combined with the reinforcement of Nigerien troops in the north of the country<sup>37</sup> have made these trafficking operations more complicated, which has reduced their frequency in the region.<sup>38</sup> This is followed by minor criminal activities such as smuggling (45.1%) and livestock rustling (42.4%). Cigarettes<sup>39</sup> but also food items represent to a large extent the smuggled products.

The main implication of this question is that for 21.8 per cent of respondents only, incursions by armed and terrorist groups represent a security problem for local border communities. Thus, nearly 8 out of 10 respondents do not consider that these incursions would constitute a security risk for these populations, suggesting that for a majority of these people the terrorist threat at the borders, if it exists, should be put into perspective with regard to other threats such as bandit

35 S. DE TESSIERES, “At the crossroads of the Sahelian conflicts. Insecurity, Terrorism and Arms Trafficking in Niger”, Op cit.

36 Ibid.

37 Including the Djado operation, which has been operating on the plateau of the same name since March 2017 and which notably replaces the Malibero operation launched in 2011 and whose aim was to contain all the threats coming from Libya.


38 S. DE TESSIERES, “At the crossroads of the Sahelian conflicts. Insecurity, Terrorism and Arms Trafficking in Niger”, Op cit.

39 Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

attacks or trafficking. This can be understood primarily by the methodology of terrorist groups in the region that rarely target local populations and prefer to target DSF or Westerners. Although they live in Agadez, these groups are mainly active in Mali and therefore do not represent a direct threat to the population, unlike bandits.

However, this feeling must also be put into perspective. Thus, groups of bandits active at the border cannot be clearly separated from the terrorist groups active in the region. Some of these groups act under the protection of terrorist groups on a commission basis or act directly for themselves. If some terrorist groups operating in West Africa are financed mainly by the ransoms they get from the abduction of Westerners,<sup>40</sup> drug trafficking is also a part of their financing system. The threat of armed bandit groups operating along the borders must therefore also be seen as a problem that feeds the terrorist phenomenon in the region. But it is also true that, unlike the Diffa and Tillabéri regions for example, the Agadez region has been better preserved from the various terrorist attacks that have taken place in the country since 2010, although the risk has not completely disappeared.

**Chart 19: Percentage of respondents by type of security problems faced by local communities at the border depending on areas**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Furthermore, these threats are not equally represented by respondents depending on their locality". Thus, the inhabitants of the department of Tchirozérine, located in the south of the Agadez region, identify fewer threats at the border than those in the department of Arlit. Only attacks by armed bandits are mentioned more often than elsewhere (73%, versus 67.6 % for Arlit). This lower concern can be explained, in part, by the greater distance of the urban communities of Ingall and Tchirozérine from the Libyan border from where most of these threats emerge.

Thus, apart from livestock thefts and attacks by armed bandits, all the other threats seem to be more important within the villages of the department of Arlit. In particular, threats linked to incursions by armed and/or terrorist groups are almost three times more frequently mentioned

40 D. GHANEM-YAZBECK (Ed.), R. BARRAS TEJUDO, G. FALEG, Y. ZOUBIR, « The Sahel : Europe's African borders », European Institute for the Mediterranean, April 2018.



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than in the department of Tchirozérine (30.8% versus 13%), which should be linked to the attacks which occurred in this area in the past. Thus, in 2013 the Arlit community was directly affected by terrorism. On 23 May 2013, the Agadez region experienced a double terrorist attack: one against a military barracks in Agadez, the other on the Areva uranium deposit site in Arlit.


Therefore, it appears that respondents located closest to the Libyan border are much more affected by these different threats than those living further

south. It is thus within the villages bordering Algeria that the threat of armed/terrorist groups is felt the most by the local population. There is also a clear difference in the prevalence of drug trafficking for Arlit, with 54.5 per cent populations mentioning it as the main threat to populations at the border, versus 46.2 per cent for Tchirozérine.

### 3.3 Assessment of security measures taken at the border


The population has a good general knowledge of the measures taken by the authorities to secure the border. A majority of respondents mention two main actions taken by these authorities: controls at border posts, mentioned by 70.3% in the sample, and patrols, mentioned by 66 per cent of respondents. Next come excavations, which are also mentioned by more than half of the interviewees (56.9%). Only the intelligence operations appear much less known by the interviewees, who are only 13.3 per cent to mention them. Finally, 9.3 per cent admit that they are not aware of any measures taken at the border.

**Chart 20: Percentage of respondents by knowledge of the measures taken to secure the border**



The respondents also have a good general opinion of the measures taken by the authorities to secure the border. However, slightly more than one in five respondents felt that these measures were insufficient. And if a large majority of them consider these measures positively (10.8% considering these measures very satisfactory and 67.2% considering them quite satisfactory), more than two thirds of them consider these measures only “somewhat” satisfactory. This should be a warning for the regional and national authorities regarding what can be done to better address the concerns of the communities in the Agadez region.

**Chart 21: Proportion of respondents by risk that may originate from poor border security management**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

While only one fifth (21.8%) of respondents believe that incursions by terrorist groups at the border are currently a real problem for the populations located in these areas, more than half (51.1%) believe that poor border security management would lead to a definite increase in this risk.

Above all acts, banditry is at the heart of the concerns of these populations. Thus, for 84.1 per cent respondents, banditry would be the first major risk in the event of poor border management, a sign that armed attacks, whether by petty criminals or more organized groups, are a major scourge and threat to communities in the region. Illicit trafficking (68%) is followed by incursions by terrorists and armed groups (51.1%).

Epidemics also appear as a significant risk for Agadez populations (38.4% of the sample). In 2014 the health authorities were already sending warnings regarding the risk of Ebola virus contamination that could be transmitted by migrants circulating in the region.<sup>41</sup> More recently, an outbreak of Rift Valley fever killed several people in the department of Ingall, near the Malian border.<sup>42</sup>

Finally, the recruitment of young people by terrorist groups is also a significant concern for the populations (26.5%). Young people are the driving forces of terrorist groups that rely on their lack of education, their marginality but also and above all, for many of them, the lack of real attractive economic opportunities which could recruit them. While it is extremely difficult to count the number of persons recruited by the various terrorist groups in the region in recent years, it is estimated that they are fewer than in the Diffa region, where the Boko Haram group is still active. However, the risk of recruitment in Agadez remains and must be fully taken into account by the authorities and communities.

41 [www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140906-ebola-vigilance-accrue-region-agadez-niger](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140906-ebola-vigilance-accrue-region-agadez-niger).

42 [www.who.int/csr/don/24-november-2016-rift-valley-fever-niger/fr/](http://www.who.int/csr/don/24-november-2016-rift-valley-fever-niger/fr/).


## 4. Perception of local communities on terrorism

From a security point of view, the Niger faces various criminal and terrorist risks from its main borders: northern Mali, southern Libya and north-eastern Nigeria. The heart of the terrorist problem for the Agadez region is now concentrated in the west. The north and centre of Mali serve as a base for groups such as Jamaat Nosrat Al-Islam wal-Mouslimin (JNIM),<sup>43</sup> AQIM or the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (EIGS).<sup>44</sup> In addition, there are non-state armed groups advocating the independence of northern Mali: the Azawad Congress for Justice based in the Timbuktu region and the Azawad Salvation Movement based in the Menaka region.<sup>45</sup>

This part of the survey provides the vision that local populations have on regional terrorism as well as their keys to reading the responses that communities and authorities must provide to combat this threat.

### 4.1 Knowledge of the terrorist threat in the region

**Chart 22: Percentage of respondents by type of known terrorist activity**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

In the Niger, terrorism violence takes various forms and is committed by different groups with multiple interests. The Agadez region is currently less affected by this phenomenon, especially compared to the Diffa region which continues to suffer regular incursions from Boko Haram. Despite this, the region remains subject to sporadic attacks against defence and security forces and communities. These attacks have varying degrees and modus operandi.

Almost eight out of ten respondents (78.3% of the sample) identify attacks against DSF as the most common type of terrorist activity. Historically, attacks against the DSF have been most often committed by terrorist or rebel groups. Recently attacks targeted the DSF in and around Agadez in 2017, including one in Assamaka near the Algerian border.<sup>46</sup>

43 JNIM was created in March 2017 following the announcement of an alliance of three main terrorist groups from northern Mali: Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the AQIM branch operating in the Sahara. See: « Shifting relationships, growing threats: Who's who of insurgent groups in the Sahel », IRIN, February 2018.

44 EIGS was created in 2015 by the spokesman of MUJAO (now deceased).

45 « Shifting relationships, growing threats: Who's who of insurgent groups in the Sahel », *Op cit.*


46 [www.sahelien.com/niger-arlit-trois-morts-et-des-blesses-graves-apres-une-attaque-contre-les-forces-de-securite-a-assamaka/](http://www.sahelien.com/niger-arlit-trois-morts-et-des-blesses-graves-apres-une-attaque-contre-les-forces-de-securite-a-assamaka/).

Respondents then identify assassinations (at 72.7%) as a means of action by terrorist groups. The last direct killings of civilians by a terrorist group in the Agadez area were carried out in May 2013 during the MUJAO attack on the Somaïr uranium mine in which one person was killed.

Finally, abductions are mentioned by 58.7 per cent of respondents. As mentioned earlier, kidnappings and demands for ransom are the main source of financing for terrorist groups in the Sahel. The last abductions in the region occurred in September 2010 with the abduction of 5 French people, 1 Togolese and 1 Malagasy working at the Areva site of Arlit, and claimed by the AQIM group.

## 4.2 Populations' perception of radicalization

**Chart 23: Percentage of respondents by reasons pushing towards the terrorist phenomenon**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

The phenomenon of radicalization and more precisely radicalization in West Africa is an eminently complex problem that covers different dimensions. Radicalization pathways are also diverse from one individual to another, even when they come from the same village or hamlet. Finally, the bridge between radicalization and terrorist action is not necessarily automatic. Consequently, trying to explain the reasons that push some individuals towards terrorism becomes a perilous exercise whose keys to understanding are often limited or obstructed.

Despite this, questioning the local populations directly affected by this phenomenon remains a necessary and enlightening task. Because these populations evolve within the same environments than those who have turned to terrorism, they can inform us about the dysfunctions existing within the society or some communities. Because radicalization and action are rarely sudden or solitary acts, and because each village or community has its own particularities, it is essential to rely on local populations to better understand and fight against terrorism.

For nearly 7 out of 10 respondents, poverty issues (69%) and lack of occupation (66.5%) are the main reasons why people in the region join terrorist groups. In 2017 the Niger was ranked 187th out of 188 countries in the Human Development Index published by the United Nations Development Programme.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> [www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr\\_2016\\_report\\_french\\_web.pdf](http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr_2016_report_french_web.pdf).


The World Bank points out that with a poverty rate of 44.1 per cent and an average per capita income of 420 US dollars, the Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world. Poverty in the Niger, although it affects all regions and all age groups, is particularly high among young people with poor education. This situation is even more visible in Agadez where the drop of tourist activities in the 2000s, together with the halt to migration as well as the closure of some mines in the north of the country has definitely affected economic opportunities for the youth and reinforced a form of marginalization within their own communities.

For many people, and for nearly 70 per cent of the respondents, poverty and lack of occupation (which is not only professional but also cultural or associative), and this detrimental environment, are structural and cyclical elements that push some individuals towards terrorism, thus agreeing with the numerous publications in the literature on the subject.<sup>48</sup>

But the ideological dimension is also one of the elements of the local perceptions of terrorism. Thus, 45.2 per cent respondents consider that adherence to ideology is an explanation for the growth of the terrorist phenomenon in the region.

Finally, to a lesser extent, respondents identified “opposition to the authorities” (26.5% of the sample), “anger and frustration” (22.3%) and “ethnic or family reasons” (21.7%). Compared to economic and ideological reasons, more social or societal reasons are therefore less valued by respondents, even if they should not to be excluded.

**Chart 24: Percentage of respondents by reasons pushing towards the terrorist phenomenon according to their municipalities**



Within different localities, if economic and ideological reasons are indeed more valued than other factors, the results can be very different from one commune to another, even for those located within the same zone. Thus, the inhabitants of the Arlit, Gougaram and Dannet communities, located less than 50km apart, sometimes have very different views on these different explanations for regional terrorism. While the people surveyed in Gougaram see adherence to ideology as a

<sup>48</sup> See note: I. OLAWALE, “Radicalisation and violent extremism in West Africa: implications for African and international security”, Conflict, Security and Development, 2013.




determining factor with 57.9 per cent, they are only 33.7 per cent in Arlit. This difference between these two municipalities is equally visible for ethnic or family reasons, mentioned by almost 40 per cent of respondents in Gougaram versus 20.8 per cent of respondents in Arlit, which is almost half less. In Ingall the lack of occupation is mentioned by 79.1 per cent of respondents when adherence to ideology only reaches 32.3 per cent. On the contrary, this last factor is mentioned by 51.6 per cent of respondents in Tchirozérine, i.e. more than for the lack of occupation (50.8%). These two municipalities are, however, located within the same zone, less than 100 km apart from each other.

Community perceptions of the structuring factors that push some individuals to join terrorist groups are therefore not only different depending on the country or region. They are also different in very localized areas, within villages sharing a priori the same social, economic, cultural, historical and geographical characteristics. This reinforces the idea that while these structuring factors are essential to understanding these radicalization processes, these pathways are also very particular and can change from one individual to another, even within the same region.

### 4.3 The danger of terrorism for communities

**Chart 25: Percentage of respondents by opinion on their community's exposure to terrorism**



Two thirds (64%) of respondents to our survey believe they are now directly exposed to terrorism. Thus, despite the low representation of terrorism as a major threat at the borders for the respondents (21.8% of the sample), they nonetheless consider the threat to be both real and significant, with only a third of them feeling safe from terrorism.


Among the latter, respondents identified two main reasons for this relative protection from the terrorist threat. The reason the most frequently mentioned is the various security measures taken by the authorities (48.9% of the sample). One explanation could be the various patrols which take place in the region and in particular near the border as well as the close collaboration between the Nigerien army and the foreign armies and in particular American and French to reinforce the capacities of the DSF in fighting against terrorism. This feeling is strongly shared in Arlit, Gougaram and Tchirozérine but is practically absent within the other communities.

The second reason is more empirical and is based on the relative stability of certain areas in the region. 40.3 per cent of respondents who feel that their community is safe from terrorism justify it by considering that they live in a peaceful area never affected by the phenomenon. This feeling is especially shared in the Tchirozérine area and to a lesser extent in Dannet and Ingall.

**Table 2: Distribution of respondents by reasons explaining why the community is safe from terrorism**

Reasons why the community is safe from terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Personal belief	61	2.2
Security measures taken by the authorities	1,336	48.9
Community mobilization/vigilance	164	6.0
Religious Protection/Collective Involvement	70	2.6
Peaceful area never affected by the phenomenon	1,102	40.3
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>2,733</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Chart 26: Percentage of respondents by reasons why the community is safe from terrorism, by municipalities**



For the respondents who believe that their community is not immune to terrorism, one quarter (25.7%) feel that this is due to a personal belief based on the current situation in the region. They are also one out of five (21.4 %) to justify this feeling by invoking the evils which feed terrorism according to them: lack of occupation/poverty/fundamentalism. Also mentioned are residual banditry (14.5% of the sample) and poor security management by the authorities (15.6%).


Three other less important reasons: low community engagement to address this phenomenon (7.1%), porosity and inadequate border security (8.4%), and vulnerability of the area in which respondents live (7.3%).

Almost one in four respondents (15.6% believing that this is due to poor management by the authorities and 8.4% due to insufficient security at the borders) among those who fear terrorism within their community justify it because of the inadequacies of the authorities in this area.

For the sample as a whole, 15 per cent of the people questioned consider themselves at risk because of the lack of concrete measures taken by the people in charge of the security of the populations. Therefore, a very large majority of respondents do not consider that this insecurity due to terrorism is the sole responsibility of the authorities, but this figure remains an indicator of the measures to be taken to better ensure the safety of populations and reassure communities.

Reasons why the community is not immune to terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Residual banditry/Attacks-Terrorist threats experienced/in the surroundings	674	14.5
Personal belief following the prevailing situation	1,198	25.7
Low Engagement/Involvement/Community Mobilization	329	7.1
Lack of occupancy/Poverty/Fundamentalist Attractiveness	998	21.4
Poor management of the security of the premises by the authorities	727	15.6
Porosity and insufficient border security	392	8.4
Vulnerable area/Not secured by the authorities	338	7.3
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>4,656</b>	<b>100.0</b>


**Chart 27: Percentage of respondents by evolution of the terrorist threat**



Moreover, only 23 per cent of the people surveyed believe that the terrorist threat is fading. Almost half of them (41.5% of the sample) consider that this threat is stable when more than a third (35.4 %) consider that this threat is now increasing in the Agadez region.

These figures are essential as they provide direct information on the state of mind of local populations on the current state of this terrorist threat. They reveal that this threat is perceived as very real by them and that they are not safe from it, 64 per cent of them feeling directly exposed to terrorist groups in the region. And very few are optimistic about the evolution of this threat in the near future with only a little more than one in five respondents saying the threat is fading.


**Chart 28: Percentage of respondents by evolution of the terrorist threat according to municipalities**



People's perceptions of the evolution of the terrorist threat are similarly shared within the various municipalities, with the exception of Arlit, which stands out for its relative optimism. The majority of people surveyed in this municipality and its surroundings consider that this threat is fading, with 55.3 per cent versus only 5.1 per cent considering it is increasing, which is 53 points less than Dannet inhabitants who like the majority perceive the phenomenon is rising. Arlit's optimism should be contextualized. Having been one of the municipalities most affected by terrorism, the "calmness" experienced by the department and especially the municipality of Arlit since 2013 can explain these differences of views compared to the other municipalities questioned.

## 4.4 Means of combating terrorism

**Chart 29: Percentage of respondents by recommended actions to prevent terrorist threats**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.


Among the measures proposed to respondents in order to better prevent terrorism in the region, two responses are strongly supported by local populations: proposing economic activities to young people (78.5%) and raising awareness among young people (75.3%).

These responses refer to previous statements by respondents that poverty and lack of employment are among the primary reasons why some people in the region are attracted to terrorist groups. These assertions corroborate the conclusions of the current literature on the phenomena of radicalization in West Africa and particularly in Agadez,<sup>49</sup> which place the socioeconomic structures within which individuals evolve as a privileged grid of interpretation to explain Jihadism in the Sahel.

As mentioned earlier, radicalization as such remains a complex phenomenon, with many ramifications and which cannot be assessed without a thorough and individualized study of each story. In this case as in others, while simple explanations may be tempting, they alone cannot provide a comprehensive and complete understanding of the phenomenon. Understanding and acting on the main factors that can lead individuals to join terrorist groups are indeed essential. But these measures cannot be seen as the only answers to these problems. Individual follow-up and support for young people undergoing radicalization must also be set up by the authorities.

In this respect, respondents are not mistaken when they consider that it is necessary to raise awareness among young people (for 75.3% respondents) and to involve community leaders (52.2%) in these counterterrorism processes. The percentage of those who wish to involve community leaders is very similar to those who see adherence to ideology as a determining factor in joining terrorist groups (45.2%). As figures respected by the people and legitimate authority regarding religious issues, community leaders are in the best position within these villages to address the ideological complexity of terrorist groups and guide those who might be tempted to join them these movements. For the people surveyed, involving them in public policies to combat this phenomenon is therefore natural.

**Chart 30: Percentage of respondents by recommended action to prevent terrorist threats, by the municipality**




Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

49 See A. MCCULLOUGH, M. SCHOMERUS, et A. HAROUNA, "Comprendre les trajectoires de la radicalisation à Agadez", Overseas Development Institute, 2017.



Lastly, almost a third of the interviewees support the establishment of Community Prevention Committees (31.5%). This option is particularly supported in the municipality of Gougaram (45.2%). Therefore, a significant proportion of respondents recognize the role that communities can play in the fight against terrorism and more generally in securing the region and border management.

**Chart 31: Percentage of respondents by type of support to the authorities to fight effectively against the terrorist**



In the event of terrorist attacks, the persons investigated also recognize the leading role of the authorities in managing this type of crisis. 98.1 per cent of respondents believe that the authorities should be immediately alerted, while only 13.9 per cent suggested that the populations should also defend themselves with weapons.

## 5. Effectiveness of border management

The security of Agadez territory and the containment of the threats to which the region is exposed depend largely on good border security management. This section focuses on respondents' views on what border security means in practice, the sense of security or insecurity that communities share, and the role of local authorities and populations in managing this security.

### 5.1 What “ensuring border security” means

This open-ended question was designed to ask respondents about their own definition of what “border security” means. Three main answers emerge from this question.

According to one third of the respondents (33.8% of the sample), this task consists primarily of monitoring the free movement of persons and goods. This is the most frequently mentioned response and it offers an open and positive definition of border security, consisting primarily of protecting individuals and their property when crossing the border and ensuring the respect of the principle of free movement in the region.<sup>50</sup>

For 23.8 per cent of respondents, border security regards primarily the protection and well-being of communities across the country and 6.6 per cent regards the security of people and property. This second type of definition refers rather to the protective dimension of the border, the idea being above all to be able to better secure the populations living in the country. Finally, 22 per cent of the interviewees consider that border security management consists in materializing the geographical limits of countries in order to better control them. A definition that therefore refers to the administrative function of the border and its geographical representation. Furthermore, 11.9 per cent acknowledges they do not know. Ensuring security at the border is thus understood by the persons surveyed in a threefold definition: being able to ensure the free movement of persons, protect the country's communities and finally mark the boundary of a territory.


**Chart 32: Percentage of respondents by opinion on what “ensuring border security” means**



<sup>50</sup> In the Agadez region, the free movement of people and goods is only ensured between Mali and Niger, in accordance with ECOWAS principles.

## 5.2 Presence of the Defence and Security Forces in the region and the communities' sense of security


**Chart 33: Percentage of respondents by patrols operating along the border**



The next two questions were designed to determine the respondents' knowledge of the presence of DSF at the border as well as within their own village or hamlet.


Three quarters of them answer that these patrols are operating all along the border. However, the municipalities of Arlit and Dannet offered more uncertainty with only 63.1 and 63.9 per cent answering affirmatively.

**Chart 34: Percentage of respondents by observation of patrols along the border, by municipality**




In addition, a very large majority of the respondents, report observing patrols within their community. Three quarters (74.9% of the sample) of the people surveyed reply that they observe patrol operations within their own village or hamlet, versus 25.1 per cent who say the opposite.

**Chart 35: Percentage of respondents by observation of patrol passage at the locality level**



These differences in assessment are mainly reflected in the Dannet, Ingall and Gougaram areas, where a large share of villages do not see patrols. In the case of the municipality of Dannet, among the villages that never observe DSF there are Tagora (100 per cent of respondents did not see any DSF), Tarinkit (95%) and Imizene (91%).<sup>51</sup> In Ingall there are the villages of Fagoshiya (96%), Tagagalte (93%), Innabangaret (92%), Tchiguegfene (98%) and Aborak (93%).<sup>52</sup> To a lesser extent, this trend is also found around Gougaram with the villages of Mayate (81%) and Tamjit (84%).<sup>53</sup>

**Chart 36: Proportion of respondents by observation of patrol passage at locality level, by municipality**



There is also a direct correlation between the perceived level of security and the passage of patrols within the various municipalities. When these different people are asked about their feelings of security or insecurity within their area, those who observe many patrols in their village feel safer than those who observe less.

<sup>51</sup> Dannet; Proportion of respondents who said they did not observe troops at: Tagora (82/82), Tarinkit (109/115), Imizene (101/111).


<sup>52</sup> Ingall; Proportion of respondents who said they did not observe troops at: Fagoshiya (23/24), Tagalte (159/170), Innabangaret (47/51), Tchiguegfene (59/60), Aborak (57/61).

<sup>53</sup> Gougaram; Proportion of respondents saying they do not observe troops at: Mayate (145/179), Araghe (65/97), Tanjit (88/105).

In fact, 20.4 per cent respondents consider that the security level is good within their zone, where patrols are observable, versus only 7.9 per cent in villages where these patrols are absent. In addition, 62.5 per cent of those who observe these patrol operations consider the level of safety as being “average” versus 47.5 per cent for those who do not observe them. As a corollary, 15.6% of respondents consider that they are in total insecurity where there are no patrols versus only 0.6 per cent where there are patrols.


This information therefore indicates that the strengthening of patrols and the improvement of their visibility within the villages of the region is directly linked to a better appreciation of the level of security among the populations. This is an important indicator in strengthening a climate of understanding and trust between communities and border security authorities.

**Chart 37: Percentage of respondents by security level according to patrol operations**



## 5.4 Local border security officials

**Chart 38: Percentage of respondents by type of known local border security managers**





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The two most well-known local officials by the surveyed people regarding border security management are the village chief (mentioned by 55.9% of the sample) and the gendarme (55.7%), two symbols of the local authority and the decentralized services of the Nigerien State, and the closest authorities to the inhabitants of the region.

Next come the armed forces mentioned by 50.7 per cent of the respondents. This strong occurrence can be explained in particular by the presence of the Djado operation (formerly Mali-bero, operations mentioned in point 3.2), which is responsible in particular for containing threats from Libya, but also because of the regular presence of the armed forces on the territory following the increase in the terrorist threat in the region.

The figure of the police officer (41.1%) and the mayor (39.9%) are also widely mentioned. To a lesser extent, the group/Canton leader (28.3%) and the customs officer (24.5%) are also mentioned.

However, departmental and regional authorities are rarely mentioned. Thus, the prefect is mentioned only by 17.9 per cent of the persons surveyed and the Sultan of Air by only 12.4 per cent of the respondents. In last position, the governor is mentioned only by 7.6 per cent of the persons surveyed, that is 7 times less than the village chief and 5 times less than the mayor.

Thus, there is a trust and legitimacy agreement based on proximity, and the closest authorities to the inhabitants are considered as the most qualified to secure the border without necessarily responding to the effective distribution of roles and responsibilities within the Nigerien administration. As representatives of the police powers and as regional representatives of the State, prefects and governors are in fact the first responsible for managing and securing the border, high above the village or cantonal chiefs whose role is to manage the day-to-day affairs of the village and to embody a moral figure and authority.




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The credit given to traditionally respected authorities such as village chiefs, mayors or traditional chiefs therefore demonstrates the interest of promoting the creation of community prevention committees composed around these local figures considered as the most legitimate in the eyes of the inhabitants.



**Chart 39: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the effectiveness of these services/authorities in border security management**




With respect to effective border security management, a very large majority (70.5% of the sample) of respondents rated the work of these authorities as “somewhat satisfactory”. 11.6 per cent of respondents even consider it “very satisfactory” when 18 per cent consider it, on the contrary, unsatisfactory.

These figures are directly related to a previous question asking respondents about security measures taken at the border. Similar ratios are found here, including a large proportion of respondents who say that the work done by border authorities is “quite satisfactory”. This point is encouraging in the relationship that the authorities have with the populations in their role of securing the territory but indicates that there are certainly many points of improvement from the point of view of these communities. This is particularly true in the higher proportion of those who find this work unsatisfactory (18%) compared to those who find it very satisfactory (11.6%).

## 5.4 The role of communities in border protection

**Chart 40: Percentage of respondents by capacity of local authorities (mayor, prefect, village chief, DSF) able to ensure border security alone without the support of local communities**




The role that local communities can play in supporting these authorities is one of the existing points and room for improvement to strengthen border security.

When asked about this hypothesis, the vast majority of respondents (82.4%) believe that local authorities (mayor, prefect, village chief, DSF) cannot totally ensure border security without the help of local communities.

These data are a strong indicator of the local communities' observation both on their vision of the authorities' inability to fully protect them and of the important role they claim they can play in securing the border. It also shows their willingness to work more with the authorities in protecting their territory and their population.

## 5.4 Relations between communities and authorities


**Chart 41: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and border security officers**



This collaboration can only be achieved through good understanding between communities and authorities. On this point, only a small minority of respondents believe that the relationship between the community and border security officers is poor (8.5% of the sample). On the contrary, a very large majority of respondents (77.1%) have a positive opinion of these relationships, including 66.6 per cent rating them as good and 10.5 per cent very good. Finally, 14.5 per cent in the sample describe this relationship as neutral.

Thus, more than two thirds of respondents see their relations with border authorities positively. These responses are encouraging as they indicate a maturity between these different parties as well as a certain unity within the communities of the region. This data points to greater integration between authorities and communities and deeper collaboration in securing the border.

**Chart 42: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and border security officers, by municipality**




However, these good relations do not exist homogeneously throughout the territory. For example, the municipality of Dannet and its surrounding villages appear to be the area where relations between the community and security agents are the worst. 22.9 per cent of the people surveyed in this area thus consider the relationships to be poor and 28.7 per cent simply consider they are “neutral”. Incidentally, it is also one of the areas where the presence of DSF is least felt by respondents.

Thus, the propensity of the communities to appreciate the security measures taken by the authorities is directly linked to the presence of the DSF in the communities, whether at the border or in the different villages.


The daily presence of the DSF in the different localities of the region thus appears as a decisive vector in the good relations they maintain with the communities. This element must also be fully taken into account in the work to be carried out to create effective collaboration between communities and authorities through community prevention committees.

**Chart 43: Percentage of respondents by knowledge about the occurrence of disagreement between local communities and border security officials**




Relations between communities and authorities, in addition to appearing good to respondents, also rarely seem contradictory. When asked about possible disputes between local communities and border security officials, the respondents are 86.8% to answer negatively. More than 8 out of 10 respondents say that they do not observe disagreements between the two parties.

**Chart 44: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between community and border security authorities**



And among those who report these disputes, they are only a minority to feel that they happen “very often” (14.9% of the sample). 53.6 per cent of respondents who observe these disputes feel that these disagreements do not occur “very often” and 31.5 per cent only “rarely”. These disputes between the two parties are therefore not common and reflect good understanding and understanding between these communities and authorities. Nevertheless, these disagreements exist and deserve to be heard and taken into account in the construction of greater collaboration between these parties.


**Chart 45: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between the community and the authorities in charge of securing the border depending on the municipalities**



This must especially be done within the areas where these disagreements appear to be the most important. These disagreements appear especially within the urban communities of Arlit and the Gougaram area where the people surveyed expressed their disagreements the most.

In Arlit, 30.5 per cent of respondents estimate that disputes very often take place between communities and authorities in charge of border security and in Gougaram they are 23.4 per cent, which is 10 to 15 points higher than the average of our sample. Efficient and productive collaboration between these two parties will therefore also be achieved by seeking to understand the origin of its disagreements in order to better reduce them.


**Chart 46: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the reasons for the disputes between the community and the border security authorities**



These disputes fall into three main categories: hassles<sup>54</sup> between authorities and community members, incidents related to border crossings, and violations of the law, divided into fines and arrests. The latter category, the most representative of the wide disparities that may exist between populations and law enforcement representatives, represents more than half of these disputes (51% of the sample). Incidents at the border (“crossing prohibition” or “slowdown”) account for 29 per cent of these disagreements. Finally, the various “hassles” mentioned by respondents are mentioned by one in five respondents (20%).

## 5.5 Meetings between communities and border security authorities

**Chart 47: Percentage of respondents by knowledge of the organization of meetings by authorities with communities to discuss border security**




<sup>54</sup> The term “hassle” also refers to an “informal” fine, demanded by the representative of the police outside any legal framework and for his personal benefit.

The work carried out by the authorities with the communities on border security includes different facets, one of them being to maintain regular contact with the populations by informing them of the evolution of the situation within their region. This can be done, for example, by organizing meetings with communities. The purpose of this question was to ask respondents about the frequency and nature of these meetings.

More than eight out of ten respondents (82.1%) say that the authorities have never organized such meetings with the communities when 17.9 per cent answered in the affirmative, a sign of the in-depth work to be done in order to increase the frequency of these meetings. Among those organized, these meetings can have different objectives: capacity-building for certain community leaders, training, awareness campaigns or the establishment of prevention committees.

**Chart 48: Percentage of respondents by knowledge of the organization of meetings between the authorities and the communities to discuss border security by municipality**




Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Among the few meetings organized by the authorities with respondents, community awareness campaigns appear to be the most popular type of meeting held by the authorities. Indeed, these meetings are mentioned the most by the populations of the different municipalities, from 51.3 per cent to 99.2 per cent in Ingall. Next come capacity-building, which is mentioned by almost one in two respondents (46.9% of the sample).

More marginally, almost a third of respondents (30.34%) also mentioned training. Finally, very few respondents mentioned the implementation of prevention committees, except in Arlit (by 38.2% of the sample) and especially in Gougaram, where 73.9 per cent respondents stated that they had attended this type of meeting.



**Chart 49: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the authorities' involvement with your community on border security**



These various meetings are mostly seen as positive by the communities. More than six out of ten respondents (61.2%) positively rate the authorities' involvement with their communities, 51.8 per cent rated it satisfactory and 9.6 per cent very satisfactory. However, the proportion of unsatisfied people remains significant. 29.8 per cent of respondents consider this involvement rather poor and 8.7 per cent even consider it very poor, a sign that there is room for improvement regarding this involvement of the authorities with the communities in border security. This greater interaction between authorities and communities is also one of the main issues for future prevention committees to be created in the region.

## 5.6 Solutions for building a good relationship between border security officials and communities

**Table (F14.a): Distribution of respondents by proposals on aspects to be improved to establish a good relationship between border security officials and communities**

Proposals of factors to improve for a good relationship	Number of respondents	%
Consultation/cohesion framework between authorities and communities	2,703	36.6
Awareness/advocacy activities (Caravan, Fora, Social Inclusion, etc.)	2,633	35.6
Operational capacities of the implemented prevention committees	606	8.2
Community membership communication materials and strategy	378	5.1
Control/monitoring and response capacities in the event of solicitation	141	1.9
Recovery and training activities for young people	137	1.9
No opinion	791	10.7
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>



This question was left open so that respondents could be given complete freedom in identifying solutions to establish a good relationship between the authorities and the communities. Two main ideas emerged from this question: the creation of consultation/cohesion frameworks between authorities and communities (36.6 % of the sample) and the organization of awareness raising/advocacy activities among the populations (caravan, forum, etc.) (35.6%).

The improvement of the operational capacities of the prevention committees in place is also mentioned by 8.2 per cent of the sample.

Therefore, respondents favour a two-dimensional strategy, the first aimed at increasing and improving direct discussions between authorities and communities. These consultations would be a means for the communities to better understand the security situation at the border and to inform the authorities on the evolution of threats on the ground. The organization of awareness campaigns in the form of caravans or fora could also enable the populations to better understand the issues and problems threatening the region while building a relationship of trust with the local authorities.




## 6. Communication between authorities and communities on border security

Improving communication between authorities and communities is essential to ensure the effectiveness of community prevention committees. If some mechanisms are already in place, they vary in their modalities and their effectiveness depending on the municipalities.

### 6.1 Intermediaries between border authorities and communities

A small majority of the respondents (56.7% of the sample) have direct contact with border security authorities and therefore do not pass through an intermediary. Less than half (43.3%) communicate directly with these people, a sign of regular and direct contact already in place between communities and border security authorities in part of the region. The nature or role of this intermediary person may vary depending on the situation, whether he or she is a traditional leader, a community leader, a representative of women, youth or civil society.


**Chart 50: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary between local communities and authorities in border security communication**



This intermediary is usually the village chief or his representative. Three quarters (75.1% of the sample) of respondents who go through an intermediary identify this authority as a privileged mediator between communities and border authorities. Second are the mayors and other local counsellors (17.1%). Less mentioned are the chiefs of tribes or groups (3.6%), the chiefs of cantons (1.7%) and finally any other person of the locality (2.5%).


This importance given to the village chief and municipal authorities by the communities is an essential information to understand the dynamics of trust and decision-making within these villages. We also find here the same dynamics as observed in point 5.4, where the respondents identified the local officials in charge of border security. The legitimacy in the management of the affairs of these communities in the Agadez region is therefore entrusted above all to the village chiefs or mayors depending on the villages and municipalities. Respect for these dynamics within community prevention committees will therefore be essential.

**Chart 51: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary between local communities and authorities in border security communication**




This organization of communications between communities and authorities may vary depending on the territory. In the Gougaram, Ingall and Tchirozérine areas, the village chief is mentioned by the majority (between 85% and 90% of the sample), while he is less mentioned in Dannet and Arlit (between 30% and 40%). On the contrary, within these municipalities the mayor or his councillors are much more mentioned than elsewhere: 50.5 per cent of respondents from Dannet, 58.8 per cent of those from Arlit versus only 8.1 per cent in Tchirozérine, 6.85 in Gougaram and 0.5 per cent in Ingall.

**Chart 52: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary between the local communities and the authorities in terms of communication on border security in each municipality**



## 6.2 Means of communication between communities and authorities

**Chart 53: Percentage of respondents by means of communication used by the population to contact the intermediary person**




Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Two main means of communication are preferred by the communities to get in contact with this intermediary person: the telephone (71.1 % of the sample) or in-person meetings (64.9%). Also mentioned by almost one in two respondents (47.6%) are village assemblies that are an opportunity to deal with different community affairs.

The Thuraya satellite network is also mentioned by one in four respondents (26.7%). Finally, radio is used by only 8 per cent of respondents. This can be explained by the lack of access to the required equipment but especially by the easy of access the populations have to the telephone. While some areas of the region have very little or no mobile Internet coverage, the telephone network operates in urban and some rural areas and thus allows a very large majority of inhabitants to communicate with each other.

**Chart 54: Percentage of respondents by means of communication used by the population to contact the intermediary, by municipalities**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.




But, like the referent persons, the means of communication to make contact with these intermediaries differ substantially according to the concerned areas. The communities of Arlit thus massively favour the telephone (93%) and the Thuraya network (60.1%). Radio is used more here than in the other areas of the region with 24.3 per cent versus 8 per cent in the rest of the territory. On the contrary, within the municipality of Gougaram, communities have more immediate contact with intermediaries. In person meetings are mentioned by 81.6 per cent of respondents and village meetings by 69.3 per cent of respondents are more than the telephone (51.7%) and Thuraya network (45.8%).

These differences in the preferred means of communication can be explained by customary habits, access to technologies, network coverage and finally the proximity that the inhabitants have with these different intermediaries.

### 6.3 Areas for improvement in communication mechanisms

**Chart 55: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measures to enable effective communication between communities and authorities about border security**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Several solutions were proposed to respondents in order to improve communications between communities and authorities regarding border security. The purpose of this question was to ask the respondents about the warning systems to be put in place regarding this security.

Among these, increasing telephone contacts is the most frequent option among respondents, who are three quarters to approve (76%). This shows a certain commitment to this mode of communication and the importance of checking everyone's access to the phone to improve communications between communities and authorities.

The population also remains attached to direct contact with the authorities or their representatives. 63.8 per cent respondents thus suggest creating or strengthening consultation frameworks between authorities and communities and almost half the respondents (47.8%) are also in favour of regular visits by the authorities to the various villages in the region. This attachment for direct contact and the movement of authorities towards communities is also an element to be




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taken into account to ensure the good management of these borders in the future. Finally, more than half of the respondents are in favour of the creation of local information committees whose mandate could be to relay the initiatives taken by the border security authorities but also the questions that the communities have about the work of these authorities.

**Chart 56: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measures to enable effective communication between communities and authorities on border security according to municipalities**




Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

These various proposals are received in a rather homogeneous way within the region. Only the areas of Arlit and especially Tchirozérine are less attached to direct contact with the authorities, with respondents preferring phone communication.

It is noteworthy that it is within these two municipalities that relations with the authorities were considered the best. This indicates that the inhabitants who wish to favour direct contacts are certainly those who feel that they need to address the authorities directly because of the disputes that may exist between the various parties. However, telephone communication can be better ensured where authorities and communities understand each other better.



**Chat 57: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the most effective means of communication between communities and authorities for border security**




Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

The telephone is mentioned by more than eight in ten respondents (80.9%) as the preferred means of communication in the future to ensure border security. This is followed by in-person meetings, use of the Thuraya network (43.7%) and village assemblies (39%). Finally, one in four respondents (25.1%) suggests the use of radio or television and 17.8 per cent respondents also promote SMS exchange.

The telephone as a communication tool is therefore more favoured for future communications than it is today. On the contrary, while nearly 65 per cent of the people surveyed say they now communicate in person with the authorities, fewer than one in two want to continue this type of meeting. The choice for the telephone correlated to a minor interest in the in-person meetings can be explained in particular by the speed of telephone communications but also by the difficulty of access to some territories. For some of the most remote and isolated villages, it is easier to contact the authorities by telephone than to meet in person with them.

**Chart 58: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the most effective means of communication between communities and authorities for border security according to municipalities**




Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

This is true for all the cities surveyed except Gougaram. Within this municipality, the contrast between the use of communication technologies (telephone, SMS, radio or Thuraya) and in-person meetings is particularly obvious. The latter are in fact favoured at nearly 77 per cent on average, against less than 30 per cent for remote communications. This is mainly due to Gougaram's low network coverage.

## 6.4 Positive effects of better communication

**Chart 59: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the positive effects of good communication between communities and authorities**




*Note:* Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

The overall objective of improving means of communication between communities and authorities is to better address border security issues and better integrate the different parties in a common effort to protect populations from the various dangers that emanate from them.

According to a very large majority of the people surveyed (80.6%), the first benefit of better communication between authorities and communities will be to obtain an immediate response from these authorities in the event of a crisis or emergency. For three out of four respondents (75.9%), this will also help to understand security issues in time. Finally, for 64.7 per cent respondents, better communication will also reduce the impact of border insecurity on local populations.

Therefore, a large majority of respondents have a very positive view of the benefits that better communication and cooperation between authorities and communities can bring.

**Chart 60: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the negative effects that poor communication between communities and authorities can have**



*Note:* Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Consequently, many respondents fear the consequences of poor communication with the authorities. Firstly, a very large majority of respondents (78.6% in the sample) believe that insecurity in the region will increase very rapidly and they also believe that this would have serious consequences for local communities.

More than three out of five respondents (62.7%) also believe that this miscommunication will inevitably lead to a delayed response from the authorities in case of emergency. Finally, almost one in two believe that this would also lead to a loss of community trust in the authorities.

Respondents therefore do not underestimate the importance of efficient communication between communities and local authorities. They are aware of the possible risks caused by poor communication and in particular its direct consequences on insecurity in the region. At the same time, they are very optimistic about the positive effects of a better dialogue between the parties, particularly on the authorities' ability to understand and respond more quickly to security threats.




## 7. Response to an emergency situation

Strengthening border management and improving communications between the communities and the authorities aim to better crisis prevention and more efficient response. This section illustrates the views of the populations surveyed on these emergencies, on the capacities of communities to manage these crises and on the role of the authorities in their prevention.

### 7.1 The risks of massive population displacements

**Chart 61: Percentage of respondents by cause of mass population movements at the border**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Two main causes are identified by the respondents as the potential causes of massive population displacements in the region: this would be mainly caused by occasional terrorist attacks (73.5% of the sample) or armed conflicts (74.6%). The prevalence of responses related to these two causes can be explained in particular by the current situation in southern Libya and Mali, which have led to the arrival of refugees in the region. Most of these refugees come from countries that have been or are currently in civil war, like the Southern Sudanese refugees who recently massively joined Agadez during the recent period.<sup>55</sup>

Three other causes of various natures are also mentioned by almost half of the respondents: migration (47.6% of the sample), natural disasters (46.3%) and finally epidemics (43%). The important part of migration is justified by the central place occupied by the region of Agadez in the sub-Saharan migrations towards Europe. It is also explained by the various humanitarian crises experienced by migrants in the region recently. These crises have two main causes: the first is linked to changes in migration routes since the implementation of Act No. 2015-36 on smuggling, which led to the deaths of hundreds of migrants in the Agadez desert.<sup>56</sup> The second is linked to the treatment of large numbers of migrants along their routes, whether in Libya or Algeria, which caused a large influx of returnees to Agadez.<sup>57</sup>

Natural disasters in the region of Agadez are also rarer but devastating. In particular, there are floods during the rainy season (June to September), which are often deadly.<sup>58</sup> These floods are

55 [www.france24.com/fr/20180212-agadez-niger-rescapes-libye-migrants-soudan-asile-reportage](http://www.france24.com/fr/20180212-agadez-niger-rescapes-libye-migrants-soudan-asile-reportage).

56 [www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/migrants-dying-sahara-niger.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/migrants-dying-sahara-niger.html). [www.nbcnews.com/news/world/migrant-crisis-emerges-sahara-desert-algeria-niger-border-iom-says-n874556](http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/migrant-crisis-emerges-sahara-desert-algeria-niger-border-iom-says-n874556).

57 [www.news.un.org/en/story/2017/12/638012-un-agency-fly-15000-migrants-home-libya-wake-reported-abuses](http://www.news.un.org/en/story/2017/12/638012-un-agency-fly-15000-migrants-home-libya-wake-reported-abuses).


58 [www.fr.africanews.com/2017/08/30/niger-plus-de-40-personnes-sont-mortes-a-la-suite-d-inondations/](http://www.fr.africanews.com/2017/08/30/niger-plus-de-40-personnes-sont-mortes-a-la-suite-d-inondations/).

also responsible for the destruction of many crops and gardens. Droughts also greatly affect this region which lives mainly from agriculture and pastoralism.

Finally, epidemics are also a significant source of concern for populations. The large part of this response refers to the same finding established in section 3.3 where 38.4 per cent respondents considered that epidemics constituted a risk for populations. In 2014 the health authorities were already warning of the risk of Ebola virus contamination that could be transmitted by migrants circulating in the region.<sup>59</sup> More recently an outbreak of Rift Fever has caused several deaths near the Malian border.<sup>60</sup>

## 7.2 The capacity of communities to manage these arrivals

**Chart 62: Percentage of respondents with community capacity to manage the arrival and displacement of a very large number of people in their village/hamlet**



Respondents to our survey are generally pessimistic about the capacity of communities to manage the massive arrival of populations in their village or hamlet. Two thirds of the surveyed people believe that communities are not prepared to deal with such situations.

### 7.2.1. Only one third of respondents are confident

Among the minority of respondents who say they are ready to manage this type of crisis, two main reasons are mentioned: a crisis situation has already been experienced and reactions have been positive on the part of the populations (58% of the sample) and the local authorities have already informed the populations regarding this subject (26.4%). A minority also considers that communities are well prepared and organized for this purpose (23.1%).

59 [www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140906-ebola-vigilance-accrue-region-agadez-niger](http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140906-ebola-vigilance-accrue-region-agadez-niger).

60 [www.who.int/csr/don/24-november-2016-rift-valley-fever-niger/fr/](http://www.who.int/csr/don/24-november-2016-rift-valley-fever-niger/fr/).



**Table 3: Percentage of respondents by reasons why communities are or are not ready to manage an emergency**

Reasons for community maturity in managing an emergency situation	Number of respondents	%
Panic and runaway as soon as they feel threatened	533	59.2
Crisis situation already experienced, positive reaction of the population	523	58.0
Crisis situation already experienced, negative reaction of the population	281	31.2
Awareness-raising by local authorities	238	26.4
Community well prepared and organized for this purpose	208	23.1
<b>Already terrified, misinformed and disorganized population</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>12.9</b>

### 7.2.2. A majority have a negative view of the capacity of communities to cope with this type of emergency


Respondents claiming that communities are unprepared for such crises justify this with several reasons. First, a majority of them (59.2%) believes that today, communities react by panicking and fleeing as soon as a threat approaches, a sign of an inability to cope with the massive arrival of displaced populations and of a relative fear of such events.

They also oppose the most optimistic respondents by estimating that nearly a third of them (31.2%) had reacted negatively when such a crisis situation had occurred in the past. Finally, they are 12.9 per cent to estimate that the communities are already terrified today, badly informed and disorganized.

These responses therefore provide information on the feeling of lack of preparation that communities have regarding this type of event. Field work combining prevention and training among these populations would therefore better prepare communities for the occurrence of this type of crisis.

## 7.3 The role of authorities and communities in an emergency situation

### 7.3.1 The role of the authorities

**Chart 63: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the roles authorities should play during an emergency situation**


Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

For a very large majority of the people interviewed (87.6% of the sample), the primary role that the authorities must play in the event of an emergency<sup>61</sup> is to be able to receive these displaced populations. A very large number of respondents (70.6%) also consider as important that these authorities are able to provide emergency equipment for these displaced persons and almost two thirds (64.3%) consider it is essential to provide assistance to the sick and injured people.

To a lesser extent, almost half of the respondents believe that the authorities should immediately take charge of the needs of these displaced persons (48.3%) and secure the reception area (44.6%). Finally, one in four respondents consider that it is the role of the authorities to participate in the relocation of displaced persons.

### 7.3.2 Community responsibility

**Chart 64: Percentage of respondents by opinion on the roles that communities must play in an emergency situation**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

The responsibilities that the communities must assume consist in the first place of having to inform the local authorities quickly (82.9% of the sample) and to receive the displaced populations (76.9%).

A very large majority of the respondents therefore assume the residents' share of responsibility for providing assistance to displaced persons but do not neglect the leading role that the authorities must play in managing these crises. We find here the same form of legitimacy entrusted to the authorities in the management of terrorist attacks that was observed in the 4.4. section. This type of response to crises, whether from the authorities or communities, will also be ensured and strengthened through community prevention committees.

<sup>61</sup> An emergency is a situation in which a large number of people are in serious danger (illness, lack of water and food, serious and numerous armed attacks, etc.). Some examples: epidemic, floods or drought, etc. An emergency situation requires a rapid response to help the victims.

## Mechanisms to be put in place in the event of a crisis

This open-ended question was designed to ask respondents about the best mechanisms to put in place in the event of a crisis. In order to better manage these emergency situations, a majority of respondents (40.2% of the sample) believe that there is a need for implementing a framework for consultation and joint action. This answer is by far the most frequent and indicates a clear willingness of these communities to strengthen mediation and collaborative efforts. This also extends beyond the intra-Community circle. As a matter of fact, 23.2 per cent of respondents also believe that it is necessary to create collaborative frameworks for intercommunity actions. These mechanisms would aim to improve collaboration between villages and municipalities in the same area and better coordinate the regional response to these crises.




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The creation of community warning and response units is also proposed by a smaller minority of respondents (13.8%). Finally, the interviewees propose to better inform and train communities on emergency situations and to develop community strategies (4.8%). 10.7 per cent of the sample also acknowledge that they have no opinion on this subject.

**Table 4: Distribution of respondents by proposed collaborative measures between communities and authorities for effective emergency management**

Measures of collaboration between communities/authorities	Number of respondents	%
Implementing a framework for consultation and joint action	2,969	40,2%
Implementing a collaborative framework for intercommunity actions	1,713	23.2%
Create community alert and response cells	1,022	13.8%
Inform and train communities on emergency situations	539	7.3%
Develop community prevention strategies (brainstorming)	358	4.8%
Non opinion	788	10.7%
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

**Chart 65: Percentage of respondents by measures to be taken before an emergency situation occurs for better management**



Note: Multiple responses are possible. Total does not equal 100 per cent.

Finally, respondents were asked about the best measures to take before an emergency situation occurs in order to better contain it. Community capacity-building in the transmission of information to the authorities appears to be the measure most favoured by respondents who are 86.2 per cent to support this initiative. This broad support confirms the orientations collected in Part 6 of this report, which highlighted an increased demand for the use of different communication technologies to better ensure border security.

Three quarters of respondents also support greater integration of communities into crisis prevention processes. Thus 75.4 per cent of them want to allow, promote and bring the local population to play a role of a vigilance committee. The populations are therefore in agreement with a shared responsibility to prevent and manage these crises.



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## Conclusion

The effective management of the borders of the Agadez region and the containment of the threats to the border depend largely on the ability of security authorities to work effectively with local communities. This study illustrates the views of these communities on border management, their feelings regarding territorial security and their proposals for better engagement between populations and authorities. It also underlines the uncertainties of these communities regarding their own future as well as their doubts about the capacity of the authorities to manage alone the challenges that trouble the region.

The populations interviewed have a varied understanding of the border, which is interpreted in both its security and administrative dimensions without a clear consensus among respondents. In particular, a large minority of these people do not seem to know how to locate the border of their region, which is explained in particular by the relative isolation of some villages compared to the rest of the territory. These populations have also been clearly affected by the fall of the Libyan regime and the beginning of the Tuareg revolts, particularly in their frequency of crossing and in the reasons for crossing the border. As a result, respondents use the border less and do so primarily for commercial and economic reasons. Respondents finally have a good understanding of the presence and role of DSF in border security management.

The risks that exist today at the border of the Agadez region are well understood by the people surveyed but they feel relatively safe from these threats, having for the most part never been affected by these problems. Terrorist attacks are also much less mentioned than threats linked to armed attacks, trafficking or livestock thefts. The responses provided by the authorities are generally well received by the inhabitants, but there is room for improvement regarding this feeling. The inhabitants fear, above all, an upsurge in banditry and an increase in terrorist incursions in case of poor border management.

The terrorist threat is less prevalent in the Agadez region than it is in other parts of the Niger, but it remains a major challenge in territorial security management. However, the inhabitants of the region, who recently have been little affected by attacks or abductions, are well aware of this threat and are familiar with the methods and modes of action of these groups. They also identify economic factors and ideological factors as the first factors of radicalization, ahead of social or political factors. A large majority of the people surveyed also consider themselves directly exposed to the terrorist threat, in particular because of the potential for recruitment within the population

but also because of the regional security context. Above all, the vast majority believe that this threat is not about to disappear. Finally, they identify the fight against the inactivity of young people and their awareness of the dangers of terrorism as the best means of action to effectively tackle this threat.

The action of local authorities regarding border management also received a generally positive opinion from respondents. The weight of local realities



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also means that the inhabitants place greater trust in the authorities closest to them, such as village chiefs, than in the most distant regional authorities.

But communities also do not neglect the role and responsibilities they themselves must assume in supporting the authorities. They also consider that these relations between communities and authorities are generally positive, as disputes rarely arise, although this reality is

not totally homogeneous throughout the territory. This good understanding between communities and authorities will be crucial in the efficient implementation of prevention committees and will, first and foremost, require greater involvement of the authorities with the communities through meetings, which are rarely organized today.

Communications between communities and border security authorities are already well structured, whether they are direct or go through an intermediary. These communications are most often conducted remotely, via the telephone, radio or Thuraya network, but in-person meetings are also common, especially where contact with the authorities is the most necessary. Respondents also favour increasing telephone use to ensure better contact with the authorities.

Finally, the risks of an emergency situation and particularly a massive displacement of populations are clearly perceived by the respondents but they are a minority to consider that the communities are ready to face these arrivals. The roles and responsibilities of authorities and communities are also well understood by interviewees. Finally, the creation of joint consultation and action frameworks is the preferred option by respondents to improve crisis management, in line with future community prevention committees.



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# Recommendations for the future implementation of the Community Prevention Committees

This report is part of the project “Engaging Communities in Border Management in the Niger”, designed and piloted by the IOM office in the Niger. As recalled in the introduction, the main goal of this research is to present and analyse the vision of communities living in border areas on their integration into border management, their understanding of migration dynamics and their perception of terrorism in the region. The results of this study will thus guide the creation of community prevention committees in the areas concerned by the project.

## General comments

In support of the answers provided by the people interviewed during this survey, it can be stated that a large majority of the inhabitants of the Agadez region see favourably the creation of community prevention committees and support their principles and functions. The different opportunities offered to respondents to choose or propose solutions to the various problems addressed reveal that communities are committed to participating directly in the treatment of problems at the border. They also wish to increase interactions with the authorities and improve communication mechanisms. Thus, the creation of consultation frameworks and the multiplication of awareness-raising activities are the two main pillars chosen by respondents in order to establish a good relationship between communities and authorities.

Finally, the interviewees also demonstrated their respect for the legitimacy of the authorities and in particular the DSF in dealing with threats and crises, and did not neglect their responsibility in transmitting information and being vigilant when facing of these risks. All these dimensions are directly at the heart of the project to create community prevention committees and thus reinforce the relevance of this initiative and its good reception among the populations.

## Recommendation 1: Work on relations between authorities and communities

As a mechanism to increase interactions between communities and authorities, community prevention committees will need to build on a good understanding between the two parties. The study confirms that these reports are good and that the opinion of the communities on border authorities’ actions is also positive. However, some reservations must be expressed, particularly in the Dannet area where these relations appear to be the most damaged. Meetings between communities and border security authorities are extremely rare and rely mainly on awareness campaigns, which are essentially unilateral.

The creation of regular and supervised dialogue mechanisms based on horizontal exchange should thus guide the creation and implementation of community prevention committees. These dialogue frameworks will strengthen the trust that







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already exists in some areas and allow communities to have their voices better heard where disagreement between populations and authorities is most frequent.

### **Recommendation 2: Respect for hierarchies and contexts**

Despite the similarities that exist from one village to another, especially within the same areas, in both geographical and social and economic dimensions, respondents' points of view on some subjects sometimes diverged profoundly. These responses indicate the existence of different perceptions and feelings that need to be well understood when creating the committees.

This primarily concerns the chief's place on these committees. While the vast majority of Agadez committees will have to favour the presence of the village chief, other local dynamics (for example in Arlit) are pushing towards the integration of the mayor or one of his municipal representatives. The goal will thus be to respect the hierarchies and legitimacy existing locally in order to fit into the habits and customs of the community to better ensure the proper functioning of these committees.

Moreover, the areas observed where the passage of DSF patrols is the rarest (or even non-existent) will also have to be treated with a particular approach, by increasing direct contacts between authorities and communities in order to build greater trust between the parties.

### **Recommendation 3: Strengthen means of communication**

Strengthening the means of communication will also ensure that community prevention committees are fully effective. One of the objectives of these committees is to ensure that, in the event of a crisis at the border, the committees can quickly alert the relevant authorities and services. This can only be done with the help of rapid access to communication technologies and mainly the telephone.

Increased telephone contact is the most popular measure used by respondents to ensure effective communication between communities and authorities about border security. This therefore requires ensuring that both the relevant committees and the authorities in charge of border security have access to the telephone while setting up other communication mechanisms (satellite network, radio, etc.) where network coverage is lacking.

#### **Recommendation 4: Prepare populations and build their capacity**

It is also important to be able to create the necessary conditions for a rapid, orderly and effective response in the event of an emergency. This implies preparing populations for this type of crisis through the multiplication of crisis simulations as well as by organizing training dedicated to communities and particularly to those who will be in charge of prevention committees. A large majority of respondents believe that communities are not at all prepared to manage a crisis such as a massive displacement of populations. They justify this feeling because of past experiences where people panicked and fled. These reflexes can only be changed through in-depth work with these communities.

The survey showed that capacity-building missions and training are only very rarely organized by border security authorities. The function of these training courses would be to promote a better understanding of the role of these authorities as well as the actions of the DSF to protect the populations. They could also be used to train committees on the right reactions to adopt in the event of an incident or disturbance in the community. Finally, this would contribute to the same objective as recommendation 1, which aims to improve relations between authorities and communities.

In this case, as in those presented in this report, the role of the DSF remains paramount. Under no circumstances will the committees be called upon to play a self-defence role or to encourage the use of violence, even to deal with illegal activities. State authority remains the only legitimate form of action against the various illegal activities that may occur at the border. But greater community vigilance coupled with better capacity to warn authorities will facilitate the work of these services in border management.

#### **Recommendation 5: Better meet the needs of populations when dealing with the terrorist threat**

Finally, the people interviewed during this study stated their concerns about the terrorist threat in the region as well as their recommendations for better prevention of this phenomenon within the communities. As in the case of border management, the prevention of terrorism must find a good balance between development and security in order to respond most effectively to this threat.

The respondents' proposals are in favour of greater investment in the development of the region and in particular in the economic opportunities for young people. The elements present in this report have shown that the marginalization of young people, particularly linked to the various economic problems that the region has experienced in recent years, contributes to this radicalization phenomenon. Enabling young people to receive better training or helping them to start another professional training would thus allow a better prevention of terrorism. This also requires greater awareness-raising efforts in line with previous recommendations.

The fight against terrorist groups remains the sole responsibility of the DSF mobilized in the region. Yet, prevention of this threat must also include efforts to strengthen community well-being and combat all forms of marginalization, especially among the youth of Agadez.



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## Annex: Questionnaire

### Consent of the respondent

Consent: (Read to potential respondent)

I am conducting a research and would like to invite you to participate. The research focuses on the involvement of local communities in border management in the Niger, particularly in the Agadez and Tillabéri regions.

Your participation is completely voluntary and we will not store your personal data, on what you choose to communicate us. There will be no compensation or penalty for participating or not participating. Of course, you can withdraw your participation at any time before the start of the research phase. Your information and advice would be appreciated and will help guide policies, programmes, and research on the involvement of local communities in border management. The interview lasts approximately one hour.

I have presented you the information on the research, do you agree to participate? (Check to confirm you obtained oral consent)

### SURVEY OBJECTIVES

This study is part of the project “Engaging Communities in Border Management in Niger”. It was designed by IOM to understand the vision of communities living in border areas on their integration into border management, their understanding of migration dynamics and their perception of terrorism in the region. This study will therefore lead national and international stakeholders to adapt their actions to better integrate communities, and act with them to better meet their needs. Ultimately, this study will demonstrate the need to remove communities from the role of potential victims of insecurity in order to make them key players in border management, through prevention committees.

This script will serve as a guide for you to explain to interviewees and community authorities/leaders you meet why IOM is doing this study and why it is important for them to support it.

### A - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

A.1. Date:		Very important preliminary information to collect.  Always use the same spelling for the village/hamlet names.
A.2. Department:		
A.3. Municipality:		
A.4. village/ hamlet:		

B - PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENT		
B.1. Gender:	<input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female	<p>If the interviewee is reluctant or suspicious, explain that all responses will be known only by IOM and remind them that the questionnaire is anonymous. Personal information will not be passed on to the authorities or to anyone outside the organization.</p>
B.2. Nationality:	<input type="checkbox"/> Nigerien <input type="checkbox"/> Malian <input type="checkbox"/> Chadian <input type="checkbox"/> Algerian <input type="checkbox"/> Other (to be specified) _____	
B.3. Ethnicity:	<input type="checkbox"/> Tuareg <input type="checkbox"/> Arab <input type="checkbox"/> Hausa <input type="checkbox"/> Djerman <input type="checkbox"/> Toubou <input type="checkbox"/> Fulani <input type="checkbox"/> Kanuri <input type="checkbox"/> Other (to be specified) _____	
B.4. Age group:	<input type="checkbox"/> 18–25 years-old <input type="checkbox"/> 26–40 years-old <input type="checkbox"/> 41–60 years-old <input type="checkbox"/> 61–80 years-old	
B.5. Professional activity:	<input type="checkbox"/> Livestock farming <input type="checkbox"/> Farming <input type="checkbox"/> Crafts <input type="checkbox"/> Business <input type="checkbox"/> Other (to be specified) _____	
C - LOCAL COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS ON BORDER MANAGEMENT		
C.1. What do you think the border is for?	<input type="checkbox"/> Delimiting the separation between two States <input type="checkbox"/> Ensuring the safety of populations <input type="checkbox"/> Allowing authorities to monitor entry and exit <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Doesn't know	<p>Ask the person what they think the border is for.</p>
C.2. Do you know exactly where the border is located?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Ask where the border is in relation to where you are right now. The purpose of this question is to find out whether the person being interviewed is aware of the border in relation to where he or she lives.</p>
C.3. Have you crossed the border in the past?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Ask if the person regularly crossed the border before 2011.</p>

C.4. Are you crossing the border nowadays?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Ask if nowadays the person crosses the border into the neighbouring state.</p> <p>The goal is to know if the person has stopped crossing the border SINCE 2011.</p>
C.5. How often do you cross the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Several times a day <input type="checkbox"/> Every day <input type="checkbox"/> Often <input type="checkbox"/> 2–3 times a week <input type="checkbox"/> Once a week <input type="checkbox"/> Once a month <input type="checkbox"/> Once a year <input type="checkbox"/> Never <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>If the answer to the previous question is YES, ask how often the person crosses the border AT THE MOMENT.</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p>
C.6.a. Why did you cross the border in the past?	<input type="checkbox"/> Family <input type="checkbox"/> Economic <input type="checkbox"/> Business <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>Ask why the respondent used to cross the border in the past (before the insecurity started). More than one answer can be given.</p>
C.6.b. Why are you crossing the border today?	<input type="checkbox"/> Family <input type="checkbox"/> Economic <input type="checkbox"/> Business <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>Ask why the person is crossing the border PRESENTLY. The aim is to know if the person has crossed the border for different reasons since the insecurity began.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
C.7. Do you know the Defence and Security Forces operating at the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Ask if the person knows if DSF elements are operating at the border.</p>
C.8. If yes, which stakeholders do you know?	<input type="checkbox"/> Police <input type="checkbox"/> Gendarmes <input type="checkbox"/> National guards <input type="checkbox"/> Customs <input type="checkbox"/> Military <input type="checkbox"/> Other (to specify) _____	<p>Ask the interviewee what elements of the DSF they feel are present at the border.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>

D - SECURITY RISKS AT THE BORDER		
D.1.a What are the nationalities of the persons crossing the border?	<p>Nationalities</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Nigeriens from other regions</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Nigeriens from the neighbouring village/hamlet</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Malians</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Algerians</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Libyans</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Western African migrants</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other</p> <p>(specify): : _____</p>	<p>Ask for the nationality (ies) of people crossing the border.</p> <p>Check multiple responses if applicable.</p> <p>A person can have several nationalities. Specify other nationalities not listed above.</p> <p>The respondent(s) may not know the nationalities. Check 'don't know' If this is the case.</p>
D.1.b. What categories of people use border crossings?	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Families</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Refugees</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Migrants</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Traders</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Others (please specify): _____</p>	<p>Ask the person what types of people are crossing the border.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
D.2. Are border-crossings used for criminal activities?	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Doesn't know</p>	<p>Ask the person if they think crossing points are used by people who commit acts prohibited by Nigerien law. Explain again that the questionnaire is anonymous and that the identity of respondents will not be shared.</p> <p>Assist respondents when appropriate by providing examples of criminal activity to facilitate the response (see next question).</p>
D.3. What types of security problems are local communities facing at the border?	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Theft of livestock</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Smuggling (pasta, rice, etc.)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Attacks by armed bandits</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Incursions by armed/terrorists groups</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Other</p> <p>_____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> None</p>	<p>Ask what types of illegal acts are involved.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
D.4. Has your village/hamlet ever been affected by a border insecurity problem?	<p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No</p>	<p>Ask the person if the village/hamlet where they live has ever been directly affected by insecurity. Be careful, this question does not concern the neighbouring localities but only the one where you are.</p>



D.5. Do you know the security measures taken at the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Border control at border posts <input type="checkbox"/> Patrols <input type="checkbox"/> Search <input type="checkbox"/> Informants <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>Ask the person if they are aware of the measures taken by the DSF and the authorities to secure the border.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
D.6. How do you rate these security measures?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very sufficient <input type="checkbox"/> Quite sufficient <input type="checkbox"/> Insufficient	<p>Ask the person for their opinion on the effectiveness of these measures.</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p>
D.7. What are the risks that can result from poor border security management?	<input type="checkbox"/> Epidemics <input type="checkbox"/> Terrorist incursions/armed groups <input type="checkbox"/> Illegal trafficking <input type="checkbox"/> Banditry <input type="checkbox"/> Recruitment of youth by armed groups <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Doesn't know	<p>Ask the person what they think the risks are if the border is not secure.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
<b>E - LOCAL COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF TERRORISM</b>		
E.1. Have you ever heard of terrorism?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Ask the person if they have ever heard of terrorism or terrorists.</p> <p>Warning, these are acts committed by members of armed groups such as Al Qaeda. This question does not concern banditry or, for example, the theft of livestock by individuals acting alone.</p> <p>If the word "terrorism" does not seem appropriate to the context in which you find yourself, you can replace it with more indirect expressions such as "Ain bidiga dady" in Haoussa.</p>
E.2. What kinds of terrorist activities do you know about?	<input type="checkbox"/> Attacks on the DSF <input type="checkbox"/> Assassinations <input type="checkbox"/> Abductions <input type="checkbox"/> Bullying <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	<p>Ask the person what types of terrorist activities they are aware of.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>

E.3. What do you think can push people towards this phenomenon?	<input type="checkbox"/> Poverty <input type="checkbox"/> Lack of occupation <input type="checkbox"/> Adherence to ideology <input type="checkbox"/> Ethnic or family motivations <input type="checkbox"/> Opposition to the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Anger and frustration <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Does not know	<p>Ask the person what motivates people to participate in terrorist activities</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
E.4. Do you think your community is safe from this phenomenon? please justify your answer	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Ask the person if they consider that their community can be affected by terrorism.</p>
E.5. Why?		<p>Ask why the interviewee considers that his/her community is safe from terrorism or not?</p>
E.6. In your opinion, is the terrorist threat in the region endangered, stable or increasing?	<input type="checkbox"/> Less common <input type="checkbox"/> Stable <input type="checkbox"/> Increasing	<p>Ask the person if the terrorist threat is disappearing is still at the same level, or is it increasing.</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p>
E.7. What can be done so that local communities can prevent this kind of threat?	<input type="checkbox"/> Raise awareness among young people <input type="checkbox"/> Offer economic activities to young people <input type="checkbox"/> Involve community leaders (village leaders, imams, etc.) <input type="checkbox"/> Establish community prevention committees <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>Ask the person what communities could do to stop terrorism.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
E.8. How can the local community help authorities in the fight against terrorism and protect itself at the same time?	<input type="checkbox"/> Alert the authorities in case of a security issue <input type="checkbox"/> Defend oneself with weapons <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Nothing	<p>Ask the person how the local community can help the authorities fight terrorism.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
<b>F - EFFECTIVENESS OF BORDER MANAGEMENT</b>		
F.1. What do you think border security means?		<p>Ask the person what this means to them in terms of border security.</p> <p>Write down the answer(s) in the field provided on Kobo.</p>

F.2. Are there any patrols along the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Ask the interviewee if he/she thinks there are defence and security forces (DSF) patrols along the border.
F.3. Are there any patrols in your village?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Ask if the Defence and Security Forces (DSF) often pass through their village for patrols.
F.4. How safe do you think the area is?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Average <input type="checkbox"/> Insufficient <input type="checkbox"/> No security at all	<p>What is the respondent's opinion about the level of security in their area?</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p>
F.5. Who do you think are the local border security managers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Police <input type="checkbox"/> Gendarme <input type="checkbox"/> Customes <input type="checkbox"/> Village chief <input type="checkbox"/> Group/Canton leader <input type="checkbox"/> Sultan <input type="checkbox"/> Mayor <input type="checkbox"/> The army <input type="checkbox"/> Prefect <input type="checkbox"/> Governor	<p>Ask the respondent which services/authorities are responsible for border security.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
F.6. How do you rate the work of these actors who manage border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Unsatisfactory	<p>Ask the respondent for their opinion on the effectiveness of these services/authorities in managing border security.</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p> <p>If the person does not seem comfortable, remind her that the questionnaire will under no circumstances be handed over to the authorities. The answers given by the respondent will remain strictly confidential.</p>
F.7. Do you think local authorities alone can fully ensure border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	Ask if, according to the interviewee, the local authorities (mayor, prefect, village chief, DSF) are able to provide border security alone - i.e. without the support of local communities.
F.8. How do you rate the relationship between the local community and border security officers?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very good <input type="checkbox"/> Good <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral <input type="checkbox"/> Poor <input type="checkbox"/> Other	<p>Find out the quality of the relationship between the interviewee's community and border security officers. The goal is to know if relationships are good or not.</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p>

F.9. Does the local community ever have disputes with border security officials?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes  <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Find out if local communities and border security officials have disagreements.</p> <p>These disagreements do not necessarily involve physical violence.</p>
F.10. If so, how often do these disputes occur?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very often <input type="checkbox"/> Not very often <input type="checkbox"/> Rarely	<p>Ask if these disputes occur very often, not very often or rarely.</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p>
F.11. What are the reasons for these arguments?	<input type="checkbox"/> Fines <input type="checkbox"/> Slowdown of passage <input type="checkbox"/> Prohibition of border crossing <input type="checkbox"/> Arrest <input type="checkbox"/> Hassles <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>Ask what the reasons were for the arguments.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
F.12.a. Do the authorities sometimes organize meetings with your community on border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Find out if the authorities have already organized meetings with communities to discuss border security.</p>
F.12.b. . If yes, which ones?	<input type="checkbox"/> Renforcement de capacité <input type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Awareness raising <input type="checkbox"/> Implementation of prevention committees <input type="checkbox"/> Other (please specify)	<p>Find out what types of meetings have been organized.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
F.13. How do you rate the authorities' involvement with your community on border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Very Satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Satisfactory <input type="checkbox"/> Weak <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly weak	<p>The aim is to know whether the authorities sufficiently involve the respondent's community in border security management.</p> <p>Choose only one answer.</p>
F.14. What needs to be improved to build good relations between border security officials and communities?	<p>Ask the person what can be done to improve relations between border communities and authorities. This question should be asked even if the person feels that the relationship is already very good.</p>	<p>Note the answer(s) in the field provided on Kobo.</p>

H- COMMUNICATION BETWEEN AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNITIES ON BORDER SECURITY		
H.1.a. Is there an intermediary between local communities and authorities on border security communication?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Find out if communities use an intermediary to contact border security authorities.</p> <p>Example: traditional leader, community leader, women or youth representative, etc.</p>
H.1.b. If so, who is it?		<p>Indicate who the intermediary person is. Indicate his function or status (village chief, imam, etc.), not his name.</p>
H.2. If so, which means of communication does the population use?	<input type="checkbox"/> Telephone <input type="checkbox"/> Thuraya <input type="checkbox"/> Radio <input type="checkbox"/> Face-to-face meeting <input type="checkbox"/> Village Assembly <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>Indicate the means of communication used to contact the intermediary person.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
H.3. How to set up an alert mechanism in case of border security problems?	<input type="checkbox"/> Consultation framework between authorities and communities <input type="checkbox"/> Exchange of telephone contacts <input type="checkbox"/> Local Information Committee <input type="checkbox"/> Regular visits by the authorities to the village <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	<p>Ask the interviewee what they think are the most appropriate measures to enable effective communication between communities and authorities about border security.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
H.4. What means do you think should be used to ensure that information is shared?	<input type="checkbox"/> Telephone <input type="checkbox"/> Thuraya <input type="checkbox"/> SMS <input type="checkbox"/> Radio <input type="checkbox"/> Face-to-face meeting <input type="checkbox"/> Village Assembly <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<p>Ask the interviewee what are the most effective means of communication between communities and authorities for border security.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
H.5. What do you see as the benefits of good communication between the authorities and the local community on border security?	<input type="checkbox"/> Immediate reaction from the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Security problem included in time <input type="checkbox"/> Reducing the impact of border insecurity on local populations <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	<p>Ask the interviewee what positive effects good communication between communities and authorities would have.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>

H.6. What do you think are the risks of poor communication between the two entities?	<input type="checkbox"/> Fast widespread of insecurity <input type="checkbox"/> Late reaction by the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Gravity of the consequences for local communities <input type="checkbox"/> Loss of community trust in authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	<p>Ask what negative effects can result from poor communication between communities and authorities.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
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## I - EMERGENCY RESPONSE

I.1. What do you think can cause massive population movements at the border?	<input type="checkbox"/> Armed conflict <input type="checkbox"/> Occasional terrorist attacks <input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Epidemic <input type="checkbox"/> Natural disasters (floods, drought, etc). <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____	<p>Ask what can cause a very large number of people to cross the border or move within the border area.</p>
I.2. Do you think the communities are ready to face such a situation?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	<p>Ask if the communities are able to manage the arrival and displacement of a very large number of people in their village/hamlet.</p>
I.3. Why?	<input type="checkbox"/> Crisis situation already experienced, positive reaction of the population <input type="checkbox"/> Awareness-raising by local authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Community well prepared and organized for this purpose <input type="checkbox"/> Crisis situation already experienced, negative reaction of the population <input type="checkbox"/> Panic and runaway as soon as they feel threatened <input type="checkbox"/> Already terrified, misinformed and disorganized population <input type="checkbox"/> Other (to be specified) _____	<p>If the answer to the previous question is yes, ask why the interviewee thinks the communities are ready to manage an emergency. Several possible answers</p> <p>If the answer to the previous question is no, ask the interviewee why they think their community is not ready. More than one answer can be given.</p>
I.4. What roles do you think authorities should play in an emergency situation?	<input type="checkbox"/> Welcoming the displaced population <input type="checkbox"/> Provision of emergency equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Rescue the sick and wounded <input type="checkbox"/> Securing the reception area <input type="checkbox"/> Immediate care for displaced persons <input type="checkbox"/> Relocating the displaced	<p>Ask the interviewee what they think authorities should do in case of emergency.</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p> <p>An emergency is a situation in which a large number of people are in serious danger (illness, lack of water and food, serious and numerous armed attacks, etc.). Some examples: epidemic, floods or drought, etc. An emergency situation requires a rapid response to help the victims.</p>



I.5. What roles should the local community play in an emergency situation?	<input type="checkbox"/> Welcome the displaced population <input type="checkbox"/> Inform local authorities promptly <input type="checkbox"/> Coordinate with the local authority to facilitate the care of displaced persons <input type="checkbox"/> Remain vigilant <input type="checkbox"/> Respect and follow the measures taken by the present authority	<p>In an emergency, what can the local community do to help those affected?</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>
I.6. How can the local community and authorities effectively manage an emergency situation?		<p>According to the interviewee, what steps should be taken to ensure that the local community can work effectively with the authorities in an emergency situation.</p> <p>Note the answer(s) in the field provided on Kobo.</p>
I.7. How to prevent an emergency with the local community?	<input type="checkbox"/> Enable, promote and encourage the local population to play the role of a vigilance committee <input type="checkbox"/> Strengthen the information transmission capacities of the local community towards the authorities <input type="checkbox"/> Other (to be specified) _____	<p>What steps should be taken before an emergency occurs to enable it to be better managed?</p> <p>More than one answer can be given.</p>

# Annex: Processing of survey data

## 1. Respondents profiles

### A.2 and A.3: Distribution of respondents by department and municipalities

Department/Municipality	Number of respondents	%
<b>Arlit department</b>	<b>3,652</b>	<b>49.40</b>
CU-Arlit	793	10.7
Dannet	1,079	14.6
Gougaram	1,780	24.1
<b>Ingall department</b>	<b>1,854</b>	<b>25.01</b>
Ingall	1,854	25.1
<b>Tchirozerine department</b>	<b>1,883</b>	<b>25.5</b>
CU-Tchirozerine	1,883	25.5
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### B.1: Distribution of respondents by gender

Gender	Number of respondents	%
Male	4,674	63.3
Female	2,715	36.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### B.3: Distribution of respondents by age group

Age group	Number of respondents	%
18–25 years-old	1,531	20.7
26–40 years-old	3,489	47.2
41–60 years-old	1,990	26.9
61–80 years-old	379	5.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### B.2.a: Distribution of respondents by nationality

Nationality	Distribution of respondents by nationality	%
Nigerien	7,212	97.6
Malian	99	1.3
Algerian	35	0.5
Chadian	35	0.5
Nigerian	3	0.0
Other	5	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## B.2.b: Ethnic distribution of respondents

Ethnic groups	Number of respondents	%
Tuareg	6,085	82.4
Hausa	565	7.6
Fulani	409	5.5
Djerma	124	1.7
Arab	116	1.6
Toubou	45	0.6
Othe	23	0.3
Kanuri	22	0.3
<b>Ensemble</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## B.4.a: Distribution of respondent by main economic activity

Professional activity	Number of respondents	%
Livestock breeding	3,397	45.97
Business	1,245	16.85
Farming	909	12.30
Managerial work	772	10.45
Unemployed	143	1.94
Crafts	135	1.83
Task worker	117	1.58
Administration	101	1.37
Student	30	0.41
Gold digger	10	0.14
Customary authority	8	0.11
Annuitant	2	0.03
Retired	2	0.03
Other activites	518	7.01
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## B.4.b: Distribution of respondents by other main types of economic activities

Professional activity	Number of respondents	%
Driver / Carrier	64	44.8
Tailor	29	20.3
Religious leader	18	12.6
Learning Koranic school	16	11.2
Koranic school teacher	5	3.5
Apprentice driver	3	2.1
Traditional hairdresser	3	2.1
Security/guard	2	1.4
Football player	1	0.7
Road Guide	1	0.7
Migrant	1	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100.00</b>

## 2. Perceptions of local communities on border management

### C.1: Distribution of respondents by purpose of the border

Purpose of the border	Number of respondents	%
Delimiting the separation between two States	4,582	62.0
Ensuring the safety of populations	3,740	50.6
Allow authorities to monitor entry and exit	3,616	48.9
Doesn't know	705	9.5
Other utilities	30	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### C.2.a: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the geographical location of the border

Knowledge of the geographical location of the border	Number of respondents	%
Do not know	2,695	36.5
Know well	4,694	63.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### C.2.b: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the geographical situation of the border according to Departments/Municipality

Department/Municipality	Knows		Does not know	
	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%
CU-Arlit	268	4	525	7
CU-Tchirozerine	1,158	16	725	10
Dannet	800	11	279	4
Ingall	1,230	17	624	8
Gougaram	1,238	17	542	7
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>4,694</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>2,695</b>	<b>36</b>

### C.3 and C.4: Distribution of respondents by time of border crossing

Border crossing	Number of respondents	%
<b>Crossing the border in the past</b>		
Have never crossed the border	3,247	43.9
Had to cross the border	4,142	56.1
<b>Crossing the border at the time of the investigation</b>		
Do not cross the border	5,074	68.7
Continue to cross the border	2,315	31.3
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### C.5: Distribution of respondents by border crossing frequency

Frequency of border crossing at the moment	Number of respondents	%
Other crossing frequencies	19	1.4
Every day	18	1.3
Several times a day	35	2.6
Two to three times a week	69	5.1
Once a week	98	7.2
Once a month	410	30.2
Once a year	707	52.1
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>1,356</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### C.3 and C.4: Distribution of respondents by border crossing according to areas

Border crossing	Arlit		Ingall/Tchirozerine	
	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%
<b>Crossing the border in the past</b>				
No	1,641	44.9	1,606	43.0
Yes	2,011	55.1	2,131	57.0
Grand total	3,652	100.0	3,737	100.0
<b>Crossing the border at the time of the investigation</b>				
No	2,406	65.9	2,668	71
Yes	1,246	34.1	1,069	29
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>3,652</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,737</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### C.6.a and C.6.b: Distribution of respondents by reason for crossing the border by period

Border crossing	Before		Now	
	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%
Family	1,952	47.1	999	43.2
Economic	2,350	56.7	1,501	64.8
Business	1,721	41.5	1,242	53.7
Other reasons	234	5.6	88	3.8

### C.7: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of DSF at the border

Knowledge of the DSF presence at the border	Number of respondents	%
Do not know	2,268	30.7
Knows	5,121	69.3
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### C.8: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the types of actors present at the border

Knowledge of the DSF presence at the border	Number of respondents	%
Police	3,480	68.0
Gendarmes	3,302	64.5
National Guard	2,385	46.6
Customs	3,010	58.8
Military	3,473	67.8
Other	23	0.4

## 3. Security risks at the border

### D.1.a: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the nationalities of persons crossing the border

Nationalities of people crossing the border	Number of respondents	%
Nigeriens from other regions	5,556	75.2
Nigeriens from the neighbouring village/hamlet	4,644	62.9
Western African migrants	4,596	62.2
Maliens	2,327	31.5
Algerians	2,053	27.8
Libyans	1,124	15.2
Sudanese	33	0.4
Cameroonian	28	0.4
Gabonese	2	0.1
Doesn't know	660	8.9

### D.1.b: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the categories of persons crossing the border

Categories of persons crossing the border	Number of respondents	%
Families	3,799	51.4
Refugees	3,019	40.9
Migrants	5,442	73.7
Traders	4,697	63.6
Doesn't know	729	9.9
Other categories	3	0.1

### D.2: Distribution of respondents by opinion on border crossing points used for criminal activities

Border crossing points used for prohibited acts	Number of respondents	%
Yes	3,952	53.5
No	866	11.7
Doesn't know	2,571	34.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>



### D.3: Distribution of respondents by types of security problems faced by local communities at the border

Types of illegal acts experienced by communities	Number of respondents	%
Attacks by armed bandits	5,197	70.33
Trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.)	3,716	50.29
Smuggling (pasta, rice, etc.)	3,331	45.08
Livestock theft	3,132	42.39
Incursions by armed groups/terrorists	1,610	21.79
No problem	621	8.40
Doesn't know	475	6.43
Migrants trafficking	13	0.18
Corruption	5	0.07
Theft of durable goods	3	0.04

### D.3: Distribution of respondents by types of security problems faced by local communities at the border respondents by areas

Types of illegal acts experienced by communities	Arlit	Ingall/Tchirozerine
Other problems	7.4%	6.0%
Attacks by armed bandits	67.6%	73.0%
No problem	6.5%	10.2%
Smuggling (pasta, rice, etc.)	48.7%	41.6%
Incursions by armed groups/terrorists	30.8%	13.0%
Trafficking (drugs, weapons, etc.)	54.5%	46.2%
Livestock theft	40.2%	44.5%

### D.4: Distribution of respondents by locality affected at least once by a border insecurity problem

Localities affected by a border insecurity problem	Number of respondents	%
Affected at least once	2,414	32.7
Never affected	4,975	67.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### D.5: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of the measures taken to secure the border

Measures taken to secure borders	Number of respondents	%
Border control at border posts	5,198	70.3
Patrols	4,877	66.0
Search	4,206	56.9
Information/Informants	986	13.3
Doesn't know	684	9.3
None	16	0.2

## D.6: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the measures taken to secure the border

Assessment of measures taken to secure borders	Number of respondents	%
Very sufficient	795	10.8
Quite sufficient	4,964	67.2
Insufficient	1,630	22.1
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## D.7: Distribution of Respondents by Potential Risks from Poor Border Security Management

Risks arising from poor border management	Number of respondents	%
Banditry	6,217	84.1
Illegal trafficking	5,025	68.0
Terrorist incursions/armed groups	3,776	51.1
Epidemics	2,841	38.4
Recruitment of youth by armed groups	1,957	26.5
Doesn't know	578	7.8

## 4. Perception of local communities on terrorism

### E.1: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of terrorism

Heard about terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Yes	6,674	90.3
No	715	9.7
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### E.1: Distribution of respondents by type of known terrorist activity

Known terrorist activities	Number of respondents	%
Attacks on the DSF	5,783	78.3
Assassinations	5,374	72.7
Abductions	4,338	58.7
Bullying	1,429	19.3
Doesn't know	657	8.9

### E.2: Distribution of respondents by type of known terrorist activity by municipality of residence

Known terrorist activities	Arlit	Dannet	Gougram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Attacks on the DSF	80.5%	80.6%	77.7%	85.5%	68.9%
Assassinations	64.5%	81.3%	66.3%	74.2%	76.2%
Abductions	64.8%	66.3%	50.6%	59.7%	56.4%
Bullying	34.0%	33.4%	16.7%	13.9%	10.4%
Doesn't know	2.7%	4.1%	9.8%	7.4%	15.9%

### E.3: Distribution of respondents by reasons pushing towards the terrorist phenomenon

Reasons pushing towards terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Poverty	5,097	69.0
Lack of occupation	4,910	66.5
Adherence to ideology	3,341	45.2
Ethnic or family motivations	1,601	21.7
Opposition to the authorities	1,965	26.6
Anger and frustration	1,650	22.3
Doesn't know	734	9.9
Other reasons	42	0.6

### E.3: Distribution of respondents by reasons pushing towards the terrorist phenomenon according to municipalities

Reasons pushing towards terrorism	Arlit	Dannet	Gougram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Poverty	68.5%	76.9%	58.6%	80.2%	62.0%
Lack of occupation	60.7%	81.0%	64.0%	79.1%	50.8%
Adherence to ideology	33.7%	50.0%	57.9%	32.3%	51.6%
Ethnic or family motivations	26.0%	20.8%	39.9%	6.3%	20.2%
Opposition to the authorities	25.3%	42.7%	38.1%	17.5%	17.9%
Anger and frustration	21.2%	25.7%	31.8%	30.0%	5.9%
Doesn't know	8.7%	4.1%	9.1%	2.2%	16.1%
Other reasons	0.2%	0.2%	1.5%	0.7%	0.2%

### E.3: Distribution of respondents by reasons pushing towards the terrorist phenomenon

Other reasons for terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Use of narcotics/drugs	26	61.9
Ignorance	9	21.4
Western Politics	7	16.7
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### E.4: Distribution of respondents by opinion on their community's exposure to terrorism

Community safe from terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Safe from terrorism	2,663	36.0
Exposed to terrorism	4,726	64.0
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## E.6: Distribution of respondents by evolution of the terrorist threat

Evolution of the terrorist threat	Number of respondents	%
Less common	1,701	23.0
Stable	3,070	41.5
Increasing	2,618	35.4
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## E.6: Distribution of respondents by evolution of the terrorist threat according to the municipalities

Evolution of the terrorist threat	Arlit	Dannet	Gougram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Increasing	5.1%	58.9%	41.5%	37.1%	32.8%
Less common	55.3%	30.9%	8.1%	14.2%	20.7%
Stable	39.6%	10.2%	50.5%	48.7%	46.6%

## E.7: Distribution of respondents by recommended action to prevent terrorist threats

Community actions to prevent terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Offer economic activities to young people	5,802	78.5
Raise awareness among young people	5,561	75.3
Involving community leaders	3,859	52.2
Establish community prevention committees	2,330	31.5
Nothing	173	2.3
Other actions	44	0.6

## E.7: Distribution of respondents by recommended action to prevent terrorist threats according to the municipalities of residence

Actions to prevent terrorism	Arlit	Dannet	Gougram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Raise awareness among young people	74.9%	58.6%	81.3%	89.0%	66.7%
Offer economic activities to young people	68.0%	86.9%	83.5%	92.2%	62.2%
Involving community leaders	29.0%	50.2%	74.0%	58.3%	43.3%
Implement prevention committees	20.7%	37.7%	46.5%	37.2%	16.7%
Nothing at all	0.7%	2.4%	1.4%	0.5%	5.8%
Other actions	0.1%	0.0%	1.7%	0.6%	0.3%

## E.8: Distribution of respondents by type of support to the authorities to fight effectively against the terrorist

Community support for the fight against terrorism	Number of respondents	%
Alert the authorities in case of a problem	7,246	98.1
Defending yourself with weapons	1,025	13.9
Nothing	77	1.0
Other activities	75	1.0

### E.9: Distribution of respondents by type of support to the authorities to fight effectively against the terrorist according to the municipalities of residence

Support for the fight against terrorism	Arlit	Dannet	Gougram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Alert the authorities in case of a problem	99.07%	99.26%	97.33%	99.41%	96.07%
Defending yourself with weapons	23.79%	9.26%	11.07%	3.94%	22.89%
Nothing at all	0.65%	1.39%	1.40%	0.11%	1.70%
Other forms of support	0.09%	0.00%	2.60%	0.43%	1.43%

## 5. Effectiveness of border management

### F.2.a: Distribution of respondents by patrol observation along the border

Patrol crossing along the border	Number of respondents	%
Yes	5,539	75.0
No	1,850	25.0
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### F.2.b: Distribution of respondents by patrol observation along the border by municipality

Municipality:	No border patrol		Border patrol		Total/Municipality	
	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%
CU-Arlit	396	36.9	676	63.1	1,072	100.0
Dannet	391	36.2	689	63.8	1,080	100.0
Gougaram	272	18.1	1,228	81.9	1,500	100.0
Ingall	435	23.5	1,419	76.5	1,854	100.0
CU-Tchirozerine	356	18.9	1,527	81.1	1,883	100.0
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>1,850</b>	<b>25.0</b>	<b>5,539</b>	<b>75.0</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### F.3.a: Distribution of respondents by observation of patrol passage at the locality level

Patrol passage in the village	Number of respondents	%
Yes	5,537	74.9
No	1,852	25.1
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### F.3.b: Distribution of respondents by observation of patrol passage at locality level according to communes

Municipality	No border patrol		Border patrol		Total/Municipality	
	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%
CU-Arlit	113	10.54	959	89.46	1,072	100.0
Dannet	451	41.76	629	58.24	1,080	100.0
Gougaram	393	26.20	1,107	73.80	1,500	100.0
Ingall	601	32.42	1,253	67.58	1,854	100.0
CU-Tchirozerine	294	15.61	1,589	84.39	1,883	100.0
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>1,853</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>5,537</b>	<b>74.9</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### F.3&F.4: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the level of safety in the locality

Security level in the area	No border patrol		Border patrol	
	Number of respondents	%	Number of respondents	%
Good	146	2.0	1,130	15.3
Average	879	11.9	3,462	46.9
Insufficient	538	7.3	911	12.3
No security at all	289	3.9	34	0.5
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>1,852</b>	<b>25.1</b>	<b>5,537</b>	<b>74.9</b>

### F.5: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of types of known local border security managers

Local border management officials	Number of respondents	%
Village chief	4,127	55.9
Gendarme	4,118	55.7
The army	3,744	50.7
Police	3,077	41.6
Mayor	2,950	39.9
Group/Canton leader	2,093	28.3
Customs	1,813	24.5
Prefect	1,322	17.9
Sultan	918	12.4
Governor	559	7.6

### F.6: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the effectiveness of these services/authorities in border security management

Efficiency of these services/authorities	Number of respondents	%
Very satisfactory	854	11.6
Fairly satisfactory	5,208	70.5
Unsatisfactory	1,327	18.0
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>



### F.7: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the capacity of local authorities (mayor, prefect, village chief, DSF) to ensure border security alone without the support of local communities

Security guaranteed by the authorities alone	Number of respondents	%
Yes	1,298	17.6
No	6,091	82.4
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### F.8.a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and border security officers

Quality of the relationship between the community and the DSFs	Number of respondents	%
Very good	774	10.5
Good	4,921	66.6
Neutral	1,069	14.5
Poor	625	8.5
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### F.8.b: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the quality of relations between the community and border security officers by municipality

Municipalities	Quality of Community/DSF reports			
	Very good	Good	Neutre	Mauvaise
CU-Arlit	8.2%	67.2%	12.4%	12.2%
Dannet	2.7%	45.7%	28.7%	22.9%
Gougaram	8.3%	81.5%	8.6%	1.7%
Ingall	5.7%	67.6%	21.6%	5.1%
CU-Tchirozerine	22.7%	65.4%	5.1%	6.7%
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>10.48%</b>	<b>66.60%</b>	<b>14.47%</b>	<b>8.46%</b>

### F.9: Distribution of respondents by knowledge about the occurrence of disagreement between local communities and border security officials

Occurrence of an argument with security officials	Effectif	%
Yes	974	13.2
No	6,413	86.8
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### F.10.a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between community and border security authorities

Frequency of disputes between community and authorities	Effectif	%
Very often	145	14.9
Not very often	522	53.6
Rarely	307	31.5
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>974</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**F.10.b: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the frequency of disputes between the community and the authorities in charge of securing the border according to the communes**

Municipality	Frequency of disputes between community and authorities		
	Very often	Not very often	Rarely
CU-Arlit	30.5%	57.9%	11.6%
Dannet	11.5%	32.5%	56.1%
Gougaram	23.4%	53.8%	22.8%
Ingall	3.4%	64.7%	31.9%
CU-Tchirozerine	16.3%	43.8%	40.0%
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>14.89%</b>	<b>53.59%</b>	<b>31.52%</b>

**F.11: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the reasons which caused the disputes between the community and the authorities in charge of securing the border according to the communes**

Reasons for disputes with security authorities	Number of respondents	%
Fines	295	30.3
Slowdown of passage	115	11.8
Prohibition of border crossing	161	16.5
Arrest	209	21.5
Hassles	194	19.9
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>974</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**F.12.a: Distribution of respondents by notice of meetings organized by authorities with communities to discuss border security**

Border Security Meeting Organization	Number of respondents	%
No	6,067	82.1
Yes	1,322	17.9
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**F.12.a: Distribution of respondents by notice of meetings organized by the authorities with the communities to discuss border security according to the communes**

Types of meetings organized	Arlit	Dannet	Gougaram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Capacity-building	84.3%	24.1%	64.3%	7.1%	54.8%
Training	37.1%	59.8%	18.9%	6.3%	29.6%
Awareness-raising	75.7%	51.3%	82.1%	99.2%	88.9%
Implementation of prevention committees	38.6%	17.1%	73.9%	5.6%	8.9%

### F.13: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the authorities' involvement with your community on border security

Assessment of the authorities' involvement	Number of respondents	%
Very satisfactory	712	9.6
Satisfactory	3,830	51.8
Weak	2,202	29.8
Fairly weak	645	8.7
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 6. Communication between the authorities and communities on border security

### H.1.a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the existence of an intermediary between local communities and authorities in border security communication

Existence of intermediary person	Number of respondents	%
No	6,067	82.1
Yes	1,322	17.9
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### H.1.b: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of profiles of intermediaries between local communities and authorities in border security communication

Intermediary profiles with the authorities	Number of respondents	%
Village chief/representative	2,401	75.1
Tribal leader/grouping	116	3.6
Mayor/Councillor of the locality	548	17.1
Sultan/Canton Chief	55	1.7
Anyone in the locality	79	2.5
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>3,199</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### H.1.c: Distribution of respondents by knowledge of profiles of intermediaries between local communities and authorities in border security communication according to municipalities

Intermediaries profiles	Arlit	Dannet	Gougaram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Village chief/representative	32.4%	39.1%	86.6%	87.6%	86.5%
Tribal leader/grouping	0.0%	0.5%	5.4%	10.5%	0.9%
Mayor/Councillor of the locality	58.8%	50.5%	6.8%	0.5%	8.1%
Sultan/Canton Chief	0.0%	7.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.8%
Anyone in the locality	8.8%	2.1%	1.3%	1.4%	3.6%

### H.2.a: Distribution of respondents by means of communication used by the population to contact the intermediary person

Means of communication used by the population	Number of respondents	%
Telephone	2,276	71.1
Face-to-face meeting	2,075	64.9
Village assembly	1,522	47.6
Thuraya	846	26.4
Radio	256	8.0

### H.2.b: Distribution of respondents by means of communication used by the population to contact the intermediary person according to the communes

Moyens de communication utilisés	Arlit	Dannet	Gougaram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Téléphone	93.2%	72.1%	51.7%	75.2%	90.1%
Thuraya	60.1%	19.0%	45.8%	11.7%	7.9%
Radio	24.3%	11.0%	2.3%	4.5%	12.2%
Face-to-face meeting	27.7%	56.0%	81.6%	78.0%	49.4%
Village assembly	12.8%	46.1%	69.3%	33.2%	33.2%

### H.3.a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measures to enable effective communication between communities and authorities about border security

Alert mechanism	Number of respondents	%
Exchange of telephone contacts	5,615	76.0
Consultation framework between authorities and communities	4,716	63.8
Local Information Committee	3,895	52.7
Regular visits by the authorities to the village	3,535	47.8
Other mechanisms	183	2.5

### H.3.b: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most appropriate measures to enable effective communication between communities and authorities on border security according to municipalities

Alert mechanism	Arlit	Dannet	Gougaram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Consultation framework between authorities and communities	54.1%	81.8%	70.2%	79.0%	39.0%
Exchange of telephone contacts	81.0%	77.0%	61.3%	74.9%	85.3%
Local Information Committee	40.1%	64.8%	61.1%	70.7%	28.5%
Regular visits by the authorities to the village	19.0%	73.2%	65.7%	55.1%	28.4%
Other mechanisms	1.1%	0.0%	3.1%	0.3%	6.3%

#### H.4.a: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most effective means of communication between communities and authorities for border security

Means of information sharing	Number of respondents	%
Telephone	5,978	80.9
Face-to-face meeting	3,607	48.8
Thuraya	3,231	43.7
Village assembly	2,885	39.0
Radio/Television	1,853	25.1
SMS	1,317	17.8
Other means	77	1.0

#### H.4.b: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the most effective means of communication between communities and authorities for border security according to municipalities

Means of information sharing	Arlit	Dannet	Gougaram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Telephone	87.6%	83.0%	42.4%	95.7%	92.0%
Thuraya	51.3%	62.9%	47.3%	52.3%	17.1%
SMS	16.1%	15.6%	10.1%	26.0%	18.2%
Radio/Television	24.7%	25.7%	16.9%	33.1%	23.6%
Face-to-face meeting	35.6%	54.8%	85.1%	32.3%	40.3%
Village assembly	9.7%	47.0%	68.8%	33.7%	32.7%
Other means of sharing guarantee	0.2%	0.1%	2.2%	0.0%	2.2%

#### H.5: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the positive effects of good communication between communities and authorities

Benefits of good communication	Number of respondents	%
Immediate reaction from the authorities	5,956	80.6
Security problem included in time	5,608	75.9
Reducing the impact of border insecurity on local populations	4,782	64.7
Other benefits	92	1.2

#### H.6: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the negative effects of poor communication between communities and authorities

Risk of poor communication between 2 entities	Number of respondents	%
Fast widespread of insecurity	5,805	78.6
Gravity of the consequences for local communities	5,278	71.4
Late reaction by the authorities	4,632	62.7
Loss of community trust in authorities	3,360	45.5
Other risks	86	1.2

## 7. Response to an emergency situation

### I.1.a: Distribution of respondents by causes of mass population movements at the border

Causes of massive population movements at the border	Number of respondents	%
Armed conflict	5,512	74.6
Occasional terrorist attacks	5,430	73.5
Migration	3,516	47.6
Natural disasters (floods, drought, etc.)	3,423	46.3
Epidemic	3,179	43.0
Poverty/employment search/better living conditions	362	4.9
Doesn't know	36	0.5

### I.1.b: Distribution of respondents by causes of massive population displacements at the border according to communes

Causes of mass displacement at the border	Arlit	Dannet	Gougaram	Ingall	Tchirozerine
Armed conflict	46.7%	71.5%	90.3%	86.5%	68.1%
Occasional terrorist attacks	53.0%	75.6%	83.4%	79.8%	69.8%
Migration	56.9%	43.1%	58.5%	34.5%	49.0%
Epidemic	53.3%	61.8%	35.5%	54.0%	21.6%
Natural disasters (floods, drought, etc.)	30.0%	73.3%	79.5%	36.4%	23.5%
Poverty/employment search/better living conditions	0.0%	0.3%	0.6%	0.8%	3.3%
Doesn't know	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%

### I.2: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the capacity of the communities to manage the arrival and displacement of a very large number of people in their village/hamlet

Community capacity to manage massive displacement	Number of respondents	%
Yes	2,502	33.9
No	4,887	66.1
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>7,389</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### I.3: Distribution of Respondents by Reasons Communities are Ready to Manage an Emergency

Reasons for community maturity in managing an emergency situation	Number of respondents	%
Panic and runaway as soon as they feel threatened	533	59.2
Crisis situation already experienced, positive reaction of the population	523	58.0
Crisis situation already experienced, negative reaction of the population	281	31.2
Awareness-raising by local authorities	238	26.4
Community well prepared and organized for this purpose	208	23.1
Already terrified, misinformed and disorganized population	116	12.9

Note: this question was asked only to those who answered Yes to the previous one (Cf. Kobo form).



### I.5: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the roles authorities should play in an emergency situation

Roles of emergency authorities	Number of respondents	%
Welcoming the displaced population	6,475	87.6
Provision of emergency equipment	5,227	70.7
Rescue the sick and wounded	4,750	64.3
Immediate care for displaced persons	3,568	48.3
Securing the reception area	3,295	44.6
Relocating the displaced	1,818	24.6

### I.6: Distribution of respondents by opinion on the roles that communities must play in an emergency situation

Community roles in emergencies	Number of respondents	%
Informer rapidement les autorités locales	6,128	82.9
Welcoming the displaced population	5,679	76.9
Coordinate with the local authority to facilitate the care of displaced persons	4,215	57.0
Respect and follow the measures taken by the authority present	2,825	38.0
Remain vigilant	2,572	34.8

### I.7: Distribution of respondents by actions to be taken before an emergency arises to enable it to be better managed

Preventing an emergency with communities	Number of respondents	%
Strengthen the information transmission capacities of the local community towards the authorities	6,367	86.2
Enable, promote and encourage the local population to play the role of a vigilance committee	5,572	75.4
Autres mesures de prévention	64	0.9



