MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

A Bimonthly Journal for and by Policymakers Worldwide

ISSN 2223-5248

Vol. V, Number 4, October–November 2015

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Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

Migrants and refugees in Horgos, at the Serbian-Hungarian border. © IOM 2015 (Photo: Francesco Malavolta)
Introduction

Solon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Welcome to the new issue of Migration Policy Practice, which focuses on the current migrant crisis in Europe.

The first article, by Alex Wittlif (Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (SVR)), examines the current methods for measuring the levels of integration of immigrants in Europe, following the European Commission’s call for the development of an EU-wide unified catalogue of indicators on migrant integration. The article discusses, in particular, Germany’s SVR Integration Barometer, which is based on a survey conducted every two years among both immigrants and German nationals. The Barometer provides a description of perception patterns and an examination of previously unconsidered integration processes. It is targeted at both policymakers and integration practitioners.

The second article, by AKM Ahsan Ullah (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the University of Brunei Darussalam), discusses the situation of Syrian separated children fleeing war. To date, thousands of unaccompanied Syrian children have journeyed on foot to seek safety across the border in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. The article discusses the key findings of in-depth interviews conducted with officials of different organizations (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and international humanitarian non-governmental organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières and the International Committee of the Red Cross) working on the ground in the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. The study shows, in particular, that many of the unaccompanied Syrian children were slipped into the hands of smugglers and traffickers and that most of those who were trafficked were unaware of their final destinations.

The third article, by Joanne van Selm (Eurasylum), questions the reasons why the EU Temporary Protection Directive has not yet been implemented in the context of the current migrant crisis in Europe. The Directive provides for Member States to agree, by qualified majority, that a named national group should qualify for temporary protection starting from a specified date. An estimate of the numbers needs to be made, and, under the solidarity section of the Directive, Member States should indicate the number of temporary protection places they are willing to offer. The article suggests that it is high time for the Directive to be considered by EU leaders in the context of the ongoing Syrian influx.

The last article, by Claudia Natali and Michael Newson (IOM), outlines the IOM approach to addressing the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean. The Organization’s position is that while legal migration channels should remain a central feature of any policy response aimed at reducing irregular migration, this is only one of a number of complementary interventions that governments must work on to address irregular migration. IOM believes, in particular, that any policy aimed at addressing seriously the challenges posed by irregular migration should include initiatives to improve resilience by building sustainable and decent livelihood and employment opportunities for the youth, and should raise awareness to promote safe migration and deter irregular migration. Sufficient resources should also be made available, including with a view to strengthening data collection efforts and therefore enhancing our understanding of the drivers and shifting sources of migration.

We thank all the contributors to this issue of Migration Policy Practice and invite readers to spare a couple of minutes to participate in a survey which aims to help us identify our readers’ profiles, the institutions they represent and their primary interests in our journal. Should you wish to participate in this survey, please click here.
Measuring migrant integration in Germany: The SVR Integration Barometer as an instrument of scientific policy advice

Alexander Wittlif

A key task for all countries is to ensure equal participation and equal access to all resources for immigrants as well as citizens without a migration background. In order to guarantee equal opportunities, an empirical basis that captures the current integration level of the immigrant population and that is able to assess their chances for participation is required. The obtained information can be used for identifying action fields for a specific target group and serve as a basis for developing strategies for discrimination reduction.

Measuring the integration level in a comprehensive manner is in many respects a challenging endeavour for migration research, which, however, all countries are prompted to undertake. In 2009, the European Union (EU) suggested the development of an EU-wide unified catalogue of indicators on migrant integration, in order to gather as many synergy effects as possible for policy development across Member States. This catalogue was worked up to comparably depict the integration level of the immigrant third-country nationals in each country and consequently to foster the learning-from-others approach, which has been commonly used in the migration policy for years. The EU’s suggestion already included a number of indicators which, in regard to the socioeconomic position of the immigrant population, aimed at the essential spheres of labour market, education, social inclusion and political participation. This kind of measurement should be differentiated from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which considers migration- and integration-specific State policies such as legal access to the labour market for immigrants or possibilities for naturalization.

How can the “soft”, intersubjective integration data be collected?

Germany took up the EU’s proposal and developed an extensive catalogue of indicators based on the largest available data source, the Microcensus, to depict the level of migrant integration every two years. It is noticeable that the German implementation focuses on the structural dimension of integration, thus neglecting the subjective dimensions of the integration process (also included in the mentioned EU’s suggestion). Emphasis of the catalogue of indicators is clearly put on the objectively measurable “hard” data such as labour-market outcomes, educational performance, living conditions, public health and the like. Subjective data on the individuals’ attitudes towards and assessments of integration is completely lacking. For example, the assessment of life in a multicultural society or other identificational integration issues cannot be extrapolated from the available statistical data sources. In 2009, to address this lack of information, the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (SVR)) developed a tailored empirical survey instrument, the SVR Integration Barometer. The Barometer allows for a description of perception patterns and an examination of previously

1 Alex Wittlif is a Senior Researcher at the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für Integration und Migration (SVR)), where he oversees all quantitative analyses and is responsible for the SVR Integration Barometer.

2 For more information, see: Swedish Presidency of the European Union, Presidency Conference Conclusions on Indicators and Monitoring of the Outcome of Integration Policies, Meeting No. 597, Malmö, Sweden, 14–16 December 2009.


unconsidered integration processes. The survey – conducted every two years – involves not only immigrants but also the majority population and, therefore, depicts the mutual acceptance on both sides of the immigration society.

Sampling immigrants for the SVR Integration Barometer

Constructing an instrument for documenting integration-relevant assessment patterns poses the challenge for appropriately representing the immigrant population. Is it sufficient to recruit an adequately large number of immigrants for a survey and draw comparisons with the majority population? The SVR goes beyond a binary survey of “immigrants versus non-immigrants” and even differentiates the different groups of origin in the Integration Barometer. Thus, it is possible to analyse integration processes in the context of greatly varying immigration and socialization patterns. The selected method – depending on the geographic-origin-specific composition of the immigrants – is principally applicable for all countries of origin, from which there is a significant share among the general population. The choice of the origin groups to be separately recruited for the survey specifically orientates on the most pertinent existing immigrant population. According to the Microcensus of 2013, and referring to the persons aged 15 and older to be involved in the survey, there are about 69 million Germans without a migration background living in Germany and 12.8 million people who either immigrated to Germany after 1949 themselves or are descendants of at least one parent with a migratory history. Itemization of immigrants by country of origin or alternatively immigration status results in their distribution into almost equally sized four groups: 3.7 million immigrants from the EU countries; 3.4 million “Aussiedler”, or immigrants with German roots mainly from the countries of the former Soviet Union; 2.1 million immigrants from Turkey who came to Germany as the so-called “guest workers”, or for the reason of family reunification; and 3.6 million from the rest of the world. Proceeding from this distribution and basing on a predetermined quota, these groups (together with a comparison group of people without a migration background) are components of the SVR Integration Barometer 2016. Thus, a detailed composition reads as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population aged 16 and older in Germany (in million)</th>
<th>Participants in the SVR Integration Barometer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without migration background</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aussiedler</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU I (Entry before 2000 or born in Germany)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU II (Entry after 2000)</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of the world</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This differentiated allocation takes the heterogeneous composition of the immigrant population into account. It also enables a detailed look at integration processes within specific origin groups, which differ due to various legal and/or historical immigration circumstances. Furthermore, not only the largest immigration populations are taken into account but also the migration flows that are currently gaining strength (EU II).

The aim of such a differentiated approach is to provide the political decision makers with an empirical basis of “soft” indicators in addition to the structural data relating to the socioeconomic position. Due to the sample size, apart from showing descriptively varying assessments between the origin groups, the SVR Integration Barometer can also reveal inter-individual and integration-relevant processes taking place within a definable socialization milieu, for example, based on value orientations of Turkish immigrants of the first and second immigrant generations.

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6 This being the Barometer’s pilot project and due to the methodical challenges it raised, the collected data was restricted to the regional survey areas. The first nationwide representative survey is scheduled for the year 2016.
Various discrimination patterns across groups of origin

Previous SVR Integration Barometers provide numerous examples indicating different perceptions of the integration processes within specific groups of origin. In this context, a significant factor hindering integration is discrimination.

The Barometer distinctly shows that not all immigrants are equally affected by discrimination. When (generally) asked about experienced discrimination at authorities’ offices and agencies, 31 per cent of immigrants of Turkish origin, 17 per cent of Aussiedler and merely 15 per cent of immigrants from the EU reported discrimination.7

Figure 1: Discrimination experiences at authorities’ offices and agencies according to origin groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Without migration background</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Aussiedler</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>Rest of the world</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SVR Integration Barometer 2014.
Note: Sample size amounts to 4,769.

When answering this general question, which involved all discrimination dimensions, immigrants of Turkish origin reported to have experienced discrimination three times more often than persons without a migrant background. On the other hand, immigrants from EU Member States were considerably less affected by discrimination. The differences between the origin groups are significant. In comparison, when considering the immigrant groups as a whole, those who felt discriminated against account for 21 per cent. Therefore, if the immigration population is viewed in a general way, important data and information relevant for conceiving anti-discrimination measures get lost. Consequently, the Barometer is approaching the empirical reality in which the integration disposal of a young and mobile immigrant from the EU cannot be compared with that of an immigrated Aussiedler in the 1980s. Classifying both of them as an “immigrant” and, on this basis, gathering subjective integration settings distorts the picture existing in reality.

The SVR Barometer’s key integration indicators

In order to comprehensively depict the integration progress, further indicators beyond discrimination experiences are needed, which should capture cultural attitudes and validly cover the subjective dimension on both sides of immigrant society. Since its first publication in 2009, the Barometer has included items that are repeatedly used – without any changes – for measuring attitudes, values and norms in four fields essential to the integration processes: labour market, education, neighbourhood and social relationships. In all fields, the surveyed population is asked about gained experiences as well as their individual norm

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7 The described differences also remain significant in multivariate analyses considering the socioeconomic position.
and value concepts. Furthermore, the performance of institutions relevant to the integration process is determined from the respondents’ point of view. For instance, the field School deals specifically with the question of whether respondents think that learning performance suffers from ethnic heterogeneity. In addition to these assessments, behavioural tendencies are measured. Here, the focus is on the respondents’ willingness to expose themselves to cultural diversity. In the relation to the field Education, the respondents are asked whether they would enrol their children in an ethnically heterogeneous school. This way the data collected over several time periods provides insights into the integration processes in specific immigrant groups and reflect the willingness of the majority population to encounter (and accept) cultural diversity.

The further topics included in the upcoming Barometer contain, among others, criteria on belonging to German society. These criteria should, for instance, clarify to which extent it is important for the majority population and especially for the various immigrant groups to have German citizenship or German ancestors in order to feel a sense of belongingness to German society. This particular question has already been answered a number of times in the case of the majority population, whereas the data from the immigrant groups’ point of view has been lacking so far, although it concerns a key identificational factor.

Conclusion

The success of an integration policy depends greatly on whether politics manages to awake the willingness among the majority and immigrant population to invest in integration. Therefore, the SVR Integration Barometer addresses policymakers at all levels of the Federal State in the first place. As an innovative instrument, the Barometer comprises the subjective and interpersonal dimensions, allows for monitoring of integration processes, and suits both policymakers and integration practitioners. With the Barometer, they can verify and, if necessary, correct their political initiatives, measures and activities in terms of their acceptance. This way, the measuring instrument makes a valuable contribution to the practical success of integration policy.

Moreover, the SVR Integration Barometer is useful for scientific integration research for two reasons. First, the survey contains a representative sample of migrant groups. Second, it provides hitherto nonexistent migration- and integration-specific analysis options, which can be applied for narrowing research gaps.

The results of the current SVR Integration Barometer will be available in spring 2016.

For further information, see www.svr-migration.de/en/barometer/.

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Huddleston, T., J. Niessen and J. Dag Tjaden


Swedish Presidency of the European Union


“...the Barometer comprises the subjective and interpersonal dimensions, allows for monitoring of integration processes, and suits both policymakers and integration practitioners.”
The independent migrants: Syrian separated children fleeing war

AKM Ahsan Ullah

This article is from the paper on the study done by the author about how unaccompanied refugee children from the Syrian Arab Republic made their way to destination countries, and how they become unaccompanied and the consequences of being unaccompanied. The study is based on interviews with Syrian child refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt and Jordan, and aid workers of international organizations who provide support for the child refugees.

Introduction

About half of the estimated 59.5 million (UNHCR, 2015) displaced persons around the world are children, and millions of these children have been separated from their families (Touzines, 2007; UNHCR, 2013 and 2014). In the past decade, more than 2 million children have been killed in conflict, with a further 6 million wounded and 1 million orphaned (Fazel and Stein, 2002; Ullah and Ragsag, 2008; Ullah, 2011 and 2014; UNICEF, 2012). Only a decade ago, there were 37 million forced migrants. Since early 2011, the main reason for the acceleration in number has been the war in the Syrian Arab Republic, currently the world’s single largest driver of displacement (UNHCR, 2015). Syrian devastating conflict – one of the protracted ones the region has witnessed in recent times – is said to be a continuation of the so-called Arab Spring, which started in 2010 in Tunisia to put an end to authoritarian rule and corruption, and to demand liberty, dignity and social justice. These demands have transcended the borders, and their outcomes have differed owing to the fact that Arab regimes are diverse among themselves in terms of their ruling mechanisms, domestic power structures and international relations (Darwisheh, 2013; Ullah, 2014). As a result, approximately 6 million Syrians – almost one third of the total population – have fled the Syrian Arab Republic. About half of the population became internally displaced (UNHCR, 2014; Orhan, 2015; Hinnebusch, 2008). About one third of the refugees living outside the country consist of children (i.e. roughly 1 million). A portion of them became refugees and the rest were able to successfully end up with their relatives or parents. Anecdotes suggest that, so far, among these thousands who have sought refuge, more than 8,000 children have crossed into neighbouring countries – mostly into Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq – without parents or adult relatives (UNICEF, 2013).

So far, around 200,000 Syrians were killed; of them about 15,000 were children (IRC, 2013). They have been experiencing psychosocial stress as a result of the conflicts, and many face persistent threats of varied kinds of diseases (UNICEF, 2014). There is no denying that Syrian children are in an urgent humanitarian situation, which has ignited a vigorous debate between advocates for refugees and humanitarian organizations and the receiving governments. While there can be multiple reasons why children leave their country, Syrian children consistently cite life-threatening violence as the prime motivation for migrating, followed by poverty and family reunification.

All potential refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic did not find the doors of their neighbours open. Political and diplomatic relationships appear important determinant whether or not refugees would be allowed in. Egypt has an important history of close ties and shared influences with the Syrian Arab Republic, and it has opened its doors to Syrians. At the beginning of the crisis, the first wave of Syrians fleeing to Egypt was primarily composed of persons with family ties, business connections or personal networks in Egypt. Iraq and Israel are not the best favoured destinations for them.
Thousands of unaccompanied Syrian children as young as eight and nine years of age journeyed on foot to seek safety across the border in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. The journey period has been significant because many of them were slipped into the hands of smugglers and traffickers on their way. Most of those who were trafficked were unaware of their destinations, while some others managed to end up in refugee camps with the help of volunteers and aid workers. This study reveals that on route, soldiers, militiamen, boatmen and unscrupulous people often stole the children’s blankets, shoes and cooking pots, if any.

This study uses the definition of “child” from the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC): “every human being below the age of eighteen years, unless, under the law applicable to that child, the majority is attained earlier” (Article 1, UNCRC) (UNHCR, 2012). “The term ‘separated children’ is a term which is now increasingly used about the group of children previously known as ‘unaccompanied children or unaccompanied minors’” (Halvorsen, 2005:77). Conceptually, unaccompanied children are those who have been separated from both parents and other relatives and are not being cared for by an adult who, by law or custom, is responsible for doing so (UNHCR, 2015; Kinch, 2008). Over the years, this definition has been tailored, especially with the creation of the Separated Children in Europe Programme (SCEP), in order to encompass the unaccompanied children in Europe (Andersson et al., 2005; Ayotte, 1999; Kohli, 2007). Media attention has been accorded primarily on the scale of the violence and warring factions. However, way less attention has been given to the plight of the children than they deserve. This paper aims at exploring the ways how unaccompanied refugee children made their way to destination countries and how they became unaccompanied and the consequences of being unaccompanied.

The paper is based on in-depth interviews with officials of different organizations, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and international humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), working on the ground in the Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. This study is based on a qualitative research method using face-to-face and telephone interviews. We interviewed 34 separated children (12 in Egypt; 8 in Lebanon (at the Shatila camp); 7 in Turkey (at the Osmaniye camp); 7 in Jordan (at the Jaatari camp)) and a total of 12 officials from MSF, IOM and UNHCR. It is an inherent challenge in such a research to select participants for interviews. The author relied on snowball and convenient sampling technique for selecting the respondents (both unaccompanied children and officials). Some six interviews with officials were conducted in person and some were on telephone.

Fractured family and separated children

There was a lot of coverage in the international media when a heartbreaking picture of a separated four-year-old boy who fled the Syrian Arab Republic was found crossing the desert alone. Surprisingly, the boy made his way across the border into Jordan with a plastic bag containing his possessions. All the separated children did not necessarily leave the country unaccompanied. Some became unaccompanied after or when they crossed the borders. Some of the children left the country on their own; some with the help of traffickers; some with relatives and neighbours and some with aid workers. Some of them merged in the group of people crossing borders. Most refugee groups are headed by parents, bringing several children and all their possessions out of the country. When the gates open, there is always a crush as desperate refugees surge forward. Thus, every day children get lost and separated.
One important factor why they left their country alone was that their “well-wishers” had facilitated them to leave in order to avoid being recruited in armed groups in the country. Some children reported that their parents had been deployed in armed conflicts, who wanted them to leave the country as their future became uncertain. Boyden and Hart (2007) found similar findings as this study. Syrian children have been exposed to grave human rights violation, including sexual violence, maiming, killing, torture, arbitrary detention and force recruitment in armed forces (UNICEF, 2012). There is no denying that they are the most vulnerable and defenseless population. Their situation turns worse when they become separated from their families.

In such a political situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, diverse factors appear active—such as traffickers, gangs and other illegal agents—to take advantage. Therefore, every journey point becomes very precarious for them. In our interview, two of the respondents claimed that they were trapped by smugglers and got rid of them at some point of their journey with the help of some aid workers and compatriots. Many of them arrived at their destinations clandestinely, hidden by traffickers or paid smugglers, or they might have attempted to migrate through immigration checkpoints. Levinson (2011) found similar situation in his research that some children presented false documents to border officials, or arrived in desperation with no documents at all. One of the respondents in a Lebanese camp was diagnosed within the autistic spectrum. She was 11 years old. It was indeed painful to see a separated child who needed her parents more than anyone else. At least, she cannot remember the ordeals she went through in her country.

### Table 1: Gender and age distribution of child refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination country</th>
<th>Male (% of the total)</th>
<th>Female (% of the total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9 (26)</td>
<td>3 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5 (15)</td>
<td>3 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>5 (15)</td>
<td>2 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4 (12)</td>
<td>3 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A myriad of factors are responsible for pushing the children out of their countries without parents or guardians. Many of the children left because their homes had been damaged totally and relatives had been killed or had left the country already. Militarization of children is one of the important factors why some parents want their children to leave the country. Seven (21%) children got separated from their families at the border when they altogether tried to cross the border and children got lost in the crowd. In some five (15%) cases, they got separated as children and parents tried to cross the border and they were not allowed in at the same time. Eight of the children left the country after their parents went missing or got killed, and with the help of relatives, neighbours or aid workers. Some children feared being arrested for having family members fighting with either the armed opposition groups or with the Syrian regime. Some children, who were mostly Palestinians, became displaced for the second or third time, as they used to live in refugee camps in the Syrian Arab Republic (Ullah, 2014). Two of the girls were pregnant. It was understandable that they were raped while in the Syrian Arab Republic. Nineteen (56%) of the children had no idea what happened to their parents; eight of them (24%) said their mothers might be still alive and the rest were not sure.

### Consequences

The news on a four-year-old Syrian girl who surrendered to a photographer when she mistook the man’s camera for a gun bled the hearts of many. A picture was taken at the Atmen refugee camp on the Syrian Arab Republic’s border with Turkey in December 2014, showing the young girl was frozen in
fear with her arms raised and her lips tightly pursed. These children are distressed, shocked, tired, hungry, wounded and uncertain about what to do. They carry multiple psychological and physical burdens such as anxiety from separation and the traumatic experience they have suffered in their countries and en route. This means that they demand specialized protection, which may include psychological rehabilitation, health and other basic needs, education, food security and safety. It is like they fell from one kind of vulnerability in their own county to another kind in the destination country. This study found that most of the children, apart from separation anxiety, still felt unsafe.

In their traumatic experiences model, Fazel and Stein (2002) mentioned three stages in the whole process of migration of refugees and the degree of trauma at different levels. First is in their country of origin, where they experience considerable trauma of varied kinds and levels, which forces them to flee their homes, and where they experience exposure to war or combat and hence witness violence, torture, and losses of close family and friends. The second stage is during the flight to safety, meaning on the way to destinations whereon they can face further vulnerabilities. It can take many months, and can expose the refugees to more life-threatening dangers. Refugee children at these times experience separation from parents, either by accident or as a strategy to ensure their safety. The last stage is in the resettling country. At this level, refugees face additional difficulties, primarily because they have to prove their asylum claims and also try to integrate into a new environment (Ullah, 2014; see also Amnesty International, 1996).

One respondent (about 13 years old) from the Jaatari refugee camp in Jordan was shedding tears when he was sharing what he experienced in his country of origin and in the destination. He was left alone for two days on debris of their damaged house after his father was killed and mother went missing.

“I thought I was dying. I wanted to shout but was scared of shouting. I guess I fainted. I discovered myself in a kiosk where one person offered me a piece of bread and water. I followed them. They helped me a lot. I am here. I am not sure where is my mother....”

Another respondent (about 14 years old) in Egypt shared how she was injured when their home was destroyed by bombing. She raised her pyjama to show the scar on her leg. She is staying with a family that was from the Syrian Arab Republic. But they did not know each other before. The woman who was taking care of her whispered with anxiety to the interviewer that the teenager was pregnant. Her pregnancy was the reason for her headache. The woman realized that the girl had been raped in the Syrian Arab Republic.

The displacement of these children has taken a tremendous toll on them. One boy, 11 years of age, who arrived a couple of weeks at the Jaatari camp in Jordan, was still crying and looking for his parents. During the interview [taken after two months of his arrival], he looked very blank and pale. He perhaps thought we were there to take him back to his parents. He started crying when we left after the interview was over.

“Where are my parents? My younger brother? I want to go home....”

Among the respondents in Egypt, two of them were brothers. They were fortunate enough to be leaving together from the Syrian Arab Republic. They ended up in Egypt with the help of aid workers and are being taken care of by an international NGO. They have already started their schooling though they lost one year while in the Syrian Arab Republic. One respondent (11 years old) in Turkey mentioned that he never thought that he would survive. He was in his school in the Syrian Arab Republic. Suddenly, the school compound became very dark. People were running in every direction. He was run over in stampede and he was discovered in a local hospital. His parents did not come to see him though some school teachers did. The day before he was released from the hospital, his relatives told him that his parents had been killed.

“...I wanted to kill myself. I fled my relative’s house and hovered around for a couple of days. I cried and shed tears on the streets. I realized many people were leaving the country. I joined them. On the way so many times we were intercepted by armed people. We were released though. I knew that the trip would be dangerous and that I might die on the road, but if I stayed home, I was certain to die....”

Their vulnerabilities are a result, in part, of their dependence on adults. Since they are physically and psychologically weaker than adults, they count on adults for care and protection (Ullah and Ragsag, 2008; Enenajor, 2008). Most children were already psychologically traumatized because of what they had witnessed: killing, violence and being uprooted.
Refugee girls are even more vulnerable than refugee boys. This is originated from the cultural and social contexts in the region where girls are less valued than boys. As a result, girls are more often subject to neglect and abuse, including sexual abuse, assault and exploitation (UNHCR, 2012; Koser, 2000).

There are many instances of adolescent girls being conscripted into armies to look after the troops in more ways than just cooking and cleaning. Rape as a crime of war is not restricted to adult women. One respondent in Lebanon (girl of 12 years old) still shivers when she is reminded of her past days in the Syrian Arab Republic. She was abducted and forced to join a combatant group. During her training, she was raped many times. She is still suffering trauma.

Refugee children suffer from the effects of coming from a war zone and of adjusting to an unfamiliar culture. There is evidence that refugee children are at significant risk of developing psychological disturbance, as they are subject to a number of risk factors. Figure 1 provides a framework for conceptualizing these risk factors. Most of the children were still anxious, saddened and physically weak. Moreover, consistent research findings show that as the number of risk factors accumulates for children, it is more likely that they would develop psychological disturbance dramatically (Fazel and Stein, 2002).

Figure 1: Vulnerability of child refugees

“...I was beaten up routinely and mercilessly. I cried and cried. I cried to go to my parents. I was released at some point and I rushed to the direction of our home. But I was unable to locate anything. Then some people brought me here....”

Around midnight, I was raped. The day after, I was raped. While training was going on, rape happened on a regular basis. A few months I was kind of captive. One day the house we were staying was captured by military (perhaps government). Most combatants were killed and I was rescued. I pleaded them that they help return to my home. They did not listen to me. They left me on the side of a street far way from the place I was rescued. I followed the people walking toward somewhere! Here I am now....”

“...we are really not sure how they are going to cope with what they experienced in their such a young age. If they ever meet their parents, we hope they can forget the scar they had in their mind and heart....”

“...I was having fever. I was given a few cookies, a banana and a bottle of water. I was not sure about the location where I was taken. I asked for medicine but none paid heed to me. They were talking to themselves that I had temperature because I was scared. I had a few sips of water and fell sleep.
One aid worker who rescued a 10-year-old unaccompanied boy shared his experience with the boy. The boy was lamenting as he remembered his lost sister, though he was physically well and was eating well. He managed to escape the strife. He was found to be talking on his own about his sister.

“...I am not sure where my sister is. She was only 5 years old in 2013. We used to play together. I do not know....”

“When we picked her she was hungry, dehydrated and exhausted. She was not talking but looking in the blank. I rushed her to a doctor who suspected that she was raped. That traumatized her. Doctor checked and confirmed that she was raped. She was shy of disclosing the fact. She needed medical treatment, psychological support and at the same time we had to ensure her that we were her close ones. I tried to make her understand that she needed treatment for that. She began to cry. As time passed, she was getting better but still out of her mind.”

Conclusion

There are no precise figures about how many have left without any parent or adult relatives and how many of these children have lost a parent, have been orphaned or have finally reunited at some point of time with their families. Separations continue to occur in the case of Syrian children fleeing violence. Separation from family brings devastating consequences to children. These children are from a wide range of socioeconomic background with different religious and cultural orientations. It is obviously difficult for the organization providing care and services to handle such issues when the inflow of refugees is huge. They have suffered both physical and psychological baggage.

Some of the children were reported to have been tortured and raped; some children got pregnant as a result of being raped. Some children became conflict orphans and left the Syrian Arab Republic. Some reported that they became separated or unaccompanied from their parents or relatives while crossing the border in the mass exodus. Some parents were arrested in the Syrian Arab Republic by the Government. Some children were left alone by their relatives on the border in order to avoid violence, and some were smuggled. These facts demand that international organizations, aid workers and UNHCR take all these facts into consideration to better address the cause of the children. The orphans and children of economically poor families became the target of the combatants to recruit in armed groups, though some children volunteered to join for survival. They were used in support functions such as cooks, porters, messengers and spies of armed groups. At some point, some of them managed to flee.

In refugee camps at least there are health services, schools and psychological rehabilitation services available. However, in Egypt there are no refugee camps. Unaccompanied children are taken care of by some Syrians who have settled in Egypt. These children of course are entitled to international protection under a range of international human rights instruments (Halvorsen, 2005). A lot of efforts are being made by UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, and other international NGOs such as the ICRC and MSF, as well as national agencies, to address the protection needs of separated and unaccompanied children in and from the Syrian Arab Republic. It is still quite insufficient.

Children’s best interest should receive the top priority when it comes to refugee children, and all neighbouring countries irrespective of their political interest should share the responsibility of children fleeing conflict. If children are without family protection, they are at greater risk of being exploited and abused, and may find it hard to cope. Therefore, organizations working for this vulnerable group should concentrate their efforts on the purpose of reunifying unaccompanied and separated children with their parents, where possible, and on providing protection and alternative care in the meantime. At least, they should be cared for by their extended families, and when this is not possible, by neighbours, friends or other substitute families, rather than in institutions.

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“Children’s best interest should receive the top priority when it comes to refugee children, and all neighbouring countries irrespective of their political interest should share the responsibility of children fleeing conflict.”
The massive arrivals of Syrians and other asylum-seekers and immigrants in Europe in 2015 need no reference or description. Not since the height of the Bosnia crisis in 1992 and the chaos of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 have refugees and migrants heading in large numbers towards the European Union (EU) received such media coverage or such a mixed reception: humanitarianism and the desperate desire to help on the one hand, and cautious regard to the strength of the right-wing anti-immigrant parties on the other. Although each time it all seems new, actually Europe has been here before. The major differences now are the post-9/11 world of not only heightened security concerns but also legitimate pause for consideration of ISIS or other groups with terrorist intent, and the fact that politicians and populations have the knowledge and experience of the previous crises and have been making efforts to work collectively on asylum and immigration in the EU since the early 1990s.

The reception of asylum-seekers, arriving as they are in what has long been termed a “mixed flow”, has been cast by many as a “shambles”, with starkly divergent approaches and neither any measures to stem the flows (by working to remove the protection need) nor any clear actions to have arrivals organized in a more effective and humane way (a category into which building fences is hard to place). Although the European Commission, led on this issue by First Vice President Frans Timmermans, has made strenuous efforts to coordinate among Member States, the focus, since the Dublin Regulation clearly broke down, has been on compulsory quotas for relocation of asylum-seekers and those found to be in need of protection. The resulting image has been one of an inability to manage not only the asylum arrivals but also the European integration process with regard to borders and movement (and that coming hot on the heels of the euro crisis).

It is likely that nothing could have provided a truly easy path to assessing the claims of Syrian and other asylum-seekers on the scale of arrivals between April and October (and significant arrivals continue as in autumn 2015, unlike in previous years, the boats keep on departing, in spite of deteriorating weather). However, one directive that the EU Member States decided on back in 2001, when they numbered only 15, and were in the relatively early stages of harmonizing their asylum and immigration policies, could have been – and indeed still could be – put into effect to give at the very least the appearance of a group of States that can be pragmatic and deal with a situation that, like it or not, they will have to manage. Applying the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) sooner would have made a statement about unity, the value of work already done, and confidence in solidarity and the asylum system to face the future. As it is, the TPD has not (yet) been implemented, and we can only wonder why that is the case.

Back to the future: What was Temporary Protection and what did it become?

During the 1990s, a major topic in the refugee world was about access to protection: whether Bosnians and Kosovars were in a situation that matched the understanding of the 1951 Convention definition.

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3. D. Robinson, S. Wagstyl and J. Shotter, “Austrian and German tensions flare over migrant crisis”, *Financial Times*, 28 October 2015, available from [www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7089b2a-7d5d-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3rXwRUaC](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a7089b2a-7d5d-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz3rXwRUaC)

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The prevailing government approach was to apply the 1951 Convention strictly to people with a demonstrable, individual fear of persecution, and not to people fleeing generalized conflict or violence. Another prevailing notion was that asylum would always be permanent. It had been during the Cold War, and, as these were the first post-Cold War, European crises requiring protection for people fleeing their reach, it was assumed that those people receiving protection would stay forever, or need great encouragement to return. What is more, the Balkan conflicts came hot on the heels of concerns that the fall of the Berlin Wall would result in significant East–West migration (which did not materialize) and at a time of upheaval in terms of understanding how European societies could integrate newcomers or indeed longer-present migrants. Multi-culturalism was waning in many places, but no new model was emerging. Much attention was therefore given to the idea of temporary protection.

Temporary Protection had history: Hungarians were protected temporarily in Austria in 1956, Czechs in 1968 and Poles in 1981, when their countries in turn became flash points of resistance to Soviet domination. The short-term protection of Indo-Chinese in Asia prior to resettlement in the 1970s and 1980s was another example, and the United States also already had a Temporary Protected Status covering individuals from specified countries and groups for a limited period.¹

The new model of temporary protection as it emerged in the 1990s in Europe was more of an alternative to asylum than a short period of protection prior to resettlement or return, as those earlier models had been. Key points of discussion was how long “temporary” could really be, and the level of rights to be upheld and how they needed to relate to Convention rights. Different States developed different temporary protection policies.

By the end of the Kosovo crisis, which saw EU and other States launch a Humanitarian Evacuation Programme to (temporarily in most cases) resettle more than 50,000 Kosovars who had initially sought safety in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, several lessons had been learned. One of these was that in a time of sudden mass influxes European citizens expect their governments to stay in control. As such, being administratively on top of the situation is of great importance: processing claims to asylum with the associated potential for long-term residence is key, but staffing and systems that annually accommodate for example 10,000 applicants cannot suddenly, in the space of say three months, produce the same outcomes for upwards of 150,000 applicants.

That lesson led to the newest version of temporary protection, contained in the 2001 directive, but never yet put into practice. No longer an alternative to asylum, this model has temporary protection as a “waiting period”, a time in which those in need of protection who have requested it in Europe (and come from a specified group or situation) receive protection but wait to have their individual asylum claims adjudicated. The wait could be one year, or at most two, and in the intervening period Member States have the duty to expand their administrative capacities in such a way that they can properly assess all claims once the procedures are opened. As such, temporary protection is no longer instead of asylum, it is prior to asylum adjudication (although in some situations it could, of course, be the case that the situation in a country of origin changes sufficiently for people to want to and be able to return before their asylum claims are actually processed.

The TPD provides for Member States to agree, by qualified majority, to a Commission proposal that a named national group should qualify for temporary protection starting from a specified date. An estimate of the numbers needs to be made, and, under the solidarity section of the directive, Member States should say how many temporary protection places they can offer. Funding is available under the European Refugee Fund, and when capacity according to the initial agreement is reached, the Directive stipulates that the Commission should return to the Council to seek more places and offer more funding.

The 2001 TPD\(^5\) was a direct product of the 1990s: a result of experience with protection for Bosnians and Kosovars, and a very early outcome of the EU efforts to harmonize their asylum and immigration policies, which officially started in 1992. It has been on the books for 14 years, but it is never used. States and the Commission have suggested its use on at least two occasions – for Afghans in 2001,\(^6\) although that was a preemptive suggestion and there was no mass influx, and more broadly in 2012, when discussion was triggered during the Arab Spring, although again, no decision was taken and the Directive was not implemented.\(^7\)

In May 2015, the Commission apparently did consider its application, but never tabled it, and more recently the Czech Government is reported to have considered it, but not made the suggestion concrete.\(^8\) A handful of non-governmental organizations and academics have raised the question of whether it ought to be used for Syrians over the past three years.\(^9\) In late October 2015, UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner for Protection Volker Türk indicated in an interview with the European Council on Refugees and Exiles that he considered the conditions for activation of the Directive to have been met (although he would like to see stronger solidarity conditions attached).\(^10\)

### Why not implement the Temporary Protection Directive?

There is thus an EU agreement already in place that does pretty much all the Commission is currently asking for, without referring to that agreement at all. Now the influx is large, and the Syrian component can be clearly identified as having specific protection needs. The question is: Why not implement this directive?

- Why push for compulsory quotas rather than use a directive that includes voluntary relocations?
- Is the TPD somehow insufficient in terms of either protection or collective, integrated EU action?
- While hindsight says the TPD could usefully have been applied as of June or July 2015, or even earlier, is it, by October 2015, too late to activate it?

The European Commission and some key Member States seem to have decided that compulsory quotas are the way to go. By the end of October 2015, it is not clear that even a qualified majority decision in September\(^11\) was sufficient to make any Member State quickly live up to their new numerical obligations (by 25 October, it was reported that only about 700 places for refugee relocation had actually been offered, as opposed to 160,000 promised).\(^12\) It could well be that the political decision to push for mandatory quotas for relocation is and was an effort to create an opportunity out of a challenge. There had been no EU

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10. ECRE interviews Volker Türk: “We should not forget history when addressing current challenges”, 23 October 2015, available from [www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1233-ecre-interviews-volker-tuerk-we-need-to-remember-why-asylum-was-so-necessary-when-it-was-first-instituted-and-why-it-is-so-necessary-now.html](http://www.ecre.org/component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1233-ecre-interviews-volker-tuerk-we-need-to-remember-why-asylum-was-so-necessary-when-it-was-first-instituted-and-why-it-is-so-necessary-now.html)


decision to create a large-scale relocation approach, although relocation had been discussed often,\textsuperscript{13} and piloted as the EUREMA project when Malta faced what seemed like a large influx in 2010–2012.\textsuperscript{14} Yet, it is not clear that forcing quotas through in the midst of a crisis is going to create either a workable relocation policy or a long-term European coordinated effort to more effectively manage significant, or indeed lower the levels of, asylum-seeker arrivals.

One distinct difficulty with relocation by numbers (putting to one side the obvious problem when some States do not even vote for it, and object vociferously) is that the people being moved are just that — people — with rights, and a sense of autonomous decision-making. If the Dublin Regulation has apparently collapsed largely because it did not take the wishes of asylum-seekers into account and they kept on arriving where they wanted to arrive (and both arrivals and the collapse could also be blamed on continuing large disparities between asylum systems and outcomes), then how would relocation work? People might be willing to be moved on from the State border through which they have entered, but will they be happy with being sent to the State chosen for them? Not only are there issues of affinity and language, where family members are to be taken into account: if the asylum systems remain different in various EU Member States, then asylum-seekers are naturally going to seek to go to the place in which they believe they and their families will have the optimal chances of (rapidly) achieving status and settling into a new life.

The TPD contains language on voluntary quotas — Member States would pledge a number of places available rather than be instructed to accept a given number decided by the European Commission. It is not necessarily the case that voluntarism would work better; however, it could have the advantages of allowing the population of the receiving States to have the sense that their governing authorities have willingly, and with due consideration, made a particular offer of spaces, and give the same image of willingness to the asylum-seeker or refugee arrivals. A voluntary system also stands at least as much if not more chance, in principle, of being mutually reinforcing — somehow seeing another State do more might prompt more from others, whereas if one is told to do a certain amount the instinct is rather to try to bargain that down.

At first sight, there would seem to be no reasons to consider the TPD deficient either in terms of refugee protection (it offers an administrative pause but upholds rights and asylum space, in fact if anything it should encourage the more effective use of the asylum system) or in terms of collective EU action. In fact, not using the single instrument available, already agreed and specifically designed to address mass influx situations at the moment of the greatest influx certainly since the 1990s and potentially the greatest forced migration movement Europe has seen since World War II, would seem to be the greatest challenge to EU collective action on the asylum issue. If States have agreed on a plan, have an approach, and then those with the power to shape the EU asylum system shelve it in favour, perhaps of trying to create a compulsory system that they hope would make a more lasting impact, then the question has to be whether they are, in effect, shooting the Common European Asylum System in its proverbial foot. Logically, what could be the reason for not using a collective tool to pause asylum that needs no discussion and offers the breathing space of managing the European aspect of the movements (acting together) while addressing the very real difficulties of where to host asylum-seekers, how to feed them and address issues such as education for asylum-seeker children, and instead having frequent crisis meetings and summits to come to an agreement on how to impose quotas while arguing over open or fenced-off borders?

One possibility is that the flow being as mixed as it is, involving multiple large groups of asylum-seekers (Syrians, Eritreans, Afghans), as well as people with no asylum claims, has meant that officials have considered it somehow discriminatory or unwieldy to address one section of this flow (e.g. Syrians) with temporary protection while not applying the Directive to others. However, if that were to be the concern, one could also imagine that multiple temporary protection programmes per nationality could work, for example.


\textsuperscript{14} Under EUREMA, some 262 people were relocated in the EU from Malta in 2011, while 307 were resettled to the United States. See: European Migration Network, Country Factsheet: Malta 2012, available from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/country-factsheets/malta-emn-country-factsheet_en.pdf
Is it already too late for the TPD? If some were calling it time for its application as far back as 2012, and if the Commission considered it in May 2015, has the flow now simply become too large and the time passed? As the basis of the Directive is to address mass influxes, that would hardly seem to be an argument for not using the approach at all – just one for saying it could have been started sooner. Does the fact that Dublin seems doomed mean that all the other previous work done on asylum directives and the construction of a Common European Asylum System is also dead? Is it now simply too late to turn the compulsory quotas decision on its head and say, “Well, actually, we can use the TPD instead”? Part of the answer to that lies in the deeper question of whether the push for compulsory quotas was made on the basis of thinking that the TPD was itself insufficient and too weak, or that this was the time to push for quotas to make an opportunity out of a challenge, or that the TPD was simply old and dusty, in a drawer somewhere, and the fresh new teams either did not know it existed or were not familiar enough with it and its origins to see that its moment of utility had come. Presumably, if the Commission considered using it in May 2015, then the TPD was not simply forgotten or ignored. A deliberate decision to push for compulsory action on quotas must have been made. That was then a political decision, and a political decision could equally be made, not to back off but to change tack to use the TPD now and recognize that the next step, after this crisis is under control, will be to develop a stronger system in which the balance of decisions and actions between Member States, and between the Council and the Commission will be clearly established.

Never say never

If ever there was a time for the implementation of the TPD, the current crisis sounds like the moment. A very significant and sudden influx, much of it focused on one member State (one would expect Germany to call on the Commission to propose this to the Council, although Greece, Hungary, Croatia, Slovenia or actually several other Member States could also do so). Solidarity, which the Commission and some Member States seek, is built into this existing tool – no need to renegotiate it. Building on the Kosovo Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, it would not be inconceivable for a voluntary system to be set up with other Member States offering to transport Syrians by air from Greece, Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia even if the original model was evacuation from beyond the EU, and evacuation as such is not explicitly part of the TPD.

The EU Member States have not agreed on very much in the asylum area, and seem unable to agree on what to do about the current crisis at all. A crisis is not the time for big decisions and variations on what is known. Cool heads agreed to the TPD in the light of the last refugee crisis – perhaps its moment has come? It is a fully European plan, all have agreed to it as a blueprint directive. It should surely be on the table. If not, why not? The Syrian influx is already in Europe, and more arriving by the day; why not get out yesterday’s plan and give the EU its best chance to look coordinated?

The TPD might not be considered ideal, but it is the only pre-agreed tool for dealing with a crisis like the Syrian arrivals in Europe in 2015. If this Directive is not to be implemented now, then it surely never will be. It’s now or never; make or break.

“The Syrian influx is already in Europe, and more arriving by the day; why not get out yesterday’s plan and give the EU its best chance to look coordinated?”
Migration’s silver bullets? 
A myth

Claudia Natali and Michael Newson

While no silver bullet, expanded legal migration channels remain a central feature of any approach aimed at addressing the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean.

Here is the thing: while we all wished there were one, there is no silver bullet to address (irregular) migration, let alone to solve the ongoing complex migration flows in the Mediterranean and Andaman seas. Any migration expert will immediately explain to you how migration is a complex phenomenon that cuts across many different areas such as health, gender, development, trade, security and the environment. Moreover, it involves countries of origin, transit and destination at different levels. As such, any serious attempt to address the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean must take into account all its different facets, actors, their respective interactions, motivations and impacts. We speak nowadays of “mixed migration” flows in order to recognize that the people we see crossing deserts and seas to get to Europe do so for a variety of different and interrelated reasons: some are primarily driven by the search for employment and a better life, while others are in search and have a legitimate legal claim to international protection, which means that any migration response must ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in place to detect genuine refugees from labour migrants. Given the complexities of the issue, the idea that an easy fix exists – be it improved border security, supporting development in countries of origin, targeting smugglers, or opening more regular migration channels – would be naïve at best and likely counterproductive to addressing the issues at hand.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) believes that a complex challenge such as migration requires a nuanced and thoughtful response. This article aims to clearly outline the IOM position and approach to addressing the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean. The Organization’s position is that, while legal migration channels should remain a central feature of any policy response aimed at reducing irregular migration, and more advocacy has to be done with destination countries to open regular migration channels, be they circular or permanent, that are accessible by those currently going irregularly, this is just one of a number of complimentary interventions that governments must work on to address irregular migration.

Reinforcing border security is often the first knee-jerk reaction of governments when faced with the rapid escalation of large irregular migration flows. If better systems are in place to detect irregular movements at borders, and border officials are provided with enhanced capacity to identify vulnerable groups such as victims of trafficking or smuggling, it seems logical to think that the volume of uncontrolled movements and cross-border exploitation would decrease. While this holds true to a certain extent, and IOM is engaged with a number of governments to improve border management and security capacities, more control does not automatically mean that people will stop crossing borders. As we have heard from so many irregular migrants in North Africa, as well as those who have made it to Europe, even in the midst of severe suffering, it is “Europe or death” and “We are not going home”. Migrants will continue to make their way across borders as the decision to migrate is often more related to socioeconomic factors in the country of origin than the policies of countries of destination. What will change though will be the routes and means used to get to the destination, often increasing the vulnerability and risk for migrants on route. Over the past decade, we have seen the ebb and flow of migrants across various migration routes from the Western Mediterranean, to the East, then to the Central Mediterranean and now with increasing numbers again coming through the Eastern Mediterranean. The focus on border control has quite visibly shifted migratory routes, but it has never been able to entirely stop the movements themselves. Border control is not the silver bullet to irregular migration, but it should certainly be part of a broader response.

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Migrants face risks throughout their journey, from origin through transit and destination. Border management should take into consideration the negative effects on migrants’ possible reliance on the services of smugglers, increasing both the costs and risks of migration. A market space is hence created for smugglers to sell their very expensive services. When the promise is a “ticket to Europe”, desperate migrants – including refugees, and low-skilled and unemployed youth and women – are ready to pay whatever price to buy their dream of a better life. Less desperate migrants often also rely on smugglers as these are seen, and they often are, the only option to facilitate their move to Europe and beyond. The lives of thousands of migrants are put into the hands of unscrupulous smugglers each month and we have recently witnessed the dire consequences this can have. Any programme aimed at managing migration, and specifically at addressing the challenge of irregular migration, should hence allow for the provision of support services for vulnerable migrants, including stranded migrants, victims of trafficking and smuggling, as well as asylum-seekers, identified along the migratory route. Among other initiatives in transit countries, IOM advocates the development of Migrant Resource and Response Mechanisms (MRRM) whereby those migrants en route who are in need can receive a range of services, including direct medical or other assistance, return home under dignified and secure conditions, and provision of information regarding asylum policies and labour market information at destination to help them make informed decisions. Again, assistance provided in a vacuum of other measures to address or prevent irregular migration is not the silver bullet, but it is a necessary part of any solution.

Recognizing that lack of sufficient livelihood opportunities in countries of origin and misinformation about the journey and the conditions that await them in the European Union (EU) are two of the principle drivers that fuel demand for smuggling and irregular migration. IOM believes that any policy wishing to seriously address the challenge posed by irregular migration must include initiatives to: 1) improve resilience by building sustainable and decent livelihood and employment opportunities for the youth; and 2) raise awareness to promote safe migration and deter irregular migration.

As identified in numerous studies, un- and underemployment are the critical root causes for irregular migration of youth, and particularly for young males who remain by far the largest demographic of cross-Mediterranean irregular flows. Indeed, the major countries of origin for irregular migration across the Mediterranean all suffer from high rates of youth unemployment and poverty. The principal North and West African countries of origin for irregular migration to the EU suffer from dual challenges regarding youth employment:

- A youth bulge in their demographics has resulted in more new entrants into the labour market than can currently be absorbed due to slow economic growth and a lack of capital for investment, and this bulge is projected to increase over the next decade before it recedes.
- Education systems, including technical and vocational training programmes, are outdated and no longer align with the skills needs within the labour market, leaving a large number of youth increasingly unemployable in decent work opportunities.

IOM believes that investments in projects to strengthen livelihood opportunities for the youth in origin countries should be a critical part of a comprehensive migration policy that also aims at addressing the ongoing flows of irregular migrants. IOM is convinced that collective funds and support of the large diaspora populations of countries of origin and transit, if guided by sound policies and programmes that encourage their engagement, can contribute substantially to economic development and job growth. In addition to the estimated USD 436 billion in remittances that were sent by migrants in developed countries to developing countries in 2014, and which are primarily used to support the daily subsistence and consumption needs of family and friends, diaspora populations can contribute substantially to stimulating economic growth through investment, development of trade networks, and transfer of knowledge and skills. The impressive economic growth of China, India, Ireland, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, for example, over the past few decades have all included a role for the diaspora within their story. It is estimated that the African diaspora as a whole currently hold savings of USD 40 billion² that could be put towards philanthropic or investment projects in countries of origin. Engaging the diaspora in both philanthropic and investment
initiatives that stimulate entrepreneurship and growth of the small and medium-sized enterprise sector in countries of origin can thus leverage considerable amounts of funding and technical support that serve to address migration drivers and development challenges.

But development aid alone is not a silver bullet to the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean. Either and will not be sufficient to address the various challenges in stimulating economic growth in countries of origin and in so doing providing alternatives to irregular migration for many migrants. Indeed, some studies have indicated that development aid, if not targeted specifically towards stimulating job growth, may actually contribute to irregular migration by distorting terms of trade. However, the fact that development aid has to be carefully designed does not mean that it is not desirable or that it is a policy option to be discarded. Development aid is yet another component of the broader approach advocated by IOM to address the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean. Concurrently, IOM promotes the full participation of migrants in societies by building the capacities of both migrants and communities. IOM works closely with municipalities and local authorities, and carries out capacity-building activities and research designed to improve integration policies and identify best practices at both local and national levels.

The decision to engage in irregular migration and purchase the services of human smugglers is not one that is taken rashly or quickly. Often, a considerable amount of time passes between the first considerations of engaging in irregular migration and when the prospective migrant makes the final decision and acquires the financial resources required to begin his or her journey. This decision-making process leaves ample time and opportunity for public messaging and awareness-raising campaigns to deter would-be irregular migrants from carrying out the practice by breaking the consumer decision-making process using a variety of public marketing techniques that respond to the different stages of decision-making and offer positive alternatives. However, currently, limited knowledge and research exist on the effectiveness of awareness-raising campaigns that could contribute to the development of more targeted and successful campaigns. IOM sees more research to identify the most effective campaigns in different circumstances as an important aspect of the broad approach to tackle irregular migration. Also, targeted and evidence-based campaigns both at origin – to inform potential migrants – and at destination – to reduce instances of xenophobia – should be part of this comprehensive and multipronged approach to address the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean, or any other irregular migration crisis.

Smugglers operate freely and have no competitors because countries of destination do not offer regular entry options, or offer very few, to migrants in need. Opening legal migration routes for lower-skilled migrants in countries of origin, as has been illustrated by circular, temporary and permanent migration schemes implemented in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, among others, has been demonstrated not to eliminate but at least to significantly curb demand for irregular migration both by providing opportunities for those who would otherwise have migrated irregularly and by reducing demand for irregular migrant labour among employers in countries of destination as they have access to regular migration programmes to meet their real labour-market needs. The development of regular migration schemes is certainly a politically challenging issue to navigate, and their design deserves careful analysis and a tailored approach to ensure that they are responding effectively and directly to the irregular flows. While certainly not a silver bullet, enhancing access to legal migration opportunities for refugees and low-skilled workers is both a morally and practically necessary part of the broader framework to address the current Mediterranean migration flows.

Acknowledging the need for a broad and comprehensive response to the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean is the first important step that governments and donors should make if they are serious about solving the issue. Further challenge lies in the implementation of the envisioned response plan. This task is further complicated by the lack of accurate and reliable data on irregular migration flows. More precise quantitative and qualitative data on irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean, broken down by sex, origin, marital status and motivations, will provide better insight into the drivers and sources of migration, and this will allow governments to develop policies and programmes, including labour migration programmes to allow regular entry to low-skilled workers, that more effectively and successfully respond to the complex migration flows in the Mediterranean. As part of the broad framework envisioned to address the situation and irregular/desperation migration more generally,
IOM advocates better data collection and analysis on migration, and supports various governments in Africa and beyond to strengthen their capacity in this direction.

**Conclusion**

There is no easy fix to the ongoing desperation migration phenomenon such as the ones we have been witnessing in the Mediterranean and Andaman seas. A series of interlinked and complementary actions have to be put in place if the ongoing crises are to be seriously addressed. Opening up more legal channels for migrants is only one part of a broader and complex response mechanism to be put in place. Governments, international organizations and donors should all work together to ensure that such a response is well articulated and targeted. To do so, it is important that sufficient resources are made available, including strengthening of data collection to enhance our understanding of the drivers and shifting sources of migration. IOM, through its long-standing and global experience on migration issues, follows this multipronged approach to continue supporting and advising governments and donors in addressing complex migration flows worldwide.

“Governments, international organizations and donors should all work together to ensure that such a response is well articulated and targeted.”
FORTHCOMING
A NEW CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM DEDICATED SOLELY TO MIGRATION,
ASYLUM AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECTS WORLDWIDE

MIGFUNDER
Crowdfunding for migration, asylum and human rights projects worldwide

Crowdfunding is an increasingly popular and successful mechanism to generate funding for worthwhile projects and initiatives.

Today, there is no crowdfunding platform that is dedicated solely to the migrant communities established in major countries of immigration, or to migrant organizations, public agencies (including international organizations), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals supporting such communities.

MIGFUNDER aims to bridge this gap by establishing the first dedicated crowdfunding site catering for migrants looking to create (or grow) their businesses abroad or in their countries of origin, as well as migrant organizations, public agencies, NGOs, and individuals looking to launch a development or humanitarian initiative in support of immigrant and refugee communities worldwide, or a research project/conference in the field of migration, asylum or human rights policy. This is a pioneering initiative that will contribute potentially to reducing the effects of budget cuts and under-funding in major refugee, migration and human rights programmes around the world.

MIGFUNDER was established by a group of European migration policy experts, including former senior government officials, reputable researchers and IT developers, who set out to extend the facilities and benefits of a crowdfunding platform to the specific needs of immigration, refugee and human rights affairs worldwide.

MIGFUNDER targets, primarily but not exclusively, members of the diaspora who are willing and able to support viable business projects from their compatriots, as well as development, humanitarian and research initiatives in the countries of immigration or origin.

MIGFUNDER’s estimated launch date is the mid-December 2015. For any further information, or to submit a campaign, please contact Solon Ardittis (sardittis@migfunder.com) or Don Ingham (dingham@migfunder.com).
We live in a world which is becoming increasingly urban. Over 54 per cent of people across the globe were living in urban areas in 2014. The current urban population of 3.9 billion is expected to grow to some 6.4 billion by 2050. Migration is driving much of the increase in urbanization, making cities much more diverse places in which to live.

Nearly one in five of all migrants live in the world’s top 20 largest cities. In many of these cities migrants represent over a third or more of the population. Other cities have seen a remarkable growth in migration in recent years. In Asia and Africa, rapidly growing small cities are expected to absorb almost all the future urban population growth of the world and this mobility pattern to cities and urban areas is characterized by the temporality and circularity of the internal migration process.

The fast rate of urbanization, and rising migration to cities, brings with it both risks and opportunities for the migrants, communities and governments concerned. The World Migration Report 2015 explores how migration and migrants are shaping cities, and how the life of migrants, in turn, is shaped by cities, their people, organizations and rules.

The report contributes to the global debate on migration and urbanization in three ways. First, it documents how migration is shaping cities and the situation of migrants in cities. Much of the current discussion about migration trends and migration policy tends to focus on the national level. Taking the migration enquiry to the city level increases our understanding of the local political economies of migration and the close connection between migration and urban development. Second, the report draws attention to the livelihood of migrants in the cities of the Global South. The existing discussions on migrants and cities are inclined to concentrate primarily on the Global North and the integration of international migrants. Third, the report examines both internal and international migration with cities across the development spectrum having to manage growing mobile and diverse populations.

The first two chapters of the report set out the main trends in cities and migration, examine the various urban settings which have experienced recent growth of internal or international or even both types of migration flows, highlighting the diversifying migration flows. Chapter 3 looks at aspects of urban vulnerabilities in general – livelihood and mobility strategies, barriers to accessing resources and specific forms of vulnerabilities, as they affect the populations most at risk including migrant women. Chapter 4 explores how urbanization and new mobility patterns can contribute to urban poverty reduction, growth and development and enhance migrant well-being. Chapter 5 studies some of the urban governance conditions for migrant inclusion and partnerships.

The final part draws conclusions and makes recommendations for future initiatives to develop migrant-inclusive urban governance, with reference to the inclusion of migration in the post-2015 global sustainable development framework.
How the World Views Migration
2015/68 pages
English

*How the World Views Migration* provides, for the first time, an insight into public attitudes towards immigration worldwide. The findings presented in the report – based on interviews with over 183,000 adults across more than 140 countries between 2012 and 2014 – represent the first steps towards understanding the lenses through which people view immigration at a global level.

Adults surveyed in Gallup’s World Poll were asked two questions about immigration: 1) In your view, should immigration in this country be kept at its present level, increased or decreased? 2) Do you think immigrants mostly take jobs that citizens in this country do not want (e.g. low-paying or not prestigious jobs), or mostly take jobs that citizens in this country want?

One of the key findings of the report is that in every major region of the world – with the important exception of Europe – people are more likely to want immigration levels in their countries to either stay at the present level or to increase, rather than to decrease. This contrasts with the negative perceptions of migration often portrayed in the media in certain regions of the world.

European residents appear to be, on average, the most negative globally towards immigration, with the majority believing immigration levels should be decreased. There is, however, a sharp divergence in opinions among residents in Northern and Southern Europe.

The report also shows that certain sociodemographic characteristics are more consistently associated with favourable or opposing attitudes to immigration. For instance, adults with a university degree are typically more likely than those with lower levels of education to want to see immigration kept at its present level or increased in their countries.

Migration Health Annual Review 2014
2015/104 pages
English

This report illustrates IOM’s health activities in 2014 and presents key achievements in the three main migration health programme areas: (a) migration health assessments and travel health assistance; (b) health promotion and assistance for migrants; and (c) migration health assistance for crisis-affected populations. The report also highlights emerging themes in migration and health – learning the importance of understanding population mobility and its health risks in the context of disease outbreaks from the 2014–2015 Ebola crisis in West Africa; and the global public health value of migration health assessments. This report aptly illustrates IOM’s growing multidimensional migration health activities and global partnerships. Guided by the Resolution on the Health of Migrants adopted by the World Health Assembly in May 2008, the report demonstrates IOM’s commitment to advance the health of migrants and their families worldwide, as well as support IOM Member States in addressing migration health challenges.
Addressing Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of Crisis
2015/16 pages
English

Trafficking in persons and other forms of exploitation occur in times of crisis yet remain largely overlooked in the context of humanitarian response. This briefing document provides contemporary, evidence-based findings indicating that trafficking in persons is not a side effect of crises but is often directly interrelated.

Based on fieldwork that assessed ongoing crises in Iraq and Libya, as well as case studies of man-made and environmental crises in Indonesia, the Philippines, the Mediterranean and more, the briefing document draws on over 120 expert interviews and provides a 20-year reflective analysis of various crises dating back from the 1990s.

The briefing offers a number of recommendations for States, the humanitarian community and the donor community to ensure that counter-trafficking and the protection of vulnerable migrants no longer remain at the margins of humanitarian response efforts.

MPP Readers’ Survey

Migration Policy Practice (MPP) was launched three years ago and the editors would now like to invite readers to spare a couple of minutes to participate in a short readers’ satisfaction survey.

The purpose of this survey, which can be taken anonymously, is to help us identify our readers’ profiles, the institutions they represent and their primary interests in our journal. The survey’s responses will contribute, in particular, to adjusting and improving, as appropriate, MPP’s content and style, and thus the reader’s experience.

Should you wish to participate in this survey, please click here.

Thank you.
Call for authors/Submission guidelines

Since its launch in October 2011, Migration Policy Practice has published over 110 articles by senior policymakers and distinguished migration policy experts from all over the world.

Past authors have included, inter alia:

Eric Adja, Director General of the International Migrants Remittances Observatory (IMRO) and Special Adviser to the President of Benin; John K. Bingham, Global Coordinator of civil society activities in the United Nations High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development and the Global Forum on Migration and Development; Ambassador Eva Åkerman Börje, Chair of the GFMD 2013-2014; Mark Cully, Chief Economist at the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Khalid Koser, Chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Migration; Khalid Malik, Director of the Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs; Ali Mansoor, Chair of the GFMD 2012; Andrew Middleton, Director of Culture, Recreation and Migrant Statistics, Australian Bureau of Statistics; Najat Maalla M’jid, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography; Robert A. Mocny, Director of US-VISIT, US Department of Homeland Security; Imelda M. Nicolas, Secretary of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), Office of the President of the Philippines; Ignacio Packer, Secretary General of the Terre des Hommes International Federation; Kelly Ryan (Coordinator of the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees – IGC, Geneva); Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament; David Smith, Director of Surveys and Reporting, Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection; Sir Peter D. Sutherland, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Migration; Ambassador William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (IOM); Myria Vassiliadou, EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator, European Commission; Catherine Wiesner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, US Department of State.

Migration Policy Practice welcomes submissions from policymakers worldwide. As a general rule, articles should:

• Not exceed five pages and be written in a non-academic and reader-friendly style.
• Cover any area of migration policy but discuss, as far as possible, particular solutions, policy options or best practice relating to the themes covered.
• Provide, as often as applicable, lessons that can be replicated or adapted by relevant public administrations, or civil society, in other countries.

Articles giving account of evaluations of specific migration policies and interventions, including both evaluation findings and innovative evaluation methodologies, are particularly welcome.

To discuss any aspect of the journal, or to submit an article, please contact:

• Solon Ardittis (sardittis@eurasylum.org); and
• Dr Frank Laczko (flaczko@iom.int)